THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL PREEMINENCE: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RHETORICAL RELATIONS, 1978-2006
By
ALLISON JOANN CLARK
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
2007
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© 2007 Allison Joann Clark
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my parents and family, specifically Mom, Daddy, Uncle Jack, and
Donny. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee – Dr. Dodd, Dr. Conley, Dr.
Rosenson, Dr. Scher, and Dr. Kaid. Finally, I would like to thank everyone else who helped make this achievement possible (you know who you are).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... 3
LIST OF TABLES...... 7
LIST OF FIGURES ...... 10
ABSTRACT...... 12
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION ...... 14
Power of Persuasion ...... 15 The Puzzle of Rhetorical Agenda Setting...... 19 Theoretical Perspectives on Presidential Persuasiveness ...... 22 Political Factors...... 22 Congressional/Institutional Factors...... 24 Political Time ...... 28 The Central Questions ...... 30 Data and Methods...... 34 Measuring Influence ...... 37 Research Outline...... 39
2 UNIFIED GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION...... 42
96th Congress, 1979-1981 ...... 43 103rd Congress, 1993-1995...... 48 108th Congress, 2003-2005...... 53 109th Congress, 2005-2007...... 56 Partisanship in Unified Government ...... 59 Conclusions...... 60
3 POLITICAL FACTORS AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION ...... 74
Electoral Mandates ...... 74 Early vs. Late...... 84 First vs. Second Term...... 86 Presidential Approval Ratings ...... 87 Conclusions...... 89
4 POLITICAL TIME...... 96
Reagan and the Politics of Reconstruction ...... 97 Bush I and the Politics of Articulation ...... 98
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Carter and the Politics of Disjunction...... 100 Clinton and the Politics of Preemption...... 101 The Political Time of Bush II ...... 103 Levels of Presidential Influence Across Political Time ...... 106 Politics of Disjunction Revisited – Carter vs. Bush II...... 108 Conclusions...... 108
5 CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT ...... 112
Why Speak?...... 112 Who Speaks? ...... 114 Chamber Matters ...... 115 Party Affiliation...... 117 Length of Service...... 118 Party Leaders and Committee Chairs ...... 120 Institutional Changes in Congress ...... 120 Congressional Factors and Presidential Influence...... 123 Conclusions...... 125
6 DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN POLICIES...... 130
Presidential Influence in Foreign Affairs ...... 130 Presidents and Foreign Policy, 1978 – 2006 ...... 134 Jimmy Carter, 1978 – 1980 ...... 135 Ronald Reagan, 1981 – 1988...... 137 George H.W. Bush, 1989 – 1992...... 139 Bill Clinton, 1993 – 2000 ...... 140 George W. Bush, 2001 – 2006...... 141 Domestic vs. Foreign – Overall Levels of Presidential Influence...... 142 Conclusions...... 144
7 INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION...... 151
Carter and the Iranian Hostage Crisis...... 153 Bush I and the Persian Gulf War ...... 154 Bush II and 9/11...... 159 Conclusions...... 160
8 GEORGE W. BUSH: A CASE STUDY ...... 167
2001 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses ...... 167 2002 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses ...... 170 2003 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses ...... 175 2004 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses ...... 177 2005 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses ...... 179 2006 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses ...... 181 Conclusions...... 182
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9 PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS...... 193
Political Factors ...... 193 Political Time...... 196 Institutional Factors ...... 198 Types of Policy...... 201 Discussion...... 203 Implications and Final Thoughts ...... 205
APPENDIX
A METHODOLOGY ...... 211
B MEASUREMENT...... 218
LIST OF REFERENCES...... 224
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 327
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LIST OF TABLES
Table page
1-1 Presidential Levels of Influence...... 41
2-1 Party Identification of Speaking Members ...... 72
2-2 Levels of Influence During Unified Government...... 72
2-3 Levels of Influence During Divided Government ...... 73
3-1 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1981 ...... 90
3-2 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1982 ...... 90
3-3 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1983 ...... 90
3-4 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1984 ...... 90
3-5 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1985 ...... 90
3-6 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1986 ...... 91
3-7 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1987 ...... 91
3-8 Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1988 ...... 91
3-9 Presidential Levels of Influence...... 91
3-10 Levels of Influence Early in the First Term...... 91
3-11 Levels of Influence Late in the First Term ...... 92
3-12 Levels of Influence in the Second Term...... 92
3-13 Presidential Approval and Level of Influence at Time of SOU Address ...... 92
4-1 Presidential Influence Across Political Time...... 111
4-2 Numeric Levels of Influence by President...... 111
4-3 Numeric Levels of Influence During a President’s First Term...... 111
5-1 Speaking Members by Chamber...... 126
5-2 Speaking Members by Party Affiliation ...... 126
5-3 Speaking Members by Party Control of the House ...... 126
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5-4 Speaking Members by Party Control of the Senate...... 126
5-5 Speaking Members by President’s Party Affiliation ...... 126
5-6 Average Partisan Difference for Individual Presidents ...... 126
5-7 Average Length of Service When Speaking, 1978 – 2006...... 127
5-8 Percentage of Party Leader and Committee Chairs, 1978 – 2006 ...... 127
5-9 Presidential Influence Based on Average Years Speaking Members Served...... 127
5-10 Presidential Influence Based on Speaking Party Leaders...... 126
5-11 Presidential Influence Based on Speaking Committee Chairs...... 126
6-1 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress ...... 146
6-2 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress ...... 146
6-3 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress ...... 147
6-4 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress ...... 147
6-5 Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress ...... 148
6-6 Levels of Influence Based on Emphasis of Domestic Policies...... 149
6-7 Average Level of Influence During Domestic Policy Discussion...... 149
6-8 Percentage of First SOU Addresses Devoted to Foreign Affairs ...... 149
6-9 Percentage Change from First to Last SOU Address on Foreign Affairs...... 150
7-1 1979 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type...... 163
7-2 1980 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type...... 163
8-1 Discussion of Domestic/Foreign Policies by Bush II ...... 191
8-2 Discussion of Domestic/Foreign Policies by Congress ...... 191
9-1 Levels of Influence During United/Divided Government ...... 209
9-2 Levels of Influence Early vs. Late in a President’s First Term ...... 209
9-3 Levels of Influence First vs. Second Term ...... 209
9-4 Presidential Approval Ratings and Levels of Influence ...... 209
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9-5 Levels of Influence During Political Time ...... 209
9-6 Presidential Influence and Average Years Speaking Members Served (AYS) ...... 209
9-7 Percent of Party Leaders (PL) Speaking and Presidential Influence ...... 210
9-8 Percent of Committee Chairs (CC) Speaking and Presidential Influence ...... 210
9-9 Emphasis of Domestic Policy and Levels of Presidential Influence ...... 210
A-1 Number of Speeches Coded Each Year...... 216
A-2 Domestic and Foreign Policies Coded...... 217
B-1 Topics Discussed by the President and Congress...... 223
B-2 Presidential Levels of Influence...... 223
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure page
2-1 1979 SOU Address Topics...... 64
2-2 1979 Congressional Response Topics ...... 64
2-3 1980 SOU Address Topics...... 65
2-4 1980 Congressional Response Topics ...... 65
2-5 1993 SOU Address Topics...... 66
2-6 1993 Congressional Response Topics ...... 66
2-7 1994 SOU Address Topics...... 67
2-8 1994 Congressional Response Topics ...... 67
2-9 2003 SOU Address Topics...... 68
2-10 2003 Congressional Response Topics ...... 68
2-11 2004 SOU Address Topics...... 69
2-12 2004 Congressional Response Topics ...... 69
2-13 2005 SOU Address Topics...... 70
2-14 2005 Congressional Response Topics ...... 70
2-15 2006 SOU Address Topics...... 71
2-16 2006 Congressional Response Topics ...... 71
7-1 1990 SOU Address Topics...... 163
7-2 1990 Congressional Response Topics ...... 164
7-3 1991 SOU Address Topics...... 164
7-4 1991 Congressional Response Topics ...... 165
7-5 1992 SOU Address Topics...... 165
7-6 1992 Congressional Response Topics ...... 166
8-1 2001 SOU Address Topics...... 185
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8-2 2001 Congressional Response Topics ...... 185
8-3 2002 SOU Address Topics...... 186
8-4 2002 Congressional Response Topics ...... 186
8-5 2003 SOU Address Topics...... 187
8-6 2003 Congressional Response Topics ...... 187
8-7 2004 SOU Address Topics...... 188
8-8 2004 Congressional Response Topics ...... 188
8-9 2005 SOU Address Topics...... 189
8-10 2005 Congressional Response Topics ...... 189
8-11 2006 SOU Address Topics...... 190
8-12 2006 Congressional Response Topics ...... 190
8-13 Domestic Policies Discussed by Bush II and Congress...... 191
8-14 Foreign Policies Discussed by Bush II and Congress...... 192
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL PREEMINENCE: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RHETORICAL RELATIONS, 1978-2006
By
Allison Joann Clark
May 2007
Chair: Lawrence C. Dodd Co-chair: Richard Conley Major: Political Science
This dissertation looks at the evolution of presidential-congressional rhetorical relations
from Jimmy Carter in 1978 to George W. Bush in 2006. My study shows that presidents
increasingly shape and dominate the nature and framing of national policy agendas in ways that demonstrate growing preeminence over Congress. This evolution is examined by analyzing presidents’ State of the Union addresses and subsequent congressional responses to them in speeches made by members on the floors of the House and Senate. Specifically, this research shows the extent to which members of Congress respond to presidents’ State of the Union addresses by embracing the president’s agenda priorities and justificatory language, by challenging his priorities and language, or by ignoring them.
Different factors which may affect a president’s ability to influence the legislative agenda
are also examined. Political factors such as divided government, electoral mandates, when the
president is speaking during his term, and presidential approval ratings are all considered.
Factors specific to the president and Congress such as political time and institutional
characteristics are also explored. Additionally, whether the president is discussing domestic or
foreign policies is also taken into consideration. Ultimately, it is determined which factors allow
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presidents the most influence and which ones place the greatest limitations on presidential
persuasion.
Aside from uncovering patterns of presidential influence, my dissertation also shows the value of using rhetoric as a measure. Using rhetoric as a measure is a relatively unique endeavor, and overcomes some of the difficulties of previous measures used to evaluate presidential-congressional relations. Therefore, my dissertation makes a contribution to the political science field in that it offers new insight into presidential-congressional relations, as well as provides a fruitful agenda for future research.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The roles of the president and Congress in the American political system have changed
greatly since the 19th century. Whereas Congress used to be preeminent, most scholars agree that
the president has increasingly become the more powerful player during the 20th century (Cooper
2005). The increase in presidential preeminence is generally traced back to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and the actions he took in trying to deal with the Great Depression and World War II
(WWII). Roosevelt exercised tremendous presidential power, especially in his role as
Commander-in-Chief when handling foreign affairs, which set a precedent for future presidents
(Schlesinger 1973). Roosevelt’s actions also allowed presidents to have more control over policy than they previously had. The shift towards presidential policy dominance had continued to increase, and can be seen in the growth of presidential liaison relations in Congress and
presidents’ increasing roles in policy initiation, crafting, and enactment.
This dissertation looks at the evolution of presidential-congressional relations over the
last 28 years, starting with Jimmy Carter. It provides evidence which shows that presidents
increasingly shape and dominate the nature and framing of national policy agendas. This
evidence comes from the examination of presidents’ State of the Union (SOU) addresses, and subsequent congressional responses to them in speeches made by members on the floor of the
House and Senate.
Specifically, this research shows the extent to which members of Congress respond to
Presidents’ SOU addresses by embracing the president’s agenda priorities and justificatory
language in their speeches during the weeks following his address, by challenging his priorities
and language, or by ignoring them. This research also reveals the policy areas in which
presidents appear more or less preeminent, and identifies shifts in presidential preeminence
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across policy domains over time. The extent to which the acceptance or rejection of the president’s agenda is influenced by factors distinctive to Congress, such as its organizational structure and norms during different institutional eras, the character of internal partisan context, and the growth of ideological extremism are also examined. Developments in the presidency, such as the role of political time and its impact on presidential assertiveness and success in agenda dominance, are taken into consideration.
Power of Persuasion
The ability of presidents to persuade is said to have played a role in the rise of presidential preeminence over Congress, which is the reason I decided to focus on speeches and rhetoric. Scholars, such as Richard Neustadt, suggest that persuasion is really the central power that presidents possess within our constitutional structure (1990). Based on this premise, presidential persuasion is closely tied to presidential preeminence. If modern presidents are able to persuade Congress, and do so often, then presidential preeminence over Congress is likely to grow.
According to scholars, modern presidents have increased their ability to persuade in
Congress. This growing persuasiveness has been attributed to presidents’ abilities to lead the nation during times of crisis and war, with critical crises and wars increasing as the nation has emerged as the world’s dominant economy and military power. Their persuasiveness is then reinforced by their access to modern communication technologies that increase their national visibility and instant access to citizens, with citizens helping convince members of Congress to take presidential leadership seriously (Edwards 2003; Kernell 1997).
Given these arguments, examining the relationship between presidential speeches and subsequent speeches in Congress provides one way to examine a critical argument made regarding presidential preeminence – the assertion that presidents have increasingly dominated
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the national policy agenda through their persuasive powers with members of Congress.
Investigating congressional responses to presidential speeches, in other words, is a relatively direct way to determine whether presidents do influence the policy agenda discussed by legislators, and to clarify what effects the changing congressional eras, the shifting character of political time, and the emergence of ideological extremism have had on these patterns. In so far as presidents appear to influence or shape the policy agenda discussed by members, we can say that they appear to have some success in efforts at one aspect of persuasion -- setting the rhetorical agenda of Congress.
Scholars have found that rhetoric can often serve as a source of power for heads of state
(Zarefsky 2002). This power is often derived from using rhetoric to provide an interpretation of events by framing them in a certain way. Even though a majority of the framing literature relates to how the media frames news stories, the same concept can be applied to how the president presents issues to Congress and the public. Framing can be defined as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Entman 2003, 417). In other words, framing is when issues are presented from a certain angle (Callaghan and Schnell 2001).
By framing an issue, the president is able to define and give meaning to it, and then suggest possible solutions. Therefore, framing issues has the potential to give presidents more influence in Congress because it could force members to discuss policies on the president’s terms.
To further investigate the relationship between the president and Congress, my research specifically looks at the rhetorical interaction between presidents and Congresses by examining congressional responses to presidents’ SOU addresses. Besides analyzing SOU addresses themselves, I also looked at speeches made by members of Congress during the weeks following
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the SOU addresses to determine the extent to which members of Congress followed, challenged, or ignored the presidents’ agenda leadership in the speeches. State of the Union addresses are a
particularly appropriate moment at which to examine presidential-congressional interaction
because they are traditionally given on an annual basis.
In Article II, Section III of the Constitution, it states that the president “shall from time to
time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient...” Therefore, it is not
prescribed that the president must give a SOU address every year even though presidents have
typically done so. It is also not mandated that the president deliver the SOU address himself.
Originally, SOU addresses were written by the president and then read in Congress by someone
else. Woodrow Wilson was the first president to deliver the SOU address in person before both
houses of Congress.
The increased importance and attention given to the SOU address shows why it is an
appropriate juncture at which to examine presidential-congressional relations. Modern
presidents have typically delivered the SOU address in person on an annual basis, and used it as
a forum to outline their legislative policy goals (Cohen 1982). In fact, it has been argued that in
the 20th century SOU addresses have become a key power for the president in his role as chief
legislator (Hoffman and Howard 2006). This is due to the type of rhetoric used by the president
during his SOU address. Scholars have assigned various names to this type of rhetoric – deliberative rhetoric (Campbell and Jamieson 1990; Malbin 1983; Tulis 1987), policymaking rhetoric (Hoffman and Howard 2006), etc. – to differentiate it from the rhetoric presidents use when addressing only the public. Regardless of what it is called, the point is that during the SOU
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address presidents use rhetoric to try and identify public problems, offer solutions, and ultimately
lead Congress and the public (Hoffman and Howard 2006).
Therefore, examining SOU addresses should display the legislative agenda the president
is trying to pursue, while analyzing the subsequent congressional responses should show whether
members of Congress are receptive to this agenda. This research helps fill a void in presidential
and congressional literature, with prior studies focused primarily on growth in presidential
functions or on leadership success as seen in roll call vote victories in Congress. Neither of these
actually examines the issue of presidential persuasion in a direct manner. In fact, increased
functions for presidents may actually be driven by congressional mandates which presidents
resist, for example, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security which President George
W. Bush initially opposed. Similarly, the appearance of roll call vote success could arise
because of the effectiveness of congressional party leaders despite ineffectual presidential leadership or persuasion.
In contrast to growing functions of presidents or roll call vote success, congressional
responses immediately following major presidential speeches such as SOU addresses is a better
way to examine whether there is actual rhetorical persuasion occurring on the part of presidents,
in terms of the adoption of agenda concerns and language of the president by individual
members of Congress. Moreover, this response by members can be more closely assumed to be
authentic, whereas so many other moments of response, such as on roll call votes, reflect
institutional pressures and constraints that have become highly institutionalized in the modern
Congress.
One of the main advantages of using rhetoric as an indicator of persuasion is that
congressional speeches do not have many institutional constraints on them, especially such
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“open time” speeches as informal “one-minute” addresses in the House of Representatives.
Members of Congress can give such speeches on the floors of the House and Senate without
leadership approval, and without the same partisan pressures on members as seen in speeches
given during legislative debates or in roll call votes. Therefore, using rhetoric as an additional
and new indicator of presidential persuasiveness reveals other aspects of leadership success and
policy dominance by presidents, separate from such things as increased functions and
quantitative success at policy enactment.
Additionally, and critically, rhetorical responses by members of Congress to presidential
speeches can be content analyzed and measured in ways that allow us to trace the rise and fall of
congressional acquiescence, challenge, and dismissiveness in reaction to presidents. With such
measures we can then assess more clearly the extent to which increases or decreases are
occurring in presidential persuasion, the policy areas in which these patterns are occurring, the historical conditions in which they are occurring, and the congressional actors who are most involved in the process. Such measures allow us to explore the issue of presidential persuasion
and preeminence in new ways, assessing whether or not increases and changes are taking place
regarding this phenomena.
The Puzzle of Rhetorical Agenda Setting
In the most basic terms, the puzzle of presidential persuasion lies in one simple question:
are presidents increasingly successful in persuading members of Congress to follow their lead in the policy agenda they propose to Congress and in the rationale for the agenda that they articulate? The dependent variable for the dissertation is thus a straightforward one: the success
or failure of presidents to use their SOU message to legislative agenda discussed by members of
Congress. The ability of presidents to influence the legislative agenda therefore is a component
of persuasion. Before analyzing the president’s ability to influence the legislative agenda, it is
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first necessary to set out and address a number of interpretive concerns to ensure that
congressional responses are measured in sensible, systematic, and thorough ways.
One interpretive concern regards measuring variations in persuasiveness, specifically in
regards to presidential persuasiveness over the legislative agenda. To measure persuasiveness, it
is necessary to look at which topics the president is addressing and whether Congress is
responding to the same matters; whether Congress is responding in a positive or negative way;
and whether members of Congress are using similar language as the president in discussing these matters. Therefore, at the most basic level, it is necessary to see which topics the president is discussing in his SOU address, and whether members of Congress are discussing the same topics. For example, if a president spends 50 percent of his speech discussing health care, and members of Congress hardly mention health care during the weeks following his speech, then it can be concluded that the president was not very successful at persuading the congressional agenda. Therefore, it was important to examine the topics the president discussed in his SOU addresses, which items he emphasized, and whether he laid out clear plans of action to take regarding certain matters.
Besides looking generally at the topics each president discusses, I also paid attention to whether presidents were discussing domestic or foreign affairs. According to Aaron
Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, presidents are usually more successful in getting Congress to support their foreign agenda than their domestic agenda (1966). Assuming this to be true, then presidents should be able to more easily persuade Congress regarding issues related to foreign affairs such as military operations, than on domestic issues such as welfare or social security.
Besides looking at whether members of Congress are discussing the same issues as the president, I also looked at how the issues were being discussed. Just because the president talked
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about implementing a new social security program and members of Congress also discussed social security, does not mean that it was discussed in the same manner. For example, whereas the president may have said that implementing a new social security program would have a positive effect and make Americans feel more secure as they aged, members of Congress may have said just the opposite. Congress may have talked about the same idea, but said that the new social security program would jeopardize social security and in turn make Americans feel more insecure.
Therefore, it was necessary to see how the president and members of Congress were discussing the same issues. Was the president talking about an issue positively whereas members of Congress were discussing the same issue negatively, or vice versa? It was also important to see which issues seemed to draw the most differences between presidents and
Congress. This revealed the issues on which presidents were most persuasive, and also the topics which were most divisive.
Besides looking at the ways issues are discussed, persuasiveness can also be measured by looking at the actual language used by a president and seeing if members of Congress use similar language when discussing the same issues. For example, in discussing education policy in his
2001 SOU address, George W. Bush said that he refused to “leave any child behind in America”
(2001). In responding to his address, members of Congress adapted the language used by Bush into the phrase “no child left behind” and used it repeatedly. Eventually, this phrase became part of the title of a major piece of education legislation which was passed in 2001. This is just one example of specific language used by a president also being used by members of Congress. I argue that when members of Congress use similar language to that used by the president, it is an indication of his persuasiveness.
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Based on these various measures of persuasion, I am able to draw conclusions regarding the president’s ability to influence the congressional agenda over the last 28 years. For influence
to have increased, I would expect to see members of Congress discussing more of the same topics as the president, speaking of them in the same way, and increasingly using the same
language. I would also expect to see more members of Congress speaking in response to the
SOU addresses. For influence to have decreased, I would expect the opposite to be true.
Besides focusing on persuasiveness and whether presidential influence has increased, it is
also necessary to look at what else is happening across the same time period. Specifically, what
effects do different congressional eras, political time, ideological extremism, and election results
have? Do these things cause presidential influence to increase, or do they have the opposite
effect? These questions show the importance of paying attention to the context under which
each SOU address was given. Looking at these contextual variables may help show why some
presidents were more persuasive than others, and how that influenced the general trend of
increasing presidential preeminence over time.
Theoretical Perspectives on Presidential Persuasiveness
Now that presidential persuasiveness has been discussed in conceptual terms, it is necessary
to examine the various theoretical perspectives which may also impact presidential
persuasiveness. There are three main areas which may affect a president’s ability to persuade –
political factors, congressional/institutional factors, and political time.
Political Factors
There are many different political factors which could potentially impact presidential
persuasiveness, one of which is divided government. There are two main schools of thought
regarding divided government and its affect on presidential-congressional relations. One
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argument, perpetuated by James Sundquist, is that divided government causes the government to be less productive because of the inability of the president and Congress to cooperate (1983).
Under divided government, the president and Congress are likely to have different views on national policies, which make them less likely to work together. Another reason critics of
divided government claim makes it more ineffective is because it is harder for voters to hold
either party accountable (Quirk and Nesmith 2000).
Even though these are some of the reasons why divided government is supposedly not as productive as unified government, other scholars such as David Mayhew claim that divided government does not affect the ability of Congress to get things done (1991). Somewhere in between Sundquist and Mayhew are another group of scholars who believe that divided government matters sometimes depending on other political conditions (Conley 2003). For the purpose of this dissertation research, it will be assumed that divided government does affect a president’s ability to persuade, but that it is only one piece of the equation. Therefore, although it is likely for a president to be more persuasive under unified government and less persuasive under divided government, this is unlikely to be absolute.
Besides divided government, another political factor likely to affect presidential persuasiveness is whether or not a president has (or claims to have) an electoral mandate. An electoral mandate can be defined as when citizens use their votes as a way to tell the government their preferences regarding certain issues (Peterson, et al, 2003). In other words, an electoral mandate indicates a shift in public opinion in a certain direction. Assuming that members of
Congress are single-minded seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974), then they are likely to adjust
their positions in response to an electoral mandate.
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It is important to note that a president does not actually have to receive an electoral mandate for members of Congress to adjust their positions. The president only has to be perceived as having received an electoral mandate in order to affect congressional behavior
(Peterson, et al, 2003). Assuming that receiving an electoral mandate does influence congressional behavior, then it is also likely to increase a president’s ability to persuade.
However, since an electoral mandate in regards to the president can only occur every four years, it would be expected that electoral mandates would only have an affect on presidential persuasiveness immediately following a presidential election. This is consistent with other scholars who claim that the effects of electoral mandates on congressional behavior are likely to endure only a short period of time before dissipating (ibid).
Other political factors which may impact the ability of a president to persuade Congress are whether the president is speaking early or late during his term, and whether or not it is his first or second term. For example, a president may not wield as much influence towards the end of his second term when presidents are often viewed as being “lame ducks”. A final political factor to consider is whether or not the president is speaking during a period of crisis. For example, if a president is speaking during a time of war, he is likely to be more persuasive.
Congressional/Institutional Factors
The main congressional factor which may affect a president’s ability to persuade is the congressional era during which a president is speaking. Four main congressional eras characterize Congress over the last 60 years – textbook, reform, post-reform, and conditional party government periods. Each era is characterized by different institutional arrangements in
Congress, some of which may impact who is most likely to speak in Congress, and if they are apt to speak in support of the president or not. Briefly discussing each congressional era should
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show how these different institutional arrangements can potentially affect presidential persuasiveness.
The textbook era of Congress occurred from the end of WWII until about 1960. During this period, Congress was characterized by strong committee government, coalitional politics, and conservative policies (Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). Members of Congress were more specialized, and were often experts about the topics discussed in their committees (Sinclair
2000). Even though it may seem that this institutional arrangement would not be conducive to presidential influence, that is far from the case. “In the Textbook Congress, even more than in the 1930s, congressional party leaders, with little internal organizational power and more divided parties, had little choice but to rely on the president to set policy goals and provide political muscle” (Cooper 2005, 381).
The reform era of Congress took place during the 1960s and 1970s. This period was marked by many changes taking place regarding the internal structure of Congress. In the
House, the reform process started in 1958 when the Democratic Study Group formed to organize reform in the House. Whereas the House had a formal reform process, the Senate did not. The only official rule change in the Senate was in regards to the filibuster, when the number of votes needed to invoke cloture decreased from 67 to 60. However, there were many other changes that took place both in the House and Senate as the result of the suggestions of the Joint Committee which formed in 1965.
The suggestions of the Joint Committee led to the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970. One purpose of this Act was to reduce the power of committees and their chairmen. For example, the Act required committees to adopt written rules; allowed a committee majority to be able to hold a special meeting to address measures opposed by the chair; and said that committee
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reports must be filed within seven days of a meeting (Deering and Smith 1997; Kravitz 1990).
The Act also tried to prevent secrecy by requiring that committees must announce meetings publicly at least a week ahead of time and publish the results of roll call votes, including how
each member had voted and whether they did so in person or by proxy. Also in regards to committee secrecy, in the Senate there were to be no closed hearings held except under special circumstances, and in the House, committee business meetings had to be open except during bill mark-ups (Kravitz 1990).
The many reforms that took place during a relatively short period of time are likely to have affected how members of Congress responded to the president, and I would expect congressional response during this period to be different than that which took place during the textbook Congress. As the power of committees and their chairs continued to diminish into the post-reform Congress, I would expect the responses to the president by members of Congress to further change.
Whereas the textbook Congress was characterized by strong committees, committees played a less important role during the post-reform era while the role of parties increased. In the
post-reform Congress, parties acted as a centralizing agent and served many different functions.
For example, parties “socialized new members, distributed committee assignments, set the
legislative agenda, disseminated information, and carried out other tasks that are essential to
Congress’s law-making, oversight, and representative functions” (Herrnson 2000, 256). All of these functions (and others) allowed parties to gain influence over their members. This, along with the weakening of the committee system, led to parties playing a much larger role in the post-reform Congress.
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The role of parties has increased even more since the Republican revolution of 1994
resulting in a new congressional era, conditional party government. So far, this era has been
characterized by not only by strong parties, but also by pronounced party leadership and strong
ties to the president during periods of unified government. This should mean that more members
are speaking out in both support and opposition to the president. It is also likely that party leaders are speaking more to send cues to their party members.
Overall, the change from a committee controlled to a party dominated Congress should have an effect on presidential persuasion and how members of Congress respond to the president. However, since this dissertation analyzes only the last 30 years and not the last 60, the
main focus will be on looking at how institutional procedures and norms during the post-reform
and conditional party congresses affect congressional response to the president. Institutional
influence should be particularly pronounced as the role of parties in Congress increase.
Besides the different congressional eras, another congressional factor which may affect
how a member of Congress responds to the president is which chamber he or she is in. There are
many electoral and institutional differences between the House and Senate which may cause
Representatives and Senators to respond to the president differently. Basic electoral differences between the two chambers are that members of the House serve two-year terms whereas members of the Senate serve six-year terms. Serving only a two-year term may limit the way members of the House can respond to the president since they have to pay more attention to their re-election chances than Senators who do not have to concentrate as much on their re-election until the latter part of their terms. This difference is likely to cause members of the Senate to more aggressively challenge the president than members of the House who have to pay more
attention to re-election.
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Another electoral difference that could affect the way members of Congress respond to the president is that members of the House focus more on their constituencies whereas members of the Senate concentrate on more national issues (Carmines and Dodd 1985). Once again, this difference may limit the way members of the House respond. Besides electoral differences, there are also institutional differences which may affect the way members of Congress respond to the president. The main factor likely to have an impact on congressional response is that the Senate is typically more ideological and policy-oriented than the House (Carmines and Dodd 1985;
Richardson and Munger 1990). This means that Senators are more likely to respond to the president, and also that their responses are likely to be more varied and ideologically extreme.
Finally, it is important to consider the possibility that members of Congress are not actually being persuaded by the president, but instead are communicating viewpoints they would have expressed anyways, regardless of the president. In looking at literature regarding cue- taking, scholars contend that people most likely to be persuaded are those already predisposed to a certain viewpoint (Bond and Fleischer 1990; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994). Therefore, it would make sense to find that members of the president’s party were more likely to support his positions and use similar rhetoric. Additionally, other scholars have shown that people tend to be selective in the information they pay attention to, and that those who are knowledgeable about a specific issue are more likely to react when presented with information regarding it (Iyengar
1990). This again suggests that members of Congress might be predisposed to respond to certain information due to factors other than the president being persuasive.
Political Time
Political time could also potentially affect a president’s ability to persuade. Political time, which Stephen Skowronek defines as “the historical medium through which authority structures have recurred,” has four categories (2002, 30). The first two, opposed or affiliated,
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concern the attitude the incoming president has towards the outgoing administration. An opposed president is one who challenges the previous president’s agenda and often replaces it with another one, whereas an affiliated president is associated with the previous president and continues to work on and possibly complete his agenda. The third and fourth categories of political time, resilient or vulnerable, deal with the previous institutional arrangement. If the institutional arrangement under the outgoing president is resilient, then it will be much harder for the incoming president to make institutional changes if he so desires. However, if the governmental arrangements are vulnerable when a president takes office, it will be much easier for him to make changes to them.
Using the categories of opposed, affiliated, resilient, and vulnerable, Skowronek develops four classifications of political time. These four categories of political time are relevant to this dissertation research because the period of political time in which a president is speaking may greatly affect his ability to persuade Congress. The first type of political time is called the politics of reconstruction, which is when there is a president who is opposed and institutions that
are vulnerable. Presidents presiding during this time period, such as Ronald Reagan, have the
best opportunity to change the political system because they came in opposing the previous
president’s agenda and the public was in favor of change. Since the resistance to presidents in
this situation is usually weak, they are able to make more drastic changes to the government if
they choose. These presidents should also have the best opportunity to persuade.
The second type of political time is called the politics of disjunction, which is when the
previous institutional arrangements are still vulnerable, however, there is an affiliated president.
This is problematic because the president is associated with a certain agenda that is not
considered the best solution to the current problems. If the president continues to adhere to the
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previous agenda then he risks alienating his political allies. Presidents presiding during this time
period, such as Jimmy Carter, are also less likely to be able to persuade Congress.
The last two types of political time deal with institutional arrangements that are resilient.
The politics of articulation is when there is an affiliated president dealing with resilient
institutional arrangements. These presidents, such as George H.W. Bush, are generally seen as
presiding over a stable, normal period because they are committed to the previous agenda and it
works. Therefore, presidents presiding during the politics of articulation are likely to be more
persuasive since they are presenting issues in a way which is already largely accepted.
The opposite is true of presidents presiding during the politics of preemption. During the
politics of preemption, the political agenda of the outgoing president is still playing out,
however, the incoming president wants to pursue a different agenda. These presidents, such as
Richard Nixon, are the “wild cards of presidential history, and are often singled out for flaws of
character” (Skowronek 2002, 44). However, Bill Clinton would also fall into this category.
They are also likely to be less persuasive since they are presenting agendas which are
unattractive to most.
The Central Questions
The main question is whether or not there is evidence that different presidents succeed in
varying degrees in setting the rhetorical agenda of Congress in their SOU addresses, and in
clarifying whether or not this success seems shaped by differing contexts in which the speeches
are presented or different topics on which the speeches focus. The main expectation of this
dissertation is to find that presidential influence in Congress has increased resulting in the president playing a larger role in policy formation. Even though I expect to find a gradual increase in presidential persuasion over time, specifically in regards to the legislative agenda, I also anticipate finding fluctuations in a president’s ability to persuade due to other factors.
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One set of factors that may affect presidential success in setting the rhetorical agenda for
Congress is political factors. The literature on presidential-congressional relations suggests that one political factor that can shape presidential influence in Congress is the presence of divided versus unified government (Binder 2002; Conley 2003; Fiorina 2002; Mayhew 1991; Sundquist
1992). I believe that under divided government a president will have less influence over the legislative agenda then under unified government. This is because fellow members of a president’s party are more likely to be receptive to his message than members from the opposing party.
Another political factor likely to affect presidential influence is whether or not a president has an electoral mandate. Presidents perceived as having an electoral mandate will likely have a better ability to persuade. This is because literature suggests that if members of Congress believe that the public elected the president based on certain policy positions, then in the interest of their own re-election, members will likely adjust their policy positions to be closer to those of the president (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Hershey 1994; Peterson, et al, 2003). This makes members of Congress especially vulnerable to presidential persuasion.
Two other political factors that are likely to affect presidential influence are whether the president is speaking early or late in his term, and if it is the president’s first or second term.
Based on the literature, I expect to find mixed results in regards to when in his term a president is speaking (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Eshbaugh-Soha 2005; Lewis and Strine 1996). If a president was just elected by a large margin, or received an electoral mandate, then he would likely be more persuasive in the beginning of his term. However, if a president did not win by a large margin, or if the election results were questionable as in the case of George W. Bush, then I would expect a president to be less persuasive early in his term. Therefore, I do not expect to
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find a discernable pattern in regards to a president’s persuasive ability based on when during his term he is speaking.
