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Yemen DDR: Apply International Learning to Conflict Transformation in Yemen. Original Draft: 2019, revised 2020.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms ADF Allied Democratic Forces AG Armed Group AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula CAR Central African Republic CBSR Cross-Border Stabilisation Rehabilitation (programme) CONADER Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CVE Countering Violent Extremism DDR Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EDPRS Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy FAR Armed Forces of Rwanda FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan) FCV Fragility Conflict and Violence FGS Federal Government of Somalia GoR Government of Rwanda GP Global Practice (World Bank) IDA International Development Association IDDRS International DDR Standards ISACS International Small Arms Control Standards ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISM Interim Stabilisation Measure LRA Lords Resistance Army MDRP Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program MINALOC Ministry of Local Government (Rwanda) NSPS National Social Protection Strategy OSESGY Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen PCPR Post Conflict Peace Building and Reconstruction PNDDR Programme National de Désarmement, Demobilisation, et Reinsertion PVE Preventing Violent Extremism RDF Rwanda Defence Forces RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front RDRC Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SEDRP Second Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project SPIP Social Protection Implementation Planning SPLM Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement SSNDDRC South Sudan National DDR Commission SSR Security Sector Reform TDRP Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Program TF Trust Fund UAE United Arab Emirates UgDRP Uganda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNDPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations

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UNSOM UN Mission in Somalia US United States of America U-CPN (M) Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist WAM Weapons and Ammunition Management

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents ...... 3 I Summary ...... 4 I.1 Conflict Analysis ...... 4 I.2 DDR Scenario Planning and Interim Stabilisation Measures ...... 4 I.3 Core Principles ...... 4 I.4 Pathways to Development ...... 5 I.5 DDR, SSR and Counter-Insurgency ...... 6 I.6 Challenging Orthodox DDR Reintegration ...... 6 I.7 Next ...... 7 1. Introduction ...... 8 1.1 Study Rationale and Limitations ...... 8 1.2 Focus of the Study ...... 9 1.3 Structure of the Report ...... 9 2. DDR and Yemen Conflict Analysis ...... 11 2.1 Conflict Analysis ...... 11 2.2 Fragmented Conflict Context and Interim Stabilisation Measures (ISM) ...... 13 3. DDR Core Principles ...... 17 3.1 Legitimacy ...... 17 3.2 Inclusiveness ...... 18 3.3 National Ownership ...... 19 4. From DDR to Development ...... 20 4.1 Stabilisation, Gender and Longer-Term Economic and Social Development ...... 20 4.2 Disarmament and Weapons and Ammunition Management ...... 22 5. DDR, SSR, and Counter-Insurgency ...... 24 5.1 DDR-SSR Nexus ...... 24 5.2 DDR and CVE ...... 25 5.3 DDR and Counter-Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism ...... 27 6. Programming for Economic and Social Reintegration ...... 29 6.1 Economic Reintegration ...... 30 6.1.1 Conflict Economies ...... 30 6.1.2 Vocational Training, Education and Life Skills ...... 32 6.1.3 Regional and National Development ...... 33 6.2 Psychosocial ...... 34 6.2.1 The Family as a Key Participant Group ...... 35 6.3 Monitoring and Evaluation ...... 36 7. Conclusion: What Might DDR in Yemen Look Like? ...... 37 7.1 Scenario Planning and Institutional Frameworks ...... 37 7.2 Tribes and Tribalism ...... 37 7.3 Alliances, Coalitions, Grievances and Coalesced Goals ...... 41 7.3.1 International/Regional Actors and their Patronage Networks ...... 41 7.2.3 Secessionists ...... 43 7.4 Elites ...... 45 7.5 SSR, CVE and Counter Insurgency ...... 47 7.6 Challenging Orthodox DDR Reintegration ...... 47 Annex 1. Select Bibliography ...... 49 Endnotes ...... 54

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I Summary

I.1 Conflict Analysis • DDR in Yemen should be built upon a conflict analysis that recognises how the conflict is a complex phenomenon. It is not a clear-cut conflict between Houthi and pro-Hadi forces nor an international proxy war between a Saudi-coalition and Iran. Expanding the analysis to a tri-partite one incorporating the secessionist STC does not take account of the complex conflict dynamics, tribal groups, militias, conflict elites and malleable allegiances that characterise the situation in Yemen.

• Conflict analysis is a foundation for planning DDR. The Yemen conflict analysis must recognise that the shifts in political and military power in Yemen are unlikely to be restored to their pre-war configurations. This has fundamental implications for the design and implementation of DDR.

I.2 DDR Scenario Planning and Interim Stabilisation Measures • DDR stakeholders must plan for DDR in a context where there is weak (if any) central government or robust policy and institutional environment for DDR. Furthermore, in a fragmented post-conflict Yemen there may be more than one central government depending on the territorial outcome of the conflict.

• Scenario planning must include interrogating how to ‘do DDR’ in the new territorial configurations that may emerge following the cessation of fighting.

• Interim Security Measures (ISMs) can buy time for increased political dialogue and forming the institutional or bureaucratic frameworks for DDR. DDR stakeholders should scenario plan for ISMs but do so in full recognition of the risks involved. Following the Somali model, ISMs could be considered as a means to reach ‘low lying fruit’ of lower level defectors from armed groups.

I.3 Core Principles • Do no harm remains the overarching principle of DDR programming where the interest of the beneficiaries is placed above the interest of the programme.

• The principles of inclusiveness, legitimacy (including ‘grounded legitimacy’), and national ownership are challenged by the complexity of the Yemen conflict.

• Inclusivity is central to DDR. It is critical at strategic and programmatic levels, both during the creation of a DDR strategy and during the design and implementation of DDR programming components. Apart from ensuring that it is included by those planning DDR there are many factors that challenge inclusivity. These include the political economy of the conflict in Yemen, the objectives of the conflict coalitions in Yemen and the interests and motivations of Sheikhs and regional commanders. These factors complicate the possible mechanisms for inclusiveness in Yemen DDR. Conventional approaches such as consultative fora and utilising a framework that recognises signatory and non-signatory parties may be useful, but critically, DDR in Yemen should properly

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understand armed groups, the interests and positions of elites and the ties between armed groups and elites on the one hand and local populations on the other.

• Local dynamics of legitimacy can constitute opportunities or risks for DDR. A significant proportion of Yemenis believe that the provision of security should not rest in the hands of the State alone. The belief is that Popular Committees, Resistance Factions, Tribal Sheikhs, Local Councils and ‘other power people’ have a role in rebuilding security and stability and protecting local communities. While it is not feasible for DDR to directly and concurrently include all non-State parties in its governance structures, programming should be designed and implemented so that it manages public perception and engages with community sentiment regarding the provision of security on local, regional and national bases. This will involve balancing local concerns on security and any lack of central government authority.

• It is possible that Yemen will not achieve a unity government. Because of this DDR stakeholders should strategize about re-defining national ownership and mapping the implication for the creation of national DDR institutions and DDR institutions in a federal state.

I.4 Pathways to Development • Stakeholders should scenario plan now for how in the future, DDR social and economic reintegration programming including political reintegration, can be informed by other peace-building interventions along the security-development nexus. These interventions could include those that may be designed to consolidate peace in areas of Yemen that are relatively insulated from the conflict. Scenario planning should include aligning social and economic reintegration programming so that it can be implemented along a continuum of development programming.

• Social and economic reintegration programming should be linked to broader stabilisation and economic development. Reintegration is a much longer process than disarmament and demobilisation and in order to be successful it requires economic development and social stability. By contributing to stabilisation DDR can lay the foundations for conflict- sensitive development strategy and programming by national governments and the donor community.

• DDR can strategically contribute to devising a pathway to development. In order to maximise its positive impact, DDR should be devised in conjunction with planning for stabilisation and social and economic recovery. Integrating DDR with regional and national development plans can greatly enhance the outcomes from DDR’s reintegration programming.

• DDR stakeholders should contribute to the foundations of a strategy for post conflict reconstruction. DDR through its own conflict analysis should not be afraid to challenge orthodoxies of reconstruction and concurrently, challenge the limitations of next generation DDR.

• Given the current challenges to implementing a comprehensive DDR program in Yemen, there are other opportunities to build confidence (such as through ISMs) and to consolidate peace and stability (such as through conflict-sensitive programming in areas

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that are minimally impacted upon by the conflict or that are insulated from front-lines and military activity). In areas less impacted upon by the conflict strong consideration should be given to designing and implementing activities to consolidate peace and development while being part of the overall approach to the security development nexus in Yemen. For example, this could take the form of multi-sectoral and partnership-based peacebuilding through inclusive economic development. Also it could include programming targeting public services and governance. Learning from implementing these approaches to peacebuilding could inform follow-up or conflict-sensitive programming in territories in Yemen that would be the first to be targeted with DDR.

I.5 DDR, SSR and Counter-Insurgency • Stakeholders must plan for what is likely to be an uneasy DDR-SSR interface. At a fundamental level this means solving the problem of deciding which combatants will enter DDR and which combatants will enter SSR. This will be complex because of the configuration of armed forces and irregular armed groups in Yemen and how particular armed groups and militias have been co-opted into formal military structures or have been identified as eligible for incorporation into formal military structures. In Yemen, a military service number is an entitlement for life and can also be inherited, therefore the expectations of those co-opted are significantly built up.

• Stakeholders in Yemen DDR and SSR should plan how to overcome the familiar challenges of creating meaningful dialogue between DDR and SSR programming, including understanding the role and remit of DDR and SSR institutional competencies, as well as budgetary issues.

• A key decision of eligibility will need to be made in regards to tribal militia sent by their respective leaders to the front based on tribal loyalties and alliances. Social reintegration of such combatant may be challenging. DDR must avoid delivering reintegration assistance to combatants where DDR may then be considered a combatant benefit or ‘reward’ programme.

• Lessons learnt from the failures of previous SSR efforts in Yemen must inform future programming.

• It is crucial that stakeholders in Yemen DDR and SSR manage and avoid conflating the human security agenda (DDR) and the security agenda (SSR). When conflation occurs it is usually to the detriment of human security.

• Stakeholders in Yemen DDR must be acutely aware that the conflation of DDR and counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism is one step further away from the human-centred and bottom-up restoration of peace and stability that is at the heart of DDR. The risks to successful peace building of this conflation must be anticipated.

I.6 Challenging Orthodox DDR Reintegration • By design, economic reintegration must take into consideration not only demographic and economic profiles of Yemeni combatants, communities and regions, but also the pervasive war economy and how to deal with its welfare aspects.

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• Reintegration will need to be community-based and tailored for sub-national territories. A homogenous national programme will not be sufficiently nuanced to take consideration of how conflict has changed the economic and social fabric of different parts of Yemen.

• DDR should be framed by a drive for sub-national and national economic recovery. For Yemen, where humanitarian disaster is a reality for many, this will be a significant challenge.

• The ambition for DDR should be that social and economic reintegration services are eventually delivered and accessed via mainstream institutional structures. This means that over time, as national recovery takes hold, services such as medical treatment and psychological and psychiatric services should be delivered through mainstream institutions.

• The family should be given greater prominence in DDR in Yemen then it has in DDR in other territories.

I.7 Next • This report envisages that a next step in the consideration of how to devise DDR policy and programming for Yemen (and what to include in that policy and programming) will be to use this report as a spring board to inform the debate.

• Conduct additional analytical work to support planning for an integrated, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approach to security, peace and development in Yemen.

• Analytical work should examine the institutional capacities in Yemen as well as profiling the social, economic and political contexts for DDR. There are significant political economy knowledge gaps in the international community as well as key gaps in practical understanding about the size and composition of armed groups.

• In effect, analytical work performed now, should lead to policy and programming across the security – development nexus in the near future. It should form the basis of advisory and capacity building cooperation with authorities in Yemen.

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1. Introduction 1. Conflict has brought major re-alignments of governance and security to Yemen and the country has pivoted into a disastrous humanitarian situation. Yemen sits on territorial fault-lines and while attention has been focused on the resolution of the ‘big war’ between Houthi and pro- Hadi forces these fault lines gave rise to secessionist forces in southern Yemen and multiple “small wars”1 between the plethora of military, political and economic powers in the country. Increasingly these multiple conflicts look set to fundamentally re-design the borders and governance of Yemen.

2. ‘Fault-lines’ are realised in the numerous active fronts in the war, by the configuration of national and regional armies, armed groups, militias, and war economies and by the lack of legitimate unifying control of armed groups in the non-Houthi camp.2 The lack of control and legitimacy of the internationally recognised Hadi government of Yemen over the proliferation of armed groups, including those created and controlled by international stakeholders like Yemen’s Emirati and Saudi neighbours, challenges the fundamental principles at the heart of orthodox approaches to conflict reduction and stabilisation including DDR.

3. Scenario planning for DDR in Yemen requires questioning the fundamentals of first and second-generation DDR programming to ensure they fit with the Yemen conflict environment. It demands one anticipate how DDR might be done in different environments including in a country divided into two or more regions by secessionist forces or reconstituted along federal lines. Scenario planning must consider the question of whether and how DDR architects (international and domestic stakeholders including government and UN partners) might start implementing DDR during conflict in Yemen. In other words how DDR be part of the strategy to manage conflict by effectively providing a pull for fighters to leave the battle zones should be explored. At least where there is spontaneous reinsertion of combatants into local or communities of origin there is potential for DDR to fulfil this function. This question draws attention to the fundamental challenges to DDR that have been grappled with in countries as far apart as Colombia and Afghanistan and for which there are no, quick answers or reliable replicable international models. Just considering the question of how and what kind of DDR could be successful in Yemen brings- home the axiom that there is no one-size-fits all answer to ‘how to do’ DDR.

1.1 Study Rationale and Limitations 4. This study is intended that this study be a living document, to be modified and updated over time as the situation in Yemen develops. Similarly, findings from the other studies in the batch should inform future revisions.

5. This report is limited by the sheer complexity of the challenge: implementing a successful DDR programme in Yemen. All aspects of Yemen DDR will need to be highly attuned to local contexts and has significant strategy, programming, evaluation and cost implications.

6. Ultimately the report is limited by scope as it is not viable to give attention to all aspects of DDR that may or may not be relevant to Yemen in the future. The questions of how the conflict will be resolved and what configuration of territories and actors will emerge from the conflict make many aspects of this report conditional.

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1.2 Focus of the Study 7. This study focuses on highlighting challenges and exploring lessons from a variety of DDR programmes and analysis. It is intended to contribute to approaching the challenges of designing DDR for Yemen from a problem-solving perspective, one which accesses learning from implementing DDR or stabilisation programming in other territories and contexts and considers whether it could be relevant to Yemen.

8. The analysis draws on lessons learned from DDR’s recent past, beginning in the mid 1990s3 and from DDR programming in sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and South America. This study draws on primary and secondary research in DDR in DRC, CAR, Rwanda, Uganda, Republic of South Sudan, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Libya and the institutionalising of DDR in the African Union. It draws on lessons learnt from DDR and strategising about DDR in Afghanistan, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Western Balkans, Northern Ireland, Colombia, the Philippines and Ukraine.

1.3 Structure of the Report 9. The report is structured as follows:

(a) Section 2 presents higher-level strategic challenges. It discusses key problems in developing a guiding strategy for DDR in Yemen and ties this to learning about DDR in other contexts where conflict analysis and policy preparation have proven to be particularly challenging.

(b) Section 3 discusses DDR core principles in the context of scenario planning for Yemen DDR.

(c) Section 4 discusses the strategic and programmatic integration of DDR into longer term stabilisation programming consistent with a human security approach.

(d) Section 5 discusses learning from DDR Reintegration programming that may be relevant for Yemen DDR.

(e) Section 6 considers the intersection human security and security programming. It focuses on the DDR-SSR nexus, DDR-CVE interface and DDR-Counter Insurgency interface.

(f) Section 7 draws conclusions and outlines the next steps in preparing for DDR in Yemen.

10. The study recognises that the most recent (2019) version of Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) Framework and the Operational Guide continues to be a founding documents in DDR. The IDDRS is a cornerstone of UN-implemented DDR and an important global strategic and operational document in DDR strategy and programme formulation. It’s guiding principles that DDR should be people centred; flexible, transparent, and accountable; nationally owned; integrated, and well planned4 are relevant to DDR planning, implementation, assessment and reform. The guide’s description of the general pathway to achieving security and stability via DDR has global relevance. These include that DDR should:

(a) Be planned and coordinated within the framework of the peace process.

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(b) Be linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other Security Sector Reform (SSR) issues.

(c) Take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament, and weapons control and management.

(d) Be linked to the broader processes of national capacity building, reconstruction and development in order to achieve the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants.

(e) Encourage trust and confidence in communities receiving ex-combatants and deal with the root causes of the conflict in order to prevent a return to violent conflict.

(f) Be flexible and carefully adapted to meet the specific needs of a particular country (and region).5

11. This study recognises that Yemen’s highly heterogeneous conflict presents scenarios that are emblematic of the challenges to next generation DDR. The UN’s own guiding framework sets prerequisites for DDR programming that in an increasing number of conflict scenarios are not present: signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR, trust in the peace process, willingness of the parties to engage in DDR and a minimum guarantee of security.6 The UN approach is regularly evolving whether in UN-implemented DDR or DDR involving national and other international actors and donors. Strategic and operational choices such as whether and how to implement DDR during conflict, how and whether to use ISMs, and how and whether to use cantonment or detention have challenged some of the fundamentals of DDR and stimulated reform in next generation DDR.

