THE WORLDBANK
DiscussionPaper Public Disclosure Authorized
AFRICA REGIONAL SERIES
Report No. IDP-130
Public Disclosure Authorized Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa:
The Evidence from
Public Disclosure Authorized Seven Country Case Studies
October 1993 MICROGRAPHICS
Report No: IDP- 130
Public Disclosure Authorized Type: IDP
Discussion Papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. They present preliminary and unpolished results of country analysisorresearchthatiscirculated toencouragediscussionandcomment;citationand theuseof sucha papershould takeaccount of its provisional character. This research was conducted for the Africa Region Working Group on Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel (composed of members from each country department in the region, the Africa Division of the Legal Department, the Africa Technical Department, the Africa Regional Office of the Chief Economist, the Public Economics Division of the Policy Research Department, and the Economic Development Institute). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely thoseof the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. PREFACE
The principal authors of this report are Sarah Keener (task manager), Suzanne Heigh (consultant), Luiz Pereira da Silva (task manager) and Nicole Ball (consultant). It is based on seven country case studies prepared by Elsie Garfield (editing of all case studies), Nat J. Colletta (Uganda), and consultants Alain Rouvez (Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe), Nicole Ball (Uganda, Nicaragua), and Suzanne Heigh (revision and fact- checking of all case studies). Rumana Huque also provided writing and research support. Ross Pfile provided editorial support and Sarah Ismael and Myrina Harris processed the document. Substantial peer reviewing was provided by Elsie Garfield, Bension Varon, Elizabeth Morris-Hughes, Philippe Benoit, George Alibaruho, Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, and Robert Armstrong. The report was financed by the Africa Region Country Departments, the Africa Regional Office of the Chief Economist, the Policy Research Department, and the Global Coalition for Africa.
This study was initially conceived of as informal research for a network of Bank stafin the Africa Region working on countries which were faced with demobilization. However, as interest in information on this subject increased, it became clear that it would be useful to share this informal fact-gathering exercise with a wider audience. While this report explores a broad spectrum of issues relevant to the transition from war to peace, it should not be interpreted as representing a statement of Bank policy in this area. Bank involvement with client countries is restricted to financing technical assistance and productive investments leading towards economic growth.
Ed dV.K. Vice P dent Africa Region Abstract
The combination of economic deterioration during the 1980s and the end of the Cold War rivalry has created a climate in which many African governments - those emerging from civil strife as well as those at peace - are starting to explore ways to shift human and material resources to non-military sectors of the economy for political and/or fiscal reasons. With a view towards filling an information gap on the practical issues arising in the implementation of programs to assist with such a transition, this study summarizes the experience of seven countries (Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) in their current and past efforts to demobilize military personnel and to facilitate their reintegration into the civilian economy and society. The study examines the projects, costs, management issues, and context of each stage of the initial transfer to civilian life (encampment, disarmament, demobilization, transportation) and provides information on the programs offered to facilitate longer-term reintegration (cash payments, NGO and community-based programs, training and employment creation).
Several common observations surface from this comparative view. A politically charged context introduced tension in several cases between achieving political objectives (balancing the political/ethnic representation of the armed forces or civil service, or providing jobs to prevent a return to fighting) and achieving a net fiscal peace dividend. Deadlines set as part of peace agreements or for elections often introduced an added time pressure to these programs which are substantially larger and more complex, logistically and institutionally, than similar civil service retrenchment programs. Moreover, the programs required coordination among a diverse group of players - donors, military leaders, NGOs, community groups - who may not have developed systems for such coordination. In terms of reintegration programs, cash compensation constituted the bulk of the program costs, although program managers stressed the importance of basic training as a component of any reintegration project.
Some preliminary lessons emerge from the experience in these seven countries. First, in practice, demobilization and reintegration represent different phases of an interdependent continuum - - with programs often implemented simultaneously instead of sequentially given the large scale and timing of demobilization. Second, program managers recommended technical assistance, coordination and negotiation at an early stage in order to make some programs more efficient given the substantial institutional demands of these programs (for example, surveys on the profile of often diverse ex- combatants and assistance to set up the institutions to manage reintegration). Third, programs that experienced fewer problems in implementation enjoyed some convergence/consensus between the political and the economic agenda of all participants. Fourth, although information is scarce on the progress of reintegration programs, some smaller-scale NGO projects appear promising, in part because they are more likely to avoid misjudging market demand for training or employment than larger-scale publicly run programs. Program managers' suggestions include providing matching credits for participation in already existing NGO or private vocational training programs. Fifth, more recent programs have included caps on civil service employment to avoid the subsequent inflation of the civil service with former combatants as occurred in Zimbabwe. Given the early stage of the majority of these programs, new lessons and insights will likely emerge as the programs mature. LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADRA Action for Rural Development CCFA Joint Commission for Formation of Armed Forces in Angola CCN Council of Churches in Namibia CCFA Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (Angola) CCPM Joint MPLA/UNITA Political Military Commission (Angola) CENPAP The National Center for Planning and Administration of Development Poles (Nicaragua) CFC Cease-fire Commission (Mozambique) CFD Caisse Franpalsede Ddveloppement CIAV Commission of Support and Verifications in Nicaragua CIVPOL Police Arm of UN Observer Force in Namibia CMVF Joint Commission for the Verification and Control of the Cease-fire (Angola) CORE Reintegration Commission CRS Catholic Relief Services (Angola) CSC Supervisory and Control Commission DRP Demobilization and Reintegration Programs DVC District Veterans Committee (Uganda) DVO District Veterans Offices (Uganda) EEC European Economic Community EPS Nicaragua's Sandinista Popular Army (Nicaragua) FALA UNITA Forces Guerrilla Army in Angola FAM Mozambican Armed Forces (Government) FAO Food & Agricultural Organization PAPLA Army of MPLA Government in Angola GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product GTZ German Cooperation Agency IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICCO Inter-Church Cooperation Organization (Angola) ID Identification Cards ILO International Labor Organization (Angola) IMF International Monetary Fund MPLA Popular Movement for the Independence of Angola political party) NGO Non-Governmental Organization NITRAM Company Formed by Ex-combatants in Zimbabwe NR Nicaraguan Resistance Fighters (Nicaragua) NRA National Resistance Army (Uganda) OAS Organization of American States ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America (Nicaragua) PAHO Pan American Health Organization PLAN People's Liberation Army of Namibia PNP Panamanian National Police (now PDF) RENAMO National Resistance Movement of Mozambique RRR Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reconstruction Committee SADF South African Defense Forces (Namibia) SEED Reintegration Proj6ct in Zimbabwe SIDA Swedish International Development Authority SPA Special Program of Assistance SPR Secrdtariat Permanent 4 la Rdinserdon des Dolaids (Okad) SWAPO South West African People's Organization (Angola) SWAPOL Former South African-sponsored Police Force in Namibia SWATP South West African Territorial Forces (Namibia) TU Technical Unit UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNDP United Nations Development Program UNHCR United Nations High Commission of Refugees (Angola) UNICEF United Nations International Children's Education Fund UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNO National Opposition Union (Nicaragua) UNTAG United Nations Transitory Assistance Group USAID United States Agency of International Development UVAB Uganda Veterans Assistance Board VAP Veterans' Assistance Program (Uganda) WFP World Food Program WHO World Health Organization WRF World Rehabilitation Fund ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, ZANU Party's Military Wing ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZIPRA Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ExeutiveSumar ...... v
Chaptwrl: Itodthion ...... 1
Rationalefor tis Stdy ...... 2
MethodologyoftheStudy ...... 3
The Demobilizadon and Reintegration Procm ...... 4
OrganizalonofReport ...... 5
Chapter f: Objectives of Demobilizaton/Reintegration Process ...... 11
Political Context and Program Objectives ...... 11
Indicators of Success ...... 19
Chaptr III: Dgn of emobhllzadon Programs ...... 23
am pm t ...... * ...... * ...... 23
A. Delays ...... 25 B.Transportation ...... 26
Registration and Iocumentation ...... 27
Disarmament and Weapons Control ...... 29
A. Disarmament of Demobilized Combatants ...... 30 B. Weapons Reclaiming Programs ...... 31 C. Mines and De-mining Programs ...... 35 Chapter IV: Institutional Managenent of Demobilization/Rentegrafon Programs ...... 37
Coordination ...... 37
Monitoring ...... 40 Institutional StructureofDemobilizatonPrograms ...... 45 Institutional StructureofReinteaPrograms ...... 48
Table of Conten I Page Chapter V: Design of Reintegration Programs ...... 51
General versus Targeted Progran ...... 51
Surveys and the Profile of Combatants ...... $ .. I . .* ...... 55
Ca hco pensatlon ...... 59
A.LupSunPayumens...... 59 B. Allowan ...... 63 C.Pensions ...... 64 D. Payment Arrangements ...... 66
Setding-inAssistance ...... 66
Targeted Reintegration Programs (Non-Cash) ...... 68
A.Pre-Release Programs ...... 68 B.Formal Education ...... 69 C.VocationaTraningandIncomeGeneraton ...... 70 D.JobPlacement ...... 74 B.Community-based and NGO Programs ...... 75 HousingandLandIssues ...... 77 SpeclN nerableGroups ...... 79
Chapter VI: Cost and Funding of Demobilization and Reintegration Program ...... 83
CostofDemobiizatlowlReintegrationPrograms ...... 83
Progra PmFundingSources ...... 89
Chapter VII: Program Results and Lessons Learned ...... 93
ssuesofProcess ...... 93
InstitutionaliManagement ...... 95
Demobilization...... 96
Reinea tion ...... 97
A. Surveys ...... 97 B.Cash Compensation Schemes ...... 97
TabI qf CoOtents Page
C. Education, Targeted Training and Employment Programs ...... 99
Program Results ...... 101 Areas for Further Research ...... 103 Bibliography Annex: Terms of Reference
Text Tables I.1 Current Status of Demobilization/Reintegration ...... 7 1.2 The ArmedFores - Before, During, and After Demobilization ...... 8 1.3 Key Economic Indicators ...... 9 11.1 Motivations and Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs ...... 17 II.2 Success of Demobilization, Reintegration, and Demilitarization Programs ...... 20 111.1 Monthly Rate of Demobilization ...... 25 IV.1 Institutional Structures for Monitoring DRPs ...... 44 IV.2 Institutional Structure of Demobilization Programs ...... 46 IV.3 Institutional Structure of Relntegration Programs ...... 50 V.1 TheProfileofCombatants ...... 56 V.2 Compensation Under Demobilization/Relategration Programs ...... 62 V.3 Levelof CashCompensation ...... 65 VI.1 The Relative Cost of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs ...... 84 VI.2 Demobilization and ReintegrationProgram Costs ...... 85 VI.3 Cost Breakdown for DRPs inNicaragua, Uganda and Mozambique ...... 88 VI.4 ProgramFundingSources(approximate) ...... 91 VII.1 Reintegration Results inZimbabwe ...... 101 VII.2 Activities of Chadians Veterans LessThan One Year After Demobilization ...... 103 Text Boxes 11.1 the Context for Demobilization ...... 11 11.2 The Political Dimension of Demobilization inZimbabwe ...... 13 11.3 The Significance of Selection Criteria ...... 18 II.1 EncampmentIn Angola ...... 24 M.2 Ironing Out Logistics with a Pilot Program inUganda ...... 27 111.3 Arms Buy back Program inPanama ...... 33 111.4 One Defense Analyst's Suggestions for Conducting an Arms Buy Back Program . . . . . 34 IV.1 Coordination inMozambique ...... 40 IV.2 The UN as Mediator inNamibia...... 42 IV.3 Program Management Functions of CIAV-OAS ...... 45 IV. 4 Angola: Implementation Difficulties with Interim Governments ...... 47 IV.5 Veterans Association inUganda ...... 48 V.1 The Social Adjustment of PLAN Guerrillas in Namibia ...... 53 V.2 Angola - The Political Motivations Behind Cash Payments...... 60
Tabe of Comeu W Page V.3 CashAllowancesInZimbabwe ...... 64 V.4 Payment Arrangements I Zimbabwe ...... 66 V.5 PaymentOptionsforAngola ...... 67 V.6 Nicaragua: Reducing the Potential for Theft of In-Kind Benefits ...... 68 V.7 Zimbabwe: Specialized Schools for Veterans ...... 69 V.8 Vocational Training in Zimbabwe: The Danhlko Project - One Success ...... 71 V.9 Zimbabwe:Cooperatives-TheZimbabwePrqject...... 72 V.10 Nicaragua: Income-Generating Projects ...... 73 V.11 Namibia: NGO-sponsored Relntegration Programs ...... 76 V.12 Angola: NGO-sponsored Reintegration Programs ...... 77 V.13 Nicaragua: Disabled Veterans Programs ...... 80 V.14 Nicaragua Reintegration: A Family Atfair ...... 81 VII.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Cash Allowasces ...... 98 VI.2 The Public Sector as "Relategrator of Last Resort ...... 101
Figures 1.1 The Typical Demobilization and Reintegration Program ...... 6 V.1 Zimbabwe: ZANLA and ZIPRA Career Ambitions ...... 57 V.2 Angola: PAPLA Career Ambitions ...... 58 V.3 Angola: FALA Career Ambitions ...... 58
iv Tabte of Conten Damoblzation and Raintegration of Military Personnel
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Backgvund
1. For many African countries, it has become painfully clear that the insecurity and diversion of fiscal resources caused by civil war represent the primary roadblock to a return to economic and social development. Such conflict has imposed a heavy burden on the continent, which Ishost to more refugees and displaced persons than any other region of the world - 20 million, of which 80% are women and childreny Countries recently embroiled in conflict such as Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan, have routinely spent between 15 and 40 percent of their national budgets and between S and 10 percent of their ONP on the military; at the same time, all rank In the bottom 15 percent of UNDP's human development index and spend only between .6% and 6% of their GNP on priority development sectors. However, the combination of economic deterioration and the end of the Cold War rivalry has created a climate in which many Aflcan governments -those emerging from civil strife as well as those at peace - are starting to explore ways to shift human and material resources to non-military sectors of the economy for political and/or fiscal reasons.
U. It is in this context that the World Bank is increasingly receiving requests by member governments for technical and financial assistance and advice for programs to reintegrate demobilized combatants into the economyy However, little published information was available on experience with demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs) in the African context. Thas, the primary objective of this study Is to begin to fill this information void by describing the experience with DRP's to date in seven country case studies with a view toward developing a tentative framework for understanding the many Issues raised in DRP design and Implementation.# While the research covers a broad range of Issues relevant to the context of a DRP, it should not be interpreted as representing or Implying a statement concerning World Bank policy or involvement in this area.
ill. Ulis study constitutes a synthesis of the main issues identified in the seven country case studies which were completed through a desk review. The research was based on written material, mostly press articles, and drew heavily on interviews with those involved in DRPs. Because of the sensitive nature of the security issues involved in a given country's DRP, and the limited information available, the case studies are, to some extent, incomplete.
11 W.I.D. Unit, Africa Teohnical Department, World Bank, formagon Meet* Rejfgee and Drplaced Women and Chidren InSub-Sahare 4#fa.
21 UNDP, Heman Development Report, 1992.
/ There ar at least sevn Afican counties which have requested assistance or advice in the past two years. iThis study -as conducted fIr the Africa Region Working Group on Demobilizatlon/Reintegration of Military Personnel, which was created in April 1992 at the rquest of the Africa Region Vice PresidenL
Executive Summary Page v Demobilikation and Reintegration of Military Personnel
IV. The seven countries were chosen as examples of the diverse situations under which a DRP may occur. The African cases include countries that had either completed a DRP (Zimbabwe, Namibia) or had a program underway (Angola at the time of research, Mozambique, Uganda, Chad). All but one of the cases took place in countries just emerging from a period of civil strife - in the case of Uganda, the civil war ended six years ago and the situation has since normalized. The one case outside the region (Nicaragua) was chosen because of the comprehensive scope of Its DRP, which was nearing completion at the time of research. Each of the case studies sought to provide information and analysis on the programs' objectives, design, cost, management, donors roles, opportunities for coordination, and experience gained.
V. Demobilization is defined for the purpose of this report as the process by which the armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces such as guerrilla armies) either downsize or completely disband. Although this definition is rather narrow, in many countries DRPs are part of a much broader transformation from a war- to a peace-time economy (transfer of resources to non-military sectors, reconstruction of infrastructure, restoration of security). A restructuring of the armed forces, which may include creating an ethnically and/or politically balanced "national army," often accompanies demobilizationy Reintegration programs generally refer to targeted programs of cash compensation, training, or income generation meant to increase the potential for economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families, or other displaced persons. Demobilfzation
vi. Political context. The mixed record of success with DRPs in the countries studied (some aborted, others delayed, others carried out successfully in the initial stages) underlines the fact that their success or failure is intertwined, to varying degrees, with the political backdrop in which they take place. The case study countries point to the very different dynamics of a DRP which is carried out during peace- time with a clearly established government in power (the case of Uganda) versus a DRP undertaken in the context of war-to-peace transition characterized by some loosely controlled factions and a some form of power-sharing in the government (Angola, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe). In the latter cases, the decisions of whether to reduce the size of the armed forces, whom to demobilize, and what benefits to offer, became part of the peace negotiation; such decisions were often influenced by the threat of one group returning to conflict, and claiming that benefits and/or positions in a new armed force were awarded inequitably or based on ethnic/political alleglances. The more ambiguous the conflict and its termination, the more susceptible the DRP seems to be to becoming embroiled in factional disputes. In contrast, in Uganda, the decisions of who would be demobilized and who would receive benefits, appear to have been less complicated (based on technical factors such as the desired composition of the
T7he process of *professionalising may include improving military training, modernizing military equipment, andlor reducing the military's politicization and increasing its loyalty to the state rather than to a particular faction or individual.
01 For example, in Zimbabwe tensions arose over the number of each army which obtained positions in the new armed forces. Also, in Nicaragua, the benefits awarded to ex-Nicaraguan Resistance fighters (NR) differed substantially from those awarded to Sandinista combatants.
Page vi Pxecutive Summary Demobilisation and Reintegation of Military Personnel restructured army, the fiscal targets for the military budget) and seem to have required comparatively less negotiation. F In addition, delays In implementation in Uganda did not have the same repercussions as they have following a conflict (as in Namibia where demobilization was considered a precondition for elections, or as In Mozambique whore many view demobilization as a prerequisite to elections and thus as connected to the rebel forces, RENAMO, buying time to first transform Into a political party)." vii. Program objectives. The motivation for Implementing a DRP can be loosely divided into four categories: political, security, economic, and fiscal. These objectives are not always mutually consistent. For example, improving the security situation could involve absorbing ex-combatants into the civil service, and achieving political objectives could include balancing the ethnic/political representation of the army/civil service; however, attaining these two objectives could reduce the fiscal benefit of demobilization, as occurred in Zimbabwe. In the case study countries which were emerging from a conflict situation (all but Uganda and Chad to a certain degree), governments naturally viewed the DRP as a key element in the transition from war to peace (although donors may place a higher value on Its utility as a tool for increasing resources for priority sectors); in Uganda, in contrast, the government designed the entire. program around achieving fiscal and economic goals (i.e. a net reduction In military expenditure was a principle of assistance).$ In both peace- and war-time situations, the ability of the government to achieve either a net reduction in military expenditures over the medium-term or to cement peace depends to a large degree on the sustained commitment and leadership of the key stakeholders (military leaders, the government). vill. Coordination. The countries studied seem to point to the efficiency of planning demobilization and reintegration at approximately the same time, and of recognizing the substantial overlap between the two. In Nicaragua, where demobilization and reintegration were planned concurrently during peace negotiations, the targeted number of ex-combatants was demobilized with less delay than in some other programs studied, and the demobilization program experienced fewer initial problems during implementation.AB' In Uganda, and some other countries, reintegration payments for ex-combatants who had left camps were planned in advance (prior to demobilization) in recognition of
71 The Ugandan military had become inflated during the l&W1980s due to widespread Internal conflict aid the governments armistice policy of integrating opposition guerrill forces into the regular government armed forces. A public expenditue review (1991) revealed that the military budgat consumed more than 30% of the government's resources in 1989 and 1990 (excluding donor fhuds), and led to the decision to downsize the army.
AF Por reference on Mozambique, soe O*ord Analydca, September 3, 1993.
21 In some countries, the military leadership may choose to increase the wages of the remaining soldiers andlor upgrade equipment and training, and thus military expenditures will not necessarily decrease with a reduction in perSonnel.
10I Although some Nicaraguan ex-combatants returned to arms within months of the demobilization, many repotedly did find employment (in November 1991 the Organization of American States (OAS) estimated that only 10% of the Nicaraguan Resistance (NR) wre not self-sufficloat and had serious economic problems). While there were some weaknesses with program design (unfulfilled promises for land, benefits scording to political affiliation), the Ibkfat program implementation proceeded relatively amoothly with individual ex-combatants processed in a matter of days. This case highlights the point that although a DRP may proceed amoothly, it cannot correat fundamental problems resulting from low growth, high unemployment, or deep-rooted tensions.
Executive Summary Page vi Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel their complex administrative requirements (transporting 73,000 people all over the country, setting up the procedures and Instruments for administering decentralized targeted benefits).9 Such advance planning required coordination among a diverse group of players (governments, NGOs, donors, military leaders) who may not typically communicate with one another. Treating demobilization and reintegration as Independent programs (as in Namibia and Angola) seems to have been among the factors which contributed to inefficiencies or delays. To illustrate, in Namibia reintegration payments were offered to ex-combatants as an afterthought, 16 months after the demobilization program. Because systems of identification had not been set up at the time of demobilization for that purpose (when It may have been easier to determine who was and who was not a combatant), twice as many people presented themselves fbr payment as predicted and a dispute ensued." However, one potential pitfall of early planning is making promises which cannot be delivered; in Nicaragua, where demobilization and reintegration were planned fairly early on, the government promised land to each ex-combatant and later encountered problems in delivering on this promise in part because of multiple claims to land and problems with land tenure. According to those involved with the program, disputes over land represented one of the most divisive issues contributing towards recent conflict from re-armed combatants. ix. Monitors. Outside monitors (bilateral or multilateral) appear to have facilitated smooth program implementation in countries where they were perceived as neutral by all parties, had a sufficiently broad mandate, and had adequate financial and staff resources (as in Namibia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe). For example, In politically tense situations, a neutral monitor has been instrumental In verifying the numbers of combatants demobilized from each force (often a subject of contention by each side), in enforcing disarmament in camps, and in assuring the equitable distribution of benefits. Without such a neutral party, the DRP process can succumb to factional disputes on these issues. For example, among the many responsibilities of UN monitors it Namibia were: verification and mediation of disputes on the ground of breaches of the peace agreement, organization of a special force to monitor the neutrality of the police force, disarming combatants and guarding weapons depots, and assistance with legal and election reform. x. Disarmament and weapons control. The case studies confirm the conventional wisdom that establishing a secure environment following a protracted civil war is a complicated task affected by many factors (the political environment, porous borders with countries having large arms markets, weak capacity of the police to professionally and evenly enforce the law, poor or dispersed control of guns by many factions). Following a protracted internal conflict (applicable to most of the case studies), weapons are so numerous both among combatants and civilians, that requiring combatants to turn in one weapon has a limited impact; In some of the case study countries, the poor quality of the weapons collected
J/ Thus, the timing of intervention by donors may Influence the dynamics of the process; early intervention in the form of dialogue and technical assistance may increase the chances of smooth program implementation. For the demobilization/reintegration process to proceed smoothly and to attain the objective of helping ex-combatants become productive members of civilian society, planning (and technical assistance to do so) would need to begin well in advance of combatants demobilization - In cases involving conflict, before the peace negotiations are completed. fV 32,000 ex-combatants claimed eligibility instead of the 16,000 budgeted, prompting ex-combatants to take over a Bank at one point. From, "Plan Pay-Out Problems,' The Nantblan, August 5, 1991: p.3 .
Pago vil Executive Summary Demobilizaion and Reintegration of Military Personnel indicated that combatants were probably hiding additional weapons (.e., arms caches) for future contingencies.y In the countries studied, general security was sought through three means: e4forcement (police enforcement of a prohibition against open carrying of weapons), persuasion(weapons are traded in by the general population In ex hange for cash or In-kind benefits), and/orforcefid seizure (typically carried out immediately following a conflict situation by an armed force). xi. Some countries have used arms buyback or arms exchange schemes as a tool to improve overall security (in addition to the seven country case studies, several other countries were examined for their experience in restoring security following conflict).If In Nicaragua, one program offered high prices in exchange for weapons from two armed groups, although additional groups (over twenty) showed up to sell weapons; however, both the weapons supply and overall level of security showed little improvementA One of the likely difficulties with such programs is that If the value of a weapon remains high (because of insecurity, lack of an effective police force, lack of economic opportunity other than banditry, or because of a continued desire to wage war because of dissatisfaction with government or with an opposing armed group), people may use money from a buyback program to purchase new weapons. Also, in situations such as in Somalia, insecurity may pose a chicken-and-egg dilemma where lack of control over weapons breeds insecurity which keeps the value of weapons high. The arrival of American and other UN troops in Somalia resulted in a significant drop in the price of guns. In areas secured by U.S. troops, such as Mogadishu, the price of an AK47 was reportedly one-tenth to one-fouith of the existing price in unsecured areas such as Baidoa.
Relatetsudfos xii. Institutional weakness. DRPs differ from civil service retrenchment programs because of the substantially larger number of people involved, the frequent need to disperse ex-combatants geographically over a short period of time, and the security repercussions of a failed program. They call for substantial institutional capacity (involving providing decentralized benefits to up to 120,000 individuals in some cases) in terms of planning, implementation and oversight for potential fraud. The management burden of planning, coordinating, and obtaining funding for reintegration programs is especially acute for countries where there is no firmly established government in place at the start of demobilization. This was the case in Angola during its temporary cease-fire and demobilization effort. The absence of clear governmental authority pending the Angolan election contributed to delays in Implementation as programs and planning became bogged down by partisan quarrels (such as clearing
12/ Lack of strict monitoring of weapons (securely storing, frequently checking, adequately guarding, and disposing of the weapons removed from encamped combatants) in Angola reportedly contributed to increased security risk. j4l An Informal background note prepared by a consultant, Alain Rouvez, examined arms repurchase and control programs in Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique, Liberia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. Of these nine countries, only Panama, Nicaragua, and South Africa had implemented some form of arms buyback or exchange schemes.
11/ Also in Nicaragua, Disarmament Brigades were formed from both Sandinista police and army officers and former Contras. The Brigades offer food, housing, construction materials and in some cases money in exchange for guns. Little information is available on the effectiveness of this program.
Executive Summary Page ix Denobllization and Reintegation of MiliWty Prsonel
all decisions with both UNITA and the Interim government). Newly elected governments following a protracted conflict also have difficulties with program planning as they are faced with a myriad of equally urgent reconstruction demands, and may lack the necessary administrative capacity and financial resources to Implement them. Even established governments not recently emerging from a conflict may require external technical assistance to help design and implement DRPs (assistance with conducting surveys, program costing, identifying appropriate institutions to manage programs, advising on how to make programs efficient and sustainable).
xiii. Donor support. Reintegration programs which rely on providing assistance to ex- combatants at their place of resettlement, instead of at camps, are complex and require substantial advance preparation and planning. At the same time, in countries such as Angola, some donors appeared hesitant to commit funds and other resources until the strength of the peace agreement was demonstrated - at which point demobilization would have already begun. However, without donor assistance, the countries studied lacked sufficient resources to plan or launch effective DRPs in a timely manner. In Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Nicaragua political circumstances created an added pressure to implement the program quickly once the agreement to demobilize had been reached. As an alternative to demobilizing to show commitment to the program, In some countries (.e. Uganda) the military has provided information key to planning reintegration (such as the settling-point for veterans, the timing and scale of demobilization) and has worked with donors to design programs. In the case of Chad, access to relevant information on those to demobilize was initially not forthcoming, In part because of the voluntary nature of the program, and possibly because of lack of full commitment by key military leaders during the initial phase of the program.
xiv. The need for surveys. Surveys conducted prior to demobilization (or during encampment) on the number, socioeconomic profile, career aspirations and intended place of settlement of the different forces within a country provides information critical to the design of tailored programs appropriate for combatants. An accurate census of the number of combatants to be demobilized is needed early on to facilitate budgeting and other preparations for demobilization and reintegration. However, in countries with non-traditional forces or loosely controlled military factions it may be impossible to obtain an accurate count of forces.Jy The cases have shown that employment and education needs and desires differ not only between countries but among various military forces in the same country. These variations can have significant implications for the design of tailored programs. For example, in Zimbabwe early reintegration programs focused primarily on agricultural cooperatives, while only 4% of ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants expressed an interest in agriculture. In Uganda, a survey of combatants carried out prior to demobilization revealed that a large percentage were HIV-positive, thus requiring special medical care and education. CIAV-OAS officials in Nicaragua, who did not have access to this sort of data when planning the demobilization programs, urged that such surveys be conducted, arguing that their programs could have been better targeted if they had some basic information about Nicaraguan Resistance (NR) troops. Advance knowledge of where ex-combatants will settle may permit
gl In countries such as Somalia or Chad, where the distinction between military and non-military forces may be blurred, or where there ar many part-time forces, obtaining an accurate census may be very difficult. However, surveys of a sample of forces to determine their desired careers and skills, can still be undertaken even in such situations.
Page x Executive Summary Demoblzation and Relategraton of Military Personnet planners to prepare specific communities where large number of ex-combatants are expected, and also allows for the development of community-based programs in these areas.1 xv. Families as a target group. In many cases DRPs affected families, not just individual combatants since many combatant groups fought and traveled with their families (Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Uganda). Failing to take into account combatants' dependents in estimating the beneficiary population for transport needs, in-kind settling-in packages, and other services can cause inadequate support, budgetary strain, and may delay reintegration. For example, In Nicaragua and Uganda, there were over twice as many dependents as combatants. In Nicaragua, providing benefits to ex-combatants' wives and families apparently resulted in a more equitable distribution of food within the family, and better control and use of money while in Uganda, benefits included payment of school fees for two children per combatant for one year. In Zimbabwe, the wives of ex-combatants proved to be successful in collective farming. Some program planners suggest giving women the responsibility for collecting food and other assistance provided as part of the settling-in kit, incorporating them into training/education programs, and giving them the opportunity to borrow money to begin small farming or other productive enterprises. xvi. Targeted vs. non-targeted reintegration programs. An important strategic choice faced by reintegration program planners is whether to emphasize tailored programs for ex-combatants and their families, or to support programs in which ex-combatants and their families can participate, but which are not restricted to this target group (labor intensive public works for example meant to benefit disadvantaged groups In general).9 The choice of non-targeted versus targeted reintegration programs hinges on the following considerations: (i) whether demobilized ex-combatants are a special needs population; (i) whether their return to productive non-military activity is more important to the overall security of the nation than that of other groups; and (ii) whether targeted programs are effective and efficient. xvii. Survey data examined for the case studies suggest many former combatants lack basic education, marketable job skills, and for some, the social skills needed for successful economic and social reintegration. The prevalence of child-soldiers in Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, Chad, and likely elsewhere, means that some soldiers are familiar only with a "military* lifestyle (15% of soldiers in Zimbabwe were under the age of 20); some may have lost their social roots; and many have foregone opportunities for fbrmal education, or for accumulating assets such as livestock, equipment, or fertile
121 In Nicaragua, the government assigned 25,000 square kilometers in 23 "development poles" to ex-NR and their families. These areas were located in remote rural areas, and were to be provided with expanded social services, and free of Sandinista police and army units. However, many ex-NR preferred their home communities in nothern Nicaragua to the development poles; problems reportedly included strained relations with local populations because some designated lands were occupied by poor peasants, subsequent problems with obtaining land title which would allow for access to agricultural credit, and fear that the poles left the NR open to Sandinista harassment (source: Eguizebal, et al. 1993). In Uganda, the government and donors are creating local veterans committees and social services in communities expecting large numbers of veterans.
I1 The rationale most ofte cited for not targeting is that ex-combatants should not be singled out for special treatment in light of the large number of other ncedy groups (for example, in Angola there may be as many as 2 million people displaced by war).
Executive Summary Pag xi Demiobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel land. For example, in Angola FALA guerrilla forces reportedly lived in non-monetized camps. Similarly, Namibian PLAN guerrillas abroad often depended completely upon the political organization, SWAPO, and faced substantial adjustment when they repatriated. In addition, governments may favor a targeted approach because they fear the threat that frustrated, unemployed ex-combatants may pose to security (through either organized political or criminal violence), national reconciliation, and indirectly, economic reconstruction efforts. Adopting a targeted approach implies clear criteria for distinguishing the beneficiary population (ID card, eligibility requirements); program managers in Nicaragua stressed the importance of defining such clear criteria for the target population early on in the DRP process. xviii. The effectiveness of targeted reintegration programs. It is still too early in most of the cases studied to assess whether targeted programs are more effective than other types of programs. Namibia initially did not provide any reintegration programs targeted to ex-combatants, but later found this approach ineffective as roughly 80% of ex-guerrillas remained unemployed sixteen months after their demobilization.19' In Zimbabwe, the only case where a DRP program ended more than five years ago, the targeted non-cash reintegration programs offered were limitod in scope (literacy and vocational training, cooperatives-in which roughly 13% of ex-combatants participated), compared to the cash payments which were higher than in any of the other programs studied. More than five years after the program ended, almost 40% of those participating in cooperatives had dropped out (largely because of lack of appropriate skills and experience), only 28% of ex-combatants had found employment outside of the public and military sector, and 17% remained unemployed.' The limited information available in the seven case studies suggests that targeted programs in financial management, literacy, civics, health, and education can enhance the likelihood of successful reintegration. However, it is too early in most cases to assess the cost-effectiveness of such programs and the long-term rate of success. xix. Targeted monetary compensation. Reintegration packages in all of the countries studied included monetary payments. Cash payments are relatively easy to administer, and are attractive to combatants who want immediate compensation. Such payments were provided in various forms: lump- sums, allowances ("severance pay"), and/or pensions. Lump-sum payments have ranged from amounts equivalent to 12% of GNP per capita in Nicaragua, to 78% in Zimbabwe. Cash allowances, typically
12/ However, a lack of progress on economic reforms and in the implementation of broad-based reconstruction programs may have contributed to a climate of low economic growth and low employment. This employment figure is derived from the estimated number of ex-PLAN guerrillas registering as unemployed in order to receive benefits following demobilization.
221 The non-cash programs in Zimbabwe consisted primarily of a program which provided combatants with skills in agriculture while they were still in camps, training, and funds for labor-intensive cooperative farming by ex- combatants (benefitting approximately 120 families). The one program which was managed while combatants were still in the armed forces, Operation SEED, suffered from mismanagement, and was stopped after the first year, having reached only about one-fifth of the intended target audience. Of the 100 or so cooperatives set up by approximately 10,000 former combatants (state-sponsored, and those in which former combatants pooled their cash allowances), only 6,383 were still operating in 1988, over five years after the program began. Problems cited included lack of funding, management skills, supply problems and poor transportation. One of the more successful education and vocational training programs run by a private organization (the Danhiko school) reportedly achieved employment rates among its graduates well above average rates for most secondary school graduates, and managed to become self-sufficient in many of its activities.
Pag xii Executive Summary Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel spread out over a period of one to two years, and often provided to ex-combatants in the village where they settle, ranged from amounts equivalent to 38% of GNP per capita in Angola to 444% of GNP per capita (on an annualized basis) in Chad.2 When compared to average wage levels in the civil service or in the formal sector, however, cash allowances averaged 73% of such wage levels across countries. xx. Cash compensation provides a needed source of income to bridge the gap between demobilization and re-employment. However, the evidence suggests that if cash payments are not supplemented by other reintegration programs or at least accompanied by mechanisms to encourage their expenditure on education and productive investments, a significant proportion of former combatants will experience difficulty using the payments to increase their long-term income. The reasons cited include combatants' limited money management and investment experience (combined in many Instances with a poorly developed financial sector), lack of practical skills, and family pressures. To counteract this, some programs included special mechanisms to encourage productive spending; for example, deducting the cost of training courses before paying out the monthly allowance; providing financial counseling and a course on budgeting and accounting; or, with the consent of combatants, setting aside a part of their allowance for purchasing means of production, i.e., land, machinery, tools, and other inputs (accompanied by an educational program to explain the purpose and method of the procedure).X xxi. Targeted in-kind assistance. Many former combatants and their families frequently find themselves without many of the basic necessities of life (shelter, medical care, food, household goods) which had previously been provided by the armed forces or guerrilla groups. In three of the countries studied, ex-combatants were provided with a "settling-in package" to furnish basic necessities to last a period of several months immediately following discharge (including civilian clothing for the soldiers, personal items, building materials, work tools, and agricultural Inputs). In Uganda, this package included payment of primary school fees for veteran's children for one year and was furnished mostly In cash in lieu of direct distribution of goods. In Namibia, the creation of Building Brigades addressed the critical need for housing of demobilized combatants and repatriates in general. Engaging returnees in building houses for their own community not only helps secure them hoosing at a low cost, but also provides valuable construction skills and work experience. In Namibia, as well as Nicaragua and Uganda, program managers provided ex-combatants with the construction materials needed to build their own houses. According to one evaluation of the DRP in Nicaragua, the initial expectation of program
21/ In most of the cases studied, allowances were provided to combatants at their final destination in order to: disperse ex-combatants; facilitate their transition to civilian life (removing them from the military community); encourage reliance on family ties; discourage growth in and reduce the likelihood of oriminal violence. In some of the countries special methods of payment were designed to compensate for the limited institutional framework and administrative infrastructure for distributing allowances to ex-combatants dispersed throughout the country. In Zimbabwe, branches of the Post Office Bank in towns near concentrations of resettled ex-combatants were used to distribute allowances. In Angola, a program involving Payment Coupons and so-called Peace Bonds was proposed to compensate for inadequacies in the banking system. nj Also, payments could be timed to coincide with the beginning of training programs or crop cycles.