I do expect to find a pattern regarding whether a president is speaking in his first or second term. I believe that presidents will have a better ability to persuade during their first term than in their second. This is because presidents are often viewed as more ineffective during their second term when they no longer have to think about re-election.
Another political factor which may affect presidential influence over the congressional agenda is the president’s approval rating. Presidents with higher levels of approval are more likely to have more leverage in Congress, therefore making it likely that they will have more influence (Bond, Fleischer, and Wood 2003; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Conley 2000; Lockerbie,
Borrelli, and Hedger 1998; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985; Sullivan 1991).
Besides political factors, presidential-congressional literature suggests that institutional factors such as the congressional eras should also impact a president’s ability to influence the legislative agenda, as well as whom in Congress responds to the president (Dodd 2005; Herrnson
2000; Lehnen 1967; Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Rohde 1991). In regards to presidential persuasiveness, the exertion of influence over Congress by the president is likely to be gradual.
This is because as Congress changes from being committee dominated to party dominated, there is more room for the president to play a larger role.
Even though the different congressional eras should have an effect on the president’s ability to persuade, they are likely to have even more of an impact on who responds to the president. For example, I expect to find that party leaders become increasingly likely to speak as
Congress moves from post-reform to conditional party government. Also during the conditional party era, I would expect more ideologically extreme members to speak. This will likely cause
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more varied responses to the president. Ultimately, I expect the different congressional eras to
largely determine which members of Congress speak and what they say.
Besides congressional eras influencing congressional response, the chamber a member of
Congress is in will also likely influence how he or she responds. For example, I would expect
Senators to respond more frequently than Representatives. This is because members of the
House have to concentrate more on re-election and they focus more on their constituencies. I
also believe that the responses given by Senators will be more varied and ideologically extreme
since the Senate is typically a more diverse, and individualistic body.
Besides institutional factors, literature suggests that political time will also likely impact the president’s ability to influence the legislative agenda (Lewis and Strine 1996; Milkis 1995;
Skowronek 1997). I expect to find that presidents speaking under the politics of reconstruction
will have to best opportunities to persuade. This is because presidents have the best opportunity
to create change under the politics of reconstruction since the president is opposed to the
previous president’s agenda, and institutions are vulnerable to change. Presidents are also likely
to be persuasive under the politics of articulation. During this political time, presidents are
committed to a previous agenda and it works, so members of Congress are likely to be easily
persuaded.
Even though presidential persuasion is likely under the politics of reconstruction and
articulation, presidents under the politics of preemption will likely have the least opportunity to
persuade. This is because under the politics of preemption, the president is opposed to the
previous regime, but institutions are resilient. Since the president would be trying to change an
agenda that most do not want changed, then he is not likely to have much success persuading
members of Congress. Presidents are also not likely to have persuasive success under the
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politics of disjunction. This is due to presidents promoting an agenda which is not the best one to deal with the current problems. Therefore, members of Congress are not likely to be persuaded.
Finally, the types of policies a president is discussing and the presence of an international crisis should affect a president’s influence in Congress. According to the two presidencies thesis, presidents are more successful when pursuing foreign policies than domestic policies
(Wildavsky 1966). Based on this thesis, as well as the work of other scholars, I would expect to find that presidents are better able to influence the foreign policy agenda in Congress than the domestic policy agenda (Andrade and Young 1996; Bond and Fleischer 1988; Morgan and
Bickers 1992; Wood and Peake 1998). Additionally, international crises will also likely increase a president’s influence of Congress due to a “rally around the flag” effect (Mueller 1985; Sinclair
2004).
In exploring these central questions, my expectations for this dissertation are for it to serve as somewhat of a pretest for my methods and measurement. I hope to learn from the coding, measurement, and empirical probing before expanding my dissertation to include additional data and test hypotheses. Aside from improving my methods and measurement, my dissertation will show that there is a real meaningful response to the president’s SOU address made by members of Congress, and that this response varies over time according to the president and other factors, and seems to do so in some patterned ways. I can then build on these findings and create a larger research agenda in which I will do more extensive testing.
Data and Methods
The main source of data for this dissertation research was be SOU addresses and the subsequent responses to them by members of Congress. State of the Union addresses were
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analyzed for every year beginning with Jimmy Carter in 19781, and ending with George W. Bush in 2006. This time period was chosen for several reasons. Initially, my intent was to analyze speeches from WWII to the present, however, due to time constraints this time period had to be reduced. In looking at modern presidents, Ronald Reagan was a logical place to start since he is considered the “Great Communicator.” However, I chose to go back to Carter to hopefully see a contrast between Carter, who was considered somewhat rhetorically challenged, and Reagan and the presidents who succeeded him.
Transcripts of the SOU addresses from were obtained from the C-SPAN website
(http://www.c-span.org/executive/stateoftheunion.asp). Besides analyzing the SOU addresses
from 1978 through 2006, speeches given on the floors of the House and Senate during the five
days Congress was in session immediately following each SOU address were also be examined.
The relevant congressional speeches from 1985 to the present were obtained from the
Congressional Record available on Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe. Congressional
speeches given prior to 1985 were obtained from microfiche housed at the University of Florida
Law Library.
The SOU addresses were the first speeches to be analyzed since to fully understand how
members of Congress were responding to them, it was first necessary to know what is being said.
In looking at the SOU addresses, each one was coded for the topics the president was discussing;
how much time he was spending discussing them; what plans, calls to action, or solutions the
president was offering for each topic; whether he specifically mentioned Congress and if so, in
what context; and what specific words or phrases the president used when discussing each item.
1 Jimmy Carter did not give a SOU address in 1977.
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Based on the topics discussed in a SOU address, congressional speeches were then
chosen for each year. Speeches were chosen based on policies discussed by the president
meaning that not all speeches given during the five days Congress was in session immediately
following the SOU address were analyzed. For a speech to be chosen, it had to reference some
topic also mentioned by the president. However, it did not have to be a topic that the president
spent a lot of time discussing. For example, even if the president only mentioned health care
once in his speech, any congressional speech mentioning health care would still be coded. This
resulted in the vast majority of speeches given during the five day period to be analyzed. Most of the speeches not analyzed were focused on topics which were not policy related, for example, speeches congratulating the winning Super Bowl team. Appendix A further discusses the criterion used in selecting which speeches to code.
Once the relevant speeches were selected for each year, they were then systematically content analyzed to see whether members of Congress were discussing the same topics as the president; whether they were responding in positive or negatives ways; and whether they were using similar language as the president in discussing these matters. To help do this, I consulted the book, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, by Ole R. Holsti. One way
described by Holsti to conduct a content analysis is to come up with a series of themes to look
for in the text being evaluated. Holsti said the “categories should reflect the purposes of the
research, be exhaustive, be mutually exclusive, independent, and be derived from a single
classification principle” (95). Since I was not looking for themes, I took the same basic idea and
applied it to policies discussed. For example, were the president and members of Congress
discussing health care, social security, etc.?
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I also conducted what Holsti refers to as a contingency analysis. Holsti describes
contingency analysis as coding material based on the absence or presence of a certain attribute
within the document. In other words, I would look for certain words and characteristics each
president used to describe the different policy areas, and also the words and characteristics
members of Congress were using as well. This was largely done by coding the speeches for the
presence or absence of specific topics (0 absence, 1 presence).
Aside from determining which topics members of Congress were discussing and the
manner in which the issues were being discussed, datasets were also created which included
descriptive information about each member of Congress speaking during the period. Some of
these variables related to partisanship such as a member’s party identification, whether the
member waas from the same party as the president, and whether the member was in the majority
or minority party in Congress. Other variables included the chamber in which the speaking
member resided, the number of years the member was in office, and whether the member was a
party leader and/or a committee chair. These datasets allowed me to explore a set of questions
and ascertain whether the study of SOU addresses is a productive way to understand presidential
agenda setting over the last 28 years.
Measuring Influence
Once the SOU addresses and congressional responses were coded, they had to be
assessed to determine the level of influence the president had in Congress at any given time.
This was a multi-step process with the concentration on the amount of agreement in the topics being discussed by the president and members of Congress and the language used when
discussing the topics. Therefore, the first step was to determine whether the president and
members of Congress were discussing the same topics. This was done by comparing the three
topics most discussed by both the president and Congress as a whole. By rank ordering the
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topics discussed by the president and members of Congress, it can be determined whether or not there was topic agreement, and ultimately how influential the president was in determining which topics members of Congress were discussing. If there was a lot of topic agreement – for example, the three main topics discussed by the president and members of Congress matched up, or maybe even two of three topics for each – then it could be argued that the president was able to exert influence over the congressional agenda. However, if there was little or not topic agreement, then it could be argued that the president was not able to exert as much influence in
Congress. This process is discussed in much more detail in Appendix B.
Aside from looking at the topics being discussed, I also analyzed the speeches to see whether the topics were being discussed in the same way. This is important to determine because the president might be able to influence the topics being discussed in Congress, but that does not mean he also has influence over the content of the discussions. Therefore, presidential influence is two-fold: influence over the congressional agenda, but also influence over policy content. To measure policy content, it is necessary to see how the president and members of
Congress are discussing the same issues.
In looking at presidential influence over both the congressional agenda and content of
discussion, it is possible to label the amount of influence the president has in Congress each year.
Four labels were developed in regards to levels of presidential influence – high, high partisan,
medium, and low. For a president to have a high level of influence, there would have to be topic agreement, and the president and members of Congress from both parties would have to discuss
the topics in the same way. There would also have to be topic agreement between the president
and members of Congress for the president to have a high partisan level of influence. The
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difference is that in this category, the president only has to influence the content of discussion among members of his own party.
There are several scenarios under which a president’s influence could be labeled medium.
One is if there was partial topic agreement and some similarities in how the president and
members of Congress were discussing the same topics. However, a president could also be
labeled as having a medium level of influence if there was topic agreement but not content
agreement, or more rarely, when there was content agreement but not topic agreement. For
example, the president and members of Congress are emphasizing different topics, but they are
discussing the same topics in largely the same ways.
Finally, a president was labeled as having a low level of influence when there was both
topic disagreement and the president and members of Congress were discussing topics in
different ways. Based on these four categories of influence, I was able to create a table which
looked at levels of presidential influence over time (Table 1-1, also reprinted as Table 3-9 and
Table B-2).
Looking at this table provides an initial glimpse into some of the findings of this
dissertation. As can be seen, during the 28 years encapsulated in my study, there were only three
periods of high influence, three periods of high partisan influence, 11 periods of medium
influence, and 10 periods of low influence, one of which can possibly be excluded due to limited
data. This table will be referenced throughout the dissertation as presidential influence is
explored through different lenses. How this table was formulated and additional information
regarding measurement can be found in Appendix B.
Research Outline
The rest of my dissertation will take each one of these factors into consideration. The
next chapter looks at how divided government, or more specifically how unified government,
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affects presidential persuasive. My third chapter then explores the effects of other political factors such as electoral mandates, whether a president is speaking early or late during his term, and presidential approval ratings.
Once some of the political factors are discussed, specific factors related to the president
and Congress are examined. Chapter 4 focuses on the president’s ability to persuade by looking
at the impact of political time on presidential influence in Congress. Chapter 5 then examines
the impact of congressional eras, specifically paying attention to the increasing role of political
parties in Congress. Other institutional factors related to Congress, such as which chamber a
speaking member is from, are also taken into consideration.
The focus of my dissertation then shifts towards the types of policies being discussed –
particularly whether the policies are domestic or foreign. Chapter 6 presents evidence which
shows that the key to understanding presidential influence might not actually be the factors
discussed so far, but might instead be based on whether presidents are discussing domestic or
foreign policies. I argue in this chapter that regardless of other factors, presidents have the most
influence in Congress when discussing foreign policies. More support for these findings are
discussed in Chapter 7, which considers how international crises affect presidential influence,
and Chapter 8 which looks specifically at the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
influence of George W. Bush. In Chapter 9, my overall findings are stated, conclusions are
drawn, and the broader implications of this research are discussed.
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Table 1-1. Presidential Levels of Influence Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II First Year High High Partisan High Partisan Second Year Low High Medium High Partisan Low Third Year Low Medium High Low Medium Fourth Year Low Medium Medium Low Low Fifth Year Low* Medium Medium Sixth Year Medium Medium Low Seventh Year Medium Eighth Year Medium Low *This may not be accurate as there were a limited number of responses analyzed in 1985.
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CHAPTER 2 UNIFIED GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION
Exploring the effects of divided government on presidential-congressional relations is not a new endeavor. Many scholars have studied the effects of divided government, however, there is not a clear consensus on whether or not divided government matters. Some scholars claim divided government makes government less effective and decreases cooperation between the president and Congress (Sundquist 1992), while others assert that divided government does not have an impact on the productivity of Congress or the leadership ability of the president in
Congress (Binder 2002; Fiorina 2002; Mayhew 1991). For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that divided government does have an impact on presidential-congressional relations, and that presidents are more likely to be influential during periods of unified government. This chapter seeks to show whether this is true by examining presidential influence during periods of unified government.
During periods of unified government, the president and Congress are more likely to work together to achieve legislative goals which will help each electorally (Conley 2003). This encourages cooperation between the president and legislators, which is likely to lead to increased presidential power in Congress. Also during periods of unified government, presidents are better able to carry out their role as chief legislator, for example by helping set the congressional agenda (Sundquist 1992).
To test these assertions, the periods of unified government during the 28 years being studied in this research were examined. Out of the 14 different congresses I examined, government was unified during only five of them.2 If presidents are more persuasive when
2 Although there was unified government at the beginning of the 107th Congress, this changed when Senator James Jeffords of Vermont changed his party affiliation from Republican to Independent on May 24, 2001, which gave
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government is unified, then I should have found that members of the 95th, 96th, 103rd, 108th, and
109th congresses were discussing largely the same topics as the president, were responding
positively to his positions on these topics, and were using similar language in discussing them.
Since I examined only one year during the 95th Congress (1978), I will primarily focus on the
96th, 103rd, 108th, and 109th congresses in trying to determine whether presidents are indeed more influential in Congress when government is united.
96th Congress, 1979-1981
During the 96th Congress, the House and Senate were both overwhelmingly controlled by
Democrats, and Democrat Jimmy Carter was president. Even though it seems these conditions
would make it likely for Carter to have great influence in Congress, this was hardly the case. For
example, in looking at the topics discussed by Carter in his 1979 and 1980 SOU addresses and
the topics discussed by members of Congress in their subsequent responses, very different topics
were being discussed.
During the 1979 SOU address, Carter emphasized both domestic and foreign policies (see
Figure 2-1). He discussed economic policy the most, spending about 13.4 percent of his speech
on it. Carter’s key concerns regarding the economy were inflation, and whether or not the
country was headed into a recession. He discussed several strategies for reducing inflation,
including passing a fiscally responsible budget, encouraging Americans not to live beyond their
means, decreasing the unemployment rate, and providing adequate health care to citizens.
The second and third most discussed topics were foreign affairs and nuclear weapons,
each of which Carter spent about 12.1 percent of his speech addressing. In regards to foreign
affairs, Carter said, “We have no desire to be the world's policeman. But America does want to
working majority of the Senate to the Democrats. For the sake of this dissertation, government during 2001-2003 will be considered divided.
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be the world's peacemaker” (1979). Carter especially expressed this sentiment when discussing
China and the Middle East.
He also discussed making peace with the Soviet Union. This discussion fell into both the
foreign affairs and nuclear weapons categories because one of Carter’s main concerns was the
possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union. He said, “Cooperation with the Soviet
Union serves the cause of peace, for in this nuclear age, world peace must include peace between
the super powers – and it must mean the control of nuclear arms” (Carter 1979).
While the three main topics discussed by Carter were the economy, foreign affairs, and nuclear weapons, members of Congress focused on an entirely different set of policies (see
Figure 2-2). The most discussed topic in Congress was the budget, which was the main emphasis of 25 percent of the congressional responses. Of those representatives speaking predominantly about the budget, 80 percent of them spoke negatively about it. Most shared a sentiment similar to that of Representative Robert Badham of California. He said, “The new budget falls far short of expectations on three fronts. It does too little to balance our budget. It does too little to reverse the damage done to our defense posture in the first two years of the
Carter administration. It does not cut spending for social programs” (Badham 1979).
It is interesting that the budget was the most discussed topic in Congress considering that
Carter devoted only 3.8 percent of his speech to it. Carter also said that the budget he sent to
Congress is “a stringent but a fair budget” and one that “provides enough spending restraint to begin unwinding inflation” (1979). This contrasts greatly with most of the comments made by legislators regarding Carter’s budget.
The second most discussed topic in Congress was the SOU address in general. Instead of focusing on a specific policy, 20 percent of the speeches were simply critiques of the President’s
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address, and all of them were negative critiques. The main criticism made was that Carter had not actually addressed anything in his speech. Not surprisingly, 75 percent of these responses came from Republicans.
The third most discussed topic was education, which also was the main topic of 20 percent of the congressional responses. There were a wide range of topics discussed regarding education ranging from school busing to more funding for higher education. Members were especially upset that Carter’s budget reduced funding for education as a means to help control inflation. “In my view, reducing the federal commitment to education is a shortsighted approach to fighting inflation” (Ford 1979). All of the members of Congress who focused on education were Democrats. This is especially interesting considering that Carter mentioned education only twice during his address.
Members of Congress not only emphasized topics Carter spent little time discussing, they also largely ignored those topics that were Carter’s main focus. For example, Carter spent the largest percentage of his speech discussing the economy, but the economy was not the main topic of one of the congressional responses. In fact, the economy was only mentioned in 35 percent of congressional speeches, and inflation in only 40 percent.
There was even less discussion in Congress of nuclear weapons. It was also not the main topic of any congressional responses, and only one member even mentioned nuclear weapons.
The one topic members of Congress did address was foreign affairs. It was the main topic of 15 percent of the congressional responses. Like Carter, members also discussed the Soviet Union and China.
The difference between the topics addressed by Carter and those discussed by members of Congress was also apparent in 1980, however, not to same extent as in 1979. In his 1980
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SOU address, Carter spoke overwhelmingly about foreign policies (see Figure 2-3). The main
topic of his address was the Soviet Union, of which he spent about 21.1 percent of his speech
discussing. Carter was especially concerned with the Soviet Union’s “military aggression”
towards Afghanistan. He said one of the main challenges facing the U.S. and world was “the
steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders” and
that “the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to
the peace since the Second World War” (Carter 1979).
Besides being concerned about the Soviet Union, Carter also discussed his concerns
about other countries. Foreign affairs was the second most discussed topic in his address,
accounting for about 19.4 percent of it. Carter was speaking during the Iran hostage situation,
which was reflected in his address. He said, “At this time in Iran, 50 Americans are still held
captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy” (Carter 1980). Aside from Iran, Carter also
discussed progress being made in the Middle East, Africa, and Israel.
The third most discussed topic by Carter was energy policy. He said that the U.S. must have an energy policy that is clear and comprehensive. “The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have
dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation's security” (Carter 1980). Carter also called on Congress to “act promptly” in passing energy legislation, and asked American citizens to continue with their energy conservation efforts.
Even with Carter’s call on members of Congress to address energy policy, energy was the main topic of only two of the congressional responses, and was only mentioned in three of the speeches analyzed. Instead, the topic discussed most by members of Congress was the budget, which was the focus of 31 percent of speeches (see Figure 2-4). Of those members concentrating
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on the budget, 88.9 percent of them spoke of it in a negative manner. Members were especially
upset that the budget was not balanced. Representative Gerald Solomon said, “Contrary to what
President Carter has promised the American people repeatedly, the budget has not been balanced
by the end of his first term” (1980).
Members were also concerned about the tax implications Carter’s budget would have on
the American public. Representative E.G. Shuster of Pennsylvania said, “The Carter budget thus
turns Uncle Sam into a pickpocket whose long arm reaches through the pockets of the American
taxpayers all the way down to their socks” (1980). Even though members of Congress were
concerned about the budget, Carter only mentioned it once during his speech. He said that as a
way to strengthen the economy, the deficit needed to be reduced and the budget balanced.
The only topics that both Carter and members of Congress discussed dealt with foreign affairs. Foreign affairs was the second most discussed topic in Congress, accounting for 28.6 percent of responses. However, even though foreign affairs were being discussed by both Carter and members of Congress, they were not being discussed in the same way. Many members questioned Carter’s foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union, Iran, China, and Afghanistan.
Representative Barry Goldwater, Jr., of California said that he has “watched this country’s
foreign policy be guided by nearsighted and often hypocritical moralizing that has nothing to do
with reality (1980). Representative Ronald Paul of Texas also questioned Carter’s foreign
policies when discussing the possibility of engaging in military action overseas. “Instead of
talking about killing our boys and girls and draining our people’s wealth, let us build up our own
defenses, get out of some of these entangling alliances, and use our power judiciously” (1980).
Besides both discussing different topics, and discussing similar topics in different ways, members of the 96th Congress also spoke of Carter in a largely negative way. In 1979, Carter
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was mentioned in 60 percent of the congressional responses. Of those who mentioned him, 72.7
percent of members spoke of him negatively, while only 27.3 percent spoke of him positively.
In 1980, members were even more negative towards Carter – he was mentioned in 80 percent of
speeches, and of those who mentioned him, 93.8 percent did so in a negative manner. Not
surprisingly, most of the members speaking negatively about Carter were Republicans.
However, this raises an interesting question: are members of the minority party more likely to speak during periods of unified government, and if so, are they more likely to speak of the president negatively? We will reconsider this question after discussing the 103rd, 108th, and 109th congresses.
103rd Congress, 1993-1995
During the 103rd Congress, Democrats once again controlled both Congress and the
White House, however, there was a much different relationship between President Bill Clinton
and members of Congress than there had been between members of Congress and Carter. This is
evident by looking at the topics discussed by Clinton in his 1993 and 1994 SOU addresses, and
the responses given to these addresses by members.
During the first SOU address of his presidency in 1993, Clinton spoke predominantly
about domestic policies (see Figure 2-5). The main topic talked about by Clinton was the
economy, of which he spent almost 18 percent of his speech discussing. Clinton was concerned
with the state of the economy, and particularly the size of the national debt. Therefore, he spent
a large portion of his speech pitching his economic recovery package. Part of Clinton’s proposed
economic program involved a tax increase which would supposedly target people who earned
higher incomes. Clinton said that in order to reduce the national debt and improve the economy
then taxes would have to be raised, and that it was only fair to increase taxes on those who made
the most.
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Employment, particularly creating more jobs and increasing wages, was another component of Clinton’s economic recovery plan. Employment was the second-most discussed topic by Clinton, accounting for 10.3 percent of his address. Clinton said that addressing the unemployment problem was essential to improving the economy.
The third-most discussed topic by Clinton was health care, which accounted for just less than 10 percent of his speech. Clinton said that there was a health care crisis in the country which needed to be addressed. He said that First Lady Hilary Clinton would be leading the effort to provide all Americans with adequate health care.
Just as Clinton addressed the economy the most in his address, the main topic discussed in Congress was also the economy (see Figure 2-6). The economy was the main topic of 41 percent of congressional responses. There was a very evident partisan divide in how members of
Congress discussed the economy and Clinton’s economic recovery plan. Democrats were largely supportive of Clinton’s plan and spoke of it positively, while most Republicans questioned Clinton’s proposals for improving the economy.
One of the biggest criticisms by Republicans of Clinton’s economic plan concerned increasing taxes. That is why the second-most discussed topic by members of Congress was taxes, which was the main topic of 23.6 percent of congressional responses. More than two- thirds of members mentioning taxes were Republicans, so not surprisingly, none of them were in favor of a tax increase. In fact, of all the members mentioning taxes, 72.9 percent were opposed to increasing taxes, even for the wealthiest people in the country. Many members felt that instead of raising taxes, there should be spending cuts.
After taxes, the next most discussed topic was the budget, which was the main topic of
18.6 percent of responses. Much of the discussion regarding the budget was related to how it fit
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into Clinton’s economic recovery plan. Many members claimed that if Clinton was serious about reducing the deficit and improving the economy then there needed to be more spending cuts in his budget. Republicans especially thought that there were not enough spending cuts. In fact, several of them gave speeches offering suggestions of where additional budget cuts could be made. In comparison, Clinton spent about 3.78 percent of his address discussing the budget.
He did not mention spending cuts, but instead mainly discussed programs he intended to fund.
In 1993, for the most part Clinton and members of Congress were discussing the same topics. The exception was health care, which Clinton spent a considerable amount of time discussing but was the main topic of only three percent of congressional responses. Even though
Clinton and members of Congress were discussing largely the same issues, there was an obvious partisan divide in how members of Congress were discussing the issues. For example,
Democrats seemed to discuss the issues in much the same way as Clinton, whereas Republicans were more likely to challenge Clinton and be critical of his proposals.
This partisan divide was also apparent when looking at the 1994 SOU address and the subsequent congressional responses (see Figures 2-7, 2-8). In 1994, the main topic discussed by
Clinton was health care, which accounted for 17.3 percent of his address. During his address,
Clinton outlined his plan for national health care. Clinton said national health care was necessary because there were millions of uninsured Americans, many of whom were unable to pay their medical costs when faced with unexpected health problems. He said, “Our goal is health insurance everybody can depend on: comprehensive benefits that cover preventive care and prescription drugs [and] health premiums that don't just explode when you get sick or you get older...” (Clinton 1994). Clinton said improving the health care system would strengthen
America overall.
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The second most discussed topic by Clinton was crime, of which he spent a little over
eight percent of his speech discussing. Clinton said he was sending a crime bill to Congress which would help “violence and prevent crime” (1994). He said part of this could be
accomplished by increasing the number of police officers, and also by encouraging more
community policing. Also, Clinton said his crime bill would target children in crime-ridden
neighborhoods to try and educate and mentor them in hopes of preventing them from becoming
criminals themselves.
The third most discussed topic by Clinton was foreign affairs in general, which accounted
for 7.38 percent of his address. Clinton did not focus his discussion of foreign affairs primarily
on one country, but instead talked about a variety of countries. He was particularly concerned
with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, however, said he was optimistic that countries would
cooperate in disarming. For example, he mentioned Russia and how it was abandoning its
pursuit of nuclear weapons and instead helping the United States (U.S.) build an international
space station. He also discussed how the U.S. was helping some of the Eastern European
countries eliminate their nuclear weapons in exchange for more economic stability.
In looking at the congressional responses, members of Congress discussed many of the
same topics as Clinton. The predominant topic discussed in Congress was also health care,
which was the main topic of 46.5 percent of speeches. Similar to 1993, there was also a partisan
divide evident in 1994. The majority of members discussing health care were Democrats (65.1
percent), and they were largely in favor of Clinton’s health care plan. Many of the Democrats
speaking told stories of constituents in their districts who either could not get insured because of
preexisting conditions, or who were faced with major medical problems while uninsured.
Democrats said these examples were evidence of a health care crisis which needed to be
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addressed, and that Clinton’s plan was a start. Republicans countered by saying that there was not a health care crisis, and that Clinton’s plan would take away Americans’ abilities to choose
their own doctors.
The next most discussed topic in Congress was crime, which was the main topic of 20.9
percent of responses. Of those members discussing crime, it was almost evenly split between
Democrats and Republicans. Unlike the discussion of health care, there was not as much of a
partisan divide in regards to crime. Most Republicans spoke in support of Clinton’s crime bill,
however, many Republicans also accused Democrats in Congress, particularly Democratic
leadership, of not putting forth a bill like the one Clinton was proposing. For example,
Republican Newt Gingrich said, “We, on the Republican side, stand ready and eager to work
with the Democratic leadership, if they will only schedule a crime bill to meet the objectives the
President outlined” (1994).
The third most discussed topic by members of Congress was drug policy, which accounted for seven percent of the congressional responses. All of the members discussing drug policy were Republicans, and most criticized Clinton for not paying enough attention to the national drug policy. For example, Republican William Clinger said of Clinton: “He waited nearly five months to appoint a drug czar, drastically cut his staff, missed deadlines for submitting a drug strategy, and has senior members of his administration openly advancing or at least studying legalization” (1994). Drug policy was a topic that Clinton did not spend much time discussing in his SOU address, only mentioning it four times.
Once again, although Clinton and members of Congress were discussing largely the same topics, there was still an evident partisan divide. However, there was not nearly the same amount of negativity towards Clinton as there had been towards Carter. In 1993, 65 percent of
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members spoke of Clinton positively, and 35 percent spoke of him negatively. Not surprisingly, all of the members speaking of Clinton positively were Democrats and all of them speaking of
Clinton negatively were Republicans. In 1994, fewer members spoke positively about Clinton.
In fact, the percentage was almost evenly split, with 54.5 percent speaking of Clinton positively, and 45.5 speaking of him negatively. Of those members speaking positively about Clinton, 76.5 percent were Democrats, and of those members speaking negatively about Clinton, 92.9 percent were Republicans.
108th Congress, 2003-2005
The 108th Congress was the first period of unified Republican control examined. One interesting aspect of the two SOU addresses given by George W. Bush (Bush II) during this
Congress is that they both focused primarily on foreign affairs. In his 2003 SOU address, the most discussed topics by Bush II were three interrelated topics – Iraq, nuclear weapons, and terrorism (see Figure 2-9). Bush II spent just over 19 percent of his speech discussing Iraq.
Since this was the SOU address immediately preceding the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, most of Bush II’s discussion of Iraq dealt with telling the American public why military action might be necessary.
Part of Bush II’s rationale for military intervention in Iraq was that it would be part of the war on terror. Terrorism was the second most discussed topic by Bush II, accounting for almost
16 percent of his speech. Bush II said that targeting countries which support or could potentially support terrorists, such as Iraq, would help prevent another attack like the one that occurred on
September 11, 2001. Also related to terrorism is the third most discussed topic by Bush II, nuclear weapons (15.6 percent). Bush II was especially concerned about “outlaw regimes” seeking nuclear weapons.
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Members of Congress also spent the most time discussing Iraq and a possible military operation there (see Figure 2-10). Republicans discussing Iraq used much of the same rhetoric and rationale as Bush II – particularly emphasizing weapons Iraq was thought to possess and
Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations (U.N.) weapons inspectors. Democrats, however, used different rhetoric. Most Democrats speaking were not convinced that Iraq had weapons and thought that the weapons inspectors should be given more time before resorting to military action.
Even though the most speeches given in Congress were in regards to Iraq, the other topics members of Congress concentrated on were not ones emphasized by Bush II. For example, the second most discussed topic was health care, which Bush II only spent a little over four percent of his speech discussing. The third and fourth most discussed topics by Congress were the economy and AIDS, each the main topic of 9.8 percent of congressional responses. Similarly,
Bush II spent a little over four percent of his speech on each of these topics as well. So Bush II and members were discussing similar issues, however, members were likely to spend time discussing domestic policies than the President.
This trend continued in 2004. Bush II discussed similar topics in 2004 as he had in 2003, however, in a slightly different order (see Figure 2-11). In his 2004 SOU address, Bush II spent
13.8 percent of his speech discussing terrorism, making it the most discussed topic in his address.
Bush II discussed terrorism similar to the way he had in 2003 – mainly by invoking images of the September 11, 2001 and other terrorist attacks, as well as updating the nation on the progress of the war on terror.
The topic Bush II discussed second most was foreign affairs. Bush II mainly discussed the Middle East region in general, as well as discussing military action in Afghanistan. The third
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most discussed topic by Bush II was Iraq, which accounted for 11.5 percent of his speech. By
the time of his speech in 2004, the U.S. had been involved in a military operation in Iraq for
about ten months and already overthrown Saddam Hussein. Therefore, in 2004, Bush II’s
discussion of Iraq was concerned mainly with U.S. reconstruction efforts there.
While Bush II discussed mainly foreign policies in 2004, members of Congress discussed
primarily domestic policies (see Figure 2-12). The main topic of the most congressional
speeches was health care, which accounted for a little over 16 percent of all congressional
responses. Members of Congress continued and furthered the President’s discussion of health
care, particularly regarding adding prescription drug coverage to Medicare. Although not
everyone saw this program as ideal, members thought it was at least an improvement. “It is not
the greatest thing in the world, but it certainly is a huge step forward, and I think seniors will
really enjoy this benefit. I am glad the President took this leadership.” (Kingston 2004).
The second and third most discussed topics in Congress were Iraq and the budget, each accounting for 12.9 percent of congressional responses. In regards to Iraq, Republicans used similar rhetoric to Bush II, for example focusing on reconstruction efforts in Iraq. However, most Democrats speaking about Iraq tried to explain why they had initially voted for the military operation but now no longer felt it was necessary.
The budget was the third most discussed topic in Congress. This is surprising considering that Bush II only mentioned the budget four times during his address. Another difference in 2004 was that members of Congress did not mention the President as often.
Whereas almost 80 percent of members mentioned Bush II in 2003, only a little over half did in
2004. However, of those mentioning Bush II, almost 65 percent of members did so in a negative manner.
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109th Congress, 2005-2007
In 2005, the main topic of Bush II’s address was social security, which was the first time since 2001 that his focus was on a domestic policy (see Figure 2-13). Bush II spent approximately 20.43 percent of his address discussing social security, especially his plan for the privatization of social security. Bush II said that without reform social security was headed for bankruptcy. He said that under this plan, social security benefits for older Americans would not change, but younger Americans would have to opportunity to invest part of their social security in private accounts.
Even though the main topic discussed by Bush II in 2005 was a domestic policy, the next two topics were both foreign policies. The second most discussed topic by Bush II was Iraq, which accounted for 12.77 percent of his speech. Bush II said that it was essential to spread freedom and democracy in Iraq as a way to combat terrorism. Terrorism was the third most discussed topic by Bush II, accounting for 11.5 percent of his address. Aside from discussing terrorism in regards to Iraq, Bush II also talked about the importance of fighting terrorism in other Middle Eastern countries.
Congress also spent the most time discussing social security, which was the main topic of
32.6 percent of the speeches (see Figure 2-14). There was a large partisan divide in discussing social security, with most Democrats critical of Bush II’s plan to privatize social security. In fact, about two-thirds of the members who spoke predominantly about social security were
Democrats criticizing Bush II’s plan. One criticism was that Bush II inaccurately predicted that social security was headed towards bankruptcy. “He says the Social Security system is in crisis.
He predicted last night that at a certain time the Social Security system would be bankrupt. But it is not in crisis, and it will not be bankrupt. He is simply wrong” (Dorgan 2005). Another criticism was that Bush’s plan would remove the guarantee of income for senior citizens.
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“Privatization will replace the security of a guaranteed check for a guaranteed gamble” (Mikulski
2005). Republicans who spoke in favor the privatization plan used much of the same rhetoric
Bush II had.