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2. DDR and Yemen Conflict Analysis 12. This chapter examines the relevance of, and challenges to conducting appropriate and sufficiently nuanced conflict analysis, that is fine-tuned to inform DDR policy and programming in Yemen. It considers the ‘bigger questions’ and identifies some of the main gaps in our conflict analysis and scenario planning for DDR in Yemen.

13. Mapping the ‘big questions’ should lay the groundwork for DDR. It should inform conversations about DDR during peace/CPA negotiations. It should facilitate the consideration of policy, political and institutional frameworks for DDR. It should inform the decisions regarding DDR’s role in confidence building, how and where it will be integrated with SSR and what are the realistic outcomes from DDR in Yemen.

2.1 Conflict Analysis 14. The Yemen conflict is complex. It has been characterised by significant shifts in political power that appear increasingly unlikely to be fully reversed either through military action or through a negotiated peace process. This means that the political, social and economic contexts for DDR policy and programming are likely to be radically different than how earlier in the conflict they were predicted to be.

15. Up until the expulsion by the Southern Transition Council (STC) of the Hadi government form Aden during August 2019, the international community had erroneously adhered to a binary conflict analysis: the conflict was one between Houthi and Hadi forces backed by a narrow base of international governments. This ignored the growing influence of secessionists and the policy of the UAE to funnel significant political, military and financial support to the STC, it’s Security Belt Forces (SBF) including elite forces in the south of Yemen. However, even a shift from a binary to a tripartite conflict analysis that includes the STC elides the complexities at play in Yemen. Yemen is

a complicated and overlapping series of rivalries and armed struggles ... Each territory has its own leadership structure, internal politics and external backers, to the extent that Yemen resembles less a divided country than a collection of mini-states, engaged in a complex intraregional conflict. The role of third parties – in particular Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) - with different and often divergent agendas deepens the complexity of the conflict and is likely to prolong it. The presence of Salafist fighters, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the local branch of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) – and the apparent separation of UAE- and US-led counterterrorism initiatives from broader policy frameworks – adds yet another layer of complexity to any attempt to resolve the conflict(s). Since mid-2017, meanwhile, internal power struggles between ostensible allies have taken priority over the national-level conflict.7

16. At a fundamental level a Yemen conflict analysis must take consideration of the complexities within and between each geographical area of Yemen under consideration. Broadly, this means that the analysis must consider the dynamics at least as they are within the Houthi- controlled north (including the highlands of western Yemen), dynamics within the south including Aden and ‘the tribal south’, and dynamics in Ma’rib, Hadramawt north and south, and Al Mahrah.

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Figure 1. Yemen Reference Map (OCHA)

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

17. The areas of Yemen more removed from active conflict and where local groups and powers have greater visibility and “grounded legitimacy” 8 than the Houthi, Hadi or STC authorities have unknown potential to bolster or restrict DDR programming and so they need to be factored into preparatory analysis for programming. Potentially, due to their relative stability and economic conditions some areas could offer opportunities for soft-reintegration activities. Two such areas are Hadramawt and Ma’rib.

18. Both Hadramawt and Ma’rib have strong secessionist tendencies. 9 In Hadramawt these tendencies have been bolstered by the UAE policy of developing elite forces drawn from local tribes in particularly sensitive, problematic or strategically valuable areas. While packaged as a core component of the UAE’s response to the threat posed by AQAP and Salafist militias to the UAE area of control and influence10 the Emirati strategy has resulted in the creation of well-paid and highly trained elite military forces that will need to be managed via DDR or SSR. Not just in these two areas but also elsewhere in Yemen, regional and local governance is well established as are regional militias (some of whom (as in Ma’rib) have already been integrated into the national army)11. In light of this, a starting point for Yemen DDR is to ensure that any proposed national DDR programme has an inclusive design process involving a wide body of regional and local actors and a dialogue with a renewed national SSR strategy.

19. Since 2016 elite forces have been created in Shabwa (Shabwa Elite Force/SEF) and Hadramawt (Hadramawt Elite Force/HEF) where they have military, policing and judicial roles. They have been utilised to capture ‘high-value’ AQAP leadership figures and secure key infrastructure including oil wells and transport links in areas where AQAP has a presence.

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Counter-insurgency operations have been conducted by elite forces, bolstered by local militias in coordination with both the UAE and the USA throughout 2017 and 2018.12

20. Hadramawt an Ma’rib have established parallel governance structures including public financial institutions. Ma’rib, with its increased stability and prosperity (despite or in part because of the conflict), its self-financing of de facto armed forces, and lack of inclusion in any negotiations for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)13, provides multiple indicators of the complex local dynamics to be recognised in any conflict analysis.14 It has implications for ensuring inclusivity in DDR governance and implementation. The rise of Ma’rib aligns with the analysis of how the emergence of war time ‘boom towns’ and the location of military fronts “can shift the locus of power away from the centre”.15 In Yemen whatever centre of government existed prior to the conflict now is severely reduced in both presence and in legitimacy.

21. There are implications: (i) for the consideration of where DDR could be implemented; (ii) for the fundamental principles of DDR particularly legitimacy, inclusiveness, and national ownership, and (iii) for how DDR can contribute to community security given the role of sub- national and local level powers (including Sheikhs) in providing security and ensuring access to public services. The conflict analysis upon which Yemen DDR can be built must consider dynamics of regional and local level power and legitimacy, the level and type of involvement of local and regional centres of power and elites in local political economy, welfare and security, and how in the complex national conflict these might impact upon buy-in and participation in DDR.

22. Illustrative examples include recent Colombian DDR. Columbian DDR encountered a challenging landscape where non-state mechanisms and actors parallel to, or removed from a central government filled the vacuum where central state presence was weak or absent.16 In preparation for DDR the conflict analysis described the likely post-DDR future scenario as one where non-state actors become key participants in the social dynamic of regions both formally and informally (outside the normative framework). In Yemen this is already the case.

23. In Colombia, the presence of ex-combatants driving these organisations means that for DDR programming there (and elsewhere where a governance vacuum is substantially filled by AG-led groups) it is important to align DDR with broader longer term normative reform, peace- building and stabilisation programming targeting an equitable distribution of the peace dividend and equitable and representative participation in regional and national governance. DDR stakeholders must understand how security-driven interventions coupled with a lack of genuine political processes can pressure DDR to provide short-term solutions to manage non-State armed groups to the detriment of addressing in the short to medium term, overall stability and prospects for reconstruction. There should be a developmental link between DDR reintegration programming and building the capacity of decentralised institutions. This will ensure that regions where there is weak central state presence have the capacity to cement peace and contribute to regional stability and development as part of an overall national (or federal) recovery from conflict.

2.2 Fragmented Conflict Context and Interim Stabilisation Measures (ISM) 24. The 2019 Riyadh Agreement formalised the transfer of the coalition’s military presence in southern Yemen from the UAE to Saudi Arabia (a process that in reality dates from June 2019, when the UAE announced its phased withdrawal from Yemen leaving its military personnel behind only in coastal Hadramawt, Shabwa, and Soqotra, and in control of the Bab al Mandab.

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Despite a reduced direct military presence the UAE retains its immediate military influence through the STC and elite forces. The agreement provided for the formation of a new, Aden- based power-sharing government composed of 12 southern and 12 northern ministers (the previous administration included a higher proportion of southerners and a larger total number of ministers). As a condition both parties were to withdraw their military and security personnel and heavy artillery from urban areas. Also the agreement provides for UAE-backed militias to be integrated into the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, while other security services are to operate under the Ministry of the Interior. The agreement stipulates that all state financial resources are to be centralised and managed through the Aden Central Bank of Yemen, a significant provision given the parallel public finical systems established in Ma’rib, Hadramawt and Shabwa governorates.

25. The Riyadh Agreement, like the GCC Agreement before it, is characterised by vague mechanisms and largely unachievable deadlines and sequencing. Where the GCC Agreement hastened the disintegration of Yemen (and gave rise to a failed SSR programme), the Riyadh Agreement is faced with a more fragmented reality and a fundamentally intransigent problem: the Hadi forces want to ‘retain’ the unity of Yemen and the STC is fundamental based on secession of the south.

26. Beyond the Riyadh Agreement lies a highly fractured national context and sub-national context (regional and governorate level). Tribes, politically relevant elites (PRE), armed groups and the extremist Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS constitute a heterogeneity of conflict actors, of which many have malleable alliances and loyalties. As outlined above despite its withdrawal the UAE retains a substantial involvement through supporting armed groups and the STC.17 Further international muddying of the waters comes in the form of the “US-Emirati counterterrorism partnership”18 and the prospect of any intervention in peace- building facing the need to “strike a balance between localism and the maintenance of central state institutions.”19 With the complexity of the sub-national context and the concomitant lack of knowledge and scenario planning arguably there is room to consider DDR from the perspective of an ISM as an interim pathway to allow for further analytical work, strategy and programme design.

27. The main objective of ISM is to strengthen the prospects for durable peace. By “holding former combatants in formal cohesive structures, maintaining a critical level of security and social support” an ISM is intended to ‘buy time’ and “create space for: continued political dialogue, a settlement of outstanding issues relating primarily to the security sector and political power-sharing; trust and confidence to emerge allowing for political dialogue; formation of provisional bureaucratic structures and legal instruments; proper assessment of absorption capacity in different sectors of society and initial economic reconstruction; sensitization of communities, and socio-psychological adjustment of combatants.”20

28. ISMs are more complex than they may first appear.21 They can constitute high-stakes political and military gambles that do not always produce the intended outcomes. They have a number of key purposes. They are intended to offer pathways for usually low-level combatants to exit the conflict arena. Also they are intended to create a space at the level of the community for sensitisation in preparation for full DDR and SSR programing and to allow for more in-depth analytical work ,particularly concerning the assessment of the absorptive capacity of local economies and labour markets (a continued short-coming in DDR and a major question mark over economic reintegration programming whether targeted or community based). However, while reaching for these outcomes ISMs can inadvertently buy time for the political and military

14 reorganisation of opposing parties. With that caveat in mind, ISMs for Yemen prior to DDR is worth considering.

29. Regarding the risks inherent to ISMs, in the Nepali case, an ISM (that included cantonment) was established through a separate agreement to the CPA. The CPA avoided all reference to DDR and SSR. 22 Over time the ISM evolved into a DDR programme that inadvertently facilitated Maoists to regroup and consolidate socially, politically and militarily. Cantonment, which was “part of the transitional first steps to build confidence and trust”23 lead to this unintended outcome due in part to extended duration of cantonment. “Intact command lines ... strengthened the Maoist Army, allowing it to function as a security guarantee for the U-CPN (M) and a threat for its political opponents.”24

30. The convergence of factors around the Nepal ISM/DDR that led to “excessively long cantonments” also resulted in some positive social impact, as well as challenging political and military import. These included “camps becoming communities that stopped discontent from boiling over, and an irresponsibly long demobilisation period for the verified minors.”25

31. Apart from cantonment in Nepal, ISMs in Cambodia, (Win-Win policies) and in Rwanda (Ingando-process) present learning that is useful in for scenario planning for Yemen DDR.

32. The Win-Win policies of Cambodian DDR constituted a pragmatic approach to ISM that included providing extended amnesty to defectors for crimes committed as part of the Khmer Rouge. The policies allowed Khmer Rouge to retain ownership of property and land, to retain military rank and positions in the civil administration. The policies lead to “three levels of integration” all of which have been replicated in DDR and SSR contexts elsewhere in the world. They were: (i) military integration of defected Khmer Rouge soldiers into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces where mid-level Khmer Rouge commanders contained to lead their soldiers; (ii) administrative integration whereby new cities and districts were formed in Khmer Rouge strongholds and Khmer Rouge retained administrative positions or could accept new ones and (iii) socio-economic reintegration through the transformation of Khmer Rouge strongholds into autonomous economic development zones with three year tax free status and encouragement to engage in cross-border trade. Economic packages were provided to combatants including land, livestock and cash.26

33. As an aside it should be noted that the use of Win-Win in Cambodia during 2017 and 2018 makes the policies politically loaded. In 2017 in the wake of economic turmoil in Cambodia the language of Win-Win policy was resurrected by the Cambodian prime minister and former Khmer Rouge commander to encourage defections from the only opposition party in the wake of its enforced dissolution by the Cambodian supreme court and the political ban handed down to 118 member of the party. Prior to its forced dissolution the opposition was posing a major threat to the Cambodian People’s Party.27

34. The Rwandan Ingando-process was part of the early stabilisation programmes of the Rwandan government under the auspices of the Rwandan Patriotic Front - RPF (later the Rwandan Patriotic Army – RPA). In various evolutions this stabilisation measure targeted civilians,28 ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR), and interahamwe (militia) that at the time were continuing to attack Rwanda from bases in eastern Congo. Ingando sites included Mutobo, located near Ruhengri close to the DRC’s eastern border, which in 2018 is the main DDR centre and planned RDRC/Government of Rwanda-run DDR ‘Centre of Excellence.’29 Ingando (like government enforced communal mutuality/umuganda, conflict resolution/gacaca or

15 education/itorero has been subject to strong accusations of social engineering and political indoctrination.30 That said, ingando as early DDR and the services offered as part of it (including socio-economic profiling and civilian orientation) have evolved over time into arguably one of the most successful SSR and DDR programmes in the Great Lakes region.31

35. The Cambodian and Rwandan examples are two cases that have success factors that are worth considering in the context of holistic scenario planning for Yemen DDR. These ISMs indicate how time can be purchased to better understand the political and security environment as well as the economic conditions for reintegration. ISMs can contribute to trust building at community and political levels and provide structures within which autonomy-of-sorts can be granted to conflict parties in order to enable gradual social and economic reintegration. They also show how interim measures can be evolved into full scale DDR and SSR. This signposts the benefits of planning interim measures in Yemen as part of longer-term interventions that align human security, security and development.

36. In the case of Rwanda, the alignment of ingando and then DDR under the ministry responsible for social protection (Ministry of Local Government/MINALOC) points to the benefits of considering reintegration as part of a wider evolution of social protection and inclusion, something which in reality may take decades to realise. Rwandan DDR has explicitly aligned with the first Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS-1) and EDPRS-2 particularly with regards to disability, mental health, and gender. It aligned with the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) and the Social Protection Implementation Planning (SPIP) thus resulting in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants being coherent with the delivery of mainstream social protection to conflict affected populations.

37. The challenge for DDR in Yemen is to scenario plan for varied political, policy and institutional environments for implementation while maintaining a focus on the end goal of incorporating ex-combatants and conflict-affected populations into future mainstream social and economic supports.

38. The impact on the core concepts of DDR could be varied. Where a peace agreement, and peace-building and recovery framework exists, the national institutions managing post-conflict governance, their roles and remits, are established. That provides clarity to DDR. During active conflict or where only a partial peace agreement exist the policy and institutional environment for DDR is radially different.

39. DDR architects in Yemen must avoid assuming that there will be a strong central government or a robust policy and institutional setting within which DDR can be established and implemented. In advance, scenario planning should be conducted around alternative scenarios including federalism and how this would influence ‘national’ DDR strategy and programming.

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3. DDR Core Principles 40. When implemented during conflict DDR divests itself of much of its traditional pre- requisites (a CPA or CPA process, a secure environment, etc.) but aspires to achieve conflict- sensitive community security and sustainability.”32 The risks of implementing DDR during conflict are high. The boundaries between human security and the security agenda can be blurred and there is a possibility when conditions are not aligned with traditional DDR that this early programmatic intervention can stress the competencies of implementing partners and be too highly complex to implement. This is particularly the case where the structures of the state are not functional and accountable. The UN’s Forced Intervention Brigade, and DDR in Colombia, Afghanistan and Somalia are examples of these challenges and complexities of implementing DDR during conflict.33

41. While not analogous with the Yemen context the Somali ISM programmes targeting the disengagement of combatants and youth provide an interesting example. They fall under the normative framework prepared by the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS)’s Inter- Ministerial Task Force on Disengaging Combatants (2013) and are implemented in four centres: Belet Weyne, Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu all of which involve to differing degrees the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

42. The normative risks of disengaging al Shabab are well documented, including those around protecting human rights.34 Similarly significant challenges around transparency, financing, operational limitation and the comfort zone of DDR policy makers and programmers should not be underestimated.35 The challenge of implementing programming targeting the disengagement of defectors including youth during conflict while maintaining adherence to IDDRS principles of DDR are clear. They include protecting human rights and protecting the welfare and safety of beneficiaries.36

43. The performance of each of the four centres in Somalia offers examples of models of ISM confidence building that map pathways to reintegration for lower-level combatants and radicalised youth. This model could be used in Yemen within the context of a national CVE strategy. Arguably avoiding describing any such low-key intervention as DDR would assist in managing expectations. Prerequisites for Yemen implementation would include adequate normative framework and a functioning security agency to interface with while monitoring the return of beneficiaries and their protection. Given the fragmented security environment in Yemen, the latter would be a significant challenge but one that could be partially addressed during the early stages of implementing a parallel SSR strategy.

