Identifying Harmful Media in End-To-End Encrypted Communication: Efficient Private Membership Computation
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Identifying Harmful Media in End-to-End Encrypted Communication: Efficient Private Membership Computation Anunay Kulshrestha Jonathan Mayer Princeton University Princeton University Abstract compression [11–19]. When a user shares media, a PHM system computes the perceptual hash and compares the value End-to-end encryption (E2EE) poses a challenge forautomated to a set of known hashes for harmful content. If the computed detection of harmful media, such as child sexual abuse material value is close to a hash in the set, the platform flags the user’s and extremist content. The predominant approach at present, media for a content moderation response. perceptual hash matching, is not viable because in E2EE a communications service cannot access user content. In the United States, the National Center for Missing and In this work, we explore the technical feasibility of privacy- Exploited Children (NCMEC) coordinates several datasets preserving perceptual hash matching for E2EE services. We of known CSAM perceptual hashes, totaling millions of im- begin by formalizing the problem space and identifying fun- ages [20, 21]. Similar CSAM hash clearinghouses exist in damental limitations for protocols. Next, we evaluate the other countries, including the U.K. [22] and Canada [23]. predictive performance of common perceptual hash functions The Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), to understand privacy risks to E2EE users and contextualize a coalition of technology firms, facilitates sharing tens of errors associated with the protocols we design. thousands of perceptual hashes for extremist material [24]. Our primary contribution is a set of constructions for Because E2EE services by design do not have access to privacy-preserving perceptual hash matching. We design and communications content, they cannot compute and compare evaluate client-side constructions for scenarios where disclos- perceptual hashes of user media. Law enforcement and civil ing the set of harmful hashes is acceptable. We then design and society stakeholders worldwide have responded by pressing for evaluate interactive protocols that optionally protect the hash a moratorium on E2EE adoption and “lawful access” schemes set and do not disclose matches to users. The constructions that for encrypted communications [25–27]. we propose are practical for deployment on mobile devices In this work, we explore the technical feasibility of a middle and introduce a limited additional risk of false negatives. ground: can an E2EE service take content moderation action against media that matches a perceptual hash set, without learn- 1 Introduction ing about non-harmful content, optionally without learning The trend toward end-to-end encryption (E2EE) in pop- about harmful content, and optionally without disclosing the ular messaging services [1], such as Apple iMessage [2], hash set? Our contributions to the literature, and the structure WhatsApp [3], Facebook Messenger [4], and Signal [5], has of the paper, are as follows: immense benefits. E2EE limits access to communications • We formalize the problem of detecting perceptual hash content to just the parties, providing a valuable defense against matches in E2EE communications: private exact mem- security threats, privacy risks, and—in some jurisdictions— bership computation (PEMC) and private approximate illegitimate surveillance and other human rights abuses. membership computation (PAMC). We also describe Adoption of E2EE does, however, come at a significant limitations in the problem formulation, including both societal cost. A small proportion of users share harmful me- technical constraints and serious policy concerns that dia, such as child sexual abuse material (CSAM), terrorist cannot be resolved through technical means (Section2). recruiting imagery, and most recently dangerous disinforma- • We evaluate commonly used PHFs for predictive perfor- tion about causes of and cures for COVID-19 [6–9]. Present mance, so that we can both characterize the added privacy E2EE deployments do not support the predominant methods risk to E2EE communications from PHM false positives for automatically identifying this content. and contextualize the additional false negatives associ- For over a decade, popular platforms have relied on percep- ated with certain of our protocol designs (Section4). tual hash matching (PHM) to efficiently respond to harmful • We evaluate client-side PEMC and PAMC designs, which media [10]. PHM systems use perceptual hash functions are straightforward and practical for deployments where (PHFs) to deterministically map media—most commonly the set of perceptual hashes is not sensitive (Section5). images—to a space