The second most discussed topic by members of Congress was the budget, which accounted for 29.1 percent of responses. There was also a large partisan divide when discussing the budget, with Republicans praising Bush II’s budget, and Democrats criticizing it. For example, Republican Judd Gregg said, “The bottom line is this: The President has proposed a stringent, responsible budget which moves us toward reducing the deficit by half in the next four years. That is what we need to do” (2005). However, comments supportive of Bush II’s budget such as this one were countered with statements such as the one made by Democrat Sherrod
Brown. Brown said, “The President's every-man-for-himself budget neglects our communities and betrays our moral values as a nation” (2005). It is interesting that members spent so much time discussing Bush II’s budget considering he only mentioned it three times during this SOU address.
The third most discussed topic by members of Congress was Iraq, which was the main topic of 10.5 percent of congressional responses. There was also a partisan divide in discussing
Iraq, with some Democrats wanting to pull American troops out of Iraq. In response to those members, Republican Mitch McConnell said, “We will leave Iraq some day, when the Iraqi democracy has taken hold and when the Iraqi military and Iraqi police can provide for their own security and not a day before that” (2005). Republicans also spoke of Iraq in much the same way as Bush II, mainly by trying to emphasize progress which had been made there.
In 2006, Bush II discussed a much wider variety of topics than he had in previous years, and did not spend an overwhelming amount of time on any one topic (see Figure 2-15).
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However, he still tended to emphasize foreign policies. The topic Bush II discussed the most was terrorism, which accounted for a little over eight percent of his address. Bush II discussed progress that had been made in the war on terror, as well as emphasized why it was important to continue the fight.
The second most discussed topic by Bush II was Iraq, of which he spent 5.5 percent of his speech discussing. Bush II said that the U.S. was helping Iraq build an inclusive government, reconstruct their economy, and was also helping train Iraqis to provide their own security. The third most discussed topic by Bush II was a domestic one – the economy. Bush II described the economy as “healthy and vigorous, and growing faster than other major industrialized nations”
(2006). Bush II said that jobs had been created which helped the growth of the economy, and that his economic plan would continue to create jobs. Bush II also said that part of his economic plan was to continue to provide tax relief to Americans.
By 2006, Congress had returned its focus almost entirely towards domestic affairs (see
Figure 2-16). The main topic discussed by members of Congress was the budget, accounting for
19.4 percent of the responses. There was again a partisan divide, with most Republicans speaking in favor of Bush II’s budget. For example, Republican James Barrett said, “I applaud the President for submitting a budget proposal that will meet America's needs while maintaining fiscal accountability and responsibility” (2006). However, Democrats criticized Bush II’s budget saying it was anything but responsible. Democrat Timothy Ryan said, “This Republican
Congress continues to borrow and borrow and borrow and spend and spend and spend, really, like drunken sailors, like there is no end in sight; and our country cannot continue to go down this irresponsible path” (2006).
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The next most discussed topic by Congress was energy, accounting for 14.5 percent of
congressional responses. Most members speaking about energy were concerned with the increasing gas prices. “The exorbitant cost of fuel is one of the most critical issues facing our
nation” (Leahy 2006). Of those members who said there was an energy crisis, 68.8 percent were in favor of finding new sources of energy other than oil. Bush II also discussed energy in his
address, spending a little over four percent of his speech on it, and was also in favor of finding
alternative sources of energy.
The third most discussed topic by members of Congress was civil rights. Most of the discussion centered around Coretta Scott King, who died shortly before the SOU address and was applauded by Bush II. In fact, all of the members discussing civil rights also mentioned
King. It is interesting that so many members mentioned King and civil rights considering that
Bush II only mentioned her twice at the beginning of his speech.
Partisanship in Unified Government
In returning to the question of how members of the minority party behave during periods of unified government, the behavior of members of the majority party also must be considered.
For example, if members of the minority party are more likely to criticize the president, does that mean that members of the majority party are less likely? Asked a different way, are members of
the majority party more likely to speak in support of the president during periods of unified
government?
To answer these questions, it first has to be determined who was speaking during the four
periods of unified government examined. Table 2-1 shows the percentage of speakers in each
year that were Democrat and Republican. Looking at the table, there appears to be no
discernable pattern in regards to who is speaking in response to the president. However, I would
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like to suggest that when more members of the minority party speak, it is an indication of less
presidential influence in Congress.
For example, after analyzing Carter’s SOU addresses in 1979 and 1980, and the
subsequent congressional responses, it appears that he had little influence in Congress, even
among members of his own party. That it is why it is not surprising that there were considerably
more Republicans speaking than Democrats. This suggests that Republicans wanted to speak as
a way to challenge Carter, and that Democrats were unwilling to speak in defense of him.
However, in looking at the other examples of unified government, there does not appear to be a
pattern. During the 96th, 108th, and 109th congresses members of one party were not consistently
talking more than members of the other. This suggests that while partisanship may play some role in who decides to speak, it does not appear to be the predominant factor.
Even though the party affiliations of members may not influence who speaks, it does have an effect on what is being said. This is particularly true in regards to whether members are speaking about issues in the same manner as the president, and whether or not they challenge him on these issues. As is apparent in the four periods of unified government examined, members of the president’s party are likely to discuss policies using similar language as the president, whereas members from the opposing party typically discuss topics using different rhetoric. This is consistent with research conducted by other scholars which has found that presidents are more likely to receive support from their parties during periods of unified government (Conley 2003). An exception to this, as was evident during the Carter presidency, is when there is a lack of unity within a political party (Sundquist 1992).
Conclusions
The real issue appears to be not whether there is unified or divided government, but instead each president’s relationship with Congress. This is consistent with other scholars who
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found having unified government does not necessarily mean increased presidential leadership in
Congress (Fiorina 2002; Mayhew 1991). In other words, while having unified government definitely gives presidents the potential to be more influential, it does not necessarily mean they will.
This can be seen by looking at Tables 2-2 and 2-3, which show levels of presidential influence during both divided and united government. During unified government approximately 55.6 percent of years were low influence, 22.2 percent of years medium influence, and 22.2 percent of years were high partisan. Looking at periods of divided government, approximately 27.8 percent of years were low influence, 50 percent of years were medium influence, 5.6 percent of years were high partisan influence, and 16.7 percent of years were high influence. Therefore, presidents actually appear to have less influence during periods of unified government although there does not really seem to be a discernable pattern. Instead, there is a mix of high, medium, and low levels of influence during both types of government.
Instead, other factors come into play. For example, in looking at the three presidents in
this example, the only one who was not very influential, even among members of his own party,
was Carter. The probable explanation for this is that Carter never had a good relationship with
Congress from the onset. According to scholars who have studied Carter’s presidency, instead of
trying to work with members of Congress, Carter had a “tendency to lambaste Congress and to
ignore or undermine supporters on the domestic measures he proposed” (Glad 1980, 426). This
led to feelings of resentment towards Carter, even among his supporters (Glad 1980).
Aside from his behavior towards members of Congress, Carter also angered Democrats
by making budget cuts to domestic programs which caused many to feel that Carter was moving
the Democratic Party away from its traditional support of social programs (Haas 1992). This
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was especially true of the 1980 budget, in which Carter recommended reductions in areas such as
housing, Medicare, and Social Security, yet included a three percent increase for military
spending (ibid). Looking at these examples, it is evident why Carter was not able to exert more
influence in Congress.
Clinton appears to have had more influence than Carter in Congress, at least with members of his own party. Members of Congress were discussing largely the same topics as
Clinton during 1993 and 1994, however, not always in the same manner. Democrats typically
discussed policies using the same rhetoric as Clinton, whereas Republicans were more likely to
challenge Clinton’s policies. Even though Clinton was getting much more support from his
party than Carter was, Clinton was still not able to influence Republicans. This was especially
true in regards to his health care plan. However, Clinton and the Democrats in Congress were
still able to accomplish other domestic policy goals (Conley 2003).
Bush II also had much influence in Congress with members of his own party, however,
faced similar problems with Democrats as Clinton had with Republicans in Congress.
Republicans used much of the same rhetoric as Bush II when discussing policies, whereas
Democrats discussed items differently and were more critical of Bush II. Another difficulty for
Bush II was that members of Congress did not always follow Bush II’s lead in setting the
national agenda. Bush II was much more likely to discuss foreign affairs whereas Congress
focused predominantly on domestic policies. This suggests that presidents may have varying
levels of influence in Congress depending on whether they are discussing foreign or domestic
policies. This question will be further addressed in Chapter 7.
Overall, whether government is unified or divided does not seem to the predominant
factor in determining presidential influence in Congress, but just one of a number of factors.
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The other factors affecting presidential influence should become more apparent in the following chapters.
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20
10
0 Percent B E H M E EconomyC Empl A F W CampaiH udget ducati eal ilitary/Defensener ivil gr or e um i ei apon t gy cult a h R oy gn n Care ights on ment ure Affai s gn Ri Fi ght rs nanc s e
Topic
Figure 2-1. 1979 SOU Address Topics
20
10
0 Percent Inf lation Foreign Affairs Budget Education Employment Bureaucratic Reform S.O.U. (general)
Topic
Figure 2-2. 1979 Congressional Response Topics
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40
30
20
10
0 Percentage Budget Educat Health CareMil Energy E Tra E For W Hu S co m o e viet U it nomy d p e a m ary/D e loymen ign Affairspo an ion ns Ri n ef g ion ense t hts
Topic
Figure 2-3. 1980 SOU Address Topics
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Foreign Affairs Military/Defense Budget Energy Soviet Union Inf lation Taxes Ir an
Topic
Figure 2-4. 1980 Congressional Response Topics
65
20
10
0 Percentage B T E S H M E E E B T E WeaponsWel CampaiCri udget axes ducati ocia eal ner conomynviron ur r m ili ade m tar eaucr pl f th gy oy ar e l S y/ e on e Care Def me ment gn curit acy n Fi ense t y nanc e
Topic
Figure 2-5. 1993 SOU Address Topics
50
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Budget Education Guns Employment Bureaucracy Taxes Health Care Economy Campaign Finance
Topic
Figure 2-6. 1993 Congressional Response Topics
66
20
10
0 Percentage Budget Educat Mi EnvironmentC E National SecurityWeaponsDrug PolicyC Gun Cont ivil m r lit ploym im ar R e y/ ights ion Def ent r ense ol
Topic
Figure 2-7. 1994 SOU Address Topics
50
40
30
20
10
0 Percent B T Ed He G E D E F C T W Crime udge axe co m orei ra de u uns rug Polic ampaign Financeel alth nomy p fare s cation loymen gn t C A ar y ffai e t rs
Topics
Figure 2-8. 1994 Congressional Response Topics
67
30
20
10
0 Percentage BudgetTax EducatSocial HealS Mi EnergyEconomyEnvironmentB E TerrorismAf Ir N ForeignW AffairsDrug PolicyAIDS ur m g aq at e lit eaucrploym hanistan i ap e t ar onal s h y/ ons ion C e a Def S curityre ac ent ense y ec u ri ty
Topic
Figure 2-9. 2003 SOU Address Topics
50
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Terrorism Economy Health Care Iraq Other Military/Defense Taxes Ener gy Environment AIDS
Topics
Figure 2-10. 2003 Congressional Response Topics
68
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0 Percentage BudgetTaxesEducatSocia Heal Military/DefenseEnergyE T EmploymentT Ir NationalForeign SecurityWeapons AffairsIm Drug Policy conomyrade er aq r m t or igr l h i ion SecuritC sm at a i re on y
Topic
Figure 2-11. 2004 SOU Address Topics
20
10
0 Percent TerrorismMil Employm Foreign AffairsEc Budg Drug PoliHe Iraq ImmigrationOth i o a ta n lt e ry o e h r /De my t Ca e c re fe n y n t s e
Topic
Figure 2-12. 2004 Congressional Response Topics
69
30
20
10
0 Percentage BudgetTax EducationSocial HealthS Mi CareE EconomyEnvironmeE T Iraq NationalForeign SecurityW ImmigrationD AIDS ner m er r li e ug e tar ploymror ap s gy Pol y/ ism ons e Def A curity ent icy n ff ense t airs
Topic
Figure 2-13. 2005 SOU Address Topics
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Terroris Social SecurityMilitary/DefenseH Budget Taxes Health CareIr I Ot a mm ome q h igratio er land m S n ec urity
Topics
Figure 2-14. 2005 Congressional Response Topics
70
10
8
6
4
2
0 Percentage BudgetTaxesEducationSociaHealMi EnerEconomyEnvironmentBureaucracyTradeE T Iraq N ForeignW AffairsW ImmigrationDrugAIDS PolicyC m er at e e r lit ploymr i aponlf ime t ar gy or onal ar l h y/ SecuritC ism e a Def S s re ent ense ec u y ri ty
Topic
Figure 2-15. 2006 SOU Address Topics
30
20
10
0 Percent TerrorismImm Military/DefenseHomelanCivil RightsEcon BudgetTaxe Educ F H E Ir N o ealt n a ucl rei e q igr o s a g rg ea my tion n A h C y a r Weapon tion d are Security ffai rs s
Topics
Figure 2-16. 2006 Congressional Response Topics
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Table 2-1. Party Identification of Speaking Members Democrat Republican 96th Congress 1979 45% 55% 1980 29.2% 70.8% 103rd Congress 1993 55.9% 44.1% 1994 50% 50% 108th Congress 2003 47.6% 50% 2004 67.7% 32.3% 109th Congress 2005 59.3% 40.7% 2006 41.3% 58.7%
Table 2-2. Levels of Influence During Unified Government 1978 Low 1979 Low 1980 Low 1993 High Partisan 1994 High Partisan 2003 Medium 2004 Low 2005 Medium 2006 Low
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Table 2-3. Levels of Influence During Divided Government 1981 High 1982 High 1983 Medium 1984 Medium 1985 Low 1986 Medium 1987 Medium 1988 Medium 1990 Medium 1991 High 1992 Medium 1995 Low 1996 Low 1997 Medium 1998 Medium 2000 Low 2001 High Partisan 2002 Low
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CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL FACTORS AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION
As shown in Chapter 2, having unified or divided government is not the deciding factor
in whether or not a president is able to exert influence in Congress. This chapter seeks to explore
some other political factors and their possible impact on presidential persuasion. One factor that might affect presidential influence is whether or not the president has (or claims to have) an
electoral mandate. Having an electoral mandate will likely allow presidents to exert more
influence in Congress. A second potential factor in regards to presidential influence is whether
the president is speaking early or late during his term, and whether he is speaking during his first
or second term. It is likely that presidents will have more influence when speaking at the
beginning of their term, or during their first term, and less influence towards the end of their
term, or when speaking during their second term. A third political factor which may affect a
president’s influence is presidential approval ratings. Presidents will likely be more influential
when they have higher approval ratings and less influence when their approval ratings are lower.
Examining electoral mandates, when a president is speaking, and presidential approval ratings
will help show whether these political factors affect a president’s influence in Congress.
Electoral Mandates
Andrew Jackson was the first president ever to claim he had an electoral mandate, even
though he did not use that exact terminology (Dahl 1990). When presidents claim to have an
electoral mandate upon taking office, what does that mean and does it allow for more influence
over Congress? First it is necessary to define what is meant by an electoral mandate since
scholars studying electoral mandates have used various definitions. For example, one simplistic
definition is that an electoral mandate is when citizens send messages about their preferences
using votes (Peterson, et al, 2003). However, other scholars claim that mandates can be divided
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into various types – policy, personal, and party (Hershey 1994). For the purposes of this
dissertation, electoral mandates will be defined as a strategic interaction between presidents and
Congress (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005).
If a president claims to have an electoral mandate, what effect does that have? First, it is
necessary to point out that for an electoral mandate to be effective, one does not actually have to
exist, but simply has to be perceived to exist (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Hershey
1994; Peterson, et al, 2003). Potentially, electoral mandates could allow the president to have the authority necessary to carry out his policy agenda (Hershey 1994). This is because electoral
mandates are believed to alter congressional behavior (Cohen 1982; Grossback, Peterson, and
Stimson 2005; Hershey 1994; Peterson, et al, 2003).
If a president claims to have an electoral mandate, then members of Congress are likely
to take notice. Members of Congress are most likely to respond to claims of a mandate if the
president is popular, or sometimes even if the president is unpopular but his policies are in line
with those of Congress (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005). This makes sense assuming
that members of Congress are indeed single-minded seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974), and
strongly influenced by concerns about re-election (Arnold 1990; Griffin 2006). If a popular
president claims to have an electoral mandate, then members of Congress will likely be
influenced out of concern for their own electoral wellbeing.
This chapter seeks to show whether or not electoral mandates have an impact on electoral
behavior by examining two years the president may have had a mandate – 1980 and 1984. When
studying electoral mandates, 1980 is sometimes cited as a year when the president received an
electoral mandate (Hershey 1994). However, other scholars do not think Ronald Reagan had an
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electoral mandate in 1980 because he won with less than 51 percent of the popular vote, and that
more voters were voting against Jimmy Carter than for Reagan (Dahl 1990).
This raises the question of how is it determined whether the president has an electoral mandate? Usually electoral mandates are associated with landslide elections (Grossback,
Peterson, and Stimson 2005; Hershey 1994). That is why more scholars agree that Reagan had
an electoral mandate in 1984 than in 1980 (ibid). In 1984, Reagan won re-election with 58.8
percent of the popular vote, and won the electoral votes of every state except Minnesota, which
was the home state of Reagan’s opponent, Walter Mondale
(http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html). However, some scholars contend that part of Reagan’s victory came not from voters reaffirming his policies, but instead from
Mondale’s poor campaigning.
To determine whether Reagan was able to exert more influence in Congress during 1981 and 1985, therefore possibly indicating the effects of electoral mandates, the level of influence he had during these two years will be compared with the rest of his presidency. If Reagan did receive electoral mandates in 1980 and 1984, then there should have been spikes in his influence during 1981 and 1985. For Reagan to have been more influential during these years, I would expect to find that members of Congress were discussing the same topics as Reagan and also using largely the same rhetoric. Also, it will be determined whether Reagan claimed to have a mandate during his SOU addresses in 1981 and 1985, and whether any members of Congress said Reagan had a mandate in their speeches.
If Reagan was not more influential during 1981 and 1985 in comparison to the rest of his presidency, this could suggest that electoral mandates do not have an impact on presidential influence or congressional behavior. This would be consistent with the claims of some scholars
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that electoral mandates do not exist (Dahl 1990; Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005). The existence of electoral mandates is generally questioned by scholars who view voters as too
“uninformed, unopinionated, and uninvolved for there to be a clear policy signal” (Grossback,
Peterson, and Stimson 2005, 406). However, it could also be that all presidents receive more influence during the first year of their term.
In 1981, Reagan did not specifically state he had an electoral mandate. Instead, he discussed the economy the most, followed by employment and taxes (see Table 3-1). In his address, Reagan acknowledged that the economy was not performing well, and outlined his plan to improve the economy which included decreasing the unemployment rate and taxes.
Members of Congress also did not state that Reagan had an electoral mandate. The most discussed topic in Congress was also the economy (36.4 percent). Similar to Reagan, members of Congress also said the economy was in poor shape and needed improvement. Most members of Congress sounded optimistic about Reagan’s economic plan, even though Democrats controlled Congress at the time. Aside from the economy, the next most discussed topic by members of Congress was the budget (13.6 percent). Even though the budget is somewhat related to discussions of the economy, Reagan only spent a little over three percent of his speech discussing the budget. Finally, members of Congress also discussed taxes (11.4 percent). Not surprisingly, most Republicans supported Reagan’s plan to cut taxes, while most Democrats were somewhat skeptical.
The economy was again the main topic discussed by Reagan in 1982 (see Table 3-2).
Reagan again acknowledged that the economy was in a recession, but said that unlike previous recessions in the U.S., his economic plan would be an effective solution to the problem. Reagan said his economic plan included decreasing government spending, taxes, and unemployment.
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Federalism was the second most discussed topic by Reagan. Reagan said that control of
programs such as welfare and education needed to be returned to the states. He said that
allowing states to control more programs would decrease the size of the national government, as
well as decrease government spending. The third most discussed topic by Reagan was foreign
affairs. Reagan mainly discussed the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and
the ongoing peace talks between the two countries.
Members of Congress again discussed largely the same topics as Reagan in 1982. The
most discussed topic in Congress was the economy, with members also discussing Reagan’s
economic plan and other possible solutions to ending the recession. Related to discussion of the
economy was the second most discussed topic in Congress, employment. Members of Congress
were also concerned with decreasing the high level of unemployment by creating new jobs. The
third most discussed topic in Congress was federalism. There was more of a partisan divide in
the discussion of federalism, with most Republicans in favor of giving more power to the states.
Reagan continued to discuss similar topics in 1983. The economy was again the most
discussed topic (see Table 3-3). Reagan started his address by saying “the state of our Union is strong, but our economy is troubled” (1983). However, he also said that his economic plan combined with the “courage, patience, and strength” of Americans would allow the U.S. to persevere (Reagan 1983).
The second most discussed topic in 1983 was foreign affairs. Reagan again discussed the
Soviet Union. He said that while U.S. relations with the Soviet Union had improved, that there were still peace negotiations taking place, particularly regarding the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Reagan discussed employment the third most. Once again he said that unemployment
was too high and that more jobs needed to be created.
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In 1983, Congress discussed largely different topics than Reagan (see Table 3-3). The
main topics discussed in Congress were social security and trade (15.4 percent each). In his
SOU address, Reagan discussed how he had been working with members of Congress in a bipartisan manner to help secure social security. However, many members of Congress felt the social security issue was not yet resolved and that they were not being included as much as they should. In regards to trade, members mainly discussed making sure trade with other countries was fair to U.S. workers.
The next most discussed topics in Congress were the economy and weapons (11.5 percent each). In regards to the economy, members of Congress again discussed ways to improve the economy, proposing many of the same solutions as Reagan – lowering unemployment, reducing government spending, etc. Members of Congress also used much of the same rhetoric as Reagan in their discussion of nuclear weapons. Like Reagan, one of their main concerns was negotiating weapons reduction with the Soviet Union. So even though members of Congress and Reagan placed emphasis on different topics, they were discussing them largely in the same way.
In 1984, Reagan once again discussed the economy the most (see Table 3-4). Reagan said that a key to economic recovery was to reduce government spending and thereby bring the federal deficit down. The second most discussed topic by Reagan was foreign affairs. Reagan again discussed peace negotiations and reducing nuclear arms, however, he also discussed continued peace efforts in the Middle East, Central America, and southern Africa. Reagan discussed taxes the third most. Reagan mainly discussed taxes in the context of lowering them as part of his economic recovery plan.
Congress also discussed the economy and specifically the economic recovery plan, however, almost half of the congressional responses focused on the budget (see Table 3-4).
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While most members agreed that government spending should be reduced, there was vast disagreement on what should be cut from the budget. Republicans typically supported Reagan’s proposed budget cuts, while Democrats challenged them. The third most discussed topic by members was foreign affairs. Similar to Reagan’s discussion of foreign affairs, members were concerned mainly with the Soviet Union, but also with peace in other countries as well.
In 1985, again Reagan did not explicitly state he has a mandate, however, he did imply that he was re-elected because Americans were satisfied with his economic program and improvements in the economy which occurred during his first term in office. This lead the economy to again be the most discussed topic (see Table 3-5). Somewhat related to Reagan’s discussion of the economy was the next most discussed topic, taxes. Reagan said he would not raise taxes as a way to balance the budget, but instead would reduce government spending. The third most discussed topic by Reagan was foreign affairs, of which he mainly discussed the
Soviet Union and Nicaragua.
An interesting situation occurred in regards to congressional responses in 1985. The day immediately following the SOU address, 14 congressional responses related to Reagan’s address were analyzed. However, then Congress adjourned for 10 days. Once Congress resumed session, no members were discussing topics related to Reagan’s SOU address. Of the congressional responses coded, four of the 14 were in regards to space travel (28.6 percent), which Reagan only briefly mentioned in his address. Other than that, two speeches each were on the budget, the military, and the economy. It appears as though members of Congress were discussing similar issues, however, it is difficult to make any generalizations since so few speeches were analyzed. Based on the fact that the speeches analyzed were generally supportive
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of Reagan’s policies and that more members did not challenge Reagan, this could be evidence of
increased influence due to the perception of an electoral mandate.
For the first time during his presidency, the economy was the not the topic Reagan
discussed most in his 1986 SOU address (see Table 3-6). Instead, the main topic discussed by
Reagan was foreign affairs (8.7 percent). As in his previous addresses, Reagan again discussed
the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union. However, Reagan also discussed spreading freedom, and specifically mentioned Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua.
Reagan discussed taxes the second most (8.1 percent). Reagan said he remained committed to not raising taxes. He also criticized members of Congress who said it was necessary to raise taxes by repeating his charge that instead government spending needed to be reduced. Reagan said, “We do not face large deficits because American families are undertaxed; we face those deficits because the Federal Government overspends (1986)”.
The third most discussed topic by Reagan was the budget (7 percent). Reagan said that it was necessary to have a balanced budget, and that passing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation would help do that. Members of Congress were especially responsive to Reagan’s discussion of the budget. The budget was the main topic discussed in Congress, accounting for
46.3 percent of responses (see Table 3-6). Some members of Congress, particularly Democrats, were critical of Reagan’s budget, claiming that his spending cuts were in the wrong areas. For example, Representative Bill Richardson said, “If you depend on Pentagon dollars, you're in good shape. If you depend on domestic spending, forget it, you're in deep trouble” (1986).
The second most discussed topic in Congress was the economy. Members of Congress were concerned about the national debt, and finding ways to continue economic growth. The third most discussed topic in Congress was the military and defense. There were a variety of
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topics discussed in relation to the military and defense, most of which concerned the Department
of Defense.
In 1987, Reagan discussed largely the same topics he had in 1986 (see Table 3-7).
Foreign affairs was again the main topic discussed by Reagan (28.9 percent). Reagan said that it
was apparent that the Soviet Union was trying to expand their power, and that the presence of
their military in countries such as Syria, Vietnam, and Nicaragua was evidence of that. Reagan
also discussed Latin America. He said that “over 90 percent of the people of Latin America live
in democracy,” and that Nicaragua was one of the last communist countries to remain (Reagan
1986). Therefore, he said the U.S. should support the efforts of the “freedom fighters” to
overthrow the Communist Sandinista government.
Somewhat related to his discussion of foreign affairs, was the second most discussed
topic by Reagan – the budget. Reagan said that Congress made defense cuts to his budget which would not allow the U.S. to be able to effectively assist other countries and protect national interests. Instead, he said cuts needed to be made in other areas, such as welfare. Also
somewhat related was the third most discussed topic by Reagan – the military. Reagan mainly
discussed the service men and women stationed in other countries, and once again mentioned the
necessity of adequate military/defense funding.
Members of Congress were also discussing mainly foreign policy topics in 1987 (see
Table 3-7). The main topic discussed in Congress was weapons. Most members continued to
express concern over the possession of weapons by the Soviet Union, and how this was a threat
to U.S. national security. Related to this was the second most discussed topic in Congress –
foreign affairs. Members of Congress discussed largely the same countries as Reagan. The main
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difference was that not all members of Congress were convinced that the U.S. should continue funding the opposition to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
The third most discussed topic in Congress was the budget. The majority of members discussing the budget were Republicans, and they used much of the same rhetoric used by
Reagan. For example, members of Congress also said the budget needed to be balanced.
Additionally, members of Congress responded to Reagan’s call to give him the line-item veto by saying that it was necessary for the president to have that power as a way to have a more fiscally responsible budget.
Reagan used his SOU address in 1988 to summarize some of the things he had accomplished during his presidency. This resulted in him discussing many of the same topics he had during his previous seven addresses (see Table 3-8). Foreign affairs was again the main topic of his address, and he once again discussed U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. Reagan also discussed U.S. assistance to other countries and said that it had helped the image of the U.S.
He said, “We've replaced ‘Blame America’ with ‘Look up to America’” (Reagan 1988).
The second most discussed topic by Reagan was the budget. Reagan said less progress had been made regarding the budget, and that budget deadlines were still continuing to not be met. Once again, Reagan also asked Congress to give the president the power of the line-item veto. Reagan was more positive in his discussion of the economy, which was the third most discussed topic. Reagan said that the economy was “strong and growing” and that to keep it that way, it was necessary to keep inflation low and employment high.
Members of Congress also discussed foreign affairs the most (see Table 3-8). Members were mainly concerned with the situation in Nicaragua, and many were hesitant to provide any
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more assistance to the Contras. Even though Reagan did mention the situation in Nicaragua, his discussion of it was much different from that taking place in Congress.
The second most discussed topic in Congress was weapons. Members again discussed the possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and arms control. The third most discussed topic in Congress was the budget. Members discussing the budget were largely supportive of Reagan and his proposals, such as sending the president 13 separate appropriations bills.
In looking at Reagan’s influence across his presidency, it appears to vary. Reagan discussed the same main topics – the economy, the budget, foreign affairs, weapons, and the military – throughout his presidency. For the most part, members of Congress were also discussing the same topics. However, members of Congress were not always discussing them the same way. For example, not all members agreed with Reagan’s economic recovery plan, particularly not raising taxes. Also, members of Congress put much more emphasis on some topics – such as the situation in Nicaragua – than Reagan did.
So is there any evidence that Reagan had electoral mandates in 1980 and 1984? Looking at Reagan’s influence during 1981 and 1985, there seems to be inconclusive evidence as to whether an electoral mandate existed, and if so, whether it had any effect on Reagan’s influence in Congress. Even though Reagan did have a high level of influence in 1981, his influence in
1985 was low. However, what appears to be Reagan’s low influence in 1985 could actually be caused by so few speeches being analyzed. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn in regards to electoral mandates and their affect on presidential influence in Congress.
Early vs. Late
Another political factor which could potentially affect presidential influence in Congress is whether the president is speaking early or late in his term. Scholars contend that presidents
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have the best ability to influence Congress early in their terms (Eshbaugh-Soha 2005; Lewis and
Strine 1996). This is likely because support for the president is generally higher at the beginning of his term and then decreases over time (Brace and Hinckley 1991). Also, presidents speaking early in their terms are likely to exert more influence since they probably have not yet established a solid relationship with Congress, meaning they are less likely to be on bad terms with Congress. Therefore, I expect to find that presidents have the highest level of influence in
Congress during the first year of their term and that their level of influence decreases over time.
Comparatively, presidents will likely have less influence at the end of their term when members of Congress have less incentive to cooperate, and presidents could be viewed as lame ducks.
To see whether this is the case, the level of influence the president had during each year of his presidency was labeled high, high partisan, medium, or low. For the president to have a high level of influence, then members of Congress would have to discuss the same topics as the president and use largely the same rhetoric. When only members of the president’s party discussed the same topics and used the same rhetoric, then the level of influence was labeled high partisan. The level of influence was labeled medium when either members of Congress were discussing the same topics but using different rhetoric, or members were discussing different topics but using the same rhetoric. Finally, low levels of influence are when members of Congress were both discussing different topics and using different rhetoric.
Table 3-9 shows the levels of influence each president had throughout his term or terms.
Looking at the table, several patterns emerge. First, it is important to note that influence was not evaluated during the first year of either Carter or Bush I’s presidencies. As mentioned previously, Carter did not give a SOU address in 1977. As for Bush I, Congress was in recess for a month after his 1989 SOU address, therefore no responses could be analyzed.
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In looking at the first years of the other three presidents, all of them had either high or high partisan levels of influence, which can be seen in Table 3-10. In fact, in looking at the first
two years of a president’s first term, 62.5 percent of years were either high or high partisan. This
suggests that influence is higher at the beginning of a president’s term.
In looking at influence after the first year, it does seem to decrease. Presidents had low
levels of influence during 50 percent of the last two years of their first term, 40 percent of years
were medium influence, and only 10 percent high influence (see Table 3-11). Therefore,
presidents appear to have more influence at the beginning of their terms.
First vs. Second Term
This is also true for the beginning of a president’s second term. Influence increases again during the fifth year, or the first year of the president’s second term. Three of the five presidents
included in this dissertation served second terms – Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II. For Clinton
and Bush II, their levels of influence increased from low to medium between their fourth and
fifth years. Reagan’s influence actually decreased from medium to low between his fourth and
fifth years, however, this is not necessarily reliable due to a limited amount of data available for
his fifth year. Nonetheless, looking at Table 3-12 provides evidence that presidents receive a
bump in influence immediately following an election.
In looking at influence during a president’s first term compared to his second term, there
does seem to be a slight decrease. This is consistent with scholars who claim that influence
decreases after the second year of a president’s second term when he is viewed as a lame duck
(Lewis and Strine 1996). Table 3-12 shows that the difference does not appear to be terribly
stark. For example, in looking at Reagan’s second term, even though he seems to have less
influence overall, he still retains a medium level of influence throughout his second term.
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Clinton’s influence definitely decreases during his second term, particularly at the end when his
presidency was surrounded by scandal.
Even though only two years of Bush II’s second term have been examined thus far, it also
appears that he is losing influence in Congress. Considering his decreasing levels of public
approval and that Democrats regained control of Congress during the November 2006 midterm
elections, it is unlikely that his influence will increase. In fact, I would expect to see conflict increase between Bush II and Democrats in Congress, and Bush II’s overall level of influence to decrease even further.
Presidential Approval Ratings
Aside from when a president is speaking, another political factor that could potentially affect presidential persuasion is the president’s approval rating. Public support is a crucial resource for the president (Edwards 2004), particularly because a higher approval rating can give presidents more leverage in Congress (Bond, Fleischer, and Wood 2003; Brace and Hinckley
1992; Conley 2000; Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 1998; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and
Rose 1985; Sullivan 1991). However, the correlation between presidential approval and presidential influence in Congress is not always consistent. There have been instances when high presidential approval did not translate into legislative success. For example, after the
Persian Gulf War in 1991, Bush I had a high level of approval but was not able to exert influence in Congress (Bond, Fleischer, and Wood 2003; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002; Collier and
Sullivan 1995). Examples such as this have led more recent studies to conclude that there is no correlation between presidential persuasion and legislative success (Collier and Sullivan 1995).
Other studies have found that although the relationship between presidential approval and influence in Congress is not always consistent, that there is a correlation (Bond, Fleischer, and
Wood 2003). These scholars attribute the variation in the relationship to partisan changes in
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Congress. They find that as partisanship in Congress increases, that the effect of presidential approval decreases (ibid). Therefore, it would be expected that presidential approval would not have as much of an effect on presidential influence in Congress as the parties become more polarized.
By looking at each president’s approval at the time they gave their SOU address, and then looking at how members of Congress responded, it can be determined whether presidents with higher approval ratings were more influential in Congress. Consistent with the studies previously discussed, I expect to find this relationship to vary over time with some presidents better able to capitalize on their high approval. If I find this to be the case then I hope to also be able to identify the factors which allow some presidents to benefit from their high approval more than others.
