Support to Agricultural Production and Diversification of the Double-Cropping-Programme in 2000, Main /Wintercrops

FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Field Evaluation of Selected Projects in DPR Korea

Report by Joint FAO–Sida Mission

25 June, 2001

Abbreviations & Acronyms

AREP Agricultural Rehabilitation and Environmental Protection Programme DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) EC European Commission FDRC Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee GDP Gross Domestic Product IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development LIFDC Low Income Food Deficit Country MOA Ministry of Agriculture NGO Non-government Organisation OCHA Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance OSRO PDS Public Distribution System ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea) Sida Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency TCOR Special Relief Operation Service TCP UN-CAP United Nations–Consolidated Appeal WFP World Food Programme

Currency Equivalents US$ 1.00 = Won 2.15

FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

JOINT FAO–SIDA FIELD EVALUATION OF SELECTED PROJECT S IN DPR KOREA

Table of Contents

MAIN TEXT

I. Executive Summary ...... i II. Introduction ...... 1 III. Background and Context ...... 2 A. Country Overview: the “Emergency Situation” in DPRK ...... 2 B. Food Security Situation ...... 3 C. The Agricultural Sector and the Double Cropping Programme...... 3 D. Donor Assistance in the Agricultural Sector ...... 4 IV. Assessment of Project Objectives and Design ...... 6 V. Assessment of Implementation, Efficiency and Management ...... 12 VI. Assessment of Results and Effectiveness ...... 15 VII. Recommendations ...... 20 VIII. Lessons Learned ...... 20

ANNEXES

1 Terms of Reference 2 List Of Places Visited and Key Persons Met by the Mission 3 List Of Consulted Documents 4 Map of DPR Korea 5 FAO Programme in DPR Korea 6 FAO Assistance to Double Cropping

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I. Executive Summary

Introduction 701. Support by Sida to projects implemented through FAO Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR) has increased significantly in recent years and the agency has decided that some of these projects be reviewed with a view to future quality improvement. The two organisations have jointly selected a limited number of projects to be subject to field evaluation, two of which have been implemented in the Democratic People’s Re- public of Korea.

2. The evaluation team undertook its work in DPRK 12–22 June through discussions with officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Representatives of the National Committee for FAO as well as with representatives and staff from other UN agencies, NGOs and donors. It also visited 10 co-operative farms in North Pyongan Province, South Hwanghae Province, Nampo and Pyongyang areas. Its preliminary findings were presented at a meeting with FAO staff and staff of the Ministry of Agriculture on 22 June in Pyongyang.

Background 702. Natural disasters and the decreasing availability of agricultural inputs within DPRK, in particular fertiliser, over the last few years, have substantially affected the agricultural production. The limited potential for increasing domestic food production through expansion of the cultivable land area, coupled with the drive for self-sufficiency, has meant that the Government has few options but to increase the productivity of existing arable lands. In 1995, following major flooding in the main production area, the Gov- ernment adopted a strategy to meet its cereal food requirements in the future that includes as its most important elements increased production through use of varieties with higher yielding potential and more efficient soil and crop management practices, and expansion of the double cropping on existing lands.

Purpose of the Evaluated Projects 703. The two projects OSRO/DRK/001/SWE and OSRO/DRK/101/SWE were aimed at increasing food production through the supply of fertiliser for the growing of spring crops during the 2000 and 2001 cropping seasons, respectively, as part of Government’s programme for increased double cropping.

Preliminary Findings 704. Project Relevance and Design. Both projects are fully in line with the country’s objectives and priorities in the agriculture sector to intensify agriculture production through the promotion of double cropping. Furthermore, they respond to an emergency need for basic agricultural inputs, as necessary conditions for this intensification.

705. The Project Documents were very brief and did not contain description of the approach, analysis of the expected outputs, the targets and the criteria for the selection of farms and farmers. The projects were designed as one-time operations (emergency agri-

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OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MAIN TEXT culture) with very little capacity building, longer-term development perspective or sustainability concerns.

706. Implementation Performance. The implementation performance of both projects has been good with respect to local distribution of the supplied fertiliser to a large number of geographically dispersed co-operative farms. However, the shipments in both 2000 and 2001 arrived too late to be applied at the crucial time of planting, thus reduc- ing the prospects for optimising the return from fertiliser application on the benefiting spring barley crop.

707. The monitoring of project activities during the cropping period and the assessment of results and actual impact have so far been insufficient to integrate past experience into the design of future projects aiming to support double cropping. Furthermore, the high degree of technicalities involved in double cropping deserves more attention.

708. In DPRK, FAO does not have a full-fledged representation. The FAO National Program Officer is alone in conducting the day-to-day management of operations. This management arrangement is acceptable and relatively effective for activities relating to emergency operations. However, a strengthened FAO representation would add to the capacity for management, co-ordination and liaison while also assisting in the development of a well-thought strategic assistance programme for longer-term rehabilitation and development.

709. Outputs and Impact. The 2000 project facilitated an incremental production of 22,000 tonnes of barley and the 2001 project is expected to generate an incremental production of 7,000 tonnes of barley. These volumes are small in relation to the total annual food requirements of approximately 4 million tonnes of grain but they are be- coming available at a time in June when food stocks are approaching their lowest annual level.

710. In view of these figures, the contribution of the two projects to their end-objective, i.e. improving national food security, is limited. However, as a whole, double cropping can make a significant contribution to national food security during the lean period.

711. The beneficiaries of the projects have been: (i) the farmers directly involved in spring crop production through receipt of additional cash income; (ii) the farm households belonging to the co-operative farms where double cropping is practised through additional food grain allotment; and (iii) the part of the population benefiting from the Public Distribution System through increased food supplies available for distribution.

712. With regard to the latter, the distribution principles applied by the Ministry of Pro- curement and Food Administration (biological, type of work and equity criteria) do nei- ther ensure a focus on the most vulnerable populations nor effectuate special additional food supplies to them. In this respect, it cannot be said that the projects have had a particular impact on that category of the population.

713. Sustainability . The future sustainability of similar projects should be viewed in the context of the double cropping programme. The experience in DPRK since 1997 indi- cates that: • Yields are highly dependent on rainfall since winter/spring crops are grown on upland plots or in paddy fields where irrigation water is normally held in reserve for

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the subsequent rice crop. This year, low natural precipitation in March and April may have reduced the average barley yield to below one tonne per hectare; • The spring growing season may be too short to allow full maturing of the present varieties of spring barley before the planting of the main crops take place. Cropping calendar conflicts also restricts autumn planting of alternative double crops with better maturing prospects such as winter wheat; • The production of an additional cereal crop between the main crops poses demands not only for additional fertiliser but also for chemicals to combat an increased risk for pest outbreaks; • In addition, the double cropping practise is straining the available labour and farm machinery capacity to cope simultaneously with the planting, weeding and harvesting operations for the field crop and the nursery production and transplanting of the subsequent main crops rice and maize.

714. Double cropping has been promoted as one option to intensify agricultural production in response to emergency food needs in a food self-sufficiency policy context. It is undeniable that, in the short term, double cropping provides an avenue to fill the food shortage. However, the practice is a complex undertaking that requires careful management of the land and farm resources to be thought of as a longer-term sustainable option for agriculture.

Recommendations Concerning the Programme in DPRK 715. Support to double cropping through the provision of fertiliser should be perceived and remain as FAO emergency agriculture operations in the nearby future as the double cropping programme can make a significant contribution to urgently needed domestic food supplies .

716. In-depth analysis of the potential and sustainability of the double cropping should be carried out. Support to double cropping as a sustainable option would require a more holistic approach, preferably within a farming system context, that goes beyond the mere provision of fertiliser but that may not be effective in responding to short-term food needs. Such an analysis will have to take into account not only the technical aspects but also the environmental, economic and social (including gender) aspects of double cropping that up to now have not been fully recognised.

717. The current support to double cropping could be made more effective by considering a number of measures relating to the timing of input deliveries, crop selection, fertiliser application and other agronomic practices.

718. The technical assistance component of the emergency projects should be strengthened. Extended technical assistance should be provided through: (i) the extension of the stay of the FAO technical expert over the cropping seasons (March to November); and (ii) the provision for technical backstopping missions to the country by the lead technical division (AGL) in the project budgets.

719. Focussing FAO support to two-three selected provinces (instead of 9-10 provinces as hitherto). A more narrow geographical focus would increase project impact, facilitate more effective monitoring and assessment while also facilitating the implementation of the measures proposed above.

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720. Strengthening FAO Representation by the appointment of a FAO Representative in DPRK as a means to improve co-ordination with other agencies in the country and to ensure a more strategic programming approach to FAO assistance in DPRK.

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II. Introduction

201. Support by Sida (Swedish Agency for Development Co-operation) to projects implemented through FAO Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR) has increased significantly in recent years and the agency has decided that some of these projects be reviewed with a view to future quality improvement. The two organisations have jointly selected a limited number of projects to be subject to field evaluation, two 1 of which have been implemented in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

202. The Terms of Reference for the evaluation require that the projects be reviewed with respect to their relevance, design, implementation performance and impact on intended beneficiaries (the complete Terms of Reference are attached as ANNEX 1 ). 2 202. The evaluation team undertook its work in DPRK 12–22 June through discussions with officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Representatives of the Na- tional Committee for FAO as well as with representatives and staff from other UN agencies, NGOs and donors. It also visited 10 co-operative farms in North Pyongan Province, South Hwanghae Province, Nampo and Pyongyang areas. Its preliminary findings were presented at a meeting with FAO staff and staff of the Ministry of Agri- culture on 22 June (the detailed work schedule for the mission is included as ANNEX 2 together with a list of people met). In addition, the evaluation team reviewed work plans and budgets, progress reports and technical reports ( ANNEX 3 ).