3.1 Legitimacy 44. The principle of legitimacy is at the heart of DDR programming. Variably interpreted as legitimate governance or (arguably more accurately) as ‘establishing legitimacy’ involves asserting government use of force as the only legitimate use of force. As discussed above, up until the expulsion of the Hadi government from their temporary based in Aden much of the international depiction of the Yemen conflict repeated a binary analysis. However, the reality is more nuanced with complex relations within territories and diminished Hadi-government legitimacy in the south. Within Houthi-controlled Yemen, the parallel structures of government were established during the Houthi-Salah alliance. The integration of Yemen’s armed security services and the less structured Popular Committees37 was complete prior to the conflict. While in the northern highlands it is reported that the pro-Houthi collar tribes are driven by local expediency rather than loyalty to any one side, disentangling irregular Houthi forces from

17 military and deciding which would receive SSR and which would receive DDR will be a significant challenge. This points to the importance of dialogue and coherence between SSR and DDR programming.

45. The public in Yemen does not have an overwhelming positive impression of the level of activity of political parties or police in the provision or underwriting of security in communities. Local tribes and tribal leaders are perceived as far more active, and local citizens and sheikhs are perceived as highly active in the provision of security. Most challenging is the perception by 52 percent of Yemenis (51 percent in the north, 55 percent in the south) that the provision of security should not rest in the hands of the state alone. Popular Committees, Resistance Factions, Tribal Sheikhs, Local Councils and ‘other power people’ are prescribed a role in rebuilding security and stability but mainly for protection of local communities.38 Thus establishing who can legitimately use force will be a significant challenge to Yemen DDR.

3.2 Inclusiveness 46. The concept of inclusivity and its application varies from DDR programme to DDR programme. In the Rwandan context inclusivity stretched to extending services to members of the armed forces, services that were delivered temporarily in place of SSR and prior to the introduction of structured reform of the Rwandan Armed Forces. In the Ugandan context, the version of DDR in the Uganda Demobilization and Reintegration Project (UgDRP) was built upon the principle of inclusivity as embodied in the Amnesty Act (2000). Rebel sympathisers and abductees were all eligible for DDR programming under the broad categorisation of ‘Reporters’.

47. In the UgDRP not all armed groups were treated equally something which, along with other exogenous factors has likely contributed to the resurgence of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and to the poverty and social stigma of communities in Uganda from which ADF combatants were drawn.39

48. During 2014 and the preparation for a renewed South Sudan National DDR (SSNDDR) programme one of the main stumbling blocks to drafting a policy on reintegration programming was the criteria for eligible groups and the principled refusal by some key officials in the programme to consider reintegration programming for ‘rebel’ groups on a level similar to anyone in the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM).

49. At a programmatic rather than policy/strategy level, one-size-fits-all economic incentives for DDR in DRC have been identified as jeopardising reintegration and the security of combatants who have deserted the various AGs in DRC to enter the Programme National de Désarmement, Demobilisation, et Reinsertion (PNDDR). The amount of cash/in-kind benefits “prompted at least some recalcitrant commanders to increase the severity of monitoring and punishment for desertion. When the organization of armed groups is similar to that of national armies, a more productive approach may be to grade DDR packages by rank in order to make them more attractive to military commanders. DDR programmes arrived too late for combatants who deserted while conflict was ongoing. Better protective measures for deserters, such as safe havens introduced prior to peace agreements, may have helped to prevent the re-recruitment of these individuals and may have also limited reprisal attacks against their family members.”40

50. In Yemen, as in other DDR programmes, it would be expected that the negotiated peace agreement would stipulate which combatants and armed groups (AGs) would be included in DDR. However, the need to find a balanced inclusiveness is overshadowed by a myriad of AGs in Yemen, ‘official’ military forces, the persistent big questions over whether DDR can be

18 formulated under a national unity government, two-state solution, federal or triple-strand framework, and the challenge of the inclusivity of the peace process to all parties.

51. Incorporating a broad range of voices into the mediation process and then into lower level discussions on what a DDR programme would look like and what incentives would be required for each party to participate in challenging. Inclusivity requires that as in approaches to peace- building, approaches to DDR will need to be highly aware of the heterogeneity of actors and the diversity of interests, motivations and malleable alliances.

52. Inclusivity is critical at strategic and programmatic levels, both during the creation of a DDR strategy and during the design of DDR programming components. The categories of participants outlined in the IDDRS41 should be included and a mechanism found to address the positions of the groups involved in conflict in Yemen. The political economy, the objectives of the loose coalitions in the south of Yemen and the interests and motivations of Sheikhs and regional commanders complicate the possible mechanisms for inclusiveness in Yemen DDR. Conventional approaches such as consultative fora and utilising a framework that recognises signatory and non-signatory parties may be useful, but DDR in Yemen should not fail to properly understand armed groups, the interests and positions of elites and the ties of both to local populations.

53. At both strategic and programmatic levels gender should be visible, nuanced and mainstreamed. Those sub-groups (including youth) that are partially addressed through gender mainstreaming should be actively included both to receive program benefits and to participate in longer-term development and reconstruction efforts.

3.3 National Ownership 54. In some DDR programmes there has been a focus on building the institutions of DDR, and institutionalising legitimacy and national ownership of DDR. While it can be a drain on resources, institutionalising DDR has contributed to its success. However often where DDR has been institutionalised (for example, via National Commissions) the “dilemma of government ownership versus broader national ownership” 42 has persisted. At times there has been insufficient inclusion of non-state partners including NGOs into layered ownership structures. The national ownership model has meant that governments have been responsible for managing and implementing DDR. However, the legacy of conflict has meant that in many cases institutions have been weak with limited capacity.

55. In other situations, political factors have stymied the work of national DDR commissions (as was the case with the Amnesty Commission as it worked to implement the UgDRP). More than one DDR commission that was established in the Greater Great Lakes region has had mixed results at lest partially because of poor political buy-in but also because of a poor economic environment. In contrast, in Rwanda, a dominant political force created strong institutions including security institutions, that in turn contributed to the proper functioning of the national DDR programme. In other more fragmented or less stable contexts institutions have struggled to create impact in DDR (Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion - CONADER in DRC for example) or have essentially become dormant as conflict renewed (the SSNDDRC in South Sudan for example).

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4. From DDR to Development 56. Reintegration programming can be designed so that it provides a pathway to stabilisation – usually via a complex process of learning-by-doing in difficult operational environments. Such design is based on the principle that DDR can play a pivotal role in peace-consolidation and stabilisation and that DDR impact is most sustainable where there is dialogue between DDR and broader conflict recovery. Essentially, DDR is used to ‘buy time’ to allow for development initiatives to be implemented. It is therefore a transitional process between the ending of conflict and beginning of peaceful development.

57. In its attempt to consolidate this point, many DDR programmes routinely combine the first and second categories of measures that the UN family identifies as constituting the main part of second generation DDR. These are: post-conflict stabilization measures including reinsertion programme and sub-national community approaches, and targeted interventions including psychosocial strategies. The approach of these DDR programmes delivers institutional capacity building (mainstream and specialist service providers including social, economic and psychosocial services) and community focused social and economic initiatives. These additions have sought to address the limitations of reintegration programming in DDR and reorient the impact of DDR to include institution building in mainstream service providers (including medical, and psychosocial service providers, and providers of vocation education and training).

58. DDR architects should not underestimate the future post-conflict development challenge in Yemen. The 2013 UNDP Yemen livelihood assessment presented a dire picture of the situation that since then has continued to deteriorate.

Conflict as well as non-conflict sources of shocks and stresses since 2011, due to underlying vulnerability and events during the revolution and confrontations with AQAP, have left the livelihoods of the majority of the people in the 4 surveyed conflict-affected governorates in a weak and precarious situation. There has been a significant shrinkage in all aspects of the asset base (human, social, political, natural, physical and economic). Options for livelihood activities, whether as labour or small business, are few. Coping strategies which are being adopted to survive are largely unsustainable and in many cases harmful. The institutional and policy framework to support people’s livelihoods is hardly in evidence. The result is that the people in these governorates, and especially those in the poorest and poor categories, are subject to a self-perpetuating vicious downward cycle. Conflict and non-conflict shocks and stresses have increased their poverty and vulnerability whilst these conditions are in turn causing more conflict and related drivers of poverty and vulnerability.43

4.1 Stabilisation, Gender and Longer-Term Economic and Social Development 59. It has been argued that the stabilization period typically encompasses five critical security and development phases: (i) ceasefire mediation and the cessation of hostilities; (ii) interim stabilization measures (ISM); (iii) SSR; (iv) DDR and; (v) post conflict peace building and reconstruction (PCPR), that are implemented in a non-sequential manner. It is a highly sensitive and highly political process that cannot be reduced to simple technocratic steps.44

60. There is greater chance of sustainable impact when DDR is strategically and technically integrated into coherent and cohesive planning for interim and then longer-term stabilization, peace consolidation, reconstruction and economic development. The ‘urgent questions’ facing

20 policy makers in a conflict/conflict recovery context can be answered through greater integration of DDR programming into longer term planning for national and regional social and economic reconstruction and development.

61. The World Bank Cross-border Stabilisation Rehabilitation Programme (CBSR) attempted to capitalise on progress made through the DDR programmes in Uganda, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Central African Republic (CAR) to deliver economic confidence-building programmes targeting conflict affected populations in areas that had been affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Based on a stripped back analysis of opportunities for consolidating the positive impact of DDR and on lessons learnt about quick return on investment, acute social needs and vulnerable groups, the programme delivered economic development programming and mental health interventions to ex-combatants, IDPs and targeted vulnerable sub-groups. In DRC and Uganda the CBSR returned evidence of positive outcomes45 for conflict affected populations such as strengthening economic associations and cooperatives in micro-economies; increasing the sustainability of livelihood activities, and delivering effective psychosocial support to IDPs and ex-combatants.

62. Some gendered aspects of DDR were addressed via the Ugandan arm of the project that in turn built on lessons acquired through an impact evaluation of the UgDRP that identified discrepancies between the economic and health situation of female civilians and ex-combatants. Under the broad ‘stabilisation’ heading, the donor developed inclusive programming promoting sustainable livelihoods and social cohesion amongst conflict-affected female community members including ex-combatants by strengthening social and economic associations and providing low-intensity mental health support.46

63. Gender is a cross-cutting issue in the IDDRS. The conflict in Yemen is skewed so that females make up a minority of combats, and appear limited mainly to Houthi conscripts formed into militias (Zaynabiyat), the 4,000 women in Houthi areas trained by Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi military experts47 and criminal gangs.48 So while DDR should be gender sensitive it should have broad consideration of the vulnerabilities of conflict-affected females who will prove vital for successful reintegration. Widening the scope of reintegration benefits can address the exacerbated vulnerabilities of female headed households and where male combatants are returning can enforce the resilience of the family in order to bolster the primary unit for reintegration. Economic vulnerabilities of single females, females with families and female headed households can be tackled, at least in part, through a focus on women’s economic associations and empowerment. To combat the mental health impacts of conflict, low-level community-based mental health interventions can be integrated with economic empowerment activities. Thus the needs of conflict affected women can be partly addressed and the resilience of households receiving demobilising combatants can be shored-up in anticipation of more prolonged assistance via stabilisation interventions.

64. The CBSR delivered quantitatively and qualitatively verified impact and highlighted: (i) that it is possible to take DDR as a point of departure to deliver stabilisation/broader social and economic programming; (ii) that complex active conflict environments can present insurmountable barriers to a project of this kind achieving sustainable impact, and (iii) the possibility that with a more long term engagement in stabilisation (in excess of the project lifetime of the CBSR) programming can address conflict recovery needs and progress to development.

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65. DDR can strategically contribute to devising a pathway to development. In order to maximise the positive impact of DDR, strategy and programming should be devised in coordination with planning for stabilisation and development interventions. As identified above, alignment of DDR and regional and national development plans can greatly enhance the positive impact of reintegration programming. Similarly, holistically designing DDR as one of the earlier steps on the road to stabilisation and development programming can help maximise the impacts of successful DDR programming.

66. Strategically and programmatically aligning DDR, particularly reintegration programming with broader recovery may appear in principle straightforward but doing so and achieving measurable impact is challenging. It involves coordination with development partners through interagency cooperation, cooperation with implementing partners, NGOs and communities. It also involves cooperation and coordination with recipient governments via a DDR mainstreaming strategy. At the very least, DDR in Yemen should seek to contribute to the foundations of a strategy for post conflict reconstruction that is linked to a sustainable livelihood strategy and Do No Harm approaches. DDR through its own conflict analysis should not be afraid to challenge orthodoxies of reconstruction and concurrently, challenge the limitations of next generation DDR.49

4.2 Disarmament and Weapons and Ammunition Management 67. In Yemen, as in other conflicts such as Somalia, the environment for disarmament is complex and risky. The pervasiveness of weapons as well as cultural and societal dynamics around small arms ownership are likely to necessitate a nuanced Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) strategy to manage both the heavy weaponry of state and non-state actors and to establish the national structures to manage small arms ownership in Yemen. This would need to be flexibly sequenced as part of, or along-side DDR operations.

68. WAM50 has become crucial in the work of the UN in post-conflict environments. Communities awash with weapons cannot achieve peace, security and development. Armed violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country’s development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in long-standing grievances among communities.

69. The nature of DDR programmes has evolved. There is a growing need to integrate technical principles of WAM and more comprehensive arms control measures into the framework of DDR programmes. It is also increasingly important to link WAM principles with innovative community violence reduction approaches, which have been developed to “reorient” DDR programmes to better address particular needs on the ground. Such CVR with a WAM component has been implemented in CAR.

70. A governance challenge to WAM in Yemen will be the identification and (if necessary) establishment of the relevant institutional structures for management of weapons and ammunition as they relate to the chain of supply of state-owned munitions as well as small arms in private ownership. National institutions will be required to coordinate national policy, monitor implementation and report in relation to WAM in all areas including physical security, stockpile management, and registration of ownership.

71. Any such a Yemeni national institution will have to cooperate with international partners to develop a national strategy/policy and to plan and site ammunition and weapons storage facilities. Strategic partnerships will be required to appropriately develop a framework to regulate

22 the civilian possession of weapons and ammunition. Consideration will need to be given to the appropriateness of the guidance offered by International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) on controlling small arms and light weapon and the extent to which they may provide a solid regional foundation for the control of SALW.

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5. DDR, SSR, and Counter-Insurgency 72. DDR and SSR have become increasing converged in post-conflict peace building. Similarly, DDR with CVE, and DDR with Counter-Insurgency.51 Examining the historical evolution of the security sector in northern and southern Yemen as it was before unity, as well in post-1990 Yemen and the successive failed SSR reforms previously implemented by previous Yemen governments offer learning about the risks of SSR in Yemen and the danger of conflating aspects of SSR with those of DDR.

73. Despite the broad characterisation of CVE as part of the ‘security agenda’ there is little analysis of the convergence of DDR and CVE. Analysis on DDR and Counter Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism is limited but also highly polarised. Learning from historic counter-terrorism policy and operations by Western and Saudi-backed interests in Yemen and documenting the risks of conflating security with human security should inform strategising for DDR in Yemen. Similarly, as has been realised in Afghanistan, there are risks associated with allowing DDR to be subsumed by counter-insurgency strategy.

5.1 DDR-SSR Nexus 74. The UN perspective on the DDR-SSR nexus is underpinned by the position that “understanding the relationship between DDR and SSR can help identify synergies in policy and programming and provide ways of ensuring short to medium term activities associated with DDR are linked to broader efforts to support the development of an effective, well-managed and accountable security sector”.52 SSR is “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”.53 The relationship between SSR and DDR can be mutually beneficial. Situating DDR within a “developing security-governance framework” can “contribute to the legitimacy and sustainability of DDR programmes by helping to ensure that decisions are based on a nationally-driven assessment of applicable capabilities, objectives and values.”54

75. From another perspective, DDR is the first step in establishing the State’s “monopoly of force” via “disbanding the competition” and SSR is the sequential “developing [of] the State’s monopoly of force”.55 From that perspective SSR problematically assumes that there is a central state and that that central state has authority and legitimacy that is consolidated and manifest in the institutions of the state. It also assumes that there is a durable political settlement in place and well-developed national security policies.56

76. As has been discussed above, the situation in Yemen is highly heterogeneous, with many complicating factors including multiple parallel structures of the state and the southern secession movement. Yemen’s increasingly complex conflict, it’s non-binary nature, and its battles over legitimacy and grounded legitimacy mean these prerequisites for DDR-SSR coalescing along an axis that consolidates the States legitimate use of force are not present and their future presence and configuration are challenging to predict.

77. In reality, DDR and SSR policy and programmes are often developed with little collaboration across actors and coherence is often poorly planned if not merely accidental. This occurs for many reasons; poor institutional competencies and limited remits, varying missions, competition and specialist agencies with competing philosophies.

