The Developrnent of Canadian and American Wheat Policy on the United Nations Reiïef and Rehabilitation Administration and the Combined Food Board by
NoeI RIBullock
Departrnent of History
Submitted in partial fulfiihnent of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario September, 1997
O Noel Bullock 1997 National Library Bibliothèque nationale u*m of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Weilingtan Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1AON4 Canada Canada Your MB Voire mIsnn>ccr
Our iUe fWre reiérenee
The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Libraty of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sel1 reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de rnicrofiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.
The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othexwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced wiîhout the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Post-war planning for Europe during World War LI reveaied that a food cnsis would follow the victory in Europe. The organization established to disuibute relief was the very first agency of the United Nations--the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitauon
Administration (UNRRA).It was also designed so as to be limited in scope. even though reports of the food cnsis indicated that the food shortage would be severe. By using wheat as a case study, this thesis examines how support for UNRRA in the Canadian and
Amencan govemments was guided by dornestic and foreign policy. The Canadian govemment saw within UNRRA a means of reducing Canadian surpluses of wheat and of improving Canada's international representation. Amencan support was limited by
Roosevelt's need to maintain the gwd-will of Congress and by the need to foster trust with the Soviets. which a stronger UNRRA rnight have jeopardized. The thesis concludes that "Real politik ensured that LWRRA's full possibilities were not realized."
iii Table of Contents
Certificate of Examinination
Abstract
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
1 The Great Powers and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)
2 The Politics of Blame: Canada, Amenca and Post-War Relief
3 Canadian Wheat Policy and UNRRA
4 The Politics of Lirnited Relief: The United States and UNRRA
Conclusion
Appendix 1
Bibliography
Vita Source Abbreviation
Departinent of Extemal Affairs, Documents DCER. year. vol #. document. p.#. in Canadian Extemal Relations, vols. eg. DCER. 1944. vol. 9. Angus to 9- 12. (Saskatchewan: Department Pearson. p.795. of External Affairs,1977-1990).
National ibchives of Canada, Ottawa, NAC Ontario.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library. FDRL Hyde Park. New York.
State Department. Foreign Relations FRUS. year. vol. #. p.#. of the United States, 1943- 1945. eg. FRUS. 1943. vol. 1. p.858. (Washington: Govemment Pnnting Office. 1967).
State De partmen t. Currenr Econornic CED.issue no.. date. p.#. Development. (Washington: Government eg. CED. no.44. April 16. 1946. p.8. Printing Office. 1945- 1946).
Individual texts to be cited in full for the first Penrose, p.205. reference. and shonened to the author's last narne and page number thereafter. Introduction
For Canadian and Arnerican policy maken. humanitarian interests were not die only consideration in providing food through the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Adminsrration (UNRRA). Diplomatic and econornic concems also influenced the extent of the relief. Each government had to overcome political obstacles as they looked to the post-war world. in Canada. the Liberals couned the support of prairie wheat farmers by participating in UNRRA. and in so doing. sought to undemine the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). In the United States, Roosevelt had to temper his support for üNRRA in light of Congressional views. so as to prevent a breakdown of Congressional-Executive relations on post-war issues. Support for
UNRRA was also guided by each govemment's foreign policy. in Canada the
Department of Extemal Mairs used UNRRA to improve Canada's international representation. The Department of Trade and Commerce also saw within UNRRA a means of attaining markets for Canadian wheat. President Roosevelt. on the other hand. needed to ensure that relief through UNRRA did not become a source of conflict with
Soviets. The several agendas of the governments uivoived in UNRRA ensured its ,ehe~adian-Ameri~an relations are also of particular import to the question of
LXRRA's success. If the U.S. State Department expected Canada to provide the bulk of wheat for the Liberated areas, then Amencan unpreparedness for relief was explicable.
Canada's importance to the liberated areas further increased due to her proximity to
Europe. as compared to Ausualia or Argentina. And Canada, unlike Australia and
Argentina. also held the chair of UNRRA's Cornmittee of Supplies and was a member of the Combined Food Board (CFB). fhe existing treatment of LWRRA has not given sufficient consideration to the
parametee in which planning for relief rook place. Rather than consider the extent to
which political consvaints influenced planners, or how plannen might have used
UNRRA to further policy objectives. UNRRA has been treated as the victim of
bureaucratie confusion. Leon ,Martel's Lend-Lease, bans and the Coming of the Cold
War exrimined UNRRA as a failure of Amencan foreign policy.' Matel's study mistook
L'NRRA's weakness for failure. rather than considering if a weak UNRRA was one step
in pursuit of a larger objective--seeuring both Amencan entry into the United Nations and
Great Power CO-operation. A sirnilar omission occurred in Soviet-Arnericun
~onfrontation.'for which a corrective is offered in this thesis.
Susan Armstrong-Reid's doctoral dissertation "Canada's Role in the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 1942- 1947") is the most authoritative
account of Canada's role in UNRRA. Her thesis covers the rnechanics of UNRRA's
operations in Canada, as well as the extent to whch humanitarian sentiment. foreign
policy and domestic poiitics guided Canadian suppon for UNRRA. However. the scope
of her thesis did not require a consideration of how UNRRA might have altered Great
Power relations. or how Amencan support for UNRRA was affected by dornestic politics
--which will be addressed in this discussion of LWRRA.
On the question as to when the Allies anticipated the post-war food crisis. the official histonan of UNRRA. George Woodbridge, wrote that such a crisis was not discemible until August 1945: while Eric Roll's, The Cornbined Food Board contends that the food-crisis could be seen from August 1944.' Yet even Roii's dating cannot explain the Cm's lack of preparation--in the face of calls for stockpiling whear. pnor
acknowledgments by the Cl% that wheat was in world-wide shortage. and the historical
precedent of WWI to indicate the conditions which would follow the peace. This study
benefits from. and hrther corroborates. the analysis of the estimates of the post-war food
crisis found in Cliff Groen' s "Food Will Win the War and Write the Peace" : The Failure
to hdequately Respond to the Food ri sis."^ ~roennotes that in March 1944 G.K.
Bennett of Stanford's Food Research Institute surveyed the range of estimates of
Europe's import needs. Despite the divenity of estirnates. there was unanimity in the anticipation of a food crisis to foilow the victory. But even the most conservative estimates-which were fa.less than what Europe eventually required- were still far greater than what üNRRA supplied.'
The first chapter establishes L?VRRA's weakness in the context of Great Power reIations at UNRIL4's Council Sessions. The Soviet Union viewed UNRRA as a precedent as to how the General Assembly of the United Nations would operate. Early negotiarions for UN'REZA revealed the Soviet Union's distrust of the West. Both the
Cnited States and Great Britain sought to maintain and develop Soviet trust for the peace.
In this environment, the maintenance of Soviet goodwill was paramount in American diplomac . de second chapter focuses on Canadian-i\merican relations in the context of agricultural production and the CF% amidst the developing food crisis. Amenca pressured Canada to punue objectives which were consistent with American production goals. In part. the Amencan governent adopted this strategy due to the President's reluctance to go before Congress to secure more money for greater agricultural production. Anerican pressure helps explain several decisions Canada took with regard to food production.
The third chapter examines Canadian wheat poiicy as it penained to LIRRA. in the context of Canada's abandonment of isolationism. Through UNW.Canada gained new stature in foreign relations. Yet UNRRA was low on the Depanment of Trade and
Commerce's iist of expon priorities. Significantly, this low prioritization was possible because Canada did not assume sole responsibility for providing wheat to the liberated areas. Despite the importance of UNRR4 to foreign policy, the prioritization given to
UNRRA did not spark a conflict with Extemal Affairs. The diplomats in Extemal Affairs were aware of the lack of support given to UNRRA by Great Britain and the United
States. ensuring that they would follow suit.
The last chapter deals with problems which a suong UNRRA would have created for President Roosevelt. After disrnissing transportation difficulties as an explanation for b7YRRA's problems. the section advances two reasons to explain why Roosevelt did not
3ct to render UNRRA more effective: a fear that high levels of spending for the fint
United Nations body would provoke a latent isolationism in Congress--at a time when an election was approaching- and, a desire to ensure the Soviets that the United States was not attempting to establish a sphere of influence in Europe. Leon Martel. Lend-Leare. bans unû the Coming ofrhe Cdd War (Coiondo: Westvrew Press. 1979). p .99.
Thomas Paterson. Soviet-Amricm Confrontation t Baltimore and London: John Hopkins Univentiy press. 1973). p.22.
Susan Armstrong-Reid. 'Canada's Role in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 1942- 1947" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1982).
' George Woodbridgc. neHisrory of rhe United Nations Relief and Rehabilitarion Adminisrrarion vol. 1 ( LJew York: Columbia UP, 1950 ), p. 323.
Eric Roll. The Combined Food Board: A Study in Warrime Intemurionul Planning (Stanford: Stanford UP,1956, p.99.
"li ff Groen. "Food WiiI Win the War und Write the Pence " :The Failure ro Adequatefy Respond ro the Food Crisis [unpublished] (MA.research memoire. University of Ottawa.1995).
Groen. pp.42-50. Cha~ter1
The Great Powers and UNRRA
Preparation for post-war Europe and Asia took concrete form on November 9.
1943. with the creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(LWRRA). "Relief* entailed the provision of food and clothing, while "rehabilitation" refe~edto essential services. such as the distribution of seed to plant crops. L'NRRA was to aid the millions of displaced penons who haci been uprooted in the conflict. A humanitarian effort of immense proportions was necessary if Europe was to recover. for the continent lay in shambles. The then Amencan Under-Secretary of State. Dean
Acheson. aptly titled his mernoin Presenr ar the Crearzon. implying thereby that Europe was no less chaotic in 1945 than the universe was at its ongin. Under these circumstances. UNRRA expended the majority of iü resources on food.' Yet despite its work. food crises were increasingly severe.' At President Truman's request. Herbert
Hoover1surveyed the food situation in ~uro~e.~On Apn122, 1946. Hoover appealed for more food. warning that "5.300,Oû tons of cereals. 300.000 tons of fats and an additional
,* 4 100.000 tons of special food is urgently needed io restore subnormal children ... . In the food crisis of 1945 and 1946. the Allies looked to wheat to aid Europe as it provided more food per acre than any other available crop. Special interest groups drew attention to the importance of wheat for liberated areas. The American National Research
Councii informed the Internationai Wheat Council and the Combined Food Board that:
' In World War I Herbert Hoover had organized relief for Belgium through the Red Cross and other volunteer orga+ations. In World War II he remained actively involved in efforts to supply Europe with food across the naval blockade. Xlthough Hoover still advocated supplying relief through votuntary organizations in World War II, he nonetheless remained a prominent figure associated with questions of relief. Wheat is a basic foodstuff in almost ail the Western World. It is the prime bulwark against a food-calorie shortage in the free United Xations. [t is the most important key to relief of stark hunger in widening liberated areas of the Soviet Union and Continental Europe. Early and effective coordination of the utilization of wheat supplies is absolutely vital to successful food management in 1943.
The importance of wheat for liberated Europe rnakes it an effective case smdy into the
parameters within which relief planning within North America took place.
UNRIU's significance lay as much in king the very f~stUnited Nations agency as in providing post-war relief. It embodied the hopes for a better post-war world sustained by international cooperation. Whether this would become a reality depended upon the ability of the Big Four to cooperate. In contrast to 1919. when neither the
States nor the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations. both countries participated in UNRRA. President Roosevelt suggested this aspect of UNRRA at the signing ceremony which inaugurated IiXRRA: "...Nations will leam to work together only by actually working t~~ether."~UNRRA would help secure the peace by fostering the development of tmst as well as providing food. This chapter examines UNRRA from the perspective of the Great Powers. The first two sections fofus on Great Power relations: first in the negotiations leading up to
LXRRA's creation. and then in UNRRA's Council sessions. They reveal that each of the
Great Powen had a collateral objective for participating in LJNRRA. In turn. these objectives guided their support for UNRRA. Less attention will be given to China's perspective for. though one of the "Big Four," it was in dire need and unable to contribute significantly to UNRRA. .Moreover. interna1 political conflicts made it difficult for
China to plan extensively for the post-war period. America's role as UNRRA's foremost financier makes it necessary to consider Congressional-Executive relations in the first section. The conclusion to this chapter discusses the abandonment of UNRRA as a function of detenorating Amencan-Soviet relations. Yet public opinion and henca's leadership in the new United Nations prevented Amenca from abandoning multilateral aid before 1946, even though she aiready had corne prefer a unilateral approach to foreign riid. The net effect of the Great Powers' usage of UNRRA to achieve diplornatic ends was to rob it of badly needed support.
Ir became apparent that there was a need for an international relief agency at the same time that Anglo-American thinking turned to the post-war world organization after the first few years of the war.' in May 1942. the United States indicated that dominance of relief by one power was unacceptable. arguing that an international body should be responsible for relief.8 This provided the impenis whch ied to UNRRA's king the fint body of the United Nations. In the negotiations which ensued, the Soviet nio on.^
rance." the ~etherlands"and later, even the United tat tes" viewed UNRRA as a precedent for the way in which the General Assembly of the United Nations would operate.
Relief affected not only the formation of the United Nations, but also the foreign policies of the Big Four. Each country expressed a particular and varying concem in
LYRRA. Differing perceptions of the role of relief did not necessarily lead to conflict, but they did demonstrate that more was at stake than the provision of food. In this context. the Great Powers carefuliy weighed decisions which might have undermined their particular policy objectives. Two issues- the relationship of the Big Four to the iesser states and the relationship of UNRRA to the nechanisms of allocation -- revealed
American, Soviet and British aims for LWRRA
[n LN2.M the Arnericans sought to encourage greater cooperation with and trust
in the Soviets.13 The dominance of the Great Powea in üNINRRA reduced the probability
that another state would divide the Big Four. The Roosevelt administration accordingly
proposed a preeminent role for the Great Powers. In 1942 the State Depanment
conducted informal talks with the British and Russians on post-war relief. The Under-
Secretary of State. Dean Acheson. supervised the work done in the State ~e~ment."'
On April79, 1942. the State Department proposed the "top down" organization of the
relief agency in a telegram sent to the American embassy in London. "in order to provide
the necessary centralization of responsibility and authority as regards both the formulation
and the execution of policy ....the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom.
Soviet Union. and China should constitute the Executive ~ornmittee."'~The fint United
Nations body recognized the Big Four's status by giving them positions of leadership.
The subsequent editing of the Arnerican telegram also revealed that the British
and Soviets generally agreed with the proposed leadership of the body. but this stili Ieft
the relationship between the greater and lesser powers unresolved. Would nations other
than the Big Four be pedtted to joui the Executive Committee? The hencans
origindy worded the telegram to read thar "ln order to contribute to unity in war effort
and deal effectively with the relief problem, ...[the] proposed organization should be based on [the] broadest possible international membenhip." The finished text replaced the phrase "broadest possible" with the word *%r~ad."'~American thinking on
internarionai organizations favored a strong, and in rhs case, exclusive executive.
International negotiations for UNRRA slowed. but Roosevelt took the initiative
for planning on November 2 1.1942 by creating the Office of Foreign Relief and
Rehabilitation (OFFRO)." The Resident hand-picked the former Governor of New
York. Herben Lehman. to lead die new organization. OFFRO would be a temporary
organization. but by common consent Lehman was to head the international agency to
foilow. Lehman spent much of his tirne working with State Department offcials as they
resumed negotiations with Russia, China and Great ri tain."
Amenca's concem for the role of the Great Powen guided her response to
Canada's petition for mernbenhip on the Executive Cornmittee. Due to the Dominion's
anticipated contribution to relief. the Canadian goverment had been arguing that Canada
deserved a place on UNRRA's Policy Cornmittee." On March 4. 1943, Dean Acheson
informed the Minister-CounseUor of the Canadian legation in the United States. Lester
Pearson. that the USSR opposed Canadian membenhip as she assumed that Canada
would dways side with Great Britain, leaving the Soviets o~uiurnbered.'~The United
States did not oppose Canadian membenhip on principle. but as a matter of expediency
in order to maintain Soviet goodwill.~OMaintaining unity among the Big Four. and especially between America and the Soviet Union. was paramount in American
diplomacy.
" Canada's efforts to sccure membership on the Policy Cornmittee will be dealt with furcher in chapter 3. The Soviets, on the other hand. wanted to rninimize Great Britain's influence in
Western Europe afier the war. On .Varch 12. 1943. Pearson recorded in his diary that.
ïhe Russians got very suspicious of the whole business and thought that they were king relegated into the background by the British ...The Russians are convinced that European relief will be as [rnuch] political as economic and that, if the British controi it in Europe. the Russians will suffer. Therefore they wish to make certain arnendmenü to the Draft Convention. minirnizing Bntain's influence."
Theweeks later the Canadian Minister to the Soviet Union. Dana Wilgress. wrote to the
L'nder-Secretary of State for Extemai Affairs. Norman Robertson stating that Soviet opposition to Canada's proposed place in UNRRA stemmed hmthe fear that Canada would merely echo Amencan views.
In my opinion there is ais0 apprehension that we will suppon the United States whom Soviet Government do not want to see taking an active part in Europe. Soviet Governrnent. basing its policy on Anglo-Soviet alliance appear to be thinking in regional terms; United Kingdom as leader of Western and Soviet Union Eastern Europe, with neither interfenng too much with the other."