Executive Summary Page sii Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
planners that ex-combatants would be self-sufficient within six to ten months was overambitious; one program providing basic supplies lasted 15 months instead of the anticipated 6.2v
xxii. Targeted training and employment schemes. Many program managers have stressed the importance of including a training component In al reintegration projects for ex-combatants, who often lack basic skills. In Zimbabwe, the government provided basic education and agricultural employment schemes to two guerrilla groups while they were still encamped. In Nicaragua, Namibia and Zimbabwe governments designed training schemes for combatants 4Qter they had been demobilized, in all cases in conjunction with employment (rice growing in Nicaragua) or cooperative ventures (the Zimbabwe Project and Development Brigades in Namibia). Although training programs were offered in each of the countries which had completed demobilization, little follow-up information Is available to assess their long-term viability, whether they have benefitted most of those wanting to participate, and how effective and relevant the courses were for veterans' subsequent civilian careers. Similarly, few studies have been completed on the success of the employment creation programs often associated with training programs. Management problems reportedly characterized the employment and cooperative schemes in Zimbabwe and some ex-combatants complained that the income generated from these schemes was insufficient to support their large extended family. Problems faced by some of the microenterprises created under this program may have been overcome had there been an assessment of other income generating activities in the area, recognition of the substantial training required to allow ex-combatants to function effectively in the private sector, and an Indication of the level of competition the enterprises would face. However, anecdotal information from those working in some of these countries at the time suggests that large, publicly-run training or employment programs may encounter greater difficulty in predicting market demand than do smaller, privately-run and/or community-based programs. Programs which subsidize existing vocational or on-the-job training may eliminate the need for such forecasting.
xxiii. Of the very limited number of reintegration programs examined, those which were managed by the private sector (NGOs or other), but which are adapted to the specific needs of combatants, appeared more successful (and more efficient) than large-scale government-created programs. One privately run program, the Danhiko School in Zimbabwe, combined education, vocational training, and apprenticeships, and reported achieving high employment rates among graduates. The school recruited ex-combatants (including disabled combatants) directly from camps, and provided them with high-quality training from proven professionals and apprenticeships in areas such as furniture design (for which a market feasibility study had been carried out). The students were required to board away from their families at the school. The school has become financially self-sufficient (through sale of goods produced during training), and sustainable as it now serves civilians as well as ex-combatants. Another new initiative which seems to balance the need for reliance on market forces with proactive programs to reach ex-combatants, is an apprenticeship program sponsored by the Otto Benecke
21 According to, U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, AID to Mearagua* U.S. ASsistnce Supports& oWomic and Social Developnea, August, 1992.
2N This was also the opinion of NGO and rAintegration program managers interviewed.
Pap XiV Executive Summary Demobilization and Reintegration of Miltary Personnel
Foundation in Namibia. The Foundation underwrites the costs of three-month private sector internships for ex-combatants. After the three months, the program staff follow-up with participants to identify skill shortcomings and to direct participants to appropriate specialized training programs. Some of the other proposals reintegration program managers have suggested for effective targeting include:
* Establishing community-based programs where concentrations of ex-combatants settle or, integrating ex-combatants into existing community-based programs. * Providing vouchers to ex-combatants which could be used as a contribution to an existing community-based project in which they could participate, or for use with existing vocational training programs (but covering only a portion of the costs) in the formal or informal sector. * Utilizing affirmative action programs such as quotas, or offering incentives to private sector companies to hire veterans, combined with temporarily subsidizing their on-the-job training (i.e., apprenticeships) to ensure there is a market demand for the training offered and counter any bias against hiring veterans. * Allowing veterans to participate in the management of programs either through veterans associations or as individuals. * Using the military hierarchical structure of the former armed force and the military discipline to: (i) implement training programs, and help ensure class attendance; (ii) send delegations of respected commanders to personally explain programs to combatants; (iii) use some of the best- educated, senior combatants as trainers; (iv) link the training and education of ex-combatants directly to income-generating activities; and, (v) establish a close link between the struggle (if It was a war of independence) and its continuation as reconstruction.
xxiv. Some NGOs believe that community-based programs provide flexibility, can be easily monitored, and help to ease the healing and reconciliation process following war by integrating veterans into civilian communities. In addition, the transition to mainstream development programs may be easier at the community-level. This transition is important because providing ex-combatants with benefits and opportunities that exceed those of the rest of the population who are also quite needy and have also suffered the consequences of protracted periods of war, may create the basis for new hostilities. According to program planners in Nicaragua, reintegration programs should seek to avoid increasing polarization among social groups by being limited in duration and integrated with regular (mainstream) development programs as soon as possible.X Specific details on community-based programs in the case studies is scarce, partly because many are still in the planning stage.
xxv. NGO Involvement. In some cases, NGOs have been governments' and donors' most valuable partners in implementing demobilization/reintegration programs. For example, NGOs have organized transportation to camps (Namibia), distributed food, medical care, and materials (Namibia), and provided training and job counseling (Zimbabwe). NGOs can compensate in part for weak public sector institutions. In addition, local NGOs are frequently involved in community-based development projects, have extensive experience of local conditions and needs, and possess a measure of independence from the government, factions, and local political parties. However, substantial communication and coordination is necessary between those managing the demobilization process and the NGOs providing
21/ USAID official.
Pxecutive Sumnary Page xv Demobilintion and Reintegration of Military Personnel
reintegration programs. Lack of sufficient NOOs willing to participate in the process posed a problem In Angola.
Coss
xxvi. The annupized costs of demobilization and reintegration range from one-third of annual ODA in Angola's planned program, 22% in Zimbabwe to 5% in Nicaragua; both Zimbabwe and Nicaragua completed demobilization, although the Zimbabwe program provided much larger cash benefits per soldier and was characterized by the long-term cost of an inflated civil service and army. The costs of programs focused primarily on demobilization (or for which information is only available on demobilization costs) such as those in Namibia, Chad, Uganda, and Mozambique range from 4 to 7 percent of annual ODA.
xxvii. The programs' per capita cost is in many cases lower (though sometimes twice the level of the country's GNP per capita) than available information on the average cost of civil service reductions In similar countries. The cost per combatant for both demobilization and reintegration ranged from US$1,938 for the NR In Nicaragua to over US$3,000 for the guerrillas in Zimbabwe.W The per combatant cost of demobilization programs with either very limited or no reintegration programs range from about US$840 in Uganda to a projected US$573 in Angola. The cost for reintegration programs alone in Namibia was US$6.4 million (the government's program, excluding repatriation).' In the one co4pleed DRP, Zimbabwe, the cost of both the demobilization and the reintegration program per ex- combatant employed or in trainingoutside of the civil service and securityforces (seven years after the program's start) was roughly US$8,469 (with demobilization accounting for the majority of costs).&
7& However, it is dificult to compare costs of the programs, because some cost totals include items not reflected in the others; for example, Zimbabwe includes the estimated cost of paying combatants' salaries while they were encamped, while the cost total for the NR does not include their salaries (if in fact they received salaries while in the camps, which is unlikely); some of the cost totals include the operating costs of the UN observer force or other external monitor, others do not.
22I The exact number of beneficiaries is not known.
l In Zimbabwe, if one Includes ex-combatants employed in the civil service among those employed, the total costs decrease to US$5,928 per employed ex-combatant. Demobilization costs here do not include US$42 million in salaries to encamped combatants. In comparison, in civil service redeployment programs in Africa, special reintegration schemes and credits cost US$11,000 in Senegal (DIRE/FNE programs), US$4,200 in Guinea and US$1,700 in Mall (FIR program). To these costs, one would need to add the often substantial departure allowances to compare with the total DRP costs presented above. These departure allowances for civil service programs ranged from 48 months of salary in some cases in Senegal, to an average of US$6,807 per person for a departure package in Mall; one could compare this latter figure with just over US$3,000 for departure and reintegration allowances in Zimbabwe. The benefits provided in Zimbabwe were higher than in any other program and a large percentage of the ex-combatants found employment in the police or military. Thus, most other programs which bar ex-combatants who receive demobilization benefits from employment in the military or civil service can be expected to have substantially lower costs. Sources: Redeployment of Laid-Off Public Sector Employees, internal draft paper by Marc Schacter, CECPS, IBRD; Civil Service Reform In Mal: An Evaluation of de Volumy DepartureProgram, internal draft paper by Albert Zeufack, APSCO, IBRD, September, 1993; Les Fonds D'nplot - Sont-il lFicaces? ine Evaluation Soco-Economiqw de la DIRE/FNE au Snigal, internal draft by Eliane Karp-Toledo, AFMSP, IBRD, July 30, 1993.
Page xvi Executive Summary Demobilization and Rvintegmion of filitary Personnel
Resufts xxviii. The objective of this study was not to quantify the contribution that a DRP may have made towards peace and employment. However, it is likely that the net benefits of these programs in both social and economic terms can be substantial. In Uganda the *peace dividend" from reduced military expenditures is estimated to be $14 million for the first stage of the program in FY93 alone. In Zimbabwe, although many former combatants ended up in the civil service, defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP nonetheless declined from 8.8% in 1980 to 6% in 1985, and finally to 6.7% in 1989. In Nicaragua, defense expenditures as a percent of GDP dropped from 28% in 1989 to 5% in 1991. In contrast with Zimbabwe, in Nicaragua the size of the civil service has decreased. xxix. Five years after the conclusion of the Zimbabwe program 83% of the former combatants found employment or were in training (although 55% of these were in the civil service or military). Along similar lines, program managers in Nicaragua estimated that 80% of the ex-NR were self-sufficient 18 months after the program's start. In Chad, a survey of 506 of the first wave of demobilized revealed that less than one year from the program's start, 78% reported some type of economic activity (although the first to volunteer for demobilization may also be those most likely to find employment).
Conclaston xxx. The success of DRPs appears to be tightly linked to the specific political, economic and security climate faced by each of the countries studied. This is particularly true in countries emerging from civil conflict. In countries where governments and program managers have been able to take an Integrated approach to planning demobilization and reintegration, implementation has proceeded relatively smoothly, which in and of itself cannot guarantee a return to security and a lower military expenditure burden. Such an integrated approach requires substantial advance coordination among a diverse group of actors. It is clear that as programs evolve, better information may become available, and new and more conclusive lessons may emerge.
ExcOutive Summary Pago vil Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa recorded important gains in economic and social sectors over the last 30 years, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s. However, progress has often been slower and more uneven than anticipated. The region was affected particularly severely by the "lost decade of development opportunities" of the 1980s, when social welfare, productive capacity, and infrastructure declined in large parts of the developing world. Economic stagnation has combined with deteriorating terms of trade, rapid population growth, and levels of indebtedness that are among the highest In the world to produce an economic crisis of significant proportions.
2. This economic crisis has presented many African countries with a dwindling revenue base at a time when growing populations require increasing resources for basic health care and education. It has also become painfully clear for some countries that the primary roadblock to a return to productive economic activity and investment is the lack of security caused by civil war. Countries in this situation, such as Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan, have routinely spent between 15 and 40% of their national budgets and between 5 and 10% of their GNP on the military. All rank in the bottom 15% of the UNDP's human development index and spend only between .6 and 6% of their GNP on priority development sectorsY The case studies examined for this report reflect the particular challenges African countries face to assure security when economic opportunities are scarce and control over combatants and weapons is used as a primary vehicle for gaining and retaining control over political and economic capital.
3. As in other regions, the end of the Cold War has had important repercussions on conflicts in Africa and has prompted increased motivation to reduce the burden of military expenditures. The demise of superpower rivalry and South Africa's movement toward majority rule have influenced a reduction in tensions throughout the region and are contributing to conditions under which efforts to end the most costly conflicts have a chance to succeed. In addition, several African countries are attempting to consolidate their transition from military regimes to civilian, multiparty governments and to reduce military expenditures and/or demobilize armies inflated by war. In some countries, the challenge of reconstruction after years of war, and resettlement of huge refugee populations is immense. In others, while the military may not represent a substantial portion of the population, the insecurity from armed forces with insufficient civilian control has an enormous cost in terms of foregone investment and growth (Chad, Somalia, Mozambique). Thus, the potential benefits of facilitating the ex-combatant's return to civilian life and to productive economic activity are substantial.
11 UNDP, Hwnm Developmea Report, 1992. 21 For example, in Angola, the military sector represents 5% of the active population; 300,000 refugees have fled to Zaire and Zambia and 800,000 are displaced within the country. In Mozambique, up to 30% of the population is displaced within and outside the country.
Chapter 1 - Introduction Page 1 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
RATIONAL FoR Tis STuDY
4. The World Bank is increasingly receiving requests by member governments for technical and/or financial assistance for programs to reintegrate demobilized combatants and displaced persons into the economy. These requests have placed new demands and challenges on Bank staff, in an area in which the Bank has little direct experience.y
5. - Experience with demobilization and reintegration is limited-especially in countries with very weak economies and low administrative and institutional capacities. In August 1991, an informal working paper was prepared to assist the Chad country team in responding to the Government of Chad's request to design a program to reintegrate combatants. This paper drew substantial attention both within and outside the Bank and confirmed the need for a more thorough review of experienceY
6. To follow up on this work, the Vice President of the Africa Region requested the formation of the Africa Region Working Group on Demobilization/Reintegration of Military Personnel in April 1992. The Group includes members from each country department in the region, as well as the Africa Division of the Legal Department, the Africa Technical Department, the Africa Regional Office of the Chief Economist, the Public Economics Division of the Policy Research Department, and the Economic Development Institute. Discussion among Bank staff working on countries such as Chad, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Liberia, and Uganda highlighted the urgent need to gather more Information on experience with demobiliution and reintegration. Such information would allow for a more informed response to governments' requests for assistance. The primary objective of this study is to describe the experience with DRPs to date in seven country case studies, and to develop a preliminary understanding of best and worst practices in the implementation of such programs. The report explores a broad range of issues arising in the demobilization process in an effort to better understand the context in which it has taken place. However, it is not meant to imply any statement regarding Bank policy in this area. The terms of reference for this study are in Annex I.
7. Donors are also starting to think about how they can use their funds to support these types of efforts. Demobilization and reintegration are closely related to some of the recommendations of donor assistance policies, for example a shift in the composition of public expenditures. Although the donor community has often linked its adjustment lending efforts to downsizing and reforming recipient countries' civil services, until recently, less has been done to address the issue of the level and nature of military expenditures. A number of initiatives are now emerging at both bilateral and multilateral levels.
I/ Several Bank and IMP studies are underway on the impact of military expenditures on development, and on the potential and economics of reaping a "peace dividend,' but no known studies had been conducted on operational responses to the demobilization of combatants.
This study uses the term 'combatants* to refer to all members of armed forces in a country, including the government ('regular')army as well as members of guerrilla armies and armed opposition factions. The label of combatant refers to support personnel as well as actual fighters, and does not imply that they are currently actively engaged in fighting. The term 'soldiers' refers specifically to members of the regular, government armed forces.
Page 2 Chapter 1 - htrodUcion Demobiliration and Reitegration of Military Personnel
At the Special Program of Assistance (SPA) meeting in Tokyo in late 1992, several donors met to discuss policy Issues and lessons regarding demobilization, dIermament and reintegration. In February 1993, a meeting was held at the Organization of Economic cooperation and Development (OECD) to educate the donor community on military expenditures and development and to formulate coherent responses to requests for funding by countries. The Global Coalition for Africa sponsored a meeting in Kampala in 1992 centered on the reduction of military expenditures, and another in Benin in June 1993 which touched upon the same topic. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned the International Development Center of Japan to prepare a report on Military Expenditures in Developing Countriesand Aid Policy in March 1992. These examples are among the numerous discussions and conferences being sponsored by donors and interest groups.,
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
8. Little information has been published, or is readily available, on experience with DRPs in general, and especially on such programs in Africa. Given the lack of literature available on this topic, extensive primary research was necessary to compile the case studies. Disparate pieces of information were assembled from a variety of sources, with particular reliance on the following: interviews with officials from governments, militaries, international and regional organizations, and NGOs actually involved with designing and implementing these programs; memoranda, and documents from these organizations; interviews with World Bank officials and reports, especially to assess the socioeconomic impact and residual problems of DRPs; and heavy reliance on press articles from the various countries involved in the programs. Because of the time-consuming nature of this primary research, and the sensitive and continually changing nature of the political, economic, and security issues involved in a given country's DRP, the case studies are to some extent incomplete.
9. The African cases selected-Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Uganda, Angola and Mozambique-include countries that either had completed a program (Zimbabwe, Namibia), or had a program underway (Angola at the time of research, Mozambique, Uganda, Chad). All but one of the countries was just emerging from a period of civil strife-Uganda's civil war ended six years ago. Country case studies were selected in order to provide a diverse sampling of the variety of situations under which a DRP may occur, but do not include all examples in the region (notably Ethiopia, and Somalia, which became a candidate for demobilization after the research for this study had already commenced). The one case outside of the region (Nicaragua) was chosen because of the comprehensive scope of its DRP to compare and contrast with the other cases chosen.
A/ Inaddition, the African-American Institute organized a Conference on Democratization and the Role of the Mmltary in Afria, held in Burundi in February 1993; the German Cooperation Agency (GTZ) issued a Propoafor the Reintegration ofRefugees, Displaced Persons and v-Combatants with Special Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa in August 1992; and the German Foundation for International Development organized a forum for policy discussion on Disarmaent and Development in February 1992. g/ Although this was based on the experienca in seven countries, some references are made, where relevant, to information on countries other than these seven which emerged during the course of research (e.g arms buy-back programs).
Chapter 1 - Introduction Page 3 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
10. Each of the seven case studies which form the basis for this report sought to provide information and analysis in the following seven major areas: program objectives and content; design; cost; management; results; donor roles and the opportunities for donor coordination; and lessons emerging from individual country experiences. The major findings from each case are compared and contrasted. This report should be read keeping in mind that it is based on the limited information available on a small sample of countries. There is still considerable opportunity to learn from the experiences from these and other country cases, and to refine the initial findings.
THE DEMODILZATION AND REINTEGRATION PItOCESS
11. Demobilization and reintegration are stages in a process by which government armed forces and/or opposition forces (i.e., guerrilla armies) are either reduced or completely disbanded, and the ex-combatants join the civilian society and economy. Thus, the number of combatants in a country is reduced, and the burden of the military wage bill on public expenditures is possibly reduced as well.2' As shown in Figure 1.1, demobilization and reintegration can be broken down into components or steps: encamping combatants or confining soldiers to barracks; performing a census and other registration and documentation activities; disarmament; transferring them to civilian status upon release; and then providing training/rehabilitation programs to enable them and their families to become productive civilians. The encampment of combatants prior to their release is often used by governments to gather information on combatants, to count them, anO to control the pace of demobilization.
12. In cases of internal conflict, the decisions on whether to reduce the armed forces, by how much, and whom to demobilize were often determined as part of the peace process. In cases such as Uganda, the demobilization process was not related to a conflict, but followed a decision by government and military leaders to reduce the number of troops.1' A restructuring of the armed forces often accompanies demobilization programs. The government, in conjunction with the military and/or opposition leaders, determines the size of the new armed forces required for the country's security needs and consequently the number of combatants to be demobilized: when opposition forces are involved, those parties negotiating determine the representation from each faction to join the new armed forces. Restructuring may include introducing an ethnic and/or partisan balance to the armed forces and increasing the military's professionalism.-' Once the number to be demobilized is set, each side determines the number of their armed forces who will voluntarily be demobilized, or who will automatically be demobilized (too young, too old, disabled) and what positive or negative incentives may be required to persuade the remainder to demobilize.
21 Because military leadership may choose to increase the wages of the remaining soldiers and/or upgrade equipment and training, military expenditures may not necessarily be reduced with the decrease in personnel. f Uganda's military had become inflated during the late-1980s due to widespread internal conflict and the governments armistice policy of offering amnesty to opposition guerrilla forces and integrating them into the regular armed forces. As the security situation improved, economic and fiscal constraints became more prominent. 2/ The proccs of *professionalizing" may include improving military training, modernizing military equipment, and/or reducing the military's politicization and increasing its loyalty to the "nation' rather than to a particular faction or individual.
Page 4 Chapter i -introduction Demobilization and Reiategration of Military Personnel
13. Reintegration in all of the case studies includes monetary compensation payments (such as severance pay and pensions), which are often accompanied by a set of programs to facilitate the return to productive civilian activities (See Figure 1.1). These programs may be targeted specifically to ex- combatants, such as vocational training and income generation projects, or to the general population, such as reconstruction programs. While commonly seen as sequential phases, demobilization and reintegration actually overlap since in most countries studied combatants demobilized in phases. Furthermore, in order to enhance a smooth transition to civilian life, reintegration programs would need to begin as soon as possible after demobilization. This Implies planning reintegration during or prior to demobilization.
ORGANIzATION OF REPORT
14. Chapter Two examines the motivations and objectives for implementing DRPs in the seven case studies, and the stages which comprise the demobilization and reintegration process. Chapter Three reviews the varied experiences with the design of demobilization programs in each of the country cases. Chapter Four examines issues of process touching both demobilization and reintegration, and management structures for both programs. Chapter Five compares reintegration program design, followed by Chapter Six which focuses on the costs and funding of the DRPs studied. Chapter Seven highlights some preliminary observations from the case experiences, and lessons learned from apparent successes and failures.
Chapter 1 - Introduction PAg 5 Figure 1.1
THE TYPECAL D OB ATION D R EGR ON PROGRAM
E Eoyed bcauscam Iiocmuooctar sEdie ncaflt E EJJöb Job
Door n U er
Coordnation Circ~us: programs Darker Bos or Circe Indicate public flnance bimpu~caton
DEMOBILIZATION E G R A T 1I N Table I: Curent Status of DenobWiadon/Relategration
Angola Chad Mozambique Namibia Nicaragua Ugasua Zimbabwe Current status Demobilization Demobilization Peace declared, Demobilization Demobilization Demobilization Program baked, return to ongoing demobilization (repatriation) completed, ongoing completed 1985 War being planned completed, reintegration reintegration ongoing, intermittent ongoing fighting Peace Eletions held in N/A, established Cease-fim Elections held Cease-fire agreed to N/A, Elections held negotiations September 1992, government in implemented 1989, established in 1990; demobliza- established govt 1980, established but UNITA did place November 1992 government in tion began April in place govt in place not accept defeat, place 1990, completed by war resumed July 1992 Demobilization Encampment Delayed by one up to 16,000 Demobilization of Contmas demobilized; Started 75,000 guerrillas incomplete, year, but (out of 103,000 all armies 85% of Sandinista December widespread demobilized' commencing to 137,000) completed before armed forces 1992; first desertion from slowly as of registered for independence in demobilized phase of 23,000 camps, 20,000 out December 1992; prem-pace 1990 completed by of 151,000 9,173 demobilization April 1993 demobilized (June demobilized or (August 1992) 1992), but retired as of but cease-fire subsequently August 1993. agreed before returned to demobilization fighting Reintegration Programs pro- No major pro- No formal Project ongoing; Range of programs. No major No major pared, not gram; relying on programs yet, unemployment and benefitted both com- program other program, relied endorsed, no cash compensa- cabinet created absorption into batant groups plus than setling-in on NGOs but gave financing secured, tions and futum to coordinate public service high dependents; little assistance; littl funds; in none implemented help from NGOs eintegration rehiring into public Veteran's 1989 public sector sector; unemploy- Assistance had reabsorbed ment and under- Board created; 55%, 17% employment high reintegration unemployed under design Disarmament/ Failed to disarm Intermittent Est. 25,000 to Comparatively Arms casily available Stable Stable .security soldiers during banditry, fighting 1.5 million stable; although despite various established encampment, weapons in crime rate up weapons control and desertion with circulation; UN buy-back programs; arms leading to peace-keeping intermittent fighting banditry; est. 2 force being sent persists in rural areas million weapons in to disarm circulation
At least 15,000 of this number were no longer active combatants, but became eligible for demobilization benefits. C44
.I1 $
-- 2
...j.9
'I _ __I
i:fi Table 13: Key Economic Indicators
ANGOLA CHAD MOZAMBIQUE NAMIBIA NICARAGUA UGANDA ZIMBABWE
Population 10 mnllion 5.9 million 15.7 million 1.78 million 3.9 mnllion 16.6 miions 6.7 mill. (1979) 8.4 mill. (1985)
Population growth 2.7%' 2.4% 2.6% 3.2% 3.3% (1991) 2.5% 3.4% rates
GNPleapita' uS$ $620 (1991)u Before $610 (1989f $210 (1991) $80 (1990) $1080 (1990) $420 (1990) $170 (1991)" $580 (1979) AAer .. .. $1120 (1991f $340 (1991' .. $640 (1985)
Real GNP - 1.0% (1990) -3.2 (1988-90) -.5% (1988-90) -1.4% (1985-90)"; -7.3 (1990) 3.3% (1980-91) -15%(19700) Growthicapita4 0.3% (1990-91) 1% (1991)n -0.8%(1980-90)
Unemployment rate - Before ...... 25-40%" 13% (1990) After ...... 30-40%" 16% (1992)" 3.4%-.3%" 12% Civil Service Before 145,000 21,500 (1987) .. 50,000 (1988) 70,000 (1990) 244,159(1988) 71,000 (1980) After nla 26,000 (1990) .. 61-65,000 (1991) 60,000 (1992) 314.700 a 89,400 (1985)
Defense Exp. as 21.5%2 3.8% 10.4% 5.7% (1988) 28.3% (1989) 1.6 (1988W 8.8% (1980) 2 % of GDp 2 2.5% (1990P 5% (19919P 6% (1985) 6.7% (1989P
Defense Exp. as 34.3%" 40%" 33% (199091 13% (1988) 38.3% (1989) 31.2" 25% (1980) % of CGE 1 6.5% (1991?1 22% (199092 14.4% (19859'
Social Sector 4.4% 4% (1989)m 1.8% (for 2.5% 7.4% (1989) 3.7% 12.7% Spending as % Education; Health 9.2% (1991) 1.7% (1990-91)N GNP" n/a)
Social Sector 14% 13.1% .. .. 23% (1989) 18.9% (1990-91) Spending as % of 34% (1991) CGE Total Combatants" Before 151,000 43,700 103,000-137,000 22,000" (1988) i16,500 (1990) 80,000 75,000 (1980) After ala n/a n/as 7,100 (1990) 15,250 (1993' n/a 46,000 (1985) TABLE : Key Ekounmc Indietars (cnt.)
1/ For mid-1990, kom 7ends In Devekqping &onomes 1992 and Social ndke~tors of Dewlopmen 1991-92, Tbe World Bank, unles otherwise ind'rated. 2/ For 1991 from 17m Worid Bank Atas, 1991, The World Bank. 2/ From Uganda: Gringt qw,fPoverty, Marh, 1993, World Bank Grey Cover Report No. 11380-UG. / Both dats from World Table, 1989-90 Edi~, The World Bank, 1990. / Avrage annual groth rate for period 1980-90, from World Bank, World Developmen Report, 1992, unless otherwise noted. f/ Most recent estimate from Socal Irdlcatorsof Devlopmen, 1991-92, 'e World Bank. 2/ For 1991 from World Devlopmen Report 1993 unles othrwise noted. If avaiable, data are presented for the year demobilition implementd, and year comped. L/ Most recent estimat from Social Indcamors ofDevelopment, 1991-92, The World Bank. 2/ For 1990, 1991 from 7he Wor Bank Atlas, 25th Anniversary FAio, 1992, The World Bank. JWl For 1990, 1991 fro~ 1e Word Bank Atkar, 25th Andrswniy F^/don, 1992, The World ank. l From Uganda: Growing Ow of Povery, March, 1993, World Bank Grey Cover Report No.11380-UG. 1l From i7 World Bank At~a, 25(h Anni~rsary Ed~bon, 1992, Tlic World Bank. 13/ This and previous years from World Tabkes, 1989-90 EdWdon, The World Bank, 1990. &4/Figures from 77h Word Bank Atdam (1983, 1991 and 1992 editions), unl~s otherwis indi«Wtd. Ig World Bank estimate from Angola: Pub&c EtpenditureIssues and PrortesDuring 7>ansiion to a Marke tonony, un 1993, World Bank GternaGreen Cover Report No. 11649-ANG. j/ Growth in real GDP per capita from Na~nba, Poverty Aleviaton wkh SnstaiableCrowh, World Bank, 1992. l/1 From IBRD President's report: ProposedEconon~c Recovry Credk to dhe RepubBc of Ncaragua,September 3, 1991 jy World Bank estimates. 19 25-30% in formal seioro om Nanbla: Povery AUreviation with Sutanabe Growth, World Bank Country Study, 1992. For 2_/ urban and rural areas, respectively, in 1992, from Tho World Bank, Uganda Growing Ow of Povery, March 31, 1993. 21 1988 figur* includes 53,593 paratatal employees; 1992 figur includes 216,800 parastatal employees; data from li World Bank, Uganda: Growg OW of Povery, March 31, 1993. W2/ For 1989, from H~anan Development Report, 1992, UNDP, unless othrwse noted. 21/ Throughout the 1980's this ranged from 15-20% according to, Angola- Publik Ependkure Issues and PrioriiesDurng Tanuiton to a Market £coa~y, June 1993, World Bank. 24/ From Nniba: Poverty AUeviaon wkh Sustainable Growth, World Bank Country Study, 1992. 25/ Figure is % of GDP; from World Bank Nicaragua country department. 261 As percent GNP. From World Mitary Kpendituresand Arm Trasfers, 1990, U.S. Arm Control and Disarmament Agency. Z21 For 1980, 1985 and 1989 as a percent of GNP. From Word M~ltary pendures and Ams Transfers, 1990, and from World Developent Report 1993, TIlæ World Bank. 28i 1992 6gures from Angola: PubSc ~penditure Issues and PriordesDuring Prans~onto a Market Economy, lune 1993, World Bank Green cover internal report No. 11649-ANG. 29/ For 1987 from World MilIkary Evpendituresand Arms Tansfers, 1990, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 2Q/ From The World Bank, Mornblque, Second Pub&c Ependitre Revew (green cover), December 31, 1992. 21/ From Worl Development Repor 1993 and NaMibla: Povery Afleviaon wih Sustanable Growth, World Bank Country Study, 1992. W2/ Fram World Bank, Nicaragua Country Dept. 2/ From, *War to Peac Transiion in Uganda,* in Finance & Development, June 1993. l4/ For 1980 and 1985 from World Mitar &pendturesandArs 7>~«sfers, 19~0, U.S. Arm Control and Disarmamnent Agency. LS/ From Biinan Dewlopment Report, 1992, combines ~pending for Education in 1989 and Heah in 1987, unless otherwise noted. L/ Fram SPA tables. 2/ Figur. combines number of troops in government's armed fores with number of combatants in guerrifa forces. ay 45,000 projected to be demobilized first year, 9,000 smeond year. 22/ Ineludes SADF (South African suppoted nilitary fores). 4Q/ ofei l fgure as of August, 1993 acoarding to CrAV-OAS official. Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
CHAPTER U
OBJECTIVES OF DEMOBILIZATION/REINTEGRATION PROCESS
15. This chapter provides background on the context in which DRPs have occurred in the cases studied. It also illustrates the link between the context and the priority placed on different objectives by governments, particularly In countries emerging from conflict. The chapter then touches upon how the program's objectives can influence the selection of who is to be demobilized. A set of criteria useful for evaluating the success of demobilization/reintegration programs is also presented.
POLrIrCAL CONIEXT AND PROGRAM OBJECMVES
16. The spectrum presented in Box IL1 illustrates the diverse range of situations in which a DRP may take place. Some of the case study countries may not fail neatly into one category, such as Chad which has intermittent small-scale fighting between armed factions but has one government in place. In
Box II.1: The Contextfor Demobilization
gm...... * t h oo Ethiogi( N ibafrni ~ f il0".....
...... S ....
if sizigl do fr sonon a powity (aon (..,Ugnd) t~~~~~~~~~~y~~~0ciooaddv1iigx .'ii ...... (...... :...... -......
M ...... 1Fi -I..** coutressuca Agoa o Zmbbw with prorac ei r thein DRPfic proess and chice of wh six of the seven cases studied, countries were recently emerging from a period of civil strife. In the countries such as Angola or Zimbabwe with protracted civil war, the DRP proess and the choice of who would stay in and leave the armed forces took on political significance; experience In the seven countries studied suggest that the more ambiguous the conflict and its termination, the more politically charged the
Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilizatioa/Reintegration Process Page 11 Demobilizedion and Reintegration of Military Personnel
context for a DRP since following civil war power often stems from control over armed forces. In such cases, the decisions of whether to reduce the size of the armed forces, and whom to demobilize, often became part of the peace agreement and were more likely to be influenced by the threat of one group returning to conflict, and claiming that benefits of demobilization and reintegration programs and/or positions in a new armed force were awarded inequitably or based on partisan or ethnic allegiance (see also para. 27). In contrast, in countries where there is a clear winner or clearly established government, as in Uganda, decisions on who is to receive benefits, and who is to be demobilized, have appeared less complicated (with a greater focus on technical factors such as the preferred skill mix needed for the restructured army) and may require less negotiation.
17. The cases of Chad and Angola illustrate the importance of commitment by all concerned parties (through sufficient Incentives) and of leadership to the success of DRPs. The demobilization decision in Chad followed the armed overthrow of the Habre regime in December 1990. The new government proclaimed that the DRP's objective was to improve security and reinforce stability, democratization, and national unity by building an Integrated, professional and smaller armed force. Chad's primary foreign supporter, France, and other donors also made it clear that the demobilization of a percentage of the armed forces and a reduction in military expenditures were important criteria for future assistance. However, despite substantial French technical and financial assistance, demobilization was, at times, challenged by military factionalism (which makes assessing underlying commitment difficult), the long-standing tradition of resorting to force to gain power, and the strength of the military factions to block reforms if they do not perceive the reform to be in their interest. In Chad's initial demobilization program of 1991, some military commanders had little incentive to let troops go, and some worried all would depart once the substantial cash benefits were announced, thus diminishing their military strengthJy Without sufficient incentive or the commitment of key military stakeholders, demobilization is vulnerable to reversal (as in Angola) or slow initial implementation (as in Chad).
18. In Angola, the Lisbon Agreement of May, 1991 ended the 16-year long civil war between the MPLA government of Angola (and its armed forces, FAPLA) led by Jos6 Eduardo dos Santos with support from Cuba and the former Soviet Union, and the UNITA guerrillas (and their military wing, FALA) led by Jonas Savimbi, who were supported by the U.S. and South Africa. The Lisbon Agreement covered the cease-fire, integration of the two armies (and thus demobilization of a percentage of each), and multiparty elections scheduled in 1992. The UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) counted 74,400 troops assembled in 46 camps throughout the country in June 1992) Demobilization had
1W One could argue that this lies behind the difficulties encountered in the demobilization program in Cambodia despite substantial effots, in terms of both financial and personnel resources, by the UN and donors to negotiate a peace accord and design a demobilization/raintegration program. Considering political control to be their dominant motivation, the Khmer Rouge saw little incentive to accede its power base.
Jj1 Afer little progress in its first demobilization attempt in 1991, the Chadians revised the terms of the program and started a now program in July 1992. 12/ "Purther Repost of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (Unavem II)," June 24, 1992.
Page 12 Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
begun, albeit behind schedule, but was reversed following the September 1992 elections in which the results were contested by UNITA, and war resumed.
