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Home , Felix culpa, Louis de Montfort, Ralph McInerny, Thomas Cajetan, Titles of Mary

“THE LORD POSSESSED ME IN THE BEGINNING OF HIS WAYS”: MARY AND THE TRINITARIAN ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE

A Commentary on Charles De Koninck’s Ego Sapientia: The Wisdom That Is Mary

Katherine M. Gardner

Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate of

DIRECTOR: Waldstein READERS: Steven Long, Roger Nutt

Department of Graduate Theology Ave Maria University July, 2013

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a debt of gratitude to Michael and Susie Waldstein that I can only aspire to repay by imitating them to the best of my ability. They constantly place themselves at the disposal of the common good, alike in the extraordinary and in the apparently mundane encounters that fill their days. If I have expressed in what follows any valuable insights into the thought of De Koninck, and through it, into the fumdamental order of God’s creation and Mary’s place therein, this is largely due to the inexhaustible generosity, friendship, and wisdom with which they accompanied me throughout this work.

Great thanks are also due to Patrick Gardner, whose insightful suggestions and careful editing not only made it possible for me to complete this work on time, but also greatly improved it. Thanks also to the Center at the , and in particular to John O’Callaghan and Alice Osberger, for so kindly facilitating my research in the archives of De Koninck’s notes and correspondence housed there. There are many others whose conversation and friendship, prayers, and support were indispensible, especially Matthew DuBroy, Jared Kuebler, Sr. Maria Josefa Bartosch, Sr. Luz-Amen Fischer, and Scott and Simone Heffelfinger. To each of you I offer my profound gratitude.

ii

Table of Contents Introduction ...... 1 Commentary on Title and Mottos: ...... 15 Commentary on the Foreword: ...... 19 Part I: Ego Sapientia ...... 27 Chapters 1 and 2: The Nature of Wisdom...... 32 Commentary Chapters 3-7 ...... 50 Initial Commentary on Chapters 3-5: the Criteria of Wisdom ...... 51 Chapter 3: Mary as Origin of God ...... 51 Chapter 4: Mary as Origin of God with Knowledge ...... 58 Chapter 5: Mary as Origin of God as Redeemer ...... 60 Chapters 4-7: Wisdom and the Trinitarian Processions ...... 62 Excursus on the Causality of the Divine Processions ...... 64 Commentary on Chapters 4-7 in light of Trinitarian Wisdom ...... 89 Chapter 4: The Likeness of the Eternal and Temporal Generations...... 90 Chapter 5: Mary as a Principle of the Temporal Procession of the Son ...... 94 Chapter 6: The Divine Maternity and the Hypostatic Order ...... 96 Chapter 7 Mary’s Habitual Grace and the Order of Redemption ...... 98 Commentary on Chapters 8-16 ...... 109 Chapters 8-9: The Shift from God to the World...... 112 Chapter 10: Mary as cause of the universal order ...... 124 Chapters 11-12 Mary as a Common Good ...... 131 Chapters 13-14: The Circular Movement in God, Mary, and creation ...... 176 Chapter 15: Summary of the First Part ...... 181 Chapter 16: The Height of Beauty in Mary ...... 187 Part II: Nigra Sum Sed Formosa ...... 189 Introduction to Second Part: ...... 190 Chapters 17-18: Mercy at the Root of God’s Works Ad Extra ...... 200 Commentary on Chapters 19-34 ...... 208 Chapters 19-25: The Nigra Sum as Applied to Human nature ...... 209 Chapters 26-30: The Nigra Sum as Applied to Sin ...... 245 Chapters 31-34: Unfolding the Most Profound Sense of Nigra Sum sed Formosa ...... 269 Commentary on Chapters 35-42 ...... 297 Chapters 36-39: The Rejection of Mercy ...... 299 Chapters 40-42: The Beauty of Mary in Humility ...... 333 Conclusion ...... 345 Divisio Textus ...... 348 Bibliography ...... 349

i Index of Texts: Ego Sapientia

Title and Mottos……………………………………………………………………………………………12 Foreword……………………………………………………………………………………………………...15 Part I Chapters 1-2………………………………………………………………………………………………….26 Chapters 3-7………………………………………………………………………………………………….37 Chapters 8-9………………………………………………………………………………………………..108 Chapter 10…………………………………………………………………………………………………..119 Chapters 11-12……………………………………………………………………………………………124 Chapters 13-14……………………………………………………………………………………………171 Chapter 15…………………………………………………………………………………………………..176 Chapter 16…………………………………………………………………………………………………..183 Part II Chapters 17-18……………………………………………………………………………………………193 Chapter 19…………………………………………………………………………………………………..207 Chapter 20…………………………………………………………………………………………………..219 Chapters 21-23……………………………………………………………………………………………227 Chapters 24-25……………………………………………………………………………………………236 Chapter 26…………………………………………………………………………………………………..243 Chapters 27-28……………………………………………………………………………………………246 Chapters 29-30……………………………………………………………………………………………254 Chapters 31-34……………………………………………………………………………………………261 Chapter 35…………………………………………………………………………………………………..292 Chapter 36……………………..……………………………………………………………………………295 Chapters 37-39……………………………………………………………………………………………316 Chapters 40-41……………………………………………………………………………………………325 Chapter 42…………………………………………………………………………………………………..330

ii Introduction

The Nature and Importance of Ego Sapientia: Its Essential Contribution to

In the first question of his Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas delineates the entire science of theology: its very existence, its nature, its principles, and its subject matter. Characteristic of Thomas’s genius is his precise view of the role of philosophy in that science:

Sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5).1

Equally characteristic of Thomas’s contribution to theology is his particular use of

Aristotle, especially of his and natural philosophy. In the systematic work that begins with Question 2 of the Summa, Thomas takes as foundational the things that God reveals about Himself in Scripture and has entrusted to the Church, never supplanting this foundation with philosophy, but making use of human reason to find the inner order of the things that have been revealed and to penetrate them more deeply, drawing out the treasures hidden within. Theology is therefore the

1 STh Ia, q1 a8 ad2. “Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidem, quia per hoc tolleretur meritum fidei; sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia quae traduntur in hac doctrina. Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei; sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati. Unde et apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. X, in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.”

1 highest form of wisdom for the wayfarer, because it allows the one who possesses it to order all other things in light of what is truly first in itself.2

Charles De Koninck’s Ego Sapientia: The Wisdom that is Mary carries this approach into the realm of Mariology. This small book introduces no new doctrine.

Instead, making particular use of the metaphysics and natural philosophy of

Aristotle and Thomas, De Koninck proposes to unfold in a more explicit and systematic way the reasons for doctrines already deeply held by the Church. It is a

Thomistic Mariology, though advancing beyond Thomas’s own work in the light of centuries of Magisterial writings and maturing Marian doctrine—in particular, the of the .3

The notable absence of such an approach may be in part responsible for the plight of modern Mariology expressed by Ratzinger in his book Daughter

Zion. He notes in the preface that he was prompted to write the lectures included in the book by the need for some doctrinal direction regarding Mary. “After the Marian element had played a reduced role in the life of the Church for many years, people wanted, in all sobriety, to hear what actually now remained of Marian belief, and what should continue to remain.”4 In the first chapter he explains that the prevalent attitudes to Mariology either dismiss it as an irrational accumulation, unfaithful to the historical and creedal content of Scripture, or tolerate it as a harmless but

2 STh Ia, q1 a6 co. 3 This dogma was promulgated in 1854 by Pius IX in the . 4 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Daughter Zion: Meditations on the Church’s Marian Belief, trans. John M. McDermott, S.J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983), 7.

2 arbitrary expression of some universal human need for the feminine. But, Ratzinger warns,

mere tolerance in the face of manifold customs will not suffice to justify Marian piety. If its basis is as negligible as might appear from the considerations just mentioned, then the continued cultivation of Marian piety would be nothing but a custom contrary to truth. Such customs either wither away because their root, the truth, has dried up, or they continue to proliferate contrary to conviction, and thus destroy the correlation between truth and life. They thereby lead to a poisoning of the intellectual-spiritual organism, the results of which are incalculable.5

There is a tremendous need to see the place of the Church’s Marian doctrine and devotion within theology as a whole, to show its foundation and its reason in light of the very heart of the faith. Ratzinger does this by rooting Mariology in the integral structure of Biblical faith. De Koninck’s approach, on the other hand, is systematic at heart, explaining the literal content of central Marian images, and through this analysis, showing the place of Marian belief within the body of Christian doctrine.

This integrating of centuries of Marian teachings into the larger theological schema, besides being desirable for its own sake, is essential for the defense of both doctrine and devotion. With regard to the former, De Koninck’s particular concern is with Mary as a principle in creation and redemption, a belief expressed by the

Church’s association of Mary with Wisdom, especially through the use of the

Sapiential Books in her liturgical prayer. That Mary is such a principle is in no way a new teaching.6 Yet the nature of the causality entailed in this role has been far less

5 Ratzinger, Daughter Zion, 11. 6 “For just as the first Eve exercised universal causality in the fall of mankind, so, inversely, does Mary, the , exercise a universal causality in the order of Redemption. This is not new doctrine. It is contained in the very words of Scripture, and was fully brought out by St. Ireneaus of Lyons in the second century. (Ireneaus had known St. , a of St. .)

3 developed. De Koninck makes particular use of the philosophical account of wisdom, the principle of order, of exemplar and final causality—in particular that of the common good—and the natural philosophy of Thomas and Aristotle regarding the place of man in the universe, to unfold Mary’s role as principle in a philosophically explicit way.

Yet we would grasp only a part of Ego Sapientia’s value if we did not see the philosophically rich explication of Mary’s role in creation and redemption subsumed into a still more properly theological perspective. De Koninck considers Mary’s place in the divine economy as a whole, the causality she exercises within it, in light of that which is absolutely first: the Holy , in its own inner life and as origin and end of all things.

With regard to the defense of devotional practices within the Church, De

Koninck’s correspondence and lecture notes reveal a special interest in the teaching of St. . In a lecture on Ego Sapientia and Laval , Fr.

Romanus Cessario first expresses the difficulty of summarizing De Koninck’s Marian book, but then adds,

If however I were obliged to characterize the essay, albeit with a certain obscurantism, I would say that De Koninck shows the authentic Thomist philosophical undergirding of Louis Marie Grignion de Montfort’s True Devotion. In other words, De Koninck explains the speculative underpinnings

The proportion which he points out to us is the following. Just as death came into this world through the disobedience of Eve, so did life come to us through the obedience of that other , Mary. You have all heard of this ‘recapitulation’—the parallel between and Eve on the one hand, and the New Adam and New Eve on the other. The first Eve’s mediating role in the fall is inversely parallel to the second Eve’s mediating role in salvation” (Charles De Koninck, “The Role of Woman in the Work of Redemption,” unpublished lecture, typewritten in English, Maritain Center archives: 8/36).

4 of de Montfort’s Marian and Christological blueprint for Christian living. Ad Iesum per Mariam.7

This judgment is echoed by a Canadian with whom De Koninck corresponded concerning Ego Sapientia. He writes, “Montfort has had until now his commentators, his disciples in spirituality. He now has in you, dear sir, his metaphysician.”8

De Koninck does not deal directly with the devotion of de Montfort in Ego

Sapientia, but he provides the ontological basis for the total consecration and practice of holy slavery taught by the latter. That is, in showing the universality of the causality Mary exercises with regard to all the members of the City of God, De

Koninck implicitly grounds the practical response to this causality on the part of the faithful. The treatment of Mary as a common good is essential to this account. Yet the relationship between divine causality and human freedom illustrated by the doctrine of mercy and the relation of human nature to divine omnipotence approaches perhaps closest to the heart of de Montfort’s doctrine of the “true devotion” to Mary.

The nexus of themes that illumine de Montfort’s teaching touch on a secondary but important contribution Ego Sapientia is poised to make. In addition to the properly theological concerns outlined above, the account of Mary as a separated common good, and of the primacy of divine mercy, also throws light on

De Koninck’s far more well-known and far more controversial work on the common

7 Fr. Romanus Cessario O.P., “Ego Sapientia: The Mariology of Laval Thomism” paper presented at the conference, Philosophy in Theological Education: A Conference in Honor of Ralph McInerny, Center for the Renewal of & Aquinas Center, Ave Maria University, Ave Maria, FL, Feb. 11, 2011. 8 Fr. Henri-Marie Guindon, s.m.m. to Charles De Koninck, June 15, 1943 (Maritain Center archives: 15/15.02). “Montfort a eu jusqu’ici ses commentateurs, ses disciples dans la spiritualité. Il vient d’avoir en vous, cher monsieur, son métaphysicien.”

5 good. De Koninck published On the Primacy of the Common Good Against the

Personalists alongside Ego Sapientia in 1943. The debate aroused by the appearance of the former, which was far more polemical in character, became intense and even vitriolic. And yet, De Koninck himself claims, in private correspondence, that Ego

Sapientia itself was the stronger attack against of the two works.9 He adds that it was the devotion of slavery to Mary taught by de Montfort that gave him his certitude regarding the very primacy of the common good. Mary illustrates in a dramatic way the true glory that belongs to the person in virtue of his ordination to the common good, of which she herself is both example and principle. At the same time, it helps to clarify, among those who fall under the label of ‘personalists,’ the true object of De Koninck’s criticism. Chief among those sometimes erroneously brought under that condemnation is Blessed John Paul II. In this light, Ego Sapientia is also able to provide an important corrective by showing the deep consonance between De Koninck’s thesis of the primacy of the common good and the claim, found in certain recent Magisterial writings, that the person is willed for his own sake.

9 “You have well understood that Ego Sapientia is a much more radical attack against personalism than the Common Good. And I must admit that my certainty of the absolute incompatibility between personalism and slavery to Mary was the deepest principle of my attack against the personalists” (De Koninck to Fr. Guindon, June 20, 1943; Maritain Center archives: 15/15.03) “Vous avez bien compris que « Ego Sapientia » est une attaque beaucoup plus radicale contre le personnalisme que le « Bien Commun. » Et je dois reconnaître que ma certitude de l’incompatibilité absolue entre le personnalisme et l’esclavage de Marie a été le principe le plus profond de mon attaque contre les personnalistes.”

6 The Need for a Commentary

The style of Ego Sapientia, and its density, not only make it difficult to summarize, as Fr. Cessario observed, but easy to misinterpret. Because it is terse and densely inlaid with passages from Scripture, the , and the commentators, it can have the look of a survey or collection of texts. Ralph McInerny, for example, characterized it in this way.10 At the same time, De Koninck makes regular use of philosophical terms and ideas, often with little or no explanation. Fr. Guindon suggests the difficulty this creates for the reader in interpreting the work. “Browsing the table of contents cannot give an accurate picture. This succession of scriptural texts appears to be a whimsical composition, in which a subtle mind has found excellent opportunity to multiply its acrobatics.”11 Guindon, nevertheless, discerns that there is a continuous argument in the text:

If the structure of the book does not present itself, strictly speaking, as usual chapters, but simply as a series of texts more or less developed—some perhaps not enough—punctuating the progression of thought, is it because a closer unity binds and constitutes these pages…12

Yet even this defense is not without a hint at the excessive density and difficulty of the book’s style.

10 “His work Ego Sapientia is a florilegium of texts brought together under drawn from the great masters of Mariology: Bernard and ” (“Ralph McInerny on a Forgotten Thomist,” interview by Annamarie Adkins, Zenit News, NOV. 6, 2009, http://www.zenit.org/article- 27462?l=english). 11 Fr. Henri-Marie Guindon, s.m.m., untitled copy of article on Ego Sapientia, which the author explains was published in Revue des Prêtres Adorateurs, enclosed in a letter sent to De Koninck by the author Sept. 28, 1943 (Maritain Center archives: 15/15.04). “Cette succession de textes scriptuaires apparaîtrait comme une composition fantaisiste où un esprit subtil a trouvé excellente occasion de multiplier ses acrobaties.” 12 Guindon, Ego Sapientia article. “Si la facture du livre ne se présente pas, à proprement parler; sous la forme accoutumée de chapitres, mais simplement comme une suite de textes plus ou moins développés—quelques- uns, pas assez peut-être—ponctuant la progression de la pensée, c’est que l’unité la plus serrée lie ces pages et constitue…”

7 This difficulty poses a danger for the book, one that has perhaps been realized. Guindon writes, “Such a density, inevitably, will limit the number of its readers. Some even, deterred by the obscurity for which the author has been criticized, may not wish to bother to pursue pages too arduous. That would be a great pity.”13 This concluding lament is perhaps intended as an explanation of his introductory remarks. “Really, has this book aroused the attention it deserved?” he asks. “A scholarly journal has honored it—ten simple lines of praise—which is not negligible under the pen that signed them. Elsewhere, a discrete reference, nothing more.”14 Whether it was eclipsed by the noisy reception of the Common Good, or failed to win serious readers because it appeared too much like a work of devotion rather than a work of theology, is perhaps impossible to judge. More than likely, its relative neglect is due to both factors.

13 Guindon, Ego Sapientia article. “Une telle densité, inévitablement, va circonscrire la nombre de ses lecteurs. D’aucuns même, prévenus par l’hermétisme que l’on a reproché à l’A. ne voudront peut- être pas se donner la peine de poursuivre des pages trop ardues. Se serait grand dommage.” 14 Guindon, Ego Sapientia article. “Vraiment, cet ouvrage a-t-il alerté l’attention comme il le méritait? Une savante revue lui a fait l’honneur –qui n’est pas négligeable sous la plume qui les signait,- de dix sobres lignes d’éloge. Ailleurs, une discrète mention, sans plus.” The 10 lines to which he refers are a review of the book in Revue Dominicaine by its sub-editor. “The love of the Holy Virgin is so natural to true Christianity that authors are able to write about her endlessly: we will never have too many of their books. But those are particularly likely to appeal who, after the example of Mr. De Koninck, know how to unite solid theology to the most delicate piety. Ego Sapientia realizes, in fact, the ancient union of prayer with doctrine, as practiced so well in the Middle Ages. The author knows and makes use of the commentators even in their refinements. Rejecting all deliberate technical discussion, he aims to educate and delight. No doubt but that those who take him as guide will taste again more deeply ‘the Wisdom that is Mary’” (Antonin Papillon, O.P., “Charles De Koninck —Ego Sapientia… La Sagesse qui est Marie,” Revue Dominicaine 49, no. 2 [1943]: 118). “L’amour de la Sainte Vierge est si naturel au christianisme véritable que les auteurs peuvent écrire sans cesse : nous n’aurons jamais trop de leurs livres. Mais ceux-là surtout ont chance de plaire davantage qui, à l’exemple de M. De Koninck, savent unir une théologie solide à la plus délicate piété. « Ego Sapientia » réalise, en effet, l’antique union de la prière avec la doctrine, comme on savait si bien la pratiquer au moyen âge. L’auteur connaît et utilise les commentaires jusque dans leurs raffinements. Ecartant délibérément toute discussion technique, il vise à instruire et à charmer. Nul doute que ceux qui prendront pour guide ne goûtent encore plus profondément « la Sagesse qui est Marie. »”

8 This “fault” in the style of the text, and the potential limitation of its audience, is by no means something of which De Koninck himself was unaware. He acknowledges to Guindon,

The density that you report is indeed a fault which I should have found a way to remedy. One finds it in everything I've written in recent years, but particularly in this little book. All this could be made much more accessible to readers lacking a scholastic training. But that would have required an effort that would have considerably delayed the publication of the volume. I dared not set back the publication of these things which were being forgotten, especially in the milieu of so-called high culture.15

In letters exchanged between De Koninck and Fr. Anthony Durand, one of his former students, it becomes apparent that De Koninck intended to produce an expanded and improved edition in English, rather than merely a translation of the text as it was. Durand, an Englishman, was originally to have produced a translation himself, but his last mention of that project reveals De Koninck’s new intention.

I was particularly pleased to learn that you are intending to write a new and expanded draft in English of Ego Sapientia. I do hope you will put this in the fore-front of all your plans because there is a real need for such a book. …I am sure a translation of it as it stands would not have failed to win some readers, but it would certainly prove too condensed and cryptic for most and too technical both in vocabulary and method of approach to the difficulties concerned. It would be a pity if a book offering so profound and dazzling a picture of the glories of Our Lady should not reach and influence as wide an audience as possible.16

15 De Koninck to Guindon, June 11, 1943 (Maritain Center archives: 15/15.01). “La densité que vous signalez est à vrai dire un défaut auquel j’aurais dû trouver moyen de rémédier. On le retrouve dans tout ce que j’ai écrit ces dernières années, mais particulièrement dans ce petit livre. Tout cela pourrait être rendu beaucoup plus accessible aux lecteurs dépourvus d’une formation scolastique. Mais cela m’aurait demandé un effort qui aurait retardé considérablement la parution du volume. Je n’osais pas remettre la publication de ces choses qu’on était en train d’oublier surtout dans les mileux de soi-disant haute culture.” 16 Fr. Anthony Durand to De Koninck, December 9, 1946 (Maritain Center archives: 15/02.08).

9 This expanded version was never produced.17 In lieu of such a work from his own hand, a commentary will be an important step in making clear the careful but not readily apparent structure of the argument of the whole book, as well as elaborating ideas that are merely hinted at or assumed by that argument. The purpose of such an effort is to render accessible the argument and the principal insights of Ego

Sapientia, which are outlined above.

Structure of the Commentary

The commentary proceeds according to the structure of the argument, thus grouping chapters together according to their place in that argument. The complete text of Ego Sapientia is included, distributed as far as possible for ease of reference, followed by the corresponding commentary. The text is given in two columns, with the original French on the left, including the original headings and footnotes. On the right is a complete English translation, adapted from an unpublished translation by

Ronald McArthur, a former graduate student of De Koninck.18 This version was preferred to the recently published English translation by Ralph McInerny for two reasons. McInerny was evidently working, with respect to the first half of the translation, from an English version of the first part published in The Thomist the same year that the full French version appeared.19 McInerny’s version is nearly identical to this article. This version, though in all likelihood De Koninck’s own,

17 “My father was never able to work on the expanded version you rightly mention as intended. He turned out to prove simply too busy with other projects, sincere though that intention was.” (, email message to author, July 23, 2012). 18 Translation made publically available by The Aquinas Review, http://ldataworks.com/aqr/imwisdom.pdf. 19 Charles De Koninck, “The Wisdom that is Mary,” The Thomist 6. No. 1 (1943): 1-18.

10 differs in some respects from the French.20 It was preferable that the entire translation come directly from a single work, and moreover, that it correspond directly to the facing French. The second reason is that, with respect to the second part as well as the first, McArthur preferred a more literal translation, which is helpful for the sake of commentary. All French and footnotes have been translated into corresponding English.21 In addition, significant differences between the French and the Thomist version are noted in a second set of footnotes.

The commentary fundamentally intends to unfold the structure of the argument itself, and so basically follows the order of the chapters. The book itself is divided into two main parts—Ego Sapientia and Nigra Sum sed Formosa—and the commentary is divided accordingly into two major parts. There are, however, four major excursuses, two in each part, which are intended to develop central background issues that contribute directly to understanding the argument of Ego

Sapientia. The first excursus deals with the causality of the Trinitarian processions, a principle implicit in the major thesis of the first part, making use primarily of St.

Thomas and Fr. Gilles Emery O.P. The second deals with the common good, drawing directly on De Koninck’s work of that name, to fill in the doctrine that is presupposed in Chapters 11-13. The third and fourth excursuses occur in the second half, the first dealing with de Montfort’s doctrine of slavery to Mary, drawing largely

20 No translator is given in the journal. The judgment that the work was De Koninck’s own was affirmed by Thomas De Koninck in an email to the author, Feb. 3, 2013. 21 The footnotes in the English version are my own translations, apart from those adapted from the works of St. Thomas for which an English translation is provided by the Dominicans. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/. Some changes have been made to many of these translations in comparison with the Latin for the sake of content or style.

11 from articles and lectures of De Koninck, and the second with personalism, which depends heavily on the Common Good as well.

12 EGO SAPIENTIA...

LA SAGESSE QUI EST MARIE THE WISDOM THAT IS MARY

PAR BY

CHARLES DE KONINCK CHARLES DE KONINCK

du Tiers-Ordre de saint Dominique of the Third Order of St. Dominic doyen de la faculté de philosophie dean of the faculty of philosophy chargé de cours à la faculté de théologie fellow of the faculty of theology de l'Université Laval of the University of Laval

A ma femme Zoé To my wife Zoé et à mes filles And my daughters Godelieve et Marie-Charlotte Godelieve and Marie-Charlotte

Je confesse mon ignorance et je ne cache pas ma I confess my ignorance, and I do not hide my own propre pusillanimité. Et pourtant, rien ne me cause faintheartedness. Yet, nothing causes me more joy, plus de joie, mais aussi rien ne m'effraie davantage, but also nothing frightens me more, than to speak que de parler de la gloire de la Vierge Marie. of the glory of the Virgin Mary.

SAINT BERNARD, In Assumpt. sermo IV.a SAINT BERNARD, On the Assumption, sermon IV.a L'excellence de la glorieuse Vierge est telle que The excellence of the glorious Virgin is so great toute langue est impuissante à la raconter et à la that all language is powerless to give an account of louer: les Écritures sont impuissantes, les it and to praise it: the Scriptures are powerless, the prophéties sont impuissantes, et les images prophecies are powerless, and the parabolic images paraboliques le sont aussi. C'est pourquoi le Saint- are as well. This is why the Holy Spirit, speaking Esprit, parlant par la bouche des Prophètes, la loue through the mouth of the , praises her not non seulement par des paroles mais encore par des only through words but also through figures and figures et des images paraboliques: et parce parabolic images: and because no one parabolic qu'aucune image parabolique ne suffit parfaitement image perfectly suffices to express her excellence, à exprimer son excellence, les similitudes et les the likenesses and the metaphors were multiplied in métaphores ont été multipliées en vue de mieux order to better celebrate her praise. célébrer sa louange.

SAINT BONAVENTURE, De Nativitate B.V.M. SAINT BONAVENTURE, On the Birth of the sermo II.b22 B.V.M., sermon II.b a “‘Fateor,’ inquit Bernardus, ‘imperitiam meam, a “‘I confess,’ says St. Bernard, ‘my ignorance; my own pusillanimitatem propriam non abscondo. Non est faintheartedness I do not conceal. Indeed, there is quidem quod me magis delectet, sed nec quod terreat nothing that would please me more, but also nothing that magis, quam de gloria, Virginis Matris habere would terrify me more, than to give a sermon on the sermonem’ (Sermo 4 in Assumpt. B.M.V. n. 5). Hoc igitur glory of the Virgin Mother’ (On the Assumption B.V.M., in principio supponamus, quod quidquid laudis dicitur de sermon 4, n. 5). Let us therefore suppose this from the beata Maria, non hyperbolice dicitur, sed defective, juxta start, that whatever of praise may be spoken about the verbum beati Hieronymi: ‘Quidquid humanis dici potest Blessed Mary is not spoken in hyperbole but imperfectly, verbis, minus est a laude Dei.’” S. Bonaventure, de just as blessed said: ‘Whatever can be said by

22 The original French mistakenly cites sermon “III,” although it is correctly cited in the original footnote.

13 Assumptione B.V.M., Sermo III, T. IX, p. 693b. human words falls short of the praise of God’” (St. Bonaventure, On the Assumption B.V.M., sermon 3, t. 9, p. 693b). b “Tanta est excellentia Virginis gloriosae, ut ab ejus b “So great is the excellence of the glorious Virgin that narratione et laude deficiant omnes linguae, deficiant every tongue falls short in the telling and the praise of it; Scripturae, deficiant prophetiae et similitudines the Scriptures fall short; the prophecies and parabolic parabolicae. Unde et Spiritus Sanctus per ora images fall short. This is why the Holy Spirit commends Prophetarum commendat eam non solum verbis, verum her, by the mouth of the Prophets, not only with words etiam figuris et similitudinibus parabolicis; et quia nulla but also with figures and parabolic images. And because similitudo parabolica perfecte sufficit ad ejus no parabolic image perfectly suffices to express her excellentiam exprimendam, ideo ad ipsius laudem excellence, manifold images and metaphors have been multiformes introducuntur similitudines et metaphorae” introduced for the sake of her praises” Ibid., de Nativitate B. V. M., Sermo II, p. 708a. (St. Bonaventure, On the Birth of the B.V.M., sermon 2, 708a).

Marie doit éclater plus que jamais, Mary must shine forth more than ever en miséricorde, en force et en grâce, in mercy, in force, and in grace dans ces derniers temps. in these latter times.

GRIGNION DE MONTFORT23 SAINT LOUIS DE MONTFORT

23 St. Louis-Marie Grignion de Montfort, Traité de La Vraie Dévotion a la Sainte Vierge, édit. canadienne, (Ottawa-Eastview: Librairie mariale du "Messager," 1940) n.50.

14 Commentary on Title and Mottos:

The three mottos that De Koninck places at the beginning of Ego Sapientia are best seen together with the concluding chapters of the two parts of the work.

The first two mottos correspond to the final chapter of the first part (16), while the third motto, placed apart from the other two in the original, corresponds to the final chapter of the whole (42).

The first two mottos emphasize a disproportion between the glory of the

Blessed Virgin and the capacity of language to do justice to it. The tone of the whole work is, in a sense, contained in this expression of disproportion. If Ego Sapientia calms those who find the effusive language of piety toward Mary in the Catholic tradition reckless and excessive, it is not by restraining that expression. On the contrary, De Koninck proposes, in the first part of the work, to establish the firm theological foundation of one such expression in all its astonishing force. The careful application of causal reasoning that characterizes this undertaking is not what one would call sobering. The more the reader grasps the profound reality of the honor

God has given to Mary, the more his wonder increases.

Do we marvel at the supereminent ‘formositas’ of this pure creature, of this wholly created wisdom? Has she not been called “Admirable mother,” that is to say, mother, principle, of which the cause is unfathomable? The most marvelous of all God’s purely created works, Mary causes us to better glimpse the incomprehensibility of the Wisdom which precedes all things. “Sapientiam Dei Preaecedentem omnia quis investigavit?” (Sir. 1:3). And to which purely created work could one well compare her? “Non est factum tale opus in universis regnis—no such work has been made in any kingdom” (3 Kings 10:20). Is she not so astonishing that, according to St. Bernard, even the princes of the celestial choir fall to asking: “Quae es ista—Who is this that arises from the desert, leaning on her beloved?” (Songs 8:5). “Quae es ista—

15 Who is this that appears like the dawn, fair as the moon, pure as the sun, but terrible as an army arrayed for battle?” (Songs 6:9).24

The first part of Ego Sapientia leads us to this peak of wonder by explaining why

Mary is properly called Wisdom. Yet the sublimity of Mary’s dignity is essential also to the argument of the second part, Nigra Sum, sed Formosa, in which De Koninck considers the relation between this surpassing dignity and Mary’s lowliness.25 This tone of wonder will mark the style and aim of the entire work.

The third motto, which stands apart from the other two, read together with the final chapter of the whole work, suggests the reason for awakening such a wonder at the Blessed Virgin, or more precisely, at God’s goodness manifested in the her. The quote, taken from St. Louis de Montfort, connects the increasing manifestation of Marian mysteries with the particular historical epoch of the writer.

De Montfort wrote these words in the 1700s; De Koninck repeats them roughly 200 years later. In Chapter 42 De Koninck explains why an increasing manifestation of

Mary’s glory is most fitting now.

Seeing the growing misery of this world and the pains to which our mother the Holy Church is submitted, it happens that it is very opportune to repeat these truths. The intellectual and moral misery of the contemporary world more than ever reveals the baseness of man, a baseness that we will more and more ignore. “Et nescis quia tu es miser, et miserabilis, et pauper, et caecus, et nudus—And you do not know that you are an unhappy one, one miserable, poor, blind, and naked” (Rev. 3:17). Never has humanity been so deprived of its purely human virtues of wisdom and prudence. Never has it so mistaken this nature it exalts. 26

24 Ego Sapientia, 16. 25 At a high point of the argument of the second part De Koninck writes: “This astonishment, this imperfect knowledge of the cause, will remain for us to the end. ‘Admirabilis ero—I will be astounding’ (Wis. 8:11). ‘In plenitudine sancta admirabitur—She will astound the assembly of saints’ (Sir. 24:3)” (Ego Sapientia, 33.2). 26 Ego Sapientia, 42.1.

16

De Koninck looks in particular at the devastation on the human community wrought by Communist regimes. Yet he traces these regimes to the warping influence of philosophies that tend to dissolve the bonds between man and the created order, and above all between man and God. These philosophies blossomed in Kant and his successors, but they have much deeper roots, as we will see in our consideration of the final part of the work.

“But the Church teaches us that parallel to this growing baseness, divine mercy will manifest itself more and more through the ages, and particularly in the more and more explicit revelation of the mysteries of Mary, Mother of Mercy.”27 In contrast to the picture of man, as drawing his greatest dignity from his liberation and domination of all things, the contemplation of Mary yields a wholly different vision. Her glory, so sublime that it is an eternal cause of wonder, is wholly received, and is realized in her weakness, her humility, and her suffering. This seeming paradox constitutes the central theme of the second part. Mary is the particular response to the debasing form of humanism advocated by Marx, Feuerbach, Kant, and the like, because she manifests the truth about the divine goodness, whose works are dominated by mercy.

27 Ego Sapientia, 42.3.

17 FOREWORD28

Comment tout ce que la Sagesse dit d'elle-même How can all that Wisdom says of itself in the dans les Livres Sapientiaux peut-il s'appliquer Sapiential Books really apply to the Virgin Mary; véritablement à la Vïerge Marie; quelle relation What relationship can be established between this peut s'établir entre cette sagesse créée et le Nigra created wisdom and the “Nigra sum sed formosa— sum sed formosa - Je suis noire mais belle (Cant. I, I am black but beautiful” (Songs, 1:5) of the Song 5) du Cantique des Cantiques, telles sont les of Songs?29 These are the questions we have questions auxquelles nous nous sommes proposé de proposed to answer. répondre. Certes, nous n'entendons pas innover: on le verra Of course we do not intend to innovate: you will par l'usage constant que nous faisons des Docteurs see this by the constant use we make of the Doctors de l'Église et des commentateurs. Ceux des textes of the Church30 and of the commentators.31 The que la liturgie consacre, dans leur sens mystique, à texts that the sacred liturgy especially dedicates in la Mère de Dieu ne nous serviront qu'à illustrer des their mystical sense to the Mother of God will only conclusions déduites du seul sens littéral d'autres be used to illustrate conclusions arrived at from passages de l'Écriture. On voudra noter toutefois looking solely at the literal sense of other passages que cette illustration, appuyée par la liturgie, in the Holy Scriptures. One should note, however, constitue une illumination véritable. that such an illustration, supported by the liturgy, constitutes a true illumination. Vu les misères de notre temps, ne convient-il pas Considering the miseries of our times, isn’t it more aujourd'hui plus que jamais de fixer appropriate than ever to fix unshakably our sights inébranlablement nos regards sur les oeuvres les on the most brilliant works of the Wisdom and the plus éclatantes de la Sagesse et de la Miséricorde Mercy of God? de Dieu? Comment dire ma reconnaissance à tous ceux de How can I express my gratitude to all of my friends mes amis qui, sans toujours s'en render compte, ont who, not always realizing it, collaborated on this collaboré à ce recueil? C'est Jacques de Monléon book? It is Jacques de Monléon who first made me qui, le premier, me fit connaître le rôle de la know the role of mercy; it is an American Jew who miséricorde; c'est un juif américain qui m'apprit la taught me the doctrine of the Blessed de Montfort. doctrine du bienheureux de Montfort: je n'oublie I am not forgetting the part played by the Reverend pas la part de l'abbé Maurice Dionne; ni celle de Maurice Dionne, nor that of Alphonse-Marie l'abbé Alphonse-Marie Parent qui s'est imposé la Parent, who imposed upon himself the unpleasant tâche ingrate de corriger mon manuscrit et les task of correcting my manuscript and the proofs; I épreuves; je pense aussi à tous ceux que je ne puis am thinking also of all those I cannot mention. If nommer. Si cet opuscule a quelque valeur, qu'on this little work has any merit at all, think only of songe uniquement à la miséricordieuse Providence the merciful Providence who ordains fortuitous qui ordonne les rencontres fortuites et qui a confié meetings and who has entrusted this composition to cette rédaction au plus indigne des esclaves de sa the most unworthy of the slaves of His Mother.32 Mère.

28 In the following texts, significant or helpful differences between the French text and “The Wisdom That is Mary,” The Thomist 6, no. 1 (1943): 1-18.) will be noted as Thomist, followed by the textual variance. 29 Thomist: the second question is omitted. 30 Thomist: “In composing this study, whose main purpose is to assemble a certain amount of pertinent quotations relating to the Mother of God as Wisdom…” 31 Thomist: The reference to commentators, next to doctors of the Church, is omitted. 32 Thomist: The reference to the times and the words of thanks are both omitted.

18 Commentary on the Foreword:

De Koninck proposes Ego Sapientia as answering two questions: First, how can we identify Mary with Wisdom, as we do by placing in her mouth the words spoken by Wisdom in the ? And second, given that Mary is identified with Wisdom, why do we also say that she is “black but beautiful,” as we do by attributing to her the words of the bride in the ?

The author’s intention is not to argue for the application of these passages to the Blessed Virgin. Rather, he takes as his point of departure that the Church does in fact apply them to her in their mystical sense. That authoritative application is found above all in the liturgy, which attributes to Mary both the first-person statements made by Wisdom in the Sapiential Books of the Old Testament and the words of the bride in the Song of Songs.33 De Koninck does not propose a direct exegesis of the

33 The Roman Breviary, a product of the , approved by (1568) and the Divine Office known to Cornelius a Lapide (1567-1637), was still in use, despite periodic revisions, when Ego Sapientia was written (and until the Second Vatican Council). Included in that volume are both the Common for Marian feasts of the Divine Office proper, and a supplemental horarium known as “The Little Office of the Blessed Virgin Mary.” Cf. E.J. Quigley, The Divine Office: A Study of the Roman Breviary, Part I, Ch. II: “Short History of Divine Praise in General, and of the Breviary in Particular” (2010). (http://www.sanctamissa.org/en/resources/books/quigley/divine- office-quigley-04.html) The edition of the Roman Breviary consulted below was the 1964 Benzinger Bros. English edition. In the common of feasts of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary on Saturday, the for Lauds and the following hours are taken almost entirely from the Song of Songs (excepting those that are not directly Scriptural), while the readings (lessons and little chapters) taken from the Old Testament consist entirely of the hymns of Wisdom to herself found in Proverbs and Sirach. The phrase, “I, Wisdom” does appear, taken from Proverbs 8 rather than Sirach 24. In total we find Prov. 8: 12-25, 34-36; 9:1-5 and Sir. 24: 14-16, 19-20. In addition, the supplemental Little Office of the Blessed Virgin Mary found at the end of the Breviary makes use of Sir. 24: 11-13, 17-18, 24. The antiphons taken from Songs include 1:4,5; 2:6, 10, 11. “I am black but beautiful” (Songs 1:5) is the third antiphone for all the hours of the common. The only Scriptural texts made use of in these commons, apart from Songs and two Sapiential hymns, are the prophesy of the virgin birth in and a portion of the nativity narrative of Luke. It is clear that the association of Mary with Wisdom and with the bride of the Song of Songs are the central Scriptural themes of the offices of the Blessed Virgin, the only texts singled out to be understood in their mystical sense as speaking of the Blessed Virgin. De Koninck’s choice of these two texts therefore follows the decided example of the Church.

19 texts of Sirach or of Songs, but rather, assuming this mystical sense, proposes to explain their meaning and the inner connection between them.

De Koninck is explicit that he does not intend to conclude to any fundamental claim concerning Mary that has not already been long held in the Church. In a partial

English version of Ego Sapientia that appeared in the Thomist, and which was most likely translated by De Koninck himself, an additional phrase appears in the foreword, claiming that the author’s “main purpose is to assemble a certain amount of pertinent quotations relating to the Mother of God as Wisdom….”34 This claim seems to be a tremendous understatement, given the elaborate structure of the argument that follows, as well as De Koninck’s use of philosophical terms not found in the Marian sources on which he draws. It is clear that he is doing much more than assembling quotations.35 Nevertheless, the perhaps hyperbolic statement reinforces the fact that De Koninck intended to unfold and give the reasons for a received doctrine rather than to propose any new doctrine himself.

Moreover, De Koninck’s argument will be built from the literal sense of

Scripture, not from the mystical or allegorical sense itself. In this he is following the rule of St. Augustine, affirmed by St. Thomas.36 Nevertheless, the mystical sense

34 Charles De Koninck, “The Wisdom That is Mary,” The Thomist 6, no. 1 (1943): 1-18. 35 One possible reason for the this phrase is the partial form of the argument appearing in the Thomist, though it does not seem to be strictly true even of the first part taken in isolation from the second. 36 “The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one - the literal - from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says [Epis. 48]. Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense” (STh Ia, q1 a10 ad1).

20 “constitutes a true illumination.”37 Mary is not called Wisdom directly in Sacred

Scripture, and yet when the proper character of wisdom is understood, both in general and in light of the Revelation of divine wisdom, we will find that the essential aspects of that character belong in a proper way to the Blessed Virgin.

Moreover, we will find these characteristics in her through what is revealed in the literal sense of Scripture. Hence, the mystical application of the Wisdom texts to

Mary illuminates our understanding by causing us to see more deeply into the mystery of her role in the divine plan for creation than we otherwise would, though all the justification of that insight is already ours in virtue of what has been explicitly revealed.

In addition, the passages of Scripture that De Koninck appeals to in their literal sense are interpreted emphatically in line with, and even directly through the doctors and commentators of the Church. Hence the consequences De Koninck draws from Mary’s divine maternity, which is a fact revealed in Scripture, are gleaned from the authority of tradition, and are not innovative interpretations. What is new is the assembling of these insights in such a way as to explain the mystical sense of the Wisdom literature in particular. The Church’s understanding of Mary’s unique dignity is allowed to explain her own practice of calling Mary Wisdom.

The acknowledgements with which De Koninck ends his foreword contain, despite their brevity, several keys to the genesis of Ego Sapientia. In a letter to Fr.

Henri-Marie Guindon of Ottawa, De Koninck fills out these succinct

37 Ego Sapientia, foreword, 2.

21 acknowledgements, beginning with the “American Jew who taught me the doctrine of the Blessed de Montfort.”38

It was the reading of True Devotion that was the thunderbolt for me—in 1941. The Jew in question—it was one of our American students, a convert, former professor at the University of Chicago, who had come here to undergo a scholastic training; he had his doctorate in philosophy from Columbia. 39 One day, I spoke to him of the greatness of St. Thomas. Suddenly, brutally, with the bluntness of a radical Jew, guessing my feelings beyond my speech he said: "For you St. Thomas takes the place of all the saints, even of the Blessed Virgin." I was deeply troubled. The same day he gave me a copy of True Devotion. And then I went to see the authors Blessed de Montfort40 praises, and the great commentators on the texts of Scripture that we find in the liturgy of the Holy Virgin. I was at that time giving a course on the notion of wisdom, and another on the use of the philosophy of nature in theology, where the idea of mercy was the keystone. Meanwhile, my dear friend Jacques de Monléon wrote me a letter in which he complained of our Catholic writers who only speak of human rights and who never speak to us of mercy, the root even of justice. You know the result of all these coincidences.41

De Montfort’s influence is more felt than seen in Ego Sapientia. He is quoted in a handful of places, but his thought is not dealt with thematically. Yet it is with his

38 Ego Sapientia, foreword, 4. 39 The American Jew who first taught De Koninck the doctrine of then Blessed Louis de Montfort was Herbert Schwartz. His identity was suggested to me by Fr. Romanus Cessario, and confirmed in an email to the author from De Koninck’s son, Thomas De Koninck. “I can emphatically confirm that it was Herbert Schwartz [who gave him True Devotion]. My dad mentioned it several times to me, and liked to say so” (By email, Feb. 3, 2013). 40 Louis Marie Grignion de Montfort was canonized on July 20, 1947 by Pope Pius XII, 4 years after the publication of Ego Sapientia. 41 De Koninck to Guindon, June 11, 1943. “C’est la lecture de la Vraie Dévotion qui a été pour moi le coup de foudre___ en 1941. Le juif en question____ ce fut un de nos étudiants américains, un converti, ancien professeur à l’Université de Chicago, qui était venu ici en vue de subir une formation scolastique; il avait eu son doctorat en philosophie de Columbia. Or, un jour, je lui parlais de la grandeur de saint Thomas. Tout à coup, brutalement, d’une brutalité de juif radical, devinant mes sentiments par delà mon discours il me dit : « Chez vous saint Thomas tient lieu de tous les saints, même de la Sainte Vierge. » Cela m’a profondément troublé. Le même jour, il me donnait un exemplaire de la Vraie Dévotion. Et là, je suis allé voir les auteurs dont le Bx de Montfort fait éloge et les grands commentateurs des textes de l’Ecriture que nous trouvons dans la liturgie de la Sainte Vierge. Je faisais en ce temps un cours sur la notion de sagesse, et un autre sur l’usage de la philosophie de la nature en théologie où l’idée de miséricorde était la clef de voûte. Entretemps, mon très cher ami Jacques de Monléon m’avait écrit une lettre où il se plaignait de nos écrivains catholiques qui ne parlent que des droits de l’homme et qui ne nous parlent jamais de la miséricorde racine, même de la justice. Vous savez le résultat de toutes ces coincidences.”

22 voice that De Koninck bookends the whole of Ego Sapientia (in the final introductory motto and the conclusion of the final chapter), and he appears at the head of the acknowledged sources. All of this suggests a subterranean presence of de Montfort in the larger argument. This influence will appear directly in the excursus on holy slavery in our commentary on the second part. As we argue there, it is this doctrine of holy slavery that stands, in De Koninck’s mind, at the heart of the devotion de

Montfort teaches.

The importance of this doctrine for De Koninck is connected to issues surrounding the composition of his better-known book, published in the same year,

On the Primacy of the Common Good Against the Personalists, as well as to the modern evils already hinted at in our discussion of the opening mottos. The

“personalists” De Koninck addresses are those who hold that each person’s private and individual good is his highest good simply speaking. De Koninck connects this view with the humanism that locates the source of man’s perfection within himself absolutely and independently. These themes will appear directly in the excursus on personalim and in our commentary on the final chapters of the second part. Here we will note that in De Koninck’s use, the terms “personalism” and “humanism” have a specific and negative connotation. The doctrine of slavery to Mary taught by St.

Louis de Montfort represents for De Koninck the fundamental alternative and remedy to these harmful and prevalent ideologies. In his second letter to Fr.

Guindon, De Koninck remarks,

You have well understood that Ego Sapientia is a much more radical attack against personalism than the Common Good. And I must admit that my

23 certainty of the absolute incompatibility between personalism and slavery to Mary was the deepest principle of my attack against the personalists.42

First in the acknowledgements of the preface and last in the list of conspiring influences given to Fr. Guindon, is Jacques de Monléon, who, De Koninck says, “first made me know the role of mercy.”43 The theme of mercy was near to de Monléon’s heart. Thomas De Koninck writes that “he was never brighter than when he spoke of mercy, his favorite theological topic.”44 Though de Monléon does not appear to have been aware of the composition of Ego Sapientia, De Koninck later reveals to his friend his unwitting role in it:

I am sending to the General copies of two small books that I published last year. The first, On the Primacy of the Common Good against the Personalists, and the other, Ego Sapientia: The Wisdom that is Mary… Both books are extremely poorly written. But the personalist tide became so violent and sickening it was necessary to make a protestation. As you see, the second book is, basically, against the humanism of the Incarnation. You put me on the track by your letter about mercy, as I say in the foreword. My whole book came out of this idea.45

De Koninck summarizes his little Marian work as being “basically, against the humanism of the Incarnation.” Here he seems to be referring to the position, held for

42 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “Vous avez bien compris que « Ego Sapientia » est une attaque beaucoup plus radicale contre le personnalisme que le « Bien Commun. » Et je dois reconnaître que ma certitude de l’incompatibilité absolue entre le personnalisme et l’esclavage de Marie a été le principe le plus profond de mon attaque contre les personnalistes.” 43 Ego Sapientia, foreword, 4. 44 Thomas De Koninck, “In Memoriam: Jacques de Monléon,” Laval théologique et philosophique 39, no. 3 (1983): 361-362. “Il n'était jamais plus lumineux que lorsqu'il parlait de la miséricorde, son sujet théologique de prédilection.” 45 Charles De Koninck to Jacques de Monléon, Jan. 3, 1945 (Maritain Center archive: 14/17.07), emphasis added. “J’envoie au Général quelques copies des deux petits livres que j’ai publié l’an dernier. Le premier «De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes» et l’autre «Ego Sapientia : La sagesse qui est Marie». … Les deux bouquins sont extrêmement mal écrits. Mais la vague personnaliste devenait tellement violente et écoeurante qu’il fallait une protestation. Comme vous verrez, le second livre est, au fond, contre l’humanisme de l’Incarnation. Vous m’aviez mis sur la piste par votre lettre sur la miséricorde, comme je le dis dans l’avant-propos. Tout mon bouquin est sorti de cette idée.”

24 example by Ludwig Feuerbach, that Christ became man because of the goodness of man rather than that of God, effectively ordering God to man rather than man to

God. That is, Feuerbach holds that there is in man a goodness so powerful that God was attracted to union with him and thus became man Himself.46 Again, this view will be unfolded more fully in our discussion of the final chapters.

It is noteworthy, however, that De Koninck summarizes the whole work here in terms of mercy, the theme of the second part. This choice shows the unity of the two parts in his mind. We will see in what follows that the accounts of Mary as wisdom (Ego Sapientia), and as Queen of Mercy (Nigra sum, sed Formosa), respond together to the distorted view that makes man his own root and origin, through the image of a circular movement that originates in and returns to God.

In his first letter to Fr. Guindon, quoted above, De Koninck refers also to the two classes he was teaching at the time that he discovered True Devotion: “a course on the notion of wisdom, and another on the use of the philosophy of nature in theology, where the idea of mercy was the keystone.”47 Among the archives of De

Koninck’s unpublished writings and correspondence is a series of notes that appear to belong to the latter course. These notes terminate with a sizable lecture entitled,

“Mercy and Redemption,” which depends on a grasp of the order of nature in contrast to the order of grace, especially on the natural condition of human nature.48

Much of the argument found in the second half of Ego Sapientia can already be found

46 Cf. Charles De Koninck, “Ludwig Feuerbach interpète de Saint Thomas” appendix IV in De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes in Oeuvres des Charles De Koninck, vol. 2: La primauté du bien commun, 107-225 (Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2010). Hereafter: Bien commun. 47 De Koninck to de Monléon, Jan. 3, 1945. 48 Charles De Koninck, unpublished, typewritten lecture notes entitled “Mercy and Redemption,” Maritain Center archives: 9/27.

25 there, though in his class notes De Koninck turns to Mary only briefly. It is noteworthy that these same thoughts also appear, in a form closer to that of the class notes, in the Common Good. It is clear how preoccupied De Koninck was at this time with the notion of mercy, and with its power to refute the pride of the

“humanists,” which is also somehow at work in “personalism.”

