First With The Most

Too bad American forces haven’t been flying While the military police probably face the great- commercial the past few years, for our soldiers est challenge in Haiti — that of maintaining order would have accumulated some serious frequent- without turning into the local sheriff — I strongly flyer miles. Last year saw infantry and light cavalry suspect, though they might not admit it to a tanker, forces trying to restore order in Somalia, and in this that those MPs and infantrymen are comforted by issue as well as the last, ARMOR covered those the clatter of track and the presence of big guns... operations. It’s beginning to look as if we learned just in case. Although the armor threat in Haiti has some expensive lessons about the role of armor in proven to be little more than a reinforced 4x4 (less support of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). I the spotlights and winch), one thing is clear. The certainly hope so, for at press time we find U.S. presence of mechanized forces has discouraged forces once again on foreign soil. This time it’s bravado, and that may prove to save American Haiti, and the thugs who have been displaced from lives. For there is just something about armor roll- power down there have got to feel rather foolish. A ing along in column that makes a thug with a hand- year ago they jumped up and gun feel weaker than a teabag down along the dock, fired their in the Mississippi River. Our weapons in the air, and turned Sheridans overwatching infan- back a ship containing some trymen in a clearing operation two-hundred U.S. personnel of- — like a big brother observing a fering humanitarian assistance. A schoolyard altercation — make year later we came back with the bully think twice about 20,000 and we didn’t wait for an throwing the first punch. Some- invitation. times the best defense is ob- One thing that seems to the tained without firing a shot. To outside observer to be different that extent, those old Sheri- about this operation is the pres- dans—the vehicles we were ence of M551 Sheridans rum- talking about scrapping back in bling through the streets of Port-au-Prince. I don’t 1979 — have more than earned their keep. Like an recall seeing such a visible, active mechanized old cavalry steed that some outpost trooper can’t force in the Somalia operation, and I must admit bear to put out to pasture, we keep mounting up that to a former member of that Sheridan battalion, on those 551s for “one more ride.” And maybe it’s those old track-slappers look pretty good. When just me, but those old campaign horses seemed to the evening news offers a glimpse of the vehicles, I brighten up and regain their spirit when they find myself straining to spot my old track from sensed the smell of powder and the roar of a main Charlie company (I wonder if they ever got the fan- gun. tower problems solved?). —J.D.Brewer

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

GORDON R. SULLIVAN MILTON H. HAMILTON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the ChiefofStaff Secretary of the Army 07352

The Real Issue is Wargaming Synchronization is a hard subject to dis­ lems that surface during rehearsals are cuss, and even harder to train and execute. found there instead of during the wargame. Too much of the synchronization process More than a few that I have met refuse to Dear Sir: occurs on those charts hanging around the wargame a course of action. To run a war­ TOC and they (I suspect) are frequently game requires an eye for the map, an un­ thrown out or put away because no one derstanding of the friendly force, the enemy I enjoyed nearly every article in the July­ has the time to digest the plethora of pa­ force, and the capabilities of all the weap­ August issue of ARMOR. I especially en­ perwork higher-level staffs throw at people. ons and other support systems that the joyed the articles on digitization and syn­ As I have stated before, a properly written battalion task force employs or gets infor­ chronization. If your readers have not al­ Commander's Intent and Concept of the mation from. To learn to do this takes time ready done so, I strongly recommend the Operation will show how the commander and training that the young officers who are book Hammer's Slammers to them. It is expects the battle to be synchronized. The S3-airs or brigade planning officers fre­ about a mercenary armored regiment in the real issue, as I see it, and MAJ Cloy al­ quently do not have. Many planners evalu­ far future, a completely digitized and lethal ludes to this, is wargaming. ate courses of action on "gut feeL" I know, force. It is written by David Drake, a mem­ Many officers do not know how to prop­ because as the brigade S4 at an NTC rota­ ber of the 11th ACR in Vietnam. erly wargame, and that is why the prob- tion, I lost patience with our plans officer.

(Note: Fort Knox Defense Switch Network (DSN) prefix is 464. Commercial prefix is Area Code 502- DIRECTORY - Points of Contact 624-XXXX).

ARMOR Editorial Offices u.s. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL Editor-in-Chief Commandant (ATZK-CG) Major J. D. Brewer 2249 MG Larry R. Jordan 2121 Managing Editor Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) Jon T. Clemens 2249 Editorial Assistant BG Lon E. Maggart 7555 Vivian Thompson 2610 Chief of Staff, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) Production Assistant COL Fred A. Treyz III 1050 Mary Hager 2610 Staff Illustrator Command Sergeant Major Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 CSM Ronnie W. Davis 4952 Armor School Sergeant Major MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR: ATIN: A1ZK-PTD, Fort CSM Henry F. Hurley 5405 Knox, KY 40121-5210. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy COL Don Elder 7848 in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) or printed out double-spaced in near-letter-quality printer mode. We COL Henry Hodge 6843 also accept stories on 3 liz or 5 lf4-inch floppy disks in MultiMate, Word­ Star, Microsoft WORD, WordPerfect, Ami Pro, XyWrite, Microsoft Directorate of Combat Developments (ATZK-CD) Word for Windows, and ASCII (please include a double-spaced print­ COL Edward A. Bryla 5050 out). Please tape captions to any illustrations submitted. NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN CSM Stephen R. Morgan 5150 AWARDS: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Con­ Reserve Component Spt Div (ATZK-PTE) nie Bright or Tonya Mitchell, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121 or LTC Bennett 1. Mott call (502) 942-8624, FAX (502) 942-6219. 5953 TRADOC System Manager for UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes Abrams and Armored Gun System (ATZK-TS) of address to Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610; commercial: (502) 624- COL Charles F. Moler 7955 2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief. Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab (ATZK-MW) COL G. Patrick Ritter 2139 ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK (The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with Office, Mounted Battlespace Integration (ATZK-AR) questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of COL Gary Krueger 7809 the Armor Force.) FAX -7585

2 ARMOR - November-December 1994 Then, I took over the planning session to British Mark VII Tank — great deal of time discussing the same idea show how to run a wargame (to the with a colleague at work. I applaud the amazement of the O/Cs and my XO’s First in Flight thought that has gone into this; however, I amusement). would like to make some modifications to Ideally, you should be able to imagine, Dear Sir: 1SG Hecht’s suggestions. without the use of a map, the ebb and flow First of all, when I was involved with the of the battle and the effects of, at least, In reference to the interesting article, OT III testing of MILES in Germany in major weapons and supporting systems. “When Tanks Took Wings,” by Colonel Ray- 1979, I knew in my heart that this system Then, with the use of a map or terrain mond Battreall in the May-June 1994 issue, was going to be an integral part of any model, refine that picture. How, then, can this was not “the first combat-operational Army training program in the future. If this we obtain this training and use it on the airlift of tanks in the history of warfare” as was going to be the case, then why not in- battlefield? claimed. British Mark VII Light Tanks, Tet- tegrate this into all vehicles produced for First, officers should play wargames. How rarch, were carried in Hamilcar gliders to the field? Operationally, it doesn’t detract many of us will spend hours playing Trivial Normandy on June 6, 1944. About half-a- from the vehicle, except when the laser Pursuit or watching a football game and dozen tanks were involved, including one systems are installed. Additionally, having never think to play a wargame? In my that was reported to have fallen through the system integral to the vehicle would years of service, when I mentioned that I the nose of its glider over the English save on maintenance by not having to in- played wargames to my commander or Channel. Some of the Tetrarch guns were stall and remove the system every time the peers, I invariably received a response of fitted with the coned-bore Littlejohn muzzle unit went to the field for training (especially “You do what?” However, I believe that war- adapter which, firing special projectiles, the onerous task of always having to reap- gaming enables me to understand terrain, doubled the armor penetration perform- ply the Velcro to the vehicle!). Finally, the friendly and enemy units, and weapons ef- ance, but I do not know if any of those crew would be as familiar with the MILES fects. There are several commercial board tanks taken to Normandy were fitted in this system as they were with the vehicle itself, games that portray an accurate repre- manner. and would know how to fight their vehicle sentation of the battlefield, such as GDW’s While on the subject of Normandy and D- with either MILES or live ammo. Sands of War. Day, some American authors were critical As for how to integrate this into an effec- Second, we have several computer war- of the Sherman DD (Duplex Drive) tanks tive IFF system, this would involve several games in the inventory that allow us to war- because nearly all of those launched at items: game courses of action. The Brigade/Bat- Omaha Beach “sank like stones.” Although First, all laser designator systems would talion Battle Simulation (BBS) and JANUS the idea was to save tank landing craft have to have a basic IFF code integrated immediately come to mind. These simula- from the risks involved close to shore, in into them. There also would need to be an- tions allow us to rapidly play (and replay) the prevailing rough sea they should not other programmable code integrated into several courses of action and evaluate have been launched 6,000 yards out. Ac- the system. This programmable code would them. It is probably seldom used for this, cording to “Armoured Fighting Vehicles in be changed on a periodic basis and and in preparing for an NTC rotation it Profile, Vol. 3" (1976), at Utah Beach 30 passed through IVIS or VINSON channels. would be of limited use because we cannot DD tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion were The purpose of this additional code is that, take all the equipment with us. Still, for the launched at 3,000 yards from shore with al- shouldthebasecodebecompromised first mission a brigade could actually fight most all reaching the beach. Although the (which given sufficient time will be, by through several courses of action in a day rough sea delayed their arrival until after either analysis or OPSEC violation), friend- and use that in its staff process. It must be the infantry had landed, they did give vital ly vehicles could still be differentiated from emphasized that a success in a simulated support. enemy ones that might be able to detect battle does not necessarily equal a success Certainly, the invasion demonstrated that and react to being lased. Also, for units op- on the battlefield. For the simulation to armor is essential to effective infantry op- erating on the flanks of divisional or higher have any hope of portraying a possible re- erations, but armor itself needs support ve- units (where most fratricide incidents occur) sult on the battlefield, the OPFOR must be hicles. Reportedly, General Bradley was of- some type of identification response would thoroughly professional and trained in OP- fered specialized armored vehicles by the be received from these vehicles. FOR doctrine and tactics. British, but he declined to accept them. Second, a transponder would be required, This lack of portability drives a require- These vehicles, which included crab flail either a return laser signal or a digital radio ment for a simple, easy-to-use computer tanks (minesweeping tanks) and Crocodile burst on a set frequency. In the first case, simulation. It should fit into one to four flame-thrower tanks, were used effectively this could be done as an addition to the linked laptop/notebook computers that by the British and Canadians and would crosswind sensor and would consist of a would enable a staff to input their informa- probably have reduced the casualties sus- rotating mirror synchronized to a laser that tion and rapidly play out different courses tained by the Americans at their beaches. would pulse when the mirror was oriented of action. Currently, there are no military In the end, of course, it was the courage in the direction that the original lase came simulations that are capable of this. No and determination of the Allied fighting men from. In the second case, this would re- commercial game I have evaluated does, that carried the day, in spite of all the un- quire either a separate system or integra- either. There are some new ones coming foreseen adverse situations. tion into the IVIS network, with a separate onto the market that may start to meet the protocol established within the system to requirement. Currently, commercial games LEONARD E. CAPON handle this information. do not support actual terrain in the detail Mesa, Ariz. With either of the systems, the opera- we require, but I see this changing. tional scenario would be as follows: In the meantime, break out the board The firing tank acquires the target and games and adapt them to your training ar- the TC initiates the fire command. The gun- eas by using clear hex sheets over the More on MILES as IFF ner lases to the target. The TC must ac- map. Use BBS as a training tool for staffs knowledge and enter the range. If the tar- to evaluate courses of action, and perhaps get is a friendly that has both the base and even sponsor some wargame tournaments Dear Sir: programmable codes, it responds to the in your units. lasing with a proper coded laser or radio It was with amazement that I read 1SG burst. A RED light would then show on the MICHAEL K. ROBEL Hecht’s letter about using MILES sensors MAJ, Armor, USAR as a part of an IFF system (July-August Birmingham, Ala. 1994 ARMOR). I had just that day spent a Continued on Page 50 ARMOR — November-December 1994 3 COMMANDER’S HATCH

MG Larry R. Jordan Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Tank 1,080: Follow-on to M1A2

The introduction of the M1A2 tank The technology that enabled us to Tank 1,080. While many of these ef- and other digitized weapons platforms build the Abrams M1A2 continues to forts are classified, the general areas of such as PALADIN has heralded the ar- move forward and is increasingly avail- concentration are not. Tank 1,080 will rival of Information Age warfare and able around the world. The current have armament enhancements in terms the first equipment fielded for Force spread and pace of technological ad- of main gun and other weapons. Re- XXI. The Abrams M1A2 is a vast vances, coupled with the increasing de- search is varied and ranges from im- quantitative and qualitative improve- velopment and proliferation of explo- proved penetrators and warheads to ment in lethality. The addition of the sive reactive armor, means that the electric gun technology. To capitalize Commander’s Independent Thermal M1A2’s qualitative advantage over po- on these improvements, we will use Viewer and other fire control enhance- tential adversaries could be at risk by technological advancements in sensors ments make it a much more capable the time tank #1,079 is produced and and processors to automate some of our fighting machine than the combat fielded in the middle of the next dec- target acquisition and fire control func- proven M1A1. Survivability enhance- ade. That sobering thought caused me tions. These improvements will signifi- ments provide it the capability to carry several months ago to ask the question, cantly contribute to a high and accurate out its mission in the most dangerous “What should tank #1,080 be like?” rate of fire, and extend our engagement of environments. ranges. Similar work is ongoing in bal- Conceptually, Tank 1,080 is the ve- Perhaps the most significant enhance- hicle that will provide the combat listic protection. Coupled with signa- ture reduction efforts to reduce detec- ments come in the form of battle com- power and technical superiority be- tion by thermal imagery, radar, aural, mand improvements. POSNAV and tween the fielding of the M1A2 and magnetic, or visual means, this effort steer-to capability provide the crew un- the eventual fielding of the Future precedented ability to precisely maneu- Main Battle Tank. The potential capa- should produce dramatic improvements in hit avoidance and survivability. ver. The situational awareness, report- bilities we will face in the middle of Suites of sensors and active counter- ing, orders issuance, and graphics capa- the next decade require significant en- bilities provided by IVIS enable leaders hancements in lethality, target acquisi- measures round out Tank 1,080’s abil- ity to prevail on the future battlefield. to exercise battle command in a man- tion, crew protection, system surviv- Less glamorous but equally as impor- ner and to a degree never before possi- ability, sustainability, decision support ble. In the hands of well-trained sol- tools, and information management. tant are efforts to provide advanced propulsion systems and both embedded diers, it is the world’s best main battle Tank 1,080 will incorporate emerging training and diagnostics. tank. In the hands of competent and technologies to enhance the fightabil- adaptive leaders, it is a tremendous ity of the current Abrams variant, and 21st Century command and control en- spearhead their inclusion in the Future Tank 1,080 will be an impressive and hancement that can fundamentally alter Main Battle Tank, anticipated by the very necessary follow-on to the M1A2. our ability to dominate land combat. 2015 time frame. It will point the way for mobile pro- The United States is building and field- Combat developers are exploring tected firepower far into the 21 Cen- ing 1,079 of these superb tanks. many possible features for inclusion on tury.

4 ARMOR — September-October 1994 DRIVER’S SEAT

CSM Ronnie W. Davis Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

It’s Your Career, WhatAreYouGoingToDoAboutIt?

All soldiers adhere to guidelines from fies the key indicators that separate the Office, Mounted Battlespace Inte- their technical manuals to prevent their ‘exceptionally’ qualified soldier from gration at Ft. Knox) vehicles from becoming deadlined. his peers. The ideas that DA PAM ••• Installation Education Center Doesn’t your career deserve the same 600-25 presents are not new, but the ••• Career Advisors in Armor Branch, level of attention? The Army is prepar- fact that they are specifically outlined PERSCOM ingtopublishinFY95theNCOPro- in a Department of the Army pamphlet fessional Development Guide, DA that will provide guidance to Armor PAM 600-25, which will become a soldiers and their leaders is new. While you can rely on the great ‘TM’ for your career. wealth of knowledge available from a wide range of sources, the DA PAM 600-25 will be the central focus of any career plan- enlisted companion to existing ning effort is you. Take the in- DA PAM 600-3, the Officer Pro- itiative to become actively in- fessional Guide. The focus of the volved in the career path you guide is to provide enlisted sol- choose. Give your career the diers with a reference manual to same attention and effort you guide them through their careers. give to your vehicle. Ensure that It will have seven introductory you... chapters providing an overall philosophy of enlisted career ••• Work in your PMOS management, leader manage- ••• Seek challenging assign- ment, education, promotion, and ments evaluations. In addition, it will ••• Attend the NCOES course at have a chapter specifically de- your first opportunity voted to Reserve Component • NCO development. ••Review/update your official military personnel file The remainder of the pamphlet ••• Attend civilian education consists of individual chapters classes. devoted to each career management Soldiers shouldn’t stop at DA PAM field (CMF). The focus for the Armor 600-25. There are numerous sources soldier will be in chapter 8, CMF19. available to assist soldiers in planning Most important, don’t be a casual ob- The Armor Chapter provides the sol- their careers: server; actively plan your career. Don’t dier with a definition of success for become ‘deadlined’ because you didn’t each rank in terms of the key leader- ••• Armor officers and senior NCOs follow the preventive maintenance ship assignments, NCOES training, and ••• The Armor Enlisted Professional checks and services required for your self-development. In addition, it speci- Development Guide (Published by career. ARMOR — September-October 1994 5 East German Plans for the Conquest and Occupation of West Berlin by Dr. Otto Wenzel, translated by Douglas Peifer

Border’s Edge 86 The scenario at the commencement of the exercise was described as follows: Author’s Note “Western provocations cause increasing The Border’s Edge (Bordkante) series tensions in the international sphere. AtendencyisemerginginGer- of exercises held by the staffs of the NATO utilizes the cover of large-scale many of downplaying the very real NVA, the East German Frontier exercises scheduled for mid-June in or- dangers that existed in the Cold Troops, and the Soviet Group of Forces der to rapidly expand its forces in War in the interest of national and in Germany between 1985 and 1988 Europe. A “Basic Alarm” order is is- international reconciliation. Mem- dealt with operations against a major sued [by NATO] on the evening of the bers of the former East German urban area. While a cover identity was 28th June. Steps are taken to reinforce Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) pub- presented in each case (Border’s Edge the troops in Magdeburg... with addi- licly claim that their military, just 1985 and 1986 dealt with operations in tional forces.”7 like that of West Germany, served the East German city of Magdeburg “Eastern” forces number 35,000 men. the interest of peace by promoting while Border’s Edge 1987 and 1988 These consist of the NVA’s 1st Motor- a continental balance of power.1 concerned operations in Leipzig), the At a Christmas service in the Ber- ized Rifle Division — composed of real focus of all exercises was West three motorized infantry regiments, an lin Cathedral last December, Berlin.4 This becomes clear if one stud- members of the French, British, ies the records. A glimpse at the files of armored regiment, and an artillery regi- American, and Russian forces ment — the Soviet 6th Independent the exercise from which the most docu- Motorized Rifle Brigade stationed in were all thanked for their contri- ments remain, Border’s Edge 86, sub- butions to peace over the last 40 stantiates that Berlin was the real focus East Berlin, nine regiments of East German Frontier Troops, a paratroop years.2 Wary of aggravating the of the exercise and illustrates exactly battalion, an additional artillery regi- wounds left by the Cold War, some how Berlin was to be occupied. seek to claim that NATO and the ment, a mortar section, a fighter-bomb- Warsaw Pact were mirror images er squadron, a transport helicopter Border’s Edge (Bordkante) 86 was squadron, three helicopter sections, two of each other, equally dangerous held between 30 June and 2 July 1986. and yet equally stabilizing. The purpose of the exercise was to im- reconnaissance airplanes, an assault en- gineer battalion, a bridge-laying battal- While the details of NATO’s war prove the “decision-making, planning, ion, and three “People’s Police Alert plans remain shrouded in official and organization of mixed assault for- Units” (each equivalent to an infantry mations engaged in joint operations secrecy, it is now possible to re- battalion). These units as a whole were construct many of the plans of the against a major urban area... causing a termed the “Special Group” which was Warsaw Pact. Among the most in- collapse of enemy resistance through to be protected from aerial assault by a the occupation of urban districts, im- teresting of these were the con- SAM brigade and fighter aircraft.8 To- portant facilities, and the city center.”5 tinually updated plans of the East tal hardware consisted of 334 tanks, German government regarding Documents from the exercise allude to 186 armored personnel carriers, 36 how West Berlin would be occu- the capture of Magdeburg, a regional capital in the Western portion of the MiG-21 bombers, 2 reconnaissance air- pied and administered. Berlin had planes, 52 helicopters, 354 guns and long been a bone in the throat of German Democratic Republic. The ac- mortars above 82mm, and 189 antitank companying map of Magdeburg indi- the East German government, and pieces.9 the records reveal that plans for cates that it was defended by an Ameri- its conquest were being main- can, a British, and a French brigade. The fighter-bomber squadron would tained well into the 1980s. The The locations of the Allied Komman- initiate combat operations with a 9- latest East German plans for Ber- datura, the headquarters of the Social minute strike against Allied command lin’s occupation can be recon- Democratic Party of Germany and the posts, communication facilities, and the structed from existing exercise Free Democratic Party, the Abgeord- airport. This would be followed by netenhaus, the Regierender Bürger- three artillery bombardments of 11, 8, documents of the NVA,3 the state- meister; and border crossing check- and 16 minutes. The goal of the artil- ments of former NVA officers, and 6 the files of the Ministry for State points were also marked — the exer- lery bombardments would be the de- Security. cise certainly concerned West Berlin struction of enemy artillery and mortar rather than Magdeburg. batteries, antitank and antiair units, and

6 ARMOR — November-December 1994 the tactical nuclear weapons assumed to be stationed in the city. Follow-on tasking included containing Allied breakout attempts. The helicopter and fixed wing transports would land and supply airborne troops, as well as con- duct aerial reconnaissance and artillery 10 spotting tasks. “Magdeburg,” who were to be con- was the focus of the entire Border’s Ground forces were to move along vinced that it was futile to “sacrifice Edge series of exercises. Another Bor- eight different routes to their jumping their lives in a hopeless struggle.” der’s Edge exercise was to have been off positions. The timetable allotted French soldiers were to be persuaded staged in late October 1989. As in the seven hours for troop movement from that they were defending American previous two years, the focus of opera- assembly areas to the line of departure. rather than French interests, a task un- tions centered on the capture of Another three hours were set aside for worthy of them. The British were like- “Leipzig.” NATO forces consisted of final preparations. In order to maintain wise to be induced against forfeiting the 28th U.S. Infantry Division and ele- secrecy, the line of departure was at their lives for American war goals. ments of the 194th Armored Brigade of least 1 to 3 kilometers from the East Americans were to be reminded that the I U.S. Army Corps. Following the German-“Magdeburg” frontier.11 their forces had never triumphed over containment of a NATO attack, these socialist forces.14 forces were to be encircled and cap- Twenty-nine minutes before the start tured.16 While a staff exercise was held of the operation, combat engineers The Politorgans also planned to ma- nipulate the German civilian popula- between the 17th and 18th of May would ready border crossing points and 1989, the exercise itself was never conduct breaches through border instal- tion, encouraging both active and pas- staged. The tumultuous chain of events lations.OnDay1andDay2oftheas- sive resistance to a bloody and pro- longed defense of the city. A propa- that led to German unification, in late sault, the “Special Group” would split 1989 and the first half of 1990, ensured “Magdeburg’s” defenders into two ganda section — complete with mobile that no further Border’s Edge exercises groups. Defending units that continued printing-press, editorial facilities, and a were staged. to resist would be destroyed on Day 3 pamphlet mortar for “agitation gre- and 4, and the entire city would be oc- nades” — would be responsible for ra- dio and loudspeaker announcements cupied. An order of the commander of The Destroyed Operational Plans the “Special Group” instructed that the and leaflet distribution. Leaflets would National Library, the Museum, the Ca- also be distributed by aircraft. The po- thedral, and the State Library should be litical departments were to have over The scenario envisioned in the exer- regarded as cultural treasures whose 70,000 safe-passage passes ready for cise Border’s Edge 86 closely resem- destruction should be avoided if com- distribution. Another 90,000 instruction bled the concrete operational plans for bat operations permitted.12 sheets were to be on hand, providing the conquest of West Berlin. The writ- guidance to the civilian population per- ten documents concerning these plans The division of enemy forces was the taining to conduct in war zones and be- weredestroyedin1990asunification primary task of the first day of opera- havior toward the troops of the GDR loomed closer, but several former offi- tions. The primary assault, intended to and Soviet Union. cers of the NVA have been willing to drive a wedge between the British and discuss the actual plan of operation.17 American brigades, was entrusted to The third task of the Politorgans would be to encourage NVA troops in the First Motorized Rifle Division, its The operational plan was code named armored regiment, and a regiment of the performance of their soldierly du- “THRUST” (German: STOSS). It con- ties. The commander of the First Front, Frontier Troops. Once the British and cerned the occupation of West Berlin American brigades were divided, they a Soviet general, would issue an appeal to the troops which would be recorded “within the scope of preventive actions were to be subjected to a second blow following prior aggression by NATO on 50 tapes and played to all elements designed to shatter resistance. Assess- outside the Central European area, for ments of enemy capabilities judged that of the assault force. Lest motivation de- generate into rampage, 10,000 hand- example an attack by Turkey on Bul- “Western” forces in “Magdeburg” garia.” Berlin was to be occupied wouldonlybeableto“buildupahasty bills were to be prepared and distrib- “while NATO was transporting its rein- uted concerning “Conduct toward the and provisional system of strongpoints. forcements from overseas and before Civilian Population of the Enemy.”15 A withdrawal of enemy forces from pe- the opening of military operations” ripheral defenses into the city center The preceding summary of Border’s along the intra-German and Czechos- was to be prevented. Bloody house-by- Edge (Bordkante) 86 is illustrative of lovakian-German borders.18 In 1987, house combat was to be avoided by 13 the various exercises focusing on the following the introduction of the new skillful application of force. capture of West Berlin. While the exer- Soviet military doctrine, certain The role of the various Politorgans cises in 1985 and 1986 allegedly con- changes were made. The plan was re- (Political Organs) in the conquest of cerned the capture of Magdeburg, and named “CENTER” (German: ZEN- West Berlin is especially interesting. those of 1987 and 1988 the occupation TRUM), and West Berlin was now to One of their primary missions was to of Leipzig, an analysis of “enemy” be occupied only “following NATO ag- weaken the resolve of the enemy Allied forces, the layout of the city, and gov- gression resulting in the violation of soldiers and West German police in ernment structures reveals that Berlin state [East Germany] borders.”19