203. The evaluation of emergency projects in DPRK presents some special difficulties. Firstly, all collected data are “official information” from the Government since the Mis- sion did not have access to corroborative data from other local sources. From the discussions held with representatives and staff from international agencies, it appears that it is not infrequent that wide gaps exist between information and analyses produced by Government and those generated by international staff working in the country. This may particularly apply to information and analysis about agricultural production and food supplies. With regard to quantitative information, the Mission felt that there are occa- sional confusions between targets and actual figures amongst the data presented by Government and other official representatives. Consequently, quantitative data provided in this report need to be viewed with some caution.

204. Secondly, during the field visits the Mission did not have the opportunity to con- duct individual or group interviews with farmers or members of the farming households. The interlocutors at the co-operative farm level have systematically been the Chairper- son or the Chief Engineer of the co-operative organisation. This has certainly introduced some inevitable bias in the findings of the Mission.

205. The Mission would like to thank the Government officials who accompanied it throughout its stay in the country. The Mission expresses a special thanks to Mr. Ri Song Chol, the FAO National Program Officer, for having well organised the itinerary and the meeting schedule. The Mission would also like to express its special apprecia-

1 OSRO/DRK/001/SWE: “ Support to the Agricultural Production and Diversification of the Double- Cropping Programme in 2000, Spring and Main Crops” ($910,000) and OSRO/DRK/101/SWE: “Support to the Double-Cropping Programme—Spring and Main Crops 2001” ($810,000). 2 Ms. Rachel Sauvinet-Bedouin (FAO/Mission Leader) and Mr. J. Erikson (Sida consultant). 8.3.2011 JOINT FAO–SIDA FIELD EVALUATION OF SELECTED PROJEC TS IN DPR KOREA

OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 6 III. Background and Context MAIN TEXT tion of the assistance provided by Mr R.V. Misra, FAO Consultant, throughout its work in DPRK

III. Background and Context A. Country Overview: the “Emergency Situation” in DPRK

301. Korea was divided into two countries shortly after the end of the Second World War. The division left DPR Korea with the major part of the mineral wealth, but limited arable land. It is estimated that the population of DPR Korea was 22.1 million in mid- 1998 3, with an annual growth rate of about 1.5 percent. Some 61 percent of the people live in the cities. The remainder, about 9.0 million, lives in rural areas, including 2.6 million co-operative farmers. Most other rural people work on state farms, in forestry or fishing or live in small mining towns.

302. DPR Korea is managed according to socialist principles, developed in its Juche ”ideology”. It is characterised by over-riding goals of (i) independence in politics, (ii) self-sufficiency in the economy, and (iii) self-reliance in defence. In line with this ideology, the country is managed through centralised planning and control with directed allocation of resources. There is almost no private sector. Almost all marketing is undertaken by Government and there are no private contractors.

303. Under the principle of self-reliance, DPR Korea rapidly evolved into a modern, essentially industrial developing nation. In the past decades, sustained investment in all sectors of the economy, combined with massive gains in labour participation contributed to a fast rate of industrialisation and intensive and scientific development of agriculture and succeeded in raising living standards for the general population. Per capita GDP exceeded US$ 1000 in 1992.

304. The economy has however suffered severely from the termination of the country’s historical trading relationships with the ex-Soviet Union and with socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Import prices of major industrial and agricultural inputs have risen since 1991. At the same time, industrial production and export earnings have fallen sharply because of disrupted trading ties and the challenge of competing with other countries in establishing export markets. This decline in the capacity to import and the very limited access to external sources of finance have placed the economy under very severe stress, having in particular extremely serious medium-term consequences for the performance of the transport sector, mining, electricity generation, agricultural input supply and other industry.

305. In the past few years, the country experienced unprecedented natural disasters, including hailstorms, floods and droughts which all seriously affected agriculture and the rural sector. This contributed to a sharp fall in production of rice and maize, the major food crops. In addition, reservoirs, river works, flood protection embankments, drainage systems and rural infrastructure in general have been severely damaged or destroyed. The 1995-97 floods have not only greatly affected the overall economic development but also produced unprecedented problems of food insecurity. With low foreign ex-

3 Official projections based on the 1993 census.

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change reserves, the country faces serious obstacles to importing large quantities of food grain commercially to meet a serious food shortage. B. Food Security Situation

306. The national food security situation highly depends on domestic food production and international food aid. The combined effects of natural disasters and underlying problems in the agricultural sector (lack of additional agricultural land, chronic input problems and lack of fuel and electricity to run the irrigation and water delivery systems) make the country regularly face serious and persistent food shortages 4.

307. There are considerable variations in access to food amongst the populations, partly reflecting regional differences in food supply. There has been some improvement amongst such groups as farm families, particularly in south west provinces which are relatively better off. Families of industrial and non agricultural workers in the east (North and South Hamgyong Provinces and Kangwon Province) and particularly those in the north east (North and South Hangyong Provinces) remain the most vulnerable. In general, factors accentuating food supply problems include: dense population concentrations; scarcity of good agricultural land; colder climate and shorter growing season in the east and the northern mountainous areas; concentrations of industrial, mining and office workers, distance from the sea, forests, or few sources of wild food. Overall, since the natural disasters between 1995 and 1997, a number of vital coping strategies have evolved to counter food shortages, including : less dependence on the Public Distribution System ( PDS), food transfer between provinces and households, growing market activity, production and distribution of alternative foods, increased animal rearing, increasing importance of housheold plots and cross border trade 5.

308. Despite overall improvements in the food security situation following better harvests in 1998 and 1999, it is recognised by all that the humanitarian food safety net needs to be continued to maintain basic nutritional standards, particularly amongst children and elderly.

C. The Agricultural Sector & the Double Cropping Programme General 309. The total land area is 12.3 million ha but the area of arable land is only about l.9 million ha. About 0.3 million ha have permanent crops. About 980,000 ha have irrigation. Over 73% of the land area is under forest and woodland. Agriculture in DPR Ko- rea is typified by its limited resource base and short growing season.

310. Although the total rainfall (about 1,000 mm per year) is adequate, its distribution and unreliability make irrigation a necessity for rice cultivation. The climate places constraints on crop production. The average temperature is below freezing point for three or more months of the year, resulting in a short growing season, which necessitates careful timing of critical operations, such as rice transplanting. Uncertain rainfall in spring can make rainfed crop establishment difficult. Heavy rainfall in July and August can cause

4 Regular joint FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions take place twice a year in DPRK, the first one at the end of the double cropping season and beginning of main cropping season (June) and the second one at the time of harvest of the main crops (October). 5 FAO GIEWS/WFP Special Report, July 2000. 8.3.2011 JOINT FAO–SIDA FIELD EVALUATION OF SELECTED PROJEC TS IN DPR KOREA

OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 8 III. Background and Context MAIN TEXT damage to crops and is a potential erosion hazard. Crop and livestock production is mainly undertaken on co-operative farms and state farms. Private ownership is limited to small household plots, usually less than 100m 2 and small numbers of mainly scav- enging livestock such as chickens, goat, pigs, rabbits and geese.

311. DPR Korea’s most fertile land is cropped every year with rice and maize. Between 1990 and 1999, an average of 594 000 ha of rice and 622 000 ha of maize were harvested. Input supplies have been directed to the production of these food grains. Other crops harvested include soyabeans (300,000 ha in 1999) vegetables (297,000 ha), wheat (63,000 ha), potatoes (170,000 ha) and fruit (159,000 ha). Average yields have declined in recent years, for example from 4.9 t/ha of paddy in 1991 to 3.6 t/ha in 1998 and from 3.5 t/ha of maize in 1990 to 2.8 t/ha in l998. In 1999, the average paddy yield was 4.0 t/ha while maize yielded 2.5 t/ha on average, due mainly to early cutting of the crop at the green stage to supplement animal feed.

312. Statistically, DPR Korea’s agriculture is highly mechanised. There are estimated to be about 79 000 tractors (mostly Chollima, 28 HP, locally made), or about 5 tractors per 100 ha. Co-operatives operate a wide range of mechanised equipment, including transplanters, threshers, trucks and others, in addition to ample pumping equipment. However, most equipment is in a poor state of repair and lacks fuel and power supply. Animal traction has become more important in recent years. Draft animals are however poorly fed and little suitable for operations that require tight scheduling. Co-operative farms need to manage their equipment more rationally, reserving mechanised and animal power to the operations for which they are best suited.

The Double Cropping Programme 313. Double cropping—i.e. using residual moisture for planting an additional crop between harvesting of main crops (paddy rice in valley bottoms and maize in upland plots) in October and their planting in June—is not a new phenomenon in DPRK. Tradition- ally, tubers such as turnips and cabbage have been planted in October for harvesting before the severe winter season to be consumed as important food supplements. This practice is ongoing in parallel to the recently introduced double cropping programme under which starch staple foods are planted just before the frost in November (winter wheat) or in late February–early March (spring barley and potato 6) to take advantage of residual moisture as well as the spring precipitation.

314. The area used for the spring crop is about 20 percent of the total area for annual field crops, capable of producing about 10% of the total starch food requirements. Part of the spring crop is planted in the paddies where it has to be harvested at least a week before the scheduled transplanting of the rice while the balance, including the potato, is planted in the upland fields where it is followed by maize and summer potato.

315. The advantage of the current double cropping programme is that it generates additional staple food in June when staple food stocks start reaching critical levels as the

6 Since the maturity period for six-row barley is about 10 days shorter than for wheat, it is the preferred cereal crop for spring planting by the producing co-operatives on purely technical grounds while wheat may be the preferred crop for consumption (harder than barley which is makes it more suitable as flour for making bread and noodles than barley). Potato has in the last few years become an increasingly important staple food crop in particularly the northern and eastern parts of the country.

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consumers have to wait 3-4 months before the main summer crops (rice and maize) are harvested.

316. The disadvantages of double cropping, as they are beginning to emerge, include: increased risks for incidence of cereal hosted pests; deterioration of soil properties due to insufficient application of fertiliser and farm yard manure; competition for labour between the requirements of the spring crop and the paddy and maize nursery and transplanting operations; and increased stress an already strained farm machinery capacity.

