The NGO Safety Office Issue: 31 1-15 August 2009

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Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-4 The upcoming elections and associated violence dominated the media during this two 5-6 Northern Region week reporting period, in some cases overshadowing other significant security develop- Western Region 7-8 ments in other parts of the country. Eastern Region 8-10 As expected, AOG carried out a devastating and high-profile suicide attack in Kabul, likely designed to disrupt the elections by frightening potential voters in the capital; more Southern Region 10-13 such attacks are expected in Kabul in the coming days. ANSO Info Page 14 AOG efforts to intimidate voters, candidates, and electoral workers remain widespread in the greater central region and much of the rest of the country; however, the overall num- ber of attacks on discernible election targets, such as ballot convoys, campaign rallies, YOU NEED TO KNOW campaign staff, observers, and election agents has been lower than many expected. Still, incidents will likely increase around the August 20 election date. • Election-related threats and In recent days, AOG have issued statements indicating their intent to target polling sta- violence overshadow other tions or centres, but it is not clear if this is propaganda, or a legitimate warning to Afghan concerns civilians. • Sensational attacks meant Other recent developments in the Central region include a complex attack against the to garner media coverage Governor’s office in in Logar, and worrying levels of AOG activity in parts and discourage voting are of Daykundi, Kapisa and Wardak. likely In the North, IMF/ANSF operations focused on Kunduz do not appear to be reducing • Increased combat along AOG activity, and the ongoing conflict is having a serious destabilising effect on the prov- past secure highways and ince. Of note during this reporting period, AOG attacked a high-profile convoy near Alia- AOG electoral-related threats are disconcerting bad which was later revealed to have been carrying former President Rabbani. In the East, the only significant development was the worrying increase in combat re- ANSO is supported by ported along the Kabul to and Jalalabad to Asadabad highways, as these are routes still being used by NGO national and international staff. In the West, ANSO reports indicate a two-fold increase in AOG activity over the same period in 2008, and Herat is now the leading province in terms of NGO incidents this year. Violence continues to creep from Herat’s suburban districts into Herat City proper, made evident by the 3 August RCIED attack in the city which killed the District Chief of Police, caused significant civilian casualties, and damaged nearby NGO compounds. The South, nonetheless, remains highly volatile due to the high volume of AOG and IMF/ANSF operations. Despite the latter actors’ recent and ongoing operations, AOGs maintain influence or control over most of the south and the ability to conduct IED strikes and attacks almost at will (although not always effectively). AOGs in the south are issuing widespread and dire warnings to the population against participating in the elec- tions. AOGs have also started broadcasting news and perspectives over the radio in parts of Ghazni. Numerous IED attacks and significant suicide attacks, including one attempt against an ANA base, were again reported across the southern region during this period. IMF airstrikes also caused more consternation and demonstrations. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 8 50 This Report Period 0 40 Kabul has remained relatively im- 30 mune from the rising levels of NGO residences, were reportedly 20 AOG initiated violence experi- blown out in structures several enced across the rest of the coun- hundred metres away. 10 try this year; however ,the rocket The security climate across the 0 attack on 4 August and the large capital will be dominated by the SVBIED outside ISAF HQ on 15 election, both prior to and follow- August served to shatter that illu- ing 20 August. There is an in- AOG ACG sion for some. The SVBIED is creasing likelihood, according to believed to have wounded over threat reporting, that AOG will gets’, such as GoA and international facilities; a 100 people and killed more than a attempt to undertake one or sev- large scale attack in the capital would signifi- dozen. Windows, including in eral high-profile attacks in the cantly undermine the confidence of voters to days before the election or in its turn out on election day. Of further concern is KEY THREATS & CON- immediate aftermath. the post election period where rumours and CERNS the election results themselves may contribute Although unlikely to directly tar- Complex attacks against high- to a deteriorating security environment. In this get polling centres and polling profile targets environment, ACG activity is expected to in- stations, AOG may take advan- Armed Criminal Groups crease as the political vacuum and specific se- tage of the election-focused stance Abduction curity focus on the election detract from the of the ANSF to attack ‘softer tar- ANP’s crime fighting abilities.

KAPISA NGO Incidents 50 KAPISA Year to Date 2 40 This Report Period 0 Anecdotal reporting indicates 30 district due to the associated levels that recent AOG attacks in the 20 west of the province are largely of violence. 10 attributable to a new AOG intent The two most recent attacks in on disrupting the election. The the west were believed to be tar- 0 east of the province continues to geting senior provincial and elec- experience regular attacks on tion officials; however, this has IMF/ANSF targets, with Tagab been difficult to confirm. In the AOG ACG likely to face severe difficulties Toghat Area of Kohistan, an IED staging any polling centres in the attached to a bicycle detonated an ous threats mentioning the election have been hour after senior election officials recorded across the province, and NGOs are had passed, injuring a local man reminded to avoid all election-related sites also KEY THREATS & CONCERNS on 6 August. Similarly, senior pro- on the day prior to and following the election. Although it is unlikely AOG will directly target Attacks on ANSF, especially in vincial officials were having lunch Tagab and Nijrab in Puli Sayad Area, when three polling centres, the recent spike in electoral- Rocket, IED, and mine attacks rockets landed in the area, leaving related violence means that the possibility can- no casualties on 9 August. Previ- not be discounted.