ARMOR — November-December 1994 7 confused with, the British, French, and pelhof Airport in the American sector American occupation sectors. was to be captured by another. The 1st The occupation of Sector I was to be Battalion of the 40th Air Assault Regi- ment and parts of 34th Helicopter the task of the NVA’s 1st Motorized Ri- Transport Squadron would provide the fle Division (minus its 1st Regiment), the 5th Regiment of Frontier Command necessary forces. Reserve forces in- cluded the 40th Security Battalion, the North, the 34th and 44th Regiments of Frontier Command Central,22 an assault engineer battalion of the 2d Engineer “Former NVA officers stand by Brigade, and four battalions of Pots- the essentially defensive nature dam’s paramilitary “Combat Groups of of Pact offensive plans. Yet the Working Class.”23 The 3d Regiment oddly, little attention is paid to of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, containing and defeating NATO flanked by the 5th Frontier Troop Regi- offenses. In fact, East German ment to its left, was to push from the intelligence evaluations con- west along Bundesstraße 5 toward cluded that NATO forces in West Spandau, where the majority of the Germany lacked the structure British Brigade’s facilities were lo- and equipment for deep offen- cated. The 34th Frontier Troop Regi- sive operations in the eastern di- ment would move out of Kladow in the rection....” west toward the British military airport at Gatow. In the southwest, the 44th Frontier Regiment was to roll along 19th People’s Police Alert Unit, and Bundesstraße 1, penetrating the Ameri- four battalions of the (East) Berlin can sector at Zehlendorf, while the 1st “Combat Groups of the Working Armored Regiment thrust directly to- Class.” The 40th Signal Battalion was ward the city center. The 2d Regiment tasked with providing reserve assets for of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division was all communication requirements. to move out of Teltow in the south to- Any military worth its salt has pre- ward Steglitz, thereby completing the pared contingency plans for operations occupation of Sector I. following the outbreak of war. The So- Sector II, the eastern portion of West viet Union and its satellites always Berlin, would be occupied as follows: claimed that both the structure and The Soviet 6th Independent Motorized planning of the Warsaw Pact revolved Rifle Brigade, part of the Soviet Group around a commitment to defeat the en- of Forces in Germany, would roll past emyonhisownterritoryfollowing en- the Brandenburger Gate, proceed down emy aggression. The initial scenario in Following the political decision to oc- the Avenue of the 17th of June to Ernst the Border’s Edge exercises postulated cupy West Berlin, a “Berlin Group” Reuter Plaza, and continue down Bis- aggression by NATO, provoking a field command would be formed out of marck Street until it reached the Kais- countermeasure by the Warsaw Pact. theEastGermanArmyHighCom- erdamm Bridge. The 18th People’s Po- Former NVA officers stand by the es- mand, located in Wildpark West near lice Alert Unit and the 33d Frontier sentially defensive nature of Pact offen- Potsdam.20 The “Berlin Group” com- Troop Regiment were to provide flank sive plans. Yet oddly, little attention is mand was to direct over 32,000 East protection. The 1st Regiment of the 1st paid to containing and defeating NATO German and Soviet troops in operations Motorized Rifle Division would assault offenses. In fact, East German intelli- against an estimated 12,000 Allied out of Pankow toward Tegel Interna- gence evaluations concluded that troops and 6,000 West Berlin police- tional airport, while the 38th and 40th NATO forces in West Germany lacked men. The equipment levels used in Frontier Troop Regiments occupied the structure and equipment for deep offensive operations in the eastern di- Border’s Edge 86 would be signifi- Reinickendorf, part of the French sec- 24 cantly raised in real operations — ap- tor. The 35th, 39th, and 42d Frontier rection. In short, taken at face value, proximately 390 tanks, 450 guns and Troop Regiments would close in on the NVA laid meticulous plans for exe- mortars, 400 antitank units, and 400 ar- Neukölln and Kreuzberg, areas within cution of an operation for which the of- mored personnel carriers would be the American sector. Support for these ficially proclaimed premise, aggression committed.21 assaults would be provided by the 40th by NATO, was evaluated as unlikely at best. The plans envisioned splitting West Artillery Brigade, an assault engineer Berlin into two sectors. The sector battalion of the 2d Engineer Brigade, boundary ran from Konradshöhe in the and propaganda detachments. Ministry of State Security’s Role northwest along the Autobahn ring road The two major assault thrusts, one from Charlottenburg to Schöneberg, from the east and one from the west, A clear picture can be reconstructed ending at Lichtenrade in the south. The were to meet at the Kaiserdamm of how the NVA intended to subdue area to the west of the divide was des- Bridge near Radio Free Berlin, thereby Berlin. The procedures to be carried ignated as Sector I, while that to the cutting the city in two. Tegel airport, in out following occupation of the city are east was Sector II. These sectors did the French sector, was to be captured of equal interest and can be found in not correspond to, and should not be by two airborne companies while Tem- the files of the former East German

8 ARMOR — November-December 1994 Ministry of State Security, or “Stasi.”25 quarters and Staff Buildings at Clay- Berlin Area of the Ministry of State Se- These files show that the Ministry had allee, the Turner Barracks (Armored curity, Lieutenant-General Wolfgang prepared a comprehensive blueprint for elements of U.S. Brigade) and the Schwanitz,26 on5August1985elabo- the communist takeover of power in ammo dumps at Holzungsweg, Hütten- rates exactly how the Stasi would deal West Berlin. weg, Grunewald Jagen 73, Stahnsdor- with the challenges of occupation. fer Damm and Potsdamer Chaussee. In A report by the XVth (Intelligence) Steglitz, the McNair, Andrews, and Schwanitz ordered that after com- Department of the [East] Berlin District mencement of operations all “signifi- Area of the ministry (dated 5 May Roosevelt Barracks were to be occu- cant enemy centers” would be occu- pied, as well as the ammo and fuel 1978) listed 170 West Berlin facilities dump at Goerzallee, the fuel dump at pied. These specifically included intel- that were to be occupied by the Stasi ligence and counterintelligence facili- during or immediately after the con- Dahlemer Weg, and the freight railroad ties, police stations, archives, and station at Lichterfelde West. quest of the city. The list was detailed staff/planning centers such as “state of- and specific, as the following summa- Planning for the occupation of West fices, research centers (academies and tion for the American sector indicates. Berlin continued into the period of universities), company headquarters, In Zehlendorf, the following American détente, indeed becoming more elabo- party offices, organization centers, facilities were to be occupied as soon rate and detailed. A two-page report headquarters of anti-communist organi- as possible: the U.S. Brigade’s Head- signed by the District Leader of the zations, and data banks.” It is of inter-

ARMOR — November-December 1994 9 est that the various facilities of the Al- specifies activities that would be con- sonnel. A lieutenant colonel would lied Brigades in Berlin were not on this fronted: “Espionage, sabotage, diver- head the office in larger boroughs such list — they presumably would be occu- sion, [acts of] terror, propaganda, un- as Reinickendorf and Neukölln, while pied by the Soviets, the NVA, or the derground political activity, rumor- in smaller boroughs a major would be Frontier Troops rather than by the Min- mongering, and false reporting leading designated as the commanding officer. istry for State Security. to unrest, plundering, strikes, and ri- In addition to the commander and dep- ots.” Based on the above quotations, it uty commander, each office had an ex- From the very first, the Stasi’s most important assignment was to be the ar- is reasonable to conclude that the West Berlin media would be subjected to rest and detention of “enemy persons.” rigorous censorship. A former Stasi lieutenant, Werner All weapons, ammunition, and Stiller, has indicated that the Ministry Naturally, a communist administration explosives which had escaped of State Security had compiled “exten- would be set up immediately. The Stasi confiscation by the military were sive files on West German citizens, would be responsible for selecting and to be seized by the Ministry of which would have been of special in- controlling the leadership and person- State Security. Handguns, hunt- terest during selection procedures.”27 nel of this “democratic organ.” Mem- ing rifles and shotguns, indus- The Schwanitz Report suggests that de- bers of the communist administration trial explosives and poisons tainees would include members of the were to be protected from “enemy were all to be turned over to the intelligence communities, leaders of defamation” and “terrorist attacks.” Stasi. anti-communist organizations, senior Border installations were also to be police officials, leading politicians, sen- safeguarded, indicating that the wall di- ior civil servants, and persons sus- viding East and West Germany was to pert for Information and Analysis, the pected of having knowledge of busi- remain in place, even after a commu- Armed Forces, Economic Affairs, and ness, scientific, or technical secrets. nist takeover. Internal Security. Each borough office Journalists known to have anti-leftist The structure of the Stasi organization also had communication and cryptogra- leanings would also be arrested. De- in West Berlin was also set forth. A phy specialists, as well as a watch and tainees were to be brought to intern- security detachment. The expert for ment camps for immediate questioning. central “Leadership Group for the West Berlin Operational Area” and local of- Armed Forces probably would have The information gained from these fices for each of Berlin’s 12 boroughs served as a liaison between the Soviet hearings would be used to build up an and East German forces. Plans for “effective locating program” aimed at would be set up. Stasi bureaucrats planned for every contingency. The manning the borough offices were not “rendering enemy persons who had planned vacancies in West Berlin were as developed as those for the “Leader- gone underground ineffective.” to be filled by 604 members of the ship Group” — only six billets within Offices of the Ministry for State Se- Ministry of State Security. Stasi work- each borough office were already curity were to ensure the continued op- ers would be provided with military filled. eration of all vital services and the ranks and designations. It should be noted that the names en- most important production facilities. tered beside the various billets in the Special attention was to be directed to The Leadership Group, headed by a manpower plans were not fictitious securing all supply warehouses and re- colonel, would exercise control over names entered for training purposes, serve depots, essential service facilities the Stasi organization in West Berlin. but were the names of actual Ministry (electricity, gas, and water), the postal, This organization would consist of the for State Security personnel. The offi- communication, and transportation sys- colonel and his staff, five operational cer who would have been appointed in tems, and radio and television stations. groups, three working groups, a cryp- charge of the Charlottenburg (West Important centers of production, espe- tography/postal/courier group, and Berlin) borough office of the Ministry cially those “sabotage-sensitive,” were guard/security forces. The operational for State Security, a certain Major to receive attention. Banks, stock and groups corresponded to the “field” de- Zeiseweis, had been the head of the security centers of deposit, technical partments within the Ministry for State Stasi’s Treptow (East Berlin) borough and scientific record collections, busi- Security. These were Field II (Counter- office in 1985 before his promotion to ness account repositories, the federal espionage), VII (Protection of the Or- lieutenant-colonel and designation as printing office, museums, galleries, and gans of the Ministry of the Interior), deputy to the Stasi’s District Leader for libraries were all to be secured against XVIII (Protection of the Economy), the Berlin Area in 1986. He recently theft, destruction, plunder and fraud. XIX (Protection of the Transportation participated in a broadcast focusing on System), and XX (Defense against “po- topics related to the former German All weapons, ammunition, and explo- litical-ideological diversions” and “un- sives which had escaped confiscation Democratic Republic (Ostdeutsche by the military were to be seized by the derground political activities”). Rundfunks Brandenburg, 31 January Ministry of State Security. Handguns, Sixty-five of the 80 billets within the and 15 February 1994), but made no hunting rifles and shotguns, industrial “Leadership Group” were already filled mention about his planned function fol- explosives and poisons were all to be when Schwanitz authorized the report lowing an East German occupation of turned over to the Stasi. in August 1985. The manpower plan West Berlin. His superior, Lieutenant General Schwanitz, was more candid Political resistance was anticipated listed billet, rank, first and last name, and personal identification number. during a speech before the study group and would be countered. The Stasi’s “Zwiegespräch” (Dialogue) on 20 May unofficial assistants28 in East and West The 12 borough offices (one for each 1992, when he passingly noted that Berlin were to “infiltrate... enemy West Berlin borough) would each be among the tasks of the Berlin District forces” and neutralize them. A list manned with between 42 and 47 per- Area office of the Ministry for State

10 ARMOR — November-December 1994 December 1986.33 Until the very last session of the National Defense Coun- cil on the 16th of June 1989, all East German ministers, as well as the chair- men of the 15 “District Defense Boards,”34 had to submit reports attest- ing to the war readiness of their minis- tries or districts. Party Chairman and Head of State Erich Honecker continu- ally reminded both military and civilian organizations to maintain a “wartime state-of-mind.”35 The final decision to launch an inva- sion of West Berlin never lay in the hands of East Germany, but always de- pended on Soviet approval and support. The party chairmen and leaders of the Soviet Union, who controlled the War- saw Pact and who would have had to issue the necessary orders for an as- Security were “measures supporting the ing the upper-level Warsaw Pact staff sault, were not reckless gamblers. occupation of West Berlin in the event exercise “SOJUS-83.” The task as- “Stalin and all his successors would of an aggression directed against the signed to the players representing the have preferred to achieve their aims — German Democratic Republic.”29 Unified Forces of the Warsaw Pact was the supposedly inevitable spread of So- the conquest of the Federal Republic of cialism to the rest of the globe, accord- Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the ing to Marxist-Leninist teaching — by Conclusion Netherlands, and France within a pe- political/economic means alone.”36 riod of 35 to 40 days from start of op- Their alternate plan, a military solution 30 The detailed and specific plans of the erations. to the East-West global competition, NVA and the Ministry for State Secu- NATO and West German officials consumed immense amounts of treas- rity for the occupation of West Berlln were unwilling to make any comments ure, talent, and attention, but was never were never executed. Does this bear about their knowledge and evaluation executed. The precondition of a suc- out claims that these plans were merely of Warsaw Pact operational plans. cessful offensive war, a decisive edge defensive contingencies, similar in na- Western intelligence reports regarding in the military balance, could never be ture to the operational plans laid by the various Border’s Edge (Bordkante) attained. The catastrophic conditions of NATO during the same time period? At exercises remain inaccessible. The ex- the communist economies, coupled least in the case of the Berlin opera- tent to which East German operational with an escalation in the cost and tech- tion, one thing stands clear: all records plans were known to the West, as well nological level of the arms race, caused and statements indicate that no serious as the defensive planning of Allied and the Soviet leadership to finally cast offensive on the part of the French, West Berlin forces, remains currently aside an offensive conception of war- British, and American brigades in Ber- classified. fare in 1987. lin was anticipated. Instead, NVA and The East German leadership believed Soviet units anticipated cutting the city that the occupation of West Berlin was in two in one day and completing oc- Notes cupation by the end of the third day. It a serious possibility well into the 1980s, as is made apparent by the enor- 1Statement by a former NVA colonel at the is highly questionable to claim now mous material and human resources that such planning contributed to the first Commander Meeting of the new Bunde- peace and stability of Berlin and that were devoted to the planning of swehr East Command, 10 October 1990. The such occupation. Every conceivable Europe. Bundeswehr East Command was the compro- preparation was made. Three examples mise solution reached regarding German unifi- East German plans concerning the oc- illustrate this. On the 23d of June 1980, cation and the military question in Germany: cupation of West Berlin must be evalu- the National Defense Council ordered the Bundeswehr was to assume response for the ated in context with higher-level War- that 4.9 billion DM of GDR currency defense of East German territory but the facili- saw Pact plans pertaining to the Fed- (emission 1955) be stored as “military ties and personnel in the new territories were to eral Republic of Germany and Western money” to be used as “a secondary remain outside the NATO structure. See Otto Europe in general. The operational currency valid in the territory of the en- Wenzel’s “So sollte in West-Berlin einmar- 31 plans remain tightly classified secrets emy and equivalent its currency.” On schiert werden,” Berliner Morgenpost. 18 April of the Russian Defense Ministry, yet the 25th of January 1985, the National 1993. reports of various exercises give an in- Defense Council ordered that a new 2 dication of what was envisioned. On medal for bravery in war be designed Bishop Dr. Martin Kruse, Advent Service at July 1, 1983, East German Minister of (the Blücher Medal for Bravery), of the Berlin Dom, 9 December 1993. Defense Hoffmann made a report to which 8,000 were to be minted imme- 3The operational plans of the Warsaw Pact the National Defense Council of the diately.32 Last, new regulations for were destroyed or turned over to the Soviets German Democratic Republic regard- “warfront reporting” were issued on 5 during the period prior to German unification,

ARMOR — November-December 1994 11 yet the other records of the NVA, including ex- 23The mechanized battalions of the “Fighting chairman, and the leader of the SED party’s se- ercise and training records, became property of Groups of the Working Class” were equipped curity division. the West German government. Many of the with armored personnel carriers, artillery, an- 3566th session of the National Defense Coun- NVA’s records are now open to public scrutiny tiair, and antitank weapons (Fiftieth Meeting of cilon17September1982,BA-MAP,VA at the Militärarchiv-Bundesarchiv, Abteilung the National Defense Council of the GDR, 18 01/39527, p. 70. Potsdam (formerly the Militärarchiv der DDR). November 1976. See Microfilm BA-MAP, VA- 36 Footnote 25 discusses the files of the Ministry 01/39495, p. 271). Beatrice Heuser, “Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the for State Security, which became the property 24Walter Jablonsky, “Die NVA im Staat der of the West German government. The latest East German Archives,” Comparative Strategy, SED,” Die NVA, Ed. Klaus Naumann, p. 56. In Nr.4/Vol. 12 (November 1993). English-language study of the NVA was pub- short, while publicly maintaining that NATO lished prior to the collapse of the GDR — see was preparing for a war of aggression against Thomas M. Forster, The East German Army: the nations of the Warsaw Pact, the East Ger- The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact (Lon- man Politburo understood that NATO’s plans of don: Allen & Unwin, 1980). forward defense and engagement of the “fol- 4 Federal Archive - Military Archive, Potsdam low-on-forces” were not equivalent to offensive Otto Wenzel was awarded a Section (hereafter cited as BA-MAP), VA-10- war planning. Ph.D. from the Free University 20750, VA-10-22942, VA-10-22939 and VA- 25These files are currently being evaluated by 10-23894. ofBerlinin1955forhisdisser- the West German “Federal Commission for the tation on “The German Com- 5BA-MAP, VA-10-22942, pp. 14, 295. See Files of the Ministry of Security of the former also Otto Wenzel, “Der Tag X. Wie West-Ber- German Democratic Republic” usually simply munist Party in 1923.” He pur- lin erobert wurde,” Deutschland Archiv. referred to as the “Gauck Commission” after sued a career in education, 12/1993, pp. 1364-1367. the name of its chairman. Copies of these files serving as the director of a 6The names of these institutions and organiza- are in the possession of Dr. Wenzel. secondary school from 1966 tions apply specifically to West Berlin institu- 26Between 1986 and 1989, Schwanitz was to 1970, and until 1985 head- tions and are not used in other German cities: one of four deputies for the Minister of State ed the department for schools for example, only in West Berlin is the Munici- Security, General Erich Mielke, a member of and culture for the Wedding pal Assembly termed the Abgeordnetenhaus and the Politburo of the SED. The last communist borough of Berlin. He has in- the Mayoralty the Regierender Bürgermeister. head of government of the GDR, Hans Mo- structed political science at the The map and exercise plans are found in BA- drow, appointed Schwanitz Director of the Of- Technische Fachhochschule MAP, VA-10-22942. Map Nr. 282. fice of National Security, a cabinet-level posi- Berlin since 1986. His publica- tion. 7BA-MAP, VA-10-22942, p. 297. tions about communist society 27Stiller was a lieutenant in the Ministry of 8Ibid., pp. 15, 39. have appeared in numerous State Security who defected to the West in 9 Ibid., pp. 17, 20, 45. 1979. As a protective measure, he was provided German periodicals and news- papers since 1954. Since 10Ibid., pp. 68, 89, 91. with a alternate identity and resided in the 11 United States for ten years. Werner Stiller, Im 1991, he has researched War- Ibid., p. 305. Zentrum der Spionage, 5th ed. (Mainz: Haase, saw Pact planning, especially 12Ibid., pp. 19, 85, 91, 272, 309. 1986), p. 158. East German plans regarding 13 Ibid., pp. 307, 310, 311. 28German: Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, abbrevi- operations against West Ber- 14Ibid., pp. 56, 123. ated IM. lin. He is preparing an upcom- 29 15Ibid., p. 58. Zwie Gespräch 9. Beiträge zur Aufarbeitung ing publication about the East der Staatssicherheits-Vergangenheit, (Berlin: German National Defense 16BA-MAP, VA-10-25911, pp. 1, 14-. 1992), p. 12. Council. 17The former officers of the NVA who have 30The National Defense Council of the Ger- assisted Dr. Wenzel in his research wish to re- man Democratic Republic was headed by Chair- main anonymous for personal reasons. See also man of the SED party and Head of State Erich Douglas Peifer received a Wenzel, “Der Tag X,” Deutschland Archiv, Honecker and at that time consisted of 10 mem- B.A. in economics and history 12/1993, p. 1362, and “Die Eroberung West- bers of the Politburo of East Germany. See re- from Miami University in 1985. Berlins,” Berlin ’93. Das Jahr im Rückspiegel cords of the 67th session of the National De- He was commissioned an offi- (Berlin: Ullstein, 1993), pp. 152-157 and fense Council, BA-MAP, VA-01/39528, p. 77. cer in the U.S. Navy, serving Helmut Göpel, “Die Berlin-Operation,” Die 31 as boilers officer and navigator NVA - Anspruch und Wirklichkeit nach aus- 61st session of the National Defense Coun- cil, BA-MAP, VA-01/39522, p. 69-. gewählten Dokumenten, Ed. Klaus Naumann aboard the Sixth Fleet flagship (Berlin/Bonn/Herford: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 3269th session of the National Defense Coun- from 1986 to 1989. He earned 1993), pp. 286-299. cil, BA-MAP, VA-01/39530, p. 161-. Berliner an M.A. in European history 18 Morgenpost, 17 November 1991. Göpel, pp. 289-95. from the University of North 33 Carolina at Chapel Hill in 19Göpel, pp. 287, 293. 73d session of the National Defense Coun- cil, BA-MAP, VA-01/39534, p. 4. 1991, and has written about 20An alternate headquarters would be situated 34The German term, “Bezirkseinsatzleitun- the Kriegsmarine. He spent in a bunker in the area of Blankenfelde to the 1993-94 in Berlin conducting south of Berlin. gen,” has no English equivalent. A Bezirksein- 21 satzleitungen consisted of the district party research for his dissertation Göpel, “Die Berlin-Operation,” p. 289. chairman, the commander of the military dis- entitled “The Development of 22A Frontier Command of the East German trict, the leader of the district Ministry for State Two German Navies, 1945- Frontier Troops was comparable to a division; it Security office, commander of the district Peo- 1961.” was commanded by a major-general. ple’s Police organization, the district council

12 ARMOR — November-December 1994 The Medieval Irony of Modern Battle by Harry F. Noyes III

“Lieutenant Carlson’s platoon estab- After weeks of bitter lished a strongpoint around a farm- battle for the ap- house overlooking a sunken road. proaches, the objec- Around nightfall the unit underwent a tive had ‘fallen’ with brief mortar barrage with no losses. barely a whimper. Just before midnight, without artillery Smith’s men set up a preparation, an enemy force estimated strongpoint at the bat- at company strength launched a tered railroad station, ground assault from the cover of the covering the main road sunken road. The attack was repulsed junction, and radioed with grenades and small-arms fire af- that reinforcements ter a sharp half-hour firefight. In the could enter the town morning, the platoon counted four en- by District Road 17. emy bodies left behind around its po- By 1100 two compa- sition. There was no further contact, nies had followed and and the platoon withdrew on company cleared the town with- order at 1430.” out encountering any real opposition aside ***** from scattered sniper “The enemy attempted a local coun- fire. Two American terattack at 0130, with approximately a battalion of infantry supported by soldiers and three en- emy troops were killed three or four tanks and an equal num- in a cops-and-robbers ber of assault guns. The assembly was spottedbyareconpatrolfromACom- type shootout when an element of C Com- pany, and pre-planned artillery fires pany stumbled across a party of en- Indeed, experts stress that much of were called in with devastating effect. what goes on in low-intensity military The disorganized foe withdrew with- emy stragglers trying to leave town with a handcart full of foodstuffs. The actions — peacekeeping, guerrilla out launching the attack.” town was declared secure at 1800. Its conflicts, and the sort — really is po- ***** new U.S. garrison went to sleep to the lice work: ferreting out an enemy “Three enemy tanks with infantry on tune of heavy small-arms fire from the cadre in one village, uncovering an board succeeded in infiltrating the continuing struggle for Hill 232 four “arms cache” with two rifles and 20 battalion’s lines under cover of dark- kilometers away.” rounds in another, guarding a medical ness and a diversionary artillery bar- clinic in a third. rage on B Company’s exposed posi- The above vignettes are fictional- But the vignettes above are not tion. Reports of an enemy armored ized, but not unrealistic, composites of breakthrough, considerably exagger- based on low-intensity conflicts. They actions one can read about in any are based on “conventional” experi- ated in the retelling, sparked a hasty number of after-action reports and of- displacement of the battalion com- ence in World War II’s European ficial histories from recent American Theater and in the Korean War, as re- mand post. Shortly after dawn, an ar- wars. tillery spotter plane discovered the lated in official Army reports (see, for hostile tanks concealed under trees The striking thing about reports from example, the St. Lo campaign book) beside a farm road 600 meters behind the down-and-dirty “sharp end” of and Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall’s in- our forward positions. The spotter war is how casual, even trivial, they terview-based histories. plane directed a fighter-bomber strike often sound. that destroyed all three tanks. Later Where is the clash of mighty armies, The old TV series “Combat” was that morning battalion outposts made the fierce unyielding fury of divisions sometimes humorously described as four prisoners among enemy survivors and corps locked in death struggles, “An Account of the Role of the Inde- trying to exfiltrate on foot.” the sweep of the 1,000-kilometer pendent Rifle Squad in the European ***** front? Tactical reports often sound Theater of Operations.” Reading after- “Sergeant Smith’s cavalry vehicle more like police blotters than classical action reports, one wonders if that is entered the town unhindered at 0845. battle narratives. really off the mark. If not squad level,