C. Donor Assistance in the Agricultural Sector

317. Overview

318. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, DPRK received assistance mainly from UN agencies directly and from bi-lateral donors through the UN system using its neutral stance. Since the floods and other recent natural calamities, most of the assistance has been for emergency relief and humanitarian purposes under the UN-CAP framework. The current FAO programme in DPRK reflects that trend (see ANNEX 5 ).

319. Emergency operations in the agriculture sector has consisted essentially in the provision of agricultural inputs, first with the provision of seeds until 2000 when DPRK declared itself self-sufficient in seeds. The bulk of the emergency assistance consists in the provision of fertilizer. The EC has been a major direct donor of fertilizer (average of 45,000 tones a year). Support to the double cropping programme has been largely chan- neled through FAO since 1997. Besides UNDP and FAO TCP funding, a variety of bi- lateral donors have supported the programme, Sweden being the most important (see Table 1 in ANNEX 6 ). Total support to the programme over the past five years amounts to almost US$ 14 million, 30 percent of which has come from the Swedish Government. Pledges have been made through the UN-CAP although the response of the donors generally been hesitant or slow.

320. Non-emergency programmes in agriculture are still of limited scope. In 1998, UNDP sponsored FAO and other agencies to prepare the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Environmental Protection Program (AREP) that was aimed to replace food aid by domestic food production in a phased, environmentally sustainable fashion. AREP is now used as the framework for assistance in the agriculture sector. The FAO’s Special Programme for Food Security is one of the rare UN initiative that is being implemented in agriculture and that is not funded under the framework of the UN-CAP. The main activities promote diversification into livestock and intensification of production through irrigation and protected vegetable production. The pilot phase funded by the Republic of Korea is now expanded thanks to the Italian Government. OPEC has recently appraised the second phase of the Pyongnam Irrigation Project. IFAD is the only multilateral fi- nancing institution operating in DPRK and has financed a sericulture project, a livestock project and a one-year fertilizer programme for key provinces. Since last year, the EC has changed its aid strategy from direct provision of food aid to rehabilitation of the agriculture sector through support in four main areas: soil improvement, rehabilitation of machinery workshops, rehabilitation of irrigation systems and support to small hydrau- lic plants.

321. The Government reiterated during the second donors meeting in June 2000 in Ge- neva that UN assistance as well as NGO support should be directed primarily to the agriculture sector in support to intensification. Donors have been reluctant to engage in

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OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 10 III. Background and Context MAIN TEXT long-term finance, arguing the need for greater policy dialogue, more transparency and more partnerships as conditionalities for supporting more developmental activities. The recently approved UNDP aid coordination project, in assisting the Government in improving the quality of interactions with the international community, represents a first step in this direction.

Swedish Support 322. Sida has recently (January 2001) prepared a position paper that analyses the situation in the the major sectors in DPRK, including food and health issues, reviews the operations and impact of foreign assistance and presents guidelines for future Swedish support to DPRK. The assistance offered by Sweden 1995-2000 amounted to $14 million, of which $2.5 million were channelled through the FAO emergency operations. Other support to the agricultural sector includes funding for farming operations and development to two co-operative farms through an NGO supported project and for short term training of Government staff in seed development and sustainable farming in Swe- den.

323. Despite past and current problems relating to lack of information about implemented activities and their impact, difficulties in conducting random monitoring visits and a general lack of transparency, Swedish support will also in the future be available for agricultural projects that aim to improve the food security situation in the country. It is envisaged that more support should be directed to capacity building in order to address some of the underlying causes of the chronic food shortages. Monitoring efficiency should be improved through strengthened co-ordination with other agencies in the agricultural sector.

Assessment of Project Objectives & Design

401. Rationale and Justification. Natural disasters and the decreasing availability of agricultural inputs within DPRK, in particular fertiliser, over the last few years, have reduced substantially the agricultural productivity. The limited potential for expanding domestic food production through expansion of the cultivable land area coupled with the drive for self- sufficiency has prompted the Government to increase the productivity of existing arable lands. In 1995, following the major flood, the Government adopted the following strategy to meet its cereal food requirement in the future: (i) increasing production by using varieties with higher yielding potentials and more efficient soil and crop management practices; and (ii) the expansion of the double cropping programme on existing lands. The policy for increasing productivity of existing lands was later reflected in the Government’s Agricultural Rehabilitation and Environmental Protection Programme, which amongst other factors, emphasises increased cereal production to alleviate food shortage in the lean period (June–August). The strategy that has been formulated in order to achieve this objective, is the revitalisation of the paddy and maize yields and achieving higher cropping intensity through use of double cropping. The two projects OSRO/001 and OSRO/101 aimed at increasing food production through the supply of fertiliser for the spring planting seasons of 2000 and 2001, respectively. In this respect, both projects were fully in line with the country’s objectives and priorities in the agriculture sector.

402. Design. The Project Documents are identical except for the budgets of projected ex- penditure. They consist of a four-page write-up including background, objective, workplan and budget. The very brief format of the document does not allow for much understanding of

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the approach, the expected outputs, the targets or the selection of farms and farmers. Projects are designed as one-time operations (emergency agriculture) with very little, if any capacity building, longer-term development perspective or sustainability concerns 7.

403. The FAO contribution as reflected in the budget consists simply of a one-time provision of fertilizers with a one-and-a-half month of international consultancy for assisting the Gov- ernment in preparing a workplan, monitoring the operations, providing advice for improving methods of double crop and diversification programmes, and assessing impact of the projects. The above activities have to be carried out by the consultant in a very short period of time. In particular, the time allocation as per Project Document does not allow close monitoring of fertilizer distribution and use over the full cropping season.

404. Furthermore, as mentioned in the overview, the introduction of double cropping, in order to be efficient, requires a careful and close management of the use of fertilizer over the spring and main cropping seasons, especially in view of the general shortage of fertilizer. Ad- vice on local fertilizer application rates and on cropping practices that would aim at improving fertilizer use efficiency and crop yield is also in great need.

405. There are a number of limits and constraints attached to the double cropping programme (including labour shortages and increased demand on machinery) that are ignored in the con- cept and design of the projects.

406. Lastly, FAO has been involved in support to the double cropping programme since 1997. The experience so far (problems, constraints and achievements) are not integrated into the project design.

7 Preferably, the brief write-ups should be supported by a Government background document on double-cropping that describes/outlines: the major actors in the realm of double cropping; criteria for selection of co-operative farms as recipients of external support; overall production targets; analysis of co-operative farm potential and constraints for achieving the targets (including soil properties, crop nutrient requirements, labour and machinery requirements, water requirements and supplementary inputs such as chemicals); inter-dependence between the spring crop and the subsequent main crop; production risks, including increased disease propensity; and utilisation of the generated outputs (wheat, barley and potato) in the national diet.

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V. Assessment of Implementation, Efficiency and Management A. Implementation of Project Activities

501. The Project Documents did not include time tables for the implementation of project activities but detailed plans for the delivery of fertiliser to the recipient farms were later prepared by MOA in conjunction with the FAO consultant. The assessment below relies to a large extent on progress reports prepared by the FAO consultant 8, including a comprehensive reference note compiled in June 2001 just prior to the arrival of the evaluation mission

Organisational Responsibilities 502. The Crop Production Department in MOA has been responsible for the implementation of the two projects (as well as other input supply projects supported by TCOR), including shipment of goods from the point of entry into the country, receipt at the consignment destination and clearing formalities. Internal distribution to the recipient co- operative farms in the designated provinces is frequently undertaken on farm-owned lorries and trailers. Local temporary storage is the responsibility of the county authorities in conjunction with the recipient farms. The recipient farms are responsible for application of the fertiliser in accordance with official recommendations (these recommendations are crop specific but pan-national without modifications to reflect local soil properties. Monitoring of the delivery and utilisation of the fertiliser has been undertaken by an FAO appointed international consultant, who also, in conjunction with MOA and the FAO National Programme Officer, assisted in preparing the distribution plan for the fertiliser.

Implementation Preparation Activities 503. Donor Agencies. Advance appeals were prepared and presented to donors in November each year. The FAO–Sida agreement on OSRO/DRK/001SWE was received on 17 January 2000 and the project was approved by Sida and FAO on 21 January. On 2 February, TCOR requested the Purchasing Unit to issue tender for fertiliser for arrival in DPRK (Nampo Port) on 29 February. The project (cash) funds were received from Sida on 11 February and on 15 February the order was placed with the lowest bidder. The delivery was subsequently delayed by one week at the request of the supplier (new delivery date Nampo Port 7 March) and approved by TCOR. The supplier subsequently asked for several delivery rescheduling (22 March, 27/28 March and 29 March) and the consignment finally reached Nampo Port on 3 April.

504. The FAO–Sida agreement on OSRO/DRK/101SWE was received on 22 February 2001 and the project was approved by Sida and FAO on 28 February. On 6 March, TCOR requested the Purchasing Unit to issue tender for fertiliser for arrival in DPRK (Nampo Port) on 24 March. The project (cash) funds were received from Sida on 14

8 R.V. Misra.

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March and on 15 March the order was placed with the lowest bidder. On 23 March, the bidder informed FAO that is was no longer able to supply the fertiliser. On 29 March, FAO cancelled the order and on 2 April a new order is placed with another supplier (at a price about 10% higher than the original price quoted by the successful bidder) for arrival of the fertiliser at Nampo Port by 14 April. The consignment reached Nampo Port on 17 April.

505. DPRK. The recipient co-operative farms were selected by the Ministry of Agri- culture according to internal criteria in 9 and 10 provinces, respectively. The input distribution plan was prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture in conjunction with FAO. Planting material—spring seed barley—was generally retained from the barley harvested the previous year while farm yard manure and other organic matter produced on the farm was collected to be applied at the time of sowing.