.As of Apnl 17.1943. the Soviet Union based its conception of post-war relations on the hnglo-Soviet treaty. which seemed Soviet thinking took concrete fonn on March 24 1943. ïhe Soviet representative. Maxim Litvinov. proposed that two Deputy Directors be appointed for Europe, a British citizen for the West and a Russian for the East. Initially, due to a British suggestion. the Director General was to appoint only one for al1 of Europe, regardless of nationality. A compromise was reached, but not until some awkward questions had ken raised. The British Ambassador to the United States. Lord Halifax. challenged the necessity of the Soviet proposal by questioning "why the Soviet Govemment should ...be concemed with the appointment of a Soviet Deputy for the entire European region." The Chinese .A.mbassador Wei shared Halifax's concem. Litvinov persisted in his view that the Soviet Union %ad a real interest in the measures to be undertaken elsewhere in Europe" and hence in his determination to have a Soviet deputy director." UNRRA's subsequent constitution included provision for the appointment of both a Soviet and a British Deputy DirectorGenerd for ail of Europe. With the rationale that she was providing a counter- balance to Great Britain, the Soviet Union created a greater role for herself in Europe. By May 25. 1943. the Great Powen were ready to submit a draft constitution of UNRRA to the other united nations for their consideration." Each member govemment would decide how much it would contribute to UNRRA. UNRRA was to have two principal bodies and a Director-Generai. A General Council composed of al1 the United Nations would meet biannually to formulate policies. An Executive Council. otherwise known as the Policy Cornmittee. composed of the Big Four. would meet between General Council sessions to conduct operations. The Director General would facilitate operations md have the assistance of standing regionai sub-cornmittees which operated in an cidvisory capacity . In participating in CTNRRA. Great Bntain intended to foster trust with the Soviet Cnion. On November 3. 1942. the British Cabinet agreed to consult the Soviet Union in al1 her dealings with the United States conceming relief, and in so doing. uphold the spirit of the Anglo-Soviet treaty3 The treaty was important in that it extended Anglo-Soviet CO-operationinto the post-war period.26 However. in the summer and fali of 1943. Britain came to see within CWRRA's relationship to the Combined Food Board (Cm)a potential problem. The CFB had been established on June 9. 1942 and represented Great Britain and the United tat tes.'" Canada becarne a full member in October 1943. The CFB recommended food allocations to each Board members national allocation rnachinery. Although the CFB had no executive power. its recornmendations were seriously considered by each of the member govemments. Allocations of food to importing nations were made only after the CFB compared these requesü to the worid-food supply- situation. if UNRRA, like the CFB, were permitted to make allocations to the constituent national allocation rnachinery. then UNRRA might. in effect, ailow the liberated areas to drain so many available resources that Bntain's food supply would be jeopardized. Britain needed to ensure that the method of food allocation not permit such a developrnent. The solution was to maintain the Combined Food Board's authority by insisting that nations which were able to pay for foodstuffs subrnit their requests directly to the CFB, rather than to CNEUU. On July 1.1943. the .Minister of Economic Warfare and the President of the Board of Trade, Hugh Dalton. described the President of the Councii. Sir John Anderson's anxiety over UNW. [Anderson] is still apprehensive that U.N.R.R. A., when set up, with "forceful" Americans in charge and a quantity of "greedy and destitute" srnall European allies clarnoring for supplies may put us in the UK in a frightful hole. Hence we need to insist on the power of the [CFB]... 27 Three weeks later Dalton recorded a conversation in his diary which he had had at a Ministerial-level meeting. The members described the roie of the Combined Food Board in relation to British support for UNRRA. "' For a discussion of the creation of the CFB. see pages 35-36. The usual long-yarn about Cornbined Boards etc. 1 am fed up with the whole thing. And. in kt.when the tirne arrives, we shail have to chuck into liberated areas whatever we can quickly Iay our han& on. And this will be so. whatever has ken decided. or still left undecided. about UNRRA or any other papa constit~tïon.~~ As the acquisition of domestic food requirements was Great Britain's priority. she pursued a nmow scope for UNRRA's authority. On October 5.1943, Richard Law of the Foreign Office contacted Dean Acheson to discuss Britain's food allocation. Law proposed that the CFB retain its existing powen and that no other naùons, (Canada excluded) be permitted to join. Rather. a form of "direct consultation" would maintain the cooperation of Liberated countries which were able to pay for relief. Law felt that "this is a kind of question on which it is most important that the politicai thinking of our two govemments should not be in disagreement. It would ... be mosr unfonunate if we advocated different policies at the UNRRA Councii table."z9 On October 12.1943. Roosevelt officially appointed Dean hcheson as the United States representative to UNRRA.~' As will later be seen, at L'NRRA's first Council session. Roosevelt agreed that the CWshould retain al1 its authority in food allocations.'" Meanwhile. the State Department encountered trouble when the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees discovered rhat Roosevelt would initiate Amencan participation in UNRRA by Executive Order. Although the substance of UNRRA's proposed constitution was acceptable to the committee. the rneans by which Amencan participation was to be decided was not. The isolationist Senator Vandenberg saw :' See pages 18-20 for a disscussion of the decision to use the CFB for allocations. wirhin Lma dangerous precedent. On July 7. 1943. he explained: " th& this is clearly a preview of the method by whch the President and the State Department intend to by-pass Congress in general and the Senate in particular. ...in settling every ...postwar issue by the use of mere 'executive agreements. 7 ** 31 This included the creation of the Cnited Nations ~r~anization.~'He proposed that Congress study the draft on CTNRRA. The very next moming the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed Vandenberg's resolution. The isolationist press supported Vandenberg and criticized the administration. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee arranged for the Secremy of S tate. Corde11 Hull. and Dean Acheson to tes@ before the cornmittee. Ln a letter to the President, Hull described a strategy for dealing with the Foreign Relations Committee. Hull began his letter to the President by stating, "The establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is imperiled."33 Congress felt as though it had not been adequately consulted. Thus, Hull proposed four steps to improve relations between the S tate Department and Congress. First, he proposed that a few appropriate House representatives be appointed for occasional consultation with the State Department. The third step proposed offering assurances that. following UNRRA's acceptance. the -govemrnent would introduce a biii allowing Congress to authorize funds to UNRRA. A founh proposed to "take imrnediate steps to infom both the public and Congress as to the necessity for relief and rehabilitation." Without revision. Roosevelt approved most of Hull's suggestions. He did not approve Hull's second suggestion which proposed that Roosevelt express his intention to have Congressional members on the herican delegation to the UNRRA Council meetings. Nevenheless. when used by Acheson. the proposais reassured Congress that it would not be bypassed on post-war issues. In meeting with the State Department. Vandenberg won some revisions whch rnsured that Congress would authorize any provision of funds. Vandenberg believed rhat the changes were significant. In light of these concessions. Vandenberg wrote. "1 expect Roosevelt's opposition... 1 have no idea what will happen. I am unable to believe really that the President will sanction what I consider to be the State Department's wholesale surrender in this whole episode."34 Des pite Vandenberg's expectations. no opposition came. either dunng the State Deparunent's meetings with the Foreign Relations Cornmittee. or later. .Most probably this was because the substance of the ciraft to implement UNRRA was not jeopardized by the revisions.'' According to Acheson, the essentials of the agreement had been preserved as the changes were only "semantics." "[The draft] no longer talked of executive agreements but of an authonzing act of Congress ... We also changed the unfonunate 'pledges full support' phrase to a more sober 'insofar as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize.' "36 This episode accomplished much by way of creating a spirit of cooperation between the State Department and Congress. This was a direct result of the State Department's acquiescing to the Senate. which was unparalleled in al1 of Vandenberg's experience on the Foreign Relations Cornmittee. In Congress on February 14. 1944. he made special note of the Department's conduct. I cannot emphasize too strongly that in the sixteen years 1 have ken in this body. the greater pan of it on the Comrnittee on Foreign Relations, I have never had an experience like the present one in its total sympathetic, cooperative attitude on the part of the State Department and what appears to be the whole-heaned purpose to yield itself completely to the congressional intent and will in respect to the entire rnatter3' The State Deparcment's cooperation with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prevented a breakdown of Congressionai-Executive relations over post-war issues. Yeanwhile, other nations notified the State Depanment of their approval. clearing the way for LWRRA to be fomally constituted. With the pomp and ceremony appropnate for the fint organization of the United Nations. on November 9. 1943 delegations representing 34 States signed the agreement in the White House. Roosevelt pointed out that the significance of üNREU went beyond relief. "[UNRRA] is one more strong Iink joining the United Nations and their associates in facing problerns of mutuai need and mutual interest." UNRRA was a forum in which the United Nations could develop a spirit of cooperauon. As much as this was tme. WRRA aiso represented "domination by the Big Four much more than it did U.N. unity."" This was consistent with Roosevelt's view of the post-war world. Agreement among the Big Four was as. if not more. important than the cooperation of the smaller nations. Given the task which lay ahead. dùs "no nonsense" qproach was warranted. "It wiil be for U.N.R.R.A.. first to assure a fair distribution of available supplies arnong al1 of the liberated peoples. and second. to ward off death by staniation or exposure among these peoples."39 With these goals. the delegates lefi the signing ceremony for a three-week conference that same day. The conference was held in Atlantic City and opened with speeches which sounded the theme of unity. The selection of the permanent chainnan of the Council Session exemplified this trend. Roosevelt had already approved a Iist for a temporary secretariat" and was concerned lest political questions be introduced into relief through the permanent chairmanship of the ~ouncil.~'Ar the same time. the Russian delegation was late arriving in Adantic City. Only the chef Russian delegate. hdrei Gromyko. was present in at the Council session. and he had not received any instructions from .Moscow as to who should be appointed as the Council's permanent chairman. Gromyko was certain. however. that one proposed country. the Netherlands. was unacceptable as a permanent chair for the Council. Mer considering and rejecting several countries. the Council appointed Acheson as chair. for Gromyko had "proposed Ac heson ... feeling certain that this would be acceptable to ~oscow.""~Even rhough Acheson's appointment as chair raised awkward questions about the relationship of the State Depanment to UNRRA. Roosevelt did not object to this appointment in the face of the substantial Arnencan unity with the Soviet Union. Having selected the chair. the Council addressed questions of procedure. The Policy Cornmittee's power was reduced to making "policy decisions of an emergency nature" between Council session^."^ The memben agreed that UNRRA would not begin operations until six months afrer the cessation of hostilities. (Military authorities would supply relief in the meantime to prevent disease and unrest.') The British and the Arnerican delegates led the discussion of these issues." Together they took two decisions of particular note. The first was the decision to adopt the Amencan plan to finance UNRRA. The second was the usage of the existing national rnachinery of allocation, that Military relief was designed to sustain the population so as to maintain suficient order that civiiian unrest would not hamper military objectives. What these objectives were has aroused considerable speculation by the writer James Bacque. [James Bacque, Other Losses (Toronto:S tocidart. 1989.)J Severai histonans have responded to the issues raised by Bacque. See Gunter Bischof and Stephan E. Ambrose (eds.) Eisenhower and fhe POWs: facrs against falsehood (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1992.). is. the CFB. Both reveal the Xnglo-Amencan desire to define narrowly the limits within whch UNRRA could function. The decision to use the allocation machinery of the CFB removed the priontizarion of supplies from UNRRA' s jurisdic tion. Rather than giving equai weight to al1 ciaimants. the national policies of the supplying countries. such as Great Britain. could take precedence over UNRRA's relief requests. Instructions for the Canadian delegation at the Fmt Council session revealed the significance of this decision. The Combined Boards are not United Nations agencies and efforts on their part to "control" relief wiU lead to difficulty. This would bring resenunent from the smailer counuies. Basically the problem is how far is LTNRRA to be the instrument for a genuine United Nations effort or simply a cloak for the doMnance of the two or three "big" powea through an extension of the functions of existing rna~hinery'~ Proposed usage of the CFB brought into question the extent to which UNRRA was really an organization of the United Nations. Not surprisingly, this issue provoked great disagreement at the Council session. One member of the Arnerican delegation, Louis Bean. was an economic advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture. Throughout the session Bean wrote to a M. Weldon Jones. Jones* correspondence and diaq entries reveai that the Director-General of ùTRRA, Herbert Lehman, vigorously opposed and Dean Acheson suongly defended the decision to use the CFB. On November 13. a Mexican delegate made "what seemed to be an innocent" suggestion deaiing with the provision of information on supplies to LrNRRA. Acheson. apparentiy "on the defensive on the Combined Food Board question. reacted imrnediately [in opposition] to this suggestion...". Later Bean recorded that the "British and Amencans are of course arguing for using the Combined Boards ... If this position prevails it would mean a greatly restricted CWRA structure." Bean expected that there would be much "hobnobbing" over the whole issue. as this was for L?Im. the ?O be or not to be? Given the Council's adoption of the CFB as the agency of allocation. it was not to be. This rernained a lasting source of contention between L'NRRA and the CFB as the Govemor Lehman later repcrted that the CFB did not give relief as high a priority as it gave other claimants." The fint Council session also accepted the American pian to finance UNRFU. In October. 1943 the Treasury official. Harry Dexter White. devised a financing plan to be proposed at the Council session. LYRRA's rnembers would contribute 1 % of their national income to fimance relief operations. Ninety per cent of a country's contribution would be allotted to UNRRA as crediü to be spent within that country. and the remaining 10 per cent was to be given to UMZRA for use wherever necessary4' While rhis meut that some rnembers would be contributing more than others. it distributed the weight of contribution according to what each member could afford. The Amencan financing scheme had important consequences for the areas where C'NRRA would operate. A clause which deemed eiigible for relief only those nations which were "unable to pay" exciuded Western Europe. Paying for relief after the war drained France's limited financial reserves and almost brought her to economic c~lla~se.~~Later on. in August, 1945, Lehman described the probable area of UNRRA operations as comprising "only the countries in the East and the South [which] had asked for aid."" Following the war, most UNRRA operations were predorninantly in areas which Soviet troops occupied. Dunng the conference in Atlantic city. the impact of the .herican plan was not Iost on the delegates from Westem Europe. hccording to the economic advisor to the Amencan Ambasador in London. E.F. Penrose. the Westem European counuies accepted this plan because "they were impressed with che insufficiency of the fun& to meet the needs of the iiberated territories as a whole."" hdeed. after White created the plan in October, 1943, he immediately realized that L'NRRA's resources would never be sufficient to cover al1 its operations. '' UNRU tailored its operations ro match hnds. not actual need. According to one observer at Atlantic City. the decisions pertaining to the scope and financing of UNRRA left "a generai feeling around the Director-Generai's office that the State Department and the British are not too interested in a strong UNRRA."" Given that the consequences of each decision were readily undentood as it was made. it is difficult to understand how Anglo-American policy could be viewed othenvise. The second Council session was held in September 1944. and it was there that the consequences of the decisions made at the fust began to unfold. In preparation for the second Council session. the Director-General distributed a questionnaire to European members designed to assess their needs in the first six months after liberation? On Iuly 10. 1944. NomGold of the Bureau of Supply of UNRRA reported to Roy Hendrickson, the acting Director-General, that Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia would need $2,400 million in aid. Yet on September 6. the Director-General reported to the second Council session that UNRRA's total resources were $600 million short of thai? By November 14. it was necessary to reduce drastically requirements-46 per cent in terms of dollars and 50 per cent in terms of tonnage--to match existing fundç. 56 Three months after the second Council session on Decernber I8, 1943, L'NRRA's lack of achievement relative to Europe's demands became a topic of discussion between Canadian and British diplomats. Lester Pearson spoke with Richard Law. Paw] gave me a pessimistic account of the operations. or lack of operations. of UNRRA; to which I repiied that the U.S. and U.K. Governments had done very Littie to make those operations more effective. He admitted that this might have ken the case, but felt that if UNRRA had ken better handled from the beginning. they wouid have encountered a more sympathetic and CO-operative attitude in London and in other places.57 Law did not expand on how UMZRA rnight have been better handled. Whatever the case. Pearson's candid response was equally accurate. perhaps more so than he realized. Six months earlier. on June 30. 1944. the former Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Shipping and the Member of Parliament for Oxford University, Sir Arthur Salter. had been "demanding to see the British] P.M. to ascertain whether the latter really desire[d] that CiNRRA should be a success... 9958 The asking of such a question betrayed a half- hearted cornmitment to UNRRA. in the rneanwhile the United States prepared for the third Council session. to be held in London in August. 1945. At the third Council session the State Department still supponed UNRRA as a means of fostenng Great Power cooperation and distributing aid, although with less conviction than in 1943. CTNRRA needed to secure another appropriation of 1 per cent of contributing nations' national incomes. which wouid be difficult. Several Congressionai members, and even some State Department officiais. were dispieased with the purportedly low level of American input in UNRRA. Lehan. spent much of his tirne urging govemments to fulfill their obligations. reported that million tons of relief had been shipped by June 30. 1945, and that another 92.2 billion dollars in relief were required. Lehman's efforts paid O& and Congress authorized a second appropriation. However. the Amencan delegate to UNRRA moved that the organization complete its work by the beginning of the fiscal year of 1946. revealing the Limit of American support.s9 The herican delegation, directed by considerations of the "Italian vote" and "domestic poiitical expediency" moved that WRRA send aid to Italy. Austria, Formosa and ~orea.~'Congress was concerned that the allies were not supplying Italy widi relief. Extending aid to Itaiy increased the probability that a second contribution could be secured? However. it aiso risked a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Pnor to the third Council meeting on July 24, 1945, the Soviet delegate. VA. Klenüov. informed the acting Director-General Roy Hendrickson that the USSR would be seeking aid at the next Council session -- to the sum of $700.000,000. He later stated chat this request was made in light of the failure of Lend-Lease and credit negotiations with the United tat tes.^' The Secretary of State. James Bymes. recognized that the request. if granted. would scuttle bWRRA and undemine Arnerican relief policy in the process: "[The Russian claim],... may well risk the collapse of UNRRA. This we are unwilling to ri~k."~~UNRRA's limited funds sirnply could not meet Russia's request.& The Amencans found themselves in a difficult position. If they supported the Russian bid. they would uphold the objective of fostenng cooperation but at the expense of providing aid to liberated areas. On the other hand, in opposing the Russian claim, they would be accused of advocating relief for ex-enemy temtories. such as Itaiy. while simultaneously opposing aid to their ally. To make maners wone. the Russians held a trump card. "[They] were ... unwilling to commit themselves to LWRRA operations in Itdy and Austria until their case was acted upon by the Resolution 23 [subJcommittee." a committee which determined who was eligible for relief. 65 The State Department was divided as to how America should negotiate with Russia On August 29. 1945 the Arnencan Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Averell Harriman. foreshadowed the Cold War by advocating a tougher line with Amenca's erstwhilc ally. ...before a fmal solution is reached 1hope our over-al1 relations with the Soviet Union wiil be given fuil weight. Having observed carefuiiy the effect on the Soviet Govemment of our generous lend-lease policy over the past 4 yean I have not found that we have obtained any benefit in good-wili on the part of the Soviet Govemment in connection with their actions which affect Our interests. Dunng the war we have obtained in my opinion full value for our lend-lease shiprnents through the strengthening of the Soviet war effort..[N]ow that the wa. is over I see no gain to the United States in dealing with the Soviets on any other than a reaiistic reciprocai bais? Harriman based this conclusion on the idea that Russia, contrary to the premises behind its earlier claim. was eligible for loans kom the World Bank and the Impon-Export Bank and should therefore not be permitted to drain UNRRA's reso~rces.~' The American Arnbassador to Great Bntain. George Winant. disagreed with Hmman and informed the Secretary of State that eligibility for reconstruction loans did not render a country ineligible for WRRA relief. as evidenced in the case of China. which was receiving bah. Moreover. "the issues raised by the Soviet request went much further...[ Tlhe Soviet [delegation] could have appealed to the Council and widespread publicity would have been given to this evidence of Xllied disuni mesummer of 1945 was not the time for it to appear as though the United States was prepared to be responsible for the breakdown of the wartime coalition. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed on a solution on September 8, 1945. The State Department preserved UNRRA by drawing upon other sources of supply for the Soviet Union. CMRRA would no longer bear the sole responsibility for aiding the Soviet Union. Reconstruction credits would be negotiated for Poland and ~zechoslovakia.~~The republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia were each to receive $250 million out of UNRRA's free hinds. in exchange. Russia withdrew its opposition to extending aid to Italy and agreed to subrnit to al1 procedures outlined by UNRRA. The episode ended successfully. The State Department, said Acheson, "protect[ed] ail of the UNRRA principles. saved UNRRA. and at the same time achieved an understanding with Russia whereby her continued pressure for additional aid from WRM should be entirely elirninated, and her request very substantiaily cut d~wn."'~ While UNRRA was a success for Amencan diplomacy. food shortages continued in Europe. In the rnidst of one of the worst. the fourth Council session twk place in Atlantic City in March 1946. CTNRRA responded by exhorting govemments to give food shipments the highest priority. The Council also appointed former Republican Congressman and rnayor of New York, Fiorello La Guardia, as the successor to Herbert Lchman. The latter resigned tactfully but his disappointment with the lack of support for CNRRA was evident." The fifth Council session was held in Geneva in August 1946. The American delegation. despite prodding from other delegations. unequivocally expressed its refisal to participare in multilateral relief. The Council prepared a sratement of Europe's food requirements for 1947 which would be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The fmai session was held in Washington in December 1946. and presided over UNRRA's liquidation. America's support for UNRRA diminished in the summer of 1945 wtüle American delegates prepared for the third Council. This episode has previously been discussed in ternis of Great Power diplomacy." However, if relations with the Soviet Union were al1 that was at srake. then the United States rnight not have supported the Soviet request for aid. When the Soviet Union made its request. the United States govemment also had to consider American leadership in the international cornmunity and public opinion in its decision making. These considerations prodded the Truman administration to find a solution which preserved UNRRA and Soviet-American relations. even though it would have preferred finding other means of administering relief. By continuing to fund UNRRA the govemment avoided foreign criticism of its leadership in the United Nations. as well as domestic cnticism over the level of suppon being given to relief efforts. in the summer of 1945. the American government reconsidered its suppon of rnultilateral relief because of reports over Soviet abuses of UNRRA." The belief that LYRRA was subsidizing the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe gained currency in the bqvemment. However. since the United States had sponsored UNRRA's formation. it " See pages 22-3 for a discussion of Amencan-Soviet relations. could not repudiate the agency. As evly as Iune 1 1.194, the Chief of the State Department's Division of Finance and iM0neta.r~Affairs, Emilo G. Collado. ...remarked that the govemment would be in an embarrassing position in advocating the establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions. the F.A.O. and even the United Nations international Security Organization if they were to withdraw their suppon from the fmt United Nations Organization to be established and to admit that its operations were regarded as less satisfactory than direct unilaterai action.73 Men Coiiado made this statement, UNRRA was looking to secure another appropriation from the United States, which it did. Even though the govenunent had several reservations about LRWRA. it rnaintained its public support for the reasons cited by Collad~enthe State Department was discussing how to handle the Soviet request for aid. Arnbassador Winant recommended that it suppon the Soviet bid. In doing so, he was thinking of more than American-Soviet relations. ,Many people held that UNRRA could accomplish more than its resources would actually permit. The ordinary person everywhere would have pointed to the readiness of the US to give UNRRA free goods for ex-enemy countries and their refusai to suppon the same treatrnent for one of our two Great Allies which had suffered unparalleled 10sses.