ARMOR — November-December 1994 13 the war seems to have been fought not that, while they may start into battle The enemy will find tactics to cope much above company level. looking like a mighty host, they must with our technology (i.e., he will find What, then, is the role of higher be prepared to end up fighting like a a way to hide in the forests, so to SWAT team. speak). echelons? Without trying to define words like “tactics” and “operational AirLand Battle doctrine, developed He may break into small units dis- art,” we might say that higher eche- to defend NATO against a Warsaw guised as civilian traffic. Don’t mis- lons move and sustain forces. War is Pact attack, recognized this. It rightly take this for guerrilla warfare. A true “maneuvered” at higher levels, but the envisioned battle as whirling, swirl- guerrilla war is a slow-percolating po- experience of “fighting” is usually — ing, helter-skelter, pulsing turmoil. litical revolution run by military ama- not always — a company/platoon/ teurs who use guns mainly for adver- squad-level experience, with the bat- Unfortunately, there appears to be a tising, not to destroy enemies in bat- talion level joining or dropping out of real danger that we may lose this bat- tle. It is tricky to fight, but low-inten- that array, depending on the nature of tle-winning, life-saving insight. sity and slow-paced. Counterguerrilla the war and local circumstances. forces have time to develop responses. There is a lot of loose talk about But, one might protest, what is the “new-age” or “Third Wave” warfare What we are discussing here is current relevance of all this? With the and a “digitized” Army in which something quite different: the use of Soviet threat converted to a mere guerrilla-like concealment tactics political and economic-develop- by a highly trained, professional ment challenge, how likely are we enemytolaunchdevastatingat- to fight World War II again? And “...Based on history, we must tacks designed to win the old- if we will only face low-intensity assume enemies will find ways fashioned way, by shattering our conflicts in the foreseeable future, forces in battle. Their approach isn’t this just rehashing the obvi- to lock us in bitter battles de- might look like the gathering of ous? Why debate the primacy of cided at foxhole level, despite the flock at Woodstock, but the small units in small-scale opera- our technology.” fighting might well resemble the tions when everybody already Battle of the Bulge. knows that will be the decisive This is not an essay on future level? every soldier will see the overall bat- warfare, however. Predicting how an Yet the future is never clear or cer- tle situation through electronic links to enemy might fight our “digital” Army tain. While it may seem silly to pre- high-speed battle-management com- is beyond the scope of this article. We dict that we will fight World War III puters of awesome power. Everyone address the point only to stress that, soon, it is suicidal to assume we will know the position of every vehi- based on history, we must assume might not. It only took six years cle at all times, we are told. enemies will find ways to lock us in (1933-1939) for Hitler to turn an age Perhaps. No one doubts technology bitter battles decided at foxhole level, that seemed more peaceful than ours will give us a big edge over less-so- despite our technology. into a wholesale calamity. It took only phisticated foes. Perhaps technology a couple of days for Saddam Hussein Such battles look neat on theater- will indeed restore the elegance of level maps, where linear fronts are to catapult us unexpectedly into what 18th-century war, when a general drawn and inconvenient gaps was, in terms of troops engaged, one standing on a hill could see his whole of the biggest wars we ever fought. smoothed out. At grunt level, they are army and guide it from afar. hard to visualize. Good tactical maps Battle accounts of the Korean War Yet, somehow, I doubt it. I cannot show that the “linear” front is really a — still a viable candidate for a se- help remembering that smoke ob- jagged series of isolated company, quel, unfortunately — show the same scured those 18th-century battlefields platoon and even squad positions. pattern as World War II reports. See after the first volley, the bad guys had That “bold thrust” portrayed by a big Marshall’s The River and the Gaunt- a habit of appearing from hidden arrow on the map at the theater press let. places behind hills, and the French camp turns out, on close inspection, to and Indians liked to hide in forests. be one platoon surrounded on a hill- Anecdotes from the Gulf War show top (probably the wrong hill), all that even its glorious image as a Today’s high-tech promises will bumper-to-bumper charge by thou- alone, hungry and thirsty, tired, and probably go the way of those made by wishing with all its heart it were back sands of armored vehicles — under 19th-century machine gun advocates, at Fort Hood. the best possible conditions for divi- who said machine guns would make sion-and corps-level fighting — can- war impossible by inflicting 100-per- Neither of these versions is wrong. not completely withstand close exami- cent casualties. The tactical maps just show how elu- nation. Soldiers are tough and smart. The sive the “big picture” can be at the There were times when our bally- enemywillfindawaytobluntour grunt level. hooed technology went on the fritz or technology. He will develop new, got shot up, people got lost, commu- cheap, effective ways to jam our elec- The foxhole soldier is like a water- nications failed, and individual pla- tronic links (smoke up the battlefield). bugtryingtorelatetoamapofthe toons and even single vehicles fought Mississippi River. The map is accurate a lonely war in which victory rode on It will still be harder to see at night in a strategic way. The river really fol- who shot first in a Dodge City show- than in day. Clouds and fog will still lows that course, and the map is use- down. It would be foolhardy to think hamper operations. Maps will still be ful to a boat captain (general). But it we might not face such a war again. If misread. Machines will still break. means little to the waterbug (captain, we do, our soldiers must understand Combat will still isolate small units. lieutenant, or sergeant), whose tactical 14 ARMOR — November-December 1994 problem is coping with local ripples This implies that the general’s most Then there was 291st Engineer and eddies caused by a passing boat. important duties come before contact Combat Battalion. In isolated penny “Uh, well, there was a lot of shoot- — training, informing, motivating packets independently led by lieuten- troops; supplying and positioning ants and sergeants, these 600 rela- ing and when it was over, it seemed units; etc. When the bullets fly, he can tivelygreentroopsstooduptothesu- we had won,” sums up the waterbug- level view of a big battle about as ac- help with his reserves, artillery, sup- perior armored force of Jochen plies, aviation, etc., but the battle is Peiper’s SS Kampfgruppe. Sometimes curately as can be done. basically in the soldiers’ hands. fighting, sometimes blowing bridges The general and his staff stitch all in Peiper’s face, they brought his dan- these confusing little pictures together Two of the first and greatest modern gerous thrust to a whimpering, inglo- into a big picture so that they can plan generals knew this. Napoleon said rious end. future actions and give upbeat brief- sometimes you just have to give battle and see what happens. Robert E. Lee There is no way these men could ings to civilian leaders, media, and have known how vital their actions public. (Ironically, the closest front- saidhetriedtogethisarmytothe line fighters may come to the “big battlefield in the most favorable possi- would be. But they knew to act, and ble circumstances and then trusted in the results exceeded what anyone picture” is seeing it in civilian and could have asked or expected. In other military media.) God and his subordinates. Nothing has happened in this century, or is circumstances, their deeds might have Modern soldiers — forced to dis- likelytohappeninthenext,tochange been less decisive, but the point is perse by the range, power, and firing that. that, in battle, one often can learn rate of modern weapons — rarely can where the greatest leverage lies only see more than a few of their fellow It is vital, but not sufficient, for gen- by trying. “When in doubt, hit out!” soldiers, even before shooting breaks erals to understand this. Individual If each unit fights its own lonely lit- out. Almost everything that affects soldiers must also recognize their piv- tle fight — however trivial it seems at them goes on beyond their sight. otal role and how much their actions the time — energetically, aggressively, For the sake of generals and privates can matter even when they don’t know and as smartly as it can, the cumula- alike, the U.S. Army is striving might- what’s happening. tive effect at the “big picture” level ily to counter this with modern tech- They must be self-conscious about will be victory. Then, when all is over, nology — with navigation technology their decisiveness. They must know the soldiers can stand up and say to fix the positions of even the small- that they can help win the war — wonderingly, as soldiers always have, est units, surveillance technology to even when they feel most “out of it,” “There was a lot of shooting and fix enemy units, computers to keep most isolated, most forgotten, most when it was over, it seemed we had everything straight, and communica- vulnerable, most unimportant. They won.” tion links to let everyone supply little- must take to heart British Maj. Gen. picture inputs and see big-picture out- J.F.C. Fuller’s vivid maxim: “When in puts. doubt, hit out.” Yet, the changes that may really help themostinbattlearetheonesde- That doesn’t mean to act blindly. Harry F. Noyes III is a Army signed to make small units and sol- One should always gather all the in- formation one can with one’s own re- civilian in the Public Affairs diers less dependent on higher-level Office, U.S. Army Health Serv- guidance: better unit cohesion, more sources and within the time available realistic combat training, enhanced before acting. However, having done ices Command, including du- professionalism of soldiers at all grade that, one should act, even if the rest of ties as assistant editor of a levels, and continued emphasis on the situation is hopelessly muddled. monthly newspaper. Pre- Do something to the enemy. Some- troop initiative and communication of viously, he was PAO, 300th intent through mission-type orders. times seemingly trivial action can un- expectedly exert decisive leverage MP Command, a five-state Ironically, modernity is bringing bat- against the foe. command headquartered in tle full circle. In medieval times, due Inkster, Mich., 1977-84, and to indiscipline rather than technology, Some fine examples come from the commanders also tended to lose con- Battle of the Bulge, where numerous editor of the Wiesbaden Mili- trol over battle once they had delivered tiny, isolated, unsupported American tary Community newspaper their troops to the point of contact. units, led by junior officers and ser- in West Germany, 1984-89. Battles broke down into a series of geants, battled hugely superior Ger- He served in the Air Force man forces and disrupted the timeta- from 1967-71 leaving active man-to-man fights, with the outcome ble on which German victory de- dependent on the cumulative effects pended. duty as a captain. He cur- of the quality of the individuals’ fit- rently holds the rank of major ness, training, and courage. There was Capt. Charles MacDon- in the Individual Ready Re- Today, the fighting is usually small- ald’s I Company, which held out in a serve. He holds a BA Degree unit to small-unit, and there is an ef- bitter forest fight longer than anyone in history from the University fort to harness it to a larger scheme. expected. Finally, it ran for dear life, But the general tenor is remarkably and MacDonald was sure he had of the South, Sewanee, like those long-ago days. Modern bat- failed. In fact, his small fight had Tenn. and a MA Degree in tle is a soldier’s battle, from private to bought vital time for higher-ups to Asian studies from the Uni- perhaps captain, or occasionally lieu- move other units into deeper blocking versity of Hawaii, Honolulu. tenant colonel. positions.

ARMOR — November-December 1994 15 Future Command and Control Systems IVIS and B2C2 Only Scratch the Surface by Major Timothy D. Cherry

Last April, we witnessed in NTC Ro- tation 94-07 the most significant ex- periment the Army has conducted since the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1940. Most first-hand observers will agree that the experiment was a success and digitization is here to stay. The need for visual, real-time information-sharing on the battlefield is critical to successful mission accomplishment at minimum cost to soldiers and equipment. Photo by Greg Stewart One of the NTC’s charters during this my experience with the Army’s premier Measurement Subsystem (RDMS), could experiment was to identify what the fu- “digital” system — the NTC Instru- be applied to future digital systems. ture digital “end-product” should look mentation System (NTC-IS) and its The CIS is the networked computer like and be capable of. To accomplish subsystems. In this article, I will iden- system that performs real-time data that and help facilitate the experiment, tify the capabilities future C2 systems processing, including position location, many of us received hands-on training should have and discuss how these sys- direct fire event pairing, and indirect at Fort Knox on both the Intervehicular tems could help the commander “visu- fire processing. The distinguishing Information System (IVIS) and Brigade alize the battlefield.” characteristic of CIS is its real-time in- and Below Command and Control 2 2 teractive software. The software con- (B C ) computer systems to better un- In order to better understand the capa- tains map control, graphic control derstand their capabilities and limita- bilities future C2 systems must have, I will briefly explain the NTC-IS. The measures, OPFOR and BLUEFOR tions. Throughout this training and ex- symbology, audio control, and E-mail periment, I analyzed these systems and NTC-IS is composed of six major sub- capability. The RDMS provides posi- systems. The capabilities of two of these developed a list of capabilities that tion location and firing data that in- must be incorporated in future digital subsystems, the Core Instrumentation 2 cludes player unit identification, loca- C systems. I based my observations on Subsystem (CIS) and the Range Data tion in UTM grid coordinates, aircraft altitude, and time of a position fix for each player unit. These two subsystems are the backbone of the NTC-IS and enable the observer controller to rap- idly analyze the cause and effect of each battle and provide near real-time feedback to the player unit leaders. To revolutionize the way we plan and prepare for missions on the future bat- tlefield, we must eliminate the time- consuming way we pass out informa- tion from higher to lower with paper copy OPORDs and acetate graphics. Our future C2 system must be powerful enough to accomplish this. It must have a map capability that can be up- dated for any location in the world, in- clude standard Army map scales from 1:25,000 to 1:250,000, be able to zoom in and out from 1X to 8X, and include both grid and contour lines (Figure 1). The future system should have a lim- ited word processing and E-mail capa- Figure 1. Map Control function allows operators to select map type, scale, feature and zoom. bility to send messages, standard re- ports, and OPORDs/FRAGOs/WAR-

16 ARMOR — November-December 1994 NOs. The system should include a full complement of graphic symbols straight from FM 101-5-1 (both enemy and friendly) (Figure 2). Graphics should be entered into the system at the appro- priate level from top to bottom and must allow a unit/vehicle to display any BLUEFOR graphics in the file. A free-draw light pen capability would al- low the user to enter graphics quickly and accurately. All combat vehicles and aircraft should have a GPS-initialized, POSNAV-fed position locator that is tracked by satel- lites or mobile locator stations through triangulation. These stations could be Figure 2. Symbols and graphics show up on the screen just as they mounted in either airborne or vehicular appear in our current doctrinal manuals. platforms. For situational awareness, each unit/vehicle should be able to se- lectively display any or all friendly ve- hicles and aircraft from platoon to corps level (Figure 3). Each combat ve- hicle and aircraft should also display a “firing vector” when firing to allow the commander and staff to observe the volume of fire in their unit. Units must also have the capability to “blackbox” friendly vehicles once destroyed by the enemy to visually show current strength. Enemy vehicles should be in two colors, yellow for templated and red for actual/confirmed locations. The G2/S2 at each level prepares a situation template in yellow and once confirmed by our intelligence systems, the G2/S2 changes the color of enemy vehicles to red and this appears on every computer screen instantly. The system on our di- rect fire vehicles and aircraft (tanks, IFVs, attack helos) should have a laser capability like IVIS with one improve- ment. Once an enemy vehicle is lased, the TC/BC should be able to select an Figure 3. BLUEFOR symbology function allows operators to selectively dis- enemy icon (T72, BMP, BRDM, etc.) play any or all friendly vehicles. to appear in red on the computer screen. Vehicle/aircraft commanders must also be able to blackbox enemy vehicles that are destroyed (Figure 4). The G2/S2 can use this to determine BDA, confirm the sittemp, determine enemy courses of action, and thus ad- vise the commander better. There are several hardware require- ments needed for our future C2 system. There are two types of computer sys- tems: one basic system for combat ve- hicles and aircraft that is hardened, has a small screen, and does not have a print capability; and one advanced sys- tem for command and control elements that has a big screen (30" or larger), a small color printer, and a large color Figure 4. Vehicle and aircraft commanders can “blackbox” enemy vehicles that printer (3’ x5’). Combat vehicles are destroyed to visually display battle damage assessment (BDA). should also have a flat panel computer display that is movable and allows the

ARMOR — November-December 1994 17 co/tm OPORD and graphics are com- plete, the XO inputs them into the computer. OPORD/overlay distribution is simplified at all levels because graphic pictures and OPORDs can be printed for each leader in the unit, quickly and accurately. Leaders can use this graphic picture (showing friendly graphics, enemy sittemp, indirect fire plan, engineer obstacles, and CSS plan) for planning and rehearsals. This also eliminates the need for manual produc- tion and distribution of OPORDs and acetate graphics. I have only scratched the surface with the capabilities a future C2 system like the one I have described can provide to BOS synchronization during all phases of mission planning, preparation, and execution. I have described the capa- Figure 5. Commanders at all levels will be able to see the enemy, the terrain, and their bilities our future digitial command and unit, and the relationship of all three. control systems should have. Our cur- rent C2 systems are cumbersome, and vehicle commander to view the screen ing to talk to any of his subordinate fail at their primary task — to help the while fighting from outside his turret. commanders or staff (he does not have commander “visualize the battlefield.” Finally, all of the digital information to ask for anything!). Future systems must help the com- must be sent and received using a sepa- mander see the enemy, see the terrain, rate digital radio that does not interfere The future C2 system will enhance and see his unit at critical points during with voice traffic. With advances in the way we conduct our orders process. the battle so he can make the right de- technology come changes in organiza- For example, brigade would call the cision to positively influence the out- tions and tactics, techniques, and pro- task force to tell them that brigade come of the battle. As witnessed during cedures. This new capability forces us graphics and OPORD are in the com- Rotation 94-07, IVIS and B2C2 are a to look at new ways to operate. Every puter. The TF TOC would display the step in the right direction, but our fu- combat vehicle (to include scout, ADA, brigade graphics and print out a large ture digital systems must be improved engineer, artillery, mortar, chemical, graphic picture in color and the to truly revolutionize the way we fight. 1 etc.) should have a basic computer sys- OPORD on 8 ⁄2 x 11" paper minutes tem. The TF TOC should have three later. The staff would use the large pic- advanced computer systems (S3, S2, ture with brigade graphics (to include FSE). The CTCP and field trains CP intel, fire support, engineer, and CSS) shouldalsoeachhaveanadvanced to conduct mission analysis, COA de- computer system. Each staff section velopment, and wargaming. Once the Major Tim Cherry was com- would display the graphics and sym- commander decides on a course of ac- missioned in Air Defense Artil- bols necessary to track its part of the tion, the staff would complete the lery from Florida State Uni- battle. During battles, each would track OPORD, input the TF graphics and versity in 1979. A graduate of the battle “real-time” without the need OPORD into the computer, and notify ADOBC, AOAC, and CGSC, for maps, acetate overlays, and having co/tms and slice. Co/tms and slice he served as a SHORAD pla- to move map symbols. The staff could would display the TF graphics, print then analyze the battle from their BOS out the OPORD, and begin their orders toon leader, XO, asst. S3, perspective to help the commander process. Co/tm and slice commanders and C Battery commander “visualize the battlefield.” The com- will still go to the TOC for OPORD with 1-59 ADA; as asst. S3, mander can fight out of his tank/IFV or briefings and face-to-face guidance, adjutant, B Troop command- a BCV-type command and control ve- while their XOs plan concurrently. er, and regimental asst. S3 hicle. This dynamic system will auto- With this technology, the staff and with 3d ACR; as brigade asst. matically update its screen with new commanders will be able to access S3 with 5th ID and squadron friendly and enemy information, allow- higher echelon plans and orders, giving S3 with 2d Squadron, 1st ing the commander to see the enemy, them the ability to conduct concurrent Cavalry; and most recently as the terrain, and his unit, and the rela- planning at all levels. One change this the senior battle staff analyst tionship of all three at the same time future C2 system requires is that the (Figure 5). This type of accurate visual co/tm XOs can no longer fight from a fortheArmorTaskForce information will enable the commander combat vehicle. They must process in- Training Team (COBRAs) at to make the right decision with regard formation and run the co/tm command the National Training Center. to maneuver, fire distribution, commit- post (CP) as they do in cavalry troops. He is currently the XO/CSS ment of forces, and use of combat mul- Co/tm and slice CPs would have an ad- trainer for the Armor Task tipliers — and he can access this infor- vanced computer system, along with Force Training Team. mation from his computer without hav- both a large and small printer. Once the

18 ARMOR — November-December 1994 Auftragstaktik:

takes are survivable and accepted as part of It’s More Than Just a Word leader development. This is crucial if subor- dinates are expected to exercise initiative. by Captain Ronald J. Bashista This explanation makes it clear that Auftragstaktik is not simply a term describ- ing a method of operating as a unit. It is a culture. Taken in its purest form, as it was originally conceived, the word describes a Auftragstaktik is a German term used quite freely in our army, culture within the profession of arms. We cannot wake up one particularly in the armor/mech community, as a description of how morning and decide we are going to practice mission-type orders we do business. But what, exactly, does this word mean? To that day. Cultures develop over long periods of time, and if not many, it means nothing more than its rough, literal translation — practiced are soon extinct. We must practice mission-type orders “mission-type orders,” or orders giving great latitude to subordi- every day, in everything we do as an Army. nates in regard to mission accomplishment. The subordinate is Our present educational system fulfills the elements of profi- given a mission, and left to his own initiative in its execution and ciency and obedience. Young officers receive a thorough ground- accomplishment. But a closer examination may reveal that this is ing in the technical aspects of their branch in the Basic Course. an imprecise and incomplete understanding. When they graduate, they are reasonably proficient in the basic The most reliable source for an explanation of auftragstaktik, skills of their trade, and additional proficiency comes with experi- would be the originators of the term — the German Army. During ence at their first duty station. Branch advanced courses bring a a recent staff ride conducted with the Bundeswehr, German offi- greater understanding and appreciation of the commander’s intent, cers gave the following explanation to a group of American offi- which is addressed as the focal point for all tactical and opera- cers about the German concept of the term: Auftragstaktik is com- tional planning. At this point, we have an officer who knows how prised of four essential elements — obedience, proficiency, inde- best to employ his weapon systems to achieve the desired endstate pendence of action, and self-esteem. In order for auftragstaktik to of his superior commander. exist, all four elements must be present. The final elements necessary to practice the culture of mission- Obedience. In the framework of auftragstaktik, obedience refers type orders are the most difficult to develop. The desire to succeed to strict adherence to the intent of the higher commander, ex- tends to quell our willingness to allow subordinates independence pressed in terms of purpose, method, and endstate. The method of action. The old maxim — about wanting something done right will probably be the least specific of the three, giving subordinates and doing it ourselves — trips us up every time. We feel that by the maximum opportunity to exercise initiative in pursuit of the controlling every aspect of what our subordinates do, our intent endstate. The subordinate ensures that any initiative he exercises will be more readily accomplished, but in doing this, we fail to adheres to and supports the commander’s intent. develop our subordinate leaders. We must allow subordinates to Proficiency refers to technical and tactical competence on the develop their own methods to accomplish given missions. When part of leaders at all levels. In order for auftragstaktik to work, they fail, we must allow them to survive and learn from their mis- leaders must be well grounded in their profession, understanding takes. We must continue to develop them without crushing their not only their own branch’s capabilities, but also the capabilities self-esteem and willingness to take risks. of other branches. They must understand the application of all bat- Auftragstaktik works, and is borne out by historical examples tlefield operating systems and be able to synchronize all available ranging from Napoleon’s marshals to the German storm troop de- combat multipliers. The educational system of the Army must fos- tachments of the World War I. Well-trained small unit leaders, ter this. Training must focus on combined arms. Proficiency builds accustomed to seizing the initiative and exploiting it, are the keys outside the school system and unit with a rigorous program of to successful military operations, and in the fast-paced world of professional self-development. The end result is a leader capable armor-mechanized operations, such leaders are crucial. Given this, of taking broad guidance and exercising initiative in an intelligent, we must fully understand and correctly implement the mission- effective manner, reflecting the intent of the higher commander. type order culture that we are so quick to embrace as our way of Independence of action. The four elements which comprise doing business. We must practice it on a daily basis. We must auftragstaktik are equally important, but if one element is at the discipline ourselves against the tendency to micro-manage. In our “heart” of the term, it would be independence of action. The subordinates, we must foster the willingness to take calculated higher commander allows his subordinate a great deal of latitude risks. Then we must take the time to evaluate their successes and in the execution of a mission, allowing the subordinate to seize the mistakes, and develop them accordingly. When we do this in our initiative as it presents itself. This necessitates leader presence for- regular course of business, then we have truly understood and ward, at the decisive place on the battlefield. From this vantage adopted the mission-type order culture. The dividends which will point, he can exercise the freedom he has been given to influence follow on future battlefields will be well worth the effort. the battle, tailoring the actions of his unit to take advantage of the tactical situation he sees. Self-esteem. The subordinate leader must possess a high degree Captain Ronald J. Bashista received his Regular Army commis- of self-confidence, and he must feel that his superiors have an sion in Armor as a 1989 Distinguished Military Graduate of Western equal degree of confidence in his abilities. This develops through New England College ROTC. He served as a tank platoon leader in training. During training exercises, superiors encourage the subor- DESERT STORM with 1-35 Armor, 1st AD. He has also served as a scout platoon leader, tank company executive officer, HHC ex- dinate leader to exercise initiative in the execution of a mission, ecutive officer, and battalion motor officer. He is a graduate of and he is not penalized if his initiative fails. He is not made to feel AOBC, BMOC, AOAC and FAOAC. While attending AOAC, he par- that he personally is a failure. Leaders analyze his actions, identify ticipated in the Huertgen Forest Staff Ride with the Bundeswehr. his shortcomings, and from this, a lesson is learned. Honest mis- He currently serves as the adjutant for 3-8 Cavalry, 1st CD.

