JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES RAISED BY THE ELECTORAL REFORM BILL 2011
REPORT 2012-2013
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES RAISED BY THE ELECTORAL REFORM BILL 2011
Resolved in the Council on 25th October 2011 –
(i) That the Council desires to refer the constitutional principles raised by the Electoral Reform Bill 2011 to a Joint Committee under Standing Order 4.7 of Tynwald Court;
(ii) that a message shall be sent to the House of Keys informing it of the Council’s desire for a Joint Committee and requesting its concurrence;
(iii) that the Council shall appoint three members to the proposed Joint Committee; and
(iv) that if the concurrence of the House of Keys is given, the Joint Committee shall be given powers to take evidence and to summon the attendance of witnesses pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the Tynwald Proceedings Act 1876.
Resolved in the Keys on 22nd November 2011 –
That the Keys concurs with the proposal of the Council that a Committee of three Members be appointed to consider the constitutional principles raised by the Electoral Reform Bill 2011 (in the Council); that the Committee be empowered to join with a Committee of the Council under Standing Order 4.7 of Tynwald Court; and that the Committee be given powers to take evidence and to summon the attendance of witnesses pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the Tynwald Proceedings Act 1876.
The powers, privileges and immunities relating to the work of a committee of Tynwald, the House of Keys or the Legislative Council are those conferred by sections 3 and 4 of the Tynwald Proceedings Act 1876, sections 1 to 4 of the Privileges of Tynwald (Publications) Act 1973 and sections 2 to 4 of the Tynwald Proceedings Act 1984.
Committee Membership
Mrs Brenda Cannell MHK (Douglas East) (Caairliagh) Hon. P A Gawne MHK (Rushen) Mr L I Singer MHK (Ramsey) Mr R P Braidwood MLC Mr D A Callister MLC Mr A F Downie MLC
Copies of this Report may be obtained from the Tynwald Library, Legislative Buildings, Finch Road, Douglas IM1 3PW (Tel 01624 685520, Fax 01624 685522) or may be consulted at www.tynwald.org.im
All correspondence with regard to this Report should be addressed to the Clerk of Tynwald, Legislative Buildings, Finch Road, Douglas IM1 3PW.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BILL AND THE COMMITTEE ...... 8
II. THE HOUSE OF KEYS: AN EIGHT-CONSTITUENCY MODEL ...... 2
CONTEXT: THE BOUNDARY REVIEW PROCEDURE UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION 3
EIGHT THREES: CONTRASTING VIEWS SUBMITTED IN EVIDENCE 4
THE VIEW OF THE COMMITTEE 5
III. POPULAR ELECTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE BRANCHES OF TYNWALD ...... 5
CONTEXT: A LONG-RUNNING DEBATE 5
BALANCE OF POWER: THE EXISTING POSITION 6
POTENTIAL EFFECT OF THE BILL ON THE BALANCE OF POWER: EVIDENCE RECEIVED 7
THE COMMITTEE’S VIEW 9
IV. POPULAR ELECTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE...... 9
THE ELECTORAL CYCLE UNDER CURRENT LEGISLATION 9
THE ELECTORAL CYCLE PROPOSED BY THE BILL 10
EVIDENCE RECEIVED 11
THE COMMITTEE’S VIEW 12
V. OTHER ISSUES PUT TO THE COMMITTEE ...... 12
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ...... 13
ORAL EVIDENCE 15
WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF INDIVIDUALS 69
Cain, H J and E N 71
Cornwell-Kelly, Malachy, Clerk of Tynwald 2001 to 2008 73
Cringle, Noel, President of Tynwald 2000 to 2011 (letter 77 dated 17th January 2012 and typescript submitted subsequently)
Grimson, John 89
Jones, R G 95
Kermode, David 97
Motley, John 99
Quayle, Robert, Clerk of Tynwald 1976 to 1987 and 2001 101
Thomas, Chris 105
Tomlinson, Roger, Chairman, Positive Action Group 111
WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 115
Andreas 117
Ballaugh 119
Braddan 121
Castletown 123
Douglas (published meeting minutes only: no direct response received) 125 Jurby 127
Lezayre 129
Marown 131
Maughold (letter and follow-up e-mails) 133
Onchan 143
Patrick 145
Peel 147
Port Erin 149
Rushen 151
Santon 153
ANNEX 1: The Electoral Reform Bill 2011 155
ANNEX 2: Summary timeline of boundary reviews and 169 Constitution Bills since 2003
ANNEX 3: Composition of the Legislative Council: 173 historical note
ANNEX 4: Timeline since 1982 of legislative proposals 177 relating to electoral reform and of Tynwald proceedings relating to boundary reviews
To: the Hon. Clare M Christian, President of Tynwald and the Hon. Members of the Legislative Council; and the Hon. S C Rodan SHK, Speaker of the House of Keys and the Hon. Members of the Keys.
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES RAISED BY THE ELECTORAL REFORM BILL 2011
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BILL AND THE COMMITTEE
1. The Electoral Reform Bill 2011 (Annex 1), a private Member’s Bill in the name of Mr David Callister MLC, puts forward two main propositions. First, that the Isle of Man should be divided into eight constituencies for the purposes of both the House of Keys and the Legislative Council; and second, that each constituency should return three MHKs and one MLC by means of direct popular election under the Representation of the People Act 1995.
2. The Bill passed its First Reading in the Legislative Council on 14th June 2011. On 25th October 2011 Mr Callister moved that the Bill be read a second time. The debate on the Second Reading was not concluded. Rather, the Council decided that the constitutional principles raised by the Bill should be referred to a Joint Committee under Standing Order 4.7 of Tynwald Court. On 22nd November 2011 the House of Keys agreed to form a Joint Committee.