~~ Winant's fear that the "ordinary penon everywhere" would criticize the government referred to the view that UNRRA had enough resources to meet the needs of liberated areas. including the USSR. If the United States refused the Soviet request. but advocated aid to Italy, she would appear to be aligning herself with former enernies. Xcheson described the solution's desirability by refemng to the fact that several United States newspapers supported UNRRA aid to ~ussia? According to Acheson. such publicity made a refusal "politically very difficu~t."'~A refusai to support CMRRA aid for Russia would be tantamount to an admission of Cm'sweakness and invite much criticism. instead. Acheson's diplomacy preserved American-Soviet relations as well as the view that UNRRA could meet Europe's relief needs. There was merit in sustaining this belief. Its preservation prevented the disillusionment which generaüy foiiows unmet expectations. Public expectations for UNRRA were often unreaiistic. given its resources. The British Foreign Minister, Emest Bevin, addressed this probiem on October 26.1945 in the House of Commons. The hopes were pfaced too high and the demands [too].... When the diff~cuities that beset it ... were realized, people then began to think that UNRRA was no use ac dl. This danger aiways arises from the Press and the public attempting to ride a thing too high and beyond what its promoten intended it to acc~rn~lish.~~ A frequent reaction to disillusionment is to search for someone to blame. And as the food situation in Europe pointed to CiURRA's weakness, Lehman worked to protect UNRRA from such a reaction. On December 22 1945. Lehrnan held a meeting with Acheson. Law and Pearson to discuss "the inadequacy of the tentative allocation of wheat to LJNRRA." The ailocation did not cover even the minimum requirements of the countries for which L%RIW had responsibility.78Lehman came to discuss blame. According to him. ... the three Govemments [of the United States. Great Britain and Canada] should not expect UNRRA to cary the responsibility for the consequences of a distribution of wheat among various claimants which had ken determined by the supply officiais of the three countries over the protest of UNRRA ...LMRRA maintained that those Governments must be prepared to accept fuii responsibility for the consequences of their decisions on the appropriate distribution of the wheat supplies.79 Lehman appreciated that CMRRA's weakness would lead to a public outcry and thus worked to prevent it from becoming the target of cnticism. Acheson, Law and Pearson al1 undenook measures to increase the supply of wheat to Europe. Despite their efforts. the food cnsis remained and American journalists cnticized the United States' poor response. On April 12.1946 a writer for the Sr. Louis Courier Journal summed up cornmon thinking when he castigated the Secretary of Agriculture: 'The whole world is now paying for the Secretary' s belief that the Amencan people would demand a heedless plenty for themselves even if it meant slow starvation for the rest of mankind."80 The food cnsis suggested that planning for relief had been poor and that the govemment was to blarne. .4 aifferent train of thought led to criticism of Russia's usage of UNRRA. In a letter to the Wall Street Journal on April 1 1,1946, joumalist John Chamberlain exemplified a growing concem: "UNRRA is actuaiiy. if indirectly. feeding the Russian armies. This same observation is meas regards Hungary, Poland and other counuies ...under Soviet military occ~~ation."~'This trend would synchronize public opinion ov rnment thinki ~%%e~an as a me8kd of disuibuting aid and fostering Great Power cooperation. Great Britain was of this view but limited her vision of UMWA's role to an executive capacity to protect Great Bntain's food supply. The Soviet Union and China supponed UNRRA from its beginning to its end. As they both were receiving nations such a stance was clearly in their interest. ïhe Soviet Union also saw within LTNRRA a chance to extend her influence in Europe. When the expected Great Power cooperation was slow in corning. American support for UNRRA waned. Yet the hopes which surrounded WRRA and the fact that America had taken great initiative in developing the organization made it politically difficult for the American govemment to refuse a second appropriation for UNRRA in 1945. L'NEZEU's weakness. when accornpanied by public dedarations of support from the Soviet Union. implied that supplying counuies were ai fault. The unanswered question was who? As sshali be seen in the second chapter. in 1945 and 1946, Canada and the United States carehlly measured their responses to the food cnsis so as to ensure that they would not be blarned. ' E.F. Penrose. Ecommic Phning For rhe Peace Rinceton:Rinceton W. 1953). p. 156. ' Forrest C. Pogue. George C. Marshall: Sraresman (New York: Viking. 1987). p.206. As late as May 27.1947, Under Secrerary of State Will Clayton. in a memo to Dean Acheson. descnbed starvation as a consequence of the food situation in Europe. 3 David Burner, Herben Hoover, A Public Life (New York: Xtheneum. 1984). p.335 ' CED. no.44. April 22.1946, p.8. ' NAC, RG 17. vol. 3461. file 1 "Starcment by the Food and Nutrition Board. National Research Council. Washington. D.C.." January 29. 1944. 6 Samuel 1. Rosenman. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1 943 Vol. 1 2. (New York. Russell & Russell. 1950). p.503. ' Warren Kimball. The luggler (New Jersey: hnceron UP. 1991). pp.83-105. and George MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lon and the Fox (New York: Harcourt. Brace and Worfd, Inc.. 1956). p.465. George Woodbridge. The Hisrory of the United Narions Relief and Rehnbilira~ionAdminirrration vol. I (New York: Columbia W,1950 ), pp. 1 1- 13. DCER. 1943. vol. 9.Memo from Under-Secretary of State to Rime Minister. p.773. 'O FRUS,vol. 1. August 15.1943. p.967. France objected to its exclusion From the Policy Committee on the grounds that it was in fact a nation deserving the same status as the orher Great Powers. 1 1 FRUS. vol. 1. lune 28,1943. p 9 17. " FRUS. vol. 1. August 25.1943. pp. 987-988. In this instance. Acheson expressed concern lest the vocing pattern in the Policy Cornittee set a precedent for the politicai body of the United Nations. This was not rypical of Acheson's earlicr views and quite probably chis change was a result of the nurnber of nations that did view bNRRA as a precedent. 13 DCER, 1943. vol. 9, p.786. " Woodbridge. UNURA. vol. 1. p. 13. l5 FDRL. Telegram to Amcrican Embassy in London. April 29. 1942. p.3. Official File 4496. UNRRA ( 1942). 16 FDRL. Telegram to Amencan Embassy in London, Apnl29, 1942, p.2. 17 Ben Pimlott(ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940-1945 (London:lonathan Cape Ltd.. 1986). p.525. " hllan Nevins. Herben H. Lehmn and His Era (New York: Charles Scnbner's Sons. 1963). pp.221-233. '9 FRUS. 1943. vol. 1. p.882. " FRUS. 1943. vol. 1. p.873. '' NAC. MG 26. N-8. vol. 1-2. Pearson Papen 1943- 1945. p. 70. DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Ministcr in Soviet Union to Secretary of State for External Affairs. pp.804-805. Set aiso. Lester Pearson. Mike The Memoirs of the Righr Honourable Lester B. Pearson vol. 1. 1987- I948. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 19721 p.256. 'FRUS, vol. 1, Marçh 24.1943. pp.886-887. '' Nevins. p.233. '6 DCER. 1942- 1943. vol. 9. "Exûact from Minutes of Cabinet War Cornmittee." p. 1857. See pages 1856- 1866 for a discussion of Canada's decision noc to enter into the trreacy undcr the guise of Great Britain. '9 FRUS. vol. 1 .October 5. 1943. p. 1015. " FRUS. vol. 1. October 20. 1943. p. 1024. " murVandenkrg. The Privarc Popers of Senator Vandenberg cd. MurH. Vandenberg, Jr.. and Joe Alex Moms (London: V.Go1lancz. 1953). p.67. " Robert A. Divine. Second Chance: The Triumph of lnrerno~iomlismin Arnerica during WorU War II (New York: Atheneum. 19671, p. 117. %DU. Memorandum. Hull to Roosevelt.. August 10. 1943. Official File. 4966. 1943- 1945 Miscellaneous. 34 Vandenberg, p.72. " FRLrS. vol. 1. Iuly 21.1943, p.947 and FRUS. vol. 11. 1941. March 3 1.1944, p.33 1. t6 Dean Acheson. Presenr nt the Creation (Toronto: George McLeod Ltd., 1969). p.72. !'Bradford H. Westefield. Foreign Po@ and Par? Politics: Pearl Harbour ro Korea (New Haven:Yale UP,1955). p. 154. and !8 Divine, p. 156. j9 Rosenman. p.502. W FDRL. IMemorandurn, Stettinius to Mrs. Brady, November 8, 1943, Official FiIc 4966. "1 am tembly sorry to bother you with a detail of this kind, but 1 am advised in the [State] Depanment that it is the usud pracuce for the President to approve appoinunents of this kind." Xccornpanying the memo was a list of people to supply the ternporary secrctariat for UNRRX's first session of Councii. 4 1 FDRL. Bean Papen, Diary, November 12. 1933. p.2. " FDRL. Bean Papen. Diq. November IL 1943. pp. 1-2. 43 Xcheson, p.76. " DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Instructions for Delegation to Fint Session of Council of UNRRA (n.d.1. p.83 1. FDRL. Louis Bean to Weldon Jones. November 14. 16 and 19. Bean Papen. 1923- 1952. Tolley- Wheat. UNRRA. 47 Officeof the Director-General, Regon of the Direcror-General to the Council: period I April 1945 ro JO June 1945 (Washington. D.C.:Government Pnnting Office. 1945). p.viii. See aiso. Woodbridge. p.4 19. Woodbridge, vol. 1. pp. 87-90. 19 Penrose. p. 156. 'O Wood bridge. p.4 1. " Pemose. p. 156. Pervose also notes that Western European countries held out for the hope thar tend- lease would be extendd. to which Penrose comrnents. 'There was indeed no more warrant for this belief or hope in the act itself, or in the debates and hearings on it," (p.157.) " FDRL. Bean Papen. Diary. November 12. 1943. p.2. " Office of the Director-General. Report of the Direcror-General to rhe Second Session of the Council c Washington. 0.C:Government Pnnting Office. 1944). p. 12. " Woodbndge. p.346. " DCER. vol. 11. Decemôer 18. 1944, p. 1618. 59 Thomas G. Paterson. Soviet-Arne~cmConfrontation (Baltimore and London:John Hopkins University Press. 1973). pp.86-87. 40 Penrose. p. 162. r> 1 Paterson. p.95. '' FRLT. 1945. vol. II. p. 1004. O' FRL'S. 1945. vol. II. p.1010. FRUS. 1945. vol. II. p. 1005. '' FRL5. 1945. vol. II. p. 1006. * FRUS. 1945. VOL. II. p. 10%. 07 Paterson. p.95. 68 FRUS. 1945. vol. II. p. 1025. 69 FRUS. 1945, vol. II, p.1026. " FRUS. 1945. vol. LI. p. 1027. '' Penrose. p.32 1. See also Nevins. p.296-299. '' FRUS. 1945. vol. 1. p. 1029. On September 10.1945 the Ambassador in Czeckoslovaiua wrote to he Secretary of State that "Soviets conanue to capitaiize UNRRA deliveries to &ho as though they were gifts from Soviet Union." Sec also , FRUS. 1945, vol. 1. p. 1000, Acting Secretary of State Grew to Winant on July 30.1945. "UIURRA fdand medicd supplies king used to foster Communist Party to disadvantage of buik of population." '' DCER. vol. 10. 1944- 1945. pt. 1. June 1 1.1945. Ambassador in the United States to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. p. 1522. -'FRUS. 1945. vol. [I. p.1025. " FRUS, 1945. vol. iI. p.1026. -'FRUS. 1945. vol. II. p. 1026. 7 Ailan Bullock. Ernesr Bevin Foreign Secrerary 1945-1951 (London: Heinemann,1983). p. 143. '' DCER. vol. 10. 1944-1945. December 22. 1945. Ambassador in the United States to the Secret~yof State for External Xffairs, p. 1539. -9 DCER. vol. 10, 1944- 1945. December 22. 1945, Arnbassador in the United States to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, p. 1539. $0 SAC, RG 25. B-3. vo1.213 1. file 728-1946 pt.5. hssAnaiysis Section. p.3. ? 1 NAC, RG 25. B-3, ~01.2131,file 728-1946 pt.5. Ress Anaiysis Section. Apnll-15. 1946. p.5. Cha~ter2 The Politics of B lame: Canada, America and Post-War Relief In 1942, the British Prime Minister Winston Churctiiil and the Amencan President Franklin D. Roosevelt established several combined boards in order to capitalize on Allied resources for the war.' The Combined Food Board (CFB)dealt with .Ulied food commodities. As the CFB operated, severai reports predicted a pst-war food crisis. making an increase in wheat production highly desirable. Early in 1944. American Under-Secreiary of State Edward Stettinius. informed Roosevelt that American allocation agencies were giving LJNRRA a low priority. Yet Roosevelt gave few. if any. indications that production patterns should be altered to produce more food for civilian relief. Planning for relief through UNRRA consequently remained a low priority.'' Meanwhile. Worid War II also saw a greater coordination of Canadian and Amencan agriculture. Canadian agricultural offîcials directed production so that Canada could provide the difference in areas where Arnerican production feu short of its objectives, such as with feed grains. Canada devoted less acreage to wheat and more to feed grains to sustain hmerican production of livestock. h this respect Arnerican agriculture was dependent upon Canadian output. American officials often pressured Canadian officiais in the Depments of Agriculture and Extemal Affain when the topic was agricultural production. This dynamic continued after the war into the relief period. American officials alleged that Canada was not doing her share to aid Europe. From 1943- 1946. ' In January 1942 Roosevelt and Churchill announced the creation of the Combined Raw Materiais Board. a Cornbined Munitions Assignment Board and a Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. in June 1942, the Cornbined Roduction and Resources Board was created as well as the Combined Food Board. " See pages 99- !00. Canadian diplomacy was a diplomacy of feu. in this case. a feu of being blamed for impairing allied objectives. The Combined Food Board was created on June 9, 1942. It was the Allies' principal allocating agency for food cornmodities such as wheat, fats and oils. and meat. Whiie the CFi3 initially represented the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada later joined as a full member in October 1943. The organization of the Board was simple. The CFB operated through a series of executive officers who presided over cornrnodity cornmittees, such as the Cereals Cornmittee. The CFB was limited in that it did not have executive authority of its own. Rather, it made recommendations to member governments. ' Its authority siernrned frorn Canada's. Amenca' s and Great Britain's cornmitment to speak with one voice. UNRRA was one of severai claimants More the CFB. When UNRRA needed food, for example, wheat, it would subrnit a request to the CFB. The CFB would examine GNRRA's request in light of world wheat supplies. at which point it would allocate to UNRRA. some. or dl, of the requested wheat. It was aiso the CFB's responsibility to infom UNRRA where the wheat would be procured. If the food was to be procured in the United States. the Director-General of UNRRA, Herbert Lehan, would contact the head of the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), Leo T. Crowley. The FEA operated foreign aid prograrns such as lend-lease, and the Office of Economic Warfare. The FEA would deduct the cost of the supplies €rom America's appropriation to UNRIW,and then contact the War Food Adminstator. Judge Marvin Jones. One of Jones' subordinates would make the technicai arrangements for UMUZA to procure the wheat.' While there were at least beebodies involved in procunng American wheat, the lines of authority between them and the CFB had been ironed-out by October 28 1943. The United States Secretary of Agriculture, Claude Wickard. was the Cm's "neutrai" chairman and the War Food Adrninistrator. Judge Jones. was the American representative to the ~oard.~Close contact between the CFB and the War Food Administration was a double-edged sword. By Ming to divide the responsibility for international and domestic food allocation. the designers of the sysem prom~teda tendency to view the international situation in light of dornestic pressures. Yet close contact was essential if the demands of the iiberated areas were to be met. which by August 1944. were known to be far in excess of supply.4 At UNRRA's signing ceremony. President Roosevelt stated that "It is hard for us to grasp the magnitude of the needs in occupied counuies." Mer emphasizing the destruction wrought by the Axis. he continued: "...we need not speculate any longer. We have had nearly a year of expenence in French Africa-and later experience in Sicily and Italy. The urgency of UNRRA's needs increased as estimates about the demand for posr-wargrel'ef yere y the urne ~h'screation the were several reports which indicated the scale of required European relief.6 The former President Herbert Hoover had been extensively involved in relief following WWI. In the 1942 November and December issues of Collier's Hoover wrote two articles entitled, "We'll Have to Feed the World Again." Using population comparisons. he dernonstrated that the relief needs to follow Mwere going to be much greater than those afier WWI. In Iune 1943. Hoover reiterated the senousness of the food problem by pointing out the expected duration of the upcoming food shonage: "we must realize that this food shonage will last for a - minimum of four. and possibly six yem. These are stupendous burdens"' In October. 1943, Vice-Resident Henry Wallace suggested the need to go beyond the relief efforts of WWI: "In those days of hunger and revolution were planted the seeds of desperate totaiitarianism which produced Mussolini and Hitler."' On November 1, 1943, the NEW York Times featured an article which gave cornparisons of caloric intake for Europeans. The "Germans are said to be receiving 2700 calories daily, residents of most occupied nations around 1,600, Poles around 80and Polish bws 4~."~While such reports were problematic, they did indicate what awaited the Ailies with respect to supplying needed foodstuffs when they iiberated Europe. The first AUied recognition of the need to stockpile food for relief had occumed as early August 2 1, 1940, from Winston ~hurchill.Io Work on estimates gained momentum in late 1942. On December 18. 1942, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Food Relief issued a report entitled, Food Relief for Occupied Corntries. The report mticipated that a severe food crisis would occur after the cessation of hostilities.' ' The Leith-Ross Committee in Britain issued a report in 1942 which indicated that a food crisis would follow the peace. The report was circulated extensively in both London and Washington and helped to correct a lingering fear that the Allies would be left with surpluses of foodstuffs following the wu." Official reports demonstrated that the magnitude of the needs after the war would be immense. In 1943, the CFE3 concluded that: ...al1 major food commodities (other than wheat. sugar and coffee) are in either deficient suppiy or in slightly excess suppiy when measured against the scaled- down requirements of current claimants.... But they would dl be in deficient supply if measured against full requirernents. especially if relief needs were to be inc~uded!~ The "scaled-down" aspect referred to the modifications in demand which the CFB made so that demand could "'confom with the scarce supply situation." The CFB reduced iü allocations to conform to existing supplies rather than increase the supply to meet demand. Consequentiy. the above statements did not Niclude the import needs of India. China, the Soviet Union or relief for the liberated areas of Europe. In 1943 world food supplies were sufficient only if the Soviet Union, China a major importing country such as India, and the liberated areas were not considered. The subtie waming inherent in the CFB allocations avoided the bold statement bat as current supplies existed, Great Britain and the United States were highly unprepared to meet the future impon demands of liberated Europe. Prior to UNRRA's creation in Novernber 1943, an International Food Conference had been held in Iune of that year at Hot Springs, Virginia. Despite ia emphasis on long-term planning, the conference also dealt with immediate problems expected to follow the peace. A rationale for the proposed agenda which the Canadian delegation sent to the State Depanment had urged it to "recognize that in the past excessive accumulations of certain agncultural products were not surpluses at al1 when rneasured by the world's minimum needs of food and clothing; these so cailed surpluses were usually the result of maldisuibution and under-cons~m~tion."~~If such conditions existed in peacetime, the relief period would require extraordinary measures. The conference issued a report which made the following observation on the availability of relief supplies to rneet future demands: ....despite dl efforts to increase production, supplies of essentid foodstuffs and certain other agricultural and marine produc &...and the means of international transponation, wili ail be inadequate to rneet basic requirernents in the transition period. which may extend for several years after the cessation of hosti~ities-'~ The food cnsis could last for years. Equally important was the realization that relief needs would be such that they could only be met in some degree. not in their entirety. The food conference also outlined steps which should be taken to prepare for post-war relief. One resolution stated that counaies should "increase the acreage under crops for direct human consumption, and even ... hold back the rebuilding of depleted livestock herds - essential ihough this rebuilding will ultimately be ..." The conference concluded by directing govenunents to act in cooperation to increase production. to allocate supplies. and to prevent "violent fluctuation[s] arising from unresvained cornpetition for inadequate supplies. in the prices of food. ...and other necessities... 7.16 Both restrictions on the rebuilding of livestock and the maintenance of price controls were important aspects of short term relief. The Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. Grover B. Hill. expressed a similar view when he testified before the Appropriations Comminee of the House of Representatives in April 1943: "Regardless of how much food we will produce. it will not be enough. Even though we could produce twice as much as we will be able to produce. we could use it dl. We have an insatiable demand from our allies for food"17 In January1944, the CFB related the supply situation to the Allies' ability to provide post-war relief. The State Department was reassessing its relations with Argentina. It inquired of the CFB as to the importance of Argentinian wheat as a portion of the world's supply of wheat. The CFB indicated that Argentinian wheat supplies would be very important as part of a common pool needed for relief? On Ianuary 10 the CFB pointed to North Amenca's inability to meet existing demands and stated: "It is ... clear that even if Australian supplies can be mobilized to a larger extent. the satisfaction of the new requirements of the U.S.S.R. and of the Allied Armed Forces in the immediate fkwe will require a substantial movement of cereals frorn Argentina."19 Wheat from di major producers would be needed to satisw demand. in mid- 1944 the British Ministry of Food. under the auspices of the London Food Council. completed a comprehensive study of food demand. It concluded that in 1945 there would be a significant gap between world supplies of wheat and demand. The Cereals Cornmittee of the CFB studied the report. As an alternative to increasing wheat production, decreasing non-essential uses of wheat, such as alcohol production and feed would increase the food available for liberated areas. The committee accordingly issued a staternent to the Executive oficen of the CFB." On August 3, 1944. the British Food .Ministry sent a secret cipher to the Food Mission in Washington which demonstrated that the problem of attaining sufficient wheat for 1945 sull rernained. The Mission prepared a short report on the food situation "so that there can be no rnisapprehension as to need for a concerted drive to maximize production of foodstuffs and to resnict non-essentiai consumption [of wheatj."" Others. such as H.R. Tolley, chief of the Bureau of Xgricultural Economics in the USDA. warned in the New York Times on December 2. 1944 that the government's removal of consumption restrictions would lead to an international food cnsis. Far from being an isolated prophecy, ToUey's waming was accompanied by several others throughout 1944.'' ïhe British representative to the CFB. Eric Roll, later wrote that the CFB "failed to make any provision for a food crisis which was clearly discemible by the autumn of 1944."3 On February 14. 1945. the CFB issued a report entitled. World Food Outlook. The report stated that . in 1945. world production was expected to be less than that of 1944 for meat, wheat, sugar. dry pas, fats and oils. This situation existed amidst higher food requirements than in 1944." On July 23, 1945. the State Depanment's weekly policy bulletin cornpared the upcoming winter to the winter of 1944 and noted that: It is recognized that another winter of hunger will have far reaching consequences and rnay cause imeparable darnage in political and social. as weli as economic fields. Unless food is supplied in excess of mere subsistence levels. there will be noung or worse and the way will be paved for discrediting democracy. 25 Predictions of food shortages came from newspapers. magazines, prorninent peaons and government organizations. Indeed, in December 1944 Roosevelt appealed to Congress on behalf of UNRRA. stating that "Europe was threatened by famine and pestilence... if assistance did not corne soon whole peoples would slip into the abyss."'6 Cronicdly. references CO a surplus of wheat cm be found as late as April2, 1945, in preparatory discussions for a tripartite meeting of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the Canadian Minister of Agriculture, James Gardiner. clearly had in mind the Canadian-rather than the international position-- when he said that "The large wheat carryover was an embarassing factor."" Indeed, as already seen, the belief that wheat was in surplus world-wide could not be based on information available to the Cm. On February 3, 1944. the Argentinian govenrnent informally contacted the International Wheat Council to determine whether or not Argentins should increase her wheat production. to which the Wheat Council replied that such action was not necessary. The British representative on the CFB. Edward Twentyman,responded with vigor: Mr. Twentyman had objected that this was a personai opinion which should not be regardcd as advice by the Council...; that the Council was not competent to give such advice; and that such information as he himself possessed did not support the opinion that increased acreage in the Argentine was not desirable? By Febrary 10, the CFB reiterated that recommendations for wheat acreage objectives were within the jurisdiction of the cFB." Twentyman's response, corroborated by previous reports of food shonages, Uidicared the need for an increase in wheat production to sustain the liberated areas. Even though wheat was more abundant than other food commodities, the imminent shonage of food to follow the peace warranted an increase in wheat production. Instead, wheat was in world-wide shonage by August, 1945, just as the period for civilian relief had barely begun. In terrns of supplying liberated Europe with relief, the FEA and the State Department were united. The FEA's director, Leo T. Crowley, took his lead from the State Deparment. He testified before the House Cornmitee of Foreign Affairs that "If the State Department said that it did not want us to adopt a particular program [as] it would affect Our foreign policy ...1 would be guided by its advice. We are the operating end of their foreign policy."30 The State Department and the FEA functioned with an eye to the international situation, while the War Food Administration, which represented Amenca on the CFB, did net? By focusing on domestic needs, the War Food Administration maintained a myoptic view of Europe's relief needs. The WFA's policies were in keeping with the leadership provided by the President who sought to maintain Congressional goodwill for both the war and the peace. When. on November 1. 