ARMOR — November-December 1994 19 Running Checkpoints Was a New Mission for The 10th Mountain Division’s 3-17 Cavalry, But Such Missions May Become Common

Ground Cavalry Checkpoint Operations In Somalia by First Lieutenant John Williamson

The announcement that the 10th perience of our DESERT STORM vet- With the initial intent of securing hu- Mountain Division had been selected to erans, FM 7-98 (Operations in a Low- manitarian relief organizations, rather deploy to Somalia came as a surprise. Intensity Conflict), the initial plan of than actively pursuing unlawful ele- Although we are a rapid deployment the 10th Mountain Division’s Second ments, we anticipated that our check- contingency force, our focus had been Brigade, and the principles of METT-T, points would be set up on a one-way toward fighting dismounted light infan- A Troop established an SOP for con- road, such as the entrance to an assem- try in a constricted environment. Even ducting checkpoints. bly area or feeding center. We also an- though specific units beyond the divi- ticipated that the checkpoints would be A Troop deployed at approximately sion ready force (DRF) Infantry Battal- 60 percent strength. This reduced us in built-up areas during daylight. Our ion had not been designated to deploy, plan called for the use of available bar- all units began preparations, including from our authorized 18-man, 6- rier materials — concertina wire, logs, the divisional cavalry squadron, the 3d HMMWV platoons to 12-man, 4- rocks, and debris — to slow and chan- HMMWV platoons. Our vehicles were Squadron, 17th Cavalry, which rede- armed with TOW 2 missile systems, nel vehicles into an inspection zone ployed from a field training exercise on (Figure 1). 2 December 1992. MK 19 grenade launchers, M2 .50 cali- ber and M60 machine guns. The TOW system could be dual mounted with an A minimum of six personnel, or a Upon notification of deployment for scout section, would operate the check- Operation RESTORE HOPE, A M60. point. After guiding the vehicle to the Troop/3-17 Cavalry, the organization’s Our initial threat analysis was very proper location, a four-man inspection ground troop, began preparing for the limited. The Marines had experienced team would search the vehicle and its potential missions we might be called only light resistance in their occupation occupants. Two members of the team upon to execute. Focusing on the So- of Mogadishu, and we expected to en- would conduct the actual inspection malia mission as a humanitar- counter even less in the rural environ- (Figure 1, items 2 and 4), while the ian/peacekeeping operation, special at- ments we were to operate in. However, other two provided close support with tention was paid to training for check- the potential for strong opposition was M16 rifles (items 3 and 5). A crew- point operations. This task was not in- always present. Thus, we planned for served weapon mounted on a cluded in our Mission Essential Tasks the greatest amount of control and se- HMMWV positioned at the exit of the List, and consequently had not been curity possible with our limited man- checkpoint would provide a show of previously trained. Drawing on the ex- ning strength. force and added firepower. The other

20 ARMOR — November-December 1994 In planning for the checkpoint, one of the most significant concerns was ex- peditiously processing vehicles. Many Somali trucks carried as many as 20 to 30 passengers and the process of un- loading, inspecting, and releasing a ve- hicle could take considerable time. Therefore, we attempted to develop a faster system. Another unexpected development was that we were not establishing the checkpoints in a built-up area, as we had planned. Nor was the road the one- way street we had expected. Further- more, the road was so deteriorated that, during daylight hours, vehicles would travel on improvised “camel paths sev- eral meters to each side of the main thoroughfare. These factors made it dif- ficult to channel traffic. The limited barrier materials available, and the tem- porary duration of the checkpoints, re- stricted us to the use of concertina wire and our HMMWVs to channel the ve- hicles into the inspection area. section of the scout platoon would be and it was believed that bandits used it some distance away, ready to double at night to harass the local villages and Although we had planned for it, we the strength at the checkpoint, if to travel to and from Mogadishu. In ad- had not anticipated conducting check- needed. Our manning strategy allowed dition to its other missions, A Troop points at night. The issue of effective for a 12-man platoon to conduct a was ordered to establish checkpoints observation for our overwatch elements checkpoint for approximately 12 to 18 along this route. The commander’s ro- was critical due to our limited night vi- hours. As a final precaution, we tational schedule called for two pla- sion capabilities. The troop was planned to dig shoulder-depth bunkers toons conducting reconnaissance mis- equipped with only PVS-5s and PVS-2s. within the checkpoint area to protect sions during the day with the third pla- dismounted personnel if an intense fire- toon executing a checkpoint along the In executing our night checkpoints, fight erupted. If available, we would MSR at night. we stuck with our basic plan — one emplace claymore mines as a last re- section conducted the search and pro- sort. Fortunately, the troop had over As with all missions, the factors of vided close support while the other three weeks to train before deployment, METT-T influenced our execution, and provided additional overwatch and rein- exercising our checkpoint SOP numer- adjustments to our plan had to be forcement. We selected checkpoint loca- ous times. made. The mission did not call for con- tions away from population centers to When A Troop arrived in Somalia on trolling access to a fixed base, but reduce civilian foot traffic. Next, we 7 January 1994, we immediately began rather inspecting all civilian traffic for tied in our positions with natural barri- conducting convoy security and zone weapons, obtaining human intelligence ers, such as irrigation canals, in order reconnaissance missions out of the bri- and discouraging bandit movement. to restrict the movement of vehicles off gade assembly area at Bale Dogle, an the road. Finally, to counteract limited old Soviet air base 70 miles west of At this point, our threat analysis had visibility, we improvised, using vehicle Mogadishu. In mid-January, the troop developed into a clearer picture. There headlights to control traffic and TOW deployed to a rural area southwest of had been very little violent activity out- missile thermal sights to provide effec- Mogadishu to participate in a week- side of the population centers of tive overwatch. long squadron zone reconnaissance. Mogadishu and Kismayu. The inci- The area was flat, with scattered vil- dents that had occurred in the rural ar- The section conducting the check- lages, each ranging in population from eas had been between local civilians. point would stagger two HMMWVs on 50 to 5,000. Our primary objective was There had been no coordinated or even the road, oriented in opposite directions to display a military presence within random violent acts directed toward (Figure2).TheseHMMWVswould the sector in order to frustrate the U.S. forces in the troop sector. On the mount an M60 machine gun and an movements of unlawful elements and contrary, the vast majority of So- M2 .50 cal respectively. This configu- discourage banditry. A major north- malians had been extremely friendly ration provided headlight illumination south MSR passed through the sector, and receptive to our presence. in both directions and provided over-

ARMOR — November-December 1994 21 without the interpreters’ assistance, we would have obtained much less human intelligence, given our limited language skills. Upon redeployment, A Troop revised the Mission Essential Tasks List to in- corporate lessons learned in Somalia, to include checkpoint operations. Al- though a keen eye will be able to dis- cern several weaknesses, A Troop’s checkpoints were successful and the mission was accomplished. A cavalry scout platoon operating in a more hostile or constrictive environ- ment would undoubtedly need further adjustments. Ultimately, A Troop exe- cuted numerous day and night check- points, resulting in the seizure of sev- eral weapons and the gathering of criti- cal human intelligence regarding bandit activity. Human intelligence gathered from a checkpoint operated by A Troop led to the discovery on the following day of one of the largest weapons caches seized during Operation RE- STORE HOPE.

Ground components of A Troop, 3/17 Cav recently deployed to Haiti and were stationed in Port-au-Prince as this issue neared publication. watch and immediate suppressive fires with a TOW missile thermal sight and from both weapon systems, regardless a Mark 19 grenade launcher. The gre- of the direction of approaching traffic. nade launcher provided extra punch for any long range contacts, while the The section would maintain strict TOW sights acted as the eyes of the light discipline until a vehicle ap- overwatch element, allowing it to gain proached to within about 25 to 50 me- detailed information about approaching First Lieutenant John Wil- ters. Then the OIC would direct the ve- traffic. Before a vehicle came within liamson received his ROTC hicle headlights to be turned on and an 2,000 meters, the inspection team knew commission from Dartmouth interpreter gave instructions to the ve- the type of vehicle and the number of hicle occupants. This inevitably caught occupants to expect. A proficient TOW College in 1990. He holds a the approaching traffic by surprise and gunner could even determine the load BA degree in Government. A brought it to a halt. While the crew- being carried in a farm produce truck. graduate of Armor Officer served weapons provided overwatch, Interpreters were of immeasurable Basic Course, Scout Platoon the inspection teams approached the Leader Course, Junior Main- vehicles and searched them. As re- value at our checkpoints. A counter-in- telligence team of two personnel and tenance Officer Course, and hearsed, each inspector had an M16 one Somali interpreter was usually at- armed guard. The inspectors carried 9- Airborne School, he served mm pistols to allow more freedom of tached to each platoon when conduct- as platoon leader of 2d Pla- ing missions. The interpreter generally movement and to reduce the risk of a accompanied the checkpoint OIC and toon, A Troop, 3-17 Cavalry hostile Somalian seizing a rifle when in interrogated the vehicle occupants from Jan 92 to Jan 94, and close contact. while other inspection team members as squadron maintenance of- The TOW missile thermal sights pro- searched the vehicle. A close working ficer (BMO) from Jan 94 to vided an unanticipated advantage. Set relationship developed with the more the present. approximately 100 meters off the road, reliable interpreters. Although A Troop the reinforcing section was positioned could have conducted checkpoints

22 ARMOR — November-December 1994 The Army’s New Mission — Backing Up a Marine Amphibious Landing Armor in Support of OMFTS by Major R.W. Lamont

The term Operational Maneuver consistent with the operational de- mand that ground combat power only From the Sea (OMFTS) is new to mands of an uncertain world. be employed against high-value objec- most soldiers. A wargame at the Ma- tives. A digitized battlefield is used rine Corps Combat Development Cen- only to focus on the enemy and mass ter, in Quantico, Virginia, tested this TheNatureofMaritimeCampaigns the effects of combat power to disrupt warfighting concept in December his operational tempo. Sensors are 1992. In analyzing power projection In the past, the focus of an amphibi- fused onto a common battlefield pic- issues, the game players emphasized ous assault was the Force Beachhead ture that guides decentralized execution the need for flexibility, tactical sur- Line (FBHL). The intent of such an by combat forces ashore and afloat. prise, and speed relative to the en- operation was to gain a lodgement These actions are consistent with the emy.1 The purpose of this article is to area of sufficient size to ensure unen- commander’s intent, as they are based discuss the role of the Army’s Armor cumbered unloading of combat power on a common command architecture. Force in OMFTS and OMFTS envisions its ability to contribute avoiding enemy com- to battlespace domi- bat strength while de- nance in the littoral re- stroying the political, gions. military, and economic sources of such Armor has tradition- strength. ally played a support- ing role in amphibious As with airborne op- operations. However, erations, combat power the scope of these op- during OMFTS must erations has ranged be built up from zero. across the full opera- The projection of tional spectrum. In ground combat power World War II, the cen- is directly tied to the ter task force that ship-to-shore move- seized Oran, Algiers, ment. This process is, included the 1st Infan- in turn, linked to the try and 1st Armored characteristics of the Divisions. The tactical landing craft that move scheme involved a the troops and their as- double envelopment of sociated equipment to the city, with the infan- the beach. The interac- try on the inner ring tions between these and the armor on the craft and the unique outer ring. This effort environmental setting placed 3,245 vehicles ashore and cov- ashore. This approach is passive in of a scenario drive the feasible opera- ered an area 70 miles wide by 15 execution if the landing force looks tional schemes open to a commander. deep.2 By present standards, this land- inward toward geographical objectives that fail to meet the operational de- Figure 1 outlines the build-up of ing was a herculean effort. combat power ashore over time. The mands of the campaign. The Anzio transition has two phases. In the surge As the armed forces continue to landing is an example of the stagna- draw down, each component will find tion that can result from turning in- phase, the early part of the landing, assault assets are moved ashore as itself facing new and expanding duties ward. to met national strategy commitments. rapidly as possible. In this phase, lim- The requirement for the Army to pro- its on landing craft, both surface and vide heavy forces in the conduct of OMFTS envisions a disconnected air, coupled with the queuing dynam- OMFTS is real. A recent memoran- and non-linear battlefield. The princi- ics of assault shipping, constrain the dum of understanding between the pal defeat mechanism of the landing ability of the commander to place Army and the Marine Corps high- force is coherent maneuver against the combat power ashore. Following the lights the tasks ahead needed to en- opponent’s center of gravity. The limi- initial surge, landing assets that will sure a power projection capability tations of constrained shipping de- complete the transfer of combat and

ARMOR — November-December 1994 23 Build-up of Combat Power Ashore Over Time

tions together in the chaos of the early hours ashore.

TheRoleofArmyArmor

Under the Army and the Marine Corps memorandum of understand- ing, the Army will provide additional armor to support OMFTS. Since the Marine Corps has organic armor bat- talions, the Army will normally be providing a brigade-size force OP- CON to the MEF commander. It is envisioned that the armor brigade will Figure 1 not make amphibious assaults, but will fight inland as part of the expedi- tionary campaign. This approach is supporting units circulate between the have communication packages that al- consistent with the Army’s experience transport shipping and the landing low the tank company commander to in World War II. During the Sicily sites. call for the massive volumes of sup- landing, a brigade of the 2d Armored porting fires needed to ensure maneu- Division was held off Licata as the floating reserve for the 3d Infantry ver in the face of superior numbers 3 TheRoleofMarineArmor ashore. Their ability to dominate the Division. It is expected that the ar- direct-fire envelope ensures the mor brigade will transition ashore dur- Three types of Marine armor play a MAGTF commander will present his ing the circulation phase of the land- key role in the surge phase. The first enemy with expanding tactical threats ing process. Finally, this brigade will is the Light Armored Reconnaissance that are difficult to counter. not subdivide its units, except engi- (LAR) unit, a combined arms forma- neer and field artillery, during opera- tion built around the Piranha family of One key to Marine armored warfare tions inland. wheeled fighting vehicles. They can during OMFTS is the combined arms Three OMFTS principles are directly move ashore by helicopter or Landing nature of its organization and opera- supported by the capabilities of the ar- Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC). These tions. The LAR unit provides the mor brigade: exploiting gaps, flexibil- units perform cavalry functions, and timely information fast-paced opera- ity, and momentum. The notion of ex- serve as an advanced force shaping tions demand. Combined arms teams, ploiting a gap is not new to Army op- the battlefield for the heavier forces backed by a full array of indirect fire erations. In the past, these gaps have that follow. They use speed and their systems, are able to mass and strike been largely geographical and physi- ability to call in massed indirect fire enemy weakness. They then disperse cal in nature. The armor brigade is from aviation and Naval Surface Fire before presenting a high-value target able to push through or around an en- Support to offset their light weight to the opponent’s fires. Habitual rela- emy that has been fixed in position. and relatively few numbers. tionships, forged during deployments Further, it has the mobility to carry and combined arms exercises, provide The second player in the surge pe- the battle deep beyond the ground riod is the Assault Amphibious Vehi- the glue needed to hold these forma- striking range of some MEF assets. cle (AAV), a tracked APC unique to the Marine Corps that serves to move infantry directly across the beach and into the zone of action. These vehicles are attached to infantry units to form mechanized infantry capable of keep- ing pace with the other mounted play- ers on the battlefield. Tanks, combat engineers, and other arms are task-or- ganized into the habitual combined arms teams built around these mecha- nized infantry formations. AAVs re- quire no lift assets to make their ship- to-shore movement, so they contribute directly to the large spike of combat power during the surge phase. Finally, Marine tanks move ashore on LCACs to support and maneuver with the other players in the Marine Air/Ground Task Force. These M1A1s Photo courtesy of General Dynamics

24 ARMOR — November-December 1994 But exploiting gaps is not limited to while being supported by a full range Notes the context of time and space. There of naval power offshore. may be exploitable gaps in the en- 1“Operational Maneuver From The Sea 29 emy’s warfighting ability — perhaps a Nov-4 Dec 92,” Studies and Analysis Division, weakness in his night fighting capabil- MCCDC, Feb 1992, p. ii. ity or an overly centralized command Conclusions and control system — that may be tar- 2Howe, G.F., Old Ironsides, Combat Forces gets for the armor brigade. Press, Washington, D.C., 1954, pp. 21-47. Seafaring nations have always prof- OMFTS demands flexibility to pro- ited by exploiting the inherit strategic 3D’este, Carlo, Bitter Victory, New York, vide the commander a wide range of mobility afforded them by using the N.Y., Harper Collins, 1988, p. 146. tactical options. Increasing the avail- sea as an avenue of approach. The ability of armor-protected, highly ma- ability to dominate the land and strike neuverable, and hard-hitting units sup- the enemy’s center of gravity is con- ports battlefield dominance by giving tingent on projecting a GCE with the thegroundcommanderawidearray prerequisite strength and mobility at Major R.W. Lamont, a 1978 of options to throw at, and around, the the deceive moment. Some scenarios graduate of the United States enemy. This in turn complicates the will require the Army to provide addi- Naval Academy, was commis- enemy’s dispositions, since he can tional armor support to the Marine sioned a 2LT in the USMC. Af- never be certain which course of ac- Corps to achieve this battlespace ter completing The Basic School tion his opponent will execute. dominance. at Quantico, Virginia, he at- Momentum is improved since the ar- The roles and requirements de- tended a similar program at Fort mor brigade is adept at concentrating manded of Marine and Army armor, Knox, was designated a tank of- combat power at the decisive point in within the context of OMFTS, are dif- ficer,andwasassignedtothe the battle. Its actions fix, confuse, and ferent and unique. Each is a key 3d Tank Battalion, Twentynine neutralize the enemy by integrating player in the various phases of power Palms, Calif. He served as a fires and maneuver at a tempo the en- projection into the littoral regions of tank platoon leader and XO for emy will find hard to counter. In addi- the Third World. This difference is re- tion, Marine ANGLICO (Air and Na- flected in the dynamics of our simple both a tank and headquarters val Gunfire Liaison Company) detach- combat power build-up model and in company, and participated in ments can provide the means for the the way these forces are trained, the formation of the Near Term armor brigade to tap naval fire sup- equipped, and organized. These subtle Preposition Ship (NTPS) pro- port and further improve the weight differences in operational charac- gram and Mechanized Test and momentum of the brigade’s teristics must not be lost as we re- Phase IV, which demonstrated blows. structure our armor forces for the way the Marine Corps’ ability to con- ahead. The interactions between the armor duct large-scale mounted opera- brigade and the Marine Ground Com- The inherent capabilities of the ar- tions. He also served as Marine bat Element (GCE) can force the en- mor brigade are consistent with the Detachment executive/guard of- emy into a dilemma: if he concen- principles of OMFTS. The potential ficer on the USS CONSTELLA- trates his combat power to face the role of the armor brigade to exploit or TION (CV-64), and was combat full weight of the armor brigade, he open gaps in the enemy’s defense can cargo officer on the USS CLEVE- will have to uncover areas along the ensure conflict termination on our LAND (LPD-7), involved in 31 shore, opening gaps that Marine units terms. The flexibility and momentum amphibious landings. In August can exploit, either operating from the that an armor brigade brings to the lit- 1985, he returned to the 3d sea or in a shore-to-shore mode, to toral region are an important step to- Tank Battalion as the assistant strike at his rear areas. Conversely, if ward battlespace dominance in the ex- operations officer and tank com- he disperses to cover the seaward ap- panded operating area envisioned with pany commander. He returned proaches, the armor brigade is pre- OMFTS. This increases in relevance sented an opportunity to overwhelm if the enemy has mechanized forma- to Fort Knox as an instructor for or bypass his defenses and crush him tions that can oppose the maneuver of the Armor Officer Basic Course, against the beach. the GCE. then the Armor Officer Ad- vanced Course. After receiving If, during the surge phase of the op- In future operations, all services his Master of Science Degree at eration, a port is captured intact, con- must seek ways to support the na- the Naval Postgraduate School, ditions may allow integration of the tional strategy and maximize their Army’s PREPO Afloat brigade di- contribution to the joint battlefield. he was assigned to the Studies rectly into the ongoing OMFTS OMFTS is a concept that calls for the and Analysis Division of the Ma- scheme. This approach is potentially integration of all services in the litto- rine Corps Combat Develop- the quickest way to counter an armor- ralregiontoachievebattlespace ment Command. He currently is heavy threat operating in the littoral dominance and victory. One of the the lead Marine analyst support- of interest. Once ashore, this joint key players on this future battlefield is ing the Joint Air Defense Opera- force is able to conduct a series of op- the Army’s armor brigade, supporting tions/Joint Engagement Zone erations intended to strike overland at the dynamic operations which are Test Team (JADO/ JEZ). the enemy’s key centers of gravity launched “...from the sea.”

ARMOR — November-December 1994 25 Clearing the Defile: A Doctrinal Discussion by Captain John W. Miller III

SSG Hughes did not like what he Analyze the Situation was seeing. His infantry squad was pinned down, and he no longer had Few leaders would argue the impor- communications with the vehicles. The tance of an intelligence preparation of enemy small arms fire that kept his the battlefield (IPB) when planning an element suppressed was the least of operation. An equal number will also SSG Hughes’s worries. The BMP tell you there is not enough time to do overwatching the trail was his biggest everything required. It does take time concern because he had no way to to do a detailed IPB, but it is time warn the approaching Bradleys of the well spent. With practice and the use danger — the company had changed of field manuals, you can complete frequencies and the RTO didn’t have your analysis fairly quickly. Focus the new one. One more time, SSG your effort on the terrain, weather, Hughes swore at his element for leav- and enemy, emphasizing their effects ing the antiarmor weapons on the on the operation. Bradleys. If they had their Dragons, or even the AT-4s, that BMP would not be a threat to the rest of his pla- Terrain and Weather toon. His thoughts of improving the PCIs and rehearsals were interrupted The defile drill is required because by the all-too-familiar sound of an M- terrain has so limited your actions that 2 moving deeper into the defile and you must completely change move- the sight of the BMP as it opened ment formations, techniques, battle fire... drills — virtually all aspects of how youplantofight.Itonlymakessense This event has not occurred in com- bat yet, but it does occur monthly at that a mission so dominated by terrain would focus on terrain analysis. When the National Training Center. Opera- conducting your analysis, focus on the tional results indicate that there is a lack of understanding throughout the military aspects of terrain by using Army about how to execute this mis- OCOKA, considering these things that are unique to defiles. sion. This article provides the com- pany/team commander with tactics, techniques, and procedures to success- Observation and fields of fire favor fully attack a defile defended by an the enemy. You must neutralize this enemy force. It is not the only way to advantage. • Lack of vehicle cover makes them accomplish this mission, but it will • Identify deadspace where the en- excellent ATGM targets. serve as a primer until you develop emy cannot see or engage you with • Available cover often precludes en- tactics and techniques you are com- emy engineer survivability effort. fortable with. direct fire. • Template overwatch positions These assets can be used else- Defiles and their impact on com- where you can place forces to sup- where. pany/team operations are often ig- port maneuver (this is critical be- nored unless the commander conducts cause reaction time is decreased Obstacles a thorough mission analysis. Once this and our weapons standoff is nulli- • Both man-made and natural obsta- analysis is complete, and the com- fied in the defile). cles influence the maneuver of any mander determines he has the mission Cover and concealment element entering the defile. to clear a defile, he must accomplish • Obstacles will reduce your ability several steps prior to crossing the line • Cover and concealment are nor- to maneuver, improve the enemy’s of departure. The first of these is the mally abundant for infantry but ability to engage your element, and analysis of the situation. scarce for trail bound vehicles. will assist any enemy withdrawal.