3. This Report and its adoption do not form part of the legislative process of the Bill. Rather, the Report is a separate exercise.
4. The Members elected by the Council to the Joint Committee were Mr Braidwood, Mr Callister and Mr Downie. The Council delegation elected
Mr Downie as its chair. The Members elected by the Keys to the Joint Committee were Mrs Cannell, Mr Gawne and Mr Singer. The Keys delegation elected Mrs Cannell as its Caairliagh. At the first meeting of the Joint Committee, on 7th December 2011, Mrs Cannell was elected Caairliagh of the Joint Committee. We have met on five occasions in total.
5. We put out a call for evidence in December 2011 and we are grateful to those members of the public who have responded.1 We also requested submissions from local authorities, the former President of Tynwald, former Chief Ministers, former Clerks of Tynwald, and Professor David Kermode and we are grateful to those from within these categories who responded. All the written evidence we have received is reproduced within this Report.
6. We heard oral evidence in public on two occasions:
on 19th March 2012, from Mr Noel Cringle OBE and Mr Robert Quayle; and on 20th April 2012, from Mr Eddie Lowey MLC and Mr Roger Tomlinson The oral evidence is reproduced in full within this Report.
7. The issues raised by the Bill are not unique to the Isle of Man but are faced by many jurisdictions. A paper by the Tynwald Information Service on Jersey, New Zealand and Norway is reproduced within this Report. One Member of the Committee, Mr Downie, also participated in hosting a visit to the Isle of Man in August 2012 by an Electoral Commission reviewing the composition of the States of Jersey.
II. THE HOUSE OF KEYS: AN EIGHT-CONSTITUENCY MODEL
8. The first of the Bill’s two main propositions is that the Island should be divided into eight constituencies for the purposes of elections to both the House of Keys and the Legislative Council. In the Keys, the Bill would abolish one- and two-seat constituencies and would require that the 24 members be
1 The six responses we received as a result of the general call for evidence were from: Mr and Mrs Cain; Mr Grimson; Mr Jones; Mr Motley; Mr Thomas; and Mr Tomlinson, Chairman, Positive Action Group. 2
drawn from eight three-seat constituencies. The Bill would therefore represent a significant reform of the Keys constituencies laid out in current legislation.
Context: the boundary review procedure under existing legislation
9. Under section 11 of the Representation of the People Act 1995 there are currently 15 constituencies returning variously one, two or three members as follows:
Single-seat constituencies Ayre, Castletown, Garff, Glenfaba, Malew and Santon, Michael, Middle, Peel Two-seat constituencies Douglas North, Douglas South, Douglas East, Douglas West, Ramsey Three-seat constituencies Onchan, Rushen
10. The boundaries of the constituencies for House of Keys elections were last fixed for the 1986 Keys General Election in response to recommendations made by the “Butler Report” in 1980. Further changes were recommended in the “Callow Report” in 1994 and by a committee chaired by Mr Robert Quayle, former Clerk of Tynwald, which reported in 2006. The 1994 and 2006 recommendations have not been implemented.2
11. Section 11(5) of the Representation of the People Act 1995 provides that:
If Tynwald so resolves, the Governor in Council shall appoint a committee of such persons as he thinks appropriate, to review the number and boundaries of the said constituencies and to report thereon to Tynwald.
Since 2004, Boundary Review Committees appointed under this provision have co-existed with a series of Constitution Bills, different views having been taken at different times as to the appropriateness of these two procedures running at the same time (see Annex 2).
12. For our own part we are aware that a Boundary Review Committee is currently in existence, having most recently been established in July 2010. In December 2011 the recommendations of its first interim report were approved
2 See the Interim Report to Tynwald on the Boundaries of the Constituencies for Elections to the House of Keys, January 2006 (GR 0002/06). The members of this Committee were Robert Quayle, John Gallacher, Walter Gilbey and John Wright. 3
by Tynwald and it was asked to complete its work by December 2012. In October 2012 the recommendations of its second interim report were approved by Tynwald and it was asked to complete its work by June 2013.
These recommendations would see the 24 seats of the House of Keys divided into 12 constituencies of two members each. We have maintained a separation between our work and the work of the Boundary Review Committee. We have corresponded with it about the procedures being followed but we have not taken substantive evidence from it and we have not, as a committee, contributed to the consultation exercise which it has been running.
Eight threes: contrasting views submitted in evidence
13. In his written submission, Mr Robert Quayle commented as follows on the Bill’s proposal to divide the Island into eight constituencies, each returning three MHKs:3
6. Turning to the proposed division of the Island into eight constituencies, I am aware from my experience as a former Chair of the Boundary Commission, that such a division is possible – indeed it does form one of the easier and more obvious divisions as it overcomes objections based on the exact boundaries of smaller constituencies which often bedevil a Boundary Commission’s recommendations. I have no problem with three member constituencies – I do have a rooted concern over the present assortment of differently sized constituencies returning anything from one to three members which seems inherently undemocratic. Any legislation which determines that problem would be an advance. One of the strongest arguments for larger constituencies, is a move away, even if it is largely symbolic, from the current highly parochial approach of much of the political process based on very small and local constituencies.
14. Mr Noel Cringle took a different view. In his oral evidence he said:4
I think we have got to be careful that, if you go down this particular road, what you are doing is not only changing the balance between Keys and Council, you
3 Letter dated 3rd February 2012 at point 6; see also Mr Quayle’s oral evidence at QQ 34 to 35 and 64. 4 QQ 17, 32 4
are changing the balance between rural and town dweller and you are changing the whole tradition and structure of our Tynwald Court... So on balance, I would think that two-seat constituencies, 12 twos are probably my favourite at the present time, but you must be careful when you are doing that, that, in fact, what we are not getting out of kilter is the balance between urban and rural.