26

Part I: Ego Sapientia

The single Rose Is now the Garden Where all loves end

-T.S. Eliot, “Ash Wednesday”

27

PART I EGO SAPIENTIA

C'est à bon droit, et pour des raisons très justes et It is right, and for most just and weighty reasons— de très grand poids - en dépit des vociférations de despite the outcries of and the heretics—that Luther et des hérétiques - que l’Église entend en un the Church intends all these things [as said], in a sens mystique toutes ces choses de la Bienheureuse mystical sense, of the Blessed Virgin in her divine Vierge, dans les offices divins de celle-ci. offices.

-Corneille De La Pierrea -Cornelius a Lapidea

CHAPTER 1 EGO SAPIENTIA (PROV. 8:12, SIR. 24:40)

Moi, Sagesse… I, Wisdom… Ego sapientia. Telles sont les paroles que l'Église Ego Sapientia. These are the words the Church puts met dans la bouche de la Sainte Vierge. Moi, into the mouth of the Blessed Virgin.49 I, wisdom. sagesse. Non pas: 'Je suis sage' ni 'Je suis la plus Not: “I am wise” nor “I am the wisest of all pure sage de toutes les pures créatures', mais: 'Je suis creatures,” but: “I am wisdom.” sagesse'. On peut dire d'une personne qu'elle est la bonté One can say of a person that he is goodness itself, même, mais cela doit s'entendre en un sens but it must be understood in a metaphorical and métaphorique et parabolique. Il n'en va pas de parabolic sense. This is not the case with Mary. She même dans le cas de Marie. Elle est dite, au sens is called, in the full sense, wisdom. And since it is plein, sagesse. Et comme il n'y a que dans les only of divine things and of the transcendentals that choses divines et dans les transcendentaux qu'une such an attribution can be made,b we will ask pareille attribution soit possible,b nous nous ourselves by what supreme and miraculous affinity demanderons par quelle souveraine et miraculeuse to God the Virgin Mary, the humble servant of the affinité à Dieu, la Vierge Marie, l'humble servant Lord, can assume such a mode of attribution.50 du Seigneur, peut revêtir un tel mode d'attribution. a Cornelius a Lapide, Commentaria in Ecclesiasticum, a Cornelius a Lapide, Commentaria in Ecclesiasticum, cap. XXIV, vers 1 et 2, (édit. Crampon, Vivès) T. IX, p. cap. 24, vers 1 et 2, (édit. Crampon, Vivès) t. 9, p. 617b. 617b; Mystice, apte Ecclesia in Officiis divinis B. “The Church rightly accepts all these things in a mystical Virginis haec Omnia (quidquid frustra obstrepat sense of the most Blessed Virgin in her Divine Offices Lutherus, et occlament haeretici) accipit de B. Virgine, (notwithstanding the futile protestations of Luther and idque justissimis et gravissimis de causis. Saint Pierre the heretics), for the weightiest and most just reasons.” Canisius rapporte que Luther condamnait comme Canisius reports that Luther condemned as blasphématoire l'application à la Sainte Vierge du blasphemous the application of Chapter 10 of Proverbs

49 While the French word used is Sainte rather than Bienheureuse, De Koninck consistently uses the former throughout the text, apart from direct quotations, while using the English idiom “Blessed Virgin” in the Thomist version. We will follow his preference, and use “Blessed Virgin” to translate both Sainte Vierge and Bienheureuse Vierge. 50 Thomist: “Of a very good person we say that that person is goodness itself, but this attribution is to be understood in a purely metaphorical or parabolical sense. There are only two cases in which one may predicate an abstract term of a concrete term in an essential proposition: when it is a question of God and of the transcendentals. ‘Abstract things,’ says John of St. Thomas, ‘cannot be truly predicated of concrete things, nor concrete things of abstract things, because of the mode of signifying, … although sometimes they are really identical, as in divine things Divinity and God, Paternity and the Father.” Whence, then, can the Blessed Virgin claim the sovereign affinity to God which such a mode of attribution implies?” (2). The quote from John of St. Thomas is contained as an endnote in the French.

28 chapitre X des Proverbes (Épître de la messe de la (Epistle of the Mass of the Nativity) to the Blessed Nativité): Quocirca nimium et vanus et virulentus fuit Virgin: “Luther was not only vain but full of poison, Lutherus, quum pro mero mendacio et in Deum when he regarded as a mere lie, and a blasphemy against blasphemia deputavit, supradictam epistolam, quae God, that the aforesaid epistle, which most fittingly Christo maxime compatit, ad Mariam hoc die festo belongs to Christ, be referred and applied to Mary, on referri et applicari. De Maria Deipara Virgine, Lib. I, this feast day” (De Maria Deipara Virgine, Lib. I, cap. cap. XII, edit. Ingolstadii, 1583, p. 84. Luther soutenait 12, edit. Ingolstadii, 1583, p. 84). Luther also argued that également que nous sommes tous égaux à la mère de we are all equal to the Mother of God and as holy as she: Dieu et aussi saints qu'elle: Confirmat nimirum Sarcerius, “Sarcerius confirms of course, what was clearly wickedly quod a Luthero impie prorsus est traditum: 'Sumus pares handed down by Luther: ‘We are equal to the mother of matri Dei, et aeque sancti sicut illa, nisi quod non God, and just as holy, except that we are not able to be possumus esse Dei matres, sicut illa fuit'. Canisius, De mothers of God, as she was’” (Canisius, De Corruptelis Corruptelis verbi Dei; cap. X, p. 121. Sur l'égalitarisme verbi Dei; cap. 10, p. 121). On the egalitarianism of luthérien, voir Canisius, De Maria Deipara Virgine, Lib. Luther, see Canisius, De Maria Deipara Virgine, Lib. III, III, cap. V. cap. 5. b Joannas a Sancto Thoma, Cursus Philosophicus, (édit. b John of St. Thomas, Cursus philosophicus (ed. Reiser), Reiser) T. I, II P., Q.V. a. 4, 364b: abstracta non t. 1, II p., q. 5, a. 4, 364b: “…abstract things are not truly praedicantur vere de concretis nec concreta de abstractis predicated of the concrete nor concrete of abstract by ex vi modi significandi, ... licet aliquando identice virtue of the mode of signifying, …though they might verificentur, ut in divinis est idem Deitas et Deus, sometimes be identical in truth, as in the godhead, deity Paternitas et Pater, et in transcendentibus idem est unitas and God, paternity and the Father, are the same, and in et unum, entitas et ens. the transcendentals, unity and one, existence and being are the same.”

CHAPTER 2 UT ORIRETUR LUMEN INDEFICIENS (SIR. 24:6)

Afin que procède la lumière indéfectible. That an unfailing light should come forth. Quel est le propre de la sagesse? L'adage dit: What is it that characterizes wisdom? As the "Sapientis est ordinare—il appartient au sage saying goes, “Sapientis est ordinare”—“It belongs d'ordonner". Comment faut-il entendre le terme to the wise man to order.” How should we 'ordonner'? Et d'abord, qu'est-ce que l' 'ordre'? Deux understand the term ‘to order’? And first of all, choses sont de la raison de l'ordre: distinction et what is ‘order’? Two things constitute the notion principe. Principe dit ce dont procède une chose de of order: distinction and principle. Principle quelque façon que ce soit. Principe dit procession. expresses that from which a thing proceeds in any La procession est movement à partir d'un principe, fashion whatever. Principle expresses procession. mouvement pouvant s'entendre, au sens large, de Procession is movement starting from a principle, toute action, tant de l'action de penser que d'un where movement can be understood, in a wide movement physique. Selon que son principe est sense, of all action, of the act of thinking as well as principe de lieu, principe de temps, ou principe of a physical movement. Whether a principle is a selon la nature, l'ordre se divisera en ordre local, principle according to place, according to time, or ordre temporel et ordre de nature. De ces trois according to nature, order will be divided into ordres le dernier est le plus profond, car il dit raison order according to place, order according to time, d'origination en ce que la nature est "ce d'où naît le and according to nature. Of these three orders, the naissant premièrement: ex qua pullulat pullulans last is the most profound, for it expresses the primo". Sous un autre rapport l'ordre se divise en notion of origination insofar as nature is “that from ordre universel et ordre particulier, selon que le which what is born is born primarily: ex qua principe est absolument premier ou premier dans un pullalat pullulans primo.”51 From another point of genre donné seulement. view order is divided into universal order and particular order, depending upon whether the

51 The phrase originates in Aristotle (Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 5 (Bk. IV, ch. 4)), but appears verbatim in Thomas’s In I Sent., d20 q1 a3 qc. 1 co. See footnote 56.

29 principle is absolutely first or first within a given genus alone. Or, de quel ordre s'agit-il dans l'adage: "il appartient Now, what order is in question in the adage: It au sage d'ordonner"? Il appartien au sage belongs to the wise man to order”? “It belongs to d'ordonner, dit saint Thomas, "parce que la sagesse the wise man to order, says St. Thomas, “because est la plus haute perfection de la raison, dont c'est le wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, to propre de connaître l'ordre".a Parce que l'ordre which it is proper to know order.”a Because order comporte principe et principe, relation, seule entails principle and principle entails relation, the l'intelligence peut atteindre l'ordre sous la raison understanding alone can grasp order under the very même d'ordre. En effet, "l'intelligence, parce que notion of order. In effect, “the undertadning, (par opposition à la volonté) elle tire les choses à because (as opposed to the will) it draws things to soi, et procède en passant de l'une à l'autre, peut itself, and proceeds in passing from one to another, comparer et atteindre formellement le rapport d'une can compare and formally grasp the relation of one chose à une autre: l'intelligence possède donc en soi thing to another: the understanding thus possesses la racine première et la raison première pour in itself the primary root and first reason for ordonner les choses, de même que pour les ordering things, as well as for comparing them comparer entre elles et établir un rapport de l'une à amongst themselves and establishing a relation of l'autre".b Or, la seule connaissance d'un ordre one to another.”b Now knowledge alone of any quelconque n'est pas comme telle sapientiale. Déjà order whatever is not as such sapiential. Simple la simple appréhension peut atteindre un ordre, et apprehension can already attain an order, and all toute science porte sur un certain ordre. La sagesse science bears upon a certain order. Wisdom will ne sera la plus haute perfection de la raison qu'en not be reason’s highest perfection except inasmuch tant qu'elle dit ordre selon un principe purement et as it denotes an order according to a principle simplement premier. Le verbe 'ordonner' exprime which is purely and simply first. The verb “to cette primauté originative. "Ce n'est pas d'être order” expresses this originating primacy. “It is not ordonné, dit Aristote, mais ordonner, qui convient to be ordered but to order that belongs to the wise au sage."c C'est pourquoi la sagesse est radicale. man,” says Aristotle.c This is why wisdom is Elle ne fait pas seulement connaître les choses les radical. It not only makes some things known in unes dans les autres, elle les atteint toutes dans leur others, but it attains all things in their first root, racine première où toutes les choses qui en where all the things that come from it are in a procèdent sont d'une certaine manière précontenues; certain way precontained; and it attains this root et elle attaint cette racine sous sa raison propre under its proper notion of origin. If this root did d'origine. Si cette racine n'avait pas raison d'origine, not have the notion of origin, the absolutely le principe absolument premier serait en primary principle would be dependent on the very dépendance de cela même dont il est premier thing of which it is the first principle; the many principe, le multiple aurait, comme tel, raison de would have, as such the notion of first principle. principe premier. La sagesse ne sera prédicable substantiellement Wisdom will not be predicable substantially of a d'une chose que si, dans son être et dans son thing unless, in its being and in its operation, it has opération, cette chose a raison de premier principe the notion of first principle from which all things d'où procèdent d'une certaine manière toutes choses proceed, in a certain manner, by way of par voie d'origination. Il ne suffirait pas qu'elle origination. It would not suffice for it to grasp the atteigne la racine première uniquement selon la first root solely according to knowledge, because connaissance, car alors, elle serait sage seulement; then it would only be wise; but it is also necessary mais il faut aussi que par sa substance même elle ait that through its very substance it has the notion of raison de racine première, et qu'elle se connaisse the first root and that it knows itself to be such. comme telle. Pour que la Sainte Vierge puisse être dite sagesse, il For the Blessed Virgin to be called wisdom, it is faut qu'elle soit un premier principe de se genre. Il necessary that she be a first principle of this kind. faut qu'elle soit elle-même premier principe, non pas It is necessary that she be herself a first principle, selon l'intelligence et la volonté seulement, mais not only according to her intelligence and her will, aussi selon la substance et selon son être propre. Or, but also according to substance and her proper qui est premier principe selon son être proper si ce being. Now, who is first principle according to his n'est Dieu? Ne faudrait-il pas que Marie soit premier own being if not God? Would Mary not have to be

30 principe, même dans son rapport à Dieu, qu'elle soit first principle, even in her relationship with God, si proche de Dieu qu'elle en participe même la to be so close to God that she even participates in raison de premier principe, qu'elle soit comme the notion of first principle;52 to be as the source of racine de l'ordre universel, voire qu'elle soit ce dont the universal order, even to be the one from whom Dieu lui-même procède d'une certaine manière, God Himself proceeds in a certain manner; to be qu'elle soit origine et génératrice de Dieu? the origin and genetrix of God? a S. Thomas, ln 1 Ethic., lect.1 (édit. Pirotta) n. 1: a , In I Ethicorum (ed. Pirotta), lectio 1, Sapientis est ordinare, quia sapientia est potissima n. 1: “It belongs to wisdom to order because wisdom is perfectio rationis, cujus proprium est cognoscere ordinem. the greatest perfection of reason, to which it is proper to know order.” b J. a. S. Thoma, Cursus Theologicus, (édit. Vivès) T. VII, b John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus (ed. Vives), t. disp. 21, a. 1. p. 744b: Intellectus autem qui trahit res ad 7, d. 21, a.1, p. 744b: “Now the understanding, which se, et ex una procedit in alterum, potest comparare, et draws things to itself, and proceeds from one thing to attingere formaliter habitudinem unius ad alterum: habet another, is able to compare, and to grasp formally the ergo intellectus in se primam radicem et primam rationem relation of one to another: the understanding therefore ordinandi res; sicut et comparandi et instituendi has in itself the first root and first account of ordering habitudinem unius ad alteram. things; as both comparing and establishing a relation of one thing to another.” c Aristote, I Metaph., cap. I, 982a 15: c Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 1, 982a15. “For it does not ὐὰῖἐὰὸὸἀ᾽ἐά belong to the wise man to be ordered but to order.”

52 Thomist: “even in His nature as first principle.”

31 Chapters 1 and 2: The Nature of Wisdom

The first two chapters lay out the basic plan of the first part by formulating the question to be answered, and the general lines along which an answer will have to be given. The question begins with the fact, accepted simply and directly on the authority of the Church, that Mary is Wisdom. De Koninck begins by showing the difficulty posed to our understanding by the mystical attribution of these texts to the Blessed Virgin. To sharpen the issue, he distinguishes between what the Church claims about Mary from any apparently similar idiomatic expressions in common use. Wisdom is not being attributed to Mary as an accidental quality—the claim is not that she possesses the intellectual virtue to an exceptional degree. The mystical sense of the Wisdom literature is rather, De Koninck says, that Wisdom is said substantially of Mary: the abstract term “wisdom” is said of the concrete individual

Mary.53

53 De Koninck seems to take this point as self-evident. The reason may be simply that the texts the liturgy associates with Mary ascribe actions to wisdom that belong to a unique principle. She is the first among God’s works and a cause of God’s presence in Israel. “Before the ages, in the beginning, he created me, and for all the ages I shall not cease to be. In the holy tent I ministered before him, and so I was established in Zion. Thus in the beloved city he gave me a resting place, and in Jerusalem was my domain. I took root in an honored people, in the portion of the Lord, his heritage” (Sir. 24:9-11). The one who speaks these words seems clearly to be claiming a sui generis place in the divine works. Joseph Ratzinger offers an example of the modern interpretation of the Wisdom texts applied to Mary in a proper sense. He argues in his book Daughter Zion that we can only undertand what it means to call Mary Wisdom in light of the rich concept of wisdom in the Old Testament. Wisdom, he says, has the notion of a mediating principle of creation and redemption. It is represented as “God’s first creature, in whom [are found] both the pure, primordial form of his creative will and the pure answer, which he discovers” Daughter Zion: Meditations on the Church’s Marian Beliefs (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983), 25. Moreover, he adds, it is not an accident that in both Hebrew and Greek the term for Wisdom is feminine. Wisdom belongs, he says, to the larger context of the Old Testament theology of woman, which finds in the feminine the expression of the creature’s fundamental relation to God. “It expresses precisely this: that there is a pure answer, and that God’s love finds its irrevocable dwelling place within it” (26). As wisdom, then, Mary forms creation as its archetype, both in her coming forth from God as the perfect and original expression of His creative will, and in her return to God, through which the gift of divine love is definitively made

32 This way of speaking presents a difficulty. Just as we would not say that Mary is “humanity,” but rather that she is human or is an individual having a human nature, we would normally say that a person is wise or has wisdom, but not that she is wisdom itself. Normally, speaking in this way is only justified with regard to God

Himself, in whom there is a real identity of being and attribute or perfection. God is divinity; the Father is paternity, as De Koninck points out. Likewise, God does not, properly speaking, have wisdom; He is His Wisdom.

Because God’s transcendent being is the reason that abstract terms can be properly predicated of Him, De Koninck frames the question about Mary more precisely as a question about her relationship to the transcendent One. We note here at the beginning that De Koninck does not frame the question in terms of Mary considered in herself simply, but rather in terms of this relationship. At the very outset we find the radical distinction between the creature and the Creator plainly affirmed. The very difficulty arises because this distinction cannot be ignored. At the same time, this distinction is the root of the wonder that Mary’s privileges will arouse in us. It is a creature who has been called Wisdom! What “supreme and miraculous affinity to God,” what relation does Mary have to God that can account for this likeness in the naming of God and of “the humble servant of the Lord?”54

The second chapter establishes the criteria according to which the answer must be sought. What is wisdom, and what would have to be the case in order for us to predicate wisdom of a person abstractly? The first question is readily approached

and received. Here we are not speaking only about a person with the habit of wisdom in the greatest degree, but about one who in her very person becomes the principle through which God disposes the whole of His works. 54 Ego Sapientia, 2.2.

33 in an Aristotelian vein. “It belongs to the wise man to order.”55 What does “to order” mean? To begin with, says De Koninck, we need to know what order is. In the article to which De Koninck alludes in Chapter 2, Thomas distinguishes three things in the account of order: priority and posteriority, distinction, and a specific difference, according to which the kind of order in question is determined.56 Distinction is more presupposed than directly signified, he says, because one cannot establish a relation of priority and posteriority among things unless they are somehow different from one another. Thomas then names examples of the species of order according to the

55 Ego Sapientia, 2.1. 56 This is the article quoted in the footnote to the text of Chapter 2, from which the phrase “ex qua pullulat pullulans primo” is taken (In I Sent., d20 q1 a3 qc.1 co.). It asks whether there is order among the divine Persons. “I answer that there are 3 things included in the account of order, namely, the account of before and after; from which follow all the ways order can be said of anything, according to which something is said to be before another according to place, according to time, and in every such way. [The notion of order] also includes distinction, because there is no order to another except to something distinct. But this is more presupposed to the name order than signified by it. Thirdly, it includes the specific account of the order from which the species of the order is drawn. Thus there is one order according to place, another according to dignity, another according to origin, and so of the others: and this species of order, namely the order of origin, belongs to the divine persons. Hence I say that the order of origin is signified when the order of nature is said, as nature is called by the philosopher, in Metaphysics 5, that from which what is born is born primarily. Thus the name ‘nature’ entails the account of origin: and so this phrase 'order of nature' is used with the force of a single word, so as to signify a species of order: and this species is indeed preserved in the divine persons with respect to the account of the difference, namely origin, and not with respect to the account of the genus, namely before and after, as many others have said. And this is shown by the definition which Augustine gives, that the order of nature is that by which something is from another, in which is placed the difference of origin, and not priority to another, by which the account of the genus is omitted. So we should not allow that there is [in God] order simply speaking, but the order of nature.” “Respondeo dicendum, quod ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum, secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia hujusmodi. Includit etiam distinctionem, quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet. Includit etiam tertio rationem ordinis, ex qua etiam ordo in speciem trahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum locum, alius secundum dignitatem, alius secundum originem, et sic de aliis: et ista species ordinis, scilicet ordo originis, competit divinis personis. Unde dico quod ordo originis signatur cum dicitur ordo naturae, secundum quod dicitur natura a philosopho, 5 Metaphys., ex qua pullulat pullulans primo. Unde nomen naturae importat rationem originis: et sic ista duo nomina ordo naturae sumuntur in vi unius nominis, ad significandum speciem ordinis: quae quidem species salvatur in divinis personis quantum ad rationem differentiae, scilicet originem, et non quantum ad rationem generis, scilicet prioritatem et posterioritatem, ut in pluribus aliis dictum est. Et hoc patet ex definitione Augustini quam ponit, quod ordo naturae est quo aliquis est ex alio, in quo ponitur differentia originis, et non prior alio, in quo removetur ratio generis. Unde non est concedendum quod sit ibi ordo simpliciter, sed ordo naturae.”

34 diverse accounts of order: order according to place, according to dignity, and according to origin. This last species of order is also the order of nature, because nature is “that from which what is born is born primarily.”57 Thomas argues that this species of order, which implies distinction according to origin, can be found in

God if we remove the aspect of priority and posteriority. In the Summa, when he asks whether the Father is a principle in God, Thomas writes, “Although this word principle, as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above.”58 In the most general way, then, we could say that the three aspects of order are relation to a principle, distinction, and a specifying difference.

De Koninck defines order in general by the first two aspects. “Two things constitute the notion of order: distinction and principle.”59 He then divides order according the special character of the principle. Unlike Thomas, De Koninck lists three kinds of order in the form of an exhaustive division: order according to place, time, or nature. Like Thomas, however, he identifies the order that is according to nature as the order that pertains to origination. This, De Koninck adds, is the most profound order, and therefore the one with which wisdom is chiefly concerned. A

57 In I Sent., d20 q1 a3 qc.1 co. quoted in Ego Sapientia, 2.1. 58 STh Ia q33 a1 ad3. “Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet hoc nomen principium, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum, videatur a prioritate sumptum; non tamen significat prioritatem, sed originem. Non enim idem est quod significat nomen, et a quo nomen imponitur, ut supra dictum est.” 59 Ego Sapientia, 2.1.

35 principle is the beginning of some kind of motion.60 The principle in the order according to place is the spot from which something first begins to move.61 The principle according to time is similarly related to the beginning of a motion. But a principle according to nature is distinguished as being the primary origin of what comes from it (ex qua …primo).62

Having an idea of what it means to order and of the kinds of order, De

Koninck returns to the question of the wise man. How is he able to order anything?

Because he has an intellect, which draws things into itself so that it is able to compare them one with another, to see a relation between them. How, we might ask here, are we to connect this passive account of wisdom, of man coming to know an order that is in things, to the active account of the one who actually orders? A man can only order things subject to his power; he can order a plantation, a symphony, an army, his daily routine, his discourse, etc. And yet the order found in these things

60 “Principle expresses procession. Procession is movement starting from a principle, where movement can be understood, in a wide sense, of all action, of the act of thinking as well as of a physical movement” (Ego Sapientia, 2.1.). 61 “Hence he says that a principle is said to be ‘that from which someone first moves something,’ i.e., any part of a continuous quantity from which local motion begins. Or, according to another reading, ‘Some part of a thing from which motion will first begin’; i.e., some part of a thing from which it first begins to be moved; for example in the case of a line and in that of any kind of journey the principle is the point from which motion begins” (Aquinas, In Metaph. lib. 5 l. 1 n. 3). “Et ideo dicit, quod principium dicitur illud unde aliquis rem primo moveat, idest aliqua pars magnitudinis, a qua incipit motus localis. Vel secundum aliam literam, unde aliquid rei primo movebitur, idest ex qua parte rei aliquid incipit primo moveri. Sicut in longitudine et in via quacumque, ex illa parte est principium, unde incipit motus.” 62 “The first [kind of extrinsic principle] is that of natural beings, in which the principle of generation is said to be the first thing from which motion naturally begins in those things which come about through motion …or that from which a complete change begins…. This is evident in the case of substantial generation; for example, a child comes from its father and mother, who are its principles, and a fight from abusive language, which stirs the souls of men to quarrel” (In Metaph. lib. 5 l. 1 n. 8). “Primo quidem in rebus naturalibus, in quibus principium generationis dicitur, unde primum natus est motus incipere in his quae fiunt per motum, sicut in his quae acquiruntur per alterationem, vel per aliquem alium motum huiusmodi. Sicut dicitur homo fieri magnus vel albus. Vel unde incipit permutatio, sicut in his quae non per motum, sed per solam fiunt mutationem; ut patet in factione substantiarum, sicut puer est ex patre et matre qui sunt eius principium, et bellum ex convitio, quod concitat animos hominum ad bellum.”

36 is not the order proper to wisdom. Rather, wisdom knows the order of things from the absolutely first principle, and this principle is in no way subject to his power: he does not establish this order but discovers it. Yet, there are two ways in which he might be said to order according this first principle himself. First, he could be said to give this order to things, insofar as in his own mind, he allows the first principle to be the light according to which he considers everything else. In this way, he orders all that he understands by the first principle. Second, he can order the things that are subject to his power in light of the highest principle. At any rate, the wisdom by which we call a man wise is a habit of seeing and knowing according to the highest things. So a man is wise because he has a certain share in the ordering power of the first principle. De Koninck contrasts the shared grasp which the wise man has of this order according knowledge with one that is according to “being and operation,” or through a thing’s “very substance.” In other words, wisdom not only knows this highest order, but is its source. Moreover, he highest principle of order cannot, as De

Koninck points out, be other than origin of the things that it orders (i.e. of all things), because it would then have to be governed by that which its very nature is to govern. It would receive the order from the thing it is to order. In effect, either all wisdom would be a share in an order established independently of itself, which would finally be to deny any intelligible order at all, or, as De Koninck says, there would be two principles which are absolutely first.

If Mary is Wisdom, she must therefore be origin of all things and of their order “through her very substance,” and know herself as such. But it is proper to

God, to pure and unparticipated Act, to be the origin of all things, and hence the

37 source of their most fundamental order, the order that is found in them according to their very natures. Whatever the Church says about Mary as being the first principle

(namely, as being Wisdom itself) will necessarily depend on some particular association with the One who is simply and absolutely first by His own Nature. But this association can only be that of origin. If Mary is to be the source of the universal order, De Koninck argues, then God, who is the principle of order by His own being, will have to proceed from her.

38 CHAPTER 3 ECCE VIRGO CONCIPIET (IS. 7:14)

Voici qu'une Vierge concevra. See, a virgin will conceive. Ne craignez point, Marie, car vous avez trouvé “Do not fear Mary, because you have found favor grâce devant Dieu. Voici que vous concevrez en before God. Behold, you will conceive in your votre sein, et vous enfanterez un fils, et vous lui womb and you will give birth to a Son, and you donnerez le nom de Jésus. Il sera grand, on will give Him the name of . He will be great, l'appellera le fils du Très-Haut; le Seigneur Dieu they will call Him the Son of the Most High; the lui donnera le trône de son père; il règnera Lord God will give Him the throne of David his éternellement sur la maison de , et son règne father; He will rule forever over the house of Jacob, n'aura point de fin. (Luc. I, 30) La Vierge enfante and His reign will not end” (Lk. 1:30). The Virgin proprement l'Homme-Dieu, elle est vraiment Mère gives birth most properly to the God-Man; she is du Seigneur, (Luc. I,43) génératrice de Dieu. truly the “Mother of the Lord” (Lk. 1:43), genetrix of God.63

Or, la génération dit origination vitale et Now, generation means vital origination and assimilation; elle est la procession d'un vivant, du assimilation; it is the coming forth of a living being dedans d'un vivant qui lui est conjoint comme from inside a living being which is conjoined to it principe de vie et qui l'assimile à sa propre nature as principle of life and which assimilates it to its en vertu de cette procession même. La génération own nature in virtue of this very coming forth. consiste donc à exprimer une similitude Generation therefore consists in expressing a propagative de la nature du principe générateur. propagative likeness of the nature of the generating Celui-ci tire de sa propre substance l'engendré en le principle. That principle draws and forms the formant. Dès lors, si la Sainte Vierge est engendered from its own substance. Consequently, proprement génératrice, cette définition de la if the blessed Virgin is truly a genetrix, this génération doit lui convenir en son sens le plus definition of generation must suit her in its most propre. Remarquons que si, dans l'acte même de proper sense. Let us note that if, in the very act of conception la mère est principe passif seulement, conception, the mother is only a passive lequel, tout en étant proprement nature, ne dit pas principle—which principle, though it is properly par lui-même assimilation active et activement nature, does not by itself mean an assimilation that expressive de soi, néanmoins envisagée dans son is active and actively expressive of self— rapport à l'engendré, la mère est proprement nevertheless looked at in her relationship to the principe actif et s'assimile vitalement l'engendré. begotten, the mother is properly an active principle En effet, une action assimilative s'accomplit and assimilates vitally the begotten. In fact, an formellement dans la production du principe passif assimilative action is formally accomplished in the de la conception, production qui se fait par l'active production of the passive principle of conception, a puissance génératrice de la femme, en vue de production that comes about by the active l'engendré. Pour cette raison, la mère participe generative power of the woman with regard to the activement à l'assimilation vitale de l'engendré.a begotten. For this reason, the mother actively Elle est proprement génératrice. participates in the vital assimilation of the begotten.a She is properly a generatrix.

Or, la nativité regarde en premier et principalement Now, birth concerns first of all and principally the l'être de l'hypostase et de la personne. Dès lors, being of the hypostasis and of the person. puisque la Sainte Vierge est mère du Christ selon Consequently, since the Blessed Virgin is the l'hypostase, elle est vraiment mère de Dieu et de mother of Christ according to the hypostasis, she is l'homme.b Selon ce qui, en Lui, est né, la Sainte really mother of God and of the man.b According to Vierge est proprement cause et origine de Dieu, that which, in Him, is born the Blessed Virgin is

63 Thomist: “The Virgin gives birth to the God-man, the branch of Jesse has flowered (Num. 17:8), She is henceforth truly the mother of God, she who has engendered God.”

39 'causa Dei et origo Dei'.c properly cause and origin of God, “causa Dei et origo Dei.”c

Cause de la cause de toutes choses, la mère de Dieu Cause of the cause of all things, the mother of God est, par conséquent, mère de toutes choses. "Elle est is, consequently, mother of all things. “She is the la mère de toutes choses, dit saint Albert, et Dieu le mother of all things,” says St. Albert, “and God the Père est l'origine de toutes choses: or tout ce qui Father is the origin of all things. Now, anything est, par soi, origine et cause de la cause, est, par soi, that is in itself the origin and cause of the cause is origine et cause de ce qui est causé: mais elle est la in itself the origin and the cause of what is caused. mère de Celui qui est la cause et l'origine de toutes But she is the mother of the One who is the cause choses: donc, elle est, par soi, mère de toutes and the origin of all things: therefore, she is in choses."d N'est-elle pas sous ce rapport cause herself mother of all things.”d Is she not in this way absolument universelle? Y a-t-il quelque oeuvre de an absolutely universal cause? Is there any work of Dieu qui ne doive se rapporter à elle? God that is not brought back to her?64

En tant qu'elle est principe substantiel de Celui Insofar as she is a substantial principle of the very même qui l'a faite—genuisti qui te fecit—, elle One who made her—genuisti qui te fecit—she fits, répond par sa maternité divine à une condition by her divine maternity, an essential condition of essentielle de l'appellation de sagesse. Étant the name “wisdom.” Since she is really the mother vraiment mère du Fils, et le Fils étant la Sagesse of the Son, and the Son is begotten Wisdom, she is engendrée, elle est mère de la Sagesse engendrée— mother of begotten Wisdom—entitatively begotten engendrée entitativement et du Père éternel et de la by both the eternal Father and the temporal mother. mère temporelle. "Elle est la mère, dit Corneille de “She is the mother,” says Cornelius a Lapide, “of la Pierre, de la sagesse éternelle en elle incarnée. eternal wisdom become incarnate in her. Insofar as De même donc que le Fils est la Sagesse engendrée the Son is Wisdom begotten and become incarnate, et incarnée, de même elle est la sagesse qui so also is she the wisdom who begets and makes l'engendre et l'incarne."e Him incarnate.”e aS. Thomas, IIIa P., q. 32, a. 4.— Cajetan, Comment., a STh IIIa, q32 a4. Cajetan's commentary: “Notice, here, ibid.: Adverte hic quod aliud est loqui de ipso actu that it is one thing to speak of the very act of conception, conceptionis: et aliud de mensura ipsius actus. In littera and another to speak of the measure of the act itself. It is non dicitur quod Beata Virgo nihil active operata est in not said in the text that nothing is actively done by the mensura actus conceptionis: sed dicitur quod nihil active Blessed Virgin in the measure of the act of conception, operata est in ipso actu conceptionis. Nam Beata Virgo in but it is said that nothing is actively worked in the very illo instanti conceptionis materiam ministravit; ac per hoc act of conception. For at the moment of conception the active operata est; quia materiam ministrare agere procul Blessed Virgin supplied the matter, and through this dubio est. Ita quod in certo tempore praecedente instans something is actively done, because to supply the matter conceptionis, Beata Virgo active praeparavit materiam, is, without doubt, to act. The conclusion, then, is that in a ut in secunda conclusione dicitur: et in instanti certain period prior to the instant of conception, the terminante tempus ministravit, ut in prima conclusion Blessed Virgin actively prepared the matter, as stated in dicitur, quasi ad terminum suae actionis perveniens. Ad the second conclusion, and she supplied it at the final ipsum autem conceptionis actum non concurrit active, instant, as stated in the first conclusion, as if reaching the sed passive, suscipiendo in materia ministrata actionem term of her actions. In the very act of conception, agentis Spiritus Sancti loco seminis. (n. VI) Feminarum however, she does not contribute actively, but passively, enim potentiae ad partem vegetativam spectantes activae by receiving the action of the Holy Spirit in the supplied procul dubio sunt: sed res facta ab activa potentia matter in the place of the seed. (n. 6) For the active feminae materiale est, non activum generationis power of women looking at the vegetative part is not to principium. Ita quod mas et femina conveniunt in hoc be doubted: but what is made by the active potency of quod utriusque potentiae sunt activae, sed different in re women is the matter, not the active principal of facta per illas potentias: nam factum a mare semen est begetting. So that the male and female agree in this, that activum generationis principium, factum vero a femina, the powers are active, but they differ in the thing made quidquid sit illud, menstruum aut semen, materiale est by means of those powers, for the seed made by the male generationis principium. (n. VIII) Dic ergo quod potentia is the active principle of generation, but what is made by generativa feminae est activa, non generationis, sed the woman, whatever that be, blood or seed, is the materiae proximae et propriae ipsius generationis et material principle of begetting. (n. 8) The generative geniti ... quia mater est causa effectiva materiae proximae power of women is active—not at the time of generation, filii, ideo filius assimilatur matri. Sed falluntur arguentes but in forming the proper and proximate matter of that

64 Thomist: “which is not to be related to her as to its principle?” (5).

40 a negata efficientia respectu actus conceptionis seu generation, and in birth... because a mother is the generationis in utero, ad inferendum negari omnem efficient cause of the proximate matter of the son, for that efficientiam respectu fîlii. (n. X) reason the son is assimilated to his mother. But they are mistaken who argue from the denial of agency with respect to the act of conception or generation in the womb, to the denial of all agency in the mother in regard to her son. (No. 10).” b S. Thomas, III a P., q. 35, a. 4, c.: Concipi autem et b STh IIIa, q35 a4 c. “Now, conception and birth are nasci personae attribuitur et hypostasi secundum naturam attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that illam in qua concipitur et nascitur. Cum igitur in ipso nature in which it is conceived and born. Since, principio conceptionis fuerit humana natura assumpta a therefore, the human nature was taken by the Divine divina persona, sicut praedictum est, quaest. 33, art. 3, Person in the very beginning of the conception, as stated consequens est quod vere posset dici Deum esse above, it follows that it can be truly said that God was conceptum et natum de Virgine. Ex hoc autem dicitur conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from this is a aliqua mulier alicujus mater, quod eum concepit et woman called a man's mother, that she conceived him genuit. Unde consequens est quod B. Virgo vere dicatur and gave birth to him. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is mater Dei. Solum enim sic negari posset B. Virginem truly called the Mother of God. For the only way in esse matrem Dei, si vel humanitas prius fuisset subjecta which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the conceptioni et nativitati, quam homo ille fuisset Filius Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first Dei, sicut Photinus posuit: vel humanitas non fuisset subject to conception and birth, before this man were the assumpta in unitatem personae, vel hypostasis Verbi Dei, Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the humanity were not sicut posuit Nestorius. Utrumque autem horum est assumed unto unity of the Person or hypostasis of the erroneum. Unde haereticum est negare B. Virginem esse Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of these matrem Dei. are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God.”

See John of St. Thomas, Cursus philosophicus, t.1, p. Item J. a. S. Thoma, Curs. Phil., T. II, III P:, Q. I, a.4, p. 569a45: “And so, as the ordinary generative act 569a 45: Et ita sicut actio generativa ordinario illud esse communicates the proper and natural being of the soul to proprium et naturale animae communicat corpori, et hac the body, and for this reason the mother of the man is ratione dicitur formalissime mater hominis et personae said also to be the mother of the person having human subsistentis in humanitate, ita generatio Virginis esse et nature, so the generation of the Virgin communicated to subsistentiam Verbi, quam invenit in anima assumpta, the body the being and subsistence of the Word, which is communicavit corpori, et ita formalissime dicitur mater found in the soul assumed, and so she is called most illius hominis seu Personae Divinae ut subsistentis in illa formally mother of that man or of that Divine Person as humanitate constante corpore et anima. subsisting in that humanity composed of body and soul.” c S. Albert, Mariale, sive quaestiones super Evangelium, c , Mariale, sive quaestiones super q. 141; Opera Omnia, (édit. Borgnet) T. 37, p. 200a: ... Evangelium, q. 141; Opera Omnia, (ed. Borgnet), t. 37, mater Dei est causa Dei et origo Dei secundum illud p. 200a: “…the Mother of God is the cause of God and quod natum est.—L'ouvrage du R. P. M.-M. Desmarais, origin of God according to that which is born.” The work O.P., S. Albert le Grand, Docteur de la Médiation of M.-M. Desmarais, O.P., S. Albert le Grand, Docteur Mariale (-Ottawa 1935), a été notre guide dans la de la Mediation Mariale (paris-Ottawa, 1935) has been Mariologie de S. Albert. our guide to the Mariology of St. Albert. d S. Albert, Mariale, q. 145, p. 206a: Ipsa est mater d Albertus Magnus, Mariale, q.145, p. 206a: “She is omnium, et Deus Pater est origo omnium: quidquid mother of all things, and God the Father is the origin of autem per se origo et causa causae est, per se est origo et all things. But whatever is through itself origin and cause causa causati: sed ipsa est mater ejus qui est causa et of a cause is, through itself, origin and cause of what is origo omnium: ergo ipsa per se est mater omnium. caused: but she is the mother of Him who is the cause and origin of all things. Therefore, she is through herself mother of all things.” e Cornelius a Lapide, In Ecclesiasticum, c. XXIV, vers. 1 e Cornelius a Lapide, In Ecclesiasticum, 24:, 2, t.9, p. et 2, T. IX, p. 617b: Ipsa est mater aeternae Sapientiae in 617b: “She is mother of Eternal Wisdom incarnate in her. se incarnatae. Sicut ergo filius ejus est Sapientia genita et As, therefore, her Son is Wisdom begotten and incarnate, incarnata: sic ipsa est sapientia illum gignens et so she is the wisdom begetting and incarnating him.” incarnans.

41 CHAPTER 4 FIAT! (LK. 1:38)

Que soit...! Let it be…! Toutefois, sagesse dit connaissance, procession Wisdom, however, denotes knowledge, procession selon la connaissance. Pour que la Sainte Vierge according to knowledge. For the Blessed Virgin to soit vraiment sagesse, il faut qu'elle ait, même par be truly wisdom, she must possess, even in relation rapport à Dieu, en plus de sa maternité divine selon to God, in addition to her divine maternity la chair, raison de premier principe selon according to the flesh, the character of first l'intelligence. C'est ce qu'elle déclare dans son principle according to the understanding. This is Fiat—qu'il me soit fait selon votre parole. what she declares65 in her Fiat—“Let it be done to (Luc.1,38) Fiat de Marie, écho du Fiat de la me according to your word” (Lk. 1:38). The Fiat of Genèse, parole d'où procède l'ordre nouveau auquel Mary, echo of the Fiat in Genesis, the word from l'ancien était ordonné. Ecce enim ego creo caelos whence proceeds the new order to which the old novos, et terram novam: et non erunt in memoria was directed. “Ecce enim ego creo caelos novos, et priora, et non ascendent super cor—Car voici que terram novam: et non erunt in memoria priora, et je crée de nouveaux cieux et une nouvelle terre; on non ascendent super cor—Behold, I create new ne se rappellera plus les choses passées, et elles ne heavens and a new earth; they will not remember reviendront plus à l'esprit. (Is. Lx) "Dieu, dit saint the things of the past, and those things will not Anselme, qui a fait toutes choses, s'est fait lui- come to mind anymore” (Is. 65:17). “God,” says St. même de Marie (ipse se ex Maria fecit), et ainsi, Anselm, “who made all things, made Himself from tout ce qu'il avait fait il l'a refait."a Mary (ipse se ex Maria fecit), and so, all that He had made He remade.”a Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum—De mon coeur “Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum—From my a jailli une excellente parole. (Ps. XLIV, 2) "Quand heart has sprung an excellent word” (Ps. 44:2). l'ange eut parlé, dit saint Augustin, Marie, pleine de “When the angel spoke,” says St. Augustine, foi, et concevant le Christ d'abord dans son esprit “Mary, full of faith, and conceiving Christ first of avant que de le concevoir dans son sein, dit: Voici all in her spirit before conceiving Him in her la servante du Seigneur, qu'il me soit fait selon womb, says: Behold the handmaid of the Lord, let votre parole." "La Bienheureuse Vierge, ajoute it be done unto me according to your word.” “The saint Albert, n'eût pas engendré le Christ Blessed Virgin,” adds St. Albert, “would not have corporellement si elle n'eût d'abord conçu et gardé begotten Christ corporeally if she had not first of le Verbe dans l'oreille de son coeur (aure cordis), le all conceived and preserved the Word in the ear of portant pour ainsi dire dans le sein de son coeur (in her heart (aure cordis), carrying him so to speak in cordis utero).”b the womb of her heart (in cordis utero).”b

Fiat de Marie—à ce verbe, principe du Verbe The Fiat of Mary—on this word, principle of the éternel par lequel toutes choses sont faites, est eternal Word by which all things are made, the suspendu l'univers tout entier. Jugez, Marie, whole universe is suspended.66 Judge, Mary, sagesse, et l'univers sera refait tout entier! “Hâtez- wisdom, and the universe will be entirely remade! vous, O Vierge, s'écrie saint Bernard, de donner “Hurry, O Virgin,” says St. Bernard, “to give your votre réponse. O ma Souveraine, prononcez la answer. O my sovereign, utter the word that earth, parole que la terre, que les enfers, que les cieux that , that heaven await…Say a word, and attendent... Dites une parole, et recevez le Verbe; receive the Word; utter your word and receive the proférez votre verbe, et recevez le Verbe divin: divine Word: express a passing word, and embrace émettez un verbe passager, et embrassez le Verbe the eternal Word.”c “Let it be done to me according éternel."c Qu'il me soit fait selon ta parole. Qu'il me to your word.” “May He kiss me with the kiss of baise du baiser de sa bouche. (Cant. 1,1) Que le his mouth” (Songs 1:1). Let the Holy Spirit take Saint-Esprit prenne ma chair et l'unisse intimement my flesh and intimately unite it to the Son of God.

65 Thomist: “This she accomplished in her Fiat” (6). 66 Thomist: “the entire new order” instead of “the whole universe” (6).

42 au Fils de Dieu. Que le Verbe qui est lumière Let the Word who is light become flesh. devienne chair. Que la Vierge imite, dans son Fiat, la procession That the Virgin imitates in her Fiat the procession du Fils en Dieu selon la connaissance, M. Olier of the Son within God according to knowledge, Mr. nous le dit de la manière la plus expresse: Olier tells us most impressively: “…As [the eternal “...Comme (le Père éternel) engender son Verbe de Father] begets His Word from all eternity by His toute éternité par sa connaissance, par retour et par knowledge, by a return upon, and a vision of, vue sur lui-même, il veut que Marie, l'image très- Himself, He wishes that Mary, the most perfect and parfaite et très-sainte de sa fécondité vierge, most holy image of his virginal fecundity, also l'engendre aussi avec connaissance; et pour cela beget Him knowingly; and to this very end He même il décrète qu'elle donnera à la génération du decrees that she will give to the generation of the Verbe dans la chair son consentement d'une Word in the flesh her explicit and solemn consent, manière expresse et solennelle, ce qui présuppose which presupposes knowledge and reason. While la connaissance et la raison. Tandis que le reste des all other mothers will not know the one who will be mères ne sauront pas ce qui devra naître d'elles, il born of them, He wants Mary to know beforehand veut que Marie connaisse auparavant quel sera le the manner of Son she will conceive; an angel will fils qu'elle concevra: un ange lui apprendra que ce make her aware that this son will be the very Son fils sera le propre Fils du Très-Haut, Dieu et of the Most High, God and man together, the homme tout ensemble, le Rédempteur du monde, et Redeemer of the world, and that his reign will have que son règne n'aura point de fin."d no end.”d a S. Anselmus, Oratio 52 (alias 51), Patr. Lat. T. 158 a St. Anselm, Patrologia Latina, t. 158, col. 956, oratio (Opera vol. I), col. 956: Deus omnia creavit, et Maria 52. “For God created all things, and Mary gave birth to Deum genuit. Deus qui omnia fecit, ipse se fecit ex God. God, who made all things, made Himself through Maria, et sic omnia, quae fecerat, refecit. Mary, and thus remade all things that He had made.” b S. Augustin, Sermo 215, n. 4 (édit. Migne) T. VII, col. b St. Augustine, Patrologia Latina, t. 38, col. 1074, 1074: Quae cum dixisset , illa fide plena, et sermo 215, n.4. “When the angel spoke, she was full of Christum prius mente quam ventre concipiens. Ecce, faith, and conceived Christ in her mind before her womb. inquit, ancilla Domini, fiat mihi secundum verbum ‘Behold,’ she said, ‘the handmaid of the Lord, let it be tuum... done unto me according to your word…’”

S. Albert, In Lucam, c. 11, vers. 27, T. 23, p. 158b: St. Albert, t. 23, p.158b, In Lucam, 11:27. “For the Christum B. Virgo corporaliter non genuisset nisi prius Blessed Virgin did not beget Christ physically unless she verbum aure cordis concepisset et custodivisset, quasi first conceived the word by the ear of her heart, as gestans ipsum in cordis utero. though bearing Him in the womb of her heart.” c S. Bernard, De Laudibus Virginis Matris, homilia IV, c St. Bernard, De Laudibus Virginis Matris, homilia 4, in Oeuvres Complètes, édit. Charpentier, Vivès, T. Il, p. Opera Omnia (ed. Carpenter, Vivès), t. 2, p. 619. 619: Da, Virgo, responsum festinanter. O Domina “Quickly, Virgin, give your reply. O Lady, give the word responde verbum, quod terra, quod inferi, quod expectant which the earth, which those who are below it, and which et superi... Responde verbum, et suscipe Verbum; profer those who are above await... Make answer, and take up tuum, et concipe divinum; emitte transitorium, et the Word; give your own and conceive the divine; pour amplectere sempiternum. out the passing and embrace the eternal.” d Vie intérieure de la Très Sainte Vierge, ouvrage d The Interior Life of the Most Holy Virgin, a work recueilli des écrits de M. Olier, Paris 1875, pp. 5-6. collected from the writings of M. Olier (Paris, 1875), 5-6.

CHAPTER 5 IN COLUMNA NUBIS (SIR. 24:7)

Sur la colonne de nuée. In a pillar of cloud. Ce Dieu dont elle est mère, c'est le Dieu This God of whom she is the mother is the Rédempteur qui, en tant que Rédempteur, est cause Redeemer God who, as Redeemer, is the final

43 finale, et par conséquent absolument première de cause, and consequently absolutely first cause of l'univers tout entier. En effet, le Christ n'a jamais the whole universe. In effect, Christ has never been été efficacement voulu comme fin de toutes choses, efficaciously willed as the end of all things if not as si ce n'est en tant que Rédempteur.a Mère du Redeemer.a Mother of the Redeemer, she is Rédempteur, elle est inséparablement unie à cette inseparably united to this final cause as co- cause finale comme co-principe. Dominus possedit principle. “Dominus possedit me in initio viarum me in initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio. faceret a principio. Ab aeterno ordinata sum, et ex Ab aeterno ordinata sum, et ex antiquis antequam antiquis antequam terra fieret—Le Seigneur m'a terra fieret—The Lord possessed me at the posédée au commencement de ses voies, avant de beginning of his undertakings, even before making faire quoi que ce soit, dès le principe. J'ai été anything in the beginning. I was established from établie dès l'éternité, et dès les temps anciens, all eternity and from ancient times, before the earth avant que la terre fût créée. (Prov. VIII, 22-23)67 was created” (Prov. 8:22-23). Mother of Mère d'Emmanuel, c'est-à-dire principe du Emmanuel, that is to say, principle of ‘the Powerful 'Puissant avec nous', elle est la première with us,’ she is the first predestined among all pure prédestinée parmi toutes les pures créatures. “Elle a creatures. “She came forth from God right from the émané de Dieu dès le commencement, dit saint beginning,” says St. Albert, “because, from all Albert, parce que, depuis toute éternité, elle fut eternity, she was predestined to become the mother prédestinée à devenir mère du fils de Dieu.”b of the Son of God.”b La mère ne se conçoit pas sans le Fils, ni le Fils- The mother is not understandable without the Son, Rédempteur sans la mère. Elle procède de Celui qui nor is the Redeemer-Son understandable without l'a faite pour que Lui-même procède d'elle. C'est the mother. She proceeds from the One who made comme principe qu'elle procède du Principe: sa her so that He Himself could proceed from her. It is procession du Principe est pour la procession de ce as principle that she proceeds from the Principle: même Principe; et elle enveloppe le Principe dans her procession from the Principle is for the sake sa procession de Lui, elle est tenue par Lui dans sa of69 the procession of this same Principle, and she procession d'elle. Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi contains within herself the Principle in her primogenita omnis creaturae—Je suis sorte de la procession from Him; she is held by Him in His bouche du Très-Haut, première-née avant toute procession from her. “Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi créature. (Eccli. XXIV, 5) Et dans cette procession primogenita omnis creaturae—I came out of the de la bouche du Très-Haut elle est elle-même la mouth of the Most High, first born before all bouche qui profère le Verbe. Osculetur me osculo creatures” (Sir. 24:5). And in this procession from oris sui—Qu'il me baiser du baiser de sa bouche. the mouth of the Most High she is herself the (Cant. I,1) Elle procède de la vraie lumière, de mouth which utters the Word. “Osculetur me Celui qui est la lumière, afin que dans les cieux osculo oris sui—May He kiss me with the kiss of surgisse d'elle la lumière indéfectible. Ego feci in His mouth” (Songs 1:1). She proceeds from the coelis ut oriretur lumen indeficiens. (Eccl. XXIV, true light, from the One who is the light, so that in 6.) Le Fils qui dans le sein du Père précontient the heavens the unfailing light will rise from her. toutes choses, y compris la Vierge, se fait contenir “Ego feci in coelis ut oriretur lumen indeficiens” dans le sein de la Vierge. Quem totus non capit (Sir. 24: 6). The Son who in the bosom of the orbis, in tua se clausit viscera factus homo—Celui Father precontains all things, even the Virgin, que tout l'univers ne peut contenir, s'est enfermé causes Himself to be contained in the womb of the dans votre sein en se faisant homme. (Messe Salve Virgin. “Quem totus non capit orbis, in tua se sancta parens, Grad.) Le Fils et la mère constituent clausit viscera factus homo—The One whom all ainsi, au principe, comme un mouvement circulaire the universe cannot contain enclosed Himself in où le principe est terme et le terme, principe; your womb in becoming man” (Mass: Salve santa mouvement qui est le symbole de la Sagesse qui parens, Grad.). The Son and the mother thus Atteint d'un bout à l'autre—Attingit a fine usque ad constitute, from the beginning, a kind of circular finem. (Sap. VIII, 1) Et ce mouvement circulaire de movement, where the principle is the term and the la Sagesse qui est plus mobile que toutes les choses term is the principle; a movement which is the mobiles—omnibus mobilibus mobilior sapientia, symbol of the Wisdom that reaches from one end to (Sap. VII, 24)68 est comme un jeu: Ludens coram the other—“Attingit a fine usque ad finem” (Wis.