NOTICE: ANSO has unveiled a new streamlined registration and amendment process for NGOs. For registration or amendment assistance, please email the Operations Coordinator Assistant, Wali Haqdost, at [email protected]. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40

Parwan has remained relatively 30 quiet during the election cam- the DAC in Shinwari on 1 and 9 20 paigning period with only low- August. AOG initiated incidents, level factional disputes being re- since the attack on the IO convoy 10 ported. Separately, the west of the in June, have remained confined 0 province – of concern for NGOs to attacks against ANSF and GoA travelling to Bamyan – experi- targets, such as the DACs, and enced two rocket attacks against have not translated into a more AOG ACG general threat to civilian traffic. rare in the district and also the province, where KEY THREATS & CON- The increased level of AOG activ- traditionally only standoff attacks are used CERNS ity in the west of Kapisa may have against IMF in Bagram and Kohi Safi. The Attacks on ANSF/IMF, espe- overflowed into the East of Par- ambush on 5 August injured three IMF and cially near Bagram Airbase wan if an ambush on IMF in Ha- drove ANSF to return to the village, culminat- Irregular IEDs targeting ANSF yat Khel Village in Sayed Khel ing in the arrests of five men and the seizure of in Ghorband Valley could be attributed to AOG. Am- a number of IEDs and other weapons. bushes against IMF are extremely

NGO Incidents 50 DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 40 This Report Period 0 The south of Daykundi remains a 30 concern due to the frequency of disrupt the election, with check- 20 points set up looking for GoA reports about AOG movements, 10 officials. Attacks on GoA facilities combined with sporadic attacks 0 on ANSF checkpoints. In most in either Kajran or Gizab, before reports, AOG intentions are to and after the election, are a dis- tinct possibility. Further north in AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CON- Khadir on 4 August, three people CERNS were abducted, and the following Banditry continues to represent a minor threat High AOG infiltration of Kiti, day one of the men was killed by to NGO operations following a further rob- Gizrab, and Kajran local AOG. It is understood that bery in Chawoosh Valley of Ishtarlay; local Security vacuum the other two men remain in cus- criminal groups are believed to be responsible AOG clashes with locals, espe- tody, and negotiations are ongo- for setting up a temporary checkpoint and rob- cially in the south ing for their release. bing people of their possessions in minivans and trucks.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN BAMYAN 50 Year to Date 1 40 This Report Period 1 On 4 August, an NGO medical 30 facility was temporarily closed Police’s convoy and a subsequent 20 following a reported abduction operation in the Shinkari Valley. 10 threat against staff. Still, events in The ANP-led operation resulted 0 Bamyan have centred primarily in the arrest of a senior AOG around Shibar, following a rocket commander who was subse- attack on the District Chief of quently taken to the provincial AOG ACG capital. Several days later, a fur- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ther AOG suspect was arrested in ing from the election, there have been no overt Increasing IEDs and mines Bamyan City. displays of violence, which is unlikely to dra- matically change in the next several weeks. Armed robbery along roadways Although reports have emerged of low-level factional disputes deriv- THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 International attention was fo- 40 cused on Puli Alam, on 10 Au- equipped with BBIED vests. In 30 gust, when five AOG launched a response, IMF were deployed to 20 10 complex attack against the Gover- the Bazaar Area in tanks, and heli- 0 nor’s office. After seeking refuge copters were used to rocket the in an adjoining five story building building that contained the re- following the initial attack, AOG maining AOG. Reports have AOG ACG then started firing from a vantage emerged that two AOG detonated riorating security situation across the country. point. It is believed that the AOG their BBIED vests to avoid cap- This attack is likely to be replicated against used SAF and RPGs and were ture; three ANSF and two civil- other DACs and provincial capitals in the lead ians were reportedly killed to- up to and following the election. Previously gether with the five AOG. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS reported intimidation threats and the known Abduction The seeming success of the opera- strength of AOG in the province will ensure Electoral-related violence tion served to distract attention that attacks against electoral-related sites and from the election and instead fo- Attacks on ANSF/IMF GoA facilities will likely be recorded in virtu- cused scrutiny on the overall dete- ally every district.

WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 2 100 This Report Period 0 80 Highway One, together with the 60 methods. In response, DACs, is the primary focus of 40 ANSF/IMF have launched sev- AOGs in Wardak. Standoff at- 20 eral joint operations against AOG, tacks on IMF, ANSF and logistics 0 convoys were unabated in Sayda- especially in Chaki Wardak and bad and Nirkh, with close range Saydabad, where in the villages of attacks favoured primarily against Ambokhak and Kharyan a total of AOG ACG the DACs in Day Mirdad and 111 people were arrested, ten were killed, and two wounded. and GoA employees. The next two weeks will Jaghatu; nonetheless, Chaki War- most likely witness a shift from intimidation to dak, Nirkh and the capital Maydan There has also been a discernible direct attacks on GoA facilities and returning Shahr are not immune to these level of electoral-related violence, election convoys and isolated attacks on poll- although mainly confined to at- ing centres and stations around election day. It KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tacks on logistics convoys. Intimi- Abduction is unlikely that direct attacks on the voting dation efforts have been recorded public will occur; however, with recent reports Rocket and IED attacks across the province, including of direct threats to the general public, then the Intimidation efforts threats against the voting public as possibility remains. well as against election workers

NGO Incidents AOG attempts to expand their presence, FARYAB Year to Date 3 meeting with mixed success. In Shirin Tagab This Report Period 0 and Dawlatabad, AOGs mostly employ IEDs Dynamics in Faryab have per- or attacks on ANP/ANBP checkpoints. sisted in terms of AOG presence Qaysar, Almar, and Pashtun Kot While such attacks often produce AOG victo- and incidents. The districts of continue to see the bulk of AOG incidents, consisting of RGP, ries in the west of the province, in the north, SAF, and IED attacks on ANSF their chance of success is inversely propor- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and IMF as well as the ever- tional to the amount of resistance put up by IEDs profitable tactic of kidnapping the ANP. In this reporting period, an AOG Attacks on checkpoints international road construction expanded the list of targets slightly by attack- Electoral-related violence company labourers. The areas ing campaigners for a presidential candidate in north of Maymana continue to see Shirin Tagab. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Criminal activity remains the chief 40 concern throughout much of the spot, which accounted for the sole 30 east of the province and has con- recorded NGO incident of the 20 year when an NGO vehicle was tinued to escape the GoA’s capa- 10 bility to remedy it. An ACG robbed. ACG groups in this area are pointedly apolitical and do not 0 checkpoint in Jilga served to har- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG ass travellers between Nahrin and ask about the affiliations of those Khost-wa-Firang for much of this they detain, but their presence AOG ACG reporting period, interfering with means that travel in the area impossible to substantiate and are more likely the travel plans of at least one should be based on up-to-date to represent remote and conservative elements NGO by causing them to delay a local information and acute situ- arming themselves and acting defensively in- planned trip. ACG activity has ational awareness, to the greatest stead of a coordinated AOG push, such as that previously been recorded in this extent possible. Additionally, is being seen in the Baghlani Jadid area. Other NGOs should carry as few valu- security incidents in Baghlan have been fo- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ables as possible in this area. Oc- cused upon internal power struggles, particu- casional reports have been re- Criminal activity larly in association with real and anticipated ceived of AOGs in remote vil- Political disputes reshuffles surrounding elections; for example, lages throughout the east of the AOGs in Baghlani Jadid one such incident led to the Dahani Ghori province, but these have proved Chief of Police being targeted with an IED.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 8 50 This Report Period 0 The ongoing joint IMF/ANSF 40 operations, focused on areas diate environs of the airport/PRT. 30 north and west of Kunduz, have An SVBIED detonated along the 20 apparently not had the overall short road from the PRT to the 10 main road, and an AOG also set impact of reducing AOG-initiated 0 activity in the province. AOGs up a checkpoint on the same main JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG operating in Kunduz have suc- road not far south of the PRT cut cessfully been able to show their -off ,which was only displaced AOG ACG with some difficulty by ANSF. In presence elsewhere, most signifi- launching an assault on the District Centre. Dashti Archi District, a major cantly around the Puli Khumri – The outcome is still unclear at the time of this AOG attack succeeded in killing Kunduz road south of Kunduz writing, but it is clear that AOG have demon- the District Chief of Police, who and Dashti Archi District in the strated strong operational capabilities through- was politically important and well- northeast of the province. South out the clash and in an area which has been connected, along with three other of Kunduz, an AOG orchestrated relatively quiet in recent months (though pro- ANP. Although ANP showed a significant RPG attack on a high AOG sentiment has always been significant in strong resolve and discipline by -profile convoy near Aliabad Archi). While local support for AOGs will be holding the police headquarters which was later revealed to have important for the long-term sustainability of during a three-hour clash, the au- been carrying former President their activities, it is also likely that the assault thorities were ultimately only able Rabbani. on the Archi DAC was supported by an excess to reassert control after irregular On at least two occasions, AOGs of AOG fighters who have been squeezed out reinforcements were sent in from manifest themselves in the imme- of other areas by IMF/ANSF operations. Be- neighbouring districts. In the af- cause of the amount and variety of threats termath of this attack was an at- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS throughout the province, travel through and tempt by ANSF to reassert con- AOG activity within should be restricted to essential only, trol that met with stiff AOG resis- Ongoing military operations with the situation unlikely to change soon. tance, followed in turn by AOGs IEDs retaking the initiative and re- THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