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78. The conflation of DDR’s human security agenda and SSR’s security agenda, inevitably to the detriment of human security is a significant risk factor. Molloy is particularly critical of the “evolving mind-set within the security sector – particularly, in the United States – that conveniently lumps SSR and DDR together, to be dealt with through an iron fist of mass and agency [and] ignoring the human security approaches to DDR.”57 The leading risk of this particular conflation of DDR and SSR is to promote commercial military securitisation over the softer concepts at the heart of reintegration programming in DDR and which have evolved from 2nd generation to next generation DDR. It imposes a top down securitised approach over and above the community-based and human security focused work of DDR thus undermining the peacebuilding and reintegration gains from DDR activities.58

79. Yemen DDR must be cautious, as where there is a rush to prepare and provide immediate assistance in peacebuilding, the “impulses of competing agencies” and competition over budget lines and boundaries can eclipse “the true purpose” of peacebuilding interventions, that is; the provision of “the most relevant and appropriately configured peace operations to help prevent and resolve armed conflict and sustain peace”.59 In this scenario DDR can be overwhelmed by SSR and defence reallocations, as was the case with DDR-SSR in Libya. During the Special Political Mission (SPM) that was established after the overthrow of General Gaddafi, there were widespread calls amongst UN member states for the disarmament of the many militias involved in the civil war. The senior mission leadership did not prioritize DDR but opted to “pursue security sector reform (SSR) objectives including a Defence White Paper. This was in spite of the absence of a “viable state” or established army. The institutional presence of DDR was reduced to a single junior officer60 and DDR and SSR in Libya remained significantly impeded.”61 Both are now defunct.

80. In the immediate aftermath of cessation of hostilities, a community-based approach incorporated as part of Yemen DDR could entice SSR planners to consider emphasising a bottom-up approach that engages with the new realities of local power politics and legitimacy. In Yemen, the challenge of integrating armed groups under the defence and security apparatus will require a strong and solid peace compact that is unlikely to prevail in the period immediately following the conflict. SSR, at the local level, should be an evolving process emanating from an inclusive security-development dialogue. Both DDR-related activities and community-based SSR could respond to short-to-medium term needs of communities such as securing humanitarian access and protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure.

5.2 DDR and CVE 81. The terminology for CVE is open to multiple interpretation and typologies of extremism (and radicalisation). Similarly, interventions targeting violent extremism and non-violent radicalisation (where the person radicalised is not the one who is or has carried out violent acts) are heterogeneous. When considering CVE and its correlations with DDR in the complex conflict in Yemen, it becomes clear that the beneficiaries of CVE rehabilitation may be also heterogeneous.62

82. The DDR-CVE nexus is sometimes considered a “natural nexus” given how DDR, CVE and WAM target rehabilitation, prevention of violence, preventing recidivism and reinserting and reintegrating former combatants and violent actors into the community and society.63 The Somali defectors programme is frequently cited as just one example of hybrid DDR-CVE programming with DDR in Mali and Libya frequently appearing in analysis. Attention is drawn to commonalities between DDR reintegration programming and CVE rehabilitation programmes

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including CVE’s engagement of violent extremists in employment programmes, strategic communication and psychosocial supports, all of which are embedded in mainstream DDR reintegration programming. 64 Principles of CVE programming such as those outlined during the Sixth Ministerial Plenary Meeting in New York on 27 September 2015, Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and GCTF’s Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence (Life Cycle Initiative) reflect those already cited in DDR: CVE rehabilitation and reintegration efforts should not follow a one-size-fits-all approach (programming should be contextually tailored); programming should be based on clearly articulated objectives with clear outcomes, and the appropriate national and international legal and policy framework should be in place to enable delivery of reintegration and rehabilitation. Finally programming should be adequately monitored and impact measured.65

83. New ways of understanding, engaging and fostering more sustainable reintegration of ex- combatants in DDR can also be replicated in CVE. Front and centre in this is the role of the family in fostering sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants and the sustainable rehabilitation of violent extremists. In DDR the family can facilitate ex-combatant reintegration and so pre- reinsertion programming and sensitisation should target spouses and families. Reintegration programming should enable better reintegration by considering the economic resilience of family 66 units and not just ex-combatants. In CVE programming:

the role of families and communities was found to be critical in transforming detainees’ behaviour and outlook, and preventing recidivism. In some programmes, such as those in Saudi Arabia or Malaysia, and the early iterations of the programme in Yemen, family or tribal elders were integral to guaranteeing the good behaviour of participants and facilitating their reintegration back into their communities. These programmes focus on family and communities is key given the relative youth of most recruits and their lost or severed connections to family, which had previously created a situation whereby the extremist group was a primary source of support.67

84. In the context of Yemen DDR, should DDR policy makers consider incorporating or aligning with CVE then there are core challenges to be considered.68 These include ensuring, as in DDR, that CVE is rooted in a reliable, nuanced, detailed analysis of the political, social, and economic context of the Yemen conflict. As in other complex conflicts,69 in Yemen this should span the macro (regional and transnational) drivers of violence and the micro level of analysis (why people join particular violent organisations involved in conflict and the particular structural, social, individual and enabling factors for violent extremism in Yemen).

85. DDR stakeholders will need to consider how their programme will come into contact with beneficiaries: as voluntary participants or involuntary detainees or both. DDR with CVE elements would need to answer the question of physically, how to manage beneficiaries (such as via some form of detention, cantonment or segregation). Also, any policy or programming will need to address the particular rehabilitative needs of beneficiaries and how they differ from ex- combatants managed through DDR reintegration programming (whether targeted or community- based) and how to manage the gender and youth in the context of violent extremism. Finally, policy and programming will need to decide how (and to what extent) safety and protection of former violent extremists can be guaranteed on return to the community or during rehabilitation.

86. A starting point for considering CVE as part of a future DDR scenario in Yemen would be to facilitate an inclusive multi-stakeholder aspect to the planning of DDR policy and programming. From this structure, strategy could be devised regarding the first steps including

26 integrating CVE analytics into the DDR analytics required for policy and programming. This is important given how any CPA is unlikely to bring a sudden country-wide stability to Yemen and how, increasingly, DDR is being called upon to provide solutions to specific caseloads of defectors and surrendering fighters along-side and integrated with those provided by CVE and counter-insurgency.

5.3 DDR and Counter-Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism 87. In so far as the conflation of DDR and SSR risks subsuming the principles of DDR into the interests of the security agenda, the conflation of DDR and counter-insurgency/counter- terrorism is one step further away from the human-centred and bottom-up restoration of peace and stability at the heart of next generation DDR. Yet Somalia, Afghanistan, Colombia, DRC, Haiti, Libya and Mali are examples of where the UN has been requested to undertake DDR in the context of counterinsurgency and on-going military operations. DDR in these contexts actively changes power dynamics in war and so questions of bias and lack of neutrality are inevitable. The risks to DDR of counter-insurgency are not only risks to the actual neutrality of agencies and actors in the DDR process, but also the risk of negative impact on trust, safety and effectiveness.

88. The perceived or real bias that actors in the international community bring to any discussion of peace building in Yemen is exacerbated by the history of counter-terrorism policy and operations in Yemen, ostensibly targeting AQAP, but not exclusively so. Prior to the current conflict and following Yemen’s ‘peaceful youth’ uprising the US pursued and aggressive counter- terrorism campaign characterised by prioritising security operations over diplomacy, human rights and social justice.70 The US and the Saleh-government backed counterterrorism strategy with its expanded drone programme (itself a geographical expansion of the use of drones in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas – FATA) was predicted to drive “increased recruitment for al-Qaeda or affiliated groups and a reduction of the Yemeni leadership’s ability to govern, increased completion from alternative groups.”71 This is precisely the outcome and since the killing of Salah it is accompanied by a consolidation of Houthi ideology and anti-imperialist rhetoric.

89. DDR in Afghanistan offers a case in point for the risks of implementing weak DDR programming delivered in a securitised development sector. Successive DDR programmes delivered in Afghanistan were done so in a highly complex environment that, along with other institutional and programmatic factors, impeded the programmes from having the desired impact. The complexity of the Afghan environment was such that even the military understanding of particular sub-national regions has been massively out of sync with reality. A case in point is the British attempts at reconstruction in in Helmand province while combating the Taliban. Locally it was widely believed that the British were “trying to destroy the province through an alliance with the Taliban, rather than their purported aim of reconstruction,”72 reconstruction that included soft community engagement and trust building via development programmes such as construction schools and bridges. This misperception was perpetuated by poor analysis by British forces and the failure to accurately understand local dynamics.

90. The US counter-terrorism engagement in Afghanistan (at its peak 100,000 troops and the SSR-counterterrorism programme ‘Operational Freedom’s Sentinel’) contrasted markedly with its lack of interest in engaging on DDR in Afghanistan. In the early days (2004-2005) the lack of US engagement in DDR strengthened the “hand of local commanders” who effectively realised their vested interests and corrupted the DDR process through the use of ghost soldiers (in 2005 approximately 80 percent of combatants were in fact not combatants),73 corruption, and taxing the

27 reintegration payments given to ex-combatants. DDR was wholly unprepared for the reality on the ground, a reality that was made more challenging by a mix of Afghan institutional weaknesses, competing international interests/disinterests and its intersection with the security/insurgency agenda of international forces.

91. The basic mechanisms of DDR: information gathering, ex-combatant profiling and tracing, all constitute areas where there can be overlap between domestic security agencies and DDR depending on the degree to which these agencies are involved in DDR institutional arrangements and the extent to which data or monitoring is shared. There are obvious risks pertaining to data protection of demobilised ex-combatants, some of whom may have fought against the state. Data protection and data integrity is one element that contributes to confidence building in DDR; re-constructing trust between the state and non-state actors, and instilling confidence in governance. Neutral monitoring of data is an important component of DDR architecture and the emphasis should be on data neutrality, data integrity and data security.

92. In some instance national armed forces implement SSR or proto-reintegration activities in tandem with national DDR programmes. In Rwanda military generals sit in senior positions as Commissioners on the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). These military personnel have hands-on involvement in ex-combatant cooperatives and businesses while also being involved in the programmes run through the Reserve Force. The Rwandan Reserve Force is shrouded in secrecy but is understood to undertake economic activities on behalf of ex- combatants and for other public bodies.74 While the Reserve Force is claimed to be voluntary, most able-bodied ex-combatants from AGs in DRC are enlisted, at least in part for military intelligence/national security purposes.75

93. The reality of implementing DDR even in ‘less complex’ environments than that presented in Yemen is that rarely will international DDR actors have unrestricted access to nationally-run DDR programmes. It may not always be possible for these actors to obtain sufficient access to national DDR data and programmes in order “to achieve both an in-depth knowledge in a highly fluid environment, or a sufficient level of control as to who enters DDR programmes, who leave and what kind of assistance DDR recipients and broader communities receive”.76 Consequently, isolating DDR programmes from intelligence-gathering operations and efforts to flip combatants to fight against their former comrades might not be easily prevented.”77 The reality is that in any conflict scenario DDR will weaken the power (military and bargaining) of at least one or more forces and provide advantages to others: “once the leaders agree to disarm and demobilise their troops they essentially lose the bargaining power they have in the peace process”.78 This is a strategic, operational and political reality facing all DDR including future Yemen DDR.

94. There is an uncomfortable relationship between DDR, SSR and counter-insurgency. The relationship poses real threats to DDR confidence-building measures and buy-in by armed groups. It undermines the safety, legal, ethical, operational and reputational risks to beneficiaries of DDR programmes (and to the international agencies working with recipient governments to implement DDR). Risks to neutrality, access, trust and effectiveness emerging from the proximity of DDR to counter-insurgency and intelligence gathering will be risks that must be recognised and well managed in Yemen DDR.

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6. Programming for Economic and Social Reintegration 95. This chapter explores experience and evidence from social and economic reintegration programming that could inform any consideration of how best to structure DDR Reintegration programming in Yemen. Along with collated learning from project documents, pilots and implementing partner reports the reference material for this chapter includes one of the largest quantitative datasets on DDR social and economic reintegration: a condensed set from 2010 to 2012 and others annual datasets up to and including 2018.

96. This section of the study emphasises that Yemen will need a finely tuned, context specific DDR reintegration solution that is embedded in regional and national conflict recovery including regional and national development plans. It highlights that Yemen has a substantial ‘war economy’ with domestic, regional and international dynamics. This war economy is complex, facilitated by domestic, regional and international conflict actors, and has substantial welfare dynamics that support conflict affected Yemeni communities. The analysis concludes that Yemen requires new thinking to understand how better to interface with the informal economic areas. This could include strategizing how to support the welfare components of the informal economy and how to gradually and progressively regulate economic sectors to encourage transition from informal to formal economic activity.

97. Community based reintegration has evolved to emphasise the transition from complementary ‘community support projects’ to include integrated economic associations and cooperatives (bringing ex-combatants and ‘ordinary community members’ together around a common economic activity), delivery of community reconciliation work, and providing access to mental health services for ex-combatants, their family and ordinary community members. There is increased awareness that communications and sensitisation must include broad community sensitisation and targeted combatant-centric communication, particularly through peer- sensitisation of active combatants as a means of encouraging defection.

98. A challenge for planning DDR reintegration programming in Yemen is to anticipate the level of control or the scope of interest donors and DDR architects will have in comparison to the level of control and scope of influence that national governments will have. This will lead to disagreements about the types of social and economic programming, the selection of beneficiaries and the ways those programmes might be implemented. As has been seen in previous DDR programmes, national governments (particularly where the military has influence) can prefer soft- preferencing of reintegration assistance to ex-combatants or particular groups of ex-combatants over what is delivered to the main population of combatants in the DDR process or indeed to the community.

99. There is much written on the time-limited nature of DDR programming and on what constitutes reinsertion vs. reintegration timelines (usually rounded to 12-month interventions versus 3 years or more).79 The view that DDR is a time-limited programme (both in terms of the intervention into the lives of ex-combatants and communities, and in terms of the overall lifetime of the project) has become increasing diffused over the course of second generation and next generation DDR. This has resulted in ‘reintegration’ being used to describe what would have been ‘reinsertion’ activities (nominally shorter term (under 1 year) activities). Partially this is a result of recognising that shorter term activities are useful (and often the main kind available given the limits of financing DDR programmes) but that to produce sustainable impact and meet the needs of ex-combatants and communities’ short-term assistance must be integrated into longer term, more broadly conceived programming. For example, ex-combatants can be given

29 immediate psychosocial counselling but access to longer-term treatment options are critical for ex-combatants (and conflict-affected populations) to have sustainable reintegration.80

6.1 Economic Reintegration 100. Economic reintegration is most likely to happen in the context of stable or improving economic conditions at regional and national level. Stable conditions assume that the markets can absorb the additional labour supply produced via a DDR programme. An economic climate of this nature is among the most important factors to achieve sustainable economic reintegration.

101. In a review of consolidated data on historic economic and social reintegration of DDR in the Great Lakes it was found that in areas where there was little change in structural barriers to economic stability, reintegration was stalling or being limited to returning ex-combatants to a comparable level of deprivation as the local community. Eastern DRC is given as an example:

The broader societal shift towards peace and development, which appears to have served as catalyst to ex-combatants’ reintegration in the other GLR countries, is visibly diminished in the contexts of continued local violence and insecurity in Eastern DRC. As a result, although ex-combatants in DRC have quickly caught up to community members across core reintegration indicators, they have had little ground upon which to root during the broader processes of reintegration.81

102. The same macro-study takes this observation further and points to the fundamental lack of evidence that reintegration programming can produce sustainable economic results without appropriate regional or national economic development. Simply put, DDR can reintegrate ex- combatants to the same level of poverty as community members (measurable through a community dynamics survey) but the level of poverty means that the risk of recidivism is not managed, and conflict is not mitigated.

The case of ex-combatant’s reintegration in DRC presents a paradox. DRC is the country in the GLR that has the greatest level of parity between ex-combatants and community members across core indicators.1 Though ex-combatants in DRC face an extensive range of disadvantages, the extent of these disadvantages to the wider community is relatively insignificant compared to other GLR countries. However, ex-combatants and community members in DRC together are arguably the worst off among those in all the other GLR countries. As such, the processes of ex-combatant’s reintegration and broader societal transformation in DRC appear perhaps the weakest across the GLR. 82

6.1.1 Conflict Economies 103. Often DDR struggles to understand the role of the war economy and how it interacts with the objectives of DDR and peace building. At times DDR is designed in a manner that largely ignores war economies. In reality, often it is the case that the viable livelihood options for ex- combatants are almost entirely within the informal economy. This has been the verified situation in CAR, DRC and South Sudan83 where these opportunities in the informal economy existed but were “restricted by low levels of human development, extreme poverty and insecurity, which had primarily been brought about through decades of poor governance and a legacy of war.”84 In these contexts the impact of traditional DDR approaches to economic reintegration are highly

1 More recent data shows that Rwanda has the more equitable social and economic reintegration. See

30 limited. Training support and basic material benefits assist beneficiaries to supplement their livelihoods but more often than not they are not used as intended by DDR design. For example, the repeated strategy of imparting reinsertion/reintegration kits to ex-combatants in all three countries largely resulted in ex-combatants selling the kits and investing the money made in other livelihood options raising the question as to why go to the cost and logistical complexities to procure and distribute these kits in the first place. In each of these countries it was noted that these depressed economic conditions place male youth ex-combatants most at risk of recidivism and/or recruitment into armed groups or criminal networks.