Input Distribution and Application 506. OSRO/DRK/001/SWE. A total consignment of 4,300 tonnes (2,300 tonnes of urea (43% nitrogen content) and 2,000 tonnes of 15-15-15) from China was off-loaded at Nampo Port (60km west of Pyongyang) on 3 April 2000. The fertiliser were scheduled to be distributed to about 340 co-operative farms in nine provinces according to the following plan :

Table : Fertilizer Distribution Plan for OSRO/DRK/001/SWE

Province/Area Number of Spring Bar- Fertilizer Allocation (Tonnes) Counties/ ley Area Urea NPK Total Co-op. Covered (15-15- Farms 9 (ha) 15) Pyongyang 5 (7) 311 47 41 88 South Pyongan 13 (80) 3,594 533 472 1,004 North Pyongan 7 (36) 1,600 240 213 453 South Hwanghae 14 (82) 3,651 548 481 1029 North Hwanghae 14 (66) 2,937 441 391 831 Kangwon 8 (22) 971 146 129 275 South Hamgyong 2 (15) 670 100 89 190 Kaesong 3 (11) 477 72 63 135 Nampo 6 (22) 981 147 130 278 Total 72 (341) 15,147 2,272 2,009 4,282

507. Monitoring of fertiliser delivery at about 30 co-operative farms has verified that the actual distribution of fertiliser closely resembles the distribution plan above.

508. The fertiliser did not arrive in time for the basal application (of NPK) which was partially compensated for through application of manure and compost. Instead, it was applied at the stage of tillering (NPK and urea) and at the stage of ear formation (60 kg of urea) at a combined rate of 280 kg per hectare.

509. OSRO/DRK/101/SWE. A consignment of 5,200 tonnes of urea from China (xx% nitrogen content) was off-loaded at Nampo Port between 17-22 April. The Project Document reflected support to spring production of wheat, barley and potato through

9 Figures in parentheses indicate number of co-operative farms .

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OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 14 V. Assessment of Implementation Performance MAIN TEXT provision of urea and NPK (17-17-17) for application as basal dressing and as top dressing at relevant stages of crop growth. However, the final specification included only urea (according to Government of DPRK, NPK would be supplied from other sources). The fertiliser arrived too late to be applied as basal application and was instead applied as top dressing on spring barley at the time of panicle initiation.

510. Due to the late arrival, the fertiliser was scheduled to be distributed to about 780 co-operative farms (as compared to about 340 in 2000) to be applied at a rate of 50 kg per hectare 10 :

Table : Fertilizer Distribution Plan for OSRO/DRK/101/SWE

Province Number of Crop Area Urea Allocation (Tonnes) Counties/ Covered (ha) Co-op. Spring Summer Spring Summer Total Farms 11 Barley Rice and Barley Rice and Maize Maize Pyongyang 9 (57) 2,700 2,670 135 801 936 South Pyongan 14 (126) 6,180 6,173 309 1,852 2160 North Pyongan 9 (79) 3,700 2,587 185 776 961 Jagang 3 (30) 880 - 44 - 44 South Hwanghae 18 (213) 10,880 - 544 - 544 North Hwanghae 15 (133) 5,880 - 294 - 294 Kangwon 7 (47) 1,800 - 90 - 90 South Ham- 5 (44) 1,750 - 87 - 87 gyong Kaesong 4 (16) 700 - 35 - 35 Nampo 6 (31) 1,650 - 82 - 82 Total 90 (776) 36,120 11,430 1,806 3,429 5,235

511. The balance of the fertiliser not used on spring barley—approximately 3,400 tonnes—has allegedly been retained on the recipient co-operative farms for use on the rice currently being transplanted and on the maize in the upland parts of the farm.

Project Management 512. There is no FAO representation in DPRK. The FAO Representative in Beijing represents FAO for DPRK. A Programme Officer (Chinese national) deals with operational and administrative aspects of the programme. In DPRK, the programme is managed on a day-to-day basis by a National Programme Officer (NPO). The FAO office is located in the UNDP premises.

10 It is not clear to what extent Government was able to compensate for the late distrbution of the ferrtilser through application of fertiliser from other sources or to what extent the co- operative farms were able to apply increased quantities of manure and compost. However, the reduced fertiliser application rate turned out to be a blessing in disguise since the lower than an- ticipated rainfall in March and April meant that nutrients, particularly nitrogen, that would not have been absorbed by the cereal plant during its growth due lack of moisture would have been partly wasted in the soil and thus become of less value for the main summer crop. 11 Figures in parentheses indicate number of co-operative farms.

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513. The NPO has direct contact with FAO Rome and Beijing and liaises formally with the Government through the National Committee for FAO 12 . He also works closely with staff of the Crop Production Department (MOA) who are responsible for the implementation of emergency provision of agricultural inputs. The frequent and good contacts of the NPO with the Government has certainly facilitated a smooth joint implementation of the projects.

514. The coordination with other agencies is difficult for the NPO as he is not perceived by those agencies as the de-facto representative of FAO. As an example, the NPO is not allowed to participate to the weekly inter-agency meeting where activities and latest sector information available are discussed among the various agencies. FAO International Consultants do not either participate in those meetings.

515. The FAO Representative has undertaken several missions in DPRK (three in one year). However, intermittent missions are not sufficient to ensure a true dialogue between FAO and the Government on issues that go beyond the day-to-day management of the current programme: i.e., issues of strategy, FAO longer-term commitments and partnerships. This is translated, among other things, by ad-hoc preparations of the FAO programme. As an example, the contribution in the UN-CAP is so far done by project consultants or FAO staff that happen to be on mission in the country.

516. While the current management arrangement is acceptable and relatively effective for day-to-day activities relating to emergency operations, it is not conducive to the development of a well-thought strategic assistance programme for longer-term rehabilitation and development.

Technical Assistance in Support of the Emergency Provision of Fertilizer 517. Over the two years (2000 and 2001), technical assistance has been and is provided through various consultancies funded through several projects. OSRO/001 and OSRO/101 provide each for a month and an-half consultancy. In the year 2000, a total of 7 person-months has been provided over the crucial cropping periods March to De- cember. So far, in 2001, three month and an half will have been provided at the end of July.

518. Overall, the total amount of technical assistance provided in support of emergency provision of fertilizer and the double cropping programme is substantial thanks to a pool of funding. The funding available through different projects has also permitted to fulfill tasks required by the consultant all along the cropping season (inspection of procurement, monitoring to impact assessment) that would not have been possible on the basis of just a month and half consultancy.

519. However, in the year 2000, technical assistance was provided by three different consultants, preventing a continuity, which is very much required in the DPRK difficult environment. Indeed, the learning process on how to operate in the country and the establishment of trustful relationships with counterparts are time-consuming. The fact that there is no FAO representation or permanent international presence in the country to fa-

12 The National Committee is chaired by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and includes three vice chairmen representing the Ministry of Agriculture, Minsitry of Fisheries and Ministry of Forestry, respectively. The Secretariat is ensured by an officer from the Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs.

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OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 16 V. Assessment of Implementation Performance MAIN TEXT cilitate relationship with the counterparts also adds to the difficulties of the consultants to adjust to the country specific situation in a short period of time. Change in consultant is detrimental to the creation of a sound working partnership between FAO and the Government.

520. The quality of the technical assistance has been mixed. First, consultants have very little time left for technical advice. Their main tasks relate to operational aspects of the distribution of fertilizers and monitoring functions. Furthermore, consultants have very little involvement in the very top-down decision-making process regarding the selection of farms and agronomic recommendations. Too limited information is available on each farm to help in their selection. Recommendations relating to fertilizer application are determined by the Academy of Agriculture Science and are uniform for all farms independently of the agro-ecological zones where they are located. Despite the obvious need for technical guidance (confirmed by the present consultant), the consultants do not have the information in hands relating to, among other things, soil fertility.

521. Monitoring activities by the consultant can only be limited in view of the wide geographical coverage of each project and the number of farms to be targeted. The present consultant visited only 35 farms out of the 776 farms planned to be provided with fertilizer only under OSRO/101. Limits to monitoring (and control) are also linked to the impossibility for the consultant to undertake “random” visits to farms.

Backstopping from FAO 522. Operational backstopping has been adequately provided by TCOR responsible officer. Since the emphasis of the support to the double cropping programme has been put on the provision of fertilizers (previously on seeds), the technical backstopping responsibility has shifted to AGLL Headquarters. A Senior Fertilizer Specialist provides support from Headquarters (no field mission), including briefing and debriefing of consultants, and review of reports. However, as there is no budget allocation for such a service, support is provided on a ad-hoc basis.

Contribution from The Government 523. Overall, the Government has met its obligations as per both project documents. The shipment of goods within the country has been effective in the case of both projects. According to the Government, distribution to the farms is carried out in approximately two weeks, which is a short period of time taking into account the dispersed lo- cations of benefiting farms. Internal logistics have thus been handled in an appropriate and efficient way.

VI. Assessment of Results and Effectiveness A. Effects and Impact Incremental Grain Production Generated from the Projects 601. The total production of spring barley generated on land benefiting from fertiliser supplied through the two projects amounted to 38,000 tonnes in 2000 and is expected to

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be 21,000 tonnes in 2001, according to figures provided by the Ministry of Agricul- ture 13 . These are small volumes compared with the total national grain production that may amount to 4-5 million tonnes but also compared to the total winter/spring crops in 1999/2000 and 2000/01 that have been assessed/projected at 370,000 tonnes and 170,000 tonnes, respectively (including potato production converted into cereal equivalents at a ratio of 4:1). The great difference in output quantity between 2000 and 2001— largely explained by Government as attributable to exceptionally low rainfall in March and April 2001—serves a reminder of one of the basic weaknesses of the double cropping programme, i.e. the low proportion of winter/spring crops grown on land irrigable at crucial stages in crop growth.

602. The incremental production generated by the supplied fertiliser is more difficult to assess. First, it is not clear what the average yield per hectare would be for the spring crop and the subsequent main crop had the FAO supplied fertiliser not been applied. The absence of fertiliser application may have resulted in a significantly lower crop production in a good spring season with ample rainfall but may have only been of mar- ginal significance in a dry season when the applied fertiliser may not have been possible for the plants to absorb. Second, if the project-financed fertiliser had not been available, Government may have been able to identify alternative supplies at a reasonable cost. In fact, the Mission was told that basal and tillering applications that were missed due to late arrival of the project fertiliser have been carried out with other fertiliser supplies although at lower rate.