19. The case of Zimbabwe (Box 11.2) provides another illustration of the interplay between the transition to peace and the demobilization process. Prior to demobilization in 1981, Zimbabwe had been embroiled in a protracted civil/independence war in which two African parties continued armed resistance against white rule in Rhodesia. The two African parties were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party of Robert Mugabe (and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army - ZANLA), and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo (and its military wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army - ZIPRA), which both operated from neighboring countries, ZANU in Mozambique and ZAPU in Zambia. The war ended in 1979 with the signing of the Lancaster House agreements which established: (1) the terms of the Constitution for an Independent Zimbabwe; (2) the terms for free elections; and (3) a British Commonwealth-supervised cease-fire. After winning the elections in 1980, Robert Mugabe of the ZANU government became Prime Minister and appointed himself as Minister of Defense. Following protracted negotiations, Mugabe gave management of the Ministry of Home Affairs, with control over the 8,000-man police force, to his rival, Joshua Nkomo. Beginning in April of 1980, the government implemented force restructuring, demobilization and reintegration programs for all three combatant groups (ZANLA, ZIPRA, and Rhodesian forces) with the objective of building an integrated, professional, and ethnically balanced armed force of 25,000.
Box 112: The PoliticalDimension of Demobilizationin Zimbabwe
."As formr freoln fighters.had been ordered to congregato ja designated assembly points but infact t all did sor tw reasons,. The first was that the.Rhodesians had been left in charge of the air firice and. . thewas a red possibility that there might be an attempted coup and that the assembly points might be ibW. For ely this did not happen. The second reason had to do with the fortheoming elections. An alatow~ indber of abotants aly meltedR back into the population for electioneering purposos. frpm'?7he.Zh4b46we cro's EAperience in Resettling Combatawts.- the Zimbabwe Projec
20. In Nicaragua, the decision to demobilize was the result of extensive regional and internal negotiations. On August 7, 1989, after a decade of civil war between the Nicaraguan Resistance (NR) and the Sandinistas, the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua signed the Tela Accord which called for the NR to voluntarily disarm and accept repatriation to Nicaragua or to a third country with the supervision of the UN and the OAS.' However, efforts to disband the
12/ In this study, for simplicity, we will refer to all of the insurgent factions as NR. The Nicaraguan insurgents, known as lcontras,* were not actually a unified group, but included at least three factions. The main force, the Nicaraguan Resistance, operated in northern Nicaragua, mainly from bases in Honduras. The Frente Sur operated in southern Nicaragua, at times from bases in Costa Rica. The smallest group, Yatama, was an alliance of several Atlantic Coast Indian groups. Each of the three groups signed separate demobilization agreements with the government, although all in the same general time period and under similar terms and procedures.
Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process Page 13 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
NR lagged until after the election of the National Opposition Union (UNO), led by Violeta Chamorro, on February 25, 1990. One month after the elections, the NR and President-elect Chamorro signed the Toncontin Accord which provided for the disarmament and demobilization of the NR. Under this agreement, Mrs. Chamorro pledged her new government "to intercede before the appropriate governments to obtain-for the duration of the demobilization process-humanitarian aid for members of the Nicaraguan Resistance as well as the necessary medical infrastructure to provide needed attention for the victims of the conflict."L These peace agreements did not address demobilization of the Sandinista's People's Army (EPS) and no arrangements were made for restructuring of the regular armed forces, nor for the integration of any of the NR into the regular army.y However, in June of 1990, President Chamorro announced that her government would cut the EPS by more than 50 percent, to 41,000 by August, 1990.1v
21. Some leaders of the NR violated the agreement and tried to avoid demobilizing by moving as many troops from Honduras into Nicaragua as possible before the demobilization process of NR in Honduras began. However, on April 19, 1990, the leadership of the BPS and the NR agreed to a cease- fire and a timetable for demobilizing all NR troops. On April 20, NR forces began assembling in designated, UN-supervised areas in Nicaragua and Honduras. They agreed that actual demobilization would not begin until after President Chamorro's inauguration on April 25. Under the agreement, demobilization was to occur over a 47-day period, ending on June 10, 1990. The U.S. Government, which was financing the DRP of ex-NR, was restricted by its own policy from financing the ex- Sandinistas; thus, the demobilization of these two forces were treated as separate programs with separate benefitsAl The particular political circumstances--the change in government and the mutual credibility of the negotiated settlement-were apparently contributing factors to the initial success the DRP achieved.ly
22. In Mozambique plans for a UN-monitored cease-fire (for October 1992) in the civil war between the FRELIMO government and the RENAMO rebel group were finalized in the Rome Agreement signed on August 7, 1992. Plans for demobilization of roughly 83,000 combatants are
I *Text of the Toncontin Accord for the Disarmament and Demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance," March 23, 1990, reproduced in Peter Kornbluh (ad.), icaragaw The Making of U.S. Policy. 1978-1990, Vokne 1. Alexandria, Va.: The National Security Archive and Chadwyck-Healey, Inc., 1991; on January 10, 1990, Nicaraguan Resistance leaders had been Informed by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson that U.S. assistance to the NR would be halted following the February 25 election but that the Bush Administration would seek to secure fndling to assist the demobilization/repatriation process (in Kormbluh (ed.), op. cit, p. 121). gI/ The agreements did, however, provide for the formation of a special police force, known as the Rural Police, comprised of former NR, for the Development Poles (described later) or where concentrations of NR settled. J/ From "Chamorro Reveals Size of Cutback," Latin American Weekly Report, WR-90-24, June 28, 1990, p.3 . 121 According to one article, the "politicization of humanitarian action continued, which had marked much of the involvement of governments in Nicaragua during the previous decade. Conditions of USAID and some international organizations, such as excluding ex-Sandinista soldiers as beneficiaries, undermined rather than supported the search for longer-term reconciliation." from HumanitarianChallenges in CentralAmerica Learning the Lessons of Recent Armed Co4fficts, Eguizabal, et al. I Some observers now argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that the cease-fire agreement was not specific enough concerning the terms of demobilization; they point to E1 Salvador's peace agreement as a better example to follow.
Page 14 Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
currently underway. In addition to the objective of cementing peace, some observers have noted that with the decline in external military assistance from former Eastern bloc countries, the fiscal burden of paying the military has become substantial.
23. In Namibia, the decision to demobilize was characterized by substantial UN involvement, and was considered a precondition for the transition to independence and free elections. For ten years prior to independence (March, 1990), Namibia had been embroiled in a conflict involving three primary military forces: the South African troops (SADF); locally recruited South West African troops (SWATP and paramilitary); and the PLAN guerrillas of SWAPO's military wing based in Angola. The UN Resolution 435 governing the transition to peace called for the completion of demobilization before elections. Thus, most of the SADF and SWATF troops had been confined to barracks and demobilized by the beginning of June. The opposing PLAN guerrillas were to report to UNTAG-monitored bases in Angola from where they, in civilian status, would return to Namibia with the other civilians being repatriated under UN supervision. The UN-supervised elections were held in November 1989, and SWAPO's Samuel Nujoma was elected president.' Thus, in contrast to Zimbabwe, there was no Namibian army at independence since almost all forces were demobilized prior to the cessation of conflict. The challenge of creating an integrated armed force (and thus decisions of whom to demobilize) was not central to the establishment of peace; it arose only after independence had been declared.
24. As illustrated in the descriptions above, in cases involving transition from an internal conflict, the priority governments place on different objectives for a demobilization effort derive, in part, from the circumstances of the conflict termination. In Ethiopia (not one of the case studies) and Namibia, where the conflict termination was less ambiguous relative to other cases following civil war, the governments placed priority on security concerns-defusing tension and rapidly relocating and dispersing the defeated forces. In Angola and Zimbabwe, where peace was reached based on compromise among opposing forces, program planners viewed demobilization primarily as a tool for preventing further outbreaks of violence, and more emphasis was placed on negotiating reductions in force sizes among different armed groups. In addition to the primary objectives, governments have often cited other reasons for demobilization; such as, maximizing the transfer of resources from the military to more productive sectors, ensuring that demobilized combatants return to productive economic activity, and improving the security situation to pave the way for stability and economic growth. Table I.1 illustrates the various types of objectives of a DRP and a set of indicators that can be used to gauge the level of success in achieving these specific objectives. The DRP objectives cited in the countries studied are summarized in Table 11.2, in order of the governments' stated priority.
25. In the one case where the demobilization effort occurred in the absence of a recent, major conflict (Uganda), fiscal and economic objectives were accorded priority and the decision of whether and how to reduce the size of the armed forces were driven largely by technical considerations (the desired
12/ In fact, more than ten years earlier, In 1978, the UN Security Council had approved Resolution 435 outlining a plan for Namibia's transition to independence under a UN Transitory Assistance Group (UNTAG). However, it was not implemented until 1989/90. In addition, the US brokered a multinational agreement linking the departure of Cuban soldiers from Angola to the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the latter's independence which was signed in December 1988 by South Africa, Cuba and Angola; but not by any Namibian party.
Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process page 15 Demobilation and Reintegration of Military itrsonnot professional composition of the remaining armed force and the budget target); also, the timing of the demobilization may have less significance for national security, allowing planners time to carefully prepare the programs and institutions. In recent years Uganda has been undergoing a process of social and economic reconstruction following 15 years of civil strife, and has achieved increased growth and economic stability. The government's decision in May 1992 to demobilize 50,000 combatants over a period of three years came after reflection and analysis by government and donors on how to capitalize on the improved security environment and reallocate public sector expenditure to the social sectors. Senior government officials, including military officers, acknowledged the security situation had improved and that the military budget must absorb fewer government resources.
26. The case studies suggest that the DRP objective, and perceived priorities, may differ among donors, the government (and various government offices), and the military. At the outset of the program, such differences in perceived priorities may not be apparent, but often as the program progresses and becomes better defined, such differences affect choices of program design and can have a substantial Impact on program results. For example, in Zimbabwe peace was sustained following demobilization, but after the program was completed, 17% of the demobilized soldiers were unemployed and another 55% had been absorbed into the civil service and the army; thus, the government's latter goal, shown in Table H.2, of reducing the size of the armed forces to be commensurate with the security risks and fiscal constraints were given less attention than immediate political and security concerns. In Uganda, the Army leadership adopted the demobilization program, but may be motivated by a different objective; the military would like to professionalize its armed forces (including improving training and purchasing equipment), and may view the demobilization as a tool for reducing the wage component of the military budget to allow for this reform. The government's primary objective, however, is to achieve a peace dividend (estimated at around US$14 million per year by the end of the program) to be used for priority development expenditures. In order to ensure that this peace dividend is achieved, explicit objectives of the program include a permanent net reduction in the armed forces, no replacement of demobilized veterans, and the barring of veterans from employment in the civil or military service.
27. In some countries, even those not emerging from recent civil conflict, the power that may be associated with control over factions in an army means that demobilization may be viewed with suspicion by certain groups; they may suspect that the underlying objective of the DRP is to squeeze them out of the military structure, thus consolidating the power of one particular opposing faction or group (see also Box H.2 on the suspicions of guerrillas in Zimbabwe). It is for this reason that selection criteria used to determine which combatants will be demobilized and which will join the new, restructured force often are important symbols for the underlying objective of the program. Without transparent selection criteria, demobilization may be viewed by some groups as a ploy to achieve a government or faction's motives; depending on the particular political situation, this may slow or halt program implementation (i.e. large numbers may not report to camps).
2g This also followed a public expenditure review which analyzed the sectoral composition of expenditures.
Page 16 Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
Table 11.1: Motivations and Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs
MOTIVA OBJECTIVES INDICATORS OF SUCCESS TION
Security * Reduce number of arm circulating and prevalence of e Peace process sustained mines 0 Reduction in number of guns circulating * Make transition from war to peace @Removal of mines from agricultural land,trnsportation routes * Defuse immediate tensions and disperse former * Ex-combatants dispersed combatants * No resumption of fighting or criminality * Restructure, professionalize armed forces to be more * Resumption of normal economic activity; increase in GNP efficient for a given security situation * Desired regional, ethnic, political, officer-enlisted * Reduce threat of former combatants returning balance in armed forces to arms, involved in political or criminal a Army discipline, training, professionalism, civilian violence (shorVinedium-term) control - smaller, more efficient amed forces
Political * Consolidte position of civil war victors Political stability * Reduce potential anti-government armed opposition * Multiparty politics, including free, fair elections, Increase government control over armed forces * results honored by all parties * Consolidate position of new government * Desired regional, ethnic, political, officer-enlisted * Increase national unity, reduce factionalism balance in armed forces
Economic * Resume normal economic activity, unconstrained by * Reduction in military expenditures security concerns * Resumption of normal economic activity * Reduce pteat of former combatants returning * Sutainabty of new ctivities/occupations to anras, involved in political or criminal f GNP per capita and lNP growth rate compared to violence before programs implemented o Increse social, economic stability * Change in overall unemployment and % ex-combatants *Ensure combatants return to (non-military) unemployedRsmo activity and mnme resultant unemployment % former combatants employed in military and public sector tImprove combatants' olsi applicable to Results of education, training program compared to civilian life combatants' preferences
iscal * Maximize financial. peace dividend or * Sustained reductions in military expenditures, public maximize cost savings: transfer resources sector employment from military to other conomic sectors * Shift allocation of public expenditures from military * Avoid inflating public sector and military to to productive sectors employ ex-combatants * Level of reabsorption of former combatants into military
Overall * Programs cos-effective relative to gains in * Sustained reductions in military expenditures, public economy, security, government finances, sector political objectives c Political objectives accomplished * Cost/benefit analysis of cost of demobilization/reintegration programs vs. public finance savings, economic, political, and security gains
Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process Page 17 Demoblization and Rolntegation of Military Personnel
Box 11.W: The Signtficance.of Selection Criteria
In inhey countries which hav eerged frin civil war, the national *army'w iay in fact be an amalgam otfsvalIdifketrmes and glibhrril gratips, each with different eduational, econoic, and lifestyle background., Titus4, deeridgwhwillbe sel.cted for th 'nehw army" when considerations for poitiaflethoncbaacing ire also vaued, oftes poises a challeng& For example, if the criteria for who
is to stay li th*rmdfteI.4- ad thus, by defanIi who s to dembilize is bae on formal tests, then ose orcswich erenotprevionely guerrilla force. wil be1 favored in the coposition of the new army. If iriteria are not based on foral tests there is the possibility of claims of favoritism.
28. In Chad, for example, the government set broad goals for the number to join the new army and to be demobilized. Since the first phase of demobilization has been on a voluntary basis, as far as can be ascertained, no selection criteria (either technical or partisan) were publicly announced concerning who was to be demobilized. However, for the second stage of the program which will begin in November 1993, there may be no more volunteers, and selection criteria will need to be defined. In Mozambique, donor countries have requested demobilization program procedures be open or "transparent" for the selection of the demobilization candidates they are helping to finance; a simple questionnaire will be filled out on each soldier to be demobilized and entered into a database, which will be provided to potential donors. In Uganda the Army Council announced selection criteria publicly on the radio. INDICATORS OF SUCCESS
29. A DRP can be evaluated according to several criteria, as outlined in Table 11.1, although program results can be more accurately assessed by keeping in mind the government's initial priorities. For example, designers of Namibia's demobilization and repatriation program were more concerned with disarming and disbanding combatants, and returning Nanibians to their home territory than with providing targeted reintegration programs. Thus, based on the program planners' priority of satisfying the pre-conditions for elections (including the complete demobilization of forces), the program could be considered a success in spite of the subsequent problems with high unemployment among the demobilized. Also, real tradeoffs often exist between maximizing the number of ex-combatants employed, and achieving a longer-term fiscal dividend. In Namibia, the government's failure to build a new armed force of 10,000 troops (only 7,000 were hired) would be assessed as favorable using fiscal criteria; however, the fact that an additional 3,000 ex-combatants remained unemployed may be unfavorable from a political point of view. 30. In addition, a DRP is but one tool in the transition from war to peace and from investment Inthe military to investment in other setodhe economy. Therefore, apparent "failures" may be due to political or economic constraints and not stem from inherent flaws in program design. Economic factors, such as the low absorption capacity of the economy, compounded by the low education level and lack of experience of many ex-combatants, may result in low employment of ex-combatants, despite the best efforts of program designers.
Pag 18e Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
31. Finally, one of the problems associated with assessing the success of a DRP lies in the difficulty of determining how the political, security and economic situation would have evolved in the absence of such a program. In Zimbabwe, the demobilization of the three armies and the integration of the remaining combatants into a new national (although fractionalized and larger than planned) army could be regarded as a success in the medium-term using security and political criteria.' The tendency toward organized violence was reduced, and, as a former combatant lamented in a November 1989 press article, *... the revolutionary armies of ZIPRA and ZANLA are today non-existent as a social or political force."*9 There have been few serious security problems since that time. Other successes in Zimbabwe include at least a partial resumption of normal economic activity since the conflict ended. Despite the increase in the size of the armed forces well beyond the desired size, military expenditures as a percentage of GDP declined from 8.8% in 1980 to 6% in 1985, and as a percentage of total central government expenditures, declined from 25.4% to 14.4% in the same years, showing some evidence of a "peace dividend." The reintegration effort has been less successful, given the high number of ex- combatants subsequently rehired by the government (a total of 55% in the civil service and military, combined) and a relatively high level of unemployed ex-combatants. Nonetheless, it would be impossible to predict the potential human and economic cost had no DRP been implemented.
32. The same question, concerning the possible course of events had no program been implemented, could be posed in Nicaragua. Recent reports of the rearming of former members of the NR and demobilized Sandinista soldiers (commonly referred to as recontrasand recompas) and clashes between them appear to have cast a shadow on the success of the DRP. One of the most important points of tension in program implementation concerned broken promises to provide land to each ex-combatant. Disputes over land titles and access to land combined with general economic stagnation, a severe drought, and, according to some sources, the exclusion of ex-Sandinistas from receiving certain benefits, to cause the current unrest. V' Nonetheless, the number of rearmed combatants is generally believed to total around 1,000-compared to the over 22,500 NR combatants who were demobilized. The program succeeded in delivering assistance in a cost-effective manner, supplying a wide range of goods and services to demobilized soldiers and their families over a period of two years for about US$393 per person, and provided the basic necessities of life during the initial phase of their reintegration into Nicaraguan society. The reintegration program also provided crucial technical and material support which facilitated the re-entry of a number of former NR combatants into the labor market, assisted them with legal problems, and made efforts to protect their human rights. However, because of Nicaragua's deep- seated economic and political problems, it is difficult to assess how much better or worse off both the former combatants and the country's situation would have been in the absence of such programs.
2i/ Shortly afer demobilization there was some armed banditry and isolated incidents of small-scale fighting. However, these did not persist and did not hamper a return to economic activity. 2/ Swday Matt, 5 November 1989. 2/ The argument that the continued politicization of aid added to tensions is made in HmnanitaianChallenges in Central America: Learning the Lessons ofRecent Armed Conflicts, Eguizabal, Cristina et al. 1993.
Chapter 2 - Objectives of Demobilization/Reintegration Process page 19 Table R.2: Suc ss of DemoblIzaton, ReLntegradon, and DemllItarI dotion Program
Creria Agota Chad Movmnque Nan~ba Nicagua Uganda ~h~nbwe Smaed Objctives øSustain ceasefire *Restore secrity *Carryout "pro~pece' *Defuse mediate Sstain peae *Reduce *aiy *Sustain pace *Improve seaurity socil and øRestructure nd demobzainn to tensions procss, defuse xpenditures, use process, defuse (m order of politicul stability, subsequent prokssioalizve ~ socal stability Build new, tesions avings in tensions priority) conomie development *Reducc burden of & reduce arms in restructured ar*y *Repatuiate, reste productive sectors øDcwobilie *Reintegrate combatants into military expendhores ciculation *Hope for ex-NR eRu~- size of gue~rillas civilian soety OPave way for *Reduce size ofarmed 'spontaneous' *Reduce military armed foes consis- Restructure integra- multiparty denmocracy fores reintegration expenditures tent with mecurity ted, ethnicuy bal- OReduce~mary *Restructurarmed ds m d armedforces expenditures forces eResett veserans -Aiga size of armed *Increase social surity *Transfer peace OProfesonalie fores with threats dividend to army (reduce it) productive sctors •Assist ex- combatant entry into civilian life PO0.I7CM.Fallure N/A Toocalyto assa Succes Partial Succesa 'I . Suiceess Transition from war Peace process not sutamined; At peace intermitten Pace process sustained Peace proccss Peace process No conflict Peace process to peace encamped cobatants resumed conffict; delays of I yr. to date, although sustmined; no arg. sustained; NR sustained; noarge- conffict in denob~lizing but demobiltn delayed scatt fighting; combatants scale ~ghting forces progressing as of 8/93 due to need to set up combatant demobilized but demobilized instituti~ and demob~lized sma ~-scale fghting RENAMO offices in res~ned
______Maputo ______SECURITY . aiur . TooEarly oary asess Mixed -ixed N/ Partial Secess Deu ii in/ Return to war; failure to Baditry, flghting UN peacekeeping forces Some iprovements SmaU reduction i Scurity Established disarm encamped combatants continu; no large-scale pan to disarm in scrity; but arm= due to disarmament increased rime rat disarmamnt program; but bandiry ~mR scale tgbting continue _ _ _ _ ECONOMJC N/ . Unspcessfu to ato To4ecrlylassäss Parial Succes. Mixed WASuedss Resumption Of At war Armd banditry and High snaR increase in NO confict Economic growlh normal conomie fghting continue to unemployment; GNP in 1992; imaproved aIt 1980 P ot reased rma banditry, ual economi ac~ivity in cosfiet, politia ruany a oeas of country instability hamper produc~o ut paI tamp ~o1 U! %L91 p3InSamS Ep qjs 1661 i1m036A Aq £pql pm~=ao s suqw ,s-~1 po~ooP peo jioi;o %m mo .Vom~O.P x~.9 01 uIlI pmpd vuo Joy avs~ %~m p ~ %s)mmsp 9o pq oqnå pmMs Opvo ~oj pmo p03 gaa~ jo oqnd 'pnmw os s pagoz saup s~ Are j o o " l pP Mz ?poaus 0~o ps upzosat~ qk1 :Spaq 1mna3 S=p~ods osuoga ogqnd u! OuPn ody ...... 4...... g s4m1, 9s
lo! 59 "~a,£ qpi3d mus e~Su routat ogqmdm~0Þg-W' o ~I pmnued4zo|| cma~daa p~uei ~uuojd ogu~n
%Ss :ams ~W '*=as ~OOm3 :ms Ct 'nqMpowm~ t #SOsv w Kum Ls In'sn~ 03 41 ~.L _ _ im_ sv (VW) N39 asMmqaqZ ~ ~~ qpmueNq~ Mbmw~ i~i Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAMS
33. As shown in Chapter One, demobilization and reintegration can be broken down into several stages. In reality, however, the distinction and sequencing may not be as clear-cut, and the process does not necessarily proceed as smoothly as portrayed. The steps of a demobilization program are as follows (although they do not always occur in the order shown, and may overlap):
* Encampment of combatants or their confinement to barracks; * Disarmament of combatants; * Transportation and transition of combatants to civilian life; * Reintegration programs.
This chapter summarizes experience with the design, and implementation of demobilization programs; management and Institutional issues will be covered in the following chapter.
ENCAMPMENT
34. In countries emerging from a civil war, encampment involved: (1) announcing and publicizing the demobilization program; (2) directing combatants to report to assembly points, and in some cases, providing their transportation to the camps; (3) providing salaries and adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care to camp occupants; (4) registration and documentation, including performing a census, maintaining a record of combatants' arrival and departures, providing identification and other documents; (5) ensuring that desertion, especially with arms, is minimized; and (6) disarming combatants prior to their demobilization. In the conflict-related cases studied, separate camps were set up for each force, and the assembly areas were located throughout the country, generally in the units' operating areas. While in the camps awaiting demobilization, in some cases combatants continued to draw a salary, and were provided with food, shelter, and medical care. Foreign forces involved in the conflict, such as the South African forces in Namibia and Cuban forces in Angola, were confined to barracks as well pending departure to their home countries.
35. The various cases show that the number of combatants who actually report to assembly areas and register for demobilization benefits may be lower-or higher-than estimated, depending partly on: (1) how secure military leaders feel in reporting to the camps and their confidence in the peace process; and (2) the incentives offered and conditions in the camps. In Zimbabwe, guerrilla leaders held back an estimated 10,000-15,000 active guerrilla combatants in reserve across the border as an insurance policy. In Angola, widespread cheating occurred on both sides during the demobilization process: the government reportedly shifted 10,000 to 20,000 elite FAPLA troops into a paramilitary police force, and UNITA kept its heaviest weapons and 25,000 or more of its best fighters hidden in the bush. Although combatants not officially registered at the assembly points would be denied eligibility for demobilization support and benefits, this was apparently not a sufficient incentive to motivate many combatants to report to the camps, nor to dissuade many more from deserting once they arrived. In Namibia, SWAPO forces
Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Pae 23 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel violated the cease-fire agreement in an attempt to avoid encampment and demobilization by crossing from Angola Into Namibia.
36. The case studies highlight the importance of the encampment stage to the subsequent success of the DRP process, as described in Box m.1. The lessons learned in Angola are already being applied to Mozambique where program planners are trying to ensure that conditions in the assembly areas are decent and acceptable. Because of food shortages and budgetary difficulties in Mozambique, the international community has been asked to supply the assembly areas with the main staples required (maize, rice, beans, oil, sugar, and soap). To support the assembly areas, a projected volume of 3,000 metric tons of food per month will have to be procured abroad, regularly reach the camps, and be fairly distributed for up to 120,000, which includes soldiers' dependents. Each assembly area will have a health clinic, which may also serve the surrounding civilian population. The UN observers will confirm food deliveries and report regularly to their headquarters on the availability and distribution of food. Medical exams, basic preventative health care, and health education will be provided to soldiers and their dependents by at least two health workers in each assembly area.
Box III.1: Encampment in Angola
Appalling living conditions ln vral camps ln Agola, including shortages of food, medicine and clothee, inadequate housing and sAitation f4ilities, and a lack of productive or recreational activities for coasbatants exacertatp conbatalite discontent with the -fire and demobilization process. In edy Obar1991, combatants in some of .the asembly areas, especially for government (PAPLA) foropwere close toatarvati6sa A special interetional appeal for the encamped combatants amd their familiei was lached; the World Food'Program organized.the delivery of thousands of metric tons of emergency fo aid to encapet combatants, whilo UMCEP provided non-food items such as blankets, tehts, family kits; ga.66 edagA6ultural implements. .A.poor conditions in the camps and the lack of incentives die.to the absenCe f rintegratiet plas, comlined with the fact that many combatants vere not convinced that tlar was attuallfer led to Widespread desertion (with arms) exacerbating arlady ne ty e on. The conditinsin cans belonging to the insurgent force, FALA, diffeed.iilic jy, which may partly explain their higher rate bf successful encampment and lower desertion ates; TAI; rassembledVc with their families in areas where some agricultural productionwas possible, Livisg.conditions were better and camps better organized. and controlled, resembling to some :wtent traditiona villages and ddriessing some of the social and recreational needs of commnity embers. ... .r*e,- l -.. .N..W ia .. Angola's.Old Foes,. Thzi Nw York The, December 16, 1991.
37. In cases in which force downsizing is not related to a peace process, as in Uganda, soldiers were confined to their bases during the demobilization process. In Chad, the demobilization/force restructuring process is being carried out unit by unit because many units lack fixed bases. Soldiers from specific units volunteering for demobilization or retirement report to designated areas or bases and are confined there, until instructed to join the new army or released. In some cases,
Page 24 Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Demobilization and Reiategration of Military Personnot
if soldiers are not paid, or there is poor control over weapons in camps, confinement to barracks or camps is ineffective and security problems arise.
A. Delays
38. The length of time required for demobilization varied, ranging from approximately two months for the first phase of the demobilization program in Uganda, roughly five months in Nicaragua, and six months in Namibia, to over two years in Chad (still ongoing) and Zimbabwe. Serious delays were common in all the programs except Namibia and Uganda. The higher rates of demobilization occurred in the countries with the largest ratio of observers to combatants, and with multilateral monitors who had a broad mandate. One factor which contributed to the initial delays in Chad was the ongoing fighting In several regions, and a lack of central control over army factions outside the capital, which impeded the census of the armed forces, confinement to barracks, and other demobilization procedures. Also, in Chad's first demobilization attempt, soldiers remaining in the "residual army" (those not yet chosen for the new army, yet not volunteering for demobilization) continued to receive their salary through French financing; those who were eligible for retirement preferred to stay in this residual army rather than retire with uncertain pension payments from the Chadian government. The French have now addressed this disincentive and the delays it caused in the current program by discontinuing salary payments to the residual army. The program's pace improved in July 1993.
Table 111.1: Montmhly Rate ofDemobizadon (no. of combatants demobilized)
Scheduled Actual Nambiaal 3,300 iaau 12,8571 4,500
10,000
(p laf 3 te actc% average rate of demobilization and retirement was 380. Recent progress reported bythe governinent of Chad.had inceased.this average substantially. The 880 trget wasn Wised for the 1992 demobilization program (initial target under 1991 Program
Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Program Page 25 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
39. Planners in Angola intended that no combatants would be demobilized until the encampment process was complete, and all combatants would be either demobilized or integrated into the new national army before the September 1992 election. The demobilization of the two forces ran far behind the original rapid schedule of roughly 20,000 per month; although the deadline for encampment was August 1991, as of June 1992 only 37% of MPLA-government troops and 85% of the FALA guerrilla forces had been confined and 20,000 combatants from either side demobilized.2y Delays resulted partly from logistical problems, including shortages of funds, civilian clothing, and transportation problems; however, more fundamentally, delays stemmed from poor planning and uneven commitment by both sides to the demobilization process. According to one source "the Impatience of those awaiting demobilization had become a major cause of tension; in several instances soldiers from both sides have stormed government offices in regional capitals demanding their demobilization papers. Others stormed aerodromes demanding to be put on planes to Luanda."& By the election date, 40,000 troops had yet to be demobilized, the two opposition forces were still nearly intact, and the new, integrated army barely formed. When the UNITA leader, Savimbi, was dissatisfied with election results, the continued existence of the two armies contributed to a rapid resurgence of the conflict. Many familiar with the Angolan situation theorize that the political necessity of disbanding the two forces prior to the elections led to an unrealistic timetable for the demobilization of so many troops.
40. In Mozambique, the initial plan for a pre-peace demobilization was not adhered to, although up to 16,000 soldiers were registered for demobilization. Contributing factors to the slow implementation include the time required to set up the various commissions and management institutions, and delays in setting up offices and staff for RENAMO, which had a very low representation in Maputo. In contrast with Angola, elections will not be held for at least a year following the cease-fire. Thus, changes in the schedule for demobilization will also likely change the schedule for elections.
41. Delays in implementation can have severe consequences, threatening not only further progress in the demobilization effort but also the peace process. Boredom and frustration in the camps can exacerbate violence, cause a loss of confidence in the demobilization and reintegration process, a loss of faith in the government's control over the program, and provoke massive desertions (usually with arms) further compounding security problems. In addition to the lost time and frustrations for those encamped, the cost of paying wages and providing other support during the delays pose a substantial fiscal burden (US$42 million in Zimbabwe). In Uganda, the Government estimated that each month's delay in demobilizing 20,000 soldiers (the Phase 1 objective) would cost US$1.5 million; through strong leadership and good planning, it managed to complete the Phase 1 demobilization in two months.
B. Transportation
42. In some of the cases, transportation problems were a significant factor which delayed the encampment process. Many of the assembly areas in Mozambique will be located in rural regions,
2I "FurtherReport of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)," June 24, 1992.
21/ "Angola: Bullets Threaten the Ballots,' Africa Confidential (October 9, 1992): 2.
Page 26 Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Demobiliation and Reintegrtion of Military Personnel
including districts devastated by the drought and difficult to reach due to mined and deteriorated roads. Similarly, in Angola, inadequate transportation to assembly areas contributed to program delays. Destruction from the war such as uncleared land mines and destroyed bridges impeded troop movements, the flow of supplies to the camps and the movements of monitoring forces. The U.S. belatedly supplied three Air Force transport aircraft to assist in transporting combatants to assembly areas, but this was still insufficient. In Namibia, the UNHCR along with its implementing partner, the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN), provided air and land transportation for SWAPO guerrillas and their dependents to camps and to their final destinations. The provision of adequate transportation contributed to rapid completion of Namibia's demobilization and repatriation program. In Nicaragua, CIAV-OAS arranged for those outside Nicaragua at the time of the demobilization to be transported to the reporting centers, which also contributed to the relatively rapid rate of demobilization and processing of the NR who typically remained in reception centers only for a period of days.
43. Several of the programs in the case studies also provided transportation from camps or reporting centers to combatants' settlement destination. In Uganda, the Government contracted with private transport companies to take soldiers home (see Box 111.2). During Chad's 1991 demobilization program, many soldiers did not understand that they had to find their own transportation home; the lack of transportation allowances or arrangements inhibited the dispersion of soldiers and inhibited many from returning home. In Chad's current program, a transportation allowance is provided to demobilized and retired soldiers and their families to return to their home districts.
Box II.2: Ironing Out Logistics with a PilotProgram In Uganda
Prortdscagiga ailcantnunber of soldiers. a unal.lpilot ptogram wa odce oietf r demobilized an deatdfmteNA(Ntoa arcsa .itneAryaTow ls for destinationsin 33 disrit.4Th io osrted anumber oflogitial d managmttlsos timt ...... O w fiint t contract tasport on th basis ditance.rahethan the n be f trips to a iven.location, it ~is ritical t fully prepare reception and tempjorarysleigtanmntfofmleswlehy wt transport fromi the District recep.tioni polit to their actual home.village; and it is desitable to provide military escorts and group isurance to protect the loss and/or theft of initial cash paiyments during tausport.
REGISTR'ATION AND DOCUMENTATION
44. Registration and documentation tasks in the cases studied included performing a census of all combatants reporting to the assembly areas and registering all forces upon their entry. Experience shows that it is difficult to obtain an accurate count, and there are generally discrepancies with the force totals claimed prior to the start of the demobiizationlreintegration process. Military leaders may deliberately inflate the size of the force to appear more intimidating to their opposition or to receive additional benefits, while others under-report to try to hold a portion of their forces hidden outside the camps "in reserve" to respond to contingencies (see para. 35). The use of noms de guerre, common in guerrilla forces, further complicates the identification and counting process. In addition, commanders
Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Page 27 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel often do not know the actual number of forces under their command at a given time. For example, in the case of guerrilla forces, often there are no formal "rolls" nor salaries, and there are often part-time combatants.
45. Rules have to be established to determine who will be eligible for demobilizationl reintegration benefits. In Zimbabwe, planners Initially decided to restrict benefits to those who reported to the assembly points and registered lbr demobilization by a certain date. However, program administrators discovered that thousands of combatants had been held back in reserve, under the orders of their leaders, who were entrusting of the cease-fire process. Another dilemma was presented by former combatants, I.e., ex-guerrillas, who had left service before the conflict ended. Approximately 10,000 additional combatants who had been in hiding and 15,000 "Inactive" combatants also eventually became eligible to receive demobilization and reintegration benefits. Program administrators, known as the Demobilization Directorate, set up a series of tests to determine whether an individual had actually been a combatant in the liberation struggle, i.e., breakdown and reassembly of a weapon. In Nicaragua, program planners underestimated the number of beneficiaries (60,000 estimated and 117,500 as of July 1991) because eligibility criteria were not sufficiently clear at the outset. This posed a substantial burden to program staff.v
46. In some cases, such as Nicaragua and Namibia, a census of the combatants was not performed prior to the start of the demobilization program; the case of Chad demonstrates how difficult a census may be to carry out, and how rampant fraud can be. In Chad a census was performed prior to the 1991 demobilization program, but the results were unreliable due to substantial movement of troops in and out of barracks. Means of identification at the start of encampment were insufficient or nonexistent, and since there was no roster of combatants, there was no way of verifying whether the individuals reporting to the camps were members of the Chadian armed forces. This enabled both fraud by individuals trying to receive benefits for which they were not eligible, and cheating at the level of the military commanders. Some individuals who had not been heard of for thirty years suddenly "reappeared" to try to claim a share of the bounty. There were also reports of combatants from Sudan posing as Chadian soldiers to obtain demobilization benefits. To address some of these problems, for Chad's current (revised) DRP, a new army census has been carried out of soldiers, and soldiers arriving at camps are photographed, registered, disarmed if they are to demobilize or retire, and then issued ID cards which makes them eligible for demobilization benefits. In Angola, inadequate monitoring of the comings and goings of combatants, a poorly controlled leave policy, and inadequate registration and documentation procedures resulted in a large discrepancy in the number of combatants claimed to be present. The discrepancy between the previously identified number of combatants in the two forces and
2/ Prom 'the Zimbabwe Project's Experience in Resettling Ex-Combatants,- August 1989.
