Western Africa's Missing Fish

Report

Western Africa’s missing fish The impacts of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and under-reporting catches by foreign fleets

Alfonso Daniels, Miren Gutiérrez, Gonzalo Fanjul, Arantxa Guereña, Ishbel Matheson and Kevin Watkins

June 2016 Overseas Development Institute 203 Blackfriars Road London SE1 8NJ

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Cover photo: A U.S. Coast Guard member and a Ghanaian navy sailor inspect a fishing vessel suspected of illegal fishing, 2014. Credit: US Navy

This report was funded by the Africa Progress Panel; however the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the Africa Progress Panel’s official policies. Abstract

Overfishing in the world’s oceans is at the centre of a crisis of sustainability. Nowhere is that crisis more visible than in western Africa. Current rates of extraction are driving several species towards extinction while jeopardising the livelihoods of artisanal fishing communities across a broad group of countries, including Senegal, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mauritania. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is at the heart of the problem. Drawing on a unique satellite tracking database, this report presents new evidence of the scale and pattern of IUU fishing. It focuses on ‘reefers’ – large-scale commercial vessels receiving and freezing fish at sea and at port – and the use of containers. We provide evidence of practices that compromise the effectiveness of multilateral governance rules aimed at curtailing IUU fishing and promoting sustainable, legal practices. Proposals set out in the report identify pathways for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to greater transparency and sustainable management of fisheries which avoids the irreversible depletion and possible extinction of species, as well as the preservation of the marine ecosystem where the fishing activities take place for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Western Africa’s missing fish 3 Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following reviewers for their valuable support, comments and feedback: David Agnew, Standards Director of the Marine Stewardship Council (UK); Sergi Tudela, Bluefin tuna expert and former head of the Mediterranean Fisheries Programme for the World Wildlife Fund (WWF); José Luis Sánchez Lizaso, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Marine Sciences and Applied Biology of Alicante University (Spain). The following experts at FishSpektrum had an essential role in this report: Roberto Mielgo Bregazzi (methodology and data analysis) and Daniel Rolleri (coordination). At PorCausa (Spain), José Manuel Márquez contributed to the research in chapter 4. We are grateful to Sergio Alvarez Leiva and Jorge Sanz at CartoDB for their impressive interactive visualisations, and Guillermo Gutiérrez at Bunt Planet for his data supervision. We would also like to thank staff at the Africa Progress Panel, in particular Damien Somé (Research Fellow), for their review and support of this report.

Abbreviations

AIS Automatic identification system EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EJF Environmental Justice Foundation FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FOC Flag of Convenience HSVAR High Seas Fishing Vessel Authorisation Record ICCAT International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas IMO International Maritime Organization IUU Illegal, unreported and unregulated OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PSMA Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing RFMO Regional fisheries management organisations ROP Regional Observer Programme SIF Stop Illegal Fishing UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UNODC United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime UVI Unique vessel identifier WWF World Wide Fund for Nature

4 ODI Report Contents

Abstract 3

Acknowledgements 4

Abbreviations and definitions 4

1. Executive summary 7

2. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing – global tragedy of the commons, western African crisis 10

2.1 Western Africa at heart of IUU fishing 10

2.2 Weak governance, fragmented architecture and institutional loopholes 11

3. Navigating around the rules and why IUU fishing matters – reefers and containers in western Africa 16

3.1 Reefers – tracking points to irregular activities 16

3.2 Transhipments – tracking points to suspicious activity 18

3.3 Containers and the fish trade 22

3.4 Undermining global fisheries governance 24

4. IUU fishing and development in westernAfrica – impacts and opportunities 26

4.1 Fisheries: a lifeline for livelihoods 26

4.2 Impacts of IUU fishing on westernAfrican development 27

4.3 Fisheries in western Africa: a lost opportunity 29

4.4 Securing a sustainable fisheries premium 29

5. Conclusions and recommendations 31

Annex: brief methodology 33

References 37

Western Africa’s missing fish 5 List of tables, figures and boxes

Tables Table 1: The 35 reefers operating in western Africa in 2013a 17

Table 2: Las Palmas imports of frozen fish from western Africa 23

Table 3: Containerised frozen fish cargo from Walvis Bay for 2014 23

Table 4: Employees per tonne of fish caught in marine fisheries 34

Table 5: Job creation estimates for western Africa 34

Figures Figure 1: Sierra Loba’s tracks, August 2013 19

Figure 2: Nova Florida’s tracks, 5 July 2013 20

Figure 3: Nova Zeelandia’s tracks, July 2013 20

Figure 4: Western African nations’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 33

Figure 5: Eastern Central and South Eastern Atlantic regions 33

Boxes Box 1: What is IUU fishing? 11

Box 2: Namibia ‘joint ventures’ 13

Box 3: Gaps in fishing information and registration (data as of 20 July 2015) 13

Box 4: Gaps in fishing information and registration (data as of 20 July 2015) 15

Box 5: Sierra King 21

Box 6: Why IUU fishing is a problem for global development objectives 27

Box 7: IUU Fishing and organised crime 28

Box 8: Conflicts between IUU fishers and local fishers 28

Box 9: Local case study – Sierra Leone’s ‘blackfaces’ 30

6 ODI Report 1. Executive summary

Overfishing in the world’s oceans has reached catastrophic This report identifies two practices at the heart of the levels. Many major fish stocks are in decline. Some species disjuncture between sustainable fishing principles and real are being pushed towards extinction. Illegal, unreported world practices. and unregulated (IUU) fishing is heavily implicated in The first practice involves reefer vessels and overfishing. As much as one fifth of the world’s fisheries transhipments: this entails catch being loaded directly from catch may originate from IUU activity, linking consumers fishing boats onto these large freezing and processing ships in Europe, the United States and Asia with a practice that is at sea. Reefer activity accounts for around 16% of western fuelling a global tragedy of the commons – a tragedy that African fish exports. is leading to the overexploitation of a common resource. Using a unique data system, we track reefers operating Western Africa is at the epicentre of the tragedy. in western African coastal waters. The FishSpektrum The region’s coastal waters include some of the world’s Krakken® UVI database – a fishing and fish carrier vessel most abundant fishing grounds that act as a magnet identifier resource – is the world’s largest fishing vessel for commercial vessels that supply Europe and rapidly tracking resource. In 2013, 35 fishing reefers visiting growing markets in Asia. The profits generated are western African waters were identified. Most were substantial. However, as highlighted by the former UN operating under flags of convenience (FOC),2 with Vanuatu Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the 2014 Africa Progress the preferred registration site. Panel report Grain, fish, money (Africa Progress Panel, Tracking signals from some of the 35 vessels point 2014), the overexploitation of West Africa’s fishery to suspicious activity. The signals were consistent with resources has produced devastating social, economic and widespread and systematic transhipment operations. Some human consequences. The livelihoods of artisanal fishing of this activity occurs in the Exclusive Economic Zones people are being destroyed, a vital source of protein is (EEZs) of two countries – Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire – being lost, and opportunities for the development of where transhipment is prohibited by law.3 In other cases, regional production and trade are disappearing. IUU the transhipment activity appears to be unauthorised or fishing is heavily implicated. inadequately monitored. We provided detailed tracking Recent years have seen a renewal of international evidence for four named vessels. While there is no efforts to combat overfishing and IUU activities. suggestion on our part that the vessels in question were Strengthened regulatory frameworks have been put in carrying out IUU activities, in each case there are questions place for monitoring and reporting through Port State to be answered. Measures.1 Legislation and voluntary codes of conduct in The second practice identified in the report relates to importing countries are creating strengthened incentives the mode of transportation for exports. We estimate that for compliance with sustainable fishery practices. These around 84% of the fish exported from western Africa moves are encouraging – but they are failing to tackle IUU leaves the region in large refrigerated containers. This is fishing practices. Far too many governments in Europe and part of a global pattern that has seen containers account in emerging markets subscribe to encouraging principles for a large and rising share of fisheries trade. From a at international meetings, but fail to enact the policies at governance perspective, the concern is that containers are home. subject to less stringent reporting requirements.

1. Port State Measures (PSM) are requirements established or interventions undertaken by port states which a foreign fishing vessel must comply with or be subject to as a condition for use of ports within the port state. National PSM would typically include requirements related to prior notification of port entry, use of designated ports, restrictions on port entry and landing/transhipment of fish, restrictions on supplies and services, documentation requirements and port inspections, as well as related measures, such as IUU vessel listing, trade-related measures and sanctions.

2. A ‘flag of convenience’ refers to a vessel being registered in a different country to that of the ship’s owners. Many shipping companies prefer to fly FOC so their ships are registered in countries with less stringent enforcement regulations.

3. An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea whereby a country has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, stretching from the baseline (normally the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal state) out to 200 nautical miles from its coast.

Western Africa’s missing fish 7 While compliance with EU regulations requires fishing that generate powerful deterrent effects. In the event vessels and reefers to provide port authorities with that local action is not taken, legal authorities in the reasonable advance notice of an intention to unload a jurisdiction of registration and/or substantive ownership catch, containers do not have to give as much notice, should take action. Interpol should be given broad which may weaken the effectiveness of port monitoring. powers to prosecute and investigate IUU activities and Moreover, it is difficult under current EU rules to establish publish an IUU blacklist. the scale and legality of catches originating in western •• Establishing IUU fishing as a transnational crime. This African waters, because containers are exempt from approach, championed by Norway, would bring IUU regulations which provide for inspection of landings at EU activities under the remit of Interpol, giving the security ports. agency the resources and powers necessary to investigate The consequences are not theoretical, but real. The and prosecute these cases. European Commission’s Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries confirmed to the report authors The effectiveness of any global governance regime on that, between 2012 and 2014, only 135 fish container fisheries for western Africa will ultimately depend on two consignments, originating from all over the world, were critical regional factors: leadership by African governments blocked because of IUU concerns. This represents a tiny and capacity development. Among the priorities are: fraction of the fish entering the EU from abroad. Ending IUU fishing and developing strong national • Improving transparency. African governments and their and regional fishery sectors would generate multiple trading partners should disclose in full the terms of benefits for development. Those benefits would not occur fisheries agreements, including information on quotas automatically. Governments in the region need to do and prices as well as any agreed licence and charter far more to develop processing sectors equipped to add agreements. Additionally, declared catches should be value to the fish caught in their waters, and to support regularly compared with data reported to the FAO and regional trade. However, with the right policies in place other agencies. we estimate that more than 300,000 new jobs could be • Prohibiting transhipments at sea. Western African created, with artisanal fishers linked to consumers through countries should ban transhipments at sea following the a vibrant trading network. Further development benefits practice of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire within their EEZs. would derive from increased export revenue. Sustainable Special derogations could be provided for ports that management of fisheries resources would also strengthen cannot accommodate large reefers, with transhipments food security, expanding supplies of protein. allowed under closely monitored conditions near port facilities. We set out a range of practical policies for unlocking these • Enhancing port measures. All countries in western benefits. Some of these policies require multilateral action Africa and elsewhere should immediately ratify the at a global level: legally binding Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing (PSMA), •• Establishing a global database and tracking system. aimed at strengthening the controls in ports where the A global, centralised IUU vessel database should fisheries catches are landed and reported, and denying be created under the auspices of the UN Food and access to any vessels suspected of IUU activity. The Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International treaty was approved by the FAO in 2009 and came into Maritime Organization (IMO), with full accessibility force on 5 June 2016, but to date Gabon, Guinea- for national authorities. All fishing vessels should also Bissau and South Africa are the only countries in the be required to carry a unique ID registration number, region to have ratified this agreement. Globally, making it harder to evade detection. The vessel tracking although the EU and the United States have ratified the information we provide in this report illustrates the agreement, major fishing nations like China and Russia possibilities. The development of a global tracking have yet to do so. system could be financed through a levy on commercial • Building regional capacity action. The international fishery fleets. community should scale up aid and technical support •• Closing the IUU container loophole. Container ships for western African countries. The World Bank, the carrying fish should be subject to the same scrutiny and African Development Bank and the FAO should reporting requirements as reefers and fishing vessels. cooperate in supporting the development of capacity to •• Banning blacklisted IUU vessels. Vessels blacklisted for draw on global satellite and terrestrial tracking systems. IUU practices, together with their owners and operators, Aid donors in the EU and emerging markets – including should be prohibited from operating and registering China – with large regional fleets should provide new vessels. Legal authorities should act swiftly to bar support for the purchase and operation of an expanded blacklisted vessels and operators from the EEZs in coastguard fleet to protect EEZs. Joint patrolling which IUU activities occurred, and impose punitive fines schemes could also be established, with an initial

8 ODI Report focus on the two main ‘transhipment hubs’ in western •• Strengthening regulation. Working in concert with Africa: around Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, including Interpol, the African Union should develop an IUU Cape Verde, Senegal and the Gambia, and another one blacklist for the whole continent. All governments in the in the Gulf of Guinea, including Ghana, Togo, Benin region should carefully review licensing arrangements and Nigeria, as identified by the UN Office for Drugs involving vessels registered under flags of convenience, and Crime (UNODC). Additionally, western African which are in some cases the equivalent of havens for navies need to work more closely together to monitor tax avoidance. Consideration should be given to the and protect their coastal waters, especially in inshore imposition of a flag of convenience tax in fisheries territorial waters crucial to the communities that depend agreements, with the revenues used to strengthen IUU on coastal fisheries. monitoring capabilities.