603. The data supplied by MOA indicate an incremental production of 22,000 tonnes in 2000 and an expected incremental production of 7,000 tonnes 14 in 2001. There is no indication of the quality of produced winter/spring crops since grains are not graded in DPRK: in the case of barley, little is known about the suitability of the 2000 and 2001 crops for the reported uses as ingredient in noodles (farm household made after local milling or industrially processed), bread (together with wheat) or cooked as grain.

Impact on Food Security 604. National Food Security. The impact of the projects on national food security can be measured by the ratio of double cropped cereal production resulting from the

13 The monitoring responsibilities of the consultant appointed by FAO are restricted to the delivery of the fertiliser and do not include the produce grown on land benefiting from the application of FAO financed fertiliser. 14 Since about 3,400 tonnes of the fertiliser were unused at the end of the spring growing season, additional benefits from this fertiliser would be realised as it is being applied on the main crop 2001. The expected incremental yield from this quantity has been projected at 23,000 tonnes (paddy and maize) by the Ministry of Agriculture.

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OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 18 VI Assessment of Results & Effectiveness MAIN TEXT projects to the total annual demand for cereal for food use 15 which is estimated at 3.8 million tonnes (minimum requirements 16 ).

605. OSRO/001, with an estimated total production output of 38,000 tonnes, contributed to 1 percent of total cereal requirements in 2000. For OSRO/101 , with an expected production output of 21,000 tonnes, the contribution is estimated to be 0.6 percent . These percentages are almost negligible. However, the objective of the double cropping is to improve food security at a crucial period of the year corresponding to the lean period between the planting and harvesting of the two main crops, paddy and maize. On average, the latter spreads over four months from June to early October. It is therefore of interest to also compare the production output under the projects to the equivalent of four-month food requirements. The contribution to food security during the lean period would be then 3 percent under OSRO/001 and 2 percent under OSRO/101.

606. In order to place the projects in a broader context, it is also useful to examine the contribution of double cropping to national food security. For the year 2000 17 , total double cropping production contributed to 10 percent of total food requirements and to nearly 30 percent of food requirements during the lean period. For the year 2001, total double cropping production is expected to contribute to 4 percent of total food requirements and to 13 percent of food requirements during the lean period. As a whole, double cropping can thus make a significant contribution to food security during the lean period.

607. Impact on Beneficiaries and the Most Food-insecure. Beneficiaries of the projects are: (i) the farmers directly involved in winter/spring crop production; (ii) the farm households belonging to the cooperative farms where double cropping is practiced; and (iii) the part of the population benefiting from the Public Distribution System (PDS, see below).

608. At the Co-operative Farm Level . From the farms visited, it appears that the output from the winter/spring cropping is partly retained at the cooperative farms for seed and as grain rations that are distributed to all farm households belonging to the co- operative farm. The rest of the output is sold to the PDS. Income from the sale of winter and spring crops is used to remunerate in cash farmers who have participated in the double cropping through the normal workpoint system. From the small sample of farms visited by the mission, it would be hazardous to quantify gains (in kind and in cash) from double cropping. In two cases, the mission was told that all members from the farm got an additional 40-50 kg of cereal grains thanks to the double cropping pro-

15 According to the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Assessment Mission (November 2000), the total cereal demand is 4.8 million tonnes and includes 3.8 million tonnes for food use and 0.9 for feed and other uses. Food use is calculated on the basis of a consumption requirement of 100kg/caput of rice and 67kg/caput of maize per annum, which provides about 1600 Kcal or 75 percent of the daily calorie requirement of 2130 kcal/day/person. The Mission assumes that all outputs for the double cropping are for food use. 16 As no official data have been released for 2001, the same food requirement estimate is considered, therefore neglecting population increase. 17 The 1999/2000 cropping year including winter wheat, spring barley and potato estimated in cereal equivalents.

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gramme in year 2000. This is to be related to an annual food grain allocation at the end of the harvest of 260 kg per member 18 .

609. Beneficiaries of the PDS. The Public Distribution System is the central mecha- nism through which all basic foods should be provided to the entire population in DPRK. Consumer prices are heavily subsidized. Each county and city district has a central warehouse that delivers food to public distribution centres at community level. However, cooperative and state farm workers and their families do not receive rations through the PDS.

610. According to WFP, with sufficient food supplies available, the PDS rationing system used to be highly effective and sophisticated with a multi-tiered system of food allocation related to demands of work. However, because of crop shortfalls, rations have been drastically reduced with low allocations to everyone regardless of the type of work performed. The ration has varied from 12 kg to 1.5 kg/person/month depending on food available for distribution through the PDS 19 .

611. Additional food supply generated by double cropping that is not retained on the farm becomes part of the centralized system and it can be assumed that it contributes to increased rations. However, there is no particular targeting of the most food-insecure segments of the population besides the WFP food aid provided through the PDS that is directed at children, elderly, pregnant and nursing women. . In this respect, it is not possible to say that the most food-insecure segments of the population have particularly benefited from double cropping.

Environmental Impact 612. Adverse environmental effects of the projects include: (a) risk for increased incidence of pests from repeated double cropping of cereals 20 (the risk for soil borne dis- eases is higher at repeated potato production than for wheat/barley–paddy/maize re- gimes); and (b) increased risk for leaking of excess fertiliser nutrients 21 into streams and rivers with adverse effects on aquatic fauna and flora. Positive effects of crop intensification may include: (c) reduced risk of crop production expanding onto erodable slopes that are unsuitable for crop cultivation due to the slope gradient or the soil texture; and (d) reduced incidence of deforestation 22 as a prelude to preparation of land for recurrent crop cultivation.

18 The amount of 260 kg was provided to the Mission by the Government. The WFP estimate of this year’s allotement is only 110-150 kg. 19 WFP Briefing Notes 20 Recurrent planting of maize in the upland parts of the co-operative farmland without rotation with legume or oil crops and with only limited intercropping with legumes serves to enhance this inherent danger; however, it is encouraging to notice that maize in many parts of the country is more frequently intercropped than produced in single stands. 21 In the absence of officially accessible soil data, it is difficult to determine to what extent current nationally uniform application recommendations match the nutirent contents of the soils and the nutirent requirements of the crops to be planted. 22 While some of the recent deforestation may by motivated be a desire to expand the arable area by co-operative farms, the immediate motive is most commonly dictated by a need to extract fuel wood for heating of homes or basic institutions in the rural areas.

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Gender Aspects 613. In DPRK, it is believed that the participation of women to the workforce is the highest in the world (89 percent) 23 . However, the two projects did not reflect a gender focus. From discussions at the co-operative farms, the mission understands that there is no particular gender division of labour for agricultural activities although the level of mechanisation is generally low. Land preparation by oxen and broadcasting of fertilizer is generally performed by men but women may be seen carrying the heavy bundles of rice seedlings from the nurseries to the paddy fields. Production of barley involves mainly manual practices: planting is done by hand as well as weeding in the absence of herbicides for weed control and harvesting is done by women, men and children using long-handled sickles. Simultaneously, household work remains essentially the task of women. Labour requirements for double cropping may thus put additional stress on women that should be taken into consideration in the design of future projects, for in- stance by encouraging initiatives to improve the efficiency of the existing farm machinery fleet.

B. Cost-Effectiveness Considerations

614. Incurred Procurement and Transport Costs. Fertilizer supplied under the two projects have been procured under international bidding arrangements which ensure that the material is purchased from the least expensive source (in both years, the cheapest supplier has been found in neighbouring China). Upon arrival, the fertilizer have been distributed in an efficient manner directly to the recipient co-operative farms on farm- owned vehicles or locally rented lorries with little transitory storing. Because of the rapid distribution, losses due to quality deterioration have been negligible.

615. Economic Return from the Applied Fertilizer. It is difficult to assess the cost- effectiveness from the fertilizer applied in 2000 and 2001 since no quantitative data has been provided by Government on complementary inputs such as fertilizer from other sources, farm yard manure or pesticides used or on labour and machinery inputs 24 . A rough estimate of the cost-effectiveness of the projects is provided by the ratio of the value of incremental cereal (or equivalent) production 25 resulting from the project in relation to the project cost. For OSRO/001, this ratio is 6 while for OSRO/101 it is only 226 . The lower ratio in 2001 is largely explained by lack of rains in March and April that could not be compensated for by supplementary irrigation or watering. In both years, the cost-effectiveness has been affected by late arrival of the fertilizer which precluded application as basal dressing at the time when the plant’s ability to absorb nutrients is most developed. Cost-effectiveness has also been hampered by the absence of analyses of the soil in the plots where the spring barley was planted: it can be assumed that the

23 WFP Briefing Notes 24 Even if quantitaive information would become available, an economic assessment is compli- cated by the lack of market values for farm labour and machinery services. 25 The value of the output is calculated on the basis of an international price of wheat of US$ 250 (Government figure). 26 The incremental value relates only to spring barley and winter wheat production. The remain- ing fertiliser may be applied to paddy and maize which would increase substantially the ratio.

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pan-national recommendations issued by the Ministry of Agriculture in many cases do not coincide with the optimum applications rates.

616. Alternative Uses of Fertilizer. As mentioned above, the return from fertilizer on winter/spring crops is significantly affected by the available soil moisture. Thus, it can be assumed that application of fertilizer on the main crops that are grown during the months of highest precipitation would yield a higher return than on winter/spring crops although such a practice would not meet the objective of improving food security during the lean period unless grain were set aside as security stocks until June-July the following year.

617. Effects of Fertilizer in Combination with Complementary Inputs. While the double cropping practice clearly demand high fertilizer application rates, its cost- effectiveness may in several cases be enhanced if it were complemented by other inputs that would match the level of husbandry standards set by the use of fertilizer. In particular, the higher risk for pest incidence caused by the double cropping practice may require use of pesticides for effective suppression. Similarly, cereal seeds that are retained from the last year’s food grain harvest require recurrent replenishment by quality seed wheat or barley to maintain the desired germination rate and purity. A balanced package of inputs designed to match the requirements of co-operative farms is likely to generate a higher economic return than if the same amount of funds is spent on a single input like nitrogenous fertilizer.