BADAKHSHAN NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Badakhshan’s usual milieu of 30 criminal activity and localised po- riod, such leaflets have also been seen in Baharak, and in Shahri 20 litical disputes was mostly un- 10 changed. Anti-GoA agitation, Buzurg, a local mullah urged fol- lowers not to participate in voting. 0 however, has ultimately made its JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG mark in the final run-up to the In Fayzabad, anti-GoA sentiment national elections. Previously, took a more violent form when a AOG ACG candidate’s campaign vehicle was little such activity had been seen personnel and facilities now also extends to outside of the occasional anti- set alight. The practical impact for NGOs, seeing that the GoA’s election officials, campaign workers, and poll- participation leaflet distributed in ing places during the actual polling. Aside Fayzabad. In this reporting pe- sphere of operations has widened, is that there are more potential from election-associated threats, other security KEY THREATS & CONCERNS targets which ought to be avoided; incidents in Badakhshan consisted of small and Electoral-related violence the list of typical GoA targets isolated attacks on ANP, which are just as likely the outcome of ACG-related issues as Criminal activity such as IMF, ANSF, and GoA they are of AOG sentiment.

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN JAWZJAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Jawzjan as a whole has remained 40 especially quiet in the pre-election where is resultant from a quest 30 period with the exception of the within the GoA system for the 20 spoils of power and influence. restive southern districts of Dar- 10 zab and Qoshtappa. This dy- Roving AOGs in Qoshtappa and Darzab continue to exercise influ- 0 namic reflects the fact that those JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG ence and intimidate at will, enter- two districts have a committed AOG ACG AOG presence while activity else- ing a village centre for a few hours in order to “collect taxes” or har- provincial council candidate recently. Along- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS assing passers-by along roads. side ACG ties, the groups active in southern They sustain themselves through AOG activity in Qoshtappa and Jawzjan have varying connections to groups Darzab such revenues or through other further afield in places like of Political disputes illegal activities, best exemplified Sar-e Pul, eastern Faryab, and the highly vola- by the kidnap for ransom of a tile Murghab Valley of Badghis.

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 0 SAR‐E‐PUL This Report Period 0 50 Incidents in Sar-e Pul have been 40 been sustained long enough to entirely confined to AOG re- 30 sponses to IMF/ANSF opera- have the desired impact, with 20 tions in Sayyad District. Such ANA often recalled to back up operations are meant to establish their comrades in other more high 10 a GoA presence but have not yet -profile trouble spots. The results 0 consist of scattered and generally JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ineffective attempts by some AOG ACG AOG activity in Sayyad AOGs to engage the IMF/ANSF, Criminal activity after which they tactically retreat lar party dominating the area means there have elsewhere until the operation has been few NGO incidents, as few NGOs are passed. The volatility of no singu- able to operate in such an exposed position. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 3 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 Threats in Farah are almost exclu- 40 ACGs and AOGs, leading to oc- sively directed at GoA, ANSF, 30 casional arrests and confronta- and IMF, with no NGO incidents 20 reported due to their lack of expo- tions along the relatively desolate 10 sure, low profile, or both. The border with Iran. AOGs active in main other source of concern in Farah have been able to continu- 0 the province is the nexus between ally demonstrate presence by am- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG bushing IMF convoys and rocket- AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ing the governor’s office. The Ambushes rate of incidents in Farah has re- of AOG presence or motivation. Travel mained fairly constant but this is through or within Farah is still not recom- IEDs possibly a result of low IMF/ mended for NGOs. Criminal activity ANSF exposure rather than lack