Table 3-13 shows each president’s approval at the time of their SOU address as well as their level of influence. In examining the table, it appears that there is no correlation between presidential approval and influence in Congress. For example, in 2002 when Bush II had 84.45 percent approval, he had little influence over the topics being discussed in topics and the way they were being discussed. So even though Bush II had high approval, his influence in Congress was low. Similarly, in 1983, Reagan was able to exert a high level of influence in Congress while having less than half of the public’s approval.
There seems to be no consistent pattern regarding the relationship between presidential approval and legislative success. The lowest levels of approval for presidents in my study were between 37.27 and 49.89 percent. However, presidents within this range were able to have low, medium, and high levels of influence. The same is true for the highest levels of approval, from
60.65 to 84.45 percent. Presidents within this range also had low, medium, and high levels of
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influence. Therefore, I have to conclude that presidential approval has no effect on presidential influence in Congress.
Conclusions
Unfortunately, due to the difficult nature of defining electoral mandates and the limited data I had, I am not able to make any conclusions regarding the effect of electoral mandates on presidential influence. I also found that a president’s level of approval does not have an impact on his influence in Congress. However, conclusions can be drawn about the impact of when a president speaks during his term. It appears that presidents are able to exert more influence in
Congress at the beginning of their terms. Looking at each president’s level of overall influence during each year of their term, most presidents started out with a higher level of influence which eventually decreased as time went on.
The same is true for presidents serving two terms. The influence of presidents increased during the first year of their second term and then decreased again after that. Also, presidents tended to have the lowest level of influence during the last two years of their second term, which
is consistent with the idea that presidents are “lame ducks” at the end of their second term. This
suggests that electoral mandates may not even matter, but instead, that all presidents are likely to
have a higher level of influence during the first year of their term, be it their first or second.
Therefore, the political factor that matters is when during his term a president is speaking.
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Table 3-1. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1981 Reagan Congress Economy 24.4% Economy 36.4% Employment 11.5% Budget 13.6% Taxes 11.5% Taxes 11.4%
Table 3-2. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1982 Reagan Congress Economy 20.3% Economy 31.3% Federalism 11.2% Employment 18.8% Foreign Affairs 10.8% Federalism 12.5%
Table 3-3. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1983 Reagan Congress Economy 27% Social Security 15.4% Foreign Affairs 12.1% Trade 15.4% Employment 10.2% Economy 11.5%
Table 3-4. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1984 Reagan Congress Economy 12.6% Budget 49% Foreign Affairs 11.8% Economy 17.6% Taxes 6.9% Foreign Affairs 13.7%
Table 3-5. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1985 Reagan Congress Economy 11.6% Economy 36.4% Taxes 10.3% Budget 13.6% Foreign Affairs 9.8% Taxes 11.4%
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Table 3-6. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1986 Reagan Congress Foreign Affairs 8.7% Budget 46.3% Taxes 8.1% Economy 12.2% Budget 7% Military 9.8%
Table 3-7. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1987 Reagan Congress Foreign Affairs 28.9% Weapons 27.4% Budget 8% Foreign Affairs 19.4% Military 6.5% Budget 12.9%
Table 3-8. Comparison of Topics Discussed in 1988 Reagan Congress Foreign Affairs 13.4% Foreign Affairs 63.8% Budget 12% Weapons 8.5% Economy 8.8% Budget 6.4%
Table 3-9. Presidential Levels of Influence Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II First Year High High Partisan High Partisan Second Year Low High Medium High Partisan Low Third Year Low Medium High Low Medium Fourth Year Low Medium Medium Low Low Fifth Year Low* Medium Medium Sixth Year Medium Medium Low Seventh Year Medium Eighth Year Medium Low *This may not be accurate as there were a limited number of responses analyzed in 1985.
Table 3-10. Levels of Influence Early in the First Term First Year Second Year Carter Low Reagan High High Bush I Medium Clinton High Partisan High Partisan Bush II High Partisan Low
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Table 3-11. Levels of Influence Late in the First Term Third Year Fourth Year Carter Low Low Reagan Medium Medium Bush I High Medium Clinton Low Low Bush II Medium Low
Table 3-12. Levels of Influence in the Second Term First Year Second Year Third Year Fourth Year Reagan Low Medium Medium Medium Clinton Medium Medium Low Bush II Medium Low N/A N/A
Table 3-13. Presidential Approval and Level of Influence at Time of SOU Address
Carter 1978 51.87% Low 1979 43.27% Low Clinton 1993 56.66% High P. 1980 57.58% Low 1994 53.06% High P. Reagan 1981 55.44% High 1995 43.54% Low 1982 47.33% High 1996 45.91% Low 1983 37.27% Medium 1997 60.82% Medium 1984 55.05% Medium 1998 66.95% Medium 1985 57.89% Low 2000 64.29% Low 1986 71.97% Medium Bush II 2001 61.72% High P. 1987 49.89% Medium 2002 84.45% Low 1988 52.98% Medium 2003 60.65% Medium Bush I 1990 66.96% Medium 2004 53.55% Low 1991 74.32% High 2005 57.07% Medium 1992 43.96% Medium 2006 43% Low
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CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL TIME
As outlined in Chapter 1, political time is a term coined by scholar Stephen Skowronek which can be used to classify presidents based on their association with the previous president’s
agenda and the institutional structures present when they take office. More specifically,
presidents can be either affiliated or opposed to the previous president’s agenda, and institutions
can be either resilient or vulnerable. Based on these categories, presidents can be classified as
presiding during the politics of reconstruction, articulation, disjunction, or preemption. Since
each type of political time encompasses its own advantages and challenges, presidents may be
more or less able to exert influence over Congress depending on the type of political time with
which they are associated.
Even though only five presidents are examined in this dissertation, each type of political
time is represented. Jimmy Carter falls under the politics of disjunction, Ronald Reagan under
the politics of reconstruction, George H.W. Bush under the politics of articulation, and Bill
Clinton under the politics of preemption. George W. Bush will be discussed separately since he
does not neatly fit into one of the categories. Instead, he seems to fit both into the politics of
articulation and the politics of disjunction.
Looking at each type of political time and the president that presided during it should be
helpful in showing whether presidents are able to exert more influence during certain periods of
political time. This chapter will thoroughly examine each type of political time and presidents’
ability to exert influence during them. Conclusions will then be drawn about which type of
political time is likely to allow presidents the most influence in Congress.
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Reagan and the Politics of Reconstruction
During the politics of reconstruction, presidents are opposed to the previous president’s agenda and institutions are vulnerable. This means that presidents presiding during this time have the best opportunity to create change. Also, there are fewer constraints on presidential power during the politics of reconstruction (Lewis and Strine 1996). This means that presidents
during this time period should be able to exert influence in Congress. Reagan was a
reconstructive president, therefore examining his presidency should show the amount of
influence he had in Congress.
One of the main staples of Reagan’s presidential campaign in 1980 was his economic
recovery plan. Reagan repeatedly pointed out that double-digit inflation, high unemployment,
and poor overall economic performance were indicators that Carter was not an effective leader.
Therefore, Reagan challenged Carter and promised to change course if elected president. The
economic situation also caused institutions to be vulnerable in 1980, meaning people were ready
for a change. So as a reconstructive president, was Reagan able to exert influence in Congress?
Reagan’s main focus when taking office, and throughout both of his terms, was the
economy. As shown in Chapter 3, the main topic of his first five SOU addresses was the
economy. Members of Congress were also discussing the economy. In 1981 and 1982, the
economy was the main topic of the most congressional responses. Members of Congress were
using largely the same rhetoric when discussing the economy, and most were supportive of
Reagan’s economic plan. This is surprising considering that Democrats controlled the House
throughout Reagan’s presidency.
Toward the end of Reagan’s first term as president, his influence in Congress began to
dissipate. In 1983 and 1984, Reagan was still focusing on the economy while Congress started
discussing other topics, such as social security and the budget. However, many of the topics
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discussed by Reagan and members of Congress remained the same – for example, foreign policy topics such as the military and nuclear weapons. Reagan regained some of his influence at the
beginning of his second term, however, never to the same level it was at the beginning of his first
term.
This is consistent with other reconstructive presidents. Most reconstructive presidents
eventually encounter problems at some point during their presidency (Milkis 1995). These
problems could be court battles, wars, or in Reagan’s case the Iran Contra Affair. The Iran
Contra Affair was very problematic for Reagan and shifted the attention of Congress away from
Reagan’s domestic agenda. This is probably why Reagan was less influential during his second
term.
Bush I and the Politics of Articulation
Scholars have pointed out that political time tends to be cyclical and follow set patterns.
For example, the politics of reconstruction are usually followed by the politics of articulation
(Milkis 1995; Skowronek 1997). This was the case in 1988 when George H.W. Bush (Bush I)
was elected as Reagan’s successor. Bush I was seen as presiding during the politics of
articulation because he was affiliated with Reagan’s agenda and institutions were resilient to
change. According to Skowronek, presidents presiding during the politics of articulation are at
somewhat of a disadvantage because they are expected to stick to the previous president’s
agenda. Therefore, their level of influence in more constrained (Lewis and Strine 1996). This
makes it difficult for articulate presidents to define legislation in their own terms and fully
exercise the power of the presidency (Skowronek 1997). Therefore, it is expected that presidents
during this political time can exert influence in Congress, however, only if they do not venture
too far from the previous president’s agenda.
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Only three years of Bush I’s presidency were analyzed because Congress was in recess the month after Bush I’s SOU address in 1989. Looking at the rest of Bush I’s presidency, he appeared to exert a medium level of influence in Congress. In 1990, the three topics most discussed by Bush I were foreign affairs, education, and the military. However, the three main topics discussed by members of Congress were the environment, the military, and social security.
Even though some of the topics differed, Bush I and members of Congress were discussing a lot of the same policies. For example, the next most discussed topics by legislators were foreign affairs and education. Also, members of Congress were using much of the same rhetoric when discussing the same topics as Bush I.
In 1991, Bush I was able to exert even more influence in Congress. When Bush I gave his speech in 1991, the U.S. was involved in the Persian Gulf War, so not surprisingly, foreign affairs and the military were two of the main topics he discussed. Members of Congress also spent the most time discussing foreign affairs and the military. They discussed the Persian Gulf
War in largely the same terms as Bush I, and also spent time expressing gratitude towards the troops.
By 1992, some of Bush I’s influence in Congress diminished. The main topics he discussed were the economy, foreign affairs, and the military. Members of Congress also discussed the economy the most, however, they put more emphasis on it than Bush I, and most of the other topics they focused on were also economic related – for example, employment and taxes. Members of Congress were more likely to criticize Bush I in 1992, especially in regards
to his decision to increase taxes which he had pledged not to do. However, he still received a
fair amount of support from members of his own party.
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In looking at the overall level of influence Bush I was able to have in Congress, it seems consistent with the politics of articulation. When Bush I stuck to discussing the economy and perpetuating Reagan’s economic plan, he was able to exert influence. However, when deviating from Reagan’s agenda, he was more likely to be criticized. The exception to this was the Persian
Gulf War. Even though this was a new issue, Bush I was still able to shape the course of discussion on the Persian Gulf War.
This makes sense considering presidents do not usually come into office with well- developed foreign policy agendas. Therefore, when discussing whether or not presidents are affiliated or opposed to the previous president’s agenda, what is really being discussed is the previous president’s domestic agenda. There are probably instances where presidents are associated with the previous president’s foreign policy agenda as well, however, this is not as likely. Issues of influence in regards to domestic and foreign policies, as well as further discussion of Bush I’s presidency, will take place in Chapter 7.
Carter and the Politics of Disjunction
Presidents are classified as presiding during the politics of disjunction when they are affiliated with the previous president’s agenda, but institutions are vulnerable. This means that changes need to be made, but the president is not making them. Carter’s presidency is an example of the politics of disjunction. Carter thought he could revive the liberal political agenda by simply fixing a few pieces of it. He said that it was not the agenda which needed alterations, but the government’s implementation of it (Skowronek 1997).
Looking at Carter’s influence in Congress, it was relatively low, especially considering there was unified government. For the most part members of Congress were emphasizing much different issues than Carter, and also discussing them using different rhetoric. For example,
Carter spent a lot of time discussing foreign affairs while members of Congress spent a lot of
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time discussing the budget. Carter’s low level of influence in Congress is further evidenced by
the large amount of criticism he received, even from members of his own party.
This is consistent with literature regarding the politics of disjunction. Presidents under
the politics of disjunction often face a fragmented party which frequently questions the ability of
the president to govern (Lewis and Strine 1996). Unfortunately, this opposition to the president
tends to increase as time goes on, as was the case with Carter. By the last year of his presidency,
it was evident that Carter was not able to exert much influence in Congress, and that there was increasing criticism of him.
Clinton and the Politics of Preemption
Presidents also have a more difficult time influencing Congress during the politics of
preemption. Under the politics of preemption, the president is opposed to the previous agenda
but institutions are resilient. This means that the president is trying to change the discourse while the agenda of the old regime is still being carried out. This was the case during the
presidency of Bill Clinton.
When Clinton was elected in 1992, he was committed to pursuing a new economic
policy, however, Reaganomics was still playing out. Initially however, Clinton was able to exert
influence in Congress. In 1993, the main topics discussed by Clinton were the economy and
taxes, which were also the topics discussed the most by members of Congress. At the time,
Congress was controlled by Democrats, and there was a definite partisan divide evident.
Members of the Democratic Party tended to use similar rhetoric to Clinton, while members of the
Republican Party were more likely to criticize his policies and offer their own.
There was a similar trend in 1994, with the partisan divide growing even more apparent.
The main topics discussed by Clinton and members of Congress in 1994 were health care and
crime. Once again, Democrats used largely the same rhetoric as Clinton and were supportive of
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his policies while Republicans used different rhetoric and were critical of Clinton. Republicans
were especially critical of Clinton’s plan to provide universal health care coverage to Americans.
During the midterm elections in 1994, Republicans were able to regain control of
Congress which greatly reduced Clinton’s level of influence. In 1995, Clinton discussed a variety of topics and did not spend an abundance of time on any of them, whereas Congress
focused overwhelmingly on the budget. The budget, particularly passing a balanced budget
amendment, was one plank of the Contract with America which was largely responsible for
returning control of Congress to the Republicans. Therefore it is not surprising that Republicans
in Congress spent so much time discussing the budget. It was evident from the topics being
discussed in Congress that the legislative agenda was being dictated by the Contract with
America, and not by Clinton. This trend continued in 1996.
However, in 1997, after Clinton won re-election and Republicans lost seats in the House,
Clinton was able to regain some influence. The main topic discussed by Clinton was education, which was also the main topic discussed by members of Congress. The partisan divide evident throughout the majority of Clinton’s presidency was surprisingly not evident in the discussion of education. This suggests Clinton had a bit of influence over this policy area. However, Clinton also discussed foreign affairs and health care which received little attention in Congress. Instead, the next most discussed topic in Congress was again the budget.
In 1998, Clinton spent the most time discussing education, foreign affairs, and health care. A large number of congressional speeches also focused on education and health care, however, the most congressional speeches were again on the budget. In 1999, there were no congressional responses because the Senate was holding Clinton’s impeachment hearings.
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In 2000, the main topics discussed by Clinton were education, the economy, and health
care. Members of Congress also discussed the economy and health care, however, the topic of
the most congressional responses was taxes. By this point, Clinton was considered to be
somewhat of a lame duck. That combined with the general distaste for Clinton by Republicans
in Congress did not allow him to have very much influence.
Overall, I am not convinced that presiding during the politics of preemption caused
Clinton to wield less influence as much as the partisan warfare which was taking place throughout Clinton’s presidency. When Democrats controlled Congress, Clinton appeared to have much more influence than after Republicans gained control. Once Republicans gained control, there was a constant battle between Clinton and Republicans over the agenda, the budget, and Clinton’s personal life. Therefore, his lack of influence cannot be solely attributed to political time.
This makes it difficult to formulate any generalizations about presidential influence during the politics of pre-emption. The lack of influence by Clinton appears to be caused more by the partisan warfare that was taking place than anything to do with the politics of preemption.
This suggests that presidential influence during the politics of preemption is affected not by political time, but instead by other factors.
The Political Time of Bush II
Looking at the presidency of George W. Bush (Bush II), aspects of both the politics of pre-emption and the politics of articulation are present. Bush II faced an uphill battle from the beginning when the legitimacy of his presidency was questioned after he lost the popular vote in the 2000 election. Bush II was opposed to Clinton’s agenda and instead pursued what he called a compassionate conservative agenda. However the situation was different for Bush II than it had
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been for Clinton during the politics of pre-emption. Even though government was divided when
he took office, Bush II was still able to influence the legislative agenda.
In 2001, the main topics discussed by Bush II were the economy, taxes, and education, which were also the three main topics discussed by members of Congress. Even though
members of Congress were discussing the same topics, there was a partisan divide in regards to
rhetoric – Republicans used much the same rhetoric as Bush II while Democrats spoke of the
same policies using different terms.
Bush II’s presidency changed drastically after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Any questions of Bush II’s legitimacy as president disappeared as the country looked towards him for leadership. As will be discussed further in Chapters 6 through 8, this resulted in an interesting relationship between Bush II and Congress in 2002. While Bush II’s SOU address focused on terrorism, foreign affairs, and the military, members of Congress discussed domestic policies almost exclusively. Therefore, Bush II was not influencing the domestic agenda in
Congress, however, the lack of response by Congress in regards to foreign policy may indicate he was able to exert much influence over the foreign policy agenda.
In 2003, Bush II again focused on foreign policies – this time foreign affairs, nuclear weapons, and terrorism. While members of Congress also overwhelmingly discussed foreign affairs, particularly the impending military operation in Iraq, they again also emphasized domestic policies. In regards to discourse on Iraq, Bush II was able to exert a lot of influence.
Bush II made the case for a possible military operation in Iraq by drawing connections between
Iraq and terrorism. Even though some Democrats expressed skepticism in regards to this linkage, they were still not overly critical of Bush II or a possible military operation in Iraq.
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In 2004, Bush II again spent a large portion of his address on foreign affairs and terrorism, however, he spent some time discussing domestic policies such as health care. Health care was the main topic of the most congressional responses, and was discussed using largely the same rhetoric as Bush II. Aside from health care, members of Congress also discussed Iraq and the budget. The discourse surrounding the discussion of Iraq was much different in Congress.
Many of the speeches given in Congress on Iraq were by members trying to explain why they initially voted to authorize use of force and why they no longer felt military intervention in Iraq was necessary.
In 2005, the main topics discussed by Bush II were foreign affairs, social security, and terrorism. During his SOU address, Bush II especially focused on social security. He said that without revisions, social security was headed towards bankruptcy. Therefore, he proposed establishing private social security accounts for younger workers. Members of Congress spent the most time responding to Bush II’s social security plan. The responses were very partisan, with Republicans speaking largely in support of Bush II’s plan, and Democrats criticizing his plan and questioning whether social security was even truly headed towards bankruptcy.
Bush II’s level of influence decreased even more in 2006. In 2006, the main topics discussed by Bush II were foreign affairs, terrorism, and the economy, while members of
Congress spoke primarily of the budget, energy, and civil rights. At this juncture, the political environment had started to change. Americans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the policy in Iraq and rising oil prices, which was reflected in speeches made by members of
Congress. This taken into consideration with the fact that 2006 was an election year suggests that Bush II’s lack of influence can be partially attributed to the quest for electoral success by members of Congress.
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Overall, looking at the influence of Bush II across his presidency, he started with a
medium level of influence which escalated to a high level of influence immediately after the
September 11, 2001 attacks. This level of influence eventually diminished as time went on
suggesting that Bush II’s influence likely had more to do with presiding during a period of crisis
than during a specific political time.
Looking at Bush’s presidency, the aspects of the politics of pre-emption and articulation
are apparent. For example, when Bush II first took office, he was trying to change from
Clinton’s domestic agenda to a more conservative domestic agenda. This was met with
resistance by Democrats, who at the time controlled Congress. However, once Republicans
regained control of Congress, Bush II and Republicans were pursuing the same agenda.
Therefore, as long as Bush II adhered to the Republican agenda, he was able to exert influence in
Congress and receive vast support from Republican members. That is why he does not seem to fit neatly into any of the political time categories. Instead, Bush II’s presidency seems to encompass different types of political time depending on other factors.
Levels of Presidential Influence Across Political Time
Looking at the overall influence of a president across his term or terms, it does appear that the political time during which he is presiding has an impact. This is further displayed in
Table 4-1. Building on the levels of presidential influence table in Chapters 1 and 3 (Tables 1-1 and 3-13), Table 4-1 shows the average level of influence a president had during his presidency and the political time during which he was presiding. To determine the average level of influence a president had, the level of influence the president had during each year of his presidency was assigned a numeric value which could then be averaged.
The coding scheme was as such: low levels of influence were coded 1, medium levels 2, high partisan levels 2.5, and high levels 3. For example, during the three years of Bush I’s
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presidency analyzed, he had two medium and one high level of influence. Therefore, I added 2,
2, and 3, and divided by 3 so his average was 2.3 which corresponded with a medium level of influence. If a president’s numerical average fell between 1 and 1.75, his influence was categorized as being low, 1.76 and 2.5 medium, and 2.51 and 3 high. High partisan was not included as a category for an overall level of influence because I felt that doing so may be inaccurate (i.e. numbers do not show whether the responses in Congress were partisan). Table
4-2 shows the numeric averages along with the category of influence for each president.
In looking at the presidents according to their average levels of influence, three presidents
– Carter, Bush II, and Clinton – had low levels, while the other two presidents – Reagan and
Bush I – both had medium levels of influence. This is consistent with the findings discussed so far in this chapter in that the politics of reconstruction and articulation seem allow the most potential for influence, whereas the politics of disjunction and pre-emption appear to limit the amount of influence a president can have in Congress. This finding becomes even more apparent when looking at the average level of influence during a president’s first term, as shown in Table
4-3.
Looking at the presidents’ first terms may be a more accurate way to determine their levels of influence during different political times. This is because all the presidents served at least one term, whereas only three of five presidents served two. Table 4-3 shows that Reagan had the highest level of influence among the five presidents, which would be expected considering he was the only president to serve during the politics of reconstruction.
Looking at Tables 4-2 and 4-3 also help settle the dispute over which political time Bush
II falls under. As discussed above, it was unclear whether Bush II fell under the politics of
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articulation or pre-emption, however, based on his overall level of influence, it seems that he might be better classified as presiding during the politics of disjunction.
Politics of Disjunction Revisited – Carter vs. Bush II
The politics of disjunction – when the president is affiliated but institutions are vulnerable – seems to aptly describe Carter’s presidency, but could it also apply to Bush II’s as well? There are many similarities between Carter and Bush II’s presidencies. For one, both were unlikely choices for president. Carter was seen as an outsider, and both were viewed as lacking the political experience necessary to serve as president. Another key similarity is that both presided during periods of unified government which should promote presidential influence in Congress, yet both had low levels of influence.
As for being affiliated presidents, Carter had hoped to revive the liberal policy agenda, whereas Bush II was associated with compassionate conservatism. Both Carter and Bush II heavily emphasized foreign affairs while members of Congress, including members of their own parties, focused on domestic policies. Finally, in accordance with the politics of disjunction, presidents presiding during this political time tend to become more unpopular as time goes on which is clearly the case with both Carter and Bush II. Therefore, I would suggest that Bush II also falls under the politics of disjunction and that the relationship between Carter and Bush II warrants more analysis at a later date.
Conclusions
Overall, political time appears to be a good indicator of presidential influence. During the politics of reconstruction, presidents are able to exert the most influence because they are opposed to the previous agenda and institutions are vulnerable. This was apparent during
Reagan’s presidency when he was able to accomplish much of his economic agenda, even under divided government. Presidents presiding during the politics of articulation also are able to exert
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influence assuming they do not stray too far from the previous president’s agenda. This was
evident in looking at Bush I’s presidency. When he adhered to Reagan’s agenda, Bush I was
able to exert influence. He only lacked influence when trying to pursue his own agenda, or
redefine items on Reagan’s agenda.
Presidents during the politics of disjunction have the least opportunity to influence
Congress. Since presidents during the politics of disjunction are pursuing an agenda that is
largely ineffective, it is left up to members of Congress to set the discourse. As with Carter, this
results not only in a lack of influence by the president, but also in an increasing hostility towards
him, even among members of his own party.
Presidential influence during the politics of preemption is harder to generalize. It is
possible for presidents to exert influence during the politics of preemption, however, much of this is determined by the partisan make-up of Congress. As seen with Clinton, he was able to exert influence when Democrats controlled Congress, but had hardly any influence when
Republicans gained control. Therefore, presidential influence during the politics of preemption is affected not by political time, but rather by other factors such as unified or divided government.
Finally, it is harder to classify Bush II, however, when looking at all the evidence it appears that he best falls under the politics of disjunction. Similar to Carter, Bush II was committed to perpetuating an agenda that did not necessarily work and this resulted in less success in influencing the legislative agenda as time went on. For example, during the first two years of Bush II’s presidency there was much policy agreement in the topics being discussed by
Bush II and members of Congress. However, as Bush II’s presidency progressed, members of
Congress were no longer discussing the same topics as Bush II, and eventually were not even
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discussing the same topics in the same manner. This is consistent with presidents serving under the politics of disjunction. Therefore, as previously mentioned, Bush II and Carter seem to have more in common than originally thought and this is definitely a relationship that warrants further research.
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Table 4-1. Presidential Influence Across Political Time Politics of Politics of Politics of Politics of Reconstruction Articulation Disjunction Pre-emption President Influence President Influence President Influence President Influence Reagan Medium Bush I Medium Carter Low Clinton Low Bush II Low
Table 4-2. Numeric Levels of Influence by President President Numeric Average Level of Influence Carter 1 Low Bush II 1.58 Low Clinton 1.71 Low Reagan 2.28 Medium Bush I 2.3 Medium
Table 4-3. Numeric Levels of Influence During a President’s First Term President Numeric Average Level of Influence Carter 1 Low Bush II 1.63 Low Clinton 1.75 Low Bush I 2.3 Medium Reagan 2.5 Medium
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CHAPTER 5 CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT
The focus thus far in this dissertation has been mainly on the president and his influence in
Congress. However, part of the president’s influence in Congress also concerns who in Congress is responding to him. What possible motivations do members of Congress have to speak? Is there something distinct about members of Congress who decide to speak? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by examining aggregate level data about all the members of Congress who spoke during the 28 years studied in this dissertation. Looking at which chamber the members were in, their party affiliation, their length of service, and whether they were a party leader or committee chair should show whether certain types of members are more likely to speak than others.
Aside from discussing which members are most likely to speak in Congress, this chapter will also examine how institutional norms and procedures during the post-reform and conditional party congresses affect congressional response to the president. The transition from a committee controlled to a party dominated Congress should have an impact on who responds to the president, and how members respond. It is likely that more party leaders respond during conditional party government, and that congressional responses become more partisan.
Why Speak?
One way to evaluate Congress and the way it fits into the larger political system is to look at the actions of its individual members (Mayhew 2002). Although there are many different actions members of Congress can undertake, this dissertation is mainly concerned with the decision of a member to speak on the floor of the House or Senate. To help determine why some members decide to speak and others do not, it is necessary to understand what motivates congressional behavior.
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Members of Congress have many different motivations behind their actions. One
prevalent theory is that members are “single-minded seekers of re-election” (Mayhew 1990, 5).
Therefore, members of Congress calculate their behavior based on what will be in their best interest electorally. Assuming this to be true, then members should only decide to speak if they think it will assist in their reelection efforts. This suggests that there may be something distinct about members who decide to speak that differentiates them from members who do not.
Another motivation potentially affecting the actions of members of Congress is their
desire to shape public opinion. Although members are portrayed as serving in Congress to represent their constituents’ interests, this is not always the case. Some scholars contend that members of Congress are more likely to shape and mobilize public opinion than passively represent the positions of their constituents (Mayhew 2002). If this is the case, then another possible reason a member might decide to speak is if he or she is trying to shift public opinion in one direction or the other. Speaking can prove to be fairly influential because public opinion about “political issues may be substantially shaped by the selection and presentation of information” (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, 223). Therefore by emphasizing certain issues and downplaying or eliminating others, members of Congress may be able to influence public opinion through their speeches.
Another way members of Congress try to influence public opinion is by taking stands on certain issues. Taking stands is when members “register a position on some matter before some audience” (Mayhew 2002, 90). For example, if a member spoke in favor of military action on the floor of the House or Senate, that would qualify as taking a stand. Taking stands are often aimed at the president, especially in opposition to his position on an issue. Opposition can be defined as “any effort by a member of Congress to thwart the aims or impair the standing of a
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presidential administration” (Mayhew 2002, 107). So in other words, opposition is any time a member of Congress vocalizes his or her disagreement with the president.
Even though members of Congress try to shape public opinion by taking stands and using certain types of information, the main way members seek to influence public opinion is by issue framing. Framing can be defined as when a member of Congress tries to define and give meaning to an issue (Callaghan and Schnell 2001). Usually framing involves focusing on certain aspects of events or issues as a way to encourage a particular interpretation, evaluation, or solution (Entman 2003). Often the frames used by members of Congress are very different from those used by the president. By using competing frames, members of Congress can try to limit the amount of influence the president has in setting the congressional agenda. This may provide members of Congress, particularly members of the opposition party, with additional motivation to speak.
Who Speaks?
There is little literature regarding who speaks in Congress, however, research indicates that certain types of members are more likely to speak than others. One possible difference that could affect who speaks is whether the member is in the House or the Senate. Due to the institutional differences between the two chambers, it is likely that there will be differences between the types of members who speak in the House, and the types of members who speak in the Senate. For example, in looking at members of the House who made floor speeches, it was found that party leaders and ideologically extreme members (either very conservative or very liberal) spoke more often than other members (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). Also, minority party members were more likely to speak as a way to offer policy alternatives (ibid).
In the House, it was found that high ranking committee members were less likely to speak, however, in the Senate, they were more likely to speak (Lehnen 1967; Maltzman and
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Sigelman 1996). Also, scholars found that there were likely to be fewer members speaking in
the Senate than in the House (Lehnen 1967). Finally, in the House, scholars do not think
seniority matters in regards to who speaks, whereas in the Senate, members who have served longer are more likely to speak (Lehnen 1967; Maltzman and Sigleman 1996).
Chamber Matters
In looking at the 617 members of Congress whose speeches were included during the 28 years of this study, there were clearly more members speaking in the House than in the Senate
(see Table 5-1). Of the members speaking, 73.6 percent were from the House of
Representatives, while 14.4 percent were Senators. This is consistent with other scholars who claimed members serving in the Senate were less likely to speak (Lehnen 1967).
It is important to note that there could have been more speeches by both members of the
House and Senate due to the way speaking members were classified. Members were classified as either serving exclusively in the House or Senate, or as having served in the House and then the Senate. In regards to the 12 percent of speaking members who served in the House and then the Senate, no notation was made in the aggregate-level data about which chamber the member was in when they spoke. This means that these members could have spoken while in the House, in the Senate, or potentially while in both chambers since many members spoke more than once over the course of their congressional careers. However, even if all of the members serving in both chambers spoke while they were in the Senate bringing that percentage to 26.4, there would still be significantly more respondents speaking in the House.
The evidence clearly indicates that there were more members responding to the president in the House than in the Senate. However, this does not necessarily mean that members of the
House are more likely to speak. The reason for this is because there are more members of the
House than of the Senate. Therefore, simply based on probability, more members of the House
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than from the Senate would be likely to speak. When taking into consideration that members of the House make up 435 of the 535 seats in Congress, then approximately 81.3 percent of
Congress is composed of representatives. Therefore, unless more than 81.3 percent of the congressional responses are from members of the House it is difficult to argue that representatives are really speaking more than members of the Senate.
Aside from the differences in size between the House and Senate, there are other institutional differences which may cause members of the House to speak more. For example, members of the House serve shorter terms. By serving two year terms instead of six year terms in the Senate, members of the House have less time to make their mark, and also have to think more about re-election. This likely encourages them to speak more, while senators do not have the same time considerations.
Another institutional difference that may result in members of the House speaking more is that the House is a more complex and formal institution than the Senate. In the House, party leadership and the Rules Committee largely dictate the agenda and debate, meaning that open time speeches may be one of the few opportunities representatives have to express their opinions.
In comparison, with fewer restraints on debate in the Senate, senators have more opportunities to speak, therefore decreasing the importance of open time speeches. Also, members of the Senate are more likely to receive media coverage than members of the House. By having other outlets to express their points of view, senators have to rely less on open time speeches.
Based on these institutional differences, it makes sense that members of the House would speak more in response to the president than members of the Senate. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that there were consistently more members of the House who respond to the president’s SOU address.
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Party Affiliation
When looking at the number of Democrats and Republicans speaking in response to the
president, the number is almost equal. Of members responding to the president’s SOU address
across the 28 years, 51.1 percent were Democrats and 48.6 percent were Republicans (see Table
5-2). There were also two Independents who spoke. This suggests that partisanship does not
make a difference in who speaks. However, the results look a little different when looking at specific years.
Scholars have suggested that minority party members are more likely to speak in
Congress, particularly when there is unified government (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996).
Therefore, it would be expected that more Democrats would speak during Bush II’s presidency,
more Republicans would speak at the beginning of Clinton’s presidency, etc. Also, minority
party members are also more likely to speak even when there is divided government. However,
looking at Tables 5-3 and 5-4 below, this does not appear to be the case.
During the 28 years studied in this dissertation, Democrats were in control of the House for 16 years. Looking at Table 5-3 shows that Democrats spoke more both while they were the
majority and minority party in Congress. This suggests either that Republicans are less likely to
speak when in control of the House, or that Republicans are less likely to challenge the majority
party.
While Democrats controlled the House for 16 of the 28 years studied, they only
controlled the Senate for 12 of 28 years. Interestingly, even though Democrats were the minority
party more in the Senate, they spoke less than they did in the House. That being said, Democrats
still spoke slightly more than Republicans, even when retaining control of the Senate. These tables suggest that the party in control of the House and Senate does not affect which party
members speak.
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Even though which party is controlling each chamber does not seem to make a difference in regards to who speaks, does the president’s party affiliation matter as to who is speaking?
Looking at Table 5-5 suggests that it does. There are clearly more Republicans speaking when a
Democrat is president, and Democrats speaking when a Republican is president. The president’s party affiliation appears to matter not only on an aggregate level, but also when looking at specific presidents.
Table 5-6 shows whether the opposition party to the president in Congress spoke more on average throughout each presidency. In looking at the table, it appears that there were slightly more Democrats speaking during Carter’s presidency, and slightly more Republicans during
Bush I’s presidency. However, during Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II’s presidencies, there were clearly more members of the opposition party speaking across their presidencies. This is interesting considering these are the three two-term presidents examined in this research. Also notable is Reagan’s presidency, during which there was an average of 24 percent more
Democrats speaking than Republicans.