67 French incorrectly cites Prov. VII, 22-23. 68 French incorrectly cites Sap. XII, 24.

44 Deo omni tempore—elle se joue sans cesse en 8:1). And this circular movement of the Wisdom présence de Dieu. (Prov. VIII, 30). which is “more mobile than all mobile things— omnibus mobilibus mobilior Sapientia” (Wis. 12: 24) is like a game70: “Ludens coram Deo omni tempore—this game is incessantly played in the presence of God” (Prov. 8:30). a Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Theol., T. VIII, disp. 3, a. 2, a John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, t. 8, d. 3, a. 2, n. 52, p. 108b: Post decretum autem istud generalis n. 52, p. 108b. “Following, however, this general decree providentiae, incepit efficax praedestinatio, et ibi incepit of providence, the efficacious began, and primo a fine, ut reparativo hominis, et sub statu it began first from the end, for the restoration of man, and reparationis ordinantis efficaciter ad illum reliquas under this of restoration efficaciously ordering other creaturas, et totum universum, etiam secundum esse creatures, and of the whole universe, to Him; even naturale, non absolute consideratum, sed ut pars status according to natural being, not absolutely considered, but reparationis, et inducens illam rationem reparabilitatis. as a part of the state of restoration, indicating the aspect Unde Christus Dominus efficaciter nunquam est intentus of reparability. From this it follows that Christ the Lord ut finis omnium, nisi determinate consideratus sub statu is never effectively intended as the end of all things, passibili, nec remedium peccati potuit esse medium unless determinately considered in the state of volitum ad hoc, ut veniret Christus ex vi primae efficacis passibility, nor can the remedy of sin be the means willed intentionis, nisi praesupponeretur praevisum peccatum: for the coming of Christ from the strength of the first atque adeo cogimur ponere remedium peccati, ut efficacious intention, unless some foreseen sin were motivum principale efficacis intentionis Christi. presupposed. And so we are compelled to take the remedy for sin as the principal motive of the efficacious intending of Christ.” b S. Albert, Sermones de Sanctis, Sermo 38, T. 13, p. b St. Albert, Sermones de Sanctis, Sermo 38, t. 13, p. 563a: Ipsa ab initio emanavit a Deo quia ad hoc ut fieret 563a. “From the beginning, she came forth from God mater Filii Dei praedestinata fuit ab aeterno. because she was eternally predestined to this, that she might become the mother of the Son of God.”

CHAPTER 6 A MARI ABUNDAVIT COGITATIO EJUS (SIR. 24:39)

Sa pensée a débordé de la mer. Her thoughts overflowed to the sea. Etant vraiment mère de Dieu,a la Sainte Vierge est Being truly the mother of God,a the Blessed Virgin liée à l'ordre hypostatique de la façon la plus intime is tied to the hypostatic order in the most intimate possible pour une pure créature. “Dès lors, dit saint way possible for a pure creature. “Since,” says St. Albert, comme la nativité en premier et Albert, “birth concerns first and principally the principalement regarde l'être de l'hypostase et de la being and hypostasis of the person, and secondly personne, et la nature en second, la Bienheureuse the nature, the Blessed Virgin is called mother of Vierge est dite mère du Christ selon l'hypostase, Christ according to the hypostasis, which laquelle hypostase est Dieu et homme, et c'est hypostasis is God and man, and this is why she is pourquoi elle est mère de Dieu et de l'homme; bien mother of God and of the man; although she is not qu'elle ne soit pas consubstantielle à Dieu sinon consubstantial with God except as to human nature quant à la nature humaine seulement, car la alone, since consubstantiality taken in itself consubstantialité prise en elle-même ne signifie signifies nothing else than the conformity in rien autre qu'une convenance en substance; la substance; birth thus belongs first and in itself to nativité appartient donc en premier et par soi à la the person, and to nature secondly and as a personne, et à la nature par voie de conséquence et consequence.”b She alone among all pure creatures en second.”b Elle seule parmi toutes les pures occupies, because of this, the summit: “Ego in créatures occupe par là le sommet: Ego in altissimis altissimis habitavi, et thronus meus in columna habitavi, et thronus meus in columna nubis— nubis—I dwelt in the highest place, and my throne

69 Thomist: “is ordained in” (8). 70 Thomist: “is like unto play” (8).

45 J'habitai dans les hauteurs les plus élevées, et mon is in a pillar of a cloud—where the glory of God is trône était sur la colonne de nuée, où se cache la hidden” (Sir. 24:7). She herself is, in a sense, this gloire de Dieu. (Eccli. XXIV, 7) Elle est elle- pillar of a cloud where the incarnate Wisdom is même, en un sens, cette colonne de nuée où se hidden.c Having left the height of heaven, her path cache la Sagesse incarnée.c Sortie du sommet du is completed in the same height. “A summo oaelo ciel, sa course s'achève au même sommet. A summo egressio ejus: et occursus ejus usque ad summum coelo egressio ejus: et occursus ejus usque ad ejus” (Ps. 18:7). She alone has traversed the circle summum ejus. (Ps. XVIII, 7) Elle seule a parcouru of heaven: she alone of all creatures71 is the le cercle du ciel; de toutes les créatures elle seule wisdom which has pierced the depths of the abyss. est la sagesse qui a pénétré les profondeurs de “Gyrum coeli circuivi sola, et profundum abyssi l'abîme. Gyrum coeli circuivi sola, et profundum penetravi” (Sir. 24:8). abyssi penetravi. (Eccli. XXIV, 8) Il est impossible qu'une pure créature soit élevée à It is impossible for a pure creature to be elevated to un degré plus haut. Par sa grâce de maternité, elle a higher degree. By her grace of maternity, she épuise pour ainsi dire la possibilité même d'une exhausts one might say the very possibility of a élévation plus grande. “La plénitude de la Sainte more lofty elevation. “The perfect fullness of the Vierge, dit saint Albert, la prive de toute vacuité: Holy Virgin,” says St. Albert, “deprives her of all en effet, tant qu'un vase peut recevoir quelque emptiness: indeed, in so far as a vessel can receive chose, il retient du vide. C'est pourquoi toute autre something, it retains emptiness. That is why every créature comporte quelque vacuité, car elle peut other creature admits of a certain emptiness, since recevoir une grâce plus grande. Marie seule est it can receive a greater grace. Mary alone is full of pleine de grâce, car elle n'a pu avoir une grâce plus grace, for she cannot have a greater grace: it would grande: il faudrait en effet qu'elle soit elle-même be necessary that she be herself united to the unie à la divinité pour qu'on puisse concevoir une divinity in order to conceive a greater grace than grâce plus grande que celle selon laquelle est tiré that according to which that which is united to him d'elle ce qui lui est uni: c'est dire qu'à moins d'être is drawn from her: that is to say that except being Dieu même il ne se peut concevoir une grâce plus God Himself it is impossible to conceive a greater grande que celle d'être mère de Dieu.”d grace than that of being the mother of God.”d a S. Thomas, III Pars. q. 35, a. 4, c. a STh IIIa, q35 a4. b S. Albert, In III Sent., dist. 4, a. 5, ad 2, T. 28, p. 85b: b St. Albert, In III Sententiarum, d. 4, a. 5, ad 2 (t. 28, p. Unde, cum nativitas respiciat esse hypostasis et personae 85b). “Whence, since birth regards the being of the primo et principaliter, naturam autem per posterius, ipsa hypostasis and of the person first and principally, but dicitur mater Christi secundum hypostasim, quae nature secondarily, she is called the mother of Christ hypostasis est Deus et homo, et ideo ipsa est mater Dei et according to the hypostasis, which hypostasis is God and hominis; licet non sit consubstantialis nisi quoad naturam man, and so she is mother of God and of man; although humanam tantum, quia consubstantialitas ex intellectu she is not of one nature [with Him] except with respect to suo non dicit nisi convenientiam in substantia; nativitas the human nature alone, because consubstantiality from autem est personae primo et per se et naturae per its own meaning is not said except from likeness in consequens et posterius. substance; but birth is of the person first and through itself and of nature as a consequence and secondarily.” c Corneille de la Pierre, In Ecclesiasticum, c. XXIV, vers. c Cornelius a Lapide, In Ecclesiasticum, 34:7 (t. 9, p. 7, T. IX, p. 623. 623). d S. Albert, Mariale, q. 34, parag.4, T. 37, p. 73a: d St. Albert, Mariale, q. 34, par. 4 (t. 37, p. 73a). “The Plenitudo beatissimae Virginis privat vacuitatem: very fullness of the most Blessed Virgin precludes any quamdiu enim vas potest recipere aliquid, tamdiu habet sort of emptiness; for so long as a vessel is able to aliquid de vacuitate. Unde omnis creatura alia habet receive something, that long does it have something of aliquid vacuitatis: quia majorem gratiam potest recipere. emptiness. It follows from this that every other creature Ipsa autem sola gratia plena, quia majorem gratiam non has something of emptiness, because it is able to receive potuit habere: nisi enim ipsa divinitati uniretur, major more grace. But she alone is full of grace, because she gratia non potuit intelligi, quam quod de ipsa acciperetur cannot have a greater grace: for unless she were united to quod uniretur: hoc enim est, nisi ipsa (esset) Deus, non the divinity, a greater grace cannot be thought than that posset major gratia intelligi, quam quod ipsa esset Dei what isunited to the divinity be received from her: for, mater. unless she should be God, a greater grace cannot be understood than that she be the mother of God.”

71 Thomist: “of all mere creatures” (9).

46

CHAPTER 7 GRATIA PLENA, IN SION FIRMATA (LK. 1:28, SIR. 24:15)

Pleine de grâce, confirmée en Sion. Full of grace, established in Zion. Afin d'être loué et glorifié en Marie, Dieu ne s'est In order to be praised and glorified in Mary, God pas contenté de la seule maternité de la Vierge— was not content with the maternity of the Virgin maternité qui n'eût pas été de la part de Marie un alone72—a maternity which would not have been retour total au principe selon tout elle-même: “La on Mary’s part a total return to the principle parenté maternelle, dit saint Augustin, n'eût été according to her whole being: “The maternal d'aucun avantage à Marie, si elle n'avait éprouvé parenthood,” says St. Augustine, “would have been plus de joie à porter le Christ dans son coeur que of no advantage to Mary, if she had not felt more dans sa chair.”a Or, en fait, elle était pleine de grâce joy in carrying Christ in her heart than in her avant même son consentement à la maternité. flesh.”a Now, in fact, she was full of grace even L'ange la disait pleine de grâce avant que le Saint- before consenting to her maternity. The angel Esprit la fécondât. “Le Saint-Esprit descendit en called her full of grace before she conceived by the Marie, dit Jean de saint Thomas, pour qu'elle fût Holy Spirit. “The Holy Spirit descended upon mère de Dieu, et pour qu'elle atteignît ainsi à l'ordre Mary,” says John of St. Thomas, “so that she hypostatique, la supposant déjà pleine de grâce. would be mother of God, and so she would reach Parce qu'elle appartient à l'ordre hypostatique the hypostatic order, supposing already that she même qui, de soi, comporte une forme de sainteté was full of grace…. Because it belongs to the very plus élevée, la dignité maternelle exige en toute hypostatic order which, of itself, entails a more convenance et de manière connaturelle la sainteté. elevated form of sanctity, the maternal dignity Que si de puissance absolue il y avait eu maternité demands in all propriety and connaturality, sans sainteté, alors le Saint-Esprit ne serait pas holiness. If from an absolute power there had been descendu en elle par mode de mission au sens maternity without sanctity, the Holy Spirit would absolu car il n'aurait pas habité en elle, mais il not have descended upon her according to a serait descendu en elle selon une mission au sens mission in the absolute sense. For he would not relatif.”b have lived in her, but he would have descended upon her according to a mission in a relative sense.”b La plénitude de grâce en Marie devint ainsi la The fullness of grace in Mary became then the root racine de son consentement à la maternité, de l'acte of her consenting to maternity, of the most free and le plus libre et le plus libéral qu'une pure créature liberal act a pure creature could perform, of the pût poser, de l'acte humain le plus radical auquel most radical human act upon which are suspended sont suspendues toutes les oeuvres de Dieu. A mari all God’s works. “A mari enim abundavit cogitatio enim abundavit cogitatio ejus, et consilium ejus ab ejus, et consilium ejus abysso magna—For her abysso magna—Car sa pensée a surgi de la mer et thoughts are more vast than the sea, and her son conseil du profond du grand abîme. (Eccli. counsels more deep than the great ocean” (Sir. XXIV, 39) La force et la douceur de la puissance 24:39). The force and sweetness of the premoving prémotrice fit surgir en Marie, qui était depuis le power raised in Mary, who was from the beginning commencement l'élue de la Sagesse divine et le chosen by divine Wisdom and the principle of all principe de toutes ses oeuvres, une grande His works, a strong determination in which she was détermination où elle fut établie et se fit établir established and established herself as a first premier principe. Non est qui possit tuae resistere principle. “Non est qui possit tuae resistere voluntati, si decrevis salvare Israel— Il n'est voluntati, si decrevis salvare Israel—There is none personne qui puisse résister à votre volonté, si that can resist your will, if you determine to save Vous avez résolu de sauver Israël. (Esther, XIII, 9) Israel” (Esth. 13:9). And because she becomes Et parce qu'elle devient elle-même principe herself a sapiential principle, it is proper that, in her sapiential, il convient qu'en qualité de sagesse elle character as wisdom, she takes on immutability

72 Thomist: “God was not content to express Himself in her maternity alone” (9).

47 revête l'immutabilité. (Sap. VII, 23) Et sic in Sion (Wis. 7:23). “Et sic in Sion firmata sum—And so I firmata sum—Et ainsi j'ai eu une demeure fixe dans was established in Sion” (Sir. 24:15). Sion. (Eccli.XXIV, 15) “La confirmation dans le “Confirmation in the good was proper to the bien convenait à la Bienheureuse Vierge, dit saint Blessed Virgin,” says St. Thomas, “because she Thomas, parce qu'elle était mère de la Sagesse was the mother of divine Wisdom, in which divine, en laquelle rien de souillé ne se rencontre, nothing defiled is found, as it is said in the book of comme il est dit au livre de la Sagesse” (Sap. VII, Wisdom” (Wis. 7:25).c 25)c De même que notre liberté est d'autant plus nôtre Just as our freedom is all the more ours insofar as it qu'elle est entièrement reçue et quant à son acte et is wholly received73 as to its end and its mode— quant à son mode—Deus est qui operatur in vobis “Deus est qui operatur in vobis et velle, et et velle, et perficere (Phil. II, 13)—, de même perficere” (Phil. 2:13)—so the Holy Virgin’s l’‘être premier principe' de la Sainte Vierge, “being first principle,” wholly received according entièrement reçu selon ce mode proprement divin, to this properly divine mode, is also all the more est aussi d'autant plus le sien propre. Il s'établit hers. There is then established, from the grace of ainsi, de la grâce de maternité à la , un maternity to sanctification, a certain circular certain mouvement circulaire qu'il a plu à Dieu de movement which God saw fit to create in her. It is susciter en elle. C'est Dieu, origine de toutes God, the origin of all things, who gives it to her to choses, qui lui donne de se faire donner d'être give herself to being the origin of God. “Ecce origine de Dieu. “Ecce imperio Dei omnia imperio Dei omnia subjiciuntur et Virgo; ecce subjiciuntur et Virgo; ecce imperio Virginis Omnia imperio Virginis omnia subjiciuntur et Deus— subjiciuntur et Deus—Voici qu'à l'empire de Dieu Behold that all things are subjected to God’s toutes choses sont soumises, y compris la Vierge; authority, including the Virgin; behold that all voici qu'à l'empire de la Vierge toutes choses sont things are subjected to the Virgin’s authority, soumises, y compris Dieu.”d Dans ce libre including God.”d In this free consent to maternity consentement à la maternité, laquelle provient that comes properly from nature, God makes it proprement de la nature, Dieu donne à la Sainte possible for the Holy Virgin to raise herself over Vierge de se hausser elle-même davantage à la and above this to the dignity of her proper dignité de sa propre maternité qui exige de toute maternity which demands sanctity appropriately convenance (congrue) et connaturellement la and connaturally. sainteté. a S. Augustin, De sancta Virginitate, c. 3, T. IX, col. 398; a St. Augustine, De sancta Virginitate, c. 3 (t.9, col. 398). Sic et materna propinquitas nihil Mariae profuisset, nisi “Thus the intimacy of maternity would have profitted felicius Christum corde quam carne gestasset. Mary nothing unless she begot Christ with more joy in her heart than in her flesh.” b Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Theol., T. IV, d, 17, a. 2, p. b John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, t. 4, d. 17, a. 2, 465: Spiritus Sanctus supervenit in Virginem ut esset p.465. “The Holy Spirit descended on the Virgin in order Mater Dei, et attingeret sic ordinem hypostaticum, that she might be the Mother of God, and thus reach the supponendo illam esse plenam gratia: sic enim prius hypostatic order, supposing her to be full of grace: for Angelus eam gratia plenam nominavit, quam diceret thus the Angel first called her full of grace, then he said Spiritum Sanctum superventurum in illam. Et sic dignitas that the Holy Spirit would come down upon her. And so maternitatis congrue et connaturaliter exigit sanctitatem, the maternal dignity fittingly and connaturally calls for quia pervenit74 ad ipsum ordinem hypostaticum qui de se holiness, because it attains to the very hypostatic order, altiorem formam sanctitatis importat. Quod si de potentia which of itself entails a higher form of holiness. For if, absoluta esset maternitas sine sanctitate, tunc non according to absolute power, there had been motherhood supervenerit in eam Spiritus Sanctus per modum without holiness, then the Holy Spirit would not have missionis simpliciter, quia75 non inhabitaret in ea, sed come into her in the mode of a mission simply speaking, secundum missionem secundum quid. because He would not dwell in her, but according to a mission in a relative sense.” c S. Thomas, Q. D. de Veritate, q. 24, a. 9, ad 2: c St. Thomas, Q. D. de Veritate, q. 24, a. 9, ad 2. “Now Confirmamatio in bono beatae Virgini competebat, quia confirmation in the good was fitting to the Blessed mater erat divinae sapientiae, in quam nihil inquinatum Virgin because she was the mother of divine wisdom, in

73 Thomist: “as it is received universally” (11). 74 The French original misquotes the Latin text as “qui pertinent” instead of “quia pervenit.” 75 The French original misquotes the Latin text as “qui” instead of “quia.”

48 incurrit, ut dicitur Sap.VII. which nothing defiled comes, as is said in the Book of Wisdom (7:25).” d Apud Grignion de Montfort, La vraie dévotion à la d "Ecce imperio Dei omnia subjiciuntur et Virgo; ecce Sainte Vierge, n. 76, édit. canadienne 1940, p. 61. imperio Virginis omnia subjiciuntur et Deus" (St. Louis- Marie Grignion de Montfort, , n.76. [This is the usual title given to English versions.] Hereafter: True Devotion).

49 Commentary Chapters 3-7

Preliminary note on the structure of the argument

Chapters 3-7 apply the two principal criteria of wisdom to Mary. These criteria are derived from Aristotle’s account of the wise man as the one who orders, but, as indicating wisdom itself rather than the wise man, also imply an association with the transcendent causality of God. Mary must be origin of God through her own being76 and she must be such an origin with knowledge. Chapters 8-14 will then show how it is that Mary as wisdom orders all things. This latter consideration flows from the former: her relation to the universe as principle arises from her relation to

God as principle. This division constitutes the basic structure of the first part.

Within this basic structure, however, a second movement takes place; a movement that is clearer in its term than in its beginning. The first movement considers how Mary fulfills the nature of wisdom understood in a general way, defined philosophically. It becomes increasingly apparent, however, that De Koninck is considering Mary in her relation to divine wisdom specified by what has been revealed to us. That is, he considers the content of divine wisdom in relation to the life of the Trinity. De Koninck thereby specifies the way in which God is the principle of all things, the character and reason of the most profound order that He places in all that comes forth from Him. Consequently, in considering Mary as sharing with

God in being principle of all things, De Koninck considers her relation to the order that flows from God as Trinity. Since God is principle of the order of creation not

76 As noted above, when De Koninck says that she must be origin of God through her own being, he means through her substantial being as opposed to the way that the wise man is the origin of order, namely, in his intellect. He does not of course mean that it follows necessarily from her very existence that Mary is the origin of God in the same way that it follows from His nature that He be the first cause.

50 only in His unity, but as Trinity, Mary’s entrance into this order, both as principle of

God and as principle of the universe, will be in some way an entrance into the order of the Processions. This underlying theme erupts, as it were, toward the end of the first part, in which De Koninck argues that Mary “is rooted in the order of the

Trinity, and she ties up the order of the universe, in a radically new way, with the order that is in God according to the processions.”77

The commentary on Chapters 3-7 will consequently have two parts. First we will follow the more apparent account of Mary as cause and origin of God according to substance and knowledge, thus fulfilling the criteria of wisdom generally defined, the topic which occupies Chapters 3-5 most directly. Then we will return to Chapter

4 and show the emergence and development of the underlying Trinitarian theme in

Chapters 4-7, attending to the way in which Mary takes on the role of wisdom in her relation to the order of the Trinity.

Initial Commentary on Chapters 3-5: the Criteria of Wisdom

Chapter 3: Mary as Origin of God

Chapter 3 immediately addresses the first, and more fundamental, of the two criteria: that Mary be principle of God in her very substance. The fulfillment of this criterion lies, of course, in her divine motherhood. The essential point is to see that by her maternity, Mary is in her own person the cause and origin of God. That Mary is the Mother of God is a fact unequivocally affirmed by the early councils of the

77 Ego Sapientia, 10.2.

51 Church as belonging to the very truth of the Incarnation.78 Mary is the mother of

Christ according to His human nature, but she, like every mother, is mother not of the nature she communicates but of the person to whom she gives that nature. This

Person is not a human person, subsisting principally in and through his human nature, but the divine Person of the Son, pre-existing, and indeed causing his true birth from Mary.79

But granting that Mary is truly the mother of the Son of God, might we not object that, because she does not give Him being simply speaking, Mary is only an accidental cause of her Son? How can we distinguish Mary’s causality vis-à-vis her

Son from the causality exercised by Zaccheus when he gives the Lord a good dinner, or Mary of Bethany when she washes His feet with her tears? In fact, the answer to this objection is already contained in De Koninck’s statement that “nativity concerns

78 In the development of the Church’s teaching on the nature of the union between God and man in Christ, faith in Mary’s divine maternity has acted as a safeguard, protecting the parameters within which the theological account of the Incarnation must be articulated. The title of , mother or bearer of God, became a kind of litmus test of orthodoxy in these matters, beginning particularly with the Nestorian controversy leading up to the in 431. Writing many centuries later, St. Thomas makes similar use of the title in his treatment of the union in the Tertia Pars, arguing that the only way to deny this title of the Blessed Virgin is to err concerning the hypostatic union in one way or another. The divine maternity of Mary is a co-implication of faith in the Incarnation. “For the only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first subject to conception and birth, before this man were the Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God”(STh IIIa q35 a4 co.). “Solum enim sic negari posset beatam virginem esse matrem Dei, si vel humanitas prius fuisset subiecta conceptioni et nativitati quam homo ille fuisset filius Dei, sicut Photinus posuit, vel humanitas non fuisset assumpta in unitatem personae vel hypostasis verbi Dei, sicut posuit Nestorius. Utrumque autem horum est erroneum. Unde haereticum est negare beatam virginem esse matrem Dei.” 79 De Koninck also takes up the question of motherhood itself, specifically whether the mother is an active principle of generation. He affirms, with Cajetan, that even in the classical account of begetting, the mother must be considered as active vis-à-vis the child who is begotten, even if she is passive vis-à-vis the father.

52 first of all and principally the being of the hypostasis and of the person.”80 While

Mary is not the cause of her Son’s being simply speaking, she is nevertheless a cause in a way that bears directly on the being of the hypostasis.

The meaning of this distinction becomes clearer in Thomas’s discussion of the one esse of Christ in the Summa and the De Unione Verbi Incarnati. In question

17, article 1 of the Teritia Pars, Thomas asks whether there is in Christ one esse or two. He begins with the first principle of Chalcedonian orthodoxy, that as Christ is one person in two natures, what belongs to the person in him is one, while what belongs to the natures is two. Being, he says, pertains to both, but in different ways—to the person as that which has being, and to the nature as that whereby something has being. Within the latter it is possible to distinguish between that nature or form whereby something has being simply, and forms whereby it has being only in a certain respect. Forms of the second sort do not pertain to the personal being of the supposit, but are accidental. The being of accidents can therefore be multiplied in one subject without multiplying the substantial being of the subject. On the other hand, the being of that whereby the person exists simply speaking cannot be multiplied without multiplying the person.

The human nature of Christ cannot be a form of the second kind; it is not an accidental attribute of Christ, like having sufficient nourishment or clean feet.

Human nature is a form of the first kind, the kind that makes a thing to be this or that, rather than merely this way or that way: a man rather than dog, not full rather than hungry. Of course, it is also the case that the humanity of Christ is not that

80 Ego Sapientia, 3.3.

53 whereby Christ actually exists simply speaking. As the eternal Word, He is identical with His existence. So we are left with a sui generis case in which one Person has two natures, neither of which are accidental, but, nevertheless, only one of which can account for His being simply speaking.

In his parallel account of this mystery in the De Unione, Thomas introduces the term “esse secundarium” to express the status of the human nature of Christ.81

Given Thomas’s crystalline approach in the Summa of drawing the conclusion that there is only one being and subsistence in Christ from the doctrine that He is one

Person, this term cannot be taken to suggest a second being simply speaking.

Rather, it seems to indicate the unique position of the human nature, which lies between an accidental form and a form whereby something subsists simply.82 To use the term esse in this way emphasizes that becoming man pertains to what Christ is. After the Incarnation it is possible to answer that question in two ways: He is both God and man.

81 “But the eternal supposit is made to subsist through human nature, inasmuch as it is this man. And thus as Christ is one simply because of the unity of supposit, and two in a certain respect because of the two natures, so he has one esse simply because of the one eternal esse of the eternal supposit. There is, however, another esse of this supposit, not inasmuch as it is eternal, but inasmuch as it is made man in time. That esse, although it is not an accidental esse—because man is not said accidentally of the Son of God, as shown above—yet it is not the principal esse of the supposit but secondary” (De Unione Verbi Incarnati, a4). “Substantificatur autem suppositum aeternum per naturam humanam, in quantum est hic homo. Et ideo sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi, et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi. Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum. Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale—quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est—non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium.” 82 It should be noted that the relationship of the two texts, which above I called parallel, has long been a subject of dispute. I am taking the position that they are in fundamental harmony, though the De Unione explores the question of the being of Christ’s human nature further. A very complete recent account of the meaning of the phrase “esse secundarium” was recently given by John Froula, “One and the Same Lord: The Thomistic Teaching on the Existence of Christ” PhD diss., (Ave Maria University, 2012).

54 For this reason, one may say that the mother who begets Christ according to

His human nature is a cause of Him in an “entitative” way,83 inasmuch as she causes

Him to be a man, though she does not simply cause Him to be. In this she differs fundamantally from what causes Him, as man, to be wounded or washed or nourished.

One might still object that those who killed Christ became causes of Christ in the same respect, since they made Him cease to be a man. It is indeed Thomas’s position that while the human soul of Christ was no longer the cause of bodily life, that is, during the three days in the tomb, Christ was not properly a man, though both body and soul remained hypostatically united to the Word.84 Yet the cause of death differs from the cause of generation as a cause of being differs from a “cause” of non-being. Non-being has no proper cause, but only an accidental one.

Executioners cannot therefore be credited with a causality vis-à-vis the person, as mothers can. In this sense, even those who cause accidental changes in the humanity of Christ such as nourishment are more properly causes of Christ than those who crucified Him.

As true mother of the Son, Mary is in her own substance, or through herself, cause and origin of God. As the lengthy quote in Chapter 3 from the Mariale85

83 “Since she is really the mother of the Son, and the Son is begotten Wisdom, she is mother of begotten Wisdom—entitatively begotten by both the eternal Father and the temporal mother” (Ego Sapientia, 3.5; emphasis added). 84 STh IIIa, q50 a4. 85 This work was attributed to Albert the Great until the 1950s. In Pius XII’s (1950), the Mariale is cited twice under Albert’s name. An Italian Carmelite published a volume on Albert’s Mariology which argued that the work is not likely that of St. Albert himself. ( Korošak, O.F.M., Mariologia: S. Alberti Magni Eiusque Coaequalium, vol. 8 of Bibliotheca Mariana Medii Aevi [Academia Mariana Internationalis: , 1954], 3ff.). It is now common to refer to the author of the Mariale as pseudo-Albert, which we will do hereafter.

55 affirms, this fact is already in some way sufficient to establish that Mary is also the cause of all things.86 But in order to avoid a misunderstanding, we must recognize a logical step that is only explicitly addressed in the fifth chapter. To make this potential misunderstanding clear, we might rephrase pseudo-Albert’s argument as follows:

Premise 1: God is the cause of all things Premise 2: Mary is the cause of God Premise 3: The cause of a cause is also the cause of the effects of that cause Conclusion: Mary is the cause of all things

The difficulty with this formulation is that God is the cause of all things by His divine nature, but Mary is not in any way the cause of the divine nature. She is rather the cause of a divine Person according to His human nature. Though she is mother of the

One who is the Creator, it does not seem that she is therefore the cause of creation.

This objection might be raised by anyone sensitive to the Nestorian controversy.

Nestorius, failing to distinguish between what belonged to Christ according to each nature, posited instead two distinct persons in Christ, thinking that to call Mary the

Mother of God was to involve the divinity in change, and to imply that the Godhead itself had a beginning in her.87 The Church unflinchingly upheld the title, arguing

86 Chapter 3 proposes to give an account of how Mary fulfills the primary characteristic proper to wisdom, substantially predicated: to be an originative principle or source of all things. In Chapter 2 this characteristic was specified by adding that it would be necessary that this causality extend in some way to God himself, since He is the cause of all things—and the divine maternity answers this necessity. But the object to which wisdom imparts order is not God but the universe. We must see that through this relation to the first principle, Mary is also an originative source of all things. Another way to say this is that we must see how Mary is a principle of God as principle of all things. 87 In a letter to leading up the Council of Ephesus, Nestorius argues that a creature born in time cannot be the origin of the eternal One, nor can that One suffer, die, or rise: “Please look more closely at their language and you will find out that the divine choir of fathers never said that the consubstantial godhead was capable of suffering, or that the whole being that was coeternal with the Father was recently born, or that it rose again, seeing that it had itself been the cause of resurrection of the destroyed temple” (Second Letter of Nestorius to Cyril).

56 that while she was truly His Mother, this maternity did not encompass the divine nature properly, and therefore did not compromise its transcendence. In contrast to this response, pseudo-Albert’s argument, as summarized above, could appear to confirm Nestorian suspicions.

To respond to this objection we must take into account a logical step that is only implicit in the text of the Mariale. Being the mother of God does not make Mary the principle of all things unless He makes Himself principle of all things according to His humanity—in and through it, as the God-Man. Yet He would not be the principle of all things as Man unless He were God. And again, because He is God, He could not become Man without thereby being as man the intrinsic final cause of creation. If God becomes Man, that Man, being God, cannot but be the apex, and the final cause of creation: the end, and hence the first cause of the whole created order.88 And since Mary could not become the Mother of God unless He became Man,

“Ἔγκυψον δέ, εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῖς ῥητοῖς ἀκριβέστερον· καὶτὸν θεῖον ἐκεῖνον τῶν Πατέρων εὑρήσεις χο ρὸν, οὐ τὴν ὁμοούσιον θεότητα παθητὴν εἰρηκότα· οὐδὲ πρόσφατον γεννητὴν τὴν τῷ Πατρὶ συναΐδι ον· oὐδὲ ἀναστᾶσαν τὴν τὸνλελυμένον ναὸν ἀναστήσασαν” (Migne, Patrologia Graeca, Vol. 77, Col. 49 ff.). Cyril responds with consummate clarity: “So have [the fathers] dared to call the holy Virgin, mother of God, not as though the nature of the Word or his godhead received the origin of their being from the holy Virgin, but because there was born from her his holy body rationally ensouled, with which the Word was hypostatically united and is said to have been begotten in the flesh” (Second Letter of Cyril to Nestorius). “οὕτω τεθαρσήκασι Θεοτόκον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἁγίαν Παρθένον· οὐχ ὡςτῆς τοῦ Λόγου φύσεως, ἤτοι τῆ ς θεότητος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι λαβούσης ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας Παρθένου· ἀλλ’ ὡς γεννηθέντος ἐξ αὐ τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου σώματος, ψυχωθέντος λογικῶς, ᾧ καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἑνωθεὶς ὁ Λόγος γεγεννῆσθαι λέγεται κατὰ σάρκα” (Migne, Patrologia Graeca, Vol. 77, Col. 44-50). 88 “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together. He is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, so that he might come to have first place in everything” (Col. 1:15-18). “God put this power to work in Christ when he raised him from the dead and seated him at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and above every name that is named, not only in this age but also in the age to come. And he has put all

57 to call her the Mother of God is already to imply that God has chosen to establish the order of all things to Himself as Man.

In the chapters that follow, particularly in Chapter 5, De Koninck makes explicit that it is as her Son, as the God-man and as Redeemer, that God establishes the new order, the order of grace, and therefore that she herself is a principle of this order. But it is with good reason that, before all else, De Koninck emphasizes in

Chapter 3, through the words of the Mariale, that Mary is the origin of God. It must be God Himself, the one who is by His very being the cause of all things, who is

Mary’s Son if she is herself to be principle of all things.

Chapter 4: Mary as Origin of God with Knowledge

Before developing this first and essential point in terms of the causality of

Christ as man, De Koninck lays down the foundation for Mary’s fulfillment of the second condition for the substantial predication of wisdom. Mary must be origin of

God, and thereby of all things, knowingly. The fulfillment of this condition is found in

Mary’s Fiat. The fact that Mary’s knowledge and will was involved in becoming a mother is not unique; motherhood is often deliberately brought about. But Mary’s consent is unlike that of any other woman’s in two ways. The first is that she consents directly to conception, not to an act that opens up the possibility of

things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all” (Eph. 1:20-23). “Long ago God spoke to our ancestors in many and various ways by the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed heir of all things, through whom he also created the worlds. He is the reflection of God’s glory and the exact imprint of God’s very being, and he sustains all things by his powerful word. When he had made purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, having become as much superior to angels as the name he has inherited is more excellent than theirs” (Heb. 1:1-4).

58 conception but which may or not result in an actual pregnancy. God wills to make this conception directly dependent on her free consent, whereas, in sexual intimacy, the consent bears only remotely on conception itself. A sign of this remoteness is that a woman may have intercourse desiring to become a mother and yet fail to conceive. Mary’s conception is a true human conception, and not as such any more at the command of her will than any other, but by the divine decree, that conception which is worked by the power of the Holy Spirit, is made to hang on the word of the

Mother-to-be.

The second difference, which brings new significance to the first, is that Mary not only consents to becoming a mother, but to becoming the mother of a particular person. At the end of Chapter 4, De Koninck, quoting M. Olier, shows the explicit nature of Mary’s consent with respect to its object. “An angel will make her aware that this son will be the very Son of the Most High, God and man together, the

Redeemer of the world, and that his reign will have no end.”89 Already in this statement, De Koninck moves the reader to see the implicit step in the argument of the previous chapter. Mary knows, through the revelation of the angel, that her Son will be God, and will redeem His people, and will establish His reign as man. In other words, she is being asked to consent precisely to bear the One who will restore all things and govern them as the Son of Man. She knows her future Son as the principle of the order of the universe, and her consent is to being the mother of that Son.90

89 Ego Sapientia, 4.4. 90 De Koninck does not claim that Mary has explicit knowledge at the time of the , or indeed at any period ofher life on earth, of the order of all things in their particularity, but rather that she knows the principle of that as principle, and consents to her role in establishing Him as such. We need not suppose any extraordinary prophetic knowledge; the revelation communicated by is sufficient for this knowledge.

59 De Koninck takes up this theme at greater length in a lecture entitled, “The

Nature of Mary’s Universal Queenship.”91 He writes that Mary’s share in establishing the reign of Christ “is less dependent upon her consent to be the mother of the Son of God than upon her voluntary acceptance of Him as the Savior.”92 It was “her consent to be the mother of such a son,” i.e. of the God who as man would redeem the world, that she is established as first principle.93 In this text, De Koninck is arguing for Mary’s role in the work of redemption, the work whereby Christ in fact establishes His kingdom and the new order of grace definitively. It is not only, then, that Mary becomes the Mother of God freely, but that she knowingly becomes the

Mother of the One who establishes the final order of all things. She consents to be principle of God as principle of the universal order.

This fact is beautifully signified by the parallelism of the Fiat by which all things came forth from God in creation and the Fiat of Mary, by which all things come forth in the new order of grace, in their re-creation in Christ. More is built on this parallel here with respect to the Trinitarian character of that order, and we will return to this theme in the second portion of the commentary on Chapters 3-7.

Chapter 5: Mary as Origin of God as Redeemer

In Chapter 5, the implicit aspect of Mary’s role as cause and origin of God is unfolded. “This God of whom she is the mother is the Redeemer God who, as

91 “The Nature of Mary’s Universal Queenship,” Maritain Center archives: 8/11. (Hereafter “Universal Queenship.”) This lecture, found among De Koninck’s papers, does not appear to correspond to any published articles. The original type-written text is in English. 92 “Universal Queenship.” 93 “Universal Queenship.”

60 Redeemer, is the final cause, and consequently absolutely first cause of the whole universe.”94 The final cause is the first cause (the cause of causes) because it is that for the sake of which the agent acts, his reason for acting at all. It is particularly in the order of final causality that Mary’s character as principle comes to light, together with the aspect of formal causality, to which it is closely allied. Mary could not have been a principle of creation in the order of efficiency. Creation is an effect proper to

God, one that cannot be mediated through any secondary causes. Not even the angels can be instruments of the creation of the corporeal world, as Thomas argues.95 Furthermore, it is not possible that an efficient cause should come into being after its effect, since the agent gives actuality to the effect—actuality which it must itself possess in some manner. But Mary was born into the fallen world at a certain place and in a certain time, after generations of Jews had lived and died, and certainly long after the formation of the heavens and the earth. These reasons make it absurd to think of Mary as a cause of all things in the order of agency.

94 Ego Sapientia, 5.1. 95 “It is impossible that anything should be created, save by . In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause” (STh Ia, q65 a3 co.). “Impossibile est autem aliquid creari nisi a solo Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in causando. Semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus, invenitur communius quam id quod informat et restringit ipsum, sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intelligere, et materia quam forma. Quanto ergo aliquid est magis substratum, tanto a superiori causa directe procedit. Id ergo quod est primo substratum in omnibus, proprie pertinet ad causalitatem supremae causae. Nulla igitur secunda causa potest aliquid producere, non praesupposito in re producta aliquo quod causatur a superiori causa. Creatio autem est productio alicuius rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum. Unde relinquitur quod nihil potest aliquid creare nisi solus Deus, qui est prima causa.”

61 Nevertheless, Mary is an inseparable principle and a cause in an efficient mode (that of generation) of the final cause of all things. Since the order of nature is ordained to the order of grace, Mary is found at the beginning of all things, in the mind of God, as principle in all that comes forth from Him. When we considered pseudo-Albert’s argument in Chapter 3, we said that, in one sense, it was not enough to say that Mary is the mother of the Creator in order to conclude that she is the principle of all things because she does not give Him that whereby He creates. But now we can add that she was indeed a principle of creation, created by God in time in order that He might proceed from her, and by doing so bring all things forth again in their final order. This is why Proverbs 8:22-23 is truly applied to Mary: “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before making anything that was made, from the beginning. I was established from all eternity, and from ancient times, before the earth was created.”

Chapters 4-7: Wisdom and the Trinitarian Processions We can already affirm that Mary fulfills the two criteria of the substantial predication of wisdom laid down at the end of Chapter 2. That Mary is the principle of God precisely insofar as He is the final cause of creation, and thus principle of the order of all things, allows us to say that she herself is Wisdom.96 But this is only the first layer of a theological consideration that runs far deeper.

Two accounts of wisdom are at work in the argument of the first part: one philosophical and one properly theological. The work as a whole is properly

96 To call Mary Wisdom means neither that she is God’s own wisdom, which is identical with His being, nor of course that she is an intellectual habit in any creature. Rather, by showing that the attributes and effects proper to wisdom belong to her, we see that wisdom should be said of her in an analogous sense.

62 theological, taking its point of departure from the words of Scripture interpreted by the prayer of the Church. Moreover, the evidence adduced to show that Mary meets the criteria of wisdom is the mystery of the Incarnation. But the criteria for the abstract predication of wisdom are derived from the philosophical account of wisdom; the definition of wisdom as that which orders all things, and even the fact that God alone is properly this principle, are truths available to human reason. But

De Koninck draws on a properly theological account of the order that divine wisdom communicates in its works to consider Mary’s role as wisdom from the vantage point of the First Cause as He reveals Himself to man.

The presence of this theological principle appears most clearly toward the end of the first part. There are two central Marian theses in which this second principle is evidently at work. The first occurs in the tenth chapter, which begins the culminating argument of the first part:

Daughter of the eternal Father, mother of the Son, spouse of the Holy Spirit, she is rooted in the Trinity, and she ties up the order of the universe, in a radically new way, with the order that is in God according to the processions.97

The second occurs in the thirteenth chapter, at the conclusion of that argument:

There is set up then a circular movement between her dignity as a separated principle and her dignity as the most noble part of pure creation; a circular movement which encompasses the very order of the parts of the universe. …And this circular movement imitates in some way the circular movement between the begotten Wisdom and the mother of this Wisdom, which imitates in its turn more profoundly the circular movement between the Father and the perfect and consubstantial Image of the Father: “quasi sit rota in medio rotae—as it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel” (Ezek. 1:16).98

97 Ego Sapientia, 10.2. 98 Ego Sapientia, 13.1.

63

These two texts cannot be understood without a theological principle that is only implicit in the text as a whole. Put briefly, the order of the processions within the

Trinity is the reason and cause of the order the universe, and consequently, as we will see, of its circular order, constituted by the coming forth of creatures from God and their return to Him. In other words, the order which divine Wisdom communicates to all that issues from it is derived from the Trinitarian processions.

This principle, though clearly at work in the passages just quoted and throughout the first part, is never directly formulated or explained in Ego Sapientia. It will be necessary for us to consider the Trinitarian order of divine wisdom in its own right if we want to understand fully the nature of the argument of the first part.

Excursus on the Causality of the Divine Processions

Prologue to the Commentary on the Sentences

Thomas Aquinas articulates this theological principle in the prologue of his

Commentary on the Sentences. There are a number of noteworthy similarities between this text and De Koninck’s book on Mary, the most obvious of which is the opening phrase: Ego Sapientia. Thomas’s introduction to his Sentences commentary is presented as an exegesis of the hymn of Wisdom in Sirach 24. He finds in this hymn an expression of the order of all things proceeding outside of God—an order marked by coming forth from and returning to the Principle—as derived from the eternal processions in God. The texts from Chapters 10 and 13 of Ego Sapientia quoted above, which define Mary’s role as principle of the universal order in

64 relation to the Trinitarian processions and circularity, effectively set Mary within

Thomas’s schema of divine wisdom and the created universe. What, then, is this schema?

Thomas’s prologue is constituted as a gloss on the Wisdom hymn in Sirach

24. He begins by quoting verse 40:

Ego Sapientia: I, Wisdom, have poured out rivers. I, like a stream out of a river of mighty water: I, like a channel of a river, and like an aqueduct, came out of paradise. I said: ‘I will water my garden of plants and I will water abundantly the fruits of my meadow.’99

Making use of the image of a mighty river from which a lesser channel of water is derived, Thomas describes divine wisdom as drawing its works in the world from the “rivers” of the divine life itself. He writes, “I take these rivers to be the flowing of the eternal procession whereby the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy

Spirit from both, in an ineffable manner.”100 The work of wisdom is at once a making known and a communication of the fluxus or flowing of the divine Persons in their eternal processions, a work that is accomplished by way of creation, redemption, and the complete return of the creature to God in grace.

Through the wisdom of God the hidden things of God are made manifest and the works of creatures are produced, and not only produced, but restored and perfected. I mean that perfection whereby a thing is called perfect when it has attained its proper end.101

99 Thomas Aquinas, In Sent., prologue. “Ego sapientia effudi flumina: ego quasi trames aquae immensae defluo: ego quasi fluvius Dorix, et sicut aquaeductus exivi de . Dixi: rigabo hortum plantationum, et inebriabo pratus mei fructum (Sir. 24:40).” 100 In Sent., prologue. “Ego sapientia effudi flumina. Flumina ista intelligo fluxus aeternae processionis, qua filius a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque, ineffabili modo procedit.” 101 In Sent., prologue. “Per sapientiam enim Dei manifestantur divinorum abscondita, producuntur creaturarum opera, nec tantum producuntur, sed etiam restaurantur et perficiuntur: illa, dico, perfectione qua unumquodque perfectum dicitur, prout proprium finem attingit.”

65 In other words, the exitus and reditus of creatures from and back to God finds its deepest explanation in the inner life of God, which is an exchange of Persons by way of processions.

The basic principle governing this account is the causality of the divine processions. Appropriating divine wisdom to the Son, in virtue of the likeness of the works mentioned above to the characteristics proper to Him, Thomas writes:

Rightly then does the person of the Son say, ‘I, like a stream out of a river of mighty water,’ in which is noted both the order and mode of creation. Order, because as a stream is derived from a river, so the temporal procession of creatures [derives] from the eternal procession of persons…. It is always what is first that is the cause of what is after, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics 2); hence the first procession is the cause and reason (causa et ratio) of every subsequent procession. The mode is signified… on the part of the creature, because just as the stream proceeds beyond the bed of the river, so the creature proceeds from God beyond the unity of essence, in which as in a river bed the flowing of the persons (fluxus personarum) is contained.102

The eternal processions are the causa et ratio of the procession of creatures. De

Koninck’s Marian thesis, expressed in Chapters 10 and 13, cannot be understood without at least implicit reference to this principle. We must therefore try to grasp this causality of the divine processions more fully.

102 In Sent., prologue. “Recte ergo dicitur ex persona filii: ego quasi trames aquae immensae defluo; in quo notatur et ordo creationis et modus. Ordo, quia sicut trames a fluvio derivatur, ita processus temporalis creaturarum ab aeterno processu personarum… Semper enim id quod est primum est causa eorum quae sunt post, secundum philosophum; unde primus processus est causa et ratio omnis sequentis processionis. Modus autem signatur quantum ad duo: scilicet ex parte creantis, qui cum omnia impleat, nulli tamen se commetitur; quod notatur in hoc quod dicitur,immensae. Item ex parte creaturae: quia sicut trames procedit extra alveum fluminis, ita creatura procedit a Deo extra unitatem essentiae, in qua sicut in alveo fluxus personarum continetur.”

66 Emery on The Order of Processions as Cause of the Order of Creation in Thomas

How can the processions be properly causes of things outside of God? The power by which God acts, the act itself, and therefore the effects of that act belong to the divine Persons in common, as to a single principle, in virtue of the unity of the divine essence. It is impossible to point to any created effect and to say, for example,

“This was done by the Son rather than the Father or the Spirit.” To do so would be to divide God into three, and to destroy the divine nature. Scripture sometimes attributes an action to one or another of the divine Persons. For example, Christ says in Jn. 16:13: “When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth.” But this way of speaking cannot be taken as exclusive, as though the Father and the Son do not also guide the Church toward the truth. Rather, such passages are generally read as appropriating divine actions to a particular Person in order to manifest something proper to Him through some affinity of that property with the act.

According to this reasoning, creation is appropriated to the Father because it has an affinity with His personal property as Principle without principle in God.

What, then, does Thomas mean when he says that the divine processions are the causa et ratio of the procession of creatures? In an essay entitled “The Personal

Mode of Trinitarian Action in St. Thomas Aquinas,” Gilles Emery insists that a simple dichotomy between unilateral divine causality, on the one hand, and the appropriative mode of speaking on the other, flattens Thomas’s real teaching concerning the divine action.

The mistake of this first response [those who limit the Personal aspect of the divine act to appropriation] does not therefore consist in an error about the principles invoked (the unity of the divine act and the appropriations), but

67 rather in the exclusivity that it attributes to them, as if the rule of the unity of operation constituted, by itself, all the explication, the single key for understanding the action of the Trinity. Aquinas’s theory does not present such an exclusivity… . In other words, the rule of the indivisibility of the Trinity in its act ad extra is perfectly exact and fundamental, but its application is excessive if one pretends to reduce to it all the aspects of the action of the divine Persons.103

While affirming the unity of the divine action ad extra, Emery argues that Thomas does not leave the Persons in their distinctness or the divine processions outside of

God’s causality.104 On the contrary, he attributes to them a proper causality in the formal, final, and even efficient orders.

Emery’s primary concern in the article is to demonstrate that Thomas holds a mode of action proper to each divine Person, following His distinct mode of being.105

“The Son exists in receiving his being eternally from the Father, and he acts in receiving eternally his act from the Father.”106 By “mode of action” Emery does not mean either a distinct action or a distinct effect, but rather that each Person possesses the one divine act, even as He possesses the one divine essence, according to the relations of origin that constitute Him as a distinct divine Person. In other words, as the Son is God from God; He creates as God from God.