104. Informal economic arrangements and collaboration between ex-combatants or between ex-combatants and civilians, have assisted the creation of vital economic safety nets. Informal cooperatives and informal joint business ventures provide greater access to capital, pooled resources including labour and distributed risk.85 In South Sudan during the 2012 - 2015 pilot reintegration projects community participation in training and cooperatives was identified as more effective at economic and social reintegration than traditional DDR community support projects (such as boreholes) that are intended to demonstrate a peace dividend.86

105. Despite the efforts of ex-combatants to pursue viable livelihoods, conditions in local economies often severely restrict sustainable economic reintegration. This emphasizes how the success of economic reintegration is heavily dependent upon alignment with positive macro- reforms:

The lack of key infrastructure, and overly bureaucratic and exploitative approach of local authorities were key problem areas. Building and repairing transport infrastructure is essentially a long-term process. However, key domestic economic reforms, such as the professionalization of the tax system, and concerted government support for emerging economic enterprises has the potential not only to be highly beneficial for ex-combatants, but also for ordinary civilians.87

106. The conflict economy in Yemen is substantial. The country has been divided into several de facto territories during the war each with its own political and military centres of power, borders and internal rivalries. An integrated trans-territorial war economy has emerged.88 This is a sophisticated, integrated, international conflict economy. Base-line analysis of wheat flour and diesel prices and facilitating financial transactions via hawala 89 point to a well-functioning shadow trade environment. Illicit goods including arms, military technology and currency are freely traded. The gradual fall in ammunition prices in Yemen during the war is indicative of the steady supply of weapons in the conflict economy. This is further evidenced in the extent to which Saudi-coalition arms are regularly making their way to Houthi forces including via long established smuggling routes.90

107. . The well-established macro-level conflict economy can hide how it includes the coping economy: essentially the war economy facilitates economic activity by conflict affected populations who use their limited asset base to more or less maintain a basic living standard to survive during conflict.91 The sizeable Yemen conflict economy with its international dynamics has macro-level implications for peace negotiations92 but at a meso and micro levels it has welfare dynamics.

108. In Yemen, during the conflict basic goods, arms, munitions and other illicit goods freely pass between territories controlled by opposition groups. Political and military players including at local and regional levels have benefited significantly from this wide-ranging war economy, as

31 undoubtedly have international actors.93 The economic interests of these actors are maintained through prolonged conflict. Without conflict the war economy falters. Consequently peace building and DDR can be threats to the interests of vested interests in the war economy.

109. Actors who have benefited from the conflict economy pose significant threats to peacebuilding. With adequate coordination, over time, a broad range of governance, security and development focused reforms can tackle high-level vested interests. At the local or sub-national level (and eventually at national level) the Criminal Justice System can be supported to more effectively tackle vested interests in the conflict economy that have the potential to spoil peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

110. For Yemen DDR, understanding geography and agency (including human agency via coping dynamics), means that economic reintegration programming can be designed to realistically take consideration of what is possible in the context of a pervasive conflict economy. It can manage expectations about the potential interface between conflict economies and national policies and can find new ways to interrogate the traditional modalities of economic reintegration programming in DDR.

111. Given the actor dynamics in the Yemen conflict it is unlikely that at any time in the near future the main traditional donors of Yemen (some of which are directly involved in the conflict), will be contributing to any significant major reconstruction funding that would support macroeconomic reforms and encourage a transition from informal to formal economies. This provides additional impetus to ensure DDR is preceded by a comprehensive and nuanced opportunity mapping that is updated on an ongoing basis to understand local dynamics including asset bases and supply chains.

6.1.2 Vocational Training, Education and Life Skills 112. It is critical that the design of economic reintegration programming is based on sound market analysis and that it challenges the assumptions around the effectiveness of traditional approaches to reintegration programming such as vocational training and education.

113. The following factors are just some of the factors to be considered during the design of educational and vocation inputs for Yemen DDR. They include:94

(a) Provide vocational or educational opportunities based on sound market analysis and previous economic activities of ex-combatants where possible.

(b) Provide training, education, mentoring and follow-up supports to ex-combatants with a clear distinction between those who will be integrated into the state military, those who will be integrated into other arms of the state, those who as civilians will be integrated into the formal economy as employees and those who will be integrated into the formal economy as entrepreneurs.

(c) Provide for literacy and numeracy training to be given prior to vocational training for those combatants who need it as can help maximize the impact of training on economic and social reintegration.

(d) Conduct comprehensive orientation based on real economic opportunities and a sound market assessment for all vocational training participants can allow beneficiaries to make an informed decision as to which skill is the best choice.

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(e) Provide economic support to ex-combatant participants and their families during training to help mitigate the difficulties faced by trainees with families.

(f) Conduct adequate monitoring and impact evaluation including during post-training follow-ups to identify challenges, offering information counselling and advice, and ensuring that graduates have resources and information can reinforce training outcomes.

(g) Offer deferral of education and training opportunities to family members and spouses in line with cultural norms.

(h) Follow fundamental do-no-harm approaches with particular attention to self (spontaneously) reinserted ex-combatants. Where ex-combatants have reinserted they should be offered the option of obtaining training (if they want it) closer to their places of settlement, agriculture, education or economic activity. During the South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Programme the project and the SPLA called ex-combatants to cantonment sites for training despite them informally demobilising many months or even years before. Ex-combatants were called during an intensive phase of the agricultural season. Consequently their livelihoods (animal stock and agriculture) were damaged while they were in cantonment to acquire skills that in the depressed markets were unlikely to be of use. This should be avoided at all costs.

114. Vocational training can produce subsidiary outcomes that go some way towards compensating for poor livelihood outcomes.95 These subsidiary outcomes for ex-combatants include increased self-confidence and independence, increased personal capacity to compete in emerging job markets, and self-reliance. Essentially, while ex-combatants may not directly use vocational training occupational skills they acquire a “package of life-skills” that allows them to “develop professionally and socially outside of the military setting and mind-set”.96 This is a enabling factor for both social and economic readjustment and reintegration.

6.1.3 Regional and National Development 115. Successful economic reintegration requires resourced and implemented regional and national recovery planning which focuses on employment opportunities and small business opportunities. Labour intensive job creation through public sector employment is a useful short- term intervention but the limitations of this strategy must be recognized by national governments in partnership with national DDR commissions.

116. It is important that where possible DDR be implemented in coordination with upstream planning for national economic recovery. Where such planning is not yet in place it is important that donors deliver capacity building to national DDR institutions and to the relevant line ministries with responsibility for economic development. Rather than DDR being implemented in isolation from mainstream planning for economic development and social protection, DDR should inform and be informed by such planning.

117. Where possible donors should give their support to aligning DDR reintegration programming with national and regional economic policy development including national youth policy. One example of this is the development of the National Framework Proposal for the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka as developed by the Sri Lankan Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights assisted by the ILO.97 Similar approaches should be taken to align DDR reintegration programming with national policies and actions on

33 public sector employment for ex-combatants and conflict-affected populations, policies on labour-intensive work, on enabling private sector development, facilitating the development of small or micro-enterprises and promoting a climate for investment. The earlier policy coordination occurs, and the more integrated longer-term economic reintegration service provision is to regional and national economic recovery, then the better the chance of sustainable outcomes for ex-combatants and their communities.

6.2 Psychosocial 118. Over time, DDR stakeholders have come to a firm recognition that the failure to address the mental health condition of ex-combatants and conflict-affected populations impedes social and economic reintegration. 98 However mental health programming continues to occupy a position way down the pecking order from socio-economic programming. This is because of cost, the need for long-term investment, challenges in mind-set and understanding particularly in recipient countries, and because of the difficulties providing appropriate care to communities in a conflict recovery setting. DDR in Yemen should incorporate early intervention to deliver low- intensity mental health counselling (psychological and psychiatric assistance) and should plan to continue provision to ex-combatants, family members and conflict-affected populations in the long term and via mainstreamed approach. Low cost options such as community-based dialogue should be considered.

119. For many ex-combatants, conflict has massive and life-long psychological impact99 and during DDR this manifests itself in many ways such as primary functional impairment. There is a wealth of epidemiological data on the prevalence of elevated mental disorders and the causal effect between war-trauma and reduced mental health in conflict affected populations.100 And for the country emerging from conflict there is an economic cost to failing to address psychological legacies. Not least of all this includes the economic fallout of social and economic reintegration that was impeded or failed as a result of functional impairment and the mental health legacy of violence and trauma.

120. For future DDR in Yemen, consideration must be given to early intervention with ex- combatants and their families and to long-term service delivery to communities affected by conflict with special consideration given to vulnerable groups.101

121. Psychosocial interventions should start as early as possible in the Yemen DDR programme and be incorporated into the design stage. Incorporation into programming should begin with a pre-disarmament assessment in which combatants, either encamped or not, are visited by assessment teams, undergo voluntary interviewing, and, in the ideal set of all cases also registration.

122. Early incorporation occurred during DDR in Somalia in 2003/4 and was routinely incorporated into the SEDRP in Rwanda before being extended to family members under the Pre- demobilisation module. Other DDR programmes including Burundi and DRC utilised early assessment. Ukraine is piloting a similar low-intensity mental health program for veterans alongside a community resilience pilot program for communities that are in the front-line.

123. Community inclusive sensitisation is critical not just to address stigma but also to identify conflict affected non-combatants needing treatment and referral. In the Rwandan SEDRP, community structures for identifying mental health issues and associated behaviours like addiction and alcohol abuse have been used to identify ordinary community members in need of

34 interventions. This somewhat logical growth in community-based reintegration programming is only possible where there are pathways of referral for ex-combatants and community members into mainstream service providers or to third party NGOs supporting mainstream services and that have sufficient resources.

124. Psychosocial interventions should offer an integrated set of health supports to vulnerable groups. For vulnerable groups mental health can be integrated into other services such as housing and physical rehabilitation as well as social and economic support.

125. Integrated substance misuse and alcohol dependency treatments should be provided. Consequences of traumatic experiences, in combination with the impact of drugs, may produce psychosomatic symptoms and reduced intellectual skills, making the concerned even more vulnerable for unemployment and poverty.

126. The ambition for DDR should be that social and economic reintegration services are eventually accessed via mainstream institutional structures. This means that over time as national recovery takes hold, social programming such as access to medical treatment and access to psychological and psychiatric services should be delivered through mainstream institutions, as soon as possible and/or once they are rehabilitated to a sufficient level. Economic programmes, particularly those delivering mainstream or vocational training should be delivered via mainstream institutions. This is not only to include ex-combatants in the mainstream but also to ensure that mainstream institutions benefit financially by the provision of education services.

6.2.1 The Family as a Key Participant Group 127. Within recent DDR, practical steps have been taken to extend pre-demobilisation services (including health screening, preliminary psycho-social counselling and early exposure to vocational sensitisation/IGA) to dependents. Ex-combatants have had the option of deferring aspects of their reintegration package to spouses and dependents. These aspects include economic reintegration services such as vocational training and education. While the uptake of deferral in Rwanda’s SEDRP has been low (5.7 percent of male ex-combatants deferred in the final stage of the project) it is an important option, particularly for ex-combatants who have a disability or require longer-term rehabilitation before they are able to become economically independent.

128. The following recommendations for family-focused DDR should be considered in the design of Yemen DDR:

(a) Widen pre-reinsertion and capacity building training of ex-combatants to include family-focused modules. These family-focused modules could include spousal and parenting skills, managing having an overly authoritarian or military approach to the family, managing aggression and guidance to partners. An effective way to implement this programming recommendation would be through action-orientated research based on an analysis of the psychosocial modules in DDR programming and their outcomes.

(b) Consider including the spouse of ex-combatants at key moments in pre-reinsertion programming including: discussion of pre-insertion assistance, skilling on parenting, and during screening for vocational training (where relevant).

(c) Widen psychosocial programming to include key supports to the family.

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(d) Where possible target the children of ex-combatants to deliver medium-term support for educational performance.

(e) Focus on improving the economic resilience of families’ during pre-reinsertion. The family of an ex-combatant functions as an economic support structure for returning ex-combatants. While the ex-combatant is away the spouse and the wider family (usually the brother of the ex-combatant or the parents) take responsibility for the economic welfare of the family. There appears to be a period after return during which the ex-combatant is unable to assume his/her roles within the household including, where relevant, the role as breadwinner. At that time any vocational training received by the ex-combatant during DDR is not utilized.

6.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 129. Despite the many approaches to the monitoring and evaluation of DDR limited attention is given to issues of “causality and correlation, actor agency or intervention outcomes.”102 To improve measurable outcomes and impact, reintegration programming should interrogate assumptions about what is effective and what is not, and assumptions about the wider economic and social environment. While planning reintegration programming, preparation should be made to collect economic and social baselines that can be accurately replicated in impact-orientated assessments (such as Tracers and Community Dynamics Surveys) and that honestly consider the factors outside the control of DDR that impact outcomes.

130. It is possible to combine evaluation of reintegration outcomes with establishing a broader peace building and development-based system to assess changes in key dynamics of how conflict-affected populations interact including where there are IDPs and refugee populations. UNDP in collaboration with SCORE have applied indexes to social cohesion in conflict environments across ECA and Africa including Liberia, Ukraine and Bosnia.103 Demographic, economic and social indicators are designed and applied in a context specific manner and can be utilised to identify risk factors for vulnerable groups; and for combatants, the propensity for a return to violence.104

131. However, at a fundamental level, for Yemen DDR it is critical to get the tools, approach and methods of collection established prior to project implementation so that normal aspects of project implementation (such as ex-combatant profiling, data collected routinely in Management Information Systems, or Information, Counselling and Referral Systems, Satisfaction Surveys) are integrated to assist with impact measurement.

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7. Conclusion: What Might DDR in Yemen Look Like? 132. Flowing from the above analysis the following tentative conclusions can be drawn.

7.1 Scenario Planning and Institutional Frameworks 133. The Yemen conflict is complex. It is characterised by shifts in political power that appear increasingly unlikely to be fully reversed either through military action or through a negotiated peace process. This means that the political, social and economic context for DDR policy and programming is likely to be radically different than how it would have been predicted earlier in the conflict. Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that in a fragmented or federal Yemen there will not be a strong central government or a robust institutional environment for the implementation of DDR.

134. DDR in Yemen should be built upon a complex conflict analysis that is not bound by perception of the conflict as binary or tripartite. Conflict analysis must take consideration of public perceptions of grounded legitimacy and the role of non-state actors in the provision of security and governance. Also, it should take consideration of the role of elite bargaining and the desire of elites to protect themselves against direct and external threats. Given the scenario that DDR may need to be implemented concurrently or consecutively in a disintegrated or federal post-war Yemen there is a wide and complex web of interests to be managed in order to design programming that can impact on human security and on the wider security environment in Yemen.

135. Planning for DDR in Yemen should consider ISMs but do so in full recognition of the risks of engaging in ISMs. Following the Somali model ISMs could be considered as a means to reach ‘low lying fruit’ of lower level defectors from armed groups. However, the potential reach of ISMs should not be overestimated.

7.2 Tribes and Tribalism 136. Getting to an understanding of the importance of Yemen’s tribes in conflict and statebuilding is challenging. There are many divergent views on the importance and role of tribes and tribalism in the conflict and in Yemen generally. However, the role of tribes and of tribalism will be an important axis for DDR including implementing programming, governance, assessing eligibility and selecting beneficiary combatants and communities. Peacebuilding, including DDR, will need to understand tribalism (including pre-2011 configurations) and realistically manage both the threat and opportunities presented by Yemen’s particular tribalism and how it has been impacted upon by the conflict. Opportunities will include the judicial, social and economic functions tribes have had in Yemen in recent times.

137. Prior to the current conflict many skaykhs had completed a shift away from traditional roles as heads of their own and allied tribes to increasing involvement in business with securing a seat in Yemen parliament (usually as a member of the General People’s Congress/GPC). Many shaykhs and prominent leaders then pursued careers as army officers in favour of traditional tribal roles.

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Figure 2. Tribal Groupings Yemen

Source: UK Government. Stabilisation Unit Tribes And Tribalism In Yemen. A Joint FCO Research Analysts And Stabilisation Unit Workshop 26 April 2012 - Workshop Report.

138. Tribal authorities have been targets for warring parties. For example, between the February 2010 ceasefire following the sixth Sa’dah war and the seizing of Sana’a in March 2011 Houthi forces effectively wiped out or displaced all signatories105 of the Trial Alliance of the Sons of Sa’dah (al-tahāluf al-qabalī li abnā Sa’dah) a confederation that attempted to oppose Houthi expansionism in the north.

139. Consequently, when eventually the Yemen conflict enters it’s peace-building phase or a phase that facilitates DDR, the roles of shaykhs and tribes in northern Yemen may differ from those elsewhere in Yemen.

140. Traditionally there have been four main tribal confederations in northern Yemen (Hashid under the Al Ahmar clan, Bakil, Madhhaj (parts of which were absorbed into the Bakil) and Zaraniq (now disintegrated). Alongside the tribes sayyid (of which the Houthis are members) and qadi (prominent during the Saleh tenure) families have had and continue to have conflict, political, social and economic importance in Yemen.

141. The key dynamics of tribes and tribalism in Yemen relevant to the role of tribes as conflict actors and potential assets for peace building are as follows106

(a) Tribalism (qabaliyyah) assures members of a collective unit, provides protection and assistance where necessary;

(b) Tribal membership infers both social and territorial identifies: a tribesperson is a member of a particular social construct (a tribe) and that tribe is located in Yemen’s particular tribal geography.

