IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 08 - FEBRUARY 2018 ISSN 22532-6570 © 2018 IAI 1 applicant in International Relations. Leo Keay isagraduate in Modern History from Oxford University and acurrent MA 1 and advanced industrial products toits provider of infrastructural investment (and beyond) bybecoming theleading economic influence over the region China Sea. Meanwhile, it seeks geo- strategic dominance in the South technologies, areintended toachieve especially its anti-access/area denial Its growing military capabilities, influence andpower across East Asia. humiliation”, Beijing aspires to regional seeking torectifyits “century of China isAmerica’s chief competitor; security”. central challenge toU.S. prosperity and with revisionist great powers as“the of long-term strategic competition (NDS) describes there-emergence age. The2018National Defence Strategy defining geopolitical question of this The threat of warfareisthe National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018- of America States of the United Strategy Defense National 2018 by LeoKeay The Perils of USHegemony Sleepwalking into Thucydides’s Trap:

Summary of the Summary of Defense, Department US 1 , January 2018, p. 2, https://www. 2, p. 2018, , January insecurity at its own decline. power suffers from aparanoid sense of syndrome”, whereby theestablished and aggression; and “ruling power a hubristic senseof self-importance whereby theascendingpolity exhibits two reasons: “risingpower syndrome”, the probability of war.Thisoccursfor of a ruling power greatly increases power’s capabilities relative tothose contends that thegrowth of arising that madewarinevitable”, Allison and thefear that thisinstilled inSparta maxim that “it wastheriseof Athens Drawing on theGreekhistorian’s notion of the“Thucydides’s trap”. issue consists of GrahamT. Allison’s The mostsophisticated analysis of this neighbours. 3 2 0.1080/00396338.2018.1427362. 7-40, p. 2018), https://doi.org/1(February-March Survival in Strategy”, Grand and New York, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017, York, New and Harcourt, Houghton Mifflin Trap? Thucydides’s and Escape China

Destined for War. Destined America Can Allison, Graham Aaron L. Friedberg, “Globalisation and Chinese Chinese and “Globalisation Friedberg, L. Aaron 2 , Vol. No. 60, 1 3 , Boston , Boston Sleepwalking into Thucydides’s Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony

Nevertheless, Allison does believe that great power system. For this reason, Thucydides’s trap can be avoided. In London was used to making significant four out of his sixteen historical case concessions to other states in order to studies, ruling powers did peacefully protect its vital interests. In the 1880s, accommodate rising powers. for instance, it sacrificed zones of informal influence in West Africa to One notable example was the “Great France and East Africa to Germany, in ” between Britain and order to safeguard its core possessions

© 2018 IAI the US at the end of the nineteenth- of Egypt and South Africa. Accordingly, century.4 Britain conceded supremacy the “Great Rapprochement” was yet in the Western hemisphere to the US another pragmatic trade-off which because it faced a more direct threat came naturally to British statesmen. to its imperial possessions and naval supremacy from Germany. Britain The US’s position today is different. therefore sacrificed its vested interests Since the end of the Cold War it has in one domain to preserve its vital enjoyed global hegemony, underpinned interests in another.5 by its unipolar military capacity ISSN 2532-6570 and its extensive alliance network. Allison recommends that Washington Consequently, Washington is prone to pursue a similar course, prioritising regard any accommodation of Beijing’s the avoidance of nuclear war over its ambitions as a unilateral retreat rather strategic and economic primacy in the than a necessary compromise. Pacific.6 President Trump’s National Security While Professor Allison’s effort to draw Strategy (NSS) exemplifies this outlook. lessons from history is praiseworthy, his China’s ambitions are described analysis of the “Great Rapprochement” as “antithetical to U.S. values and misses an important point. Unlike interests”.8 Both states are engaged in “a twenty-first century America,geopolitical competition between free nineteenth-century Britain was not a and repressive visions of world order”,9 hegemon. Despite its naval superiority, whereby China seeks to “displace Britain was never a significant land the in the Indo-Pacific power in continental Europe.7 It was region”.10 instead a leading member of a multipolar Washington’s alliance commitments p. 27 and 43-44. further intensify its rivalry with Beijing. 4 Ibid., p. 85. Any failure to side with partners 5 Graham Allison, “Can America and China such as Japan and the Philippines in Avoid Going to War in the Future?”, in Evening a confrontation with China would Standard, 13 July 2017, https://www.standard. co.uk/comment/comment/can-america- and-china-avoid-going-to-war-in-the- 8 The White House, National Security Strategy future-a3587081.html. of the United States of America, December 2017, 6 Graham Allison, Destined for War, cit. p. 25, http://nssarchive.us/national-security- strategy-2017. 7 Muriel E. Chamberlain, ? British 9 Foreign Policy, 1789-1914, London and New Ibid., p. 45. York, Longman, 1988, p. 7. 10 Ibid., p. 25. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 08 - FEBRUARY 2018 18 | 08 - FEBRUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