Looking at these results suggests that party affiliation only affects who speaks sometimes. It appears that on the aggregate level, there is little difference between whether
Democrats or Republicans speak. Also, when looking at which party controls Congress, it does not appear that minority party members are any more likely to speak than majority party members. However, the party affiliation of the president did seem to have an impact on who spoke, with members of the opposite party more likely to speak.
Length of Service
Although partisanship does not appear to have a large impact on which members of
Congress speak, the length of time they have served in Congress does. The average length of time speaking members served was 15.5 years. This differs from the average number of years all
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members, both speaking and non-speaking, served. For example, during the 109th Congress, the
average length of service in the House was 9.3 years, and in the Senate was 12.1 years.
However, the average length of time a speaking member served during the 109th Congress was
13.8 years. There is a similar trend present during other congresses. This suggests that on average speaking members served longer than non-speaking members.
Since the amount of time a member served when speaking was not accounted for in the aggregate data, this could mean one of two things. One, it could suggest that only members who have served longer decide to speak. However, it could also mean that speaking members of
Congress are able to retain their positions longer. To try to determine which the case is, it is necessary to look at the average length of service for each year (see Table 5-7).
When looking at the average length a speaking member served each year, it is apparent that most members have been in Congress for several years before deciding to speak. The lowest average was 6.34 years in 1995, which can likely be attributed to the influx of new members of
Congress caused by the Republican Revolution of 1994. In fact, it seems that there is a slight decline in the number of years a speaking member served immediately following each election.
This suggests that some new members may decide to speak as soon as they take office.
In looking at the average time a member served in Congress when speaking, it is
interesting that more senior members were speaking during Bush II’s presidency. While the
average was low during his first year of office (8.05), this number almost doubles by 2002
(15.79). This suggests that the September 11, 2001 may have had an impact on which members
of Congress were speaking, with more senior members deciding to speak.
Overall, it appears that seniority matters in who speaks in Congress. If it did not, then the average length of time members had served when speaking would be much lower. However,
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when the average across 28 years is 15.5 years, and the lowest average during any of those years
was 6.34 years, this is evidence that seniority does matter.
Party Leaders and Committee Chairs
One other factor that may affect who speaks in Congress is whether the member is a party
leader or committee chair. Looking at the aggregate level data, there were clearly more committee chairs speaking than party leaders. Of the 617 members speaking across the 28 years,
21.9 percent were committee chairs while only 8.1 percent were party leaders. This suggests that
committee chairs are more likely to speak.
There are several possible explanations for this, one being that committee chairs are
likely to be more knowledgeable about policies discussed in their committees. Having more
knowledge about a topic might cause members to have a stronger opinion and also make them
more likely to want to share their opinions.
Looking at Table 5-8, which shows the percentage of party leaders (PL) and committee
chairs (CC) during each year, it is apparent that there was a large variation in the percentage of party leaders and committee chairs speaking from year to year. There also does not appear to be any discernable pattern in regards to the variation. One interesting finding is that there was a much larger percentage of party leaders and committee chairs during 2002 and 2003. These are the same two years during which there was an increase in seniority. Again, it could be an effect of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks since these are the two years immediately following the attacks. The impact of the terrorist attacks will be more closely examined in Chapter 8.
Institutional Changes in Congress
Now that who was speaking in Congress has been discussed, it is important to see how this relates to broader institutional changes which took place in Congress during the 28 years studied. There are four main congressional eras that characterize Congress over the last 60 years
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– the textbook, reform, post-reform, and conditional party government periods. These congressional eras range from strong committees during the textbook Congress to strong parties during conditional party government. It is important to examine the different institutional norms and procedures during the four congressional eras to see whether they affect how members of
Congress respond to the president.
Just two congressional eras are encompassed in this dissertation since it only examines
Congress from 1978 through 2006. Therefore, the main focus will be looking at institutional norms and procedures related to the post-reform and conditional party government eras. The numerous reforms that were implemented in Congress during the 1970s caused committee chairs to lose influence and parties to gain influence. For example, during the post-reform Congress, parties started playing a larger role in committee assignments and setting the legislative agenda
(Herrnson 2000).
However, the influence of parties was not top-down, meaning it is not party leaders which drive legislation. Instead, during conditional party government, the roles are reversed and widespread support for policies among party members in Congress is what causes party leaders to use the tools at their disposal to promote the positions of the party (Rohde 1991). Committee members are expected to not interfere with popular legislation, and party members who consistently oppose legislation are chastised by losing or not obtaining desired committee assignments (ibid). Therefore, during conditional party government members of Congress are expected to support their party.
The era of conditional party government has allowed the role of parties to increase in
Congress. The role of parties became even more pronounced after the Republican revolution in
1994. The two major parties have become more unified internally, and also have become more
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polarized from each other. This has allowed party leaders to have more influence in Congress,
and also has caused party members to have a stronger tie to the president when government is
unified.
Some of these changes are evident from looking at the 28 years studied in this
dissertation, whereas others are less apparent. One obvious change is the increasing partisan response to the president. During Carter’s presidency, there was not as much partisan unity and
Democrats were not always supportive of the president. As was seen in Chapter 2, there were varying responses to Carter in Congress which cannot necessarily be attributed to partisanship.
Democratic members of Congress responded to Carter very differently, with many of them not afraid to openly criticize him in Congress.
The way members of Congress responded during Reagan and Bush I’s presidencies were different. While there still was not partisan unity, Republicans were more likely to be supportive
of Reagan and Bush I, while Democrats were more likely to oppose the presidents. The partisan
divide in congressional responses did not become overtly evident until Clinton’s presidency.
During Clinton’s presidency, Democrats tended to discuss the same topics as Clinton and do so
using the same rhetoric, while Republicans were extremely oppositional and critical of Clinton.
This partisan divide continued during Bush II’s presidency. The main difference was that
Bush II seemed to receive even more support from Republicans in Congress than Clinton had from Democrats in Congress while he was president. This is evident not only from examining
the rhetoric used by Bush II and members of Congress, but also by the fact that Bush II did not
veto any legislation until July 2006 mainly because the Republican-controlled Congress was not
passing any legislation with which he disagreed. Therefore, the evidence confirms that parties
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did start playing a stronger role during the post-reform Congress culminating in the era of conditional party government.
Even though there is evidence that the institutional changes which took place in Congress affected the way members responded to the president, there is less evidence to suggest that who was responding changed. For example, due to the increasing importance of parties in Congress, it would be expected that the percentage of party leaders speaking would increase. However, looking at Table 5-8, this is clearly not the case. Also, since the role of committees in Congress diminished during this period, it would be expected that the percentage of committee chairs speaking would decrease, however, this is also not the case. Therefore, even though the institutional changes taking place in Congress did cause members to respond in a more partisan manner, they did not largely affect who responded.
Congressional Factors and Presidential Influence
Now that which types of members are more likely to speak have been discussed, it is necessary to see how this corresponds to presidential levels of influence. One way to do this is to look at the average number of years a speaking member served compared to a president’s level of influence during that year. Are presidents more influential when younger members speak or does it make a difference? Table 5-9 shows the average number of years a member served when speaking (AYS) and the president’s influence during that year (LI).
An interesting pattern is revealed when examining the table. It appears that presidents had more influence when the speaking members had served fewer years in Congress and less influence when more senior members of Congress were speaking. This suggests that one component of presidential influence in Congress is not being challenged by the members with longer tenure. It also suggests that presidents might be more successful at persuading more junior members of Congress.
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There is more evidence to support this claim when looking at presidential influence based on the percentage of party leaders speaking in Congress. Table 5-10 shows the percentage of party leaders (PL) during each year along with the president’s level of influence during that year.
Although there is not as identifiable of a pattern as in Table 5-9, it still shows that when there
were the highest percentages of party leaders in Congress, the presidents had lower levels of
influence. For example, during the five years when party leaders made up more than 10 percent
of the speaking members, presidents had low levels of influence during every year except one
during which there was a medium level of influence. Again this suggests that presidents are not
able to exert as much influence when certain types of members are speaking, which means that
part of a president’s level of influence comes from who is responding to him.
Finally, Table 5-11 shows presidential influence based on the percentage of committee
chairs speaking. Similar to Table 5-10, there is not an easily identifiable pattern, however, again
there appears to be lower levels of influence when the largest percentage of committee chairs are
speaking.
Another interesting finding from looking at Tables 5-9, 5-10, and 5-11 is that there again
appear to be similarities between the presidencies of Carter and Bush II. In all three tables,
Carter and Bush II are listed at the high end – high number average of years members served
when speaking, high percentage of party leaders, and high percentage of committee chairs. Also,
during these years Carter and Bush II both had low levels of influence. Similar to the discussion
at the end of Chapter 4, these findings suggest that there are many similarities between Carter
and Bush II’s presidencies and their relationships with members of Congress. Again, this
warrants more research at a later date.
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Conclusions
In looking at the speaking members from 1978 through 2006, it appears that members of
the House and those who have served longer are more likely to speak than members of the
Senate and newer members. Also, it appears that there is an inverse relationship between
seniority and a president’s level of influence. The longer number of years a member has served when speaking seems to correspond with a lower level of influence for the president.
Aside from chamber and seniority, whether a member is a party leader or committee chairs appears to make some difference, however, it varies widely each year. Looking at the percentage of party leaders and committee chairs speaking each year compared to levels of
presidential influence shows a somewhat similar pattern to that found in regards to seniority,
however, not enough to draw any strong conclusions.
The one factor that does not seem to have an impact is party affiliation. Almost an equal
number of Democrats and Republicans spoke during the 28 years, and there were not
significantly more members of the opposition party speaking. Therefore, members of the House
and members who have served longer are most likely to respond to the president.
In regards to the impact of institutional changes in Congress, the decreasing role of
committees and the increasing role of parties did have an effect on congressional response to the
president. Looking at congressional responses from Carter through Bush II, the responses
became more partisan over time, with responses being the most partisan during Bush II’s
presidency. Even though the institutional changes affected how members of Congress
responded, they did not have an impact on who responded.
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Table 5-1. Speaking Members by Chamber Percentage House 73.6% Senate 14.4% House and Senate 12%
Table 5-2. Speaking Members by Party Affiliation Percentage Democrat 51.1% Republican 48.6% Independent .3%
Table 5-3. Speaking Members by Party Control of the House Democratic Republican Control Control Democrats 55.78% 49.3% Republicans 44.22% 42.3%
Table 5-4. Speaking Members by Party Control of the Senate Democratic Republican Control Control Democrats 51.4% 50.2% Republicans 48.6% 49.8%
Table 5-5. Speaking Members by President’s Party Affiliation Democratic Republican President President Democrats 48.5% 56.3% Republicans 51.5% 43.7%
Table 5-6. Average Partisan Difference for Individual Presidents Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II Opposition -1.46% +24% -0.8% +2.56% +5.07% Party
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Table 5-7. Average Length of Service When Speaking, 1978 – 2006 1978 12.47 1987 9.55 1997 8.22 1979 11.97 1988 10.83 1998 9.95 1980 12.76 1990 10.48 2000 10.24 1981 8.95 1991 11.96 2001 8.05 1982 10.59 1992 12.80 2002 15.79 1983 10.77 1993 8.84 2003 17.07 1984 7.84 1994 9.24 2004 13.45 1985 10.92 1995 6.34 2005 12.17 1986 11.34 1996 10.18 2006 13.87
Table 5-8. Percentage of Party Leader and Committee Chairs, 1978 – 2006 Year PL CC Year PL CC Year PL CC 1978 17% 18.9% 1987 8.1% 12.9% 1997 1.7% 8.6% 1979 6.3% 21.9% 1988 8.5% 14.9% 1998 8% 9.3% 1980 23.8% 7.1% 1990 9.7% 9.7% 2000 7.1% 8.3% 1981 9.1% 11.4% 1991 7% 7% 2001 9.4% 12.5% 1982 3.1% 15.6% 1992 6.6% 6.6% 2002 16.7% 23.8% 1983 3.8% 3.8% 1993 5% 7.5% 2003 21.4% 26.2% 1984 5.9% 2% 1994 8.2% 2.4% 2004 6.5% 3.2% 1985 7.7% 0% 1995 1.7% 1.7% 2005 7% 5.8% 1986 7.3% 4.9% 1996 5.1% 10.2% 2006 11.1% 11.1%
Table 5-9. Presidential Influence Based on Average Years Speaking Members Served AYS Year LI AYS Year LI AYS Year LI 6.34 1995 Low 10.18 1996 Low 11.97 1979 Low 7.84 1984 Medium 10.24 2000 Low 12.17 2005 Medium 8.05 2001 High P. 10.48 1990 Medium 12.47 1978 Low 8.22 1997 Medium 10.59 1982 High 12.76 1980 Low 8.84 1993 High P. 10.77 1983 Medium 12.80 1992 Medium 8.95 1981 High 10.83 1988 Medium 13.45 2004 Low 9.24 1994 High P. 10.92 1985 Low 13.87 2006 Low 9.55 1987 Medium 11.34 1986 Medium 15.79 2002 Low 9.95 1998 Medium 11.96 1991 High 17.07 2003 Medium
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Table 5-10. Presidential Influence Based on Speaking Party Leaders PL Year LI PL Year LI PL Year LI 1.7% 1995 Low 6.6% 1992 Medium 8.5% 1988 Medium 1.7% 1997 Medium 7% 1991 High 9.1% 1981 High 3.1% 1982 High 7% 2005 Medium 9.4% 2001 High P. 3.8% 1983 Medium 7.1% 2000 Low 9.7% 1990 Medium 5% 1993 High P. 7.3% 1986 Medium 11.1% 2006 Low 5.1% 1996 Low 7.7% 1985 Low 16.7% 2002 Low 5.9% 1984 Medium 8% 1998 Medium 17% 1978 Low 6.3% 1979 Low 8.1% 1987 Medium 21.4% 2003 Medium 6.5% 2004 Low 8.2% 1994 High P. 23.8% 1980 Low
Table 5-11. Presidential Influence Based on Speaking Committee Chairs CC Year LI CC Year LI CC Year LI 0% 1985 Low 7% 1991 High 11.4% 1981 High 1.7% 1995 Low 7.1% 1980 Low 12.5% 2001 High P. 2% 1984 Medium 7.5% 1993 High P. 12.9% 1987 Medium 2.4% 1994 High P. 8.3% 2000 Low 14.9% 1988 Medium 3.2% 2004 Low 8.6% 1997 Medium 15.6% 1982 High 3.8% 1983 Medium 9.3% 1998 Medium 18.9% 1978 Low 4.9% 1986 Medium 9.7% 1990 Medium 21.9% 1979 Low 5.8% 2005 Medium 10.2% 1996 Low 23.8% 2002 Low 6.6% 1992 Medium 11.1% 2006 Low 26.2% 2003 Medium
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CHAPTER 6 DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN POLICIES
Most presidents begin their term in office with a domestic policy agenda they want to pursue. Although most presidents have foreign policy goals as well, these are generally not as fully developed and instead either are partially inherited from the previous administration or are created over time in response to international events and conflicts (Wood and Peake 1998). Does the type of policy the president is pursuing affect the level of influence he is able to have in Congress? Does the president specifically focus on one type of policy as a way to gain influence? In other words, does whether the president is trying to influence the domestic or foreign policy agenda in
Congress make a difference in his success? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by looking at why presidents might decide to focus on foreign policy and whether they are ultimately able to exert more influence in Congress by doing so.
Presidential Influence in Foreign Affairs
Do presidents have more influence over foreign policy than domestic policy?
According to Aaron Wildavsky’s “two presidencies” thesis, the answer is yes.
Wildavsky’s thesis states that presidents have more control and influence over foreign affairs than domestic affairs (1966). According to Wildavsky, it is often hard for presidents to gain support for their domestic policies, but it is easier for them to be successful in the foreign policy realm. If Wildavsky’s thesis is correct, then presidents should be able to exert more influence in Congress when pursuing foreign policy goals than domestic policy goals.
One reason presidents may be more autonomous in regards to foreign affairs is because foreign policy objectives generally do not require the same approval from
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Congress as domestic policy objectives (Andrade and Young 1996). There are a few ways presidents can create foreign policy, however, all of them can be restricted in some way by Congress.
One power the president has is the ability to issue an executive agreement, which is an agreement between the United States and another country or countries (Edwards
1980). Executive agreements do not require the consent of Congress and are as binding
as treaties, however, they cannot conflict with any other prior statutes. Also, Congress
can in effect reject executive agreements by not appropriating funds to support them,
although this is rare.
One means Congress does have to stop the president’s actions in foreign affairs
comes from the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The War Powers Resolution requires the president to consult with Congress prior to and throughout military action, and to remove troops if Congress has not declared war or passed a resolution authorizing use of
force within 60 days. Time can be extended 30 days at the president’s request. Even
though this resolution does limit the president’s ability to act in foreign affairs, it is
questionable what constitutes consultation with Congress, and there is debate whether the
president could put the United States in a position during 60 days where congressional
withdrawal of troops would be difficult (Edwards 1980).
The president’s role in introducing foreign affairs into the political system is
another reason why he may be more successful in the foreign policy realm. Whereas
domestic policies are often introduced by members of Congress and interest groups, the
president is the primary venue for the introduction of foreign policy (Wood and Peake
1998). This is because the president is the only political actor who can speak for the
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United States as a nation, and the American public often expects him to do so, especially
in times of crisis. In other words, “foreign policy is primarily centered on the presidency
due to constitutional obligations, the need for strong centralized leadership, and
expectations by the public and other institutions” (Wood and Peake 1998, 181).
Wildavsky says that presidents are especially successful in regards to foreign
policy when they present it as a way to help protect the nation (1966). This suggests that one reason presidents may be more successful with foreign policy is due to a “rally around the flag” effect. A “rally around the flag” effect can be described as when something occurs which evokes patriotism in Americans (Sinclair 2004). Usually this effect is “associated with an event which (1) is international and (2) involves the United
States and particularly the president directly; and it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply focused” (Mueller 1985, 208). Since the president is seen as the primary representative of the United States, “rally around the flag” effects usually cause public approval of the president to increase and allow the president more influence in foreign affairs. Therefore, one possible cause of presidents wielding more influence in foreign affairs may be a result of a “rally around the flag” effect.
Even though “rally around the flag” effects, constitutional provisions, and the president as the national figurehead all seem to explain why presidents may be more influential in regards to foreign affairs, there are still many scholars who dispute
Wildavsky’s thesis. One interesting argument is that the two presidencies thesis does not hold true for all presidents, but primarily for Republican presidents (Bond and Fleisher
1988; Sigelman 1979). This argument claims that “Republican administrations are characterized by two presidencies while Democratic administrations are not” (Bond and
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Fleisher 1988, 755). One possible explanation for this is that Democratic presidents typically fare better with domestic policy than Republican presidents, so there is a more stark difference between a Republican president’s success in domestic and foreign policy.
Another possible explanation is that Republican presidents tend to receive more support from their party leaders and committee chairs in Congress than do Democratic presidents
(Bond and Fleisher 1988).
Aside from ways presidents can potentially influence foreign affairs, there is also the question of motivation. Why would presidents seek to influence foreign affairs as opposed to domestic affairs? The most obvious answer is because they likely have more influence in the foreign policy realm, however, there may be other motivations as well.
One is that world events, such as wars and crises, may force a president to concentrate on foreign policy. When hostages were taken in Iran during Jimmy Carter’s presidency or terrorists attacked the U.S. during George W. Bush’s presidency – these types of events force presidents to focus their attention on foreign policy.
Another theory is that presidents may focus on foreign policies as a way to distract attention away from domestic problems, sometimes even going so far as to engage in a military operation (Andrade and Young 1996; Brace and Hinckley 1991;
Morgan and Bickers 1992; Ostrom and Job 1986). So if there are internal problems in the United States, for example, if the level of unemployment is high, then the president may want to focus the public’s attention elsewhere. Also, focusing on foreign policies has a tendency to increase presidential approval (Brace and Hinckley 1991; Morgan and
Bickers 1992).
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Another possible motivation for presidents to focus on foreign affairs is that if they do indeed wield more power in that realm, then they are more likely to accomplish their foreign policy goals than their domestic policy goals (Andrade and Young 1996).
Presidents generally like to enact as many of their policies as possible, particularly if they are running for re-election. Finally, scholars have found that there is a direct and inverse relationship between a president’s emphasis on foreign affairs and his level of influence in Congress (ibid). In other words, presidents who do not have as much influence in
Congress are more likely to focus on foreign policies than those presidents with higher levels of influence.
Presidents and Foreign Policy, 1978 – 2006
To determine whether or not presidents are able to exert more influence in
Congress when pursuing foreign policies, the topics being discussed by both the president and members of Congress during the 28 years being researched in this dissertation were labeled as either domestic or foreign policies. Examples of policies that were classified as domestic are topics such as education, social security, and health care, whereas the military, nuclear weapons, and international trade are examples of policies that were identified as foreign. Once the policies for each year were classified, percentages were calculated which showed the amount of each president’s SOU address spent on domestic and foreign policies. Classifying policies as either domestic or foreign also showed the percentage of time members of Congress spent on each.
When looking at the results, there are several possible indicators that the president is exerting more influence in the foreign policy realm. One potential indicator of influence is that when the president discusses foreign policies, members of Congress also discuss them using largely the same terms. This suggests that there would be a
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correlation between the percentage of foreign and domestic policies discussed in the president’s SOU address and the percentage of foreign and domestic policies discussed by members of Congress. A second indicator of influence would be when the president spends a large portion of his speech discussing foreign policies but Congress does not respond. This would suggest that members of Congress are unwilling to challenge the president and therefore are allowing him to be very influential in shaping foreign policy.
For the president to not be exerting more influence in regards to foreign policy, then it would be likely that members of Congress would spend more time discussing foreign policies than the president. Another possible indicator of a lack of presidential foreign policy influence would be if members of Congress are discussing different foreign policy issues than the president, or if they are discussing them using largely different rhetoric.
This chapter will look at each of the 28 years being studied in this dissertation by president to determine whether or not presidents were able to exert more influence in the foreign policy realm. The results are grouped by president so that any external factors which may affect presidential influence can be addressed. For example, the September
11, 2001 attacks during George W. Bush’s presidency are likely to have an impact on his influence. After discussing the influence of each president, I should be able to draw larger generalizations about the effect of domestic and foreign policies on presidential influence.
Jimmy Carter, 1978 – 1980
In 1978, Carter and members of Congress spent almost the same amount of time discussing domestic and foreign policies (see Table6-1). Looking at Table 6-1, the president spent 65.5 percent of his SOU address on domestic policies, while 60.4 percent
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of congressional speeches were also about domestic policies. This means that 34.5
percent of Carter’s speech was devoted to foreign policies, as were 39.6 percent of congressional responses. In looking at the types of foreign policies being discussed,
Carter talked about other countries, particularly the Soviet Union. Carter was especially
concerned with the arms race between the U.S. and Soviet Union, and called for a ban on
nuclear explosives. Members of Congress also discussed the Soviet Union, and agreed
that something had to be done regarding nuclear weapons. This suggests that Carter was
able to set the foreign policy agenda in regards to the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons.
In 1979, Carter spent even more time discussing foreign affairs while Congress
shifted its focus back to domestic policies. Carter spent the majority of his SOU address
(56.6 percent) on foreign policies, while the vast majority of congressional responses
were on domestic policies (85 percent). Again, Carter was discussing the Soviet Union
and nuclear weapons. Looking at the historical context of Carter’s 1979 SOU address, it
took place about six months before an agreement was reached to limit strategic nuclear
weapons launchers as part of the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT). This helps explain why Carter spent a large portion of his address discussing
the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons, and SALT II in particular.
However, members of Congress were largely uninterested in discussing the Soviet
Union or SALT II. Only two members speaking in 1979 mentioned the Soviet Union,
and only one mentioned SALT II. Instead, members of Congress were more concerned
with domestic policies such as the budget and education. Since members of Congress
were not challenging Carter regarding the Soviet Union or SALT II, this suggests that he
was given quite a bit of leeway concerning foreign affairs.
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In 1980, Carter spent even more of his address on foreign affairs (76.6 percent).
Carter began his speech by addressing the Iranian hostage crisis, which he referred to as
“international terrorism”. Aside from the Iranian hostage situation, Carter again
discussed the Soviet Union, focusing on what he called their “military aggression” towards Afghanistan.
The percentage of congressional responses increased from 1979 to 54.2 percent,
meaning the majority of speeches made by members of Congress concerned foreign
affairs. While members of Congress were discussing the Soviet Union and foreign affairs
in more general terms, only 25 percent of members mentioned the Iranian hostage crisis.
However, members of Congress were much more likely to challenge Carter’s foreign
policy in 1980 – many members questioned whether American foreign policy was headed
in the right direction. This suggests that Congress took away some of the flexibility they
had given Carter in regards to foreign affairs, meaning that he had less influence over
foreign affairs in 1980 than he had in 1979.
Just after looking at Carter’s influence regarding foreign affairs suggests that
Congress is willing to give the president a fair amount of control over foreign affairs for a while, however, are not afraid to take it away if the president pursues foreign policies with which they disagree. It will be interesting to see if this trend continues when looking at the other presidents and their influence over foreign affairs.
Ronald Reagan, 1981 – 1988
While there were some discrepancies in the amount of time Carter and members of Congress spent discussing domestic and foreign affairs, there was more correlation between the amount of time Reagan and members spent discussing both types of policies.
For example, in 1981, Reagan spent 90.1 percent of his address on domestic affairs and
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81.9 percent of congressional responses were on domestic affairs. This trend continues as can be seen in Table 6-2.
The one exception was in 1988 when Congress spent much more time than
Reagan discussing foreign affairs. The majority of the congressional responses in 1988 focused on the Iran Contra Affair. Members of Congress were concerned about the role of the Reagan Administration in the affair, as well as the situation in Nicaragua. Many of the members of Congress discussed whether or not the U.S. should continue to provide aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, with some legislators expressing concern over providing additional aid. For example, one member of Congress said that continuing to provide the
Contras with aid would “insure conflict, not peace” (Viscolsky 1988).
Reagan made no mention of the Iran Contra Affair, but did briefly discuss the situation in Nicaragua, and asked Congress to “sustain the freedom fighters” in order to help provide “peace, freedom, and democracy in Nicaragua” (1988). As seen in some of the congressional responses, members of Congress were not afraid to challenge Reagan on providing aid to the Contras. So even though Reagan and Congress both discussed
Nicaragua, Reagan did not spend nearly as much time on it as members of Congress.
This suggests that Congress had more control over leading the discussion on Nicaragua than Reagan in 1988.
Overall, it appears that Reagan was not overly influential in regards to foreign affairs. He did dictate the discussion of foreign affairs somewhat in that when he discussed foreign affairs, members of Congress did as well, and they also generally used similar rhetoric. However, Congress clearly had more influence in the discussion of foreign affairs in 1988. Congress wanted to discuss the Iran Contra Affair, and Reagan
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clearly did not want to address the issue. Although Reagan and Congress both discussed
Nicaragua, aside from asking for additional aid for the Contras, Reagan did not have a lot
to say on the issue which allowed Congress to largely set the terms of debate.
George H.W. Bush, 1989 – 1992
In 1989, no congressional responses were evaluated. This is due to the fact that
the SOU address was on February 9, and Congress adjourned until February 21. This
was too long of a period between the time George H.W. Bush (Bush I) delivered his
address and members had a chance to respond. In 1990, Bush I spent about 43 percent of
his address on foreign affairs, whereas only about a quarter of congressional responses
were on foreign policies (see Table 6-3). Bush I discussed a variety of different foreign
policies, most concerning Eastern Europe and Soviet military presence there. The lack of
comments made by Congress suggests they were unwilling to challenge Bush I on these
issues, therefore giving him leverage over foreign policy.
In 1991, Bush I spent almost an equal amount of time discussing domestic and
foreign affairs. During this period, the U.S. was involved in the Persian Gulf War, which
was viewed as a largely popular military operation. In his address, Bush I mainly
discussed the justification for the war and its larger purpose. “What is at stake is more
than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are
drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace
and security, freedom, and the rule of law” (Bush 1991).
More than half of the congressional responses in 1991 were devoted to foreign
policy (see Table 6-3). Members of Congress also discussed Iraq, however, they focused
more on the troops stationed in the Middle East. Many members of Congress expressed their support for the troops and encouraged Americans to do the same. Based on the
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foreign policy topics discussed and rhetoric used by members of Congress, it is evident
they were satisfied with Bush I’s foreign policy, particularly in regards to the Persian
Gulf War. Therefore, Bush I was able to exert a fair amount of influence over foreign
affairs in 1991.
In 1992, Congress shifted its focus primarily back to domestic affairs while Bush
I continued to discuss foreign policies. By this point the Persian Gulf War had successfully ended, and Bush I was campaigning for re-election. At the time of his SOU
address, Bush I’s popularity was at a little under 44 percent approval
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/popularity.php). This suggests that his emphasis on foreign affairs was partially due to his desire to gain influence and increase his approval rating.
As has been pointed out by other scholars, the state of the economy is one of the most influential factors affecting a president’s public approval (Andrade and Young
1996; Brace and Hinckley 1991). So with the economy performing poorly in 1992, Bush
I likely focused on foreign policies as a way to distract public attention from domestic problems. The fact that Congress left foreign affairs largely unaddressed in their responses suggests that Bush I’s strategy of focusing on foreign affairs to gain influence may have been somewhat successful.
Bill Clinton, 1993 – 2000
In looking at the percentage of time Clinton and members of Congress spent discussing foreign affairs during Clinton’s presidency, it is obvious by looking at Table
6-4 that Congress generally deferred to the president. In Clinton’s first SOU in 1993, he spent only 2.9 percent of his speech on foreign affairs, and none of the congressional responses addressed foreign policy. However, for the remainder of Clinton’s two terms,
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he spent between 17 and 27.2 percent of his addresses discussing foreign affairs, while
congressional responses focused on foreign affairs ranged between zero and 9.3 percent.
Without looking at the circumstances, these percentages suggest that Congress generally
deferred to Clinton regarding foreign affairs.
There were two years during Clinton’s presidency when Congress did not discuss
foreign affairs at all. For example, in 1997, Clinton spent 27 percent of his address
outlining his foreign policy agenda. Clinton said that the North American Trade
Organization (NATO) needed to be expanded by 1999 to include former Soviet countries;
that the U.S. must continue and expand trade with Asia; and that overall the U.S. must
embrace the challenge of a global economy. Clinton also said that American security
must be ensured by preventing countries from acquiring and using nuclear weapons, and
that the U.S. must maintain a “strong and ready military” (1997). However, not one
member of Congress spoke about foreign affairs. This again suggests that Congress
allowed Clinton to have a certain amount of leeway in regards to foreign affairs since
they were unwilling to challenge his foreign policy.
George W. Bush, 2001 – 2006
Of all the presidents researched in this dissertation, the most pronounced example of Congress deferring to the president came after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Before the terrorist attacks, George W. Bush (Bush II) focused mainly on domestic policies, as did Congress (see Table 6-5). Once the terrorist attacks occurred, Bush II quickly shifted his focus towards foreign policies, spending a little over half of his 2002 SOU address discussing foreign policies. Surprisingly, Congress did not address foreign affairs in
2002 and instead seemed to wait for Bush II to set the foreign policy agenda and see how the public would respond.
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Congress only started addressing foreign policy issues in 2003 after Bush II started discussing potential military action in Iraq. Many members of Congress challenged Bush II’s foreign policy, especially in regards to Iraq, during their responses in 2003. However, by 2004, Bush II still spent a little over half of his address on foreign affairs while Congress started returning their focus to domestic policies. Bush II’s presidency, and particularly his shift from domestic to foreign policies is discussed in much further detail in Chapter 8.
Domestic vs. Foreign – Overall Levels of Presidential Influence
To further assess the levels of influence presidents have in Congress when discussing domestic and foreign policies, it is necessary to categorize presidential influence according to the amount of time each president spends discussing each type of policy. Table 6-6 classifies presidents as either high domestic, medium domestic, and low domestic depending on the percentage of time they spent discussing domestic policies and their corresponding levels of influence.
Presidents were classified as high domestic if they spent 75 percent or more of their SOU address discussing domestic policies, medium domestic if between 50 percent and 74 percent of their address was devoted to domestic policies, and low domestic if less than 50 percent of their speech was on domestic policies. When looking at the aggregate data presented in the table it actually appears that presidents are more influential when talking about domestic policies. For example, when calculating an average level of influence for each category of domestic policy discussion (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B for the methods used) presidents actually had higher levels of influence when spending more time discussing domestic policies. This can be seen in Table 6-7 which shows the numeric averages for each level of domestic policy discussion.
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Table 6-7 shows that presidents had a medium level of influence when spending
at least 75 percent of their speech discussing domestic policies which tapered down to a
low level of influence when spending less than 50 percent of their speech on domestic
policies. Although this seems to greatly contradict my findings, it does not. Instead, it has to do with the way levels of influence are measured. As previously discussing in
Chapter 3, a president’s level of influence is based on two main factors: agreement in topics discussed by the president and members of Congress, and the content of that
discussion. When the president and members discussed the same topics using largely the
same rhetoric influence was labeled high, whereas influence was low when different
topics were being discussed in different ways. However, how does this measurement
scheme work when looking at foreign policies? I would like to suggest that it cannot be
viewed in the same way.
The reason for this is because foreign policies are handled in different ways than
domestic policies. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, presidents have more
means to carry out foreign policies without Congress than they do in regards to domestic
policies. For example, presidents can use the War Powers Resolution to send troops into
combat without congressional approval, but the president has no means of enacting
universal health care without the cooperation of Congress. Therefore, in order to have
influence over the domestic policy agenda in Congress, members of Congress would
have to be discussing the same issues as the president and doing so in largely the same
way. However, in regards to foreign policies, the fact that Congress is not discussing the
foreign policy issues being discussed by the president can be an indication that Congress
is allowing the president to pursue his own foreign policy agenda. Therefore, just
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because a president might have slightly more topic and content agreement when discussing domestic policies does not necessarily mean his influence over domestic policies is greater. Also, the evidence suggests that presidential influence over foreign policies might not be consistent, but instead may vary over time according to specific factors.
Conclusions
Looking at the results, several conclusions about presidential influence in foreign policy can be drawn. One is that presidents do appear to exert more influence regarding foreign policy, even if sometimes that influence is only temporary. Each of the five presidents discussed exerted more influence than Congress over foreign affairs at some point during their presidency. Sometimes this influence was more pronounced than others – for example when Bush II spent 56.7 percent of his SOU address discussing foreign affairs and only 2.4 percent of congressional responses focused on foreign policy.