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(c) Tribes are not hermetic, rather have difficult to discern borders with opaque units meaning that the border between one tribe and the next is not always clear.

(d) While blood relations are central to tradition aligning members of a particular tribe as descendants of a common ancestor a particular member of a tribe is able to pass to another tribe if authorised by the new tribe. Within any particular tribe the allegiance or an ordinary member to the shaykhs is consensual rather than strictly autocratic. 107 Shaykhs tend to be notable figures who have been entrusted with certain authorities on specific occasions and in limited ways.108

(e) In the absence of or in cooperation with the central state the tribe via the skaykh may provide a welfare system for members.

(f) Tribes have traditionally “organised their own affairs” with little interference from the state. Tribalism as a code of ethical behaviour (qubaliyyah) and common/tribal law (urf/pl. a’rāf) has provided communities with “ethical codes and mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes. These mechanisms have been preferred to the formal judicial system as they are perceived as more efficient and less corrupt.”109

(g) Tribes constitute economic units engaged in crop growing and livestock-based agriculture and tribal groups maintain pooled resources (including potable water) which are also, at times, the focal points of resource-based conflict.

(h) Since the 1970s tribes created micro-credit and cooperatives (ta’awun) and during the conflict have at times contributed to significant local development that in turn is built on resources accrued via the local war economy;

(i) Tribes in northern and southern Yemen have been instrumental in the replacement of successive ruling groups in Yemen.

142. There is no clear quantitative data on the level of active participation in conflict or on the reserve force of tribal agents. 2011 analysis suggested that no more than 20 percent of Yemenis belong to a tribe that then had armed capabilities. Tribes are dominant in the north and south while the swathe of Yemen below the Zaydi-Shafi’i divide including the highlands north and south of Taiz and in the Tihama costal plain is populated by a peasantized society where tribal identities and ties exist but are muted.110

143. Tribes have had important impact in the Sana’a wars and in the current conflict. At least in part because of the lack of primary analysis (including field-time with tribal leaders, tribes and combatant groups), understanding the extent and depth of tribal influence on other conflict actors or the role of particular tribes in the conflict is difficult to ascertain.

144. For DDR, tribes should have a place in the taxonomy of armed groups in Yemen precisely because of their permeable borders and shifting allegiances as well as the dichotomist relationship with the Yemen state prior to the conflict. How tribes are engaged in DDR governance and as programme beneficiaries should be based on solid primary analysis that takes full account of the salience of historical narratives and the conflagatory import of historic conflicts (particularly the Sa’dah wars).

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145. Entrenched cultures of patronage and the place of tribes and particularly elites within tribes are likely to constitute a threat to DDR. Like post-conflict reconstruction generally, DDR cannot be separated from politics and like most reconstruction programming it will be influenced by a variety of factors above and beyond the need of beneficiaries and beneficiary communities. DDR, like reconstruction, contributes to the shaping of a new political and economic order and as such tribal actors will be acutely aware of dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, empowerment or marginalization. Hence, when operationalizing DDR in Yemen, it will be important to constitute what WDR 2011 coined as “good enough coalitions,” that is; governing bodies that are inclusive, attuned to local conditions and in the case of Yemen, considerate of local and regional tribal dynamics and histories.

146. When conducting conflict analysis DDR should pay particular attention to where and how tribes have been incorporated into forces sponsored by regional actors or in the strategies of international actors. The UAE’s strategy in southern Yemen analysed the local tribal geography and devised the best way to coalesce tribal support around a particular armed forces. Based on that analysis the UAE provided logistical and financial support to the Southern Resistance Forces/SRF (under the STC), the organization with the broadest appeal to the tribes in southern Yemen (which, are smaller and more dispersed than those in northern Yemen).111

147. The UAE approach to the SRF has evolved into a tribal strategy to develop a partnership with tribes against common opponents (Houthis, AQAP and ISIS) and over time develop a system of patronage that would bond tribes under a central authority. Initially that authority was the Hadi government but over time this has shifted and the UAE has built tribal support on a province-by-province and area-by-area approach to recruiting and mobilising tribal militias to fight common opponents in their local areas.112 Given the disparity of tribal interests and the animosity towards the Hadi government in many areas of southern Yemen the UAE tribal strategy has focused on coalescing the armed involvement of tribes around the STC with it’s objective of southern independence.

148. Within Shabwa and Hadramawt the UAE tribal strategy has included incorporating tribal militia in the two elite forces. The SEF sides with the STC and draws on combatants from the Bel’abeed, Bani Hilal, Balhareth and al-Wahidee tribes.113 Within the HEF the allegiance to STC is not clear cut with many advocating for independence for Hadramawt governorate.114 A similar desire for independence in Mahra has frustrated UAE attempts to build an Elite Force for Mahra and Socotra.115 Ultimately within the tribal configuration of the UAE-backed forces in southern Yemen, tribal groups are fighting ultimately for divergent different configurations of a future independent south Yemen which poses a high risk to peacebuilding or negotiated DDR.

149. Within the populations of the southern governates are local elites who have been displaced by those more successful at cultivating a relationship with their UAE sponsors. There is a likelihood that these displaced actors will at some point fight to recover what influence, wealth and power they have lost under the UAE tribal strategy.116 The competing agendas of Gulf actors are empowering divergent tribal, military and political groups. In Mahara this includes Hadi loyalists (Backed by Saudi Arabia), wider secessionist forces (back by the UAE) and anti- coalition actors (backed by Oman) with the only apparent foreign policy goal being to block Iranian leverage in Yemen.117 The chaos this may cause now and in the future, in Mahra and elsewhere could be significant.

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7.3 Alliances, Coalitions, Grievances and Coalesced Goals 150. The conflict in Yemen has taken the complexity and shifting allegiances of the preceding Sana’a wars and added to the confusion. Structuring much of the current conflict are complex, layered and unstable alliances exist from the highest levels (international coalitions) to the local such as the tribal alliances in southern Yemen.

7.3.1 International/Regional Actors and their Patronage Networks The more external actors involved, the longer civil war is likely to last ... they are unlikely to cease their involvement until their independent agendas are met and the more agendas in play, the more difficult for any resolution to satisfy all players.118

151. The number of external actors involved in the Yemen war, their at times uneasy alliance, the divergent strategies and objectives of the major regional actors, their direct and indirect military action and the long term consequences of their engagement with local conflict actors helps sustain and escalate the Yemen conflict with the impact of postponing and/or significantly narrowing the window for peacebuilding and DDR. What is more, international involvement to the extent seen in Yemen reduces the peacebuilding pool of traditional donors to Yemen and raises sub-national barriers to where regional and international actors may have been in a position to positively influence peacebuilding programming.

152. The main division of labour between the regional coalition has generally been the Saudis lead on training, equipping, funding and providing air cover to offensives in northern Yemen without significant ground troop deployment and the UAE lead on training, equipping and funding conflict actors in southern Yemen and deploying ground troops and navy. With the withdrawal of UAE troops in late 2019 and early 2020 the active presence of the UAE is reduced but its reach via Yemeni groups (or via air power) is not curtailed. Both countries have a deep coalition of regional and international actors with the US and European allies including the UK providing broad logistical and military support.

153. Saudi patronage has shifted to focus on al Islah (particularly given al-Islah’s disavowal of the Muslim Brotherhood119) and the leadership of Ali Mohsen while UAE patronage is firmly among southern (including Mahra in the east) independence forces and Salafi tribal networks. Tensions between these two axis of the coalition and between Saudi and Emirati supported armed groups has boiled over into fighting in locations where both are present, in particular Aden and Taiz. As is discussed above this includes the drive for succession and the expulsion of Hadi forces by the STC in August/September 2019.

154. The revelations around UAE-hired US mercenary forces and their assassination campaigns against al-Islah senior figures (including Anssaf Ali Mayo120), Islamic clerics and others selected through the UAE military reveals a long relationship of enmity that recent (November 2018)121 meetings between UAE and al-Islah is unlikely to quash.. The attempted assassination of Ali Mayo is viewed from the continuum of over two decades of Emirati hostility, domestic and foreign operations against the Muslim Brotherhood.122 Put simply, while Saudi Arabia largely works to restore the political status quo of Yemen that existed prior to the conflict (albeit with different elite figures in charge), the UAE has been working to alter Yemen’s political geography in its favour.123

155. The Saudi-Emirati division of labour has evolved into a geopolitical strategy and a marginalisation of Hadi and the Hadi government from northern and southern Yemen. It is increasingly argued in commentary on the Yemen conflict that the international adherence to the

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Hadi government being the legitimate government of Yemen is now only a pretext to facilitate UN Security Council authorisation of the Gulf coalition’s intervention.124 The internal divisions of territory have only hardened with the strategies of the main international actors. The higher level objectives of the two major coalition actors: Saudi Arabia to prevent a pro-Iranian presence at it’s border and UAE to control maritime and trade routes and to counter the threats of AQAP, al-Islah and ISIL, elides the factors that are layered at the local level below the strategies of the coalition countries. There appears to be little room to consider how actively polarizing local armed groups will likely prolong violence and erect fundamental barriers to peacebuilding including DDR. There are consequences to arming, training and resourcing local conflict actors with opposed political goals that, in the Yemen context, have yet to come to light.

156. Iran’s cooperation with Houthi movement includes historical agreements from 2015 on multiple aspects of trade and natural resources with northern Yemen.125 In the conflict Iranian involvement in support of the Houthis is providing Iran with a significant return for modest financial and military investment. 126 Iranian financial involvement in Yemen increased in 2014/2015 but in late 2018 Brookings estimate that in comparison to Saudi-Arabia’s US$5-6 billion dollar monthly bill for the war in Yemen, Iran spends “only a few million dollars a year”.127 Iran’s strategic interest in Yemen is summarised thus:

Iran’s long-term strategic interest in Yemen is simple. Located on the south western tip of the Gulf peninsula, Yemen is a poorly governed, fractious country straddling Saudi Arabia’s southern border, which can be likened to a sieve in terms of ancient smuggling routes still used by those wanting to covertly enter the kingdom. And with a population that is 35 percent Shia, Yemen could serve as a potentially friendly base of operations in Iran’s rivalry against Saudi Arabia. 128

157. A failing in the Brookings analysis is the conflation of Houthi Zaydism and Iranian Twelver Shi’ism which has overtones suggesting natural links between the Houthis and Iran. This conflation owes much to the Saleh government’s labelling of the Houthi movement as “Iranian- backed Shi’a who were leading a series of sectarian Sa’dah wars.129 Over time this was duly adopted in particular by Western analysts and media in service of a Shia-Sunni lens so often applied to the Middle East and Gulf countries. The importance of challenging the conflation of Houthis and Iran lies in the threat such simplistic analysis gives to the complexities (including religious identities) of the Yemen conflict. It “provides a dangerously simplistic short cut for policymakers who are unfamiliar with Yemeni history and politics.”130 Similarly, what should be understood is that in realty, Iran’s interests in Yemen are already well served. In comparison to Iranian involvement, given the level of expenditure and involvement required by the Saudis and the coalition as they fight effectively to a stalemate with the Houthi forces, the Iran strategy can be considered as success.

158. On the margins of the GCC group lies Oman, the immediate interest of which appears to lie mainly in Mahra, with which Oman’s Dhofar region shares a border. Oman has been the only GCC member to not intervene in Yemen militarily and the it has steadily carved out a middle ground via its position on Yemen. That said, it has come under increasing scrutiny for both it’s mediation between Houthis and the GPC 131 and for ignoring or facilitating Iranian arms shipments overland to Houthi forces.132 Oman’s position is informed by internal politics including upcoming political transition and a history of defeating the leftist independence movement in Dhofar which was led by the Yemen-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). 133 Despite Oman’s successful modern counter-insurgency model, Yemen’s southern independence movement, the potential for Mahra to agitate for autonomy and

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UAE’s patronage of the STC and secessionist militias in southern and western Yemen all present threats to Oman’s border region. Since the souring of Saudi Arabia’s and UAE’s relationship with Oman, the coalition has come to rely on Kuwait as a potential mediator in the conflict.

7.2.3 Secessionists 159. Analysis on southern Yemen characterises the region as a powder keg of tensions and rivalries, a territory extensively populated with armed groups and one that is awash with light and heavy weapons. 134 Prior to August 2019 conflict analysis of southern Yemen suggested that plausible scenarios that may occur prior to or immediately after a cessation of hostilities along the pro and anti-Houthi axes included an outright declaration of secession, an unrestrained internal conflict over control of Aden, or the gradual formation of a de facto autonomous or independent state having to deal with the presence of sectarian militias.135 As has been seen, since then southern separatist positions and control has hardened. The UAE’s gradual withdrawal and since 2019 the phased but rapid withdrawal of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces has changed the characteristics of the battlefield but not significantly impacted on lines of conflict or on the position of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) on secession. Despite the withdrawal of ground troops to facilitate the Riyadh Agreement the UAE still maintains air-presence, support of Elite Forces and other militia and controls 7 key economic sites (excluding Aden port and the capital itself): Mokha, Bab a-Mandab Rayyan Airport in Mukalla, Socotra, Mayon Island and the port of Balhaf in Shabwa governorate.136

160. During August 2019 the STC moved on Hadi loyalists to expel them from the south of Yemen. Ensuing battles that resulted in territorial gains by pro-Hadi loyalists were largely stopped by UAE air offensives that repelled pro-Hadi loyalists from Aden and other sites in Abyan. On 5th November 2019 a power-sharing agreement was signed in Riyadh between the Saudi-backed Hadi government and the STC, supported by the UAE. Among a range of ambitious political, economic, military and security commitments and dispensations the agreement provides for power sharing between Hadi forces and STC separatists and the return of Prime Minister Moeen Abdelmalek to Aden to re-establish state institutions.137

161. The 2019 Riyadh Agreement formalised the transfer of the coalition’s military presence in southern Yemen from the UAE to Saudi Arabia (a process that in reality dates from June 2019, when the UAE announced its phased withdrawal from Yemen leaving its military personnel behind only in coastal Hadramawt, Shabwa, and Soqotra, and in control of the Bab al Mandab. Despite a reduced direct military presence the UAE retains its immediate military influence through the STC and elite forces. The agreement provided for the formation of a new, Aden- based power-sharing government composed of 12 southern and 12 northern ministers (the previous administration included a higher proportion of southerners and a larger total number of ministers). As a condition both parties were to withdraw their military and security personnel and heavy artillery from urban areas. Also the agreement provides for UAE-backed militias to be integrated into the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, while other security services are to operate under the Ministry of the Interior. The agreement stipulates that all state financial resources are to be centralised and managed through the Aden Central Bank of Yemen, a significant provision given the parallel public finical systems established in Ma’rib, Hadramawt and Shabwa governorates

162. The Riyadh Agreement, like the GCC Agreement before it, is characterised by vague mechanisms and largely unachievable deadlines and sequencing. Where the GCC Agreement hastened the disintegration of Yemen (and gave rise to a failed SSR programme), the Riyadh Agreement is faced with a more fragmented reality and a fundamentally intransigent problem: the

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Hadi forces want to ‘retain’ the unity of Yemen and the STC is fundamental based on secession of the south.

163. Beyond the Riyadh Agreement lies a highly fractured national context and sub-national context (regional and governorate level). Tribes, politically relevant elites (PRE), armed groups and the extremist Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS constitute a heterogeneity of conflict actors, of which many have malleable alliances and loyalties. As outlined above despite its withdrawal the UAE retains a substantial involvement through supporting armed groups and the STC.138 Further international muddying of the waters comes in the form of the “US-Emirati counterterrorism partnership”139 and the prospect of any intervention in peace- building facing the need to “strike a balance between localism and the maintenance of central state institutions.”140

164. Southern Yemen is not a coherent entity and has not been since British colonialism when the former territory of what became the PDRY was composed on Aden and a further 25 entities of varying sizes governed by “local potentates.”141 the PDRY attempted to reduce the importance of tribalism the PDRY by incorporating leaders from all areas into the party and party institutions. However, tribal identity and identity based on locale of origin persisted and frustrated PDRY attempts at nation building via political incorporation of local leaderships. 142 During the unification of Yemen, the diversity of the south, the internal conflict of the YSP and the lack of coherent national identity ensured that for Saleh, “divide and rule” would be comparatively easily implemented. The strategy was aided by return migration of exiles and elites, some of whom reclaimed former positions of political indulgence and others, such as Tareq al-Fadhli and the return Afghan jihadists propped up the Saleh regime.143 Identity-based divisions, linked to geographic origins persist today and are made all the less permeable by the conflict and by the strategy of the UAE to bolster often competing southern groups as it creates it’s tribal security belts, largely against the Houthis, Islah, AQAP and ISIS.

165. A coherent southern independence movement began with the disaffected and economically and militarily disaffected military officers of the Association of Retired Military, Security and Civilian Personnel in Lahej Governate that later morphed into Hirak. Hirak itself aligned with anti-Salah opposition in the 2011 Arab revolution and the lack of an emerging leadership from Yemen youth left a space for “older, mostly exiled leaders of the colonial period and the PDRY to re-emerge ... and they soon took the helm and redirected the movement towards separatism, diverting it away from general political aims and restricting their demands to separation alone.”144

166. After 2011 there was a major proliferation of southern separatist organisations estimated to number nearly 100. During the period of the National Dialogue Conference (2012-2015) international mediation via the UN failed to address the heterogeneity of the southern question and failed to be inclusive.145 Between the NDC and the failed Constitution Drafting Commission during 2014 the south witnessed (as had been the case in the north) a drastic reduction in the presence of the state and a failure of centralised governance.

