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Final Test Report on a Survey of Radio Frequency Energy Field Emissions from the Cape Cod Air Force Station PAVE PAWS Radar Faci

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Final Test Report on a Survey of Radio Frequency Energy Field Emissions from the Cape Cod Air Force Station PAVE PAWS Radar Faci Final Test Report on A Survey of Radio Frequency Energy Field Emissions from the Cape Cod Air Force Station PAVE PAWS Radar Facility Prepared for PAVE PAWS Public Health Steering Group June 2004 Broadcast Signal Lab, LLP 503 Main Street Medfield, MA 02052 508 359 8833 Broadcast Signal Lab, LLP PAVE PAWS Emissions Study, 2004 Table of Contents 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Overview of the PAVE PAWS Radar.......................................................................... 4 1.2 Overview of BSL’s Work ............................................................................................ 8 1.3 Organization of the Report........................................................................................... 9 1.4 Other Supporting Documents..................................................................................... 11 2 Methods and Locations ...................................................................................................... 11 3 PAVE PAWS Measurement Task...................................................................................... 13 3.1 Results........................................................................................................................ 13 3.2 Sites ............................................................................................................................ 16 3.3 Measurement Methodology........................................................................................ 19 3.4 Observations............................................................................................................... 21 3.4.1 Antenna Position Variations at Individual Sites ................................................ 21 3.4.2 Propagation Characteristics Evident in Power Density Values ......................... 25 3.4.3 Path Loss Exponent............................................................................................ 26 3.4.4 High versus low measurements.......................................................................... 29 3.4.5 Peak to Average Ratios ...................................................................................... 30 3.4.6 Reflections.......................................................................................................... 33 3.5 Summary Values ........................................................................................................ 35 4 Ambient Measurements...................................................................................................... 38 4.1 Results........................................................................................................................ 38 4.2 Sites ............................................................................................................................ 40 4.3 Measurement Methodology........................................................................................ 42 4.4 Observations............................................................................................................... 43 5 Propagation Modeling Task ............................................................................................... 46 5.1 Results........................................................................................................................ 46 5.1.1 Propagation Model Results ................................................................................ 46 5.1.2 PAVE PAWS Antenna Model Results .............................................................. 48 5.1.3 PAVE PAWS Public Exposure Matrix .............................................................. 49 5.2 Drive Test Sites .......................................................................................................... 52 5.3 Propagation Modeling Methodology ......................................................................... 52 5.3.1 Propagation Model ............................................................................................. 52 5.3.2 Prediction of Drive Test Beacon Coverage........................................................ 53 5.4 Drive Test................................................................................................................... 54 5.5 Antenna Model........................................................................................................... 56 5.6 Comparison of Estimate with Field Measurements ................................................... 56 5.7 Peak Exposure............................................................................................................ 58 6 Project Highlights............................................................................................................... 59 2 Broadcast Signal Lab, LLP PAVE PAWS Emissions Study, 2004 Figures Figure 1 -1 Locus Map of PAVE PAWS Radar Facility ....................................................................................6 Figure 2 Radar Zones ...........................................................................................................................................16 Figure 3 50 PAVE PAWS Measurement Sites with Zones................................................................................18 Figure 4 Spatial Power Density Distribution of Low PAVE PAWS Measurements.......................................22 Figure 5 Time Variation in Power Density with Fixed Antenna Position........................................................23 Figure 6 Spatial and/or Temporal Variations in Radar Average Power Density ...........................................24 Figure 7 Average Antenna Power Density by Zone and Distance ....................................................................25 Figure 8 Views of PAVE PAWS Facility from Treetops at Shawme Crowell State Park and Ground Clutter at Site................................................................................................................................................27 Figure 9 Average Power Density by Zone and Log Distance, ...........................................................................28 Figure 10 Paired Average levels at 30-ft and 10-ft AGL Antenna Heights......................................................30 Figure 11 Peak-to-Average Ratios by Distance and Antenna Height...............................................................32 Figure 12 Peak-to-Average Ratios by Distance and Zones................................................................................32 Figure 13 Pulse Triplet Modulated by Delayed Reflection ...............................................................................34 Figure 14 Pulse Triplet Deeply Modulated by Delayed Reflection...................................................................34 Figure 15 Comparison with Previous Measurements........................................................................................37 Figure 16 Fractions of Ambient MPE at Each Site (dBMPE) ..........................................................................39 Figure 17 Power Density of Cape Cod FM and TV Transmissions..................................................................41 Figure 18 IEEE Std C95.1-1999 Exposure Curve for Uncontrolled Environments.........................................42 Figure 19 Route 6 Exit 6 Commuter Lot, Low Band.........................................................................................43 Figure 20 Route 6 Exit 6 Commuter Lot, Mid Band .........................................................................................43 Figure 21 Route 6 Exit 6 Commuter Lot, High Band........................................................................................44 Figure 22 Distribution of the Departures of Computer Estimated Test Beacon Coverage from Corresponding Drive Test Measurements..................................................................................................47 Figure 23 PAVE PAWS Average Antenna Pattern – Exposure Window........................................................48 Figure 24 PAVE PAWS Average Public Exposure............................................................................................50 Figure 25 PAVE PAWS Average Public Exposure (Detail)..............................................................................51 Figure 26 Exposure Window Derivation—Based on Analysis in Final Test Plan...........................................53 Figure 27 Predicted Coverage of Test Beacon....................................................................................................54 Figure 28 Drive Test Route ..................................................................................................................................55 Tables Table 1 Appendices................................................................................................................................................10 Table 2 PAVE PAWS Measurement Summary .................................................................................................14 Table 3 Antenna Positioning Sequence ...............................................................................................................19 Table 4 Antenna Positioning Sequence ...............................................................................................................20 Table 5 Path Loss Exponents for Different Environments................................................................................26
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