C. Sustainability

618. Emergency input support for winter/spring crop production has been provided by FAO and other donors since 1997. After the initial rationale to mitigate against the effects of flooding of agricultural lands, new requests have been forthcoming annually from Government justified on the basis of additional natural disasters, including the drought that was experienced earlier this year 27 . Support to the double cropping has been primarily driven by the Government’s unswerving policy of food self-sufficiency, leaving very limited options for meeting the food requirements and filling up the food gap. However, it is difficult to deflect the thought that the agricultural sector in DPRK only under the most favourable conditions would be able to sustain its population with the required carbo-hydrate staple foods (leave alone protein and fat requirements) due to the limited land available for agricultural production (about 0.1 ha per caput). In fact, recurrent measures to maintain carbo-hydrate staple food production at maximum levels are likely to increase the pressure against the agricultural, technical, economic and social constraints that have already been accumulating in over the last three to four years. The limited attention paid to supplementary measures to achieve a more balanced agricultural sector may make a future ineluctable re-transformation take longer than necessary to accomplish.

619. Agronomic . There are agronomic risks associated with double cropping under the conditions in DPRK: (a) increased disease and pest incidence (that is difficult to combat in the absence of effective organic or synthetic sprays or dusts); (b) depleted or-

27 Government Statement. In the absence of any long-time series on weather conditions, the Mission has some doubts about the validity of such a statement.

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OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 22 VI Assessment of Results & Effectiveness MAIN TEXT ganic matter content since the offtake at two harvestings may exceed the compost replenishments effected prior to the crop plantings; (c) depleted nutrient content due to repeated under-application of fertiliser in fields that are particularly deficient in nutrients (in the absence of reliable analyses of soil nutrient and organic matter contents); and (d) deteriorating quality of the seed in the absence of replenishments by approved or certified seed.

620. Co-operative Farming Capacity. In addition to the agronomic aspects referred to above, the “insertion” of a winter or spring food crop in the annual crop schedule poses particular constraints on the labour and machinery/transport capacity available at the co-operative farms.

621. In the case of winter wheat, which from a risk management point of view may be the preferred double crop, the October/November manual sowing coincides with the manual paddy harvesting and the subsequent transportation of the padi crop to village stores. Lack of labour capacity at this time thus limits the ability of the co-operative farms to plant winter wheat.

622. At the time of spring planting of barley (ideally in late February/early March) or potato (slightly later when soil temperatures have reached the required level for sprout growth), most farm management attention is devoted to the padi nurseries that have to be prepared and managed according to a pre-determined, tight schedule. At the time of harvesting the winter/spring crops in June, the farm work force is also preoccupied with transplanting of padi seedlings and with planting/transplanting of maize which limits the time that can be spent on cutting, threshing, winnowing and drying the grain and harvesting and transporting potato.

623. Economic Sustainability. The economic sustainability of barley production is determined by the value of the grain output in relation to the production cost. Although it is possible to calculate an import parity price for grains like barley and wheat that are widely traded, it is more difficult to assess the production costs incurred by the co- operative farms. Few data exist on production inputs except the fertiliser supplied through the projects and farm labour and machinery services lack market values. It is also difficult to assess the opportunity cost of labour since little is known about wages or the value of work points outside the farm sector. However, in other countries with similar production conditions to DPRK, wheat yields of 1-2 tonne per hectare and barley yield of 0.5-1,5 tonnes per hectare would be considered low unless the production regime is very extensive with low input levels and a minimum of labour and machinery services.

624. Financial Sustainability. The financial sustainability is also difficult to assess although the produced crop is assigned a value at the point of purchase by PDS on the co-operative farms and at the point of leaving the distribution centres 28 . At the official exchange rate (W2.15=$1.00), the total production of spring barley in 2000 would have been worth $ 6.5 million (37,000 tonnes at $177 per tonne) while the 4,300 tonnes of fertiliser, if fully paid for by the recipient co-operative farms, would have cost about $ 1 million at farm gate (including costs of procurement and shipping to Nampo Port and

28 The PDS price of barley is W381/tonne ($177) at farm gate (a price roughly reflecting world market price parity) while its price to consumers is only W60/tonne, or only 15% of the price paid to the producers.

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local clearing and transport costs that were met by the Governnment of DPRK and the recipient farm organisations, respectively). This implies that the co-operative farms would be left with $ 5.5 million to pay their members in cash and in kind, set aside grain for seed and meet the cost of other farm inputs such as fuel. It appears that the re- maining surplus would have been sufficient to at least partly meet the cost of the fertiliser procurement for the spring barley in 2001 (amounting to about $ 0.9 million).

625. For PDS , distribution of cereals such as spring barley is not a profitable operation. For every tonne of barley grain sold, the organisation makes a net loss of W474 ($220) that has to financed through Government subsidies together with the operating costs of the organisation.

VII. Recommendations

701. Support to double cropping through the provision of fertilizer should be perceived and remain as FAO emergency agriculture operations. Double cropping has been promoted as one of the very few options to intensify agricultural production responding to emergency food needs in a food self-sufficiency policy context. It is undeniable that in the short-term, double cropping provides an avenue to fill the food shortage . However, double cropping appears to be a complex and risky enterprise and requires careful management of the land and resources if it should be thought as a medium to long-term sustainable option for agriculture.

702. In-depth analysis on the potential and sustainablity of the double cropping should be carried out. Support to double cropping as a sustainable option would require to develop a holistic approach in the farming system context that goes beyond the mere provision of fertilizer but that may not be effective in responding to short-term food needs. In parallel to emergency support to double cropping, it is suggested that an in-depth analysis is carried out through FAO technical assistance on the potentialities of the double cropping, taking stock of the past five years experience during which the programme has been widely expanded. Such an analysis will have to take into account not only the technical aspects but also the implications of the double cropping on environmental, economic and social factors that up to now have been neglected to a certain extent.

703. The current support to double cropping could be made more effective by considering a number of possible measures relating to timing of input deliveries, crop selection, fertilizer application and other agronomic practices:

• Timing: It is crucial to find a way to improve the timing of input delivery. This can be done through further efforts in timing the preparation of the appeal, advocacy with the donors for pledging inputs for the current year’s winter wheat and for the next year’s spring barley and potatoes. For winter wheat, the input should be in the country latest by August. Similarly, for spring barley and potatoes, the input should arrive latest by February.

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• Crop Selection: More flexibility and adjustment based on local food preferences and agronomic considerations (soil features and cropping calendar of the main crops) should be introduced in the selection of the crops to support. Support to double cropping has been focused largely on spring barley. It appears to be the least preferred food staple in most instances. It also seems to be the most competing crop in terms of calendar. Increased support to winter wheat or spring potatoes should be examined.

• Supply of pesticides together with fertilizer (to mitigate against increased pest incidence caused by double cropping).

• Support in parallel to pilot testing cereal/tuber programme on FAO supported co- operative farms, including fast-maturing, high yield paddy and maize varieties. Provision of fertilizer should be accompanied by the provision of fast-maturing, high yield paddy and maize varieties seeds for testing on double cropped areas; in addition, more wheat and barley varieties may merit testing for fertilizer response, maturing period and drought resistance.

• Fertilizer Application: In order to maintain soil fertility and increase fertilizer use efficiency, soil testing at farm level should be carried out urgently on beneficiary farms to define more appropriate and balanced fertilizer recommendations based on targeted yield and resource availability.

• Accompanying “soft” fertilizer measures : More considerations and guidance should be given on possible substitutes (although partial) to fertilizer supply gap such as Farm Yard Manure or efficient microorganism (EM). Although they are already being applied in many farms, there is urgent need for improving the quality of FYM and more precise evaluation of the attributes of EM.

704. The technical assistance component of the emergency projects should be strengthened. Monitoring of project activities through out the cropping period and assessment of results and actual impact are insufficient so far as to integrate past experience into project design. Furthermore, the high degree of technicalities involved in double cropping deserves more attention. Therefore, extended technical assistance should be provided through (i) the extension of the stay of the technical expert over the cropping seasons (March to November) (ii) including provision for technical backstopping missions to the country by the lead technical division (AGL) in the project budgets.

705. Focussing FAO support to two-three selected provinces (instead of 9-10 provinces as hitherto). A more narrow geographical focus would increase project impact, facilitate monitoring and assessment, and permit the implementation of the above mentioned proposed measures.

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ANNEX 1:

Terms of Reference for Evaluation Mission

27.3.01 Terms of Reference for a Joint Evaluation by the Government of Sweden and FAO

FAO's Relief and Early Rehabilitation Programme

Second Phase – Evaluation of Selected Field Projects and Preparation of a Synthesis Evaluation Report on Swedish-Funded Agricultural Relief Operations

1. Background

The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden has for a number of years funded agricultural relief operations through FAO’s Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR) with a marked increase in recent years. The Government of Sweden expressed the wish to review, together with FAO, the Swedish-supported projects with a view to further improving their quality. The Government indicated to FAO in December 1999 that it agreed to the terms of reference proposed by FAO for this joint evaluation and that the evaluation should take place in two stages.

The first stage of the evaluation comprised a selective desk review of emergency relief operations in 13 countries, which was completed by a consultant in January 2000. The desk review examined twelve projects in eight 29 African countries, five projects in four 30 Asian countries and one project in Europe (Kosovo). It also proposed three countries (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Liberia and Tanzania) for a more in- depth review by a field mission in the second stage. The Swedish Government wished the selected countries to have different types of issues for relief assistance and to be located in different regions.

Based on the results of the desk study and after consultation between the Swedish Government and FAO, it has been decided to evaluate two projects in each of the following two countries: Tajikistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPR Korea) for the second stage of the evaluation exercise.