22/ Initial estimates of program beneficiaries were based upon the number of people the U.S. Government had supported in Honduras. However, this estimate did not account for the number of NR who were already living in Nicaragua, or those who were being repatriated by the U.N., but who were not close relatives of former NR members. Aftar discussions between OAS, the U.N. and U.S., it was agreed that these two groups would be included. One of the lessons drawn by the U.S. Goverament on this program is to establish clear eligibility criteria at the outset of the program in order to avoid this problem in planning. Prom, U.S. GeneralAccounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, "AID to Nicaragua, U.S. Assistance Supports Economic and Social Development, " August, 1992.
Page 28 Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnot the actual number of UNITA and MPLA forces in the assembly camps motivated the government to declare that only those present in camps as of a certain date plus those authorized to be absent would be considered eligible for demobilization compensation packages. Establishing such a cut-off date was seen as necessary to motivate combatants to report to and remain in camps, and to identify more exactly the number eligible for demobilization benefits and reintegration assistance.
47. In Mozambique, the demobilization plan calls for all troops reporting to the assembly areas to be registered by their military commander under UN supervision. A simple questionnaire will be filled out for each soldier, Including personal information needed to monitor and further plan the DRP. The registration lists and questionnaires will be sent to the capital (where a data processing unit will be established) which would maintain a data base useful in the planning of reintegration programs as was done for the 16,000 government soldiers previously registered in preparation for the pre-peace demobilization program which was never actually implemented. In turn, the data processing unit will Issue for each registered soldier: (I) a demobilization Identification card; (il) an entitlement to travel, accompanied by closest relatives, to the district chosen; and (li) an entitlement to six months salary. These documents will only be valid after signed and stamped by UN observers at the camps. As demobilization and force restructuring proceed, the records will be transmitted to the Ministries of Finance and Defense to administer payment of indemnity salaries to those being demobilized or army salaries to those joining the new army. Combatants in several other case studies were provided identification cards. In Uganda, program planners invested substantial time in finding the I.D. card least likely to be subject to counterfeit. These IDs facilitate the registration process, and are used for proving eligibility for subsequent demobilization benefits.
48. An accurate census and information provided from the registration and documentation procedures are valuable for planning other demobilization steps, such as budgeting food and other costs, to design reintegration programs, and to determine who will, and who will not, be eligible for benefits. This data can be used to plan transportation arrangements and to assess the cost of relocating combatants following their demobilization. Knowing in advance the intended destinations of ex-combatants and their families can also be used to help make necessary preparations and impact assessments for the regions where they will be concentrated. In Nicaragua, program planners tried unsuccessfully to direct ex-NR to pre-determined areas where services were to be provided (Development Poles); most NR preferred to return to their home areas. Also requesting combatants to indicate their preferred occupational field following demobilization can be helpful for tailoring training and employment programs. The value of surveys and developing a profile of demobilizing combatants will be covered more fully in Chapter Five.
DIsmAm AmD WEAPOS CONTROL
49. In the several of the countries studied (Nicaragua, Chad, Zimbabwe), restoring security following conflict poses a complex challenge which appears to be influenced by many factors (the political environment, porous borders with countries with active gun markets, low police capacity to professionally and evenly enforce civil laws, poor or dispersed control over weapons by splintered factions, prevalence of a "weapons" culture). This challenge is exacerbated by the lack of economic opportunity that insecurity engenders. In the countries studied, establishment of security was attempted through three means: ernforcement (enforcement of a prohibition from open carrying of weapons), persuasion (weapons
Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Pa 29 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
are traded in by the general population in exchange for cash or in-kind benefits), and/orforcefid seizure (typically carried out immediately following a conflict situation by an armed force or through reliance on searches, surveillance, and rewards for tips on location of arms caches).
A. Disarmament of Demobilized Combatants
50. In all the cases studied, combatants were required to turn in a weapon either upon registration at the camps or upon their demobilization, to become eligible for various benefits.' Some countries have been more effective than others In enforcing disarmament at camps.
51. In Namibia, when paramilitary forces established by South Africa were demobilized prior to the elections, the UN force, UNTAG, also confiscated and guarded their weapons and equipment. However, much of the war material and semi-automatic firearms continued to be held by combatants from the different armed factions after their demobilization, since they had created arms caches during the transitional period.2' To address the proliferation of weapons, the Namibian government announced an amnesty period for the surrender of illegal and unlicensed weapons. The period was subsequently extended, following which heavy penalties were established for unauthorized possession of weapons. "Some success was achieved, although only a small fraction of the anticipated volume was turned in."L'
52. In Angola, UNAVEM-II eAperienced difficulty in effectively disarming combatants because of substantial movement in and out of camps (which at one point had inadequate food), and an inadequate number of monitors with a limited mandate. According to anecdotal accounts and UN sources, the collected weapons were poorly guarded and stored in unsecured locations in the camps. UN officials reported that in some cases, combatants at the assembly points awaiting demobilization were given their guns back on the understanding they were used only to hunt for food, fearing that tens of thousands of hungry soldiers could turn to violent crime if provision were not made for them. There were no plans by either UNAVEM-II (it was outside their mandate), by Angolan authorities, or foreign
21/ In addition to the examples above, in Mozambique, it is planned that collection of combatants' weapons be supervised by five unarmed UN observers at each assembly area. In Chad, soldiers are required to turn in their weapons upon demobilizing or retiring to become eligible for related benefits.
21 For example, military and paramilitary forces established by South Africa, totaling roughly 33,000 and including 11,578 "oitizen forces" and "commandos," were demobilized prior to the elections, with their weapons and equipment under UNTAG guard. However, some units were reactivated during clashes with SWAPO groups in April 1989, but were soon demobilized again. The South African-sponsored Koevoe paramilitary force, over 2,000 strong, was ostensibly absorbed into the police as a counterinsurgency force prior to implementation of Resolution 435. Because the ex-Koevoet units resembled a military force more than a police force, they actually should have been disbanded with the other military forces. They continued to patrol in armored and heavily armed convoys in the northern region, and were violent, disruptive and repressive until a special Security Council Resolution (number 640) demanded their disbandment. *Security Council Demands Disbandment of Paramilitary Forces in Namibia," UN Chronicle, December 1989.
IQ/ Simon David, "One year on", Namilba Yearbook 19W91, 67.
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contributors to try to reduce the high number of weapons prevalent throughout the countryAl As in other countries, reports on the poor quality and limited quantity of the weapons stored at assembly camps indicated that both FAPLA and FALA were storing hidden weapons for potential future contingenciesA This was also the case in Nicaragua, where the NR forces were required to turn in one weapon, although they likely had many more; many of the weapons turned in were reportedly old or unserviceable.ay
53. In Zimbabwe, combatants were granted the right to keep their arms when they entered the assembly points, but were required to store the arms with camp administrators while on leave from camps. Combatants were required to turn in a weapon when demobilizing to become eligible for benefits. The confiscated weapons were guarded by the British monitoring force, and later transferred to the National Armory, for use by the remaining military.
B. Weapons Reclaniming Programs
54. Following a protracted internal conflict (applicable to most of the case studies), weapons are so numerous in both the combatant and civilian sphere that requiring combatants to turn in one weapon has a limited impact. In Angola, Namibia, and Nicaragua some demobilized combatants reportedly turned to banditry; in Nicaragua and Mozambique some soldiers belonging to the regular armed forces allegedly stole weapons and sold them on the black market. Without economic opportunity and censure for the possession of weapons, ex-combatants can re-arm, and the civilian population may possess weapons as well. During a civil war, so much of a country's population becomes mobilized for the military effort on one side or the other, and the definition of a combatant becomes less precise, as peoples' militia and other part-time forces are formed. Militia members receive weapons and minimal military training, and following a conflict often retain their weapon as well. Accountability and records of the weapons distributed are often poor or nonexistent in such a situation.
55. Because none of the seven countries in the case studies has local arms manufacturing capabilities, all firearms must be imported. Government forces can obtain weapons from foreign governments, including sales and grants, legitimate commercial imports, and black market smuggling (both for new and second-hand weapons). In addition to the above sources, rebel groups and armed factions can also obtain weapons from sympathetic foreign insurgent groups, captured government stocks, sympathetic army deserters, and sales from disillusioned or cash-hungry government soldiers. The borders of these countries are generally so porous that smuggling, of weapons and other goods, is very common. Proliferation of weapons among civilians can occur by their distribution to civilian
1/ Purther Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM-II), 24 June 1992.
N1 Account by Dale Lautenbach reported in "Angola: Tale of 2 Armies", 77 Star (Johannesburg), 22 June 1992, 11; quoted in FBIS-AFR-92-121, June 23, 1992, 20. Also, "Angola: Arms Dump," Focus on Afica, June 1992.
2I The weapons were handed over to the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRP), a non-goverunental organization which had assisted 153 countries in programs for the rehabilitation of disabled people. The scrap metal was eventually to be recycled into artificial limbs. ("Arms for Arms,* Disarmanent Newsleer, October 1990, p.6 .)
Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Pag 31 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
sympathizers by besieged governments or insurgent groups during the conflict, as well as by commercial sale of legitimate imports, and the black market, including sale of weapon stocks stolen by undisciplined soldiers. An additional source of weapons proliferation is failure to disarm soldiers who are demobilized or retired, or otherwise end their military service.
56. Arms buy back or arms exchange schemes have been used in some countries as a tool to Improve overall security. V In countries where these were used (including countries not among the seven case studies), they did not appear to provide durable solutions to insecurity, particularly where borders are porous, economic opportunities scant, and widespread insecurity prevails. In the summer of 1991 in Nicaragua, after demobilization of the NRs, an armed conflict began to intensify in the rural northern and central regions between approximately 1,500 former NRs and Sandinistas commonly referred to as "Recontras" and "Recompas" (many ex-combatants had hidden arms prior to demobilization). As the violence increased in November of 1991, the Government announced plans for a disarmament program addressing both groups jointly and requested that CIAV-OAS mediate between the recontras and government officials. 2- Above market prices were offered in exchange for weapons from the two armed groups, although many more (over 20) additional groups showed up to negotiate the purchase of their weapons. Although the program purchased more than the planned number of weapons (17,000 instead of 5,000), insecurity and large numbers of weapons persisted. In a second operation (Fall of 1991), Disarmament Brigades were formed by both Sandinista police and army officers and former NRs to disarm groups of people.-V The Brigades offer food, housing, construction materials and in some cases cash in exchange for weapons. Another program attempted in Panama is summarized in Box I.3. Some recommendations of best practices on arms buy back programs from one defense analyst are presented in Box III.4.
MI An informal background note by Alain Rouvez, consultant, examined programs to improve domestic security in nine countries (Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique, Liberia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan); of these only Panama, Nicaragua and South Africa had implemented some form of arms buyback or exchange schemes.
g/ CIAV-OAS officials located rearmed groups in the countryside, persuaded them to suspend hostilities, coordinated arrangements for their disarmament and demobilization in conjunction with Disarmament Brigades, and negotiated the release of hostages taken. They maintained a dialogue between these groups and the government authorities, and monitored compliance between the government and rearmed groups.
g/ While negotiation with re-armed groups continues in January 1992, the government made a public distinction between criminals (who would be prosecuted) and rearmed groups who were in negotiations (CIAV-OAS, Progress Report, February-March 1992)
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Box 111.3: Arms Buy back Programin Panama
*Dgring its nilitary interventio in Panma in Decemuber 1989, the U.S. Iplmetd a weapos buiybackptogram, beginning only' a few days aAenr the initial assautandwhilootilitie. were still otioing in some parts of the country. The U.S. Army aet up a collections a.te in each offPaamas three mnajor cties. The program was well pubiised, and offered ch for weapons t all coners (PanaMiWan DefeniePoeo(PDP) as well as lvilan.) wa no questions asked0The weapons collection points were heavily protected by well-armed U.S. troops. 'rhee 41w: 'th as no previously set time period for the fpurchasing program, but by the end of the second week weapons returns had dropped to a trickle. Concluding that most weapons already had been repurchased which could be collected through fnancial incentives (at the price offered), the U.S. military closed the collection centers. Following the closing of the formal collection centers a few additional weapons were turned In for cash to U.S. troops.
. A total of 8,848 weapons and loose ammunition were collected through the weapons buy back program at a cost of USS811,000 (this total does not include organizational and administrative costs, which the U.S. military did not compute). Prices were set according to the following scale, although the method used to arrive at these prices is unknown: USS150 for rifles and automatic weapons; US$125 for shotguns; US$100 for pistols and revolversi US$50 Jor RPG grenades; US$25 for fragmentation grenades; and US$25 for an unknown amount of loose. ammunition.
Rewards were offered for information on weapons caches, up to a maximum of USS5,000 per cache. The weapons collected ranged from slingshots and small arms to high caliber, automatic weapons, of several, different manufactures and countries of origin. Small caliber weapons were overwhelmingly from East bloc countries,-and some were U.S. and western European. Automatic weapons included mostly U.S. MI6s and Soviet AK-47. Repostedly, many.of the weapons turned in were unserviceable or in bad condition..
U.S. forces also carried out weapons seizures, although information on the amount and types of weapons collected is unknown. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, U.S, forces also confiscated some weapons they deemed threatening or whose possession was illegal. The owners of the confiscated weapon received a receipt,. and eventually received either their weapons back or financial compensation.
The seized and repurchased arms were crated and shipped to a U.S. Army depot In Pennsylvania, whera4 complete inventory was made. Approximately two years later, the U.S. government returned to Panama many of the weapons deemed appropriate for police duties (i.e., no high-caliber weapons) and of U.S. maInufacture, for . use by the Panamanian National Police (the PNP - formed from the remnants of the former PDP).
Because neither U.S. nor Painamanian forces were performing a public security function during the first days of the U.S. military.operation, there was a breakdown in civil order resulting in rampant looting and other criminal acts. Looting and crime dipped when U.S. troops took on a temporary public security role, then increased again (although not approaching early Just Cause levels) when security responsibilities were transferred to the newly constituted PNP.
The weapons buy back program accomplished its immediate objective of reducing the number of weapons available.. for organized opposition to U.S. forces and for criminal violence during a period of high political tensions and civil disorder. To the question of how useful it was, U.S. government spokesmen respond that they think the progranf'. was helpful in establishing security in the short-term, but it is difficult to know what the situation would have been like without it. In the longer term, those desiring to replenish their weapons stocks likely have had the ability to do so, throuAh both leaitimate and illicit sources.
Chapter 3 - Design of Demobilization Programs Page 33 Demob~ntion and Rintegration of Military Porsonnel
Box I.4: One Defense Analyst's Suggestionsfor Conductng an Ams Buy back Programla
On.ofthø mast Imporait mechanismø for providing an incentive structure amenabie to arms buy back programs, is to siestabishsa socur nvironment thøreby lowering the security value of guns and to put In place caonomlo programs a,ithulategrowt and employment and thus decrease thecconomlc value of gunn. WIth ths aveat In mind, defense .. pb ~avs cd hWfx6"owing best practices in a weapons buy back program:
EMb6ih "vUy protocted wcapone acquisition centers in major cities and at east one center in each of the zone 4ld by the main -fighting factions.
2 Open as many collection polits as posaible all over tho country.
. ÈertisI thé program through assive infomation campaig a few days beforo-the collection staM. Thu Ipfonatin campalgn should be pursued aggreasively throughout the whole wcapons buy back program and ahould tnean inpæmion of éverwhclming success, accentuating that all parti of the country and all factions ar ;urMing
veø for grouped returns, by way of a commlsson, in order to create peer pressuro to reun weapans
on a.o-quesdons-asked policy, with no pautiality. o 1%.þ"I,.scod team to rural amas to collect weapons In villags, in addition to conducting pramshinuban.
'Stesq Local gropp'could assist, if monitored by neutral foreign observers. 7fro i sould pbejiu above the black market value, and slightly below the cmmércial value. Prico sca ahauld. bo mad avalable for each category of wcapons and explosives and their condition (prices cod be saled tortflect thc weapons' condition).
" t brtlafly accpting all types and condition of weapons may be helpf for caablishing the program.
9 b4o elear turp-in prooedurs.
Tfl&owa r f caéb r~etrned weapon could be requestd to firo 10 rounds of ammunition to show that itill scgvjéabte.(and ta'help us up ammunition). Ammunition buy back could accompany the weapona buy back programsspcIally large caliber or rare types of åmmunition).
l Ddotroy weapons on theBpot, Or quickly remove them from the ara; weapon stragø and tmnsportation must be well-protocted. -
stabus a prvitoly set time period, of one to two weeks; an open-ended program increas the chance that people fwinsmugf,1* in weapans fram outside the country to receive the boy back bounty.
13 To prvidc an additional incentive, it could be announced tha a buy back pogram will be followed by a weapons urvh'and seizuro program, during which illegal wcapons holders will inur stiff penalties. During a seue ·progamnrinformen could be rewarded according to a pra-rated scale (a larger reward for a larger cache).
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57. In Somalia (not one of the case studies), although persuasion through buy back programs was not used, the Multilateral Task Force led by the U.S. gradually disarmed weapons holders in secured zones. According to UN officials Involved in the operation, the price for an AK47 in the US-secured zones was one-tenth to one-fourth of the existing price in the unsecured areas: the demand, and consequently the value of weapons collapsed when security was restored (at least temporarily). If accompanied by a means of providing security, weapons reclaiming programs may help improve a country's security situation, especially in the volatile and polarized situation immediately following a civil war, or in cases such as Chad or Somalia with conflict between numerous armed factions, and acts of violence by armed factions against unarmed civilians. This seems to suggest that the value of a weapon and the willingness to part with it depends primarily on two factors: its perceived economic value--in terms of the economic gains it can be used to obtain-and Its security value--the perceived requirement of that weapon to preserve one's security and/or threaten that of others.
C. Mines and De-mining Programs
58. A legacy of a protracted, internal conflict, especially where substantial foreign support from major powers was involved, is a prevalence of buried land mines. Mines continue to maim hundreds of people yearly, threaten security and interfere with the economy (commerce, transportation, investment and reconstruction efforts) well after the conflict has ended. Estimates of the number of mines which remain in Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Angola exceed one million. Most of the mines In Nicaragua are buried on prime agricultural land in rural areas within Nicaragua and on its borders with Costa Rica and Honduras. Casualties are most frequent during plowing season. These affected countries have neither the mine-clearing expertise and equipment needed to remove the mines in a timely manner, nor the funds to obtain an adequate demining capability. In Angola, mines have maimed nearly 80,000 people, often children, and interfere with transportation and agriculture.21 Joint mine-clearing efforts have been undertaken, but progress is slow.
59. The Nicaraguan military has made a serious effort to demine rural areas. The locations of many mine fields are unknown due to inadequate record-keeping, and maps which do exist are imprecise since many of the mines have shifted over time. No information on the locations, type, and numbers of mines laid by the NR has been provided, due both to inadequate record-keeping and their reluctance to cooperate with the Sandinista army and the Chamorro government. Removing the mines is a challenging endeavor, because of the advanced age, varied type, and tentative locations, modern mines are often not made of metal, and thus more difficult to locate. The Sandinista army has only a limited demining capability and requires better demining training and more equipment. In 1992, appeals by the Nicaraguan government for financial, technical and training assistance yielded some results: the OAS Secretary General established a special regional fund to assist Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras in their demining efforts, with funding by the U.S., Canada, Japan, Norway, Italy and other donors of up to US$10 million. The fund will sponsor training and equipment to local personnel, who would then actually conduct the demining effort.
i Finkel, Vicki, "Brothers in Arms," Africa Report (MarchlApril 1992): 63. Also, recent estimates of the number of unexploded mines in Angola exceed one million. Source: Coulson, Anita. "The Paradox of Peace," Africa Report, September-October 1991.
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CHAPTER IV
INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION/REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS
60. This chapter examines the institutions which manage DRPs, and Issues of process arising in the implementation of such programs. In some countries there is overlap between the institutions managing demobilization and reintegration; given the links between the two programs, institutional management for both programs is discussed in this chapter.
COORDINATION
61. DRPs in the cases studied tend to involve large numbers of people (as many as 120,000 in some cases), and, at the same time, are often constrained by the political necessity of completing the process quickly. Thus, the experiences of the DRPs in the countries studied show that the nature of the DRP process calls for early coordination among the various actors (government agencies, armed forces, NOs, relief organization and the donor community) and advanced planning of all stages in order to be more successful (i.e. to avoid riots in assembly camps, ensure payments promised can be made, in order to prevent fraud, etc.). Early coordination is often important because of the long time needed to design reintegration programs and arrange funding, because the nature of the programs often Involve surmounting substantial logistical obstacles, and because once demobilization actually begins, action must proceed quickly to avoid a long period of encampment.9
62. In Nicaragua, demobilization and initial reintegration were planned and coordinated along with the peace process. Comprehensive programs were designed in advance which addressed the many short-term needs of combatants and their families (including the Food and Materials Program; Self- Sufficiency Programs; Disabled Veterans Program; Medicine Distribution Program; U.S. Government Cold Ration Program). After the initial six month program, OAS decided to expand its efforts to include development projects and longer-term support (Housing and Schools program, Managua Clinic, Atlantic Coast Rice Production Project). Because OAS was not bureaucratic, it was able to respond quickly to develop programs to fit ex-combatants needs as they arose. Some analysts of Nicaragua's demobilization program attribute the relatively successful demobilization of many of the NR to this integrated, long-range planning and early coordination. In Uganda, programs for both demobilization and initial reintegration (Institutional support at the local level) were designed together prior to initiation of any of the program steps. As Uganda's program is still ongoing it is too early to assess the long-term results of this approach, however, program administrators and donors are very optimistic.
a/ One of the reasons for early coordination is that, in many programs, demobilization, reintegration and force restructuring overlap in time. Since most countries have a limited capacity to demobilize and transport combatants, demobilization can stretch out over many months or even over a year meaning that the two stages-demobilization and reintegration-will overlap.
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63. In Namibia, Angola, Chad, and Zimbabwe, demobilization, reintegration, and disarmament were viewed by planners as distinct programs; at times, even the various components of an Individual stage were treated separately. For example, in Namibia it was initially hoped that reintegration would occur *spontaneously* after combatants were demobilized and the government Initially made no special plans to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. Faced with a high level of unemployment and a highly inflated public sector sixteen months after independence, the government began a haphazard approach to reintegration (i.e., a lump-sum cash payment insufficient to make a significant productive investment, and the Development Brigades, a publicly-financed on-the-job vocational training program). This late start produced extremely limited results and public outcrys over the mechanism used to identify who had been a combatant.a' In Zimbabwe, although the demobilization of approximately 75,000 guerrillas was relatively successful, the government paid scant attention to the reintegration of combatants. Then, rather than incur the immediate political and security risk potentially posed by a large number of discontented, unemployed ex-combatants, the government rehired many of the combatants into the civil service and the military: as noted previously, by 1988, over half of those demobilized had ended up either In the public service or armed forces. Failing to plan in advance for reintegration may have resulted in the recourse to inflating the bureaucracy, with negative long-term consequences.
64. Some of the case studies suggest that in the aftermath of an internal conflict with no clear winner, an adequate reintegration package may play a role in persuading the key parties involved to agree to demobilize. To avoid long encampment periods (as occurred in Zimbabwe where some soldiers were encamped for over a year), financial, technical, and material resources for the programs to reintegrate ex-combatants would be most effective if in place at the beginning of the demobilization process to provide incentives to leave the military. In Mozambique, one group of combatants reportedly caused some unrest as they demanded compensation for demobilizing. Unfortunately, countries seeking to secure resources face the dilemma that donors are reluctant to provide financing unless governments have demonstrated their commitment to the program by launching it. However, governments are unable to plan, let alone launch, a full-fledged program unless they have some sense of the amount of resources that will be available to them. This dilemma has been at the heart of many of the problems that such programs have faced.
65. The reasons for the setbacks in Angola's peace process and demobilization program are multiple; however, a well-planned reintegration program with secured financing might have provided incentives for combatants to report to and stay in camps in anticipation of benefits. Most donors, other than the European Economic Community (EEC), were slow to respond in firming up resources for monitoring, demobilization, or reintegration (see next section on monitoring) because they feared political instability. The political agreement to encamp and demobilize combatants thus seemed to be a step ahead of securing sufficient financing and personnel for UNAVEM-II and for the encampment, demobilization, and reintegration process; as noted previously, this contributed to starvation in some camps, the need for
I/ The Ministry of Home Affairs and Defense had called for registration of ex-oombatants in September and October 1990, Vler they had been demobilized and dispersed. According to one newspaper reports, the Minister for information and Broadcasting, Mr. Hidipo Hamutenyathought that many of the ex-combatants may have misunderstood the meaning of the word *gratuity* in the call for registration for benefits - *Plan Pay-outs Could be Stopped warns Hamutenya," 7he Nanibian, July 24, 1991.
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emergency food supplies to be shipped in, widespread desertion from the camps, and a worsening security situation. In addition to the political tensions which characterized the program, there appeared to be insufficient equipment and personnel to handle the actual demobilization of the ex-combatants.
66. In Chad, both the 1991 and 1992 programs for demobilization dealt only marginally with the issue of reintegrating soldiers to civilian life. The programs were designed by French and Chadian military planners, who hoped that civilian authorities would later develop appropriate reintegration projects and secure funding from donors. The demobilization program fell behind schedule in part because of the time required to set up the administrative structures (15 local reintegration offices) and payment mechanisms in a country where institutional capacity is low. Some of the administrative problems included lack of computerization and basic materials for the Veteran's Office, which was supposed to establish and verify the list of those eligible to retire. Although the second demobilization program was started in July 1992, plans for reintegration programs are, according to one source, still "...at a level more theoretical than operational." However, as the program has progressed, the government strategy towards reintegration has evolved, and seems to be focused more narrowly on cash compensation than initial plans suggested. This stems from the government's survey of 506 ex- combatants which showed that ex-combatants are reintegrating on their own, with only 22% of the ex- combatants reporting that they had no economic activity, and the majority of the rest occupied in agriculture/pastoralism and commerce. Nonetheless, this first stage of demobilization is voluntary, and the next phase of combatants (of 8,000) may have a harder time reintegrating as many will likely not be volunteers.
67. Some donors note that there may be essentially two sources for slow initial progress in designing reintegration plans in Chad: (1) the military was slow in providing the necessary information to civilian authorities (and others) on the profile of the combatants to be demobilized and their intended place of origin (partly because the program is supposed to be voluntary); and (2) donors were taking a wait-and-see approach, wanting to see whether demobilization progressed (and that there was firm commitment to it by all parties concerned) and what form it would take before investing staff time and risking funds to design and implement a reintegration program. In addition to the issue of coordination and communication between the civilian government and the military (which facilitates design of tailored reintegration programs), a secondary issue concerns coordination between the government, the military, NGOs, and donors. During the 1991 demobilization program in Chad, a donor-NGO working group was formed to help the government's Haut Comit design and plan reintegration programs. However, since the military did not participate in the group, lack of information on veterans profiles continued, and after the 1991 Protocol on demobilization was suspended, the working group lost steam. As discussed earlier (see para. 17), the difficulties encountered in designing Chad's reintegration program are not likely to be the major source of slow program implementation (soldiers are offered substantial cash allowances upon demobilizing).
68. In Mozambique, although programs have been designed for demobilization of both government and guerrilla forces and for creating a new integrated force, little attention has been paid to the reintegration of combatants. Based on the examples of Namibia and Zimbabwe, even if forces are successfully persuaded to demobilize, reintegration will be much more difficult to achieve (and likely more expensive) if/when it becomes a future objective than if it had been included in earlier planning.
Chapter 4 - Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs Page 39 Demobilization and Reintegrtion of Militay Peusonnel
Box IV.1: Coordination In Mozambique
A General Coordinator will be a.ppoitetd to asit ith oordination and connnmunication b een the ovenmnt, R o n errogrn #expert? will com*prise the tehiclit (TU) with the followigfunctions: (1)eordinate thesupply at food Ibthe asembly ares; (2)assume resoabilty fo halth care proison and fbtimp~roving ain amootly The TU will work closly with the ctral Relatgionuoffice and its provincial
In Namibia and Zimbabwe, because there were sufficient political incentives, the inadequacy or absence of a reintegration program did not jeopardize demobilization-although lack of such programs may have made it more difficult for combatants to return to productive activities.
69. In the peace time situation of Uganda, coordination among the government, military leaders, and donors occurred from the initial planning stages, resulting in a carefully planned, phased demobilization and reintegration program; the total US$19.4 million budget for the first phase of the program (transporting and providing interim benefits to 23,000 soldiers and 50,000 dependents) has been fully subscribed by donors. Recognizing the need for coordination of the various stages of and participants in the coordination process, planners of Mozambique's demobilization and reintegration program have deliberately designed an institutional structure to support this, as shown in Box IV.1. MONIORING
70. The case study results suggest that outside monitors or observers-either bilateral or multilateral-who are perceived as neutral, greatly assist the demobilization/reintegration process in two ways: (1)by providing a mechanism to resolve disputes arising In implementation and thus strengthening the neutrality and credibility of the program, particularly in cases of internal conflict; and (2) by providing impartial management of goods and services to ensure that they are distributed efficiently and fairly.
71. UN observer forces were deployed to Namibia and Angola, aided observers from the OAS in Nicaragua, and are currently in Mozambique to verify all aspects of the peace process following the cease-fire. Bilateral monitors assisted the process in Zimbabwe (British) and are both overseeing and actively assisting the demobilization/force restructuring process in Chad (French). As the demobilization program in Uganda is being carried out in a non-volatile situation, there is apparently less need for an external monitor. 72. During the encampment stage in the countries studied, monitors verified the number and affiliation of combatants entering and leaving camps, helped settle disputes between opposing armed forces, and discouraged fraud. A monitor's ability to resolve such disputes helps ensure the demobilization process proceeds smoothly in politically tense situations. Because the leadership of both sides of an internal conflict often try to "cheat" through holding a large portion of their forces in hiding,
Page 40 Chapter 4 -Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs Demobiliztion and Reintegration of Military Personnet
external monitors are helpful for trying to verify such reports (as in Namibia), locate unassembled combatants, and try to persuade them to participate in the peace/demobilization process. Although there were allegations from both sides in the Namibian conflict of attempts to "cheat,* as described in Box IV.2, the UN observer force had a sufficiently broad mandate and adequate resources to enable it to mediate such disputes and complete the demobilization and repatriation process within the scheduled period of time.A
73. . In Angola the demobilization process was accompanied by political disputes and tension which the UN forces were ill-equipped to mediate. For example, the MPLA allegedly shifted military units to paramilitary units In the police force (which fell outside of the UN mandate), and the MPLA repeatedly accused UNITA of holding 20,000 combatants in the southeastern province of Cuando Cubango (although the actual number is less than this allegation, the UN forces did not have the personnel to bring in those outside of the camps).91 Thus, both sides of the conflict questioned the declared number of troops (and thus the number eligible for demobilization) of the opposing side. When the UNAVEM forces attempted to provide a *neutral" count of forces from each side within the camps, their numbers were suspect because they had inadequate controls to monitor the exit and entry of troops into camps, and they only conducted a group count of who was in the camps once a week. Because of inadequate UN personnel to monitor demobilization, desertion and uncontrolled extended leave from the camps with arms were common.
74. The contrast between the role of UN monitors In Angola and Namibia suggests that monitors require adequate resources (financial and human) and a fairly broad mandate in order to ensure that the demobilization process proceeds smoothly. For Angola's population of 10 million and 150,000 combatants, UNAVEM-II was assigned 450 personnel and a budget of roughly US$163 million:- a ratio of 1:333 UN observers to combatants, and a ratio of financial resources of less than US$1100 per combatant. In contrast, in Namibia, with a population of only 1.78 million, UNTAG was allocated 8,000 persons and a budget three times as large as in Angola (nearly US$400 million) to demobilize 20,000 PLAN guerrillas and disband or deport 32,000 or so troops from the SADF and SWATF: a ratio of 1:6 UN observers to combatants and nearly US$7400 per combatant. According to the UN special envoy in Angola, 'The world tried to do this one on the cheap. ...That's one of the reasons things came apart."R/ In. Mozambique, the UN force will reportedly have a ratio of between nine and ten combatants per observer and a broader mandate than the UN force in Angola.
AQ/ UNTAG's broad mandate included monitoring the disbandment of citizen's forces (including SWATF), monitoring SADP personnel in Namibia as well as SWATF forces in neighboring countries, securing installations in the northern border area, monitoring cessation of hostilities by all parties, keeping the borders under surveillance, monitoring the police, and resolving tensions even at the local level. Thes tasks apparently went well beyond those in previous UN peacekeeping operations, and were supplemented by the UNs activities to assist with the implementation of fair elections.
41l The Joint Commission for the Verification and Control of the Cease-fire (CMVF), technical advisors to one of the UN monitoring bodies, subsequently searched the province for the alleged concealed army. Although they did not find a large hidden force of the size alleged by the MPLA, their search confirmed that there were at least several hundred encamped UNITA troops.
S21 Taylor, Paul -inAngola, Seeking Peace 'On the Cheap' Renews War, The Washington Post (March 29, 1993): Al.
Chapter 4 - Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs Pap 41 Demobilization and Rlntegration of Military Peronnel
Box IV.2: The UN as Mediator in Namibla
fatl5198 bfor te tdi4fUN~ forae had ad$ved, N~zaiiaW,. PLAN ~r uerrilla...... allegdly .. ..- tried sntled;d teni tt IaiWAPC) eaintd that its PLAN fatoes were entering into Namibia a celehrat th mk Mni UN Resolutlot 435 and to hand weapons over to the UN force b Able (UNTAOfw ottr Af~it authoritis i eseted that this zreseted an aresoThi d putt ledtoA ainjor clakisvp4 which# hundreds1 0~r% of ?W PLAN guerrilas were kied. ...UNTAO ...... bad atienttipowe a r*ee in ~anibit at 6h thi to prevent the violation, but helped tesolve 00...... hereiodleaingWhelnghut totheelecion UNZ 4had o adres reeatd alegaron4-mstl
.i~wwL~w..~* w~w......
disputeangreume5thedemobiiations Sphfre e.40th ropeashain..o .h O fh by SP . I
...... ------ord paey i sibe foinatr tho~~atancentos ed SPF P yerdsonnebreeposreen a pihsg Hte18fa 1 the amlaborddNThes PE llkegations we Ngedd byAntW n ......
P5. INT' soe4ontiebsd mnditot prod ing ate adtiona oleec ofsanpobsrerth moitr easatively nole tned miiseigth d/emblzatln antOfrshd reinertund roms Anaah caewt CAhOAS iUns Nicaagu pas shn ecinsTbe V1 V2adBx V nNcrga h secetris-eral75.~0ZIn soecutis0nadto0t f thereN andeOs ared th oefrigtetaiina itablnishlo thd ntentinaldoe Commssionrofuort fa bevrh and rfctaislbAtd)agbithmontoctiel ws ivovedinadinstein theUN rganelizain,e te emoilzaio aoUnited an NatioknintoslerveleGrouosiffCeenraarinegatin0roras,0s0asth casewithCIAVOASAmeriea (ONC hichn Niaragaaisrted withrnasshow demoblezatontosueisther in abls IV1, I.2 ad Bo.IV...InNicaagua.thdeoito n drlton an Vriictins(CAVsecetris-gnealoftheUNan aon wthth te OS U gredtogaiztin,a als niedNaios.bsrvr.rop.n.enrah nentoa omsino upr ofNtroops anthr depndendthe areqeta in thera1Acor. P apprt fhidr resonslityinlded AmericaofNRtropadthirdeenetsasreuetd ~ ~ g (ONUCAwhc-site:ihdmoiiain, n heTea cor. aruevs o heoiiainadrlcto her esoniiltyinlue atin asotacinedatrbewensat msfias rediator ewe ttofcilOaReamdx-obtns(cmp,rcnrs,ndgus ofcalsoad re-modlieatcoatani s forcoinNma ryotraseangrop
Page42 haptr 4* Intittionl Mnageentof DmoblizaionReinegrtionProram from 4 ThCBheHept,A eve 4f UntitNtion Maaeken o DemnilizationRitgrto Porm Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel of both joined together "revueltos"). They would locate military units which had re-armed in rural areas and negotiate with them to stop their operations; they thus claim to have demobilized and destroyed the weapons of 15,000 ex-combatants who had re-armed. Another area where CIAV-OAS served as a monitor was in Investigating and bringing to the attention of the Government, human rights violations against former NR. In addition to acting as monitors, the CIAV-OAS representatives also administered the demobilization and reintegration functions. Where external monitors have been involved in program management, they have been cited as important actors in verifying the equity with which demobilisaion and reintegration benefits are provided to the participating sides, and helping to track program costs.