1943 Roosevelt outiined his Food Program to Congress. he was aware of the dangers facing Allied forces. Anglo-Amencan forces were heavily engaged in Italy, the Soviets were forcing the Germaas out of Russian. and the smtegic bombing I campaign was gaining momentum. if not occasionally suffenng temble losses. hdrhe fighting in the Pacific offered linle hope of an easy victory there. Roosevelt was dso conscious of the importance of food to the Allied cause: "Food is as important as any other weapon in the successfui prosecution of the war. It will be equaily important in rehabilitation and relief in the liberated areas. and in the shaping of the peace that is to corne." '' Roosevelt descnbed the pnorities of American food production, in order. as. the Ainericm military, American civilians, and food for America's fighting allies. It was not made explicit, but "fighting allies" presumably included civilian as weli as rmlitary consumption. The placement of the liberated areas later in Roosevelt's speech was significant: they were last among America's commitments and immediately before an appeal for money to continue farm subsidies. This juxtapositioning was no accident. Roosevelt preferred to maintain agncultural production through support payments. which had the effect of preventing inflation. On the other hand. Congress prefered to ailow a rise in farm prices to increase production. Were the President to appeal for increased production for CTNRRA, it would in all probability mean going before Congress for money. on what was already a contentious issue. Thus. even if the War Food Adminisirator. Judge Jones. wanted to take the necessary measures to increase production, he would not have had Roosevelt's suppon. LWRRA was important to the Roosevelt administration, but it was not so important as to jusw the conflict which would have resulted were an increase in wheat production attempted. On Febmary 19, 1944. the Under-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius initiated correspondence with Roosevelt which further revealed that the Resident did not insist upon a hi h level of suppon for UNRRA. On that %ate, the Assistant Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, wrote to Roosevelt concerning a problem with the production and supply of food for UNRRA. The allocation agencies in the CFB and War Distribution Administration had no guidelines with which to deal with UNRRA's requests. Accordingly. "there ha[d] been some tendency to mat IIIM(RA9s needs] as secondary, to be filled ody out of residues remaining afier taking care of al1 other requirements." One month earlier. on January 1 1. 1944, Dean Acheson described the policy which Ied to this situation to the House Committee of Foreign Affairs. No reserves were earmarked for civilian relief. and if necessary. the Amy or any other agency could exhaust the supply of wheat from which food could be drawn. There was no guarantee that food would be available for bNUU.j3 Rectifying this situation was of great importance to Stettinius: It is clearly a matter of great importance. as a matter of national policy, that the= be avdable in all liberated areas those supplies that will be necessary to prevent disease, chaos and collapse.... immediate action is necessary, particularly in the case of items having a long manufacturing cycle." Wheat had a long "rnanufacniring cycle," and the crop for 1944 spring wheat would not be planted for several weeks. Stettinius concluded by recommending that the President issue a staternent to the allocation authorities on the importance of relief supplies. Roosevelt indicated the level of his support for UNRRA through the form-letter which he sent to American allocation agen~ies.~'Stemus drafted the letter for the President, which stated that several claimants would be competing for American supplies. .i\dministraton were reminded that it was important that Liberated areas receive those supplies which will be sufficient "to prevent disease. chaos and c~lla~se."'~Each oficial was to "communicate this matter to the various claimants which appear before your agency so that the national position with regard to the importance of these requirements will be known to Informing potential claimants of Roosevelt's message served a dual purpose. A diplornatic goal was achieved as the Resident could reiterate his support for post-war relief to Arnenca's ailies. A practicd goal was also attained as Roosevelt could indicate, to both claimants and docation agencies. the level of relief which he thought desirable-enough to prevent "disease. chaos and collapse." On March 13. the War Food Adrninistrator. Judge Marvin Jones, responded to the President and revealed that current relief planning was geared toward the prevention of "disease chaos and unrest." Jones* reply was a description of existing relief preparation. Significantly, Jones did nothing to suggest that civilian relief would be given a higher priority in allocations. He indicated that through the Combined Civil Main Cornmittee, the military would be respnsible for the provision of relief in the frst six months of occupation, and that relief plans were fomulated in "close coordination with UNRRA."~~Jones concluded by stating that "Within these Limitations every effort is being made to provide ample supplies for relief feeding... we are endeavoring to stimulate production of the kinds of foods. seeds, and other supplies that are most suitable for military and rehabilitation needs." Aithough Jones' letter sought to reassure, it indicated that amidst existing demands. there was liale room for civilian relief under current agriculniral production patterns. Jones' usage of the phrase "within these limitations" was revealing, not only in the sense that there were severai ciaimants for American food, but in the sense that there was little room for Jones to maneuver as the War Food Administrator. He had the unenviable task of defending the administration's food policy to Congress. Little couid be done to increase production without provoking the ire of political opponents. Few men lasted longer than a year in this position. When Jones became the War Food Administrator. he did so with the provision that he was ody on loan from the Judiciary. and that he should continue to collect his saiary from that branch of government- a condition which he understood as providing job sec~rit~.'~Survival meant attracting as litde attention as possible. and Jones punued such a cou~se.~Personally. Jones favored Congress' method of increasing production by permitting price increases. nevertheless he followed Roosevelt's lead. On at least one occasion the President rebuffed Jones for making a speech which intimated a depamire from the administration's policy of increasing production through the use of subsidies." hdjusting Amencan production for LNRRA was a futiie task when the President indicated that civilian relief was only to prevent disease and chaos. And even if the President had supported such an initiative. Congress would stiil have to be won over to the prospect of increased subsidies for a United Nations body, which would be a political battle. Between Congress and the President. it is not surpnsing that Jones did not advocate altenng production patterns to increase the arnount of food for relief. When compared to the turmoil which an increase in wheat would have creared in the United States. relying upon Canada to supply liberated Europe became an attractive alternative. Yet this was also an umealistic alternative for two reasons. The first was that as of 1943 Canada seemed to have already produced and shipped the maximum wheat possible. On December 4. 1943. G.R. Pattenon .the Canadian Executive Officer to the CFB, wrote to H.F.Angus. the Chairman of the Canadian Food Requirernents Committee. Pattenon inquired as to "whether or not Canada can in effect make commitrnents for 1944 in addition to those already in hand." Canada could not. Her provision of wheat to the Soviet Union had aiready reduced the arnount available for Great Britain. and Patterson recognized that it was "obvious that the United Kingdom will have Iess to offer for the newly anticipated requirements [of the Liberated area~j"~" As of 1943. Canada was already unable to rneet the anticipated needs of liberated areas. Relying upon Canada to supply the liberated areas with increased wheat was also unredistic because the coordination of Canadian and Arnerican agricultural production directed Canadian production away from wheat. This redirection can be seen in two cornmittees. the Joint Economic Cornmittee and the Joint Agricultural Cornmirtee. Canada and the United States had created a Joint Economic Committee in 1942 which dealt with agricultural collaboration. The sub-cornmittee on Agriculture passed a resolution which encouraged Canada to expand its production of flaxseed and feed grains. both for Canada's livestock prograrn as well as "to provide a surplus for export to the United tat tes...'") Both the Canadian and Arnerican delegates approved the resolution on February 27.1942. which was then sent to the Prime ~Ministerand to the Resident. who in tum, sent it to each country's respective Depments of Agricuiture. where final approval was given.u In January 1943. representatives of the Canadian and Amencan depanments of Agriculture met in Washington to discuss each country's production goals with a view to avoiding any overlapping of production. The American Secretary of Agriculture. Claude Wickard, generaiiy suggested the problems which the United States would have in "increasing or even maintaining production during 1943 at levels sufficient to meet al1 requirements including the anticipated needs of re-occupied countrie~.'~~He then cited specific problems such as the need to increase feed production for the United States* livestock program, as well as the greater need for dajr produca. comodities which were in demand by American civilians and by the rnilitary. The Canadian Minister of Agriculture. James Gardiner. described Canada's wheat and grain situation, as well as Canada's cornmitment to supply the United Kingdom's bacon. cheese and egg requirements. The assembled agricultural officiais resolved to maintain close coordination of agricultural policies through a Joint Agricultural Conmittee. which was discontinued when Canada joined the CFB in October 1943.~ The conference concluded by issuing a press release that described current production objectives. Special emphasis was placed on the importance of expanding livestock numben in both countries. This is expected to reduce greatiy the present large North Amencan feed supply and necessitate a corresponding increase in feed production for use especiaily in 1944. It was agreed to take steps toward establishing adequate reserve supplies of feed with a view to a possible interchange of such supplies between countries as the need arises." By integrating Canadian agriculture into the North Amencan context. Canada undenook programs which reduced her need to produce wheat. This was in keeping with the expressed preferences of the United States' Department of Agriculture. as well as Canada's cornmitment to the United Kingdom. The United States pressured Canada to adopt policies which were in keeping with her own objectives as Canada took on a greater international role. Canada accordingly sought to avoid king blamed for a breakdown in negotiations as she balanced her export comrnitments with American demands. In Ianuary 1943. Canadian agriculniral offlcials received unsethg news at the joint Canadian-American agricultural conference. The United States War Roduction Board had "intimated that Canada was impairing the war effort by insuficient attention to fiaxseed production."4g Ln al1 probability. the timing of diis intimation was not an accident. It would pressure Canada into pursuing policies which the Amencans deemed desirable. lest a shortage of flaxseed be blamed on Canada. The Canadian govemment's impulse to avoid blame infiuenced the decision to accept the chairmanship of UNRRA's Committee of Supplies. initially. Canada had sought rnembership on UNRRA's Executive Cornmittee. On April 6 1943. the Minister- Counsellor of the Canadian iegation in the United States, Lester Pearson, advised the L'nder-Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs. Norman Robertson, that Canada should accept the Chair of the Committee of Supplies instead: "if we reject this compromise. it may be alleged that we are responsible for the failure of the whole United Nations Relief ~ian.""~The Rime Minister accepted the avoidance of blarne as a suitable reason for accepting the ~ornprornise.'~' Even in the commercial aspects of Canada's wheat policy. Canadian diplomacy sought to avoid blarne. The htemationai Wheat Councii represented the principal wheat-growing nations. The United Kingdom participated as a very influentid buyer of wheat. The Councii was having difficulty coming to a consensus over an acceptable price for wheat. One communication breakdown within the Canadian delegaùon resulted in a general rnisundeatmding. On May 3. 1944 Pearson described the tenor of the negotiations to Hume Wrong: ""1cm assure you that I have seldom seen more hostiliry displayed at an international meeting than was aimed at me on this particular occasion ....I think it wiil be quite difficult to avoid the efforts of the other members (if negotiations break down) to pin the responsibility for this breakdown on us." In finishing his Iener Pearson restated that "if we are not extremely careful. we wiU find that negotiations will break down completely... and we wiil be accused of being entirely respon~ible."~~The United States pressured Canada on agricultural production objectives for the war. L.rlRRA. and commercial policy. This continued into the post-war penod. Soon after UNRRA began its work it was apparent that UNRRA was unable to prevent mass hunger in continental Europe. Canada had been slated for a big role in LTNRRA and her need to avoid cnticism increased in proporiion to the length of the food "' Sçe pages 66-70for a discussion of Canada's acceptance of the compromise solution. cnsis. Lester Peanon was aware of a gowing resentment which would be directed towards Canada On March 14. 1945 he: Sent two long telegrams to Ottawa... waming them about the dangers for Canada inherent in the developing attack against the food and relief policies of the [UNRRA] Administration here. Canada as the land flowing with miik and honey, wili become a pawn in this conflict. We should do something to let the Americans know that our civilian population are making as great sacrifices as theirs. Discussed the matter w ith [Canadian Agricultural Counsellor] Camp bel1 and Pritish Minister to the Embassy in the United States] Paterson. but there does not seem ro be much interest in Ottawa over this. One of these days they will be ~on-y.~' Canada eventuaily followed Pearson's advice and undertook measures to ensure that her relief efforts were not misrepresented. Canada's diplomacy on the Cereals Cornmittee of the CFB was indicative of this trend. The method of food allocation had becorne a source of contention. The issue was whether or not to continue with international food allocations or to take a regional approach. At the 12th meeting of the Cereals Cornmittee from December 6-8 1944. Col. Cook of the State Department attended as an advisor to the American representative. Cook, reponed directly to the chair the disinclination of the Department of State to view favorably the participation of the United States in any unmodified continuation of the international aliocation recommendation into 1945. With considerable emphasis. he indicated that the Department of State was opposed to the continuation of the allocation of comrnodities not in total short supply unless shipping or other handling problems temporarily necessitated such action. Specificaiiy, he questioned... the necessity for recornmending 1945 wheat allocations over a period as long as six months. if they were made at The State Deparunent was under pressure to relax wariime controls. However. Cook did not mention another significant feature of his proposai. The proposed ailocation method would not provide food for relief at a faster rate. By providing ailocations solely on a basis of existing transportation it would be possible to meet 100 per cent of the allocations. even if the allocations themselves were deficient. By making less observable the margin between what was ailocated and what was needed, the State Department had lessened the margin for cnticism over Ame~canforeign policy. The Cornmittee was chaired by the Canadian. George Mclvor. who emphasized that Canada opposed such a recommendation. McIvor maintained that: It is the opinion of Canada [that]... these limited stocks of wheat can only be attained by the proper docation of supplies and the shipment of these supplies in accordance of carefully worked out plans ... It is the opinion of Canada that if ailocations are not proceeded with at this tirne. unstable and confbsed conditions will exist at a very early date ...to the detriment of importing couniries and procuring agencies...s3 McIvor concluded: Canada will not now assume responsibility in discarding the procedures which the Comrnittee on Cereals foilowed in 1944 and which have served and will serve a useful and necessary purpose in the f~sthaif of 1945.. the discarding of the present procedures of the Cornmittee on Cereals must be the sole responsibility of the United tat tes? Mc1vorfscomrnents revealed the Canadian preoccupation with king held responsible for the food cnsis in Europe. For the time king, the Canadian position prevaiiied. but upon American intiative, in June 1945, international allocation was ended. However. this decision was short-iived, in 1946. when the CFB grappled with another wave of the food crisis, one of its very first actions was to re-instaü international allocation. On January 3 1, 1946 the Cereds Comrnittee recornmended that "the decision taken in mid-1945 to remove wheat and flour from fonnal international Allocation recommendations shouid be rescinded fo~thwith."~~Immediately afier this recommendarion the Cereals Committee implied that the revend did not imply the assignment of blame: "...the recornmendation was not to be taken as necessady implying any particular outcome of the proposed reconsideration of the mid- 1945 de~ision."'~Neither the United States, nor any other government. wished to be identified as the cause of policies which hindered relief efforts. Lronically. Canada's delegate to the Cereals Committee opposed the reinstatement of international ailocation. Canada and the United States had different conceptions over what was entailed in international allocation. Canada viewed an aiiocatioa as a contract, whde the United States viewed it as a target. which might--or which was often the case-- might not be met in ~1.~'TWO members of the Canadian delegation to the Cereals Cornmittee, J.N. Lewis and R.N. Hickman, observed that "Obviously, in such an arrangement it is to the detriment of Canada to enter into an allocation arrangement while the U.S. policy remains as it is." They pointed to the undesirable publicity this would create for Canada: in addition to the unfavorable position in which Canada may appear as a result of announced U.S. expon programs which indicate very large supplies to be made available, the acnial U.S. shortfalls in the past have become a responsibility of Canada in sorne cases.58 The authon felt that the United States won the benefits of favorable publicity, while Canada bore the responsibility for picking up the short-fall." Nevertheless, international allocation was re-instated without a fundamental change in Canadian or American views. During the food crisis of 1946. Canada aiso defended her agncuiturai policies from public statements by American officiais. On January 26, the Washington Post printed a statement made by President Truman in which he asked Canada, Argentina and Ausualia to provide their "proportionate share" of wheat to meet the needs of iiberated counuies. The same day, the Canadian Wheat Board wmte a reply for the Cnder- Secretary of State for Extemai Affairs, Norman Robertson. which noted that The fact of the matter is that Canada has carried her share and compared with the United States. Argentins and Australia far more than her share of the problem ..." The Wheat Board continued: 'This was only possibie because Canada alone arnong the wheat exporting countries had built up a very large stockpile of wheat during the early years of the The Canadian Wheat Board and Extemal Affairs were concemed lest Canada be wrongly blamed for the food ~nsis.~' Canada continued to defend her record on relief actions into 1946. On April 15, Pearson wrote to the Director-General of CTNRRA. Fiorello La Guardia, in response to phone conversation between the two. [Pearson wasj surprised to hear that there are those who think that we have ken lagging in our efforts in this field. Our own view is that if al1 supplying counuies had done as much as [Canada]... the world would not be in quite as bad a mess as it is insofar as cereals are concemed. 6L The view that Canada had not done her share was so erroneous that Pearson sent LaGuardia information on Canadian exports in order to set the record straight. Critics of Canadian policy focused on Canada's p~ferencefor trade with Britain. Canada was charged with denying Europe food in the name of economic interests. On September 9, 1946 Omawa's Chargé d'Affaires in the United States sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for External Affain stating: There is a feeling in some quarters that. notwidistanding Canada's excellent record of export movement. Canadian interests are leaving the major impact on the United States for supplying relief areas that would normally not interest eirher country as commercial outlet. [Canada should supply less to] countries like Beigium and Hoiland. and more to such deficit areas as the United Kingdom zone in Germany. UNRRA and h~dia...~~ The nature of the criticism was somewhar of a surprise as the United States had been well aware of Canada's trading preferences. In fact. the United States had participated in the price negotiations. George McIvor was both the chairman of the CWCereals Comminee and a member of the Wheat Board. &McIvorspoke on behalf of the govemment's Wheat Board when he replied to pressure to drop the British preference. As far as Canada is concerned we now have a No. I priority which is the minimum home requirements of the United Kingdom. This priority is a matter of govenunent policy ... As long as we maintain our British preference ...there is not much opportunity for UNRRA to gain additional supplies of residual Canadian w heat? Canada's defense was simply to state the policy which it openly pursued throughout the war-'' On February 6 1946. Pearson encouraged the govemment to change its allocations of wheat to CO-ordinatewith those of the United States. It is felt here by UNRRA and also by certain American authorities. that in so far as wheat is concerned Canada is largely to blame because of the separate arrangements we have made regarding the disposition of our whear ...1 think that we should very senously consider Our attitude? On February 7. 1946 the Privy Council stated in a secret rnemorandum that "Canada should generally match the U.S. program for increasing food supplies for e~~ort."~~On April 21.1946 Extemal Affain informed the United Kingdom. the United States and the CFB that "the Canadian govemment consents to agreed diversions of Canadian wheat, tlour and bread grain substitutes from the United Kingdom to other destinations in which imrnediate needs are found to be ac~te."~' - - -- " See page 84 and Appendix 1 for a discussion of Canada's maintainance of Great Britain's needs as Canada's nurnber one priority. From 1943 to 1946 the United States pressured Canada--upon pain of king blamed for impairing allied objectives-- to adopt those policies which were in keeping with American agricukurai and relief policy. ïhe President's reluctance to go More Congress for support for UNRRA was in sorne measure responsible for rhis dynamic. The importance which Canadian foreign policy anached to UNRRA might have led the State Department to expect chat Canada would produce what the United States could not provide. Yet Canada did not accept hiIl responsibility for the liberated areas. nor would her expon cornittments pennir her to do so. Eric Roll. heCombined Food Board: -4 Srudy in Warrime Inremnrioml Pfanning (Stanford: Stanford L'P. t 956). pp.54-57. ' US. Congress. House. Comminee of Foreign Affairs. To Emble rhe United Srares ro Panicipare in the Work of the United Narions Relief and Rehabilirarion Adminisrrarion. 78th Cong.. 1st and 2nd Sess.. 1943- 1944. Comminee Pnnt, pp.2 17-319. ' Roll. pp.9 1-97. Roll. p. 182. ' FDRL. Pre-release memo of Roosevelt's speech of Nov.9. 1943. Official File 4966. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 1943- 1945 Miscellaneous. 1943. ' Cliff Gmen. "Food Will WUi rhe War and Wrire the Peoce '' :The Fuilure tu Adequately Respond ro rhe Food Crisis [unpublished] (MA. research memoire. University of Ottawa.1995). Bela Gold. Wanime Economic Planning in Agriculfure:A Stdy in the Allocarion of Resources (AMS Press: New York. 1949). p.6 1. 3 Gold. p.6 1. .Vew York Times. November 1. 1943. p.20. 10 Woodbridge, pp.7-8. Churchill declared: Let Hitler bear his responsibilities to the full. and let the people of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the coming of the day when that yoke will be broken. Meanwhile, we wilI mange in advance for a speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area when this pan has been wholly cleared of German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our utmost COencourage the building up of reserves of food al1 over the world, so that there will cilways be held up before the people of Europe including -- 1 say deliberately - the German and Ausuian peoples. the certainty that the shanenng of the Nazi powet will bring them al1 irnmediaîe food. freedom and peace " Gold. p.445. '' Penrose. p. 139. ' Gold. pp.53-54. 14 DCER. vol. 9. Charge d'Affaires in the United States to Secretary of State for Externat Affairs. p. 843. i S Penrose. p. 12 1. 17 Gold. p.S.-- ''Roll. p.181. l9 NAC. RG 17. vol. 346 1. file F. Combined Food Board to the Combined Shipping Board. Januaq IO. 1944. p. 1. " NAC. RG 25. vol. 2498. file IO8 (pt. 1). "Founh Meeting of the Comminee of Cereds and Feeds". p.8. The staurnent to the Executivt officers was not included in the above fiIe. '' NAC. RG 25. vol. 2497. file 30 FRC min 94. Ministry of Food to British Food Mission. August 3.1941. p. 1. -1 - Walter W. Wilcox. ïhe F'nner in the Second World War (Iowa: Iowa State College Press. 1947). p.282. and Penrose, p. 159. Roll. p.99. " NAC. RG Z. vol. 2965. file 3265-D-IK. Combined Food Board. World food Outlook 1945. pp.2-3. " CED. no. 5. July 23. 1945. p.10. 'Nevins. p.247. " DCER. vol. 10. Minutes of a Meeting betweeen Representatives of Canada and the United Kingdom. April 2,1945. p. 1667. NAC. RG 17. vol. 3461. file H "Meeting of the Combined Food Board:' Febmary 3. 1944. p.5. " NAC. RG 17. vol. 3461. file I "Meeting of the Cornbined Food Board." February 10. 1944. p. 1. 30 US.Congress. House. Committee of Foreign Affairs. Tu Enable the United States ru Participate in the Work of the United Narions Relief und Rehabilirarion Administration, 78th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess.. 1943- 1944. Committee Rint. p. 1 15. Hereafter referred to as Hearings befon the Cornmittee on Foreign Affw House of Representatives. " Roll. p. 180. 3 2 Rosenman. p.466. " Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Houx of Representativa. p.262. " FDRL. Steninius to Roosevelt. February 19.1944. Oficial File 4966. (Department of State). 1943- 1 Miscellancous. 1944. " The letter was sent to the Chainnan of the War Production Board. the War Food Administrator. the War Shipping Administrator, the Directot of the Office of defense Transportation and the Petroleum Administrator for War. 36 FDRL,Roosevelt to Marvin Jones, War Food Administrator. February 22,1944, Official File 4966. 1943- 1945 Miscellaneous. 1944. " FDRL. Roosevelt to Marvin Jones. War Food Administrator. February 22.1944. Official File 4966. 1943- 1945 Miscellaneous,1944, j8 FDRL. Manin Joncs to Rooseveit, March 13.1944. Official File 4966. 1943- 1945 Miscetlaneous, 1943. - -- -- '' Marvin Jones. Marvin Jones Memoirs. (Texas: Texas Western Press. 