103 Gilles Emery O.P., “The Personal Mode of the Trinitarian Action in St. Thomas Aquinas,” in Trinity, Church, and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays, 115-153 (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press, 2007), 127. (Hereafter, “Personal Mode.”) 104 “In the divine action, the essence is not on one side, with the personal properties on the other side. Everything converges in the relation (conceived as based on the procession) and in the person who formally gathers the aspect of the distinction and the aspect of the essence. The persons create and act in the world in virtue of the processions…” (Emery, “Personal Mode,” 126). 105 "Though the same nature is in Father and Son, it is in each by a different mode of existence, that is to say, with a different relation" (De Potentia, q2 a1 ad13). "Licet eadem natura sit in Patre et Filio, est tamen secundum alium modum existendi, scilicet cum alia relatione." 106 Emery, “Personal Mode,” 132.

68 The proper mode of the personal action does not imply that the effect is exclusively proper to one person (the created effect, like the divine action that produces that effect, is appropriated); rather, this mode concerns the relative property of the persons, that is, the intra-Trinitarian relation of person to person.107

The inseparability of the divine Persons in their actions and in their relationship with creatures should not be seen, Emery argues, as obscuring the distinction of

Persons. The perfectly common and unified divine act, then, is not emptied of the relational aspect of the divine Persons, but rich, as it were, with the Triune life.108

This continuity between the inner life of God and His creative and redemptive works is, according to Emery, at the heart of Thomas’s account of the

Trinitarian causality in creation. But that account is not limited to the personal mode of action, that is to the order of efficient causality. Emery interprets Thomas’s claim that the processions are the causa et ratio of creation and redemption in the broadest possible way:

The Trinitarian processions are the exemplary, efficient, and final source of the procession of creatures (creation and grace), the motive of the creative action on the part of God, and the principle of creatures in the ontological order and in the order of intelligibility.109

It is the exemplar and final causality of the processions in particular that throw light on the order that divine wisdom gives to its works.

107 Emery, “Personal Mode,” 143. 108 Another way to make this point is to say that the perichoresis of the divine Persons, which involves the order of relation, is true of the economic as well as immanent Trinity. According to the doctrine of perichoresis, the divine Persons mutually indwell one another so that where one is, the three are inseparably present. But this very doctrine is built on the mutual relations that constitute that perfect communion. “Relation thus grounds the Trinitarian communion. Perichoresis sheds light not just on the being and the relations of the Trinity in itself, but also on the act of the Trinity within this world. In the first place, the mutual ‘being in’ of the persons implies their common act”(Emery, “Personal Mode,” 147). 109 Emery, “Personal Mode,” 123.

69 In another article, Emery compares Thomas’s account of the Trinitarian causality of creation in the Commentary on the Sentences with those of Sts. Albert and Bonaventure.110 Thomas adopts much of the thought of both, but all three are building upon a line of thought already well-established, as Albert indicates in a sed contra:

Anselm says that the procession of the persons is the cause of the procession of creatures, as appears to be the case in this verse: For he spoke, and it came to be; he commanded, and it stood firm, etc. [Psalm 33:9 (32:9) and 148:5]; and in this: By the word of the Lord the heavens were made [Psalm 33:6 (32:6)]. And Augustine explains it thus: He engendered the Word by whom all things were made. Thus, since the cause is anterior to the effect caused, it appears that the power by which the persons proceed is anterior to the power of creating and operating. The same [teaching] is derived from John 1:3, All things came into being through him. It is therefore necessary to presuppose the Word and the power of the procession of the Word before all things.111

The discussion here turns on the divine power with respect to the notional acts and with respect to creation, but the argument assumes, in part on the strength of the

Scriptural texts, a proper causality with respect to the procession of the Word. That is, the fact that the creation is said to be accomplished through the Word is taken to indicate a causality of the procession of the Word vis-à-vis creation, and hence to

110 “Trinity and Creation: The Trinitarian Principle of the Creation in the Commentaries of Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas on the Sentences,” in Trinity in Aquinas, 33-70 (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press, 2006). Hereafter: “Trinity and Creation.” 111 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 36; quoting Albert, In I Sent. d20 a3 s.c.: “Anselmus dicit, quod procession personarum est causa processionis creaturarum: sicut etiam patet in illo versu: Ipse dixit, et facta sunt: ipse mandavit, et create sunt (Ps. 32:9; Ps. 148:5): et illo, Verbo Domini coeli firmati sunt, etc. (Ps. 32:6) Quod exponens Augustinus, dicit: verbum genuit in quo erat ut fieret: cum ergo causa sit ante causatum, videtur quod potentia qua procedunt personae, sit ante potentiam creandi et operandi. Idem accipitur, Joan. 1:3, Omnia per ipsum facta sunt: ergo necesse est Verbum et potentiam processionis Verbi omnibus praesupponere.”

70 show the primacy of the divine power as generative over divine power as creative.112

In explanation of this causality, Albert quotes St. Basil: “To receive a nature is common to the Son and to all creatures.”113 Emery comments, “we find here an analogy per prius et posterius between the nature which the Son receives from the

Father through generation, and that which the creature receives from his

Creator.”114 The procession of the Son is the first and perfect communication of divine being; in the Word, all things are somehow already spoken. The procession of creatures is an imperfect communication of a finite participation in divine

112 Cf. De Pot. q2 a6 s.c.; co. “Now God is able both to generate and to create by one power, and all the more seeing that the generation of the Son is the prototype of the production of creatures, as Augustine expounds the words, He spoke, and they were made (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6, 7): That is to say He begot the Word in whom they existed as things to be made. Therefore the generative and creative powers are but one power”; “Accordingly if we take power in its relation to an essential act, such as intelligence or creation, and power in its relation to a notional act such as generation, and compare them together as power, we find that they are one and the same power, even as nature and person have but one being. And. yet we understand at the same time that each power has its peculiar relationship to its respective act to which it is directed. Therefore the generative and creative powers are one and the same power, if we consider them as powers, but they differ in their respective relationships to different acts.” “Sed per unam potentiam Deus potest generare et creare, praecipue cum generatio filii sit ratio productionis creaturae; secundum illam Augustini expositionem: dixit, et facta sunt; id est, verbum genuit, in quo erat ut fierent. Ergo una tantum potentia est generandi et creandi” ; “Si ergo potentia quae est respectu actus essentialis, sicut potentia intelligendi vel creandi, comparetur ad potentiam quae est respectu actus notionalis (cuiusmodi est potentia generandi) secundum id quod est ipsa potentia, invenitur una et eadem potentia, sicut est unum et idem esse naturae et personae. Sed tamen utrique potentiae cointelligitur alius et alius respectus, secundum diversos actus ad quos potentiae dicuntur. Sic ergo potentia generandi et creandi est una et eadem potentia, si consideretur id quod est potentia; differunt tamen secundum diversos respectus ad actus diversos.” In this article, Thomas shows that the power of generation and the creative power of God are identical in being, though they differ in account in relation to the respective acts of generation and creation. The act of generation is not that through which God creates, but the power whose act in God is generation, or the perfect communication of the divine being, is identical with the power whose lesser act is creation, or the imperfect communication of being by way of a finite participation. This reasoning would allow Thomas to say with Albert, “It is therefore necessary to presuppose the Word and the power of the procession of the Word before all things.” Yet the full meaning of creation “through the Word” must be further developed. 113 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 38; quoting Albert, In Sent. prologue: “Accipere naturam Filio cum omni creatura commune est.” Albert in turn is quoting St. Basil, Homilia 15, De fide, no. 2 (Migne, Patrologia Graeca, 31, 467-68). 114 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 38.

71 perfections. All creatures resemble God in some way, but in so doing, they are conformed to the One who comes forth from the Father as perfect, consubstantial

Image. Though creation as an act is common to the three Persons, its term is a conformity to the procession of the Son in a proper way, so that in the order of exemplar causality, the procession is not a cause by appropriation but properly.

Bonaventure, drawing on the principle of the primacy of the first,115 likewise finds a proper, and exemplar causality, in the procession of the Son. Emery writes:

The Son proceeds as ratio exemplandi. Generally speaking, we must thus recognize that the generation of the Son is the exemplary reason for all emanation. The same principle was to direct Thomas’s thinking when he attributed the procession of creatures to the procession of the Son: a perfect Image who possesses the plenitude of divine perfection, archetype, and reason for the production of creatures by way of an imitation of nature.116

As we saw above, Thomas turns to a related principle, by way of Aristotle, to justify the attribution of causality to the procession of the Son in his prologue. “It is always what is first that is the cause of what is after, according to the Philosopher; hence the first procession is the cause and reason of every subsequent procession.”117

115 “We find here, at the heart of St. Bonaventure’s thinking on the Father, a principle which was to be used by Thomas in his commentary in order to explain the connection between the Trinity and creation: Within a given genre, primacy provides the reason for the role of principle assumed by the first ‘element’ in this genre with regard to that which comes afterwards” (Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 48; citing Bonaventure, I Sent. d27 a. un., q2 ad3 [sol auctoritas]: “ratio primitatis in aliquo genere est ratio principiandi in illo”). 116 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 50; citing Thomas, In I Sent., d10 q un. a1 sol. “…we trace back the procession of creatures, imperfectly representing the perfection of the divine nature, to the perfect image containing the divine perfection most fully, namely, the Son, as to a principle, and as though [the former] were a natural procession of creatures from God, that is, according to the imitation of His nature, the exemplar and reason.” “…processionem creaturarum naturae divinae perfectionem imperfecte repraesentantium reducimus in perfectam imaginem, divinam perfectionem plenissime continentem, scilicet filium, tamquam in principium, et quasi naturalis processionis creaturarum a deo, secundum scilicet imitationem naturae, exemplar et rationem.” 117 In Sent., prologue. “Semper enim id quod est primum est causa eorum quae sunt post, secundum philosophum; unde primus processus est causa et ratio omnis sequentis processionis.”

72 Albert also sees in the procession of the Spirit the exemplar and reason of the return of the creatures to God. Of course, there is no “return” to the Father in God in the sense that there is a prior separation to be overcome. In His procession from the

Father, the Son does not leave or depart from the unity of essence, and so strictly no reditus like that of creatures is required or possible. But there is nevertheless a certain return to the Father “to the extent that the reciprocal love of the Father and the Son implies a ‘return’ of love to the Father (union of the persons) and that the power of spiration is communicated to the Son by the Father, thus referring back to the Father.”118 An analogous return is already found in the very procession of creatures insofar as coming forth from a principle implies order to an end. But the

118 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 44. Thomas identifies this second union in the Trinity, the union of the persons through love, in several places; for example in his commentary on John 17:22, and a parallel text in his Roman commentary: “We should say to this that there is a twofold unity of the Father and the Son: a unity of essence and of love. In both of these ways the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father. The words ‘even as you, Father, are in me, and I in you,’ can be understood of the unity of love, according to Augustine, and then the meaning is: even as you, Father, are in me, through love, because love, charity, makes one be with God. It is like saying: as the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father, so the disciples love the Father and the Son. Then the words ‘even as’ do not imply equality but a remote likeness” (In Ioan., cap. 17 l. 5). “Sed dicendum, quod in patre et filio est duplex unitas, scilicet essentiae et amoris; et secundum utramque pater est in filio, et filius in patre. Quod ergo hic dicit sicut tu, pater, in me, et ego in te, potest referri uno modo ad unitatem amoris, secundum Augustinum, ut sit sensus: sicut, te, pater, es in me per amorem, quia caritas facit unum esse cum Deo; quasi diceret: sicut pater diligit filium, et e converso; ita ipsi diligant patrem et filium. Et sic ly sicut non dicit aequiparantiam, sed quamdam remotam similitudinem.” “In reply to the third we should say that the Father and the Son are one in two ways: through essence, and thus He says: ‘I and the Father are one,’ (Jn. 10); and through the consonance of love, and this union is through the Holy Spirit, and concerning this [union] it is said in Jn. 17: ‘that they may be one in us as we are one,’ namely, through the consonance of love, for in this way we are all one in God and not through essence. For if there were not another union in the divinity except through the essence, the Lord would not have said, that they may be one in us as we are one. Whence this is to be understood as referring to the unity which is through the consonance of love” (Lect. Rom. d10 q3 ad3). “Ad tertium dicendum quod Pater et Filius sunt unum dupliciter: per essentiam, et sic dicit: ego et Pater unum sumus, Ioannis X; et per consonantiam amoris, et haec unio est per Spiritum Sanctum, et de hac dicitur Ioannis XVII: ut sint unum in nobis sicut et nos unum sumus, scilicet per consonantiam amoris, hoc enim modo omnes unum sumus in Deo et non per essentiam. Si enim non esset alia unio in divinis nisi per essentiam, non diceret Dominus, ut sint unum in nobis sicut et nos unum sumus. Unde intelligitur de unitate quae est per consonantiam amoris.”

73 return that Albert considers, and with him Bonaventure and Thomas, is that of the rational creature to God in grace, a return accomplished by a particular renewal or intensification of the causality of the processions in the created order—that is, by the temporal processions or missions, a point we will discuss in greater detail below.

Bonaventure attributes exemplarity, in the coming forth of creatures, to the

Spirit as well, who, proceeding as Love and Gift, is the reason for all divine giving.

Emery writes:

Examining the formula “the Holy Spirit is the Gift by whom all gifts are given,” Bonaventure attributes to the Holy Spirit (in a proper way and not simply by attribution) the exemplary causality with regard to created gifts. In this sense, the Holy Spirit proceeds as the first Gift, “in such a way that every right and free act of giving takes place after this [first act of giving] and receives from it the very nature of an act of giving.”119

Emery follows this remark with an important clarification. The claim is not that divine gifts are the sole effect of the Holy Spirit. “This is rather a question of exemplary causality under the aspect of the mode of procession of the divine person, as we saw in the study of the procession of the Son (ratio exemplandi).”120

Bonaventure considers the exemplarity on the side of God’s love for the creature rather than of the creature’s impulse of return toward the Father, and in fact associates the return of the creature with the Son in particular. The reason for this is that he sees both processions as pointing or leading back toward their

Principle, and consequently, he sees that the Father is the ultimate source to whom

119 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 51; quoting Bonaventure, In I Sent., d18 a. un., q1 concl.: “Ipse enim prociedit per modum primi doni, ita quod omnis donation recta et gratuita post illam est et ab illa accipit rationem donationis.” 120 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 51.

74 we are brought back. This being so, it is by conformity to the Son, who first comes forth from the Father, that we are brought back to Him.

Bonaventure attributes this reductio to the Son, for it is in his image that we become children of God: All subsequent reality must be ‘led back’ by the first in the genre. The Holy Spirit himself, since he proceeds from the Son, is ‘reduced’ to the Father by the Son with the creatures whom he leads back.121

The attribution of the leading back to the Son or to the Spirit in diverse ways is appropriative, but the return to the Father by conformity to the Son indicates a proper causality of the Son.

This last point shows the very close affinity of exemplar and final causality in the processions with repsect to the rational creature in particular. Even in the order of nature, the creature returns to God both by its proper likeness to Him and by its place in the larger order of the universe. But in the order of grace there is both explicit knowledge of the divine Persons in their distinctness, and an incomparably superior conformity to the procession of the Son and Spirit. While the grace of adoption and the gifts of wisdom and love, like all divine effects, are referred to the agency of the Three Persons in common, these gifts conform us to particular divine

Persons (and this is very closely tied to exemplar causality), but still more, unite us to the Persons, that is, allow us to attain the Persons in their distinct properties.

Emery writes,

St. Thomas is very clear: By grace, “we enjoy (fruimur) the property of each person.” To enjoy the divine Person is to be “conformed” to the Son and to the Holy Spirit who are sent to us, and to be united to the divine Persons as “object” of knowledge and of love, that is, to be caught up in the divine

121 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 52.

75 Persons known and loved by faith (and then by vision) and by charity (fruition).122

The creature can be said to enter into the very relation of the Son and Spirit to the

Father, as we will see in greater detail below in the discussion of the missions. The processions belong to the rational creature’s attainment of his supernatural end, when he is “caught up in the divine Persons known and loved.”

In his prologue to the Sentences commentary, Thomas makes this Trinitarian causality the principle of the order of the theology, which follows the order of things seen in their First Principle. In distinguishing Thomas’s use of the principle of the causality of the processions from that of his predecessors, Emery writes,

Neither Albert nor Bonaventure developed the creative causality of the Trinitarian processions in a manner comparable to Thomas. The systematic exploitation of this thesis appears as a characteristic feature of his theology. The Trinitarian processions are the exemplary, efficient, and final source of the processions of creature (creation and grace), the motive of the creative action on the part of God, and the principle of creatures in the ontological order and in the order of intelligibility.123

In the prologue, Thomas characterizes wisdom as a channel flowing out of a mighty river, communicating the very order of the processions to all that comes forth from

Him. This is the order that the highest Wisdom places in all its works.

Circularity

There is a second aspect to the causality of the processions without which we will not be able to grasp De Koninck’s argument fully. Having established that Mary, as wisdom, connects the order of the universe to the order of the processions in God,

122 Emery, “Personal Mode,” 151, quoting Aquinas, In I Sent., d1 q2 a2 ad2: “Proprietate uniuscujusque personae fruimur.” 123 Emery, “Personal Mode,” 123.

76 De Koninck adds in Chapter 13 that this order is circular, having its roots in the circular movement between the Father and the Son.124 How Mary is a principle of this circular order in creation will emerge in our reading of the chapters leading up this claim. Here we will lay the groundwork for that argument by considering this circular movement as it is found in God, and how it relates to the causality of the processions.

Emery introduces this question by way of St. Albert. Albert argues that within the Trinity, the processions have a certain circular character because, as the Father is the origin, so also He is in some way the term of the processions.

Albert makes particular use here of the dynamics of love, suggesting the image of a “circle” of procession within the Trinity (origin in the Father and return to the Father): He who loves proceeds in some way toward the one who is loved, and the loved one returns to the lover, within a context of reciprocal love (egressus-regressus) which gives rise to a medium consisting of love.125

Albert sees this pattern of egressus-regressus as the foundation of the dynamic of exitus and reditus in creation. We have already discussed the qualification we must make regarding the idea of a “return” in God. What we should note here is that the circular structure of reality is itself seen as a particular likeness to the Trinitarian life. In its divine root Albert conceives of this circularity in the form of a union of

124 “There is set up then a circular movement between her dignity as a separated principle and her dignity as the most noble part of pure creation; a circular movement which encompasses the very order of the parts of the universe. … And this circular movement imitates in some way the circular movement between begotten Wisdom and the mother of this Wisdom, which imitates in its turn more profoundly the circular movement between the Father and the perfect and consubstantial Image of the Father: “quasi sit rota in medio rotae—as it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel” (Ezek. 1:16)” (Ego Sapientia, 13.1). 125 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 43-44; citing Albert, In I Sent., d11 a1 sol.: “…for the one loving in a certain way goes out into the object loved, and the one loved in a certain way returns into the one loving, and love itself is the medium of going forth from them.” “…diligens enim quodammodo egreditur in rem dilectam, et dilectus in rediligendo quodammodo regreditur, et ipse amor est medium egrediens ab eis.”

77 love. On the side of the divine economy, “this circular structure finds its chief expression in the Incarnation of the Son, in whom the ‘conjunction’ of the ultimum

(man) to the primum (God) is accomplished, thus bringing about the perfect completion of the circle.”126

While Thomas does not speak about a circular movement in God in this context,127 he does speak in another place of a circularity in the divine processions of Word and Love from the Father. In Question 9, Article 9 of the De Potentia,

Thomas asks whether there are three divine Persons. He argues from the dual activities of the intellectual nature, which involve an internal procession, but distinguishes these acts and their corresponding processions in God from their creaturely counterparts. The creature depends on something external both in the beginning, and in the completion of its intellectual acts. In this way, a circle is established from the good perceived by the creature back to itself.128 The good moves the intellect to know it, and the intellect in turn presents the good to the will, which makes a return to the good by love.

126 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 44; citing Albert, In III Sent., d20 a4 sed contra 5: “Further, the perfection of the universe consists in a circular measure, as the Philosopher showed: and because nothing can be added to a circle, therefore it is the greatest perfection of the natural world. Therefore, since the works of God are likewise perfect, the last should be concluded in the first so that there is a circle. But the first is God, and the last is man: therefore God and man ought to be united, and this should happen, even if man should not sin.” “Item, Perfectio universi consistit in dimensione circulari, ut probat Philosophus: et quia circulo nihil est addibile: ergo maxima perfectione naturae mundus est perfectus: ergo cum similiter Dei perfecta sunt opera, ultimum debet concludi in primum ut fiat circulus: primum autem est Deus, et ultimum homo: ergo Deus et homo debent uniri: et hoc contingeret, etiamsi homo non peccaret.” Cf. d1 a1 arg. 3. 127 Emery observes this difference in Albert and Thomas’s use of the causality of the processions as explaining the circular structure of reality. “The idea of circulatio/regyratio associated with the processions of the persons appears to be a theme previously analyzed by Albert in his study of the concept of procession, and one which Thomas employs systematically but only in the context of ad extra works” (Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 64). 128 The intellectual creature can know itself, and in this way the circle is completed in it without reference to something actually external. But the perfection of the intellectual acts is found in an object that is above and other than the creature itself, namely, God.

78 Accordingly, both in us and in God there is a certain circular movement (circulatio) in the acts of the intellect and will: for the will returns to that whence came the beginning of understanding: but in us the circle ends in that which is external, the external good moving the intellect and the intellect moving the will, and the will by appetite and love tending to the external good.129

God, however, does not depend on anything external in the acts of understanding and love.

Now the order of understanding and willing is not the same in God as in us. We receive our intellective knowledge from external things: and by our will we tend to something external as an end. … On the other hand God does not acquire knowledge from things, but by his knowledge is the cause of things: nor by his will does he tend to anything external as his end, but he directs all external things to himself as their end.130

Therefore, the circular movement of divine knowing and loving begins and ends in

God Himself.131 There is a circularity to the acts of the intellectual nature as such, but this circularity is found pre-eminently and in a more perfect way in God. This circularity is the only one explicitly so-named by St. Thomas with reference to the

Trinity.

129 “Est ergo tam in nobis quam in Deo circulatio quaedam in operibus intellectus et voluntatis; nam voluntas redit in id a quo fuit principium intelligendi: sed in nobis concluditur circulus ad id quod est extra, dum bonum exterius movet intellectum nostrum, et intellectus movet voluntatem, et voluntas tendit per appetitum et amorem in exterius bonum” (De Pot. q9 a9 co.). 130 “Ordo autem intelligendi et volendi aliter se habet in Deo et nobis. Nos enim cognitionem intellectivam a rebus exterioribus accipimus; per voluntatem vero nostram in aliquid exterius tendimus tamquam in finem. Et ideo intelligere nostrum est secundum motum a rebus in animam; velle vero secundum motum ab anima ad res. Deus autem non accipit scientiam a rebus, sed per scientiam suam causat res; nec per voluntatem suam tendit in aliquid exterius sicut in finem, sed omnia exteriora ordinat in se sicut in finem” (De Pot. q9 a9 co.). 131 “[I]n God, on the other hand, the circle ends in him. For God, by understanding himself, conceives his word which is the type of all things understood by him, inasmuch as he understands all things by understanding himself, and from this word he proceeds to love of all things and of himself.” “… sed in Deo iste circulus clauditur in se ipso. Nam Deus intelligendo se, concipit verbum suum, quod est etiam ratio omnium intellectorum per ipsum, propter hoc quod omnia intelligit intelligendo seipsum: et ex hoc verbo procedit in amorem omnium et sui ipsius” (De Pot. q9 a9 co.).

79 In Albert’s account, the circular movement belongs not to the reciprocity of the intellectual acts of knowledge and love, but to the nature or dynamics of the divine love itself. Nevertheless, Thomas also sees the procession of the Holy Spirit as a certain return to the Father in love, a return that also constitutes a mutual or reciprocal relationship between Father and Son. We see this reciprocity in clearly where he speaks of the procession of the Spirit as, in a certain respect, a mutual procession of the Father and Son toward one another.

The Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father to the Son and from the Son to the Father, not as recipients but as objects of love. For the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father to the Son inasmuch as he is the love whereby the Father loves the Son; and in the same way it may be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son to the Father inasmuch as he is the love whereby the Son loves the Father. 132

As we saw above, Thomas holds that in the mutual procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son, there is a second union of the divine Persons, in addition to the undisturbed unity of essence.133 It is precisely this second union that is the pattern of the return of the rational creature God for both Thomas and Albert.

Thomas sees the “flowing of the divine Persons”134 as the reason and cause of the circular structure of reality, of the exitus and reditus of creatures from and back

132 “[S]piritus sanctus et a patre procedit in filium, et a filio in patrem, non quidem sicut in recipientem, sed sicut in obiectum amoris. Dicitur enim spiritus sanctus a patre in filium procedere, inquantum est amor quo pater amat filium; et simili ratione potest dici quod spiritus sanctus est a filio in patrem, inquantum est amor quo filius patrem amat” (De Pot. q10 a4 ad10). 133 See note 119 above. 134 “Flumina ista intelligo fluxus aeternae processionis, qua filius a patre, et spiritus sanctus ab utroque, ineffabili modo procedit. … sicut trames procedit extra alveum fluminis, ita creatura procedit a Deo extra unitatem essentiae, in qua sicut in alveo fluxus personarum continetur” (Thomas, In Sent., prologue). “I take these rivers to be an eternal procession whereby the Son proceeds from the Father and the Holy Spirit from both in an ineffable manner. …just as the brook proceeds beyond the bed of the river, so the creature proceeds from God beyond the unity of essence, in which as in a river bed the flow of the persons is contained.”

80 to God. In the complexity of its diffusion in space and time, creation bears within itself the rhythm of this reciprocity of procession and union found in God Himself, but radicalized by otherness, by a being that is not God. Spoken through the Word, creation tends toward a likeness of that Word in seeking to make a return to its

Origin by a knowing love. Thus the circular order of the processions is the cause and reason of the circular order of creation. In this sense, what was spoken in silent eternity was spoken again and anew in time.

We have also distinguished the causality of the processions in the coming forth of creatures from God from the causality of the same processions in the definitive return to God through grace. It is the temporal processions that become the principle of the final reditus. The missions of the divine Persons bind the created order to the processions in a new and incomparably more perfect way than creation alone. On Thomas’s account of the effects of the mission of the Spirit, Emery writes:

The exposition is based upon the circular structure (circulatio) of the real, which takes place around a unique reality (God as principle and end) by means of the same media: The procession from the principle and the return to the end are accomplished per eadem. The audacity of this theological insight lies in the identification of these media with the processions of the divine persons: Just as they are the ratio productionis creaturarum a primo principio, the processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are the ratio redeundi in finem.135

The temporal processions of the Son and Spirit are the road by which man achieves his definitive union with God, entering into the unitatem or consonantiam amoris of the Father and the Son.136

135 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 61-62. 136 “I answer, it should be said that, although in the divine persons properly speaking procession is said according to the ratio of going out from a principle, which does not necessarily tend into

81 Missions

It is this new and unimaginable penetration of the created order by the divine Persons that permits a creature to become a principle connecting the universe to the order of the processions. The relation of the missions to the eternal processions, and their power to draw man into intimacy with the divine Persons, is therefore of particular importance if we are to understand Mary as Wisdom in the fullest sense.

Although the missions of the divine Persons are the principle of the work of redemption, and encompass the Incarnation and its effects, Thomas does not treat them at the beginning of the Tertia Pars, as one might expect him to. He places them rather at the end of the treatise on the Trinity in the Prima Pars, prior to the consideration of any of the works of God ad extra, even creation. The reason for this perhaps surprising choice is found in the body of the first article. Thomas begins by distinguishing two elements in the notion of a mission. The first is a relation of the one sent to one who sends (that is, some manner of procession from another), and a new relation to the term to which he is sent (that is, a new presence of the one sent).

With respect to the term of the sending, the divine Persons cannot of course begin to be where they were not before, since they are everywhere by essence, power, and presence, in Thomas’s words, “as the cause existing in its effects which

another, however the procession of the Holy Spirit has this from the mode of his own procession, inasmuch namely as he proceeds as love, which tends into another, namely into the beloved, as into the object” (Aquinas, In I Sent., d14 q1 a1 co.). “Respondeo dicendum, quod quamvis in personis divinis, proprie loquendo, dicatur processio secundum rationem exitus a principio, qui non necessario tendit in aliud, tamen processio spiritus sancti ex modo suae processionis habet, inquantum scilicet procedit ut amor, quod in alium tendat, scilicet in amatum, sicut in objectum.”

82 participate in His goodness.”137 They can, however, begin to be present in creatures in a new way. Thus in the visible missions, the second Person of the Trinity begins to be visibly present in the world as the author of sanctification, and the third Person of the Trinity as the sign of sanctification.138 In the invisible missions, the Son and the Holy Spirit begin to be present in the soul as in a temple, by sanctifying grace.139

137 STh Ia, q43 a3 co.: “sicut causa in effectibus participantibus bonitatem ipsius.” 138 “God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as explained above. Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures. This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to be the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification” (STh Ia, q43 a7 co.). “Respondeo dicendum quod Deus providet omnibus secundum uniuscuiusque modum. Est autem modus connaturalis hominis, ut per visibilia ad invisibilia manuducatur, ut ex supra dictis patet, et ideo invisibilia Dei oportuit homini per visibilia manifestari. Sicut igitur seipsum Deus, et processiones aeternas personarum, per creaturas visibiles, secundum aliqua indicia, hominibus quodammodo demonstravit; ita conveniens fuit ut etiam invisibiles missiones divinarum personarum secundum aliquas visibiles creaturas manifestarentur. Aliter tamen filius et spiritus sanctus. Nam spiritui sancto, inquantum procedit ut amor, competit esse sanctificationis donum, filio autem, inquantum est spiritus sancti principium, competit esse sanctificationis huius auctorem. Et ideo filius visibiliter missus est tanquam sanctificationis auctor, sed spiritus sanctus tanquam sanctificationis indicium.” 139 “The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone; and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace. For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace. Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent. To the first I reply that, by the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given” (STh Ia, q43 a3 co., ad1). “Respondeo dicendum quod divinae personae convenit mitti, secundum quod novo modo existit in aliquo; dari autem, secundum quod habetur ab aliquo. Neutrum autem horum est nisi secundum gratiam gratum facientem. Est enim unus communis modus quo Deus est in omnibus rebus per

83 In fact, of course, all three Persons dwell in the soul by grace, as implied in the doctrine of perichoresis discussed above. Yet only the Son and Spirit are sent, and this is because of the first element of a mission, a procession from another.

This relation to one who sends in the missions of the divine Persons in the world is nothing other than the eternal processions of the Son from the Father and the Spirit from Father and Son. The term of the sending is something new, something in time, but the root of the sending is the eternal processions, through which a divine Person is said to be from another, and therefore can fittingly be said to be sent. The missions of the divine Persons have, as it were, one foot in eternity and one foot in time. The mission itself is something in time because of its term, but the word “procession” itself, which denotes only the origin, can refer either to the immanent procession of the Persons in eternity or to the procession of the Persons from the same origin into the world.140 Hence, the missions are sometimes called the

essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, sicut causa in effectibus participantibus bonitatem ipsius. Super istum modum autem communem, est unus specialis, qui convenit creaturae rationali, in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante. Et quia, cognoscendo et amando, creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea sicut in templo suo. Sic igitur nullus alius effectus potest esse ratio quod divina persona sit novo modo in rationali creatura, nisi gratia gratum faciens. Unde secundum solam gratiam gratum facientem, mittitur et procedit temporaliter persona divina. Similiter illud solum habere dicimur, quo libere possumus uti vel frui. Habere autem potestatem fruendi divina persona, est solum secundum gratiam gratum facientem. Sed tamen in ipso dono gratiae gratum facientis, spiritus sanctus habetur, et inhabitat hominem. Unde ipsemet spiritus sanctus datur et mittitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per donum gratiae gratum facientis perficitur creatura rationalis, ad hoc quod libere non solum ipso dono creato utatur, sed ut ipsa divina persona fruatur. Et ideo missio invisibilis fit secundum donum gratiae gratum facientis, et tamen ipsa persona divina datur.” 140 “But ‘procession’ and ‘going out from,’ in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission” (STh Ia, q43 a2 co.). “Processio autem et exitus dicuntur in divinis et aeternaliter et temporaliter, nam filius ab aeterno processit ut sit Deus; temporaliter autem ut etiam sit homo, secundum missionem visibilem; vel etiam ut sit in homine, secundum invisibilem missionem.”

84 temporal processions. It is for this reason that they are treated within the treatise on the Trinity itself rather than together with the work of redemption in the Tertia

Pars.141

Nevertheless, the missions are at the root of the whole economy of salvation, which at once reveals the divine Persons in their properties and allows man to receive the divine Persons themselves. The missions, and the work of redemption carried out through them, bring the processions into the world in a radically new way, and at the same time, offer man entrance into the mystery of the eternal processions in a similarly new way.

Although we are speaking about the missions with reference to man’s end, and hence the Trinity as final cause, the missions themselves belong to the efficient order, and it is in virtue of the personal mode of existence and action of the Persons who are sent that the missions manifest the eternal relations and give man a certain entrance into them. Emery summarizes Thomas’s teaching that the visible missions

“consist in a twofold manifestation: the manifestation of the eternal procession of the person sent, and the manifestation of a plenitude of grace that flows forth visibly, in the presence of witnesses, in order to establish the Church in faith and charity through word and sacrament.”142 The Person is made known exactly in the

141 “This context of the study of the divine missions is completely remarkable. On the one hand, it signifies that while treating the missions of the persons, the theologian does not cease to probe the intra-Trinitarian mystery. On the other hand it indicates that the divine persons, in their mission, are given according to their personal distinction.” Gilles Emery O.P., “The Treatise on the Trinity in the Summa Theologiae,” in Trinity in Aquinas, 121-164 (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press, 2006), 159-160. 142 Emery, “Personal Mode,” 145; citing Aquinas, In I Sent., d16 q1 a1 and a2. “Three things therefore belong to the account of the visible mission of the Holy Spirit: namely, that He is sent from another, and that he comes to be in another in a special mode, and that each of these is shown by a visible sign, on account of which the whole mission is said to be visible” (a1).

85 way in which He appears as the source of grace in the world, and this way corresponds to His personal properties, which are relative properties. The Son comes visibly as making the Father known and as giving the Holy Spirit: as the author of sanctification. The effect of the missions of the divine Persons is identical—no one effect of the divine action can be attributed to one divine Person rather than another—but the visible mission manifests the way in which the sanctifying act belongs to each; namely, in the case of the Son, as received from the

Father and origin of the Holy Spirit.143 “What acts in virtue of another tends in its effect to reveal that other,” Thomas writes, “for the action of a principle which proceeds from another principle manifests this principle.”144

The visible missions are ordered to the invisible; they not only reveal the

Trinity but offer man communion with God, a share in the divine life. Emery speaks of the divine indwelling by grace, which is common to the three Persons, but which nonetheless introduces to the soul a special conformity to the personal properties of the Son and Holy Spirit. “St. Thomas here speaks of a ‘sealing’ (sigillatio) of the Son and the Spirit who give men a participation in their eternal relation to the Father, by

“Ad rationem ergo visibilis missionis spiritus sancti tria concurrunt, scilicet quod missus sit ab aliquo; et quod sit in alio secundum aliquem specialem modum, et quod utrumque istorum per aliquod visibile signum ostendatur, ratione cujus tota missio visibilis dicitur.” 143 In the visible mission of the Son, the humanity of Christ is a principle of acts that belong properly to Him. These are acts of the divine Person through the conjoined instrument of His humanity, and so are called theandric acts. But the power these acts have of manifesting the properties of the Son does not arise solely from the fact that they are worked through the human nature and hence attributed to the Son alone—rather these acts manifest the Son because the humanity is hypostatically united to Him, and hence exists according to the mode proper to the Son: the filial mode. Hence all that is worked in and through His humanity expresses the Son’s relation to the Father and to the Holy Spirit. Cf. Emery, “Personal Mode,” 141, citing STh IIIa q16 a4 q19 a1. 144 In Ioan., cap.17 l. 1, cited in Gilles Emery, O.P., “Biblical Exegesis and the Speculative Doctrine of the Trinity in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on St. John,” in Trinity in Aquinas, 272-298 (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press, 2006), 292. “Sciendum est enim, quod agentis cuiuslibet, quod agit ab alio, intentio est reducere suum effectum in causae manifestationem: nam ex actione principii quod est de principio, manifestatur ipsum principium.”

86 imprinting in the saints a participation of their eternal relation. By faith and charity, fruits of grace, the saints have access to the Father by participating in the relation which the Son and the Spirit hold with the Father.”145 Here Emery cites St. Thomas in the Commentary on the Sentences.

Just as the divine goodness is said to proceed into creatures in the going forth of things from the principle—inasmuch as it is represented in the creature through a likeness to the divine goodness received in itself; so also in the return of the rational creature into God, the procession of the divine person is understood, which is also called a sending inasmuch as the proper relation of the divine person itself is represented in the soul through some likeness having been received of which it is the exemplar and origin from the property of the eternal relation itself. As the proper mode by which the Holy Spirit is carried back to the Father is love, so too there is a proper mode of referring the Son back to the Father, because he is his own [the Father’s] word manifesting himself. Whence, as the Holy Spirit proceeds invisibly in the mind through the gift of love, so the Son [proceeds invisibly] through the gift of wisdom; in which is the manifestation of the Father himself, who is the final end (ultimum) toward which we run.146

In this text we return to exemplar causality in the effect of the mission, which is the participation of the creature in the properties of the divine Person, but we also see that in this conformity to the divine Persons, man completes his return to God, and specifically, by way of the Son and the Holy Spirit, in whose properties he comes to

145 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 162. 146 In I Sent., d15 q4 a1 co. “[S]icut in exitu rerum a principio dicitur bonitas divina in creaturas procedere, inquantum repraesentatur in creatura per similitudinem bonitas divina in ipsa recepta; ita in reductione rationalis creaturae in Deum intelligitur processio divinae personae, quae et missio dicitur, inquantum propria relatio ipsius personae divinae repraesentatur in anima per similitudinem aliquam receptam, quae est exemplata et originata ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae; sicut proprius modus quo spiritus sanctus refertur ad patrem, est amor, et proprius modus referendi filium in patrem est, quia est verbum ipsius manifestans ipsum. Unde sicut spiritus sanctus invisibiliter procedit in mentem per donum amoris, ita filius per donum sapientiae; in quo est manifestatio ipsius patris, qui est ultimum ad quod recurrimus.”

87 participate, he returns to the Father, as his final end.147 Thus the circle of the going forth and return of creation is completed in and through the processions, just as it was begun, but in this order of grace the return is worked on a higher level, through a radically new involvement of the processions in creation by the divine missions.

Conclusion of Excursus on the Causality of the Divine Processions

Thomas sees in the causality of the Trintarian processions the reason and cause of the very order of creation.

The procession of the divine persons is the cause, the reason, the origin, or the archetype of the procession of creatures. Thomas sees in this the main foundation for the structure of the exitus-reditus which is the inspiration behind his theological examination of all reality and dictates the organizational arrangement of his commentary.148

The eternal processions are in this account the true illuminating principle of reality—that which explains most profoundly the reason for all that comes forth

147 Though Emery does not, one could also speak of adoptive sonship as a participation in the eternal relation of the Son to the Father, offered to man by the mission of the Son. Thomas does so in his commentary on the letter to the Ephesians: “It must be through contact with fire that something starts to burn since nothing obtains a share in some reality except through whatever is that reality by its very nature. Hence the adoption of sons has to occur through the natural son. For this reason the Apostle adds ‘through Jesus Christ,’ which is the third characteristic touched on in this blessing, namely, the mediator who draws all to himself. ‘God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that he might redeem them who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons’ (Gal. 4:4-5). This is accomplished unto himself, that is, inasmuch as we are conformed to him and become servants in the Spirit. ‘See what love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God; and so we are,’ after which comes: ‘We know that when he shall appear we shall be like him’ (1 Jn. 3:1-2)” (Super Eph. cap. 1 l.1). “Quia vero illud quod fit ignitum, per ignem hoc oportet fieri, quia nihil consequitur participationem alicuius, nisi per id quod est per naturam suam tale: ideo adoptionem filiorum oportet fieri per filium naturalem. Et ideo addit apostolus per Iesum Christum. Et hoc est tertium, quod tangitur in isto beneficio, scilicet mediator alliciens. Gal. IV, 4-5: misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere, factum sub lege, ut eos qui sub lege erant, redimeret; ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Et hoc in ipsum, id est inquantum ei conformamur, et in spiritu servimus. I Io. III, 1: videte qualem charitatem dedit nobis Deus, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus. Et sequitur ibidem et scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus.” 148 Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” 53.

88 from God. Such a first principle, understood as giving a definite order to all that comes forth from it, is nothing other than the Divine Wisdom.

This is the perspective from which we can approach De Koninck’s most properly theological account of Mary as wisdom, which culminates in the claim that

“she is rooted in the order of the Trinity, and she ties up the order of the universe, in a radically new way, with the order that is in God according to the processions.”149

As we pursue the argument that leads up to this thesis, we will see in particular how

Mary enters into the divine missions, which are the cause of this new entrance of creation into the Trinitarian order.

Commentary on Chapters 4-7 in light of Trinitarian Wisdom

The first part of Ego Sapientia considers Mary as wisdom, looking first at the relation to God whereby she is established as wisdom, and second, at her relation to the world, in which her role as wisdom—that is, as the source of order—is manifested. To be such a source, she must be a knowing origin of the One who is the absolutely first principle according to His own nature, and it is this relationship to the first principle that enables her in turn to be the source of the order of all things.

Chapters 3-7 address the first point, Mary as wisdom in her relation to God. In our initial reading of Chapters 3-5, we saw that Mary, by her Fiat, knowingly becomes the cause and origin of the Redeemer-God.

On a second level, De Koninck considers Mary as wisdom not only broadly as origin of God and thereby the source of the universal order, but in light of the

Trinitarian content of divine Wisdom. Attending to this principle, a second reading

149 Ego Sapientia, 10.2.

89 of Chapters 4 and 5, together with the next two chapters, will reveal the way in which Mary’s motherhood associates her with the divine missions, and therefore with the very order of the processions. This account will form the foundation of the central theses of Chapters 10 and 13.150

Chapter 4: The Likeness of the Eternal and Temporal Generations

Our initial reading of Chapter 4 established that Mary is a principle of the

Son with knowledge, through her Fiat. On a deeper level, this consent also leads us to see that Mary’s motherhood is shaped by the eternal relations of the divine

Persons. In this chapter we meet with the repeated use of the word ‘procession.’ The new order is said to proceed from the Fiat of Mary as creation from the Fiat in

Genesis. But at the conclusion of this chapter, Mary’s Fiat is compared to another and prior procession. De Koninck writes:

That the Virgin imitates in her Fiat, the procession of the Son within God according to knowledge, Mr. Olier tells us most impressively: “…As (the eternal Father) begets His Word from all eternity by His knowledge, by a return upon, and a vision of, Himself, He wishes that Mary, the most perfect and most holy image of his virginal fecundity, also beget Him knowingly.151

The procession of the Son from Mary is an image of the eternal procession of one and the same Son from His eternal Father insofar as she begets Him in virtue of her word of consent. Now, the role of the understanding in the two cases is quite

150 These theses were introduced in the section entitled, “Wisdom and the Trinitarian Processions,” above. 151 Ego Sapientia, 4.4.

90 different.152 The Son does not proceed from the Father in dependence on a prior act of consent, but with the necessity of nature. Yet the Son proceeds as the Word of the

Father, the fruit and expression of the divine self-knowledge. In Mary’s case, the Son does not come forth according to an intellectual mode, although His conception is related to the intellect in a unique way, as discussed above. Nevertheless, this remote likeness of the temporal generation to the eternal indicates the continuity between them, which is based on the identity of the one who is begotten.

In the question on the nativity of Christ, Thomas asks whether He is Son of the Father and of Mary by one filiation or two. He argues first that the cause of sonship in Christ is twofold, since it is nativity that causes the relation of sonship, and there are two nativities of Christ which differ specifically. However, the subject of sonship is the Person rather than the nature, and nothing outside of God can place a real relation in a divine Person. Therefore, Christ’s birth from Mary does not introduce a second relation of sonship to the divine Person. But this “lack” of a second filiation should not be understood as diminishing Mary’s status as true principle of Christ.

152 “The procession of Christ imitates very perfectly the procession of the Word. In both [there is] true generation. In God, the Word proceeds according to the Understanding. Here on earth, inasmuch as He proceeds by way of generation, He does not proceed according to the understanding. However, thanks to the knowledge of the Blessed Virgin concerning what her Son would be, we can say that in this respect our Lord proceeds according to the understanding. She gave her consent to this Son who must save mankind. She has established herself as the principle of the whole universal order. This is why one can say of her that she is Wisdom. In this respect, there is no antecedent principle, except the divine Wisdom, which moves ‘suaviter et fortiter’” (De Koninck, “Mercy and Redemption”). “La procession du Christ imite très parfaitement la procession du Verbe. Dans les deux : véritable génération. En Dieu, le Verbe procède selon l’Intelligence. Ici bas, en tant qu’Il procède par voie de génération, Il ne procède pas par intelligence. Cependant, grâce à la connaissance de la Sainte Vierge sur ce que serait son Fils, on peut dire que sous ce rapport Notre-Seigneur procède selon l’intelligence. Elle a donné son consentement à ce Fils qui doit sauver le genre humain. Elle s’est établie elle-même le principe de tout cet ordre universel. C’est pourquoi on peut dire d’elle qu’elle est Sagesse. Sous ce rapport, il n’y a pas de principe antérieur, si ce n’est la Sagesse divine qui la meut « suaviter et fortiter ».”

91 First, Mary is not less truly the Mother of Christ than any other human mother of any human son: in her, the relation of maternity is real.153 But further, as

Christ is established in His Personhood only by His eternal birth from the Father, it is this relation that He expresses also in His temporal missions. In other words, the unicity of sonship in Christ in a certain way allows His birth from Mary to express

His birth from the Father. It is consummately fitting that when the Son chooses Mary as a principle of His temporal birth, he makes that birth express His eternal birth by a certain likeness. While normally a son is conformed to the condition of his mother, this Mother is conformed, in her giving birth, to the properties of the Son.154 Since

153 “Now, every relation which is predicated of God from time does not put something real in the eternal God, but only something according to our way of thinking, as we have said in the First Part. Therefore the filiation by which Christ is referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation of reason. Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must say that there are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if we consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although lordship is not a real relation in God, yet He is really Lord through the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her motherhood to Christ” (STh IIIa q35 a5 co.). “Omnis autem relatio quae ex tempore de Deo dicitur, non ponit in ipso Deo aeterno aliquid secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum, sicut in prima parte habitum est. Et ideo filiatio qua Christus refertur ad matrem, non potest esse realis relatio, sed solum secundum rationem. Et sic quantum ad aliquid utraque opinio verum dicit. Nam si attendamus ad perfectas rationes filiationis, oportet dicere duas filiationes, secundum dualitatem nativitatum. Si autem attendamus ad subiectum filiationis, quod non potest esse nisi suppositum aeternum, non potest in Christo esse realiter nisi filiatio aeterna. Dicitur tamen relative filius ad matrem relatione quae cointelligitur relationi maternitatis ad Christum. Sicut Deus dicitur dominus relatione quae cointelligitur reali relationi qua creatura subiicitur Deo. Et quamvis relatio dominii non sit realis in Deo, tamen realiter est dominus, ex reali subiectione creaturae ad ipsum. Et similiter Christus dicitur realiter filius virginis matris ex relatione reali maternitatis ad Christum.” 154 We do not deny that Christ is also conformed to His mother, as all children are. Nor is this conformity limitd to the reception of her nature. De Koninck argues in the second part of the book that she forms Christ in the humility that corresponds to His mission. “She therefore had to adapt herself to her Son’s future condition, and even to anticipate it in some way, and to prepare the way for Him: above all because, just as proud mothers impress pride and a haughty spirit upon their sons, so likewise humble mothers impress upon their sons a meek and submissive spirit” (Ego Sapientia, 29.1).

92 He is the One who is born as the Father’s Word, He chooses to be born also, though in a different way, by the word of his Mother.155

Thus, while there is no real relation in Christ in virtue of His procession from

Mary, her true motherhood is characterized by the nature of His eternal procession.156 Seeing this likeness between the Father and the Blessed Virgin reinforces our grasp of the unity of the eternal and temporal processions. It also

155 “The eternal Father, first Person of the blessed Trinity, engenders his consubstantial image, the Word of God, the Son, the second Person of the Trinity. And this Son proceeds, he is born eternally from the Father according to a purely intellectual procession, entirely spiritual. And in this birth of the Son in God proceeds at the same time the representation of all that God can do and all that He has done. But among the things of which the Word is the conception—without Whom nothing of what has been made has been made—there is first of all the Son himself, but as incarnate, as savior, and of his Mother ‘united in all eternity to Jesus Christ, in a mysterious manner, by one and the same decree of predestination.’ Without the Mother, the incarnate Son could not have the nature of son according to humanity, but only according to his birth from the eternal Father. In other words, God has willed that the coming of the Son among us should be a procession by way of birth, which imitates the eternal generation to the point of being, it too, a generation in the most proper sense of the word” (Charles De Koninck, La Piété du Fils: Études sur l’Assomption, [Québec: Les Presses Université Laval, 1954], 34; unpublished translation by David Quackenbush). “Le Père éternel, première Personne de la très sainte Trinité, engendre son Image consubstantielle, le Verbe de Dieu, le Fils, la deuxième Personne de la Trinité. Et ce Fils provient, il naît éternellement du Père selon une procession purement intellectuelle, entièrement spirituelle. Et dans cette naissance du Fils en Dieu procède en même temps la représentation de tout ce que Dieu peut faire et de tout ce qu’Il fait. Or, parmi les choses dont le Verbe—sans lequel rien n’a été fait de ce qui a été fait—est la conception, il y a, premièrement le Fils lui-même, mais en tant qu’Incarné, le Sauveur, et sa Mère ‘unie de toute éternité à Jésus-Christ, d’une manière mystérieuse, par un même et unique décret de prédestination.’ Sans la Mère, le Fils incarné n’aurait pas la nature de Fils selon son humanité, mais uniquement selon sa naissance de Père éternel. En d’autres termes, Dieu a voulu que la venue du Fils parmi nous soit une procession par voie de naissance, qui imite la génération éternelle à ce point d’être, elle aussi, une génération au sens le plus propre du mot. ” 156 While the principal likeness highlighted in this chapter between the Son’s eternal and temporal births is the role of knowledge, other likenesses are also indicated. M. Olier calls Mary the image of the Father’s “virginal fecundity,” indicating that in both cases there is generation without sexual union. In Chapter 23, quoting St. Bernard, De Koninck also introduces the likeness of the two generations in the aspect of silence, or hiddenness. “'In the womb of his mother, (The One Who Is) is as if he were not: thus sleeps the almighty as if he were impotent, and the eternal Word holds itself in silence.’ Yet, in this silence is hidden the most powerful manifestation of the Word: by this silence in the womb of the mother, the Word imitates at the same time in a very striking manner His silent procession in the bosom of the Father” (Ego Sapientia, 23.1). In both cases the Son, who is the Word, comes forth as the manifestation or expression of the Father, and yet in both cases, His procession is unseen by man. Such silence is found of course in every human conception, but it takes on a particular poignancy in light of the virginal conception. Mary alone among human beings knows the Word that comes forth from her mouth, as in eternity God alone knows the Father’s Word.