15. Written evidence from local authorities shows a mixed reaction to the proposal. Jurby, Maughold, Rushen and Santon favour the retention of the existing constituency layout. Andreas, Ballaugh and Onchan favour 24 single- seat constituencies. Marown and Peel advocate waiting for the outcome of the latest Boundary Review Committee.
The view of the Committee
16. Within the Joint Committee, a majority of Members support the Bill’s proposition that the Island be divided into eight constituencies for the purpose of elections to the Legislature. We have not, however, reached a consensus view as a Committee.
III. POPULAR ELECTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE BRANCHES OF TYNWALD
17. The Bill’s second main proposition is that each constituency should return three MHKs and one MLC by means of direct popular election under the Representation of the People Act 1995. As far as the Legislative Council is concerned this would represent a significant change in the method of election.
Context: a long-running debate
18. The Legislative Council was for many centuries a fully appointed body under the Kings and Lords of Mann. Its composition changed radically in 1919 with the introduction of members elected by the House of Keys. Incremental adjustments were made throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s, with the most recent change being the creation of the office of President of Tynwald in 1990 (see Annex 3). Today the Legislative Council has nine voting members, eight of them elected by the House of Keys acting as an electoral college.
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19. The idea that the Legislative Council should be composed of members elected not by the House of Keys, but by the public, has been the subject of more or less constant debate for at least as long as the Council has had its current form. Since the early 1980s the following alternatives have been considered:
a single General Election to a Tynwald of 32 or 33 members, with legislative duties being assigned after the election – put forward by Mr Quine in 1983, 1988 and 1990, Mr Cannell in 2000, Mr Rodan in 2004 and Mr Cannan in 2007 an eight- or nine-constituency model for direct elections to the Legislative Council – put forward by Mr Kneale in 1982, by the Legislative Council in 2005 and by Mr Quayle in 2007 a five-constituency model for direct elections to the Legislative Council – put forward by Mr Lowey in 1999 and Mr Quine in 2003 a single all-Island constituency model for direct elections to the Legislative Council – put forward by Mr Karran in 2007
Balance of power: the existing position
20. By 1969 a majority of voting Members of the Council were not appointed but were indirectly elected to the Council by the Keys. Today eight of the nine voting Members of the Legislative Council are so elected. Apart from this power to “hire and fire”, the predominance of the Keys is reflected in the current arrangements for:
primary legislation, where under the Constitution Act 2006 the Council cannot veto a Bill but can only delay it (provided that 17 Members of the Keys support it); and motions in Tynwald, where under the Isle of Man Constitution Act 1961 and Tynwald Standing Order 3.19, if a motion is carried in the Keys and defeated in the Council, the Keys can over-ride the Council in a combined vote at a subsequent sitting (provided that 17 voting Members of Tynwald support the motion).
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Both Mr Cringle and Mr Quayle in their oral evidence said that they thought the current arrangements were not widely understood by the public.5 Mr Tomlinson disagreed.6
Potential effect of the Bill on the balance of power: evidence received
21. The Bill does not propose any alteration to the existing legislation restricting the powers of the Legislative Council. On the face of it, therefore, the Bill would leave the balance of power unchanged, the House of Keys retaining the dominant position. During the First Reading debate on 14th June 2011, Mr Callister MLC said of his Bill:
It would not change the role taken by the Council Members. They would continue to be primarily a revising body in matters of legislation – in other words, the work that they now do would continue ... this would not change the responsibilities or the other powers of the Legislative Council in relation to the House of Keys and I do not see how it would.
22. Contrary views have also been put forward during the passage of the Bill thus far, and in evidence to us. In the First Reading debate on 14th June 2011 Mrs Christian MLC (in one of her last contributions to debate before being elected President of Tynwald on 12th July 2011) said:
If, in future, Council Members and Keys Members are to be elected on the same franchise in the same constituencies, believe me, it will not be long before they will seek to have the same powers as Keys Members. Why would you stand for a lesser power? So that is an issue that is a consequence, I believe, of the proposal... The Hon. Member has also highlighted the fact that changing the system of voting will probably come about in Tynwald because if Members have an equal franchise, there may well be a move to say, “We want an equal way of voting in Tynwald... So, if the public truly want an elected Council, they have, in my view, to be prepared that the whole framework within Tynwald Court will eventually change... [Iceland] are a unicameral chamber now and I believe we, too, will become unicameral.
5 QQ 13, 46, 72 to 74 6 Q 159 7
23. In oral evidence to us Mr Noel Cringle OBE (who had served as President of Tynwald from 2000 until Mrs Christian’s election in July 2011) put forward a similar point of view, saying:7
If the Members of the Legislative Council are publicly elected, without doubt, in my book, it will lead to the Isle of Man becoming unicameral, because if the Members of the Legislative Council [are] elected publicly on the same mandate as the House of Keys, why should they, as a body, say, “We will take notice of what the House of Keys say and accept their decision”? They would not do so – no need for them.
24. Mr Eddie Lowey MLC, who proposed the establishment of this Committee, said:8
The Keys, which we now recognise as the legitimate and primary voice, will not be primary any more. In fact, if you look around the world, you will see that upper houses that are voted on larger electorates tend to be the dominant partner in their constitution and I believe that would happen here. I do not think that is required. I do not think it is what the people would expect, but I think that is what would happen, almost as sure as night follows day.
25. Mr Robert Quayle, Clerk of Tynwald from 1987 to 2001, identified a similar risk, writing:
2. ... if LegCo becomes directly elected by the people as opposed to an electoral college, its mandate changes dramatically. Not only can its members claim to represent the voters directly and they will have a mandate to prove it ... they can claim to have an enhanced mandate over their House of Keys colleagues. Even if that principle is not readily accepted, it is undisputable that the vote of a LegCo member, being one of eight rather than one of twenty-four, carries greater influence over any outcome so long as each Chamber sits and votes separately.