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 13 50 This Report Period 0 The most significant event to 40 have occurred in the province was the attack followed a number of 30 failed attempts. While such major consistent with violence that has, 20 until now, been only common- events rarely happen within the 10 place in the districts that surround confines of Herat City, they are Herat City; this time, however, a commonplace in its suburbs; these 0 sensational RCIED attack oc- attacks, although not entertaining JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG curred in Herat City. The explo- the same attention as incidents AOG ACG sion, which garnered a significant within the city, show that this at- amount of media attention, took tack posed no extra difficulties, inadvisable due to AOG control and rivalries. place at a busy intersection and logistically. Kushki Kuhna and Karukh districts also con- succeed in killing the Looking at the province as a tinue to host AOGs, making civilian travel Chief of Police along with 13 whole, with over twenty recorded between Qal’ai Naw and Herat difficult, at ANP and 20 other bystanders; AOG-initiated incidents, it easily best. Furthermore, AOGs have continued to also, it caused significant damage trumps other known and recog- show their regular ability to target the airport to the compound of an INGO nized trouble spots, such as Kun- with rockets and disrupt air traffic in and out located nearby. The cause of the duz and Badghis. Moreover, of Herat. The threat of airport closure is fur- CoP’s targeting was the typical AOG activity in Herat appears ther underlined by frequent and awkwardly combination of AOG methods unique in its scope and diversity. coordinated closures for maintenance. The mixed with political rivalries, and AOGs, and ACGs, have resorted location and subsequent susceptibility of the to the time-tested methods of airport to AOG activity and closure means that KEY THREATS & CONCERNS IEDs, illegal checkpoints, and organizations wishing to utilise it should leave IEDs SAF attacks. a window of two to three days, both coming and going, to allow for cancellation and delay Illegal checkpoints Road travel east of Herat, starting of their flights. Criminal activity west of Pashtun Zargun, remains

ANNOUNCEMENT: In the coming months, ANSO will be providing input for an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 9 GHOR This Report Period 0 50 The threat from AOG activity in 40 on IEC workers seems to have the southern districts of Taywara 30 been their satellite phones, rather and Pasaband has receded in this 20 reporting period, with other activ- than their role in the elections. In 10 ity in Ghor being mainly criminal another instance, an ACG suc- in nature. The object of an attack ceeded in robbing travellers along 0 the road between JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG

and Lal-wa-Sarjangal by donning AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANP uniforms and posing as a Criminal activity checkpoint. Travel through Shah- to shifting allegiances between AOG and ACG Political disputes rak and areas west along the route leaders and other sundry local commanders to Herat is still to be avoided due that encourage further strife.

NGO Incidents Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 40 Laghman has seen a worrying in- crease in combat along Highway Khogyani or Surkh Rod). In sum, 30 1; for example, AOGs thought to the threat to NGOs in both areas 20 be based in Mitharlam District is the possibility of being inadver- 10 tently caught in the middle of a have conducted three recent di- 0 rect attacks on police posts in the clash between combatants. Tengay Area. There have also To highlight this, there have been been three IMF fuel tanker am- no reports of illegal check points AOG ACG bushes on Highway 1 closer to or AOG targeting anything other Jalalabad. (The latter perpetrators than security force vehicles and There was one election-related violent inci- are believed to be based in posts. dent, however, reported this period: a Provin- cial candidate was ambushed in Mitharlam Dis- Another development is a de- trict. The candidate escaped unharmed, but KEY THREATS & CONCERNS crease in the number of reported one attacker was wounded and arrested. Lastly, Attacks along Highway 1 IEDs in the province over recent election observers do not expect voting to oc- Continuing IED threat near DACs months, with only one reported cur in the three northern districts. this period.

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 7 NANGAHAR This Report Period 0 50 Despite instability elsewhere, 40 Nangarhar has been stable and Highway 1 to Torkham is secure, and NGO local staff report the 30 quiet this period. Most AOG ac- 20 tivity has occurred in the western road to Peshawar is also quiet. districts and has involved IEDs. Additionally, political rallies have 10 been held without incident in Jala- 0 KEY THREATS & CON- labad. With this, one should note CERNS that a mosque that had been des- Kidnap threat ignated as a polling station in AOG ACG AOG attacks on JAF and GoA was attacked more, election observers expect voting to be facilities with an RPG during the evening difficult in any district bordering Pakistan, but Attacks on DACs and polling of 14 August. (No casualties or they do not foresee major problems in Jala- stations damage were reported). Further- labad, or the central districts. THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents NURISTAN NURISTAN Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 Nuristan has been stable, but with improved reporting for both ported this period in Bargi Matal 30 ANSO and the UN, statistically and Kamdesh. 20 will appear to have more AOG A major event occurred in 10 activity. IMF combat operations on 14 August when a demonstra- 0 continued in Bargi Matal, and tion voicing discontent with the there were four AOG attacks re- governor’s handling of the elec-

tion turned violent, and police AOG ACG shot several demonstrators. While KEY THREATS & CONCERNS there are rumours that AOG fired Increased military operations from the crowd, these remain un- ing to be held in Nuristan, and due to the AOG pervasiveness confirmed. On another note, elec- prevalent security vacuum, NGOs are advised tion observers do not expect vot- to generally avoid the province.