Western Africa’s missing fish 9 2. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing: western African crisis

In Africa’s coastal waters, IUU fishing has reached epidemic proportions. This plunder destroys entire coastal communities when they lose the opportunities to catch, process and trade. Commercial trawlers that operate under flags of convenience, and unload in ports that do not record their catch, are engaging in organised theft disguised as commerce.

Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General and Chair of the Africa Progress Panel4

There is a crisis of global governance playing out on the catch quotas and fishing out of season. Governments and world’s oceans. One of the most visible symptoms of that the international community cannot sustainably manage crisis is the depletion of fish stocks. According to the UN scarce marine resources in the absence of timely, accurate Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), almost two and transparent information on the size of catches. Yet thirds of stocks for which information is available are fully IUU fishing accounts for as much as one fifth of the global exploited. Another 28% are over-exploited: that is, fish are fisheries catch, worth $10 billion to $23.5 billion annually being caught at a rate that exceeds regeneration potential (Agnew, 2009). Put differently, between 11 million and 26 (FAO, 2014b). According to one estimate, the amount of million tonnes of fish are extracted from the world’s oceans fish in the oceans has been halved over the past 50 years, without proper reporting. with some species – such as tuna and mackerel – falling by IUU fishing has profoundly damaging consequences. three quarters (WWF, 2015). It is contributing to the unsustainable exploitation of a At the heart of the crisis is some simple arithmetic. It vital marine asset, eroding the oceans’ ecosystems and has been estimated that the capacity of the world’s fishing jeopardising future supplies of a vital global food security fleet is two and a half times larger than the sustainable asset. extraction level for fish stocks. The resulting crisis in Nowhere are the costs of unsustainable resource fisheries is a living example of a modern-day ‘crisis of the management more visible – or more immediate – than in commons’ – in other words, the tendency to undermine the world’s poorest countries. IUU fishing is endemic in long-term collective interests through short-term the coastal zones of many developing countries. Marine overexploitation of shared resources. Tackling the crisis of and coastal fish stocks provide millions of people in these the commons requires multilateral rules and institutions countries with a source of protein, a livelihood and an that are geared towards sustainable resource management. income. This is the core aim behind Goal 14 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, which calls on states ‘to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine 2.1 Western Africa at heart of IUU fishing resources for sustainable development’. Western Africa is at the epicentre of IUU activity. With its Translating that commitment into practice will require coastline stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to Cape a concerted drive to reverse and then stop IUU fishing. IUU Town in South Africa, this region has some of the most fishing takes many forms. These range from catching fish diverse and economically important fishery locations in the without a licence to harvesting banned species, exceeding world. This includes the Canary Current and the Benguela

4. For Kofi Annan’s launch remarks, see Africa Progress Panel (2014a).

10 ODI Report Current marine ecosystems, which extend from north-west account those losses would be greatly magnified. As it is, Africa to Guinea-Bissau and from western South Africa to IUU fishing led to: Angola. These systems maintain some of the world’s richest tuna fishing grounds. •• Senegal losing around $300 million in 2012 due to IUU Today, western Africa’s coastal fishery resources are fishing – equivalent to 2% of gross domestic product operating well beyond the brink of sustainable utilisation, (GDP) (USAID, 2013); in part because of IUU fishing. More than 50% of the •• Guinea losing $110 million a year (MRAG, 2005); fisheries resources in the stretch of coast ranging from •• Sierra Leone losing $29 million annually due to IUU Senegal to Nigeria alone have already been overfished fishing – a figure that may appear modest, but which (FAO, 2011). It has been estimated that IUU fishing represents around a tenth of the country’s education accounts for between one third and half of the total budget (MRAG, 2005: 6). regional catch (Africa Progress Panel, 2014). Three types of IUU fishing are of special concern Similarly, the wider social, economic, environmental and for western African coastal states: unlicensed foreign human costs of IUU activity are increasingly evident. industrial vessels; fishing in prohibited areas, particularly Overfishing by large industrial trawlers is contributing to close to shore, using illegal nets; and fishing by artisanal the collapse of artisanal fishing – an activity that supports vessels, many of which are unlicensed and also fishing millions of people in coastal areas. The multiplier effects of with illegal nets (MRAG, 2010: 2). Investigations by lost revenues through the vast national and intra-regional the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) provide a trading networks linking consumers to artisanal fishers are glimpse into the huge extent of the problem. Data from enormous (Béné et al., 2007). Fisheries are estimated to Guinea-Conakry’s coastal waters found that 53 out of 104 employ, directly or indirectly, 600,000 people in Senegal identified vessels were either linked to, or engaged in, IUU (Africa Progress Panel, 2014) and more than 160,000 fishing (EJF, 2009: 9). This report focuses on the activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo – not including of foreign fishing fleets and the way fish is transported out the thousands of jobs in fish processing plants in which of the western African region. most workers are women (FAO, 2014: 32). As artisanal fishing shrinks, it creates pressures to migrate from coastal communities. Meanwhile, a vital source of food is under Box 1: What is IUU fishing? threat. In countries like the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Ghana, fish provide more than 60% of the animal protein IUU fishing refers to any of the following activities: necessary for healthy growth, and in remote coastal •• Fishing in waters under the jurisdiction of a state communities almost all of these proteins come from fish. without permission or in violation of applicable As we show in this report, translating sustainable fishery laws principles into practice would generate wide-ranging •• Fishing conducted by vessels flying the flag of benefits. Specifically, it has the potential to create more states that are parties to a relevant regional than 300,000 new jobs across the region, divided almost fisheries management organisation, but are equally between fishers and processors, enabling some operating in contravention of its conservation 90,000 women to enter the work force. and management measures •• Fishing that has been unreported or misreported to the relevant national authority or regional 2.2 Weak governance, fragmented architecture authorities, in contravention of applicable laws and institutional loopholes •• Fishing conducted by vessels without nationality, The geographic scope and scale of IUU fishing is flying the flag of a state not party to the regional symptomatic of the wider global governance failure organisation governing the relevant fishing area that is eroding the integrity of oceanic ecosystems. The or species, or fishing on stocks with no applicable vast patchwork of treaties, conventions and voluntary conservation or management measures in place. arrangements now in place affords weak protection at best. Globally, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Note: Authors’ work, based on International MCS Network, 2014 (UNCLOS) governs the rights, obligations and dispute settlement procedures for the world’s oceans. UNCLOS sets out the duty of countries to cooperate in the IUU fishing has damaging economic consequences for the management of shared fisheries resources. It also recognises affected states. According to the Africa Progress Panel, jurisdictional boundaries of individual states set 200 West Africa (defined in the report as the region lying nautical miles off a state’s coastline, known as Exclusive between Mauritania and Nigeria) is losing $1.3 billion Economic Zones (EEZs). Most of the richest fisheries in annually to IUU fishing (Africa Progress Panel, 2014). If the world are located in these zones, which cover some 38 the whole of the western African coastline were taken into million square nautical miles.

Western Africa’s missing fish 11 UNCLOS also underpins the activities of the UN vessels have operational Automatic Identification Systems agencies and bodies dealing with the oceans. Chiefly, this (AIS) and IMO registration. includes the FAO, which supports science and management However, the current arrangements are unfit for the of global fisheries and is a major source of statistical purpose of promoting sustainable management. The rules, information; and the International Maritime Organization institutions and enforcement mechanisms now in place (IMO), which is largely responsible for maritime safety, are circumvented with near total impunity. Extensive liability and compensation. use of untracked vessels, port states failing to fulfil their Ocean governance to prevent IUU fishing is also responsibilities, flag states ignoring their obligations and managed at local, national and regional levels. Regional the absence of effective sanctions to penalise bad practice fisheries management organisations (RFMOs)5 have been all contribute to this situation. set up to manage stocks, including highly migratory Why is the battery of governance arrangements so species such as tuna that move across vast areas. Regional ineffective? Technology provides part of the explanation. It bodies include the International Commission for the is increasingly possible for fishing vessels to use a wide range Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) which is active in of devices – such as sonar devices, airborne optical lasers western Africa, and was set up to manage and aid in the and remote sensing technologies – to identify fish stocks. conservation of tuna species. Loopholes built into the governance regime, weak Individual countries and regional groupings add to compliance and limited enforcement are also problems. the patchwork of rules. For example, following a 2010 Widespread use of flags of convenience (FOCs) from regulation, the European Union only allows imports of states – such as Liberia, the Bahamas and Panama – that marine fisheries products certified as legal by the competent are unable or unwilling to enforce existing regulations flag state or exporting state, bans ‘non-cooperating’ weakens the rule of law. FOC registration is cheap and countries or IUU fishing vessels and sanctions EU operators very easy to obtain. Vessels sighted at sea engaged in IUU fishing illegally anywhere in the world under any flag activities can quickly change their name and registration (European Council 2008). The UK provides detailed – a practice known as flag-hopping – to avoid being guidance for British businesses, including retailers and food identified in a port, making it extremely difficult to track suppliers, to help keep illegal fish products out of its food down the actual owners. supply chain (BRC and EJF, 2015). Spain, which owns Approximately 15% of the world’s large-scale fishing Europe’s largest fishing eet,fl recently passed a new fisheries fleet is flying FOCs or listed as flag unknown (Gianni and law which imposes strong penalties against any citizen Simpson, 2005). The largest ownership and management involved in IUU fishing (EJF, 2015). In 2008, the United of FOC vessels is the European Union, of which Spanish States strengthened the Lacey Act, making it unlawful to vessels account for half, followed by Taiwan, Honduras land illegally caught fish in US ports. and Panama (Couper et al., 2015). One widespread Despite these arrangements, IUU fishing continues practice in western Africa involves companies setting up to flourish. While the evidence is inevitably partial (a joint ventures with local partners. This allows foreign consequence of the illegality of the activities), it points vessels to be re-flagged as western African vessels and to unequivocally towards extensive IUU activities. For benefit from special authorisations reserved to the national example, the EU – the world’s largest importer of fish fleet. One example comes from Namibia (see Box 2). products – may have imported €1.1 billion in illegal fish Effective monitoring at ports could limit the scope for products every year (European Parliament, 2014; IUU activities – but progress in this area has been modest. Sustainable Earth, 2008). Another top importer, the United In 2009, the FAO approved the Port State Measures States, may have imported in 2011 between $1.7 billion Agreement (PSMA) aimed at denying port entry and (Gravitz, 2014) and $2.1 billion of illegal wild-caught services to any vessel suspected of engaging in IUU fishing. seafood – or up to 32% of total seafood imports The agreement allows for dockside inspections and seizure (Pramoda et al., 2014). Recent years have seen renewed of illegal catch. This came into force on 5 June 2016, momentum behind efforts to strengthen the governance of as this report was being finalised, after 30 governments fishing and combat IUU practices. There has been an ratified it. However, of these, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and emphasis on improved monitoring and reporting on South Africa are the only countries in the region included catches through Port State Measures. Retailers and in this agreement, so it is likely to have limited impact processors have adopted a wide range of voluntary in western African waters unless more countries agree sustainable seafood standards, including a requirement that to be bound by it. Fish transhipment is another means

5. RFMOs are international organisations formed by countries with fishing interests in an area. Some of them manage all the fish stocks found in a specific area, while others focus on particular highly migratory species, notably tuna, throughout vast geographical areas. These organisations are open both to countries in the region (‘coastal states’) and countries with interests in the fisheries concerned. While some RFMOs have a purely advisory role, most have management powers to set catch and fishing effort limits, technical measures and control obligations.