167. Across southern Yemen it appears that most southern Governates are under control of different armed groups, of local origin what at time includes tribal entities. This is despite the presence of the UAE-backed elite forces. The loyalty of the armed groups under UAE patronage is debateable and when presented with a clash of UAE vs. personal or collective interests it is unclear where loyalties would lie.146 Recently control of Lahej remains under STC and is a location prone to confrontations between jihadi armed groups, SRF and SBF. Abyan and Shabwa

44 are the site of contested control between local groups, jihadists and AQAP. Hadramawt and al- Mahra, as discussed above, are both sites where the UAE has tried to establish its SBF and both have a debateable commitment to either a unity Yemen or a secessionist southern Yemen.

168. Ultimately a complex mix of historic conflicts and narratives of marginalisation, separatism and local allegiance coupled with a shifting influence of AQAP and a political and military system characterised by local allegiances and outside patronage means that southern Yemen is far from a united separatist south and it is highly likely that all these factors will come into play once conditions allow. This will frustrate peacebuilding and DDR efforts. Basic DDR steps such as identifying eligibility criteria and the best incentives to participate will constitute major challenges that cannot be met with significant work on the ground in Yemen with armed groups and communities affected by conflict. Any approach to ISM or DDR should be inclusive and wholly aligned with a thorough and rolling analysis of local political economy and the history of each part of southern Yemen.

7.4 Elites 169. A thread running through much Yemen crisis and conflict analysis is the role of elites – both domestic and regional. This includes the role of the “politically relevant elite (PRE)”147 and how the kleptocratic culture and institutions around, among others, Saleh, the Ahmar family (the Hashid confederation and al-Islah) and Hadi compromised the GCC initiative and legitimised the rebranded Houthi movement (as Ansar Allah) by virtue of public perception of the movement as untouched by and opposed to state corruption.

170. Elites are the powerbrokers at governate and local levels, in the military and among political movements. Often they have controlling interests in the war economy. There are elites ousted through being excluded from UAE and Saudi patronage and who, should conditions allow, may return to contest their positions. And there are regional or local governate elites, those power-brokers in regional actors that have influence above and beyond peacebuilding.

171. At the national level in Yemen the PRE were found at the heart of Saleh’s strategy of division and patronage to ferment inter-group conflict and cement control in post-unification Yemen including through allocation of parliamentary positions via the GPC or (via alliance with the Ahmar family in the Hashid Confederation) al Islah to influential shaykhs. His creation of a network of compliant powerful elites in the north western highlands of Yemen, his creation of an inner circle of family and shared extended tribal kin who, among other areas occupied controlling positions in the security and military apparatus, and his alliance with the Ali Mohsen and Ahmar families148 and their tribal networks all exemplify the post-unification role of elites in shaping the political, military and economic environments in Yemen.

172. Salah’s alliances with Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar of the Hashid confederation (and later his son Sadeq), with Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar of Saleh’s Sahan clan (also de facto Commander of the Army as opposed to the more numerous Republican Guards and Special Forces as well as the Air Force, and ally of al-Islah) cemented control via a tribal identity-based network of elites, a form of identity that Saleh’s patronage sought to undermine and shape for his own purposes. Leading up to the 2011 uprising at the core of the PRE were Salah’s family and members of the Sanhan tribe who “were mostly high-ranking military offices and until 2012 collectively controlled the security apparatus while making vast fortunes through the Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO), a military conglomerate with business interests in many sectors”,149 essentially the heart of the military-industrial complex benefiting a select few.

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173. PRE elites were not confined to the GPC but persist throughout the political, security and economic spheres in Yemen. Following the 2011 uprising elites including those in Al-Islah and from tribal networks marginalised grassroots activists.150 As seen above, exiles and marginalised elites including military elites brought hardline leadership to the Al Hirak movement. Elites are not confined to the top tier of Yemen’s political, military and economic spheres but exist at different (regional and local) levels controlling access to or networks of social, economic and military power. These “peripheral elites”151 have interests and loyalties that may or may not coincide with the interests of the PRE and they will require similar dynamics of alliance building and cooperation across the spheres of influence.

174. Generally, domestic elites (whether PRE or regional and local actors) have disproportionate control over or access to resources (including natural resources but also power, knowledge, perceived legitimacy, money and other assets). They have vested interests in not just the outcome of conflict but also, at times, in the prolonging of conflict including via utilising dynamics of alliance building and common enemies. So while, when conditions are right for the introduction of DDR, domestic elites can at the very least contribute to keeping order and promoting conditions for stabilisation. Also, they can also constitute intransigent barriers to achieving the objectives of peacebuilding programmes including those of DDR.

175. The Yemen conflict has emphasised that Yemen elites can be heavily influenced by external vested interests, area heterogeneous (often within the one party/actor such as has been the case with Islah) and are part of continuously shifting political, economic and military axes of power.

176. Put simply, elites may not support change particularly if that transformation comes at their own political, military or economic cost. Behind the complexity of the Yemen conflict is the general ‘rule of thumb’ of all conflict: “ruling elites often demonstrate continuity across pre- conflict, conflict and post-conflict episodes and it is therefore likely that their actions contributed to the outbreak of armed conflict in the first place”152 and along with intermediate and lower level elites they will contribute to any flare-ups during peacebuilding or where settlements do not address an appropriate portion of their interests.

177. The heterogeneity of Yemeni elites, the malleable nature of alliances particularly those between larger actors and local or regional tribal entities and militias, and the multiple levels upon which elites have influence in Yemen emphasises how DDR negotiations must be inclusive and take account of local political economy. DDR will need to at a minimum, be aware of how wider peacebuilding is seeking to reconcile the diverging goals of domestics elites and what barriers to DDR may arise from that process. A comprehensive mapping of elites as conflict actors that takes cognisance of historical alliances, conflict and patronage should inform DDR strategy and contingency planning while facilitating DDR to be implemented in a changing and fragile security environment.

178. All levels of elites should be closely mapped and addressed at strategic and operational levels in any DDR strategy and operational planning both from the perspective of elites as spoilers (for example, those with vested interests in the war economy and the capacity – including militarily – to maintain conflict) to the perspective of elites as positive actors in peace building and DDR.

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7.5 SSR, CVE and Counter Insurgency 179. DDR in Yemen must plan for what might be an uneasy DDR-SSR interface. At a fundamental level this means deciding eligibility for DDR and SSR. This will be highly complex in light of the configuration of armed forces and irregular armed groups, and because of the gradual or promised incorporation of armed groups and militias into formal military structures.

180. At the level of strategy and policy, Yemen DDR should prepare for challenges to dialogue with SSR as a result of institutional competencies and remit of DDR and SSR stakeholders, varying missions, competition between specialist agencies with competing philosophies. Future Yemen DDR and SSR must avoid conflating human security agenda and the security agenda.

181. The DDR-CVE nexus is realised in ISMs such as those in Somalia that target lower level defectors from Al Shabab. However, like DDR generally, Yemen DDR will need to ensure that any DDR-CVE strategic or programmatic interface is rooted in a reliable, nuanced, detailed analysis of the political, social, and economic context of the conflict. As in other complex conflicts, in Yemen this should span the macro (national, regional and transnational) drivers of violence and the meso and micro level of analysis (including why people join particular violent organisations involved in conflict and the particular structural, social, individual and enabling factors for violent extremism in Yemen).

182. DDR stakeholders will need to consider beneficiaries and how to tailor rehabilitation/reintegration to their particular needs and profiles. Policy and programming should need to decide how (and to what extent) safety and protection of former violent extremists could be guaranteed on return to the community or during rehabilitation.

183. The starting point for considering CVE as part of DDR in Yemen is to facilitate a multi- stakeholder element to the planning of DDR policy and programming. Through this approach, a strategy could be devised to integrate CVE and DDR.

184. With regards to counter-insurgency, Yemen DDR must be acutely aware that the conflation of DDR and counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism is one step further away from the human-centred and bottom-up restoration of peace and stability at the heart of next generation DDR. If anything, the risks of this conflation must be anticipated by stakeholders in DDR.

185. In preparation for DDR, stakeholders should consider the implications of what type of armed forces (for example, Yemeni, Regional Arab Force, or UNDPKO) will be deployed while DDR programming is being implemented. The identity and configuration of armed forces that provide security will impact on perceived program legitimacy. This emphasises the importance of understanding how (or how not) DDR, CVE and Counter-Insurgency will come into contact.

7.6 Challenging Orthodox DDR Reintegration 186. Yemen DDR will need a finely tuned, context specific reintegration solution that is embedded in national and local conflict recovery including national and sub-national development plans and any changes in governance structures.

187. Yemen DDR must not assume a one-size-fits all approach will suffice. In concrete terms this means that planning economic reintegration must take consideration not only of the demographic and economic profiles of ex-combatants, communities and regions but also of the pervasive conflict economy and how to deal with the welfare aspects of this economy.

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188. DDR reintegration must align with, inform and be informed by upstream planning for economic recovery. Where such planning is not yet in place it is important that donors deliver capacity building to national DDR institutions and to the relevant line ministries with responsibility for economic development. Rather than DDR being implemented in isolation from mainstream planning for economic development and social protection DDR should inform and be informed by such planning.

189. Reintegration will need to be community-based and specific to sub-regional territories. Even a national programme will not be sufficiently nuanced to take consideration of how conflict has changed the economic and social fabric of different parts of Yemen. Any DDR reintegration strategy must be framed by a drive for regional and national economic recovery. For Yemen, where humanitarian disaster is a reality for many, this will be a significant challenge.

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Annex 1. Select Bibliography Alusala, Nelson. Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in the Great Lakes Region: Lessons Learned. ISS, 2011.

Ballentine, Karen and Heiko Nitzschke (Eds). Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War. Lynne Reinner, 2005.

Bleie, Tone and Ramesh Shrestha. DDR in Nepal: Stakeholder Politics and the Implications for Reintegration as a Process of Disengagement. University of Tromso, Centre for Peace Studies, 2012.

Botha, Anneli and Mahdi Abdile. Radicalisation and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia. ISS, 2014.

Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict. Charles Hurst and Co. 2017.

Bryden, Alan. Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa. Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo 12-14 June 2007.

Caparini, Marina. DDR and SSR Challenges in Mali. NUPI Working Paper 853. NUPI, 2015.

Carapico, Shelia. “Yemen Between Revolution and Counter-Terrorism”.

Casey-Malsen, Stuart. Disengaged Combatants in Somalia: a review of the normative framework. UN 2013

Cheng, Christine et al. Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict. Government of the United Kingdom. Stabilisation Unit. 2018.

Civic, Melanne A. and Michael Miklaucic (Eds.). Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR. Institute for Institute for Strategic Studies. National Defence University. 2011.

Cockayne, James and Siobhan O’Neil. UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: is it fit for purpose. UN, 2015.Colletta, Nat J. et al. The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa. IBRD, 1996.

Colletta, Nat J. et al. Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. STHLM Policy Group. Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2008.

Colletta, Nat. J and Anthony Finn. Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 2015 Evaluation (2012 to 2015) and Strategic. Considerations for the establishment of a Rapid Response Facility to super-cede the TDRP and substantially expand its Remit. World Bank. 2015.

De Silva, Samantha. Role of Education in the Prevention of Violent Extremism. World Bank. N.d.

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EU DG External Policies. EU-Led Security Sector Reform, and Disarmament, Demobilisations and Reintegration Cases: Challenges, Lessons Learnt and Ways Forward. European Parliament. 2016.

Finn, Anthony. Things Fall Apart, Things Come Together: the Family in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda during the Absence, Return and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. World Bank, 2014.

Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Community Dynamics Study. Government of Rwanda. 2014.

Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Tracer Study. Government of Rwanda. 2014.

Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Community Dynamics Study. Government of Rwanda. 2016.

Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Tracer Study. Government of Rwanda. 2016.

Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Community Dynamics Study. Government of Rwanda. 2018.

Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Tracer. Government of Rwanda. 2018.

Finn, Anthony. Second Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (SEDRP – P112712) Final Evaluation. Independent External Evaluation. Government of Rwanda, 2018.

Finn, Anthony. Sustainable Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Shadow Economies and Cross- Border Trade. World Bank, 2012.

Finn, Anthony. UgDRP Independent Evaluation. World Bank. 2011.

Finn, Anthony. The Drivers of Reporter Reintegration. World Bank. 2011.

Finn, Anthony et al. Beneficiary Impact Assessment (Uganda). World Bank. 2011.

Finn, Anthony et al. Making Vocational Training Work. World Bank 2014.

Finn Anthony et al. Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement. World Bank, 2018.

Grossman, Lt. Dave. On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in Wall and Society (Rev’d Ed.). Back Bay Books. 2009 (1995).

Guichaoua, Yvan and Nicolas Desgrais. Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Mali Case Study. Dfid Stabilisation Unit, 2018.

Harb, Charles. Promotion Social Cohesion in the Arab Region Project: Background Methodological Paper. UNDP. 2017.

Heinze, Marie-Christine (Ed). Addressing Security Sector Reform in Yemen: Challenges and Opportunities for Intervention During and Post Conflict. CARPO. 2017.

Heydemann, Steven. Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States. Brookings, June 2018.

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Hill, Ginny. Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi Adventurism and The Future of Arabia. Oxford UP, 2017.

Hinkel, Harald. The War Within: a Critical Examination of Psychosocial Issues and Interventions in DDR. World Bank, 2013.

Hudson, Leila et al. Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates through Counterterrorism? Middle East Policy Council. http://www.mepc.org/drone-warfare-yemen-fostering-emirates- through-counterterrorism. Accessed August 22nd 2018.

Karam EG, et al. “Cumulative traumas and risk thresholds: 12-month PTSD in the world mental health (WMH) Surveys.” Depression and Anxiety 31: 130–142, 2014.

Keen, David and Larry Attree. Dilemmas of Counter-Terror, Stabilisation and Statebuilding. Saferworld, 2015.

Kim Jial Liah. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Post-Conflict South Sudan: a study of challenge facing reintegration of ex-combatants (XCs) in selected areas of South Sudan. (Thesis). Oslo University College. 2011.

Kingma, Kees. “The Impact of Demobilization”. Kingma, Kees (Ed.) Demobilization in Sub- Saharan Africa. Macmillan Press, 2000.

ILO. Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. 2010.

Lacher, Wolfram. Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Libya Case Study. DFID Stabilisation Unit, 2018.

Lackner Helen (Ed.). Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition. SOAS Middle East Studies, 2014.

Lamb, Guy. Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies. The cases of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. World Bank, 2012.

Lebovich, Andrew. Reconstructing Local Orders in Mali: historical perspectives and future challenges. Brookings, N.d.