3. Thus any proposal to have LegCo members elected directly, unless appropriately constrained, would have the effect of reducing the legislative supremacy of the House of Keys.
26. Mr Quayle’s successor as Clerk, Mr Malachy Cornwell-Kelly, wrote:
7 Q 6 8 Q 81 8
4. ... it seems likely that [under the Bill] each Council Member could claim to be elected by a greater number of electors than could each MHK, or to have in some sense a superior or different democratic mandate.
5. A possible consequence would be conflicts between the two chambers, and a demand for the traditional supremacy of the Keys to be foregone or diminished. Such an outcome would not only lead to slower decision making by the legislature, but could also have an undesirable effect on the perception of a stable political system in the Island.
27. Professor David Kermode brought a historical perspective to the issue of the balance of power between the branches, writing:
If the Legislative Council becomes an elected chamber, there is a strong case for restoring parity of power with the Keys and resolving conflict between the branches over legislation and other matters by a joint vote in Tynwald.
The Committee’s view
28. Within the Committee, four Members believe that the proposals in the Bill need not necessarily affect the relationship between the branches. Two Members considered that the Bill would affect that relationship although the Keys would still have the greater numerical strength.
IV. POPULAR ELECTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE
The electoral cycle under current legislation
29. Currently under the Representation of the People Act 1995, the House of Keys is dissolved every five years with the General Election following immediately after the dissolution. The last General Election was in September 2011. The next will be in 2016.
30. Under the Isle of Man Constitution Amendment Act 1919, each elected member of the Legislative Council serves a term of just under five years, running until the last day of February in the relevant year. The House of Keys
9
procedure for filling the resultant vacancies begins one month before the vacancies arise.9 Four members went out of office in 2008 and four in 2010. Therefore four vacancies will arise at the end of February 2013 and four at the end of February 2015.
31. The result of these arrangements is that elections are set to occur three times in every five years, as illustrated by the following table:
House of Keys Legislative Council
2011
2013 (four members)
2015 (four members)
2016
2018 (four members)
2020 (four members)
The electoral cycle proposed by the Bill
32. The Bill does not propose any change to the electoral cycle as described above. For the elections to the Legislative Council it abolishes the procedure for election by the House of Keys and substitutes popular election under the Representation of the People Act 1995.
33. The years of elections to the Legislative Council would remain as they are at present, but the expiry date of the Members’ terms of office would be moved from the last day of February to the Thursday following the third Tuesday in August, and the elections to the last Thursday of September.
34. The Legislative Council would still be divided into two groups of four. Once the eight new constituencies have been determined, the President of Tynwald
9 Isle of Man Constitution (Elections to Council) Act 1971, section 2(1B)(a). 10
would have to designate four of them to “go first”, with their elections two years after the Keys General Election. The other four constituencies would then have their Council elections four years after the Keys General Election.
35. According to the Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum, it is anticipated that the costs arising from the Bill in respect of the elections to the Council will be £170,000 in each five year term of the Keys.
Evidence received
36. Mr Robert Quayle commented in his written submission as follows:
4. I struggle to understand the purpose of having LegCo members elected at different times than House of Keys members. It certainly would not reduce their authority or diminish their mandate – indeed I could see candidates defeated at a House of Keys election having a “second bite” at a subsequent LegCo election and claiming an equal or even superior mandate notwithstanding their defeat at the earlier contest. I also think that the electorate would struggle to appreciate why elections were staggered, and would not generate as much enthusiasm for LegCo elections; it would also be difficult to express a collective view on a Government’s record if elections were not held contemporaneously.
5. The cost of holding a series of elections would obviously be higher than one election in each constituency every five years (more frequently in the event of by-elections).
37. Mr Malachy Cornwell-Kelly in his submission advocated simultaneous elections for similar reasons.
38. Professor David Kermode favoured separate Keys and Council elections with the latter occurring once every five years. He wrote:
The proposed staging of elections to the Legislative Council would result in the Island having elections in 3 out of every 5 years, a sure recipe for instability of membership of both executive and legislature. A single election 2 or 3 years after that for the Keys would be less disruptive and would have the advantage of allowing the whole Island to vote in a mid-term election.
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39. We have noted that in Jersey moves are underway to bring together on a single day, once every four years, the elections for the different types of States members (senators, constables and deputies).
The Committee’s view
40. Within the Committee one Member favours the proposal in the Bill while five consider that it would be preferable to have one election to the whole of the Legislative Council every five years.
41. The Secretary of the House of Keys, Mr Roger Phillips, has advised that the idea of “dissolving” the whole of the Legislative Council would have implications for the legislative process and could in itself be considered a constitutional innovation. Currently at a General Election it is only the House of Keys which is dissolved while the Legislative Council and Tynwald Court continue in existence. A Bill which is before the Legislative Council can continue its passage irrespective of the Dissolution (although under Keys Standing Order 4.26(4) a Bill which had started in the Keys would need to go through its Keys stages again after the General Election). These arrangements enable a Bill to be “kept alive” despite a Dissolution. If in future the Legislative Council, and therefore the whole of Tynwald Court, were to be dissolved at the same time, this possibility would no longer exist. All business before Tynwald Court would also lapse.
V. OTHER ISSUES PUT TO THE COMMITTEE
42. Within the written and oral evidence we have received, a number of other issues have been put to us. A number of witnesses have described to us alternative models for the reform of the composition of the Legislature. Mr Robert Quayle argued for the introduction of regular boundary reviews. Both he and Mr Noel Cringle made the point that the Bill is hard to read and advocated some form of consolidating legislation.