Regardless of the case, the president’s influence in foreign affairs was evident either by him clearly setting the agenda and members of Congress following suit, or by members of Congress refusing to challenge the president on his foreign policies.
A second conclusion is that aside from focusing on foreign affairs in response to international events and crises, presidents do seem to sometimes purposely focus on foreign policy as a way to potentially gain influence in Congress. This was clearly evident in 1992 when Bush I was running for re-election, his popularity was low, and he spent a third of his address on foreign affairs. Also, an interesting pattern emerges when looking at when presidents tend to emphasize foreign affairs. For example, with the exception of Bush I in 1989, Table 6-8 shows that presidents typically do not focus a lot on foreign affairs during their first SOU address.
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This trend makes sense in that during their first SOU address presidents have typically not established a relationship with Congress yet so there is no need for them to emphasize foreign policy as a way to gain influence. The reason this may not have been the case with Bush I in 1989 is because he had been vice president during Reagan’s presidency, and therefore already had established a relationship with Congress. Also,
Table 6-9 shows that in all of the cases the percentage of time presidents spent on foreign affairs between their first SOU address and their last increased.
Therefore, it appears that as their presidencies progress, presidents are likely to spend more time discussing foreign affairs. This could be partially in response to international events and crises that arise, but is also likely part of a strategy used by presidents to increase their influence in Congress. Overall, discussing foreign affairs is not a surefire way to gain influence, however, under the right circumstances a president could have success in doing so.
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Table 6-1. Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress Domestic Foreign 1978 President 65.5% 34.5% Congress 60.4% 39.6% 1979 President 43.4% 56.6% Congress 85% 15% 1980 President 23.4% 76.6% Congress 45.8% 54.2%
Table 6-2. Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress Domestic Foreign 1981 President 90.1% 8.9% Congress 81.8% 18.2% 1982 President 77.6% 22.4% Congress 87.5% 12.5% 1983 President 73.7% 26.3% Congress 61.6% 38.4% 1984 President 72% 28% Congress 78.5% 21.5% 1985 President 70.6% 29.4% Congress 71.5% 28.5% 1986 President 66.7% 33.3% Congress 80.4% 19.6% 1987 President 43.4% 56.6% Congress 46.8% 53.2% 1988 President 60.5% 39.5% Congress 21.3% 78.7%
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Table 6-3. Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress Domestic Foreign 1990 President 57% 43% Congress 74.2% 25.8% 1991 President 49.4% 50.6% Congress 38.5% 61.5% 1992 President 68.6% 31.4% Congress 91.2% 8.8%
Table 6-4. Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress Domestic Foreign 1993 President 97.1% 2.9% Congress 100% 0% 1994 President 77.7% 22.3% Congress 97.6% 2.4% 1995 President 80.3% 19.7% Congress 98.3% 1.7% 1996 President 83% 17% Congress 94.2% 5.8% 1997 President 73% 27% Congress 100% 0% 1998 President 75.3% 24.7% Congress 90.7% 9.3% 2000 President 79% 21% Congress 94% 6%
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Table 6-5. Discussion of Domestic and Foreign Affairs by the President and Congress Domestic Foreign 2001 President 92.3% 7.7% Congress 98.4% 1.6% 2002 President 43.3% 56.7% Congress 97.6% 2.4% 2003 President 38.4% 61.6% Congress 46.4% 53.6% 2004 President 48.1% 51.9% Congress 69.4% 30.6% 2005 President 48.8% 51.2% Congress 81.3% 18.7% 2006 President 51.9% 48.1% Congress 77.5% 22.5%
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Table 6-6. Levels of Influence Based on Emphasis of Domestic Policies Year President Influence High Domestic 1981 Reagan High 1982 Reagan High 1993 Clinton High Partisan 1994 Clinton Low 1995 Clinton Low 1996 Clinton Medium 1998 Clinton Medium 2000 Clinton Low 2001 Bush II High Partisan Medium Domestic 1979 Carter Low 1983 Reagan Medium 1984 Reagan Medium 1985 Reagan Low 1986 Reagan Medium 1988 Reagan Medium 1990 Bush I Medium 1992 Bush I Medium 1997 Clinton Medium Low Domestic 1980 Carter Low 1981 Carter Low 1987 Reagan Medium 1991 Bush I High 2002 Bush II Low 2003 Bush II Medium 2004 Bush II Low 2005 Bush II Medium 2006 Bush II Low
Table 6-7. Average Level of Influence During Domestic Policy Discussion High Domestic 2 Medium Medium Domestic 1.78 Medium Low Domestic 1.56 Low
Table 6-8. Percentage of First SOU Addresses Devoted to Foreign Affairs 1981 8.9% 1989 24.75% 1993 2.9% 2001 7.7%
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Table 6-9. Percentage Change from First to Last SOU Address on Foreign Affairs Carter +42.1 Reagan +30.6 Bush I +6.6 Clinton +18.1 Bush II +40.4
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CHAPTER 7 INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION
Many studies have been conducted regarding the effect of crises on presidential
approval. According to these studies, presidential approval increases during periods of
crisis (Callaghan and Virtanen 1993; James and Rioux 1998; Sigelman and Conover
1981). This chapter looks at some reasons why presidents may gain support during periods of crisis, and whether periods of crisis cause presidential influence over the legislative agenda to increase as well.
The main reason times of crisis increase presidential support is that outside threats generally promote cohesion (Sigelman and Conover 1981). Therefore, any disagreements tend to disappear – at least temporarily – so that the crisis can be addressed. People especially rally around the president during times of international crisis. This is because in his role as head of state, the president serves as a single figurehead for the country that citizens can look towards. Due to these factors, presidential support is not only likely to increase during times of crisis, but presidential influence in Congress is also likely to increase.
This is consistent with literature on “rally around the flag” effects. A “rally around the flag” effect is when an event occurs which evokes strong responses of patriotism from citizens (Sinclair 2004). Typically, the event has to be international, involve the U.S. directly, and be “specific, dramatic, and sharply focused” (Mueller 1985,
208). Scholars have found that “rally around the flag” effects cause presidential support
to increase not only with the public, but also with members of Congress as well
(Callaghan and Virtanen 1993; Hetherington and Nelson 2003; James and Rioux 1998;
Sigelman and Conover 1981; Sinclair 2004).
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There are two main schools of thought regarding the cause of rally effects. One is the patriotism school which says that people rally around the president during times of crisis because he is a symbol of national unity, a type of living flag (Hetherington and
Nelson 2003). However, the second school of thought says that rally effects occur when opposition leaders in Congress do not challenge the president, or they make mildly supportive statements (ibid). For the sake of this dissertation, the main concern will be congressional behavior. If members in Congress from the opposition party speak supportively of the president, or at least do not challenge him, this will be indicative of a rally effect and therefore presidential influence.
To determine whether this is the case, three different crises and their impact on presidential influence will be examined – the Iranian hostage crisis, the Persian Gulf War, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Although there were other international conflicts the U.S. was involved in during the 28 years studied in my dissertation, these three were chosen because they fit the criterion outlined by Mueller as likely to elicit a rally around the flag effect. This is because all three crises are international, involve the
U.S. directly, and were focused events.
If presidents are able to exert more influence in Congress during periods of crisis, then certain behavior should be expected of members of Congress. One, members of
Congress should be discussing the same topics and doing so using similar rhetoric.
However, the biggest difference in congressional behavior during times of crisis should be the way members of the opposition party behave. At the beginning of a crisis, congressional behavior should not be affected by partisanship (Sigelman and Conover
1981). This means that members of the opposition party should be supportive of the
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president, or at least not overly critical of him. However, opposition support should start to dissipate the longer the crisis lasts.
It is also important to note that opposition support will likely only be in regards to foreign policy, and particularly the crisis at hand. This means that it is possible for there still to be a partisan divide in regards to domestic policies. So in looking at presidential influence during the Iranian hostage crisis, Persian Gulf War, and after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, responses will be examined both based on partisanship, and whether the main topic was foreign or domestic. This should show whether presidents are able to gain support from the opposition party during times of crisis.
Carter and the Iranian Hostage Crisis
The Iranian hostage crisis began on November 4, 1979, when American hostages were taken at the American Embassy in Iran. After the hostage crisis began, Carter’s public approval rating increased drastically. If the crisis increased Carter’s approval, then did it also cause his influence in Congress to increase? For his influence in Congress to have also increased, then there should be a noticeable difference between the level of influence Carter had at the beginning of 1979 and the beginning of 1980. However, in looking at his overall level of influence, Carter’s influence in Congress was low throughout his presidency, and did not seem to increase due to the Iranian hostage crisis.
Looking at the congressional responses, there was an increase in responses on foreign affairs between 1979 and 1980 both by Democrats and Republicans (see Tables
7-1 and 7-2). However, not all the foreign affair responses were about Iran. In fact, there were more congressional speeches discussing the Soviet Union and China, than ones about the crisis situation in Iran. This suggests that even though members were not
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speaking in support of Carter’s handling of the hostage situation in Iran, they were also not openly criticizing him.
However, members were not afraid to criticize Carter’s domestic policies. Carter received much criticism in Congress – both from Democrats and Republicans. Members of Congress were not only critical of Carter’s domestic policies, but also of Carter personally. Therefore, the fact that members were not criticizing Carter in regards to his foreign policies suggests that he was able to exert more influence in the foreign policy realm. However, this influence was temporary.
Bush I and the Persian Gulf War
While Carter’s presidency was discussed in detail during previous chapters, Bush
I’s presidency has yet to be discussed in the same detail. In order to determine whether
Bush I was able to exert more influence during the Persian Gulf War, it is necessary to closely examine Bush I’s presidency – specifically looking at 1990 through 1992.
Analyzing these years will show the influence Bush I had during the Persian Gulf War in comparison to the influence he had in years both before and after the war. For the
Persian Gulf War to have allowed Bush I more influence, then it would be expected that he would have more influence in 1991, which is when the U.S. was involved during the military operation. For the war in Iraq to have not given Bush I more influence, then his influence across the three years should remain relatively the same.
In 1990, the main topic discussed by Bush I was foreign affairs, accounting for
18.7 percent of his speech (see Figure 7-1). Bush I discussed spreading freedom to the rest of the world, and how many of the former Communist countries had become free democracies. The second most discussed topic by Bush I was education. Bush I discussed spending more money on programs such as Head Start, as well as raising the
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overall standards “of our schools, our teachers, of our kids, of our parents, and ourselves”
(1990).
The third most discussed topic by Bush I in 1990 was the military. Bush I congratulated the military for a job well done in Panama, and said that soon the rest of the troops from Panama would be returning to the U.S.
While Bush I was mainly discussing foreign policies, members of Congress were focused more on domestic policies (see Figure 7-2). The main topic discussed by members of Congress in 1990 was the environment (17.7 percent). Specifically, members discussed Bush I’s plan to amend and improve the 1970 Clean Air Act, and also his proposal to make the Environmental Protection Agency a cabinet department. Most members discussing these proposals were supportive. For example, Senator Orrin Hatch said that Bush I’s plan was a “flexible, market-driven approach to cleaning our air”
(1990). However, not all members thought Bush I was doing enough in terms of the environment. For example, Senator Al Gore said that Bush I had failed to address global warming so far in his presidency (1990).
The second most discussed topic in Congress was the military (16.1 percent).
Some members of Congress – predominantly Republicans – praised Bush I’s plan to reduce the presence of American troops in central Europe. However, many Democrats criticized Bush I’s defense budget was too large and that more cuts were needed. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy offered a Democratic alternative to the Bush I defense budget.
The third most discussed topic in Congress was social security, accounting for
14.5 percent of responses. Even though most of the responses came from Republicans,
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both Democrats and Republicans were in agreement that the social security trust fund
should not be used for other purposes. As Representative Thomas Campbell said, “keep
your cotton-pickin' hands off Social Security” (1990).
Although Bush I and members of Congress were discussing largely different
topics in 1990, this changed in 1991 after the Persian Gulf War began. In his 1991 SOU address, Bush I spent the most time discussing Iraq (see Figure 7-3). Bush I started off his address discussing the Persian Gulf War and its larger implications. He said, “What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind -- peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law” (Bush 1991).
Aside from discussing Iraq, the next most discussed topic by Bush I was foreign affairs in general. Bush I discussed the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, and spreading democracy and freedom to Eastern European and Latin American countries.
The third most discussed topic by Bush I was the economy. Bush I said that even though the country was fighting a recession, there was still reason to be optimistic. He said, “Together, since 1981, we've created almost 20 million jobs, cut inflation in half, and cut interest rates in half” (Bush 1991).
In 1991, members of Congress also spent the most time discussing Iraq (see
Figure 7-4). There was no debate regarding whether or not the U.S. should be in Iraq.
Members agreed that it was necessary to retaliate against Iraq for their invasion of
Kuwait, and therefore were supportive of Bush I. However, members of Congress did
discuss whether or not Saddam Hussein should be allowed to remain in power. Some
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members expressed fear that if left in power, Hussein could continue to cause instability in the Middle East.
The next most discussed topic by members of Congress was the military. In their discussion of the military, most members of Congress discussed troops actively serving in Iraq. Specifically, members mentioned and expressed gratitude to service men and women from their districts and states who were serving.
Aside from discussing Iraq and the military, members of Congress also discussed the budget. There was a fairly large partisan divide evident in discussions of the budget, with most Republicans supporting the budget and most Democrats criticizing it. Even though members of Congress were discussing the budget, Bush I only spent about three percent of his speech on it. Similarly, even though Bush I spent a large portion of his speech discussing the economy, only 1.8 percent of congressional responses focused on the economy.
Although Bush I appeared to gain influence in Congress in 1991, at least in regards to foreign policies, this influence seems to have diminished by 1992. In his 1992
SOU address, the main topic discussed by Bush I was the economy (see Figure 7-5).
Bush I said that even though inflation and interest rates were down, that unemployment was too high. He said that Congress needed to bring “the same courage and sense of common purpose to the economy that we brought to Desert Storm” (Bush 1992). Bush I also said that it was necessary for Congress to pass his economic plan in order to meet the economic needs of the U.S.
Aside from the economy, Bush I again focused on foreign policies. The next most discussed topic by Bush I was foreign affairs in general. Bush I discussed
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American success in the Persian Gulf War, as well as the continuing talks with the Soviet
Union. Related to his discussion of foreign affairs was the third most discussed topic by
Bush I – the military. Bush I mainly thanked troops for their performance during the
Persian Gulf War.
In 1992, members of Congress also discussed the economy the most (see Figure
7-6). Similar to Bush I, members of Congress were concerned about the state of the economy and discussed possible solutions. Most Republicans were supportive of Bush I and his plan for the economy. However, many Democrats were critical of the President and suggested that he had not even truly outlined an economic plan. For example,
Representative Rosa DeLauro said that Bush I she did not hear Bush I discuss any economic plan which would benefit the majority of Americans. Instead she said that,
“what I heard was the same message of tax cuts for the wealthy and trickle-down hopes for everyone else” (DeLauro 1992).
The next two topics discussed most by members of Congress were also ones which Bush I spent time discussing. The second most discussed topic by Congress was unemployment. Just as Bush I had discussed rising levels of employment and needing to address them, so did Congress. The difference was again partisan in that Republicans
were largely supportive of Bush I, while Democrats were largely critical. Similarly, there
was also a large partisan difference in the way members of Congress discussed taxes,
which was the third most discussed topic.
In looking at the three years of Bush I’s presidency which were analyzed, it is
apparent that he was able to exert more influence during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 –
at least in regards to foreign affairs. Members of Congress were largely supportive of
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Bush I in regards to his Iraq policy. Not only did they speak supportively of him, but there were also not members of Congress criticizing him. It also appears that Bush I was able to retain his influence over foreign affairs, even after the Persian Gulf War ended.
However, in regards to domestic policies, Bush I was not able to increase his influence in
Congress either during or after the Persian Gulf War.
Bush II and 9/11
The case of George W. Bush (Bush II) and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was very different from that of Carter and the Iranian hostage crisis, and from
Bush I and the Persian Gulf War. The largest jump in presidential approval recorded by
Gallup occurred after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when Bush II’s approval climbed 35 points (Edwards 2004). Almost immediately, the country looked towards
Bush II for leadership in the time of crisis. Was Bush II able to use this public support to exert influence in Congress?
The level of influence Bush II exerted in Congress did change between his 2001 and 2002 SOU addresses, however, not in the way expected. In 2001, Bush II and members of Congress were discussing largely the same topics. However, in 2002, when
Bush II switched his focus to foreign policies, members of Congress continued to talk about domestic policies. This suggests that Bush II was able to wield a large amount of influence over foreign affairs immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks.
The effect of the September 11, 2001 attacks on Bush II’s influence in Congress, as well as whether or not Bush II was able to retain this influence is discussed in detail in
Chapter 8.
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Conclusions
Overall, the results show that presidents potentially have the ability to exert much more influence during times of crisis, however, there are limits to this influence. One has to do with partisanship. Presidents are typically able to exert more influence during times of crisis because the behavior of opposition party members in Congress changes.
Opposition members in Congress are less likely to criticize and challenge the president, at least in regards to foreign affairs.
Both Carter and Bush II were presiding during unified government when their crises occurred, however, members of their own parties responded very differently.
While Democrats in Congress initially supported Carter, this support was temporary.
Republicans in Congress during Bush II’s presidency were much more consistent with their support. Having a majority Republican Congress which was largely supportive is likely one reason Bush II was able to exert more influence during and after his crisis than
Carter.
Even though Bush I was presiding during divided government, Republicans and
Democrats in Congress responded to him much in the same way they did to Bush II.
Republicans were typically supportive of Bush I and his policies, while Democrats were mostly critical. Therefore, unified or divided government does not seem to be what matters, but instead the relationship each individual president has with members of
Congress.
A second limitation in regards to presidential influence during periods of crisis has to do with the distinction between foreign and domestic policies. While a president’s influence may increase in regards to foreign affairs, it does not necessarily also increase in regards to domestic affairs. This is especially apparent when looking at Bush II and
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9/11. Even though Democrats were not initially challenging Bush II in his response to
the September 11, 2001, attacks, they were not hesitant to continue criticizing his
domestic programs. Therefore, the influence gained by presidents during times of crisis is limited to foreign policy.
A final limitation on the president’s influence during times of crisis is that the
increase in influence is likely to be temporary. Depending on the type of crisis, some presidents may be able to sustain their higher level of influence longer than others. For example, the increased support for Carter and therefore his increased influence was much more short-lived than that of Bush II. Carter’s approval increased from 37.8 percent to
51.5 percent following the onset of the Iranian hostage crisis
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/popularity.php). Carter’s approval peaked at 57.6
percent in January of 1980, but was down to 39.1 percent again by the end of March 1980
(ibid).
In contrast, Bush I’s approval increased almost 20 percentage points – from 64.3
percent to 82.7 percent once fighting began in the Persian Gulf War on January 17, 1991
(ibid). Bush I’s approval peaked at a slightly over 89 percent when the war ended on
February 28, 1991, and his approval remained above 60 percent until the end of October
1991. Therefore, Bush I was able to retain his increased approval longer than Carter.
Bush II’s approval increased even more drastically than his father’s. Bush II’s
approval peaked at 90 percent on September 22, 2001, and still remained at above 80
percent for almost six months afterwards (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). A year after
the September 11, 2001, attacks, Bush II’s approval was still hovering around 70 percent
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/popularity.php). Therefore, it appears that not
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only is a president’s approval likely to increase during periods of crises, but their levels of influence in Congress are as well.
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Table 7-1. 1979 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type Foreign Domestic Democrat 37.5% 62.5% Republican 7.1% 92.9%
Table 7-2. 1980 Response Topics by Party and Policy Type Foreign Domestic Democrat 66.7% 33.3% Republican 50% 50%
20
10
0 Percentage B T E S H Military/DefenseEconomyE B Civil RightsEmpl A F WeaponsD A Cri udget ax ducati ocia eal nvironur gr or r ID ug m e eaucr icult ei S s th oy gn Pol e l S on e Care ment ment ur A curit acy e f icy fai y rs
Topics
Figure 7-1. 1990 SOU Address Topics
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20
10
0 Percent B T E H Mili E Dru For Soc Edu Bur S.O ud ax nv ea co es iro tar no g eig ia e . ge lth catio aucr U. (g t nm C y/D my Pol n A l Se are ef icy c n a e en ff urity cy nera t ens airs e l)
Figure 7-2. 1990 Congressional Response Topics
30
20
10
0 Percentage BudgetTaxesEducatHealM EnergyEconomyEnvi BureaucracyCivilTradeEmploymI ForeignWeapons D AIDSC C raq r r am ili ug Poli im tar th ronment Righ e paign Fin i y/ on C D A ar ef t ent ffairs cy e e s nse anc e
Topics
Figure 7-3. 1991 SOU Address Topics
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30
20
10
0 Percent B T Enviro Ir Health M Weapo E D Emplo F Energy udg a aq con ore xes ilit ru ary g P et om ign n Care /De n o y men s y licy men A fe ffai t nse t rs
Figure 7-4. 1991 Congressional Response Topics
10
8
6
4
2
0 Percentage BudgetTaxesEducationSocia HealthMili CareEconomB C Tr E N Fore W W Drug PolicyAI C ur ivi a m at e e D ri t e l d p i a lf S me ary/Defe au R e l onal i pons ar l S oym gn Affair c ights e ecur y racy S ent ec ity nse u rity s
Topics
Figure 7-5. 1992 SOU Address Topics
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40
30
20
10
0 Percent BudgetT EnergyHeal M W EconomDrug EmploymFor BureaucracyCrim Social S. a xes ilitary/Deapons O ei . th Poli gn e U S . ( Care y Af ec ge e cy e fense nt f u neral) airs rity
Figure 7-6. 1992 Congressional Response Topics
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CHAPTER 8 GEORGE W. BUSH: A CASE STUDY
In looking at the five presidents examined in this dissertation and their emphasis on domestic and foreign policies, no president made as dramatic of a policy shift as
George W. Bush (Bush II) after the September 11, 2001 attacks. As mentioned in previous chapters, Bush II started his presidency talking almost exclusively about domestic policies and shifted his focus to foreign policies after the terrorist attacks. This chapter seeks to take a more in-depth look at Bush II’s presidency and his drastic shift from domestic to foreign policies.
Specifically, this chapter looks at the effect of Bush II’s policy shift on his level of influence in Congress, and how members of Congress responded to the change of policy focus. Also, the chapter examines whether Bush II continued to concentrate on foreign policies long after the September 11, 2001 attacks, or whether he shifted his focus back to domestic policies. This is done by analyzing and discussing each year of Bush
II’s presidency from 2001 through 2006.
2001 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses
Bush II’s 2001 SOU address focused predominantly on domestic policies (see
Figure 8-1). The three items he discussed most were the budget, taxes, and health care.
Bush II spent the most time talking about the budget. In approximately 16.2 percent of the sentences Bush II mentioned the budget which he called “reasonable” and
“responsible”. Bush II said that his budget was based on the philosophy that
“government should be active, but limited; engaged, but not overbearing” (2001).
Besides the budget, the next most discussed topic was taxes. Bush II spent about
14.3 percent of his SOU address discussing taxes, and more specifically, his plan to
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institute a tax cut. Bush II said his plan was to “return [money] to the people who earned
it in the first place” (2001). Part of Bush II’s rationale for his tax cut plan was that the budget surplus showed that taxes were too high. Bush II said, “The people of America have been overcharged and, on their behalf, I am here asking for a refund” (2001). Bush
II said that his tax plan would benefit people from all tax brackets, and would help the economy. He said, “To create economic growth and opportunity, we must put money back into the hands of the people who buy goods and create jobs” (Bush 2001).
The third most discussed topic in Bush II’s 2001 SOU address was health care.
Bush II spent approximately 10.9 percent of his speech discussing health care in general, as well as more specific health care items such as Medicare and a prescription drug plan.
Bush II said that people need “quality health care” and that more money was being
budgeted for medical research. Bush II also said that his budget increased funding for
Medicare, and that a prescription drug plan was being developed for low-income senior
citizens. He said this was because “no senior in America should have to choose between
buying food and buying prescriptions” (Bush 2001).
Members of Congress also focused on domestic policies, and discussed mainly
the same topics as Bush II (see Figure 8-2). However, there was a very evident partisan
divide in how members of Congress discussed these topics. For example, the main topic
discussed in Congress was taxes, accounting for approximately 39 percent of the responses. Approximately 93.3 percent of Republicans were supportive of Bush II’s plan for tax cuts, as compared to only 6.7 percent of Democrats. Those members of Congress speaking in favor of the tax cuts used a similar rationale as Bush II, saying that a surplus
showed taxpayers were paying too much and therefore should be refunded through a tax
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cut. “Rejecting a plan to use a portion of the surplus for tax relief is the equivalent of paying for a gallon of milk at the grocery store with a $10 bill and having the cashier refuse to give you back the change” (Davis 2001). Members also agreed with Bush II that the tax cuts were beneficial to people from all tax brackets, and that it only made sense for those who put in the most to get back the most.
Those members not supportive of Bush II’s tax cut plan rejected these lines of rationale, and said that the tax cuts would unfairly benefit the wealthy. The wealthy
“receive 43 percent of the Bush tax cut. Sadly, there are literally millions of families that receive no benefit from the President’s tax cut. They are people who pay a payroll tax and not an income tax. They are taxed families. They need relief” (Durbin 2001).
Besides being concerned that the tax cuts would primarily benefit the wealthy, unsupportive members also expressed concern that there would not be enough money to sustain such a large tax cut.
There was also a partisan divide between members of Congress discussing the budget. The budget was the second most discussed topic, accounting for a little over 23 percent of the congressional responses. Not surprisingly, all of the members who said they were supportive of Bush II’s budget were Republicans, and 87.5 percent of the members not supportive of Bush’s budget were Democrats.
The rhetoric used by members of Congress when speaking in support of the budget was similar to rhetoric used by Bush II. For example, Representative James
Gibbons of Nevada said, “This budget is responsible. It is visionary, and it is right for our future” (2001). However, the biggest criticism of Bush II’s budget made by members of
Congress was that his calculations were inaccurate. “The budget claims to provide
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massive tax cuts and maximize reduction of the national debt and keep our commitments under Social Security and Medicare and make the investments needed to keep the nation strong. It makes five claims that are arithmetically impossible. The numbers simply do not add up” (Kennedy 2001).
There was a much less partisan response to education, which was the third most discussed topic in Congress and accounted for 15.6 percent of the responses. About two- thirds of the members who spoke about education were supportive of Bush II’s stance.
Looking at the partisan makeup of this support, 57.1 percent came from Republicans, and
42.9 percent from Democrats. Many members of Congress, regardless of party, used similar rhetoric to Bush II when discussing education. This was especially true in regards to the phrase “no child left behind” which Bush II used in his address. For example,
Republican Senator Kay Hutchison said, “We want no child in our country to be left behind” (2001). Similarly, Democratic Representative Major Robert Owens said, “Here we are with President Bush producing a plan which says he will leave no child behind”
(2001).
2002 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses
Bush II delivered his 2002 SOU address a little over four months after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Not surprisingly, his speech focused primarily on foreign policies (see Figure 8-3). Bush II started off his 2002 SOU address by saying:
“As we gather tonight, our nation is at war, our economy is in recession, and the civilized
world faces unprecedented dangers.” From this statement and onward, it was apparent
that Bush II was discussing very different topics than he had in 2001. The three main
topics discussed by Bush II in 2002 were terrorism, the military, and homeland security.
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Terrorism was definitely the predominant topic, with Bush II spending almost a
quarter of his speech discussing it. In speaking about terrorism, Bush II said, “Thousands
of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw
regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off
without warning” (2002). That is why he said one of the goals in the war on terrorism
was “to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and
allies with weapons of mass destruction” (2002). He was especially concerned with
making sure another attack like the ones that took place on September 11, 2001, did not
happen again. Bush II also issued a resolve to countries that might have weapons which
could be used to commit terrorist acts. He said, “The United States of America will not
permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most
destructive weapons” (Bush 2002).
Besides discussing terrorism in general, the next most discussed topic by Bush II was
the military and defense, of which he spent a little over nine percent of his speech
discussing. Bush II said that the U.S. would not be able to fight the war on terrorism
without the members of the armed services, and praised their efforts overseas. He said,
“The men and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every
enemy of the United States: Even 7,000 miles away, across oceans and continents, on
mountaintops and in caves -- you will not escape the justice of this nation” (Bush 2002).
The third most discussed topic was homeland security, which accounted for 6.7
percent of Bush II’s address. Bush II said that the September 11, 2001 attacks illustrated the need for heightened homeland security. “America is no longer protected by vast
oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased
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vigilance at home.” Bush II also said that increased homeland security would be beneficial all around. He said, “Homeland security will make America not only stronger, but, in many ways, better” (Bush 2002).
Members of Congress responded much differently to Bush II in 2002 than they had in 2001. In 2001, members responded by discussing largely the same issues the president had discussed. However, in 2002, while the President focused overwhelmingly on foreign policy, members of Congress largely ignored foreign policy and instead concentrated on domestic issues (see Figure 8-4). The three topics which dominated the speeches given by members of Congress were the economy, the budget, and taxes.
Approximately 28.6 percent of responses given by members of Congress focused on the economy. Of those members who mentioned the economy, 52.4 spoke of it in a negative way, whereas the rest spoke of the economy in a neutral manner. An example of the type of negative rhetoric used is a statement made by Senator Thomas Carper of
Delaware. He said, “We have had a sick economy, and we have been working to try to figure out how we might ensure the full, complete, and healthy recovery of that economy” (Carper 2002).
Besides discussing an economic downturn, 50 percent of the speaking members in
Congress also labeled the economy as being in a recession. Of those who stated the economy was in a recession, there was little partisan division with 57.1 percent being
Republicans and 42.9 percent Democrats. However, the reasons members gave for the recession were more partisan. Democrats typically blamed the recession on the
September 11, 2001 attacks. For example, Senator Daniel Akaka from Hawaii said, “The slowdown of our Nation's economy has been a matter of increasing concern following the
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terrorist attacks on September 11th. Millions of Americans are dealing with the economic
repercussions of the attacks on our Nation” (2002). However, Republicans were more likely to claim the recession started before the 2000 presidential election. “As far as the
economy is concerned, the downturn started before President Bush ever took office,
before we ever knew that the dastardly acts which occurred on September 11 would ever
happen to us” (Grassley 2002).
There was also a partisan divide regarding the budget, of which 23.8 percent of
speaking members of Congress addressed. Republicans largely supported Bush II’s
budget and claimed that it would help accomplish the goals of Americans. “The
President's budget meets the requirements of victory and the test of responsibility. The
President's budget holds government accountable for results that address these priorities
of the American people: Winning the war on terrorism, strengthening protections of our
homeland, and revitalizing our economy and creating jobs” (Stearns 2002).
However, many Democrats claimed the budget to be “unbalanced” (Reid,
February 5, 2002). “The Administration's new budget is wrapped in the flag. Literally. It
has a beautiful red, white and blue cover. But the fine print inside should be written
mostly in red ink. Contrary to one pledge after another, from one Administration official
after another, this plan rejects a balanced budget in favor of a ‘borrow and spend’
approach” (Doggett 2002).
Republicans and Democrats also disagreed on what to do about tax cuts, which
were the primary topic of 21.4 percent of congressional responses. Of the members who
said they were still in favor of a tax cut, 90 percent were Republicans, and only 10
percent were Democrats. Speaking in favor of tax cuts, Republican Representative
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Spencer Bachus said, “…when Congress makes a commitment to give Americans tax
relief, it should honor that commitment. To put it plainly, Americans should get the tax cuts that they have been promised. Americans should have the tax relief that they desperately need” (2002). However, many Democrats felt that economic changes which took place following the September 11, 2001 attacks made tax cuts no longer feasible.
“Unfortunately, when it comes to the tax cut, the administration is unwilling to admit that the world has changed. If future tax cuts which disproportionately favor our wealthiest citizens are treated as a sacred cow, many of the programs that help our neediest citizens will be sacrificed” (Kennedy 2002).
The three main topics discussed by members of Congress – the economy, the budget, and taxes – were largely unaddressed by Bush II in his SOU address. Bush II only discussed the economy in 4.3 percent of his address, and the budget and tax cuts 3.4 percent and 2.9 percent respectively. In regards to the economy, Bush II did state that
there was an economic recession, however, he did not spend much time discussing a plan
to revive the economy. He did mention reviving the economy as one of the goals of his
budget: “My budget supports three great goals for America: we will win this war; we’ll
protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy” (Bush 2002). However, even the
goals of Bush II’s budget were more focused on foreign policy and national security
issues. Bush II said the main way he hoped to revive the economy was by creating jobs
and cutting taxes. He said, “The way out of the recession, the way to create jobs, is to
grow the economy by encouraging investment in factories and equipment, and by
speeding up tax relief so people will have more money to spend” (Bush 2002).
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Just as the topics discussed most by Congress were not ones Bush II spent a lot of time discussing, the topics Bush II talked the most about were largely unaddressed by
Congress. For example, Bush II spent 23 percent of his address discussing terrorism, whereas it was the primary topic of only one congressional speech. In fact, terrorism was only discussed in 14.3 percent of all the congressional speeches analyzed. More members of Congress mentioned the September 11, 2001 attacks (28.6 percent), but only
7.1 percent mentioned the potential for future terrorist attacks. Surprisingly, not one member of Congress mentioned weapons of mass destruction.
Even fewer members of Congress discussed the military. The military and/or defense was not the main topic of any of the congressional speeches analyzed, and only mentioned in 23.8 percent of speeches. Similarly, homeland security was also not the main topic of any of the congressional speeches. However, homeland security was discussed in some capacity in 28.6 percent of speeches.
2003 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses
Bush II again addressed foreign policies in his 2003 SOU address (see Figure
8-5). When Bush II gave his address, there was much discussion about the U.S. possibly entering into a military operation in Iraq. Congress passed a resolution to authorize use of military force against Iraq in October 2002, and the Bush Administration was increasingly trying to link a military operation in Iraq to the war on terrorism. Not surprisingly, Iraq was the topic discussed most by Bush II in his 2003 SOU address, accounting for just over 19 percent of his speech. In discussing Iraq, Bush II tried to justify military action there. Bush II’s main justification was that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that he could potentially use to attack the U.S., or that
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Hussein could give or sell them to some terrorist group who would. So in discussing
Iraq, Bush II continuously tried to draw links between Hussein and terrorism.
The topic discussed the next most by Bush II was terrorism, which accounted for
15.96 percent of his speech. In discussing terrorism, Bush II made several mentions of
the September 11, 2001 attacks, and also cited other terrorist attacks which had taken
place. Bush II also discussed the progress of the war against terrorism, and said that the
U.S. was winning this war. He said that the United States had “terrorists on the run, and
[are] keeping them on the run. One by one, the terrorists are learning the meaning of
American justice” (Bush 2003).