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 6 200 This Report Period 0 The security situation in Kunar is 150 largely unchanged. Combat is dures than a lack of AOG explo- 100 common in Manogai, Narang, sive devices. 50 Wata Pur and Sirkanay districts. Over the past several years, the Direct attacks on convoys and Jalalabad- Asadabad Highway has 0 IMF/ANP remain the most fre- been secure enough that interna- quent AOG tactic with the appar- tional staff travel to Asadabad was ent lack of IED use being due common; this may be changing, AOG ACG more to IMF reporting proce- though. The most troubling devel- opment in Kunar during this pe- been running illegal checkpoints north of Jala- labad, an action that will hopefully re-establish KEY THREATS & CON- riod was a firefight on 8 August CERNS that blocked the Jalalabad- Asada- a high level of security on the highway. Spread of AOG operation onto bad Highway in Nurgal between Although no direct election violence was re- the Jalalabad - Asadabad High- security forces and people ported in Kunar this period, election observ- way “dressed as ANP”. With this, se- ers, not surprisingly, do not expect voting to Inaccurate IDF on IMF/ANP curity forces recently arrested be possible in the most volatile districts. three groups of ANSF who had

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA 50 This Report Period 0 Paktya remains volatile with 17 40 the centres of AOG operations. AOG incidents reported this pe- 30 riod. The incidents were a mix of With the threat of violence, there 20 IEDs and direct fire attacks on was an unusual lull in kidnapping, security forces, including eight IEDs on the Gardez-Khost Road, 10 successful ambushes or IED at- and attacks on construction com- 0 tacks. Gardez and Zurmat remain panies this period. In light of the violence, though, NGOs are ad- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS vised to avoid road travel in the Complex attacks in Gardez City districts. AOG ACG THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 9 KHOST This Report Period 0 50 remains highly 40 volatile with ten IEDs exploding and indirect fire attacks. Shamal 30 or being found in Khost City. Sa- District also experienced indirect 20 bari District was also active with a fire attacks, distinguishing itself by 10 failed BBIED attack on the DAC being the site of the only direct 0 fire attacks on security forces in the province. In spite of AOG

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS attempts to utilise IDF and un- AOG ACG IEDs conventional tactics, AOGs’ pre- Abduction ferred weapon remains the IED, in other eastern region provinces. Because of Attacks on GoA and IMF and their ability to coordinate op- this reliance on IEDs, NGOs area advised to erations appears to be better than avoid road travel in the province.

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 1 PAKTIKA 100 This Report Period 0 Security incidents in Paktika were 80 typical, minus a few exceptions. Centre on 2 August that resulted 60 The most significant incident oc- in 4 AOG and 2 ANP fatalities. 40 curred in Sharan City on 2 August Additionally, AOG attacked an 20 when AOG attacked the Provin- ANP post with heavy weapons 0 cial Governor's residence with and SAF, resulting in 2 AOG heavy weapons from 2 directions. killed, again in Sharan City on 2 IMF air support responded to the August. AOG ACG scene, and the clash lasted for one Besides attempts to target ac- hour with no reported casualties. cepted combatants, typical meth- The prevalent threat remains IEDs, however, AOG also demonstrated their ods of intimidation, such as exe- with strikes occurring in several districts, in- intent to conduct prolonged at- cution or abduction of perceived cluding Yahya Khel, Omna, Khushamand, tacks in the two hour siege of an GoA collaborators, were evident Khair Kot, Yosuf Khel and Sharan Districts; in ANP post and the Nika District in the killing of a school teacher in total, 7 ANP, 1 civilian, 2 PSC guards and 3 Nika District on 12 August and employees of a road construction company KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the 11 August abduction of the were killed in the strikes. Additionally, NGOs IEDs Gayan District Administrator, should expect that AOG elements in the area Abductions both occurring whilst the victims would like to conduct further sensational at- AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes were on there way home. tacks, usually against GoA, ANSF, or IMF facilities.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 5 200 This Report Period 1 The state of insecurity in Kanda- 150 har continues to be volatile, with And as should be expected, AOG 100 distributed anti-election night let- AOG-IMF/ANSF strife afflicting 50 all districts, especially Kandahar ters in Districts 1 and 9 of Kanda- 0 City, predominately in the form of har City; with this, on 13 August roadside IED strikes. Significant in District 2, ANP detained 4 incidents were marked by the 5 AOG members that were riding August hijacking of an NGO mini on 2 motorbikes and possessed 15 AOG ACG -bus, with a group of deminers on night letters and a pistol. board travelling from their daily NGOs should also note the dem- The AOG intent to plan and orchestrate at- work site to their office. The per- onstration that occurred on 5 Au- tacks inside Kandahar City was again made petrators bound them and appro- gust outside the Kandahar Gover- evident, this time in the seizure of 500 kg of priated the NGO’s vehicle, but nor’s compound in response to explosives and other IED manufacturing items ANP deployed and pursued the purported civilian casualties that in District 9 on 4 August. The reliance on perpetrators, later finding the ve- resulted from an IMF airstrike in IEDs was concurrently seen in the numerous hicle abandoned. In a separate Arghandab District the previous IED strikes that occurred during the period; incident, an IED detonated prior night. The demonstrators had for example, 8 IEDs hit civilian vehicles in to the arrival of a passing demin- transported the 4 corpses to the different locations, killing a sum of 13 civilians, ing vehicle on 1 August, wound- scene and demanded action; this including children, and wounding an additional ing 1 deminer. all occurred, of note, while IMF 26. Also, 4 IEDs hit IMF vehicles, killing 4 conducted several operations and IMF soldiers and wounding 9 others, including KEY THREATS & CONCERNS airstrikes in Kandahar City and 2 international journalists. NGOs should note Banditry/Hijacking Arghandab, Panjwayi, and Zhari that the province, as a whole, continues to be Kidnap Districts, reportedly killing 29 perilous due to AOG attempts to confront the GoA, IMF, and ANSF. Roadside IEDs AOG and 9 civilians.