1973). p. 157. Jones relucruitly accepted tfie position. after recommtnding Herbert Hoover and othen. In speaking with Rooseve1t.Jones "said the way ha had the food job set up, no man could hold it for six rnonths and then be confirmed to any ocher position. [Roosevelt] laughed again and said. "You can." " hin M. May. .Warvin Jones. The Public Life of an Agrarian Advocate (College Station and London: Texas X&M University Press), p.2 14. The Chicago Sun observed of Jones' strategy: "[Jones] has dont litde toward originating new ideas. but hc has made geat stndes in taktng the kinks out of programs aireaây in operation....[ Thcj con of his policy from the beginning has ken to cut regulations and regirnentaaon to the bare minimum. find out what Congres and the famers want before announcing any program, and stay off speakmg forums as much as possible." r I May, p.220. " NAC. RG 25. vol.24988. fdke 108 (pt 1) G.R.Parierson to H.F. Angus. December 4. 1943. l3NAC. RG 25 B-3, vol 2 161, file "Joint Economic Committee- 1944." "Formation and Activities of the Joint Economic Commi~ees,"p.7. U YAC. RG 25 B-3, vol 2 16 1. file "Joint Economic Committee- 1943," "Formation and Activities of the Joint Economic Committees."p.8. " XAC. RG Z, vol. 2497. file 30 FRC min 91.description of the joint +p3.tl~rdmeeting. January. 1943. p.3. YAC. RG 25 8-3, vol. 2 161. file 465: 1943- 1946 "Joint Agriculturai Committee." TA.Stone to I.G. Parsons, Juty 1 8,1946, p. 1. 47 MC,RG 17. voi.3468. file A. Canadian Minister in the United States to che Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs. January 6.1943. pp. 1-2. JBG.E. Britnell and V.C. Fowke, Cadian.-igriculrure in War and Peace (Stanford, CaIifomia:Stanford University Press. 1962.) p. 142. 19 DCER. vol. 9. Memo from the Deparunent of External Affairs to the Cabinet War Committee. p. 796. ?AC. >lG 26. NI. vol. 17.. file "Wrong. Hume: 1913- 1947". Pearson to Wrong. May 3. 1944. pp. 2 and 4. " NAC. MG 26. N-8. vol. 1-2. file "L.B. Pearson Divies and Penond Papen 1934-1945." Wednesday. March 13, 1945. %AC. RG 25. vol. 1968. file 3265-AGJO. Repon on the Meetings of the Cereals Comminee: C FB. p.11. %.AC. RG 25. vol. 2968. file 3265-AG-U). Repon on the Meetings of the Cereals Cornmittee : C FB. p. lt. "N.~c.RG 25. vol. 2968. file 3265-AGJO. Repon çn the Meetings of the Cereals Comrnittee : C m. p. 12. "DCER. 1946. vol. 12. Ambassador in the United States to Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs. p. 533. "DCER. 1946. vol.12. Xmbassador in the United States to Secrewry of State for Extemal Affairs. p. 533. '' N.4C. RG IS B-3. ~01.2135.file 728- 1916 '.Relief Supplies." I.N. Lewis and R.N. Hickman ro A.E. Ritchic. Ianuary 3 1.1946, p. 1, " NAC. RG 25 8-3. ~01.2135.file 728- 1916 b*ReiiefSupplies." I.N. Lewis and R.N. Htckrnan CO A.E. Ritchit. January 3 1,1946, p. 1. '9 NAC. RG 25 B-3. vol.2135. file 728- 1946 "Relief Supplies." J.N. Lewis and R.N. Hickman to A.E. Ritchie, January 3 1.1946. p. 1. NAC. RG U 8-3. vol. 2 135. file 728- 1946 Relief Supplies. telegram by Canadian Wheat Board to Norman Robertson. January 26, 1946- *'NAC. RG 25 B-3. vol. 2 135. file 728- 1946 Relief Supplies. Hickerson to Pearson. January 39.1946. In this letter Hickerson informeci Pearson that he has received assurances that an upcoming speech by the State Depanment wouid not place "Canada in a bad light." '' NAC. RG 25. vol. 213 1. file 728(pt 4). Pearson ro LaGuardia April 15. 1946. '' DCER. 1946, vol. 12. Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Secretary of State for Extemal Xffairs. p. 597. w~~&~.1946. vol. 12. Chief Commissioner. Canadian Wheat Board. to Linder-Secretary of State for External Affairs, p. 535. '5~~~~.1946, vol. 12. Ambasador in the United States to the Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs. p. 540. f?6DCER. 1946, vol. 12 , Extract from Minutes of Cabinet War Comminee. p. 54 1. 97 DCER. 1946, vol. 12, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in the United States. p. 573. Cha~ter3 Canadian Wheat Policv and LWRRA One of the problems facing the Allies was the distribution of production responsibilities: who should produce what? During the war, Canada undenook the large task of supplying Great Britain's minimum food requirements, as weil as supplying wheat to Russia through mutual-aid, and supplementing shortfails in American agricultural production. Beyond these. there was littie left for Canada to provide any one claimant. The ~Ministêrof Agncuiture consequently undentood Canada's cornmittment to UNRRA as pan of a joint effort. Yet üNWA also played an important role in Canadian foreign policy. Through LJNRRA, the Departments of Extemal Affairs and Trade and Commerce advanced Canadian foreign policy, which was directed both towards secunng greater recognition for Canada in the international community and preparing for post-war trade. To accomplish the former objective, Extemal Affairs devised the functional pnnciple. and for the latter, Trade and Commerce focused on the attainment of markets for Canadian agriculture. While the Prime Minister believed that Canada deserved better representation abroad, he also viewed UNREU through the prism of domestic politics. His caution reflected his accountability to the electorate. Support for participation in L?IRRA was thus widespread within the Canadian govemment, but for different reasons. Despite ihis support, Canada furnished LNNAwith only 62 per cent of the CFB's targeted ailocations of Canadian wheat.' This apparent shortcomuig was not the result of a monopoly of policy by Trade and Commerce, but was, instead, the result of a CO- ordinated policy by Extemai Affairs and Trade and Commerce. This chapter examines how UNRRA funhered the goals of Canadian foreign policy. The fmt section maintains that the Prime Minister's support for CMRRA derived primarily from domestic politics. The rise of the CCF (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation). and the input of External Affairs, prodded the Prime ,Minister to overcome his isolationist tendencies. However, the scope of this chapter does not permit an intensive analysis of the Prime Minister's role in detemiining foreign policy. The second section addresses Canada's struggle to gain membenhip on LNRRA's policy Cornmittee. This episode was representative of Canada's overall objective of irnproving her international representation. The thkd section discusses Trade and Commerce's view that CNRRA was primarily a means of reducing Canada's surplus of wheat. The fourth section deals with wheat policy as it was developed by the Minister of Agriculture, James Gardiner. in cooperation with the Department of Trade and Commerce through the Canadian Wheat Board. meeting Great Britain's and the United States' wheat requirements was the priority of Canadian wheat policy. This priority made it diff~cuitfor Canada to satisQ WRIW's need for Canadian wheat, but Gardiner understood relief as a joint effort to whch Canada would contribute. rather than a task for which she would be solely respons ible. The last section discusses in ter-de partmental relations in the Canadian government. It was likely that Pearson's doubts about LINRRA's efficacy enabled him to accept Trade and Commerce's prioritization for relief. This shared understanding of C'IRRA afforded a unity of purpose which allowed Extemai Affairs and Trade and Commerce to advance Canadian foreign policy successfuUy. Canadian foreign policy undenvent a revolution in World War II.' Canada began to express her interests on the world stage with a voice distinct from Great Britain's or the United tat tes." This development took place despite the Prime Minister's cautious view of foreign policy. in part. this must be attributed to a sincere conviction of the Prime .Minister that Canada had eamed her independence and should develop a foreign policy which reflected this stanis. But Canadian foreign policy was directed by ideas developed primarily in Extemal Affairs. External Affairs' arguments for a more active foreign policy were compelling in and of themselves. but the Prime Minister's willingness to adopt them belied another concem. King could expect severe criticism from the CCF should he fail to ensure a prominent place for Canada in UNRRA~The CCF was unique from the other parties in that its policies emphasized preparation for the post-war period and it had its strongest base on the prairies.5 in September 1943. an opinion poil indicated that 29 per cent of voters would vote CCF,while only 28 per cent of voten would vote ~iberal.~As early as January 1. 1943 the Rime Minister recorded in his diary his concem over the Liberals' decline. "Little by Little, the effect the war is having on some members of government [is] to make them so reactionary as to cause the party generally to lose ground io the CCF."' The CCFTsgrowth steeled the Prime Minster against a quick compromise over Canadian representation on CTM(RA. The Rime Minister's position during the struggle for membership on UNRRA's Policy Cornmittee did not signim a conversion to intemationdism. Britain's Dominions Office described King's position during the stniggle as characteristic of his typicaily cautious stance in foreign relations. ... Mr. Mackenzie King...has so far shown little desire to participate in higher strategical decisions and that even now it is on bodies dealing with questions of supply ... that he is primarily pressing for a full measure of Canadian representation. In questions of food and relief. Canada's contribution and practicai interest are great, and it is doubtless felt that Canada cannot afford... to sunender her claims to a voice in the formation of policies which will rami@ into the pst-war ~orld.~ The Rime Minister's position in arguing for Canada's place in UNRRA's Policy Committee did not mark a significant shift in his thinking. When it was clear that Canada would not sit on the Policy Cornmittee, but was offered a compromise. King accepted this by making reference to criticism which he would receive both inside Canada and out.' Indeed. as late as 1945 King was not fully cornrnitted to the intemationalism embodied in the United ~ations.~King was displeased that Pearson had ken invited to travel to Europe with UNRRA's Director General. Herbert Lehman. King told Pearson: ... I doubted the wisdom of bringing too prominently to the fore the part we were playing in UMZRA. and indeed in many things which involved the expendinire of public money. That I thought there would be a strong feeling in Canada, immediately [after] the war was over in Europe. for confining our expendinires to our own country. People would not understand the free gifis to Greece and other countries. Also the mutual aid business. We rnust cut down on these things. 'O Even derCanada's struggle for mernbenhip in the Policy Committee, the Prime Minister preferred a lirnited cornmiunent to the United ~ations."His hesitancy arose from anticipated changes in public opinion. King limited his vision of foreign policy to that which was defensible in the Commons. whereas the diplornats in Extemai Affairs were not hindered by such considerations. .Much thought and energy had been expended ------' See pages 68-70 for the rationale behind the Prime Minister's acceptance of the compromise. " Sec pages 6670 for a discussion of Canada's accepcance of the compromise solution. determinhg Canada's place on the world stage. The functional principle would now be used to jus@ Canadian foreign policy. During World War II External Affairs sought to irnprove Canada's representation in the international community. This manifested itself as a concem over the rotes which the Big Four alloned for themselves in post-war planning, and was reveaied in a 1945 report entitled "Canadian Participation in Policy Decisions of Great Powen Postwar Planning." Among other items of concem, was the proclamation of the Atlantic Chmer on August 14, 1941. The listing of countries in the Charter was not in the aiphabeticai order that usuai practice dictated. The Big Four were enumerated fit, then the remaining countries. ' ' Commenthg on the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, Extemal Affairs expressed "the need for avoiding Great Power domination and ensuring a s uitable role for secondary States in the international organization." '' Yet opposition to Great Power dominance was not enough. Canada needed a method by which to advance the position of lesser powen. For this purpose. the Assistant Under-Secretary of State. Hume Wrong developed the hnctional principle. On January 26 1942 Wrong wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs. Noman Robertson, on the subject of Canada's role in a world of growing Great Power cooperation and corresponding Canadian exclusion. Wrong expressed the fùnctional principle as it came to be adopted by Extemai Affairs. How far. then, is Canada entitled to go in pressing a claim to participate in inter- Ailied bodies which are designed to CO-ordinatethe war effort? It is easy to state the general principle. but remarkably difficult to apply it. The principle, I think, is that each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of the war proportionate to its contribution to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of those various countries should be greatest in connection with those matten with which they are most directly concemed. Among suppliers of war materials...Canada ranks third.. .13 LWRRA became the Litmus test for the functional principle. Canada's stniggle for rnembership on UNRRA's Policy Committee typified Extemal's concem over pst-war representation. On May 23.1942 the Foreign Secretary of the U.L. Anthony Eden. sought the approval of the Dominions before accepting the United States' draft constitution of the international relief organization. '' Canada approved "in pnnciple" but noted that "[iln view of Canada's probable pst-war position as a major supplier of foodstuffs. it will be found necessary to raise the question of the fonn of Canadian participation More the proposed organization takes definite ~ha~e."'~On July 29. the War Committee of the Cabinet agreed that Canadian exclusion frorn the Policy Committee was unacceptable. '' From the summer of 1942 until ApBl7, 1943 Canada negotiated for representation which was acceptable to both henelf and the Big Four. The Canadian govemment believed that Canada's position in UNREU would set a precedent for other post-war agencies. A proposal to expand the Policy Committee from four to seven members resulted in an impasse within the Big Four. with only Great Britain supporting the expansion. This prompted the Under-Secretary of State for Extemal Main to write to the Prime Minster that, 'The issue has ken broadened in these discussions so that its solution seems almost certain to affect the form of the post-war ~r~anization.""The Soviet delegate, Maxim Litvinov. also opposed the expansion of the Policy Committee out of a conviction that "what was done in connection with relief would be taken as a pattern for future arrangements in senling other post-war matten."18 Such talk by the Great Powea could only confm the Canadian government's fear that üNRRA foreshadowed post-war relations in the United Nations. Nothing less was at stake than recognition in the post-war world of Canada's contribution to victory. On January 22, 1943 Noman Robertson wrote to Vincent Massey. the High Commissioner in Great Britain that: The United Nations cannot in Our view be merely divided into one group of great powen exercising responsibility on behalf of them ail for the political and military settlement and another group composed of aii the rest no rnatter how great their contribution may be nor how profound their interest in the questions to be settled.Ig Robertson's emphasis on representation as a function of a nation's contribution refiected the consensus in Extemal Affaits that functionalism should detemine the organization of .. . the post-war ~orld.'~Canada had not sought participation in the rnilitary direction of the war. but did insist that her voice be distinguished from those of countries which had stakes thus raised. the government would be in a precarious position should it inadequately advance Canada's position. Canadians had made sacrifices for the war and would not take lightly a Great Power refusal to acknowledge them. On February S Robertson wrote to Leighton McCarthy, the Minister in the United States chat the public was interested in "the place accorded to Canada in the various inter-allied bodies which have been set up for the direction of the ~ar."'~Robertson grasped the political significance of an offended electorate, especially one that felt the govemment had done its job poorly. This. as well as Canada's conviction over its deserved place in the United Nations. guided the government's initiai rejection of what had becorne known as the "compromise solution." ------"' Functionalism has evolved into the notion that nations might cooperatc on matters of less politicai significance in the hope that aust might be developed which enables them to cooperate on more important matters. For a historical discussion of this idea see, Peterson. Ib Damgaard. The Dynamic Lows of Inremarional Political Systems 1823-1973 (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Studies. University of Copenhagen, 1980). On February 26, Pearscn contacted Extemal Affak. The Big Four had refused to expand the Policy Cornmittee. Xoel Hall of the Foreign Office and Dean Acheson of the State Department had proposed a compromise whereby Canada rnight be named as chair of the Supplies Cornmittee. Canada would sit on the Policy Cornmittee. but without a vote." The Deputy Minister of Finance, W.C.Clark, rejected the proposai out of the conviction that UNRRA would be a precedent for post-war econornic and political organizations. Here too, die Soviets opposed this compromise as they felt bat Canada 77 would arbitrarily side with Great Britain.-- hitiaily King held to the views expressed by Clark. When Anthony Eden met the Canadian Cabinet on March 3 1. 1943, he heard King state that acceptance of the compromise would be a retreat from the recognition of Canada's statu in 19 19 and his declaration that Canada would have to "oppose any great power conception of international ~r~anization."~A change was precipitated on April6 when Extemal Xffairs contacted the Cabinet War Cornmittee to state that the Soviets had accepted the compromise. As China had aiready agreed to support the compromise, Great Bntain was now isolated amidst the Big Four and unable to defend Canada's position. Extemai Affairs recommended acceptance and bluntly stated the consequences of refusal: "If we reject this compromise. it may be alleged that we are responsible for the failure of the whole United Nations Relief ~lan"" King adopted the stance recornmended by Extemal Affairs. His response revealed that any advantages in continuing to cavil would have undesirable consequences. "Canada would be subject to severe criticism both inside and outside it if could be alleged that we were responsible for the failure of the whole United Nations relief plan."3 X refusal wodd anger both Canada's allies and Canadian citizens. On April7. 1943 the War Cabinet accepted the compromise sol~tion.'~Extemal Âffairs did not gain rnembenhip on the Policy Cornmittee. but Canada's limited role in LTNRRA represented a partial success for the hnctional principle. Trade and Commerce adopted different cnteria when considering the me& of participation in UNRIU. When World War II began. Great Britain received the majonty of Canada's exports. This relationship changed as the war continued. It became clear chat Canada was increasingly dependent upon the United States as a buyer of Canadian goods. This situation caused two problems, for which a multilateral trade agreement provided the antidote. Fintly, muftilaterai uade would prevent dependence on the United States from replacing dependence on Great Britain. Secondly, it would prevent a breakdown of trade as had existed in the 1930s. As the dicturn Vade follows aid" was popular in government UNRRA provided the means by which to increase trade." By 1941. Bntain no longer had the resources to buy Canadian agricultural goods. Britain had accumulated a f 700 000 000 debt to Canada, primarily in food purchases. Humanitarian and econornic interests motivated Canada to provide aid to Britain. While Canadians had every desire to support Britain as she stood poised against Nazi Germany. supplying aid would also protect their most vaiuable market. The govement proposed to eliminate Britain's debt and provide a gift of 5 1 000 000 000. On March 1 1. 1942. the Leader of the Opposition, R.B. Hanson, linked aid for Britain to Canadian expon markets. - There is a hnher important reason why we should make this [multi-million dollar] gant. in peace time Great Britain has been Our best customer for food produc &...Theprincipal item making up the balance of trade has ken food and food products from Canada.... Since the war began Great Britain has been practicaiiy our only customer for fdproducts. The United States have taken certain quotas... but by and large Britain has been Our besr customer for food products over a long pendof years. Then, in a far-sighted observation. Hanson related this policy to the provision of post-war relief for Europe. Then rhere is the post-war period; where then shail we look but to Britain again for an outiet for a substantial part of our food products? Someone will Say. the continent of Europe wiii have to be fed, but I doubt very much whether they will be able to pay for it. Ail these are to me at least compelling reasons why ail loyal Canadians should and will support this grad' The enabling legislation for aid passed without opposition. Loyalty and economic necessity were powerful motivaton. The Department of Trade and Commerce agreed with Hanson's expressed priorities. in 1943, the Canadian Wheat Board, under the auspices of Trade and Commerce. became the'sole buyer and seller of Canadian wheat. The Wheat Board established a fixed price for Canadian wheat to ensure that Britain would never again acquire such a debt. This guaranteed a cheap supply of wheat to Great Brirain over a set penod of time. On September 15. 1943, the Agricultural Advisory Comminee discussed the shipment of ieed grains to eastern Canada, revealing the govemment's priority for Great Britain. Shiprnents of feed grains wouid be lirnited, as Canada had "a set cornmitment of wheat with the United ~in~dorn."'~ As Trade and Commerce supplied Great Bntain with its food, it became increasingly aware that Canada was becoming less dependent upon Britain for trade. This awareness did not prevent Canada from maintaining its British preference. but it did create a certain "elasticity" within the War Cabinet's thinking. Canadian econornist Louis Rasminsky described this phenornenon by comparing it to "a split [Canadian] personality in which complexes [would] aise only if she [were] forced to choose between Britain and the United s tares. The war hastened Canada's integration into the North American economy. in 1940 King signed the Ogdensburg Agreement and in 1941 he compieted the Hyde Park Agreement. In 1942 Canada and the United States established a Joint Economic Cornmittee. ln September 1943. Norman Robertson. the Under-Secretary of S tate for Extemal Affairs. sought to persuade the Pnme Minister that "a comprehensive and thoroughgoing trade agreement wirh the United States ...could be the fmt major installment of the multilateral program which nearly everyone recognizes as the desirable Robertson was not alone in this belief. Many govemment officiais held that prosperity in the post-war world could be facilitated through multilateral ~ade.~'On AApn122.1944. King's Pariiarnentary Secretary . Brooke Claxton, comected trade and UNRRA in a radio address entitled, the "World Cornmunity Chest," [Tlrade is the bais of prosperity of Canada and of ali nations. In helping the people of Europe and Asia to establish thernselves we shall be helping to create the conditions in which trade can be carried on. The work UNRRA wiIl do will heip CO restore friendiy relations between nations that have ken isolated by war. and in providing assistance to liberated counuies. we shall be assisting ourselves by providing employment to those who produce in Canada the go& which will largely make up our contrib~tion.'~ Charles Wilson, the chairman of the Canadian Wheat Board, continued in this vein when he wrote in the Canadian Businessrnan. Through relief and rehabilitation of war suicken peoples the means may be found of fostering fnendly CO-operation among these peoples in the efforts of the United Nations towards secunty and a king peace. Finaily. through the permanent organization which is expected to follow upon the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agricultwe. Canada is looking to the building of an expanding world economy. in which increased food roduction will be required to meet adequately world food consumption needs. e LTNRRA provided a bridge for Canada to reach out to new markets. Prior to the 1944 budget. King ensured that increased trade was pan of the Liberal economic platform. [King] asked if anything had ken done in the matter of indicating the government's desire to further more in the way of freedom of trade. He said the budget contained no reference to that. [King] said that [he] thought it was absolutely imperative that we should nail Our colours to the mast in the budget. in reference fmt of ail to greater freedom of vade as essential to [the] new world order and in the budget itself make some changes that would make it clear that we intended to help the farmer in preparing for meeting post-war situations ...I pointed out that if we did not do something the CCF would move an amendment and many of our members would support or in any event not vote against [it 1. We might in the end be obliged to accept it and the CCF would get the whole credit of king the party that really was giving relief to the primary producers ...3 s LYRM was part of the Liberai economic policy which would help defeat the CCF. not to mention improve post-war trade. The govemment's cornmiunent to post-war trade was especially important to agricultural interests as they were dependent on foreign markets. The Canadian Federation of Agriculnire(CFA) strongly supported involvement in UMUZA and the Food and Agricultural ~r~anization.~~The September, 1944 issue of the Countrv Guide noted rhat "If UNRRA is successful in attaining its objectives... Canadian farmen need not woqabout future markets." Given their concem over the post-war trade. it was important that farmers be aware the government was working to secure markets. The Wartime Information Board distnbuted information to newspapers which emphasized WRRA's need for Canadian wheat." .-\griculniral interests expected to supply C'NRM with much wheat. A failure ro meet these expectations would be problematic for the Liberals. Trade and Commerce ensured this situation did not arise by designating a portion of Canada's contribution to LWRRA as wheat. In August, Pearson contacted the Trade and Commerce advisor to Extemal Affairs. H.F. Angus, to discover "...the prionty which Canada proposes to assign to WRRA as a purchaser of suitable types of surplus supplies."38 This close consultation facilitated the establishment of a common objective for Canadian policy. On October 1 1. 1944. Angus conveyed the substance of a meeting of the Extemal Trade Advisory Commission (E.T.A.C.) to Pearson. The Commission was concerned that LWRRA would not purchase a substantial quantity of wheat before its credits with Canada were exhausted. The Commission also "emphasized that it would be politically impossible not to fumish a considerable quantity of wheat as part of Canada's contribution to UNRRA." UNRRA had already purchased Canadian goods to the sum of 53 1.000.000. It was essential that UNRRA not spend the remainder of its credits in Canada without taking a "quantity of wheat that Canadian opinion would consider adequate ... .-739 The Commission recommended the acquisition of 25,000,000 bushels of whear. nus, the remainder of Canada's contribution to UNRRA would be nearly sxpended. To satisfy the agricultural interests, Canada would have to earmark a portion of her contribution specifically for wheat purchases. WRRA officials tned to prevent such a course of action as it u~ecessarilyrestncted their freedom to purchase necessities. On October 19, 1944, LJNRRA officials hdrew Cairns and David Weintraub assured capada that they "anticipated fairly heavy demands for wheat when UNRRiZ cakes over ,,ponsibility for Jiberated area~-'*~Angus described LMUtA's reaction as a *'naturd but felt that. if the entirety of the Canadian contribution were used up. it would be easy for the United States to block funds frorn its contribution for the purchase of ,hgat outside the United tat tes." Pearson's conduct in this situation epitomized his dipiomacy. He pursued (-dada's interests while trying not to put UNRRA in a difficult position. Mer ,onsulting with the chairman of the Canadian Wheat Board, George McIvor. Pearson infdmedExtemal Affairs that "we need not push for UNRRA allocation at the moment becPuse we already have our han& full supplying the existing demands." AMore im~flântly*Pearson added that "[wlith a Canadian Chairman on that Cornmittee [of supplies),we ought to be able to ensure that an appropriate arnount of UNRRA wheat from canada."'" Pearson felt that Canada's diplomats could simultaneously protect Canadian interests and preserve WRRA's freedom to spend its credits as needed. Pearson's tactics had ment. It would have ken "embarrassing" for UNRRA if s,pplying countries had ken able to stipulate which supplies could be purchased for relief.'3 Canada's ear-marking of credits would have created an awkward precedent. ,ffe UN@. have created conditions which made UNRRA's task excessively diffic~lt.