12 ODI Report of concealing IUU activities. While fish transhipments Box 2: Namibia ‘joint ventures’ at sea are a common and largely legal practice6, abuse is Around 10 Namibian–Spanish joint ventures widespread. Vessels often transfer part or all of their catch operated in 2011 from the massive Walvis Bay, to refrigerated cargo ships with freezer capacity known as where the processing factories were so ‘high-tech’ reefers, which in turn freeze and transport the fish to port. that this port was known as the ‘Wall Street’ of When the transfers occur on an unreported basis, catch fish (García Rey and Grobler, 2011). One operator numbers can be understated and IUU fish mixed with legal – the China Fishery Group, a subsidiary of the catches, so any controls at port may come too late (EJF, multinational Pacific Andes* – was reported to have 2013c). overpaid a new Namibian quota holder to use its The registration of fishing vessels is critical for any fishing quota for the year, going above the price governance regimes aimed at tackling IUU fishing. It paid by competitors. The company then covered the extra costs by cutting salaries, prompting Namibian is striking, however, that there is no global register of trade unions to denounce it for alleged poor labour high seas fishing vessels. To make matters worse, unlike conditions (Agritrade, 2013; Shinovene, 2012). merchant ships, these vessels are not required to carry a unique identification number, making it hard to track them Note: * Pacific Andes Food Ltd is one of the largest providers (GOC, 2013). Efforts to close the registration deficit have of frozen fish and fish products in the world. Its business met with limited success (see Box 3). includes the whole chain from fishing, sea-based processing, Some states in western Africa have attempted to transportation, land-based processing and distribution. legislate against transhipment. Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire ban transhipments at sea altogether. Some monitoring organisations – for example, ICCAT – also operate

Box 3: Gaps in fishing information and registration (data as of 20 July 2015) Many of the vessels engaged in IUU activities are unregistered. Efforts to develop a global registration regime have met with limited success. In 1993, the FAO created a High Seas Fishing Vessel Authorisation Record (HSVAR), requiring states to provide information about their vessels authorised to fish on the high seas. Fifty-eight nations are party to the agreement and 44 nations have (at least once) provided a listing of authorised vessels. Honduras and Sierra Leone have not accepted the agreement. However, they have both voluntarily provided information in the past, according to information provided by the Fisheries and Aquaculture Department of FAO. The Global Ocean Commission notes that, since 2013, the HSVAR has listed 2,452 vessels (out of 6,292) whose authorisation to fish had ‘expired’, suggesting that states have not provided up to date information. The FAO maintains another vessel register, the Vessel Finder. However, as of 2015 it contained 238,689 fishing vessels – a fraction of the more than 4 million fishing vessels currently operating in the world, according to FAO’s own estimates. Interpol, the main international law enforcement agency dealing with IUU fishing, does not fare well either. It publishes Purple Notices (PNs) when seeking information on working methods, objects, devices and concealment methods used by criminals accused of involvement in IUU fishing. The first was published in September 2013 at the request of Norwegian authorities for a vessel named Snake. However, only nine PNs have been issued since then. Some private projects have attempted to reduce the registration gap, so far unsuccessfully. The Global Fishing Watch initiative, for example, is the product of a technology partnership between SkyTruth, Oceana and Google designed to show all trackable fishing activity in the ocean. However, this interactive web tool is still in prototype stage, and only contained some 40,000 fishing vessels at the time of writing, severely limiting its usefulness to law enforcement officials. The database used for this report put together by FishSpektrum is by far the most comprehensive, with more than 820,000 fishing units on it. The European Commission and others use it as a source for major studies. But it remains a privately held resource and, given the scale of the problem outlined in the following pages, there is an urgent need to develop more comprehensive and publicly available resources, in line with the latest technological advances.

6. Transhipment is the transfer of goods from one ship to another. Fish transhipments at sea involving reefer vessels are always to load fish onto a reefer, not to unload from the reefer. At anchor, reefers do not unload. Transferring fish at anchor, if the sea conditions are right, is the cheapest way to transfer fish, because ships do not have to call at port, be moored and pay the port fees. Fishing vessels (with fishing gear on board) do not usually call at port precisely to avoid paying the port fees, and prefer to transfer their catch at sea.

Western Africa’s missing fish 13 prohibitions in regional waters. However, the majority of $150,000 in an out-of-court settlement – a tiny fraction of countries in the region still authorise fish transhipments the value of its IUU catch (EJF, 2012). within their EEZs, citing as a rationale the inability of Western African officials openly admit that small fines ports to accommodate large reefers. The United Nations are failing to deter vessels from continuing to engage in Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified two IUU fishing. For instance, Haidar El-Ali, Senegal’s fisheries main ‘transhipment hubs’ in western Africa. One is located minister, last year said: ‘Vessels we caught pay a fine and in the Eastern Central Atlantic around Guinea and Guinea- go, but they do it again. We must be able to keep them Bissau, including Cape Verde, Senegal and the Gambia. when we seize them, so there’s a real punishment.’ (Fessy, The other is found in the Gulf of Guinea, including Ghana, 2014) Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Western Africa’s IUU crisis also illustrates the Gabon and São Tomé and Principe (UNODC, 2010). In debilitating effect of having a weak capacity for Section 3, we draw on new data to document the activities implementation. As with any governance regime, fisheries of reefers operating in these hubs. are only as effective as a state’s capacity to monitor Efforts to enforce anti-IUU arrangements are often activities in its EEZ. Elsewhere in the world, governments weakened by wider problems. While many countries in have taken robust action: for example, Indonesia western Africa require observers to be present on board (Washington Post, 2016) and Argentina (CNN, 2016) have fishing vessels, in some cases these observers are paid by recently gone as far as to sink ships involved in IUU fishing the vessel operators. The incentive to expose illegal trade in their waters. But most countries in western Africa lack is accordingly limited (EJF, 2012). Corruption is another the systems needed to monitor and track the activities of barrier to effective action. One third of the countries in fishing vessels. These are countries with long coastlines western Africa were in the bottom quarter of Transparency and limited resources. Meanwhile, their marine ecosystems International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2014. and abundant stocks of high-value fish act as a magnet for The consequences can be seen in the governance of the industrial fishing vessels. fisheries sector. In Senegal, for example, highly placed The FishSpektrum database highlights the acute capacity political figures have been investigated and, in some cases, constraints facing governments in western Africa. In 2013, prosecuted for selling illegal permits to foreign fleets for the FishSpektrum data identified more than 600 fishing personal gain (Faye, 2011; Vidal, 2012). Meanwhile, vessels off the coast of western African nations that were African-flagged vessels, including Ghana’s commercial tuna from China alone. Yet one of these nations – Sierra Leone fleet, have been implicated in IUU activities. In 2014, the – had only two coastguard boats available to monitor EU warned Ghana that further cases of IUU fishing would the activities of all fishing vessels in its waters (Naranjo, mean an end to Ghanaian fish exports (House of Ocean, 2014). Whatever rules are put in place, these are likely to 2014). prove of limited effectiveness in the absence of a greatly In the few cases where an IUU catch is discovered and strengthened regional capacity for monitoring. the owners prosecuted, fines are often too small to have a Information gaps and asymmetry in access to deterrent effect. In 2011, according to the EJF, the Liberian information makes it difficult to establish the full extent Coastguard arrested the Korean-flagged Seta 70 at sea for of IUU fishing in western Africa. That is why investment fishing illegally in the area. The vessel, owned by Korean in monitoring is so critical. Inconsistencies between trade multinational Inter-Burgo Company Ltd, was fined $36 data and fishery quotas suggest that current estimates may million and legal proceedings were initiated against the understate the scale of IUU activities, as illustrated by vessel’s operators. However, the vessel ended up paying only evidence relating to China’s fleet (see Box 2.4).

14 ODI Report Box 4: The numbers game and ‘a sea of obscure agreements’ China’s western African fleet has grown rapidly in recent years. In testimony to the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Mallory (2012) concluded that China now owns the largest distant-water fishing fleet in the world, with an estimated 1,900 vessels operating in 2010, followed by countries like Japan, Spain, South Korea, Russia and Taiwan, although no one knows the exact number. While there is no clear-cut evidence that this fleet is more or less culpable of IUU activity than vessels from other countries, there are various concerns. In June 2011, a deal was signed between the Mauritanian government and China’s state fishing company Poly Hondone Pelagic Fishery Co., a subsidiary of the Poly Technologies group, one of the largest recent fisheries access agreements signed in the region. The 25-year deal involved an investment of $100 million, with the Chinese company promising to build a fish processing factory in Noadhibo and create 2,463 jobs in exchange for fishing rights, according to a copy of the document supplied to the authors. Under the agreement, Chinese vessels would be re-flagged to Mauritania.* Details of the fishing agreement initially remained secret until it was leaked by a Mauritanian member of parliament, according to TransparentSea, which is an initiative to promote access to information and accountability in marine fisheries (TransparentSea, 2016). Concerns over a lack of transparency regarding the exact terms of the agreement and a lack of safeguards to protect the country’s threatened deep-sea fishing resources caused a public outcry at the time and even prompted opposition law-makers to boycott the vote in parliament (Reuters, 2011). Additionally, Poly Group’s vessels include bottom trawlers which are industrial fishing vessels of a kind likely to be destructive, as their nets, pulled down by heavy weights, are dragged along the bottom of the sea bed, destroying coral, sponges and other plant and animal species. More widely, the Mauritanian authorities confirmed to the report authors that 45 Poly Group vessels are part of this agreement, and are allowed to catch between 80,000 and 100,000 megatonnes (Mt) of fish annually. They insist that they were reflagged, meaning that any fish they caught would be considered Mauritanian. China’s total declared catch in the whole of western Africa for 2013 was only 4,139 Mt, according to FAO Fishstat. This would mean that the Chinese fleet is mainly fishing in Mauritanian and western African waters under local flags. Mauritania on the other hand caught 277,624 Mt of fish in 2013, according to FAO Fishstat, despite barely having a functioning industrial fishing fleet. This should not be a problem except that Chinese fisheries agreements with local governments remain largely secret, meaning that it is difficult to determine the real Chinese fishing capacity and actual catches in the region compared to other countries, and whether these are sustainable or hide illegal activities. According to a report, prepared at the request of the European Parliament, by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies, ‘activities and catches of the Chinese distant-water fleets are almost completely undocumented and unreported, and often, may actually be illegal, thus spanning the entire gamut of IUU fishing’ (Blomeyer et al, 2012). Based on the review of several studies, Mallory (2012) concluded with reference to China that ‘fisheries access agreements on the whole have led to unsustainable use of fisheries resources and have negatively impacted the socioeconomic development of host countries’. He shows that in Guinean waters, for example, more than half of IUU vessels identified were Chinese; in Liberia, 200 industrial vessels were observed operating despite the country having only granted 17 fishing licences; and in Liberia, Chinese vessels frequently violate the moratorium in the three-nautical-mile artisanal zone. All this provides further proof of the urgent need to ensure that the agreements between Chinese and other major foreign operations with western African governments are transparent, ensuring the sustainability of the region’s overexploited fisheries.

* The Mauritanian authorities told the report authors that just 1,663 jobs have been created to date due to some delays in the implementation of the agreement, while the total investment reached $105 million by the end of 2014.