NGO Incidents NIMROZ NIMROZ Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 100 AOG continue to dominate of- 80 fensive operations in the province. Ghor Ghori, Khash Rod District, Recently, on 13 August, ANP assaulted the staff, and stole one 60 shot a suicide bomber riding in a motorbike. In addition, on 8 Au- 40 gust in the same district, five vehicle rigged as a VBIED after 20 the suicide attacker failed to heed armed individuals attacked the given warnings to stop at their house of a local civilian nurse 0 post, resulting in the death of the working for a health clinic, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG suicide bomber. wounding the nurse’s daughter. AOG ACG And on 6 August, three armed Just as elsewhere, AOG distrib- men entered a medical clinic in uted warning letters to Khash Rod post, searching vehicles and looking for GoA residents, stating not to participate and foreign workers. in the upcoming elections, or they The majority of incidents in Nimroz, however, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS would face death. Additionally, continue to be resultant from its access to Suicide attacks in Zaranj and AOG attacked the Khash Rod cross border areas, mainly entailing illicit op- Khash Rod ANP HQ on 1 August for three erations by criminal and opposition elements, Kidnap hours, resulting in 10 AOG killed. including human trafficking and drug smug- Prevalent security vacuum Also, on 9 August in the district, gling - a situation that will likely continue due AOG had set up an illegal check to the province’s relative isolation. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND This Report Period 0 100 This reporting period in Helmand 80 that instructed residents not to concluded with a number of sig- 60 nificant incidents. The most sig- vote. On the same date, report- 40 nificant one occurred on 14 Au- edly, five civilians were killed and gust in Laghman Jada, Lashkar a further 12 were wounded during 20 Gah City, when a Toyota Corolla an IMF airstrike in Sangin Dis- 0 rigged as a VBIED approached an trict. And 7 AOG were reportedly JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG ANA base and was engaged by an killed during an IMF airstrike in AOG ACG on-duty ANA, causing the device on 10 August. to detonate and kill the suicide AOG were also active on the IED hit a local tractor carrying civilians that bomber. The VBIED detonation same day, killing 2 IMF and were participating in a wedding party in Garm- was followed by two rockets, with wounding an additional 3 in a ser District on 5 August, killing 5, including one striking the base, and the convoy ambush in . women and children; another IED struck a other striking a residence. Anti- With this, AOG conducted sev- civilian vehicle, killing 5 occupants in the same election activity persisted, also, eral armed assaults on check- district the following day; and a third IED with the 1 August distribution of points and IMF/ANSF patrols; again struck a civilian vehicle, killing 11 in night letters in Garmser District for example, AOG attacked a Nahri Sarraj District on 12 August. As well, joint IMF/ANA patrol, killing 3 three IED incidents occurred against ANP vehicles, killing 10 ANP and wounding a fur- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANA soldiers and wounding 1 ther 4; and 4 IEDs struck IMF vehicles on IMF on 9 August. Suicide attacks separate occasions, one which was followed by Furthermore, a significant number Roadside IEDs an AOG ambush that reportedly killed 8 IMF. Significant AOG threat of IED strikes occurred during the reporting period: a roadside

NGO Incidents GHAZNI G HAZNI Year to Date 2 100 This Report Period 0 AOG maintained the initiative in 80 10 August when AOG attacked a the province, and demonstrated 60 determination and ingenuity; for joint IMF/ANSF convoy in Ajris- 40 example, AOG activated a mobile tan District for one hour; reported radio station by the name of casualties included 1 IMF, 3 20 “Shariat Ghag Radio” (Voice of ANA, 4 ANP, and 9 AOG killed 0 Islamic Law) in Qarabagh District. and 1 IMF, 6 ANA , 3 ANP and 7 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG The radio is broadcasting AOG AOG wounded. Also during the AOG ACG news and perspectives, and broad- period, IMF purportedly killed 18 casts can be heard in bordering AOG in an airstrike in Nawa Dis- AOG were said to have emplaced IEDs in the districts. Tensions in Qarabagh trict on 12 August. district and to have procured BBIED vests for are likely further flamed with in- And as to be expected for an later use, also within the district. formation that approximately 90 AOG-contested region, AOG Electoral-related threats persisted, further- AOG members have migrated to warned residents more, in the reports that 40 AOG members the district. not to participate in the upcoming infiltrated with the supposed Of note, a major clash ensued on election with the penalty of death. intent to attack polling centres, and an un- The threat was apparently voiced known armed person shot and wounded an KEY THREATS & CONCERNS directly to shopkeepers, amongst ANP providing security at a campaign rally for Abduction others, causing them to shut a presidential candidate. In sum, NGOs should IEDs & convoy ambushes down their shops. Further insta- expect that there will likely be an upcoming Rocket/RPG attacks bility in the district should be ex- period of intensifying violence in the province. pected, for example, because THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 2 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100