2 Sleepwalking into Thucydides’s Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony

weaken the credibility of America’s into a global military conflict. security guarantees. The NSS therefore calls for “sustained U.S. leadership” The only way to avoid future against China, providing a “collective conflagrations is to adopt an attitude response that upholds a regional of radical humility. America’s leaders order respectful of sovereignty and must accept that the tectonic shifts of independence”.11 America, therefore, geopolitical power cannot be reversed, appears to be suffering from an acute only managed so as to minimise

© 2018 IAI case of “ruling power syndrome”: the friction. This is more profound stakes of hegemony are so high that any than the distinction between vital significant concession to Beijing would and vested interests suggested by irrevocably compromise Washington’s Allison. It requires the ruling power to position. fundamentally scale down its ambitions to those of a great power. This is not a unique situation, unipolarity led Napoleon to declare war The US must cease to aspire to global against Russia in 1812. After coercing hegemony, and instead aim for limited ISSN 2532-6570 all other powers to participate in the dominance. President Obama had continental blockade against Britain, the foresight to appreciate this. As he he could not tolerate Russia’s refusal explained in his 2015 NSS: “America to cooperate. Despite his personal leads from a position of strength. But, friendship with Tsar Alexander, this does not mean we can or should Napoleon could only see Russian policy attempt to dictate the trajectory of all in hostile terms, concluding in 1811 that unfolding events around the world […] “war will come about, though I don’t our resources and influence are not want it, neither does he, and though it infinite”.13 is equally against the interests of France and of Russia. I have seen this happen One possible solution could be to return so often before”.12 to the fundamentals of nineteenth- century US grand strategy, the Monroe Rigid alliance structures also magnify Doctrine. the risks of great power conflict. On the eve of the First World War, Europe was Washington’s priority should be to divided between the “” of preserve its strategic autonomy in the Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the Western hemisphere. Consequently, “” of France, Russia and it must continue to safeguard its Great Britain. It was the unshakeable security in the Pacific by maintaining nature of each bloc’s security its military bases and honouring its commitments that transformed alliance commitments there. Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia

11 Ibid., p. 46. 12 Napoleon to Frederick, King of Württemberg, Paris, 2 April 1811 (Corresp., xxii, 17553), in 13 Barack Obama’s statement on the 2015 Letters of Napoleon, edited by J.M. Thompson, National Security Strategy, February 2015, http:// Oxford, Blackwell, 1934. nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2015. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 08 - FEBRUARY 2018 18 | 08 - FEBRUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

3 Sleepwalking into Thucydides’s Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony

Nevertheless, Washington should ultimately be prepared to cede ascendancy in East Asia to Beijing. Chinese naval dominance within the First Island Chain should be accepted as a fait accompli. Furthermore, the US’s alliances should be defensive pacts providing limited support

© 2018 IAI against unprovoked aggression, not blank cheques offering unconditional assistance.

These decisions might appear to compromise the world order that Washington has long worked to sustain. Nevertheless, the costs of losing global hegemony must be weighed against ISSN 2532-6570 the benefits of retaining limited dominance.

Not only would the US avoid war with China, it would be better placed to secure Beijing’s cooperation over numerous issues of mutual interest, chiefly economic growth, international security and nuclear non-proliferation. The US would therefore retain immense influence over world politics, but less as a lone sheriff than a co-partner with China. Much will depend, however, on whether future American leaders embrace the wisdom of humility or yield to the arrogance of power.

21 February 2018 IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 08 - FEBRUARY 2018 18 | 08 - FEBRUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

4 Sleepwalking into Thucydides’s Trap: The Perils of US Hegemony

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, IAI does research in the fields of foreign policy, political economy and international security. A non-profit organisation, IAI aims to further and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences and publications. To that end, it cooperates with other research institutes, universities and foundations in Italy and abroad and is a member of various international networks. More specifically, the main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle © 2018 IAI East; defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations. IAI publishes an English- language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), two book series (Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).

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