where proximity reflects perceptual simi- • We design and evaluate novel interactive protocols for larity. PHFs are designed to be robust against common trans- PEMC and PAMC (Section6). Our protocols consist of formations, including geometric transformations, noise, and four steps: bucketizing PHF values for efficient lookup Locality-Sensitive Hash Private Information Private Threshold Private Equality Test (§9) Bucketization (§7) Retrieval (§8) Comparison (§ 10) Reduces the hash space for Compares hash values, Compares the computed practical PIR. Introduces Retrieves an LSH bucket from selectively revealing the result. Hamming distance to a a false negative risk in the Server, without disclosing Computes Hamming distance similarity threshold, without the approximate setting. the bucket choice to the Server. in the approximate setting. revealing the Hamming distance. Private Exact Computationally Private Exact Membership Bit Sampling (§ 7.1) Private Information Equality Test with N/A Computation (§ 11.1) Retrieval (§ 8.1) ElGamal PHE (§ 9.1) Privacy-Preserving Private Approximate Miniature Computationally Private Approximate Comparison with Membership Perceptual Private Information Equality Test with Commutative Computation (§ 11.2) Hashes (§ 7.2) Retrieval (§ 8.1) BFV FHE (§ 9.2) Encryption (§ 10.1) Figure 1: An overview of our protocols for privacy-preserving perceptual hash matching in E2EE communications. (Section7), private information retrieval for PHF buck- selects a fixed similarity threshold δH < k for identifying ets (Section8), private equality testing (Section9), and nearly identical media. finally (for PAMC only) private threshold comparison Informally, a perceptual hash is a special type of locality- (Section 10). Figure1 depicts our overall protocol design. sensitive hash (LSH) [28, 29] that preserves similarity not After presenting each step, we complete our protocols only within hash buckets, but also across hash buckets.3 If the for PEMC and PAMC (Section 11), then describe our im- Client’s media is perceptually nearly identical to media with plementation and provide benchmarks (Section 12). The hash value y, with high probability dH ¹x;yº ≤ δH . Otherwise, protocols that we propose are practical for deployment with high probability dH ¹x;yº > δH . on mobile devices and, in PAMC, introduce limited false After computing the perceptual hash x, the Server compares negatives beyond those inherent in PHFs. x to a set of k-bit perceptual hashes for media known to be B ⊆ f gk 4 The paper concludes with a discussion of related work (Sec- harmful, 0;1 . Some PHM deployments require an tion 13) and directions for future study. exact hash match: the Server identifies media as harmful if x 2 B.5 In other deployments, the Server uses approximate hash matching: the Server identifies media as harmful if 2 Problem Formulation 6 9y 2 B such that dH ¹x;yº ≤ δH . We begin by explaining current PHM systems, using an If there is a perceptual hash match, the Server takes a content abstraction (Section 2.1). Next, we formalize a set of prop- moderation action in response. The action could range from erties for privacy-preserving PHM in E2EE communication displaying a warning, to terminating the Client’s account, to (Section 2.2). Finally, we describe limitations of the problem sharing the Client’s identity with law enforcement [30]. formulation and our protocol designs (Section 2.3). Privacy Properties. Current PHM implementations de- 2.1 Perceptual Hash Matching pend on Server access to the Client’s media, so that the Server B 1 can both compute x and compare x to hashes in . We refer to Current PHM systems function, abstractly, as follows. A confidentiality for the Client’s media and x as client privacy. user (generically the Client) possesses media that they wish to We consider these values as equivalent in privacy sensitivity share via a communications service (generically the Server). because x may have a known preimage (e.g., an image that The Client transmits the media to the Server with transport has been publicly shared) and because PHF constructions encryption, and the Server receives the media in plaintext. typically leak information about media content [31]. The Server then applies a k-bit perceptual hash func- 3We do not offer a more formal definition of PHFs as a subset of LSHs, tion PHFk ¹·º to the media, generating the perceptual hash k 2 because LSHs usually incorporate a quantitative measure for similarity across x = PHFk ¹mediaº 2 f0;1g . The PHF preserves perceptual inputs and are accompanied by a proof of matching probabilities. similarity between images as locality in the hash space, with 4We assume in this abstracted system that B exclusively contains harm- robustness against common media transformations [11–19]. ful media. As we discuss in Section 2.3, communications services and