76. Monitoring Is also important to prevent already demobilized combatants and non- combatants from entering camps to obtain food and other benefits. In Mozambique, documents stating eligibility for demobilization benefits will only be valid after being signed and stamped by UN observers at the camps. The UN observers will confirm deliveries and report regularly to their headquarters on the availability and distribution of food.A There is apparently a danger, however, of encouraging dependency on the external organization, something which occurred somewhat in Nicaragua where USAID and CIAV-OAS provided for most needs of the NR, which prompted a USAID official participating in the demobilization/ reintegration process to state: "It is important that the government not be allowed to sit back and expect the international community to do everything."
77. The multilateral monitors who assisted the demobilization/reintegration process in Nicaragua, Namibia, Angola, and thus far in Mozambique were/are reportedly perceived as neutral and legitimate by most parties concerned. Despite numerous delays and problems, the demobilization process was successfully completed in Namibia, and was proceeding in Angola before being cut short by the resumption of conflict; in Nicaragua demobilization proceeded well but the persistence of some re-armed groups casts a shadow on the program; and in Mozambique, it is still too soon to evaluate the success of the UN monitoring effort. The performance of the bilateral monitors is mixed; the British monitoring force was reportedly successful In conducting Itself as a neutral, effective observer and manager in Zimbabwe, and the required forces were demobilized. The Chadian press has, at times, been critical of the role of the French in their country. 78. CIAV-OAS's initial success both in managing the demobilization and reintegration processes and in verifying the requirements of the peace process was apparently due to a combination of reasons: a broad mandate, adequate resources, and its perception as a neutral party. Its legitimacy was strong both within Nicaragua and in the international community; this was especially important given that CIAV-OAS's mandate applied only to demobilization of one side of the conflict, the NR, and its funding was provided almost entirely by the United States-the NR's former backer. Unique among the cases studied, CIAV-OAS also monitored the human rights status of returning NR soldiers and their families under the Human Rights Monitoring and Mediation Efforts program, as noted above.
nl Delivery of the commodities will be made through the World Food Program/UNILOG, which will be authorized to suboontract the transport and monitoring to private enterprises or NGOs
Chapter 4 - Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs Page 43 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
Table IV.1: InstitutionalStructuresfor Monitoring DRPs
Country Monitor(s) Mandate/Punctions Resources/Person naol Angola * UNAVEMIUNAVEM-U * Verify withdrawal of Cuban troops; supervise * 450 personnel at ceasefire; assemble troops; count combatants; peak disarm combatants, store weapons; oversee elections * Joint Commission (CCPM) with * Monitor encampment; issue IDs, money, * n/a observers from US, Russia, Portugal clothes; arrange transportation * Joint Commission for the *Verify cease-fire; verify and locate * /a Verification and Control of the unassembled troops Cease-fire (CMVP) * Joint Commission for the * Oversee force restructuring process *n/a Pormation of the Armed Porces (CCFA), with participation of Prance, UK, and Portugal * Political Commission * Oversee implementation of politial * n/a principles of Lisbon Agreement _ Namibia UNTAG, including police Assemble, disarm, guard and demobilize-PLAN 8,000 persoAnel at detachment (CIVPOL) guerrillas; guard assembly points, weapons peak, including dqpots, patrol country; oversee departure of 2,000 civilians, South African forces and disbanding of South 1,500 police, African-sponsored SWATF; monitor South 4,500 military African-controlled police force in Namibia, personnel SWAPOL Zimbabwe British monitoring force Assemble, disarm combatants 1,300 troops Nicaragua qlAV-OAS, ONUCA Oversee assembly, disarm combatants, destroy n/a weapons; mediate disputes (plus administrative ___functions noted In Table IV.2) Uganda UVAB (Ugandan Veteran Assistance Select demobilization candidates n/a Board) Chad Demobilization dirctly supervised Select demobilization candidates; collect n/a by Ministry of Defense. with weapons and uniforms; issue Ids; distribute assistance by French military. departure sum Mozambique United Nations observer force Supervise registration of combatants at 7,500 (ratio 1:10) assembly areas and disarmament; validate personnel to eligibility documents; provide communications combatants and transportation support
Page 44 Chapter 4 - Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
INS UnurIONAL STaUcRE OF DEMOULIZATION PROGRAMS
79. In certain cases there is a substantial overlap between the institutions monitoring the peace process and encampment, managing demobilization, and overseeing reintegration activities. In Uganda, for example, some program elements (i.e. payments to ex-combatants once settled in their home district, veterans assistance organizations which will help with demobilization but which will also serve long-term functions helping ex-combatants reintegrate at the local level) which are considered part of the reintegration package in other countries, are categorized as part of the demobilization program. In other countries, as in Nicaragua, one institution (CIAV-OAS) was involved in monitoring implementation of the peace agreement, management, and implementation of demobilization and reintegration. In contrast, in Namibia, demobilization and reintegration were viewed as two separate processes and thus had fairly distinct management (demobilization primarily with the assistance of UN forces, and reintegration
Box 1V3: ProgramManagement Functions of CZAV-OAS
Aiesaiu sgency, CIAV-OAS was able to4eiuvedgverment butmmeracy and af-taspe, and voldled1mdue topifraeand conuption.' The CIAVWASQ af drawa from sveral O)AS Me t4 ws.dht co itd pofesi.nal ad.oetremely c oste scious. CIAV.OAS maxtained alieM oer the distribu~tionof reice ad .prinzdt.he buxdgets.of NOOS tjects. Whei issomes were ditributed otsde th tar.t Wli&Nu1..0 RI aliijafoisigle mdicl creprovided by thePan AmerarlHealth 0rganizatio@A-A . . ~ .. M...... SAWi thetl nd t.endoned thprc.tice....h..plicati.on of 11S Goe ettditipietess .n*igeouasnt~yapiio of stingnt accounting prcie.TeCA-A aeul rce .n (an tMtoced.ecommay a posor~ octaluidiiotnstrwer usi1ped in deferenc to
line bu with arealsillsa vioL Cotract#were based ioMflat eeinoporatinig all ccfor poteritWinosses adhetha per itiglse to be compested at fall vaue Officials fmila wit th iaaMtoeainhvesg.est tht. DPs boul be am~ by multifateral orgaiizati tby inte national magzeet conslting firms to uarantee that themonitoring function thii hytuesay flriiit t respond.to.eesa they ase,
activities primarily with development organizations and ministries). Thus, for certain countries, demobilization and reintegration, and consequently their management, are treated as different, overlapping, phases of one process. For this reason, management and institutional issues concerning both demobilization and reintegration are discussed in this chapter, although information on reintegration program design is treated in Chapter Five.- 80. The administrative structure of demobilization programs variqd, although there are some common elements to most of the programs as summarized in Table IV.2. The three most common
Chapor 4I-Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs Page 45 Demob da~n and Reintegration of Miltary Peronnel
Table IV.: Instuonal Smucure of DaobilizationPrograms
Conr InttuinPunctiona Angola Joint UNITA/MPLA commission (CCPM), Oversw demobilization and force restructuring. supervised by UNAVEM Namibla Tripurtite Committee (UNTAG, SWAPO, and Overse ~asmbly and confnement of PLAN guerr~las; assist SouthWest African forces) repastiation of rofugees and guerrlas; overse d ~parture or disbanding of South African forme (SADP) and South African-sponsormd SWATP. Zimbabwe Cabinet-level committee for both ö Overse Demobilzation Directorate. demobi~lzation, & rintegration, chaired by Minister of Labor & Social Wälfare * British mnitoring force Overe. encampment; disarm combatant . • Demob~dan Directorat * Administer demobiliotlon procesa. Nicaragua • UN (ONUCA) and OAS (CIAV) together with • Supervise demobaton and relocation of NR trops and their repmesentatves of Verication Comm~ne. of .dependents; lauc D; distribute seting-in package. Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo - CIAV-OAS • Set up ausembly camps; transport NR and dependents to camps and to Sal destination; asskst with disarmament and conflict mediation. • ONUCA ' Disarm NR, destroy weapon. • Pan American Hath Organization (PAHO) • Conduct medical oxama In camps. Uganda Uganda Veteran' Assistance Board Select candidates for demobiliatin, implement demob ~Mtin. Chad • Ministry of Defense, with Prench m~itary * Select soldiers to be retired or demobilized; supervise all m~itary assistance aspet of program; collet weapons and uniforma; issne ID cards; distribute departur alowance and benet entitlement documenta. o Haut Cad, prealded over by Ministry of * Overall aministration of demobiliion program. Planning and Cooperaton * Secretarfat Permanent d la Rinseron des • Subordinate to Haut Comd, manages Implementation of program. D~fats (SPR) * 12 regional representatives of SPR • Supervis local level implementation; obaerve al demoblintin activities; conduct documentation; establish lista of candidates for demobilization/ etirement; prepare verication lista for entitlement benefits. • 20 Freach advisora • Reinforce SPR, asaist In distribution of money, food, equipment, etc.; verfy applications of de=obilization candidates. * Financial management delegated by Chad's * To pay reintgration al~owance, Frech CaLws de Deovlopp.nent Ministry of Financ to Mead of French Mission (CPD) advances Månds to special acount in commercial bank in Chad, for Cooperation and Cultural Affairs. mnged through double Franco-Chadia signature process. Mozambique • Supervisory and Control Commission (CSC) * Oversees all aspets of peace agreement
• Cease-fire Commi«ion (CPC) • Oversees logistic aupport to as bly areas and system of registaton and documenta~n " Technical Uni (TU), composed of General * Assist coordination and communication between government, Coordinator, and 3 experta RENAMO, central and local CORE, other paticipanta; coordinate food supply to assembly camps; overs~e camps' heMh care, living condition ; assist regiatration and dcumenataa process
Pag 46 Chaptr 4- Institutional Management of Demobilzation/Reintegration Program Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
elements were: (1) a high-level planning committee charged with broad policy formation, coordination at the ministerial level, (2) a secretariat attached to the planning committee responsible for day-to-day operations and oversight and; (3) local implementing bodies.
81. Developing Institutions needed to,plan, coordinate, and obtain funding for DRPs is especially problematic when there is no established government in place at the start of demobilization. In a situation such as Angola (highlighted in Box IV.4), the absence of clear governmental authority contributed to the lack of coordinated action to undertake long-term planning for reintegration programs. Newly elected governments following a protracted conflict, such as that of Namibia, also have difficulties with program planning as they are faced with a myriad of equally urgent reconstruction demands and may lack the necessary administrative capacity and financial resources. Even established governments not recently emerging from a conflict, as in Uganda, rely on external technical assistance to help design and implement demobilization and reintegration programs. In Uganda, emphasis was placed on developing local capacity to manage the DRP through the provision of training seminars for staff managing the programs for veterans (in job duties and responsibilities, problem solving and counseling, communications skills, and management). At the same time, the program sought to integrate the temporary structure managing demobilization with the longer-term structure of veteran's associations by requiring that staff also serve as Veteran's Officers.
82. Mozambique's peace agreement, the Rome Agreement, created several commissions to carry out the peace process, including the demobilization program, as shown in Table IV.2 which are currently in the process of becoming operational. As noted previously, the Mozambique program includes in its Institutions a mechanism for coordination (Box IV.1). The Mozambican government also received support from the Swiss Development Corporation to develop institutions such as the Commission for Supervision and Control of the Peace Process (CSC). In a similar fashion, and as noted above, the Nicaragua peace agreement included the creation of the institutions to manage and monitor the DRP (CIAV-OAS).
Box IV.4: Angola: Implementation DWIculties with Interim Governments
ot i.co.btat .athe.diviliant economy was left toKa JoitMPI.AUklTA Polide Military Com son CC M.sthb CCM consistd ofeweennttvwo bt MPTZA aud UNI?A, th
...... 11-T, MINT..-A
46moiizth asithAigolaX.. rimidly becausofthe gov6tnmt'da pareIlak t caest in moving
83. For security and economic reasons, many program planners try to disperse ex-combatants throughout the country upon their demobilization and avoid concentration of ex-combatants in urban areas. However, this creates additional challenges to administer subsequent reintegration programs and
C6pter 4 -Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Progmams Page 47 Demobilization and Rolntegration of Military Personnel
distribute benefits, requiring development of a broader institutional structure to carry out these functions. For example, in Uganda, the government delayed demobilization until the institutional structure to manage support at the local level and subsequent reintegiation, the Veteran's Assistance Board, was In place (an option not available to many countries demobilizing immediately following a conflict situation). This ability to delay demobilization meant that program planners could Identify potential problem areas where large numbers of combatants Intended to settle for increased social services and veteran's support (see Box IV.5). The way in which program planners tried to avoid this in Nicaragua was by trying to concentrate ex-combatants from one side (NR)in pre-designated areas, development poles, which could be provided with services. As noted previously, this was ultimately unsuccessful.
Box IV.5: Veterans Association in Uganda
%ay... ~e& ...... aq a~~t.w~ V th4e polloide at ordhiIted at the iniserla level sAd suervise an io tDsrc Veteran&
01 Q re dbgitly bbiord, the JVAB' accoitswill aidrge exdttal audiib onceyary
6UAS s uagittd byt a perofesina staff and a support staff. District Vterazn Office (DVOs) e stibisei aen it ahih ocetrtinof Nainf slatance An (1RA) veteranal they * e posibe or eb awith vethus c adytoday bisl densatng tey teeve1the beft
' ..... t.i....iir...... h.., .. P..i.l-...... NE.
gm ZMES... ..
(5) Montodyhe inkda asiess f the ocal Vaeris Assisatnce Prgrm ldng
6)Unernkngcom iftmuteach to enur vea will be ell-seceived bythloa
INSTnrtIONAL STRUCTURE OF REINIEGRATION PROGRAMS
84. The institutional structure to manage reintegration programs has varied according to the focus of the strategy for reintegration (and whether planners were focused on reintegration or preoccupied primarily with demobilization). In Mozambique, special provincial commissions (CORE) will manage the reintegration process and programs at the provincial level and will coordinate with donors and NGOs. In some cases, donors sought to channel reintegration assistance through NGOs and community-based
Page 48 Chapter 4 -Institutional Management of Demobiliz.ation/Reintegration Programs Demobilization and Relntegration of Military Personnol programs (discussed in Chapter Five). In the cases of Nicaragua and Uganda, special veterans associations have been used at the local level to manage reintegration programs and provide assistance to veterans. In Nicaragua, in addition to the role of CIAV-OAS noted previously, a NGO called The National Center for Planning and Administration of Development Poles (CENPAP) was created by the Civic Association of the NR, to assist those who settled in the development poles. After the concept of the development poles was abandoned because many veterans did not want to settle in the designated areas, CENPAP assumed the responsibilities of promoting social and economic development in rural communities affected by the war. CENPAP provided legal and technical assistance, social orientation and integration, and organized micro-enterprises and cooperatives. As described in Box IV.5, program pLanners in Uganga created an institutional network managed at the local level by civilian Veterans Assistance Boards to oversee the transition of soldiers belonging to Uganda's National Resistance Army. This network is unique in its organization and attention to the need for coordination. In Namibia a privately-run veteran's association, SWAPO's Veteran's Trust, has been established to offer veterans loans and grants, vocational training, support for veterans with post-war psychological stress and to act as an ombudsman with the government. Both veterans programs are in the early stages, and it is thus too early to assess the utility of such organizations in facilitating reintegration. However, staff from one NGO in Zimbabwe (The Danhiko School) which had managed a reintegration project stressed the importance of including veterans in the management of programs targeted to them.
Chapter 4 - Institutional Management of Danobiliztion/Reintegration Programs Page 49 Demobilization and Reaintegration of Military Personnel
Table IV3: hasiutonalStructure of Reintegration Programs
Country Institution Function Angola * Interministerial cabinet level offim headed by * Draft programs for reintegration, raise funds, instruct Prime Minister and with participation of provincial units Ministries of Planning, Defense, Finance, Labor, Territorial Administration and Education * Local units * Monitor reintegration process Namibia * Cabinet level steering committee, including * Oversee Development Brigades Minister of Information and other Ministers * UNHCR assisted by Council of Churches in * Carried out bulk of repatriation and initial Namibia (CCN), and Emergency Repatriation, reintegration of repatriates (inclu4ing ex-combatants) Resettlement, and Reconstruction Committee (RRR) * UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNESCO, PAO * Supported repatriation/ reintegration effort in their I respective areas of speclaliation Zimbabwe * Demobilization Directorato * Administer demobilization and reintegration proces * Ministry of Education * Responsible for formal educational programs * NGOs * Vocational training Nicaragua * CIAV-OAS * Oversee humanitarian assistance and social reintegration programs, human rights status of returning combatants and families. * CENPAP * Promote social and economic development in rural communities affected by war; provide legal and technical assistance to agricultural sector. * UNHCR * Repatriate ex-combatants to Nicaragua from camps in Honduras; oversee programs for refugees. Uganda * Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) * Formulate and monitor programs * District Veterans Offices (DVO) * Support UVAB at local level, to: ensure veterans receive beneits due; implement, coordinate, and evaluate programs; counsel veterans; prol ide career guidance; organize training programs; monitor local finances * District Veterans Committee (DVC) * Supervise DVO. Chad Franco-Chadian Development Fund Special credit fund to be created from leftover Demobilizatio funds; ex-soldier and others apply for loan and grats
Mozambique * Reintoration Commission (CORE); includes * Oversees combatants' transition to civilian life and representatives from Directorates of Finance, various steps of reintegration process; prepare monthly Planning, Transportation, Health, Social Action reports for government, RENAMO, and UN observers; train provincial CORE representatives; assist provincial CORE offices * Provincial CORE in each province (composed * Prepare local reintegration programs, coordinate local of Provincial Emergency Commission, where saintegration process, inform NGOs and private they exist) enterprises of and involve them in programs
Page 50 Chapter 4 - Institutional Management of Demobilization/Reintegration Programs Demobilization and Reintegration of Militay Personnel
CHAPTER V
DESIGN OF REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS
85. This chapter discusses the design, and implementation experiences of reintegration programs. The purpose of reintegration programs in the case studies included providing an incentive to combatants to demobilize, helping to ease combatants' transition to civilian society, and reducing potential security problems following demobilization. All of the demobilization and reintegration programs studied used some type of monetary compensation (a cash payment-either a lump-sum payment for transportation and other Immediate needs-and/or a series of subsequent payments over a given period of time, such as a pension). Some of the cases, including Zimbabwe and Nicaragua, also provided targeted training, public work schemes, creation of cooperatives, or counseling to help reinsert demobilized combatants into the productive economy and society (following the model of safety net programs accompanying a reduction in the size of the civil service). Other countries adopted a less targeted approach, of providing reconstruction, economic adjustment, and employment creation programs which would benefit the population in general.
GENERAL VERSUS TARGETED PROGRAMS
86. A key choice in designing reintegration programs is whether to adopt a targeted or non- targeted strategy to help ex-combatants reintegrate. This choice hinges on the question of whether demobilized ex-combatants are a special needs population, whether their return to productive non-military activity Is more important to the overall security of the nation than that of other groups, and finally, whether targeted programs are effective. Determining whether combatants are a special needs population and assessing their potential security threat can only be done on a country-specific basis, and on the basis of the characteristics of military factions within a country.
87. Many governments and donors prefer addressing the needs of demobilized combatants as part of their general efforts toward helping needy communities, rather than as a discrete target group. Under this non-targeted approach, combatants are provided short-term financial compensation upon demobilization, then rely on mainstream development programs. According to this strategy, by providing an enabling environment that facilitates growth, private sector development and productive employment, market forces will create employment opportunities for demobilized combatants. This implies that assistance and employment creation programs will reach beneficiaries according to their needs and priorities.
88. However, many experts recommend tailored programs to improve the skills and experience of ex-combatants, and counseling to ease the transition to civilian life. One common remark of those who have managed reintegration programs, Is the emphasis that needs to be placed on providing traiing (civics courses, basic accounting, problem solving) in conjunction with any type of reintegration program; in many cases (Nicaragua, Angola, PLAN members in Namibia), ex-combatants must adapt
chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Program Page S1 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
to a completely new way of life, and may lack many of the skills that other beneficiaries of development projects possess. Many former combatants also lack the social skills to obtain jobs and the access to land and other inputs necessary to succeed in farming or In starting businesses, having spent the better part, if not all, of their productive lives in the military.0 It is for these reasons that in Uganda the ex- combatant and his family were considered as a vulnerable social unit and were provided support under a social fund program (PAPSCA). In many countries, including Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, and Chad a practice of conscripting *children-soldiers," into the military even before adolescence was common and, in some cases, remains prevalent. These children-soldiers have little recollection of life outside of the military. Approximately 54% of MPLA soldiers in Angola were less than 25 years old, 15% of soldiers in Zimbabwe were less than 20 years old, and an estimated 35% of combatants in- Mozambique are under 18, many having served under arms since the age of 12. Even if individual veterans possess marketable skills (and selected statistics on the cases here suggest that in many cases they do not), they often lack job-search skills. Finally, a common rationale cited for targeting demobilized combatants with tailored repatriation programs Is based on the risk they may pose to security, political reconciliation, and indirectly, economic reconstruction efforts given their training as combatants and (potential) access to arms, which could lead them to resort to both criminal and organized, political violence.
89. There is still too little information to judge whether targeted programs are worth the investment in terms of increasing the likelihood of the combatants social and economic integration. Most of the programs studied are still in the early stage, and there is a marked absence of ex-post evaluations for the few completed programs, which makes it difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of a targeted approach. In particular, the case studies have revealed the paucity of information on the design and success of training programs. In the Uganda DRP, beneficiary assessments, evaluations and audits have been included in the program design and may provide useful lessons in the future.g
90. Namibia is a case where a non-targeted approach was initially used, of hoping for "spontaneous" reintegration to follow the cessation of conflict, demobilization and repatriation. However, most of the economic reforms which might have stimulated economic growth and greater employment opportunity did not occur: there has been little government involvement in rural development activities and infrastructure improvements (partly due to donor limitations on lending because of Namibia's skewed income distribution which results in a deceptively high per capita income). In mid-1991, one year and a half after repatriation, unemployment of ex-PLAN combatants had reached an estimated 80% (compared
1l In Namibia, some female guerrillas repatriated to find that they were excluded from the new military; they faced substantial social and economic adjustment. (Prom *Women Sidelined by Defence Men," Namibian, April 26, 1990).
A/ For programs which are ongoing or recently finished, it would be important to ensure that the lessons from these experiences are not lost. Some NGOs have likely done such evaluations and resource persons in-country could catainly shed more light on the DRP process (Nicaragua, Namibia, Zimbabwe). For future projects, this points to the need to build project evaluation into the program design.
Page 52 Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Dm~obition and Reintegration of Military Personnel
Box V.1: 7e Social Adjustnent of PLAN GuerrillasIn Nambla
ilâífŠ rivd th ermiclfeeahjxdsplièrfercture Many-devlped y. t W...... PO, awaitigsntionsot t À nie ....f.p
proles,proptngArmy Cif, Mejor'9enera1 Salomo Ha*waIa o recogi in Augus 1991, that afe 27 onhs te arhad left some,S5 if. . not...... mot f u llsufein5 frm nfounde nersisaans...... n
Many returnes hadfamil.es.to..turnto,but withtime theiep y on the... fmi. y tu ...... a supotvescil ewokte ar ntone atrd fby WAO)ad itotøtepital tsad resources'
Unupiigy,tertree'dpnec on parntsandfamly an hi inblt tofdjb xcrae
th,ae f ersîn alcoholism, siide an uteours to violence Adohe fan ofanioca . 1151&NtE*t behvir.Eviene ro t.norher hospia 4get returne,y wer eseca ucpilV~é~ to paranoid psyhosa d nuroodepesi Three necos itriaae tack of uneandn ofmnKWA.<. .C.S.... POAa Uø
acation program ~.s4 l4 ...... ' .....
«.«« ......
ater5 - s f Rinte~ Po Page Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
to 57% for all repatriates a year earlier), and overall unemployment was up to 35%.A According to one evaluation, ex-PLAN members had become dependent on the military support structure, and faced considerable social adjustment (see Box V.1). In response, the Namibian government changed their strategy and implemented a limited number of reintegration programs specifically targeted to ex- combatants including cash payments.
91. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of a targeted approach from the Namibian case because the reintegration programs implemented were so limited in scope. The direct compensation program appeared to buy some short-term social peace, but was allegedly not enough to finance productive investments, educational programs, or housing. The Development Brigades, government-sponsored on-the-job training described in detail later in the chapter, appeared promising conceptually but were not actually implemented on the scale originally planned. However, the 2,000- 3,000 ex-combatants in the Brigades will receive a pension of sorts for up to two years, and be notionally removed from the ranks of the unemployed. The most extensive targeted programs were carried out in Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, which will be discussed further in the following section on targeted reintegration programs.
92. The Angolan governnient showed a preference for reintegration programs which specifically targeted the needs of ex-combatants, in addition to providing financial compensation such as pensions and severance pay. In Angola, the EEC developed a program for the reintegration of Angolan combatants, and intended to direct a budget of US$31 million toward three areas: (1) 25% for basic training courses; (2) 25% for imports of essential goods for employment in agriculture, fishing, construction, etc.; and (3) 50% for NGO use in training, roads and sewer reconstruction, health center and state building construction, road de-mining, and assistance in medical, agricultural and resettlement programs. Some other donors were concerned that developing targeted programs for the large number of ex-combatants would lead to overambitious plans for a resource constrained economy, and that the inability to fulfill such promises because of lack of capacity or financing could lead to even greater tension (as did unfulfilled promises for land in Nicaragua). Those tasks competing for resources included integrating an even larger number of refugees and displaced persons, and repairing an economy and physical infrastructure devastated by war.
93. Once assistance to veterans and their families moves beyond immediate resettlement assistance and training and into projects that are designed to increase the long-term welfare of participants, questions are legitimately raised as to why veterans and their families should be singled out for special attention. The special reintegration programs (land, housing, settling-in package, training, health care) for one side of the conflict in Nicaragua, the NR veterans, did raise some resentment about their favored treatment.9 One USAID official familiar with the Nicaraguan program suggested that
IV Tapsoott and Mulongeni, An Evaluaton of the Weare and Future Prospect of Repaniated Namiblans in Nordern NamWa, August 1990, University of Namibia. The unemployment figure for ex-combatants derives from the number registering as unemployed in order to obtain reintegration payments.
#2/ See Equizabal et al, Hwnanitarlan Challenges in Central America: Learnig the Lesson ofRecent Aaned Coilice, 1993.
Page 54 Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Demnobilizton and Reintegration of Military Personnel after a certain period of time participating in targeted programs, ex-combatants should be mainstreamed into general development programs. Another possibility strongly advocated by some NGOs is establishing community-wide programs which could speed the reintegration of former combatants and their families, help strengthen the local economy, create local employment opportunities, and reduce the chance of local resentment of ex-combatants. The Uganda program, for example, bolsters existing social services in communities where large numbers of disabled or sick veterans will settle and thus provides benefits to the entire community.
SURVEYS AND THE PROFILE OF Ex-COMBATANTS
94. The case studies show that the profile and the career ambitions of the combatants to whom targeted assistance is directed can vary considerably. Surveys have been used in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola (see figures V.1 - V.3) to assess the socio-economic characteristics of those likely to be demobilized, to determine future career interests and to predict where concentrations of ex-combatants will settle. The data provided during the planned registration and documentation process for demobilizing combatants in Mozambique, including detailed questionnaires to be filled out with assistance from trained observers, will fulfill a similar function. Surveys may also provide information on whether a targeted or non-targeted reintegration program is most efficient for a particular situation. In general, although there are wide variations among forces (particularly between rank and file soldiers and officers), the majority of those to be reintegrated are relatively young (under 25 years old), have little previous employment experience, and often have ambitions which do not match the available opportunities in the country. The percentage of combatants with dependents and those to be accompanied by their family members during the encampment stage varied both among countries and between forces (regular and guerrilla) in the same country; such information is helpful for planning reintegration programs and for budgeting demobilization and reintegration costs. The differing backgrounds of the two or more armed forces or factions within a country suggest that reintegration programs even within a country may be tailored to the group of combatants being targeted (i.e. PLAN veterans versus other veterans in Namibia).
95. In Angola, an EEC-supported survey of the government's FAPLA forces provided information on their skill level and employment interests, as shown in Table V.1. The survey highlights the many differences between the two combatant groups in the same country (FAPLA and the guerrilla group, FALA). Notably, a vast majority of FAPLA combatants (83%) want to pursue some form of education or training. Unexpected in a country where the population is 70% agrarian, the survey indicates only 8.8% of these combatants have demonstrated an interest in agricultural activities while 60% showed an interest in transportation and construction. FAPLA combatants have normally been dispersed throughout the country, often in urban areas, and do not generally travel with their families. In contrast, FALA forces reportedly showed a preference for agriculture, and generally traveled with their families in less urbanized areas.
Cbaper 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Pag 55 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
Table V.1: 7he Profile of Combatants
Angola: PAPLA Forces Angola: PALA Forces Mozambique: PAM Zimbabwe: (MPLA) (UNITA) Soldiers ZANLA/ZIPRA Combatants in 1980 * Normally live in areas * Generally operate closer to * 60% age 25-34 * 50% age 20-25 other than home region; home district * 72% have 7 years of * 80% single dispersed * Generally travel with service or more * 13% no previous * 54% under 25 families * 42% are single education; 69% partifull * 75% are career soldiers * Live in less urbanized *-63% have basic primary * 83% expressed interest in areas education * 75% no previous assistance to reintegrate Have lived in non *Largest occupation employment or unskilled through traininglacquiring -monetized economy, in prior to army was new skills camps agriculture (55%) * Strict disciplino
96. Donors financed local technical assistance in Uganda to carry out a survey of the background and career ambitions of soldiers. Among other useful information, the survey revealed that approximately half were sick, maladjusted, or disabled, and about two-thirds wanted to return to agricultural activities. In cases where an outside donor has not provided the technical assistance to carry out such a survey of the needs of those to be reintegrated (as with the FALA forces in Angola and SWAPO's PLAN forces in Namibia), information has been much less reliable. In Nicaragua, CIAV-OAS staff responsible for overseeing the DRP argued that their programs could have been better targeted if they had better information about the profile and destination of the NR troops. *
97. In Chad, a census of the armed forces was carried out, but focused more on counting combatants than on surveying a sample (which may be easier in Chad than counting all of the combatants given their frequent movement in and out of camps) to determine their socioeconomic profile and career ambitions. Such a survey could provide useful information on whether the combatants come primarily from northern regions, where economic opportunity is extremely limited, or the southern area, where a strong cotton sector provides opportunities for agricultural activity. One of the primary complaints of NGOs and donors interested in preparing reintegration programs during the 1991 DRP attempt was the slow provision of information on the background of those to be demobilized; according to the Chadian government, the voluntary nature of the program's first phase made it impossible to provide such information in advance.A However, after the DRP had been in place for almost one year, in June
.0/ The lack of information on the intended destination for NR in Nicaragua may have contributed to designing a program around Development Poles whoe NR ultimately did not want to settle.
42/ Often the type of information needed is in which specific communities ex-combatants intend to settle, and it is either not available or not provided by the military. In Ethiopia (not a case study), one NGO noted the difficulty of establishing an ex-combatant profile. It notes that while government sources provided general numbers on career ambitions of soldiers, the numbers were not broken down on the local level and local government offices did not have
Page 56 Chapter S - Design of Reintegration Programs Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
1993, the Chadian Government produced a survey of the first phase of demobilized combatants. N The survey showed that the average ex-combatant was 33.5 years old, had 1.2 wives, 3.1 children, and cared for an additional 3.6 people. Approximately 40% expressed an interest in agriculture, followed by 30% in commerce, and 17% in livestock/pastoralism. Only 7.7% expressed an interest in participating in an economic activity with other demobilized combatants', while 34% wanted to work with others or in a group, and 58% wanted to work alone. Almost half had no education, and 28% expressed interest in learning to read, while 38% were interested in vocational training. The survey also provided information on the place of settlement of the combatants, although this may not be a good pr-dictor for the future residence of future demobilized combatants.
98. In Zimbabwe, although many of the guerrillas had originally come from rural families, the vast majority of Zimbabwean guerrilla veterans had no desire to "return" to the land. Only 2% of 5,000 encamped guerrilla soldiers surveyed in 1980 expressed interest in receivig agricultural tfaining and only 4% indicated their intention of taking up farming after demobilization. The majority foresaw careers in industry (33%), the civil service (21%), and commerce (6%).
Figure V.1 ZIMBABWE: ZANLA & ZIPRA Career Ambitions
15% U Other/Undecided O Agriculture --% 15%U Commerce I Civil Service
O Ag. Training 4% * Transport & Construction
2% O Industry 21% U School
lists of ex-combatants returning to their locale; this makes advance planning for sometimes large influxes of ex- combatants difficult. g1 The surioy consisted of a questionnairegiven to those demobilizing in the program's first phase and is based on 506 responses received. However, because it is not based on a random sample, the responses may not necessarily constitute a good predictor of the characteristics of al demobilized, or of those who may not be voluntary in the program's second phase.
Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Page 57 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Peronnel
Figure V.2 Angola: FAPLA Career Ambitions
E Other/lndecided 59% 15% * Agriculture Commere
Health Car
O Civil Service
5%9 Transport & Construction 5% %
Figure V.3 Angola: FALA Career Ambitions
23%
23%39% 0 Agricultur
Other/Undecided
13%
Page 5g Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegrntio Programas Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel
CASH COMPENSATION
99. Governments frequently use cash compensation schemes as the main channel to facilitate the combatants transition to civilian life. Such schemes were often used because they are popular and easily implemented, particularly in countries where there is low Institutional or donor capacity to provide more complex programs (such as training, job creation, job counseling, and job placement). Three general forms of cash compensation schemes have been used with the demobilization and reintegration programs studied: lump-sum cash payments, allowances, and pensions. All of the case study countries have offered or plan to offer lump-sum and/or some form of severance payment spaced out over a period of time (typically one to three years). However, the amount of compensation and the beneficiaries vary widely.
100. In Nicaragua, for example, demobilizing NR members only received US$50 in cash; the majority of the compensation was provided in-kind in the form of a settling-in package, and in various training and income generatloi programs (described later in this chapter). In contrast, a program demobilizing soldiers from Nicaragua's Sandinista Popular Army (BPS) provided a lump-sum payment equal to approximately six months' salary; and 2,000 officers were slated to receive between 35 and 48 months salary, as well as other possible benefits such as free medical care and access to the Army commissary for a period pf time. Information available on the EPS demobilization is sketchy and the programs were managed separately.
101. The compensation in many of the programs differs according to combatants' rank or affiliation. Offering officers superior compensation packages is common among the cases studied, partly because officers receive a much higher remuneration and are accustomed to a higher atandard of living. and thus demand greater incentives for demobilizing; also, greater compensatioi packages are often used to try to satiate.potentially threatening leaders (to discourage coup attempts). In Chad, officers receive US$1,212, non-commissioned officers US$1,024, and rank-and-file US$758 over the course of one year for reintegration. In Angola, the officer corps would have been highly favored in the distribution of financial rewards. Even in absolute terms, the 10,000-strong officer corps would have received almost as much money as all of the lower ranked combatants combined.v Reportedly, additional benefits were also to be granted to the officers through government concessions and businesses.
A. Lump-Sum Payments
102. In Nicaragua, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, ex-combatants received lump sum payments which ranged from the equivalent of 12% of GNP per capita in Nicaragua to 78% in Zimbabwe. They tend to be more modest in size than cash allowances and are provided in one installment, not spaced over time. They are sometimes meant to defuse actual or potential political tensions by providing tangible-If
&I The calculations were made on the basis of the March 1992 salary stracture:
Soldiers NKz 12,000/month $8 NCOs NK 32,400/month $22 Officers NKs 166,000/month $111
Chapters - Design of Reintegration Programs Pag 59 Demoblisation and Relateraton of Miltary Personnel
Box V.2: Angola - The PoliticalMotivations Behind Cash Payments
flgeti eobla ode asn f(te)amed, beomei a badt. Afrustrated demobilized aoier be aigaiotsan oerts t tane scale: he becomes a potentia coupmkr Itles in this .t..... ovense#t.i devoted ome special attn to the pension benefits sad other Ibeh f~oma 6ffteirp Itit wasconidered an issue of sate aecrity, but can sla biibodi44&prdtiin highl air 4oddprivlege for the format office corps. I Angola, whep weapoin sitepoyed y'oungMWA... men a so ...... abundat and where govemment lstitutionsare in * tda4st ofhe a ompleteal er*balpgliaeomm and are extrem~elya fragile,h.. the b.... seenrityelmn.e dimension .t.gaeby.b.nnimrsnn of depobiflization ~isai at atiiiig parallel miliay comamand structuins. In some otlher ouintries emerging famn
...... W 4 1 .EW : ~ th ysoftningtheypotetial discontent by givingthese a stake in the stuvva of
token--evidence that the government recognizes the sacrifices combatants have made on behalf of their country or cause. Lump-sum payments have been used to encourage combatants to demobilize rapidly, as in Zimbabwe, where soldiers who voluntarily left the army In 1980 received a lump sum payment equivalent to US$556. Acceptance of the cash compensation implied that the beneficiary lost all rights to regular military pay (which combatants were receiving while encamped pending their demobilization). Given that Zimbabwe's ONP per capita was US$710 in 1980, the scheme had a strong appeal among many combatants. However, soon after accepting the compensation and departing the camp, many returned to the camps out of financial need. The relatively large lump-sum payment apparently had ittle lapact on the combatant's ability to find productive employment;~ the government subsequently offered another package, which included monthly allowances.