93 begins to show us how Mary’s role as principle of Christ draws her close to the eternal processions in a way that is wholly unique to her.

Chapter 5: Mary as a Principle of the Temporal Procession of the Son

Chapter 5 introduces another likeness to Himself that the Father creates in

Mary, not by a comparison of the two generations, but insofar as they are principles of the temporal generation itself. The Son is inseparable from the Father, His eternal origin and principle, and cannot be understood apart from Him. This inseparability remains true of the Son as man; the Incarnate Word cannot be understood apart from His relation to His Father.157 And yet, since He willed that His procession within the world be a true generation, the Incarnate Word also cannot be understood apart from Mary.

“Mother of the Redeemer,” De Koninck writes, “she is inseparably united to this final cause as coprinciple,” and, “The mother is not understandable without the

Son, nor is the Redeemer-Son understandable without the mother.”158 In the same decree by which God places Christ at the head of His works, He places Mary there as well.159 “Mother of Emmanuel, that is to say, principle of “the Powerful with us,” she

157 As discussed above, even the humanity of the Son, while distinct from the Godhead, is characterized by the personal mode of the Son, in whom it has subsistence. Thus, all that the Son is and does expresses the Father, and this is characteristic of His very Person. The mission of the Son depends on this power of the Son’s humanity to express the eternal relation of the Son to the Father, which is nowhere more apparent than the Gospel of John. For example, Christ says: “Whoever believes in me believes not in me but in him who sent me. And whoever sees me sees him who sent me’” (Jn. 12:44-45), and “the Father and I are one” (Jn. 10:30). Knowledge of Christ is above all knowledge that He is the one who comes from the Father. “Now they know that everything you have given me is from you… and know in truth that I came from you; and they have believed that you sent me” (Jn. 17:7-8). 158 Ego Sapientia, 5.1, 2. 159 “Hence the revered Mother of God, from all eternity joined in a hidden way with Jesus Christ in one and the same decree of predestination…” (Pius XII, Munificentissimus Deus, 40).

94 is the first predestined among all pure creatures.”160 Mary’s predestination is implied in Christ’s own because it is essential to His temporal procession that He make for Himself a second principle from whom He comes forth as man.

Mary’s predestination to be the Mother of God results in a mutual (though diverse) procession of Mary and Her Creator from one another.

She proceeds from the One who made her so that He Himself could proceed from her. It is as principle that she proceeds from the Principle: her procession from the Principle is for the sake of the procession of this same Principle, and she contains within herself the Principle in her procession from Him; she is held by Him in His procession from her. “Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi primogenita omnis creaturae—I came out of the mouth of the Most High, first born before all creatures” (Sir. 24:5). And in this procession from the mouth of the Most High she is herself the mouth which utters the Word.161

Like all creatures, Mary comes forth from God, but unlike any other creature, she comes forth from Him in order that He might come forth from her. All creatures are like the Son in their coming forth from God, but only Mary shares with the Father being the principle from whom the Son proceeds. By being a principle of the temporal mission of the Son, Mary herself is uniquely assimilated to the eternal procession of the Son, uniquely drawn into the relations of the divine Persons.

“Idcirco augusta Dei Mater, Iesu Christo, inde ab omni aeternitate, ‘uno eodemque decreto’ praedestinationis, arcano modo coniuncta…” “Predestined from eternity by that decree of divine providence which determined the incarnation of the Word to be the Mother of God, the Blessed Virgin was on this earth the virgin Mother of the Redeemer, and above all others and in a singular way the generous associate and humble handmaid of the Lord” (Vatican Council II, Lumen Gentium, 61). “Beata Virgo, ab aeterno una cum divini Verbi incarnatione tamquam Mater Dei praedestinata, divinae Providentiae consilio, his in terris exstitit alma divini , singulariter prae aliis generosa socia, et humilis ancilla Domini.” 160 Ego Sapientia, 5.1. 161 Ego Sapientia, 5.2.

95 It is in view of this mutual procession that De Koninck introduces the theme of circular motion for the first time in Ego Sapientia.

The Son and the mother thus constitute, from the beginning, a kind of circular movement, where the principle is the term and the term is the principle; a movement which is the symbol of the Wisdom that reaches from one end to the other—“Attingit a fine usque ad finem” (Wis. 8:1).162

This circular motion is unique to Mary. It is not like the circular motion found in

God, because the divine Persons do not proceed mutually; nor is it like the circular motion of creation as a whole, since no other creature returns to God in such a way as to become a principle of a divine Person. Mary’s return to God is truly sui generis; she returns to God as a principle of the principle whereby all things return to Him.

Chapter 6: The Divine Maternity and the Hypostatic Order

Chapters 6 and 7 speak about the grace by which Mary is set apart from all other creatures. This grace is first of all the grace of the divine maternity itself, which is proper to her alone. But Mary also possesses a grace of sanctification, and this grace she holds in common with all the faithful. Yet, as the doctrine of the

Immaculate Conception reveals, even this grace in Mary is set apart from all others of its kind. In both cases, it is due to Mary’s unique relationship to the temporal processions, the principles of the whole order of redemptive grace, that she herself possesses grace, even the grace of sanctification, in a supereminent manner.

Chapter 6 considers the grace of the divine maternity itself. “Being truly the mother of God,” De Koninck writes, “the Blessed Virgin is tied to the hypostatic

162 Ego Sapientia, 5.2.

96 order in the most intimate way possible for a pure creature.”163 Msgr. Maurice

Dionne, who is acknowledged by De Koninck in the foreword, explains this claim in an article entitled, “The Grace of Mary is of the Hypostatic Order.”164 Hypostatic in the theology of the Incarnation refers to the divine Person of the Word in whom the union of the divine and human natures takes place. We can distinguish in Christ the grace of the hypostatic union itself and his habitual grace or the grace that sanctifies

His human soul. According to St. Thomas, the latter is a fruit of the former, a direct result of the subsistence of the divine Person in human nature.165 Because it is possessed in virtue of the divine Person itself, the habitual grace of Christ belongs to the hypostatic order.

The grace of the divine maternity is likewise of the hypostatic order.166 This does not mean that Mary’s person is divine, but that her motherhood itself

163 Ego Sapientia, 6.1. 164 Msgr. Maurice Dionne, "La Grâce de Marie est d'Ordre Hypostatique," in Laval théologique et philosophique 10, no. 2 (1954):141-5. English translation by Jared Keubler. Hereafter, “The Grace of Mary;” “La Grâce de Marie.” 165 “For grace is caused in man by the presence of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence of the sun. … But the presence of God in Christ is by the union of human nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood to follow this union, as light follows the sun” (STh IIIa q7a13co.). “Gratia enim causatur in homine ex praesentia divinitatis, sicut lumen in aere ex praesentia solis... Praesentia autem Dei in Christo intelligitur secundum unionem humanae naturae ad divinam personam. Unde gratia habitualis Christi intelligitur ut consequens hanc unionem, sicut splendor solem.” “Hence habitual grace is not understood to have preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a natural property. Hence, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): ‘Grace is in a manner natural to the Man Christ’” (STh IIIa q7a13ad2). “Unde gratia habitualis non intelligitur ut praecedens unionem, sed ut consequens eam, sicut quaedam proprietas naturalis. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod gratia est quodammodo Christo homini naturalis.” 166 “In fact, the hypostatic union formally constitutes the hypostatic order, which infinitely transcends the order of grace and glory. Even the divine maternity belongs, because of that in which it terminates, to the hypostatic order, and it transcends the plenitude of grace in Mary although this plenitude is, indeed, a derived and most fitting perfection so that the Blessed Virgin Mary may be worthy to be the Mother of God.” Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange O.P., Christ the Savior: A Commentary on the Third Part of St Thomas' Theological Summa, trans. Dom Rose (B. Herder Book Co., 1950), commentary on STh IIIa q24 a2, http://www.thesumma.info/saviour/saviour54.php.

97 terminates in the divine Person, the source of all grace. This is the highest grace possible even in principle, for a pure creature.167 De Koninck concludes the sixth chapter, quoting the Mariale: “Mary alone is full of grace, for she cannot have a greater grace: … that is to say that except being God Himself it is impossible to conceive a greater grace than that of being the mother of God.”168

In light of this maximal elevation, De Koninck formulates the circular motion found in Mary in a second way.

Having left the height of heaven, her path is completed in the same height. “A summo caelo egressio ejus: et occursus ejus usque ad summum ejus” (Ps. 18:7). She alone has traversed the circle of heaven: she alone of all creatures is the wisdom which has pierced the depths of the abyss. “Gyrum caeli circuivi sola, et profundum abyssi penetravi” (Sir. 24:8).169

As a creature, Mary comes forth from God in diversity of essence, and hence infinitely remote from her Origin. Yet, by the extraordinary grace bestowed on her, she reaches the hypostatic order, and so returns as intimately as possible to her divine Origin. In this sense she reaches from one extreme to the other and back again.

Chapter 7 Mary’s Habitual Grace and the Order of Redemption

167 “The divine maternity is by its nature higher than adoptive sonship. This latter produces only a spiritual and mystic relationship, whereas the maternity of the Blessed Virgin establishes a relationship of nature, a relationship of consanguinity with Jesus Christ and one of affinity with the entire Trinity.” Edouard Hugon, O.P., Marie, Pleine de Grâce, 5th ed., (Paris: Lethielleux, 1926), 63; quoted by R. Garrigou-Lagrange in “The Divine Maternity, Its Eminent Dignity,” ch. 1 in The Mother of the Savior and Our Interior Life, trans. Bernard Kelly, 17-40 (Rockford: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 1993), 38. 168 Ego Sapientia, 6.1. 169 Ego Sapientia, 6.1.

98 De Koninck proceeds in Chapter 7 from the grace of the divine maternity to the gratia gratum faciens,170 that is, the sanctifying grace in Mary’s own soul. In relation to the division of the first part according to the general criteria of wisdom abstractly predicated, this chapter develops the question of Mary as a knowing principle. Mary’s free consent was itself a gift of God, flowing from the holiness she already possessed in virtue of the Immaculate Conception. From the perspective of wisdom in light of the Trinitarian processions, however, Chapter 7 continues the discussion of Chapter 6, showing the special character of Mary’s grace in light of her role as principle of the temporal procession.

It is relatively easy to identify the grace of the divine maternity as reaching the hypostatic order. In comparison, Mary’s sanctifying grace appears to be on a level with our own, even if it is the highest instance thereof. This grace is a participated grace, like our own, and unlike Christ’s habitual grace, it does not stem directly from the union of a divine Person with the assumed human nature.

Nevertheless, Msgr. Dionne insists that “not only does the grace of the divine maternity belong to this order, but even the gratia gratum faciens of Mary. In other words, the [habitual] grace of Mary is distinguished again from ours by an eminent mode proper to the hypostatic order.”171

Why does Dionne make this claim? The divine maternity makes Mary a principle of the visible mission of the Son, while the holiness of Mary is the fruit of

170 Cf. STh Ia IIae, q111 a1 co. 171 Dionne, “The Grace of Mary.” “Et non seulement la grâce de la maternité divine appartient à cet ordre, mais aussi la grâce ‘gratum faciens’ de Marie. En d’autres termes, la grâce de Marie se distingue elle encore de la nôtre, par une mode eminent proper à l’ordre hypostatique” (“La Grâce de Marie,” 142).

99 the invisible missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. The distinction between principle and fruit seems to be grounds for distinguishing also between what belongs to the hypostatic order and what belongs instead to the derivative order of redemption. And yet, because of the Fiat, the hypostatic union itself, the principle of our sanctification, is also a fruit of Mary’s sanctification. It is this fundamental ordination of Mary’s holiness to her role as Mother of God that sets her sanctification apart from all others.

De Koninck argues that in proportion to her office as Mother of a divine

Person, it was fitting that Mary have an extraordinary form of holiness. Quoting John of St. Thomas, he writes: “Because it belongs to the very hypostatic order which, of itself, entails a more elevated form of sanctity, the maternal dignity demands in all propriety and connaturality, holiness.”172 We could understand this point in a as simply indicating that a person with a lofty office ought to be fittingly distinguished in other ways as well. It would be unseemly for a head of State to live in a hovel, or for a Queen to appear dressed as a servant. Likewise, according to this reasoning, the vessel that receives Our Lord’s bodily presence ought to be the purest and fairest ever to have graced the earth.

But the correspondence between Mary’s sanctifying grace and her maternity can be understood more deeply when we consider not only the fact but the purpose of her maternity. The Incarnation itself was undertaken in order to make possible an otherwise inconceivable return of creation to God. And this return, as we have seen, was to be accomplished by giving the creature a new relation to the processions.

172 Ego Sapientia, 7.1.

100 The Incarnation is a new breaking into the world of the eternal procession of the

Son, but it is for the sake of the invisible mission, of the elevation whereby man is caught up into a participation in the eternal processions. Man is to return to God by being assimilated and united to the Son and Spirit in their relation to the Father.

This union is what constitutes the invisible missions.

We saw in the excursus above that the missions constitute man’s return to

God on this account because they mark the soul with the processions. Indeed, they not only mark the soul, but unite the soul to the divine Persons, for which reason the

Persons themselves are said to be given.173

And, because according to the reception of these gifts there is effected in us a likeness to the properties of the persons; therefore, according to a new mode of being, as a thing is in its own likeness, the divine persons are said to be in us, insofar as we are likened to them in a new way. And according to this, each procession is called a mission. Further, as the aforesaid gifts originate from each of the persons, so also they do not attain their effect—so as to be conjoined to their end—unless by the power of the divine persons; because in a form impressed by some agent, the power of the one imprinting is present. Whence, in the reception of this kind of gift, the divine persons are had in a new way as though conducting to the end, or uniting. And therefore each procession is called a giving, inasmuch as there is there a new mode of possessing.174

173 “And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple” (STh Ia, q43 a3 co.). “Et quia, cognoscendo et amando, creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea sicut in templo suo.” 174 Aquinas, In I Sent., d15 q4 a1 co. “Et quia secundum receptionem horum duorum efficitur in nobis similitudo ad propria personarum; ideo secundum novum modum essendi, prout res est in sua similitudine, dicuntur personae divinae in nobis esse, secundum quod novo modo eis assimilamur; et secundum hoc utraque processio dicitur missio. Ulterius, sicuti praedicta originantur ex propriis personarum, ita etiam effectum suum non consequuntur ut conjungantur fini, nisi virtute divinarum personarum; quia in forma impressa ab aliquo agente est virtus imprimentis. Unde in receptione hujusmodi donorum habentur personae divinae novo modo quasi ductrices in finem vel conjungentes. Et ideo utraque processio dicitur datio, inquantum est ibi novus modus habendi.”

101 In other words, the conformity of the soul to the Word and Love is not achieved in a remote way, but by the presence of the divine Persons themselves who fill and move it, and this is why Emery speaks of the return that man makes to God in grace as a participation in the ‘return’ of the Son and Spirit to the Father. “By faith and charity, fruits of grace, the saints have access to the Father by participating in the relation which the Son and the Spirit hold with the Father.” 175

Mary’s holiness is for the sake of her maternity. Her maternity is the principle of the visible mission of the Son, which has as its end the return of man to

God through a new and direct intimacy with the fluxus of the divine Persons— through the invisible missions. When Dionne says that Mary’s gratia gratum faciens is also of the hypostatic order, he is not claiming that it is an unparticipated grace, but that it relates to the order of grace derived from the missions in the same way as

Christ’s, insofar as it fits her to be a principle of that order.

On the one hand, we can distinguish grace of the hypostatic order from all other graces in virtue of the relation to the source of grace, which is God Himself.

Graces that somehow comprehend a divine Person in their very account (the hypostatic union, the divine maternity, and the habitual grace of Christ) are set apart from all other graces, which flow from the divine Persons as a participation.

But in another way, we can distinguish graces according to their relationship to the order of grace and glory in the Church. As the Person of Christ is the source of that order, so likewise His habitual grace, the divine maternity, and even Mary’s own

175 Gilles Emery O.P., “The Treatise on the Trinity in the Summa Theologiae,” in Trinity in Aquinas, 121-164 (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press: 2006), 162.

102 holiness, pertain to the establishment of this order. In this sense, Mary’s sanctifying grace belongs to the hypostatic order itself.

As a universal principle of the grace received by the members of Christ’s

Body, grace that belongs to the hypostatic order differs from all other graces not only in degree, but by the eminence of its mode.

The agent must act on others by reason of a certain pre-eminence. Now it was said above that grace was received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this grace is bestowed on others—and this belongs to the nature of the head. 176

The grace that is the cause of all other graces, is distinguished by a higher mode.

Christ’s grace is had not by participation but by the hypostatic union. Mary’s grace, though derived from Christ’s and participatory in nature, is nonetheless elevated above our own in virtue of her place as co-principle of the order of redemptive grace. Dionne writes:

Likewise, all proportion being guarded, the grace of Mary is distinguished from ours. Our grace is a common grace, an effect of the reparative redemption, and which obeys the common law. On the other hand, the grace of Mary is wholly singular, a privilege which removes the Mother of God from the common law. Non pro te, sed pro omnibus haec lex constituta est (Esther 15:13). 177

176 STh IIIa, q8 a5 co.“Oportet quod agens in alia habeat actum secundum eminentiam quandam. Dictum est autem supra quod in anima Christi recepta est gratia secundum maximam eminentiam. Et ideo ex eminentia gratiae quam accepit, competit sibi quod gratia illa ad alios derivetur. Quod pertinet ad rationem capitis.” 177 Dionne, “The Grace of Mary.” “De même, toute proportion gardée, la grâce de Marie se distingue de la nôtre. Notre grâce est une grâce commune, effet de la rédemption réparatrice, et qui obéit à la loi commune. En revanche, la grâce de Marie est toute singulière, privilège qui soustrait la Mère de Dieu à la loi commune. Non enim pro te, sed pro omnibus haec lex constituta est (Esther, xv, 13)” (“La Grâce de Marie,” 142).

103 This singularity of Mary’s grace is expressed in the doctrine of the Immaculate

Conception.

By an extraordinary privilege Mary’s grace removes her from the inheritance of sin, and hence, in the moral order, from the line of Adam: she is like a new creation, immaculately conceived. Hence, Mary’s habitual grace is not reparative, in the sense of restoring something that was lost, but rather preservative, in the sense of preventing that loss from ever taking place. “Redeemed in a sublime manner,” writes Dionne, “by way of a preservative redemption, she becomes a co-principle of the reparative redemption.”178

The debate over the Immaculate Conception in the Middle Ages was fueled by concern that removing Mary from the ranks of fallen man would compromise the universality of the mediation of Christ. St. Thomas writes:

If the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never incurred the stain of , this would be derogatory to the dignity of Christ, by reason of His being the universal Savior of all. Consequently after Christ, who, as the universal Savior of all, needed not to be saved, the purity of the Blessed Virgin holds the highest place. For Christ did not contract original sin in any way whatever, but was holy in His very Conception, according to Luke 1:35: ‘The Holy which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God.’ But the Blessed Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but was cleansed therefrom before her birth from the womb.179

178 Dionne, “The Grace of Mary.” “Rachetée d’une manière sublime, par voie de rédemption préservatrice, elle devient co-principe de rédemption réparatrice” (“La Grâce de Marie,” 144). 179 STh III q27 a2 ad2. “Ad secundum dicendum quod, si nunquam anima beatae virginis fuisset contagio originalis peccati inquinata, hoc derogaret dignitati Christi, secundum quam est universalis omnium salvator. Et ideo sub Christo, qui salvari non indiguit, tanquam universalis salvator, maxima fuit beatae virginis puritas. Nam Christus nullo modo contraxit originale peccatum, sed in ipsa sui conceptione fuit sanctus, secundum illud Luc. I, quod ex te nascetur sanctum vocabitur filius Dei. Sed beata virgo contraxit quidem originale peccatum, sed ab eo fuit mundata antequam ex utero nasceretur.”

104 It was Bl. who saw the way to reconcile the universality of Christ’s mediation with Mary’s freedom from every form of sin:

The most perfect mediator exercises the most perfect act of mediation possible with respect to some person for whom he mediates: therefore Christ had the most perfect form of mediation possible with respect to someone for whom He was Mediator. But for no one did He exercise a more excellent form of mediation than for Mary; therefore, etc. But this would not be so if He had not merited to preserve her from original sin.180

To be completely preserved from sin does not remove Mary from the mediation of

Christ, but is instead the most perfect effect of that very mediation.181 Mary’s redemption does not restore something broken, but prevents original sin from ever taking hold in her.

The dispute between Thomas and Scotus is not perhaps as small a matter as it might seem. Thomas held that Mary was sanctified in the womb, perhaps in the first instant after her conception. We might be excused for thinking that it is a question of the lightest blemish, of a freckle on an otherwise ivory cheek. We might think that we are debating about a matter of days, or even a split-second. But the

180 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, III, d3 q1 n.17. “Perfectissimus enim mediator habet perfectissimum actum mediandi respectu alicujus personae, pro qua mediat; sed Christus est perfectissimus mediator; igitur Christus habuit perfectissimum gradum mediandi possibilem respectu alicujus creaturae sive personae, respectu nullius personae habuit excellentiorem gradum quam respectu Mariae, igitur, etc. Sed hoc non esset nisi meruisset eam praeservari a peccato originali.” 181 In the bull defining the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854, Bl. Pope Pius IX confirms that it is only through the merits of her Son that Mary receives her singular privilege of sanctity. “We declare, pronounce, and define that the doctrine which holds that the most Blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instance of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege, granted by Almighty God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Savior of the human race, was preserved free from all stain of original sin, is a doctrine revealed by God and therefore to be believed firmly and constantly by all the faithful” (Pius IX, Ineffabilis Deus; emphasis added). “Declaramus, pronunciamus et definimus, doctrinam, quae tenet, beatissimam Virginem Mariam in primo instanti suae Conceptionis fuisse singulari omnipotentis Dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum Christi Iesu Salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis culpae labe praeservatam immunem, esse a Deo revelatam, atque idcirco ab omnibus fidelibus firmiter constanterque credendam.”

105 difference between totality and near-totality in this case is much more profound. If we consider her special privilege in light of its purpose within the divine economy, we can discover in the Immaculate Conception and perpetual innocence of the

Blessed Virgin a super-eminent mode of return to God.

The purpose of the missions is to establish the definitive return of the creature to God, a return whereby creation is bound even more closely to the eternal processions of the divine Persons, which are its pattern and cause. In God, where there is no division, unity is added to unity, and there is no moment in which the One who comes forth is not united to His Origin, both by essence and by communion. Man not only came forth from his Origin in diversity of essence, but by his first, and every subsequent sin, refused to make a willing return to God. Every human person from the first to the last, excepting only Mary, has at some point fallen away from the movement of return to God. Since He is God, there can be no question of separation in Christ Himself. But in Mary, who receives her participation in divine life from her Son, we find one perfect example of a creature that at no time and in no degree ever failed to return all that she was to God. Had this not been the case, John of St. Thomas says, there would have been “a maternity which would not have been on Mary’s part a total return to the principle according to her whole being.”182

“If from an absolute power there would have been a maternity without sanctity,” says John of St. Thomas, “the Holy Spirit would not have descended upon her with a mission in the absolute sense. For he would not have lived in her, but he

182 Ego Sapientia, 7.1.

106 would have descended upon her according to a mission in a relative sense.”183 There would be something gravely unfitting in Mary being a principle of the order of grace if she were not prepared by a grace proportionate to that role. Instead, she possesses in a pre-eminent way the gift of which she, with and through her Son, is the giver. Mary’s consent to become the principle of the Son in His procession into the world was itself an entrance into the movement of the Spirit, a response of grace that expressed the term of the invisible missions.

It is because Mary enters into the very order of the processions as co- principle of a divine Person, because she is “tied to the hypostatic order in the most intimate way possible for a pure creature” that her grace is of a unique and super- eminent kind.184 The missions bind the created order in a new way to the order of the processions, and because Mary is predestined to be a principle of this binding for the whole world, she herself is bound to that order more closely still by the movement of grace in her own soul. Dionne writes: “God the Father, principle of the visible mission of the Word which is worked in Mary, predestined her to a superior effect of the invisible mission.”185

Circular Movement: Mary comes forth as a Principle

In Chapters 5 and 6, De Koninck introduced a circular movement found in

Mary. He described it first as a movement of mutual processions between the

Mother and the Son, and then as a movement that, like wisdom, extends from one extreme to the other and returns again. In Chapter 7, the circular movement is

183 John of St. Thomas, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 7.1. 184 Ego Sapientia, 6.1. 185 Dionne, “The Grace of Mary.” “Dieu le Père, principe de la misson visible du Verbe qui s’opère en Marie, l’a prédestinée à un effet supérieur de mission invisible”(“La Grâce de Marie,” 144).

107 expressed in a third way. Here De Koninck identifies a reciprocal movement between the grace of maternity and the grace that renders Mary pleasing to God. By her consent Mary becomes a principle of God as Mother. Yet both her being and her grace-filled consent are from God, who is her Principle.

There is then established, from the grace of maternity to sanctification, a certain circular movement which God saw fit to create in her. It is God, the origin of all things, Who gives it to her to give herself to being the origin of God.186

Like the other two accounts of the circular motion found in Mary, this third account shows that what is unique to Mary is that she comes from God in such a way that she is able to enter into the very order of the processions as principle of the temporal mission of the Son, and hence also of the Spirit. The latter aspect belongs more properly to the consideration of Mary as a principle with respect to the universe, which takes place in the following chapters. Mary is the substantial origin of the Son and not of the Spirit. But it is precisely this special relationship to God that establishes her as a font of God’s gift of Himself to the universe in the order of grace.

The divine Persons come forth without leaving the perfect unity of the divine life. Creatures by their very nature come forth infinitely far from the divine life, though they bear the marks of their origin. By the grace of God in Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit, mankind is enabled to enter again into the divine exchange from which it proceeds. But Mary alone comes forth as a creature in order to be herself an origin of that exchange entering into the world. By doing so, she becomes the principle of the definitive return of all things.

186 Ego Sapientia, 7.3.

108 Commentary on Chapters 8-16

The argument of the first part makes its primary turn in Chapter 8, from

Mary’s relation to God to her relation to the world. By being the cause and origin of

God in her own person and with knowledge, Mary becomes a principle of the whole order of the universe flowing from God as its first cause. “Would Mary not have to be first principle, even in her relationship with God,” De Koninck wrote in Chapter 2,

“to be so close to God that she even participates in the notion of first principle?”187

Hence, Chapters 3-7 consider Mary in her relation to God as principle, and Chapters

8-14 shift to consider Mary as a principle of the order of the universe.

This second part begins with two chapters (8 and 9) establishing the connection between the two parts. Chapters 10 and 13, as we have already seen, together formulate the central theological thesis of the first part, Mary’s role as wisdom in light of the causality of the processions and the circular order of creation.

The intervening chapters turn to the concept of the common good. Together,

Chapters 10-14 give the most explicit account of the universal causality exercised by

Mary in the divine economy. Chapters 15-16 summarize the causality exercised by

Mary as wisdom, and reflect on the proper and super-eminent dignity that is hers in virtue of this role, thus providing the transition from the first part to the second.

187 Ego Sapientia, 2.4.

109 CHAPTER 8 MITTE RADICES (SIR. 24:13)

Faites pousser des racines dans mes élus. Grow roots in my chosen ones. Par cette surabondance de grâce et de gloire By this superabundance of grace and glory exprimée en elle, la très Sainte Vierge effectue le expressed in her, the most blessed Virgin brings retour au principe selon la raison même de principe about the return to the principle according to its de toute grâce et de toute gloire. C'est à elle, en very character as principle of all grace and all qualité de sagesse, qu'il conviendra de mettre dans glory. It is to her, in so far as she is wisdom, that les élus le principe de leur conversion à Dieu, les the role will be assigned of sending forth into the racines divines. Tunc praecepit, et dixit mihi chosen the principle of this conversion to God, the Creator omnium: et qui creavit me, requievit in divine roots. “Tunc praecepit, et dixit mihi Creator tabernaculo meo, et dixit mihi: in Jacob inhabita, omnium: et qui creavit me, requievit in tabernaculo et in Israël haereditare, et in electis meis mitte meo, et dixit mihi: in Jacob inhabita, et in Israel radices—Alors le Créateur de toutes choses me haereditare, et in electis meis mitte radices—Then donna ses ordres: et celui qui m'a créée se reposa the Creator of all things commanded, and spoke to dans mon tabernacle, et il me dit: Habite en Jacob, me: and he that made me, rested in my tabernacle. aie ton héritage en Israël, et pousse des racines And he said to me: let your dwelling be in Jacob, dans mes élus. (Eccli. XXIV, 12-13) En cette and your inheritance in Israel, and take root in my sagesse réside toute la grâce de la voie et de la elect” (Sir. 24:12-13). In this wisdom resides “all vérité, en elle toute l'espérance de la vie et de la the grace of the way and of the truth, in her is all vertu. (Eccli. XXIV, 25) hope of life and virtue” (Sir. 24:25).

CHAPTER 9 APPROPINQUAVIT AD MARE (SIR. 24:43)

Elle a rejoint la mer. She has reached the sea. Demeure édifiée par la Sagesse—Sapientia Dwelling built by Wisdom—“Sapientia aedificavit aedificavit sibi domum (Prov. IX, 1)—“Marie est le sibi domum” (Prov. 9:1)—“Mary is the sanctuary sanctuaire et le repos de la Sainte Trinité, où Dieu of the Holy Trinity, where God exists more est plus magnifiquement et divinement qu'en aucun magnificently and sublimely than in any place in lieu de l'univers, sans excepter sa demeure sur les the universe, not excepting His dwelling about the Chérubins et les Séraphins”.a Cette inhabitation est cherubim and seraphim.”a This indwelling is so si plénière qu'en tant même que sagesse la très complete that insofar as she is wisdom the most Sainte Vierge est le resplendissement de la lumière Blessed Virgin is “the brightness of eternal light, éternelle, le miroir sans tache de la majesté de and the unspotted mirror of God’s majesty, and the Dieu, et l'image de sa bonté — Candor lucis image of his goodness—Candor lucis aeternae, aeternae, speculum sine macula Dei majestatis, et speculum sine macula Dei majestatis, et imago imago bonitatis illius. (Sap. VII, 26) Cette image bonitatis illius” (Wis. 7:26). This image is so est si parfaite qu'à son tour elle a raison de racine et perfect that it has in its turn the character188 of the d'original pour toutes les créatures. Elle fut root and original for all creatures. She was the l'exemplaire sapiential d'après lequel Dieu composa sapiential exemplar in virtue of which God l'univers: Cum eo eram cuncta componens—Je fus composed the universe: “Cum eo eram cuncta avec Lui composant toutes choses. (Prov. VIII, 30) componens—I was with him forming all things” Et en cela même elle est unie à l'image (Prov. 8:30). And in virtue of this she is united to consubstantielle du Père, à la Sagesse engendrée, the consubstantial image of the Father, to begotten au Verbe par lequel toutes choses ont été faites, et Wisdom,189 to the Word by which “all things were

188 Thomist: “it in turn fulfills the function” (12). 189 Thomist: “to the incarnate Wisdom” (12).

110 rien de ce qui a été fait n'a été fait sans Lui. (Jo. I, made, and nothing that was made was made 3) Image de la Bonté, elle imite l'original dans without Him” (Jn. 1:3). Image of Goodness itself, l'universelle diffusion de bonté et elle donne aux she imitates the original in the universal diffusion êtres leur impulsion première et leur mouvement. of goodness and she gives to things their primary Épouse du Saint-Esprit qui se compare aux eaux et impulsion and their movement. Spouse of the Holy se meut au-dessus des eaux, (Gen. I, 2) esprit de Spirit who compares Himself to the waters and Sagesse, elle peut dire à son tour: Ego sapientia who “moves over the waters” (Gen. 1:1), spirit of effudi flumina—Moi, la sagesse, je me suis Wisdom, she can say in her turn: “Ego sapientia déversée en fleuves. Je suis comme le chemin où effudi flumina—I, wisdom, have poured myself out s'écoule l'eau immense d'un fleuve, comme le canal in rivers. I am like a brook out of a river of a d'une rivière et comme une source jaillisant du mighty water, like an aqueduct of a river and like a paradis. (Eccli. XXIV, 40-41) Et sa diffusion est si spring gushing out of paradise” (Sir. 24:40-41). universelle qu'elle y rejoint Dieu, imitant la And her diffusion is so universal that she rejoins190 manière dont Dieu meme se rejoint dans toute God, imitating the manner by which God Himself diffusion de sa bonté: Et ecce factus est mihi rejoins Himself191 in every diffusion of His trames abundans, et fluvius meus appropinquavit goodness: “Et ecce factus est mihi trames ad mare. —Et voilà que mon canal est devenu un abundans, et fluvius meus appropinquavit ad flot abondant, et mon fleuve a gagné la mer. (Eccli. mare—And behold I became a great river, and my XXIV, 43) Miroir sans tache de la majesté de Dieu, river came near to a sea” (Sir. 24:43). Mirror cette sagesse créée est dans son effusion de grâces without blemish of God’s majesty, this created comme un signe formel: aucune limite n'est wisdom is in its effusion of graces as a formal sign: imposée à la médiation de Marie. C'est pourquoi no limit is placed upon Mary’s mediation. This is elle est dite subtilis. Elle pénètre partout à cause de why she is called subtilis. “She reaches everywhere sa pureté. Elle est le souffle de la puissance de by reason of her purity. She is the breath of the Dieu, une pure émanation de la gloire du Tout- power of God, a pure emanation of the glory of the Puissant: c'est pourquoi rien de souillé ne se Almighty: and therefore no defiled thing is found rencontre en elle. (Sap. VII, 22-25) in her” (Wis. 7: 22-25). Ce même tabernacle de la Sainte Trinité, cette This very tabernacle of the Holy Trinity, this demeure édifiée par la Sagesse, cette cité sainte, dwelling built by Wisdom, this holy city, this new cette Jérusalem nouvelle, ce ciel nouveau qui Jerusalem, this new heaven which renews the earth, renouvelle la terre, devient le tabernacle de Dieu becomes the tabernacle of God with men: “Ecce avec les hommes: Ecce tabernaculum Dei cum tabernaculum Dei cum hominibus” (Rev. 21: 3). hominibus. (Apoc. XXI, 3) a Grignion de Montfort, op. cit., n. 5, p. 3. a St. Louis de Montfort, La vraie dévotion, n. 5, p. 3.

190 Thomist: “she reaches God” (12). 191 Thomist: “the manner in which God Himself is found” (12).

111 Chapters 8-9: The Shift from God to the World

Drawing on the consideration of Mary’s extraordinary graces in Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter 8 makes explicit that by these graces, she herself is a cause of the return of the created world to God in the order of grace. She “brings about the return to the principle according to its very character as principle of all grace and all glory.”192 Precisely as wisdom, to which, we recall, it belongs to order all things,

Mary has the role “of sending forth into the chosen the principle of this conversion to God, the divine roots.”193

Two central images govern the turn from Mary’s relationship to the Trinity to her role as principle of the return of all things to God. The first is that of a radiation of light and overflowing of waters. The second is that of a dwelling place: a tabernacle, a house, a city, and a finally a new heaven. While the former image suggests a diffusion, a communication, the latter suggests a gathering in, a communion. The relationship between these two aspects on a theoretical level will become more apparent in Chapters 10-13, which consider Mary formally as a common good. Chapter 9, however, gives the reader a particular sense of the unity of the considerations of Mary in her relation to God and the world by means of these images.

Diffusion

The presence of the Trinity in Mary is so total that God Himself is reflected in her person more perfectly than in any other pure creature. In virtue of the graces

192 Ego Sapientia, 8.1. 193 Ego Sapientia, 8.1.

112 that make her a principle of God with respect to His being the origin and end of all things, Mary takes on, though in a creaturely mode, the very characteristics of divine goodness. “Insofar as she is wisdom the most Blessed Virgin is ‘the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God’s majesty, and the image of his goodness—Candor lucis aeternae, speculum sine macula Dei majestatis, et imago bonitatis illius’ (Wis. 7:26).”194 And it belongs to the very account of goodness that it communicate itself.195

The diffusion of divine goodness ad extra relates to the properties of the Son and the Spirit in distinct ways, as already suggested in the excursus on the causality of the processions, and De Koninck shows that Mary is likened, by her surpassing

194 Ego Sapientia, 9.1. 195 Thomas affirms the application of this principle to the divine goodness in the article concerning the fittingness of the Incarnation: “To each thing, that is befitting which belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, reasoning befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by ‘His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three—the Word, a soul and flesh,’ as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate” (STh IIIa, q1 a1 co.). “Respondeo dicendum quod unicuique rei conveniens est illud quod competit sibi secundum rationem propriae naturae, sicut homini conveniens est ratiocinari quia hoc convenit sibi inquantum est rationalis secundum suam naturam. Ipsa autem natura Dei est bonitas, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom. Unde quidquid pertinet ad rationem boni, conveniens est Deo. Pertinet autem ad rationem boni ut se aliis communicet, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde ad rationem summi boni pertinet quod summo modo se creaturae communicet. Quod quidem maxime fit per hoc quod naturam creatam sic sibi coniungit ut una persona fiat ex tribus, verbo, anima et carne, sicut dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin. Unde manifestum est quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari.” “...and it gives a share first in a measure of splendor, then to those who taste the light and desire it more, it gives itself in and shines more abundantly, ‘because they loved much,’ and always stretches them up and onward in proportion to their upward gaze. The good above all light is called intellectual light as the fountain-like ray and hyper-gushing pouring of light” (Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names and the , 4.6; trans. Michael Waldstein). “…καὶ μεταδιδόναι πρῶτα μὲν αἴγλης μετρίας, εἶτα ἐκείνων ὥσπερ ἀπογευομένων φωτὸς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐφιεμένων μᾶλλον ἑαυτὴν ἐνδιδόναι καὶ περισσῶς ἐπιλάμπειν, “ὅτι ἠγάπησαν πολύ ”, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀνατείνειν αὐτὰς ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσω κατὰ τὴν σφῶν εἰς ἀνάνευσιν ἀναλογίαν. Φῶς οὖν νοητὸν λέγεται τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν φῶς ἀγαθὸν ὡς κτὶς πηγαία καὶ ὑπερβλύζουσα φωτοχυσία...”

113 grace, to each. We recall that as cause and origin of the Word in His temporal mission, Mary is inseparable from her Son as the final cause and exemplar of all things. This exemplarity is a principle of the communication of the divine goodness to creatures. De Koninck writes:

This image is so perfect that it has in its turn the character of root and original for all creatures. She was the sapiential exemplar in virtue of which God composed the universe: “Cum eo eram cuncta componens—I was with him forming all things” (Prov. 8:30). And in virtue of this she is united to the consubstantial image of the Father, to begotten Wisdom, to the Word by which “all things were made, and nothing that was made was made without Him” (Jn. 1:3).196

But at the same time, Mary, the co-principle and chief fruit of the mission of the

Spirit, is likened to that Love which is the reason for all gifts given to creatures.197

Image of Goodness itself, she imitates the original in the universal diffusion of goodness and she gives to things their primary impulsion and their movement. Spouse of the Holy Spirit who compares Himself to the waters and who “moves over the waters” (Gen. 1:1), spirit of Wisdom, she can say in her turn: “Ego sapientia effudi flumina— I, wisdom, have poured myself out in rivers. I am like a brook out of a river of a mighty water, like an aqueduct of a river and like a spring gushing out of paradise” (Sir. 24:40-41).198

Mary is so caught up in the divine processions that she herself becomes a channel of the river that takes what is God’s and pours it out into creation. She takes on, in her own mode, the characteristics of the processions as causes of creation and grace.

196 Ego Sapientia, 9.1. 197 “Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since we give something to anyone gratuitously inasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence, it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above, He proceeds as the first gift” (STh Ia, q38 a2 co.). “Ratio autem gratuitae donationis est amor, ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo quod damus ei, est amor quo volumus ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod amor habet rationem primi doni, per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur. Unde, cum spiritus sanctus procedat ut amor, sicut iam dictum est, procedit in ratione doni primi.” 198 Ego Sapientia, 9.1.

114 De Koninck continues: “And her diffusion is so universal that she rejoins God, imitating the manner by which God Himself rejoins Himself in every diffusion of His goodness.”199 That is, the good of which Mary herself becomes a diffusive principle is not something less than God, not a part, but the whole, the truly universal Good. It is God that Mary communicates to the world. This is true in one way in her physical motherhood, but it is true also of her role as principle of the order of the cosmos, which is a consequence of both the divine maternity and the concomitant indwelling of the Trinity.

Dwelling

Chapters 8 and 9 both employ the second image, that of a dwelling place.

Chapter 8 quotes Sirach 24:12-13, interpreting it according to the divine indwelling in Mary. “Then the creator of all things commanded, and spoke to me: and he that made me, rested in my tabernacle. And he said to me: let your dwelling be in Jacob, and your inheritance in Israel, and take root in my elect.” This passage shows a dual election, that of a privileged creature in which God is present, and the larger election of the whole people, with which the first is immediately associated. God will be present in Mary in a particular way, the passage suggests, so that she, who is to live in the midst of the elect, might bear that presence to them.

199 Ego Sapientia, 9.1.

115 Chapter 9 reiterates that Mary is the privileged dwelling place of God, quoting St. Louis de Montfort, whose True Devotion, De Koninck says, was the catalyst for the writing of Ego Sapientia.200

Dwelling built by Wisdom—“Sapientia aedificavit sibi domum” (Prov. 9:1)— “Mary is the sanctuary of the Holy Trinity, where God exists more magnificently and sublimely than in any place in the universe, not excepting His dwelling about the cherubim and seraphim.”201

The chapter concludes with a repetition of this language, and, just as Chapter 8 shifts from the Trinity dwelling in Mary to Mary’s dwelling with the elect, so here the image of Wisdom fashioning itself a house broadens into the view of that house as the dwelling place of God with men.

This very tabernacle of the Holy Trinity, this dwelling built by Wisdom, this holy city, this new Jerusalem, this new heaven which renews the earth, becomes the tabernacle of God with men: “Ecce tabernaculum Dei cum hominibus” (Rev. 21: 3).202

Added to the domum of Wisdom here is the complex of images surrounding the vision of the holy city of Revelation.203 In his terse style, De Koninck simply points to these images, hinting at the rich tradition associated with them by way of de

Montfort.

200 “It was the reading of True Devotion that was the thunderbolt for me—in 1941” (Charles De Koninck to Fr. Guindon, June 11, 1943). “C’est la lecture de la Vraie Dévotion qui a été pour moi le coup de foudre—en 1941.” 201 Ego Sapientia, 9.1. 202 Ego Sapientia, 9.1. 203 “Then I saw a new heaven, and a new earth. The old heaven, the old earth had vanished, and there was no more sea. And I, John, saw in my vision that holy city which is the new Jerusalem, being sent down by God from heaven, all clothed in readiness, like a bride who has adorned herself to meet her husband. I heard, too, a voice which cried aloud from the throne, ‘Here is God’s tabernacle pitched among men; he will dwell with them, and they will be his own people, and he will be among them, their own God’” (Rev. 21:1-3).

116 Yet one indication of the power De Koninck finds in these words is his decision to end the entire work with a chapter entitled “Civitas Dei.” This chapter

(42) concludes with another quote from de Montfort: “This city that men will find at the end of times, to convert themselves and to recover the hunger they will have for justice, is the Most Blessed Virgin, who is called by the Holy Spirit: town and city of

God.”204 This image is both an aspect of De Koninck’s appropriation of de Montfort’s thought, and a likeness particularly well-suited to expressing the reality described in the following chapters, namely, Mary’s role as a truly universal common good.

Augustine on the Heaven of Heavens

In Chapter 12 of his Confessions, Augustine interprets the first line of Genesis:

“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” as referring to the whole material cosmos on one hand, and on the other to the immaterial heavens, to “the heaven of heavens,” which he presents as a rational, spiritual creature, in which God

Himself dwells most perfectly. Augustine spends the better part of the chapter contemplating this creature and its attributes. Chief among these attributes is the purity of its will, which is so fixed in God that it attains a degree of immutability that gives it a creaturely share in God’s eternity.

Likewise You have said to me, with a strong voice in my inner ear, that that creature, whose delight You alone are, is not co-eternal with You—that creature which, with a most persevering purity drawing its support from You, in no place and at no time displays its own mutability; while You Yourself are ever present with it, to whom with its entire affection it holds itself, having no future to expect nor conveying into the past what it remembers, and which is varied by no change, nor extended into any times. O

204 Ego Sapientia, 42.3.

117 blessed one—if any such there be—in clinging to Your blessedness; blest in You, its everlasting Inhabitant and its Enlightener!205

This creature, which is called the “heaven of heavens,” is marked by the divine indwelling through perfect charity. For this reason, Augustine continues, it is also to be called the House of God.

Nor do I find what the heaven of heavens, which is the Lord’s, can be better called than Your house, which contemplates Your delight without any defect of going forth to another; a pure mind, most peacefully one, by that stability of peace of holy spirits, the citizens of Your city “in the heavenly places,” above these heavenly places which are seen.206

We find a similar shift in Augustine’s contemplation of this House of God to that which De Koninck makes in speaking of Mary as the dwelling place of God. De

Koninck begins by considering Mary as the privileged dwelling place of the Trinity, but moves to the fact that this indwelling makes Mary the place where the elect come to dwell with God. Augustine makes a similar shift with a dramatic immediacy, not by explaining the role of the heaven of heavens in the universe, but by

205 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, ch. 12[11]; “Item dixisti mihi voce forti in aurem interiorem quod nec illa creatura tibi coaeterna est, cuius voluptas tu solus es teque perseverantissima castitate hauriens mutabilitatem suam nusquam et numquam exerit, et te sibi semper praesente, ad quem toto affectu se tenet, non habens futurum quod expectet nec in praeteritum traiciens quod meminerit, nulla vice variatur nec in tempora ulla distenditur. O beata, si qua ista est, inhaerendo beatitudini tuae, beata sempiterno inhabitatore te atque inlustratore suo!” 206 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, ch. 12[11]. “Nec invenio, quid libentius appellandum existimem caelum caeli domino, quam domum tuam contemplantem delectationem tuam sine ullo defectu egrediendi in aliud, mentem puram concordissime unam stabilimento pacis sanctorum spirituum civium civitatis tuae in caelestibus super ista caelestia.” Cf. ch. 19 [15]: “Since You, O God, show Yourself to him, and are sufficient for him, who loves You as much as You command, and, therefore, he declines not from You, nor toward himself. This is the house of God, not earthly, nor of any celestial bulk corporeal, but a spiritual house and a partaker of Your eternity, because without blemish forever. For You have made it fast for ever and ever; You have given it a law, which shall not pass away.” “quoniam tu, deus, diligenti te, quantum praecipis, ostendis ei te et sufficis ei, et ideo non declinat a te nec ad se? haec est domus dei non terrena neque ulla caelesti mole corporea, sed spiritalis et particeps aeternitatis tuae, quia sine labe in aeternum. statuisti enim eam in saeculum et in saeculum saeculi; praeceptum posuisti et non praeteribit.”

118 expressing his own subjective longing to be drawn into this spiritual House. First, he repeats the source of its beauty, and how the indwelling by love transforms the heaven of heavens. “Yet is there in it that mutability itself by which it would become dark and cold, but that, clinging to You with sublime love, it shines and glows from

You like a perpetual noon.”207 Then, moved by the beauty he has just described,

Augustine exclaims:

O House, full of light and splendor! I have loved your beauty, and the place of the dwelling of the glory of my Lord, your builder and owner. Let my wandering sigh after you; and I speak to Him who made you, that He may possess me also in you, seeing He has made me likewise. “I have gone astray, like a lost sheep;”9 yet upon the shoulders of my Shepherd, your builder, I hope that I may be brought back to you.208

Two things stand out from this remarkable prayer. First, this supreme creature is an object of longing for Augustine, a good that draws him by the surpassing radiance it derives from the divine Goodness. Second, Augustine sees his own union with God as being at the same time a belonging to this House of God, as being possessed in it, or brought into it, as a part to its whole.

The above passage shows that the creature Augustine designates as the

House of God has the character of an end, a good to be attained by the soul, and a principle of communion of the soul with God, both of which ideas drive us toward the notion of the common good. De Koninck himself makes this connection by way of Thomas’s commentary on Jn. 14:2, “In my Father’s house there are many dwelling

207 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, 15 [21]. “Inest ei tamen ipsa mutabilitas, unde tenebresceret et frigesceret, nisi amore grandi tibi cohaerens tamquam semper meridies luceret et ferveret ex te.” 208 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, 15 [21]. “O domus luminosa et speciosa, dilexi decorem tuum et locum habitationis gloriae domini mei, fabricatoris et possessoris tui! tibi suspiret peregrinatio mea, et dico ei qui fecit te, ut possideat et me in te, quia fecit et me. Erravi sicut ovis perdita, sed in umeris pastoris mei, structoris tui, spero me reportari tibi.”

119 places.”209 Thomas argues that the Father’s house should be taken in two ways: In one way, it is to be understood as the communion of saints, or the Church, both militant and triumphant. “The house of any one is where he dwells, and so the house of God is where God dwells. Now God dwells in his saints.”210 In the second way, the

Father’s house is God Himself. “It is into this house that he gathers us.”211 In both senses, De Koninck observes, God’s dwelling in the house exceeds His dwelling in each of the mansions or rooms. “We must note that, whether we compare the mansions to the House that is God or to the house that is the Church, in either case they are mansions, and the mansion of a house is a part.”212

In the excursus on the common good below, we will see how the superabundant communicability of the common good is the source of unity. The image of a House is particularly helpful in preparing us for this account because it expresses the power of the good to gather together into one all those who share in it. Thomas finds in this image an expression of the extrinsic common good, which is

God Himself, and the intrinsic common good of the community gathered into Him.

De Koninck, with de Montfort, identifies a third meaning for this House in the

209 Charles De Koninck, Pour la défense de Saint Thomas: Réponse aux objections du Père Eschmann contre La primauté du bien commun in Oeuvres de Charles De Koninck, vol. 2, 227-403 (Quebéc: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2010) 324-327. Hereafter, Pour la défense. Translated by Sean Collins as In Defense of St. Thomas: A Reply to Fr. Eschmann’s Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good in The Aquinas Review 4, No. 1 (1997): 304-308. Hereafter: In Defense. 210 Aquinas, In Ioan., cap.14, l. 1. “Cum uniuscuiusque domus sit in qua habitat, illa dicitur domus Dei in qua habitat Deus; Deus autem habitat in sanctis.” 211 Aquinas, In Ioan., cap. 14, l. 1. “Et in hac domo nos colligit.” 212 De Koninck, In Defense, 307. “Que ce soit à la Maison au sens où il s’agit de Dieu ou à la Maison entendue comme l’Église que l’on compare les demeures, il faut noter que les demeures sont dans l’un et l’autre cas des demeures, et la demeure, dans une maison, est une partie” (Pour la défense, 326).

120 person of Mary, who, he will argue, is herself both an extrinsic common good, and the interior principle of the intrinsic common good of the universe.