43. While we are grateful to all the witnesses for their wide-ranging and thought- provoking contributions, we have determined that these matters fall outside our remit.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
44. In moving for the establishment of this Committee in the Legislative Council on 25th October 2011, Mr Eddie Lowey MLC said:
It [the Bill] is a bit premature: but I think we could actually say we wish to get this show on the road and have both Branches having an input into the principles that are enunciated in Mr Callister’s Bill. I think it is a positive move, not a negative move, and I would urge Hon. Members to give it consideration... I believe both Branches should be involved in the constitutional development of the Isle of Man, and this is a vehicle which would allow that to take place.
45. Our remit is to consider the constitutional principles raised by the Bill. The written submission which we have received from the Positive Action Group queries whether the Bill has raised any constitutional principles at all. It states by way of conclusion:
Despite having members present at both readings of the Bill, PAG readily admits it is not able to identify constitutional principles raised by the Bill.
46. In his oral evidence, Mr Roger Tomlinson, Chair of the Positive Action Group, expanded on this concern as follows:10
I do not think you are affecting the constitution in the Isle of Man. Will you have a Legislative Council? Yes. Will you have a House of Keys? Yes. Will you have a Tynwald? Yes. It is not being affected at all.
47. We recognise that there is scope for argument as to whether all the issues raised by the Bill should properly be designated “constitutional principles”. The question of dissolving the Legislative Council is certainly of constitutional significance; however, this question does not arise on the face of the Bill but has arisen in our discussion of the evidence presented to us. We have decided to report in any case on the main issues raised by the Bill in order to fulfil the remit given us by the Branches.
48. We have given careful consideration to the issues raised by the Bill and to the evidence we have received from Members and former Members, expert
10 Q 134 13
observers and the public. We have discussed at length the information we have collected and the views we have heard. We have not reached a consensus on the desirability or otherwise of any element of the Bill’s proposals.
49. In these circumstances we have concluded that the only thing we can do is make our report to the Branches and allow the legislative process to take its course. The Bill is currently before the Legislative Council, where the Second Reading has been moved but has not been voted on.
50. We therefore make the following recommendation:
That the Electoral Reform Bill 2011 should be returned to the Legislative Council for the continuation of the legislative process.
B Cannell
P A Gawne
L I Singer
R P Braidwood
D A Callister
A F Downie
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ORAL EVIDENCE 16 TYNWALD COURT OFFICIAL REPORT
RECORTYS OIKOIL QUAIYL TINVAAL PROCEEDINGS
DAALTYN
HANSARD
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES RAISED BY THE ELECTORAL REFORM BILL 2011
CO—VING TINVAAL MYCHIONE PRINSABYLYN BUNRAGHTOIL TA GIRREE ASS BILLEY LHIASAGHEY REIHYSSAGH 2011
Douglas, Monday, 19th March 2012
PP62/12 JCERB, No. 1
All published Official Reports can be found on the Tynwald website www.tynwald.org.imlOfficial Papers/Hansards/Please select a year:
Reports, maps and other documents referred to in the course of debates may be consulted on application to the Tynwald Library or the Clerk of Tynwald's Office. Supplementary material subsequently made available following Questions for Oral Answer is published separately on the Tynwald website, www.tynwald.org.imlOfficial Papers/Hansards/Hansard Appendix
Published by the Office of the Clerk of Tynwald, Legislative Buildings, Finch Road, Douglas, Isle of Man, IMI 3PW. 0 Court of Tynwald, 2012
17 JOINT COMMITTEE, MONDAY, 19th MARCH 2012
Members Present:
Chairman: Mrs B J Cannell, MHK Mr L I Singer, MHK Mr D A Canister, MLC Mr A F Downie, MLC
Clerks: Mr RIS Phillips Mr J King
Apologies: Mr R P Braidwood, MLC Hon. P A Gawne, MHK
Business Transacted Page
Procedural 3
Evidence of Mr N Cringle OBE 3
Mr Quayle was called at 10.50 a.m.
Procedural 13
Evidence of Mr R Quayle 13
The Committee sat in private at 11.46 a.m.
2 JCERB
18
JOINT COMMITTEE, MONDAY, 19th MARCH 2012
Joint Committee on the Constitutional Principles raised by the Electoral Reform B ill 2011
The Committee sat in public at 10.00 a.m. in the Legislative Council Chamber, Legislative Buildings, Douglas
[MRS CANNELL in the Chair]
Procedural
The Chairman (Mrs Cannell): Good morning and welcome to this sitting of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Principles raised by the Electoral Reform Bill 2011. I am Mrs Brenda Cannell MHK, and I chair this Committee. The other members of the Committee are, from the Keys, Mr Gawne, Mr Singer and from the Council, Mr Downie, Mr Braidwood and Mr 5 Callister. Mr Braidwood has submitted his apologies this morning and Mr Gawne is indisposed. For the benefit of Hansard, could I ask anybody, members of the public here if they would please switch off their mobile phones? It is no good just keeping it on silent, because it does in fact interfere with the recording equipment. Also for the benefit of Hansard I shall be making sure that we do not have two people speaking at once. 10 The Electoral Reform Bill 2011 is a Private Member's Bill in the name of Mr David Callister MLC. It makes two main proposals; first that the Island should be divided into eight constituencies and second; that each constituency should return three MHKs and one MLC. The Bill passed its First Reading in the Legislative Council on 14th June 2011. On 25th October 2011 the Legislative Council decided that the constitutional principles raised by the Bill should be referred to a joint 15 committee under Standing Order 4.7 of Tynwald Court. On 22nd November 2011, the House of Keys agreed to form a Joint Committee. Today, we welcome two very distinguished witnesses. We first of all have Mr Noel Cringle, who is a former President of Tynwald Court and Speaker of the House of Keys, and no doubt has a length of both experience and knowledge in respect of the workings of both the House of Keys and 20 the Legislative Council, and of course Tynwald Court. Our second witness today is Mr Robert Quayle, who is a former Clerk of Tynwald Court, and of course he has stepped into the fray on numerous occasions and acted as Counsel to the Speaker and of course acted as the Clerk in Tynwald Court. If I could, first of all, welcome Mr Noel Cringle and ask him to come forward, please. I 25 apologise: there is no tea for you this morning, Mr Cringle, (Mr Cringle: Okay.) but feel free to pour yourself a glass of water.