103. The rationale for lump-sum payments as opposed to allowances spread out over time Is that they provide an up-front sum for combatants who want Immediate compensation. However, the payments have not been substantially larger than monthly allowances, and ex-combatants in the cases studied have tended to have little success in investing the lump-sum for productive purposes. Combatants' limited money management and lavestment experience, and the small amount offered compared to their immediate needs have been cited as a partial explanation for these sums being consumed so rapidly, Instead of being invested In income-earning possibilities. Unlike allowances, all eligible combatants tend to receive equivalent flat rate lump sum payments which do not vary according to rank.
104. In Namibia, SWAPO guerrillas did not receive any compensation at the time of demobilization. South African-sponsored forces, including SWATF and paramilitary forces, were provided a pension payment system set up by the South African Government which was In place after Namibian Independence; those combatants ineligible for a pension, received a "mustering out" pay
Pg 40 Chapter5 - Design of Reintegration Programa Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel equivalent to two months' salary.v Many soldiers in SWATF and other paramilitary groups had been drafted, were eaget to return to civilian life, and did not face diminished job prospects as they had not been involved with the armed forces for a prolonged period of time. Thus, the mustering out pay constituted sufficient incentive, and many voluntarily left the armed forces. In contrast, many PLAN guerrillas had spent all their adult'life in military service away from home and generally faced a more difficult task of finding employment and adapting to a new way of life (see Box V.1). Sixteen months following demobilization, the Namibian government and South Africa provided compensation to all unemployed, demobilized combatants in Namibla. The payments of Ri,400 (US$476) to former SWATF and other South African-sponsored paramilitary forces went smoothly since the registration records were well-organized. However, payments to ex-PLAN guerrillas were more difficult as PLAN combatants had not always been formally registered; according to newspaper accounts, In the fall of 1990, after demobilization had been completed, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Defence requ3sted that ex- combatants register their names on a "master list" with t e government for payment. However, some reports suggest that ex-combatants may not have been abib to travel to register, showed up at the wrong collection points, may not have been aware of the need to register, or may not have fully understood the meaning of the word "gratuity" in the announcement for registration.& In April of 1991, the Ministry of Home Affairs went to northern Namibia to issue temporary 1.D. cards to people who had already registered in order that they be eligible to pick up their paymetit at the Bank. However, under pressure officials allegedly gave 30,000 testimonials for people who had not previously registered and thus who were not on the master list. Ultimately, the government paid only the 16,080 on the master list, while up to 32,000 individuals presented themselves for payment at the designated banks, prompting demonstrations, delays, and protest. There were also alleged reports that some people who were already employed were receiving payment.A
105. In Angola, conscripts, specially PAPLA combatants, were generally willing to be demobilized without incentive packages, while career combatants would apparently have to be offered appropriate incentives such as severance pay.
106. It is difficult to assess the utility of lump-sum paynients in providing an incentive for combatants to demobilize under voluntary schemes; in Nicaragua, although the value of the cash payment was small, the program was relatively successful in demobilizing a substantial number of combatants (although some then re-armed) -however, it was supplemented by other in-kind benefits. In another voluntary program, in Chad, demobilization proceeded slowly up unti! June 1993, in spite of large cash payments offered. This suggests that the necessary administrative structure to make payments and support of key military commanders, also represent key components of smooth Implementation.
W1 A pension was granted after 15 years of service, based on the highest grade served for three years. While according to some reports South Africa is no longer paying the pensions, which have technically become the responsibility of the government of Namibia, other sources indicate some ex-soldiers still receive South African pension checks. a/ 'Plan Pay-Outs Could be Stopped Warns Hamitenya,' 11mes ofNanbta, July 24, 1991: p.3. Also, "Plan Hits Back," The NMnibl4n, July 25, 1991.
3 A1 "Ex-Plan Fighters up in Arms Over Pay-Out,' The Namibian, July 25, 1991: p. . To quote, The whole problem had been caused by the fact that the terms for the registration of ex-Plan combatants had not been properly clarified. 'We do not know who is to benefit and who not.'"
Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Page 61 ⋯喲 ．!- DanobMadon ad RebOgration of MURaq Pmound
B. ADowances
107. Monthly allowances allow financially constrained governments to spread the Meg burden of demobilization/reintegration support over a longer period of time and provide the ex-combatant with a longer transition period to civilian life. In Chad and Uganda, the allowances are provided to ex- combatants in the region where they are to settle, thus providinglin incentive for combatants to return to their home regions rather than to settle In urban areas. 7be rationale of dispersing ei-combatants Is to facilitate their transition to civilian life (by removing them from the military community), encourage reliance on family and community ties, discourage growth In urban unemployment,'and reduce the likelihood of criminal violence.9 IMe weakness of the local banking and/or postal systera, however, may make the distribution of such decentralized payments problematic, as will be discussed Authdr below. 108. Insome cases, such as Zimbabwe and the demobilization of the regular armed forces of Nicaragua, allowances were the most important components of the DRP. Unlike the lump sum payments, the allowances tended to be scaled to rank or time in service. The duration of the allowan6es varied from six months (Mozambique, Uganda) to two years (Zimbabwe). In Angola, Mozambique, Chad and Zhnbabwe allowances were used or are proposed which amount to between the equivalent of 38% of GNP per capita (Angola) and 444% of GNP per capita (Chad) on an annualized basis. 109. Ito generous allowance offered to soldiers In Zimbabwe (US$259 each month for two- years after demobilizing) reportedly fueled high expectations and provided a dIsbxewIw for ex- combatants to find employment. Demobilized combatants had difficulty saving their allowances and severance fees for law investment or educational expenditures (see Box V.3). Some reportk iaggest many ex-combatants could have benefted from financial counseling. A former Zimbabwe governmat' ddnister identified the allowances as *one of the most serious mistakes made in the demobilization process." However, where cash payments me low (i.e., Angola), no/few complementary reintegration program are offered, and employment options are extremely limited, demobilized combatants may be motivated to return to the use of force to support themselves. 110. Although there are many advantages to cash compensation schemes, the results of reintegration program suggest that Ifthey fbrm the primary or only source of assistance to veterans (Zimbabwe), a significant proportion of fortner combatants will continue to experience difficulty trying to enter the civilian work force.
Ul In Eftpk (not one of do am du&a) &Woxh=Wy350,000 combaWnts (the krpd deawbWadon in Affin to daft) have bm demob4md; according to Cathoho ReWf Samoes (CRS), awy ex- co do rA Vant to or cannot raturn to dWr od&d homes, ad have remaked in Mfis Ababa or odw urban anas whm job proqvw am dW. 7W potatW inVW on urban unemploymat is significarL
Chqur 5 - Dedga of ReWegrafi= Progrants Pap 63 Demobilhation and Relategration of Military Personnel
Box V3: Cash Allowances In Zmbnabwe
-obiliat ionabyno, a*an a poular opio*i forth thousands of people wh~o had rised ain t
Mraten hoht hatwit th(i is (tcal sppot the demobees col fid thior w fee
(IMIsa pl Whl st- otu i asml oit,bft thesees tufa dpeIent ,tanzr ofthe faed thehad* aferth wa-atou, youngt ad laerrcilr .A~A~ A\ S &...... NO WN A n a r.w u ...... ... .:5..- ... 5 h'. ax At hp ~ ...... As~..~ ~ ...... C...... Io... ia. In most of the cses, soldiers who served In the regular armed forces for a specified period of time are entitled to pension payments, assuming that the pension system is not bankrupt, as was the case in Chad's 1991 program. Uncertainty about the ability of the government of Chad to meet its pension obligations resulted in potential retirees' reluctance to leave the armed forces. P 64 Chapter 5- Design of Reintegration Programs Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel Table VJ : Level of Cash Compensation US$/Combatant GNP Per Wage Level Pt. of GNP Pot. of Wage (1) Capital' US$ (3) PC = (1)/(2) (1)/(3) US$ (2) LUMP SUM Nicaragua 50 420 396.2 12% 13% Namibix 476 1080 NA 44% NA Zimbabwe 556 710 105 78% 530% Uganda 119 170 NA 70% NA ALLOWANCE (Total over 1 yr) Angola 235 610 4180' 38% 56% Mozambique 86 80 516 ' 108% !7% Chad 9333' 210 2728-29550' 444% 32-34% Zimbabwe 3108 710 16802' 438% 185% Uganda 372 170 NA' 218% NA 11 GNP per capita for approximately the same year as payment. 2/ Minimum wage; other wage levels lower: Agriculture US$79, Manufacturing US$341, Government US$115, Services, US$210. 1 Weighted average based on those demobilized & retired to date. Includes initial payment which could be considered as lump sum departure fee (). Officers receive US$1,212 (of which US$493 is initial payment), non-commissioned officers US$1024 ($379), and rank-and-file US$758 ($227). A/ Military wage: public sector wage higher at US$1,769. I/ Military wage: wage for unskilled worker is US$168-240, and increase up to US$2,916 in the civil service, and US$13,332 in the private sector for more skilled workers. I Estimate World Bank - Chad Country Economist of civil service wage. Effective military wage may be lower as salaries are sometimes delayed. 1US$ = 263.8 CFAF 2/ Guerrilla wages. Minimum wage lower: US$1,176/yr. 1l No average wage is available although the amount can be compared to low-end civil servioe wage of US$136 and higher end civil service wage of US$1,116. 112. Pension schemes can be altered to facilitate the demobilization process. In Zimbabwe, for example, the agreement that resulted from the Constitutional Convention mediated by Great Britain guaranteed the pension rights of members of the Rhodesian Army. This was an important factor favoring the orderly demobilization of many Rhodesian Army troops. The guerrilla forces, ZANLA and ZIPRA, however, had no pension schemes. In the interests of equity and in an effort to defuse potential tensions, the Zimbabwe government ultimately extended pension coverage to all ex-combatants. Benefits for former members of ZANLA and ZIPRA were calculated on the basis of age and length of service. Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Pag 65 Daobization and Reinltgration of Military Personnel D. Payment Arrangements 113. Various methods of payment were designed to compensate for the limited administrative Infrastructure in some of the countries to pay allowances to ex-combatants dispersed throughout the country, and to encourage the use of lump-sum payments and allowances for productive purposes. Box V.4: Payment Arrangements In Zimbabwe .~...... *Mao aranemetswere made fpr individual exnibatants to make a maiamm advance Atd e JS$360, nd b p e**cobatatto pol thee .ethd be usd forproducti.ve inemna a panel. wao p to advise ad appmovo uch inidd thii&du plcesa MnOO00 the Zimba~bwe Projct Subseuent siggetions by progra .dibo how to impro.ve6thimth.d ofpayment.included.: deu.the cost oftraining courses .jai. sit *A mon~thl allowanc.; prvde a ras cors onbugting ad anting before ti.b in;.. r wit the consen.of com.atant, s..aidea.p.t f the a~llownc for purchasing anyif ushntio Le . nd,mchne.y, tools, and.iother ipuacpanied by an edncational 114. The Angolan government considered setting up a line of credit for demobilized combatants, especially for officers to start businesses. However, the banking system in Angola is very weak and does not reach throughout the country. If the government guaranteed the debt, this may have resulted In an additional outright subsidy to demobilized combatants. If the government did not guarantee the debt, it would have been very difficult for the weak banking system to properly screen applications and to recover loans. One alternative discussed was the payment and credit mechanism described in Box V.5. Another alternative focused instead on the creation of a revolving fund for decentralized private initiatives, set up at the local level to finance small-scale or micro-projects, instead of a line of credit through the formal banking system. This was seen as a way to finance productive enterprises as well as a mechanism to privatize small-scale state enterprises; it would use the local community as a pressure mechanism for the recovery of loans. After much reflection in Uganda, program planners decided to provide much of the benefits intended for housing, and equipment in cash instead of trying to administer distribution of massive amounts of material goods throughout the entire country. SerruING-m AssisrANCEu 115. Immediately after demobilization, former soldiers and their families frequently find themselves without many of the basic necessities of life such as shelter, medical care, food, clothing, and household goods, all of which had previously been provided by the armed forces or guerrilla groups. In this they-aliffer almost completely from civil servants whose positions are terminated as a result of public-sector restructuring. P4.66Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Progruns Demobilisation and Reintegration of Militay Personnel Box V.5: Payment Optionsfor Angola isAfinprook(embe'S by thegovernmeuntg nd donr fvld eting non-cash alterntivs mat* g wdyasitr su n a tw?or*tee tim~es their nominal valus Because the Peaee bond?sold e pole an serea collatera for cdi n otht fomln inora o ditmd W .Rt ~A possibtsS, draback ofrie fedes Bond concep~t is that alace most of UNIT'A's fooces were not paid c~a1sh ntie#anni ived is commonetized camps it iscetai whether thy oud ndrsan the potntil Vles6f aknsevene pay in the orm of a voucher that ican be redeemed~ ayest at two' hence or5 mtipl fits fa~ce vahaU~ rater than receiving an immdiate apsmpym 116. In recognition of this problem, a number of demobilization/reintegration programs have provided or plan to provide the basic necessities for a period of several months immediately following discharge. In Nicaragua, demobilized NR soldiers had access to a series of programs which provided them-and ofen their dependents--with food, civilian clothing and personal items, household goods, building materials, work tools, agricultural inputs, and some medical assistance. Several of these programs were In place for a year or more. All repatriated refugees in Namibia-a category which included demobilized SWAPO guerrillas since all guerrillas were discharged and disarmed prior to repatriation-received several months' stock of dry food, basic household goods, cooking facilities, bedding, agricultural tools and se%As, and housing construction material. The settling-in program being implemented in Uganda provides similar assistance over a period of six months worth US$228 and including school fees, transport home, tin roofing materials, and social services (but as noted previously, cash payments for other types of settling-In benefits were preferred for logistical reasons). The other demobilization/reintegration programs surveyed for this study offered little or no settling-in assistance, relying instead on cash payments, as in Zimbabwe. 117. The settling-in programs for NR veterans in Nicaragua were intended to be short-term in nature. However, several were extended beyond their initial period (approximately 6 months in some cases) in response to participants' needs. The Food and Materials Program, for example, ran for fifteen months, rather than the anticipated six; a U.S. government report noted that it was unrealistic to expect ex-combatants to be resettled and self-sufficient after the anticipated six to ten months. & All settling-in assistance programs have to confront the problem of losses due to corruption and theft. The experience of CIAV-OAS in Nicaragua suggests steps that can be taken to ensure those entitled actually receive assistance, and fraud and theft are minimized, as shown in Box V.6. !n Nicaragua, it was found that designating the wives of ex-NR members to be responsible for collecting the monthly food rations associated with the settling-in assistance was an effective way to ensure that veterans' families received the rations intended for them. Settling-in assistance may supplement or replace cash allowances. Ex- gg/ U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, AiD to Nicaraga. U.S. Ausistance 8apports Boonomfc and Socdal Devekopnent August 1992. Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Progam Page 67 DomAbillation and Reintegration of Milkiry Peronnel Box V.6: Nicaragua:Reducing the Potentialfor The qf In-Kind Benefits wh CIAl CAM s~litgindifo#o dembiliatial reitegration proramps avAilable +46asist a 4 hipdtade t CAV4OAs estaished twntyreionial washouse from wip Mi AC) 4 liate + npthL Senuity at thes Milities wa apparently Y inibioth rcrdnammoa as poselbles this redced the coat of thee a hpsedigiiot ed d the dlsat a they had to be transported, thereby anfp}oghv ?t duce thMi fthett. Aspart of esln-inpackage, NR 19ta on loghi k toofthi houss they would b9 buildin~g themselves at their final deghne The folieti w ivn te posiiltyfor rasporting theown roofing mnaterials pub~CAVWA niilaslerumer otheotiiris fitfo and materiasprogram~ sait a-fi4divlomnt pole(itted vit selit on ans 'records. When it subeqently co.mputto1back distribution and forecast food eds, it heped control cases of frad * oecirsrwo44 t8 pwie benefits by going too than onie distribution centetrrby guerrillas in Nicaragua and Namibia received settling-in assistance and a small demobilization payment, but no cash allowances. TARGETED REENI~EGRATION PROJEIS (NON-CASH) 118. The majority of training and employment schemes in the countries studied were offered to combatants after they had been demobilized, although in a limited number of cases training was provided while combatants were still encamped. Four major kinds of targeted post-release programs have been Implemented isothe countries covered by this study: formal education, vocational training, income- generating projects, and job placement. A. Pre-release Programs 119. In the spring of 1980, Operation SEED was launched in Zimbabwe. The program con2sisted of income-generation projects for soldiers who were still in the military. Strongly supported by Primne Minister Robert Mugabe, it had two purposes: (1)to provide basic skills to combatants waiting in assembly camps to be discharged or inducted into the new Zimbabwe Army; and (2) to increase .military units' self-sufficiency, reducing the military's dependence on the civilian economy for food and basic services by having them organize into production units to grow food. The project had to be aborted after one year due to poor administration and an insufficient infrastructure; however, the low participation - rate by the end of that period reflected its subject matter was inappropriate: only one-fifth of the target Page 68Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Demobilization and Reintegration of Mililary Personnel audience actually became involved. This was to be expected, since while the project concentrated on agriculture-related activities, a survey of combatants indicated only 4% desired a career in agriculture. The SEED program also contributed to the justification for maintaining a large armed force since the armed forces now had an additional role to that of security, becoming a production unit. Another program In Zimbabwe, focused on providing training for ZANLA and ZIPRA soldiers while they were still in assembly camps, including basic education and literacy courses. These courses were very popular, but it is not known if all who would have liked were able to participate. The instructors were paid by the military, and the number of courses may have been limited by insufficient funding. It is also unknown how the courses offered affected veterans' subsequent civilian careers. B. Formal Education 120. * In many developing countries, particularly those emerging from protracted periods of civil strife, many combatants have foregone formal education, even at the primary school level. A socio- economic profile of some 5,000 encamped guerrilla soldiers in Zimbabwe found that fewer than 20% had more than a primary education. Thirteen percent had no formal education. Governments may find it in their Interest to provide veterans with the opportunity to complete their formal education. In the short term, this could reduce pressure on the job market by keeping them in school, particularly if large numbers of soldiers are demobilized within a short period of time. In the longer term, the educational level of the workforce will be enhanced. 121. In Zimbabwe, ZIPRA and ZANLA veterans were offered room and board at special schools and places within the regular school system. However, less than 10% of them opted to complete their education. Many had family responsibilities, which put a premium on obtaining remunerative employment as soon as possible, and others, if offered places in the regular school system, would hesitate to be placed in a class of children. In Uganda, vouchers to pay the school fees of the children of veterans are being provided as part of the settling-in package. Box V.7: Zimbabwe: Specialized Schoolsfor Veterans After independ.. te Zimabwen gove t establishd seven pecial cools for veteransan d@lceprsos,eah1 h cpstty o2,000stdt.~ Two were for ZIPRA veerans, five for wereZANLAiveterade. fully finded byThe.schoolswartilo the govermet and offeredfarm odtoomad sothat theyboard. could Discipliwa..... become' sfsu sti int TheAll Europea EcnmcCmuiy(E n wds aentoa DvelopmentA.tority (SIDA) posedsome of th scoo buildings..Ini addition, the regular school.systemi was.equired to icldidg UAN (secondary) level sand niversity courses. Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Page 69 Demobbization and Relategration of Military Personnot C. Vocational Trainng and Income Generation 122. Just as most veterans have had little formal education, many have very few marketable skills. InZimbabwe, combatants Indicated their preference for technical/vocational training over formal academic education, 4specially for older, less-educated and more. senior-ranking combatants. A socio- cultural survey of 5,000 encamped guerrilla soldiers InZimbabwe found that three-quarters of them either had never been employed previouisly (52%) or were unskilled (23%). A similar study of 1,200 Uganda soldiers caided out in 1901 found that over 55% either possessed only military skills (47%) or were totally unskilled (8.5%). 123. Theprimary reintegration program supported by the Namibian government is the Development Brigades. This program envisioned providing vocational training for up to 25,000 veterans of the SWAPO and South West African forces through providing collectlve training and skills in agriculture, construction and water. development. Trainees received a salary of R50/month (less than US$240/yedr, compared to the 1990 GNP per capita of US$1080 and were to be deployed to six resettlement centers around the country.2 The Zimbabwe government relied heavily on NGO programs for vocational training, notably an NGO known as the Zimbabwe Project (see Box V.9). CIAV-OAS programs in Nicaragua also offered some on-the-job training in basic vocational skills such as carpentry and masonry, despite the fact that their initial purpose had been to provide only short-term resettlement aid. In Mozambique, programs are reportedly being developed to provide vocational training in the following fields: bricklaying, carpentry, electrician, pipelaying, mechanic, forester, and game warden. No further details on these plans are currently available. 424. The Namibian internship program for artisans in specific companies sponsored by the Otto Benecke Foundation tackled one of the most serious problems of skilled returnees, including ex- combatants: their lack of employment experience. The foundation placed candidates on three-month iaternships with private companies, and underwrote the costs. Trainees gain work experience, becoming more marketable; companies receive free labor (after providing substantial attention during the training phase) and the opportunity to assess prospective employees without incurring future obligations. The Foundation followed up by Identifying candidates' skill shortcomings, and directed them to appropriate specialized training programs. No data is available on the results of this program, or how successfully it was Implemented. 125. Many of the vocational training programs have been inadequately funded and have reached only a small proportion of the potential target population. Only 2,000-3,000 trainees received places in Namibian Development Brigades during Its first year of operation, and the drop-out rate was high. Funding was reportedly limited, and some brigade members organized a march in June 1992 claiming increasing frustration with the government's inability to provide them with support or jobs. It is also unclear what proportion of the trainees obtained long-term employment in their area of specialization. In contrast, the Danhiko project run by a private sector organization for disabled veterans, provided Intensive vocational training to veterans (including the disabled) who were recruited directly fli Prom, Ex-Fighters Dployed," 7bw of Nania, August 27, 1991. Pap 70 Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Prograom Demolation and Reintegration of Military Personnel Box. V.8: Vocational Training In Zimbabwe: The Danhiko Project - One Success ateahisraW ttA Tdha fto15Teh trted4by providig tw utrwyeso desv trainifg in garodt Nuadthraitufe design and. upholstery,. to (including the disabled) :ie4td ditetly at asenily points. Ex-combatants would undero e ym of triing , nd one to two yaiwof tralinig.d.productIon (whch was.sold. to genekate'revenues for the school). Many of the es. nt&were.ineligible.for the-high qusliy training at the Government's Pol jWWc echoW1 because they ad not completed the prerequisite formal education. Because of the intensive nature.of the propm, ex- tswererequid toboard at the school, At first the school expanded by incrementadue to fudlng Q"nstbuints. but eventually also provided secondary school courses and obtained accreditation from the Govenment;of Zimbabwe. By tho third year of operation, the school became self-sufficient in paying. for Odtton costs and.it Ii currently able to pay for the teachersas well in most courses. As late as 1985, hbe ictolar rcnited diqabled.SWAPO conibatants fm Landa. Approximately two-thirds of the graduatis Aund T loynient (a sbstantially higher rate than for..other es-combatants). -At pr nttecol S@rve $ot suibtintihciliana#like. and has added courses.in plhtrcal rephir and computesa. Wbpn asked lanout tlsorsntiting to.the success of the schbl, and the comparative expedino with goren r programs the former director had the following observat 1:iae 4rector consulteia wide range ofpeople l the private sector to fOit determine t potential market naiches (iniruiture it "DaWsh designed pieces, unavailable in the country). Incontrast, in one of the >-gove*ent-rn training programs lether shoes were produced whilelarge-sale production shoes had- already.saturated the warket. ) instructors were igghly skilled professionals in the field in which they were teaching.,,. ) duction designs equired -o imported inputs.. reoSkills only pettof the stosy.- placing ez-combatants in boarding houses allowe4 them:togetaway family ditractions1 and allowed them the concentration. for the lateralisIe.raining their 1ow.*ills level called ti. .d S) Some other pr such as theZimbabwe Project had attrition because some of the ex-combatants" were terribly faning.adanexpeced.in Id how to work in a cooperative, If they encountered logistical:problems such s a pump breaking, they were ill-equipped to resolve them.' -fomr projeco direcr from camps (see box V.8); the program claims to have boosted the employment rate of its graduates compared to employment of other veterans substantially.X Very little additional information was available on the program design and success of the Namibian Development Brigades, the Zimbabwe Project, or the projects in Nicaragua. 126. A certain amount of the vocational training delivered to veterans in the countries surveyed in the course of this study was tied to specific employment ventures: agricultural and commercial cooperatives and small-scale industry. The Zimbabwe Project, for example, helped to establish 100 Il According to the former project director who carnied out some post-program evaluations. Chapter5 - Design of Reingration Programs Page 71 Demobdzation and Rdlategration of Military Prsmonnel Box V.9: Zmbabwe: Cooperatives - The Zimbabwe Project. AtG thato usk .Plsfoti...4.i.. 0 Z anelM of iports~t waselip to idisand appr*jove vania~~~~ .t.as...d..nt.l..ew.e..ca.at.n. ou. . A. p...... t. mi usai M t ahoo 1 inew bo~*tiv.s cooprave S...... tci d o w l r ( l h ,rk. owA I' M. e blns oQve ll, Mosow natlw been.~. reir sot many of act of ptirn I uidailsgned go lead to I'M~ \~~~b Emmit f naalti cia nowbe idv4 bas ,arniurdu enepdaetumed out to bodew -d.^ na.tA.m..&nts.Msat superintS...... s thersinesle mhinly ft4A sporin w.ites. Most magisuhes en proseutriasut wel a 30tyrisonk oThbes)ciedprovieedwelfut suppartononer fimdin.doBay 94 sme 1t 0t the ahar recebng block wae cat l the amn agu e cyat X% ...... abe a dequa to se t the o t1 his fAmy d ew workert ealuin wee ot amtbaherPrjeacmat latinnedAis i vwhit i meienZAmstlal Ns,in Rematts hth imbe fb'mbaan Proetia Aumphe stavi 19M depndent onlexternald cooperatives which employed former soldiers, provided 75 th Ingbem anoubsh atilnvder roof t pro daricipans relevantndrophe trainingtie familiertcians)I (including training aand prosecutors as well as 300 prison officers), and provided welfare support to ex- combatants in need. As with most local NGOs, the Zimbabwe Project was heavily dependent on external funding. By 1984, some 10,000 veterans had received basic vocational training in agriculture, cattle maigement, bookkeeping, and carpentry. In addition to training participants, it provided technical and financial assistance to set up the cooperatives. According to one project evaluation (see Box V.9), over the long-term a substantial number of the project participants dropped out (40% of participants). In aspther initiative in Zimbabwe, ex-ZAPU combatants formed a company named NITRAM, funded by contribution from ZIPRA veterans. This company purchased farms, hotels, and small businesses which Pago 72 Chapter 5 - Dealgn of Reintegration Progrms Demobilzation and Raintegration of Military Personnel were run by veterans. The discovery of arms caches on a.NITRAM property in 1982 caused the ZANU goverment to disband the company. 127. In Nicaragua, the National Center for Planning and Administration of Development Poles (CENPAP), an NGO established by the Civic Association of the Nicaraguan Resistance, has helped NR veterans establish more than 100 micro-enterprises and cooperatives and ran numerous workshops on human relations and community development. The cooperatives are primarily in agriculture, but include fishing, transport, carpentry, and shoemaking enterprises. In Mozambique, plans are being made to help create micro-enterprises in agriculture, fishing, bricklaying, carpentry, electrician, pipelaying, and mechanics. No furtiier details are yet available on this program. Box V.10: Nicaragua: Income-GeneratingProjects Ti.Atlantic Coat Rie product.ioPrpject was intended to mstors traditional rice cultivation. It distributed eeds; tools, andsother supplies to 18,000 faraers in 250 commjwimme between May and November 1991. the.ptgqet was carried out by JJSAID and CIAY-QAS incollaboration with nearly one dozen governmental. and -governmental organizations active in the Atlauntic region; ranging from the UNHCR to the Nicaraguan Institut for Agrarian Reforno thoCatholie dioces. of Santa Maria. USAID and CIAV-OAS provided each of t5,000fainers withi a packagea vlued at US$40 .(including. transportation costs) which contained 100 pound of rice seeds,. tooli d othin supplies. Th other oaboratorn provided 3,000 additional farmrs .with rice sed. . Vocational ánd ticnical training was also provided (for over 2,000 people) as well as UNHCR-quick impaq prjls (in agicultur health, education, etc.). CIAV-OAS mde'payment in-kind (sugar, salt, toots, tools, batteries, and anatches) for grain purchased. It asisted in the election asd storage of seeds and provided technical. assistance in the construction of three: Warhous"s with drying.siloo and purhased -cargo bouts for transportingth rice crop down the Coco River.. In addition to this project, CIAV-OAS had supported other -agricultural venturs for veterans including the' ciivation Mnd marketing of black beas:for.eiport. 128. CIAV-OAS also helped establish the Atlantic Coast Rice Production and Commercialization Project (see 0). Judging from the number of families receiving assistance, this program must not have been limited to NR veterans. Tie project succeeded in establishing a fair market price after the first growing season, which was considered a key indicator of its success. Initially run by the CIAV-OAS regional office, three local governing boards were established in March 1992. The boards worked in collaboration with CIAV-OAS during a start-up period that ran through June/July 1992. However, the long-term viability of many of these enterprises is unclear. While CIAV-OAS worked very hard to put the Atlantic Coast rice projects on a commercial footing and to provide them with the necessary infrastructure, there is no guarantee that local management will be able to overcome all future problems. Furthermore, the Atlantic region has been the site of considerable political tension and some violence between the government and disaffected former soldiers. This could well affect the long-term viability of the rice projects. Similar constraints affected the NITRAM project in Zimbabwe. Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Prograins Page 73 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel D. Job Placement 129. Inaddition to assisting veterans by creating jobs, reintegration programs have assisted veterans in finding existing jobs, both In the private and the public sectors. The economies of all of the countries surveyed were very weak at the time of demobilization, and their ability to absorb new entrants to the civilian labor market was correspondingly low. In addition, none of the governments appear to have established formal mechanisms for assisting veterans to find employment in the private sector. In Zimbabwe, it was suggested that industry receive tax breaks and other economic incentives to hire veterans, but it is not clear that this proposal was ever implemented. Although the government did not make any efforts to directly place veterans in jobs, one NGO offered a job counseling program. There Is little information on the impact of that program. However, eight years after independence, only about 28% of Zimbabwean veterans had found work in the formal sector or were self-employed. In Mozambique, a national reconstruction program Is being developed which, it is hoped, will offer ex- combatants employment in helping to rebuild roads and sewers; rebuild health centers and state buildings; demine roadways; and construct channels and wells. 130. InNamibia, the private sector has been extremely reluctant to hire former guerrillas, for several reasons: the East bloc training received by many is considered inadequate; a lack of previous professional experience; and political bias. Most veterans have settled in the north, while the majority of job opportunities are in the south. They have found it difficult to obtain information on available jobs, and have often walked for assistance from SWAPO that was not forthcoming. The government tried to address the fact that many veterans were unaware of job opportunities outside of their region by broadcasting openings on special radio programs. This did not solve the problems though, since, in addition to not knowing where to look for jobs, veterans also usually did not have the resources to travel to other regions in the hope of finding employment.9 131. The state remains one of the largest sources of employment for demobilized soldiers. When national armies are reconstituted following protracted civil wars, many former soldiers (regular troops and guerrillas) are the first to join. Others are employed by the police or as game wardens. In March 1992, the Angolan government issued radio announcements that the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was prepared to employ up to 60,000 veterans in rural farming projects or as park and game reserve wardens. By 1992, it was alleged that nearly 40% of the former SWAPO guerrillas had been absorbed into the new army and police force. The role of the state in reemploying veterans Is most clearly seen in the case of Zimbabwe, the only case that has been completed for over five years. The lack of a program to contain the civil service or the military meant that the program provided large benefits and the civil service and military grew substantially (armed forces from 15,000 in 1980 to 54,500 in 1992, and the civil service from 71,000 in 1980 to 89,400 in 1985)N While employing large numbers of ex-combatants in the public sector may solve some of the political and security problems facing governments, it fails to provide adequate relief to the public budget. The Zimbabwe government 12/ Tapsoott and Mulongeni, An Evadon f the Welare and Future Prospects of RepaaiUaed Namibians in Nortern Namibla, August, 1990. Sg/ Some of this growth may be attributed to the task of creating a more racially integrated civil service after the war. Page 74 Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Demobiliation and Reintegration of Military Personnel spent a total of US$250 million on its demobilization/reintegration program, only to find eight years later, that It was still paying the salaries of 55% of the demobilized soldiers. More recent programs have focused on both military and civilian downsizing (Uganda, Chad, Mozambique) and thus may have a greater chance of Increasing the long-term fiscal *peace dividend" from demobilization. E. Community-Based and NGO Programs 132. In cases where the government is weak, donors have sought to channel programs through NOOs and local communities In an effort to enhance sustainability. Many NGOs believe that community- based programs are more easily monitored and therefore have a better chance of being successful, and that the reintegration of combatants Into *normal" communities would ease the healing and reconciliation process as well.0 However, working with NGOs requires an open channel of communication between those managing the demobilization process and the NGOs providing reintegration programs-as well as sufficient NGOs willing to participate in the process.9v 133. In Namibia, NGOs were responsible for managing most of the reintegration programs. The most significant work In favor of returne"o was performed by the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN). The CCN acted as local partner for UNHCR and established a special emergency Repatriation, Resettlement and Reconstruction committee (RRR). Two hundred thirty pastors and church workers were trained to deal with the special problems of repatriation. RRR employed up to 450 staff members, most of them Namibians. Other NGO-sponsored reintegration programs in Namibia are shown in 1. 134. As noted previously, an EEC-designed program in Angola Intended to direct 50% of its assistance through projects coordinated with the local authorities and Implemented by a partnership of European and Angolan NGOs. They believed that allocating their assistance through NGOs, particularly in rural areas, would provide them with greater freedom to accomplish specific tasks at the local level and assist In the repopulation and resettlement of the Angola's abandoned regions. The EEC was making special efforts to spread its programs over the entire country, and provide each sub-region with medical, agricultural and training projects. One NGO active in Angola, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), believed that only In established communities would ex-combatants find the sustained social support that they required. CRS had also been considering creating a new Angolan NGO or a consortium of NGOs specifically oriented toward reintegration of ex-combatants. However, development programs, including those aimed at demobilized combatants, were inhibited by a lack of local NGOs in Angola, posing statutory problems for international NGOs or other donors whose policy it is not to channel resources fil In Nicaragua, some NGOs ran small-scale agricultural projects focused on building confidence between ex-contras and ex-Sandinistas. (Eguisabal at al., 1992). JV As touched upon in footnote 51, one key aspect of this communication is the provision of information on the profiles and specific destinations of ex-combatants to NOs. In Uganda such information was available and thus facilitated planning at the community level. In Chad and Ethiopia, such information was either not available in a form helpful for local communities or not provided by the military. Chapter5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Page 7S Demobiization and Reintgmtion of Military Personnl Box V.11: Nandbta: NGO-sponsoredReIntegraton Programs throug governat (r miliary)uistituon thr, formornoetherNG ls actienAoa, dembilzaton as lw piorty.A smpigdoftetye of pronjiectl tmtopproposdb GsiAgIs .vsoeservts he inotrdinat the omplat 4cale ini a se Bta n to predint apopnt fraing fr exper.nco preentW rproti 2 se rojct wee nt mplminte befbreth Afgian ctolled esmed 135.~ ~ ~~~~ 40 Rstmtigt ffrvctobctrives pra to rvdemilnizad rnsoir SWamp priiat. Anteratrntv is tofcso'rvtl-u,sal-cl'riiSporm hc h2lang pogra inimbawe aidi accualpic thmema wciith mpoygment. sintheome btrughgernmyferntied135.hIt istep tomlor mylatttins. offer vcatibnain urtheoe programs for may otofmit demobilized theiin Ngaiv soldiers inrwinh Angolacas dhemiation was alo prority a amplfting ofs thkel tyes-cofmprojets proos by NGs in Acilngol wish prweenten.the projects ere ntmplemne beor the AtoBnekongatoln confliced resume.12)Hec ute rat, boer slt tcn gns fr xitirn vocatale traiing programs or which conduct adequate market research a was done inthe Dankiko Project inZimbabwe (Ref. Box V.8). OY CatHO Res Servics anosndum, Feary 199 Pap 76 Chapr5 - Desin of ReeVation PWormm Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Paronnot Box V.12: Angola: NGO-sponsoredReintegradon Prograns 136.I Zi eiom omashexrWorrsaroiing tranmploy eto .4, 11W11 aesp4citt exali dipacs in Agola thelete thcivilian coprifor toihaemoliion 7eyatedming prefene A tendrfivin d workinrmaith t usngthe mauhiltrieraheiltut ofr the or f me andre thetsamnsaoc ionmoilM tar di 1ipinto Imleen tranti mogurpapropos:tohl esrOsa d tedarocr; to rsett legai000 o wmmuiy rom tohs AI a ementswe e b tn o seioncmatadas iesas inktheining f eduaind o xcomaant s toprdctoC.ecl 136. In Zimbabwe, some combatants expressed their desire for receiving traning relative to thecontin civilian atioeconomyseonstlactoan prior to demobilization. zto a Theymtdt stated lnttheir preferencecaiiaeafre for living WPand workingapi within a collectivity, because they were accustomed to living in large groups and working together. Some NGOs recommendedW o.the nusing the military andhierarchicalovegolen voceioellroling structureagecedepelotment of the former PPAtop.Fnnilbda armedproursar force for and the military discipline to implement training programs: to help ensure class attendance; to send delegations of respected commanders to explain programs in person to combatants; to use some of the best-educated, senior combatants as trainers; to link the training and education of ex-combatants to production, directly to income-generating activities; and to establish a close link between the liberation struggle and its continuation as reconstruction. 