26 ARMOR — November-December 1994 • Defiles can be easily reinforced • Focus on terrain that affects the • Determine slow-go and no-go ter- with wire, mines, and log cribs. fight in the defile. rain — this helps you determine • Defiles occurring in ridges or rock • Consider terrain overlooking ap- what type of force leads and when formations may have bedrock proaches to the defile and terrain (infantry vs. vehicles). floors, preventing effective use of that dominates the defile exit. ditches and craters. Detailed terrain analysis requires Avenues of approach time to consider each of these factors • Evaluate to determine degree of and is essential to mission success. canalization, trafficability, and The commander suddenly issued a Key terrain amount of maneuver space in the FRAGO to clear a defile may not • Terrain that dominates, controls, or defile. have the time required to thoroughly influences avenues of approach. • Conduct an analysis of time and analyze all aspects of the terrain. • The defile you have been tasked to space factors, determine the length There are some aspects of OCOKA clear is higher headquarters key of the defile and how long it will that are more pertinent when planning terrain. take to clear. to clear a defile than others. It is criti-

ARMOR — November-December 1994 27 cal that the commander have a de- tailed understanding of the avenues of approach leading to, through, and ex- iting the defile to ensure he properly sequences his forces into the fight. He must also understand which ter- rain is key, i.e., the terrain that con- trols or dominates the fight in the de- file. This will provide terrain-oriented objectives for subordinate units to seize, facilitating clearance of the de- file. Finally, focus your analysis on the identification of man-made and natural obstacles. This is vital infor- mation when developing your scheme of maneuver and establishing the con- ditions that must be set prior to breaching obstacles in the defile. Figure 1. Example of a SITEMP for a defile clearing operation. When conducting the analysis of the situation, consider the effects of weather and its influence on your op- Composition and Strength complete, you have essentially devel- oped a doctrinal template. Modify this eration. Consider the trafficability • Determine what type of force you along avenues of approach and in the are facing and what type of equip- template, based on the enemy’s defile itself, for both mounted and dis- strength and the terrain to develop a ment they have. situational template that you can mounted forces. Analyze visibility to • Determine the number and types of determine how obscurants will per- vehicles and personnel in your area graphically depict and hand to your subordinate leaders (Fig. 1). form and the effects on optics (i.e., of operation. binoculars, day sights, etc.). Will ther- • Identify the type of reserve avail- The situational template focuses mals be required for vehicles, and if able. your forces and graphically depicts so, what about night vision devices wheretheyshouldlookforenemypo- for soldiers and small arms? How Disposition sitions while avoiding his kill sack. It long will NBC agents be effective? • Template enemy positions down to provides the basis for your observa- You must consider the effects on your vehicle/key weapon level. tion and direct fire plans and also pro- soldiers. What will the temperature • Determine locations of kill sacks vides requirements for indirect fire be? Will you need more water or a and subsequent positions. planning. Leaders at all levels must warming plan? What MOPP is re- • Identify type and location of confirm or deny the situational tem- quired, and how long can troops fight OP/CSOP. plate quickly in order to change or ad- in MOPP IV? Also consider the ef- just the plan as required. fects on equipment, especially in ex- Capabilities treme conditions. Do weapons require • How much artillery is in support Youmustalsodeterminetheen- special lubricants? What is the tem- and where will he employ it? emy’s most dangerous course of ac- perature and barometric pressure? And • Does the enemy have NBC, and tion. This will depict your worst case is there a plan for periodic updates? It will he use it? scenario and will allow you to de- is not enough to publish information • Can he reinforce his defense of the velop a plan in case the enemy is un- on wind speed and light data without defile? cooperative and does not do what you telling your units the effect of the expect. Ideally, your scheme of ma- weather on the operation. Now that you have answered these neuver will be able to defeat both en- questions, you can start to figure out emy courses of action. You must how the enemy will conduct the de- evaluate the chances of the enemy Enemy Situation fense. Initially, focus your effort on conducting what you consider to be what he will most likely do. Find out the most dangerous course — the Complete the analysis of the situ- what the enemy wants to do and how higher this percentage, the more your ation with a thorough study of the en- he will accomplish it, given his doc- scheme of maneuver must focus on emy forces, focusing on composition, trine. From this you can depict how defeating this COA. strength, disposition, capabilities, and he would position his forces without courses of action. Decide what the en- regard to terrain. Ask yourself what he Normally, a comparison of own emy can do to you and determine how is most likely to do, based on doc- troops available with the enemy’s you can best react to his actions. Use trinal norms. Where will he position composition and strength provides the the task force S2’s situational tem- his weapon systems, and why? Is he commander with an accurate force ra- plate, his analysis (paragraph 2 of the part of a security zone or the main tio. But typical force ratios may not OPORD), and subsequent intelligence belt, and how does this affect his ac- be as significant when fighting in the updates to accomplish this. tions? Once this thought process is defile. You want a 3:1 force ratio dur- 28 ARMOR — November-December 1994 ing attacks against a defending enemy, • Hand over battle to but terrain in the defile will limit the task force. size of the force you can introduce at • Continue the mission. any given time. Terrain is neutral, however, and will also limit the de- Phase 1 focuses on get- fender from employing all of his as- sets against you. ting combat power into the defile and postured to Plan to utilize available combat mul- begin clearing operations. tipliers to isolate enemy formations. The commander must Set conditions for assaults against por- first establish overwatch tions of the defending force, ensuring and destroy or suppress that other enemy positions are isolated any known enemy posi- by effective suppression and/or obscu- tions to allow forces to ration, or masked by intervening ter- approach the defile unim- rain. Determining how you can obtain peded. Artillery and an advantageous force ratio brings us smoke can be used with back to the importance of terrain great effect to assist this analysis and detailed depiction of the effort. Determine what enemy situation. These efforts will element will lead your provide you with enough information movement, based on the to develop a scheme of maneuver that enemy situation. Plan for masses your combat power and de- dismount points, ensuring stroys isolated enemy positions until that your force is covered he is forced to withdraw or die in the by direct fire as it moves defile. to these points. Dismount the infantry and get them oriented to the ground as Fundamentals for Clearing a Defile the Bradleys provide cover. This dismount The actual business of clearing the point should be in a posi- defile is time-consuming and re- tion that will secure a source-intensive. There are certain foothold for the com- fundamentals that optimize the pany/team to continue chances of success. The three phases the attack to seize the de- of the operation are shown below with file. The first phase of the tasks to be accomplished and the the operation is complete conditions that should be set before once the infantry is pre- starting the next phase. pared to conduct the movement to contact. Phase 1 - Approach The second phase of the operation, the actual Establish support-by-fire to sup- • clearing of the defile, be- press or destroy enemy forces. gins as quickly as the • Position infantry to clear the defile. first phase ends. The dis- Secure a foothold, and begin clear- • mounted infantry moves ing operation. forward on both sides of Figure 2. Dismount element clears pass for Phase 2 - Clear the defile high up on the Bradleys. walls. This provides them • Infantry conducts movement to with excellent visibility contact to make contact or seize and prevents the enemy objectives. Bradleys. As the infantry comes to a Mounted/dismounted integration from firing down on your infantry, • and possibly pinning them down. It is bend in the trail, or a terrain feature develops the situation. also easier to clear from top to bottom that would provide cover, they call the • Clear defile of all enemy and by- than the other way around. vehicles forward. This variation of pass or create lanes through all ob- bounding overwatch should continue stacles. Assign the dismounted element the until the defile is clear or contact is task of seizing objectives at the far made (Fig. 2). Phase 3 - Secure end of the defile. They then conduct a • Establish support-by-fire positions movement to contact to clear the de- Phase lines can be used to control the on far side to: file, which should be cleared once the movements. The key is to clear with - Defeat enemy counterattack. objectives are seized. The dismounts infantry, the smallest element making - Protect obstacle reduction effort. conduct the clearing operation, main- contact first, and then bringing the - Support continuation of TF attack. taining communications with the Bradley into the fight as needed. Upon

ARMOR — November-December 1994 29 The commander has to ensure that he can defeat an enemy counterattack and support the continuation of the task force attack while preparing to follow on in support of the task force, as required (Fig. 4).

Tactics and Techniques

The defile drill requires a great deal of centralized planning and execution. The commander should determine his Figure 3. Dismounted Infantry and BFVs work together to clear the defile. critical tasks and assign these to each subordinate element. Determine the critical event, and assign this as the making contact, the dismounted leader Thethirdphaseofthisoperationis primary task and purpose to the pla- must assess whether he can destroy or to secure the far end of the pass until toon that will be your main effort. force the withdrawal of the enemy the task force can pass through and Once this is decided, it is relatively force. The commander must commit pick up the fight. The company/team easy to determine the primary task the Bradleys to support the clearing must posture itself to defeat a possible and purpose for the other elements to operation if he cannot. This requires enemy counterattack, protect the re- support the main effort’s mission. crosstalk between mounted and dis- duction of the obstacles in the pass to As a general rule of thumb, tanks mounted elements. allow the TF unimpeded movement, should initially provide overwatch to The Bradley will be entering the and support the continuation of the TF allow infantry to enter the defiles. attack with direct and indirect fires. fight without an exact location of the They should also be prepared to as- The commander must develop control sault an objective on the far side to enemy and is relying on the dis- measures to orient his platoons as mounts to point them out. This must secure the defile or defeat an enemy be done through spot reports based on they exit the pass. The dismounts counterattack. Infantry should always should move to a position that allows be considered as two distinct maneu- planned graphic control measures or long-range observation and where identifiable terrain features. The dis- ver elements, one mounted, the other mounted leader has to quickly orient they can provide early warning of an dismounted. Dismounted infantry is enemy counterattack. The Bradleys best while on the ground, clearing the the BFV because exposure increases occupy support-by-fire positions with vulnerability. The dismounts provide defile to allow unimpeded movement suppression as the BFV attempts to designated sectors of fire. The tank for vehicles. Bradleys provide greater platoon exits the pass to occupy a destroy the enemy position (Fig. 3). firepower and protection against small support-by-fire position and is pre- arms and indirect fires in the defile The commander will normally have pared to provide security for the rest and are better equipped to continue of the company/team as the infantry the fight on the far side. They should some form of indirect fire at his dis- begins to reorganize and consolidate. posal but must consider the effects of be used to support the dismounted these systems in constricted terrain.

Dismounted and mounted infantry must be mutually supporting and should have, as much as possible, equal capabilities. Dismounted sol- diers should have antiarmor weapons and sufficient class V to sustain the fight and provide suppression to allow the mounted element to acquire and engage enemy vehicles. They should have a forward observer and the abil- ity to breach wire and mine obstacles.

It is a good technique to dismount an engineer squad with sufficient dem- olitions to clear several obstacles, us- ing the infantry to provide suppres- sion, obscuration, and security as the engineers breach and reduce the ob- stacle. Figure 4. Thedefileisclearandtheco/tmisposturedtocontinuethemission.

30 ARMOR — November-December 1994 of pyrotechnic signals. A colored star or parachute flare can signal that a lane is established as easily as a radio transmission. In fact, the pyro signal can inform everyone of a specific event if they know what the signals mean. Colored smoke and VS-17 pan- els are other methods of communica- tion; you are limited only by what is available.

PCIs and Rehearsals

Figure 5. Graphics illustrate the plan and aid understanding during all phases of The importance of proper pre-com- the operation. bat inspections (PCIs) is illustrated over and over again at the NTC. It is critical that leaders check soldiers and troops, as required, and to provide the positions are established throughout equipment. This sounds rational, and basis for the initial support-by-fire po- the zone of attack. These may move most leaders would agree, but one of sitions as the company/team exits the once the position is occupied or ob- the first events to go out the window defile. The company/team commander served. Subordinate units must under- during a time crunch is the PCI. The will have a command and control stand that the intent is to put effective commander must provide guidance for nightmare if he does not plan the op- suppressive fire on the enemy. Subor- the PCI by establishing what should eration adequately and redundantly. dinate leaders must understand they be inspected, who will inspect, and This type of operation is best exe- can move to accomplish this, if re- when inspections will be complete. A cuted when centrally controlled. There quired. Phase lines are used to control prioritized, comprehensive list will as- are many systems moving and shoot- movement and fires. Fratricide risks sist the conduct of a PCI and stand- ing in a small area. Additionally, there are decreased if the dismounts under- ardize what is checked for each mis- will probably be engineers with stand that they are to clear up to PL sion. PCI checks should include, but demolitions or a Combat Engineer Ve- Carp and the FSO knows that artillery are not limited to, some of the follow- hicle that can further complicate the fires cannot land short of PL Pike. ing items: operation. The fratricide risk is high, and only increases if the operation is Dismount points designate where the • Dismounted breach kits (ensure dismounting infantry will get off the kits are man-packable and include not controlled by one person. Assign- vehicles and start to lead the move- ing task and purpose goes a long way smoke pots) towards clear understanding of com- ment. This is developed using the • Radio checks and SOI data mander’s intent. The commander situation template and terrain analysis, • Boresights/zeros on all weapon and obviously does not prevent the in- systems should receive briefbacks from subor- fantry from dismounting sooner. The dinates upon completion of the opera- • Uniform common to all tions order to show they understand commander can also establish objec- • Graphics and maps tives and an axis of advance to orient Demolitions and engineer equip- the plan and their responsibilities. He and direct the infantry clearing opera- • should periodically check on the de- ment velopment of platoon orders to ensure tion. He must also develop direct fire • Night observation devices control measures that will allow him Vehicle tow hooks, pintles, pins, his intent is being met. Another effec- to lift, shift, distribute, and mass di- • tive C2 tool is a set of complete and tow bars, and cables detailed graphics that are drawn and rect fires throughout the zone of at- tack. issued as part of the order. Each Rehearsals are based on the time leader should enter every fight with a No discussion on command and con- available. There is no substitute for a set of maneuver graphics, enemy situ- trol would be complete without talk- rehearsal, especially if units are not ation template, fire support overlay, ing about communications. Every ele- used to working with each other and CSS graphics. These graphics ment must be able to talk to the other. (newly attached engineers, for exam- should extend down to the Bradley The commander must ensure all sys- ple). Focus the rehearsal on key commander and dismounted squad tems are operating either secure or events and tasks, consider the enemy’s leader level. A properly prepared set non-secure, but not a mixture of both. course of action, and incorporate com- of graphics provides guidance and il- Every leader and RTO should have bat multipliers that are available to lustrates the commander’s plan better complete SOI information for the cur- you. The commander will have to de- than words in an operations order rent and subsequent time periods. The termine what type of rehearsal he will standing alone (Fig. 5). The graphic company/team is operating in a pass, be able to conduct, but he should use control measures will vary by opera- and the topography may affect radio an actions and orders format. This for- tion, but should include whatever will operations. The commander must plan mat develops the situation and enables ensure execution of the plan as in- for redundant communications, the leaders to issue their orders based on tended. Ensure that support-by-fire most common method being the use that development. Rehearse the criti-

ARMOR — November-December 1994 31 cal event, even if that is all you have equipped with their bags to provide tional hand grenades, M203 rounds, time for. It is detrimental to mission immediate attention, and the medics and plenty of SAW/M60 ammunition. success to have the movement to the should stay forward as long as possi- One way to resupply infantry forward L/D well rehearsed but not the actions ble to sustain medical support. If pos- is to use empty litters to transport on the objective. Never assume that sible, organize litter teams from Class V. Two men bearing a litter can the enemy will do what you have sources other than dismounted infan- carry more ammo than two men with planned, and rehearse contingencies to try or vehicle crewmen. their hands and this gets two needed increase your flexibility to respond to Recovery is another concern based assets forward, the Class V and the a new development. Leaders at the on trafficability. You don’t really want litter. platoon level should rehearse “full- to recover for maintenance reasons, up” as much as possible to discover but you do want to be able to pull a problems early on. Commanders can vehicle blocking the lane out of the Conclusion facilitate this by setting out a priority way. It is not feasible to bring an M- of work in the warning order that fo- 88 up to recover a disabled or dam- Understanding the terrain and enemy cuses the dismounts in the proper di- aged vehicle, so you have to plan for situation and applying the fundamen- rection. Dismounted infantry tals of defile clearing will go a can practice movement tech- long way towards ensuring niques, actions on contact, and your unit doesn’t end up like breach drills. FM 7-7J has SSG Hughes’s. This mission, several battle drills that are The integration between infantry and like any other, requires focused applicable to actions that pla- infantry fighting vehicles is not some- planning and detailed prepara- toons can expect to execute in tion. Company/team command- a defile. Dismounted leaders thing that can be achieved the day prior ers must ensure they enter a de- ensure each soldier rehearses to leaving the L/D. Commanders must file with a well-thought-out dismounting with required fully develop this critical cohesion as plan, supported by graphic con- equipment and weapons. soon as possible. trol measures. The integration Bradleys rehearse, as a mini- between infantry and infantry mum, dismounted/mounted in- fighting vehicles is not some- tegration (for example, dis- thing that can be achieved the mounts calling forward vehi- day prior to leaving the L/D. cles and orienting them to a specific like-vehicle recovery. Ensure that each Commanders must fully develop this target), direct fire control, actions in vehicle has toe pintles and hooks critical cohesion as soon as possible. support-by-fire positions, and actions mounted prior to the operation and The proper employment of the correct on contact. has tow cables readily accessible. tactics, techniques, and procedures Crews have to be proficient in hook- during planning, preparation, and exe- ing vehicles up and quickly pulling cution will maximize your ability to Logistic Considerations them out of the way. These vehicles, defeat the enemy while protecting once out of the way, can later be re- your men and equipment. They are covered by maintenance assets. They the keys to mission accomplishment. There are some unique considera- also make a good covered position to tions when planning to support a de- place less critically wounded person- file-clearing operation that may re- nel awaited evacuation. Plan as well quire additional assets from higher for emergency resupply of both Class Captain John W. Miller III re- headquarters. Identify these early, and III and V. The dismounts may require submit requests so the affected agen- resupply while in the pass, while the cently served as a live-fire cies can respond in time. A chief con- Bradleys probably won’t need it until mechanized infantry company cern in a defile is medical evacuation they are through the pass. Depending team observer/controller at the of wounded soldiers, a problem com- on the time it takes to clear the pass, National Training Center. He pounded by inaccessibility and the tanks will probably only require fuel. previously commanded com- fact that traffic is one-way until the task force has cleared the restricted Small arms resupply should be con- panies in 3d Battalion, 7th In- terrain. Logistics planners have to de- figured for use, not given to dis- fantry, 24th Infantry Division velopanevacuationplan.Agood mounts while still in the shipping (M), including a tour during technique is to request additional am- crates. Plan to cross-level ammunition Operations DESERT SHIELD bulance support from the task force as soon as possible to continue the and DESERT STORM. His and establish a casualty collection mission on the far side of the pass. first assignment was with 2d point (CCP) as close to the mouth of This will sustain your operation if the Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d In- the pass as possible, while still allow- fuel and cargo HEMTTs are bumped fantry Division (M) in Ger- ing vehicular movement to the rear. by combat vehicles coming through many. He is a 1984 graduate Provide lead elements with medics the pass. of Old Dominion University. He and litters, establish litter teams, and Bradleys will require an HE-IT evacuate casualties that require imme- heavy mix of 25mm Class V when is currently a small group in- diate evacuation back to the CCP. conducting defile clearing operations. structor for the Armor Officer Combat lifesavers must be trained and Dismounted infantry will need addi- Advanced Course.

32 ARMOR — November-December 1994 It’s Time to Include Friendly Target Panels in Tank Tables VII and VIII Training Target Confirmation by Captain Robert S. Langol

Since Operation DESERT STORM, “well-oiled machine.” The cliché is upon his individual armored fighting the subject of fratricide has been dis- useful, however, for understanding vehicle and aircraft recognition cussed nearly constantly. Much of the need to change our gunnery ta- skills. This step is conducted prior to the discussion has centered on rec- bles. The correct method for firing the conduct of fire; that is, before the ommended technological solutions to the tank is set forth in our gunnery initial fire command is given. the problem. manuals, and has been developed The final step of the target acquisi- into a standard drill. The “well-oiled The generally accepted view is that machine” is the tank crew that, tion process is target confirmation. the majority of the fratricide inci- This step is conducted during the dents during DESERT STORM re- through use of drill, has reached the conduct of fire, or after the initial level at which engaging a target is a sulted from a disparity between the nearly reflexive process. Through elements of the fire command but be- range of modern weapons systems repetition and incentives, crew mem- fore the command of execution. It is and the resolution of our optical and defined as “the rapid verification of thermal sighting technology. The im- bers develop conditioned responses, the initial identification and classifi- such as reaction to a fire command. plication is that most of the tank-in- This level of conditioning is seen as cation of the target,” and it is con- itiated fratricide during DESERT ducted by both the TC and the gun- STORM occurred because tank com- protection against the fear and confu- ner.3 sion of combat. manders and gunners engaged targets The complete target acquisition and which they were unable to positively FM 17-12-1-1, 19 March 1993, identify as enemy. My own experi- Tank Gunnery (Abrams) Volume 1, engagement process for a precision main gun engagement usually fol- ence, however, leads me to believe describes accepted principles of tar- lows this pattern: search, detection, that at least some of the tank-initi- get acquisition and correct tech- ated fratricide during that war oc- niques for initiating direct fire at the location, identification, classification, initiation of the fire command (alert, curred at ranges close enough to al- tank crew level. Chapter 6 describes ammunition, description), confirma- low positive identification of vehicle the six steps of the target acquisition by type. I feel that at least some frat- process: crew search, detection, loca- tion, command of execution. This process includes two steps — identi- ricide incidents were the result of our tion, identification, classification, fication and confirmation — which own tank gunnery training methodol- and confirmation. Identification is ogy. If we want to reduce the inci- defined as “the friendly, hostile, or should prevent engagement of friendly dence of fratricide in future conflicts, neutral character of a detected poten- vehicles or troops. we must improve the way we con- tial target determined by its physical Effective tank gunnery training is duct tank gunnery training. Specifi- traits (such as size, shape, functional designed to translate this process, in- cally, we need to include friendly tar- characteristics).”1 Crews rely upon cluding these two critical steps, into get arrays in the intermediate tank their ability to recognize armored the series of conditioned responses gunnery tables. fighting vehicles and aircraft in order described above. to identify the specific type of target, Our tank gunnery manuals and or at least to “identify friend, foe, or Army regulations ensure a minimum The Nature of the Problem neutral.”2 standard for tank crew proficiency It is a cliché to describe the opera- The ability of a crew member to throughout the armor force. They tion of a fully-trained tank crew as a perform this step properly depends also have the effect of establishing ARMOR — November-December 1994 33 performance during tank gunnery as target arrays. Our crews learn ar- Recommended Solution the common yardstick by which tank mored fighting vehicle identification crews and units are measured and (AFVID) in garrison and are tested We fight as we train. It is unreason- compared. For example, no sane on it during the Tank Crew Gunnery member of the armor force should Skills Test (TCGST). Tank com- able to expect a tank commander or gunner in combat to remember to suggest that as much emphasis is manders and gunners also train the take an extra second to confirm his placed on UCOFT as on Tank Table entire acquisition and engagement VIII. process in the UCOFT. However, target if his training never before re- quired him to do so. If we want our Although there is often institutional these training events don’t carry the tank crews to perform target confir- same weight as live fire training. As pressure to reach a certain reticle aim we don’t present friendly target ar- mation, we should test whether or level, few battalion or brigade com- rays on individual tank crew ranges, not they do so during the intermedi- manders have the time to watch each ate tank gunnery tables. of their crews every time they fire a we don’t force crews to practice tar- get confirmation. Furthermore, scor- I propose that friendly target arrays UCOFT exercise. The point is that, ing is based on a combination of be presented during Tank Tables VII since the live fire training is per- formed under great scrutiny, any les- time and target hits (with adjust- and VIII. I believe that friendly pan- ments for safety, proper procedures, els should be raised in addition to sons learned on the range are likely etc). In short, during the culminating the enemy target panels during the to have a greater impact on the crew than those learned elsewhere. event of all tank gunnery training, existing tasks. Including a friendly when the pressure is really on, we vehicle panel as a separate task (as is Currently, our intermediate tank teach tankers to shoot the first big done in UCOFT exercises) would al- gunnery tables do not contain friendly hot spot down range. low crews to stop confirming targets 34 ARMOR — November-December 1994 after completing the “friendly task,” opment of a new thermal panel for perfect, and even an electrical firing and would be rendered useless if a the turret, unless two TU-2 panels inhibitor can be overridden. By em- distinct scenario cue were read. could be overlapped. The M2/M3 phasizing the importance of target However, if friendly vehicle panels panel uses the M5 BTR panel, but confirmation during tank gunnery were presented at the same time as displays the turret off-set to the right. qualification, we can significantly the enemy on all or decrease the risk of some of the engage- fratricide in future ments, then the tank conflicts. commander and gun- ner would have to confirm each target Notes before firing. Engage- ment of a friendly panel would be a 1FM 17-12-1-1, Tank crew duty failure, re- Gunnery (Abrams) Volume sulting in a thirty 1, 19 March 1993, p. 6-1. 4 point crew cut. 2FM 17-12-1-1, p. 6-22.