The third most discussed topic by Bush II was nuclear weapons (15.6 percent).
Although Bush II predominantly talked about nuclear weapons in relation to Iraq, he also discussed other “outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons” (2003). For example, Bush II identified Iran as a government which “pursues weapons of mass destruction,” and said that North Korea was “using its nuclear program to incite fear and seek concessions” (2003).
One similarity between the topics Bush II discussed and the ones addressed by
Congress was that the President and members of Congress both discussed Iraq the most
(see Figure 8-6). Iraq was the number one topic discussed by legislators, and was the main topic of almost 44 percent of congressional responses. Also, many members of
Congress, particularly Republicans, discussed Iraq in terms similar to those used by the
President. Many members cited specific weapons Iraq was thought to possess, just as
Bush II had in his address. Members also pointed out that Iraq had repeatedly failed to
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comply with U.N. weapons inspectors. This was the same rationale Bush II had used in his address when trying to justify potential military action.
However, of those who mentioned Iraq, only a little more than half were in favor
of military action, and not surprisingly, they were all Republicans. Democrats who spoke
in opposition to taking military action against Iraq rejected Bush II’s claims. For
example, Senator Edward Kennedy said, “The administration has totally failed to make the case that Saddam Hussein is an imminent threat to our security” (2003). Besides feeling that there was not enough evidence to justify military action in Iraq, other members thought weapons inspectors should be given more time, attempts to reach a diplomatic solution should be exhausted first, and that military action in Iraq should only occur multilaterally.
Other than discussing Iraq, most of the rest of the speeches given by members of
Congress focused on domestic policies. The second most discussed topic in Congress was health care (12.2 percent), followed by the economy and AIDS (each at 9.8 percent).
Even though these were the topics emphasized by members of Congress, Bush II spent only about four percent of his speech on each health care, the economy, and AIDS.
Therefore, aside from Iraq, Bush II and members of Congress were clearly discussing different topics, with legislators choosing to emphasize predominantly domestic policies.
2004 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses
In his 2004 SOU address, Bush II again emphasized foreign policies, focusing on terrorism, Iraq, and foreign affairs in general (see Figure 8-7). Bush II discussed terrorism the most, spending about 13.8 percent of his address on it. Similar to his discussion of terrorism in 2002 and 2003, Bush II invoked images of the September 11,
2001 attacks and discussed preventing future terrorist attacks.
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The next most discussed topic by Bush II was foreign affairs, which accounted for
13.45 percent of his speech. Bush II discussed the Middle East region in general, and
also updated the nation on occurrences in Afghanistan. He also responded to criticism
that the military action in Iraq was a unilateral one by discussing American allies and
specifically naming who they were. Bush II also once again mentioned North Korea and
their desire to acquire nuclear weapons.
Iraq was the third most discussed topic by Bush II (11.5 percent). Between his
2003 and 2004 SOU addresses, the United States began a military operation in Iraq and
overthrew Hussein, so this had an effect on how Bush II discussed Iraq. In 2004, Bush II focused his discussion of Iraq more on spreading democracy there and how the Iraqis had
been liberated. He did however acknowledge there were factions in Iraq which continued
to fight against U.S. troops, and that this was making Iraq’s transition to democracy more
difficult.
Although the three main topics discussed by Bush II in 2004 again focused on
foreign affairs, the topics discussed by members of Congress shifted even more towards
domestic policies (see Figure 8-8). Members of Congress spent the most time discussing
health care (16 percent of speeches). Similar to Bush II’s discussion of health care,
members of Congress discussed the rising cost of prescription drugs and a possible
solution. Even though not all members agreed with Bush II’s plan to add prescription
drug coverage to Medicare, members were still discussing health care using largely the
same rhetoric as Bush II.
The second and third most discussed topics in Congress were Iraq and the budget,
each accounting for 12.9 percent of congressional responses. Much of the discussion of
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Iraq in Congress involved members trying to explain why they had initially voted in favor
of the military operation. Members claimed that they voted in favor of the operation
primarily because Iraq was thought to have weapons of mass destruction. However, no weapons had been found, and this caused many members to express anger towards the
Bush II administration. For example, Representative Joseph Hoeffel of Pennsylvania said, “But we have not found the weapons of mass destruction, and it is clear that an extraordinary amount of exaggeration and deception occurred from the White House on the subject of weapons of mass destruction before we went to war in order to win congressional support for going to war” (2004). So even though members of Congress were discussing Iraq, most were not discussing it using the same rhetoric as Bush II.
The budget was the third most discussed topic in Congress, which is surprising considering that Bush II only mentioned the budget four times during his address. Once again, this shows that members of Congress were focused more on domestic affairs than on foreign affairs. Also, even though there were some similar issues emphasized by Bush
II and members of Congress, by 2004, legislators were discussing these issues in largely different ways.
2005 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses
During his 2005 SOU address, Bush II discussed a domestic policy the most for the first time since his 2001 address (see Figure 8-9). In 2005, Bush II spent about 20.4 percent of his address discussing social security. Bush II expressed concern that social security was headed towards bankrupt, and therefore offered his plan to privatize social security as a solution.
Although the main topic discussed by Bush II was a domestic policy, the next two topics he discussed most were foreign policies. The second most discussed topic by Bush
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II was Iraq, which accounted for about 12.8 percent of his speech. Bush II said it was
important for the U.S. to succeed in Iraq as a way to combat terrorism. He said, “Our
men and women in uniform are fighting terrorists in Iraq, so we do not have to face them
here at home” (Bush 2005). Bush II also said that the U.S. had already been successful in
Iraq, citing the Iraqi elections as evidence.
The third most discussed topic by Bush II was terrorism, which accounted for
11.5 percent of his speech. Bush II was concerned not only with preventing terrorism by
U.S. military action in Iraq, but also with preventing terrorism elsewhere in the Middle
East. He said, “To promote peace in the broader Middle East, we must confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder” (Bush 2005). For example, he mentioned Syria and Iran. Bush II also discussed progress being made in the
war on terror, specifically mentioning improved national intelligence, expanded research
on defenses against chemical and biological weapons, and improved border security.
Social security was also the most discussed topic in Congress (see Figure 8-10).
Members of Congress responded to Bush II’s call to privatize social security along
largely partisan lines. Republicans in Congress used much of the same rhetoric as Bush
II and were mostly supportive of his plan, while Democrats used different rhetoric and
were mostly critical of Bush II and his social security plan. Some Democrats even
questioned whether or not social security was truly headed towards bankruptcy.
The budget was the next most discussed topic in Congress, accounting for 29.1 percent of responses. There was also a partisan divide between members discussing the
budget. Similar to the partisan divide present in the discussion of social security,
Republicans were largely supportive of Bush II’s budget while Democrats were critical.
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It is surprising that there was so much discussion of the budget considering that Bush II
only mentioned it three times during his address.
Although members of Congress mainly discussed domestic policies in 2005, Iraq
was the third most discussed topic (10.5 percent of responses). Again there was a
partisan divide – this time in regards to what the next course of action should be in Iraq.
Similar to the rhetoric used by Bush II, Republicans wanted to “stay the course” in Iraq.
Many Democrats on the other hand wanted to pull troops out of Iraq.
2006 State of the Union Address and Congressional Responses
Although Bush II discussed a wider variety of topics in 2006, his emphasis was still on foreign policies (see Figure 8-11). Bush II discussed terrorism the most, spending
a little over eight percent of his address on it. He said, “To promote peace in the broader
Middle East, we must confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursue
weapons of mass murder” (Bush 2006). For example, he mentioned Syria and Iran.
Bush II also discussed progress being made in the war on terror, specifically mentioning improved national intelligence, expanded research on defenses against chemical and biological weapons, and improved border security.
Iraq was the next discussed topic by Bush II accounting for 5.5 percent of his speech. Bush II discussed the progress the U.S. was making in Iraq, but also acknowledged the presence of militants in Iraq. Even with the presence of the militants,
Bush II said the U.S. and Iraqis would ultimately be victorious. He said, “I am confident in our plan for victory; I am confident in the will of the Iraqi people; I am confident in the skill and spirit of our military. Fellow citizens, we are in this fight to win, and we are winning” (Bush 2006).
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Although the majority of topics discussed by Bush II were still foreign policies,
he did also address some domestic policies. For example, the third most discussed topic
by Bush II was the economy. Bush II said he wanted to continue economic growth by
creating more jobs and providing more tax relief.
Even though Bush II’s focus was still on foreign policies, by 2006, Congress had
returned its focus almost entirely towards domestic policies (see Figure 8-12). As was
the case in regards to congressional discussion of domestic affairs throughout most of
Bush II’s presidency, there was again an evident partisan divide. For example, the most
discussed topic in Congress was the budget, and as was the case in previous discussions of the budget, Republicans spoke largely in favor of it while Democrats were mostly critical.
An exception to this partisan divide was congressional discussion of energy, which was the second most discussed topic. Regardless of party affiliation, members of
Congress were concerned with increasing gas prices and spoke about finding alternative sources of energy.
Conclusions
In looking at the results, several different conclusions can be drawn about Bush II,
Congress, and the relationship between the two. First, it is evident that Bush II does change his focus from domestic to foreign policies after the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Examining the topics Bush II discussed in 2001, 92.3 percent of them were domestic policies (see Table 8-1). However, in 2002, only 43.26 percent of the topics discussed by
Bush II were domestic, and by 2003, that number decreased to 38.44 percent. Even though by 2006 Bush II was spending more time discussing domestic policies (51.9 percent), his attention to domestic policies never returned to where it was before the
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September 11, 2001 attacks. This shows that the terrorist attacks did have a direct effect
on the topics being discussed by Bush II.
While the September 11, 2001 attacks had an effect on what Bush II was
discussing, they did not have nearly the same impact on the policies discussed by members of Congress (see Table 8-2). Before the terrorist attacks in 2001, 98.4 percent of congressional responses focused on domestic policies. In 2002 after the terrorist attacks, 97.6 percent of congressional responses were still on domestic policies.
Congress only started spending more time discussing foreign policies after Bush II started discussing a military operation in Iraq. For example, right before Operation Iraqi
Freedom began in 2003, 53.6 percent of congressional responses were on foreign policies. This appears to be a short-term change though because by 2006, 77.5 percent of congressional responses again focused on domestic policies.
Looking at how the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks impacted the policies discussed by Bush II and Congress suggests that the terrorist attacks did not have nearly
the impact on the policy concerns of Congress as they did on Bush II’s policy agenda.
This is consistent with the idea that presidents typically wield more power in the foreign
policy realm (Wildavsky 1966). By members of Congress largely ignoring terrorism and other foreign policy issues, it can be concluded that members were unwilling to challenge
Bush on these issues. Like other scholars have suggested, this implies that in the immediate post-September 11, 2001 environment, there was more bipartisan unity and
Bush able to exert a tremendous amount of influence over foreign policy (Nelson 2003;
Sinclair 2004).
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Even though there may have been some bipartisan unity in regards to foreign policy immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks, this was not the case in regards
to domestic policy (see Figure 8-13). There was a consistent partisan divide in the way members of Congress discussed domestic policies. Generally, Republicans would
discuss domestic policies much in the same way as Bush II, sometimes even using the
exact same language. This suggests that Bush II did have influence in Congress at least
with members of his own party. However, Democrats were typically critical of Bush II’s
policies and were not afraid to challenge him. Also, any bipartisan unity in regards to
foreign affairs immediately after the terrorist attacks appears to have diminished by the
time Bush II and members of Congress started discussing Iraq in 2003 (see Figure 8-14).
So although the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks seem to have caused a short-term
change in partisanship related to foreign affairs, this effect quickly dissipated.
Overall, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks changed Bush II’s focus from
domestic to foreign, had little impact on the policy focus of Congress, and only
temporarily altered the partisan relationship between Bush II and Congress. Although
Bush II gained a lot of influence over foreign affairs immediately following the
September 11, 2001 attacks, this influence waned as time went on. This is evident by
more members of Congress challenging Bush II on his foreign policies, particularly Iraq,
and also their refusal to fund certain foreign policy expenditures. So while the terrorist
attacks did have an influence on presidential-congressional relations, it was not a
permanent impact.
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20
10
0 Percentage B T E S H M E EconomyEnv B Civil RightsT E A T Campai udgetax ducatiocial Securityeal ilitary/Defensener ur ra m gr er eaucr de pl ic r e t gy ir or s h on oy ul i on Care ment mentture sm gn acy Fi nanc
e
Topics
Figure 8-1. 2001 SOU Address Topics
50
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Budget Education Health Care Ener gy Taxes Social Security Military/Defense Surplus
Main Topic of the Response
Figure 8-2. 2001 Congressional Response Topics
185
30
20
10
0 Percentage BudgetTaxesEducatSocial HealthS Military/Defense CareEnergyEconomyE T E Agri Terr Ir N ForeignWelfare nv rade m aq at i ploym i ronment cul or on i t ism al on e ure A curity ent S f ec fairs urity
Topics
Figure 8-3. 2002 SOU Address Topics
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Terrorism Economy Taxes Health Care Welfare Employment Budget Social Security Energy Environment
Main Topic of the Response
Figure 8-4. 2002 Congressional Response Topics
186
30
20
10
0 Percentage BudgetTax EducatSocial HealS Mi EnergyEconomyEnvironmentB E TerrorismAf Ir N ForeignW AffairsDrug PolicyAIDS ur m g aq at e lit eaucrploym hanistan i ap e t ar onal s h y/ ons ion C e a Def S curityre ac ent ense y ec u ri ty
Topic
Figure 8-5. 2003 SOU Address Topics
50
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Terrorism Economy Health Care Iraq Other Military/Defense Taxes Ener gy Environment AIDS
Topics
Figure 8-6. 2003 Congressional Response Topics
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16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0 Percentage BudgetTaxesEducatSocia Heal Military/DefenseEnergyE T EmploymentT Ir NationalForeign SecurityWeapons AffairsIm Drug Policy conomyrade er aq r m t or igr l h i ion SecuritC sm at a i re on y
Topic
Figure 8-7. 2004 SOU Address Topics
20
10
0 Percent TerrorismMil Employm Foreign AffairsEc Budg Drug PoliHe Iraq ImmigrationOth i o a ta n lt e ry o e h r /De my t Ca e c re fe n y n t s e
Topic
Figure 8-8. 2004 Congressional Response Topics
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30
20
10
0 Percentage BudgetTax EducationSocial HealthS Mi CareE EconomyEnvironmeE T Iraq NationalForeign SecurityW ImmigrationD AIDS ner m er r li e ug e tar ploymror ap s gy Pol y/ ism ons e Def A curity ent icy n ff ense t airs
Topic
Figure 8-9. 2005 SOU Address Topics
40
30
20
10
0 Percent Terroris Social SecurityMilitary/DefenseH Budget Taxes Health CareIr I Ot a mm ome q h igratio er land m S n ec urity
Topics
Figure 8-10. 2005 Congressional Response Topics
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10
8
6
4
2
0 Percentage BudgetTaxesEducationSociaHealMi EnerEconomyEnvironmentBureaucracyTradeE T Iraq N ForeignW AffairsW ImmigrationDrugAIDS PolicyC m er at e e r lit ploymr i aponlf ime t ar gy or onal ar l h y/ SecuritC ism e a Def S s re ent ense ec u y ri ty
Topic
Figure 8-11. 2006 SOU Address Topics
30
20
10
0 Percent TerrorismImm Military/DefenseHomelanCivil RightsEcon BudgetTaxe Educ F H E Ir N o ealt n a ucl rei e q igr o s a g rg ea my tion n A h C y a r Weapon tion d are Security ffai rs s
Topics
Figure 8-12. 2006 Congressional Response Topics
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Table 8-1. Discussion of Domestic/Foreign Policies by Bush II Domestic Foreign 2001 92.3% 7.7% 2002 43.3% 56.7% 2003 38.4% 61.6% 2004 48.1% 51.9% 2005 48.8% 51.2% 2006 51.9% 48.1%
Table 8-2. Discussion of Domestic/Foreign Policies by Congress Domestic Foreign 2001 98.4% 1.6% 2002 97.6% 2.4% 2003 46.4% 53.6% 2004 69.4% 30.6% 2005 81.3% 18.7% 2006 77.5% 22.5%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Bush 10
0 Congress Percent 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Figure 8-13. Domestic Policies Discussed by Bush II and Congress
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100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Bush 10
0 Congress Percent 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Figure 8-14. Foreign Policies Discussed by Bush II and Congress
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CHAPTER 9 PRESIDENTIAL PERSUASION CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Throughout the previous eight chapters, this dissertation examined the evolution
of presidential-congressional relations over the last 28 years. Specifically, it looked at
different factors which affect the president’s ability to shape and dominate the framing of
the national policy agenda in Congress. Political factors, political time, institutional
factors, and the effect of pursuing different policy types were all examined. As was
shown, certain factors allow presidents to wield more power than do other factors.
Overall, this dissertation has shown that presidents have become increasingly more
influential over the agenda in Congress.
Political Factors
One political factor examined was divided government. My expectation was that
presidents would be more persuasive during periods of unified government. By
examining the five periods of unified government contained in my research, I was able to
determine that unified government does not have an effect on presidential influence, and
in some cases presidents actually seemed to have less influence during periods of unified
government. Table 9-1 shows whether presidents had high, medium, or low levels of influence during both unified and divided government. As shown, presidents had low levels of influence during more than half of the years during which there was unified
government.
Therefore, it is not necessarily unified or divided government that matters, but
instead each president’s individual relationship with Congress. For example, Carter had a poor relationship with Congress and therefore was not able to wield much influence. In
contrast, Bush II and members of the Republican party were already pursuing largely the
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same agenda so there were times when Bush II was able to exert more influence (or at
least appear to). As was shown and will be discussed further, there are factors other than
divided or unified government that have an impact on a president’s relationship with
Congress, and therefore his ability to exert influence.
Another finding was that members of the opposition party do not speak more
during periods of unified government. Although it seems that opposition party members
would be more likely to speak as a way to challenge the party in power, this was not the
case. However, even though members of the opposition party were not more likely to
speak during periods of unified government, they typically used different rhetoric than
the president and other majority party members. Therefore, unified government may not
have encouraged members of the opposition party to speak, but it did have an effect on
what they said.
A second political factor considered was whether or not the president had (or was
perceived as having) an electoral mandate. Since Reagan was the only president included
in this study that was thought to have an electoral mandate, I examined the influence he
had throughout his presidency to see whether he was able to exert more influence during
the first year of each of his two terms (1981 and 1985). While I found that he did have
more influence in 1981, I was not able to make solid conclusions about his influence in
1985 due to a small number of speeches analyzed. Therefore, I was not able to make
conclusions about whether having an electoral mandate – real or perceived – allowed
presidents to wield more power in Congress.
One discovery made related to this was that when a president is speaking during
his terms does matter. In looking at influence during each year of a president’s term, it
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became evident that presidents typically are able to wield more power during the first
year of their term. This relationship is shown in Table 9-2.
Table 9-2 shows that presidents were able to be more influential early in their
terms as opposed to late in their terms. For example, presidents had a high level of influence during 62.5 percent of the early years of their presidencies as compared to
having a low level of influence during 50 percent of the later years of their presidencies.
This is likely because presidents have yet to establish a relationship with Congress.
However, it was determined that even presidents beginning their second term in office
receive a bump in influence during their first year. This suggests that influence is not
increased based on the margin of victory by which a president wins an election, but
instead due to the fact that he won.
It was also determined that presidents do not have as much influence during their
second term in office as they did during their first. Three of the five presidents included
in this study served two terms. In all three cases, the president’s influence started to
decrease in the last two years of his second term. Table 9-3 shows the levels of influence
the three presidents had in their first term as compared to their second. During 41.7
percent of the years of presidents’ first terms they had high levels of influence as
compared to there not being one year of high influence during any of the president’s
second terms. This is consistent with the perception that presidents are often “lame
ducks” at the end of their last term in office.
A less conclusive political factor examined was presidential approval ratings.
Although this analysis was somewhat preliminary, there does not appear to be a strong
correlation between a president’s approval rating and his level of influence in Congress.
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Table 9-4 examines this relationship. As shown, it does appear that having an approval rating of below 50 percent results in having a lower level of influence in Congress – presidents who had less than 50 percent approval also had low levels of influence in 50 percent of cases. However, having a higher approval rating does not necessarily translate into having a higher level of influence. Of those years where presidents had more than
50 percent approval, only about 26 percent also had high levels of influence.
In looking at political factors overall, unified or divided government does not seem to affect presidential influence in Congress. Presidents are just as likely to influence Congress during divided government as they are during unified government, and maybe sometimes even more so. Also, electoral mandates do not seem to matter.
One political factor that does make a difference is when during his term a president is speaking. Presidents appear to have more influence during the beginning of their term.
Also, presidents have more influence during their first term than their second. Finally, there does seem to be some relationship between presidential approval ratings and levels of influence, however, more research needs to be conducted before concrete conclusions can be made.
Political Time
In looking at the four types of political time – the politics of reconstruction, articulation, disjunction, and pre-emption – it was determined that the political time during which a president is presiding does matter. Presidents presiding during the politics of reconstruction have the best ability to persuade. This is because during the politics of reconstruction the president is opposed and institutions are vulnerable. For example, Reagan was able to wield much influence during his presidency because economic change was desired and Reagan was seeking new economic policy. Therefore
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during the politics of reconstruction change is wanted and the president is willing to provide it, allowing him a lot of room for influence in Congress.
Presidents presiding during the politics of articulation also have the potential to be influential in Congress. However, articulate presidents are more limited than reconstructive ones in that presidents during the politics of articulation can only exert influence as long as they adhere to the previous agenda. If president’s stray from the previous agenda, then they are likely to wield less influence. This was apparent when examining Bush I’s presidency. Bush I was able to have influence in Congress when adhering to Reagan’s agenda, however, lost influence when he strayed too far from it.
Presidents are the least likely to wield influence during the politics of disjunction.
During the politics of disjunction, the president is affiliated but institutions are vulnerable. For example, during Carter’s presidency, he was trying to pursue an agenda that was clearly not the solution to the nation’s problems. Therefore, as was shown by looking at Carter’s presidency, presidents during the politics of disjunction are unlikely to exert a lot of power in Congress.
The only political time during which generalizations could not be made regarding influence was the politics of pre-emption. During the politics of pre-emption, presidents are opposed but institutions are resilient. Clinton fit into this category, and by looking his presidency, it seemed that what mattered was not political time but partisanship. For example, during the beginning of Clinton’s presidency when there was unified government, he was able to exert much more influence than at the end of his second term when there was divided government and much partisan conflict.
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Bush II was much harder to place in terms of political time. Initially, I thought he
fell somewhere between the politics of articulation and the politics of pre-emption,
however, after examining all the presidents I determined that Bush II was better classified
as falling under the politics of disjunction. There are many reasons for this that I discuss
in Chapter 4, however, the main one is the similarities between Carter and Bush II’s
presidencies.
Table 9-5 shows the levels of influence presidents were able to have during
different periods of political time. In looking at political time overall, presidents
presiding during the politics of reconstruction have the best potential to be persuasive.
Presidents during the politics of articulation also have the ability to exert influence, however, they are more limited than presidents during the politics of reconstruction.
Presidents during the politics of disjunction have the least ability to wield influence in
Congress. Finally, presidents during the politics of pre-emption may or may not be able
to be persuasive depending on other factors.
Institutional Factors
It was determined that certain institutional factors affect who in Congress
responds to the president. For example, members of the House are much more likely to
respond to the president than members of the Senate. As was discussed in Chapter 5, this
is likely because of institutional differences between the House and Senate. In the House,
there are more members, terms are shorter, and members are more constrained by
chamber rules and majority party leadership. Also, senators are likely to have more
outlets available to express their opinions and respond to the president. Therefore, it
makes sense that members of the House would be more likely to take advantage of open
time speeches.
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Aside from which chamber a member resides in affecting who speaks, it was determined that a member’s party affiliation did not make a difference. Members of the opposition party were no more likely to speak than members of the majority party. In fact, it was found that regardless of which party controlled Congress, Democrats tended to speak slightly more than Republicans. The only exception to this was that the party affiliation of the president did seem to have some impact on who spoke. Members from the party opposite of the president, regardless of which party controlled Congress, were slightly more likely to speak then members of Congress from the same party as the president.
Even though party affiliation did not make much of a difference in determining who in Congress spoke, the amount of time a member served in Congress did matter.
The average length of time speaking members had been in Congress was 15.5 years.
This suggests that most members did not speak immediately upon taking office. Instead, members tended to wait until they had been in office for at least a full term or more before speaking.
Also, a relationship was found between the average number of years a member had served when speaking and the level of presidential influence. Table 9-6 shows this relationship, which appears to be inverse. For example, presidents had a low level of influence during 75 percent of the years when speaking members had served at least 13 years or more. This is compared to presidents having low levels of influence during only about 11 percent of years when members had served less than 10 years when speaking.
In regards to whether a member was a party leader or committee chair, it did not seem to make much of a difference in who spoke. Even though party leaders and
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committee chairs spoke more during certain years, no discernable pattern was found.
Therefore, even as Congress transitioned from being committee centered to party dominated, no pattern was found in regards to party leaders and committee chairs speaking.
However, there were some patterns found in regards to levels of presidential influence when more party leaders and committee chairs were speaking. Similar to the inverse pattern found in regards to the average number of years a member had served when speaking, Tables 9-7 and 9-8 show that presidents were likely to have less influence when more party leaders and committee chairs were speaking. For example, presidents had low levels of influence during 75 percent of the years when the highest percentage of party leaders were speaking.
Aside from institutional factors related to who was speaking, there were also institutional factors related to changes in congressional norms and procedures which affected presidential influence. As Congress moved from the post-reform era into the era of conditional party government, parties gained more control in Congress. This lead not only to parties becoming more important, but also to parties becoming more unified internally, and more polarized from one another.
The changing congressional eras affected presidential influence in Congress in that there was a more evident partisan divide in how members responded to the president.
By the time Clinton became president, Democrats were discussing largely the same issues as Clinton and discussing them in much the same way, while Republicans were consistently challenging the President. Related to this, the positions of the two parties became farther apart from one another, and there was more unity within each party.
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Therefore, institutional factors do have an influence on both who in Congress is speaking, as well as what they are saying. Members of the House and members who have served in Congress longer are more likely to speak than members of the Senate and newer members of Congress. Party affiliation and whether a member is a party leader or committee chair does not seem to affect which members speak. Even though changes in congressional norms and procedures did not affect who spoke, they did have an impact on what was being said. It was evident that speeches in Congress grew more partisan over time as parties became the dominant force in Congress, grew more unified internally, and became more polarized from each other.
Types of Policy
One of the largest and most interesting findings of this dissertation was in regards to the impact the types of policies a president was discussing had on his influence. It was found that whether a president is discussing domestic or foreign policies does matter.
Consistent with Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, presidents are able to wield more power when discussing foreign policies. However, this influence is not evident in the way expected. In regards to domestic policies, influence was usually identified when members of Congress discussed the same topics as the president and talked about them using largely the same rhetoric. However, in regards to foreign policies, it was found that members of Congress would defer to the president by not discussing the issues. In not challenging the president, members of Congress were allowing him large amounts of influence over foreign affairs. This can be seen in Table 9-9, which looks at levels of presidential influence based on their emphasis on domestic affairs.
Looking at the table shows that presidents discussing domestic policies the most also had higher levels of influence, whereas those presidents focusing on foreign affairs
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had lower levels of influence. Although this seems to contradict my findings, there is a
logical explanation for it. As discussed in Chapter 6, presidents who are weak on domestic policies often focus on foreign policies as a way to try and increase their influence. Even though they may be able to gain some influence over foreign affairs, they are still weak presidents and therefore get labeled as having an overall low level of influence. Bush II is a good example of this phenomenon in that he was able to exert tremendous influence over foreign affairs however was not able to transfer that influence to domestic policies.
Aside from overall influence over foreign affairs, presidents were able to be especially persuasive in Congress regarding foreign affairs surrounding international crises. By examining presidential influence during the Iran hostage crisis, Persian Gulf
War, and immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, it was determined that not only is it likely for presidential support to increase during periods of crisis, but that presidential influence increases as well. However, clearly not all presidents are able to sustain their heightened support and influence as long as others. For example, Carter’s influence during the Iran hostage situation was relatively short lived compared to Bush
I’s influence during the Persian Gulf War and Bush II’s influence following the
September 11, 2001 attacks.
Finally, one of the most fascinating examples in regards to presidential influence was Bush II’s presidency. Bush II started his presidency on uncertain terms which caused some to question his capability to ever exert influence in Congress. However,
Bush II proved to have much success in Congress. Part of this can be attributed to the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Bush II was given tremendous influence after the attacks in
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regards to foreign affairs. However, Bush II was also able to be successful in Congress
because for most of his presidency he had a Republican majority that was pursuing
largely the same policy agenda. Now that Bush II has lost support, is not wielding as
much influence regarding foreign affairs, and no longer has a Republican majority in
Congress, it will be interesting to see how his relationship and therefore influence in
Congress changes.
In regards to the type of policies a president is discussing, presidents discussing foreign policies are typically able to wield more power than when pursuing domestic policies. Members of Congress generally defer to the president on foreign policy issues, however, are not afraid to challenge the president when they think he is leading the country in the wrong direction. Presidents are especially able to exert power in Congress surrounding international crises, however, this influence is usually limited to foreign affairs.
Discussion
Many of my findings run counter to what other scholars have said about presidents and their abilities to persuade. For example, some scholars have found that presidents are not very successful at persuading the public (Edwards 2003). If presidents are truly not able to persuade the public, then some could question their ability to
persuade members of Congress as well. However, I would like to suggest that the first
step in understanding the conditions under which the president can or cannot persuade the
public is to look at a president’s relationship with political elites.
This is consistent with the two-step flow of communication theory which suggests
that effective communication with the public originates with political elite (Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). Therefore, analyzing congressional speeches shows the
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conditions under which the president is successful at setting the rhetorical agenda.
Additionally, it has the potential to show how the president’s message is transmitted to the public and through which channels.
There has also been much criticism regarding Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis. Some scholars have discredited Wildavsky’s thesis altogether saying that it no longer applies (Cohen 1982; Shull and LeLoup 1981; Sigelman 1979). For example, some scholars believe that wars are now less able to build congressional support for the president (Cohen 1982). Other scholars believe that the two presidencies thesis does not hold true for all presidents, but instead mainly applies to Republican presidents (Bond and Fleischer 1988; Sigelman 1979). This is likely because Democratic presidents typically fare better at domestic policies, and Republicans get more support from their party leaders and committee chairs in Congress (Bond and Fleischer 1988).
One of the greatest criticisms of Wildavsky’s thesis is that its basis was the use of boxscores, which are considered to have reliability and validity problems (Bond and
Fleisher 1988; Edwards 1985; Sigelman 1979). However, scholars other scholars have tried to discredit Wildavsky using other questionable measures such as key votes
(Sigelman 1979). Key votes are issues chosen and analyzed by CQ based on meeting one or more the following criteria: being “a matter of controversy, a test of presidential or political power, [and/or] a decision of potentially great impact on the lives of Americans”
(Shull and Vanderleeuw 1987, 573). Key votes show the members in Congress who supported and opposed the president, however, there are generally a small number of key votes each year – usually between five and 20 - and many are not related to foreign policy issues.
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While I acknowledge the need to improve upon my methods and measurement, I
believe that my findings are legitimate. Using rhetoric as a measurement has shown that
there are variations regarding presidents’ abilities to influence the rhetorical agenda of
Congress, and that these variations are due to specific factors which can be measured. In adding to this research, I should be able to further validate my findings and respond to scholars who may dispute them.
Implications and Final Thoughts
There are several implications of this research. One concerns the use of rhetoric as a measure. This dissertation has shown the value of using rhetoric as a measure of presidential-congressional relations. Unlike roll call votes and other previous measures that have been used, using rhetoric provides additional insight into the relationship between individual presidents and congresses. For example, while using roll call votes as a measure might show a partisan division in Congress in that Democrats are voting one way and Republicans are voting the other, it reveals nothing about why that partisan divide exists. In using rhetoric, the specific reasons why Democrats and Republicans take different positions on the same issue can be shown.
Another implication of this research is that showing the factors which allow presidents to wield more influence in Congress could potentially allow scholars to predict
which presidents will be more influential. For example, presiding during a period of
unified government or having a high approval rating does not necessarily mean a
president will be influential. However, when a national crisis occurs, or the president is
focusing on foreign policies, he will likely be able to exert more influence. Knowing
which factors affect presidential influence could also potentially allow presidents to
utilize this information to their benefit. For example, if a president realized that after a
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national crisis, such as a terrorist attack, he could wield more power in Congress, then he might decide to pursue different pieces of legislation then he would have otherwise.
Overall, the findings of this dissertation are important because they provide new insight into presidential-congressional relations. Looking at the language used by the president and members of Congress shows how they interact with one another, and how this relationship is affected by partisanship. Also, in examining this relationship, it was shown which issues were most likely to cause conflict (for example domestic issues such as taxes) and which issues were less divisive (usually foreign affairs issues). Therefore, much has been unveiled about presidential-congressional relations from this dissertation, and it has also laid the foundation for future research.
My findings as a whole suggest that looking at congressional responses to presidential speeches does begin to provide an additional dimension to understanding presidential persuasion as seen in agenda setting. I found that there is a real variation in the president’s capacity to set the rhetorical agenda of Congress in the weeks after the
SOU address, and that this is a pattern which has never been discovered by political scientists before in this clear manner. The pattern shows that some presidents in certain contexts have much more success in setting the rhetorical agenda then do other presidents in different contexts. Moreover, my findings show that there is some degree of consistency between these patterns and other patterns as discussed in presidential- congressional literature.
Even though my findings are in conflict with those of some other scholars, such as
George Edwards who finds that presidents are not very successful in persuading the public (2003), I find that presidents are also limited in persuading members of Congress
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so that presidents have high levels of influence in only six of the 28 years of this dissertation. However, there is real variation among presidents and the variation indicates that presidents are more apt to be influential under certain circumstances, for example early in their term and during the politics of reconstruction. In addition, my findings seem to suggest that some factors such as divided government, which is contested in the literature on presidential influence in Congress, are irrelevant to presidents’ success in setting the agenda.
However, my study only contains 28 years, and during these 28 years there is only
one of a small number of presidents over the last 80 years considered to be a good
communicator: Reagan. Not included are presidents such as Franklin Roosevelt, John
Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and possibly Harry Truman – presidents who had some success
in agenda setting at least in some years and contexts. Therefore, I intend now to move beyond the dissertation to build on my research by extending it back to Herbert Hoover.