Augstine’s account of the House of God, in his commentary on the Heaven of heavens, in a sense prepares us for this third meaning. He takes the house to be something in creation, and this seems to correspond to Thomas’s first reading of the

House as the Church. 213 Yet Augustine nevertheless represents this House as a concrete intelligent individual, a person. It is not absolutely clear how Augustine intends this creature to be understood. There is no immediate indication that he is thinking of the Blessed Virgin. Yet the parallels between his account and Ego

Sapientia are suggestive. Augustine also describes the heaven of heavens as “that wisdom which has been created, namely, the intellectual nature, which, in the contemplation of light, is light. For this, although created, is also called wisdom.”214

Besides the eternal and uncreated Wisdom of God, there is “a certain created wisdom [which] was created before all things, the rational and intellectual mind of

213 Augustine emphasizes the participated eternity of the heaven of heavens, drawing on the wisdom literature in saying that it is created before all other creatures, and is in some ways above time and change. Fr. Matthew Lamb argues that this language need not suggest something like pre- existing souls or the abstract world of ideas, but points rather to the nature of the Divine Wisdom as eternal, for whom the end and perfection of His creation is always present. He explains the heaven of heavens as the final end of creation. “Could we say that by calling the caelum intellectuale the civitas Dei Augustine was referring not to pre-existing souls or an abstract ‘world of ideas’ but to that eternal life in which the totality of all times and persons and events are created, redeemed, punished and beatified? From our temporal perspective we think of the past as closed and the future as not yet; but in the total simultaneity of divine wisdom creating-redeeming all that is, the whole of the universe and all of human history in the concrete immensity of space and time and countless generations of individuals are all present in the divine wisdom and love” (Matthew Lamb, “St. Augustine on Memoria and Commemoratio,” in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, ed. Kent Emery Jr. et al., 237-248 [Boston: Brill, 2011], 244-245). The participated beatitude of each rational creature, as well as the communion of all in the shared , is present to God from the beginning, and is in a way first, as the final cause is in a way first, though in the course of time it comes about last. It is for the same reason that the Church in her liturgy applies to Mary the words of the hymn of wisdom, “I was with Him creating all things.” 214 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, 15 [20]. “Sed profecto sapientia, quae creata est, intellectualis natura scilicet, quae contemplatione luminis lumen est; dicitur enim et ipsa, quamvis creata, Sapientia.”

121 that chaste city of Yours, our mother which is above, and is free, and ‘eternal in the heavens.’”215 For De Koninck, as for St. Louis de Montfort, that heaven, city, house, wisdom, and mother is Mary.

Keeping in mind the dual images of outpouring and gathering in, and their relation to the common good, we move from Chapters 8 and 9 to the heart of the argument of the first part, in which the key premise is Mary’s role as a truly universal common good.

215 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, 15 [20]. “[E]st quaedam sapientia, quae creata est, mens rationalis et intellectualis castae civitatis tuae, matris nostrae, quae sursum est et libera est et aeterna in caelis.”

122 X OMNIA INNOVAT (WIS. 7:27)

Elle renouvelle toutes choses. She renews all things. L'ordre est de la raison de la sagesse. Celle-ci est à Order is of the very notion of wisdom. It is at the la fois une et multiple, stable et mobile. (Sap.VII, same time “one and many, stable and mobile” 22-23) La sagesse peut se dire du principe de (Wis. 7:22-23). Wisdom can be said of the l’ordre sapiential en tant que ce principe a raison de principle of the sapiential order insofar as this racine et de précontenance de l'ordre dont il est principle has the character of root, precontaining principe. Marie est, avec son Fils, à l'origine même the order of which it is the principle. Mary is, with de l'univers; elle est comme la racine de l'ordre her Son, at the very origin of the universe; she is as universel: Ego sum radix—Je suis la racine. the root of the universal order: “Ego sum radix—I (Messe de Marie Médiatrice, Trait) am the root” (Mass of Mary ). Ce que Dieu veut principalement dans l'univers, That which God principally desires in the universe c'est le bien de l'ordre. Et cet ordre est d'autant plus is the good of order. And this order is the more parfait que son principe intérieur est plus perfect insofar as its interior principle is more profondément enraciné en Dieu. Or, Marie est le profoundly rooted in God. Now, Mary is the purely principe purement créé de cet ordre, principe created principle of this order, purely created purement créé le plus proche de Dieu et le plus principle closest to God and the most perfect parfait qui se puisse concevoir. Comme principe de conceivable. As principle of the sapiential order, l'ordre sapiential, elle participe de l'unité et de she participates in the unity and the very unicity of l'unicité même de ce principe; elle est à la fois this principle: she is at once emanation and émanation et immanence; son pouvoir s'étend à immanence216; her power extends to all things, toutes choses, qui tiennent d'elle leur incessante which take from her their incessant innovation innovation. (Sap. VII, 25, 27.) Nous concevons, en (Wis. 7:25, 27).217 Indeed we conceive of vital effet, l'émanation vitale comme un constant immanence as a constant renewal from within, and renouvellement par le dedans, et dans leur rapport in their relation to the first principle things receive avec le principe premier les choses ont l'être par their being by an ever new procession. Indeed, the une procession toujours innovatrice. En effet, l'être being which things would hold from themselves que les ehoses tiendraient d'elles-mêmes serait would be nothingness. “Una est columba mea, néant. Una est columba mea, perfecta mea. (Cant. perfecta mea” (Songs 6:8); “Et cum sit una, omnia VI, 8) Et cum sit una, omnia potest: et in se potest: et in se permanens omnia innovat—One is permanens omnia innovat. (Sap. VII, 27) —Une my dove, my perfect one. And being but one, she seule est ma colombe, mon immaculée. Etant can do all things: and remaining in herself the unique, elle peut tout, demeurant la même, elle same, she renews all things” (Wis. 7:27). Daughter renouvelle tout. Fille du Père éternel, mère du Fils, of the eternal Father, mother of the Son, spouse of épouse du Saint-Esprit, elle est enracinée dans the Holy Spirit, she is rooted in the order of the l'ordre de la Trinité, et elle relie l'ordre de l'univers, Trinity, and she ties up the order of the universe, in d’ue manière radicalement nouvelle, à cet ordre qui a radically new way, with the order that is in God est en Dieu selon les processions. Collum tumn according to the processions. “Collum tuum sicut sicut turris eburnea—Ton cou est comme une tour turris eburnea—Your neck is as a tower of ivory” d'ivoire. (Cant. VII, 4) (Wis. 7:4).

216 Thomist: “an emanation and an indwelling” (13). 217 “For she is a vapour of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty God: and therefore no defiled thing is found in her… And being but one, she can do all things: and remaining in herself the same, she renews all things, and through nations conveys herself into holy souls, she makes the and prophets” (Wis. 7:25, 27).

123 Chapter 10: Mary as cause of the universal order

From the imagery of Chapter 9, De Koninck returns to the account he has been building of Mary as wisdom. To see that Mary is really wisdom involves both seeing how she is established in such a position by her relation to divine Wisdom, and how she actually carries out the role of wisdom. In the course of establishing the first point, we have seen not only that Mary is a substantial principle of the

Redeemer God by her consent, but also that becoming such a principle involves her in the order which is the cause of the created universe, namely, the order of the processions in God. The imagery of Chapters 8 and 9 indicates that Mary’s nearness to the Trinity makes her a principle of all things, as one who communicates what she receives, and also as the one in whom the communion of the elect with God is established. Chapter 10 ends with the explicit affirmation that Mary imparts the order of the processions to creation in a particular way: “Daughter of the eternal

Father, mother of the Son, spouse of the Holy Spirit, she is rooted in the order of the

Trinity, and she ties up the order of the universe, in a radically new way, with the order that is in God according to the processions.”218

De Konink begins Chapter 10 by reminding us that “[o]rder belongs to the account of wisdom.” Wisdom is the cause of order, De Koninck adds, because it is the root, precontaining the order that it imparts to what comes forth from it. Now, the root, in its unity, cannot contain the order of the parts in the same way as the parts themselves. The conductor does not possess the order of the symphony in the same way that the ensemble of instruments do; he possesses it, but in a more unified and

218 Ego Sapientia, 10.2.

124 simpler way, or else he would not be able to guide his performers. He possesses the reason for the order found in the parts. Wisdom must therefore precontain the order it imparts in a higher way.

The grace of the divine maternity, and the pre-eminent sanctification ordered to it, distinguish Mary from all other creatures first of all by placing her at the origin of the procession of the Son into the world. This role as principle and origin of God gives Mary an affiliation with the Trinitarian order that differs from, and is the source of the affiliation with, the Trinitarian order that the whole universe will receive in the economy of grace. And the order of nature is taken up into the higher order of grace. Hence, “Mary is, with her Son, at the very origin of the universe; she is as the root of the universal order: ‘Ego sum radix—I am the root’ (Mass of Mary

Mediatrix).”219

In line with the images of outpouring and dwelling in Chapters 8 and 9,

Mary’s role as principle is not simply an instrumentality exercised at a particular moment in the divine economy, but a permanent ontological status occupied by the

Blessed Virgin as the principle of the enduring order of the whole. De Koninck compared Mary’s causality above to a radiating light. A lamp fills the room with light only so long as it is in the room. Its light cannot be given once and for all; it cannot be possessed independently of the source from which it is received. The quality of permanence is still more evident in the image of a house or dwelling. In both cases we understand that the kind of influence Mary has over the concrete order of the

219 Ego Sapientia, 10.1.

125 universe as wisdom is essential to the very account of that order. Switch off the light and the room is immersed in darkness.

“Mary is the purely created principle of this order,” De Koninck writes, the interior principle of the universe most perfectly ordered to God, and therefore responsible for the ordering of the whole.

As principle of the sapiential order, she participates in the unity and the very unicity of this principle: she is at once emanation and immanence; her power extends to all things, which take from her their incessant innovation (Wis. 7:25, 27). Indeed we conceive of vital immanence as a constant renewal from within, and in their relation to the first principle things receive their being by an ever new procession. Indeed, the being which things would hold from themselves would be nothingness.220

Emanation and immanence, like diffusion and dwelling, signify the two aspects of

Mary’s enduring role. The divine Maternity makes Mary a source of the created order, not only in the order of becoming (by playing an instrumental role at a particular moment in time), but in the order of being. She transcends the effect, so that it depends radically on her.

The procession of the order of the universe from Mary is, in its unceasing coming forth, akin to the procession of the divine Son from the eternal Father, and likewise to the procession of creatures from God. Creatures receive being from God as the room receives light from the lamp. The procession of being and of light is ongoing—at every moment that the effect is present, it is being received from the cause. This is participated being, and in an analogous way, the order that the universe receives from Mary is a participated order, possessed by her in a way that transcends it and makes it possible. “‘Una est columba mea, perfecta mea’ (Songs

220 Ego Sapientia, 10.2.

126 6:8); ‘Et cum sit una, omnia potest: et in se permanens omnia innovat—One is my dove, my perfect one. And being but one, she can do all things: and remaining in herself the same, she renews all things’” (Wis. 7:27).”221

221 Ego Sapientia, 10.2.

127 CHAPTER 11 IMAGO BONITATIS ILLIUS (WIS. 7:26)

Image de sa bonté. Image of His goodness. Comme principe du bien inhérent à l'univers, As principle of the good inherent in the universe222 comme Regina et Domina de toutes choses, elle est as Regina and Domina of all things, she is a good un bien séparé de l'ordre universel, un bien separated from the universal order, a properly commun proprement universel, un bien qui dans universal common good, a good who in her son indivisible et surabondante unité est le bien de indivisible and superabundant unity is the good of toutes choses. Et ce bien est meilleur que le bien all things. And this good is better than the good qui existe comme forme dans l'ordre des parties de which exists as a form in the order of the parts of l'univers; il est antérieur à celui-ci et il en est le the universe; that good is anterior to this one and its principe, comme le chef est principe de l'ordre dans principle, as the general is the principle of the order l'armée. Voire, le bien qu'elle est à elle-même ne dit of the army. Note, the good she is for herself does même pas une dépendance matérielle des choses not even connote a material dependence on the qui sont ordonnées, ni de la forme qu'est leur ordre. things which are ordered, nor on the form which is Étant sagesse, toute sa gloire est du dedans. Omnis their order. As wisdom, all her glory is from within. gloria ejus filiae regis ab intus. (Ps. XLV, 14) “Omnis gloria ejus filiae regis ab intus” (Ps. Parce que Marie a raison de bien commun 45:14). Because Mary has the character of a proprement universel, parce qu'elle est pour nous properly universal common good, because she is principe de tout bien spirituel, il ne suffit pas for us the principle of all spiritual good, it is not d'aimer la Sainte Vierge comme on s'aime soi- sufficient to love the Blessed Virgin as one loves même, ni de l'aimer tout autant que soi. De même oneself, nor to love her as much as oneself. Just as qu'il faut aimer le Christ plus que soi-même, il faut it is necessary to love Christ more than oneself, one aimer la Sainte Vierge plus que soi-même. must love the Blessed Virgin more than oneself. “Chacun, dit Jean de S. Thomas, s'aime soi-même, “Each one,” says John of St. Thomas, “loves après Dieu, plus que son prochain. En effet, on doit himself, after God, more than his neighbor. Indeed, aimer les autres comme soi-même, de sorte qu'on one should love others as one loves himself, in such est soi-même comme l'exemplaire premier de ceux a way that one is oneself as the first exemplar of qu'il faut aimer: soi-même comme participant à la those one must love: oneself as participant in the gloire divine, et les autres comme nos associés dans divine glory, and others as our associates in this cette participation. Je fais cependant exception du participation. I make exception nevertheless, of Christ Seigneur, même comme homme, et de la Christ Our Lord, even as man, and of the Blessed Bienheureuse Vierge mère, parce qu'ils ont, pour Virgin mother, because they have for us the nous, raison de principe diffusif de grâce et de character of principle diffusive of grace and béatitude. En effet, le Christ est, comme homme, beatitude. In effect, Christ is, as man, the head chef (caput—tête) de gloire, et la Bienheureuse (caput) of glory, and the Blessed Virgin is mother Vierge est mère de ce chef, et elle est comme le cou of this head, and she is as the neck through which par lequel la grâce descend de cette tête en nous; et grace descends from this head to us: and for this pour cette raison nous devons les aimer plus que reason we should love them more than ourselves.”a nous-mêmes.”a a Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Theol., T. VII, q. 23, p. 403; a “But after God, anyone will love himself more than his Post Deum autem, unusquisque magis diligit se quam neighbor, for he ought to love others as himself, so that proximum, debet enim diligere alios sicut seipsum, unde he himself is like the first exemplar of those to be loved, ipsemet est quasi exemplar primum et diligendorum, quia because [he loves] himself as participating in divine se ut participem gloriae divinae alios ut socios in glory and others as companions in participation. I except, participando. Excipio tamen Christum Dominum, etiam however, Christ the Lord, even as man, and the Most ut hominem, et Beatissimam Virginem matrem, eo quod Blessed Virgin mother, because they participate in a participant quamdam rationem communicantis nobis certain character of communicating grace and glory to us, gratiam et beatitudinem, est enim Christus ut homo caput for Chirst as man is head of glory, and the Most Blessed gloriae et Beatissima Virgo mater capitis, et collum per Virgin is mother of the head, and the neck through which

222 Thomist: “As the principle whence comes the good of the universe” (13).

128 quod derivatur gratia, et ideo magis debemus ipsos grace is derived, and therefore we ought to love them diligere quam nos. more than ourselves” (John of St. Thomas, Cursus theolgicus, t. 7, q. 23, p. 403).

CHAPTER 12 CIRCUMDATA VARIETATE (PS. 44:10)

Entourée de variété. Surrounded by variety. Quand, par ailleurs, nous la considérons comme When, furthermore, we consider her as wholly tout intérieure à l'univers, nous pouvons comparer interior to the universe, we can compare the la Sainte Vierge au bien intrinsèque de l'univers, Blessed Virgin to the intrinsic good of the universe, bien qui consiste dans la forme qu'est l'ordre de ses the good that consists in the form which is the parties. Cette forme est comparable au visage et à order of its parts. This form is comparable to the la figure. Dans cette forme consiste la plus haute face and the countenance. In this form consists the dignité de la pure création, c'est-à-dire ce qui, par highest dignity of pure creation, that is to say that Dieu, est le plus voulu ‘pour soi’ et le plus which is most desired by God “for itself” and that parfaitement ordonné à Lui. En tant que bien séparé which is most perfectly ordered to Him. As de l'univers, la Sainte Vierge est plus digne que separated good of the universe, the Blessed Virgin l'ordre de l'univers dont elle est principe has a dignity greater than the order of the universe transcendant, ainsi que nous l'avons vu. Par contre, of which she is a transcendent principle, as we have quand nous la considérons comme tout intérieure à seen. On the other hand, when we consider her as l'univers où elle a raison de partie, la dignité de wholly interior to the universe, where she has the l'univers est plus grande que celle de la Sainte character of a part, the dignity of the universe is Vierge envisagée, non pas absolument, mais greater than that of the Blessed Virgin seen, not formellement en tant qu'elle a raison de partie, absolutely, but formally insofar as she has the raison qui vient pour elle en second. character of a part, a character which belongs to her secondarily. Néanmoins, il convient de remarquer ici que, même Nevertheless, it is fitting to remark here that, even sous ce rapport, elle demeure la racine intrinsèque under this consideration, she remains the intrinsic de la dignité qui inhère à l'univers comme forme, et root of the dignity which inheres to the universe as qu'en même temps elle participe davantage de cette form, and that at the same time she participates all dignité. En effet, la dignité du tout dépend the more in this dignity. In effect, the dignity of the matériellement de la dignité de ses parties et du whole depends materially on the dignity of its rapport que fondent ses parties les unes aux autres. parts, and on the relations which these parts have, Or, l'excellence des parties inférieures est contenue one to another. Now, the excellence of the inferior dans les supérieures d'une manière plus noble que parts is contained in the superior parts in a more dans les parties inférieures elles-mêmes. Les parties noble way than in the inferior parts themselves. supérieures ont, par rapport aux inférieures, raison The superior parts have, in relation to the inferior de forme: la splendeur que revêtent les inférieures parts, the account of form: the splendor which dans leur subordination aux supérieures est plus clothes the inferior parts in their subordination to grande que la splendeur qu'elles tiennent d'elles- the superior is greater than the splendor they hold mêmes absolument. Or, envisagée de la part des of themselves absolutely. Now, looked at from the parties elles-mêmes, l'excellence de la partie side of the parts themselves, the excellence of the principale du tout a raison de forme pour toutes les principal part of the whole has the account of form parties subordonnées. Par conséquent, la Sainte for all the subordinated parts.223 As a consequence, Vierge, en tant que partie, est la forme et la cause the Blessed Virgin, as part, is the form and the principale purement créée de la dignité qui ordonne principal wholly created cause of the dignity which le plus prochainement et le plus parfaitement toutes orders most closely and most perfectly all the other les autres parties à la dignité du tout. Comme partie parts to the dignity of the whole. As principal part, principale, elle tire après elle toutes les autres vers she draws all the others after her toward the dignity

223 Thomist: adds “This derivated splendor is foremost in the ordination of the parts to the whole” (15).

129 la dignité du tout. Trahe me: post te curremus— of the whole. “Trahe me: post te currans—Draw Entraînez-moi: nous courrons après vous. (Cant. I, me; we will run after thee” (Songs 1:3). 3) Parmi toutes les parties purement créées de Among all the purely created parts of the universe, l'univers, elle participe davantage à l'ordre de she participates most fully in the order of the l'univers, et elle en revêt davantage la splendeur et universe, and she shows most fully its splendor and la variété. Sa splendeur est la plus comparable à variety. Her splendor is most comparable to that of celle du tout—decora sicut Jerusalem (Cant. VI, the whole—“decora sicut Jerusalem” (Songs 6:3); 3); elle est entourée de la variété de toutes les she is surrounded by the variety of all the other autres parties—circumdata varietate. (Ps. XLIV, parts—“circumdata varietate” (Ps. 44:10). She is 10) Elle est la partie purement créée de l'univers the purely created part of the universe thanks to grâce à laquelle celui-ci peut revêtir une si grande which it can show forth such a great dignity. “Fons dignité. Fons autem adscendebat de terra, et autem adscendebat de terra, et irrigabat omnem irrigabat omnem faciem terrae—Une source (une faciem terrae—But a spring rose out of the earth, vapeur) montait de la terre, et arrosait toute la watering all the face of the earth” (Gen. 2:6). “Face surface (le visage) de la terre. (Gen. II, 6) “Visage of the earth,” comments St. Augustine, “that is to de la terre, commente saint Augustin, c'est-à-dire say, dignity of the earth—it is most fitting dignité de la terre, c'est très justement (rectissime) (rectissime) that the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, que la Vierge Marie, Mère de Dieu, est ainsi is so named, she whom the Holy Spirit—who in the nommée, elle que le Saint-Esprit, qui dans Gospel is called under the name of fountain and of l'Evangile est appelé du nom de fontaine et d'eau, water—waters so that from such a clay there would arrosa pour que d'un tel limon fût, pour ainsi dire, be, so to speak, formed the man who was placed in formé l'homme qui a été place dans le paradis pour paradise to cultivate and keep it, that is in the will le cultiver et pour le garder, à savoir dans la of the Father, so that he would accomplish and volonté du Père, afin d'accomplir celle-ci et de la conserve it.”a conserver.”a a S. Augustin, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, Lib. II, c. a St. Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, lib. II, c. 24, T. III, col. 216: Facies terrae, id est, dignitas terrae, 24, t. III, col. 216. “Face of the earth, that is, dignity of Mater Domini Virgo Maria rectissime accipitur, quam the earth, The Virgin Mary mother of the Lord is very irrigavit Spiritus Sanctus, qui fontis et aquae nomine in rightly so called, whom the Holy Spirit, who is signified Evangelio significatur, ut quasi de limo tali homo fieret, by the name of fountain and water in the Gospel, watered qui constitutus est in paradiso, ut operaretur et custodiret, so that as from such clay a man would be made, who is id est, in voluntate Patris, ut eam impleret atque servaret. established in paradise to work and care for it, that is, in the will of the Father, to cultivate and conserve it.

130 Chapters 11-12 Mary as a Common Good

Chapters 11 and 12 do in a philosophically explicit way what Chapters 8 and

9 do by way of images—they give an account of how Mary’s causal relationship to the universe should be fundamentally conceived. How does Mary “tie up the order of the universe, in a radically new way, with the order that is in God according to the processions?”224 We have already considered how Mary is related in a particular way to the order of processions; we have yet to consider how this relationship, which is proper to Mary, is communicated to or participated in by the created order.

De Koninck does so by employing the notion of the common good.

Excursus on the Primacy of the Common Good

A. What Kind of Cause is the Good?

The good, says Aristotle, is that which all desire.225 If we understand this definition to mean that something is good when and if it is desired, then desire would be the cause of the good. “Good” would therefore be a name applied to a thing in reference to the desire that springs up of its own accord in another. In order to avoid this misinterpretation of Aristotle’s definition, we might add St. Thomas’s

224 Ego Sapientia, 10.2. 225 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, i, 1. “καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ᾽ἐφίεται.” This paragraph is essentially a summary of an argument found in Marcus Berquist’s unpublished article: “Common Good and Private Good” (unpublished manuscript, made available online 2011) 3- 5: http://www.scribd.com/doc/61181449/Marcus-Berquist-Common-Good-and-Private-Good. Much of the following consideration is owed to this pellucid treatment, which closely follows De Koninck’s thought (Berquist was a graduate student of De Koninck at the University of Laval), but is presented in the form of a manuductio. Also very helpful is an article by Gregory Froelich: “On The Common Goods,” The Aquinas Review 15 (2008), http://ldataworks.com/aqr/FroelichOnTheCommonGoodsLargePrint.pdf.

131 account of the good as what is perfective of another in the manner of an end.226 By including the notion of perfection, Thomas indicates that the good has a certain actuality, and it is in virtue of this actuality that it elicits desire. By adding “in the manner of an end,” he distinguishes the way that the good is perfective of another— not as working to achieve some perfection, but by being the reason for acting, the goal for the sake of which some labor is undertaken or movement begun. Aristotle’s definition points to the sign of the good, it indicates that some good must stand at the beginning of any practical reasoning, since the good and nothing else is the object of desire. But it is because of something in it, something actual, that a thing is desirable in the first place. The good has from its own nature the power to attract, and to move another.

B. What is a Common Good?

A common good is first of all distinguished from other kinds of good by the way in which it is an end. Some goods are by their very nature only the good of a single individual. For example, a pair of shoes is a good for the particular person whose shoes they are. On the other hand, some goods have the ability to be possessed or enjoyed by many at once. What sort of good is able to shared in this way? Of course, one might take a baked potato and slice it into two halves, so that the single potato can be enjoyed by two at once. Yet, by the very fact of giving a portion of the potato to one person, we exclude the other from enjoying that same portion. It is only by dividing the original potato that we can feed two. Some goods,

226 De Veritate, q21 a2 co.: “ratio boni in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per modum finis.”

132 on the other hand, do not need to be divided in order to be shared by many. A symphony is not enjoyed by a number of people by being divided into bundles of notes, with each person privately enjoying his own bundle. Rather, each person is able to hear and enjoy the whole symphony, and the fact that others do so with him not only does not diminish his possession of the symphony, but even enriches it.

They share the experience and will be able to recall it together and discuss it afterward.

Goods like the potato are private goods, while goods like the symphony are in some measure common. But we must be precise about how the word “common” is to be understood. Common in this sense is not opposed to what is particular, but to what is exclusive. That is, the symphony is not common in the sense that it is something general, like a species. Giraffe can be said of each and every particular giraffe; it is common in predication or logically. But the symphony is numerically one. It is common because, while remaining one, it is able to be enjoyed by many.

Nor is the symphony common in the sense that it is not the good of any individual. Contemporary political uses of the term “common good” may lead to this mistaken idea. For example, the money in the state treasury is common in the sense that it no longer belongs to the individual citizens but to the state. Though it is destined to be used for the good of the whole, for example by maintaining the government and military, the money itself cannot belong to the government without ceasing to belong to the individual citizen. The money I have paid in taxes I can no longer spend on food. On the other hand, I do not have to renounce my enjoyment of the symphony in order to allow even thousands of others to enjoy it with me. While

133 the symphony is not my private good, it is nonetheless my good, and the good of every one who listens.227 A common good, then, is a good that is able to be the good of many individuals without being diminished in any way and while remaining itself one.

Why are certain goods able to be shared in this way as opposed to others? A good is an end for another because of what it is, because of its own being and perfection. If some goods can be ends in a common and universal way while others can only do so in an exclusive and private way, the reason for this difference will lie in the character of the goods themselves. What makes it possible for a symphony to be shared without being divided into parts, but not a potato? Compare the way in which each is an end or a good. The potato is a good for the one who eats it precisely in his bodiliness. The potato and its goodness are possessed in a material way. The symphony, on the other hand, is possessed by the listener in a more spiritual way. Of course, it is produced by material people and instruments, but the listener does not have to put the horn and viola inside himself in order to enjoy them, as a man must put a potato inside himself in order to be fed.228 The good of music is a higher sort of

227 “The good is what all things desire insofar as they desire their perfection. This perfection is for each thing its good—bonum suum—and in this sense, its good is a proper good. But thus the proper good is not opposed to the common good. …This desire for the common good is in the singular itself. Hence the common good does not have the character of an alien good—bonum alienum—as in the case of the good of another considered as such” (On the Primacy of the Common Good Against the Personalists and The Principle of the New Order, trans. Sean Collins in The Aquinas Review 4, no. 1 [1997]: 1-131; 14. Hereafter: Common Good. “Le bien est ce que toutes choses désirent en tant qu’elles désirent leur perfection. Cette perfection est pour chacune d’elles son bien – bonum suum – et, en ce sens, son bien est un bien propre. Mais alors, le bien propre ne s’oppose pas au bien commun. …Cet appétit du bien commun est dans le singulier lui-même. Dès lors, le bien commun n’a pas raison de bien étranger – bonum alienum – comme dans le cas du bien d’autrui pris comme tel” (Bien commun, 120). 228 The senses themselves already represent a more spiritual way of receiving a good than eating food, for example, though they are part of man’s material or animal nature. Animals share this quasi-

134 good than the good of food—it perfects man in his spiritual nature, not in his materiality. This superiority is essential to its ability to be received by many without diminution.229

But a symphony is only an example; it is neither the only kind, nor the highest kind of truly common good. Even within the specific sense we are employing here, namely, a single unified good that is common by perfecting many individuals— i.e., common in causality—there is an uncountable variety. A child is a common good for a couple and a family; victory is a common good for an army; peace is a common good for a community of any kind; order is a common good of any diverse whole, and God Himself is the common good of the whole universe. Obviously, there is a hierarchy among these goods. God is simply speaking the end of all things, while other goods are ends only for a certain group of beings or in a certain respect.

Furthermore, there is a distinction between a common good that exists apart from those whose good it is, and a common good that exists within the whole whose good it is. Thomas calls the former extrinsic (finis extrinsicus) and the latter intrinsic

(bonum extrinsecum) goods, and there is a definite order between them.230 In the

immaterial way of receiving material things, but as the animals lack a spiritual nature, they cannot perceive the order and beauty of sensible things. 229 The sense of common we have been unfolding, which is opposed to what is exclusive or private, is a result of something in the good itself, as noted above, a perfection that is superabundantly communicable. We must be careful, then, particularly in the case of extrinsic common goods, to distinguish this commonness, which belongs to it through itself from the de facto multiplicity of those to whom it actually is communicated. The common good is not common because many share in it, but many are able to share in it because it is a certain kind of good, which we have called “common.” For this reason, it is not incidental to the individual’s love of the common good that it is common. That commonness, which we might also call its communicability, is inseparable from the very perfection of the good. To love such a good is to love it precisely as common. 230 “For the good, inasmuch as it is the end or goal of a thing, is twofold. For an end is extrinsic to the thing ordained to it, as when we say that a place is the end of something that is moved locally. Or it is intrinsic, as a form is the end of the process of generation or alteration; and a form already acquired is a kind of intrinsic good of the thing whose form it is. Now the form of any whole which is

135 realm of common goods, the intrinsic good of a whole exists in the order of the parts, while the extrinsic end of the community is the principle and reason of that order, as victory is the reason for the order of the army.231 The intrinsic common good is derived from the extrinsic, and exists for it.

An extrinsic common good communicates itself to many, and in so doing, brings together or unites those who share in it. There is a double aspect of outpouring and gathering in, for which De Koninck has prepared us through the images of radiating light and flowing waters on the one hand, and the house and city on the other. Being brought together by a good that communicates itself to each, the multitude shares in the unity of the good itself. This unity, like the common good itself, can be of various kinds. In the case of an army, the soldiers share in the unified vision the general has of the whole—not by seeing it themselves, but in their order to it—a vision which is ordered to the external end of victory.232 In this sense, it is

one through the arrangement of its parts is the order of that whole. Hence it follows that it is a good of that whole” (In Meta., XII l. 12, n. 2627). “Bonum enim, secundum quod est finis alicuius, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsicus ab eo quod est ad finem, sicut si dicimus locum esse finem eius quod movetur ad locum. Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma finis generationis et alterationis, et forma iam adepta, est quoddam bonum intrinsecum eius, cuius est forma. Forma autem alicuius totius, quod est unum per ordinationem quamdam partium, est ordo ipsius: unde relinquitur quod sit bonum eius.” 231 “According to the Philosopher in Meta. 11, the good of the universe consists in a twofold order; namely, in the order of the parts of the universe to each other, and in the order of the whole universe to its end, which is God Himself; just as there is in the army an order among the parts of the army to each other, according to their different roles, and there is an order to the good of the leader, which is victory; and the latter order is the principal one, on account of which the first order exists” (In I Sent., d44 q1 a2 co.). “Secundum philosophum in 11 Metaph., bonum universi consistit in duplici ordine; scilicet in ordine partium universi ad invicem, et in ordine totius universi ad finem, qui est ipse Deus; sicut etiam est in exercitu ordo partium exercitus ad invicem, secundum diversa officia, et est ordo ad bonum ducis, quod est victoria; et hic ordo est praecipuus, propter quem est primus ordo.” 232 St. Thomas uses the example of an army to make the point that the intrinsic common good exists for the sake of the extrinsic and is derived from it: “In an army we find two orders, one by which the parts of the army are related to each other, and a second by which the army is directed to an external good, namely, the good of its leader. That order by which the parts of the army are related to each other exists for the sake of the order by which the

136 the desire for victory that unites them, that dictates the order among them, and it is through this order that the soldiers have a hope of actually attaining that end.

We have considered the symphony as a certain extrinsic common good of those who listen to it, but we can also consider the orchestra of instruments playing the symphony on an analogy with the order of the army. While one man can hear a whole symphony, it is impossible for a single man to play it. A single violinist has his part, his share in the symphony, and knows it well. He is able to practice it alone, and if he is skilled and the symphony is good, his part will likely be beautiful even in isolation. Perhaps this will be less true of other parts, which are more removed from the melody and ordered rather to off-setting or supporting other instruments. Some parts will not have a great deal of beauty played alone. But even for that part which is most complete in itself, its beauty will increase exponentially when it is played within the whole orchestra. However minor the horn or the drum might seem compared to the violin, the violin’s part is inexpressibly more beautiful because of them, and vice versa.

The order among the parts within the orchestra is a great good, an intrinsic common good, and one that allows each member to attain the good of the symphony entire army is subordinated to its leader. Consequently, if the subordination to the leader did not exist, the ordering of the parts of the army to each other would not exist. Consequently, whenever we find a group whose members are ordered to each other, that group must necessarily be ordered to some external principle” (De Ver., q5 a3 co.). “…per similitudinem exercitus, in quo invenimus duplicem ordinem: unum quo exercitus partes ordinantur ad invicem, alium quo ordinantur ad bonum exterius, scilicet bonum ducis; et ordo ille quo partes exercitus ordinantur ad invicem, est propter illum ordinem quo totus exercitus ordinatur ad ducem; unde si non esset ordo ad ducem, non esset ordo partium exercitus ad invicem. Quamcumque ergo multitudinem invenimus ordinatam ad invicem, oportet eam ordinari ad exterius principium.” The army exists for the sake of victory, a good not only desired by the general, but attained through his planning and the execution of his orders. So the good that the whole army seeks exists more perfectly in the general, and the order found among the soldiers is derived from, and is for the sake of attaining, what is found in a higher way in the general.

137 more perfectly than he could do alone. Each part is ordered to the intrinsic common good precisely in virtue of its order to the extrinsic common good, and each one attains the latter more perfectly as ordered to the former. No single part suffices to produce the harmony of the whole, and yet each part is itself more beautiful, more glorious, as a part of the whole than by itself. The whole, and the extrinsic good as possessed by the whole, in some way belong to each, even though at the same time it exceeds the capacity of each.

We can consider the way the common good surpasses the individual who shares in it in two ways. One way is the inexhaustibility of the good that is not diminished in being given. The sun can as easily cause all the plants on earth to grow as a single tree. Even though the actual communication of a good to many does not increase the common good, or cause its communicability, the actual communication to many increases the good on the side of those who partake in it. The sun does not shine brighter because a new plant emerges from the soil, but it is good for the plant to be bathed in the light. In this sense, the participation in divine goodness is greater in the whole universe than in any individual, and this is a good for each rational creature who knows and loves that good, not because he could not attain God alone, but because He loves the divine goodness, and thus loves every communication thereof.233

233 After raising the question why God created a multitude of intellectual creatures, De Koninck writes: “The only acceptable reason is that He wished to communicate Himself abundantly, and that the communication of Himself to a single created intellect could not meet the greatness of His design. He has not chosen to manifest Himself merely to this person, but to many persons. In this respect it is the manifestation of Himself to the manifold which is His primary intention. …Yet He is the good of this and of that person. That He can be the good, the infinite good, of this and of that person is not accidental; it is His very nature, whether or not He makes only this person or only that. Hence, when He does make the one and the other, in no sense could He be called a common good per accidens. Yet

138 But there is another respect in which the common good surpasses the individual. This way was suggested by the metaphor of the instruments playing a symphony: there is more in the symphony than a single instrument can contain, not in a quantitative but in a qualitative sense. When St. Thomas asks the question, why did God make many and diverse things, his answer makes use of this principle. The only adequate image of the Father is the Son, because no finite being can possibly reflect all that is in Him. Because of this finitude, a multiplicity of creatures is better able to reflect God than any single created nature. The likeness to God in creatures is perfected in the multitude of creatures not only as being communicated to more numerically, but as an integral whole, in virtue of its order.234

such would be the case if the community of the divine good depended upon the existence of this and that person” (De Koninck, “In Defense,” 303). “La seule raison acceptable est qu’Il a voulu Se communiquer abondamment, et que la communication de Lui-même à un seul intellect créé ne pouvait suffire à la grandeur de Son dessein. Il n’a pas choisi de se manifester seulement à telle personne, mais à un grand nombre. En ce sens c’est la manifestation de Lui-même à la multitude qui constitue Son intention principale. …Mais Il est le bien de telle personne, et de telle autre. Qu’Il puisse être le bien, le bien infini, de cette personne et de cette autre n’est pas accidentel ; c’est sa nature même, qu’il crée ou non seulement l’une ou l’autre personne. On ne peut par conséquent en aucun cas l’appeler bien commun par accident s’Il crée l’une et l’autre. En revanche, ce serait le cas si la communauté du bien divin dépendait de l’existence de telle personne et de telle autre” (“Pour la Défense,” 323-324). 234 “The distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever”(STh Ia, q47 a1 co.). “Distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam; et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas; ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia. Nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim; unde perfectius participant divinum bonitatem, et repraesentat eam totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura.”

139 This is why De Koninck writes in Chapter 10 of Ego Sapientia, “That which

God principally wills in the universe is the good of order.”235 We must understand this primacy in light of all that has been said about the relation of the parts to the whole. The common good is not an alien good. It is not that God intends a kind of superstructure with respect to which the individuals are mere material. The common good is precisely the good of each of the parts, and this is true both of the extrinsic common good and of the intrinsic common good. It is in fact a better good of the part.

Is this true also of rational persons, who by grace are able to see God face to face in beatitude, to attain the extrinsic common good directly? Certainly a created person does not need any other in order to be fully satisfied by the vision of God.

And yet, there is an aspect of increase, not of object but of participation, in receiving

Him as members of a body. The common good must be loved according to its communicability and its superabundance, and thus in its power to form a communion among those who receive it.

In his discussion of the House of God, to which we referred above, De

Koninck noted the twofold meaning of the House as either God Himself (the extrinsic common good of the universe), or the communion of the Saints in their attainment of Him (the highest intrinsic common good of the universe). In light of this twofold meaning, he considers the relation of each person, for whom Jesus tells us a particular “mansion” has been prepared, to the House as a whole. This passage

235 Ego Sapientia, 10.2.

140 is well worth quoting at length because of its power to bring together the images of the common good with the theoretical account we have just been making.

The mansions are mansions of the same house both in the first meaning of house and in the second, and anyone's formal beatitude is but a single mansion. God Himself dwells in each mansion, yet His dwelling in the house is more abundant than in any single chamber. It is because of the narrowness of the individual mansion that it cannot receive Him in the fullness with which He is received in the house. When He said to His disciples: Where there are two or three gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst of them, He did not mean that He is not then present to Peter as Peter, or to John as John; yet He is more fully present then to Peter and John than to either Peter or John alone. And this is the reason why, even in the present life, that is, in the house in which God dwells according to faith, if two of you shall consent upon earth concerning anything whatsoever they shall ask, it shall be done to them by my Father who is in heaven (Mt. 18:19-20).

So it is in beatitude. Both Peter and John know that it is better that He be present to both together. They see the infinite greatness of God is such that, in truth, it can never be fully manifested neither to one nor the other, nor to both, nor even to all those whom He has chosen. Nor would they see God if they did not see that this goodness is incomprehensible, illimitable. They see that His indwelling in the house which is the Church, is, absolutely speaking, "eligibilior" [more choiceworthy], because their viewpoint is truly divine. In seeing God, Peter sees what is greater than anything which could be his proper good for he knows that he is only Peter; he sees that God is infinitely more communicable than He is to Peter himself, and it is this infinity of goodness Peter loves, because he loves God in Himself and in that bounty which, of its very nature is diffusive of itself. For this diffusion is not what proceeds from Him, "secundum operationem causae efficientis" [according to the operation of an efficient cause], it is His own goodness—"prout est beatitudinis objectum" [as He is the object of beatitude]. And if there be also John to share the vision, Peter cannot fail to rejoice, because the superabundance of the divine good is his joy. And if the share of John be greater than his own, Peter will again rejoice, for the prime measure of their happiness is neither Peter nor John, but the immeasurable liberality of the divine good. Yet the one soul does not need the other, for their operation is their own; nor does the one aid the other to see, for God alone encompasses and draws them; and the very immediacy and freedom have their reason in

141 the universality of divine truth and goodness. Even if Peter alone had been chosen, he would know that his is only a mansion in comparison with the House that is God Himself.236

C. Four Marks of the Common Good and Its Primacy

We can draw from the foregoing four characteristics of a genuinely common good: communicability, superabundance, incommensurability, and unifying power.

The root quality, that which makes a common good common in the way we have delineated above, is its communicability. “The common good is better for each of the particulars which participate in it, insofar as it is communicable to the other

236 De Koninck, “In Defense,” 304-306. “Les demeures sont les demeures de la même maison à la fois au premier et au second sens de ce mot, et chaque béatitude personnelle est une demeure particulière. Dieu Lui-même habite en chaque demeure, mais sa présence dans la maison tout entière est plus abondante qu’en aucune des demeures particulières. C’est à cause de leur étroitesse qu’aucune des demeures particulières ne peut Le recevoir pleinement ainsi qu’Il est reçu dans la maison tout entière. Disant à ses disciples : Là où deux ou trois sont réunis en mon nom, je suis au milieu d’eux, Il ne voulait pas dire qu’Il n’est pas alors présent à Pierre en tant que Pierre ou à Jean en tant que Jean ; mais il est alors plus présent à Pierre et Jean qu’à Pierre seul ou à Jean seul. Et c’est la raison pour laquelle, même en cette vie présente, c’est-à-dire dans la maison où habite Dieu selon la foi, si deux d’entre vous s’accordent sur la Terre, quoi qu’ils demandent, ils l’obtiendront de mon Père qui est dans les Cieux. Il en est de même dans la Béatitude. Pierre et Jean savent qu’il est meilleur qu’Il soit présent à tous deux à la fois. Ils voient que la grandeur infinie de Dieu est telle que, en vérité, il n’est pas possible qu’elle se manifeste pleinement ni à l’un ni à l’autre, ni aux deux à la fois, ni même à tous ceux qu’Il a choisit. De même ils ne verraient point Dieu s’ils ne voyaient que cette bonté est incompréhensible, sans limite. Ils voient que Son séjour dans la maison qui est l’Église est, absolument parlant, « plus désirable » (eligibilior), parce que leur point de vue est réellement divin. En voyant Dieu, Pierre voit ce qui est plus grand que tout ce que pourrait être son bien propre, parce qu’il voit qu’il n’est que Pierre ; il voit que Dieu est infiniment plus communicable qu’à lui, Pierre, seulement, et c’est cette infinité dans la bonté que Pierre aime, parce qu’il aime Dieu en Lui-même et dans cette bonté qui par sa nature même est diffusive de soi. Car cette diffusion n’est pas ce qui procède de Dieu « suivant l’opération de la cause efficiente » ; c’est Sa bonté même – « en tant qu’il est l’objet de la béatitude ». Et s’il y a là Jean, prenant part lui aussi à la vision, Pierre ne peut manquer de s’en réjouir car c’est la surabondance du bien divin qui fait sa joie. Et si la part de Jean est plus grande que la sienne, Pierre s’en réjouit encore, car ni Pierre ni Jean ne sont l’aune et la mesure de leur bonheur, mais l’incommensurable libéralité de la bonté divine. Aucune des deux âmes n’a toutefois besoin de l’autre, leur opération étant propre à l’une comme à l’autre ; aucune n’aide l’autre dans la vision : Dieu seul les entoure et les conduit ; et cette liberté et cette immédiateté de la presence divine n’ont d’autre raison que l’universalité de la vérité et de la bonté divines. Même si Pierre avait seul été choisi, il saurait qu’il n’est pas plus qu’une simple demeure, en comparaison de la maison tout entière qui est Dieu Lui-même” (In Defense, 325).

142 particulars; communicability is the very reason for its perfection.”237 We noted above that goods of higher orders have the power to be an end for many. Such a good “reaches many, not by confusion but because of its very high determination which principally reaches that which is highest in the inferiors: ‘a higher cause has a higher proper effect.’”238 The nobler the cause, the more universal its effect.

On account of the perfection of the good itself, then, there is also a certain superabundance. Because it is not diminished in any way by being communicated, there is an inexhaustibility in the common good, an abundance that does not run dry. The complementary aspect of this communicability and superabundance on the part of the good is found in the incommensurability of the common good with the individual who receives it. In other words, the common good transcends those who participate in it. The individual is exceeded by the good in which he participates, so that he cannot possess the whole of the good in which he shares—as the lone cellist cannot possess the whole of the symphony—except by being ordered to it.

For this reason the individual is always as a part with respect to the common good.239 De Koninck makes this point most poignantly in discussing the good of beatitude:

237 Common Good, 16. “Le bien commun est meilleur pour chacun des particuliers qui y participent, en tant qu’il est communicable aux autres particuliers : la communicabilité est de la raison même de sa perfection” (Bien Commun, 119). 238 Common Good, 51. “Il s’étend à plusieurs, non pas grâce à une confusion, mais à cause de sa détermination très élevée qui s’étend principalement à ce qu’il y a de plus élevé dans les inférieurs : « une cause plus élevée a un effet propre plus élevé »” (Bien Commun, 141). 239 “The common good differs from the singular good by this very universality. It has the character of superabundance and it is eminently diffusive of itself insofar as it is more communicable: it reaches the singular more than the singular good: it is the greater good of the singular. … The particular attains to the common good considered precisely as common good only insofar as it attains to it as to something communicable to others” (Common Good, 16). “Le bien commun diffère du bien singulier par cette universalité même. Il a raison de surabondance et il est éminemment diffusif de soi en tant qu’il est plus communicable : il s’étend

143 We reply that if beatitude in itself does not depend on its actually being communicated to many, it does nonetheless depend on its essential communicability to many. And the reason for this is the superabundance of this good in which beatitude consists, and its incommensurability with the singular good of the person. The sin of the angels consisted in wanting to make every good commensurable with their proper good. Man sins when he wants the good of the intellect to be commensurable with his private good. And so if even only one single person enjoys beatitude, that person still must always have the aspect of a part vis-à-vis this superabundant good; for even if in fact the person were the only one to enjoy it, the single person could not consider this good as his singular good.240

While the individual person enjoys God in an immediate way in beatitude, and is filled by God despite his own finite capacity, he can never comprehend the divine goodness.

The fourth characteristic of the common good is an immediate consequence of its communicability and superabundance, and of its incommensurability with the individual. These three qualities look toward the outpouring of the good, its communication to others. They explain the images of shining light and flowing waters with reference to the causality of the good. The fourth quality explains the image of the house and city—it is the power of the good to gather into itself all those who share in it, establishing communion among them.

davantage au singulier que le bien singulier : il est le meilleur bien du singulier. … Le particulier n’atteint le bien commun sous la raison même de bien commun qu’en tant qu’il l’atteint comme communicable aux autres” (Bien Commun, 119). 240 Common Good, 52. “Nous répondons que si de soi la béatitude de la personne singulière ne dépend pas de la communication actuelle de cette béatitude à plusieurs, elle n’en dépend pas moins de son essentielle communicabilité à plusieurs. Et la raison en est la surabondance de ce bien qu’est la béatitude, et son incommensurabilité au bien singulier de la personne. Le péché des anges consistait à vouloir tout bien commensurable à leur bien propre. L’homme pèche quand il veut le bien de l’intelligence commensurable au bien privé. Dès lors, quand même une seule personne jouirait de la béatitude, elle aurait toujours raison de partie en face de ce bien surabondant : même si en fait elle était seule pour en jouir, jamais la personne singulière ne pourrait considérer ce bien comme le sien singulier” (Bien Commun, 141).

144 In the beautiful passage about the House of God quoted at length in the previous section, De Koninck shows how the good of each person belongs to the other inasmuch as both belong to—are ordered to—the common good.241 We also saw that the order of each to the extrinsic common good has as a consequence the ordering of each part to the other, and of each one to the intrinsic common good.

The desire for victory is the reason for the obedience of the soldier to his superior.

Both the extrinsic and the intrinsic common good unite those who belong to them.

Again referring to the good of beatitude, De Koninck writes:

And this communication with the common good founds the communication among singular persons extra verbum: the common good insofar as it is common is the root of this communication which would not be possible if the Divine good were not already loved in its communicability to others.242

These four characteristics account for the primacy of the common good over the private good as such, and for the individual’s relation to the common good as a part. The immediate correlative of this primacy is that the common good is more worthy of love than the private good of the person, and his own share in the common good.

We are first of all and principally parts of the universe. It is for this reason that we love naturally, and to a greater degree, the good of the whole. "In natural things, each being which is according to nature and in its very being of another (quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est alterius est), is

241 “That does not mean that the others are the reason for the love which the common good itself merits; on the contrary, in this formal relationship it is the others which are lovable insofar as they are able to participate in this common good” (Common Good, 16-17). “Cela ne veut pas dire que les autres sont la raison de l’amabilité propre du bien commun ; au contraire, sous ce rapport formel, les autres sont aimables en tant qu’ils peuvent participer à ce bien” (Bien Commun, 120). 242 Common Good, 30. “Et cette communication au bien commun fonde la communication des personnes singulières entre elles extra verbum : le bien commun en tant que bien commun est la racine de cette communication qui ne serait pas possible si le bien divin n’était déjà aimé dans sa communicabilité aux autres” (Bien Commun, 127).

145 principally and more inclined towards that from which it has its being (id in cuius est) than towards itself.243

Because the human person is of another in his very being, he is radically dependent, radically a part primo et per se. And consequently he is principally and to a greater degree inclined towards that in which he participates in his very being.244

The created person therefore loves God and the communion of all the blessed in

Him more than himself. Clearly, therefore, this love cannot be an appropriative love, as though the common good were ordered to the person’s possession of it. To love

God as a common good is to love Him in His very incommensurability with oneself.

The love of the common good is therefore a self-giving love, a love that draws the person out of himself in a union with that which is above him precisely as being above. Every creature is therefore ordered to God and to the order of the universe as

243 STh Ia, q60 a5 co.; quoted in (Bien Commun, 142)."Unumquodque autem in rebus naturalibus, quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cujus est, quam in seipsum.” Thomas continues: “Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because ‘according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved,’ as stated in Phys. 2. For we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.” “Et haec inclinatio naturalis demonstratur ex his quae naturaliter aguntur: quia unumquodque, sicut agitur naturaliter, sic aptum natum est agi, ut dicitur in II Physic. Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit ad conservationem totius: sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, hujusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis: est enim virtuosi civis, ut se exponat mortis periculo pro totius reipublicae conservatione; et si homo esset naturalis pars hujus civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei naturalis." 244 Common Good, 54. “Parce que la personne humaine est dans son être même, d’autrui, elle est radicalement dépendante, elle est radicalement partie, primo et per se. Et, par conséquent, elle est principalement et davantage inclinée vers ce dont elle participe son être même” (Bien Commun, 142).