2. Purpose of the Evaluation (stage two)

29 PR Congo, DR Congo, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 30 DPR Korea, China, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan

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Within the overall terms of reference for this joint exercise (see Annex), the purpose of this second stage is twofold:

• Part I: To analyse and assess in depth the efficiency and effectiveness of the selected projects in the two countries with particular focus on the projects’ results in the field (see section 3 below). The evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations will be prepared separately for each country.

• Part II: To prepare an overall synthesis evaluation report , based on the review results of the selected projects in two countries but drawing on findings and issues arising from the desk review. The synthesis report should reflect all the main points contained in the overall terms of reference for this joint evaluation, and will be prepared following the broad analytical lines presented in section 4 below.

The evaluation work will draw on interviews with concerned technical and operational FAO staff, a review of project files maintained in FAO Headquarters and field visits to the two selected countries (DPR Korea and Tajikistan).

3. Part 1: Evaluation of Selected Swedish-funded Relief Operations

The following projects have been selected for field evaluation in each country:

Tajikistan : OSRO/TAJ/901/SWE : US$ 324,950 – April 1999 to March 2001 (extended) – “Emer- gency Assistance to Animal Health and Potato Seed Production”. OSRO/TAJ/702/SWE : US$ 130,676 – December 1996 – May 1997 Emergency Supply of Agricultural Inputs for the 1998 Cropping Season.

DPRK : Double Cropping Programme and Potato Production OSRO/DRK/001/SWE : US$ 910 643 “Support to the Spring Double Cropping Pro- gramme. Project completed in Dec. 2000”. OSRO/DRK/101/SWE : US$ 811 000, “Spring Double Cropping Programme 2001”.

For each project, and to the extent that data is available to the team, the evaluation should cover the following points.

Project Design

Adequacy of rationale and justification of the project; Quality, clarity and adequacy of project design, including clarity and logical consistency between, inputs, activities, outputs and objectives (quality, quantity and time frame); Adequacy of identifying the target groups, including their potentials and constraints as well as considerations of gender aspects;

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Realism and clarity in the specification of prior obligations and prerequisites (assumptions and risks); Realism and clarity of external institutional relationships, and in the managerial and institutional framework for implementation and the work plan; Likely cost-effectiveness of the project’s design; Extent of connectedness with follow-up rehabilitation activities (if any).

Project Implementation

Both the process and the context of the operational phase of work should be analysed, with focus on:

Efficiency and adequacy of project implementation including availability of funds as compared with budget, for both the donor and national component, and quality and timeliness of input delivery by both FAO and under the national component; Managerial adequacy, including work planning, monitoring and reporting, the extent of national support and commitment, and the quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO; Strengths and weaknesses in implementation, including main factors responsible.

Project Results

Key outputs produced to date, including the quantity and quality as compared with work plan, and their adequacy in achieving the immediate objectives; The extent to which the target beneficiaries, especially the vulnerable groups, have benefited from the project, including the strengthening of their capacity for self-reliant food/agricultural production; The prospects for sustaining project results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the project (connectedness criteria), including actions taken by them for this purpose; The observed cost-effectiveness of the project, taking into account the assessment of any particular conditions relating to the emergency situation which may cause cost levitation for all donors and partners in the humanitarian effort; Overall strengths and weaknesses of the project in the light of the results, including the main contributory factors, issues and lessons for the future.

4. Preparation of the Synthesis Evaluation Report

The synthesis report will be prepared on the basis of the findings and recommendations of the desk review as well as on the field project evaluations. The synthesis report will highlight the main findings and recommendations accordingly along the following lines:

Identification and Design:

Assessment should cover both the process for relief operations identification and preparation as well as the quality of resulting design (as expressed in the project documents), with special attention to the following points:

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Rationale or Justification for Proposed Relief Operations:

Relevance to the wider socio-political context in which relief operations or projects are to operate; Adequacy of problem analysis and identification of issues the relief operations are intended to address; Structure and inter-linkages of proposed relief operations, with attention to the role or function assigned to the Swedish-supported operations in the broader context of the overall FAO emergency programme in the beneficiary country.

Project Design:

Relevance and realism of proposed rehabilitation and immediate objectives of relief operations, including adequacy of identification of target groups and needs ; Scheduling and linkages/complementarity of the project activities, to the extent that they are conceived as part of the broader FAO emergency programme in the beneficiary country; Adequacy of means-ends analysis, including realism of planned duration, timeliness of interventions and identification of measurable targets (quantified inputs and outputs) as a realistic basis for monitoring; Extent to which gender-related aspects have been considered in the project design and formulation of results; National/local institutional arrangements for implementation of relief operations, including co-ordination with other agents and partners and the role assigned to them and to FAO; Expected local constraints and risks; Potential contribution to rehabilitation of the agricultural sector and/or expected sustainability.

Project Implementation:

The evaluation should focus on:

Analysis of how and to which extent the relief operations have generally been able to adjust and respond to the specific emergency, including the adequacy of project management and support by the host government, FAO and donor; Assessment of key factors, both positive and negative, that have affected significantly the implementation process, including the identification of good practices.

Project Results:

Particular attention should be given to:

Analysis of outreach and the impact of the operations on the different groups of the affected populations;

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Extent to which relief operations have influenced the vulnerability and/or capacity of target group(s) to cope with the severe emergency situation, and eventually initi- ate recovery; Analysis of the attention and support given to women and, more generally, disad- vantaged groups in project implementation, and how equitable inputs distribution is ensured; Assessment of the functioning of the different channels that implementing partners have used for providing assistance, as well as the cooperation mechanisms set up with other humanitarian organizations; Identification of the sustainability and development enhancing effects of the operations, including overall impact (or extent of rehabilitation achieved) on the sector; Overall assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the emergency operations, including the key contributory factors as well as issues and lessons for the future.

5. Composition of the Mission

The evaluation team will consist of two persons: one assigned by FAO's Evaluation Service, and the other assigned by the Government of Sweden: the team leader will be designated by FAO and SIDA by joint agreement. The beneficiary governments will also be invited to designate a suitable person to participate in the country mission. The cost of such national participation would be borne by the donor.

To preserve the mission’s independence of judgement, mission members should have had no previous direct involvement with the project with regard to its formulation, implementation or backstopping. Moreover, nationals nominated as mission members should preferably be persons with an intimate knowledge of the country’s institutions and policies as well as its recent history and experience of emergency aid, particularly in the agricultural sector.

6. Timetable, Budget and Itinerary of the Mission

The second phase of the evaluation will be implemented as follows:

• 1- 4 May: Briefing in Rome

• 6 – 16 May: Mission to Tajikistan Briefing in Dushanbe (2 days) Field visits (5 days) Report writing and debriefing (3 days)

• 21-24 May: Preparation of the Synthesis Report

• 4-15 June: Mission to DPRK Briefing in Beijing (1 day) Briefing in Pyongyang (2 days) Field visits (5 days) Report writing and debriefing in Pyongyang (3 days)

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• 18-22 June: Rome: Preparation of Synthesis Report and Debriefing

The overall time allocated to the preparation of the synthesis report will be 8 days. The draft report will be discussed at the debriefing of the mission, and will be finalised by the mission leader within two weeks thereafter.

Budget for the FAO component: It is understood that this will be covered by the Government of Sweden, and the amount is estimated at US$ 36,000 (one staff member for 40 days, US$ 16,000, travel costs and DSA US$ 18,000, miscellaneous/contingencies US$ 2,000)

7. Consultations

The mission will maintain close liaison with the Representatives of the donor and FAO and the concerned Government ministries, as well as with national and international project staff. Although the mission should feel free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not authorised to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor or FAO.

8. Reporting

The mission will prepare its draft reports for discussion at debriefing at FAO after its field visits. The individual country reports will follow the usual format with appropriate adaptation as per the present terms of reference. The mission will also prepare an overall synthesis evaluation report, drawing overall conclusions and recommendations, based on the individual country reports and reflecting also salient points arising from the desk review report.

The mission is independent and responsible for its reports, which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government, the donor or FAO. To the extent possible, individual country reports will be completed prior to departure from the country and the findings and recommendations discussed with all concerned parties and wherever possible consensus achieved.

The mission will also complete the FAO Project Evaluation Questionnaire.

The mission leader bears responsibility for finalisation of all parts of the synthesis evaluation report, which will be submitted to FAO within two weeks of mission completion. FAO will submit the synthesis report to the donor and individual country reports to the Government and donor, in all cases together with its comments.

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FAO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS OSRODRK001_101SWE_2001_ER.DOC ANNEX 2B

A N N E X 2 A :

Mission Work Schedule

Day Date Time Location Activity/Event

Wednesday 6 June FAO, Rome Briefings (Evaluation Dept.); preparations for DPRK visit Thursday 7 June FAO, Rome Briefings (Inv. Centre; TCOR); preparations DPRK visit Friday 8 June FAO, Rome Preparations for Synthesis Evaluation Report Saturday 9 June Rome-Beijing Monday 11 June Beijing Meeting with FAO Resident Representative and DPRK Programme Officer Tuesday 12 June Beijing- Review of work schedule; welcoming dinner Pyongyang Wednesday 13 June Pyongyang Meetings with MOA representatives, UN Resi- dent Co-ordinator, WFP Dep. Country Director Thursday 14 June Pyongyang Visits to Jangsuwon, Songmun, Munam Co- area operative Farms, Pyongyang City Friday 15 June Pyongyang Meetings with Swedish Chargé d’Affaires, In- ter-agency Committee members, EC Represe- antative Sunday 17 June Mahyongsan Monday 18 June North Pyongan Sinam Co-operative Farm; Jangsion Co- Province operative Farm; Chonguon Co-operative Farm Tuesday 19 June Nampo area Chongsan Farmer Co-operative; Jamjil Co- operative Farm; Sinhung Co-operative Farm Wednesday 20 June South Hwang- Baesok Co-operative Farm; Saegil Co- hae Province operative Farm Thursday 21 June Pyongyang Meeting with PDS; report drafting Friday 22 June Pyongyang Briefing UNDP, WFP; Round-up meeting with Govt DPRK Saturday 23 June Pyongyang- Briefing UNDP, WFP; Round-up meeting with Beijing-Rome Govt DPRK