EVIDENCE OF MR N CRINGLE OBE
Ql. The Chairman: First of all, can I thank you for your letter of 17th January 2012, and also for your additional information, which was very interesting. If I could, first of all, start by asking you whether or not you think this is a good piece of legislation that is before the Legislative 30 Council at the present time; and if not, why not?
Mr Cringle: Good morning Committee and an interesting question to start off — 'is it a good piece of legislation?' As a piece of written work, I imagine, as I tell you in my letter that, in fact, mechanically it would work. Whether it is good or not, will ultimately be before the Keys and the 35 Council to decide. In my view, it is definitively flawed.
3 JCERB 19
JOINT COMMITTEE, MONDAY, 19th MARCH 2012
Q2. The Chairman: In what way?
Mr Cringle: It is flawed in a number of ways, but I equally tell you that, in my correspondence 40 and there is no need, I do not think at this particular stage, to go through each individual item, Chair, because if in fact, as a Committee, you are considering the electoral reform procedure of the Isle of Man, are we definitively looking at this particular piece of legislation alone, or in fact, are you looking at the principles of election to the Keys and the Council in the Isle of Man as it currently is? Are you looking at the whole of the package, or just looking at this particular Bill? 45 If you are looking at just this particular Bill, I could very easily start off on clause 2(2) where it says:
`(ca) he is not a member of the Council;'
50 Well, I sometimes wonder why that is in, in effect and how can a Member of Council become a Member, if he cannot stand? If in fact, you turn over the page and you look at 10B, what happens when a Council Member, for example, decides to resign, to stand for the House of Keys? In fact, can he do so? If there is a by-election which crops up through death or whatever in the House of Keys and a Member of the 55 Legislative Council, under this particular legislation, wishes to stand down to become a Member of the House of Keys, stand for that by-election seat, the procedure, or the ability of that person to stand down is not clearly spelt out in this particular legislation; and similarly it goes on, upon the death of a Legislative Council Member, vice versa, could a Member for the Keys stand for that Council seat? It is unclear and it needs to be spelt out in the Bill if, in fact, you are going to alter 60 the law.
Q3. The Chairman: May I, Mr Cringle, say that what you are advocating therefore is, although you say that it could mechanically work as piece of legislation, it would require amendment in order for it to become satisfactory, in your opinion? 65 Mr Cringle: Unquestionably.
Q4. The Chairman: Can I just say that what we are formed to consider is the constitutional principles raised within the legislation, and that being that there should be eight constituencies and 70 that Members of the Legislative Council should be elected by public vote. Do you have any objection to those two principles?
Mr Cringle: Both of them. 75 Q5. The Chairman: You have objections to both?
Mr Cringle: Both of them, and I think, Madam Chair, I have spelt it out again in my letter. I think it is quite straightforward and plain. Certainly, as far as the election to the Legislative Council by the public goes, I think it will be a mistake. I say that quite openly and quite 80 straightforwardly to the Committee. As I said in my letter to you, I think ultimately that that would lead, without question, to the Isle of Man going down a unicameral system of parliament. If they are publicly elected to the Legislative Council, there is no way in which, in the future, Members of the Legislative Council elected in that manner would bow down to, the Members of the Legislative Council... I think what a lot of people do not realise is that, in fact, the Legislative 85 Council can always be over-ridden by the House of Keys, the elected assembly, if the House of Keys so wish.
Q6. The Chairman: Mr Cringle, in your letter, you do not actually oppose the idea of unicameralism, do you? 90 Mr Cringle: Not of unicameralism and I thought I was quite plain, Madam Chairman, that in fact in the Bill, in my letter, I thought I was quite plain in telling you that in fact, if that is the way... and I am not against change, if Members of the House of Keys ultimately change, so be it. I am not against change. That will happen and always has happened and will happen again. 95 The point I was making in my letter to you was that, if the Members of the Legislative Council are publicly elected, without doubt, in my book, it will lead to the Isle of Man becoming unicameral, because if the Members of the Legislative Council elected publicly on the same
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mandate as the House of Keys, why should they, as a body, say, 'We will take notice of what the House of Keys say and accept their decision'? They would not do so — no need for them. 100 The Chairman: I might just invite Members of my Committee now to question. Mr Callister.
Q7. Mr Callister: Thank you very much. 105 I will try to avoid calling you 'Mr President', Mr Cringle. You were in Tynwald a long time — a long time in the Keys, of course, as well. Particularly in the Keys, there were several attempts during those years to have a publicly elected Legislative Council, from Victor Kneale and other Members and so on, even in recent times with Mr Quayle's Bill. Did you ever vote in favour of any of those Bills in the past? 110 Mr Cringle: I am sure you have checked the record, Mr Callister: I have not, but I can equally tell you that, as time goes by — and you will also realise, as you even get older, Mr Callister — sometimes your recollection and your ability to decide at the time will change. I can tell you, for example, in relation to electoral reform in my very first manifesto of 1971, 115 Mr Callister, I was proposing single-seat constituencies. I would not today.