146 its end and good. “That which God principally wills in the universe is the good of order.”245

Chapter 11: Mary as a Separated Common Good of the Universe

We should hold all that we have said about the common good before us as we read in Chapter 11 that Mary is “a good separated from the universal order, a properly universal common good, a good who in her indivisible and superabundant unity is the good of all things.”246 This can only be the case if Mary transcends the good of the universe as a whole in such a way that she is eminently communicable, superabundant, and, as the source of good for all creatures, is incommensurable with any one part of the universe. She must furthermore, in virtue of this communicability, cause the very unity and order of the whole.247

In Chapter 9, De Koninck writes that God is so fully present in Mary’s soul by grace that she herself becomes a good communicable to the whole of creation.

“Image of Goodness itself, she imitates the original in the universal diffusion of goodness and she gives to things their primary impulsion and their movement.

…And her diffusion is so universal that she rejoins God, imitating the manner by which God Himself rejoins Himself in every diffusion of His goodness.”248 Mary’s union with God is so perfect that what she communicates is not something proper to her own finite nature, but God Himself. Her communicability, her superabundance

245 Ego Sapientia, 10.2. 246 Ego Sapientia, 11.1. 247 In the following chapter, De Koninck also considers Mary as a part of the cosmos. Nothing that is said about Mary as a separated common good should be taken as a denial of the fact that in her nature she is a creature and a part of the created universe. 248 Ego Sapientia, 11.1.

147 and the incommensurability of the good she communicates with every possible participation in it, are consequences of this surpassing union which is proper to her as the Mother of God.

But if we want to understand how Mary is truly a separated common good of all things, it will not suffice to see that God passes through her in some way. We must also see that she communicates God in the manner of an end. This is particularly important and particularly difficult to see with respect to the end of the rational creature, whose end is union with God by grace. Because Mary is neither

God nor created grace, it would be possible to think that we can only speak of her as an instrument. The sacraments, though they are endowed with the very power to communicate divine life to the soul, are nevertheless only means, 249 and when the end has been definitively attained, they will pass away. To say that Mary gives us

God not only as an instrument but in the manner of an end is to say that her role in our salvation is not as a means that passes away once the end itself is possessed.

Rather, she must be a good that is attained and held, and is perfective of others by her union with them.

This seems to be an extreme claim to make for a creature. “Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence,” 250 says

St. Thomas, and furthermore, our union with God is immediate. Many creatures are instrumental in bringing us to this point, but nothing can mediate the vision of God.

249 The Eucharist is an exception inasmuch as it contains Christ Himself under the sacramental signs. In this sense, though it does not possess the end in the manner of a rational creature, it is the end. Yet the sign itself will also pass away. 250 STh Ia IIae, q3 a8 co.: “ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae.”

148 No finite form could lead the created intellect to the essence of God as He is in

Himself, and therefore, preparing the soul by a supernatural light, God actualizes the intellect directly by His immediate presence, taking the place of an intellectual species.251 The divine presence, in the immediacy of glory, is our beatitude. How could our union with Mary belong to our final end?

The path toward an answer must lie in the humanity of Christ. Mary enjoys no privilege and no causality that is not derived from her inseparability from her

251 “For since in every knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen, this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God in His essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence. This, however, must not be understood as though the Divine essence were in reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as in natural things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and color are received into a transparent object, light being to color as form to matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul, together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are not received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be shown as follows” (In IV Sent., d49 q2 a1 co.). “Cum enim in qualibet cognitione sit necessaria aliqua forma, qua res cognoscatur, aut videatur, forma ista, qua intellectus perficitur ad videndas substantias separatas, non est quidditas, quam intellectus abstrahit a rebus compositis, ut dicebat prima opinio; neque aliqua impressio relicta a substantia separata in intellectu nostro, ut dicebat secunda; sed est ipsa substantia separata, quae conjungitur intellectui nostro ut forma, ut ipsa sit quod intelligitur, et quo intelligitur. Quidquid autem sit de aliis substantiis separatis, tamen istum modum oportet nos accipere in visione Dei per essentiam, quia quacumque alia forma informaretur intellectus noster, non posset per eam duci in essentiam divinam: quod quidem non debet intelligi, quasi divina essentia sit vera forma intellectus nostri, vel quod ex ea, et intellectu nostro efficiatur unum simpliciter, sicut in naturalibus ex forma, et materia naturali; sed quia proportio essentiae divinae ad intellectum nostrum est sicut proportio formae ad materiam. Quandocumque enim aliqua duo, quorum unum est altero perfectius, recipiuntur in eodem receptibili, proportio unius duorum ad alterum, scilicet magis perfecti ad minus perfectum, est sicut proportio formae ad materiam; sicut lux, et color recipiuntur in diaphano, quorum lux se habet ad colorem sicut forma ad materiam: et ita cum in anima recipiatur lux intellectiva, et ipsa divina essentia inhabitans, licet non per eumdem modum, essentia divina se habebit ad intellectum, sicut forma ad materiam. Et quod hoc sufficiat ad hoc quod intellectus per divinam essentiam possit videre ipsam divinam essentiam, hoc modo potest ostendi.”

149 Son as Redeemer. 252 So we will first ask whether union with the humanity of Christ belongs to our final end, since His human nature is created and therefore “outside” the divine essence, though united to a divine Person. We might reason that the humanity of Christ is the means to the beatific vision but does not belong to it, because the object of the beatific vision is the divine essence—the uncreated Trinity which dwells in man. How could the created humanity, the body and soul of Christ, belong to that vision?

Nevertheless, it is clear from Scripture itself that union with Christ belongs not only to the way but to the end. Whether or not the humanity itself is part of what constitutes the primary object of the beatific vision (and indeed it seems that it cannot directly and properly do so), it is certain that it is integral to our possession of this vision. We are told, “this is eternal life, that they know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent” (Jn. 17:3). Likewise, the always conjoins the “Ancient of Days” and the “Lamb who was slain” as the object of the worship of the elect and cause of their joy, as well as the source of their enlightenment. “I saw no temple in the city, for its temple is the Lord God the

Almighty and the Lamb. And the city has no need of sun or moon to shine on it, for

252 “Mother of the Redeemer, [Mary] is inseparably united to this final cause as co-principle” ; “She was the sapiential exemplar after which God composed the universe: “Cum eo eram cuncta componens- I was with Him forming all things” (Prov. 8:30). And precisely in this she is united to the consubstantial image of the Father, to begotten Wisdom” ; “Mary is, with her Son, at the very origin of the universe” ; “He has willed that the whole universe, no less than the order of grace, should be referred and ordered to Christ and the Blessed Virgin as to its complement and end” (Ego Sapientia, 5.1; 9.1; 10.1; 15.1).

150 the glory of God is its light, and its lamp is the Lamb.”253 St. Thomas makes use of this passage to show that the priesthood of Christ is eternal:

The Saints who will be in heaven will not need any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated, they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory depends, as is written (Rev. 21:23): "The splendor of God has enlightened it," that is, the city of the Saints, and its lamp is the Lamb.254

How does the glory of the saints “depend” on Christ? Thomas says that the saints depend on Him in the consummation of the work of the priest. To understand what this means, we have to consider the office of a priest in relation to our final end.

The role of a priest is to be a mediator between God and man, that is to unite them by offering to God what is due to Him from man, and by offering the divine gifts to man.

The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people: inasmuch namely as He bestows Divine things on the people, for which reason "sacerdos" [priest] means a giver of sacred things… and again, inasmuch as he offers up the people's prayers to God, and, in a manner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins.255

253 Rev. 21:22-23. Cf. Rev. 5:13; 7:17; 14:1-4: “Then I heard every creature in heaven and on earth and under the earth and in the sea, and all that is in them, singing, ‘To the one seated on the throne and to the Lamb be blessing and honor and glory and might forever and ever!’” “They will hunger no more, and thirst no more; the sun will not strike them, nor any scorching heat; for the Lamb at the center of the throne will be their shepherd, and he will guide them to springs of the water of life, and God will wipe away every tear from their eyes.” “Then I looked, and there was the Lamb, standing on Mount Zion! And with him were one hundred forty-four thousand who had his name and his Father’s name written on their foreheads. …these follow the Lamb wherever he goes. They have been redeemed from humankind as first fruits for God and the Lamb.” 254 STh IIIa, q22 a5 ad1. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sancti qui erunt in patria, non indigebunt ulterius expiari per sacerdotium Christi, sed, expiati iam, indigebunt consummari per ipsum Christum, a quo gloria eorum dependet, ut dicitur, Apoc. XXI, quod claritas Dei illuminat illam, scilicet civitatem sanctorum, et lucerna eius est agnus.” 255 “[P]roprium officium sacerdotis est esse mediatorem inter Deum et populum, inquantum scilicet divina populo tradit, unde sacerdos dicitur quasi sacra dans… et iterum inquantum preces populi Deo offert, et pro eorum peccatis Deo aliqualiter satisfacit” (STh IIIa, q22 a1 co.).

151 A mediator can only unite those between whom he mediates if he somehow touches both extremes. The Son is God from God, and is always with the Father.256 But in taking on humanity, He must unite us into one in Himself in such a way as to allow us to participate in His union with the Father. But this is impossible except by transforming us, because our humanity is far from God through sin.

In Book 10 of the The City of God, St. Augustine explains that the way of transformative union is sacrifice. He begins by explaining that the way to union with

God is contained in the twofold commandment to love God and one’s neighbor, because it is by love that we are united to God, and in love that we draw one another to this same end. This love makes of our lives a sacrifice.

[W]e offer to him, on the altar of the heart, the sacrifice of humility and praise, and the flame on the altar is the burning fire of love. To see him as he can be seen and to cleave to him, we purify ourselves from every stain of sin and evil desire and we consecrate ourselves in his name. For he himself is the source of our bliss, he himself is the goal of all our striving.257

“Thus,” he continues, “the true sacrifice is offered in every act which is designed to unite us to God in a holy fellowship.”258 It does this by consuming the soul in such a way as to transform it; that is, to convert it from attachment to the world and to sin, to the life of God.

256 “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (Jn. 1:1). 257 Augustine, City of God, Bk. X, Ch. 3. “[E]i sacrificamus hostiam humilitatis et laudis in ara cordis igne feruidam caritatis. Ad hunc uidendum, sicut uideri poterit, eique cohaerendum ab omni peccatorum et cupiditatum malarum labe mundamur et eius nomine consecramur. Ipse enim fons nostrae beatitudinis, ipse omnis appetitionis est finis.” 258 Augustine, City of God, Bk. X, Ch. 6. “Proinde verum sacrificium est omne opus, quo agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo.”

152 The Letter to the Ephesians in particular shows how Christ’s sacrifice on the

Cross reveals both sides of His mediation. On the one hand, the sacrifice of Christ is the gift of divine love to man.

But God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us even when we were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ—by grace you have been saved—and raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus, so that in the ages to come he might show the immeasurable riches of his grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus. For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God (Eph. 2:4-8).

But at the same time, having united Himself to sinners, Christ makes of Himself an offering to the Father in obedience and perfect love.

Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children, and live in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God (Eph. 5:1-2).

Both the gift of God and the offering of man, the aspects of Christ’s mediation and the content of the sacrifice that unites us to God, take place in His Humanity. “For it was this form he offered, and in this form he was offered, because it is under this form that he is the mediator, in this form he is the priest, in this form he is the sacrifice.”259

Further, it is by man’s union with Christ in His humanity that he is caught up into the unifying movement of His sacrifice. He unites us to Himself in a single body, so that insofar as we belong to Him as members, we are sacrificed with Him, transformed and united to God in Him. By the gift of grace (the outpouring of light and waters) we are gathered into Christ (the unity of the house and city).

259 Augustine, City of God, Bk. X, Ch. 6. “Hanc [formam] enim obtulit, in hac oblatus est, quia secundum hanc mediator est, in hac sacerdos, in hac sacrificium est.”

153 But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups [gentiles and Jews] into one and has broken down the dividing wall, that is, the hostility between us. He has abolished the law with its commandments and ordinances, that he might create in himself one new humanity in place of the two, thus making peace, and might reconcile both groups to God in one body through the cross, thus putting to death that hostility through it. So he came and proclaimed peace to you who were far off and peace to those who were near; for through him both of us have access in one Spirit to the Father. So then you are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are citizens with the saints and also members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus himself as the cornerstone. In him the whole structure is joined together and grows into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom you also are built together spiritually into a dwelling place for God (Eph. 2:13-22).

In this passage we see the good of order that exists among the parts in their order to the common good, as well as the relation of that order to the final end. “In His flesh

He has made both groups one.” That is, Christ as man is like the house in which God dwells principally, and by uniting the faithful to Himself, He also incorporates them into this house, so that they might be themselves “a dwelling place for God.” Christ’s humanity is the locus of the union of God and man. To receive His grace is to share in a life that is constituted by Him. Union with Christ, who laid down His life for us, belongs per se to our union with God.

It is also clear now how the characteristics of the common good apply to

Christ the Redeemer. The union of each soul with God depends on Christ because it is a participation in the grace that is properly His in virtue of the hypostatic union.

We call the grace by which the Trinity fills Christ’s human soul “capital grace” because it flows from Him to the faithful like the life of the head to the extremities of the body. Being Himself one, He communicates the divine Goodness to all those who

154 believe in Him, and by extension to the whole universe which finds its perfection in its order to Him. What is His properly is ours by participation, and in being united to

Him, we become members of each other, united into a single body.

Having seen how the humanity of Christ relates to our final end, we return to the role of His Mother. De Koninck concludes the chapter on Mary as a separated common good with a text from John of St. Thomas concerning the order of charity.

In general, he notes, one must love God first, and then oneself before one’s neighbor.260 “I make exception nevertheless,” he continues,

of Christ Our Lord, even as man, and of the Blessed Virgin mother, because they have for us the account of principle diffusive of grace and beatitude. In effect, Christ is, as man, the head (caput) of glory, and the Blessed Virgin is mother of this head, and she is as the neck through which grace descends from this head to us: and for this reason we should love them more than ourselves.261

260 In STh IIa IIae, q26 a4, Thomas shows that our love of the good itself is the foundation of our love for ourselves as partakers in the good, and our love for the good and for ourselves as partakers in it is the foundation for our love for others who share in it. “God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share.” “Debet homo magis se diligere, post Deum, quam quemcumque alium. Et hoc patet ex ipsa ratione diligendi. Nam sicut supra dictum est, Deus diligitur ut principium boni super quo fundatur dilectio caritatis; homo autem seipsum diligit ex caritate secundum rationem qua est particeps praedicti boni; proximus autem diligitur secundum rationem societatis in isto bono. Consociatio autem est ratio dilectionis secundum quandam unionem in ordine ad Deum. Unde sicut unitas potior est quam unio, ita quod homo ipse participet bonum divinum est potior ratio diligendi quam quod alius associetur sibi in hac participatione.” Thus, the principle of the good is loved prior to oneself, and one’s neighbor posterior to oneself. This is true to some degree of every common good. That is, the good itself or the principle of the good is always loved more than one’s share in it, since the latter is derived from the former. 261 Ego Sapientia, 11.1. One loves any principle of the good better than his derivative share in the good for the reasons given above, and thus one loves the head of the state more than oneself as citizen, for example. Yet, it is only with respect to that common good which comprehends man’s whole good that we can say he loves it more than himself simply and absolutely. Our love for Christ and Mary is set apart from other cases because it is man’s final end that they communicate to us.

155 This image of head and neck suggests that our participation in the grace of Christ is at the same time, albeit in a different manner, a participation in the grace of Mary.

Mary’s sanctifying grace, while it is wholly derived from the Head, is nonetheless of a higher order than our own, being ordered to the divine motherhood. Once more, all the privileges of Mary are hers because of her relation to Christ and in dependence on Him. Thus her mediation must be exercised in subordination to and together with His. But it is precisely in her inseparability from Christ that we find

Mary too particularly fitted for the role of mediation. She is a creature, one of our own, infinitely inferior to God. Yet as Mother she is principle of a divine Person, which, Cajetan says, “makes her attain the very frontiers of the divinity.”262

In what does Mary’s subordinated and yet co-extensive mediation consist?

Or, better, how does she so attain the end of her Son’s mediation that she becomes a co-principle of the same mediation? Recalling all that has been said, we know that

Mary attains the end of the divine missions (union with God by the indwelling of the

Trinity) in such a way as to become principle thereof. The indwelling of the Trinity enables her to give the consent that allows God to come forth from her into the world. But that motherhood entails much more than the physiological fact of maternity: it entails the whole life of the one of whom she consented to be Mother— it entails the whole redemptive economy which draws man into a union with the

262 , in IIa IIae, q103 a4 ad 2: “Ad fines Deitatis B. V. Maria propria actione attigit, dum Deum concepit, peperit, genuit et lacte proprio pavit,” quoted by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “The Influence of Mary Mediatrix,” Chapter 6 in The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Prelude of Eternal Life, vol. I, trans. Sr. M. Timothea Doyle, 119-126 (St Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949), 121. (Hereafter: Mary Mediatrix).

156 Father by a participation in the divine life. By her Fiat, Mary consented not only to become the Mother of God, but the Mother of the Redeemer.

By giving express consent to be the mother of such a son she accepted no less the lot that was to be hers as a consequence. She knew that by this consent she was to share in the whole work of Redemption. For, the Angel had plainly stated that this Savior would be King and that He would reign forever. Mary’s free acceptance not only made possible the one and the other but in each instance she must be recognized as a “per se” cause.263

Mary’s sanctity fits her to share in the redemptive work of her Son as Mother.264

263 De Koninck, “Universal Queenship.” 264 Lawrence Feingold summarizes the dual aspects of Mary’s relationship to Redemption as follows: “In order to better understand the mediation of Christ and Mary, theologians distinguish between objective redemption, and subjective redemption. Objective redemption refers to the universal cause of human salvation worked in the Incarnation and Passion of Christ. Subjective redemption is the application of the merits of the objective work of redemption to each individual man. In both senses, Christ is the one Redeemer of mankind; Mary‘s co-redemption is entirely and utterly subordinate to Christ. Mary, however, is an associate of Christ in both senses: objective and subjective. Theology speaks of Mary‘s participation in the objective work of redemption with the title, Co-Redemptrix, and it speaks of Mary‘s participation in subjective redemption (application of the fruits of Redemption) with the title of . … Obviously the one who principally crushes the head of the serpent is Christ, but Mary cooperates in Christ‘s work in a subordinate way. This cooperation has two principal moments: (a) her consent at the Annunciation in the place of humanity, and (b) her consent at the foot of the Cross” (working manuscript on Mariology, distributed as coursenotes for the Institue for Pastoral Studies, Fall, 2011), 117. Among the magisterial texts Feingold collects to throw light on Mary’s role in the passion are the following: “Moreover it was not only the prerogative of the Most Holy Mother to have furnished the material of His flesh to the Only Son of God, Who was to be born with human members (S. Bede Ven. L. Iv. in Luc. xl.), of which material should be prepared the Victim for the salvation of men; but hers was also the office of tending and nourishing that Victim, and at the appointed time presenting Him for the sacrifice. Hence that uninterrupted community of life and labors of the Son and the Mother, so that of both might have been uttered the words of the Psalmist ― ‘My life is consumed in sorrow and my years in groans’ (Ps. 30:11). When the supreme hour of the Son came, beside the Cross of Jesus there stood Mary His Mother, not merely occupied in contemplating the cruel spectacle, but rejoicing that her Only Son was offered for the salvation of mankind, and so entirely participating in His Passion, that if it had been possible she would have gladly borne all the torments that her Son bore. And from this community of will and suffering between Christ and Mary she merited to become most worthily the Reparatrix of the lost world and Dispensatrix of all the gifts that Our Savior purchased for us by His Death and by His Blood” (St. Pius X, Laetissiumum, [1904]). “With her suffering and dying Son, Mary endured suffering and almost death. She gave up her mother‘s rights over her Son in order to procure the salvation of mankind, and to appease the divine justice, she, as much as she could, immolated her Son, so that one can truly affirm that together with Christ she has redeemed the human race. Now since for this reason every kind of grace which we receive from the treasury of the Redemption is ministered as it were through the hands of the Sorrowful Virgin, no one can fail to see that it is from her also that we must look for a holy death, for

157

Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange discusses two aspects of Mary’s mediation: that of her participation in the sacrifice of the Cross, and that of her role in the gift of to men.265 With regard to the first, he points out that as Mother, Mary is able to offer the sacrifice of Christ in a unique way, with the same totality of freedom as her Son.

Jesus renounced His right to life; He offered Himself wholly for our salvation. Of Mary, St. John says: "There stood by the cross of Jesus, His mother," (Jn. 19:25) surely very closely united to Him in His suffering and oblation. As Pope Benedict XV says: "She renounced her rights as a mother over her Son for the salvation of all men." She accepted the martyrdom of Christ and offered it for us.266

In Mary, the free acceptance of the divine will is also the gift of her own Son for our salvation. This action of voluntary participation in the laying down of Christ’s life for us is the perfection of what began at the Annunciation. Her submission to God’s will communicated by the angel was at the same time a gift of her own person to God and of God to the world. At the Cross, Mary’s submission to the divine will makes

it is precisely by this gift that the work of the Redemption is effectively and eternally completed in each individual man” (Benedict XV, Apostolic Letter Inter Sodalicia, 1918, AAS 10, 182). “For since she brought forth for us Jesus our Redeemer, and nourished Him, and offered Him as a victim by the Cross, by her mystic union with Christ and His very special grace she likewise became and is piously called a Reparatrix. Trusting in her intercession with Christ, who whereas He is the ‘one mediator of God and men’ (1 Tim. 2:5), chose to make His Mother the Advocate of sinners, and the minister and Mediatrix of grace” (Pius XI, Miserentissimus Redemptor [1928]). 265 “This title [universal mediatrix] is consecrated by the special feast which is celebrated in the universal Church. To have a clear understanding of the meaning and import of this title, we shall consider how it is becoming to Mary for two principal reasons: because she cooperated by satisfaction and merit in the sacrifice of the cross; and because she does not cease to intercede for us, to obtain for us, and to distribute to us all the graces that we receive. Such is the double mediation, ascending and descending, which we ought to ponder in order daily to draw greater profit from it” (Mary Mediatrix, 121). 266 Mary Mediatrix, 122-123; quoting Benedict XV, Litt. Apost., Inter sodalicia, March 22, 1918.

158 her a principle in the execution of that will. She not only enters into the offering of

Christ, as others do, but offers Him entire as something of her own.

Mary’s free offering of that sacrifice was for her, as for her Son, an experience of the most intense suffering, in proportion to the intensity of love that consented to it. “More than anyone else, Mary endured the very suffering of the Savior; she suffered for sin in the degree of her love for God, whom sin offends; for her Son, whom sin crucified; for souls, which sin ravishes and kills. The Blessed Virgin's charity incomparably surpassed that of the greatest saints.”267 De Koninck makes the same point in an essay on the Assumption:

In other words, the evil of Christ’s passion and the evil of the compassion of his Mother are the same evil, and they suffer it per modum unius. And since she loves her Son more than she loves herself, she suffers the more from the evil inflicted on her child than she would have any evil inflicted on herself. No one could have shared in the suffering of the innocent victim more perfectly than the Virgin who is the Immaculate Conception—Alma Virgo virginum. No other man could ever attain to this knowledge and this experience.268

Prepared by her Immaculate Conception and the indwelling of the Spirit that increased in her with every act throughout her whole life, Mary’s love surpassed that of any save Christ. As Augustine says, love is the fire that makes the sacrifice transformative, allowing it to bind the soul to God. After the love of her Son, the love with which Mary offered Him to God for man was the greatest act of love ever made

267 Mary Mediatrix, 123. 268 Piety, 43. “En d’autres termes, le mal de la passion du Christ, et le mal de la compassion de sa Mère, sont le même mal, et ils en souffrent per modum unius. Et comme elle aime son Fils beaucoup plus qu’elle ne s’aime elle-même, elle souffre beaucoup plus du mal infligé à son enfant, qu’elle ne pourrait souffrir d’un mal infligé uniquement à sa propre personne. Or personne ne peut compatir à la souffrance de la Victime innocente plus parfaitement que la Vierge qui est la Conception Immaculée—Alma Virgo virginum. Les autres hommes ne sauraient jamais atteindre à cette connaissance et à cette expérience” (La Piété, 31-32).

159 on the earth. This love was so total that she merited congruously all that Christ merited condignly in virtue of His divine Personhood.269

“Some saints, in particular the stigmatics, have been exceptionally united to the sufferings and merits of our Savior,” Garrigou-Lagrange writes, “for example, St.

Francis of Assisi and St. , and yet their share in His suffering cannot be compared with Mary's. How did Mary offer her Son? As He offered

Himself.”270 Through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, Mary was consumed by love to a greater degree and in a different manner than any other, insofar as her love, with her Son’s, was to be the fire by which He was offered to the Father, as the true sacrifice for all mankind. In the encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi, Pius XII connects this very act with Mary’s universal spiritual maternity:

269 “The Office and Mass proper to Mary Mediatrix assemble the principal testimonies of tradition on this point with their scriptural foundations, in particular the clearcut statements of St. Ephrem, the glory of the Syriac Church, of St. Germanus of Constantinople, of St. Bernard, and of St. Bernardine of Sienna. Even as early as the second and third centuries, St. Justin, St. , and insisted on the parallel between Eve and Mary, and showed that if the first concurred in our fall, the second collaborated in our redemption”(Mary Mediatrix, 124). The author cites the texts to which he refers in footnote 19: “St. Irenaeus, who represents the Churches of Asia where he was trained, the Church of Rome where he lived, and the Churches of Gaul where he taught, wrote (Adv. haeres., V, 19, I): ‘As Eve, seduced by the discourse of the (rebellious) angel, turned away from God and betrayed His word, so Mary heard from the angel the good tidings of the truth. She bore God in her bosom because she obeyed His word. …The human race, enchained by a virgin, was delivered by a virgin. . .; the prudence of the serpent yielded to the simplicity of the dove; the bonds which chained us in death were broken.’ In a prayer used in the second nocturn of the Office of Mary Mediatrix, St. Ephrem concludes from this parallel between Eve and the Mother of God, that ‘Mary is, after Jesus, the mediator par excellence, the mediatrix of the entire world, and that it is through her that we obtain all spiritual goods (tu creaturam replesti omni genere beneficii caelestibus laetitiam attulisti, terrestria salvasti).’ St. Germanus of Constantinople (Oratio 9, pa, XCVIII, 377 ff., quoted in the same nocturn of the Office) even says: ‘No one is saved except by thee, O most holy; no one is delivered except through thee, O most immaculate; no one receives the gifts of God except through thee, O purest.’ St. Bernard says: ‘O our mediatrix, O our advocate, reconcile us with thy Son; recommend us to thy Son; present us to thy Son’ (Second sermon adventu, 5). ‘It is the will of God that we should have everything through Mary’ (On the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, no. 7). ‘She is full of grace; the overflow is poured out on us’ (Sermon II on the Assumption, no. 1).” 270 Mary Medaitrix, 122.

160 It was she, the second Eve, who, free from all sin, original or personal, and always more intimately united with her Son, offered Him on Golgotha to the Eternal Father for all the children of Adam, sin-stained by his unhappy fall, and her mother's rights and her mother's love were included in the holocaust. Thus she who, according to the flesh, was the mother of our Head, through the added title of pain and glory became, according to the Spirit, the mother of all His members.271

De Koninck cites this text in order to show how the Motherhood of Christ, understood in its fullness as entailing also the particular sanctity of the Immaculate

Conception, is realized in Mary’s share in the Cross and in her relation to us. “Note how profoundly and intimately this spiritual maternity vis-à-vis us is founded in her physical maternity vis-à-vis Christ,” he writes. “It is by suffering with Him whom she bodily engendered that she becomes our spiritual mother.”272

This spiritual maternity is realized fully in the solicitude Mary shows for all men in her glorified state. “Since she is, with the Savior, a quite first principle of the kingdom whose enemy is already vanquished, is it not fitting that she enjoy now her perfection as mother?”273 As the grace by which Mary is made pleasing to God and by which He indwelled her in this life is set apart from all others by its ordination to the divine Motherhood, so the consummation of this grace in the vision of God is set apart from all others in a certain respect. The vision of God is nothing other than the presence of God to the soul together with the light of glory, so that God Himself enlightens the understanding to know Him as He is… face to face. God dwells in

271 Pius XII, Mystici Corporis, 110; quoted by De Koninck in La Piété, 32. 272 Piety, 44. “Remarquez combien profondément et intimement cette maternité spirituelle envers nous est fondée sur sa maternité physique envers le Christ. C’est en souffrant avec Celui qu’elle a corporellement engendré qu’elle devient notre mère spirituelle” (La Piété, 32). 273 Piety , 44. “Puisqu’elle est, avec le Sauveur, un tout premier principe de ce royaume dont l’ennemi est déjà vaincu, ne convient-il pas qu’elle jouisse maintenant de son être très parfait de Mère?” (La Piété, 33).

161 Mary more fully and more perfectly than in any other place in the universe, apart from the soul of Christ. Thus her vision of the Trinity is proportionately more perfect and more intense than any other’s. The wisdom with which Mary recognized man’s need and God’s love in the moment of her Fiat is perfected in the vision of God that sees how the divine love disposes all things in their particularity. We could say that even at the Annunciation she already fully possessed the principle according to which all things are to be ordered to God. But in the vision of the divine essence,

Mary also sees every particular creature, and in that knowledge knows how to draw each one back to God according to that principle which she herself has become.274

At the Cross Mary’s motherhood is transferred or extended from Christ to His members as she offers Him for their sake. In heaven this motherhood takes the form of active solicitude for each of her children. De Koninck writes:

The Holy Virgin is so pure a principle of mercy, that she can herself be consummately merciful. Graces pass through her as through a rational creature. She knows distinctly all those who receive grace. She must have a wondrous counsel! Here we see that she has the knowledge of good and evil: she is a kind of universal Providence. Queen of mercy, it is she who governs. Yet through it all: "Nigra sum..." There is no way to be closer to God than she is, because she is so close to the "Prima Radix.”275

274 Garrigou-Lagrange distinguishes two aspects of the universality of Mary’s mediation of the grace of God in the teaching of the Church: that she is the principle of every kind of grace, and that she is the principle of every particular grace. In support of this universality, he quotes Pope Leo XIII: "According to the will of God, nothing is granted to us except through Mary; and, as no one can go to the Father except through the Son, so generally no one can draw near to Christ except through Mary" (Leo XIII, Encyclical on the , Octobri Mense, 1891 [Denzinger, no. 3033], quoted in Mary Mediatrix, 126-127). With respect to the second aspect in particular, Garrigou-Lagrange appeals to the final petition of the , which asks for Mary’s intercession “now and at the hour of our death.” “This ‘now’ is said every moment in the Church by thousands of Christians who thus ask for the grace of the present moment,” he writes. “This grace is the most individual of graces; it varies with each of us, and for each one of us at every moment” (Mary Mediatrix, 127). 275 “La Sainte Vierge est un principe si pur par miséricorde, qu’elle peut elle-même être davantage miséricordieuse. Les grâces passent par elle comme par une créature raisonnable. Elle connaît distinctement toutes les personnes qui reçoivent la grâce. Elle doit avoir un conseil fantastique ! Là on voit qu’elle a la science du bien et du mal : elle est une sorte de Providence

162

In this brief passage we discover the theme that occupies the second part of Ego

Sapientia, mercy, connected with the mediation Mary exercises in heaven. Here we want to note only that as principle of the Son, Mary becomes universal principle in the distribution of grace.276 Mary is both the principle of the new order and knows this order, actively drawing all things into it. “Mary is consummately a mother because she is consummately a principle: principle by her nature and by her understanding and will. Indeed she has agreed to be the Mother of that Son [who was] described by the Angel. She participates in some fashion in the divine certainty.” 277

Mary therefore participates in the mediation of Christ: both the “upward” mediation of the transformative sacrifice of love on the Cross, and the “downward” mediation of bringing men into a share in the divine life by the dispensation of

universelle. Reine de miséricorde, c’est elle qui gouverne. Et cependant à travers tout cela : « Nigra sum… » Il n’y a pas moyen d’être plus proche de Dieu qu’elle, puisqu’elle est si proche de la « Prima Radix »” (De Koninck, “Mercy and Redemption”). Garrigou-Lagrange makes the same point regarding Mary’s precise knowledge of all souls. “With even greater reason after the assumption and her entrance into glory, Mary is the distributor of all graces. As a beatified mother knows in heaven the spiritual needs of her children whom she left on earth, Mary knows the spiritual needs of all men. Since she is an excellent mother, she prays for them and, since she is all powerful over the heart of her Son, she obtains for them all the graces that they receive, all which those receive who do not persist in evil. She is, it has been said, like an aqueduct of graces and, in the mystical body, like the virginal neck uniting the head to its members” (Mary Mediatrix, 128). 276 In “Universal Queenship,” De Koninck cites the following words of Pope Pius XII to pilgrims at Fatima in 1943 as a guide on this subject: “He, the Son of God, reflects on His heavenly Mother the glory, the majesty and the dominion of His Kingship; for, having been associated with the King of Martyrs in the ineffable work of human Redemption as Mother and Cooperatrix, she remains forever associated to Him, with an almost unlimited power, in the dispensation of graces which flow from the Redemption. Jesus is King throughout all eternity by nature and by right of conquest; through Him with Him and subordinate to Him, Mary is Queen by grace, by divine relationship, by right of conquest and by singular election. And her kingdom is as vast as that of her Son and God, since nothing is excluded from her dominion.” 277 “Marie est davantage Mère parce que Marie est davantage principe : principe par sa nature et par son intelligence et volonté. En effet elle a accepté d’être la Mère de ce Fils décrit par l’Ange. Elle participe en quelque manière à la certitude divine” (De Koninck, “Mercy and Redemption”).

163 grace. The unique mode of her participation in the mediation of Christ belongs to her as the creature who, with the Father, gives the Son, and through Him the Spirit, to the world.278 This co-mediation likewise reveals the communicability and superabundance of Mary as a universal good. As principle of the Son, who is in

Himself incommensurable with any creaturely participation in His grace, Mary possesses God in a way that allows us to possess Him anew.

By this superabundance of grace and glory expressed in her, the most blessed Virgin brings about the return to the principle according to its character as principle of all grace and all glory. It is to her, in her quality as wisdom, that it belongs to send forth into the chosen the principle of this conversion to God, the divine roots.279

The fourth mark of a common good noted above was its power to bring together or to unify those who share in it. To understand Mary as a separated common good, we must also see how this unifying power is realized in her. Once more, we will only be able to understand the Mother in relation to her Son. When He prays to His Father in preparation for His Passion, Jesus speaks about the purpose of

His “hour,” that is, of His sacrificial death and the final revelation of His love, precisely in terms of the unity to be brought about among believers:

I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in me through their word, that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me. The glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they may be one, as we are one, I in them and you in me, that they may become

278 “The Blessed Virgin was on this earth the virgin Mother of the Redeemer, and above all others and in a singular way the generous associate and humble handmaid of the Lord. She conceived, brought forth and nourished Christ. She presented Him to the Father in the temple, and was united with Him by compassion as He died on the Cross. In this singular way she cooperated by her obedience, faith, hope and burning charity in the work of the Savior in giving back supernatural life to souls. Wherefore she is our mother in the order of grace" (Lumen Gentium, 61). 279 Ego Sapientia, 8.1.

164 completely one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me. Father, I desire that those also, whom you have given me, may be with me where I am, to see my glory, which you have given me because you loved me before the foundation of the world (Jn. 17:20-24).

In this prayer, Christ reveals that His death is intended to draw His disciples into communion with one another. This unity is meant to manifest the Trinitarian relations, the Father and the Son existing in a communion of Love, and it is accomplished by extending the very communion of the Father and the Son to believers by the gift of Love. Here the unifying power of the common good comes together with our previous discussion of the missions as tying up the order of the universe with the order of the processions.

At the beginning of this section, we asked how it is that Mary causes in the manner of end, how she can belong to the very possession of the end rather than being instrumental in our journey in a passing way. We began by asking the same question of Christ according to His humanity, and we saw that the very vision of God depends on Christ the mediator, because it is by entering into Him as a member of

His mystical body that we are united to the Father. The unity of the mystical body manifests the power of Christ as a common good to gather into one those who are ordered to Him. The unifying power of Mary is likewise realized in the mystical body of her Son. With her Son, Mary is a co-principle of the grace given to man, even as she was a co-principle of the redemptive passion and the Incarnation. She is therefore, a co-principle of the gathering together of the members of Christ’s body, specifically in her identity as Mother of Christ.

“Note,” De Koninck writes in The Piety of the Son,

165 that the Mystical Body of Christ will not be achieved in its first principles, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, unless she who is in her proper person ‘the most holy Mother of our Head becomes the mother (genetrix) of all the members of Christ.’ For, ‘she who was bodily the mother of our head (nostri Capitis mater) becomes spiritually the mother of all his members... who ‘completes what was lacking in the suffering of Christ... for his Body which is the Church’ (Col. 1, 34); she who surrounds the Mystical Body of Christ, born from the pierced heart of our Savior, with the same maternal vigilance and the same eager love with which she has warmed and nourished with her milk the infant Jesus in the manger.’280

Mary is a principle of the communion that is the goal of the Passion, a principle of the union of believers in Christ with the Father. This follows from all that we have said about her participation in the mission of her Son. And yet we can consider more precisely her particular role in the realization of this communion as an end and a good in herself.

Here the concept of the City of God is particularly eloquent. As evidence of the permanent association of the humanity of Christ with our possession of God in the beatific vision, we looked at the Lamb who, in the Book of Revelation, is an object of worship and a source of enlightenment. Mary’s presence in these pages, through images, is conspicuous and distinct. The Lamb is represented as standing at the center of the throne, and as the temple and the light of the heavenly city together with the Lord God Almighty, who is seated on the throne. God and the Lamb, that is

280 Piety, 51-52; quoting Mystici Corporis, 110. “Notons… que le Corps mystique de Christ ne serait pas achevé dans ses premiers principes ni extrinsèques, ni intrinsèques si n’était pas là en sa propre personne « la très sainte Mère (Genetrix) de tous les membres du Christ ». Car « celle qui corporellement était la mère de notre Chef (« nostri Capitis mater ») devient spirituellement la mère de tous ses membres (…) ; qui… compléta ce qui manquait aux souffrances du Christ … pour son Corps qui est l’Eglise (Col., I, 24) ; elle qui entoura le Corps mystique du Christ, né du Cœur percé de notre Sauveur, de la même vigilance maternelle et du même amour empressé avec lesquels elle avait réchauffé et nourri de son lait l’Enfant Jésus de la crèche » (La Piété, 37).

166 the whole Trinity, now embracing the humanity of Christ, are the center and the object, the source of all good to the heavenly community.

Then one of the seven angels who had the seven bowls full of the seven last plagues came and said to me, “Come, I will show you the bride, the wife of the Lamb.” And in the spirit he carried me away to a great, high mountain and showed me the holy city Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God. It has the glory of God and a radiance like a very rare jewel, like jasper, clear as crystal. …I saw no temple in the city, for its temple is the Lord God the Almighty and the Lamb. And the city has no need of sun or moon to shine on it, for the glory of God is its light, and its lamp is the Lamb. The nations will walk by its light, and the kings of the earth will bring their glory into it (Rev. 21:9-11;22-24).

The city in this context is not represented as the source, but as the one who receives all from God, by a spousal union with Christ. This is indicated by the name “bride,” which is applied to the City of God, the New Jerusalem.

The bridal imagery helps us to understand the distinct places of Christ and

His Mother in glory. While incorporation into the mystical body emphasizes the identity of the disciples with their Head, and the fact that all good flows to them from Him, the spousal analogy points to a union that requires distinction. The union of Christ and His Church emerges beside the complementarity of masculinity and femininity, in which each one has a distinct role.281 The Church receives Christ’s gift

281 Commenting on Ephesians 5, Blessed John Paul II points out that the ‘one body’ metaphor in marriage is built on the spousal complentarity of the man and the woman. The difference between them is the basis of their union. On the level of Christ and the Church, of which the spousal union is a sign, the adoptive sonship whereby we enter in union with Christ into the Trinitarian life, is based on a prior reciprocality of gift and reception, in which Christ and the Church are subjects with distinct roles. “In this description, the Church, the body of Christ, clearly appears as the second subject of conjugal union, to whom the first subject, Christ, shows the love of one who has loved by giving himself for her” (John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A , trans. Michael Waldstein [Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006], 91:4). Mary, as the principle and type of the Church, likewise enters into the universal causality of Christ by way of a distinct and receptive relation to Him.

167 of Himself, consummated at His death, but enduring as a permanent bond into eternity. The Church on her side receives Christ with a totality founded on the Fiat of Mary.

Christ is God, and therefore is the object of worship, at the center of the heavenly liturgy. Mary, however, is a pure creature, and it is as a creature that she is able to give the response of faith on behalf of the whole universe to the gift of the

Incarnation. Her ‘yes’ at the foot of the cross also constituted the response of the

Church to the spousal gift of Christ. This response is given by Mary in a way that is superior to any other, in a way that becomes the principle of every other ‘yes.’ She has received the whole of His gift to man, and has returned it to Him in a total way.

All acts of faith in Christ are precontained in the ‘yes’ that springs from her pure understanding and her pure heart. Therefore, her intercession in paradise consists of conforming each individual in a particular way to herself, of giving each one a voice in the perfect response she herself became.

The House of God, which Thomas interprets either as God Himself or as the

Communion of Saints, therefore has a third meaning in Mary herself, as the extrinsic common good that is the dwelling place of God with men, and a principle of the communion of all others in God. “This very tabernacle of the Holy Trinity, this dwelling built by Wisdom, this holy city, this new Jerusalem, this new heaven which renews the earth, becomes the tabernacle of God with men: ‘Ecce tabernaculum Dei cum hominibus’ (Rev. 21: 3).”282 Mary is the City of God because in her is found the total response of the bride, and it is she who, in virtue of her maternal sanctity,

282 Ego Sapientia, 9.2.

168 directs each one to his share in that spousal exchange. Communion among the parts of the Church—and by extension, of the parts of the universe which are taken up in the new order established by Christ—can be said to arise from a mutual abiding in

Mary.

The inseparable consequence of this superiority and communicability is that

“it is necessary to love the Holy Virgin more than oneself.”283 Does this necessity constitute an exception to the order of charity? As we noted above, the order of charity, building on nature, places the love of God first, followed by the love of self, and then the love of neighbor. This ordering indicates that our own union with the common good is the principle of our love of all those who are also able to share in it.

As the text from John of St. Thomas with which De Koninck concludes the chapter indicates, the love of Mary, like the love of Christ, comes before love of self, precisely because they are not considered as individuals co-partaking of grace and glory, but as “principle[s] diffusive of grace and beatitude.”284 The necessity of loving Mary more than oneself is not, therefore, an exception to the order of charity as articulated by St. Thomas, but instead flows from the fact that Mary is not primarily to be considered as our neighbor in the communion of spiritual goods, but as our

Mother.285

283 Ego Sapientia, 11.1. 284 Ego Sapientia, 11.1. 285 In speaking about the love due to the common good because of its superiority and communicability, we are moving toward the grounds of Marian devotion, especially that of St. Louis de Montfort. The “true devotion” taught by de Montfort was, as we have already noted, a catalyst for the writing of Ego Sapientia. This doctrine is also of particular importance in comparison with the error of “personalism” against which De Koninck directed, in different ways, both the Common Good and Ego Sapientia. We will discuss that devotion, namely, holy slavery, in greater detail in the second part.

169 Desire to belong to the City of God is, at least implicitly, a desire to belong to

Mary, born from her as Mother and, in being ordered to her, entering into her, as it were, as the place in which God is to be found most fully present in creation. Pius

XII, affirming the doctrine of the bodily into glory, shows how the love of this Mother, so singularly united to the Trinity, flows in and out of the very desire to belong to Christ:

We are confident that this solemn proclamation and definition of the Assumption will contribute in no small way to the advantage of human society, since it redounds to the glory of the Most Blessed Trinity, to which the Blessed Mother of God is bound by such singular bonds. It is to be hoped that all the faithful will be stirred up to a stronger piety toward their heavenly Mother, and that the souls of all those who glory in the Christian name may be moved by the desire of sharing in the unity of Jesus Christ's Mystical Body and of increasing their love for her who shows her motherly heart to all the members of this august body.286

This is why the words of Augustine to the Heaven of heavens express so well the love we should have for Mary as a common good:

O House, full of light and splendor! I have loved your beauty, and the place of the habitation of the glory of my Lord, your builder and owner. Let my wandering sigh after you; and I speak unto Him that made you, that He may possess me also in you.287

Chapter 12: Mary as Compared to the Intrinsic Common Good of the Universe

In calling Mary a separated common good of the universe, De Koninck does not deny that she is also truly a part. Like all creatures, from herself Mary is nothingness, and according to the nature she receives from God, she is among the

286 Pius XII, Munificentissimus Deus, 42; cited in Piety, 51. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_p- xii_apc_19501101_munificentissimus-deus_en.html. 287 Confessions, Bk. XII, 15 [21].

170 lowest of created persons, an intellectual animal. The lowliness of Mary is essential to the governing thesis of the second part of Ego Sapientia, and De Koninck develops it there in great detail. We must therefore also consider Mary’s place in the order of the universe as a part. While Mary’s grace is unlike that of any other creature and makes her a principle of the whole order of grace and glory, she is herself a creature brought forth from God and redeemed by Him, and therefore a part of that order by which all things come forth from God. Nevertheless, even as a part of the universe,

Mary possesses a unique and causal role.

The order of all things to the extrinsic common good entails an order of the parts themselves, one to the other. In this hierarchy, which derives from the extrinsic good, the lower parts are not only ordered to the whole but also, consequently, to the higher parts. Thus, “The superior parts have, in relation to the inferior parts, the character of form: the splendor which clothes the inferior parts in their subordination to the superior is greater than the splendor they hold of themselves absolutely.”288

Considered as the highest single part of the purely created universe, Mary is like the very form of the universe, like the intrinsic common good.289 “In this form consists the highest dignity of pure creation,” De Koninck writes, “that is to say that

288 Ego Sapientia, 12.2. 289 Christ’s human nature, as something created, may also be considered as a part of the universe, and in this sense even ordained to the extrinsic common good. Being guided by the rule we set down at the beginning of this section, we will find Mary’s unique dignity in her relation to the humanity of her Son. Nevertheless, the distinction we made above in looking at the distinction between the Lamb and the New Jerusalem in Revelation is relevant here as well. The interior perfection of the universe in its return to God is in one way expressed better in Mary than in her Son, who as an uncreated Person, fills all things. Mary, as created Wisdom, to repeat the words quoted earlier, is “God’s first creature, in whom [are found] both the pure, primordial form of his creative will and the pure answer, which he discovers.” (Ratzinger, Daughter Zion, 25). Mary expresses the complementarity of the creature to the gift of God. She “expresses precisely this: that there is a pure answer, and that God’s love finds its irrevocable dwelling place within it” (Daughter Zion, 26).

171 which is most desired by God ‘for itself’ and that which is most perfectly ordered to

Him.”290 As a part of the universe Mary too is ordered to this form, and yet, because she attains the form most perfectly, all the other parts attain it more perfectly because of her, because they belong with her to the whole.

It is through Mary that the beauty of the multitude exists and is perfected. In

Mary creation offers to God the love He should have received from Eve, and far more. Because of Mary, God Himself comes forth from within creation. Mary’s role as part manifests how high God wishes to lift up the lowly, how fully He wishes to give Himself to His creatures. De Koninck will speak about this mystery of divine mercy more fully in the second part, but here it is enough to see that it is in virtue of containing Mary that creation as a whole and all creatures in particular attain God to the degree that they do.

Just as the less conspicuous bass in Allegri’s Miserere is resplendent with the beauty of the soaring soprano in virtue of his order within the whole work, so the lowest created person possesses as his own the beauty that can be found in the whole because Mary is within it. This is what Dante expresses when he writes about his appeal to the instruction of St. Bernard, “I called upon the teaching of him who drew beauty from Mary, as the morning star draws beauty from the sun.”291

Precisely because they are parts, each part can say to the others, even to Mary, in an

290 Ego Sapientia, 12.1. 291 Dante, Paradiso, canto 32, 106-108. “Così ricorsi ancora a la dottrina di colui ch’abbelliva di Maria, come del sole stella mattutina.”

172 echo of the Son’s prayer, “All that is mine is yours, and yours is mine, and I am glorified in what is yours.”292

292 “All mine are yours, and yours are mine, and I am glorified in them” (Jn. 10:17).

173 CHAPTER 13 QUASI ROTA IN MEDIO ROTAE (EZEK. 1:16)

Comme une roue au centre d'une roue. As a wheel at the center of a wheel. Si elle est déjà si belle et si louable en tant que If she is already so beautiful and worthy of praise partie de l'univers, même sans ce qui est caché au as part of the universe, “even without that which is dedans—absque eo quod intrinsecus latet, (Cant. hidden within— absque eo quod intrinsecus latet” IV, 1,3) combien ne l'est-elle davantage en tant que (Songs 4:1,3), how much more so is she as principe et bien séparés. Elle est sous ce dernier separated principle and separated good. She is in rapport absolument antérieure à sa raison de partie, this second relationship absolutely anterior to her car, en tant que bien séparé, elle est principe par role as part, for, as separated good, she is a rapport à cette raison de partie. Son ‘être partie’ est principle in relation to her role as part. Her “being ordonné à son ‘être principe séparé’. Elle est née au part” is ordained to her “being separated principle.” dedans pour être principe séparé, elle naît dans She is born within to be a separated principle, she l'univers pour être mère de toutes choses. Ce qui est rises within the universe to be the mother of all au dehors procède du dedans, et ce qui est au things. That which is outside proceeds from within, dedans y procède pour procéder du dehors. En tant and that which is within proceeds in order to que principe séparé de l'univers, elle est plus au proceed from outside. As separated principle of the dedans de l'univers qu'elle ne l'èst comme partie universe, she is more within the universe than she principale de l'univers: du dehors elle est plus au is as a principal part of the universe: from without dedans qu'elle ne l'est du dedans. Intrinsecus ejus she is more within than she is from inside. per circuitum. (Ezech. I, 27) Il s'établit ainsi un “Intrinsecus ejus per circuitum” (Ezek. 1:27). movement circulaire entre sa dignité de principe There is set up then a circular movement between séparé et sa dignité de partie la plus noble de la her dignity as a separated principle and her dignity pure création, circulation qui embrasse l'ordre as the most noble part of pure creation; a circular même des parties de l'univers. L'ordre et la dignité movement which encompasses the very order of inhérents à l'univers sont par là d'autant plus unis à the parts of the universe. The order and dignity ce principe séparé que celui-ci est lui-même la inherent in the universe are by that very fact all the partie principale intérieure à l'univers. Et cette more united to this separated principle as this circulation imite en quelque façon le mouvement principle is itself the principal part interior to the circulaire entre la Sagesse engendrée et la mère de universe. And this circular movement imitates in cette Sagesse, lequel imitait déjà plus some way the circular movement between begotten profondément le mouvement circulaire entre le Wisdom and the mother of this Wisdom, which Père et l'Image parfaite et consubstantielle du Père: imitates in its turn more profoundly the circular quasi sit rota in medio rotae—comme une roue au movement between the Father and the perfect and centre d'une roue. (Ezech. I, 16) consubstantial Image of the Father: “quasi sit rota in medio rotae—as it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel” (Ezek. 1:16).