~ The situation resoived itself when the international Wheat Council authorized LXRRA to act as the Council's distributor of wheat- Under the terms of the Wheat Agreement. Canada stiil had an obligation to provide 10,000,000 bushels of wheat. which was srnalier than the original 25.000.000 busheis stipulated. Mthough LMRRA was not pleased that Canada had designated a specific quantity of wheat as part of her contribution, Canada did so in order to fulfill the conditions of an international agreement and thus avoided sening a precedent which other nations might follow. As well, the Canadian government could be sure that a specified quantity of her contribution consisted of wheat. This episode revealed the extent to which Trade and Commerce viewed UNRRA as a means of reducing Canada's annual carry-over of unrnarketed wheat. Contnbuting to UNRRA was not the only way the Liberais assured producers of their greater cornmitment to post-war trade. Liberals sought input frorn producen through conferences on agriculniral policy with a view to gaining their suppon. The .Minister of Agriculture foxmalized this reiationship on February 17. 1943 when he wrote ro Herbert Hannam. the president of the CFA and asked him to become chairman of the Cabinet Wheat Cornmittee's Advisory Cornmittee. Hannam realized that this would entail a formidable workload. He was dso aware that the Minister might inadvertently CO-optthe CFA through the Advisory Board. A facade of influence could reduce the CFA's political clout. Hannarn wrote to the CFA executive that acceptance of the position might mean a forfeiture of the CFA's right to criticize govenunent policy.~sYet a refusal to join would also allow the govemment to rehte any CFA cnticism by stating that the CFA had refused the chance to offer input. With the proviso that two other CFA experts be allowed to join. Hannam accepted the offer on February 22. The Advisory Board became an effective means of government-producer consultation in the development of wheat policy for 1944 and 1945. When the ~Ministerof Agriculture estabfished wheat policy for 1944 and 1945. he made sure that Great Britain's and the United States' import requirements rook precedence. Planning for the post-relief period also took place under the guise of reducing wheat carry-oves. As such. Little planning went into the development of reserves for future international relief. In December 1943, the Dominion-Provincial production conference reflected the Wnister of Agriculture's cautious perspective. He did not recornmend an increase in wheat production for 1944. ...the Dominion Minister of Agriculture cited the extent of remaining wheat surpluses and expressed the view that an average crop in 1944 on the same acreage as was planted in 1943 would provide Canada with suficient wheat to meet the highest possible demand in the next two years. Therefore the safest course of action wouid be to maintain present output of coarse grains and keep summer-fallow acreage at a high level so as to be in a position to produce more wheat if and when later required. without further aggravating the surplus position.J6 As Minister of Agriculture. Gardiner directed policy first by considering its domestic ramifications. He sought to meet the immediate needs of the United States and the Cnited Kingdom. The levels of wheat acreage in 1943 were the lowest in more than 25 years. This fact. whiie beneficial domestically. was later to have repercussions on the amount of wheat available for relief. Gardiner's conclusion did not make explicit an important objective of agncuh.mil policy and therefore his last sentence [quoted above] would therefore have better read "Therefore the safest course of action in order to reduce surpluses would be to maintain present output..." Gardiner actively sought to reduce Canada's surplus of wheat. .And as has already been seen. Canadian participation in UNRRA furthered this objective The information Gardiner used when he stated thar the level of wheat pianted in 1943 was sufficient to meet the "highest possible demand in the next two years" is uncenain. Given the various reports on food crises which would follow in the imrnediare post-war period, it is difficult to make sense of this prediction. Quite probably Gardiner meant that the levels of whear acreage would be sufficient to meet the highest possible demand placed on Canada. in this sense. Canada would fulfül its obligations to meet the CFB's allocations. Gardiner's statements in the offcial record of the 1943 production conference support this understanding. Even if 1944 should see the liberation of the greater part of axis-dominated Europe. and if Canada should be called upon to supply a large proportion of relief shipments. because of the shon haul. there would appear to be little doubt of being able to meet such requirements without any immediate increase in production ... In connection with expons and relief shipments, it must be recognized that in the post-war period rhere will be wheat surpluses in Argentina, Ausualia. and perhaps the United States from which stocks could be drawn as we11." Why else would he refer to Australia, Argentina and the United States. except to point out that Canada was not wholiy responsible for supplying aii of liberated Europe with wheat? The Canadian govemment anticipated that the provision of relief would be a joint effort. Gardiner's plans, however. were contingent upon a number of other factors and nsked leaving Canada ilf-prepared for relief. as was imrnediately painted out by the Advisory Commi e Fofiowing the Dominion-Provincial conference. the Advisory Cornmittee met in Ottawa. The cornmittee proposed an increase of 10 percent of acreage devoted to wheat and an increase of maximum deliveries from 14 to 18 bushels per authorized acre. ft cited the size of potential relief and rehabilitation needs as the justification for this change." In January. 1944, the Cabinet Wheat Committee responded to these latter propsals by increasing the maximum delivery to 18 bushets per acre and by ending wheat reduction payments."g The cornmittee. no longer willing to pay to sustain the current low Ievels of production, expected farmers to infer that the government sought some increase in wheat acreage. By April 17 1944. Clive Davidson. formerly of the Dominion Bureau of Statisrics and now a member of the Advisory Committee. remained dissatisfied with the lack of publicity given to the necessity of increasing wheat production. The cornmittee sent a report to the Chairman of the Cabinet Wheat Cornrnittee. There is every prospect that the 1944 production and accumulated stocks of Canadian wheat will go into consumption before the end of 1944-45 and there will be a difficuit supply position during the fmt six months of 1945..50 The report also noted that the determination of the number of bushels per acre to be delivered to the Canadian Wheat Board need not be settled irnmediately, so long as the principle that production goals should be set with a view to meeting domestic and export demands was accepted. in Apd 1944. James MacKinnon. the ,Minister of Trade and Commerce. suggested in Parliament that the demand for Canadian wheat in the upcoming year would be quite large. Since. however. some uncenainty existed as to the actuai "quantity of wheat which will be marketable." he gave no outright endorsement for increased production.5' On .May 10. 1944. H.J. Wesson of the Saskatchewan wheat pool pubiicly cxpressed the Advisory Cornmittee's dissatisfaction. The famers are now in the middle of seeding and we beiieve they should have the latest information regarding the wheat situation. We aiso believe they should be frankly advised of the necessity of substantially increased wheat acreage this spring before it is too late ...The wheat situation has changed from one of large available supplies pressing heavily upon limited demand into a position where the wheat problem next year wiil be largely in tenns of receiving and vaasporthg enough wheat to supply the market ... The wheat glut is gone-our concem now should be a possible shortage of supply in the event of a shon crop or crop iai~ure.'~ Producers responded to these promptings and increased wheat acreage by 36 per cent in ~944.'~The govemment's policy was to meet the existing dernands for whear. principaiiy those of Great Britain and the United States. while decreasing the carry-over of whea6, 1945. rhe priority of Canadian agriculture continued to be providing Great Britain' s needs. On December 1-6. 1944 at the Dominion-Provincial production conference. the chairman. Charles Wilson. was concerned about fulfilling Great Britain's meat requirements. To meet his concern. the conference endoned a 22 per cent increase in acreage devoted to feed grains and an 8 per cent decrease in acreage devoted to wheat. Xlso. Wilson had adopted the Cm's Cereals Cornmittee allocation of 350 million bushels of whear as the demand upon Canada in the upcorning crop year." Gardiner's suppon for these proposais revealed that his primary concem was for Cmadian agriculture in the post-relief period. While a continued demand for Iivestock products means indirectiy a good market for oats and barley, the outlook for wheat, on the other hand. is less certain. There is every prospect that over the next year or two a market will be available for as much wheat as can be transponed. but the long-run position is more obscure. There is an abundant supply of wheat in store in Canada and elsewhere; there is the ease and rapidity with which acreage may be increased and the uncertainty as to what rnay be done by European countries in this comection,.. 55 While Gardiner conceded that the demand for relief would be as large as Canada could possibly handle. to him. the reduction of carry-ovea was still paramount as he did not want to retain a surplus, given his uncertainty over European agriculniral production. Gardiner's statement that "the long-tem position is more obscure" revealed the period towards which Canadian agriculture was king directed in 1944: the post-relief period. Wilson explained the mood in whch these proposals were made as one of "reserve and caution."56 The United States was importing less Canadian wheat for feed, making Canada more dependent on overseas markets. In September 1944 the United Grain Growea related reduced American dernand for feed to the prospects of supplying wheat for relief in The Countrv Guide. Such a situation. however, rnay not last long, for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of Europe may be accomplished so rapidly that before the next crop year is out Canadian wheat will be in demand ...j ust as rapidly as it can be shipped.. . 57 Wheat benknew that the liberated areas would require extensive Canadian wheat. fn January 1945. when Gardiner endorsed the proposals made in December, he was again opposed by Wesson. Wesson eventually reversed his position. but lus initital opposition worried both Gardiner and the ,Minister of Finance, Usley. However, before anyone publicly criticized the government. demands for wheat from Europe forced the government to reverse its policy on not raising the delivery quota, which it did on October 1, 1945 kn explaining the govemment's decision to accept deliveries beyond 14 bushels per authorized acre. Charles Wilson in A Century of Canodinn ~rain'~avoided stating that relief for Europe was to be given out of residual Canadian supluses. which the -goverment had been acuvely reducing. Instead. Wilson explained that "From V-E Day fonvard. the irnpon demand for Canadian wheat exceeded ail e~~ectations."~~While requirements from Europe were larger than expected this does not fully explain the gap between what was avadable for liberated areas and what was known of those demands. Estirnates of world food requirements showed that demands for food would be vast and would not be met in fuli. In March, 1944 the Cereds Comrnittee of the CFB studied a document by the London Food Cornmittee which demonstrated that the depletion of wheat stocks threatened the Allies' ability to meet the food requirements of the liberated areas. 6 1 An increase in acreage would have left Canada better prepared for this eventuality. By emphasizing the nature of the demand. Wilson avoided a discussion of what was known to be the effects of current govemment policy as it related to the provision of wheat for relief. Wilson also referred to the poor crop in 1945 as a reason for the wheat shonage. "The Iuiy cmyover, predicted earlier at 320 million bushels. actually amounted to 258 mi~lion."~'The extent of Canada's unpreparedness for such a plausible contingency as a short crop exposes the need for greater consideration of the effects of policy as it related to preparation for relief. Indeed. the short crop of 1945 was simply the realization of Wesson's feus as expressed in 1944. Again, Wilson presented circumstance as the cause of the shonfalls in production during the 1945 food crisis. "European production fell600 million bushels below normal In the period in which Canadian wheat policy was determined- Decernber, 1944 to .March 2. 196- it was obvious that liberated Europe would not be able to produce as much wheat as she had prior to World War II. A Iune 1944 column in the Countw Guide, "News of Agriculture." described Europe's diminished capacity to produce wheat. Following the First World War. in 19 14- 19 18. it took about seven years for the European continent to restore its food production to pre-war levels. Basicaily, the agriculturai situation in Europe today is weaker than it was at the conclusion of WWI. The longer the war lasts. the weaker it will become. and the reconstruction of European agriculture will be long delayed. Given that World War II had seen the extensive use of tanks and heavy bomben unlike anything seen in World War 1. the above statement was obviously me. Policy maken were cenainly not ignorant of the issues raised in the Countrv Guide. Rather. the Canadian govemment had different goals for Canada's agriculture. The Depamnents of Trade and Commerce and Extemal Affairs both advocated panicipation in UNRRA. but for different reasons. Trade and Commerce's primary motivation for participating in UNRRA was to provide an outlet for Canadian wheat and secure post-war markets. With its concem for the post-war economy, Trade and Commerce seemed to place less emphasis on relief than it might have. A low priontization for relief appeared to be at cross-purposes with Extemai AfTairs. whch had a stake in seeing UNRRA succeed since Canada had a prominent place in the relief organization. Instead, doubts about UNRRA's efficiency in External Affairs facilitated an unexpected CO-operationbetween the two departments. Trade and Commerce directed wheat policy towards sustaining Great Britain. This necessitated different planning than would have ken necessitated by the objective of sustaining Europe through UNRRA. Charles Wilson compared Trade and Commerce's prioriries for wheat and Britain as they existed in the rnidst of the 1945 food crisis. In a report to the government entitled. "Observations on Wheat ~olicies."~~(See Appendix 1.) Wilson stated that: From December. 1945 the distribution of wheat expons has ken subject to United Kingdom needs and available supplies as well as available transportation... Owing to the international food situation, the United Kingdom stated [its] needs in ternis of minimum requirements ... hpiementing the British priority involved the placing of limits on the quantities of wheat going to other c~untries.~~ Canada's pnoritization of wheat limiid hie &ïûuiii wikù wii~avaiiaoiç îor orner The net effect of the British preference was to make less wheat available to L'NRRA through the Combined Food Board (CFB).Wilson's 1946 "Observations on Wheat Policies" statistically demonstrated that Canada's relations with Bntain pre- committed the lion's share of Canadian wheat. (See appendur 1.)Where Canada's preference for Britain and wheat for UNRRA were not mutuaily exclusive. relief was much less of a pnority for Trade and Commerce. Such a scenario was ahost inevitable as the two commitments pulied Canadian wheat policy in different directions. In light of Canada's stniggle to win a seat on UNRRA's Policy Cornmittee. one would expect the prioritization given to relief by Trade and Commerce to provoke a conflict with Externai Affain. hdeed. Pearson had his doubts about wheat policyp7but such a conflict still did not materialize. Pearson recognized that UNRRA did not enjoy the full support of Great Btiiain or the United tat tes.^^ Such an awareness would easily have dissuaded him from taking his colleagues to task for offering less-than-full support Pearson had misgivings about both Amencan foreign policy and bTRRA. As early as 1942 he described LMRRA as "more of a headache than an opportuniry.-69 u, 1943 he expressed fears over isolationist tendencies in &encan foreign polic y, which boded il1 for UNRRA as it was to be massively fmanced by the United States. .My own view is that American policy after this war is not going to be much more intelligent than it was after the last. The fact of the matter is bat most Amencans are naturd isolationists and only international CO-operatonin an 70 emergency. We are in for a sticky time. On March 6, 1944 Pearson described the prospect of king made UNRRA's Director- General as a "... a fate [which] would be aimost worse than dearh in the present condition of LNRM."7'Later, in a nine-page memo written on July 11 1944. Pearson analyzed Roosevelt's foreign policy in light of the upcoming Presidentiai election." Pearson revealed his awareness of the obstacles which the President faced in supporting an international organization such as üNRRA. One month later. these obstacles must have been in mind as Pearson closed the Second Council Session, for he did so without exposing the United States' and Great Britain's sornetimes questionable diplomacy. However. he did exhon al1 governrnents to support UNRRA apart hmnarrowly national inter est^.'^ Pearson's experience showed as he supponed UNRRA to the best of his abilities while not placing his superiors in an awkward situation. His stance was not due to doubts about intemationdism. but rather, reflected an awareness of the constraints whch acted upon policy makers. Moreover. if there had ever been a time when Pearson might have encouraged greater allocations for UNRRA. it would have been in the fall of 1944. Yet when Angus first raised the issue of ear-marking, Pearson merely sought to reconcile Canada's and LXRRA's needs. Pearson would have also have had great difficulry convincing Angus ro allot more wheat for LMRRA. When Mgus leamt of the United States and Great Britain's efforts to doctor the agenda for WR.RATsSecond Council Session. he was very critical of Canada's senior allies for fading to supppon LTNRRA. which he thought was a principal source of UMUZA's ~eakness.'~It is almost certain that Pearson had read Angus's comments or was at least aware of his views. To recornmend an increase in production or allocations for UNRRA would thus be tantamount to planning foreign policy through an organization which enjoyed only the partial support of Canada's allies. By using the functional principie. Canada lmproved her international representation through LMRRA. The Prime Minister supported this representation but the initiative came from Extemal Affairs. At the same time Canadian wheat production was unofficiaily directed towards sustaining Bntain from 1941 forward, and officially so from 1943 on. These two objectives pulled agncultural production in two different directions at the expense of relief. However. lingering doubts about UNRRA's ability ta accomplish its task undemined some of the cnticism which might have matenalized. As a result, Extemal Affairs and Trade and Commerce were in agreement as to the nature of Canada's cornmiunent to WRRA. Such a consensus preserved UNRRA's image as well as any oppominity to breathe new life into the organization. hpoitantly, the Mïnister of Agricuiture and the Canadian Wheat Board did not accept sole responsibiiity for providing for the liberated areas. Canada had already undextaken to sustain Great Britain, and to meet other dernands for the Soviet Union and the United States. Littie remained for UNRRA after these commitments were met. Yet the Canadian governent was conscious that wheat famers on the Prairies were attracted to the CCF. which looked to the post-war period. Politicaiiy. the Liberais could not afford not to join WRRA. and participation in UNRRA represented the Liberal cornminment to finding markets for Canadian wheat. In the United States. the opposite pmblern existed. Roosevelt could not appear too zealous for WRRA, lest he provoke what he understood as a latent isolationisrn in the American public. ' NAC. MG 30. E3O 1. vol. 19. file 19- 12. S taternent by A. Cairns on the World Food Situation and Canadian Agriculture at the Opening Session of the 26th Annual Meeung and Convention of the Agricultural Institute, Monday, 24 June. 1946. p. 1. jack Granastein. The Orrowo Yen: The Civil Service MnndarUrr. 1935- 1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1982). p.252. 3 Granatstein. The Onawa Men. pp. 128- 13 1. F. Soward. C& in World Affairs, I9&-1946 (Toronto:Oxford University Press. 1950). pp.86-87. Walter D.Young, Democraq and Disconrenr (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.. 1978). p.69. 6 Young. p.7 1. Jack Granatstein. Cd'sWar: The Politics of rhe Mackenzie King Govenvnenr, 1939- 1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1973, p.262. 3 Granatstein. C&'s War pp.302-303. Pearson. p.289. 'O Susan Armstrong-Reid. 'Canadas Rolc in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitatioo Administration. 1942-1947" (Ph.D. dis. University of Toronto, 19821, p.306. " NAC. RG 25,voi 3500. file 2 1-f- l9Wl "Atlantic Charter" " SAC. RG 25. ~01.3500.file 2 1-f- 1- 1945Il "Canadian Participation in Policy Decisions of Great Powen in Post-War Planning," p.38. 13 Granatstein, The Onawa Men, p. 126. IJ DCER. 1942, vol 9, High Commissioner in Great Brinin to the Secretary of State for External hffairs r hereafter EALp.769. ls DCER. 1942. vol. 9. Ssretary of State for EA to the High Commissioner in Great Brirain. p.769. 1.6 DCER, 1942, voi.9, Extract fiom the Minutes of War Cabinet Cornmittee, p.770. " DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Memo from Under-Secretary of State to Prime Minister. p.773. ''DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Memo Fmm Under-Secretary of State to Pnme Minister. p.773. '9 DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Secrecary of State for EA to High Commissioner in Britain. p.775. " DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Exuact from Minutes of Cabint War Cornmittee. March 3 1. p.791. " DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Memo by Under-Secrrtacy of State for EA. p.782. -7 7 DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Minister in the United States to the Secretary of State for EA, p.786. DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Extracts fiom Cabinet Wu Cornmittee. p.79 1. '' DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Memo from DEA to Cab. War Cornmince. p.797. DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Exaaçr fiom Minutes of Cabinet War Cornmittee. p.797. " DCER. 1943. vol. 9. Exuact frorn Minutes of Cabinet War Cornmittee. p.798. " Armstrong-Reid. 'Canada's Rolc in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 1942- 1947" "G.E. Briuiell and V.C.Fowke. p.104. " NAC. MG 28 166. vo1.9. file 1(a). Meeting of the Agnculturd Advisory Cornmittee. Septcrnber 15.1943. -XIJack Granatstein (ed.). Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd.. 1993). p. 183. 3 1 Granatstein (ed.), CdianForeign Policy, p. 184. " Granatstein. The Onawa Men. pp. 139- 142. 35 Armstrong-Reid. pp. 184- 185. " The Canadian Federation of Agnculntn (CFA) followed closely developments in UNRRA and the implications of the FA0 for agriculturd production. NAC, (CFA papers) MG 28 166, vol. 3 1. file 102 "United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, 1943" and file 103 "UNRRA 1944." j7 NAC. RG 36-31. vo1.9.4-2-18 Wartime Information Board. R.W. Baldwin to various editors. December 20. 1943. '' DCER. 1944. vol. 10. Minister. Embassy in United States to Vnder-Secretary of State for Exremal Xffairs. p. 1497. Pearson informai Angus that "Canadian arrangements appear to have progressed considerably funher than the U.S. or U.K arrangements for making surpius supplies availablc to UMüU." Disposal of U.K. surplwes was king considercd in light of a papa released on My18. and the disposal of American surpluses would "depend on the outcome of present deliberations in the Senatc." Pearson added chat "in neither of the bills before the Senate is thcre any specific provision for UNRRA in the priorities arranged." 39 DCER. 1944. vol. 10. Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs to Ambassador in United States. p. 1499. U) DCER. 1944. vol. 10, Ambassador in United States for Secretary of State for External Affairs. p. 1499. " DCER. 194.4. vol. 10. Secrctary of State for External Affairs to hbassador in the United States. p. 1500. " DCER. 1944. vol. 10. Ambasador in United Sutes to Secretq of State for Extemal Affairs. p 1501. " DCER. 1944. vol. 10. Special Wanime Assistant to the Under-Secretary of Stace for W ro Minster. Ernbassy in the United States. p. 15 14. U DCER. 1944, vol. 10, Speciai Wartirne Assistant to the Under-Secretary of Sute for EA to Minster. Embassy in the United States, p. 15 15. "NAC. MG 28 166. vol. 9. file l(a) "Agncultural Advisory Committec. 1943." CFA Resident to the CFA executive. " BrimeIl and Fowke. p.217. 47 BritnelI and Fowke. p.2 17, "c.F.Wilson. A Cenrury ojCdianGrain Governmem Policy to 1951 (Saskatoon: Western Roducer Rairie Books. 1978), p.804. 49 Wilson. p.804. 'O Wilson. p.805. 5' Wilson. p.806. " Wilson. p.807. Wilson. p.807. " Wilson. pp.808-809. 5 5 Bntnell and Fowke, p.2 18. '6 Wilson. pp.808-809. 57 Countc Guide. Seprember 1944, p.29. '' Wilson. p.829. '9 Wilson. A Century of CdimGrain Goventmenr Poliq to 1951. (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prame Books, 1978). * Wilson. p.828. '' YAC. RG 25. ~01.2498.file 108 (pt 1). Founh (1944) Meeting of the Committec of Cereals and Feeds. March 27-29, I954. p.7. 52 Wilson. p.828. '' Wilson. p.828. & Country Guide. june 1944, p. 12. " YAC. MG 30. E3OI. vol. 21. file 21-8. Observations on Wheat Policies. iipnl 26. 1946. * NAC. MG 30. E3OI. vol. 21. file 21-8. Observations on Wheat Policies. April 26. 1946. pp.24. 67 NAC. MG 26. NI. vo1.17. file "Wrong. Hume: 1942-1947" Pearson to Wrong. May 3. 1944. p.2. While workmg with the Wheat Board during the international price negotiations of 1944, Pearson stated he had "grave doubts as to the wisdom of our whole policy." 'DCER. 1944. vol. 10. p.1488. Sec also. NAC. MG 26. NI. ~01.62.'*UNRRA 1943- 1947". Pearson to Robertson. January 27, 1944. pp. 1-2. 69I. English. Shadow of Heaven: Tne Life of Lester Pearson vol. one 1897-1948 (Toronto:Lester and Orpen Dennys Ltd.. 1989). p. 281. 70 NAC, MG 26 N8 Vol. 1. Pearson's Diary, Feb. 13.1943. 7 1 NAC. MG 26. N8. vol.1. Pearson's Diary. Tues.. March 6,1944. " NAC. RG 25. vol. 5723.7-CH(s). Pearson to Robertson. July11.1944. 