Western Africa’s missing fish 15 3. Navigating around the rules and why IUU fishing matters – reefers and containers in western Africa

The first step towards sustainable fishery resource Krakken® UVI database – a fishing and fish carrier vessel management is information. The development of clear and identifier database. All the data included in the Krakken® enforceable rules on Port State Measures, vessel registration UVI database come from official public registries and and flags of convenience is a necessary condition for effective reports. The version used for the purpose of this study governance – but it is not a sufficient condition. Governments (Krakken® V.7.1) accounts for some 1,582,000 historical in western Africa and other regions need credible data on references for more than 820,000 vessels, making it the catch volumes. In this section we identify two practices that world’s largest existing fishing vessel database. It provides are systematically weakening data availability, creating an comprehensive characterisations of fishing vessels from enabling environment for IUU activities. There are concerns around the world, with more than 100 specific information that the operations of reefers and the use of containers may items per vessel, with historical data going back to 2009. be facilitating practices designed to evade reporting. Further technical details are provided in Annex 1. The area covered by our data exercise extends from 3.1 Reefers – tracking points to irregular activities the Strait of Gibraltar to Cape Town. We look at fishing Reefers occupy a pivotal position in the global fisheries activity in the whole of western Africa, which includes trade. These specialised refrigerating cargo ships can deep- countries’ EEZs7 as well as the open seas. Western African freeze, process and store catch at minus 28°C, enabling waters fall under the FAO’s Eastern Central and South them to travel long distances. They can go port-hopping, Eastern Atlantic regions. (See Figure 2 in the Annex for unloading or uploading fish in conventional terminal further details on the area covered.) facilities, and can also ‘comb’ fishing grounds in search of In 2013, according to FishSpektrum’s database, 35 vessels with full holds that prefer to ‘tranship’ – that is, fishing reefers visited western African waters. They were transfer – the fish at sea. flagged to the Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, Belize, Panama, Malta, Kiribati, Japan, Spain, Vanuatu, Sierra The FishSpektrum tracking system Leone and Ghana, most of which are considered flags For this study we use a unique data source to examine of convenience (FOCs).8 Nine of the 35 reefers (all of reefer activity in western African waters. The analysis of the tuna reefers except one) were flagged in Vanuatu the reefer vessels’ activity is derived from the FishSpektrum alone – a jurisdiction marked by limited capacity, a lack of

7. Atlantic, Eastern Central (Major Fishing Area 34): The waters bounded by a line running from a point of the high-water mark of North Africa at 5°36’ west longitude; thence running in a southerly direction following the high-water mark along the coast of Africa to a point at Ponta do Padrão at 6°04’36’’ south latitude and 12°19’48’’ east longitude; thence along a rhumb line in a northwesterly direction to a point at 6°00’ south latitude and 12°00’ east longitude; thence due west along 6°00’ south latitude to 20°00’ west longitude; thence due north to the equator; thence due west to 30°00’ west longitude; thence due north to 5°00’ north latitude; thence due west to 40°00’ west longitude, thence due north to 36°00’ north latitude; thence due east to Point Marroqui at 5°36’ west longitude and 36°00’ north latitude; thence due south to the original point on the African coast.

8. Flags of convenience are registries that allow a ship to be registered in a sovereign state other than that of the ship’s owners. Ships are registered under flags of convenience to reduce operating costs or to avoid the regulations of the owners’ country. For example, 84% of the Netherlands Antilles’ registry is foreign, including mainly ships from the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey and others; Belize’s registry is 62% foreign, including mainly ships from China, Russia, Turkey and Latvia (The Basement Geographer, 2012).

16 ODI Report transparency and failure to enforce minimum international For the purposes of this study, we have classified the 35 reefers social standards on its vessels (IFT, 2015). Vanuatu has into four major groups (Table 1). These groups are as follows: also been accused of registering a large number of vessels allegedly involved in IUU fishing, and of resisting pressure •• Tuna reefers, registered with ICCAT and with observers on from Australia, New Zealand and the Organisation for board. These are relatively small freezing and transporting Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for vessels transporting high-value tuna and connecting tighter controls, and of accommodating owners seeking to western African fishing grounds with Asia. Most of them avoid full disclosure (Van Fossen, 2012). Vanuatu’s registry are flagged to Vanuatu. is made up of 94% foreign ships, mainly from Japan, Poland, Russia, Canada and Greece (Vanuatu Maritime Services Limited, 2016).

Table 1: The 35 reefers operating in western Africa in 2013a

Type Reefer name Flag Carrying capacity (Mt) Trips outside western Africa Tuna reefers Chikuma Vanuatu 3,009.78 3 Tuna long liners, ICCAT-listed, with observers on Futagami Vanuatu 731.41 3 board Genta Maru Vanuatu 2,983.33 1 Harima 2 Vanuatu 1,734.62 1 Haru Vanuatu 1,731.41 2 Ibuki Vanuatu 3,009.78 1 Meita Maru Vanuatu 925 1 Shin Fuji Vanuatu 857.05 2 Taisei Maru 159 Vanuatu 4,060.90 0 Taisei Maru 24 Japan 4,049.36 2 Shuttle reefers Rangiroa Belize 2,064.10 2 Hai Feng 895 Panama 2,243.59 9 Inter-western African Lucky Ever Sierra Leone 1,877.88 0 Reefers doing inter-African routes, linking western Normandic Belize 2,452.02 0 African ports10 Volta Glory Ghana 2,106.28 0 Volta Victory Ghana 2,801.28 0 Meltemi (previously New Prosperity) Kiribati 2,947.44 0 Others China Frost Panama 2,872.02 2 Tokachi Frost Belize 2,511.92 1 Monte Laura Panama 2,176.28 5 Plate Reefer Panama 1,017.95 1 Dolly 79811 Philippines 2,148.72 0 Izar Argia Spain 2,467.95 2 Reina Cristina Panama 1,537.76 2 (MFD 68) Sierra Medoc Malta 3,004.17 2 Astraea 102 Panama 1,458.33 2 Paloma Reefer12 Malta 735.9 0 Princesa Guasimara Malta 769.23 1

9. In 2013, Taisei Maru 15 left Japan, crossed the Indian Ocean towards East Africa and entered western African waters on 18 December, not leaving the region for the remainder of that year.

10. No trips are registered here for these reefers as they were not observed leaving the region.

11. The Dolly 798 only travelled from Gibraltar to Papua New Guinea in 2013, crossing but without stopping anywhere in western Africa.

12. The Paloma Reefer started its activity in 2013 from the port of Las Palmas in Spain, but does not seem to do any transhipments in western African waters that year, focusing instead in the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

Western Africa’s missing fish 17 Table 1: The 35 reefers operating in western Africa in 2013a (cont’d) Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles reefers Nova Zeelandia13 Netherlands Antilles 2,386.73 2 Sierra King Netherlands 2,416.12 4 Nova Florida14 Netherlands Antilles 2,797.76 1 Cool Expreso Netherlands 2,833.43 3 Sierra Loba Netherlands Antilles 2,976.92 2 Pacific Netherlands 3,004.62 2 Sierra Leyre Netherlands 4,719.49 2

Note: The amount of fish transported outside western Africa (calculated as the total capacity of reefers multiplied by the number of round trips they do outside the region) is: Tuna reefers – 33,152 Mt; Shuttle reefers – 24,321 Mt; Inter-western African reefers – 0 Mt; other reefers (including Netherlands reefers) – 84,999 Mt; making a total of 142,471 Mt.

•• Shuttle reefers linking the ports of western Africa with International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic the Spanish free port of Las Palmas, where fish are Tunas Regional Observer Programme (ROP) for At-Sea unloaded, containerised and transported to markets in Transhipments for example, requires that all transhipments Europe. of ICCAT species (tuna and tuna-like species) must take •• Inter-western African reefers serving regional ports and place in port unless they are monitored under a Regional not leaving regional waters. Observer Programme Authorised Carrier Vessel (Interpol, •• Other reefers that sail to wider regions, including ports 2014: 14). In western Africa, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire and fishing grounds in the Pacific. Within this group, have banned transhipments in their EEZs (EJF, 2013c). there is a strong presence of Dutch vessels. Several importing countries have attempted to regulate fish transhipments. The EU’s IUU Regulation restricts fish The 35 reefers illustrate how deeply western Africa is transhipments by vessels flagged to Member States. This now integrated into a global web of transactions. Among is to ensure that the fish being loaded onto reefers can be the countries and ports visited by the reefers were Las tracked and the legality of the catch established. However, Palmas (Spain), New Orleans (US), Weymouth (UK), Tokyo transhipments are allowed when a vessel is operating under (Japan), Malta Freeport, Seoul (South Korea), Singapore the auspices of an RFMO,15 which would mean having and Shanghai (China). However, it is the transhipment observers on board (European Commission, 2010). In activities of some of the reefers within the EEZs – 200 western Africa, the only RFMO operating is ICCAT.16 miles off the western Africa coast – which give most cause FishSpektrum’s database combined with the Automatic for concern. Identification System (AIS)17 signals which FishSpektrum acquired for this report, make it possible to identify patterns consistent with transhipment activity at sea. One 3.2 Transhipments – tracking points to ‘signal’ for such patterns includes a vessel remaining in a suspicious activity fixed location for a period of time. Another is a tracking Fish transhipments can take place at sea, in port and in pattern indicating that a vessel is not travelling between controlled harbours near to shore. ports at cruise speed but is operating – and potentially Transhipments at sea can make it harder for port seeking out fish transhipment business – in a specified authorities or the flag authorities to monitor how, by area. Reefers crossing an EEZ at cruise speed will show whom and where transferred fish were caught as both a straight trail, emitting signals regularly. By contrast, IUU and legal catches can be mixed. This is why such if a reefer is transhipping catch, the tracks will have an transhipments are subject to stringent national and undulating, zigzagging or irregular shape, or be grouped in global rules, and in some cases are banned outright. The clusters. This behaviour could also be explained by other

13. The Nova Zeelandia behaves like an inter-western African reefer, operating mainly within these regional waters except for two trips to A Pobra do Caramiñal and Las Palmas in Spain.

14. The Nova Florida behaves like a shuttle reefer too for most of the year until October, when it leaves towards America crossing the Atlantic.

15. The EU market is still open to fish transhipped at sea by third-country vessels.

16. ICCAT is an intergovernmental fisheries organisation responsible for the conservation of tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas. ICCAT is one of the many regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), but is particularly relevant in this region.

17. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a tracking system employed by vessels for identifying and locating vessels by electronically exchanging data with other nearby ships, AIS terrestrial stations and satellites, to improve marine safety (Weather Dock, 2016).

18 ODI Report activities such as repairs and the transfer of fuel, gear and nautical miles off Dakar (18 July), 73 nautical miles other goods, though normally these would happen near (21 July) and 87 nautical miles (23 July). Figure 3 shows ports and along the coastline, as opposed to the open sea. tracking data consistent with transhipment activity In any case, irregular tracking signals do provide prima (20 July). facie evidence of possible transhipment activities. The vast majority of the 35 reefers tracked in our exercise These three cases are not in any sense statistically generate tracks consistent with possible transhipment in representative of the 35 reefers – but neither are they in EEZs. This includes several vessels with tracks indicative of any sense abnormal. Our data do not constitute evidence probable transhipment in Senegal’s and Côte d’Ivoire’s EEZs, of transhipment linked to IUU fishing. However, the data which would be illegal. The Sierra Loba, Nova Florida and do raise concerns, in part because authorities in western Nova Zeelandia, all carrying Netherlands Antilles flags – Africa are unable to monitor the vessels; and in part considered to be a FOC – and operated by Seatrade Reefer because the weaknesses in the wider governance regime Chartering N.V., based in Willemstad Curaçao and with a for fisheries mean that vessels engaged in transhipment- branch office in Antwerp (Belgium), are three examples. related IUU are able to evade reporting systems. Detailed tracking of one particular vessel –Sierra King – illustrates Sierra Loba. At the beginning of June 2013, the vessel how tracking patterns consistent with transhipment generated an erratic trail consistent with transhipping in may undermine the regulatory approaches of importing Côte d’Ivoire’s EEZ. The activities occurred in an area countries, and the sustainable resource management efforts located in the middle of the EEZ and close to Ghana’s of governments in western Africa EEZ. Additionally, from 6 to 23 August the vessel remained In response to our findings, Seatrade Reefer Chartering in Senegal’s EEZ, and from 18 to 22 August it generated N.V., the company which owns Sierra King reefer and tracks in an area some 124 nautical miles from the coast, appears as the operator of Nova Florida, Sierra Loba and tracing an erratic, J-shaped trail consistent with those of a Nova Zeelandia, referred us to a company called Greensea reefer on the lookout for fishing vessels (Figure 1). Chartering. Greensea in turn confirmed that it operates all these vessels and is owned 50% by Seatrade. Greensea Nova Florida. The vessel generated trails consistent with Chartering said that it was company policy not to share transhipment in an area adjacent to Dakar, some 37 to 38 information except with relevant governments or regulatory nautical miles from the coast, between 29 June and 6 July. bodies. However, its spokesperson did say ‘the fact that a The erratic trail of this reefer on 5 July is shown in Figure 2. vessel has been tracked in an EEZ of a country does not Nova Zeelandia. The vessel’s tracks are consistent with mean that a transhipment operation took place. Ships often transhipment activity in Senegal’s EEZ in areas 62 have to wait for next employment at strategic places’.