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A N N E X 2 B :

Key Persons Met by the Mission

FAO Rome Donor Agencies Hilde Niggeman-Pucella, Operations Officer David Morton, UN Resident Coordinator/ TCOR Humanitarian Coordinator Dr. Rabindra Roy, FAO Fertiliser Specialist, Deirdre Boyd, UNDP Dep. Res. Rep. AGLL Roberto Christen, UNDP AREP Co- Daud Khan, Head Asia Division, Investment ordinator Centre Karin Manente, WFP Dep. Country Director Mr. Azad, Investment Centre Svante Kilander, Chargé d’Affaires Swedish Ambassy Beijing Sven-Erik Johansson, PMU Interlife Omar Salah Ahmed, FAO Permanent Repre- Jean-Francois Letang, Mission Chief, Euro- sentative pean Commission Wang Tangreng, Programme Officer for Co-operative Farm Representatives DPRK Chairman. Jangsuwon Co-operative Farm, Samsok District, Pyongyang City Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Chief Engineer, Jangsuwon Co-operative FAO Farm Ri Song Chol, FAO National Programme Of- Joh Yun Jae, Chairman. Songmun Co- ficer operative Farm, Samsok District, Pyongyang R.V. Misra, FAO Consultant City Government Kim Giong Il, Chairman, Munam Co- Yun Su Chang, Secretary General, National operative Farm, Kangnamm County, Py- Commttee for FAO, Ministry of Foreign Af- ongyang City fairs Kim Yung Sun, Chairman, Sinam Co- Kim Hyok Jin, Vice Director of Agricultural operative Farm, North Pyongan Province Production Development, Ministry of Agri- Kim Hu Pun, Chairman, Jangsion Co- culture (MOA) operative Farm, North Pyongan Province Kim Gyong Il, Department of Agricultural Kim Ki Chun, Chief Engineer, Jangsion Co- Production, MOA operative Farm, North Pyongan Province Pak Chin Il. Senior Official, National Com- Kim Ryong Il, Chief Engineer, Chongsan mittee for FAO Co-operative Farm, Nampo Kim Song Chol, Interpreter, National Com- Kim Chang Sik, Chairman, Jamjil Co- mittee for FAO operative Farm, Nampo Paek Man Ho, Ministry of Procurement and Ri Siong, Chairman, Sinhung Co-operative Food Administration Farm, Nampo Jo Oh Oyon, Chief Engineer, Sinhung Co- Sin Gi Gae, Ministry of Procurement and operative Farm, Nampo Food Administration Chae Song Sut, Chairman, Baesok Co- operative Farm, South Hwanghae Province

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ANNEX 3

A N N E X 3 :

List of Consulted Documents

Policy Guidelines Sida . Positionspapper för fortsatt humanitärt bistånd till Nordkorea . October 2000 Sida . Action Programme for Poverty Reduction . 1997

Planning Documents OSRO/DRK/001/SWE Project Document Support to the Agricultural Production and Diversification of the Double-Cropping Programme in 2000, Spring and Main Crops (February–December 2000) OSRO/DRK/101/SWE Project Document Support to the Double-Cropping Programme in 2000, Spring and Main Crops 2001 (February–December 2001)

Progress Reports OSRO/DRK/005/NOR Support to the Agricultural Production of the Double-Cropping Programme: Preliminary Report Based on Field Visists by R.V. Misra, November 2000

Follow-up/Evaluation Reports OSRO/DRK/001/SWE and OSRO/DRK/101/SWE Reference Note for the Evaluation of Swedish Funded Agricultural Relief Operations, R.V. Misra, FAO, Pyongyang, June 2001) Double Cropping Programme—A Review , R.V. Misra, FAO Consultant FAO Relief and Early Rehabiliation Programme: Overall Analysis of Swedish Funded Relief Operations (Desk Study), 2001

Other Reports TCP/DRK/8927(T): Disease Free Seed Potato Multiplication to Increase and Sustain Food Availability in North Korea , P.C. Gaur, September 2000 FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture/World Food Programme FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, July 2000 DPRK Pyongnam Irrigation Rehabilitation Project — Stage 2 Appraisal Report, FAO Investment Centre, June 2000 DPRK Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) Programme , FAO Investment Centre, November 1998 World Food Summit Follow-up: Draft Strategy for National Agricultural Development, orizon 2010

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A N N E X 4 :

Map of Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea

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A N N E X 5 :

FAO Programme in DPRK

( situation as of 26 April 2001)

I. FAO emergency activities (TCOR) in DPR Korea.

Emergency assistance during 2000/2001 for increased food production:

a) Assistance in 2000 : In response to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for DPR Korea 2000 in support of increased food production, FAO has provided emergency assistance through the following projects (agricultural inputs to the Double-Cropping Programme):

OSRO/DRK/001/SWE - Support to the Agricultural Production and Diversification of the Double-Cropping Programme in 2000, Spring and Main Crops Donor: Sweden Budget: US$910 643 Objective: Increased food production through the supply of fertiliser for the 2000 spring planting season. Duration: February to December 2000 Status: Field operations completed successfully.

OSRO/DRK/002/ITA – Support to Agricultural Production and Diversification of the Double-Cropping-Programme in 2000, Main /WinterCrops. Donor: Italy Budget: US$921 422 Objective: Increased food production through supply of fertiliser for the 2000 main/summer planting season. Duration: May to December 2000 Status: Field operations completed successfully.

OSRO/DRK/003/FIN – Support to Agricultural Production and Diversification of the Double-Cropping Programme in 2000, Main/Winter crops. Donor: Finland Budget: US$158 748 Objective: Increased food production through supply of pesticides for the 2000 main/summer planting season. Duration: June to December 2000 Status: Field operations completed successfully.

OSRO/DRK/004/NOR – Support to Agricultural Production and Diversification of the Double-Cropping Programme in 2000, Main/Winter crops. Donor: Norway Budget: US$220 380 Objective: Increased food production through supply of pesticides for the 2000 main/summer crops. Duration: June to December 2000 Status: Field operations completed successfully.

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OSRO/DRK/005/NOR – Support to the Agricultural Prodcution of the Double-Cropping Programme- 2000/2001 Winter crops Donor: Norway Budget: US$424 755 Objective: Increased food production through supply of fertiliser for the 2000/2001 winter grain crops. Duration: October 2000 to October 2001 Status: Fertiliser supplied for the winter crop planting season. Crop to be harvested in the summer 2001.

TCP/DRK/0065 (E) – Increased Food Production through the 2000/2001 Winter Crop Programme Budget: US$400 000 Objective: Increased food production through supply of fertiliser for the 2000/2001 winter grain crops and provision of technical expertise. Duration: October 2000 to October 2001 Status: Fertiliser supplied for the winter crop planting season . Crop to the harvested in the summer 2001.

b) Assistance in 2001 : • UN Appeal 2001 for DPR Korea asking for US$40 million in support of increased food production. • So far, Sweden, Finland and Norway have approved funds to FAO in response to the Ap- peal launched on 29 November 2000. • Sweden granted US $ 819 672 in February 2001 for project OSRO/DRK/101/SWE in support of the Spring/Summer Double-Cropping Programme. • In April, FAO has delivered to DPR Korea 5 235 tons of fertiliser covering 36 120 ha for the spring barley crops and 11 430 ha for the summer main crops of rice and maize. The FAO consultant, Mr Misra, is presently in DPR Korea, for monitoring of this operation and would be available for consultation with the Swedish Delegation in Pyong Yang. • Finland granted US$300 000 in April for the same programme. Funds are allocated for provision of fertiliser and related monitoring. • Norway granted US$330 000 in April for the Double-Cropping Programme of the summer/autumn crops. Funds will be allocated for plant protection inputs and monitoring.

II. Support to medium-term agricultural development:

FAO in cooperation with UNDP contributed with technical expertise to the formulation of the country’s agricultural medium-term development plan, the Agricultural Recovery and Environ- mental Protection Plan (AREP) . FAO’s emergency operations contributes to the programme’s main objective of increased of food production.

In addition, agricultural medium-term programmes are promoted through FAO’s Special Pro- gramme for Food Security in DPR Korea, mainly funded by the Republic of Korea.

ANNEX 6:

FAO Assistance to Double Cropping

Table 1: Major Agricultural Input Assistance through FAO

Channel/Donor Contribution Inputs

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( US $) Seeds Fertlizers Pesticides/ (t) ( t ) Equipment (litres/units ) 1997 FAO/TCP (E) 400,000 Barley Urea 297 650 FAO/NOR 367,308 Urea1045 Deltamethrin 9,880 FAO/EC 1,300,000 Baley 600 Veg. 110 FAO/SWE 651,042 Urea3107 FAO/TCP(E) 400,000 Urea1600 FAO/WVI 100,000 Urea 493 FAO/CRE 343,729 Urea1680 FAO/MUL 150,000 Urea 74 1998 FAO/TCP(E) 372,000 Wheat NPK200 350 FAO/Luxembourg 113,394 Barley Urea295 140 Potato2.1 FAO/WFP 945,000 Barley 3000 FAO/Norway 533,817 Urea1750 DAP590 FAO/Brunei Darussalam 75,000 Urea225 DAP 75 FAO/ROK 295,820 Deltamethrin 9350 Sprayers3000 Pr. Clothes3000 FAO/Sweden 609,000 Wheat NPK750 1474 1999 FAO/TCP(E) 400,000 Urea 702 DAP 600 MOP 376 FAO/Norway 532,765 Barley Urea 935 935 NPK 438 FAO/Sweden 1,298,701 Barley 715 Urea4100 NPK1800 FAO/WFP 300,000 Barley 1350 FAO/NOR 251,915 Urea 58 DAP 56 MOP 35 2000 FAO/Sweden 910,643 Urea2273 NPK2010 FAO/Italy 921,813 Urea 4980 FAO/Finland 158,748 Deltamethrin 18,550

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