Creation of friendly 3 panels would be a FM 17-12-1-1, p. 6-25. relatively simple task. 4Crew duties penalty Panels would not points are listed in FM 17- have to be perfect 12-1-2, Tank Gunnery replicas of friendly vehicles. It would Ranges equipped with older target (Abrams) Volume II. 19 March 1993, pp. 16-13 suffice to have panels with distinctly panels could also present panels to and 16-14. replicate friendly vehicles. If, for in- different shapes and thermal signa- 5 turesthenthosebeingusedasenemy stance, enemy vehicles were repre- New Standard Targets are depicted in FM targets. The cost of procuring sented by rectangular panels, then 17-12-7, Tank Combat Training Devices, 11 friendly (or enemy) panels suffi- friendly vehicles could be octagonal March 1992, pp. 3-4 through 3-23. ciently detailed for target identifica- panels (see Figure 2). The exact tion training would probably be cost shape used for friendly and enemy prohibitive. Remember, the TCGST panels is irrelevant. As long as certifies a crew member’s AFVID friendly panels can be distinguished skills, and passing the TCGST is a from enemy, tank commanders and prerequisite for participating in live- gunners presented with both will be Captain Bob Langol was fire training. Tank commanders and forced to perform target confirma- commissioned through Du- tion. gunners with weak AFVID skills quesne University Army ROTC should never be allowed to fire live rounds. The purpose of adding in 1989. He served as a tank friendly panels is to reinforce target Conclusion platoon leader and tank com- confirmation as an essential element pany XO in 2-66 Armor, 2AD of the acquisition and engagement (FWD), and as mortar platoon As armor leaders, we must be cer- leader in 1-70 (CATF), 194th process. tain we are not taking the easy way SAB. A graduate of the Armor Friendly panels for ranges equipped out by accepting technology as the with New Standard Targets could be solution to the fratricide problem. Officer Basic and Advanced designed as shown in Figure 1.5 The The world may not wait for us to de- Courses, he is currently as- M1A1 panel is taller and wider than velopandfieldsuchasystembefore signed to A Troop, 3/16 Cav- the T72, and displays a larger, angu- our tanks once again board fast alry, Ft. Knox, Ky. lar turret. It would require the devel- ships. Furthermore, no new system is

ARMOR — November-December 1994 35 The Task Force Staff Ride: Enhancing Professional Development at the Battalion Level by Lieutenant Colonel Guy C. Swan III and Captain Neal D. Norman

The staff ride has we will define the been used for many staff ride, discuss years as a teaching our objectives, the vehicle within the importance of the Army’s professional site/battle selection, military school sys- why we chose tem. Some readers Alam Halfa, and may have partici- how we conducted pated in a staff ride the three principal while attending a phases of the staff branch school ad- TF 4-64 Armor, gathered for a staff ride at Alam Halfa Ridge in Egypt. ride. vanced course or at Command and Staff College and know that a well-exe- fection by Rommel, Montgomery, Background cuted staff ride requires a good deal Bayerlein, and others! In considering of individual study, preparation, and how to take advantage of this oppor- In March 1941, after the Germans tunity, we selected the staff ride to intervened in North Africa to prevent logistical support, all of which are an Italian defeat by British forces, available within the Army school sys- glean lessons of desert warfare that tem. Outside the “schoolhouse,” the might apply to our own training mis- German and Italian forces under the overhead required to conduct a good sion in BRIGHT STAR ’94. Further, command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel began a protracted and suc- staff ride may appear too extensive to narrow the scope of a staff ride to a and time-consuming to commanders manageable and meaningful exercise cessful campaign against the British of units with ongoing operational or for the junior officers of a battalion- Eighth Army. With wide flanking ma- size unit, we settled on the Battle of neuvers and surprising counterattacks, training missions. But the “school- Rommel pushed the Eighth Army to a house” need not be the only place for Alam Halfa Ridge, one of the series the staff ride. It can be tailored to of preliminary actions that set the defensive line at El Alamein by June conditions for the decisive El Alamein 1942. At El Alamein, he was only 60 meet the needs of leaders in compa- miles from his objective, the port of nies, battalions, and brigades in the campaign. Rather than focusing on field as an integral part of a unit’s Of- strategic and operational issues, Alam Alexandria. From there, Rommel Halfa would allow us to study tacti- planned to drive to the heart of the ficer Professional Development Middle East — the Nile Valley, (OPD) Program. The purpose of this cal-level operations on the same article is to show how one battal- ground we would have to “fight” on Cairo, and the Suez Canal. ion/task force (Task Force 4-64 Ar- in our own training exercise. We Axis forces tested the Alamein line mor (TF TUSKER)) used the staff wouldbeabletoexamineoperations from June to August 1942 with little ride concept to enhance its OPD pro- below the division level, where we success. British defenses grew gram and generate participant interest could readily grasp the lessons learned stronger with each passing day while in using military history as a profes- by soldiers like ourselves who fought both Churchill and Hitler urged their sional development aid. there over 50 years ago. commanders to attack. It was during Our primary reference for planning this period that Churchill placed Ber- and conducting the staff ride, and in nard Law Montgomery in command During the planning for BRIGHT of the Eighth Army. Shortly after as- STAR ’94, a biannual combined exer- writing much of this article, was the U.S. Army Center for Military His- suming command, Montgomery and cise with the Egyptian Army, leaders the Eighth Army fought the battle of the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regi- tory’s brochure, “The Staff Ride,” by Dr. William G. Robertson. This book- some historians call the “beginning of ment recognized that the force-on- the end” for Rommel in Africa. force maneuver area was located near let outlines the fundamentals of plan- El Alamein, site of the decisive battle ning, preparation, and execution of a staff ride, and is required reading for of World War II’s North African The Battle of Alam Halfa Theater of Operations during the fall any unit or class planning one. of 1942. What a great opportunity for To better understand how TF TUS- By August 1942, Montgomery’s a tank battalion/task force to be able KER conducted its staff ride, we will Eighth Army occupied a defensive to stand on the ground where mobile begin with some background and a line from the small trading post of El armored warfare was practiced to per- brief discussion of the battle. Then, Alamein on the Mediterranean Sea

36 ARMOR — November-December 1994 •

ARMOR — November-December 1994 37 The Battle of~~ " ,.. Alam Halfai AIedite.lTllllellll [Q] ROMMEL

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south some 60 km to the impassable 44th Infantry Oivision had prepared The British 22nd Armored Brigade Qattara Depression, which is just south strong defenses. was defending on the southwest end of the area shown on the map above. of the ridge, oriented south. The two Rommel. outnumbered in tanks and The attack began as scheduled at around 2400 hours on 30 August panzer divisions of the OAK moved infantry, planned to concentrate his 1942. Rommel's plan went awry northeast and attacked. The numeri­ forces and penetrate the British de­ early, as his lead units experienced cally inferior but better equipped fenses in the south (as he had done OAK began to take its toll on the several times earlier that summer) difficulty negotiating complex obsta­ cles previously reported as lightly de­ British, though the 22nd Brigade held during hours of darkness on 30 Au­ fended and easily breached. Units them off with the skillful commitment gust. The Afrika Corps (OAK) would of its reserve and by repositioning ar­ then rapidly exploit the penetration spent most of the night in the obsta­ cles and minefields. severely disrupt­ mor on its vulnerable left flank. When and move east 40 km into the Eighth darkness fell, the panzers were still Army's rear. At dawn, German forces ing Rommel's meticulously planned time schedule. Bogged down by the south of the ridge and easily detected would drive north to envelop the sur­ obstacle belt and soft terrain, and hit by the RAF night bombers. prised defenders, enabling them to be defeated in detail. hard by the RAF, the OAK had By morning on 1 September, only an moved east only 15 km by daybreak, understrength division of the OAK Montgomery expected an attack in instead of the anticipated 40 km. To could make any offensive effort. The the south and put most of his armor make matters worse for Rommel, the 22nd Brigade's dug-in forces held behind the forward defensive posi­ 21st Panzer Division commander was them off the ridge while the RAF con­ tions on or near the Alam HaIfa ridge. killed and the OAK commander was tinued to pound them from the air. His units in the south were to delay seriously wounded in the night's This, compounded by the Germans' the advancing Germans while the fighting. At approximately 1200 hours shortage of fuel, kept them from mak­ Royal Air Force (RAF) attacked the on 31 August, Rommel considered ing a serious effort to take the ridge, panzer columns. Montgomery antici­ calling off the attack. Surprise was and Rommel broke off the attack, or­ pated that Rommel would be forced to lost, the fuel situation was critical, dering his forces to withdraw. The tum north prematurely toward Alam and casualties were quickly mounting. German High Command had assured Haifa, where the 22nd (Br) Armored However, instead of calling off the at­ Rommel that fuel would be available Brigade (under the command of Colo­ tack, Rommel changed the OAK ob­ to his forces during the battle, but the nel G.P.B. "Pip" Roberts) and the jective to the Alam Haifa ridge. fuel never made it to the front. Rom-

38 ARMOR - November-December 1994 Above, LTC Swan and several olher members of his unit visit the EI A1amein Military Museum, where lhey met LTC EI Khoney, ttIe museum curator. Above right, the graceful arches atlhe entrance to Ihe war cemetery near the battle site. At right, Swan and CPT Norman prepare to brief other unit members at one of the in­ structional points 00 A1am Haifa Ridge.

mel conducted a phased retrograde cused on termin. historical baulefi eld • To better understand the human while receiving onl y limited anacks tours do not usually involve system· dimension of desert warfare opera­ from Allied ground forces. alic study and preparation. These vis· tions. Montgomery attacked the retrealing its will often stimulate thoughtful dis-­ • To re view the lessons of WWTI Gennans. mainly with artillery and cussion. but the objectives of such a desert operations and compare with air. while conserving his ground tour are much simpler than for either current U.S. Anny doctrine and les­ force s for a later offensive. a staff ride or TEWT. sons learned al the NTC and during A staff ride consists of the system· DESERT STORM. • To show the effects of termin on atic preliminary study of a selected plans and their execution. The Staff Ride campaign or battle. followed by an extensive visit to the actual battlefield. • To provide a case srudy in how Although the conduct of the staff It concludes with an opportunity to in­ logisti cs operations affect tactical op­ ride has evol ved since its inception in tegrate the lessons derived from the erations. the mid-nineteenth century. the con· • To encourage the officers of TF cept has remained basically the same home-study and on-the-ground experi· ences. It envisions maximum student TUSKER to study their profession - to place students on termin. con· through the use of military history. front them with a situation. and stimu· involvement before visiting the battle­ late them to reach conclusions from field to guarantee thoughtful analysis and discussion at the site. as well as the historical perspective. This me th­ Selecting a Battle odology differs significantly from two during the later integration phase. other teaching vehicles. the tactical The staff ride can be easil y tai lored Since each battlefield or campaign exercise wi thout troops (TEWT) and to focus on the training objectives set offers its own lessons. there are sev· the hi storical battlefield tour. by the command. It is a versatile eral fac tors involved in selecting the A staff ride uses the historical sce­ process that allows the participants to staff ride bailie. These are additional orchestrate the event to account for reasons we chose Alam Haifa: nario as the principal teaching tool. limited available stud y lime or other Set on the specific terrain on which competing training requirements. For • Access. TF TUSKER's deploy­ that scenario took place. a staff ride example. our objecti ves for the Alam ment to Egy pi gave us access to a bal· also involves a significant degree of Haifa staff ride were: tlefield with historical significance. preparatory study to full y draw out • Echelon of Command. The the lessons learned from an historical • To take advantage of a unique echelon of command we studied (bri­ ac ti on. A TEWT. on the other hand. opportunity 10 visit the site of one of gade and division) corresponded fa­ uses termi n as its focus. combining the most crucial mechanized battles vorably with the experience level of doctrine and a hypothetical scenario fought in the North Africa theater of the task force officers. This is an im­ to develop its lessons. Whi le also fo- operations during World War II. portant factor to keep in mind. Select

ARMOR - November-December 1994 39 a battle, or aspects of a battle, that are lion mines laid on the Alamein defen­ tour if the participants are not pre­ appropriate for the target audience. sive line were never cleared. pared. And in the case of TF TUS­ • Type of Terrain. Select battles • Source Availability. Staff rides KER, that battlefield tour would have that occurred on the type of ground on require some research and reading by degenerated into a useless walk in the which your unit may be called to all participants. This is necessary even desert. We used a combination of se­ fight. The Egyptian desert supported in a unit-run staff ride so that instruc­ lected readings, group lectures, and our objectives nicely as our unit is fo­ tors, students, and role players can OPD-type seminars beginning eight cused on the Southwest Asia AOR. adequately prepare for the field study weeks prior to our deployment. The • Type of Unit. Most battlefields phase. Sources can include history battalion commander designated four can support the training objectives of books, biographies, journals, docu­ company commanders as principal any type of unit combat, combat mentary videos or films, newspaper role players for Rommel, Montgom­ support, or combat services support. articles (microfiche) or interviews, ery, Roberts, and Colonel Fritz Bayer­ Our focus was on mechanized opera­ and should address not only the chro­ lein, Chief of Staff of the DAK who tions, but we also learned significant nology of the battle, but contemporary commanded the DAK during the bat­ lessons in each of the battlefield oper­ doctrine and equipment. With assis­ tle. During this phase the battalion ating systems. tance of the Combat Studies Institute commander facilitated discussion on • Integrity of Historical Setting. at Fort Leavenworth and the British topics concentrating on: Battlefields range from totally undis­ Armor School at Bovington, our pro­ ject officer found adequate material • Order of Battle. Unit sizes, desig­ turbed and well-preserved to nearly nations, armament, previous experi­ on Alam Haifa to help us prepare at obliterated by urbanization or other ence, qualitative advantages/disadvan­ factors. The Egyptian desert offered Fort Stewart. We also distributed pho­ tages. us the chance to see a relatively un­ tographs, diagrams, and characteristics of the armored vehicles used in the • Main weapon characteristics. changed battlefield. Though time and • Biographical background of key weather had covered the holes, old battle to provide additional context leaders (role players). and frames of reference. fighting positions and trench lines • Doctrine and tactics of opposing were clearly visible. Memorabilia like forces. rusty disintegrating fuel cans and even • Terrain analysis of the area of op­ half of a British helmet found by a Preliminary Study Phase erations. soldier added to the excitement of the • Weather and light data for the staff ride! We were, however, slightly Preliminary study at home station campaign. prepares the participants for the field limited in our exploration of the bat­ • Chronology of the campaign tlefield because we could not enter study phase. Otherwise, the staff ride events leading up to the battle of certain areas. As many as a half mil- becomes little more than a battlefield Alam Haifa. • Opposing commanders' intents, objectives, and goals of the opposing forces, and end state sought by both sides. Lieutenant Colonel Guy C. Swan III was commissioned in Armor upon • Role and influence of allies. graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1976. He served as a • Service support considerations tank platoon leader in 1st Bn, 72d Armor, 21D in Korea; as a cav pla­ and logistics. toon leader, troop XO, and adjutant for 3d Sqdn, 3d ACR; as com­ A variety of audio-visual training mander A Co, 2d Bn, 77th Armor, and as aide-de-camp to the CG, 9th aids can make the field study phase of ID (Motorized) at Ft. Lewis, Wash.; and as an Armor Branch assign­ the staff ride more interesting, adding ment officer at MILPERCEN. His more recent aSSignments include a sense of realism. Period maps, pho­ chief, G3 Plans, lAD, Ansbach, Germany, and lAD deputy G3 in tographs, drawings, newspaper head­ lines/articles, tape recordings, and ter­ Southwest Asia during DESERT STORM; XO, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR, rain boards help to augment the read­ Fulda, Germany; and regimental XO, 11 th ACR. He is currently the ings assigned in the preliminary study commander of 4th Bn, 64th Armor, 24th ID (M) in Ft. Stewart, Ga. He is phase. a graduate of AOBC, IOAC, Ranger School, CGSC, AOAC, Field Artil­ lery Officer Advanced Course, the Air and Staff College, and the De­ TF TUSKER was to operate in the same area during BRIGHT STAR, so fense Strategy Course. He holds a Master of Arts degree in National we had our own exercise map sheets Security Studies from Georgetown University and a Master of Military as visual aids for the Alam Haifa bat­ Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies. tlefield. And while history books also provide a good source of maps or Captain Neal Douglas Norman was commissioned as a Distinguished sketches, "GI-issue" military maps, Military Graduate from George Mason University in 1987. After complet­ overlayed with operational graphics. unit locations, and other designations ing the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course, he was assigned as a significantly enhance the picture for detachment commander, USASSD, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. He the participants. Our project officer served as electronic warfare platoon leader and company XO with Co went so far as to convert the historical C, 102d MI Battalion, and then as battalion assistant S3. After complet­ maps of Rommel's and Roberts' battle ing the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, he served a~ 1st plans to acetate overlays. When Bde assistant S2 until assuming his current position as battalion S2 for placed over the exercise maps, the 4th Bn, 64th Armor. time-space aspects of the battle of

40 ARMOR - November-December 1994 Alam Haifa became instantly real to had our final staff ride session after Our goal was not to create a group of all participants. returning to Fort Stewart. At this military historians, but to learn from point, we concentrated on tactical-op­ history and apply the lessons to our erational-strategic linkages, lessons profession. Field Study Phase learned from both forces by BOS, and After arriving in Egypt, TF TUS­ the conduct of combined arms opera­ tions in a desert environment. We also The next TF TUSKER staff ride is KER divided the field study phase now in the early planning stages and into six segment.,. took the opportunity at this session to because our experience in Egypt was solicit comments from the participants so successful, several officers have al­ • At Stand I, on the hill where the on the actual conduct of the staff ride ready volunteered to assist in the 22nd Brigade actually defended, and suggestions for future staff rides. "Colonel Roberts" and "General planning and execution of our next The Battle of Alam HaIfa staff ride staff ride. Drawing upon the historical Montgomery" led a discussion of the British tactical scheme. The stand was a great learning and team-build­ battle experiences of others is crucial was ing event, and we had fun in the proc­ in the development of professional reconnoitered in advance by the bat­ talion scout platoon and the 22nd's ess. Each officer in the group had soldiers, particularly for those with lit­ positive comments and expressed ap­ subunit battle positions staked out. tle or no combat experience. The staff preciation for the lessons learned. We ride offers a unique, rewarding, and • The German attack plan was kept our slice elements involved from fun way to apply military history to a briefed by "Field Marshal Rommel" the beginning and their participation unit Officer Professional Development and "Colonel Bayerlein" at Stand 2, helped solidify our unit relationships. Program. in the vicinity of the DAK penetration of the Alamein defensive line. • Travelling in HMMWVs over the DAK attack route to Deir el Ragil (where the Afrika Korps turned north Office, Mounted BaHlespace Integration toward Alam Haifa) gave participants (OMBI) appreciation for the difficult traffica­ bility facing the German advance. Effective immediately the Office of the Chief of Armor (OCOA) is subsumed • A follow-up discussion by role within the Office, Mounted Battlespace Integration (OMBI). This change is de­ players on the situation half-way signed to better fulfill CG TRADOC intent for the United States Army Armor through the battle from British and Center (USAARMC) to be the doctrine, training, leadership, organization, ma­ German perspectives took place at teriel, and soldier integrator for mounted warfare and mounted battlespace. Stand 3, near the 22nd Brigade's bat­ tle position. OMBI is responsible for several functions. Foremost, it serves as the primary • Another HMMWV ride over the point of contact and prinCipal entry point into USAARMC for coordination of DAK attack route to the position mounted issues that cut across proponent or functional lines. However, agen­ south of the ridge took us to the point cies external to Fort Knox are still encouraged to coordinate directly with Di­ where the German advance was rectorate of Combat Developments (DCD), Mounted Warfighting Battlespace stopped. Lab (MWBL), TRADOC System Manager-Abrams/Armored Gun System (TSM­ • A final group discussion of les­ ABRAMSlAGS), and the Armor School on issues within their specific areas of sons learned, conducted from Stand 4 responsibility . at a vantage point atop Alam Haifa OMBI contains the USAARMC Battle Lab Support Element (BLSE) within the Ridge, concluded the field study Mounted Battlespace Initiatives Division to coordinate support to other TRA­ phase of the staff ride. DOC battle labs, the Armor Proponency Division continues fulfilling AR 600-3 At each opportunity, the role players and AR 5-22 responsibilities, and the ARMOR Magazine. discussed the battle from their per­ COL Gary Krueger is Chief, Office of Mounted Battlespace Integration (OMBI). spective and read selected passages File symbol remains ATZK-AR. DSN 464-7809/1961/5155. from memoirs and unit journals to further illustrate the commanders' In conjunction with the organization of this new office, USAARMC has acti­ plans and concerns on the battlefield. vated a Mounted Battlespace Integration Bulletin Board. This BBS has been set up as a computer assisted information tool to support the Mounted Force During this phase, task force officers as it moves into the 21st Century. It has been established by the Chief of specifically addressed the chronology Armor to provide a central automated information collection and dissemination of the battle, as well as the role of fire point for people throughout the Mounted Force. Users of this board will be support (artillery and air), obstacles able to: and barriers, defensive theory versus the offense, the role of intelligence • Download professional files such as: and reconnaissance, and the effects of - The Armor Enlisted Professional Development Guide morale and human factors on the op­ - The Excellence in Armor Guide posing forces. - The Officer Professional Development Guide • Download information papers that the Chief of Armor publishes . • Interact with others through information forums (message bases). Integration Phase To access the office of Mounted Battlespace Integration BBS: Integration allows all participants to • Set your modem to 8-N-1. review the experience together. We • Dial commercial 1-502-624-3305 or DSN 464-3305.

ARMOR - November-December 1994 41 MILES Warfare with the Yugoslavian M84 Tank and the Russian BMP-2 by Staff Sergeant (P) Earl Barner and Chief Warrant Officer Two Bryan Jay Hinkel

During the month of September 1993, the Kuwaiti 8th Tank Battalion, 35th ‘Al Shaheed’ Brigade, and American Task Force 2-37, 3d Bri- gade, 3d Infantry Division, conducted joint training maneuvers during Exer- cise INTRINSIC ACTION 3-93. Part of INTRINSIC ACTION was four days of ‘force-on-force’ where Ameri- can M1A1/Bradley company teams at- tacked Kuwaiti company teams equipped with Yugoslavian M84 tanks (a T-72 variant) and BMP-2s in the defense. In order to make the exercise as realistic as possible, we installed MILES gear on both the American and Kuwaiti armored vehicles. The task of adapting U.S. MILES belts to Soviet bloc armored vehicles fell to the Special Forces teams work- ing with the Kuwaiti 8th Tank Battal- ion. Along with SSG Lenny Miles and Mr. Rick Harmon, MILES Training Prior to the Gulf War, Kuwait purchased a fleet of Yugoslavian M-84s, a variant of the T-72. Director, Europe, we spent many long They were adapted to use the MILES system for greater realism in a recent exercise in Ku- hours tracing the wiring systems in wait with TF 2-37, 3d Brigade, 3d ID. the M84 and the BMP-2, and redes- igned the MILES belts so that they wouldworkonthesetwovehicles. In developing a mount to install the front of the turret using existing at- Wecameupwithamethodtooperate main gun/coax laser transmitter into tachment points. the M84 and the BMP-2 with MILES. the breech of the 125-mm main gun The detector belt fits the turret the In the course of our investigation, we used by the M84, we were using the M60A1/A3 MILES system. The trans- samewayitdoesonanAmerican also discovered a much more stable tank. We glued Velcro tape around the installation for the MILES tank trans- mitter and retainer assembly would turret and adjusted the belts to fit. mitter that can be adapted to the U.S. not fit into the breech, so we took a M1-orM60-seriestanks. 125-mm aft cap and modified it to The BMP-2 presented a completely mount the main gun/coax laser trans- different problem: the electrical power The current method of installing the mitter inside. circuit for the BMP-2 is different than MILES transmitter in American tanks the Bradley and it was only after con- is a multi-part system that mounts the We drilled the base of the aft cap 5 siderable research and testing that we laser transmitter in the breech assem- around the primer to 5- ⁄16“inorderto secure the laser transmitter inside. We were able to install the Bradley bly. This mounting allows the system MILES on the BMP-2. to vibrate, and it will lose its zero af- drilled and tapped holes into the cas- ter even a short movement by the ing to firmly secure the transmitter. To accommodate the laser transmit- 1 tank. Currently, tankers wedge pieces Finally,wemadea2"x ⁄2”weldat ter designed for the 25-mm Bradley of cardboard in and around the mount the bottom rear of the aft cap. With main gun in the BMP2’s larger 30- in order to hold it securely in the this system installed, the breech is mm main gun, we removed the small breech. easily closed by hand, resting on the securing blocks on the laser transmit- weld at the bottom. This holds the ter and the Atwess light and wrapped Instead, we mounted the transmitters transmitter solidly in the breech as- pieces of rubber inner tube around the on “aft caps,” the stub bases of main sembly. transmitter to secure it in the larger gun cartridges that are left after firing barrel. a round. We used a 125-mm aft cap We installed the Hoffman device on for the M84, and a 120-mm aft cap the barrel of the main gun, and se- The detector belts fit the BMP-2 as for the M1A1. cured the Atwess light on the left they do on the Bradley, with the TOW

42 ARMOR — November-December 1994 As an Added Benefit, belt going across the top of the turret SSG(P) Earl Barner is a Auxiliary Power Units and in front of the TC/gunner hatch. Special Forces Engineer as- Reduce Tank Thermal Power for the MILES transmitter signed to ODA 576, A Co, 3d Signature, Tests Show came from the BMP-2 turret power Bn, 5th Special Forces Group fuse box in the back of the turret com- (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Ky. partment. The 50 amp fuse was the He and the 5th Special only one that would not blow when Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) now we hooked up the MILES gear. Forces Group trained with the under development for the M1A2 tank Kuwaitis during DESERT were supposed to save fuel and reduce For easy access and less wiring, we SHIELD, fought with them maintenance, saving an estimated used the BMP-2’s coax trigger power during DESERT STORM, and $167 million a year. But tests are to fire the main gun MILES transmit- showing an added, unexpected benefit: ter. Since the voltage from the coax have been conducting an on- going training program with running the tank on its APU, rather trigger on the BMP-2 was 24.32 volts than its main engine, reduces its ther- (2 amps), and the voltage from the the Kuwaitis for the past 3 mal signature, making the tank much Bradley computer to fire the main years. In addition to his train- less vulnerable to detection by thermal gun/coax transmitter is only 9 volts (2 ing as a Special Forces Engi- imagers and destruction by a new gen- amps), we reduced the voltage by us- neer, SSG Barner has re- eration of smart weapons. ing5watt120ohmresistersinase- ceived extensive armor train- ries circuit. The original concept of the APU was ing from the Kentucky Na- to allow shutdown of the main engine Because of time restraints, we did tional Guard, the 100th Divi- while the tank was not moving, so as not hook up the missile system for the sion (Tng) AR at Fort Camp- to supply the crew’s power needs, ra- BMP-2. Given more time, we are sure bell, and from the Armor dios, and computers while saving fuel. that it can be done (for INTRINSIC School at Fort Knox, Ky. His Current research and development ACTION, the observer/controllers previous assignments include could lead to adoption of the units as used their controller guns to determine 3d Bn, 75th Infantry Ranger early as 1995. ATGM hits). Regiment and the 197th The “thermal cloaking” discovery With the proper equipment and more Mechanized Infantry Brigade. grew out of experiments at Eglin AFB, testing, the Bradley MILES system Fla., where research was underway to will adapt and work on the BMP-2 us- CW2 Bryan Jay Hinkel is teach new smart weapons to recognize ing all weapons systems and the inter- various thermal signatures. Tanks run- com to fight or defend in a tactical currently assigned to Co A, ning on their main engines emit a heat battle using the MILES system. The 3d Bn, 5th Special Forces plume several stories high, creating a system we have developed will enable Group (Airborne) as the SF vulnerability to heat-seeking arma- the BMP-2 to engage targets with Technician for ODA 576. ments. Armored vehicles running on MILES using its 30-mm main gun Over the course of the last 11 their APUs were almost thermally un- and register hits. years with the 5th ‘Legion,’ he detectable. For INTRINSIC ACTION 1-94, the has worked as a detachment -Adopted from Inside the Turret, the Special Forces team working with the commander on an A Team, Fort Knox weekly newspaper. Kuwaiti 15th Brigade will use our de- as an operations sergeant sign for the M84 MILES to equip that and communications supervi- unit with MILES. We have also sub- sor on a B Team, and per- Armor School Essay Contest mitted the complete design for the formed the duties of opera- M84/T72, the M1A1, and the BMP-2 tions sergeant, intelligence Draws 44 Entries Probing to the Army suggestion program in or- Effect of the Information Age der to improve the MILES hardware sergeant, communications su- currently being used. pervisor and heavy weapons sergeant on an A Team. His The recent Armor School Essay Con- Comments, suggestions, and requests armor experience includes test on the subject “What Does the In- for the complete write-up on how to working with the Kuwaiti 7th formation Age Mean to Armored War mount the MILES gear in these vehi- fare” drew 44 entries. cles is available by writing my de- and 8th Tank Battalions, 35th tachment at: Brigade last summer and with The winner in the officer category the Egyptian 4th Armor Divi- was LTC Mark P. Hertling, com- Commander SFODA 576 sion during Operations DE- mander of 1-16 CAV. The NCO cate- A Co, 3d Bn, 5th SFG(A) gory was submitted by a group, Alpha ATTN: SSG Earl Barner [MILES Gear] SERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Section of 1st Platoon, ANCOC Class Fort Campbell, KY 42223-5000 94-1D, who will share their prize. The Our final product was a MILES sys- third $100 winner was Mr. Michael O. tem that worked with the Kuwaiti ar- Kelley, chief of the Combined Arms mored vehicles and enabled them to themselves against the American Training Division, 16th CAV, Fort conduct realistic training with TF 2-37 M1A1. Without the MILES, I am sure Knox. Copies of all entries were re- during INTRINSIC ACTION 3-93. that the Kuwaitis would have never viewed and evaluated for useful ideas The Kuwaitis loved the MILES gear approached this joint training with the by several post directorates and the and truly enjoyed the chance to pit motivation and enthusiasm they had. deputy CG, BG Lon E. Maggart. ARMOR — November-December 1994 43 Now, Where Do We Put It?

by Major Michael Mergens and Captain William K. Weldon

In the beginning, there was the Sol- dier and his “stuff,” and this was good. Then there was the vehicle, and the vehicle could carry the Soldier and his “stuff,” and that too, was good. When it was found that the vehicle could carry the Soldier and his “stuff,” the Engineer quoth, “Give to the Soldier camouflage nets, poles, picks, shovels, mines, stakes, and wire with which to protect himself, and all manner of detectors to find those mines which would do him harm.” The Logistician quoth, “Give to the Soldier oil, grease, hydraulic fluid, track blocks, road wheels, center guides, end connectors, and endless number of tools with which to care for the vehicle, along with food and water with which to sustain himself.” The Chemical Guru quoth, “Give to the Soldier all manner of detectors and accessories to protect him from the harmful vapors and chemicals to be found in the hands of our enemies.” And, yea, verily, it was good to have said equipment to protect life and limb and to provide sustenance for the Soldier. Finally, the Commander said, “You shall carry all these things and your “stuff” upon your vehicle and you shall do so in a secure and orderly manner, so as to please the Sergeants Major and the First Sergeants by its appearance.” The Soldier looked upon the prodigious pile of things given unto him, his “stuff,” and his vehicle, and wailed, “There ain’t no !#$^%$* way!!.” Thus was born the Bustle Rack.