Adding an additional forty or fifty years to my study will help me further explore the questions raised in this dissertation, and also do so in a more quantitatively rigorous manner.
As previously stated, my intention is to extend my research back to Herbert
Hoover so that I can explore the interaction between the president and Congress both before and after the Great Depression. It would also allow me to examine the effects of other economic crises such as recessions and oil shortages. Aside from looking at other economic conditions, extending my research will also allow further exploration of the difference between a president pursuing foreign and domestic policies by looking at the
effects of other military operations such as World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Another
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potential factor worth exploring is whether presidents with prior congressional experience
had better relationships with Congress. Finally, I will continue to examine the factors
included in this dissertation – political factors, political time, and various other
congressional and institutional factors. Doing so should allow me to build on the findings of this dissertation, and hopefully provide more evidence for the patterns I found.
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Table 9-1. Levels of Influence During United/Divided Government United Government Divided Government High Influence 22.2% 22.2% Medium Influence 22.2% 50% Low Influence 55.6% 27.8%
Table 9-2. Levels of Influence Early vs. Late in a President’s First Term Early Late High Influence 62.5% 10% Medium Influence 12.5% 40% Low Influence 25% 50%
Table 9-3. Levels of Influence First vs. Second Term First Term Second Term High Influence 41.7% 0% Medium Influence 25% 66.7% Low Influence 33.3% 33.3%
Table 9-4. Presidential Approval Ratings and Levels of Influence Less Than More Than 50% 50% Approval Approval High Influence 12.5% 26.3 Medium Influence 37.5% 42.1% Low Influence 50% 31.7%
Table 9-5. Levels of Influence During Political Time Politics of Politics of Politics of Politics of Reconstruction Articulation Disjunction Pre-emption High Influence 25% 33.3% 11.1% 28.6% Medium Influence 62.5% 66.7% 22.2% 28.6% Low Influence 12.5% 66.7% 42.8%
Table 9-6. Presidential Influence and Average Years Speaking Members Served (AYS) 0 – 9.99 AYS 10 – 12.99 AYS Above 13 AYS High Influence 44.4% 14.2% Medium Influence 44.4% 42.9% 25% Low Influence 11.1% 42.9% 75%
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Table 9-7. Percent of Party Leaders (PL) Speaking and Presidential Influence 0 – 7% CC 7.1% – 14.9% CC 15% and Above CC High Influence 25% 27.2% Medium Influence 41.7% 45.5% 25% Low Influence 33.3% 27.3% 75%
Table 9-8. Percent of Committee Chairs (CC) Speaking and Presidential Influence 0 – 7% CC 7.1% – 14.9% CC 15% and Above CC High Influence 20% 25% Medium Influence 50% 41.7% 25% Low Influence 30% 33.3% 75%
Table 9-9. Emphasis of Domestic Policy and Levels of Presidential Influence High Domestic Medium Domestic Low Domestic High Influence 44.4% 11.1% Medium Influence 22.2% 77.8% 33.3% Low Influence 33.3% 22.2% 55.6%
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APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY
There are two key components to my analyses – the SOU addresses and the
congressional responses. Separate, but similar, coding schemes were used for each. The
first speeches coded were SOU addresses. When coding these addresses, a sentence was
my unit of analysis. I was coding for topics discussed such as education, social security,
the budget, etc. Also, each sentence could contain more than one topic. Based on how
many sentences the president discussed each topic, I could establish the percentage of the
speech he spent on any one policy. In some cases, the president would go into great
detail about certain topics, whereas others he might only mention once.
Once the SOU addresses were coded, the congressional speeches were analyzed.
The selection of these speeches and coding schemes used were slightly more complicated
than for the SOU addresses. First, it is necessary to discuss how the speeches were
chosen. Congressional speeches were chosen from the weeks following each SOU
address. Specifically, I chose speeches given during the five days Congress was in
session immediately following the SOU address. It was rare that these would be five consecutive days, but instead they usually spanned a two week period.
The transcripts of the speeches were obtained from the Congressional Record, and the speeches chosen were given in both the House and the Senate. The speeches were not those given as part of debate, but instead were open time speeches. For example, in the
Senate, many of the speeches were given during morning business, and in the House, many of the speeches were one-minute speeches. I did not include speeches that were an extension of remarks.
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This resulted in a different number of speeches being coded for each year. The
number of speeches coded for each year ranged from 14 to 163, with the average number
of speeches coded each year being 63. Table A-1 shows the number of speeches coded in
each the House and Senate for every year included in my study.
Not all of the speeches given during the five days Congress was in session
immediately following the SOU address were chosen to be analyzed. Instead, speeches
were chosen based on policies discussed by the president. For a speech to be chosen, it
had to reference some topic also mentioned by the president. However, it did not have to
be a topic that the president spent a lot of time discussing. For example, even if the
president only mentioned health care once in his speech, any congressional speech
mentioning health care would still be coded. This resulted in the vast majority of
speeches given during the five day period to be analyzed. Most of the speeches not
analyzed were focused on topics which were not policy related, for example, speeches
congratulating the winning Super Bowl team.
Also, some of the topics discussed by the president were broad enough to
encapsulate numerous congressional speeches. For example, if the president discussed
foreign affairs, as he did to some extent in every SOU address. In regards to foreign
affairs, the president would generally refer to different countries – so he might discuss
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. However, if a congressional response focused on China, even if the president never mentioned China, it would still be chosen because it was related to foreign affairs. Therefore, because of the presence of these broad categories most of the speeches given in Congress were coded. In other words, I was not randomly choosing which congressional responses to analyze, and was not simply choosing
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speeches which I thought would support my thesis. Rather, I was trying to find a way to
choose speeches to code for which one might expect the president’s SOU to set the
Speaker’s agenda. This seemed essential because of the vast array of speeches devoted to
minor concerns like the Super Bowl, to local issues of interest to constituents, and to seemingly insignificant policy statements of little relevance to broad national politics.
In focusing on speeches that contained at least one item mentioned in the SOU
message of the president, I believed I had located a reasonable population of
congressional speeches for which the president could realistically be expected to ‘set the
policy agenda’ for Congress. My question then was: among those congressional
speeches that mentioned any item discussed by a president’s SOU, and thus for which we
can assume an opportunity existed for the legislator to follow the president’s policy lead,
did the president in fact set the overall policy agenda of the speech or not?
Once the congressional speeches were chosen, they were coded systematically.
First, it was coded whether the speech discussed a single topic or multiple topics (0 single
topic, 1 multiple topics). Then the main topic of each response was coded. This was
determined by looking at which topic was discussed in the most sentences. For example,
if the speech had ten sentences and six were devoted to education, then the main topic of
the speech was coded as education. If two topics were discussed in the exact same
number of sentences, then I looked at the title of the speech to solve the dispute.
Aside from coding the main topic of the speech, the speech was also coded for the presence of a variety of topics. For example, it was coded whether the member speaking mentioned topics such as social security, health care, the budget, specific countries, etc.
Generally the items were coded 0 for absence of the topic and 1 for presence of the topic.
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This allowed me to later compare the topics members of Congress were emphasizing with the ones being focused on by the president to see if they were discussing similar or different topics.
I also coded the speeches to see whether the members of Congress were discussing topics in the same manner as the president. For example, in 2005 when discussing social security, Bush II presented his plan for creating private social security accounts. Therefore when analyzing congressional speeches in 2005 which mentioned social security, I looked for whether or not members mentioned creating private social security accounts, and if so, whether they were in favor of this plan.
In addition to coding each speech for the topics discussed, I also coded the speeches for whether the member specifically mentioned the SOU address and/or the president. If a member mentioned the president, then I wanted to know in what context.
Many times members would simply refer to the president in a neutral context. For example, a member might start off by saying, “Last night, the President talked about the environment.” So the member was simply stating fact and including none of their opinion.
However, members also sometimes used negative and positive connotations when referring to the president. An example of a positive statement would be if a member said,
“I want to commend the President on his fantastic leadership.” In contrast, a negative statement would be if a member said, “The President’s actions have deeply hurt the economy.” Basically, positive statements were those which complimented the president and/or his actions, whereas negative statements were those which criticized the president.
However, in the majority of cases, members spoke of the president in a neutral manner.
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Finally, information about each member of Congress speaking was recorded. I coded whether the member was in the House or the Senate, his or her party affiliation, how long he or she served in Congress when speaking, and whether the member was a party leader or committee chair. Recording this information allowed me to determine whether certain types of members were more likely to speak than others. It also displayed whether members of the president’s party were more or less likely to agree with him, and whether this support was constant or varied by president.
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Table A-1. Number of Speeches Coded Each Year Year House Senate 1978 15 36 1979 20 6 1980 24 18 1981 39 7 1982 33 0 1983 15 9 1984 47 4 1985 9 5 1986 30 11
Year House Senate 1987 44 18 1988 36 12 1990 35 24 1991 35 11 1992 59 31 1993 124 39 1994 66 27 1995 122 7 1996 88 27
Year House Senate 1997 40 18 1998 46 29 2000 58 26 2001 47 18 2002 14 28 2003 8 34 2004 38 20 2005 50 37 2006 32 31
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Table A-2. Domestic and Foreign Policies Coded Domestic Policies Foreign Policies Budget Military/Defense Taxes Trade Health Care Terrorism Social Security Specific Countries Energy Security Economy Weapons Environment Immigration Bureaucracy Allies Civil Rights Military Operations Employment Agriculture Welfare Crime Drug Policy Gun Control
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APPENDIX B MEASUREMENT
Once the SOU addresses and congressional responses were coded, they had to be assessed to determine the level of influence the president had in Congress at any given time.
This was a multi-step process with the concentration on the amount of agreement in the topics being discussed by the president and members of Congress and the language used when
discussing the topics. Therefore, the first step was to determine whether the president and
members of Congress were discussing the same topics. This was done by comparing the three
topics most discussed by both the president and Congress as a whole. A direct comparison of
percentages was not done because two different methods were used to determine the topics
receiving the most emphasis by the president and Congress.
The topics discussed in the SOU address by the president could be rank ordered
depending on the percentage of sentences he devoted to each. For example, if the president spent
25 percent of his speech on the military, 10 percent on health care, and 15 percent on social
security, then the topics would be rank ordered military, social security, and health care. In
contrast, the amount of time spent by members of Congress on topics was calculated based on
the main topics of the speeches. As discussed in the methodology section (Appendix A), each
congressional response was coded for a main topic. Looking at these main topics, it could then
be determined the percentage of speeches devoted to each topic by Congress. For example, if 20
speeches were being analyzed and 10 were focused on education, five on the military, three on
the environment, and two on the economy, then the topics could be rank ordered education,
military, environment, and economy based on the percentages of congressional speeches devoted to each (50 percent, 25 percent, 15 percent, and 10 percent respectively).
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Once the topics for each year were ranked ordered, they could then be compared. In continuing with this particular example, a table might be developed which looks like Table B-1.
Simply from looking at the table and without looking at percentages, it is apparent that the president and members of Congress were largely discussing different topics. After the initial comparison, percentages were then also taken into consideration. For example, I might first look at the topics discussed by the president. The main topic he discussed was the military. I would then look over and see that the military is the second most discussed topic by Congress. Even though a direct comparison of the percentages cannot be made, I could see how much of the
SOU address or congressional speeches were devoted to a topic. So in this case, the president spent 25 percent of his address discussing the military and 25 percent of speeches in Congress were also on the military. Therefore, this suggests that both the president and members of
Congress were spending a bit of time discussing the military, so there is topic agreement.
An example of topic disagreement might occur when looking at the main topic discussed by members of Congress. Fifty percent of congressional speeches were on education, however, education is not listed in the top three topics discussed by the president. I would then look down the rank ordered list of topics discussed by the president to find education. If education was the fourth most discussed topic by the president – say he spent nine percent of his speech on it – then it might be determined that there was some topic agreement. Education was one of the topics discussed more by the president and the most discussed topic by members of Congress.
However, if education was towards the bottom of the topics discussed by the president – maybe he only mentioned it once – then there would be topic disagreement. The president barely made mention of education yet that is what Congress wants to discuss.
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Therefore, by rank ordering the topics discussed by the president and members of
Congress, it can be determined whether or not there was topic agreement, and ultimately how
influential the president was in determining which topics members of Congress were discussing.
If there was a lot of topic agreement – for example, the three main topics discussed by the president and members of Congress matched up, or maybe even two of three topics for each – then it could be argued that the president was able to exert influence over the congressional agenda. However, if there was little or not topic agreement, then it could be argued that the president was not able to exert as much influence in Congress.
However, this is only part of the measurement of presidential influence. The other part has to do with whether the president and members of Congress are discussing the same topics in the same ways. Yes, there might be topic agreement if the president and members of Congress are discussing largely the same topics, however, if they are discussing them in completely different ways, then the president is not exerting as much influence. Therefore, presidential influence is two-fold: influence over the congressional agenda, but also influence over policy content. To measure policy content, it is necessary to see how the president and members of
Congress are discussing the same issues.
A good example of the president and members of Congress discussing the same topic in different ways is in 2003 when discussing whether or not to pursue a military operation in Iraq.
The discussion of Iraq was very partisan, with Republican members of Congress discussing Iraq using much of the same rhetoric as Bush II, while Democratic members of Congress were discussing Iraq using different terms. Bush II and Republican members of Congress emphasized that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein’s failure to disarm was an indication that he planned to use these weapons either directly or indirectly to harm the
220
U.S. In contrast, Democratic members of Congress said that U.N. weapons inspectors should
have more time to search for weapons before military action was taken. Therefore, even though
Bush II and members of Congress were both discussing Iraq in 2003, they were talking about it
in different ways. This shows that Bush II’s influence over the terms of discussion surrounding
Iraq was somewhat limited, at least in regards to the Democratic members of Congress.
In looking at presidential influence over both the congressional agenda and content of discussion, it is possible to label the amount of influence the president has in Congress each year.
Four labels were developed in regards to levels of presidential influence – high, high partisan, medium, and low. For a president to have a high level of influence, there would have to be topic agreement, and the president and members of Congress from both parties would have to discuss the topics in the same way. There would also have to be topic agreement between the president and members of Congress for the president to have a high partisan level of influence. The difference is that in this category, the president only has to influence the content of discussion among members of his own party.
There are several scenarios under which a president’s influence could be labeled medium.
One is if there was partial topic agreement and some similarities in how the president and members of Congress were discussing the same topics. However, a president could also be labeled as having a medium level of influence if there was topic agreement but not content agreement, or more rarely, when there was content agreement but not topic agreement. For example, the president and members of Congress are emphasizing different topics, but they are discussing the same topics in largely the same ways.
Finally, a president was labeled as having a low level of influence when there was both topic disagreement and the president and members of Congress were discussing topics in
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different ways. Based on these four categories of influence, I was able to create a table which
looked at levels of presidential influence over time (Table 1-1, also reprinted as Table 3-9 and
Table B-2).
Aside from assigning a level of influence to each president for each year, I also was able to calculate an average level of influence. This could be done for a particular presidency, or for
other categories such as political time. To determine the average level of influence a president
had, the level of influence the president had during each year of his presidency was assigned a
numeric value which could then be averaged.
The coding scheme was as such: low levels of influence were coded 1, medium levels 2,
high partisan levels 2.5, and high levels 3. For example, during the three years of Bush I’s
presidency analyzed, he had two medium and one high level of influence. Therefore, I added 2,
2, and 3, and divided by 3 so his average was 2.3 which corresponded with a medium level of
influence. If a president’s numerical average fell between 1 and 1.75, his influence was
categorized as being low, 1.76 and 2.5 medium, and 2.51 and 3 high. High partisan was not
included as a category for an overall level of influence because I felt that doing so may be
inaccurate (i.e. numbers do not show whether the responses in Congress were partisan).
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Table B-1. Topics Discussed by the President and Congress President Congress Military Education Social Security Military Health Care Environment
Table B-2. Presidential Levels of Influence Carter Reagan Bush I Clinton Bush II First Year High High Partisan High Partisan Second Year Low High Medium High Partisan Low Third Year Low Medium High Low Medium Fourth Year Low Medium Medium Low Low Fifth Year Low* Medium Medium Sixth Year Medium Medium Low Seventh Year Medium Eighth Year Medium Low *This may not be accurate as there were a limited number of responses analyzed in 1985.
223
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259
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260
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261
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262
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263
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264
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265
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266
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267
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268
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269
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270
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271
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272
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273
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Pallone, Frank. 1996c. “Pass a Clean Debt Ceiling Extension.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Pallone, Frank. 1996d. “Bring Up a Clean Bill to Extend the Debt Limit.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
293
Pallone, Frank. 1997a. “President Correctly Places Nation’s Education System at the Top of our Priority List.” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006.
Pallone, Frank. 1997b. “Political System Overhaul.” 11 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006.
Pallone, Frank. 1997c. “Comprehensive Campaign Finance Reform.” 11 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 May 2006.
Panetta, Leon. 1978. “The State Civil Rights Committees Act.” 23 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Panetta, Leon. 1982. “A Balanced and Fair Budget Resolution or None at All.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Panetta, Leon. 1983. “One Hundred Years of Civil Service Myths and Realities.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Parris, Stanford. 1981. “The Growth of Imperial Presidency.” 25 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Parris, Stanford. 1990. “Keep Our Commitment to Civil Service and Military Annuitants.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Paul, Ronald. 1980. “The Chilling Talk of War.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006.
Paul, Ronald. 1981. “The Message for Flint.” 25 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Paul, Ronald. 1982. “There’s No Liberty Without Life.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Payne, Donald. 1995. “Higher Minimum Wage Produces Additional Jobs.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Pearson, James. 1978. “Energy.” 20 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
294
Pease, Donald. 1981. “Defense Spending Commitments.” 23 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Pease, Donald. 1983a. “Introduction of Social Security Reform Act of 1983.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Pease, Donald. 1983b. “TRA Training for Displaced Industrial Workers.” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Pell, Claiborne. 1984. “Testing of F-15 ASAT System.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Pell, Claiborne. 1986. “National School and Guidance Counselor Week.” 6 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
Pell, Claiborne. 1987. “Education: The Powerful Weapon of a Free People.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Pell, Claiborne. 1990. “How to Fight Global Warming.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Pell, Claiborne. 1991. “Iraq Must Comply with Geneva Conventions, Give ICRC Access to POW’s.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Pell, Claiborne. 1992. “President’s Nuclear Initiatives.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Pell, Claiborne. 1993. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006.
Pelosi, Nancy. 1988. “In Opposition to Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Pelosi, Nancy. 1992. “Children Are Still Having Nightmares.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
295
Pelosi, Nancy. 1993. “Continued Unemployment Concerns.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006.
Pelosi, Nancy. 1994. “Health Care Crisis: Many Americans are One Paycheck Away from Being Uninsured.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Pelosi, Nancy. 1995. “Let Us Have Truth About Social Security.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Penny, Timothy. 1993. “No More Business as Usual.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Percy, Charles. 1978a. “Future of Trucking Deregulation.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Percy, Charles. 1978b. “Support for Panama Canal Treaties.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Percy, Charles. 1981. “Proposed Arms Sales.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Perkins, Carl. 1982. “We Should Learn From History.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Peterson, Douglas. 1992. “America’s Forgotten Allies: The Veterans of South Vietnamese Army.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Peterson, David, Lawrence Grossback, James Stimson, and Amy Gangl. 2003. “Congressional Response to Mandate Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 47.3 (July): 411-426.
Petri, Thomas. 1982. “Resolution Introduced to Proclaim March 21, 1982, as Afghanistan Day.” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Petri, Thomas. 1990. “A Misleading Standard of Comparison in Education.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Peyser, Peter. 1982. “Deficits Must be Reduced.” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
296
Pickett, Owen. 1991. “United States Needs a Policy for Energy Independence.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Pickle, James. 1982. “Social Security Student Benefits.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Pickle, James. 1983. “Social Security Issue Not Yet Settled.” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Pomeroy, Earl. 1993. “Larry Villella, a 14-Year-Old Patriot.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Pomeroy, Earl. 1995. “A Need to Specify Where the Cuts Take Place.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Porter, John. 1988. “The Continuing Resolution: The Gipper Won’t Sign it and the Budget Clock is Running.” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Powell, Richard. 1999. “Going Public Revisited: Presidential Speechmaking and the Bargain Setting in Congress.” Congress and the Presidency 26 (Fall): 171-191.
Pressler, Larry. 1990. “Middle East Military Base.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Pressler, Larry. 1992. “A Challenge to Act.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Price, David. 1993. “This is the Moment.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Price, David. 1994. “Health Care: Time for Change.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1978. “Genocide and Human Rights.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1979a. “Youth and Minority Unemployment.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006.
297
Proxmire, William. 1979b. “Ratification of the Genocide Convention.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1979c. “The Cities’ Increasing Dependence on Federal Aid.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1980a. “The Economic Effects of Sanctions Against the Soviet Union.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1980b. “Now is the Time for a Budget Surplus.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1983a. “Scientists Answer to U.S. First Use of Nuclear Bomb Policy.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1983b. “Why We Need Flexibility on Both Sides in Nuclear Arms Reduction Talks.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1984a. “Facts on the Nuclear Arms Buildup.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1984b. “Can We Verify Nuclear Explosions Underground Down Below a Single Kiloton?” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1985. “Can Massive Deficits Lead the Way to Permanent Prosperity?” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 10 March 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1986a. “The Terrible Consequences of a Reasonable Economic Forecast.” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1986b. “Could the Reagan Initiative on Underground Nuke Testing Advance Arms Control?” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
298
Proxmire, William. 1986c. “Star Wars Will Devastate More Essential Research.” 6 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1986d. “Yes, the Massive Federal Deficits Are Our Prime Economic Problem.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1987a. “The Reagan Administration: An Arms Control Disaster.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1987b. “Yes, The Time for Doom and Gloom Has Come.” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1987c. “Why Arms Control is Essential to National Security.” 4 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1988a. “Mission of Arms Control: To Strengthen Nuclear Deterrence.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1988b. “Is U.S. Economic Policy Torpedoing Our NATO Allies?” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1988c. “How Do We Bring Democracy to Nicaragua?” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Proxmire, William. 1988d. “Women in the Military – Time for a Change.” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Pryor, David. 1992. “The Defense Budget.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Pryor, David. 1993. “Empower America.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006.
Pursell, Carl. 1990. “Elementary School Counseling Act.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
299
Quirk, Paul, and Nesmith, Bruce. 2000. “Divided Government and Policymaking: Negotiating the Laws.” The Presidency and the Political System. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 507-530.
Rahall, Nick. 1984. “The Balanced Budget Amendment – A Republican Scapegoat.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Railsback, Thomas. 1978. “Merit Selection of Federal Judges and Prosecutors.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Ramstad, James. 1994. “Abolish New Taxes.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Ratchford, William. 1982. “Concerns the President Overlooked.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Ravenel, Arthur. 1990. “Secretary Cheney Needs Update.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Ray, Richard. 1988. “In Support of Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Ray, Richard. 1991. “Administration’s Overtone to Saddam Hussein is Inappropriate.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Reagan, Ronald. 1981. “State of the Union Address.” 18 February. C-Span State of the Union Transcript. 13 February 2006.
Reagan, Ronald. 1982. “State of the Union Address.” 26 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript. 18 February 2006.
Reagan, Ronald. 1983. “State of the Union Address.” 25 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript. 23 February 2006.
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Reagan, Ronald. 1987. “State of the Union Address.” 27 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript. 6 March 2006.
Reagan, Ronald. 1988. “State of the Union Address.” 25 January. C-Span State of the Union Transcript. 10 March 2006.
Regula, Ralph. 1980. “The Other Budget.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006.
Reid, Harry. 1991. “War Patience.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Reid, Harry. 1994. “The State of the Union.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Reid, Harry. 1994. “America’s Health Care in Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Reuss, Henry. 1982. “President Reagan, Meet President Hoover.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Reynolds, Mel. 1993. “President Clinton’s Economic Plan.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Richardson, Lillian and Michael Munger. 1990. “Shirking, Representation, and Congressional Behavior: Voting on the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act.” Public Choice 67: 11- 33.
Richardson, William. 1986. “The State of the Union.” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
Richardson, William. 1991. “Administration’s Budget: Nothing But Smoke and Mirrors.” 4 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
301
Richardson, William. 1993a. “President Clinton Hit a Home Run.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Richardson, William. 1993b. “The President’s Economic Plan.” 23 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Richardson, William. 1994a. “Crime Bill is No Place for Partisanship.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Richardson, William. 1994b. “America’s Goal in Health Care Reform: To Provide Security for American Families.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Richardson, William. 1995. “Different Approaches to a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Richmond, Frederick. 1978. “Congressmen Richmond Meets with Farmers.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Ridge, Tom. 1986. “President’s Budget Eliminates the UDAG Program.” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
Ridge, Tom. 1990. “Republican Task Force Protects Social Security.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Riegle, Donald. 1994. “Health Care Crisis.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Ritter, Donald. 1991a. “We Need an Energy Strategy.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Ritter, Donald. 1991b. “Japan is in the Big Leagues Now.” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Ritter, Donald. 1992. “The President Has Given us a Blueprint for Economic Recovery.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
302
Rivers, Douglas and Nancy Rose. 1985. “Passing the President’s Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 29.2: 183-196.
Roberts, Herbert. 1978. “Americans Buried in the Panama Canal Zone.” 23 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexis- nexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>.
Rockefeller, John. 1993. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006.
Roemer, Timothy. 1993. “Good Programs, Spending Cuts, and Reform of Congress.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Rohde, David. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Rohrabacher, Dana. 1992. “Democrats Complain and Play Politics While American Economy Sinks and People Suffer.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Rohrabacher, Dana. 1993. “What President Clinton Says Really Means.” 23 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Rohrabacher, Dana. 1996. “President Has Not Kept His Promises.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Roth, William. 1978. “President’s Tax Cuts Will Not Offset Tax Increases.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Roth, William. 1981. “Time for Government to Cut Back.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Roth, William. 1993. “State of the Union Response.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006.
Rowland, John. 1987. “The Message of the President is Clear: Let Us Get on With the Work Facing This Historic Congress.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
303
Rudd, Eldon. 1979. “U.S. Credibility Rests on Action to Honor Defense Commitments to the Republic of China.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 8 February 2006.
Rudd, Eldon. 1980. “The President’s Proposed 1981 Federal Budget is a Fiscal Disaster.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006.
Rush, Bobby. 1993. “Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Sanford, Terry. 1990a. “The President’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 5 April 2006.
Sanford, Terry. 1990b. “Air Force Units from North Carolina Participate in Operation Just Cause.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Santorum, Rick. 1993. “More Budget Cuts.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 20 April 2006.
Sarpalius, William. 1991. “My Vision: Make America a Better Place to Live For Our Children.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Sarpalius, William. 1993. “We Have to Change the Direction in Which Our Country is Going.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Sasser, James. 1978a. “Farmers Deserve Our Support.” 20 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006. < http://web.lexis-nexis.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/congcomp>.
Sasser, James. 1978b. “True Tax Reform.” 20 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Sasser, James. 1987a. “The Lack of Catastrophic Health Insurance.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Sasser, James. 1987b. “Catastrophic Health Care for the Elderly.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Saxton, Hugh. 1990a. “Money Laundering Bill.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
304
Saxton, Hugh. 1990b. “Fifty-five Percent of Our Armed Services Are Made Up of Either Reservists or Guardsmen.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Saxton, Hugh. 1994. “New Jersey is Open for Business.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Schiff, Steven. 1990. “A Proposed Reduction of Social Security Revenues.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Schlesinger, Arthur. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1981a. “Our Allies Must Also Do More in Defense.” 19 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1981b. “NATO Must Do More.” 23 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1981c. “A Balanced Budget Remains Elusive.” 19 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1984. “Reagan is Sending His Bills to Our Kids – They Cannot Vote.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1987. “Zero Arms Control Agreements Under President Reagan.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1992. “Romer Rains on Bush’s Blue-Sky Budget.” 4 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1995a. “Take a Look Under the Hood of the Balanced Budget Amendment.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1995b. “Time to End Freebie Culture.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
305
Schroeder, Patricia. 1995c. “Getting Tough on Child Support Enforcement.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1996a. “Holding the Nation Hostage.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Schroeder, Patricia. 1996b. “Campaign Reform.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Schulze, Richard. 1987. “The Blue Collar ITC.” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1987. “A Fumble by the Gipper.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1991. “America Must Rally Support for Israel’s Cause and Security.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1992. “Great Speech, Wrong Audience.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1993a. “Put up or Shut up.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1993b. “Pass Safe Schools Act and Brady Bill.” 23 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1995. “Protecting Social Security in a Balanced Budget Amendment.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1996a. “Holding Debt Ceiling Hostage is Bad Politics.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1996b. “Dumb and Much Dumber.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Schumer, Charles. 1996c. “The Meaning of our Current Debate.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
306
Scott, Robert. 1994. “Urging a Responsible Debate on Crime.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Seastrand, Andrea. 1995. “Gridlock.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Seastrand, Andrea. 1996. “Actions Speak Louder than Words.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Seiberling, John. 1984. “The President’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Sensenbrenner, Frank. 1981. “Generation Skipping Tax Relief Act.” 25 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 22 February 2006.
Sensenbrenner, Frank. 1993. “Support the Brady Bill.” 23 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Seymour, John. 1992. “A Message of Hope and Optimism.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Shannon, James. 1983. “High Technology Trade Act of 1983.” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 February 2006.
Shaw, Eugene. 1990. “Fraudulent Free Medical Screening Tests for Senior Citizens.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Shaw, Eugene. 1993. “Time to End the Luxury Tax on Boatbuilding.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Shays, Christopher. 1996a. “Balancing the Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Shays, Christopher. 1996b. “Getting our Financial House in Order.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
307
Shull, Steven and Lance LeLoup. 1981. “Reassessing the Reassessment: Comment on Sigelman’s Note on the ‘Two Presidencies’ Thesis.” The Journal of Politics 43.2 (May): 563- 564.
Shumway, Norman. 1987. “President Reagan is No Lame Duck.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Shuster, E.G. 1980. “President Carter’s Budget.” 28 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006.
Shuster, E.G. 1980. “Carter Tax Burden Highest in Peacetime History.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 February 2006.
Sigelman, Lee. 1979. “A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis.” The Journal of Politics 41.1 (November): 1195-1205.
Sigelman, Lee and Pamela Johnston Conover. 1981. “The Dynamics of Presidential Support during International Conflict Situations: The Iranian Hostage Crisis.” Political Behavior 3.4: 303-318.
Sikes, Robert. 1978a. “The Farmers’ Bill for the 100-percent Parity.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO.
Sikes, Robert. 1978b. “The Continuing Controversy over the Canal Treaty.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO.
Sikes, Robert. 1978c. “Wasteful and Unnecessary Destruction.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO.
Sikes, Robert. 1978d. “A Further Effort to Assist the Farmer.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 1 February 2006.
Sikorski, Gerald. 1984. “The President’s Budget.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Simon, Paul. 1984. “United States-Soviet Relations.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Simon, Paul. 1993. “President Clinton’s State of the Union Address.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006.
308
Simon, Paul. 1996. “Student Loans and Corporate Welfare.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Simpson, Alan. 1990. “The President’s State of the Union Address.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Simpson, Alan. 1991. “Global Warming.” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Simpson, Alan. 1992. “President Bush’s State of the Union Address.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Simpson, Alan. 1993. “The President’s Economic Program.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 22, 2006.
Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. Unorthodox Lawmaking. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Sinclair, Barbara. 2004. “Patriotism, Partisanship, and Institutional Protection: The Congressional Response to 9/11.” In Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism, ed. Richard Conley. New York: Prentice Hall, 121- 134.
Skaggs, David. 1987. “Past Time for a Nuclear Test Moratorium.” 4 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 22 2006.
Skaggs, David. 1992. “Honesty, Please, Mr. President.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Skaggs, David. 1994. “No Health Care Crisis?” 3 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Skaggs, David. 1995. “Spell Out Plan for Balanced Budget.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
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Slattery, James. 1984a. “State of the Union Message.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
309
Slattery, James. 1984b. “Commonsense in Federal Budgeting.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
Slattery, James. 1988. “Calling on the President to Withdraw His Request for Contra Aid.” 2 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Slattery, James. 1992. “Tax Withholding, A Rude Surprise for Taxpayers.” 4 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Slattery, James. 1993. “Commending the President for Leadership in Cutting the Deficit.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Slaughter, Daniel. 1986. “The President’s Proposal for Catastrophic Coverage.” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 15 March 2006.
Slaughter, Daniel. 1988. “Lessons from Iran-Contra Affair.” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Smith, Lamar. 1988. “Further Contra Aid Would Continue Pressure on Ortega.” 27 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. March 29 2006.
Smith, Lamar. 1993a. “The Largest Tax Hike in History.” 18 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Smith, Lamar. 1993b. “Unplug the Spending Machine.” 23 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Smith, Lamar. 1993c. “Financing Campaign Promises.” 24 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 20, 2006.
Smith, Lamar. 1994. “Mr. Clinton Should Meet Mr. Kuenstler.” 1 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
Smith, Lamar. 1996a. “The Two Clintons: Rhetoric vs. Reality.” 24 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 25 April 2006.
310
Smith, Lamar. 1996b. “Supporting Immigration Reform.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Smith, Lamar. 1996c. “Ballistic Missile Defense.” 31 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Smith, Lawrence. 1990a. “Global Warming and President Bush.” 6 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Smith, Lawrence. 1990b. “Federal Retirees – Not Social Security Recipients – In Jeopardy.” 7 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 5, 2006.
Smith, Lawrence. 1991a. “America Must Not Forget Who Its Enemies Are.” 30 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Smith, Lawrence. 1991b. “What Kind of Country Will Our Troops Come Home to?” 5 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 12, 2006.
Smith, Lawrence. 1992a. “President’s State of the Union Message: No Whole Cloth, Only Bandaids.” 29 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Smith, Lawrence. 1992b. “The United States-Japan Relationship.” 4 February. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. April 15, 2006.
Smith, Nick. 1996a. “Limiting Increase in Marketable Debt.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
Smith, Nick. 1996b. “Budget Impasse.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
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Smith, Robert. 1984. “Action Needed to Recall Marines from Lebanon.” 26 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 3 March 2006.
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Stearns, Cliff. 1996b. “Let Us Judge President by Past Performance.” 25 January. Congressional Record. Washington: GPO. 28 April 2006.
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314
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316
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Allison Joann Clark was born and raised in Brooksville, Florida. She attended Hernando
High School, where she was a third-generation graduate, as well as valedictorian. Allison
pursued her Bachelor’s degree at the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida where she
initially studied journalism before deciding on political science. After graduating magna cum
laude with a Bachelor’s degree in political science, Allison attended the University of Florida in
Gainesville, Florida for graduate work. Upon completion of her Ph.D. in political science,
Allison hopes to gain employment teaching full time at a four-year university.
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