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Endnotes

1 See: Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. December 2017. 2 Ibid. 3 See for example, Colletta, Nat J. et al. The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa. IBRD, 1996. 4 IDDRS Operational Guide. 26 5 IDDRS Operational Guide, 24-25. 6 UN DPKO. Second-Generation Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping. UN DPKO. 2010: 4. 7 Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. 2017. 8 Ibid. 9 See: Rageh, Mansour et al. “Yemen without a functioning central bank: the loss of basic economic stabilization and accelerating famine”. Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west- asia/yemen-without-functioning-central-bank-los 10 Heras, Nicholas A. ‘Security Belt’: The UAE’s Tribal Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen. Terrorism Monitor, 16 (12). https://jamestown.org/program/security-belt-the-uaes-tribal-counterterrorism-strategy-in- yemen. Accessed November 20th 2018. 11 Senior Ma’ribi tribal leader quoted Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. 2017: 30. 12 See for example, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/uae-backed-yemen-forces-seize-one-of-al- qaeda-s-largest-strongholds-in-shabwa. April 28th 2018. Accessed November 18th 2018, and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-emirates August 3rd 2017. Accessed November 18th 2018. 13 Senior Ma’ribi tribal leader quoted Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. 2017: 30. 14 Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. 2017: 29-30. See also “As Yemen Crumbles, One Town is an Island of Relative Calm”. New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/world/middleeast/yemen-marib-war-ice-cream.html. Accessed August 12th 2018; “In a Devastate Country, One City is Thriving.” http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-city-of-marib-is-flourishing-while-yemen-falls-apart-a- 1177800.html 15 Cheng, Christine et al. Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict. Government of the United Kingdom. Stabilisation Unit. 2018: 19. 16 World Bank. Technical Review of the Reintegration Process of Former Combatants in Colombia: Building Towards Peace (not disseminated). 2016: 18-19 17 Ibid: 28. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Colletta, Nat J. et al. Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. STHLM Policy Group. Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2008. 21 Molloy, Desmond. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. Lynne Rienner. Boulder and London. 2017: 147. 22 Colletta, Nat J. et al Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. STHLM Policy Group. Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2008: 43. 23 Ibid. 24 Bleie, Tone and Ramesh Shrestha. DDR in Nepal: Stakeholder Politics and the Implications for Reintegration as a Process of Disengagemnet. University of Tromso, Centre for Peace Studies, 2012: 35. 25 Ibid. 26 Colletta, Nat J. et al Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. STHLM Policy Group. Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2008: 58 - 59. 27 See: Hutt, David. “The Eternal Win-Wins of Hun Sen’s Power in Cambodia.” The Diplomat. December

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06, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/the-eternal-win-wins-of-hun-sens-power-in-cambodia/ Accessed August 15, 2018. See also Prak Chan Tual and Amy Sawitta Lefevre. Cambodia’s Man Opposition Party Dissolved by Supreme Court.” Reuters, November 16, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics/cambodias-main-opposition-party-dissolved-by- supreme-court-idUSKBN1DG1BO. Accessed August 20th 2018. 28 Mgbako, Chi. “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Harvard Human Rights Journal Vol. 18. 2005: 201-224. 29 Colletta, Nat. J and Anthony Finn. Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 2015 Evaluation (2012 to 2015) and Strategic. Considerations for the establishment of a Rapid Response Facility to super-cede the TDRP and substantially expand its Remit. World Bank. 2015. 30 See for example, Mgbako, Chi. “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Harvard Human Rights Journal Vol. 18. 2005: 201-224, and Purdeková Andrea. Rwanda’s Ingando Camps: Liminality and the Reproduction of Power. Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper Series No. 80. University of Oxford, 2011. 31 See Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Community Dynamics Study. Government of Rwanda. 2014, 2016 and 2018. Similarly SEDRP Tracer Study. Government of Rwanda. 2014, 2016 and 2018. 32 Molloy, Desmond. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. Lynne Rienner. Boulder and London. 2017: 109. 33 Ibid: 110f 34 Casey-Malsen, Stuart. Disengaged Combatants in Somalia: a review of the normative framework. UN 2013. 35 Cockayne, James and Siobhan O’Neil. UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: is it fit for purpose. UN, 2015: 104f. 36 Molloy, Desmond. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. Lynne Rienner. Boulder and London. 2017: 125-126. 37 Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. 2017: 13. 38 Yemen Polling Centre. Perceptions of the Yemeni Public on Living Conditions and Security-Related Issues. May 2017: 156. 39 Finn, Anthony. Things Fall Apart, Things Come Together: the Family in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda during the Absence, Return and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. World Bank, 2014. 40 Small Arms Survey. Demobilisation in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organization Control. Armed Actors Issue Brief No. 1 (2013): 3. 41 IDDRS 2.30. 42 Molloy, Desmond. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. Lynne Rienner. Boulder and London. 2017: 51. 43 Singh, Naresh. Multidimensional Livelihoods Assessment in Conflict Areas in Yemen: Integrated Summary Report. UNDP. 2013: 26. 44 Nat J. Colletta, et al. Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post Conflict Peace Building. Folke Bernadotte Academy and Global Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Sweden: Stockholm. 2008. 45 There were significant changes in income levels for those participating in the project. In the DRC there was an increase in income levels over baseline (US$64 rising to US$157) compared to control groups whose income averaged US$51. 46 Despite being a limited programme this Uganda CBSR component managed to target 1,800 direct and 10,800 indirect beneficiaries for economic support and mental health services. Cite evaluation 47 “Yemeni Activists Blast Houthi Recruitment of All-Female Militas.” Asharq Al-Awsat. 24th April 2019. https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1692801/yemeni-activists-blast-houthi-recruitment-all-female- militias. Accessed 10th February 2020. 48 “Gangsters in War-Torn Yemen Ensnare Women to Do their Dirty Work.” Middle East Eye. 11th October 2016. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/gangsters-war-torn-yemen-ensnare-women-do-their- dirty-work. Accessed 10th February 2020. 49 Heydemann, Steven. Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Reconstruction in Fierce States. Brookings, June 2018: 16. 50 This section is drawn from UNDPKO. Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing

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Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context. Handbook for UN DDR Practitioners, 2018. See also UNIDIR. Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia, n.d, and Parker, Sarah and Silvia Cattaneo. Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National Reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008. UNIDIR, 2008. 51 For broader examination of DDR-SSR nexus see von Dyck, Christopher. DDR and SSR in War to Peace Transition. DCAF, 2016. For a discussion of the intersection of counter-terrorism, stabilization and statebuilding see Keen, David and Larry Attree. Dilemmas of Counter-Terror, Stabilisation and Statebuilidng. Saferworld, 2015. 52 UN. IDDRS 6.10. 53 Secretary-General’s report Securing Peace and Development: the Role of the United Nations in Security Sector Reform (S/2008/39) of 23 January 2008 cited UN. IDDRS, 6.10. 54 Ibid. 55 McFate Sean. “There’s a New Sheriff in Town: DDR-SSR and the Monopoly of Force. Civic, Melanne A. and Michael Miklaucic (Eds.). Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR. Institute for Strategic Studies. National Defense University. 2011. 56 von Dyck, Christopher. DDR and SSR in War to Peace Transition. DCAF, 2016: 15. 57 Molloy, Desmond. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. Lynne Rienner. Boulder and London. 2017: 169 58 Ibid. 59 Muggah, Robert et al. Sequencing Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Peace Processes. Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD). 2015: 12. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Cockayne, James and Siobhan O’Neil. UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? UN University, 2015: 65. See also: Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence Addendum to the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders. https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Toolkit-documents/English-Addendum- to-the-Rome-Memorandum-on-Legal-Frameworks.pdf. Accessed August 20th 2018. 63 Cockayne, James and Siobhan O’Neil. UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? UN University, 2015: 66. 64 Ibid. 65 Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence Addendum to the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders. https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Toolkit-documents/English-Addendum-to-the-Rome- Memorandum-on-Legal-Frameworks.pdf. Accessed August 20th 2018. 66 Finn, Anthony. Things Fall Apart, Things Come Together: the Family in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda during the Absence, Return and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. World Bank. 2014: 45. 67 Cockayne, James and Siobhan O’Neil. UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? UN University, 2015: 69-70. 68 For greater detail see Cockayne, James and Siobhan O’Neil. UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? UN University, 2015. 69 Botha, Anneli and Mahdi Abdile. Radicalisaiton and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia. ISS, 2014. 70 Carapico, Shelia. “Yemen Between Revolution and Counter-Terrorism”. Lackner Helen (Ed.). Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition. SOAS Middle East Studies, 2014: 29-49. 71 Hudson, Leila et al. Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates through Counterterrorism? Middle East Policy Council. http://www.mepc.org/drone-warfare-yemen-fostering-emirates-through- counterterrorism. Accessed August 22nd 2018. 72 Martin , Mike. An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict. Hurst and Company. London. 2014: 225. 73 Rossi Simonetta and Antonio Giustozzi. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex- Combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities. LSE, 2010: 6. 74 See for example, https://greatlakesvoice.com/no-basic-information-about-rdfs-reserve-force/ 75 Senior Military Officer. Conversation with the author. Kigali, Rwanda. February 2017. 76 Cockayne, Jame and Siobhan O’Neil. UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose?

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UN University, 2015: 38. 77 Ibid. 78 Colletta, Nat J. et al. Nat J. Colletta, et al. Interim Stabilization: Balancing Security and Development in Post Conflict Peace Building. Folke Bernadotte Academy and Global Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Sweden: Stockholm. 2008: 21. 79 ILO. Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. 2010. 80 Hinkel, Harald. The War Within: a Critical Examination of Psychosocial Issues and Interventions in DDR. World Bank, 2013. 81 Rhea, Randolph. A Comparative Study of Ex-Combatant Reintegration in the African Great Lakes Region: Trajectories, Processes and Paradoxes. World Bank. 2014. 82 Ibid 9. 83 Lamb, Guy. Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies. The cases of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. World Bank, 2012. 84 Ibid: 69 85 Ibid. See also Lemasle, Natacha. Ex-Combatants Economic Associations in the Republic of Congo: Collective Microprojects and Revenue Creation. World Bank. 2012. See also World Bank. South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Project: TDRP Key Learning Report. World Bank, 2014. 86 World Bank. South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Project: TDRP Key Learning Report. World Bank, 2014. 87 Ibid. 88 Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. December 2017: 24. 89 ibid. 90 Letter from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the president of the Security Council, United Nations, 27th January 2017. Cited in Salisbury Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. December 2017: 26. 91 Pugh, Michael C. et al. War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation. Boulder, CO. 2004. See also, Finn, Anthony. Sustainable Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Shadow Economies and Cross-Border Trade. World Bank, 2012. 92 Letter from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the president of the Security Council, United Nations, 27th January 2017. Cited in Salisbury Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. December 2017: 26. 93 See: Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House. December 2017. 94 The following section borrows from Finn, Anthony et al. Making Vocational Training Work. World Bank 2014. 95 See: Finn, Anthony. SEDRP Tracer Studies (2014, 2016 and 2018) and subsequent studies on reintegration impact in Uganda. These include: Finn, Anthony et al. Beneficiary Impact Assessment (Uganda). World Bank. 2011; Finn, Anthony. UgDRP Independent Evaluation. World Bank. 2011 and Finn, Anthony. The Drivers of Reporter Reintegration. World Bank. 2011. 96 RDRC official quoted in Finn, Anthony et al. Making Vocational Training Work. World Bank 2014: 30. 97 ILO Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. 2010: 30. 98 Hinkel, Harald. The War Within: a Critical Examination of Psychosocial Issues and Interventions in DDR. World Bank, 2013. See also Kingma, Kees. “The Impact of Demobilization”. Kingma, Kees (Ed.) Demobilization in Sub- Saharan Africa. Macmillan Press, 2000. 99 See Grossman, Lt. Dave. On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in Wall and Society (Rev’d Ed.). Back Bay Books. 2009 (1995). 100 See for example, Karam EG, et al. “Cumulative traumas and risk thresholds: 12-month PTSD in the world mental health (WMH) Surveys.” Depression and Anxiety 31: 130–142, 2014, and Steel Z et al. “Association of torture and other potentially traumatic events with mental health outcomes among populations exposed to mass conflict and displacement: a systematic review and meta-analysis.” Journal of the American Medical Association 302, 537–549. 2009. 101 The following section is based on the recommendations in Hinkel, Harald. The War Within: a Critical Examination of Psychosocial Issues and Interventions in DDR. World Bank, 2013 and supplemented with project assessments from relevant countries. 102 Muggah, Robert. Innovations in DDR policy and Research: reflections the Last Decade. NUPI Working

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Paper 744, Norwegian Institution of International Affairs, Oslo. 2010. 103 Lordos, Alexandros. SCORE Ukraine: Current Sociopolitical Trends – Programmatic and Policy Implications. N.d. See also SCORE Bosnia-Hercegovina and SCORE Liberia. 104 Harb, Charles. Promotion Social Cohesion in the Arab Region Project: Background Methodological Paper. UNDP. 2017. See also, Finn Anthony et al. Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement. World Bank, 2018. 105 See Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: a History of The Houthi Conflict. Hurst And Company, 2017: 330. 106 See ibid and also, Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict. Charles Hurst and Co. 2017; Phillips, Sarah. Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism. New York. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; and Dresch, Paul. “The Tribes of Hashid wa Bakil as Historical and Geographical Entities” in Jones, Alan (Ed). Arabicus Felix: Lumminosus Britannicus Essays in Honour of AFL Beeston on his Eightieth Birthday. Oxford, Ithaca Press. 1991. See also, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/tribes.htm; al Dawsari, Nadwa. Our Common Enemy: Ambiguous Ties Between al Qaeda and Yemen’s Tribes. Carnegie Middle East Centre. January 11th 2018, and Schmitz, Charles. “Understanding the Role of Tribes in Yemen.” CTC Sentinel 4 (10). https://ctc.usma.edu/understanding-the-role-of-tribes-in-yemen 107 Gordon, Sarah. Map of Abayani Tribes. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/map-of-abyani-tribes- methodology. Accessed October 18th 2018. 108 Peterson, J.E. “Yemen: Tribes, the State and the Unravelling” in Rabi, Uzi (Ed). Tribes and States in the Changing Middle East. Hurst and Company, 2017: 111 – 144: 118. 109 Ibid and Carapico, Shelia. Civil Society in Yemen: the Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia. London. CUP, 1998 as cited in Peterson. 110 Peterson, J.E. “Yemen: Tribes, the State and the Unravelling” in Rabi, Uzi (Ed). Tribes and States in the Changing Middle East. Hurst and Company, 2017: 111 – 144: 117. 111 https://jamestown.org/program/security-belt-the-uaes-tribal-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/. Accessed October 20th 2018. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Horton, Michael. “Can the UAE and it’s Security Forces Avoid a Wrong Turn in Yemen” CTC Sentinel 11 (2), February 2018: 15-20. 115 UAE-Backed Military Merger Rejected by South Yemen Body”. Middle East Monitor. October 30th, 2017. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171030-uae-backed-military-merger-rejected-by-south- yemen-body/. Accessed October 23rd 2018. 116 Ibid. 117Ardemangi, Eleonora. Emiratis, “Omanis, Saudis: the rising competition for Yemen’s Al Mahra.” LSE. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2017/12/28/emiratis-omanis-saudis-the-rising-competition-for-yemens-al-mahra. Accessed 24th October 2018 and “Controversial Shift Seen In Oman’s Role in Yemen.” 30th September 2018. https://thearabweekly.com/controversial-shift-seen-omans-role-yemen. Accessed October 24th 2018. 118 Philips, Christopher. The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East. Yale University Press, 2016 cited Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House MENA Programme. December 2017: 11. 119 https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/yemen-s-islah-party-distances-itself-from-brotherhood- 1.2154324. Accessed September 28th 2018. See also Yadav, Stacey Philbrick. Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood and the perils of powersharing. Working Paper. Brookings 2015. 120 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/mercenaries-assassination-us-yemen-uae-spear- golan-dahlan. Accessed October 24th 2018. 121 https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/11/20/uae-and-yemens-al-islah-an-alliance-of- convenience-only. Accessed November 26th 2018. 122 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170615-uae-and-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-story-of-rivalry-and- hatred/ Accessed October 24th 2018. 123 See summation in Stratfor Worldview. “The UAE’s Ulterior Motives in Yemen”. November 29th, 2017. Available at https://www.stratfor.com/api/v3/pdf/285617. Accessed October 20th, 2018. 124 IISS. IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2018. Routledge, 2018: 155.

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125 Al Qadhi, Mohammad Hassan. The Iranian Role in Yemen and Its Implications on the Regional Security. AGCIS, n.d. 126 See for example Brandt, Marieke. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict. London. Hurst and Company, 2017, Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order. Chatham House MENA Programme. December 2017, 127 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/06/in-yemen-iran-outsmarts-saudi-arabia-again/. Accessed October 24th 2018. 128 Ibid. 129 See: Gordon, Anna and Sarah E. Parkinson. How the Houthis Became Shi’a. MERIP, January 27th 2018. https://www.merip.org/mero/mero012718#6. Accessed October 25th 2018. 130 Ibid. 131 https://thearabweekly.com/omans-involvement-yemen-comes-under-scrutiny. Accessed October 22nd 2018. 132 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-iran/exclusive-iran-steps-up-weapons-supply-to- yemens-houthis-via-oman-officials-idUSKCN12K0CX. Accessed October 26th 2018. 133 Barrett, Roby. Oman’s Balancing Act in the Yemen Conflict. The Middle East Institute, June 17th 2015. http://www.mei.edu/content/at/oman’s-balancing-act-yemen-conflict. Accessed October 26th 2018. See also MERIP. The Struggle for Liberation in Oman. MERIP Report 36 (April 1975). 134 See the sister stud to this, Finn, Anthony. Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in Yemen: Learning and Considerations to Inform DDR Policy and Programming in Yemen. World Bank, 2018/2019 (unpublished). See also, Salisbury, Peter. Yemen’s Southern Powderkeg. Chatham House, 2017. 135 Salisbury, Peter. Yemen’s Southern Powderkeg. Chatham House, 2017: 27. -تدمير-اليمن-في-اقتصادية-مواقع-9-تحتل-الإمارات/See: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2019/11/1 136 الإيرادات Accessed December 9th 2019. 137 See: http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/the-riyadh-agreement-on-yemen-arrangements-and- chances-of-success. Accessed December 9th 2019. 138 Ibid: 28. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Lackner, Helen. Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of the State. London, SAQI. 2017: 168. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid: 181. 145 Ibid: 183. 146 Ibid 147 Transfeld, Mareike. Political bargaining and violent conflict: shifting elite alliances as the decisive factor in Yemen’s transformation. Mediterranean Politics 21(1), 150 – 169. 148 See: Salmutter, Kim. “Why did the Transition Process in Yemen Fail”? SciencesPo Kuwait Programme Student Paper. 2017. 149 Transfeld, Mareike. Political bargaining and violent conflict: shifting elite alliances as the decisive factor in Yemen’s transformation. Mediterranean Politics 21(1), 150 – 169: 152. 150 150 Transfeld, Mareike. Political bargaining and violent conflict: shifting elite alliances as the decisive factor in Yemen’s transformation. Mediterranean Politics 21(1), 150 – 169. 151 Giustozzi, Antonio. Double-Edged Swords: Armies, Elite Bargaining And State-Building. Crisis States Research Centre. Working Paper No. 86. LSE. February 2011. 152 Van Veen and Lisa Denney. Security Progress in Post-Conflict Contexts: Between Liberal Peacebuilding and Elite Interests. ODI March 2015: 13.

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