Q8. Mr Callister: Yes, thank you for that. Now, do you agree that this Bill does not promote a unicameral system? 120 Mr Cringle: It doesn't, but it will.
Q9. Mr Callister: It might be a precursor of that, but the Bill that is before us really only provides for two things, that is eight three-seat constituencies, which would allow for Members of the Council to be elected into those same constituencies, have the same mandate and so on. As for 125 being overridden by the Keys, this Bill does not change that, in fact, because it still leaves the House of Keys... Provided they can find the 17 votes, they can pass anything.
Mr Cringle: Yes, I accept what you are saying in that regard, Mr Callister. My view is that, as I say in my letter to you, it will lead to unintended consequences, and the 130 unintended consequences will be that the Members of the Legislative Council will not, in future, accept what they are accepting easily today.
Q10. Mr Callister: That again is purely a matter of opinion. The Bill does not say that. Currently there are five Members of the Legislative Council who have no public mandate — 135 and they are, of course, Mr Butt, Mr Turner, the new Member Mr Wild, the Lord Bishop and myself — so that is a majority of the Council: 9 out of 33 in Tynwald. Over 27% of the representatives of the people have no public mandate. Is that something that should be a matter of concern?
140 Mr Cringle: Not particularly, because in fact the Legislative Council are a revising Chamber and have specific duties. As I have already pointed out — and you accept, Mr Callister — the Legislative Council will always and can always be overridden by the House of Keys, should the elected House so desire. I accept that five of you have no public mandate at the present time. That was at the wish of the House of Keys, the representatives sent to the House of Keys by the public 145 of the Isle of Man. They have that duty. The House of Keys have a duty to elect the Members to the Legislative Council. Nobody else can do that; only the House of Keys. If I go back to my early days in Tynwald Court, and even before being in Tynwald Court, it was the custom that senior Members of the House of Keys were moved on to the Legislative Council. That was the then wish of the House of Keys because the House of Keys felt, in fact, that 150 those with knowledge of the law which had been passed and some knowledge of procedure would serve better in the revising Chamber. In more recent times, it has been the desire of the House of Keys — nobody else; the desire of the Members of the House of Keys — to elect people who they thought, from outside, would be satisfactory. I think, in fact, memory serves me right, or maybe it doesn't, but I think the first to be elected 155 from outside was probably Deemster Luft.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Callister.
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Mr Callister: Can I just go on from that — 160 The Chairman: Can I come back to you?
Mr Callister: — because my question is not finished?
165 The Chairman: Can I just come... Oh, okay.
Q11. Mr Callister: If, then, at sometime in the future, all nine representatives — all nine Members of the Legislative Council — had no public mandate, then would that concern you? 170 Mr Cringle: No, not if the House of Keys are responsible for electing them. I have already said, Mr Callister, the House of Keys has a duty to elect the revising Chamber, the Legislative Council. It is their duty and it is what the House of Keys do that is predominant. If the general public get cross with that, the general public will vote out the Members of the House of Keys. 175 The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Callister. Mr Singer.
Mr Singer: Good morning.
Mr Cringle: Good morning. 180 Q12. Mr Singer: You mention the words 'specific duties' of the Legislative Council, but `specific duties'... There are 'specific duties' that are relevant to LegCo Members and they are clearly defined, so surely LegCo Members cannot demand more, if these duties remain the same, however large their electorate are going to be? 185 Mr Cringle: I see exactly where you are coming from, Mr Singer, I understand the angle which you are taking, but in fact, I would suggest to you that that is not the way it would happen. I am quite satisfied that there would be contention, there would be disagreement, there would be a continual pull and I think the public of the Island would realise quite easily what is going to 190 happen and what would happen and if the public then realise, the pressure would come on, even greater, to go down the road of a unicameral system. That it is my view, Mr Singer.
Q13. Mr Singer: But surely the public would be quite well aware, when they were voting for a Member of the Legislative Council, what their duties were. I would think, rather than support the 195 Legislative Council demanding more powers, surely they would say, `No, we voted you in with these powers — carry on with those and don't demand any more.'
Mr Cringle: I would think, Mr Singer, that that is a premise which is flawed simply by the fact that you would imagine today that the general public of the Isle of Man would know what the 200 duties of the Legislative Council are today, and you would admit that you are not going to change them particularly by this Bill. I am satisfied, sitting here, absolutely satisfied, that the biggest percentage of the public of the Isle of Man do not realise the difference between a Member of the House of Keys and their duties and a Member of the Legislative Council and their duties, and a lot of the public of the Isle of Man 205 do not realise that the Legislative Council can always be overridden by the House of Keys. That message does not get firmly across to the general public of the Isle of Man. My intent is that it will do.
Q14. Mr Singer: There would probably be four to five years before an election and surely, it is 210 the responsibility of the House of Keys and Legislative Council in those five years to get it over to the public, what in fact they are voting for and if they do not do that, then they have failed.
Mr Cringle: Which is quite common —
215 Mr Singer: If it happens, it happens.
Mr Cringle: — and happens on regular occurrences, and that is why, in fact, since the change of the nominated Members to the Legislative Council, it has taken probably, nearly enough a century
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now for the public to understand that the Keys has the duty to elect the Members to the Legislative 220 Council. I know it is strange, but I can assure you that it is true.
Q15. Mr Singer: I am sure you would be a leader in making sure that the public got to know what the position was. 225 Mr Cringle: Well, I am trying, that is exactly part of the reason that I decided that I would give evidence to this Committee, Mr Singer, otherwise I would just be a normal person in the community, as I am. I decided that, in this instance, it was necessary maybe to come and give evidence to the Committee. 230 The Chairman: Thank you, Mr Singer. Mr Downie, do you have any questions?