Figure 1: Sierra Loba’s tracks, August 2013

Dakar

SENEGAL

THE GAMBIA

Senegal’s Exclusive Economic Zone, where transhipment High density of signals (hotspot), where a ship has slowed Signal emitted (moving catches from shing boats to reefers) is illegal. down or stopped. Can indicate transhipment activity. by ship.

Source: ODI design based on CartoDB, using FishSpektrum data.

Western Africa’s missing fish 19 Figure 2: Nova Florida’s tracks, 5 July 2013

Dakar

SENEGAL

THE GAMBIA

Exclusive Economic Zones. In Senegal’s EEZ transhipment High density of signals (hotspot), where a ship has slowed Signal emitted (moving catches from shing boats to reefers) is illegal. down or stopped. Can indicate transhipment activity. by ship.

Source: ODI design based on CartoDB, using FishSpektrum data.

Figure 3: Nova Zeelandia’s tracks, July 2013

Dakar

SENEGAL

THE GAMBIA

Source: ODI design based on CartoDB, using FishSpektrum data.

20 ODI Report Indeed, our data does not establish either fish •• The South Korean-owned, Sierra Leonean-flagged transhipments in banned areas or IUU fishing on the Lucky Ever was identified in a 2013 report by the part of any of the 35 named reefers. The concern is that Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) as a vessel repeat patterns of irregular tracking data could point in that is believed to have carried out a number of that direction. Moreover, these patterns are consistent unauthorised transhipments. EJF also claimed that with a gathering body of evidence raising concerns over Lucky Ever was engaged in ‘flag-hopping’ – a practice irregularities. To cite some of the more high-profile cases: consistent with circumventing control measures imposed by flag states aimed at curbing IUU fishing (FAO, 2014b).

Box 5: Sierra King Sierra King, a reefer operated by Holland Klipper Shipping Company B.V. and flagged in the Netherlands, generated several tracks during 2013 that may indicate transhipments in western African EEZs – a possible breach of EU regulations which restricts fish transhipments by vessels flagged to Member States. Given the capacity of the vessel – 2,416 Mt – any over-fishing activities would have consequences for sustainability. In the course of 2013 Sierra King operated in several western African EEZs. Several irregular tracking patterns can be detected. For example, the vessel stayed in front of the port of Lagos, a major entry point for fish being imported into the country, for an entire day in August without calling into port. The vessel then sailed to the middle of the EEZ, stayed there and returned to Lagos, calling at port early on 16 August. It remained at port until 19 August when the vessel departed for the south-east edge of the EEZ, some 200 nautical miles from the coast, where it stayed until 22 August. These patterns are consistent with the movement of a reefer on the lookout for fishing vessels wishing to empty their holds (see figure below). The next day it called at the port of Warri, possibly to unload fish for the huge Nigerian domestic market (estimated at $1.75 billion annually) (Emejor, 2013). Sierra King, a tuna reefer, is registered with ICCAT. This means that it should have an observer on board to monitor transhipments of tuna. However, a copy of ICCAT’s 2013 observers’ records obtained by the authors makes no mention of Sierra King, suggesting that that any transhipments that were made were not witnessed by authorised observers – a breach of EU regulations.

Tracks showing Sierra King staying for two days at the edge of Nigeria’s EEZ before returning to port

I G aos IGIA GAA

xlusive onoi ones ih densit of sinals hotsot, here a shi has sloed inal eitted b shi don or stoed an indiate transhient ativit

Source: ODI design based on CartoDB, using FishSpektrum data. Note: Although Sierra King appears in the FishSpektrum Krakken® UVI database to be operated by a company called Holland Klipper Shipping Company B.V., ICCAT Sierra King records show Holland Klipper Shipping Company B.V./ Seatrade Groningen B.V. as both owner and operator of this vessel, meaning that they are the same entity. Seatrade Groningen B.V. in turn is part of the Seatrade group which owns Seatrade Reefer Chartering N.V. see: http://www.iccat.int/en/VesselsRecordDet.asp?id=27470).

Western Africa’s missing fish 21 •• The company Seatrade Reefer Chartering N.V., based in is an equally urgent case for governments in the region Willemstad, Curaçao, operates Nova Zeelandia and five and aid donors to expand the size and efficiency of the other reefers in our list. Seatrade was named in an EJF coastguard fleet, and to share satellite tracking data. report as the owner of a reefer called Nova Australia that was spotted apparently waiting to illegally tranship fish from two trawlers in Guinea’s waters in 2006 (EJF, 2009). 3.3 Containers and the fish trade •• The China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC), It has been widely assumed that reefers account for which operates Hai Feng 895, was identified in a report most of the fisheries’ catch transported out of western by EJF as the company operating several vessels with Africa waters. Closer analysis of our 35 reefers calls that a similar name (Hai Feng 823, Hai Feng 829 and Hai assumption into question. Feng 830) illegally transhipping in 2009 (EJF, 2009). Drawing on the FishSpektrum dataset we have According to Greenpeace, CNFC also underdeclared estimated the volume of fish taken out of western Africa’s gross tonnage for 44 of the 59 vessels it operates in EEZ by reefers. Specifically, we identify that 27 reefers of three western African countries (Senegal, Guinea-Bissau the 35 we identified operating in the region in 2013 left and Guinea) in 2014, allowing them to evade licence western African waters that year. These reefers made a fees, and also illegally giving these higher volume vessels total of 61 trips in total outside the region. We downloaded access to prohibited areas (Greenpeace, 2015). information on the individual carrying capacity of each •• In 2013, the organisation Stop Illegal Fishing (SIF) published vessel, making the assumption that they were operating at a report about a tuna purse seiner18 and two reefers, Volta 100% capacity – an assumption that pushes our estimate Glory and its sister Volta Victory – both on our list of 35 in the direction of likely overestimation. We then multiply reefers. Owned by the Ghanaian Panofi Company Limited, capacity by number of trips to derive an overall volume. these vessels were ‘found fishing without a license well Using this method we estimate that reefers transported a within the Liberian EEZ as well as and illegally transhipping total of 142,471 Mt of fish out of western Africa in 2013.21 fish within Liberian waters’ (SIF, 2013). Even with a discount applied to reflect a the presence of •• The Panama-flagged Monte Laura, which is owned and fish caught outside western African waters, this represents operated by Gestra Corporation S.A. of Panama, is part only around 16% of total net exports22 reported in UN of the Spanish Calvo Group.19 In a report published in trade data which amounted to 893,187.57 Mt that year.23 2007 Greenpeace alleged that Calvo had sold illegal tuna Even allowing for the widely acknowledged (2007).20 One of the Groups’ sister vessels, Monte Cruz, shortcomings in official fish catch and trade data, this is another tuna reefer operated from Panama, was named an enormous gap. But if the fish is not leaving by reefers – in the Greenpeace report for carrying out transhipments how else is it being transported? inside the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries That question can be answered through simple Commission region without proper authorisation. deduction. Land transportation is not a credible route given the poor quality of transport infrastructure and Leaving aside the claims and counterclaims made with the high costs that would be incurred. Air transport is respect to individual cases, the weight of evidence points a similarly implausible route for mass exports. So the in a very clear direction. Transhipment has emerged as a fish almost certainly leaves by sea. Fishing trawlers are vehicle for underreporting catch, circumventing rules and unlikely to account for more than a small share given the increasing profit at the expense of sustainability. Ocean long journeys and the costs of transporting. All of this governance reform efforts need to focus far more strongly points towards the central role of refrigerated containers on the regulation, or outright prohibition, of transhipment in accounting for the bulk of export trade. Based on the in waters where monitoring capacity is weak. Given the available data we estimate that most of the remaining 84% extent of transhipment practices in western Africa, there of the fish transported from western Africa is exported in

18. This type of vessel has a fishing seine that is drawn into the shape of a bag to enclose the catch.

19 The Calvo Group’s report lists Gestra Corp. Inc., from Panama, as the company in charge of part of its fleet (see: http://grupocalvo.com/memoria/ CALVO_report_2013_ing.pdf). ICCAT’s records of Monte Laura show Gestra as the owner and include the Calvo email address in its references (see: www.iccat.int/en/VesselsRecordDet.asp?id=16219).

20. Greenpeace lists Calvo’s Montes fleet, which includes, apart from Monte Laura, Monte Alegre, Monte Celo, Monte Claro, Monte Cruz, Monte Frisa, Monte Lape, Monte Lucía, Monte Rocío and Monte Sol, trawlers, fishing vessels and reefers based in Panama, Cape Verde, El Salvador and Seychelles. The only reefers in the list are Monte Laura and Monte Cruz.

21. Reefers transported a lot of fish within the region, as the reefers doing inter-African routes show. This was not taken into account, as we looked only into the fish transported out of the region.

22. Trade data are drawn from the UN ComTrade Database, using Harmonised System codes 0302, 0303 and 0304 which represent the bulk of the traded fish.

23. Overall, 5,244,866 Mt of fish were reportedly caught in western African waters in 2013, according to FAO Fishstat. Western African coastal countries caught 4,383,747 Mt with the remainder was caught by countries from outside the region.

22 ODI Report containers. Containers play an increasingly important role Table 3: Containerised frozen fish cargo from Walvis Bay for 2014 in global transport systems (Economist, 2013). They now carry around 90% of non-bulk seagoing cargo (Ebeling, Destination country Amount of frozen fish (Mt) 2009). Container ships now rival crude oil tankers and Algeria 836 bulk carriers as the largest commercial vessels in the Australia 2,178 ocean. Refrigerated containers can ship perishable cargo. While they cannot freeze fish, they can be powered to keep Bahamas 1 content frozen. Belgium 704 Container trade has grown in sub-Saharan Africa. Chile 44 In western Africa, there are major container hubs at Walvis Bay (Namibia), Cape Town (South Africa), Dakar China 242 (Senegal), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Lagos (Nigeria) and France 4,246 Tema (Ghana), to name some of the main ones. Just Georgia 44 beyond western Africa is the Spanish free port of Las Palmas – a major hub for fish being transported from the Germany 5,852 region into Europe. Greece 264 For this report we carried out an investigation into the Indonesia 132 transportation of fish from western Africa through the Spanish free port of Las Palmas – one of Europe’s largest Italy 8,954 container hubs. Port authorities provided the authors with Japan 1,232 records of vessels transporting frozen fish from western Africa in 2013. In total, 349 trips were recorded from Jordan 44 destinations including Angola, South Africa (Cape Town), Lebanon 44 Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritania, Morocco (Agadir), Western Libya 484 Sahara (Laayoune); and all but one (from Angola) involved containers. Total imports of western African fish carried by Liechtenstein 88 the containers amounted to 118,701 Mt.24 Malaysia 220 Similarly, data from the container port of Walvis Bay Mauritius 242 in Namibia, a regional hub for western African exports, underscores the deep integration of the region into global Netherlands 5,170 markets (Figure 3.5). Strikingly, however, almost two thirds Norway 44 of Walvis Bay exports went to Spain.25 Poland 462

Portugal 9,196

Table 2: Las Palmas imports of frozen fish from western Africa Russian Federation 242

Singapore 1,166 Countries No. of trips Amount (Mt) South Korea 1,210 South Africa (Cape Town) 23 500 Senegal (Dakar) 99 44,624 Spain 91,498 Mauritania (Nouadhibou) 108 39,839 Sweden 44 Mauritania (Nouakchott) 23 1,783 Switzerland 66 Nigeria* 39 1,509 UAE 88 Western Sahara (Laayoune) 16 2,193 UK 4,972 Morocco (Agadir) 41 28,253 Uruguay 176 TOTAL 349 118,701 USA 880 TOTAL 141,065 Note: * The ports were not specified in the records.