To date, activity in Uruzgan has 80 been minimal in comparison with Moreover, tensions between IMF other provinces in the south; the and ANSF should be heeded in 60 10 and 11 August AOG attacks Tirin Kot because of the IMF 40 against IMF/ANSF convoys in shooting and consequent killing of 20 an ANP while he and others were Char Chino District that resulted 0 in the death of 10 AOG and on patrol in the town. IMF may JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG also find themselves the object of wounding of 6 others were of AOG ACG note, though. Also, AOG shot further ire because of the two ci- vilians that were killed during an and killed an off-duty ANP offi- soldiers on 7 August in , and 2 airstrike in Chora District on 9 cial whilst he was visiting his fam- IEDs targeted IMF vehicles in Char Chino August. Furthermore, IMF fired a ily in Dihrawud District. District on 12 August, ending in the deaths of rocket that struck a civilian house, 2 IMF and the wounding of an additional 6. In killing 3 children, on 7 August in addition, another IED struck a patrolling ANP Khas Uruzgan. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS vehicle in Tirin Kot, and another IED targeted Possible increase in IEDs Of special note to NGOs, though, an ANP vehicle in Dihrawud District, wound- AOG opposition to NGO opera- was the prevalence of IED strikes ing 3 civilians. Because of the general security tions during the reporting period; for vacuum, NGOs should avoid travel to areas IMF erroneous employment of example, an IED hit a patrolling outside of Tirin Kot when possible. IMF vehicle, wounding 2 IMF

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 During this reporting period, a 80 person outfitted with a BBIED As a result of 13 IED explosions 60 targeted an NDS vehicle, killing in various locations, 6 AOG (due 40 to premature detonations), 3 civil- himself, 1 NDS official, and 4 20 civilians and wounding 2 NDS, 1 ians, 5 ANA, 1 NDS and 1 ANP were killed; and 3 civilians, 7 PSC 0 ANP and 16 civilians. In sum, a JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG number of IED incidents have guards, 10 ANP, 3 ANA, 1 NDS official, 4 IMF and an unknown also occurred during the period. AOG ACG number of AOG were wounded. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG conducted prolonged in Atghar District on 2 August, and another BBIED attacks armed assaults during the period, being an hour clash with PSC guards in Qalat Roadside IEDs one being a four hour exchange of on 10 August; of note, though, is that these Attacks on ANP fire with a joint IMF/ANP patrol ambushes both resulted in low casualties.

PLEASE NOTE: The charts enclosed in this report are current as of 12 August 2009. THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) could not provide ANSO is hosted by Phil Priestley - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe analysis for the prov- Mukhtar Hussain - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 inces of:

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Panjshir Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 To Register with ANSO Samangan contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) Takhar [email protected] John Binns - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 Badghis Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 This is because we ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) do not know enough Board. If you have any Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 about the area to feedback, good or bad, let comment on the sig- them know on: nificance of the inci- [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) dents occurring Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 there. ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim - [email protected] - 0707 474 135 If you can help us IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) understand the prov- Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Sebastien Hogan - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 ince better, please sition Groups / GOA- Ali Riazi - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 contact us. Government of Afghanistan Vacant - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- E. Estoque - [email protected] - 0797 093 073 tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- Improvised Exploding De- vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- NEW RSA tion Forces / RPG-Rocket ANSO would like to introduce its new West RSA, Patrick Malach, to the Western Propelled Grenade / IDF- NGO community. Patrick will be in place at our West office in the coming weeks. Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Exploding Device / TRAINING PRP-Previous Reporting ANSO will be instituting a new training module for NGO national staff in- Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- tional Border Police / SAF- volved in communications, with a pilot session occurring in Kabul City after Small Arms Fire / NDS- Ramadan. Further information will be provided to registered NGOs. National Directorate of Se- curity (intelligence) / PSC- Private Security Company / REGISTRATION and AMENDMENTS DC-District Centre ANSO has unveiled a new streamlined registration and amendment process for NGOs. Email the Operations Coordinator Assistant at [email protected] for details.