Q16. Mr Downie: Yes. Good morning, Mr Cringle. I do not know whether you have had... yes, you obviously have had an opportunity to peruse 235 the Bill, but I would just like to get your views on section 11, and I will read section 11. It says:
'Section 11 is substituted to make new provision about constituencies. In particular, a "Boundary Committee" appointed by the Governor in Council has to draw up 8 constituencies, subject to the approval of Tynwald and each of these constituencies is to return 3 members of the Keys and 1 member of the Council.' 240 As we both know, we have both been involved in politics in the Isle of Man for a long time, I would like to have your views on how you see this causing an upheaval within the various areas in the Isle of Man and the loss of all the traditional sheadings and some of the problems that that particular section will bring, if this Bill is advanced. 245 Mr Cringle: Sorry, Mr Downie, could I just go back to... Could you just go over your question again? I was finding it a little bit difficult to find section 11 in relation to what you... I think you were reading from the notes at the start of the page, were you? (Mr Downie: Yes.) Right, so you were not actually reading from the Bill itself; you were simply reading from the explanatory 250 memorandum in paragraph 5. Is that right?
Mr Downie: Yes, and I would also say to you that the Bill is quite complicated and it is not easy for people to understand, so —
255 The Chairman: Can I just interject, please? We are here to actually ask questions and seek the opinion of our witness.
Q17. Mr Downie: I am asking Mr Cringle to give me an opinion on section 11, which is on the front page of the explanatory memorandum, and how that would work, how he sees it would 260 work.
Mr Cringle: I think I also say, in my letter to you, in relation to that particular matter, that in fact this particular Bill, as you say, is difficult, and if you look at the repeal provisions you will see that in fact it ought to be read with many other pieces of legislation as well, in order for it to fit. 265 But your premise here, on section 11:
... is substituted to make new provision about constituencies. In particular, a "Boundary Committee" appointed by the Governor in Council has to draw up 8 constituencies, subject to the approval of Tynwald and each of these constituencies is to return 3 members of the Keys and 1 member of the Council.' 270 As I have said already, when you read that particular piece, if you wish to divide the Isle of Man up into eight constituencies, that is practical and can be done mechanically. Mr Callister has made the point, in his notes to this Bill, that in fact he refers to the Butler Commission coming up and saying that there should be eight constituencies — I think is what Mr Callister said — and I say 275 to you in my letter, Madam Chair, that in fact my recollection of the Butler Commission is the fact they had numerous suggestions, not just the one suggestion which Mr Callister refers to as being the practical one. Yes, I can understand that it can and could work. Anything could work. I mean to say, I remember very well when STV was introduced into the Isle of Man, there was even talk that that 280 would be the be-all and the end-all and in fact, all we needed is to vote for 24 Members of the
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House of Keys in one constituency for the Isle of Man. You could just have all 24 elected on a long list. People would vote from 1,2,3,4, all the way down to 24. All those things are practical. I think we have got to be careful that, if you go down this particular road, what you are doing is not only changing the balance between Keys and Council, you are changing the balance between 285 rural and town dweller and you are changing the whole tradition and structure of our Tynwald Court. As I said, Madam Chair, I am not against change and I am happy if, in fact, the change will work and be practical. I am unhappy that I honestly believe that setting it out in this way, it will lead to further disagreements between the branches. It will lead to the branches, effectively, being at arm's 290 length, instead of working cohesively under guidelines which have been accepted for a century.
Q18. The Chairman: Can I just come in there, Mr Cringle. If the Bill were to go forward — and possibly amended, who knows — and it did lead... or it was decided that it would go forward where there were elections across eight constituencies seeking the election of three Members of 295 the House of Keys plus one Member of the Legislative Council, that seat being distinguished from the House of Keys — in other words, you are electing three Members of the House of Keys to undertake what they do now, but their primary role is studying primary legislation etc, and the Legislative Council Member who would also be elected in that particular constituency will be elected to do what the Legislative Council do at present — would you agree with me that, in fact, if 300 that were to go forward, the only difference would be that the Legislative Council would have a constituency base to look after, akin to the House of Keys Members, and that, in fact, would be the only difference? Bearing in mind that Members of the Legislative Council get the same pay as a Member of the House of Keys and all the privileges that go with that office are shared equally right across the 305 board between both Chambers, the only difference which would result is that Members of the Legislative Council had a constituency base to look after, which currently they do not. How, in the face of that, which is the reality of the inevitability of a Bill like this going through, would that not be a good thing?
310 Mr Cringle: You can argue that it would be a good thing, but I would argue backwards, Mrs Cannell, that, in fact if there was a general election called in these constituencies and you had three seats being elected to the House of Keys and one to the Legislative Council and as you point out, all being equal in all regards, other than that, can I suggest to you that if I was a politician in the Isle of Man standing for election, I would wish to stand for the House of Keys and not the 315 Legislative Council. Why would anybody want to stand in the same election at the same time, to be elected to the Legislative Council, when the opportunity is there for them in the same constituency to fight for a seat in the House of Keys, which is the predominant body? I mean to say, it is a nonsense, absolute nonsense.
320 Q19. The Chairman: Well, you say it is a nonsense and I accept the fact that you yourself were elected as a Keys Member (Mr Cringle: Absolutely.) and were a Member of the Keys, so obviously you are going to have that fighting spirit and I am pleased to see it is still there. What I would suggest to you is that, if the constituents, the people were asked to elect three Members of the House of Keys and a Member of the Legislative Council, whose role would be to 325 study legislation, to check that the legislation that comes forward from the House of Keys is in fact fit and good and proper and very much exercise a very important and essential scrutiny role, that role would, in fact, attract, possibly, candidates who were interested in that aspect of the work?