24. Data supplied by Las Palmas Port authorities (2013) to authors.

25. Officials at the Walvis Bay port authority told the report authors that figures for 2014 were similar to those for 2013, but were not available. Assuming similar exports to Spain, and given that the free port of Las Palmas did not register any imports from Walvis Bay in 2013, it would be reasonable to assume that most Walvis Bay exports to Spain went to ports other than Las Palmas, landing directly in mainland Spain where fish would be consumed, re-exported to third countries or processed.

Western Africa’s missing fish 23 3.4 Undermining global fisheries governance imposing sanctions on operators, banning imports and port The rise of containerised trade threatens to derail efforts to access, and restricting seafood imports from ‘uncooperative’ curtail IUU fisheries. This is for the very simple reason third countries, which are those that the European that containers face less stringent inspection and reporting Commission regards as not doing enough to combat this regimes than reefers and fishing vessels. In essence, the activity. Another provision allows for legal sanctions to be fastest growing means of export and the largest share applied to EU nationals engaged in IUU fishing. of western African exports are subject to the weakest The problem is that requirements to inspect landings in reporting systems. EU ports under the IUU Regulation (European Parliament, The governance threat is a problem for importers as well 2014) only apply to fishing vessels and reefers. Container as exporters. Consider the case of the EU, which claims to vessels are exempt. In fact, the EU Regulation explicitly be leading the fight against IUU fishing. The EU is by far the excludes container vessels from the scope of the definition biggest seafood market in the world, and a key market for of fishing vessels. For the purposes of the Regulation western African fish. In 2013, it imported more than $23 fishing vessels are defined as: billion worth of frozen fish, representing 40% of the world total, according to UN ComTrade. Western African coastal any vessel of any size used or intended states exported 274,000 Mt of fish to the EU that year, for use for the purposes of commercial accounting for 44% of their total exports abroad. exploitation of fishery resources, including The European Council Regulation on IUU fishing26 support ships, fish processing vessels, came into force in January 2010, implementing the 2001 vessels engaged in transhipment and carrier United Nations International Plan of Action on IUU vessels equipped for the transportation of 27 Fishing. One of its aims was to prevent the importing fishery products, except container vessels. of seafood products obtained through IUU fishing by requiring consignments of fish to be accompanied by a This restricted legal definition is poorly aligned with the catch certificate validated by the fishing vessel’s flag state. realities of global fisheries trade in general – and with EU– In theory, this makes eligibility for access conditional on western Africa fisheries trade in particular. According to exporters demonstrating that products have been certified the EU’s own handbook on the application of its anti-IUU as legal by the relevant flag state. legislation, container ships do not have to abide by the When flag states are unable to certify their products, the same rule that applies to third-country vessels.28 European Commission starts a process of cooperation and Container vesselsare not compelled to provide the same assistance with them to help improve their legal frameworks. information as fishing vessels and reefers to the competent The milestones of this process are the warnings. In the event port authorities. They are not subject to Article 6 of the of failed compliance, the Commission first issues a ‘yellow IUU Regulation which rules that these third-country vessels card’, meaning that trade with that country is at risk unless must notify the competent authorities of an EU Member it tackles the concerns raised. Continued failure leads to a State whose (designated) port facilities they wish to use ‘red card’, a trade ban. In 2013, Ghana was issued a ‘yellow at least three working days prior to the estimated time of card’ for failing to act against IUU fishing. The warning was arrival, or entry into that port may be denied, to ensure the lifted in 2015 (European Commission, 2015b). In the case of effectiveness of controls. Guinea, the EU imposed trade sanctions in November 2013 While it is true that EU regulations also state that all that are still in force fish importers have to certify the legality of the catch, the The EU Regulation contains wider mechanisms. These certification scheme itself is flawed.29 Specifically, it relies range from ‘blacklisting’ vessels engaged in IUU fishing to on paper copies of documents, severely compromising

26. Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999.

27. Article 5(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 on IUU fishing, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008R1005& from=EN

28. See European Commission Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs And Fisheries (2008: 12): ‘Are container vessels included in the scope of the definition of fishing vessels in Article 2(5)? No, container vessels fall outside the scope of fishing vessels and will therefore not have to give prior notification as indicated in Article 6. However, all marine fishery products must be accompanied by a catch certificate regardless of the mode of transportation to the EC (by any type of vessel, by airfreight, by surface transportation)’.

29. As a general rule, the importer is required to submit to the authorities of the importing Member State catch certificates three working days prior to the anticipated arrival of the consignment. The IUU Regulation foresees, irrespective of the means of transport, controls that are the responsibility of and conducted by Member States.

24 ODI Report document security and traceability. Although control Worryingly, the Commission does not know how many capacities have been improved, in many cases it is up to containers carrying fish arrive at EU ports. In January third countries’ authorities to determine whether the fishing 2013 it admitted to the European Parliament that it ‘does products covered by the catch certificate were actually not have specific information as to the volume of fish caught legally and that no illegal transhipments occurred. transported by refrigerated shipping containers’, something Given the capacity constraints facing regulatory bodies in which has not since changed, as the Commission confirmed western Africa and other low-income regions, this offers the to us. EU at best a limited mitigation of IUU import risk. Asked about the volume of IUU fish entering the EU, The EU also lacks the capacity to cross-check the the Commission’s Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs authenticity of the certificates, and there is no centralised and Fisheries told the report authors that, although it is system allowing European countries to cross-check impossible to provide precise figures, information and identify fraud. Fortunately, the EU recently recognised the need to tackle this issue. Its past estimates concluded that 19% of the Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, worldwide reported value of catches was Karmenu Vella, announced in a communication on the EU IUU. Taking into consideration that the Regulation to Combat IUU fishing that the Commission EU is the biggest seafood market and aims to introduce a digital system by the end of 2016 imports two thirds of its consumption, (Hidas, 2015). a substantial percentage of the IUU This lack of control mechanisms is reflected in reality. products could be destined [for] the EU. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries confirmed to the report Further investigation is required to determine how much authors that only 26 fish container consignments30 were of the fish exported in containers is actually IUU catch. It blocked due to IUU fishing concerns in 2012, another 75 in could be that that licensed foreign vessels take more than 2013 and 33 in 2014, originating from all over the world, they declare or catch fish in prohibited areas. However, not just western Africa. In total, they amounted to only what is clear is that transhipments, inadequate port 8,000 Mt, a tiny fraction of the fish entering the EU from controls, along with the looser regulation of container abroad. traffic, combine to make a system ripe for exploitation.

30. A ‘consignment’ means products that are either sent simultaneously from one exporter to one consignee or covered by a single transport document covering their shipment from the exporter to the consignee. In consequence, consignments can either cover one container or multiple containers.

Western Africa’s missing fish 25 4. IUU fishing and development in western Africa: impacts and opportunities

When the number of fishermen increases or decreases, a domino effect occurs. Fish processors and traders are obviously affected but so are boat builders, fuel providers, wood sellers and other less financially rewarding, often temporary and unrecorded, jobs which provide a real safety net for the poor.

FAO report on the contribution of fisheries to economies in West and Central Africa (FAO, 2006)

IUU fishing in western Africa confronts governments in the the incidence of preventable diseases, poor nutrition levels region, the EU and the wider international community with and the alarming gaps between rural and urban sectors. complex legal, technical and administrative challenges. For Fisheries occupy a pivotal role in the livelihoods of the people of the region the challenges are more immediate. people across the region. According to the FAO, 10 In a region marked by high levels of poverty and inequality, million people are directly employed in the fisheries and IUU fishing has devastating human consequences. It aquaculture sector in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, undermines the livelihoods of vulnerable people, creates 70% of whom are in western and Central African food insecurity and robs people and countries of the countries (FAO, 2006). Recent estimates suggest that revenues they need to support inclusive economic growth. marine artisanal fisheries alone employ more than 32,000 This section will provide an overview of the impact of workers in the Gambia, 45,000 in Côte d’Ivoire and almost IUU fishing on livelihoods and food security, as well as its 100,000 in Senegal, just to name a few western African links to crime and other illegal activities. The reverse side countries (de Graaf and Garibaldi, 2014). of this impact is the huge scope for self-reliant development Women feature prominently in the work force. Around that could be unlocked if the losses associated with IUU a quarter of the total labour force in fisheries is comprised fishing could be stemmed. We estimate that some 306,000 of female workers, mostly employed in post-harvest new jobs could be created in local fisheries and processing jobs,31 especially in fish processing activities (ibid.). Their industries if the region developed the fishing resources on income brings wide-ranging benefits to their families and a sustainable basis – helping to reduce poverty, giving hope communities, allowing them to provide much needed food, to the region’s huge young population. health and education for their children. Fishery sectors account for a significant share of western Africa’s national income. An analysis of nine western 4.1 Fisheries: a lifeline for livelihoods African countries showed that the average contribution Western African countries lie at the very bottom of the of the fisheries and aquaculture sector was 4.1% of development ladder. While the picture varies across GDP, almost half of which was linked to the post-harvest countries, collectively they have high rates of child industry (FAO, 2014). This figure does not include the and maternal mortality, poor education opportunities value of processing activities, which would dramatically and extremely high levels of inequality. Most have life increase the total value of this sector. expectancy levels 20 years lower than in Europe, reflecting

31. Post-harvest refers to all fisheries activities taking place after actual fishing, including fish processing, transport and sale of fish.

26 ODI Report Box 6: Why IUU fishing is a problem for global development objectives In 2015 governments around the world adopted an ambitious set of Sustainable Development Goals aimed at eradicating extreme poverty and expanding opportunity. For western Africa, the fisheries sector has a crucial role to play in delivering on these goals:*

•• providing income for millions of families, as well as food security through affordable, nutritious means (Goals 1 and 4) •• underpinning the education and health of children and their mothers through the livelihoods and the equitable promotion of hundreds of thousands of women (Goals 2, 3, 4 and 5) •• ensuring marine environmental sustainability by providing an alternative to depleting industrial practices (Goal 7) •• offering western African economies a chance for enhanced trade balances, progressive partnerships and alternative economic means (Goal 8).

How much of this can be sustained and increased in the coming years depends largely on the fight against IUU fishing. For the first time ever, the global road map for development in the next 15 years includes a mandate to ‘conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development’, with an explicit reference to the depletion of marine resources and the overexploitation of coasts around the world – something the region is far from being able to achieve at the moment.

* Extracted from WorldFish (2005).

4.2 Impacts of IUU fishing on western African consumed per capita in these and other countries in the development region is higher than the African average (FAO, 2016). IUU fishing is having a huge impact on western African Artisanal and subsistence fishers are on the front line of livelihoods and economies by directly contributing to the the crisis associated with IUU fishing, along with millions overexploitation of the region’s fisheries resources, as seen of people living in small coastal communities. In Sierra earlier in the report. Leone, the fisheries sector played a critical role in the First and foremost, IUU fishing threatens small-scale post-conflict recovery of the country. In 2005, fisheries fisheries. This is one of the most important employment contributed as much as 9.4% to GDP and employed more sectors in the region, accounting for up to a quarter of jobs than 240,000 people, many of them small-scale fishers and in some countries. Artisanal fisheries, in fact, contribute women. Almost two thirds of the animal protein consumed more to African economies than industrial fisheries in the country comes from fish, which is available and through a vast intra-regional trading network in which affordable. Yet some estimates put the IUU catch in excess women play a central role – one that is now at risk (FAO, of 25% of total catches – an enormous diversion of 2014a). opportunity and income from local fishers and processors To make matters worse, those fishers who follow all (EJF, 2011). regulatory requirements can also be affected by IUU As previously stated, weak governance, limited fishers who poach local resources. They end up earning accountability and failures of transparency combined less money as a result of competition from lower-priced to create a fertile environment for IUU fishing. A IUU products caught by fishermen who do not pay tax on report by the British consulting firm Marine Resources profits or to gain access to fisheries resources. This, in turn, Assessment Group concluded that the lower rates of means that IUU fishers have lower costs and therefore can IUU fishing actually seemed to correlate with proxies of sell their products more cheaply than legal operators. good governance, such as access to information, media IUU fishing also threatens the food security of millions censorship and levels of perceived corruption. This suggests of people in the region. In Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal fish that fighting this practice and enhancing development go provides an estimated 45% of animal protein, and the kilos hand in hand (MRAG, 2005; GOC, 2013).