The foregoing is a somewhat humor- and personal gear, as well as the items world. The alternative to carrying all ous and simplistic view of a major mentioned in our small parable, are this equipment was that items per- problem that has faced the mounted obviously not fully integrated into the ceived as having limited use usually warrior since the beginning of the Ar- system. became “combat losses,” sometimes mored Force. As technology expands weeks prior to any actual combat! A classic example of this is the M1. and the capability of the soldier in- When first fielded, the M1 had an an- Vehicles currently in development, creases, so does the amount of equip- ment required to accomplish the mis- gled slope to the rear of the turret. On such as the AGS and LOSAT, also this slope were numerous “footloop” suffer from this problem. Current con- sion, and this all has to be carried fastening locations for a net-like cov- figurations of AGS do not have any somewhere in order to be available for use when needed. ering that was supposed to act like a type of bustle rack, and there appears bustle rack. Gone, too, were the famil- to be a similar approach to external The problem facing the mounted sol- iar sponson boxes that lined the sides stowage as was originally placed on dier of today is, where do I put it? of the M60-series vehicles then in the M1. The obvious answer is to carry it service. However, the amount of equip- LOSAT’s design precludes any ex- ment wasn’t reduced one bit. somewhere on the tank or BFV. How- ternal stowage at all, yet has a three- ever, almost every vehicle produced mancrew.Thepop-updesignofthe over the history of armored warfare Nor is the M1 unique in this regard. launcher will not allow the storage of A look back shows that the M47 was has not had built into it the capacity one of the first vehicles to have a anything on top of the vehicle. As to store everything that is added on with all Bradley chassis-based de- the vehicle by and for the crew. dedicated storage area built on to the signs, anything carried on the front of rear of the turret. And like the crews Granted, there is a place for every- of today, crews then solved the prob- the vehicle interferes with accessibil- ity to the engine compartment and thing associated with the vehicle’s Ba- lem by improvising storage schemes possibly blocks the driver’s vision. sic Issue Items (BII), and these are in- and load plans. The resultant “gypsy tegrated into the design of the vehicle. caravan” look of armored columns is In order to have a feel for the size of But, those items such as CTA 50-900 one that has persisted throughout the the problem, consider the amount of

44 ARMOR — November-December 1994 Above, an M1A1 Abrams with the Abrams Bustle Rack Extension Individual crewman’s equipment bags provide greater protection and mounted to the fixed bustle rack. easier access than does the current duffle bag.

“stuff” a typical M1 crew has to carry. blocking the view of the TC and for deployment, such as ships or air- According to the M1A1 Combat Load loader, both in the open hatch and craft. It also remains out of the way Plan, ST 17-184-1A1, dated Novem- closed hatch configurations. This has during routine maintenance operations ber 1987, each crewmember is allot- obvious implications in safely operat- while not in the field or being used. ted for their CTA 50-900 and personal ing the vehicle and in the operational Finally, any system must be easily items 1 each, ALICE Pack, duffle bag, effectiveness of the crew. Another installed and not require major modi- and flight helmet bag. In most in- safety-related problem with this man- stances, the flight helmet bag is car- ner of stowage is the obstruction of fications to the vehicle. Extensive use must be made of all available hard- ried inside the vehicle and doesn’t en- the ammunition compartment blowout ware and existing features of the vehi- ter into this discussion. panels and crosswind sensor. cle as attachment points. These attach- The approximate dimensions of the Nor is the storage area of the bustle ments must also be strong enough to duffle bag are 14" in diameter and 38" rack sacrosanct. Presently the External carry the load and secure the device tall for a volume of about 5,850 cubic Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) is de- during rough maneuvering. inches or 3.4 cubic feet. The ALICE signed to reside in the bustle rack. Although there is little that can be Pack is about 14" x 10" x 28", 3,920 This unit takes up approximately 11.3 cubic inches or 2.3 cubic feet. There- cubic feet (although it extends about done with regard to lessening the number of items to be carried, there fore, a crew of four needs 4 x 5.7 cu- 11" above the bustle rack, for an ef- have been several attempts at solving bic feet or 22.8 cubic feet of total fective loss of 6.25 cubic feet). storage for personal gear. The current this problem that range from locally Any type of system that is designed produced brackets to specially de- bustle rack is about 15" x 14" x 112" to alleviate this storage problem has signed carriers. for an available volume of 13.6 cubic feet; which translates to a 10.1 cubic several key requirements. First, it The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has must be strong enough to carry a sig- foot shortfall! Crews have solved this nificant load, 400 to 500 lbs typically. built several different types of vehicle by standing the duffle bags up inside racks. One type hangs off the sides of the bustle rack and attaching the It also has to be strong enough to the M113 and significantly increases withstand additional loads induced by ALICE Packs to the outside. shock while driving over rough ter- the amount of material that can be carried. The MERKAVA’s specially An alternative is to have the com- rain. This shock loading can be three designed hammock-type arrangement pany trains carry the extra duffle bags to four times as great as the static and to have the first sergeant bring load, or about 1,500 lbs. has a hinged bottom that drops the them forward when needed. For a rucksacks of the infantry once they Second, it must be large enough that deploy from the vehicle. typical company this would require 56 it significantly increases the amount duffle bags or 190 cubic feet of stor- These designs are tailored to the re- of storage volume. Ammo cans and lo- age volume. A typical 21⁄ ton (M35 quirements of the IDF in that they ex- 2 cally produced brackets, although series) has a carrying volume of 444 cheap, do not increase the storage vol- tend beyond the sides of the vehicles cubic feet, which would mean one and are constructed of metal. For ar- half of the truck would be filled with ume more than 10 percent. Any sys- eas in which the IDF operates — de- tem must increase the volume at a duffle bags. How many company minimum of 75 percent, preferably sert, sparse vegetation, and urban ter- commanders have this much excess rains — this is acceptable. However, carrying capacity in their company 150 percent. theU.S.Armyrequiresthatwealso trains? Any type of storage system must it- operate in close vegetation, such as forests and thick brush. The loading scenario described self be able to be stored or removed above, along with the stacking of when not being used for its intended In this environment, a rigid system, items and tying them down to the tur- purpose. This feature facilitates the or one that extends beyond the sides ret roof, etc., has an added effect of loading of vehicles in confined spaces of the vehicle, are prone to being ARMOR — November-December 1994 45 Captain William K. Weldon was commissioned in 1985 from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. He has served in a number of Armor positions, including tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, and company executive officer while at Fort Polk, La. He was then as- signed to Camp Casy, Korea where he served as battalion supply officer snagged and damaged, especially and later commander of C Company, 1-72 Armor. He recently served as when the driver of the vehicle is un- the Materiel Branch Chief of the Directorate of Combat Developments at sure of the location of his fenders and the Armor Center, Ft. Knox, Ky. He is currently an advisor for the 3-116 the TC/BC is occupied in navigating Cavalry (ARNG) in La Grande, Oregon. and directing the vehicle. A prime ex- ample of what can happen is evi- Major Michael E. Mergens was commissioned through ROTC at Texas denced by the large number of reports A&M University with a degree in Mechanical Engineering. He has of survey and statements of charges served in a number of Armor positions including platoon leader, scout for lost tanker’s rolls and rucksacks platoon leader, headquarters company commander, tank company com- snatched from bustle racks while mander, asst. brigade S3, and S3 air, and brigade S1. He is currently a moving along tree lines during exer- member of the Texas Army National Guard serving as the operations cisessuchaspastREFORGERs. chief, G-2 Section, 49th AD. In his civilian capacity, he works for One system specifically designed for Oceaneering Space Systems (OSS) as a design and project engineer the M1, and in development, is the on the International Space Station Alpha refrigerator/freezer project. He Abrams Bustle Rack Extension is also the senior project engineer for Armored Vehicle Habitability Up- (ABRE). This is a system made of du- grades for OSS. rable webbing, capable of supporting 3,000 lbs/web and attaches directly to the top rail of the existing bustle rack. It also attaches to the bottom and camouflage covers, and is designed to The device is laterally secured by sides for stability during maneuvering. be removed from the device for indi- means of adjustable side straps and The device includes four 27" x 14" x vidual packing and storage. Two hook straps on the bottom that attach 14" individual equipment storage bags. straps secure each bag to the device. to existing eyes welded to the bottom 3 Apieceof ⁄8“-thick fabric-reinforced Rucksacks can be attached to the ex- of the bustle rack to prevent the de- rubber forms the bottom of the com- terior of the device, as is currently vice from bouncing off. These bottom partment, gives shape to the device, done in most unit load plans. straps are loosened when the device is and prevents it from sagging below folded flat against the bustle rack for the bottom of the bustle rack and in- Placing mostly personal gear in the storage. terfering with the operation of the tur- stowage device frees up space in the ret. bustle rack for heavier items. These Velcro along the entire bottom of the device facilitates the mounting of the Being made of rubber and fabric, the heavier items then would not have to rear turret belt for MILES. Also, be stored on top of the blowout pan- mounting points can be added for ve- device is designed to resist damage els, increasing the safety of the crew. when caught on trees or brush, or This would also lower the profile of hicle identification signs, gunnery through contact with more solid ob- lights, etc. This basic design can be stored items and allow the crew better adapted to any number of vehicles. A jects. If damaged, repairs are much all-around observation. simpler than they would be for an all- prototype was developed for the LAV- metal device. 25, while concepts for the Bradley Theentiredeviceweighsonlyabout and AGS are currently being devel- For the protection of the individual 40 lbs and can be attached in about oped. crewmember’s personal items, a wa- five minutes by a single crewman. terproof/NBC protective bag is avail- The primary means of attachment is The system is an inexpensive solu- able. This bag is made of butyl-coated by hooks that go over the top rail and tion to an age-old problem. Any num- nylon, the same material found in secure with a ring. ber of load plans cannot escape the simple fact that there is just too much “stuff” and nowhere to put it. Future systems have to be designed with the simple fact in mind that the soldier and his noncombat equipment must be The focal point for the identification of all support items for the Mounted carried by the vehicle because it is his Combat Soldier is: home. The logistics system is stretched to its limits just providing fuel, ammo, Materiel Branch, Soldier Support Division and food for the soldier, let alone Director of Combat Developments dragging his clothes around. U.S. Army Armor Center Fort Knox, KY 40121 The ABRE, as designed and devel- oped by Oceaneering Space Systems For further information and technical details about the ABRE, other similar of Houston, Texas, could be procured stowage systems, or soldier-related support items, please contact the as early as 1995, if funds were avail- branch chief at (502) 624-1750, DSN 464-1750. able.

46 ARMOR — November-December 1994 Resident Training Detachment: A Captain’s Perspective — Two Years Hence by Captain (P) Leon I. Smith IV

“The deployment requirements of the Bold Shift initiative. My mission will these higher levels of training and modern Army mean that we have fully be to advise and assist the commander readiness.”2 integrated force packages, each con- to implement training programs that September 1992, I PCS to become a taining high priority Reserve Compo- will maximize the use of limited time nents (RC) units. We must tailor our available to enhance pre-mobilization “Resident Training Detachment (RTD) Senior Trainer” for an M1A1 tank training and readiness policies to pre- training readiness. battalion. Because this is a pilot pro- pare the Total Force to meet these new requirements. Bold Shift is the ve- “The Bold Shift effort is a top prior- gram, I begin to lay the groundwork ity throughout the Total Army. Its in- for the implementation of the Bold hicle to accomplish this most impor- tent is to design those policies, proce- Shift initiative. I write my duty de- tant task.”1 dures and execution techniques that scription: will ensure high levels of training and readiness. The year 1992 is a pilot Senior Army Company Trainer for a year in which selected high priority Roundout MTO&E M1A1 tank battal- The phone rings in my office (it’s ion assigned to 1st ID(M). Responsi- March, 1992), and it’s Armor Branch... Reserve Component units, at least one ble for planning, conducting, and it’s the captain’s assignment officer, ARNG unit per state and one USAR who gives me a WARNORD for my unit per Major U.S. Army Reserve evaluating pre-mobilization tasks for a tank company, battalion mortar pla- next assignment. I’m informed that Command (MUSARC), will partici- toon, and the battalion S3 section. As- my next assignment is in support of a pate in Bold Shift. We will then assess congressionally mandated Active Com- performance and develop a formal sists in identifying and defining train- ing goals and ensures the training ponent full-time support to ARNG concept and implementation action principles found in FM 25-100/101 (Army National Guard) as part of the plan that will produce and sustain are instilled and utilized. Ensures technical and tactical proficiency of leaders at all levels is met through rig- orous training exercise and AARs. RESIDENT TRAINING DETACHMENT (RTD) Upon mobilization, assist in post-mo- bilization and deployment of unit.

I list my performance objectives: • Be the expert on FM 25-100/101. • Assist in developing soldier, leader, collective, and battle staff training. • Assist in the preparation and exe- cution of collective training with emphasis on tank platoons and crews. • Teach leaders how to identify indi- vidual and collective tasks and in- tegrate them into training. • Assist in the development of the company METL and training strat- egy based on last year’s Annual Training TAM results. • Be able to support and observe training and deliver an effective AAR. Figure 1

ARMOR — November-December 1994 47 RTD RATING SCHEME (FOR THIS UNIT ONLY) Army, let me ex- talion commander in the battle staff INTERMEDIATE SENIOR plain the RTD role training areas of emphasis. RATER RATER RATER (from a captain’s standpoint), as I Expect to train anyone from the RTD CHIEF, RTD CDR *LETTER INPUT ADC(M) company commander down to the MAJOR LTC GUARD BN CDR BG know it. lowest private in the company. Plan to RTD SENIOR RTD CHIEF N/A RTD CDR train more than one level down and TRAINER, MAJ LTC CPT First, an RTD evaluate two levels down. Prepare quickly learns the yourself to train company command- MAINT OFFICER, RTD CHIEF N/A RTD CDR W-3 MAJ LTC RC acronyms and ers, XOs, PLs, PSGs, TCs, and pri- the RC guidance vates. At the same time, prepare your- MASTER GUNNER, RTD SR. N/A RTD SR. and directives de- self to assist in evaluating tank crews E-7 TRAINER TRAINER CPT CPT scribedinFMs25- during TCGST, TCPC, STXs, etc. You 100/101. Initially, I will be asked to demonstrate your *Letter input may be provided to Senior Rater by individuals reviewed the as- skills to anyone and everyone in the holding position as RTD Chief. sessment of the pre- company. The skill level of the sol- vious year’s train- diers varies greatly and is not always ing and the existing dependent on their grade. Some of the Figure 2 year’s training cal- areas in which you may be expected endar with the bat- to train and/or evaluate are: talion. Most of the • METL tasks were Plan for an STX (Co Cdrs, PLs, PSGs, and TCs) assessed as a “P.” • • Write OPORDs (Co Cdrs and PLs) Prepare tank gunnery in the con- The yearly training calendar is shown • duct of tank maneuver/gunnery in Figure 3. How to tank (everyone in the com- simulation training. pany, i.e. boresighting, maneuver • Plan for exercising mobilization techniques, radio procedures, map reading) plans and assist in mobilization re- Expectations: • view. How to prepare for an inspection • Assist in coordinating and certify- You will be assigned specifically to (full-time personnel). ing gunnery-related matters. train one or two tank companies and, • Ensure gunnery training follows possibly, one of the special platoons Do not expect to be an advisor to the the guidelines IAW 17-12-RC (Re- in the HHC Company. Additionally, unit. Keep in mind the word “advisor” serve Component Tank Gunnery you can be expected to assist the bat- isnolongerawordusedbytheRTD. Training Program). • Assist to make all Operational Readiness Evaluations (OREs) successful. Yearly Training Calendar • Assist the battalion commander 1st Qtr 2d Qtr 3d Qtr 4th Qtr and staff in functional and tactical ORE APFT Annual training. (Record) Training • Plan, evaluate and assess “Platoon 100% Small (Ft. Stewart) Lanes” for the armor platoons and Arms Qual MCOFT the battalion mortar platoon. TCPC • Assist in the implementation of all Post AT MCOFT/UCOFT training pro- Legal Briefs Inventory grams. • Plan and write MOIs for the tank APFT AAC (Diagnostic) platoons and mortar platoon. Conduct of Plt STXs • Ensure training is always done to Fire Classes (Ft. Stewart) standard. • Ensure training meetings are con- TTV ducted IAW TC 25-30 “A Leader’s Maint Tgt Acq SIMNET Guide To Company Training Training Drills Exercise Meetings.” TTVIII Rock Drills TCGST Initially, the RTD was a skeleton de- Train-up tachment. After six months, our man- TCGST Load for ning distribution to support the Guard Annual Tng battalion is pictured in Figure 1 and our rating scheme in Figure 2. To avoid confusion and lack of in- Figure 3 formation throughout the Active

48 ARMOR — November-December 1994 As an RTD, the staff will quickly captain in the U.S. Army. “The role of world. Leave with a feeling of accom- learn to use the word “assist” in lieu the RTD is to enhance the chain of plishment. There will be soldiers who of the old cliche “advisor.” You are command, not replace it, and building will maintain those skills passed down the person who has the expertise! You a strong leader training program is the by you. Someday, when the RTD goes have the answers to assist leaders and key to building strong units.”3 away, our job will not be left behind. soldiers in the entire company. You There will be RC/Guard soldiers as- can help the company or platoon in sisting the Army as part of a fully in- the planning phase, which will aid in Accomplishments: tegrated force package. their Inactive Duty Training (IDT) They will be small. Small accom- weekend. By providing your hands-on knowledge from your previous assign- plishments are your best measure for ments, you can enhance the goals and your success; don’t expect to change Notes everything. If you can improve plan- accomplishments of the Guard. For ning areas, i.e. leaders use “TC 25- example, you can demonstrate the ef- 1Memorandum for Total Army Commanders, fective use of rehearsals and rock 30,” then you are on the right track for success. Never allow a training Subject: BOLD SHIFT Information letter, para. drills, which allows soldiers to in- event to be trained without a measur- 4, dated 10 August 1992, written by GEN Ed- crease their chance of success during win H. Burba, Jr., former FORSCOM com- the initial iteration of a collective task. able standard. Enforce task, condi- tions, and standards and don’t allow mander. soldiers to be satisfied with marginal 2 Plan on being the “battalion com- Ibid., para. 5. “Go’s.” If you accept this, you will be mander, company commander, platoon 3 allowing soldiers to train to die in Active Army Orientation Course, Booklet H, leader, supply sergeant, IG...etc.” You combat. Resident Training Detachment Information will wear many hats during your time Packet, National Guard Education Center, MOI, in an RTD. Don’t get tunnel vision Work on soldier and junior leader Subject: RTD, dated 20 July 1992, p. 2, written and cause yourself to miss implied development. Take the time to show by COL Michael G. Jones, CofS, 4th ID(M). tasks! Remember, you are the expert the company commanders how to when you arrive at this assignment; train their platoon leaders. This is thus, the unit will expect you to pro- where you can make a difference. You vide them with the correct answers. may see inexperienced company com- manders; but remember, no one took Start preparing yourself now. You Captain (P) Leon I. Smith want to be the guy who can walk a the time to train them. Do not be IV was commissioned in tank crew through the TTVIII Rock afraid to train the company com- 1983 through Officer Candi- mander on the duties. The commander date School and has at- Drills IAW 17-12-RC. Know the Re- maybetooshytoaskyouopenlyfor serve/Guard roles and standards in tended AOBC, JOMC, Air- conjunction with Army Regulations. assistance, so take the initiative and 3 fix the problem. borne, AOAC, and CAS . Be prepared to plan and execute an He holds a BS Degree in event in 1-2 months. There will be management from the Uni- times when you have limited re- As I depart my two years as an RTD versity of South Carolina sources, but must help plan a task to captain with a Guard tank battalion, I and a MA Degree in man- be executed the following month. Ex- think of my significant contributions agement from Webster Uni- pect to represent the “Senior Leader- (remembering my small accomplish- versity. He served with 1st ship” during many of the weekend ments are sometimes the biggest to Squadron, 11th ACR as a drills. You will be writing many conquer). Some of my small accom- tank platoon leader, scout AARs during your tour, as you ob- plishments are: serve training. Periodically, your input platoon leader, and com- • Teaching company-level junior pany XO; commanded a will be orally briefed to the Brigade leaders how to execute training commander. The brigade commander tank company with 4-40 meetings IAW TC 25-30. may expect you to be his “eyes and • (now 2-35) Armor, 4th ears” for training, as well as giving Enforcement of FMs 25-100/101 ID(M); was a tactics instruc- during the year. him a pulse reading sometime during • tor for the Engineer Officer the training year. Pushing leaders to have physical training during every drill week- Advanced Course; and One thing will always remain the end. served as a tactical advisor same. Don’t ever lower the standards • Providing a basic background to for 3d Army for breaching adopted for the training event (i.e. leaders on tactics, techniques, and operations during DESERT state or Army regulation). Maintain procedures. SHIELD/DESERT STORM. focus, direction, and vision in every- • Executing training to standard, the He recently served as an thing you do as an RTD and don’t al- way it was planned. RTD for 1st ID(M) with low anyone to use shortcuts. Always • Flexibility as changes occur. 218th SHB(M). He is cur- be the leader and mentor to those who rently attending the Com- expect nothing but the best from you. Your assignment will be rewarding. Remember, you represent the qualifi- Small accomplishments are RTD mand and General Staff cations of a typical active duty armor achievable; don’t try to defeat the College.