73 Armstrong-Reid, p. 308. In his spcech Pearson stated that "...even if it possessed the wisdorn and tact of a Generai Eisenhower and the practical sense of his quartermaster-genera1, -1 cannot succeed unless the governrnents we rcpresent, and the peopie behind these governments, back it to the limit and beyond; not merely with the supplies and facilities and personnel. but with the full mord and political support which it is entitled to receive. If governments base their reIationshp to UNRRA on narrowly national considerations. there will bc no such support, The danger is not that any governments wiIl oppose Lm.That wiIl not happen. The danger is in indifference. doubts. suspicions. prejudices. These are the booby naps that may block UNRRA's advance." '1 '1 DCER. 1944 vol 10, memo from Department of Extemai Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for Extemal Affairs. pp. 1490- t 49 1. Chaoter 1 ïhe Politics of Limited Relief: The United States and UNRRA LWRRA was designed to be of limited scope.' Yet its creation led to the assumption that it would be able to supply Europe with relief adequately. Luther Johnson of the House Cornmittee of Foreign Affairs highlighted ihis when he required Dean Acheson to go on record as saying that the liberated areas would have to Furnish 95 per cent of the supplies and services needed to recover. Johnson stated, "...some people think U.N.R.R.A. is going to hiniish dl relief for these counuies. 1 think it is important for the public to be disillusioned of any such misapprehension .....Z This evident "misapprehension" existed at a the when both the eiectorate and the Republican party were undecided as to the nature of Amencan involvement in the post- war world. Reueating from European politics was not an option. but for the United States a foreign policy which downplayed the United Nations was still a possibility.3 The first United Nations body, UNNU was viewed as a mode1 for the membeahip and structure of the United ~ations.~On Decernber 10. 1943. Govemor Lehman stated that if UNRU was riddled with problems it would undermine confidence in the ability of the Cnited Nations to cooperate in the post-war world: "If U.N.R.R.A. should fail. there is grave doubt that any collaboration of the United Nations can survive the test of practical application."5 It was important to maintain the belief that LiMZRA would be able to supply Europe with sufficient post-war relief in order to preserve confidence in the Cnited Nations and maintain the belief that participation in the UN would not mean undue burdens for the United States. This chapter will examine the extent to which Amencan agriculturd policy- makers faiied to prepare for post-war relief. Political considerations. such as congressional-execurive relations and Soviet-Amencan relations. will be offered as an explanation as to why the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) gave such a Iow pnority to the provision of aid through LMRRA. But since even half-hearted support from the Roosevelt administration ensured UNRRA's sumival, the administration need have not provoked Congress through demands for increased spending, and not suain herican-Soviet relations. It will be necessary to consider briefly the relationship be~eenthe Truman administration and UNRRA. ïhe seeds planted (or more appropnately. not planted) during the Roosevelt years created problerns for President Truman. By this time. a deterioration in Amencan-Soviet relations had brought about a bipartisan preference for bilateral aid. The changing attitudes in the Truman years will be canvassed to indicate the desire to disuibute aid through bilateral agreements. Shortly after Truman took office. the type of cooperation envisioned in UNRRA became increasingly difficult to achieve. Yet the story of UNRRA's undoing had begun long before Truman took office. in the USDA. Throughout the war, Amencan wheat policy was designed to prevent overproduction and to supply livestock with feed. On August 30. 1944. the Department of Agriculnire published nie Wheat Siruution, which discussed the likely demands on Amencan agriculture in 1945. The report observed that "Post-war requiremenü will depend upon the quantity of wheat used for animai feed and the volume of Our e~~orts."~ Thus. the USDA's preparation for post-war requirements can be examined by considering the use of wheat for feed crops and export demands. Such an examination reveals that USDA poiicy conuadicted the recommendations made by relief agencies and that the department's preparauon for relief was negligible. ïhe USDA increased the amount of wheat to be used for feed crops. The rationaie behind this decision, as described in ne Wheat Sitzution was that: "Xow that growers are accustomed to using large quantities of feed. its use for this purpose may be increased." ' Ranchen had become accustomed to using wheat for feed earlier in 1943 and 1944. afier there had been a rise in livestock prices. The governrnent did not initiate price controls on livestock. and farmen responded by increasing their herds, which exhausted the supply of feed. In view of the increased livestock production, the 1944 Agricultural Appropriation Act removed restrictions on the amount of wheat used as feed for livesto~k.~Moreover, in 1944 the govenunent continued to penalize those farmers who produced more wheat than permitted. increasing the number of livestock ignored the recommendations made at the Hot Springs Food conference in 1943. The conference had recomrnended that govemments "increase the acreage under crops for direct human consumption, and even ... hold back the rebuilding of depleted livestock herds - essential though this rebuilding will ultimately be ...'" .An econornics professor at Harvard. Dr. John Black. funher cnticized USDA policy in 1943. when he analyzed the problems of food production in Food ~nou~h." BIack wrote. 'The basic issue is whether we want to use much of our land and labor resources extravagantly by keeping up a very large livestock population, or use them in such a way as to have food to spare for the people of allied and friendly nations in their day of great need."' l neUSDA's preparation for post-war requirements also entailed consideration of the exports. The Wheat Situarion noted that "Udess abnomaiiy large shipments are required by Europe during the 1941-15 year. the surplus in prospect from the four exporting countries should go far toward meeting import requirements."" Given that during this penod. worken in UNRRA as well as War and State Depanment officials expected the war to be over within a matter of weeks, it is difficult to comprehend why they did not anticipate European impon needs when assessing the overd wheat situation. Furthemore. wheat supplies were sufficient to rneet anticipated needs onLy if China and the USSR were excluded from the calculation." Thus. in August, 1944 the USDA could state that supplies could meet post-war requirements only if it did not consider the needs of China, the USSR and of Europe. The USDA's method for cdculating post-war requirements reduced its estimation of demand, which in mm led to a fear of surpluses. Considering the ne& of China. the USSR or Europe might have alieviated some of this feu. but the USDA did not do this. Similady, the means by which USDA officials determined the adequacy of supply defies cornmon sense. Rather than compare production to current worid needs, which was the mechod followed by every other study on post-war requirements, the USDA judged the adequacy of production by comparing it to those of previous years. such as the period from 1935- 1939.'' An increase in production over the past was thought to justify the conclusion that current supply might be able to cover current demands. This was illogical. The USDA's rationale was intended to hide the fact that the department was only considenng domestic consumption. Agncultural policy-makee also proceeded without regard to relief in the abandonment of price controls and the refusal to stockpile wheat. The International Food Conference as Hot Springs had warned against removing price controls in an effort to prevent "violent fluctuation arising from unrestrained cornpetition for inadequate supplies. in the prices of food." Of the removal of price controls. the economic advisor to the American arnbassador to Great Britain. E.F. Penrose, has written, "It is difficult to see how the United States can be acquitted of an act of bad faith in the scrapping of pnce convols on and after V-J ~a~.""High prices meant that less relief could be purchased for Europe. A further instance where agicultural policy developed without consideration for UNRRA can be seen in the refusal to stockpile relief goods. On several occasions Amencan and British officiais recommended the building of stockpiles for relief needs. As early as September 1941 the Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture to the President expressed the need to build "a reserve of finished goods ...to give the starving conquered peoples of Europe something to depend on ..." Later the Secretary of Agriculture wrote to Roosevelt: "[SJtockpiies rnean financing in the form of loans or purchases. and consequently 1 am hesitant to encourage the production of stockpiles until you tell me to do ~0."'~While the initiative for creating stockpiles lay with the President, the Arnencan entry into the war focused concems on dornestic requirements. Buffer stocks of wheat were also proposed du~ginternational Commodity negotiations in 1942. l7 S tockpiles were again recommended by the British econornist Meynard Keynes, as a means of stabilizing the wheat economy and providing aid.18 Likewise. the American Great Plains Agriculturai Council advocated the establishment of reserve wheat stocks." At Hot Springs. the British delegation also stressed the need to create buffer stocks. As economic advisor to Ambassador Winant. Penrose creared a plan whereby buffer stocks could be sold to deficit areas through an International Commodity Council (ICC) and an International Food Council (IFC). This scheme would have benefited producen of surplus goods and protected them against a general drop in the pnce of wheat. This latter plan was rejected as it included discriminatory pricing. contrary to the trade policies of the United tat tes." Given the repeated proposais for stockpiling, one might have anticipated the creation of a buffer-stock. or at least the maintenance of a large carry-over of goods from one year to the next. The very opposite happened. A policy of "bare shelves" was adopted in 1944. A fear of agncultural surpluses prevented the build up of reserves for relief. Strictly enforced, this "[came] as close as possible to seeing that the last GI potato. the last pat of GI butter and the last GI slice of bread was eaten just as the war's last shot was fired."" Despite the numerous predictions of food shortages. the CFB maintained an optimistic view of future needs. Eric Roll. who was a British representative on the CFB. has wriaen of the assumption behind such optimism. "[Such optimism] could be justified only if a shon view of relief needs was taken of future prospects, in particular. if the possibility of a large increase of requirements from liberated areas was vim~allyignored."" As has been seen in the CFB estimate of 1943, and the Whent Situation report of August 1944. ths is what happened. .4gricultural policy exasperated wheat growers: "The government claims that it wanrs more food, and wheat will give them much more food on Our acres than anything Farmen, like the delegates at the conference at Hot Springs. recognized that wheat produced more food for human consumption per acre than other available crops. Yet from 194 1- 1943. the percentage of rotal acreage devoted ro w heat decreased from 18 to 15.3%. This decrease was accompanied by a 1.5% increase in acreage devoted to feed crops. in 1944 and 1945 wheat production increased to 18% and then again to 19.2% of the total acreage. However, the increased acreage was intended to provide feed for the growth in livestock herds. rather than stockpile food for relief. .More wheat could have been grown through an increase in acreage devoted to food crops. The USDA estimated that. in 1943. there couid be an increase of 22 million acres devoted to wheat over the expected 358 million utilized. and a merincrease of 29 million acres devoted to wheat over the 35 L million pianted in 1944." Much of the land king brought into use was simply land which had been kept idle through federal pay-outs under the Agricul tural Adjusment Act (AAA). After canvassing soi1 conservation rneasures. another report suggested that 35-60 million acres of land could have been brought in10 production. Whatever estimate is used. in 1943, only 18 million acres were brought back into use? From 1939-1945 the total acreage devoted to wheat increased by only 2.9%? Given the repeated statements that food needs could not be met. such cautious growth bespeaks short-sighted inaction. Most famien were generaily prepared to alter production patterns so long as the government bore the economic risk involved." Wheat famers had already secured parity pricing and were guaranteed that it would continue for two years after the cessation of hostilities. This ensured farmen that their wartirne standard of living would be maintained in the immediate post-war era. Fymers were protected through Congressional funding against any sudden decrease in demand. Why. in the fail of 1944 was the USDATs fear of surpluses allowed to guide agricultural policy? The answer is ohen found in temis of local surpluses in Nonh Xmenca due to transpox-tation bonlenecks and a lack of storage space for those surpluses. That local surpluses existed in North Amenca does not mean that sufficient supplies existed to meet relief requirements. A determination to see relief needs successfully met. would have produced a detemination to break the local bonle-necks. (which was done by August 3,1944)'~rather than adopt a bue-sheives policy. As has been seen. in Febniary 1944. Under-Secretary Stettinius was womed over the lack of guidance given to the CFB and the War Food Administration by the United States.' Relief continued to remain a low priotity as dernonstrated on December 19, 1944 when Stettinius wrote to the President. Stettinius requested that guidance on prioritization be issued to allocation authorities. Stettinius outlined the four major sources of demand on Amencan food supplies including UNRRA which was Listed in "item 4." dong with relief for Western Europe. Stettinius pointed out that "it is essential that Item (4) should not be excl~ded."~~Stettinius' concem that the President might cxclude relief indicates that during the rnonths between February and December 1944. rven Roosevelt did not give relief through LJNRRA a high priority. Transportation provided one of the most significant challenges facing UNRRA. h iack of transportation facilities meant that even if the United States produced more - -- ' Sec pages 45-46. food. it could not be shipped to those persons who needed it. UNRRA's overall record of coordinating transportation from Amencan famis to ports, and then to European porrs. and inland destinations, is a credit to the agency. While UNRRA was generally not to begin operations und afier the war ended, it began work earlier in Greece and ltdy.'O in these instances UNRRA personnel were formaliy under rnilitary command. During the war the militaxy's demands on shipping lirnited the amount of relief which could be transported. However. the bulk of CMRRA's work in Europe began in the fall and winter of 1945. Ln peacetime. transportation was not an obstacle to supplying relief. Yet alleged transportation problems provided an "out" for politicians who did not place a high priority on relief. Cargo shipped overseas by the U.S. military peaked in 1944 at 48-512.945 tons, then dropped to 43 million tons in 1945. Mer V-J day, munitions shipments declined drastically. freeing up cargo space for relief supplies.3' On June 28, 1945. the Acting Secretary of State wrote to the American Ambassador in Belgiurn that "Shipping authoriues have transition problem in hand ...Acting Secretary expecü transition will be effectively achieved and that supply allocations and shipping will be suitably adjusted within overail limit~."~'On November 26, the State Department policy bulletin, Current Economic Developrnent, stated that: UNRRA now has no serious difficulty in obtaining a large volume of supplies and gening them to their destination. provided it has the funds. From military surpluses UNRRA is obtaining adequate amounts of trucks, medicai supplies and engineering stores.. .34 Most shipping problems were solved by the sumrner and fall of 1945 as militas, sources converted their uansponation facilities to civilian purposes. Indeed, Penrose has noted that opponents of domestic restrictions on the usage of wheat often cired the limitations on the quantities which codd be shipped oveneas. Penrose commented that, "...this argument was of doubtful validity. and its frequent use was ~npo~ular."~~ The Truman administration used technical excuses when, for different reasons, it was more expedient to offer relief through channels other than LTNRRA. In 1946, the press was criticizing the govemment's response to the food cnsis. The Secretary of Agriculture, and later President Truman. identified transportation difficulties as the source of the problem in sending relief to Europe. However. the Offce of Defense Transponation refuted the contention that a lack of transport hampered relief ~hi~ments.'~ The evidence has suggested that, despite several warnings of a post-war food cnsis." agricultural policy-maken ignored. or actually contradicted. recomrnendations to prepare for relief."' Wiile transportation was a signifiant obstacle. it had been overcome by the time most of UNRRA's operations had begun. Even after Steninius informed Roosevelt that allocation agencies were not giving UNRRA due consideration. Roosevelt did not press for WNRRA to receive a higher priority by allocation agencies. An absence of the political will to prepare for relief. not technical problems. lay at the heart of UNRRA's problems. " See pages 37-43. '" See pages 93-97. The Roosevelt administration favored a weak raiher than a strong WRM. Afrer incerviewing the president in 1942. journalist Forrest Davis wrote that the President's primary concem for the United Nations was the provision of security. and not Vice President Henry Wallace's "welfare politics."37 This left relief agencies Iower on the United Nations' list of pnorities. This perspective informed the financing scheme developed by Harry Dexter White. How did the shortage of fun& affect Lm?One consequence was the development of gaps in the chah of relief. The FEA purchased only those go& for which defdte orders could be supponed by satisfactory financial arrangements. But, during the fa11 of 1945. when the European famine was developing, its purchase of export shipments was alrnost none~istent.'~On Ocrober 15, 1945. the Stace Deparunent poiicy bulletin, Current Econornic Developmenr, explained Lm'sproblem: "UNRRA is in a precarious position financiaüy. At the present it has practically no hinds left. Procurement has nearly stopped for this reason and al1 the Administration cmdo is ship the supplies already procured and contracted for."39A lack of funds was UNRRA's most persistent problem. The American financing plan had another important consequence. A weak LYRRA would not provoke what die over-cautious President perceived as a latent isolationism in the American public. inevitably. UNRRA was feeble financially. Early in 1944, Penrose conducted a snidy on post-war planning. He Iater wrote, ''The chef result of my study was to bring out the danger chat the establishment of UNRRA would create the illusion chat the financial needs of the transition penod had been provided for... 9 *JO The Treasury department. the countries of Western Europe, and even speciai ambassadorial assistants reaiized that UNRRA could not complete al1 the casks set out before it. But the public did not. What seemed like a suong United Nations relief agency was not. Lester Pearson unwitungly discovered the limited role wtiich the United States, and Britain, had envisioned for UNRRA. Two months afier LrNRRA's creation, on Ianuary 27, 1944, Pearson was in Britain. During conversations in the War Office Pearson learnt of the diverse motives which had brought about UNRRA's creation. The Deputy Director for Civil Affairs in the War Office. Mr. Stoppford: expressed the War Office view in this matter when he said that UNRRA was really more for window dressing than for anything else.... in between this squeeze there would not be very much for Lehan and his associates to do in Europe. Western Europe was definitely outside their jurisdic tion ... the Bntish cenainly had no intention of encouraging their activities in the Far East. [UNRRA ] would be given a corner of the Balkans ... Stoppford assured me this was the view he got from the War Office, the War Department. and even from the State ~e~artment." Stoppford described as "window dressing." Earlier. Penrose had been concemed that UNRRA had created the "illusion" that preparation for relief had been undertaken. Both had indicated that in one form or another, UNRRA had as rnuch image as substance. To what purpose? The Roosevelt administration wanted a weak UNRRA to strike a compromise satisving both isolationist and intemationalist public opinion. The administration was unsure of intemationalism's political clout in the upcorning election. UNRRA had been hailed as an example of intemationalism, but statements about the new worid order were ooly generalities. and no details of the new United Nations were to be released to the press until much later."* In this climare of uncenainty. UNMU could be pointed to as an example of Roosevelt's intemationalism. but one whch would not place undue burdens The breakdown of congressional-executive relations in 19 19 loomed in the forefront of Roosevelt's thoughts. To him. UNRRA did not warrant a confrontation with a Congress that was increasingly concemed with fiscal resuaint. Senator Vandenberg demonstrated the iimits of politicdly acceptable intemaiionaiisrn. As Vandenberg put it. Roosevelt could not appear as though he had "pledge[d] our totai resources to whatever illimitable scheme for relief and rehabilitation al1 around the world our New Deal crystal gazers might desire to pursue..9.43 In the United States. the politics of "economy- mindedness and isolationism" stood in opposition to a stroog uNR&Lu in the New York Times on May 14, 1944 Hadley Cana of the Office of Public Opinion at Princeton University since 1939. warned against rnaking too much of findings which showed that: ... 86 percent of us Say we are willing to continue food rationing to help to feed the starving... Caution is needed in explaining our generosity. First of dl, there is a high prestige value in answenng these questions the unselfish way ..... Second, ...nght now we can afford to be generous. S tudies show that if conditions change, if we should enter a post-war depression, the chances are we would not give quite so generously and would not toierate generosity on the part of the Federai ~ovemment.'" On December 29. 1944 Canuil offered his advice on foreign economic relief to Oscar Cox of the State Department, but whether the State department consulted Canuil about WRRA is unknown? Cantnl's conclusions suggest that a campaign to increase food resources for UNRRA might have caused voters to reconsider the ment of participaiing in an organization which claimed to represent the United 'laûons but which relied heavily on mencm resources. Roosevelt had no illusions about how significant intemationalists would be in the upcoming election. On June 10. 1944 he referred to the softness of public support after World War 1 when he had spoken in support of the League of Nations. 'They were with me 100% but I do not dunk I made a single vote. Now. as then, the intellectuais are nearly al1 with us.'"" UNRRA was forced to navigate a course which would satisQ both Congress and the intemationalists. So as not to offend internationalist sentiment. UNRRA's appearance as an effective relief organization had to be maintained. even at the risk of some questionable tactics. The second UNRRA Council session was scheduled for Montreal in September. 1944. On August 3 the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington reponed to Ottawa the substance of a conversation which he had overheard. Dean Acheson and Richard Law of the Foreign Office had approached the Director-General. Herbert Lehman. as they were concerned about the agenda for the upcorning Council session. They insisted that there "was a very great danger of panic and separatisrn developing at the Council meeting unless careful plans covering the scope and tone of the meeting are prepared in advance." They said that 'There would be al -...if the view became prevalent that LJ'NRRA's supplies and resources were not adequate ... [Achesonl urged the desirability of avoiding any suggestion in the Council that supplies are known to be inadequate." To preserve images. Acheson and Law recommended that: 1. No precise balance sheet should be issued at this Councii meeting. 2. Favorable developments in the general supply position should be StrmStates and United Kingdom speakers should be invited sol that the rnemben could appreciate the extent to which the immediate needs of the countries are king looked after."* This episode is important. Firstly. it demonstrates. again. that resources were known to be inadequate. Secondly, it shows that it was important to maintain the illusion that UNRRA was able to meet its tasks. Most importantly. it had implications for the question of how to determine Europe's relief needs. ïhe solution to preserving UNRRA's fasade lay in inaccurate figures. When writing of Acheson's involvement in the food crisis of 1945- 1946, the historian Thomas Paterson illustrated that Acheson downplayed the severity of the food situation to accommodate State Department policy, reveaiing that what Acheson stated of Europe's food needs coincided with political agendas as much as real need9 During the second UNRRA council session in September. the CFB issued an overly optimistic report on the world supply situation. which was intended to cairn the receiving nations at the council session. Acheson stated "...that the time has corne for UXRRA to put on one side worry about availability of supplies. Somebody else has undertaken to meet that responsibility. If they fail, as they will not. we wiil know where the responsibility lies."50 This avoided the real issue of the availability of supplies. and since Acheson already knew that supplies were inadequate. his response was devious at best. Acheson's continued focus on blame reveals an underlying concern over L'NRRA's appearance. Though CMRRA was ill-prepared for relief. it was important that it not be blamed, lest it seem ineffectual at a time when the role of the United Nations in hencan foreign policy was an election issue. The increased spending required to make GNRRA effective would have provoked Congres In redirecting responsibility to the CFB. Acheson ternporady shielded WNRRA from cnticisrn while maintaining the notion that the United Nations were working effectively together. With a Presidential election two months off, rnaintaining rhis sense of cooperation was imporrant. in ternis of Amerka's entry into the United Nations. clearly securicy issues. such as the granting of a veto to dl members of the Securiry Council. were vital. But to a lesser extent UNRRA facilitated Arnerican entry into the United Nations Organization by ailowing Roosevelt to create a cooperative relationship with Republicans. The new relationship was described by Senator Vandenberg on August 24. 1943. "lt involves a new and direct system of consultation between the State Department and the Senam Foreign Relations Cornmittee which shoufd be able to avoid many of the stalemates of which we are historicaily aware."" Given that the State Department's kowtowing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was vimially unprecedented, it was iikely approved by Roosevelt. UNRRA (in fact, a weakened LTNRRA) was thus an important stepping Stone for the Arnerican entry into the United Nations. Cooperative relations with the Soviets were ais0 facilitated by a weak United Nations relief agency. The Soviets were concerned that food for relief might be used by the United States as a diplornatic tool. Both the United States and L!felt that relief should be administered on a non-political basis. Had a suong relief program been created, the clash of views would have been greater, forcing the United States to abandon its pnncipk of non-political relief. or causing a breach of tmst between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mass hunger in Europe was incompatible with American national interest. Social unrest wrought by hunger would threaten the unity of the Big Four, the linch pin of the peace. On December 26, 1944 Dean Acheson wrote: With [hunger]... come[s] agitation and unrest ...With it also come[s] arbitmy and absolutist controls. Then f'ollows the overthrow of govemments with rival aspirants for the succession from the right to the left. And with this cornes dissension among the great powers. with one backing one faction; and another. another faction. North Africa. Yugoslavia, Greece should furnish iiiusuation enough? The situation descnbed by General Lucius CIay in Gennany applied equally to Italy and France: ".. .there is no choice in becorning a Communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on LW calorie^."'