Western Africa’s missing fish 27 Box 7: IUU Fishing and organised crime IUU fishing is not just about the loss of biodiversity and a threat to livelihoods. There is a growing body of evidence pointing to IUU fishing as part of the wider web of organised cross-border crime, money laundering, tax avoidance and even financing for terrorist activity in western Africa (UNODC, 2011). For instance, Interpol points out that many foreign vessels associated with human trafficking in western Africa also engage in IUU fishing (Interpol, 2014). It adds that the lack of capacity of regional governments to monitor illegal activity at sea, combined with a lack of awareness, make identifying and prosecuting human trafficking in the fishing industry an extremely difficult task. Even when intercepted, many human trafficking cases are treated as associated forms of crime, such as a breach of immigration laws. The campaign group Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) documented several cases of human trafficking and labour abuses aboard IUU fishing vessels in the region. The human rights abuses suffered include physical and emotional abuse, incarceration, forced labour without pay and inadequate living conditions (EJF, 2010). Crucially, transhipments appear to make life for criminals easier. According to the Black Fish Project, ‘transhipments between fishing vessels are a common method to traffic drugs, smuggle migrants and weapons’ largely due to the lack of controls over this activity (Bondaroff and Teale, 2015). Tax evasion is also rife. According to an OECD global report on this issue, tax crime in the fisheries sector globally includes ‘fraud in respect of taxes on profit or earnings, customs duties, VAT and social security’. The report adds that the prevalence of offshore companies with little or no oversight, and flags of convenience which are commonly used by IUU operators, are a hallmark of a sector that benefits from global legal loopholes, contributing to the theft of regional resources. All of this has huge development implications, hollowing already weak governance institutions and diverting finance from priority investments in jobs, health and education. The security challenges associated with IUU extend far beyond western African coastal waters.

Box 8: Conflicts between IUU fishers and local fishers Direct conflict between IUU fishers and local fishermen is commonplace in western Africa. Kelleher and Rottingen (2002) reported that, in some western African countries, conflict broke out between industrial and artisanal fishermen especially where fishing grounds were narrow and close to the shore. Ousman Drammeh (2000), has also described this tension:

The ever-increasing competition for fish in small scale fishing grounds has brought about conflicts amongst small-scale fishers and also conflicts between small-scale and large-scale (industrial) fishers. This competition has resulted in diminishing economic returns from fishing operations and a threat to the livelihood security of small-scale fishers and their families. Out of sheer desperation, many small-scale fishers have resorted to the use of explosives, poisons and highly destructive fishing gears, methods and techniques.

According to Drammeh, a former Director of Fisheries in the Gambia, in the coastal waters of western Africa, ‘industrial fishing vessels are habitually encroaching in small scale fishing grounds and they are on record for employing fishing gears, methods and techniques which are prohibited for use’ (ibid.). Conflicts between IUU industrial and artisanal or semi-artisanal fishers were particularly prevalent in shrimp fisheries around western Africa, including Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well as in the inshore fisheries of Mauritania and Senegal. According to the Marine Resources Assessment Group,

Conflicts may be direct (vessels running others down) or indirect (removing all available fish or shrimp), the former often leading to accidents, death and injury amongst artisanal and other local inshore fishers. These, in turn, will have economic and social consequences for fishers and their families, including lower catches through injury, loss of earnings (MRAG, 2005).

The incidence of armed resistance to surveillance and enforcement operations appears to be on the increase too. The Gulf of Guinea – including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Principe –is an area of intense fish transhipments. It was identified in a European Council report as being a ‘hotspot for piracy and armed robbery at sea’, to the extent that the European Council’s Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme developed an action plan to tackle ‘priority threats’ including armed robberies, hijackings and cargo theft (European Council, 2015).

28 ODI Report 4.3 Fisheries in western Africa: a lost to build a sustainable indigenous industry based on a opportunity natural resource already present in the area. Foreign investment in fisheries can provide poor countries Fishing has indeed been a powerful basis of some successful with much needed income. In western Africa, taxes, tariffs, modern industrialisation experiences elsewhere, such as Japan. export revenues and quota fees from fisheries could make a In his book describing the Japanese experience after the war, key difference to the region’s development. Roger D. Smith (2014) offers a picture that has a surprising Currently, much of the benefit to Africa from fishery resemblance to the modern needs of the western African region: exports is generated through the sale of fishing rights to foreign operators. According to the FAO, the revenue from It was hoped that a strong fishing this source runs to around $400 million per year for the industry would allow the Japanese to whole continent (FAO, 2014a:). The same estimate suggests provide for their own food requirements that African states could, in theory, generate eight times while relieving the United States of more than this – some $3.3 billion – if national fleets burdensome aid expenses and create the harvested and exported the fish. necessary impetus to rebuild essential The nature of the agreements signed with certain foreign economic sectors such as ironworks and countries and companies gives rise to legal loopholes, such shipbuilding. Furthermore, exports of as the practice of linking payments to vessels rather than surplus fish products could provide much to the value of the catch (FAO, 2014a). Local processing needed hard currency and help build could add greatly to the export value of fish, with significant foreign exchange reserves. employment gains. Despite their pivotal role in development prospects While Japan did not have to face the intensive depletion of for many countries, fisheries attract modest levels of aid. natural resources that threatens western African countries, its Total development assistance flows to the fishing sector experience is relevant for a region which is on the verge of a (including policy development and management) in ‘demographic dividend’. That is, one that could take advantage western Africa amounted to $71 million in 2013, four- of the productive capacity of the additional labour supply fifths of which was concentrated in Angola ($40.4 million) provided by its booming young population (ILO, 2005: 53). and Mauritania ($15.2 million) (OECD.Stat, 2016).32 According to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), one The contrast with expenditure on subsidies is striking. It is in three sub-Saharan Africans – including many in western estimated that governments in the major fishery trading nations Africa – are in the 10- to 24-year-old age range, the highest spend $27 billion in direct subsidies and tax exemptions every in the developing world (UNFPA, 2014). Yet, the region year, equivalent to 41% of the value of the global catch (Africa suffers from disturbingly high levels of underemployment Progress Panel, 2014). These subsidies encourage overfishing. and precariousness, something that the fisheries sector has They also make it difficult for investors in western Africa to the potential to reduce (ILO, 2005: 53). develop fleets equipped to compete against their rich foreign rivals, or to develop indigenous fleets even if they wanted to. The African Union sought to address this by adopting 4.4 Securing a sustainable fisheries premium an integrated maritime strategy two years ago. This aimed Uncertainties over the full extent of IUU fishing make it difficult to ensure that only African-owned vessels would be able to establish the social, economic and human costs incurred in to trade within Africa’s coastal waters. However, many western Africa However, it is possible, on the basis of indicative experts doubt that such an ambitious scheme can be extrapolation, to estimate the potential benefits were the region implemented in the near future since it would require the to secure a greater share of the benefits of the export trade.34 kind of resources which the region lacks.33 Additionally, For the purposes of this report, we develop a simple the African Union’s limited supra-national powers pose a methodology to illustrate the scale of the opportunities strong political barrier to the strategy becoming a reality. facing countries across western Africa – and, by extension, As a result of all this, western African countries the extent of current losses. Using FAO criteria and applying are failing to take full advantage of the opportunities it to current trade flows, we estimate that 306,000 new jobs underlying the fisheries sector, despite having the potential – divided almost equally between fishers and processors – would be created in western Africa if the region took control

32. In Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, where fisheries employ tens of thousands of poor people, aid has reached a maximum $57 million and $19 million in the past decade, respectively, down 0.2% and 0.3% in the latest available year.

33. Institute for Security Studies: ‘Taking Back the Seas: Prospects for Africa’s blue economy’.

34. MRAG (2010) offers a case study on the economic impacts of illegal fishing activities in Cape Verde, the Gambia and Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. According to their report, ‘The combined value added lost to countries (removed through illegal fishing and not landed in-country) was $8 million for the industrial case studies and $74 million for the artisanal case studies … Their industrial case studies covered a relatively small, but highly valuable, set of fisheries. If other industrial fisheries are included, the total value added lost for industrial and artisanal fisheries combined could be close to $300 million.’

Western Africa’s missing fish 29 of the fishing resources now in the hands of foreign investors •• Around 90,000 more women would join the workforce, (see Table 2 in Annex).35 triggering a domino effect of social and economic benefits for their families and societies. Additionally, our study reveals that: If just a fraction of the fish caught by foreign fleets were •• There would be a nearly 10% increase in the total local to be consumed in local households, the impact on local workforce of the western African fisheries sector. nutrition levels would be significant.

Box 9: Local case study – Sierra Leone’s ‘blackfaces’

Usmane Kpanabum is the head of the Bohoi people, a tiny fishing community located on the island of Sherbro on the southern coast of Sierra Leone. A few days prior to this photo being taken, he had clashed with a ‘blackface’, the term locals use to refer to a dozen massive South Korean trawlers which regularly approach the coast, destroying their artisanal fishing gear. They catch fish in the area, exhausting local fishing stocks to the point of forcing the local fishermen to go further out to sea to try to find fish, hugely increasing their costs. He explains that these foreign vessels’ activities are illegal since they regularly penetrate the five miles reserved for artisanal fishermen, and also because they catch juvenile fish and destroy the seabed, transhipping their catch onto reefers without previously declaring them to the local authorities. Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources mandates that these vessels should carry observers on board. However, the observers are paid by the shipowners, meaning that they do not get paid if they produce a negative report. One of the observers, who refused to be named, confirmed this problem, adding that ‘these vessels are particularly interested in capturing sea bass which can be found near the coast, they can only capture this fish illegally’. Locals do not complain only about South Korean vessels. European, Russian and Japanese vessels all follow similar patterns, operating unheeded off Sierra Leone’s coast thanks to the government’s inability to police its waters and enforce anti-IUU legislation. ‘I miss the time of civil war,’ Kpanabum says. ‘At least then the huge foreign fishing vessels fled from here and we had lots of fish.’

35. Briefly summarised, the methodology employed by the FAO (de Graaf and Garibaldi, 2014) involves estimating the number of jobs created per tonne of caught fish in different sectors and regions in Africa (see Table 1 in Annex). The resulting set of coefficients translates each tonne of fish caught in different sectors and regions in Africa into the number of workers employed in fishing and post-harvest activities. These coefficients, therefore, allow us to estimate the number of artisanal and industrial fisher and processing jobs that could be created were western African nations to take control of the fishing resources now being exploited by foreign nations.