ARMOR — November-December 1994 49 LETTERS (Continued from Page 3) laser rangefinder and lock out the firing geous fight, but lost 35 vehicles and 126 What Can We Do About tank’s firing controls. A manual override men captured (Clarke and Smith p. 180). VI would bypass this lockout in case the TC Corps commander Major General Lucian the Vulnerable Antenna? could positively identify the target. If the tar- Truscott was later critical of the cav squad- get vehicle was friendly but didn’t have a ron, but this was unjustified; he had simply Dear Sir: programmable code, the laser rangefinder assigned missions “that were beyond its would show an AMBER light, but not lock capabilities,” and his criticism may reflect I continue to read about all the amazing out the fire controls. If the target vehicle his frustration at finding his flanking moves things digitalization of the battlefield will do was in fact enemy, A GREEN light would constantly thwarted. The official history for the Armored Force, but we seem to be displayed and the rest would be, “FIRE!” notes that the 11th Panzer’s “primary mis- have forgotten the oldest, most poorly-pro- “ON THE WAY” “TARGET, CEASE FIRE, sion, protecting the retreating army’s flank, tected component in this whole marvelous DRIVER MOVE OUT.” had thus been accomplished” (p. 180), system — the antenna. though it also was taking losses. 1SG Hecht’s suggestion of a tone gener- All those boxes full of state-of-the-art ated in the CVCs of the targeted crew is an Nothing but credit is due the GIs and electronics and those advanced, multi-color excellent one and could very easily be inte- Germans who fought these stiff clashes up display screens will be useless when the grated into the system proposed here. the Rhône Valley 50 years ago this autumn. antennas get blown off the outside of the I’m sure that there are many other sce- vehicle! One accurate and cheap artillery narios possible with the technology avail- A. HARDING GANZ airburst can neutralize a million dollars in able today, but if we wait to evaluate all of Ohio State University, gizmos in the blink of an eye. them, we will probably lose more good Newark Campus With all the portable telephones, transmit- tankers to fratricide. We have the technol- ters and remote speaker systems that are ogy. Let’s finally put this problem behind us available today on the commercial market, and concentrate on our real business, that there must be some kind of unbreakable of being prepared to close with and destroy Post-Mobilization TTVIII antenna out there that can be easily con- the enemy by means of fire and maneuver Would Lower Standards verted to military use. and shock action. Or, would it be possible to make the an- tenna(e) part of the vehicle/turret structure? Dear Sir: MICHAEL MERGENS Could it be made retractable? It would MAJ, Armor, TXARNG unreel from its stowage area for burst HQ, 49th Armored Division Recently, I was able to see a partial after- transmission, and then go to minimum ex- action review for the 1st Army Armor Con- tension for reception. ference. One of the issues that was con- More on “Champagne Campaign” tained in the review had to do with the pro- A tank is only as good as its tracks, gun, posal of the National Guard Bureau to and radios. If the radios can’t send and re- Dear Sir: postpone Tank Table VIII to post-mobiliza- ceive because the antenna is easily dam- tion. This is disturbing because as it stands aged or destroyed, then digitalization is a now, Reserve Component tank crews and waste of money. I am interested to see that my “11th platoons are supposed to maintain a crew Panzers in the Defense, 1944” (March-April level of proficiency at gunnery (TTVIII) and GREGORY J. SAMSON 1994 issue) has generated additional infor- sustain the ability to fight/maneuver as a Clinton TWP, Mich. mation about the 1944 campaigns, and I platoon. This has been reinforced by ma- am gratified that several veterans have ex- neuver lanes training and the requirement pressed an interest in contacting their foes to qualify tank crews at TTVIII every other of half a century ago. year. By postponing crew-level qualification Bring Back the Blues It should be emphasized, however, that to post-mobilization, we lower the training the article is not a detailed study of the standards and deviate from the “Band of various specific engagements, but rather an Excellence” in accordance with FM 25-100. Dear Sir: account of how the 11th Panzer Division at- If anything, we should try to make a pla- tempted to carry out its missions under toon-level gunnery a requirement for those Captain Barber’s article, “Bring Back the generally adverse conditions. There are a RC tank platoons. It could be done via sub- Blues” (Jan-Feb 93 issue), hit a spark in my number of detailed studies for the Lorraine cal fire, MILES, or, for those lucky few, by spurs, so to speak. I had to convey my Campaign, especially Hugh M. Cole’s out- SIMNET. A live-fire TTXI or TTXII is prob- thoughts on this crucial reconnaissance standing official U.S. Army history Lorraine ably not feasible with current budget re- subject. You see, it is not an emotional plea Campaign, published in 1950. But many straints. This would allow post-mobilization on my part for the past, but it was a reality readers may not be familiar with the re- training to progress further and shorten for me back in June 88-June 90. I was a cently published official history volume on times to deploy should that become neces- squad leader with a long-range reconnais- the Rhône Valley campaign, Jeffrey J. sary. We need to maintain ourselves at a sance platoon assigned to HHT 1/9th U.S. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to higher level of proficiency if the Total Force Cavalry, 9th ID (Motorized), Ft. Lewis, the Rhine (Center of Military History, 1993). is to be a reality. Wash. Our MTOE consisted of a 28+1-man Regarding the Meximieux fight on 1 Sep- platoon with equipment varying from three Crew-level proficiency is a must, and tember 1944, for example, (Clarke and cargo Hummers, one armored Hummer, six lanes training is an excellent training tool Smith p. 177) list casualties for both sides, UH1Hs, and 24 250cc motorcycles. This for platoons for gunnery and maneuver. Let including 185 Americans “missing and platoon was a squadron reconnaissance us keep up that level of training and even probably captured,” this referring to F Com- asset, sometimes used by the brigade. The improve it by having tank platoons showing pany, 2d Bn, 179th Regt (my p. 29); and missions and capabilities of the platoon up at mobilization stations fully ready to that the 11th Panzer thrust did “disrupt would cover all types of reconnaissance, to move on with training. preparations” for a 179th Infantry attack, limited raids and ambushes of high priority which “was von Wietersheim’s primary mis- targets deep across the FLOT. sion.” JEFF M. ALSTON The platoon in general would operate 5- On 3 September at Montrevel, Troops A 2LT, Armor 15 kilometers across the FLOT with 24- and B of the 117th Cav put up a coura- Wisconsin ARNG hours active reconnaissance, unlike avia- 50 ARMOR — November-December 1994 Battalion Motor Officer Course Prepares Officers For Unit-Level Maintenance Positions tion aircraft which are limited by weather, pilot fatigue, and the increasing cost of The Battalion Motor Officer Course (BMOC) is designed for Active Army, maintenance. This platoon allowed the Reserve Component, and National Guard units. The primary students are squadron and brigade commander to de- CPTs and LTs who have completed the Officer Basic Course and have velop a mission plan much faster, with ac- been in the field for more than six months, warrant officers, and allied na- curate intel being updated by the minute, tions officers. BMOC is designed to prepare these officers for maintenance and painted a more accurate picture of the positions at the unit (battalion and below) level, with emphasis on manage- situation developing. This intel update was ment and supervisory operations. not possible with the LRSD teams because they worked for the MI battalion which, in The compact four-week, two-day course is designed to give incentive to turn, updated the division commander. The commanders to allow the Active and Reserve Component officers attending division cavalry needs that intel first, being BMOC on TDY status to complete the course. Many commanders are hesi- the most forward combat unit in the divi- tant to release officers for a nine- or six-week course, but are more willing sion. Our brigade commander, COL Crews, saw this need, as did our squadron com- to let them attend a four-week course. The new, shorter course will also mander, LTC Tadonnio. This superb leader- help RC and NG officers who must leave a full-time job to attend, because ship started at the platoon level with 1LT many civilian employers also find it difficult to release employees for the Johnson and later 1LT Barber, both Ranger longer courses. qualified. Our PSG, SFC Lincoln, 1SG Kaminski, and CPT Drumm allowed us to The BMOC is now starting its 30th year of operation. The Organizational grow militarily, by far the best chain of com- Maintenance Officer Course #1 was held in 1964. This course was an out- mand anyone would envy. growth of the Armor Maintenance Officer Course, which was revised to I am not trying to plug these men, but create a course geared to all maintenance officers, regardless of branch. In saying that it was this ideal command cli- January 1972, the course became the Motor Officer Course. It was short- mate that allowed SGT Johnson and me to ened to four weeks and two days in 1992. train our men to standard. Even knowing we were 19Ds, we lived by the Ranger The BMOC course currently consists of 160 hours of instruction, and is Handbook and related publications. With divided into two areas: 104 hours of classroom instruction and 44 hours of the MTOE the way it was, our platoon did specific instruction on five different vehicles. Students receive training not have to beg for support from other based on the type of vehicle at their assigned unit. The five vehicles used units, such as our helicopter support. Our in training are the M1A1 Abrams tank, the M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, platoon used this asset for 85 percent of all the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, the M977 Heavy Expanded Mobility our insertions; this would not have been possible if not organic to our squadron. Our Tactical Truck (HEMTT), and the M998 High Mobility Multi-Purpose pilots were so good that a CW4 with some Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The program of instruction emphasizes the engineering background fabricated mounts use of hands-on training and practical exercises. Classroom lectures are on the birds to carry two motorcycles on used to teach the proper maintenance procedures and the use of standard each aircraft. This gave each OP team a Army forms, but most learning occurs in the maintenance bays on actual fast, mounted reconnaissance asset to re- vehicles. con all NAIs. With this well-proven concept, the 3d Brigade and Task Force Saber de- The main topics covered in classroom instruction are: Army Maintenance ployed to the NTC and, as noted from the System,operations records and dispatch procedures, maintenance records, OPFOR command general, did to the OP- maintenance publications, Materiel Condition Status Report, repair parts FOR what the OPFOR reconnaissance has supply, tool and TMDE equipment, light schedule service, heavy schedule been doing to the Blue Forces for years. service, preventive maintenance indicators, hazardous materials, automo- As far as the men go, we could not find tive electrical systems, safety, Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS), direct more than 20 or so troopers who could vehicle recovery, and power plant troubleshooting. keep up with the high state of physical fit- ness necessary to perform our mission. The training was constantly demanding, CLASS REPORT START END with PT runs exceeding six miles daily and never-ending road marches. All this was 05-95 23 Jan 95 24 Jan 95 23 Feb 95 necessary, given the extreme distance and 06-95 14 Feb 95 15 Feb 95 17 Mar 95 loads we had to carry. I do not understand 07-95 6 Mar 95 7 Mar 95 5 Apr 95 why the Army has not kept this organiza- 08-95 27 Mar 95 28 Mar 95 26 Apr 95 tion alive in the division cavalry. In my ex- 09-95 11 Apr 95 12 Apr 95 11 May 95 perience, this asset is not only needed, but 10-95 4 May 95 5 May 95 6 Jun 95 required in today’s cavalry. I do wait with 11-95 30 May 95 31 May 95 29 Jun 95 excitement to the day the Army realizes its 12-95 19 Jun 95 20 Jun 95 21 Jul 95 mistake and brings back the blues. This 13-95 10 Jul 95 11 Jul 95 9 Aug 95 SSG stands by with a 4187 in hand for an- 14-95 31 Jul 95 1 Aug 95 30 Aug 95 other chance to do it all over again. “Scouts 15-95 21 Aug 95 22 Aug 95 21 Sep 95 Out.” 01-96 4 Oct 95 5 Oct 95 3 Nov 95 02-96 25 Oct 95 26 Oct 95 24 Nov 95 03-96 13 Nov 95 14 Nov 95 15 Dec 95 SSG CHRISTOPHER AUDETTE Cavaly Scout For more information, call BMOC CW3 Peyton or SFC Snyder at DSN Korea 464-8119/7756 or (502)624-8119/7756.

ARMOR — November-December 1994 51 BOOKS Moving Bradleys, Beans, and Bullets to the Gulf

Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the APCs unloading at Gulf War by William G. Pagonis and a railhead in the Bremerhaven Ter- Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. Harvard School minal near Carl of Business, Boston. 1992, 248 pages, Shurz Kaserne $24.95. were part of hun- dreds of tracked Lieutenant General William “Gus” Pago- and wheeled vehi- nis, one of the U.S. Army’s main architects cles loaded aboard of victory during DESERT SHIELD/DE- ships for transport SERT STORM, has written a masterful ac- to Southwest Asia. count of the war from the viewpoint of a logistician. As is often the case, both the Photo by SFC Dana Jacson generals who fought the war and the mili- tary historians who analyze the conflict tend to concentrate on strategy, tactics, and equipment, often ignoring or downplay- mid-1970s when he served as a Congres- and amount of training they participated in ing the role of logistics or the personnel sional liaison officer. After heading a study between 1973 and 1990. Warden added: that played an equal role. Pagonis’s Mov- that saved the XM1 (later M1 Abrams), the “The efficiency, camaraderie, and personal ing Mountains, however, examines the role general turned down what was then an ex- relationships built by such exercises con- of logistics by incorporating all of these tremely lucrative offer to remain in Wash- tribute immensely to combined combat ef- categories into a single, highly readable ington D.C. as a lobbyist for one of the Big fectiveness when the forces are later volume. The book likewise attempts to illus- Three automakers. He decided instead to merged during a crisis or war. Even the lo- trate how the techniques used to manage remain in the Army. gistics of moving a corps out of one theater the rapid influx of materiel into the Persian General Pagonis, from the mid-1970s un- and into another are practiced in the an- Gulf can have civilian applications. The til 1988 when he was assigned to U.S. nual REFORGER exercise, a capability that author specifically examines the logistical Forces Command (FORSCOM), served in proved crucial to the deployment of VII aspects of the Gulf War from three distinct a variety of assignments, all preparing him Corps from Europe to Saudi Arabia in forty- phases which includes DESERT SHIELD for his role in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT five days.” (August 7, 1990-January 15, 1991), DE- STORM. The general wrote that the two One of the book’s major shortcomings is SERT STORM (January 15-March 4, most important assignments were his time infailingtodiscussthecreationofthefleet 1991), and DESERT FAREWELL (March- at Division Support Command at Fort Car- of Near Term Prepositioned Shipping in the December 1991). General Pagonis explains son, Colorado (DISCOM), and at the 21st early 1970s. Pagonis makes only a vague that each phase had its unique aspects Support Command (SUPCOM) at Kais- reference to the creation of the vital NTPS and problems, and he illustrates their inter- erslautern, Germany. Pagonis wrote that program, a critical omission since NTPS relationship throughout the Gulf War and its these two assignments, more than any oth- was the forerunner of the Maritime Pre-Po- immediate aftermath. This interrelationship ers, prepared him for the herculean tasks sitioning Shipping program that made DE- is best understood by the comment Gen- that awaited him during the Gulf War. The SERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM the suc- eral H. Norman Schwarzkopf made while general states that while commanding DIS- cess that it was. The author likewise fails to briefing journalists on February 27, 1991: COM, he was able to learn the intricacies discuss the reorientation of U.S. strategy “...And I can’t give credit enough to the lo- of desert warfare and the problems associ- during the late 1970s from one of a land- gisticians and the transporters who were ated with supplying forces engaged in de- based, Europe-first strategy to that of a able to pull this [the famous ‘End Run’] off. sert warfare at the National Training Center maritime strategy. Historian Allan R. Millett Pagonis’s journey to command of the 22 at Fort Irwin, California. The author writes: wrote in Semper Fidelis that the emphasis Support Command began with his commis- “This gave me a thorough understanding of on a maritime strategy gave the United sioning in the Transportation Corps in how things operated in the desert, and of States the necessary “flexibility and strate- 1964, a move that he had some misgivings how the desert challenges soldiers and gic mobility” to respond to a variety of about, but nonetheless accepted. The early their equipment.” After leaving DISCOM, threats and crises outside of the NATO years of General Pagonis’s career molded Pagonis served as special assistant to the context. General Pagonis makes it sound his concept of logistics and, above all else, deputy commanding general (DCG), and as if MPS was a new concept when the leadership. Pagonis claims that these same later as deputy commanding general of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was principles enabled him to undertake the 21st SUPCOM, where he was involved in first formed in 1980, In fact, it dates back to task of managing DESERT SHIELD and several REFORGER exercises. In these, 1970. DESERT STORM 26 years later. The he gained valuable experience not only in When Pagonis was assigned to the Office author presents a convincing case for this utilizing host-nation resources, but in nego- of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics as last statement. Throughout General Pago- tiating with local contractors. These were the Director of Plans and Operations he nis’s early climb up the chain of command, skills extensively utilized during his 18- became involved in contingency planning a theme that is constantly repeated is month stay in Saudi Arabia. for a possible Soviet invasion of Southwest “leadership by example.” Willingness to The importance attached to General Asia. OPLAN 1002-90: The Defense of the take risks early on provided Pagonis with Pagonis’s experience as DCG with the 21st Arabian Peninsula, had been authored by the motivation and desire to remain in the SUPCOM is enhanced by military analyst General Schwarzkopf. He was then trans- Army despite his own periods of doubt as John A. Warden, who wrote in his book ferred to U.S. Forces Command (FOR- to whether or not to remain. He illustrates The Air Campaign: Planning For Combat SCOM), at Fort McPherson, Georgia. While this last point by recalling an incident that the U.S. Armed Forces were better at FORSCOM General Pagonis served as shortly after his return from Vietnam in the prepared for the Gulf War due to the level the J4-Director of Logistics. Little did he re-

52 ARMOR — November-December 1994 alize at the time that the experience gained this, the book remains too parochial; it Military analyst Bruce H. Watson wrote in at the 21st SUPCOM, Office of the Deputy tends to concentrate on the Army’s role his Military Lessons of the Gulf War that, Chief of Staff, and FORSCOM would all and ignores the other services and mem- “Logisticians certainly provided Coalition come into play when Saddam Hussein in- bers of the Allied coalition who played just forces with the sustainability necessary to vaded neighboring Kuwait on August 1, as critical a role. For instance, little mention achieve a quick and decisive victory...” 1990. is made of either the U.S. Marine Corps’ Watson, however, points out one noticeable Moving Mountains provides an excellent unmet needs for JP4 fuel for its LAVs and omission from Moving Mountains in that its overview of those first few hectic days Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) and author fails to discuss the “what-ifs” had when the United States course of action the constraints that were placed on it just Saddam Hussein’s forces had been able to was still uncertain. Pagonis provides some as the ground war was about to com- utilize their tactical air power or their SCUD little-known details of the confusion that mence. General Pagonis likewise makes lit- missiles more effectively against the Ameri- reigned in both the White House and within tle mention of the shortage of spare parts can logistical bases. Watson adds: “If the General Schwarzkopf’s headquarters as to that occurred as a result of the centraliza- air situation had been one in which the what, if any, response the United States tion of the logistics effort in Southwest Asia. Coalition did not enjoy air supremacy, then would make. When the U.S. decided to in- The issue of logistics in any future war will the Allies might have had problems. Cer- tervene militarily, Pagonis and his boss, require addressing in this era of jointness. tainly, they would not have enjoyed the lux- Lieutenant General John Yeosock, were As one Marine Corps study states, “Had ury of dispatching long columns of nose-to- tasked by Central Command (CINCCENT) Iraqi military forces been more aggressive tail vehicles to travel along in daylight.” to come up with a “shopping list” of mate- in their defense, the lack of equipment, Moving Mountains, written under the aus- riel that any U.S. force would require if “in- spare parts, and the frequent need to im- pices of the Harvard School of Business, is vited in” by the Saudi government. Pagonis provise modifications on their armored ve- a book that does not confine itself to purely wrote that it was a “shopping list” fit for a hicles would have held disastrous conse- military matters. While it is not a book that king. Prior to General Yeosock’s departure quences for Marine armored units.” Moving can assist in the increase of sales or widen for the desert kingdom, Pagonis was in- Mountains does mention that the Air Force a company’s existing market, it does, how- structed to begin preparing his command to came with its own support infrastructure ever, outline the basic principles of sound move large quantities of supplies in a hurry. during the Gulf War because its logistical management and leadership that every It is here that military analysts and histori- needs are different than that of the Army or manager and student enrolled in a Masters ans will look back with pride upon the crea- Marines. Despite this, however, the book of Business Administration program should tion of the NTPS/MPS program. Pagonis could have been more specific on the prob- be familiar with. lems associated with having three air writes that if any one factor contributed to Moving Mountains, however, is a book victory in the Persian Gulf, it was the avail- forces in the theater of operations, each with its own unique requirements. that all in the military and in the field of ability of these ships, which had been sta- military history should read. Pagonis’s tioned in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia), For the military historian and analyst, book, like Martin Van Creveld’s Supplying Somalia, and the Philippines. however, General Pagonis’s book provides War, brings to the forefront the problem of General Pagonis provides an excellent a vast historical perspective that clearly creating a logistical system to suit the op- overview of the planning and deployment emphasizes the importance of logistics in erational-strategic goals of a commander. of the tens of thousands of American sol- warfare. The general is lavish in his praise The general’s book does an excellent job in diers to Saudi Arabia during the first of Alexander the Great and of the British providing both an operational and historical months of DESERT SHIELD. He skillfully il- 8th Army during its desert campaign of context from which an officer can best de- lustrates how he built a logistics infrastruc- World War II. General Pagonis notes, for termine his or her needs for a forthcoming ture with both active duty and reserve per- instance, that he utilized the precedent es- operation. Besides being a “must read” for sonnel. Pagonis lavishes praise on the tablished by Field Marshal Montgomery, those individuals at the various Command Army’s Total Force Concept, which pro- famed commander of the British 8th Army, and Staff Colleges, Pagonis’s book should vided so many personnel from the Army in the creation of mobile supply depots. As be read by officers and staff noncommis- Reserve side of the house, but he con- the 8th Army advanced, so did the supplies sioned officers alike before going to the tends that, while this system worked ex- necessary for sustainment in the desert. National Training Center or the Marine tremely well during the war in the Persian The general admits that “The notion of Corps equivalent at Twentynine Palms, Gulf, some of the more important elements stripped-down, movable logistical bases California. Moving Mountains, similar in ap- of the Army’s Combat Service Support was a compelling one, much more compel- proach and content with that of James R. (CSS) capability should be put back into ling, for example, than the fire bases of Vi- McDonough’s Defense of Hill 781, is a the active Army. This reviewer disagrees. It etnam.” Pagonis says that perhaps the book that transcends any one service and must be remembered that any future con- most significant book he read while prepar- holds lessons for all to learn and put into flict will be what Pagonis calls “a come-as- ing the U.S. Army for battle in the Persian practice. you-are party,” denying the Army its critical Gulf was Donald E. Engels’s masterful CSS capability due to the legal ramifica- book, Alexander the Great and the Logis- tions of activating the Reserves. In this age tics of the Macedonian Army. What im- SSG LEO DAUGHERTY III of sudden mid- to low-intensity conflicts, pressed him the most, he says, was the The History Department the reserves of all services will serve as an simple fact that supply was the basis of Al- Ohio State University important “pool” for the active side to draw exander’s strategy and tactics. Pagonis’s Columbus, Ohio upon, as was seen during DESERT astute knowledge of military history en- SHIELD/DESERT STORM. This alone abled him to organize and build the type of should guide future Army contingency plan- logistics system necessary to fit Schwarz- ning by forcing Army planners to ask the kopf’s “End Run.” critical question, “What role will the re- General Pagonis’s chapter on DESERT Ordering Information serves play, if any?” STORM, however, is one of the weaker for Fields of Armor General Pagonis’s Moving Mountains rep- chapters of an otherwise informative book. resents perhaps one of the better books on The general’s overall conclusion is that the To order the Fields of Armor video the Gulf War since it blends the logistical system worked with minimal problems, but tape, reviewed in the July-August element into the strategic, operational, and as Marines and other Coalition members 1994 issue, phone 1-800-635-6400. tactical concerns faced by men who now admit, the logistics effort was not with- planned the successful ground war. Despite out its problems. ARMOR — November-December 1994 53 Colonel Ira C. Welborn, Medal of Honor Recipient and Tank Corps Pioneer, Honored in Memorial Day Ceremony by Captain (Major-Select), W. P. McLaughlin, USMC

Recently, I had the honor of attending a Memorial Day ceremony that highlighted a Medal of Honor recipient who is also a prominent figure in Armor history. As an active duty advisor to a Marine Reserve unit in Gulfport, Mississippi, my mission is not only to train Reserve Marines for combat mobilization, but also to maintain a rapport with the local community. This is how I learned of Colonel Welborn’s resting place here on the Gulf Coast. My commanding general, Major General James E. Livingston USMC, was the guest speaker for the Biloxi, Mississippi Veterans Administration Hospital and National Cemetery complex’s 1994 Memorial Day Remembrance. General Livingston is an Infantry officer and a Medal of Honor recipient from the Vietnam War. As Commanding General, Marine Reserve Forces, headquartered in New Orleans, La., he was invited to speak at this occasion, honoring the dedication of a new head- stone for a distinguished Army Medal of Honor recipient, Colonel Ira Clinton Welborn, Infantry, U.S. Army. Local press commented: “The ceremony singled out Col. Ira Clinton Welborn of Section 12, row 4, grave 12 as one of the nation’s highest military honorees for valor during the Battle of San Juan Hill on July 2, 1898. On Mon- officer ranks to provide young, proficient, bold leaders with firsthand day (30 May 1994) there were no flags or floral arrangements atop experience.2 his grave, but there was a new marker bearing a small gold replica Although Colonel Welborn eventually returned to the Infantry, his of the Medal of Honor. (Author’s note: This was written prior to impact on the “young Turks” of the World War I Tank Corps was Senator Cochran and Mrs. Elizabeth B. Welborn, daughter in-law felt for years to come. paying their respects at the grave. The national colors were placed to honor Colonel Welborn). “Officials learned in the last year that he received the Medal of Endnotes Honor during a distinguished military career that ended in 1932.” 1Treat ’Em Rough, The Birth of American Armor 1917-20 by Dale E. Colonel Welborn was a member of the West Point Class of 1898. Wilson, 1990, Presidio Press, p. 31. Assigned to the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment, as an Infantry company 2Ibid., pp. 64-69, 82, 209, 217. commander, 2LT Welborn participated in the Santiago Campaign, the Battle of San Juan. He was also recommended for two brevets for gallantry in the Battle of San Juan, July 1-2, 1898. During this battle, 2LT Welborn voluntarily left shelter and went under fire to the I would like to credit the following individuals: Mr. Charlie Byrd, Na- aid of a private of his company who was wounded. For this action, tional Cemetery, Biloxi, Miss.; Mr. Scott Taylor, ACAP, Ft. Knox, Ky., coordinator for dedication of Welborn Hall 1992; and CWO4 Weis- he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. neck, USMCR, Marine Reserve Forces, Public Affairs Office, New Colonel Welborn’s later military career included further combat in Orleans, La. the Philippine Insurrection. Although not as well known as other Captain (P) William P. McLaughlin was commissioned through the pioneers, his influence was profound in the infant stages of the Tank NROTC program at The Citadel in 1983. He served in 2d Marine Corps. Division (MD) as a plt. cdr. and S-3A to include a deployment as “...On 5 March [1918] the Secretary of War appointed LTC Ira C. the assault amphibian vehicle plt. cdr. for Marine Detachment, Welborn, an Infantry officer awarded the Medal of Honor during the United American States XXVII to South America. He served as a Spanish-American War, to serve as director of the Tank Service in rifle plt. cdr. for Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team Company and the United States.”1 later as its XO and weapons plt. cdr., completing his tour at Marine Corps Security Force Battalion as the Security Force Training Cen- As a mentor to a young Army officer, Dwight D. Eisenhower, ter’s training and operations officer. After completion of AOAC at Ft. Colonel Welborn also had a profound impact on another generation Knox, he served as CO, D Co., 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 2d of fighting men in the Second World War. MD. He deployed with his company to Southwest Asia and sup- ported the 6th and 8th Marines, and also 2d Tank Battalion during Colonel Welborn, as a combat experienced officer, gave the admin- the ground offensive. He also served as a U.N. Observer in the West- istrative oversight to produce tanks and train young soldiers to fight ern Sahara. He also served as the CO of HQSVC Co. and is pres- in France. He also had the foresight to believe that this new techno- ently the inspector-instructor for 4th Plt. (Rein.) Co. A(-) 4th AA BN, logical invention, would require technically competent officers. He 4th MD, FMF, USMCR. He has been selected to attend the Marine endorsed the commissioning of Tank Corps enlisted soldiers into the Corps Command and Staff College in 1995.

PIN: 073154-000