^ In Europe. hunger could be potentiaily divisive for the Great Powers. And part of LTNRRA*s job was to help ensure that the political order it foreshadowed was realized. in October 1943, Roosevelt decided that Lend-Lease would end when hostilities did. but UNRRA was to take iü UNRRA would be responsible for generating sorne of the goodwill created by lend lease. The President stated at UNRRA's signing ceremony that "...Nations will lem to work together only by actually working together ...We look on the signing of ths agreement by al1 United Nations as a means of joining them together still more fdy."5s .Maintaining a cooperative relationship with every member of the United Nations. and especially the Soviet Union. would not be easy. At first glance. cooperation could be achieved by having the United States rehabilitate Europe through UNRRA. The Soviets. though, felt that UNRRA should reward those who had resisted Nazi aggression. And a vigorous program of relief would have focused at least as much on Western Europe as Eastern Europe, arousing the Soviet suspicion that Arnerican use of the relief agency was an attempt to increase their influence there. Soviet-Amerkan differences had firsr arisen dunng the 1943 negoùations for LWKRA. The Soviet delegate. Maxim Litvinov. immediately made the connection between food and diplomacy. In writing a cirafi constitution for UNRRA. he sought to establish the principle that "nothing should be done in any given country except with that country's consent and as it chose." This statement was only necessary udess one believed that relief was in fact a disguised anempt to increase national influence. "Food". Acheson said. "with righteous fervor. must be kept free from politics. The idea amused Litvinov. in the Soviet Union nothing was free from politics." 56 Litvinov's statement assumed that food would be used as a political weapon. Like the Marshail Plan in 1947. Amencan-backed relief and rehabilitation could appear as a provocative gesture, straining Amencan-Soviet relations. in any event, the United States was to supply UNRRA with the rnost of its finances and supplies, and many Europeans would view L'NRRA as Amencan. WRRA repeatedly needed to make the point that relief supplies were neither American nor Soviet, but from the United Nations. LTNRRA's relief program was quite lirnited. On July 20. 1944. the State Department's Director of the Office of European Affairs. James C. DUM. stated that LYW, like the military relief before it. would be "limited to providing minimum essential relief needs ....,57 Despite UNRRA's lirnited program of relief. problems still arose in June, 1944, between the USSR and the United States. In UNRRA's European CounciI for Relief, the Soviet Union again proposed that relief be distnbuted on the basis of resistance to the Nazis. The Arnencan Secretary of State. Corde11 Hull. maintained that "for the sake of order, it is essential that this problem not be injected into the discussion of bases of requirements." The Soviet proposal ran counter to the Arnerican view that relief should not be a politicai weapon. However. the Soviet Representative. Uiushenko, indicated to the herican Embassy in London "on a persona1 and confidentid basis. that he had ngid instructions from Moscow to put fonvard this resolution: that he had no authority to agree to bases that did not contain this tat te ment."'^ The State Department indicated that if the Soviet resolution were adopted. the United States would "find it necessary to object ro the recommended bases both in the Committee for Europe and in the ~ouncil."~~The two governmenrs were at an impasse. As the Soviet Union did not argue from strength. its resolution was not adopted. Despite the weakness of LJNRIW's relief program, the Soviet Union was still concerned that relief would be poiitically advantageous to the United States. The United States limited UNRRA in scope and power. in part. so as to maintain post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union. Yet the United States exened little influence in Soviet occupied countries. The United States Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan, wrote: ...in de ference to this pipe dream of a general European coilaboration. and out of fear, in pariicular. lest the Russians be offended if we took any important action without them, we were neglecting positive undertakings for the reconstruction for the vigorous and hopeful state of affairs in the part of Europe which was really accessible to our influence. ...It is possible that 1 overrated the extent to which things were king thus held up in deference to the chimera of Soviet collaboration. 1 had in mind. among other things. the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRRA) operations.60 This dynamic led Kennan to advocate a complete separation of spheres of influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. .Many would soon follow Kennan's lead. When President Truman took office in April 1945. he inherited an administration chat was generally doubtful of b.RRA-For a few weeks following V-J Day. foreign aid policy was still flexible enough to provide two Soviet Republics with 5 250 million through a special appropriation of UMüU. Similarly. a special arrangement was made to finance through lend-lease those goods for Russia still in the "pipeline."6' On ai 30. 1945. though, cornplaints began to be heard in the State Depanment that Eastern Europe was a .'Soviet sphere of infl~ence."~' On July 30. Secretary of State Byrnes stated to President Truman that he "would hate very much to see UNRRA develop into a general relief organization.ld3 Both Democrats and Republicans were increasingly reluctant to suppon UNRRA. Nonetheless Truman had to maintain public support for the organization so as not to break faith with the United Nations. In August, 1945. upon herican initiative, it was decided that LTNRIU would end its work in December, 1946. The principal Amencan objection to LURRA stemmed from the changing nature of Amencan-Soviet relations. Both Congress and the State Deparunent felt that UNRRA was being used to finance the Soviet entrenchment in Eastern Europe. Soviet tmops in .Ausuia were inhibiting the rehabilitation process by requisitioning local supplies in order to feed themselves. On April 1. 1946 the UNRRA council responded by adjusting the level of aid given to such counuies.* Equally a fear existed that UNRRA goods were being used in Yugoslavia to support Tito's communist forces. rather than to feed the civilian population.6s Likewise. the S tate Department womed that in Poland recipients of aid would mistakenly believe that their benefactors were the Soviets, rather than an international organization hinded largely by U.S. dollan. And the United States could not dictate LWRRA poiicy. Trying to gain some son of control. Congress attached conditions to its appropriations stipularing that any country receiving LWRRA aid must allow reporters to enter and observe the distribution of LWRRA supplies.66 However. this was far short of the level of input that Congress would have preferred. America would continue to supply Europe with aid after CTNRRA. but on a bilaterai basis to ensure greater control over the spending of Amencan hinds. Early in 1947Acheson pointed out to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "if you have an international body which conuois the allocation of funds. we only have one voice out of many voices and one vote ...**67 Greater control over hinding would allow American aid to go towards snengthening democracies in Western Europe. Such considerations led to the marsh hall Plan in 1947. ' United States. Hearings before the House Committee of Foreign hffairs. p.272. When a mernber of the Comrninee. .W. Burgin. asked Dean Acheson whether UNRRA wodd provide only a "meager" levcl of relief. Acheson replied "Yes: chat is correct." ' United States. Hearings More the House Cornmittee of Foreign Affairs. p.50. ' H. Bradford Westertield. Foreign Policy und Pa- Politics: Pearl Harbor ru Korea (New Haven: Yale University Ress, 1955). pp. 150- 157. Philip J. lessup. "UNRRA. Sarnplc of World Organization." Foreign Affairs. vol.22. (3) 1944. pp. 362- 371. p.368. 5 United States. Hearings beforc the House Committee of Foreign Affairs. p. 120. 6 FDRL. Bean Papers, Wheat Economics: General. The Wheat Siruarion, August 1944. p.2. ' FDRL. Bean Papers. Wheat Econornics: General. The Wheat Siruarion. August 1944. p.2. Wilcox. p.131. 9 Penrose, p. 12 1. 10 John D. Black, Food Enough (Pennsylvania: Jacques Cane11 Ress. 1943). " Black. p. 169. 12 FDRL, Bean Papers. Wheat Economics, The Whear Sirwtion. iwgust 1944, p.3. 13 FDRL, Bean Papen, Wheat Economics: General. The Wheat Siruation. August 1944. p.3 and p.8. IJ FDRL. Bean Papers, Wheat Economics: General. The Whear Siruarion. August 1943. p.5. l5 Penrose. p. 1%. " FDRL. Bean Papen. Wheat Economics:General. Whear Srdies of rhe Food Research Imirure. vol. 'UX. No. 2, Novembcr 1942, p.32. 18 Penrose, p.7 1. 19 Black, p. 159. " Penrose. p. 130. '' Gold. p. 435. .-l -'Roll. p. 146. Black. p.158. " Btack. p. 127. Gold. p.88. " Wilcox. p.5 1. Black. p. 154. Roll. p. 145. " Woodbridge. vol. LI. pp. 257-260 and p. 98. 3 1 Charles Wardlow, United States Amy in Worïd War II: The Technical Services. The Transportarion Corps: Movemenrs. Training and Supply (Washington: Office of Military History, Department of the .My. 1956). p.328. " The posstbility of increased shipments after the peve was realized in 1944. See. Office of die Director- General. Report of the Director-General io the Second Session of Council, (Washingon. D-C:Government Rinting Office. 1944)- p.29. 34 CED,no.23. November 26, t 945. p.6. A1so see. Nevins. pp.280-28 1. 35 Penrose. p.32 1. '15 Allen J. Matusow. Fam Policies and Polirics in rhe Truman Years (Cambridge:Harvard University Press. 1967). p.25. 37 Divine, pp. L 14- 1 15. '' Wilcox. p.283. 39 CED. no.17. October 15. 1945, p.5. U] Penrose. p. 18 1. " N.4C. MG 26, NI. vo1.62. file "UNRRA 1943- 1947". Pearson CO Robertson. lan.27. 1944. pp. 1-2. '' Divine. p.204. LI Westerfield, p-209. 4s Hadley Cantril. "What we Don't ffiow is Likeiy to Hurt Us" dVew York Times. May 14. 1944. M George C. Hemng Jr.. 'The United States and British Banhptcy, 1944- 1945: Responsibilities Deferreci", Polirical Science Quarterly. vol. LXXXVT. No. 2. June, 197 1, pz7 1. 17 Divine. p. 167. " DCER. 194. vol. 10. Charge d'Affaires in the United Srates to the Secreq of Sraet for EA. August 3. 1944. p. 1488. 49 Thomas G.Patterson. Soviet-Arnericnn Confrontafion: Pasnvar Reconstrucrion und ihe Origins ojrhe Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopiuns W. 1973). p.88, 5 1 David C-Tornphns, nte Papers of Senator Arthur Vandenburg (Michigan: Michigan State Universiry Press. 1970). p.73. " FRUS. 1945. vol.lI. p. 1060. "Memorandum by the State Dtpanment'* "~eanEdward Smith .d..The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay Germany 1945 - 1949. Vol 1. ( B loomington: Indiana W. 1974). p. 184. 54 George C. Herring, Aid To Russia. p.146. " Srnuel Rosenrnan (cd.), The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt 1933 t New York: Russell and Russell. 1950). pp.50Q-S. 56 Dean Acheson, Present at the Crearîon. (New York: Nonon, 1969). p.69. rir) George F. Kennan, Mernoirs (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967). p.250. 61 George C. Herring, Aid ro Russia, (New York: Columbia UP.1973). p.243. 52 Hernng. Aid ro Rucsia, p.230. 53 Paterson. p.83. * CED. no. 34 1. Apd 1. 1945. p.7. O5 CED. no. 34 1. April 1. 1945. p. 12- ri6 CED,no. 25. Dcember, 10, 1945, p.5-6. 67 Paterson, p.88. Conclusion The scale of UNRRA's relief was significantly less than that required by Europe. so much so that UNNW was charactenzed as "window dressing" in the British War Office. the U.S. War Department and the State Department. Such an assessrnent stands in stark contrast to the ueatment given by üNRRAts official historian. George Woodbridge. who wrote that "90 per cent of the delivenes planned in the program of operations" were fulfilled.' While such a record sounds irnpressive. it must be recalled that in order to rneet 90 per cent of the deliveries. the importing countries had been required to reduce their requirements. 16 per cent in ternis of dollars and 50 per cent in tem of tonnage- to match available funds.' The good will expressed by the delegations at the fint Council session did not establish an organization equal to the vdor of their sentiments. in as much as its success depended upon national objectives. UNRRA has become a forerunner to other UN agencies. such as the United Nations Educational. Scientific and Cultural Organization (CMESCO),reveaiing that govemments still prefer to conduct important matters of policy through traditional diplomatic channels. Part of this preference denved from the difficulty of delegating responsibilities. which was a constant problem for IMRRA. Which commodities should Canada grow and whkh ones should the United States provide? Canada was the main source of food for the United Kingdom and other areas of U.K.responsibility, not to mention her alreaay signifiant commitments to the Soviet Union and the United States. The Canadian .Minister of Agriculture. James Gardiner. thus expected that relief for the liberated areas would be a joint effort by supplying nations. Whether or not the Arnerican Secretary of State. Corde11 Hull or his Assistant Secretary of State. Dean Acheson were aware of Gardiner's views is unclear. But what is certain is that Canadian-Americm agricultural relations during World War II were not adequately synchronized with the Allied commitrments through LJMUW. Given Canada's existing cornmiunenü. the State Department could not have relied upon Canada to supply the majocity of UNRRA's wheat. But. Canada coufd have been expected to play an important role in relief. Indeed. foreign and domestic politics combined with humanitarian interest to bolster the Canadian support for LJNRRA. Prime Minister Mackenzie King could point to UNRRA as the Liberal Party's concem for wheat farmers. who. it was feared, might vote for the CCF. On the other hand. the Deparunent of Trade and Commerce saw within C'MUZA a means of fostenng post-war uade, while Extemal Affairs used the functiond pcinciple to improve Canadian representation in üNRRA. Despite these motives. the Canadian governent accorded a low pnority to LWRRA. not only because of Canada's existing export commitments. but also because it was aware of the low priority which the Great Powen gave to UNRRA. The larger, more important objectives of Amencan foreign policy could suil be achieved within the existing patterns of agricultural production, even if UNRRA might suffer, suggesting that the United States placed little stock in LJNRRA as a rnechanism of relief. The discrepancy in perspectives between the State Department and the USDA was so great that the economic advisor to the American Ambassador in England, E.F. Penrose. characterized the USDA's preoccupation with surpluses as "wishhl thinking" and dream-ii!~e.~Indeed. those who considered Europe's relief needs foresaw a food crisis.' The Assistant-Secretary of S tate. Edwrd Stettinius pointed to this problem in February 1944. but little was done to rectiQ die situation. The failure to CO-ordinate agricultural policy with foreign relief needs had it origins less in Canadian-Amencan relations than in the place which the USDA held in the Roosevelt adminstration. The President nsked losing Congressional good-will if he was too generous with .Arnerican resources for UNRRA. Roosevelt's strategy for agriculniral production through subsidies made the prospect of increased production for UNRR4 unlikely. In the face of this obstacle, the Amencan governent exerted pressure on Canada's agriculturd and relief policies. However. this was more than diplornatic bullying: it signified a real concem for the shape of the pst-war world. Dean Acheson testified before the House Cornmittee of Foreign Affairs on November 14. 1945. Ihat "UNRRA is not just another agency which we can alter or discard to suit some temporary inconvenience for it has become one of the foundation blocks of Our whole world effort to secure a functioning international oqanization." ' The peace would be secured first and foremost by the CO-operationof the Big Four. The United Nations organization was an important means of achieving this end. and as the fmt United Nations body, LJNRRA embodied the hopes for relief and international cooperation. Reconciling the conflicting agendas surrounding WRRA tested the skills of American diplomats. On October 12, 1943. Roosevelt "designated Acheson as the U.S. representative to UNRRA."' In fact, long before this date Acheson had ken involved in the negotiations leading up to UNRRA's creation. Histonan Gaddis Smith charactenzed Acheson's contribution to the State Department as "an important role in an unimportant See pp.2-3 and pp. 37-43. deparunent."6 President Roosevelt. like every politician. realized that success hinged upon the ability to foresee and forestall potential problerns before they developed. Acheson undertook this task when he assured the Senate and House Cornmittees that the United States would not play "Santa Claus" to Europe through UNRRA. And in the critical weeks leading up to the election. on August 3. 1944. he sought to prevent general disagreement and panic over the state of UNRRA's resources in light of Europe's needs. If this came to light as an election issue. Roosevelt's intemationalisrn would have been discredited. This aspect of Acheson's diplomacy made him invaluable. UNRRA's problerns ultimately trace their mots back to the United States. the greatest supplier of relief. Supplying food to liberated areas was a national policy. which would have significant repercussions on the shape of the peace. The importance of this issue surpassed that of Roosevelt's program of agriculturai subsidies. and a Presidential approach to Congress was in order. But no such approach was made. More was at stake than the President's agricultural production policy. increased spending for UNRRA-- the first United Nations body-- might scare a Congress which was emerging frorn isolationism. If Congress revolted before the United Nations as it had done More the League of Nations in WWI, a major instrument of the peace would have ken lost. And securing the peace was an objective which took precedence over ail other objectives. The success of the peace also depended upon the abiiity of the United States and the Soviet Union to CO-operate.The American view that relief should be distributed on the bais of need clashed with the Soviet perspective. which saw relief almost exclusively in terms of political influence. A iimited UNRRA would maintain Soviet trust and still distribute aid, if only on a reduced scale. American support of UNRRA was thus determined in light of the long-term objectives of Amencan foreign policy--enuy into the United Nations by assuring the support of Congress. and ensunng the trust of the Soviet Union. so necessaq to secu~gthe peace. In his preface to The United Stares and the Origins of the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis stated that there was a "narrow range of altematives open to Amencan leaders during this pend as they sought to deal with probkms of war and ~~eace."'Such. unfortunately. was the case with WRRA. Real polit& ensured that UNRRA's full possibilities were not realized. 3 I)enrose. p.320 and p. 329. ' Paterson, p.87. FRUS. 1943. vol. 1. p. 1024. note. 17. See also. FDRL. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Steninius to President Roosevelt, Octobcr 20.1943, Official File, of 4966, Box 2, " United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 1943- 1945 Miscellaneous ( 1943)". Gaddis Smith. Dem Acheson. (New York: Cooper Square Publishen. 1972). p.18. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origim of the Cold War,1941-1947. (New York Columbia University Press. 1972). p.vii. Cornparision of Canadian Wheat Expons to the United Kingdom and UNRRA from November 1945 to April 1946. (Derived from Charles Wilson's "Observations on Wheat Policy."') 1945 August Se~ternber October November Total U.K. 11 957 137 8 301 152 10 602 232 16 088 808 16 949 329 UNRRA 2605333 1 549 546 2 496 603 759 821 7 411 303 1946 December " January Febniarv March April Total U.K. 7 703 333 9 922 350 9 682 694 15013836 IO 081660 52 403 873 UNRRA 888450 LOO1 906 901 784 1157780 1925315 6 175235' ' MG 30, E 301, vol. 2 1. file 8, Observations on Wheat Policies, ApriI 26. 1946, pp.24. " Decembcr. 1945 Primarv Documents Canadian : Published Deparunent of Externai Affairs. Documents on Cdian&teniof Relarions. 1943. vol. 9. Edited by John Hilliker. Regina University of Saskatchewan hss. 1980 Department of Extemai Affairs. Documents on C'ianErreml Relarioru. 194445. pt. 1. vol. 10. Edited by John Hilliker. Regina University of Saskatchewan Press, 1987. Depanment of Extemai Affairs. Documenrs on CdimExrem1 Relations. 1944-45. pt.2. vol. Il. Edited by John Hilliker. Regina University of Saskatchewan Press. 1990. Department of Extemal Affairs. Documents on Cunadian fiferml Relarionr. 1946. vol. 12. Edited by Donald M. Page. Regina. University of Saskatchewan Press, 1977. Counp Guide. 1943- 1944. Pearson. Lester. Mike The Mernoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson voI. 1. 1987-1948. Toronto. University of Toronto Ress. 1972. Un~ublished: National Archives of Canada, Ottawa .Manuscript Groups Pearson Papers: ,CfG 26. N-8,VOIS. 1-2. MG 26, N 1. vol. 17. .MG 26, N 1. vol. 62. Charles Frederick Wilson Papers (Deparunent of Trade and Commerce): MG 30. €301, vol. 19, files 19 and 21. MG 30. E301. vol. 21. file 8 Xgriculturai Advisory Cornmittee: >IG 28 166. vo1.9. Canadian Federauon of Agriculture: MG 28 166, vol 3 1. Record Groups Dr. Barton Papers (Deputy Minister of Apculture): RG 17. vol. 3461. RG 17. vo1.3468. Food Requuements Cornmittee: RG 25. vol. 2497. RG 25. vol. 2398. Wartime Information Board: RG 36-3 1. ~01.9. Combtned Food Board: RG 25, vol. 2965. RG 25. vol. 2968. Ress Analysis Section: RG 25. 0-3. vo1.2 13 1. Post-Hostïlities Planning Cornmittee: RG 25.~013500. Deparunent of External Affairs: RG 25 B-3. ~01.2135,file 728- 1946 "Relief Supplies." RG 25 B-3, vol 216 1. file "Joint Economic Cornmittee- 1944." RG 25 B-3,vol. 2 16 1, fiIe 465: 1943- 1946 "Joint AgncuItural Cornmittee." RG 25. vol. 5723.7-CH(s). U.S. Congress. House. Commi ttce of Foreign Affairs. To Enable the United States to Panicipafe in rhe Work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 78th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess.. 1943- 1944. Conmittee hnt. US. State Departrntnt. Currenr Economic Development, 1945- 1946. Washington, Government Pnnting Offkt. 1945- 1954. U.S. State Depanment. Foreign Relations of rhe Unired States, 1943. vol. 1 General. Washington. Government Pnnting Office. 1963. U.S. Statt Dcparuncnt. Foreign Relations of rhe Unired Srates. 1944, vol. II. Washington, Government Pnnting Office. 1963. U.S. Statc ûcparunent. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945, vols. 1-11. Washington. Government hnting Office, 1963. Xcheson, Dean Presenr at the Crearion. Toronto. George McLeod Ltd.. 1969. Black. John D. Food Enough. Pennsylvania. Jacques Cattell Press. 1943. Clay. Lucius D. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945 - I939 Vol 1. Edited by Jean Edward Smith. Bloomington. Indiana University Press, 1974. Fuller. HeIen. "Politics and Food." New Republic. Nov.8, 1943. Jessup, Philip J. "UNRRA. Sample of World Organizrition." Foreign Affairs. vo1.22. (3). 1944. pp.362- 373. Jones, &Marvin. Murvin Jones Memoirs. Texas. Texas Western Ress. L 973. Kennan. George F. .Memoirs. Boston. Litde Brown and Company, 1967. ,Vew York Times. Novcmber. 1943 and April. 1944. Roosevelt. Franklin D . 7he Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1 943 Vol. 12. Edi ted by Rosenman, Samuei 1. New York. Russell & Russell, 1950. Vandenberg. Arthur. 'Ine Private Papers of Senafor Vandcnberg. Edited by Vandenberg ..4rthur(lr.) and Morris. heAlex. London. V.Gollancz. 1953. Unpublished : Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Official File. 4496. L'NRRA 1942-1945. Louis Bean Papen, 1943. British: Published Bevin,Ernest. Ernest Bevin Foreign Secrerary 1945-1 951. Edited by Allan Bullock. London. Heinemann, 1983. Dalton. Hugh. neSecond World War Dian of Hugh Dalton 1940-1 945. Editcd by Ben Pimlo~ LondonJonathan Cape Ltd., 1986. L!: Published LTuRRA. Office of the Director-General. Report of rhe Director-General to the Council: period Seprember 1944 ro 30 3une 1945. Washington. D.C.. Govemment Printing Office, 1945. Armstrong-Reid. Susan. "Canada's Role in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 1942- 1937" Ph.D. diss.. University of Toronto, 1982. Groen. Cliff. "Food Will Win tfw War and Wnre the Peace" :7ne Failure ro Adequately Respond to the Food Crisir" MA. r-ch memoire, University of Ottawa, 1995. Second- Sources Britnef 1, G.E.and V.C. Fowke. CdianAgriculture in War and Peace. Stanford, CaliforniaStanford Universrty Press. 1962. Burner. David. Herben Hoover, A Public Life. New York. Atheneum.1984. Divine. Roben. A Second Chance: The Triumph of lntenarionolism in Amenca during Warid War II. Xew York. Athentum, 1967. Engiish, J. Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lesrer Pearson vol. one 1897-1948. Toronto.Lester and Orpen Dennys Ltd., 1989. Gaddis. John Lewis. ne United Stares and the Origins of the Cold War. /%i-1947. New York. Columbia University Rcss. 1972. Gold, Bcla Wartime Economic Planning in Agriculture: A Study in the A flocarion of Resources. AMS Press. New York, 1949. Granatstein. Jack. Tne Ottmva Men: The Civil Service Mandorim. 1935- 2957. Toronto. Oxford Univentty Press, 1982. - Canada's Wuc The Politics of the Mackenzie King Govemenr. 193SJ-iW5. Toronto. Oxford University hss, 1975. (ed.). Canadiun Foreign Policy. Toronto. Copp Clark Pitman Ltd.. 1993. Hemng, George C. Aid to Rrcrsia New York. Columbia W.1973. . 'The United States and British Bankruptcy, 19441945: Responsibilities Defemd" Political Science Quanerly. vol. LXXXVI. NO. 2. pp.260-280. Hillikcr. John. Canada 's Depamnenr of iktentai Afairs The Earfy Years. vol. 11909- 1 946. ~Moncrealand Kingston, Insutute of Public Administration of Canada 1990. Kimball. Warren. The Juggler. New Jersey, Princeton W.1991. MacGregor Burns. George. Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. New York. Harcourt. Brace and World. Inc.. 1956. Marusow, Allen 1. Fann Policies and Politics in she Truman Years. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1967. Martel, Leon. Lend-Lease. bans and rhe Coming of the Cold War. Colorado, Westview Ress. 1979. ,May, lrvin M. Marvin Jones, The Public Lqe of an Agrarian Advocate. ColIege Station and London. Texas A&M University Press. Nevins. AlIan. Herben H. Lehman and His Eru New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1963. Paterson, Thomas G. Soviet-Ame~cmConfionration. BaItimore and LondonJohn Hopkins University Press. 1973. Penrose, E.F. Economic Plnnning For the Peace. Princeton.Pnnceton UP. 1953. Pope, Fontst C. George C. Marshall: Statesman. New York, Viking, 1987. Roll. Eric. The Combined Food Board: A Study in Wartime Inremarional Planning. Stariford, Stanford UP. 1956. Smith, Gaddis. Dean Acheson. New York. Cooper Square hiblishers. 1972. Soward. F. CaMda in World Afairs, lg#-Z 946. Toronto.Oxford University Press. 1950. Tompkins. David C. ne Papers of Sennror Anhur Vandenburg. Michigan. Michigan State University Press. 1970. Wardlow, Charies. United Stases Amy in World War II: nie Techical Services. The Tiansporration Corps: lMovemnrs. Training and Suppiy. Washington. Office of Military History . Depanment of the Amy. 1956. Westerfield, Bradford H. Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbour ta Korea New Haven.Yale University Press. 1955. Wilcox. Walter W. The Farmer in the Second Worfd War. Iowa Iowa Stace CoIlege Press. 1947. Wilson. C.F. A Cenrury of Canadion Grain Governmem Policy to 1951. Saskatoon, Western Producer Rairie Books. 1978. Wood bridge, George. The History of rhe United Nations Relief and Rehubilirarion Administrarion, vols. I- iü. New York. Columbia üP,1950 . Young, Walter D. Democracy and Discontent. Toronto. McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.. 1978. I ivinuC LvnLun I IUN TEST TARGET (QA-3) APPLIED & IMAGE. lnc S 1653 East Main Street --.- - Rochester. NY 14609 USA ------Phone: 716,482-0300 ------Fax: 71 W88-5989 O 1993. Applied Image. lnc.. Ail Rights Reserved