137. In Mozambique, government and development agencies are developing plans for community-based programs to be implemented in most of the districts where ex-combatants are to settle. This wBi include distribution of seeds and agricultural tools, training programs, and infrastructure rehabilitation. Specific details on these programs are not available at this time-partly because many are still in the planning stage. HOUSING AND LAND ISSUES 138. * A common theme in reintegration programs among the countries studied is to assume or encourage ex-combatants to "return" to rural life and take up farming. However, this depends on ox- combatants having the desire to become involved in agriculture, and on the availability of land, .equipment, and training. Ch3apier 5 - Deign of Raintegration Psegrams Pago 7TI Demobilization and Relategraion of Military Personnel 139. In Angola, over 80% of FAPLA combatants expressed Interest In returning to urban, not rural, areas (consistent with their greater concentration In urban areas). In contrast, most former NR soldiers wanted to settle In rural communities, as do two-thirds of Ugandan army personnel facing demobilization. For these individuals, the problem is access to land. The Chamorro government promised each demobilized Sandinista Army and NR soldier 25 manzanas of land. However, because the Sandinista government had nationalized the land and distributed it to its supporters, there are now significant problems of multiple titles and claims. Many individuals who had land nationalized by the Sandinista government are seeking to retain title. Many former soldiers have not received the land or clear titles to land. Lacking clear title, they have difficulty obtaining the loans they need for equipment and other necessities to work the land they occupy-these disputes over land, combined with a drought the same year they demobilized, have proven to be one of the most important factors contributing to renewed political unrest in rural areas of Nicaragua. By July 1991, only slightly over half of the former NR had received land from the government; as of November 1991, OAS officials estimated that an additional 25% of ex-NR had obtained access to land, leaving 25% with to access.P In Uganda only 30% of arable land is currently in use so land availability may present less of an issue (although quality and competing uses such as for cattle raising may pose a problem). The local veterans committees in Uganda will attempt to mediate land conflicts if they arise. 140. The expectation by governments that the agricultural sector will absorb the vast majority of former soldiers is thus conditioned on the availability of fertile, unclaimed land. There may be no free land to redistribute or land tenure patterns may prevent easy absorption. The experience In Zimbibwe, where a substantial portion of the communal lands distributed to veterans was deforested in the pursuit of profit, suggests that it may be desirable to require former soldiers to pay for the land they receive. It seems that when individuals receive land free of charge-particularly if they have no previous farming experience and are not especially committed to making a career of farming-they view the land they are given as the way to turn a quick profit rather than as a source of sustained Income requiring proper management. 141. While in military service, combatants are provided barracks or shelter; upon being demobilized they require housing, and many do not have the financial resources necessary to provide housing for themselves and their families (especially when they do not receive large lump-sum payments upon demobilizing). In Namibia, Building Brigades composed of teams of repatriates, including ex- combatants, addressed the critical need for housing of returnees; engaging them in building houses for their own community not only helped secure them housing at a low cost, but also provided valuable construction skills and work experience. Preliminary information indicates that this program was effective and may be worth duplicating. In Namibia, as well as Nicaragua and Uganda, ex-combatants were provided the construction materials needed to build their own houses. In Nicaragua a program of self-help housing resulted in the construction of 1,231 homes and 41 schools in 1992: the beneficiaries brought to the site roofing material they had received after demobilization and formed teams to build the houses they would inhabit. W U.S.G.A.O., Aid to Nkaragua, U.S. Astance S4Ppor Bconomic and Social Devlopment, August, 1992: p. 37. Pap 78 Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Demobilisation and Relategration of Military Personnel SPaCrAI/VULZ GRoUs 142. While it is appropriate In many instances to classify demobilized soldiers as a "disadvantaged group" because of their lack of resources, their low skill levels, and their unfamiliarity with civilian society, there are three subgroups that warrant special attention: disabled veterans, veterans' dependents, and "children-soldiers." 143. One legacy of protracted civil strife Is large numbers of individuals with severe medical and psychological disabilities. While providing special medical facilities for veterans is not uncommon In the Industrial countries, It Is nonetheless legitimate to question whether separate programs should be established for veterans in countries where large numbers of civilians have been physically and mentally damaged as a result of war, particularly when veterans' programs might be created at the expense of similar programs for civilians. 144, In Angola, a minimum of 40,000 Individuals are estimated to be mutilated by war and 50,000 children abandoned by war.t Many of those were non-combatants. Similarly, in Mozambique, by far the largest number of those who suffered physically and mentally from the 16-year civil war were civilians. In some cases, although civilians may be equaily needy, restrictions on funding may limit the clientele of rehabilitation programs to ex-combatants. CIAV-OAS programs in Nicaragua were supported by United States financing, which was intended to be used solely for NR veterans. In other cases, such as the Centre for the Disabled at Nakayale, Nainibia, civilians and former soldiers are treated together. 145. Programs directed specifically at disabled veterans have been set up in Angola, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, while others are planned for Mozambique and Uganda. These include special pensions, medical rehabilitation, and training. The Angolan government provides disabled veterans with a monthly pension equivalent to their wages in the armed forces plus a food allowance. Most of the rehabilitation and training programs have relied entirely on foreign funding and other assistance. Information on most of these programs is sketchy and it Is unclear whether they have succeeded in (1) reaching a large share of their potential clientele or (2) integratingrehabilitated veterans into the civilian workforce. The program funded by CIAV-OAS for NR veterans (described in 3) clearly made an effort to find employment for rehabilitated veterans. In Namibia, the Centre for the Disabled at Nakayale reportedly lacked links to the local economy which would have enabled rehabilitated veterans with newly acquired skills to gain employment. In contrast, the Dan&iko school in Zimbabwe, which included in its target group a large number of disabled veterans, appears to have enjoyed some success in improving their employment prospects. 146. In the Uganda program, some estimate that half of the ex-combatants are disabled, socially maladjusted, or severely Ill (including those with AIDS). The program has contracted with NGOs and private-sector agencies to provide additional specialized social services to the communities where the ex-combatants will concentrate. The services are essentially provided to the community (not 0/ "Pather Report of the Secretary-Genal1 on the United Nations Angola VeArification Mission (UNAVEM-II)," June 24, 1992. hapter 5 - Design of Rointegration Programs Pag 9 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel just the Individual ex-combatant) and are directed at strengthening exIsLig basic social service capacity, thus avoiding exclusion of other needy groups and the creation of a separate institution. Box V.13: Mcaragua:Disabled Veterans Progans he isbld etrm ogra funded by CIAV-OAS in Nicaraga provided medicai assiatance to# d ilNcaeuan Reistance veteas aid Aidped rentegrate them inito society. Between July 1990 indebrary1991, Creative Aaeociateoi International, a US bad NQOO ran a temporary program wihprovided me dical assistance and physledhinental health idbabilitation to some.432 veterans and ~ad s#ocial renerainpogam, Ih1atofwih te for *hout one yest, fromi April1 1991 t1March 2, ted. .w.term 7. )M W*11-1 a medicat asstance psb dit iv somne 300 patiests**..***..**..*._ah _en Patients were ete taed toil(tt odp ie or were refomid beslzoitals in anaua and IATTiidad4(ome 15%). The adc l sstnproge wvas laitially sta the another~ flS-bsed NGO( naeQ, eat Fbnditinsiequty, CIAV10AS operited it directly kost of the patients were ales aged 21" ...... nodici traitnent throigh teohdegp Center~ Sighty on vteranis received vocational training in employed in disabl$d Vteronet When themocia eiegraton prosint4osed la M.ch 199Z, CIAV O)ASnassmed epnilty fr~adpeigcntklno itssfrdsbe veea.Sm10 ofthehousea ontuted under the llwig uwSholPora y CtAV4CA3 wrer eamre 147. Although demobilization/reIntegration programs focus on veterans, it is equally important to take the needs of veterans' dependents into account when designing these programs and calculating their costs. Indeed, in many cases, it can be argued that what is being reinserted into civilian life is not "the soldier" but "the family unit." The CIAV-OAS program in Nicaragua was ostensibly aimed at the approximately 22,500 NR veterans who presented themselves for demobilization during 1990, but ended up 1 providing assistance--either directly or Indirectly--to 82,000 dependents as well (see 4). In addit. -, 11 International agencies and NGOs established a child survival program in Nicaragua, Ho.auras, and Costa Rica to aid children who were victims of civil strife. In Namibia, all programs for former SWAPO members were by definition aimed at families, because they were extended to all returnees, not just combatants or the combatants' immediate families. The program being implemented in Uganda has, from the beginning, explicitly planned to provide support for demobilized soldiers and their dependents. Page 80 ChapterS5- Design of Reintegration Programs Demnoblization and Reintegration of Military Personnel 148. To improve the efficiency of distribution of benefits and to reach the objective of providing basic needs to people, it may be desirable to structure programs so that veterans' wives are fully integrated into the process. Studies have shown that women who receive income or food are more likely to pass it on to the children in the household than men. CIAV-OAS staff members in Nicaragua preferred channelling food through veterans' w!,es for this reason. In addition, to ensure the timely completion of housing projects constructed by small teams of veterans, CIAV-OAS staff only allowed families to move into the new homes when all the houses a team was to construct had been finished. This ensured that the women would make sure that their husbands presented themselves for work each morning for the duration of the project. In Zimbabwe, the wives of ex-combatants have proved successful in collective farming. This has prompted the transfer of specific agricultural ministerial portfolios to the Ministry of Cooperatives and Community Development and Women's Affairs.' Through this ministry, the Zimbabwean government *has actively continued: to advise, train, and offer financial assistance to cooperatives; promoted greater access of ex-combatants to raw materials, product markets, as well as managerial services and appropriate technology; assisted new and existing ex-combatants' cooperatives which demonstrate the capacity to increase their economic growth production and employment with investment capital cashflow and expert management services."' 149. Children-soldiers inarguably constitute a needy group which would experience difficulty making the transition to civilian life. Because many of these soldiers are familiar with a military lifestyle, they may require psychological counselng in addition to other services. Although one program was tentatively proposed by UNICEF for demobilized children-soldiers in Chad, no further information is available on whether this program has been approved or implemented. Box V.14: NicaraguaReinegration: A Faintly Affair hp cari tbyCJAY)ASMs1o iNicaragua alargeextent amilyerinted rog ,delivering befits oth' to Niaagtoan Reitac veta d their T toftheeing i wa ine agami .. , with theie. soliehilw ili upilninted 17 54pounds,...... ecftick i en,12pud aho at fler co dn,~ n uatndU on eahotokn i n ikfiec dienh of aly mebeTteins suchM$pltes, tus spoons and tothrshesiwethe prso~ided according to family sa *CiCA OAS.housng program eftted more than the inidividual NR vreteran by pmvidig sese1200 famites.w welleth tracted sheltes. The imedicne distribution program eardted out in 904fuaidwt the Pan Ameica Hkealth oraniton uplemented Nicaragues Miistr f Health pr ...... to lR veterans4lbl and their dependen (and also to some members of the itheNR) The ie. pdu comeialia projects to* ...... W "Unity a Must if Africa's Economy is to Survive," in Windhoek Obsever, July 6, 1991, p. 2.08 Q/ Ministerial Statement to Parliament of Zimbabwe on 'Plight of Ex-Combatants," August 4, 1988, p. 783. Chapter 5 - Design of Reintegration Programs Page 81 Demobilizadon and Reintegration of Militay Persomit CHAPIER VI COST AND FUNDING OF DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 150. This chapter analyzes the cost of DRPs. Sufficient resources are needed to produce the balance of positive and negative incentives needed to induce combatants and their leaders to proceed with demobilization. Donors are often reluctant to commit resources, preferring to wait and see how successful the demobilization effort is before becoming involved; however, experiences from the cases suggest donor involvement-in the form of technical assistance and promoting discussion and program coordination-is needed at an early stage to help design adequate programs and provide the incentives needed to carry out demobilization. COSr OF DEMOBILIZATION/REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS 151. The costs-of most of the programs, while at first glance quite high, are not substantial when comparel with the amount of ODA given to these countries. As shown in Table V1.1, the DRP cost (on an annualized basis) ranged from 32% of annual ODA InAngola to 2% in Nicaragua. The costs of smaller-scale programs focused primarily on demobilization (or where cost information is available only for demobilization), such as those InNamibia, Chad, Uganda, and Mozambique range from 4 to 7% of the annual ODA. Total program costs are difficult to compare on a standardized basis, as there are variations in the cost components included in the total (see Table VI.2).W 152. V The programs' per capita cost is in many cases smaller (though sometimes twice the level of the country's GDP/capita) than the average cost of civil service reductions in similar countries. In the one case completed (Zimbabwe), the total program cost per soldier employed or in training (excluding those re-employed in the civil service and military) is approximately US$8,469; because this program provided substantially larger cash compensation than any other and allowed re-employment in the civil service and military, one could expect the costs of other programs per employed ex-combatant to be much f/ Por example, the funds allocated to CIAV-0AS in Nicaragua are not broken down into categories specifically for demobilization and reintegration. Also, the costs of the UN observer force and the administrative costs of the OAS foreln Nicaraguawere not included, although similar costs were included for some of the othercase studies. Another discrepancy is that Zimbabwe's total includes payment of salaries to combatants while they were encamped; in other cases, this cost was covered by the government's defense budget or guerrilla force (in some cases, such as the guerrilla force in Angola, PALA, combatants did not receive salaries at all). For Mozambique, high and low estimates for each cost component were based on the anticipated number of demobilizing combatants. Chapter 6 - Cost and Puding of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Pap 8 Demobli,aton and Røintegration of Milary Pørsonnel Table V.1: 7he Relaive Cost of Demobilization/ReintegrationPrograms US$million Angola Chad aMombique Naibia Nicaragua Uganda Zlmbabwe DRP $1251' $18.9 $54.4 - 62.6 $46.4 - $43.62' $19.4 $230 Overal $429.4V Cost (Projected) $62.5 $18.91 na n/a $18.5 $19.4 $46 Anual Average Annual ODAV $196 $262 $920 $184 $826 $525 $208 Rado of DIP/ODA 31.8% 7.2% 6.7% nla 2.2% 3.7% 22.1% y This includes US$13 million in emnergency assistance to oneamped combatants. IThe lowr est~nate inlude diret compensation to ex-combatanta, the Development Brigads, and UNHCR repatrion of 44,000 returnees from abroad inaluding an estimated 10,000 guerrillas. The higher oat estimate includes the entire UNTAG budget of $383 million wbich covered administrtive costs and eeetions, demobilitian, and repatriation.(of cviliMans a well as ex-combatmnts). y DRP osts for NR only; costa for subsequent demobiliation of Sandinista military unavailable. / Includes cost of combatants' malaris while they were en~amped for I year or moro (US$42 milion), not included in total DRP cost of other case. Does not include $23 million in NGO programs and a fund for ex-combatants sine the annualied cost of these program are unknown. g/ Based on US$1 = 263.87 CFAF, 1992 average. g/ Net disbursements of official development assistance from all sources for 1991, excep Zimbabwe (1983) and Angola (1990); in Angola the program aborted and fighting resumed. Sourwe World D*wlopm Report, 1993, World Bank. Source for Zimbabwe, World Døvlopment Report, 1988, World Bank. Source for Angola, UNDP Angola mission estimate. Page 84 Chaptr 6 - Cost and Funding of Demobilitin and Reintegration Program 墜 動 紹几”當 鄴“O 嶼 勵 細 娥學劇黠 間 細 腳 ”絨學魄祺 中刈。O 增 兀k 閑甲矚 $13 W~ in as~ to cm~ Comb~. 21 UNTAG b~ of $383 ~= for 0100~. MM~ft. admåk~. monboring aM dembM~ UNTAG*9 b~ did " ~Våb between mmba~ ex-comb~ were.fepa~ a c~ and å~ ~ h~ CIAV~ mm for dmobfl~ and reku~jo, «~ oAs o~cad. CoM i=nred by dw N~~ Göver=m4 ONUCA. agd *c UNncR repuftållon am not h~ hem o~~ to ~ frm 7~ ~ b~ OM of «hån to coft~M am~ amffing dawbö~ (US$42 m~ this lower.P In terms of the cost per ex-combatant (and not per job found), programs ranged from a low- end estimate of US$655 in Mozambique (where full reintegration programs are not yet developed) to over US$3,000 in Zimbabwe. Detailed breakdowns of per capita costs are presented in Table VI.2. 153. It is difficult to evaluate the cost/benefit of a given DRP as it is impossible to predict the likely social and economic consequences of not implementing a program. However, if the political environment is conducive, demobilization and reintegration programs can potentially have a high ratio of marginal efficiency if one takes into account the risks and costs of not implementing a program at all, or the Impact that a haphazard demobilization with inadequate resources can have on a country's social and political environment. 154. Table VI.3 provides an indication of the distribution of resources among various components of a DRP in Nicaragua (for the NR), Mozambique, and Uganda. Such detailed cost information is not available for the other programs. The breakdown shows the emphasis on Mozambique's program on cash compensation, versus the Nicaraguan approach of providing targeted reintegration programs. In the case of Mozambique, several different reintegration programs are being discussed but are all still in the planning stages. 155. The known costs per combatant of US$655-807 for Mozambique's demobilization program, including compensation allowances, appears to be low compared to that of similar programs In some other countries; however, this does not represent the total costs, as the budget of the UN observer force was not included in the cost estimate as it was for some of the other case studies. Also, it only includes the cost of one possible (as yet unapproved) reintegration program, and others are reportedly being planned. The anticipated cost of the encampment process is US$9.3-9.7 million, US$112-121 per combatant. The cost of the demobilization allowance (regular salaries for six months, with no additional lump stun severance pay) is low compared to that in most of the other cases, but the per capita income in Mozambique is the lowest among the cases; also, the cost of the allowances is high as a percentage of the total cost of Mozambique's DRP. Each cost component of Mozambique's program includes an extra 5%which was budgeted for contingencies. The design of Mozambique's demobilization f& In Zimbabwe, if one includes ex-combatants employed in the civil service among those employed, the total costs decreaseto US$5,928 per employed ex-combatat Demobilization costs here do not include US$42 million in sadaries to encamped combatants. In comparison, in civil service redeployment programs in Africa, special reintegration schemes and credits cost US$11,000 in Scnegal (DIRE/PNE programs), US$4,200 in Guine. and US$1,700 in MalH (IR program). To these costs, one would need to add the often substantial depatum allowances to compare with the total DRP costs presented above. These departure allowances for oivil service programs ranged from 48 months of salary in some cases in Senegal, to an average of US$6,807 per person for a departure package in Mali; one could compare this latter figure with just over US$3,000 for departure and reintegration allowances in Zimbabwe. Sources: Redeployment of Lald-Of Pub& Sector Fmployees, internal drat paper by Mare Schacter, CECPS, IBRD; Civil Service R4form in Malk An Evaluationof the Volutary DepartureProgra, internal draft paper by AlbeRt Zeufack, APSCO, IBRD, September, 1993; Lea Fonds D'iplot - SW4t fflacs Une Evaluaton Socio-Bconomique de la DIREFNE au Sdagal, intemal draft by Elian Karp-Toledo, AFSP, IBRD, July 30, 1993. Chapter 6 - Cost and Funding of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Page 87 DemobIiuation and Re~tegration of M~itary Personnel Table VI3: Cost Breakdownfor DRPs in mcaragua, Uganda and Mozambique Category Nicaragua (%) Uganda (%)1' Moambique (%) Food 23.5 19 9.112' Operational Costs 19.3 åla alt Construction materials/tools 10.5 50Y nya Special rconstruction projets 7.8 D/a 29 Resettlement of disabled 7.6 åla b/all Transportation 1.3 1^ 30-39 Medical care 5.8 3' 27' Agricultura toola 5.1 4 n/a Clothing 2.g 5 3 Demobiliation Allowance 2.3 n/a 35-41' AgriculturalProject 2.3' n/a n/a Administation u/a1*' 8-1011' 12 Other 3.5 n/a . TOTAL COST (S million _ $43.6 (proicted) $19.41, (projected) $54.4 - 61.2 1/ Much of the assistnce pravided to ex-combatans in Uganda was In cub; during the first six months, excombataznts receive payments of $490 in ash, ulthough this Is åat~nded and calculated for certan purposes, and only $228 In in-kind oods roo& materials, school fe, tnsport to home distrit, and communiy social services). 2/ Projected cost of food for assembly areas; delvery will be made thmugh World Food Program/UNILOG, which will be authorized to ubcontract the transport and monitoring to private ar~ or NGOs. 1/ Cost of materius for building 3-room mud-and-watle house, roofed with corrugted iron sheeus, for each demobilied soldier. ~lCoversantiated cost of necessaryinfrastructntral improvemnentsto .isemblyareas, .e., sanitation, well-rilling, installation of water pumps; any remaider wil go to Mozambique's National Rural Water Program, to provide water to rural seUlements. 1/ Plans for disabled still Inptnning stages. / Basio medical care v fre-ofchargs to al Ugandans; cos includes a supplement to cover puhase of medicines for ech combatat (the person cost ofpving medicalassitancewas basedon shareof GNP spent on health per capitaG xtimerod (0.05 x US$2 x 612). 7/ 50 pr~ of which will go toward medicin and suppes; unused resources wil bo provided to Mozambique's National ffeji systm. 1/ Includes cost of administrative arrangements. 2/ Punded by USAID; beneficiaries inoluded other (non-combatant) reuidents of Atlantic Coast region as well. Q/ Cos not broken out as separate category; pautly included under categories of Operational Costs and Other. IV Ptje adminite cost of the dm six months of the Veterans' Ausistance Program including salaries for Veterans' opersonnel, rent, equ~pment, and supplies. l/ Cost of regsation and documentation of combatant. 1/ An early estimate of the cost of the s~&ling-in it al (not including sverance pay) was US$13.11 million for 23,000 soldiers and ther dependent. A morm recent estimate ril 1992) places the cost of the fir pase of the program (demobili~rin, transport, s~tting-in) at around US$19.4 n; d ition is assumed to have remained approximately the sam. In additon, US$5 nillion has been for fature reintegration programs (xcoluded here). Pg88 Chapter 6 - Cost and Punding of Demobilization and Reintegration Program Demobillisedon and Relategration of Military Personnel program seems to be highly efficient, especially the registration, documentation, and database procedures. If successfilly implemented, such procedures will likely result in cost savings through efficiency and reduced fraud. 156. For Chad, demobilization allowances and transportation allowances combined are estimated to cost US$18.1 million, plus an estimated US$758,000 for administrative costs, for a total of US$18.9 million. Although the initial 1991 program reserved roughly US$1.2 million to be pooled into a Development Fund to cover the reintegration of ex-combatants and others, this plan has since been given a lower profile. No other funds have been committed to the reintegration effort. It Is difficult to evaluate the benefits of the demobilization and force restructuring efforts since they are still In progress. The cost per combatant of the demobllization and reintegration efforts are difficult to evaluate given the initial voluntary nature of the program and frequently changing force totals and targets declared by the government. Total cost estimates in Table VI.2 of approximately US$1,050 per soldier for one year, are based on an expected 18,000 soldiers demobilizing or retiringA 157. For Namibia, the UNTAO/UNHCR operations for the cease-fire, peacekeeping, demobilization, repatriation, and the elections cost roughly US$429 million from February 1989 to April 1990; UNTAG Incurred the costs of demobilization and ensuring combatants from all sli returned home or were disarmed and disbanded while UNHCR paid for most of the repatriation operation. Since the UNTAG cost data are presented as a lump sum, it is difficult to estimate the cost of the demobilization program. 1 Most of the UNTAG/UNHCR programs were directed toward the general returnee community. The Namibian government later allocated at least US$6.4 million for the reintegration of former combatants, US$5 million -to- the direct cash compensation program for unemployed ex- combatants, and US$1.4 million for the Development Brigades, described in Chapter Five. Since not all 20,000 ex-PLAN guerrillas benefitted from these two programs, it is more accurate to estimate the cost per participant than the per combatant cost; each beneficiary received $476 in cash compensation, and the estimated cost of the Development Brigades is US$480 per participant. PROGRAM FUNDING SOURCES 158. Each of the DRPs studied relied heavily on external sources for funding. The US government funded the total cost of CIAV-OAS programs InNicaragua for the demobilization of the NR, with the exception of one program, the Atlantic Coast Rice Commercializatiom Project, which was 2f In the 1992 agreement a flat figure of 15,000 to demobilzoiretire was Oatated ad the new army was to reach 25,000. The 18,000 figure comes from. more recent estimates by the Chadian Governmat. 71/ Some of the UNTAG and UNHCR Aods were allocated to raturoes' immediate, basic rolutegration needs such as food, basik household goods, temporary cooking facilides and shelter; initial rehabilitation assistance, including tools and seds for agriculture, shAeter construedon and family suppost, and limited basic training, and programs becwfiting the disabled. Chapter 6 - Cost and Punding of Demobilisation and Reintegration Progams Page 89 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel supported by the European Community. CIAV-OAS also obtained a small amount of funding from the UNHCR and the Government of ItalyX 159. In Uganda, following the NR Army Council's announcement of the demobilization plan, President Musavent personally raised the issue of financing with senior U.S. and multilateral organization officials during a visit to Washington, D.C. in June 1992. Also in June 1992, the Government of Uganda hosted a meeting with the resident donor community in Kampala to solicit financial support for the proposed Veterans Assistance Program. Without external funding the program could not go forward, since only very limited local financing was available. Donors were highly supportive of the demobilization plan and considered the settling-in kit proposal well thought out, and favored funding it. They did, however, raise questions about the speed with which demobilization was planned to begin, the number of troops that could be covered in the initial round of cuts, and the advisability of agreeing to fund the first six months without any information on the government's long-term plans for veterans. Because of budgetary cycles and the length of the decision-making process within donor institutions, the donors were unable to free up as much funding as rapidly as the government's proposed demobilization schedule required. Donors were prepared to consider a program that would cover fewer troops-20,000 instead of 30,000-and begin at a later date (around October 1992). The World Bank played a coordinating role in the effort to obtain pledges of assistance-financial or in-kind-to support the settling- in program for 20,000 veterans with its financial contribution and those of other donors pooled through the social dimensions of adjustment project - PAPSCA. Several donors were already cbannellng contributions through the PAPSCA social fund, and thus financing the DRP merely required increasing their allocation, rather than setting up new budgetary and disbursement agreements with each donor. This contributed to rapid Implementation of the program. 2Y/ The United States also provided the UNHCR with US$2.5 million and US$10 million for its refugee assistance programs la Nicaragua and Honduras, respectively, to assist Inthe repatriation effort (most of the NR combatants had to be patriated from Honduras and Costa Rioa to Nicaragua). As noted previously, due to restrictions by the US Congress, CIAV-OAS's activities had to be directed solely to former NR combatants. Page 90 Chapter 6 - Cost and Funding of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel Table VIA: ProgramFunding Sources (approimate) County Amount (US$ MpllIons) Purpose Angola Demobilization Benefits: to UN, - Goverment 34.7 Angolan Govement, or UNITA - Foreign - US, EEC (40%), 71.5 for emergency food and Egypt, Itay, Denm* preparation of reintegration programs Nicaragua Resettlement of NR and refugees - Mostly US funding 67 1990-1993 budget Uganda Demobiliation - transpotation - Goveriment (.739 and settling in kits - Other donors 19.4 Chad Demobilliation and reintegration - French funding 18.9 allowances and administration I/ Excluding UNAVEM's own budget. a/ Proposed by the Government of Uganda in July 1992. 1/ Donors included the World Bank, the Dutch, British, Swedish, Danish, Americans, Germans, EEC, UNDP, and UNICEF. Chapter 6 - Cost and Funding of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Page 91 Damoblization and Relategration of MlhaWy Pesonnel CHAPTER VB PROGRAM RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED 160. This chapter presents some of the lessons on both process and programs, which emanate from the variety of countries studied. Most of the countries examined are at a relatively early stage in Implementing aDRP (only Namibla, Nicaragia and Zimbabwe have completed demobilization, Zimbabwe alone has completed reintegration), and thus the observations presented below may change as the programs in the countries concerned mature. The chapter also examines the specific outcome of the DRP process (whether ex-combatants found employment and where) in the countries which have completed demobilization. ISSUES OF PROCESS 161. DRPs are complex programs - politically, institutionally, and logistically - Involving sonietimes enormous numbers of combatants and their dependents. Because of this, and because of the variety of actors involved, such programs may have a higher rate of success if planning and coordination begins early on and if the linkages between the demobilization stage and the reintegration stage are recognized. The programs typically involved a diverse set of actors, who may not be in the habit of coordinating among themselves, each with a specific function to fulfill and a comparative advantage at each stage of the DRP process: * External monitors/mediators (bilateral governents or international political bodies): set peace conditions, negotiate terms of demobilization among competing military factions, verify numbers of demobilized combatants and enforce disarmament in (and sometimes outside of) camps; * he mallitry, sonethnes with governments: establish selection criteria for those to be demobilized, determine the number to be demobilized, obtain information (through census or survey) on the profile of the force to be demobilized; * The mlitary, the government (usually the MinLstry of F =ance), and donors: determine cash compensation and payment method, design logistics of transporting demobilized combatants and their families, design reintegration programs; * NGOs and concerned communities provide assistance during encampment, provide some reintegration programs, typically at the local level, provide support services at the local level to ex-combatants, their families, and to communities which may be strained by the influx of new residents. 162. Because each of the stages of a DRP is interdependent, and often overlapping, falling to coordinate planning and implementation of one phase with others can result in redundancy, contradictory Chapter 7 - Progrm Remaks and Lessns Learned Page 93 Denobillation and R-4tegration of filitary Personnel programs, andmwaste., Often,. d6nors focus on and fund only specific parts of a program. Multilateral organizations might be willing to fund reintegration programs but are less likely to finance demobilization. The UN might be more Interested in financing the peace process and performing a monitoring role. Inability to treat the process as a whole and the lack of coordination among all players Increase the risk of a poorly designed progran and the inability to attract adequate funding. Financing only one aspect of the program is inefficient if proper coordination is lacking and/or financing is not available for other key parts of the demobilization/reintegration process. 163. Donors' disaggregated approach to funding DRPs is partly due to reluctance to commit funding until the government demonstrates Its political will and ability to Implement a DRP, or even until Initial demobilization success 6ccurs. !lowever, the governments in question generally lack the resources and Institutional capacity to design and Implement a DRP on their own. In many cases, governments undertaking a DRP are In transition, or are newly formed, and may not be able to focus on the careful planning needed to design such programs. To break the stalemate between governments and donors, governments (and the respective military institutioni) hive, in some cases, expressed their commitment by: (1) initiating discussions and requesting technical advice from donors and other would-be participants (local NGOs, the private sector) on optionstr reintegration programs; (2) being open with relevant Information on those to be demobilized to facilitate planning; and (3) working with donors to design reintegration plans prior to requesthig funding, At aft early stage, donors could offer technical assistance (including support for assistance froi organitions in other countries which have already undergone a DRP) or advice on reintegration, lobby other donors to raise funds, or encourage coordination between the government, the military, and NGOs who may need advance notice to plan programs. 164. For the demobilization/reintegration process to proceed smoothly and attain the objective of helping ex-combatants become productive members of civilian society, it is important that planning begin prior to the encampment and demobilization of combatants, possibly during peace negotiations. For targeted programs, waiting until after demobilization has been completed and ex-combatants dispersed may complicate the already challenging task of identifying who is to receive targeted assistance (as in Namibia where failure to do so resulted in large numbers of people showing up for benefits) and of the most appropriate programs for veterans. However, in DRPs which take place in a peace-time context, planners may be less constrained by the need to proceed rapidly with demobilization for political reasons, and may be able to delay demobilization until the appropriate programs and institutions are in place (as in Uganda). In Mozambique, program planners have postponed elections until after demobilization and disarmament, rather than proceeding with elections as was done in Angola.. 165.. The cases showing the most success or progress thus far in countries emerging from civil strife, have had an external,. neutral body to enhance coordination and communication, and to mediate disputes, i.e., the UN in Namibia. Once the decision to demobilize has been made, external mediators can play 'an important role in coordinating discussions between the military, the various ministries Involved in the process, lenders and NOOs on the possible content of the reintegration program. This becomes especially Important in post-conflict situations, where demobilization may begin before elections mandated by peace accords are held. As shown in Angola, governments in existence prior to the elections may not have sufficient legitimacy to engage in the long-term planning required by a successful Page 94 .Chapter 7 - Program Results and Lessons Learned Demobilizatdon and Reitegration of Militay Personnel DRP. If an external, neutral actor could take responsibility for the planning process, in consultation with local groups, demobilization/reintegration might have a greater chance for success. 166. Monitors have played a positive role in demobilization where they have been regarded as neutral, had sufficient resources, and a sufficiently broad mandate to effectively carry out program objectives and sustain the peace and demobilization processes. In Angola, the UN force monitoring the demobilization and peace process (UNAVEM-I) did not have sufficient human or financial resources and was unable to effectively monitor police forces or those not reporting to camps. In Namibia, UN monitors played an extensive role, as they essentially ran the demobilization and repatriation program. While It is clearly not desirable to encourage dependency on external organizations, some form of external monitoring is helpful in politically tense situations to conduct an unbiased census, to verify the number and affiliation of combatants entering and leaving camps, and to ensure that goods and services are delivered rapidly, efficiently, and fairly. 167. The political climate and atmosphere of insecurity often influence program planners in their choices about priority program objectives (rapidly carrying out demobilization to disperse combatants, perhaps without reintegration packages; ensuring that combatants receive services to enhance their employment prospects; providing employment for combatants even if it means absorbing them into the public service; ensuring that the program results in a net fiscal "peace dividend"). Political considerations also influence the decision to demobilize combatants, the selection criteria used, the reintegration programs chosen, and overall program results. For example, in Nicaragua the outcome of CIAV-OAS programs was sometimes negatively affected by events beyond CIAV's control, such as the inability of the Chamorro government to provide each demobilized combatant with land and credits as promised, and the significant upsurge in political violence. CIAV-OAS has been able to assist some NR veterans in obtaining clear title to their land, but there are significant problems of multiple titles and claims. Failure to provide land or clear titles to land to ex-combatants is among the problems that have fueled political unrest and rearming of former combatants. 168. Because a DRP is essentially a political process, particularly in countries emerging from civil strife, the first step in determining whether Investment in reintegration programs is warranted would be to assess the strength of the political settlement preceding demobilization and the commitment of a key stakelholder, the military. Appropriate economic incentives (such as demobilization allowance and titrgeted reintegration programs) canfaciltatethe DRP process, but sufficient political incentives are key to determining whether demobilization will succeed. INSTrrUrIONAL MANAGEMENT 169. Case results indicate that programs, however comprehensive and detailed, will amount to little if not adapted to local infrastructure and institutional capacity. While some countries will only need technical assistance to strengthen existing capabilities, others may requir. or prefer an external actor (in some cases the monitoring agency) to manage and even administer the program. However, there is a need to balance this with the experience in Nicaragua; in Nicaragua programs to benefit former NR combatants were entirely supported by outside donors (mostly the U.S.) and managed by CIAV-OAS administration and thus no plans were made for conversion to mainstream development programs (i.e. Chapter 7 - Program Results and Leaons Lenod Pag95 Demobila-tlon and Reintegration of Military Personnel managed by the Nicaraguan Government). This suggests that in programs administered by external actors project components could be included to develop local institutional capacity in order to increase programs' longer-term sustainability. For example, in Uganda, the program design includes the creation of local veteran's offices. 