30 ODI Report 5. Conclusions and recommendations

There are compelling reasons for governments to curtail Based on the evidence set out in this report, we propose IUU fishing. On any measure of impact, overfishing eight measures that could make a difference. At the global has reached catastrophic levels, and IUU activities are level: at the heart of the problem. Maintaining business as usual confronts the world with the prospect of losing a •• Establish a global database and tracking system. major source of protein, with loss of species and with A global centralised IUU vessel database should a deteriorating ocean environment. Governments have be created under FAO–IMO auspices, with full endorsed many of the principles needed to underpin accessibility for national authorities. All fishing sustainable resource management. Unfortunately, most vessels should also be required to carry a unique have failed to act on these principles. Far too often, the ID registration number, making it harder to evade interests and the lobbying power of commercial fishery detection. The vessel tracking information that we operations have been allowed to trump commitments to provide in this report illustrates the possibilities. The sustainable resource management, reinforcing a global development of a global tracking system could be tragedy of the commons. financed through a levy on commercial fishery fleets. Nowhere is that tragedy more visible than in Automatic information-sharing systems should be western Africa. IUU fishing is destroying livelihoods, put in place to identify vessels engaged in suspicious compromising food security and undermining prospects activity. for transformative growth on a regional scale. Reversing •• Prohibit transhipments at sea. Western African the current cycle of destruction before fishery stocks – and countries should forbid transhipments at sea, following the artisanal fishing sector – are pushed beyond the point the practice of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Special of no return is a priority that demands the highest levels derogations could be provided for ports that cannot of national political leadership, backed by strengthened accommodate large reefers, with transhipments allowed international cooperation. under closely monitored conditions near port facilities. The problems associated with tackling IUU fishing are Vessels and operators that violate this ban should be well known. Navies and coastguards have been unable to added to a blacklist to prevent repeated offences and to protect long coastlines and large expanses of ocean against deter non-compliance. IUU encroachment. Strengthened Port States Measures, •• Close the IUU container loophole. Container ships more stringent regulation of flags of convenience, and carrying fish should be subject to the same scrutiny and more effective enforcement of sustainability standards reporting requirements as reefers and fishing vessels. by importers could make a difference. However, failure This means container ships should be required to to address the challenges posed by transhipping and the inform port authorities of their intention to unload their use of containers for export is eroding the credibility and catch several days ahead of their arrival (to ensure that effectiveness of multilateral rules. monitoring arrangements can be put in place) and to The good news is that technologies now available fully disclose and document details of their catch. Port can provide the data needed to enforce more effective authorities should in turn use data tracking systems to governance. As we have shown in this report, satellite verify catch details. data and transponders make it possible to track fishing •• Ban blacklisted IUU vessels. Vessels blacklisted for IUU vessels and reefers, alerting authorities to irregular and practices, together with their owners and operators, suspicious activities – and to the presence of vessels in should be prohibited from operating and registering prohibited areas. However, data alone will not solve new vessels. Legal authorities should act swiftly to bar the IUU crisis. Even the best and most timely data will blacklisted vessels and operators from the EEZs in only deliver results if governments are willing and able which IUU activities have occurred, and impose punitive enforce rules. In the case of western Africa, this will take fines that generate powerful deterrent effects. In the a significant increase in naval and coastguard monitoring event that local action is not taken, legal authorities capacity. in the jurisdiction of registration and/or substantive

Western Africa’s missing fish 31 ownership should take action. Interpol should be given this agreement, major fishing nations like China and broad powers to prosecute and investigate IUU activities Russia have failed to do so. and publish an IUU blacklist. •• Build regional capacity action. The international •• Establish IUU fishing as a transnational crime. This community should scale up aid and technical support approach, championed by Norway, would bring IUU for western African countries. The World Bank, the activities under the remit of Interpol. This is particularly African Development Bank and the FAO should necessary since, as we showed earlier, IUU fishing is cooperate in supporting the development of capacity to directly linked to other types of crime, such as drug draw on global satellite tracking systems. Aid donors in trafficking, human trafficking and tax evasion. the EU and emerging markets – including China – with large regional fleets should provide support for the At a regional level: purchase and operation of an expanded coastguard fleet to protect EEZs. Joint patrolling schemes could also •• Improve transparency. African governments and their be established, with an initial focus on the two main trading partners should disclose in full the terms ‘transhipment hubs’ in western Africa: around Guinea of fisheries agreements, including information on and Guinea-Bissau, including Cape Verde, Senegal and quotas and prices, as well as any agreed licence and the Gambia, and another one in the Gulf of Guinea, charter agreements. Additionally, the FAO or another including Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, as identified international independent body should regularly by UNODC. Additionally, western African navies need compare their declared catches with this information to to work more closely together to monitor and protect prevent any instances of underreporting. their coastal waters, especially in inshore territorial •• Enhance port measures. Countries in western Africa waters crucial to coastal fisheries communities. should immediately ratify the legally binding Port State •• Strengthen regulation. Working in concert with Interpol, Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing the African Union should develop an IUU blacklist Agreement (PSMA), to strengthen the controls in ports for the whole continent. All governments in the where the fisheries catches are landed and reported. The region should carefully review licensing arrangements treaty was approved by the FAO in 2009 and came into involving vessels registered under flags of convenience, force on 5 June 2016 after being ratified by 30 countries which are in some cases the equivalent of havens for at the time of writing this report, but to date Gabon, tax avoidance. Consideration should be given to the Guinea-Bissau and South Africa are the only countries imposition of a flag of convenience tax in fisheries in the region to have ratified this agreement. Globally, agreements, with the revenues used to strengthen IUU although the EU and the United States have ratified monitoring capabilities.

32 ODI Report Annex: Brief methodology

Trade data and geographical scope of the report Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, All data regarding trade flows to and from western Africa Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Principe, Gabon, the used in this report were extracted from the UN ComTrade Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Database, using Harmonised System codes 0302, 0303 and Namibia and South Africa. 0304 which represent the bulk of the traded fish.36 We look at fishing activity in the whole of western The study encompasses the region of western Africa, Africa, which includes countries’ EEZs as well as the open stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to Cape Town, seas, as shown in Figure 4 below. Western African waters and including the following countries: Morocco, fall under the FAO’s Eastern Central and South Eastern Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia, Cape Atlantic regions – fishing areas 34 and 47 respectively as Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 4: Western African nations’ Exclusive Economic Figure 5: Eastern Central and South Eastern Atlantic Zones (EEZs) regions

Source: FishSpektrum, using Google Earth mapping Source: FishSpektrum, using Google Earth mapping37

36. Live fish (HS code 0301) was not included in this study as it is negligible in trade to and from western Africa. The same goes for HS codes 0305 (dried fish), 0306 (crustaceans) and 0307 (molluscs).

37. Atlantic, Eastern Central (Major Fishing Area 34): The waters bounded by a line running from a point of the high-water mark of North Africa at 5°36’ west longitude; thence running in a southerly direction following the high-water mark along the coast of Africa to a point at Punta do Padrão at 6°04’36’’ south latitude and 12°19’48’’ east longitude; thence along a rhumb line in a northwesterly direction to a point at 6°00’ south latitude and 12°00’ east longitude; thence due west along 6°00’ south latitude to 20°00’ west longitude; thence due north to the Equator; thence due west to 30°00’ west longitude; thence due north to 5°00’ north latitude; thence due west to 40°00’ west longitude, thence due north to 36°00’ north latitude; thence due east to Point Marroqui at 5°36’ west longitude and 36°00’ north latitude; thence due south to the original point on the African coast.

Atlantic, South Eastern (Major Fishing Area 47): The Southeast Atlantic comprises all the marine waters, bounded by a line beginning at a point on the west coast of the African continent at 6°04’36’’ S latitude and 12°19’48’’ E longitude; thence running in a north westerly direction along a rhumb line to a point at the intersection of the meridian 12°00’E with the parallel 6°00’S; thence due west along this parallel to the meridian 20°00’W; thence due south along this meridian to the parallel 50°00’S, thence due east along this parallel to the meridian 30°00’E; thence due north along this meridian to the coast of the African continent; thence in a westerly and northerly direction along the coast of Africa to the original point of departure.

Western Africa’s missing fish 33 Information used for job analysis and development impacts

Table 4: Employees per tonne of fish caught in marine fisheries

Employees per tonne of fish caught in marine fisheries No. fishers per tonne No. processors per tonne Marine fisheries group Sub-sector Male Female Male Female

Artisanal 0.22 0 0.02 0.09 Canary Current Industrial 0.05 0 0.06 0.12

Artisanal 0.38 0 0.17 0.6 Guinea Current Industrial 0.08 0 0.56 0.22

Artisanal 0.66 0 0.26 0.2 Benguela Current Industrial 0.29 0 0.02 0.04 de Graaf and Garibaldi (2014) ‘The Value of African Fisheries’. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular. No. 1093

Western African countries included in each current Canary Current Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia, Capo Verde, Guinea-Bissau

Atlantic Eastern Central Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Guinea Current Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Principe, the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo

Atlantic Southeast Benguela Current Angola, Namibia, South Africa

Source: (FAO, 2014a).

Table 5: Job creation estimates for western Africa

Estimates of job creation38 Reported Catches non-Western African countries Fisher jobs Processor jobs Tonnes Subsector Male Female Male Female Country Fishing Area (FAO Fishstat data)

Artisanal 2439 0 386 1403 Eastern Central 40.656,00 Industrial 2114 0 5041 2765 France Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0,00 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 54 0 9 31 Eastern Central 905,00 Industrial 47 0 112 62 Greece Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 3169 0 502 1822 Eastern Central 52.820,00 Industrial 2747 0 6550 3592 Latvia Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

38. Should the region take control of the fishing resources now in the hands of foreign investors, it cannot be assumed that the fish would instead mostly be caught by artisanal fishers. This is unfeasible given that much of the catch is taken offshore by trawlers and could not be caught inshore by artisanal fishers. As such, we have adopted a general split of 20% artisanal/80% industrial, which may be achievable given that much of the current foreign fleet catches include some fishing close to shore.

34 ODI Report Estimates of job creation (cont’d) Reported Catches non-Western African countries Fisher jobs Processor jobs Tonnes Subsector Male Female Male Female Country Fishing Area (FAO Fishstat data) Artisanal 3713 0 588 2135 Eastern Central 61.880,00 Industrial 3218 0 7673 4208 Lithuania Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0 Artisanal 828 0 131 476 Eastern Central 13.806,00 Industrial 718 0 1712 939 Netherlands Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Eastern Central 0,00 Industrial 0 0 0 0 Netherlands Antilles Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 3248 0 514 1868 Eastern Central 54.138,00 Industrial 2815 0 6713 3681 Poland Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 362 0 57 208 Eastern Central 6.027,00 Industrial 313 0 747 410 Portugal Artisanal 36 0 6 20 Southeast 593,00 Industrial 31 0 74 40

Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Eastern Central 0,00 Mixed Flag (France and Industrial 0 0 0 0 Spain) Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 8676 0 1374 4989 Eastern Central 144.595,00 Industrial 7519 0 17930 9832 Spain Artisanal 1718 0 272 988 Southeast 28.639,00 Industrial 1489 0 3551 1947

Artisanal 2 0 0 1 Eastern Central 32,00 Industrial 2 0 4 2 UK Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 1020 0 162 587 Eastern Central 17.000,00 Industrial 884 0 2108 1156 Belize Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0,00 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Western Africa’s missing fish 35 Estimates of job creation (cont’d) Reported Catches non-Western African countries Fisher jobs Processor jobs Tonnes Subsector Male Female Male Female Country Fishing Area (FAO Fishstat data) Artisanal 2175 0 344 1251 Eastern Central 36.258,00 Industrial 1885 0 4496 2466 Republic of Korea Artisanal 407 0 64 234 Southeast 6.775,00 Industrial 352 0 840 461

Artisanal 12829 0 2031 7377 Eastern Central 213.821,00 Industrial 11119 0 26514 14540 Russian Federation Artisanal 1330 0 211 765 Southeast 22.167,00 Industrial 1153 0 2749 1507

Artisanal 954 0 151 549 Eastern Central 15.900,00 Industrial 827 0 1972 1081 Saint Kitts and Nevis Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 2267 0 359 1304 Eastern Central 37.784,00 Saint Vincent and the Industrial 1965 0 4685 2569 Grenadines Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0,00 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 311 0 49 179 Eastern Central 5.184,00 Industrial 270 0 643 353 Taiwan Artisanal 929 0 147 534 Southeast 15.486,00 Industrial 805 0 1920 1053

Artisanal 1354 0 214 778 Eastern Central 22.562,00 Industrial 1173 0 2798 1534 Ukraine Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Artisanal 7 0 1 4 Eastern Central 122,00 Industrial 6 0 15 8 Vanuatu Artisanal 0 0 0 0 Southeast 0,00 Industrial 0 0 0 0

Total 878.035,00 98404 0 117294 90057 98404 207352 305756

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Cover photo: A U.S. Coast Guard member and a Ghanaian navy sailor inspect a fishing vessel suspected of illegal fishing, 2014. Credit: US Navy

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