170. The role of CIAV-OAS in monitoring the human rights of former NR combatants and mediating in ex-NR disputes with the government and with the Sandinistas illustrates the utility of having an institutional capacity to protect human rights and to mediate internal disputes between different factions (i.e., ex-NR and Sandinistas) and between ex-combatant groups and the government. 171. Creation of a strong government organization or committee with cabinet-level participation can play a role in developing viable programs for the demobilized. Such committees have played roles In: advising and assisting on employment and training issues; coordinating programs with other government departments, participating international organizations and NGOs; assisting with efforts such as surveys; and providing feedback needed for programs to be adapted. In cases of civil war, such an organization may have more credibility if political representation is balanced. 172. Some program planners have stressed the importance of involving veterans in the management of reintegration programs and support services. Veterans' Associations have been used in Nicaragua, Namibia, and Uganda to provide an organization ex-combatants feel is responsive to their concerns and represents them in dealing with the government and external agencies. Providing a legitimate political outlet and a focal point to address veterans' complaints may help defuse tensions. Such associations could also help monitor the problems and progress of veterans at the local level. DMoM27ATION 173. The success of the encampment stage of demobilization may affect the success of subsequent stages of the DRP process; encampment requires resources, but also presents an opportunity to gather information which is key to planning reintegration programs. Failure to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and transportation for combatants and their dependents to and from the camps has caused problems in the demobilization process, sometimes compounding problems of armed banditry and desertion from camps. Case experiences show strict supervision and control of combatants in assembly camps-and ensuring all the designated combatants report to the camps-is another key element for encampment to proceed smoothly. Courses in basic education, civics, money management, health education, etc., provided to combatants while in assembly camps may facilitate their transition to civilian life and keep them occupied during sometimes prolonged waiting periods in camps. Determining eligibility for future reintegration benefits (cash or other) and providing a means of identification for eligibility Is essential if targeted reintegration programs are to be offered later on. 174. In all of the cases, combatants were required to turn in a weapon either upon registration at assembly camps or upon their demobilization, to become eligible for various benefits. However, these confiscated weapons were not always securely stored and guarded (Angola), and in many cases were not destroyed but 1erely redistributed within the country (I.e., added to regular army's arsenal). Procedures need to be devised for frequent checks of stocked weapons, and for attending to and disposing of Page 9g Chapter7 - Program Results and Lessons Learned Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel weapons. However, most cases indicate that disarming combatants at camps is insufficient in reducing the overall level of arms circulating in a country, as many combatants own more than one weapon, and many civilians are armed as well. 175. Measures to reclaim weapons, I.e., seizures or buy back programs, have been used in a limited number of countries examined in this study, as a tool to re-establish security. Weapons buy back programs have had a limited medium-term impact in reducing the number of weapons circulating in countries which have: (1) porous borders with countries with active weapons markets; (2) lack of capacity to enforce regulations on the open carrying and criminal use of weapons, and; (3) a political, economic, or security climate which enhances the security and economic value of owning and using a weapon. In order to prevent the re-purchase of new weapons, some buy back programs have offered In-kind Incentives, such as construction materials or food, instead of cash. REINTEGRATION A. Surveys 176. Conducting surveys of combatants to determine their number, their educational/skill levels, intended place of settlement, employment history/aspirations and of the country's economic needs and training capacity prior to demobilization Is crucial to designing targeted programs appropriate for combatants' needs and preferences and the country's economy. The cases have shown that employment and education needs and desires may differ both between countries and among forces in the same country. CIAV-OAS officials in Nicaragua, who did not have access to this sort of data when planning the demobilization programs for veterans, strongly urged that such surveys be conducted, arguing that their programs could have been better targeted if they had some basic information about NR troops. Information on the Intended place of settlement of ex-combatants can be critical to planning community- based programs and to preparing communities for sometimes large influxes of veterans (as is currently being done in Uganda). Technical assistance with surveys constitute one area where donors have provided needed assistance. Also, an accurate census of the number of combatants to be demobilized is needed early on to assist budgeting and make other preparations for demobilization and reintegration. B. Cash Compensation Schemes 177. An over-reliance on cash compensation may be ineffective in reintegrating combatants and discourage them from becoming productive members of the society. The case of Zimbabwe suggests that cash compensation is best used if accompanied by complementary programs in basic accounting and literacy, for example, and should be limited to those who are not planning to re-enter the military or civil service. Giving large cash benefits to ex-combatants may satisfy them for a certain period of time, but without the skills necessary to find jobs, their continued unemployment and poor prospects may aggravate unrest-and the government may resort to re-employing them into the public sector to reduce potential upheaval. 178. Lump-sum payments can assist the initial transition process, providing some spending money for immediate transition needs, but do not contribute significantly to combatants' long-term Chapter 7 - Program Results and Lesons Leaed Page 97 Demobiliation and Reintegration of Military Personnel reintegration. In cases where lump-sum payments were used, they were allegedly insufficient to pay for training courses or productive investments, -although anecdotal information suggests that attending to family needs may also be an important factor in the lack of investment of such funds. In addition, ex- combatants may lack the financial knowledge and discipline to save and make productive investments. Supplementing or replacing such payments with in-kind assistance known as settling-in packages, as in Nicaragua, may be more effective. Box VI.1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Cash Allowances Benefits Potential Problems 1. Politial: When payments are made in the home 1. Limited institutional framework and infra- district of soldier, they help disperse soldiers structure makes distribution of payments to over the country, diffusing political tensions and dispersed ex-combatants a challenge. reducing the prospects of combatants for reassembling and resuming warfare. 2. Enomic: Sustain ex-combatants while 2. Payments may be more productive if they searching for employment, in school, beginning coincide with start of education programs or farming or starting a business. planting season. 3. Eiggh In the form of monthly payments or 3. Most combatants will probably prefer cash and governments bonds, they help to spread the immediate payments. Since their educational goverment's fiscal burden over time. level is generally low, they are unlikely to comprehend the complexities of bonds and premiums. 179. Payment methods can be designed to distribute severance pay to dispersed ex-combatants. However, such mechanisms require both institutional capacity and infrastructure (banks, post offices) which are often at their weakest following war. In Zimbabwe, branches of the Post Office Bank in towns near concentrations of resettled ex-combatants were used to distribute allowances. In Chad 15 reintegration offices were created all over the country. In Angola, a program involving Payment Coupons and so-called Peace Bonds was at one point discussed as an alternative to cash payments. 180. To encourage the use of lump-sum payments and allowances for productive purposes, administrators can deduct the cost of training courses before paying out the monthly allowance; provide a crash course on budgeting and accounting before demobilization; or, with the consent of combatants, set aside a part of the allowance for purchasing means of production, i.e., land, machinery, tools, and other inputs, helping to involve combatants in creating their own wealth (accompanied by an educational program to explain the purpose and method of the procedure). Also, payments could be timed to coincide with the beginning of training programs or crop cycles. 409g Chapter 7 - Program Results and Lessons Learned Demobilhation and Relategration of Militay Penonnel C. Education, Targeted Training and Employment Programs 181. The low educational levels of most soldiers and lack of experience in thrcivilian sector indicate a need for basic education, such as literacy training and basic mathematics, and in some cases social support services and counseling. In Zimbabwe, basic education courses were very popular. Where demobilization involves an extended period of encampment, this would be a useful time to provide such courses. 182. Surveys of ex-combatants have revealed that relatively few combatants have extensive formal education. Little emphasis was placed on formal education in the cases studied. In Zimbabwe, schools were provided by the government, but were only filled to a small fraction of their capacity. In some cases, older ex-combatants placed in regular schools felt humiliated at having to sit in classes with much-younger (but more educationally advanced) students. Alternatives to formal education include educational stipends for existing well-functioning adult education classes. 183. The combination of low education and skill levels, and ex-combatants' Immediate need for income (thus discouraging long-term involvement in formal education) point to the need for vocational training. Vocational training in the cases was in some cases underfunded, and based on the scant information available, results have been mixed (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua). However, the limited experience suggests that large, publicly-run programs may have greater difficulty in designing training programs which are consistent with market demand than do smaller, privately-run programs. One way of tapping into existing training capacity In the private (including informal) sector would be to offer matching credits (veteran pays half) for entrance to these programs. On-the-job training, such as laternships and apprenticeships, may also help provide appropriate marketable training. One such progran was implemented by a NGO InNamibia, but its results are unknown. Another private program was implemented in Zimbabwe, with some success. 184. Before designing income generation or vocational training projects, the impact and viability of similar projects designed for civilians.would need to be evaluated. In existing reintegration -prograps, most income-generationprojects have focused on agricultural cooperatives (Development Poles In Nicaragua, also cooperatives in Zimbabwe) and some micro-enterprises (CENPAP's programs in Nicaragua, the NITRAM project in Zimbabwe). While cooperatives on the.whole have worked well, - micro-enterprises have been associated with poor management skills, poor infrastructure, lack of raw naterials, and consequently, high attrition rates. Some of the problems faced might have been overcome had there been an assessment of other income generation projects in these areas, an examination of existing businesses to assess the economy's needs, recognition of the substantial training needed to allow ex-combatants to successfully function in the private sector, and an indication of the level of competition micro-enterprises would face. 185. Job placement/counseling programs are helpful as most ex-combatants lack job-searching knowledge and skills, and the resources to travel to areas where jobs may be located. In addition, there Is often a bias against hiring veterans in the private sector-this may be partly remedied by affirmative action programs ("hire a vet"), i.e., incentives for businesses. These problems were cited in Namibia, where unemployment is estimated at between 30 and 40%. Chapter7 - Program Results and Lessons Learned Pagep Demobilization and Relategration of Military Personnel 186. Programs targetod solely at former combatants and their families have the potential of creating resentment from non-beneficiaries. According to donors involved with the Nicaraguan program, DRPs could avoid Indreasing polarization among social groups by being limited in duration and Integrated with regular development and community-based programs as soon as possible. Programs aimed exclusively at former combatants can be justified in some cases: fo example, to provide assistance to individuals who have no home after leaving the armed forces, or have become disabled during military service; to provide contractWally agreed upon severao packaes; to make up for educational, training and job opportunities foregone due to military service; and -for children-soldiers, who require such extensive preparation to make the transition to civilian life. However, providing soldiers with benefits and opportunities that exceed those of non-combatants li a situation where the jatter are also quite needy and mmerous, an4 probably have suffered the consequences of protracted periods of war, may create the basis for new hositi. 187. Reintegration may be enhanced by Incorporating ex-combatants into new or existing community-based development projects, thus offsetting some of the potpntlal resentment from non- beneficiaries. Some unexplored possibilities include providing matching grants to soldiers wishing to participate in commnity-based development projects. The potential for using community-pressure to monitor some of the projects of veterans has been untapped in many of the reintegration programs. In Nicaragua, veterans were provided with material and training in housing construction, and each veteran was allowed to move into his/her house only when all the houses a team was to construct were finished. 188. Case study results,lndicate that for many combatant groups, it is most appropriate to target families, not just individual combatants. Failing to take into account combatants' dependents can result in inadequate support and may delay thei reintegration. Some evidence exists from Nicaragua and Zimbabwe that providing benefits to. ex-c6mbatants' wives and families, may increase program success. In Nicaragua, program managers found that distributing benefits to the wives has resulted in a more equitable distribution of food withip the family, and better control and use of money. In Zimbabwe, the wives of ex-coambatants proved to be successful in collectivearming. Women could be given the responsibility for collecting food.and other assistance provided as part of the settling-in kit, trained in the management of household finances, and given the opportunity to borrow money to begin small farming or production enterprises. 189. In some cases, NGOs have been governments' and donors' most valuable partners in Implementing DRPs. For example, NGOs have organized transportation to camps (Namibia), distributed food, medical care, and materials (Namibia), and provided training and job counseling (Zimbabwe). NGOs can help compensate in part for weak public sector institutions. In addition, local NGOs are frequently involved in comminity-based development projects, have extensive experience of local conditions and needs, and possess a measure of Independence from the government, factions, and local political parties. In countries where ex-combatants need to be dispersed but government institutional capacity is weak, NGOs present a cost-effective vehicle for designing and Implementing reintegration programs. f1/ In Angola, for example, there may be as many as 2 million displaced persons. Page 100 Chapter 7 - Program Results and Lessons Lxarned Demobllftina and Rointegration of Mihary Prsonne Box VII.2: 7he Public Sector as "Reintegrator of Last Resort ...... ff er ärla w p lired nohe civi e bIR tl wa .&g.U.u.x~r~u~.n..å-.p.qa...... Iq ~ au . n o.. % rvidring the war ofli6eration und to '*dilute" the white Rhiodesian c~Iyi service whdeb _e_f csa lakyitd~ t bato v25,00troopsanJ 1992hee 5eart O500 Sot a sabtageö o dûcted at Afriean Naionatt Coaessjte n7mabe PROGRAM RESULTS 190. In Zimbabwe, 83% of former combatants found employment or were in training eight years after the DRP was implemented. However, as shown InBox VII.2 and in Table VII. 1, the primary source of employment was the public sector (the military and civil service). In Namibia, the public sector has expanded significantly since independence, but much of the growth was needed to assume responsibility for functions previously carried out by the South African government. Data are not available on the number of ex-combatants in the civil service; however, some of the expansion reportedly occurredChaic to 7-Prgrareward Rmuis political nd supportersesonsLorno and to assist the government's political party, SWAPO, in1ago10 gaining control over the bureaucracy. Similarly, the police force has absorbed former guerrilla soldiers and is considered overstaffed (5% of former guerrillas are now in the police force). A substantial number of former guerrillas (15%) are allegedly employed in Development Brigades, also funded by the government. 191. Escalation of intermittent violence in Nicaragua in late summer 1993 point to the mixed results of its program. On the one hand, a substantial number of NR were demobilized relatively quickly (no long waiting times in camips), many allegedly have not re-armed, and the EPS army was reduced substantially within a short period of time having a dramatic impact on defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP (from 28% in 1989 to an estimated 5% in 1991). In contrast to Zimbabwe, the size of the civil service has decreased. CIAV-OAS has estimated that as of November 1991 75-80% of Cae DemobiliSation and Reintegraton of Mulitay Personnel Table 11.1: ReinteeradonResults former NR were self sufficient (although there is no hard data to verify this).7 On the other hand, official employment and unemployment has increased, with some figures estimated at as high as 54% and intermittent violence persists.- No known surveys have been conducted to date on the present activities of ex-combatants. 192. In Chad, a survey returned by 506 of the first to be demobilized was produced in June 1993 (the second demobilization program had begun In July 1992).A The survey reveals that 78% of the ex-combatants reported some type of economic activity (See Table VII.2) and that 53% reported having no available financial means, while 47% reported having an average of US$379. Since, most of the demobilized would still be receiving their reintegration payments less than one year after the start of the program, it is possible that there may have been some misreporting of financial means. 193. The reintegration experiences of Zimbabwe, and to some extent that of Namibia and Nicaragua, suggest the ------following: (1) successful reintegration will not happen by itself: reintegration programs are important to maximize the percentage of ex-combatants finding productive activities; and, (2) even if reintegration programs are provided, it may take some time for veterans to find employment, and there will likely always be a percentage who do not find employment. It is therefore crucial to manage expectations about the speed with which employment will be found and the nature of the jobs veterans are likely to obtain-and to supply tempormty means of sustenance for a pre-defined period of time. 194. Most of the countries studied face substantial economic difficulties, and generally have high unemployment rates. Thus, in evaluating program success, one legitimate question to pose is whether the unemployment rate of former combatants exceeds the country's overall unemployment rate. 2W1 According to U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, AID to Ncaragua*U.S. Assistance &8pporEcootme and Social Development, August, 1992. 711 Unemployment and underemployment figure from "Nicaragua, After the Sandinistas," The Atlantic, July, 1992. 2W1 The results of this survey are from the first 506 questionnaires turned in. Because it is not based on a random sample, the sample may be blased. Pag 102 Chapter 7 - Program Results and Lessons Learned Demobiliation and Rolntegraton of Miltaq Personnel Unfortunately, reliable unemployment data is scarce for the countries concerned. Nonetheless, in both Zimbabwe and Namibia, a portion of ex-combatants remain unemployed, and one might expect a similar pattern in other reintegration programs currently underway. Table VII.2: Activities of Mzadlans Veterans Less than One Year After Demobilization ...... X .W.*...... p.u..4.% I'M MO M ... SMin MahaM.20 .ulig ui.?w.pr . 1.1% ...... ~~IIVMiscollaneous1 Animal:124W sowing MaIline - 2.096 d prernmentafChad...Pose.s.Lad.74Nushceit .49 Misednaaceou, Source'~~ lVOtftOfCa0"...ytb Poisess Lad .47.4%. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 195. In undertaking research for the case studies, It became obvious that little information has been published or is readily available which addresses the issues of demobilization and reintegration programs in general, or which provides specific information and analysis of DRPs to date in Africa. In some cases, finding information on these programs through a desk-study is virtually impossible. This report thus represents only an initial attempt to pull together available information. Additional doompientation probably exists in-country, particularly on smaller-scale NGO or privately-run programs, which Is less accessible through a desk-study but would be helpful for comparing experiences and suggesting further lessons which can be applied to future programs. In addition, a number of NGOs and bilateral donors may be beginning to gain experience with such programs in numerous countries (Catholic Relief Services, the EEC, USAID, GTZ), and could also be valuable sources of future information. Chapter 7 - Prgramn Results and Lessons Learned Page 103 Demobilization and Reiategration of Military Personnel BIBLIOGRAPHY GENERAL "Arms for Arms," Disarmament Newslettr. October 1990. Ball, Nicole. "Levers for Plowshares: Using Aid to Encourage Military Reform," Arms Control Today, November 1992, pp. 11-17. Cuny, Fredrick C. and Barry N. Stein, Ph.D. Repatriation During Conflict. A Guide for NGOS. (draft) Dallas: Intertect Institute. German Cooperation Agency (GTZ), "Proposal for the Reintegration of Refugees, Displaced Persons and Ex-Combatants with special reference to sub-Saharan Africa", August 1992. Gesellschaft FOr Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation - GTZ). "Development of a Conceptual Framework for Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees, Demobilized Soldiers and other Displaced Persons," Workshop Report, 1992. Global Coalition for Africa, OCA Sub-Committee on Democracy and Governance. "Reducing Military Expenditure in Africa." Document GCA/AC.2/04/4/92. Report presented at first meeting, Kampala, May 5-6, 1992. Gurtov, Mel. "China's Conversion of Military Industry to Civilian Production," Report prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., April 2-5, 1992. Hewitt, Daniel P. "Military Expenditure: International Comparison of Trends," International Monetary Fund (unpublished manuscript), May 1991. Horr, Manfred. "Reintegration of Expellees, Refugees and Demobilized Soldiers, West Germany's Experience after 1945 and its Transferability to Refugee Reintegration in Asian and African Countries," (draft) Saarbrucken: University of the Saar, May 1992. Julius E. Nyang'oro. "National Security and Defense Expenditure in Africa: A Political and Economic Analysis. Africa Development, Vol XVII, No. 4, 1992, pp. 5-28. Lake, Anthony et al. After the Wars. Reconstruction in Afthanistan. Indochina. Central America. Southern Africa. and the Horn of Africa. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990. Smock, David R. "Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Mediation of Africa's Wars, " Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29 - September 1, 1991. Bibliography Page 1 Demobilization and Rolntegration of Military Peronnel United Nations, Unite Nations -Peace-epng. New York: UN Department of Public Information, DPI/1048, May 1990. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace!KeegiLg (New York: United Nations), p. 372. United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia," S/23613, February 1992. Woods, James, L, Charles R. Snyder and Robert W. Hess. "Military Factors In Sustaining the Peace," Paper prepared for the International Negotiation Network, The Carter Center of Emory University, Atlanta, GA, January 15-17, 1992. ANGOLA "Angola's Old Foes Struggle to Unite," The New York Times, December 16, 1991. Burling, Kate. "Women and War, An Angolan Experience," The Monitor. June 13, 1991, p. 5. Clouard, Jean-Luc. "Choses Vues au Temps de la Cohabitation," Jeune Afrique Economle, Fevrler 1992, pp. 166-169. Coulson, Anita. "Politics After Peace," Africa Reort, July-August 1991, pp. 49-52. -. "The Paradox of Peace," Africa Rort., September-October 1991, pp. 41-43. -. "Constructing Capitalism," Africa Re t, November-December 1991, pp. 61-65. -. "Angola Tastes Political Freedom," The Washington Times, May 14, 1991. -. "Arms Dump," Focus on.Africa June 1992, pp. 11-14. Finkel, Vicki R. "Brothers in Arms," Africa Reort, March-April 1992, pp. 60-64. Green, Paula L. "Cease-Fire Agreement Increases Business Opportunities in Angola," Ie Journal of Commerce, May 7, 1991. "Jonas Savimbi Ira au Bout de sa Logique," Jeune Afrique Economie, Fevrier 1992, p. 170. McCormick, Shawn. "Angola: The Road to Peace," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Africa Notes, no. 125. Washington, D.C., June 6, 1991. -. "Angola in Transition: The Cabinda Factor," Center for Strategic and International Studies Africa Notes, no. 137. Wash!ngton, D.C., June 1992 Page 2 Bibliography Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel McGreal, Chris. "Savimbi's Loose Cannons," Indendent. June 2, 1991. Minter, William. "The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as Described by Ex-participants and Foreign Visitors," Research report submitted to the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), Washington, D.C., March 1990. Morrison, J. Stephen. "The Long Road Home: Angola's Post-War Inheritance," U.S. Committee for Refugees, Issue Paper, Washington, D.C., August 1991. Ozanne, Julian. "Angola Ripe for an Economic Revolution," Pinancial Times, May 8, 1991. Richburg, Keith B. "Dreams of African Democracy Deferred by Strength of Autocrats, Traditions,"'I]l Washington Pos, October 23, 1992, pp. A23-24. United Nations, "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification * Mission (UNAVEM II), S/24145, June 24, 1992. "War-weary Angolans Faced with Rising Crime Wave," &=, June 9, 1991. CHAD "Accord de Paix avec un Groupe Arm6," Marchds Toicau, 26 juin 1992. Charlton, Roger & Roy May. "Warlords and Militarism In Chad," Review of African Political Economy, 1989, No. 45/46. "Combats dans la Rdglon du Lac Tchad," Marchds Tropicaux, 12 juin 1992. Economist Intelligence Unit. "Cameroon, CAR, Chad," Country Report No. 3, 1991. Government of Chad, "Protocole d'Accord Portant Aide b la Rdduction des Effectifs de I'Armde Tchadienne," 30 juin 1992. Government of Chad, "Protocole d'Accord Portant Aide I la Restructuration de I'Armde Nationale Tchadienne," 30 juillet 1991. Gouvernement Frangais, "Les Combattants Tchadiens: Essai d'Analyse," Novembre 1991. "Mesures d'austdrit6," March6s Tropicaux, 24 juillet 1992. Oulatar, Y.B. "La R6forme est-elle Voulue?". N'iamengHebdo, No. 63, 5 novembre 1992. MOZAMBIQUE Bibliography Page 3 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel Ayisi, Ruth Ansah. "Fighting the Crime Wave," Africa Reort November-December 1991, p. 66-68. "Croisade des Gueux au Mozambique," Le Monde, January 9, 1991, p. 5. Meldrum, Andrew. "Railway of Refuge,", Africa Rport. May-June 1991, pp. 64-66. "Mozambique: Peace Process," Oxford Analytica, September 3, 1993 Pighetti, Olivier. "Le Combat des Buffles," Jeune Afrique Economie, no. 149, Novembre 1991, pp. 126-131. "The Party's Over, Start Having Fun," The Economis, January 18, 1992, p. 44. Republic of Mozambique, "A Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Mozamiblcan Military Personnel, First Phase 1991-1992," Maputo, May 25, 1992. "Shaky Passage," The Economist, Feb 16, 1991, p. 35. "Terror and Hope in Mozambique," The Christian Century, Aug. 22-24, 1990, p. 756. NAMIBIA "Action Plan on Way to 'Brush Up' Discipline in NDF," The Namibian, July 12, 1991. Arnwine, Barbara R. and Gay J. McDougall. "South Africa and Namibia: New Challenges," yers' Committgg for Cil Rift Under L , Southern Africa Project Annual Report, 1988- 1989. "Discipline in Policy: Askaris our Shame," Times of Namibi ,July 16, 1991, p. 1. The Economist. "Namibia: Beauty v. Beast," February 16, 1991. Esterhuysen, Pieter. "Countdown to Independence". Namibia 1990 (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, April 1991), p. 72. "Ex-Plan Fighters up in Arms over Pay-out," T1e Namibian, July 25, 1991. "Ex-Plan Get paid," Times of Namibia, July 16, 1991. "Ex-Fighters Deployed," Times of Namibi ,August 27, 1991, p. 2. "Ex-Plan Payment: Cheating won't be tolerated," Times of Namibia ,July 5, 1991, p. 2. "FAPLA Soldiers Arrested in North," Times of Namibia, August 16, 1991, p. 2. Page 4 Bibliography Demiobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel "Furious Ex-Plans Blame Government," Times of Namibia July 17, 1991. Hartmann, Paul, "The National Accounts", Namibia .I Hutcheson, A. MacGregor. "Namibia: Physical and Social Geography," Africa South of the Sahga, 1992, pp. 738 - 755. "Important Pay-out News for Ex-Plan Combatants," The Namibian, July 30, 1991, p. 5. "Introduction by the Prime Minister," Namibia Brief, November 1990, No. 12. "Kaokoland: Arms Cache," Times-of Namibia, August 14, 1991, p. 1. "Massive pro-Plan Demo in Owanbo," The Namibian, July 23, 1991, pp. 1-3. Mbako, Tobias. "Role of the Council of Churches in Namibia," Namibia.Brief, November 1990. "No Pants for Plan Papers," Times of Nambia, August 5, 1991. "Plan Fighters' Fury Ends in Bloodshed," The Namibian, July 24, 1991. "Plan Hits Back, 'They Can Keep the Moneyl'," 3b Namibin. July 25, 1991, p. 1. "Plan Pay-outs Could Be Stopped Warns Hamutenya," The Namibian, July 24, 1991, p. 3. "Plan Pay-out Problems," The Namibian, August 5, 1991. "Reflections on Progress and a Vision for the Future," Namibia Revuje March 1992, pp. 2-7. "Security Council Demands Disbandment of Paramilitary Forces in Namibia," UN Chronic., December 1989, p. 12. "72,000 on State Payroll," The Namibian, August 23, 1991. Simon, David. "One Year On," Namibia Yearbook:1990-1991. Smith, David A. "Options for a PVO Response in Namibia," New York: Private Agencies Collaborating Together, June 1, 1990. Sparks, Donald L. and December Green. "Namibia, The Nation After Independence," Westview Press, 1992. Sylvia Schloss. "Developing through Cooperatives," Hambia,Revue. April 1992, pp. 5-7. Bibliography Page 5 Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel Tapscott, Chris and Ben Mulongeni. "An Evaluation of the Welfare and Future Prospects of Repatriated Namibians In Northern Namibia," Windhoek: University of Namibia, August 1990. "Two Days in the Army," The Namibian, August 23, 1991, p. 5. "Thousands of Namibians Return Home", UN Chronid., September 1989, pp. 3-4 United Nations, "Election Supervision: The United Nations Experience in Namibia and Nicaragua," United Nations Focus, November 1990. "Veterans' Trust Receives Contributions at Coast," Times of Namibia. August 15, 1991. NICARAGUA Eguizabal, Christina, David Lewis, Larry Minear, Peter Sollis, and Thomas G. Weiss. "Humanitarian Challenges in Central America: Learning the Lessons of Recent Armed Conflicts," Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper no. 14, 1993. Johnson, Tim. "Nicaragua Defuses Jungle War as Insurgents Lay Down Arms," The Miami Herald, February 15, 1992 Nicaraguan Embassy, A proposal by the Government of Nicaragua for a Support Program for the Repatriation of the Nicaraguan Resistance. Organization of American States, Permanent Council, 1-fo-me del Secretario General Sobre los TrabAj v Proramas de la CIAV/OEA en Nicaragua. OEA/Ser.G; CP/doc.2112/90, October 30, 1990. Organization of American States, Permanent Council, Informe del Secretario General Sobre los Trabalos y Pro&ramas de la CIAVIOBA en Nicaragna (Informes de progreso hasta el 30 do novembre de 1921). OEA/Ser.G; CP/doc 2112/90 add.2; December 3, 1991. Organization of American States. Unpublished bimonthly CIAV-OAS progress reports, December 1991- January 1992, February-March 1992, April-May 1992. United Nations, "Election Supervision: The United Nations Experience in Namibia and Nicaragua," United Nations Focus, November 1990. United States General Accounting Office. "U.S. Assistance Supports Economic and Social Development," August 1992. UGANDA Colleta, Nat J., Nicole Ball. "War to Peace Transi:"on in Uganda." Finance & Development, June 1993. Page 6 Bibliography Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel ZIMBABWE Boesak, Alan. "Unity a Must If Africa's Economy is to Survive," Windhoek Observer, July 6, 1991, pp. 2.06-2.08. Carter, Gwendolen M. "The First Year," Africa Rert, May-June 1981, pp. 62-66. Chitsaka, Cephas and William Chikoto. " War Veterans Association. Does This Mark the Re-entry of Ex-combatants into the Political Life of the Country?", Sunday Mail, November 5, 1989. Dennis, Allistair. "The Integration of Guerrila Armies into Conventional Forces: Lessons Learned from BMATT in Africa." Institute for Defence Politics Working Paper, issue no. 5, presented at a conference on Changing Dynamics: Military-Strategic Issues for a Future South Africa, Pretoria, August 6, 1992. "Employment Chances for Ex-combatants Slim, Says Acton," Sunday Mail, May 18, 1986, p. 8B3. Madlumutsa, Malachia. "Zimbabwe Project Helps Former Fighters Build Co-operatives," HrA, December 28, 1984, p. 8B3. "Plight of Ex-Combatants," Ministerial Statement to Zimbabwe Parliament on August 4, 1988. "A Soldier Faces His Critics, General Walls talks about his country's future," lin, September 1, 1980, p. 34. "Soldiers Get Details of Demob Terms," erald, August 17, 1981, p. 8AL. "A War-torn Nation's Revival," Businesl Week December 15, 1980, p. 118, 122. The Zimbabwe Project, "The Zimbabwe Project's Experience in Resettling Ex-Combatants", August 1989. Bibliography Page 7 ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE TERMS OF REFERENCE STUDY OF BEST PRACTICESPRELIMINARY LESSONS ON REINTEGRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND OTHER DISPLACED PERSONS 1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 1. The recently formed Working Group on Demobilization/Reintegration in African countries has brought together World Bank staff working on African Countries currently undertaking or considering demobilization of military personnel. Meetings on this topic have highli,zhted the increasing frequency with which the Bank is being asked for technical and/or financial assistance for programs to reintegrate military personnel and displaced persons. Country teams for Angola, Chad, Mozambique and Ethiopia have been involved, to varying degrees, in discussion on this topic with Government. Other countries such as Liberia, Sudan and Somalia may face the challenge of demobilization/reintegration in the future. 2. Given the lack of Bank experience in this field, and the potential impact that demobilization/reintegration processes may have on operations, there is a strongly-felt and urgent need by staff to obtain further information on the past and current experience of various countries with reintegration programs. At a meeting of interested staff held in February 1992, chaired by Ms. Katherine Marshall (AF5DR), it was agreed that a study of best practices in this area was essential to provide guidance to Bank staff currently being asked for advice by client governments. The scope and focus of the proposed study have been discussed by members of the Working Group. An outline of the study, intended to be completed within the next two-to- three months, is presented below. 3. In sum, the proposed study would be a cross-country study in which the assessments of country cases of reintegration programs would cover: (i) the stated or imputed objectives, approaches and policv and other instruments of the programs; (ii) policy and program implementation; and (iii) analyses of the reasons for the success or failure of implementation, including evaluations of whether the program 6bjectives were appropriate to begin with. The comparative analysis would distill lessons of experience across countries and provide recommendations regarding the design and implementation of demobilization/reintegration programs under varying country circumstances. In addition, the study should summarize relevant lessons derived from studies on related issues such as refugee resettlement, civil service retrenchment/reintegration programs, and job training and placement programs. II, SCOPE AND CONTENT 4. This study will be based on information available in Washington, from sources inside and outside of the Bank. It can build upon a previous working paper by Sarah Keener (AF5CO September 1991) that described briefly the demobilization experiences of African and non-African Countries. This study should give priority to African cases of already-completed or ongoing reintegration programs (e.g. Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe). The study should also apply the derived lessons of experience to African countries now at the beginnin of the process of demobilization and reinsertion (e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia). -2- 5. While it is preferable to draw upon examples in Africa, limited experience with these types of programs in the region will merit the inclusion of at least three non-African cases illustrating particular aspects of reintegration (e.g. Nicaragua, Columbia, China for training). 6. The study will consist of three parts. PattL. will consist of an executive summary presenting the most important conclusions and recommendations. E=RlI will contain the several country case studies. Pat..111 will comprise the comparative analysis, deriving lessons of experience across countries and providing recommendations regarding demobilization/reintegration policies and practices to be emulated and avoided in African countries. III. OUTLINE OF COUNTRY CASES - PART II 7. The coty cases to be presented in Part II should provide information and analysis in the following areas: A. Program Obiectives and Contexts - Political/ethnic/economic context of the program (e.g. fiscal retrenchment, war-to-peace transition, prolonged civil or brief external conflict,) state of the overall security and employment situations prior to the period of demobilization/reintegration. - Objectives of Government and major donors, such as: (i) providing demobilized soldiers with what is due contractually, and ensuring their mobility into economically efficient jobs by creating an enabling environment (training, information on-job opportunities, etc.); (ii) ensuring (or guaranteeing) that the demobilized personnel have jobs; and/or (iii) ensuring that demobilized soldiers do not threaten civil society or continue to fight (by providing alternative employment/activities and/or disarming them). B. Policy Instruments and Proram Approaches - Program design: * the process of program design, including the role of donors * if planned, the staging/sequencing of the programs * whether credit to soldiers and reintegration programs are subject to same criteria as other credit allocations and other projects * for programs focussed on targeted material benefits, detailed descriptions of the nature and extent of the benefits provided (e.g. severance payments, land, oxen, tools, jobs in the public or private sector, etc.) to specific target groups (soldiers, refugees, displaced persons). * for programs focussed mainly on creating an enabling environment for reintegration, descriptions of specific significant actions (e.g. focus on labor- intensive projects in the investment program, etc.). -3- - Program costs and financing: * total and unit costs (e.g. per soldier or beneficiary) by main program component (tables). * sources of financing, local and foreign, by main component (tables) * assessment of fiscal/financing issues Program management * organizations/agencies involved in managing the program and their capacities. C. Implementation Experience and Issues - Program results: * outcomes in terms of quantitative indicators of numbers of people "reintegrated* in various ways, numbers receiving benefits, etc. * identification of successes/failures in achieving 'stated" objectives and methods/criteria used for tracking success. . assessment of program according to criteria which may not have been part of stated objectives (cost-effectiveness, quality of services provided, perception/acceptance of program by general population). * main constraints to effective implementation. * evaluation of reasons for success/failure of main program components, including commitment and "ownership" by stakeholders and implementing agencies as well as sequencing of reintegration and demobilization. - Donors Roles and Aid Coordination Issues: * donor roles in implementation, forms of technical assistance * identification/assessment of aid coordination problems/lissues * World Bank role. D. Summary Assessment of Individual Country Cases - Lessons of lutnty experience with particular reference to * appropriateness and costs/benefits of objectives, approach, instruments (i.e. did bypassing regular investment criteria produce new economic distortions) * best/worst practices: what worked best and worst and why * pros/cons of targeting soldiers directly vs. combining reintegration of soldiers with other displaced persons. * most/least efficient types of assistance to soldiers and displaced persons. * nature and timing of Bank involvement (actual or hypothetical). E. List of Publications and References - List of key publications referred to (with brief annotations where important) - References: list of persons consulted/identified -4- IV. OUTLINE OF SYNTHESIS - PART III 8. Part Il should provide a comparative assessment of the experience of the case-study countries in designing, financing and implementing programs of demobilizations/reintegration. It should distill the lessons of experience across countries and provide guidance on programs most likely to succeed (according to various criteria) under different conditions. 9. The presentation will be most useful if done in a taxonomic form using tables or matrices to present comparative data, key indicators and summary comments.