CHAPTER 14 DE FRUCTU SUO COGNOSCITUR (LK. 6:44)

Elle se reconnaît à son fruit. She is known by her fruit. Que son Fils la surpasse infiniment en privilèges et The very fact that her Son surpasses her infinitely en dignité, cela même manifeste la souveraine in dignity and privilege manifests the sovereign dignité de la mère. C'est, en effet, son Fils à elle, le dignity of the mother. For it is her Son, the “fruit of fruit de ses entrailles (Luc. I, 42), le Verbe qu'elle a her womb” (Lk. 1:42), the Word which she has tiré de son coeur, qui la surpasse infiniment. “Nous drawn from her heart, who surpasses her infinitely. concédons, dit Saint Albert, que son Fils la “We concede,” says St. Albert, “that her Son

174 surpasse dans tous les privilèges, mais loin d'y être surpasses her in all privileges, but far from being diminuée la louange de la mère s'y trouve exaltée diminished, the praise of the mother is exalted en ce qu'elle n'a pas engendré un Fils seulement insofar as she did not beget a Son merely equal to égal à elle, mais un Fils infiniment meilleur qu'elle. herself, but one infinitely better than she. And even Et même sous ce rapport la bonté de la mère est in this way the goodness of the mother becomes in rendue, en quelque façon, infinie: en effet, chaque a certain way infinite; in effect, “each tree is known arbre se reconnait à son fruit propre (Luc. VI, 44): by its proper fruit” (Lk. 6:44): so that if the dès lors, si la bonté du fruit bonifie l'arbre, la bonté goodness of the fruit makes the tree good, the infinite dans le fruit manifeste encore une bonté infinite goodness in the fruit manifests also an infinie dans l'arbre.”a infinite goodness in the tree.”a a S. Albert, Mariale, q. 197, p. 287b: Concedimus etiam a St. Albert, Mariale, q. 197, p. 287b: “We also admit quod a Filio suo in omnibus privilegiis suis antecellitur: that she is exceeded by her Son in all His privileges: and nec in hoc laus matris suae diminuitur, sed exaltatur in eo the praise of His mother is not thereby diminished, but quod non tantum genuit sibi filium coaequalem, sed exalted in this, that she not only begot from herself a son infinitum meliorem. Quod etiam ex hac parte equal to her, but infinitely better. Indeed, in this respect quodammodo infinitat bonitatem matris: omnis enim the goodness of the mother is somehow infinite: for arbor ex fructu cognoscitur proprio: unde si bonitas every tree is known by its proper fruit: so that if good fructus bonificat arborem, infinita bonitas in fructu adhuc fruit makes the tree good, infinitely good fruit also shows ostendit infinitam in arbore bonitatem. infinite goodness in the tree.

175 Chapters 13-14: The Circular Movement in God, Mary, and creation

The two ways in which Mary relates to the order of the universe, as principal part and as principle, stand in a reciprocal relationship. Mary must be a part of the universe in order to be raised to the level of a principle of the whole. She must be a creature in order to become a created principle of a divine Person. And yet, as a part, she is ordered to and exists for that good which stands above the universe, the good of which she herself as Mother of Christ is a principle. Her very existence as a part of the created universe is for the sake of her place as principle. “Her ‘being part’ is ordained to her ‘being separated principle.’”293

The reciprocity of the two roles constitutes a kind of circular movement—a movement that De Koninck describes in terms of a dual procession. “That which is outside proceeds from within, and that which is within proceeds in order to proceed from outside.”294 There is a mutual dependence between these two aspects of

Mary’s place in the created order. And yet one side of this reciprocal relationship has priority simply speaking. “She is in this second relationship [as principle] absolutely anterior to her role as part, for, as separated good, she is a principle in relation to her role as part.”295 As principle Mary both gives and increases her own dignity as part. That which is higher lifts that which is lower above the dignity it would have from itself. “There is set up then a circular movement between her dignity as a separated principle and her dignity as the most noble part of pure

293 Ego Sapientia, 13.1. 294 Ego Sapientia, 13.1. 295 Ego Sapientia, 13.1.

176 creation; a circular movement which encompasses the very order of the parts of the universe.”296

This circularity that has a definite beginning—an absolute origin that is also the end, echoes the circularity to which De Koninck drew our attention in Chapters

5, 6, and 7, namely, the circular movement between the Son of God and His Mother.

“And this circular movement [between Mary’s roles as part and principle] imitates in some way the circular movement between begotten Wisdom and the mother of this Wisdom.”297 God is, absolutely speaking, Mary’s origin, but He lifts her far above the dignity proper to her own nature, and even above the dignity of every other rational creature participating in grace, to the dignity of a (created) first principle.

God has taken a creature who proceeds from Him in diversity of essence, and made her the one from whom, with the Father, the Son comes forth within His own creation. She had to be a part of creation for this to happen, and yet by this very fact she is lifted out of it and placed above it as a source. God gives Mary alone the gift of giving herself to Him as the one who gives Him to the world.298

But the circularity found in the relation of the Mother and the Son is itself a unique conformity which God gives Mary to the order of the processions of the divine Persons, to the order that belongs properly to God, to the procession from a principle and union of love that constitute the Holy Trinity. Thus, the circular movement between Mother and Son “imitates in its turn more profoundly the circular movement between the Father and the perfect and consubstantial Image of

296 Ego Sapientia, 13.1. 297 Ego Sapientia, 13.1. 298 “It is God, the origin of all things, Who gives it to her to give herself to be the origin of God” (Ego Sapientia, 7.3).

177 the Father: “‘quasi sit rota in medio rotae—as it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel’

(Ezek. 1:16).”299 The order of the universe emerges as a fugue-like cascade beginning in the heart of the Creator. The order found there is the reason and cause, the pattern of the order God places in the universe. Yet He perfects the likeness in an unimaginable way by drawing creation itself into the original, into the exchange of the divine Persons, through the missions of the divine Persons. He chooses Mary to enter into that exchange in a particular and magnificent way as principle of the Son, and therefore, as principle of the return the universe as a whole will make to its origin. This insight into the circular order found analogously in creation, in Mary, and above all in God Himself, together with the key text from Chapter 10, constitutes the theological thesis of the first part of Ego Sapientia.

Daughter of the eternal Father, mother of the Son, spouse of the Holy Spirit, she is rooted in the order of the Trinity, and she links up the order of the universe, in a radically new way, with the order that is in God according to the processions.300

Chapter 14 expresses the dynamic of the circularity we have been speaking about, a dynamic that will only be fully explained in the second part, under the aspect of mercy. The Son remains infinitely higher than the Mother. He is divine and she is a pure creature. The will of God to raise her so high that God Himself is a fruit of her own person does not destroy this difference. And yet, however much Christ exceeds Mary—and He does so infinitely—so much is her dignity increased by being made His Mother.

299 Ego Sapientia, 13.1. 300 Ego Sapientia, 10.2.

178 CHAPTER 15 MONS IN VERTICE MONTIUM (IS. 2:2)

Montagne au sommet des montagnes. A mountain at the peak of mountains. Dans son admirable commentaire sur les Livres In his admirable commentary on the Sapiential Sapientiaux, notre Corneille de la Pierre exprime de Books, our Cornelius a Lapide expresses most la façon la plus formelle la raison première de cette formally the first reason for this appellation of appellation de sagesse en se plaçant au point de vue wisdom in placing himself from the point of view de la fin, cause des causes. Comment peut-on faire of the end, cause of causes. How can we say of the dire à la Sainte Vierge les choses que la Sagesse dit Blessed Virgin the things which Wisdom says of d'elle-même: J'ai fait en sorte qu'une lumière herself: “I made that in the heavens there should indéfectible se levât dans les cieux; et J'ai répandu rise light that never fails,” and “I have poured out des fleuves? (Eccli. XXIV, 6, 40) A cela “Je rivers” (Sir. 24:6,40)? To this “I answer first of all, réponds, premièrement, que dans le sens mystique, that in the mystical sense we should understand the on doit entendre ces mots comme suit: J'ai fait en words in this way: I have made it so that in the sorte que dans les cieux, c'est-à-dire dans les heavens, that is in the Church, Christ was born, Églises, naquît le Christ, qui est le soleil de justice; who is the sun of Justice; I have made it so that in j'ai fait en sorte que dans l'Église se levât la lumière the Church there would rise up the light of faith. de la foi. De plus, la Vierge, ainsi qu'une mer de More than this, the Virgin, insofar as she is a sea of grâces, répand ses fleuves sur l'Église et les fidèles. graces, pours out her rivers on the Church and the —Deuxièmement, que dans le sens littéral, il faut faithful. —Secondly, in the literal sense one must lire: J'ai été cause de ce que Dieu a créé la lumière, read: I was the cause in virtue of which God les cieux, la mer, les fleuves et tout l'univers. En created the light, the heavens, the sea, the rivers, effet, la création de Dieu a été ordonnée, comme à and the whole universe. For God’s creation has sa fin, à la justification et la glorification des been ordained, as to its end, to the justification and Saints, accomplies par le Christ moyennant la glorification of the Saints, accomplished by Christ Bienheureuse Vierge; car l'ordre de nature a été through the Blessed Virgin; for the order of nature créé et institué pour l'ordre de grâce. Ainsi donc, has been created and instituted for the order of c'est parce que la Bienheureuse Vierge a été mère grace. Then, it is because the Blessed Virgin was du Christ que, conséquemment, elle est devenue the mother of Christ that, consequently, she has médiatrice de tout l'ordre de grâce institué par le become the mediatrix of the whole order of grace Christ; d'où, pour la même raison, elle a été cause instituted by Christ; from which it follows, for the finale de la création de l'univers. En effet, la fin de same reason, that she was the final cause of the l'univers est le Christ, ainsi que sa Mère et les creation of the universe. For the end of the universe Saints, c'est-à-dire que cet univers a été créé pour is Christ, together with his Mother and the Saints, que les Saints jouissent de la grâce et de la gloire that is to say, this universe has been created so that par l'intermédiaire du Christ et de la Bienheureuse the Saints may delight in grace and glory through Vierge. C'est pourquoi la cause finale de la création the intermediacy of Christ and the Blessed Virgin. de l'univers a été la prédestination du Christ, de la This is why the final cause of the creation of the Biènheureuse Vierge et des Saints. Quoique, en universe was the predestination of Christ, the effet, le Christ et la Bienheureuse Vierge soient des Blessed Virgin, and the Saints. Although, indeed, parties de l'univers, et soient par conséquent Christ and the Blessed Virgin are parts of the postérieurs à lui dans le genre de la cause universe, and are as a consequence posterior to it in matérielle, cependant il lui sont antérieurs dans le the order of material cause, nevertheless they are genre de la cause finale. Aussi bien, il existe une anterior to it in the order of final cause. Thus there certaine dépendance réciproque entre la création de is a certain reciprocal dependence between the l’univers et la naissance du Christ et de la creation of the universe and the birth of Christ and Bienheureuse Vierge; Dieu, en effet, n’a pas voulu of the Blessed Virgin; For God did not wish that que le Christ et la Bienheureuse Vierge naquissent, Christ and the Blessed Virgin be born, otherwise sinon dans ce monde-ci; Il n'a pas non plus voulu than in this world; nor did He wish that this que cet univers-ci existât sans le Christ et la universe exist without Christ and the Blessed Bienheureuse Vierge, bien plus, c'est pour eux qu'il Virgin; more than that: it is for them that He l’a créé. Il a voulu que l'univers tout entier, non created it. He has willed that the whole universe, no

179 moins que l'ordre de grâce, fussent référés et less than the order of grace, be referred and ordered ordonnés au Christ et à la Bienheureuse Vierge to Christ and the Blessed Virgin as to its connue à leur complément et à leur fin. Le Christ et complement and end. Christ and the Blessed Virgin la Bienheureuse Vierge sont donc la cause finale de are then the final cause of the creation of the la création de l'univers, et en même temps ils en universe, and at the same time they are its formal sont la cause formelle, c'est-à-dire exemplaire, à cause, that is to say the exemplar, understood as the savoir l'idée. C'est que, en effet, l'ordre de grâce, où idea. This is because the order of Grace, where le Christ et la Bienheureuse Vierge occupent la Christ and the Blessed Virgin occupy the first première place, est l'idée et l'exemplaire d'après place, is indeed the idea and exemplar in terms of lequel Dieu a créé et disposé l'ordre de nature et de which God has created and arranged the order of tout l'univers.”a nature and of the whole universe.”a a Corneille de la Pierre, In Ecclesiasticum, c. XXIV, vers. a Cornelius a Lapide, In Ecclesiasticum, c. XXIV, vers. 1 1 et 2. T. IX, p. 618a: Dices: Quomodo cum veritate et 2. T. IX, p. 618a. “You say, ‘How can those things, aptari possunt B. Virgini illa, quae Sapientia dicit de se, which Wisdom says about herself truly be applied to the vers. 6: "Ego feci ut in coelo oriretur lumen indeficiens"; Blessed Virgin: (vers. 6): I brought about that an vers. 40: "Ego effudi flumina"? Respondeo, primo, unfailing light might rise in the heavens and (vers. 40) I mystice, q. d. Ego feci ut in coelis, id est Ecclesiis, poured out rivers?’ To this I say, firstly, in the mystical oriretur Christus qui est sol justitiae; feci ut in iis oriretur sense: I have made it that in the heavens, that is to say, in lux fidei. Rursum, ipsa, quasi mare gratiarum earum the Church, Christ, who is the Sun of Justice, should rise; flumina in Ecclesiam et fideles effundit. Secundo, ad I have made the light of faith arise in them. Secondly, in litteram, hoc sensu, q. d. Ego fui causa, cur Deus creavit the literal sense, I was the reason that God created the lucem, coelos, mare, flumina totumque universum. Hujus light, the heavens, the sea, the rivers and the whole enim creatio ordinate fuit ad justificationem et universe. For the creation of these was ordained to the glorificationem Sanctorum, factam a Christo per B. justification and glorification of the Saints, accomplished Virginem, tanquam ad suum finem; ordo enim naturae by Christ through the Blessed Virgin, as to their end; for creatus et institutus est propter ordinem gratiae. Quia the order of nature was created and instituted for the sake ergo B. Virgo fuit mater Christi, ac consequenter fuit of the order of grace. Because, therefore, the Blessed medium nostrae redemptionis, ac totius ordinis gratiarum Virgin was the mother of Christ, and consequently the a Christo instituti; hinc pariter fuit causa finalis creationis way of our redemption, and of the whole order of grace universi; universi enim finis est Christus, ejusque mater instituted by Christ, thus she was equally the final cause et Sancti; ut scilicet, Sancti in universo hoc per Christum of the whole universe. For the end of the universe is et B. Virginem, gratia et gloria donentur. Quare Christ, and His mother and the Saints; so that the Saints creationis universi causa finalis fuit praedestinatio in the universe might be given grace and glory through Christi, B. Virginis et Sanctorum. Licet enim universi Christ and the Blessed Virgin. That is why the final partes quaedam sint Christus et B. Virgo, ideoque eo cause of the creation of the universe was the posteriores in genere causae materialis; tamen in genere predestination of Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and the causae finalis sunt priores. Quare inter creationem Saints. For although Christ and the Blessed Virgin are universi et nativitatem Christi et B. Virginis, est mutua certain parts of the universe, and so posterior to it in the quaedam contradependentia; nec enim Deus nasci voluit genus of material cause; nevertheless in the genus of Christum et B. Virginem, nisi in universo hoc; nec final cause they are first. For this reason there is a certain vicissim voluit universum hoc existere sine Christo et mutual interdependence between the creation of the Beata Virgine, imo propter illos illud creavit. Totum universe and the births of Christ and of the Blessed enim universum ad Christum et Beatam Virginem, Virgin. For God did not will Christ and the Blessed ordinemque gratiarum, velut ad sui complementum et Virgin to be born except in this universe; nor on the other finem referri et ordinari voluit. Christus ergo et B. Virgo hand did he will the universe to exist without Christ and sunt causa finalis, ob quam creatum est universum, ac the Blessed Virgin; indeed He created it for them. For He proinde ejusdem sunt causa formalis, puta exemplaris, willed the whole universe to be referred to Christ and the scilicet, idea. Ordo enim gratiarum, in quo primus est Blessed Virgin, as well as the order of grace, as to its Christus et B. Virgo est idea et exemplar, juxta quod complement and end. Therefore, Christ and the most Deus creavit et disposuit ordinem naturae totiusque Blessed Virgin are the final cause on account of which universi. the universe was created, and thus they are also the formal cause, the exemplar, that is, the idea. For the order of grace, in which Christ is first with the Blessed Virgin, is the idea and exemplar according to which God created and arranged the order of nature and of the whole universe.

180 Chapter 15: Summary of the First Part

De Koninck introduces the lengthy quotation from Cornelius à Lapide that essentially constitutes Chapter 15 by renewing the governing question of the first part of Ego Sapientia: “How can we say of the Blessed Virgin the things which

Wisdom says of herself?” 301 He then specifies the question with the two verses to which Lapide’s commentary refers. “‘I have made an unfailing light to arise in the heavens,’ and ‘I have poured forth rivers.’” Both are taken from Sirach 24, the hymn to wisdom which St. Thomas uses to explain the causality of the divine processions in creation and redemption. It is also from this hymn that De Koninck draws the title of the book as a whole, and of the first part in particular—Ego Sapientia.

“[O]ur Cornelius a Lapide,” De Koninck writes, “expresses most formally the first reason for this appellation of wisdom in placing himself from the point of view of the end, cause of causes.”302 In the first two chapters, De Koninck provided a general definition of wisdom as a first principle from which all things proceed in their fundamental order. Implicit in this definition is the importance of the end, toward which wisdom directs what comes forth from it. As the absolutely first principle, wisdom is necessarily both origin and end. But the self-description of wisdom in Sirach specifies this account by pointing—as St. Thomas reads it—to the revealed nature of divine wisdom, and the order that belongs to things as proceeding from and being ordered to the fluxus personarum in the Holy Trinity. The processions in God are the origin and end, the reason and cause of the universe.

301 Ego Sapientia, 15.1. 302 Ego Sapientia, 15.1.

181 Lapide’s twofold reading of the verses from Sirach shows Mary in the first place as principle of the temporal processions, and in the second place, as the final cause of the universe, together with Christ, in consequence of her role as principle.

The first he gives as a spiritual interpretation of the verses:

I answer, first of all, that in the mystical sense we should understand the words in this way: I have made it so that in the heavens, that is in the Church, Christ was born, who is the sun of Justice; I have made it so that in the Church there would rise up the light of faith. More than this, the Virgin, insofar as she is a sea of graces, pours out her rivers on the Church and the faithful.303

Mary makes a light arise in the heavens because she gives birth to Christ in the

Church. Moreover, at the Cross she obtains graces for the whole Church with and in her Son, and in glory she communicates these graces to the faithful, thus becoming co-principle of the gift of the Spirit through the surpassing grace in her own soul.

The second reading of the passage, which Lapide calls the literal sense,304 shows Mary with Christ as the principle according to which God orders all His works in two ways: as final cause and exemplar of creation. Both of these ways are in fact closely related to De Koninck’s account of Mary as a common good. Lapide begins with the final cause:

I have been the cause in virtue of which God has created the light, the heavens, the sea, the rivers, and the whole universe. …[I]t is because the Blessed Virgin was the mother of Christ that, consequently, she has become the mediatrix of the whole order of grace instituted by Christ; from which it follows, for the same reason, that she was the final cause of the creation of the universe.305

303 Ego Sapientia, 15.1. 304 Lapide calls this reading of the verses from Sirach “literal” not as though the human author were aware of the Marian sense of the words and intended it, but because in this reading the “light” which Wisdom causes refers to light in a literal sense: the physical sun, moon, and stars, rather than to Christ. 305 Ego Sapientia, 15.1.

182

Like the sun illumining the earth, Mary is a principle of the whole created order by a continuous relationship of dependence. “Indeed we conceive of vital immanence as a constant renewal from within, and in their relation to the first principle things receive their being by an ever new procession.”306

The second way Lapide names in which God orders His works through Mary, with Christ, is that of exemplar causality.

Christ and the Blessed Virgin are then the final cause of the creation of the universe, and at the same time they are its formal cause, that is to say the exemplar, understood as the idea. This is because the order of Grace, where Christ and the Blessed Virgin occupy the first place, is indeed the idea and exemplar in terms of which God has created and arranged the order of nature and of the whole universe.307

Not only do Christ and Mary cause the order of things in the sense that creatures will attain God by attaining them, in different ways, but they cause the order of things as being themselves the very form God intends to put into His work as a whole.

[W]e can compare the Blessed Virgin to the intrinsic good of the universe, which consists precisely in the form which is the order of its parts. This form is comparable to the face and the countenance. In this form consists the highest dignity of pure creation, that is to say that which is most desired by God “for itself” and that which is most perfectly ordered to Him.308

The notion of Mary as exemplar first appeared in Chapter 8, in which De Koninck shifted the consideration from Mary as a cause of God to Mary as a cause of the

306 Ego Sapientia, 10.2. 307 Ego Sapientia, 15.1. 308 Ego Sapientia, 12.1.

183 order of creation. The principle governing this shift was the unique image that Mary is of divine goodness through the superior indwelling of the Trinity in her soul.

This image is so perfect that it has in its turn the character of the root and original for all creatures. She was the sapiential exemplar in virtue of which God composed the universe: “Cum eo eram cuncta componens—I was with him forming all things” (Prov. 8:30).309

In this sense Mary’s causality can be found from the very beginning and before the beginning, in the eternal wisdom which she was created in order to communicate and express. As exemplar and final cause, Mary is present in God as a created principle—an aspect of the divine plan originating entirely in His will—whereby He orders all things from the beginning, and more importantly, toward which He orders all things. By grace she herself knows the order she is to impart in its root, and by glory she knows it and willingly communicates it in its least detail.

As wisdom, Mary has poured forth rivers, which means that she has given the divine processions, the most profound principle of the order of all things, anew to the world, or united the world more to the order of the processions. This is what wisdom does, it communicates that order to all that comes forth from God in whatever degree possible. The Father extends this order into creation by sending the Son and the Spirit into the world, through Mary, and by gathering us into the Son with the Spirit, once again through Mary. Our intimacy with the Trinity depends on our union with Christ and Mary, though in differing and complementary ways, as

309 Ego Sapientia, 8.1.

184 explained in the foregoing. As the Mother of Christ, Mary becomes the City of God, into which God gathers all the glories of the earth.310

310 “The nations will walk by its light, and the kings of the earth will bring their glory into it. Its gates will never be shut by day—and there will be no night there. People will bring into it the glory and the honor of the nations” (Rev. 21:24-26).

185 CHAPTER 16 QUAE EST ISTA? (SONGS 3:6, 6:10, 8:5)

Qui est-elle? Who is she? Nous étonnerons-nous de la suréminente Do we marvel at the supereminent ‘formositas’ of ‘formositas’ de cette pure créature, de cette sagesse this pure creature, of this wholly created wisdom? purement créée? N'est-elle pas nommée ‘Mère Has not she been called “Admirable mother,” that admirable’, c'est-à-dire mère, principe, dont la is to say, mother, principle, of which the cause is cause est insondable? La plus étonnante de toutes unfathomable? The most marvelous of all God’s les oeuvres de Dieu purement créées, Marie fait le purely created works, Mary causes us to better mieux entrevoir cette incompréhensibilité de la glimpse the incomprehensibility of the Wisdom Sagesse qui précède toutes choses. Sapientiam Dei which precedes all things. “Sapientiam Dei praecedentem omnia quis investigavit? (Eccli. I, 3) Preaecedentem omnia quis investigavit?” (Sir. 1:3). Et à quelle oeuvre purement créée pourrait-on bien And to which purely created work could one well la comparer? Non est factum tale opus in universis compare her? “Non est factum tale opus in regnis—Il n'a été fait aucune oeuvre semblable universis regnis—no such work has been made in dans tous les règnes. (III Reg. X, 20) N'est-elle pas any kingdom” (3 Kings 10:20). Is she not so tellement étonnante que, selon saint Bernard, même astonishing that, according to St. Bernard, even the les princes de la cour céleste sombrent dans princes of the celestial choir fall to asking: “Quae l'interrogation: Quae est ista—Quelle est celle-ci es ista—Who is this that arises from the desert, qui monte du désert, appuyée son bien-aimé? leaning on her beloved?” (Songs 8:5). “Quae es (Cant.VIII, 5) Quae est ista—Quelle est celle-ci qui ista—Who is this that appears like the dawn, fair as apparaît comme l'aurore, belle comme la lune, the moon, pure as the sun, but terrible as an army pure comme le soleil, mais terrible comme une arrayed for battle?” (Songs 6:9). armée rangée pour la bataille? (Cant. VI, 9)

186 Chapter 16: The Height of Beauty in Mary

Having summarized, through Cornelius a Lapide, the reasons that the Church calls Mary Wisdom, De Koninck asks, are we astonished by these reasons? Does calling Mary the final cause of the universe, present with God as He created the world, seem fantastic? He responds that this astonishment is precisely what Mary ought to provoke in us. Mary is a proper cause of wonder, not only for us on earth, but even for the blessed in heaven and the angels. If Mary has really been drawn so near to her cause, if she is so immersed in God that she appears together with Him in all His works, then she manifests not only the goodness, but the very superabundance, the incommensurable excess and unsearchable depth of that goodness. She is the effect that points most directly to the infinity of her cause.

This response recalls the two mottos with which the work opens, both of which point to the disproportion between all that our words can convey about the

Blessed Virgin and her true glory. The second was taken from St. Bonaventure:

The excellence of the glorious Virgin is so great that all language is powerless to give an account of it and to praise it: the Scriptures are powerless, the prophecies are powerless, and the parabolic images are as well. This is why the Holy Spirit, speaking through the mouth of the Prophets, praises her not only through words but also through figures and parabolic images: and because no one parabolic image perfectly suffices to express her excellence, the likenesses and the metaphors were multiplied in order to better celebrate her praise.311

The note of wonder, expressed in Chapter 16 by the rhetorical refrain “Quae est ista,” from the Song of Songs, is also intended to carry into the second part of the

311 St. Bonaventure, quoted in Ego Sapientia, second motto.

187 work. Amazement at the “supereminent ‘formositas,’”312 at the beauty that transcends all other created beauty, is necessary if we are to understand the magnitude of divine mercy revealed in her. It is this beauty alongside of the total poverty of her nature that is expressed by Nigra sum sed Formosa, the title of the second part of the work. Because we know that she is a creature, the wonder we have at Mary is a wonder at her Cause—Mary emerges out of nothingness, like the barrenness of the desert, but she is found inseparably linked to the One whose very nature demands our adoration and our love. The question, “who is this that comes up from the desert, leaning on her beloved?” is therefore finally a question about the

Mercy of God.

312 Ego Sapientia, 16.1.

188

Part II: Nigra Sum Sed Formosa

Do not let me hear Of the wisdom of old men, but rather of their folly, Their fear of fear and frenzy, their fear of possession, Of belonging to another, or to others, or to God. The only wisdom we can hope to acquire Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.

-T.S. Eliot, “The Four Quartets”

189

Introduction to Second Part:

The relationship between the two parts of Ego Sapientia can be considered from several angles. The foreword points us first of all to the Church’s liturgical practice.313 As noted in the commentary on Chapter 1, the antiphons for the commons of the Blessed Virgin Mary on feasts and Saturdays are taken almost entirely from the Song of Songs, while the readings taken from the Old Testament consist in the hymns of Wisdom found in Proverbs and Sirach.314 Each of the two parts begins by asking what these texts mean when placed on the lips of Mary. The first asks about the phrase, “I, wisdom,” and the second about the phrase, “I am dark but beautiful.” In choosing verses from Sirach and Songs, De Koninck takes his point of departure from the prayer of the Church.

The choice of the first text, “I, Wisdom,” seems sufficiently evident because it summarizes the use of the Wisdom literature in general. A further reason, however, is needed to explain the selection of the second text from among the verses of Songs appearing in Mary’s offices. The choice of “I am black but beautiful” is best explained

313 De Koninck begins by asking: “How can all that Wisdom says of itself in the Sapiential Books really apply to the Virgin Mary; What relationship can be established between this created wisdom and the “Nigra sum sed formosa—I am black but beautiful” (Songs 1:5) of the Song of Songs? These are the questions we have proposed to answer” (Ego Sapientia, 1.1). The motto following the foreword, which is from Cornelius a Lapide, reiterates that the work aims at explaining the fittingness of the Church’s prayer in this regard. 314 In the Common of feasts of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary on Saturday, the antiphons for Lauds and the following hours are taken almost entirely from the Song of Songs (excepting those that are not are not directly Scriptural), while the readings (lessons and little chapters) taken from the Old Testament consist entirely in the hymns of Wisdom to herself found in Proverbs and Sirach. In total we find Prov. 8: 12-25, 34-36; 9:1-5 and Sir. 24: 14-16, 19-20. In addition, the supplemental Little Office of the Blessed Virgin Mary found at the end of the Breviary makes use of Sir. 24: 11-13, 17-18, 24. The antiphons taken from Songs include Songs 1:4,5; 2:6, 10, 11. “I am black but beautiful” (Songs 1:5) is the third for all the hours of the common. Cf. footnote 11 in part I.

190 in light of the theme that governs the second part: mercy. De Koninck makes the connection between the Nigra sum and mercy clear in the very first chapter of the second part, and throughout the discussion that follows. The two verses governing the two parts of the work are chosen because they are particularly representative of the themes of wisdom and mercy. Yet, we have only shifted the question of the overall ground of the choice from the verses to the themes. Why link the themes of wisdom and mercy?

We have already noted the somewhat accidental account suggested in a letter

De Koninck writes to Fr. Henri-Marie Guindon about the genesis of Ego Sapientia.

Having explained that de Montfort’s True Devotion was the thunderbolt behind the whole project, he refers to some additional circumstances that conspired in its composition.

I was at that time giving a course on the notion of wisdom, and another on the use of the philosophy of nature in theology, in which the idea of mercy was the keystone. Meanwhile, my dear friend Jacques de Monléon wrote me a letter in which he complained of our Catholic writers who only speak of human rights and who never speak to us of mercy, the root even of justice. You know the result of all these coincidences.315

The themes of wisdom and mercy were very much present in De Koninck’s mind at the time that he read de Montfort’s book.316 De Koninck finds these events

315 De Koninck to Guindon, June 11, 1943 (Maritain Center archives: 15/15.01). “Je faisais en ce temps un cours sur la notion de sagesse, et un autre sur l’usage de la philosophie de la nature en théologie où l’idée de miséricorde était la clef de voûte. Entretemps, mon très cher ami Jacques de Monléon m’avait écrit une lettre où il se plaignait de nos écrivains catholiques qui ne parlent que des droits de l’homme et qui ne nous parlent jamais de la miséricorde racine, même de la justice. Vous savez le résultat de toutes ces coïncidences.” 316 The reference to his friend’s letter and to “our Catholic writers who only speak of human rights” suggests the context that appears at the end of the second part, as well as in the author’s simultaneous work on the common good, namely, the concern to refute the doctrine of the primacy of

191 coincidental because they converged on a single, unified vision of Mary. Yet they are not themselves the reason for the unity of that vision. What is the inner connection between wisdom and mercy?

We might observe, first, that wisdom and mercy correspond to the first principles of divine action ad extra: the divine intellect and the divine will. While wisdom belongs formally to the intellect, which draws things into itself so as to relate them and thus to order them according to a principle, mercy belongs to the will, to the motivation for every gift given to creatures, including creation itself, as

De Koninck explains in the first chapter. If Mary relates to wisdom and to mercy in a way that is unique and proper to her, in a way that sets her apart from every other creature, this relationship will surely be at the foundation of a systematic Mariology.

But De Koninck himself points us still deeper, toward the relationship between divine wisdom and mercy themselves. The double question with which he begins the second part already shows us that this deeper connection between wisdom and mercy, as it applies to Mary, is precisely what he wants to draw out.

Why does the Blessed Virgin tell us “I am black but beautiful” (Songs 1:5)? What relationship would there be between the attribute of wisdom and that of blackness which signifies a state of inferiority, as indicated by the preposition ‘but’?317

The first way of stating the question compares the two parts of the text from Songs: a state of inferiority and of beauty.318 These are the two terms, or endpoints of

the private good of the person over the common good. We will consider the connection between mercy and this doctrine in detail when we look at the final portion of the book. 317 Ego Sapientia, 17.1. 318 While the Latin text is “Nigra sum sed formosa,” the Septuagint reads: “μέλαινά εἰμι καὶ καλή,” the former contrasts, and the latter merely links. The Hebrew conjunction (ve) is ambiguous—it could be interpreted as “and” or “but.” The context seems to point to a contrast, as the bride

192 mercy in De Koninck’s account, and he will show how they apply to Mary on a series of levels. The second way of stating the question, however, replaces beauty (as the term that contrasts with blackness) with wisdom, recalling the conclusion of the first part, in which the place of Mary as a separated common good and principle of the order of the universe makes her a proper cause of wonder, supereminently lovely.319 In other words, the height described in the first part enters into mercy as one of its two terms. There is a “bond of dependency,” a “a very intimate connection between this blackness the mother of God attributes to herself and her very character as first principle.”320 The account of mercy will unfold the wonder contained in the final chapter of the first part, wonder at the cause of such a tremendous dignity given to a creature.

The dynamic of lowliness and being lifted up by the communication of divine goodness provides the basic structure of the second part, which begins with an

continues to explain that her coloration is a result of ill treatment. The mystical interpretation of Songs often makes use of this contrast to illustrate the sinfulness of man and the gratuity of Christ’s love. De Koninck interprets the text as indicating a definite contrast between the two terms, yet one that points to a deeper connection. The blackness of Mary, as he explains it, is not itself beautiful, but it is precisely through this blackness that the highest beauty of Mary realized. 319 De Koninck assumes rather than explains this interchanging of beauty and wisdom. Beauty, in the aesthetics of St. Thomas, involves both order (in the sense of proportion, or the harmonious unity of a manifold) and splendor. “Something is called beautiful inasmuch as it has splendor of its kind either spiritual or bodily, and inasmuch as it is constituted in due proportion” (In De Div. Nom., n. 339). These two aspects correspond very closely to those of the common good, represented by a shining light and as the gathering of many into a single dwelling place (Ego Sapientia, 9.1). Mary is wisdom insofar as she communicates God Himself, and thereby orders them, giving them diverse shares in the intimacy with the Trinity she herself possesses in a higher way. She is therefore the very splendor of the created world, the “face of the earth.” “Her splendor is most comparable to that of the whole—‘decora sicut Jerusalem’ (Songs 6:3); she is surrounded by the variety of all the other parts—‘circumdata varietate’ (Ps. 44:10). She is the purely created part of the universe thanks to which it can show forth such a great dignity. ‘Fons autem adscendebat de terra, et irrigabat omnem faciem terrae—But a spring rose out of the earth, watering all the face of the earth’ (Gen. 2:6)” (Ego Sapientia, 12.3). Her power to communicate, to reveal the infinity of her Source, thereby being herself ordered in a pre-eminent way and ordering others, is nothing other than beauty. Her power to cause wonder at her Origin should not be conceived in a calculating way, but with the immediacy of beauty, which, being seen, pleases (STh Ia q5 a4 ad 1). 320 Ego Sapientia, 17.1.

193 account of mercy itself, and then turns to consider four aspects of the lowliness of

Mary through which God manifests Himself in her in a surpassing way, providing in each case a particular sense of the words “I am black but beautiful.” But in the final portion of the second part, De Koninck considers the unique relationship Mary has to mercy as a principle of the order of God’s works. Here he speaks about her title as

Queen of Mercy in particular. This return to the notion of order leads us to the most profound connection between divine wisdom and mercy.

The major theological thesis of the first part of Ego Sapientia, formulated in

Chapters 10 and 13, is that, in virtue of her unique relationship to the Trinity, Mary communicates to the created universe a more perfect participation in the order that is found in God according to the processions. This order is a circular order, beginning with procession from a principle and concluding with a return to the principle. Divine Mercy, which reaches down from the fullness of divine goodness to the emptiness of the creature and draws it toward itself, is the communication of the

Trinitarian circularity ad extra. It is because of the inequality of the creature that procession involves a bending down, and return an elevation. And yet the principle remains the same.321 The innermost connection between wisdom and mercy as realized in Mary emerges, therefore, in light of the mystery of the Trinitarian life.

321 The sameness lies in the communication that is circular, beginning in a Principle and returning, in some sense, to that same principle. This “returning” was discussed in the excursus on the causality of the processions in the first part. The union of love between the Father and the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit is a kind of return to the Father. One could ask whether the principle of this communication is a point of likeness between the procession of the Son and of creatures. In the case of the latter, that principle is mercy as an expression of divine, and even more precisely, paternal love, as we will see below. Certainly in the case of the divine processions, mercy cannot be the motive or mode of communication because there is neither poverty nor potency of any kind in Him—the Son like the Father is He Who Is. But what of the love of which mercy is an expression?

194 The final section of the second part returns to the circumstances that inspired De Koninck’s work on Mary, and to the reasons that he saw this work as both timely and urgent. He compares the principle of self-centered love and the principle of the primacy of the common good as embodied in their purest forms by contrasting the fallen angels with the Blessed Virgin. By so doing, he shows Mary to be the measure of the spirit of the age, and the contemplation of the beauty of Mary to be the remedy.

Thomas explicitly denies that love, taken either notionally or essentially, can be a principle of the procession of the Son. The Holy Spirit is not the principle of the Son, nor is the Son the result of a choice of the will in God, nor again does He proceed in the manner of love proceeding, as the Spirit does, although certainly divine love concurs in the eternal begetting of the Son, so that He can be said to proceed “with love” (In Ioan. 753, on Jn. 5:20). Some theologians propose a distinct sense in which love may be understood as the principle in the procession of the Son: neither as a deliberate act of will, nor notionally, but according to the very constitution of essential love itself, which has two ‘moments,’ namely, gift and union. This proposal gives an alternate reading to that of St. Thomas of the gift of the divine nature to the Son expressed in Jn 17:24, “to see my glory, which you have given me because you loved me before the foundation of the world.” No such proposal appears in De Koninck, nor is it possible to enter into this debate here. Nonetheless, as De Koninck’s thesis leads us to the heart of the divine life, we should at least be aware of the further question.

195 CHAPTER 17 UNIVERSAE VIAE DOMINI MISERICORDIA ET VERITAS (PS. 25:10)

Toutes les voies du Seigneur sont All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. miséricorde et vérité. Pourquoi la Sainte Vierge nous dit-elle Je suis Why does the Blessed Virgin tell us “I am black noire, mais belle? (Cant. I, 4)322 Quel rapport y but beautiful” (Songs 1:5)? What relationship aurait-il entre l'attribution de sagesse et celle de would there be between the attribute of wisdom and noirceur qui signifie un état d'infériorité, comme on that of blackness which signifies a state of le voit par la particule mais? Loin de s'exclure, ces inferiority, as indicated by the preposition ‘but’? deux qualificatifs n'auraient-ils pas entre eux un Far from excluding each other, would not those two lien de dépendance? N'y aurait-il pas un lien très adjectives have a bond of dependency? Would intime entre cette noirceur que s'attribue la mère de there not be a very intimate connection between Dieu et sa raison de premier principe? this blackness the mother of God attributes to herself and her very character as first principle? Pour entrevoir la nature de ce lien, il nous faudra To understand the nature of this connection, we remonter au motif premier et à la voie universelle will have to go back to the first motive and the de la communication de Dieu au dehors—ad extra. universal manner of God’s communication outside Or, ce motif n'est autre que la bonté divine en tant of Himself—ad extra. Now that motive is nothing qu'elle est diffusive de soi. La racine et la voie other than the divine goodness inasmuch as it is première de cette diffusion et de cette manifestation diffusive of itself. The root and first way of this au dehors, c'est la miséricorde: Universae viae diffusion and of this manifestation outside of Domini misericordia et veritas — Toutes les voies Himself is mercy: “Universae viae Domini du Seigneur sont miséricorde et vérité. (Ps. XXIV, misericordia et veritas—All the ways of the Lord 10) C'est pourquoi saint Bernard appelle la are mercy and truth” (Ps. 24:10). This is why St. miséricorde de Dieu ‘causalissima causarum’ — la Bernard calls the mercy of God “causalissima plus cause des causes.a La miséricorde est racine causarum”—that which is preeminently cause of première, même de la justice: “En effet, dit saint all the causes.a Mercy is the first root, even of Thomas, l'oeuvre de la justice divine présuppose justice: “Now,” says St. Thomas, “the work of toujours l'oeuvre de la miséricorde, et trouve en elle divine justice always presupposes the work of son fondement. Car rien n'est dû à la créature qu'en mercy, and is founded thereupon. For nothing is raison de quelque chose qui, en elle, préexiste ou due creatures, except on the supposition of est prévu; derechef, si ce quelque chose est dû à la something preexisting or pre-known in them. créature, ce ne sera qu'en raison de quelque chose Again, if something is due to a creature, it must be d'antérieur. Et comme on ne peut procéder à l'infini, due because of something prior. And since we il faut en arriver à quelque chose qui ne dépend que cannot go on to infinity, we must come to de la seule bonté divine, laquelle est fin ultime. something that depends only on the divine C'est comme si on disait que le fait d'avoir des goodness, which is the ultimate end. We may say, mains est dû à l'homme à cause de son âme for instance, that to possess hands is due to man raisonnable; que le fait d'avoir une âme raisonnable because of his rational soul; and his rational soul is est dû à ce qu'il est homme; et que le fait d'être due to him because he is a man; and his being a homme est dû à la bonté divine. Ainsi, dans toute man is for the sake of the divine goodness. So, in oeuvre de Dieu, quant à sa racine première (prima every work of God, viewed in its first root (prima radix), apparaît la miséricorde. Et sa vertu se radix), there appears mercy. And the power of conserve dans tout ce qui procède de cette première mercy remains in all that proceeds from this first racine; elle y opère même d'une manière plus forte, root; and it works indeed with even greater force, tout comme la cause première influe plus fortement as the influence of the first cause is more intense (vehementius) que la cause seconde.”b (vehementius) than that of the second cause.”b Ayant raison de racine absolument universelle, la Mercy, insofar as it is an absolutely universal root,

322 The French citation follows the numbering of the .

196 miséricorde s'étend d'un bout à l'autre de l'univers. spreads itself from one end of the universe to the Même la souveraine dignité de l'Incarnation n'est other. Even the sovereign dignity of the Incarnation voulue qu'en vue de la manifestation de la gloire is willed only in view of manifesting the divine divine par voie de miséricorde et de justice. Toute glory by way of mercy and justice. All dignity dignité autre que celle de Dieu même est un absolu other than that of God Himself is only a relative relatif seulement. “La fin pour laquelle (cujus absolute. “The end for the sake of which (cujus gratia) s'est accomplie l'Incarnation a été la gratia) the Incarnation was accomplished was the manifestation de la gloire de Dieu par voie de manifestation of the glory of God by way of mercy miséricorde et de justice. Dès lors, parce que and justice. Consequently, because the Incarnation l'Incarnation pouvait accomplir comme effet de could accomplish as an effect the manifestation of manifester la miséricorde et la justice dans la mercy and justice in the redemption of men, the rédemption des hommes, le motif de vouloir motive of willing the Incarnation was not the l'Incarnation a été, non pas la dignité même de dignity itself of the Incarnation considered l'Incarnation considérée absolument, mais absolutely, but the Incarnation itself as being able l'Incarnation elle-même comme pouvant produire to produce such an effect.”c Because it has the un tel effet.”c Puisqu'elle a raison de racine character of a perfectly universal root, “mercy is parfaitement universelle, "la miséricorde apparaît seen even in the damnation of the reprobate, not by dans la damnation même des réprouvés, non pas totally remitting the penalty, yet by alleviating it in pour suspendre totalement la sentence, mais pour a certain measure, in punishing short of what is l'alléger dans une certaine mesure, ne punissant deserved.”d jamais qu'en deçà de ce qui serait dû.”d Le concept de miséricorde inclut une perfection The concept of mercy includes a wholly eminent tout à fait éminente: elle est la vertu du supérieur en perfection: it is the virtue of the superior as tant que supérieur. “Il appartient en effet à la superior. “It belongs to mercy to pour itself out to miséricorde de s'épancher sur autrui (alii effundat); others (alii effundat), and what is more, to provide et qui plus est, de suppléer dans les autres ce qui for others what they lack; and this pertains chiefly leur manque; et c'est là principalement le fait du to one who stands above. Hence, mercy is proper to supérieur. Aussi, avoir pitié est-il propre à Dieu, et God; and it is in this above all (maxime) that His c'est en cela surtout (maxime) que se manifeste sa omnipotence is manifested. On the other hand, with toute puissance. Mais, relativement à son sujet, la regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest miséricorde n'est pas la plus grande des vertus, à virtue, unless that subject be the being par moins que ce sujet ne soit l'être par excellence excellence (maximus), who has no superior and (maximus) qui n'a aucun supérieur et qui est au- who is above all beings. For, for every lower being, dessus de tous les êtres. Car, pour tout être it is a greater and better things to be united to that inférieur, c'est chose plus grande et meilleure d'être which is above than to supply what is lacking in a uni à un être supérieur que de suppléer ce qui being lower than itself. This is why, as regards manque à un être inférieur à soi. Voilà pourquoi man, who is lower than God, charity, by the very relativement à l'homme, qui est inférieur à Dieu, la fact that it unites us to God, is greater than mercy, charité par là-même qu'elle nous unit à Dieu, by which we come to the help of our neighbor. But l'emporte sur la miséricorde par laquelle nous of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, venons en aide au prochain. Toutefois, de toutes les mercy is the highest as it is the act of the superior. vertus qui ont le prochain pour objet, la miséricorde Indeed, to supply what another needs is, in this est la plus excellente puisqu'elle est l'acte du respect, the act of the superior, and is more supérieur; en effet, suppléer ce qui manque à un perfect.”e autre est, sous ce rapport, l'acte du supérieur et du plus parfait.”e a S. Bernard, In antiphonam , Sermo I, n. 3, a St. Bernard, In antiphonam Salve Regina, sermo 1, n. 3 T. VII, p. 43a. (t. 7, p. 43a). b S. Thomas, Ia Pars, q. 21, a. 4, c.: Opus autem divinae b STh Ia, q21 a4 c. “Now the work of divine justice justitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae, et in eo always presupposes the work of mercy, and is founded fundatur. Creaturae enim non debetur aliquid, nisi thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for propter aliquid in eo praexistens, vel praeconsideratum: something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if et rursus, si illud creaturae debetur, hoc erit propter something is due to a creature, it must be due on account aliquid prius. Et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, of something else that precedes. And since we cannot go oportet devenire ad aliquid quod ex sola bonitate divinae on to infinity, we must come to something that depends

197 voluntatis dependeat, quae est ultimus finis. Utpote si only on the goodness of the divine will—which is the dicamus quod habere manus debitum est homini propter ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess animam rationalem; animam vero rationalem habere, ad hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and hoc quod sit homo; hominem vero esse, propter divinam his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and bonitatem. Et sic in quolibet opere Dei apparet his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in misericordia, quantum ad primam radicem ejus. Cujus every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there virtus salvatur in omnibus consequentibus; et etiam appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy vehementius in eis operatur; sicut causa primaria remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the vehementius influit quam causa secunda. influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes.” c Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Theol. T. VIII, d. 3. a. 3, n. c John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, t. 7, d. 3, a. 3, 13, p. 114a: Finis cujus gratia fuit gloria Dei n. 13 (p. 114a). “The end for the sake of which it [the manifestanda per viam misericordiae et justitiae, unde Incarnation] was accomplished was to manifest the glory quia incarnatio valebat ad hunc effectum manifestandi of God by way of mercy and justice. So, because the misericordiam et justitiam in redemptione hominum Incarnation could achieve this effect of manifesting motivum volendi incarnationem fuit non ipsa mercy and justice in the redemption of men, the motive incarnationis dignitas absolute, sed ipsa incarnatio ut of willing the Incarnation was not the absolute dignity of valens ad talem effectum. the Incarnation itself, but the Incarnation itself as capable of such an effect.” d S. Thomas, Ia Pars, q. 21, a. 4, ad 1: Et tamen in d STh Ia, q21 a4 ad1. “Even in the damnation of the damnatione reproborum apparet misericordia, non reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally quidem totaliter relaxans, sed aliqualiter allevians, dum remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of punit citra condignum. what is deserved.” e S. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 4, c.: Respondeo dicendum e STh IIaIIae, q30 a4 c. “I answer that a virtue may take quod aliqua virtus potest esse maxima dupliciter: uno precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; modo secundum se; alio modo per comparationem ad secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself, mercy habentem.—Secundum se quidem misericordia maxima takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy est; pertinent enim ad misericordiam quod alii effundat; to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor et, quod plus est, quod defectus aliorum sublevet; et hoc others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who est maxime superioris. Unde et misereri ponitur proprium stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper Deo: et in hoc maxime dicitur ejus omnipotentia to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be manifestari. chiefly manifested. Sed quoad habentem, misericordia non est maxima, But with regard to its subject, mercy is not the nisi ille qui habet sit maximus, qui nullum supra se greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all habeat, sed omnes sub se. Ei enim qui supra se aliquem others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him habet majus est et melius conjungi superiori quam that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that supplere defectum inferioris. Et ideo, quantum ad which is above than to supply the defect of that which is hominem qui habet Deum superiorem, caritas, per quam beneath. Hence, as regards man, who has God above Deo unitur, est potior quaro misericordia, per quam him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than defectus proximorum supplet. Sed inter omnes virtutes mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. quae ad proximum pertinent potissima est misericordia, But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy sicut etiam est potioris actus: nam supplere defectum is the greatest, as it is the act of the superior, since it alterius, in quantum hujusmodi, est superioris et melioris. belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.”

CHAPTER 18 MISERATIONES EJUS SUPER OMNIA OPERA EJUS (PS. 145:9)

Ses misérations sont au-dessus de toutes His mercies are above all his works. ses oeuvres. Si la miséricorde s'accomplit dans l'élévation de If mercy is accomplished in the elevation of the l'inférieur, cette élévation sera d'autant plus inferior, this elevation will be the more merciful miséricordieuse et manifestative de la bonté et de la and will more manifest the divine goodness and toute-puissance divines qu'elle élèvera davantage ce omnipotence insofar as it will further elevate him qui est le plus inférieur. En d'autres termes, nous who is most inferior. In other words, we can judge

198 pouvons juger la mesure dans laquelle Dieu a voulu the extent to which God wanted to manifest se manifester, par le degré d'élévation Himself by the degree of merciful elevation He miséricordieuse qu'il a choisi de réaliser. chose to realize. Si la miséricorde divine se manifeste déjà dans la If divine mercy is already manifested in creation,a it création,a elle éclate davantage en tant qu'elle élève shines forth the more insofar as it elevates others les autres au-dessus de leurs défauts (inquantum above their defects (inquantum defectus aliorum defectus aliorum sublevat). Miserationes ejus super sublevat). “Miserationes ejus super omnia opera omnia opera ejus—Les miséricordes du Seigneur ejus—The mercies of the Lord are above all His sont au-dessus de toutes ses oeuvres (Ps. CLXIV, works” (Ps. 164:9). Now, among defects, evil, 9). Or, parmi les défauts, le mal proprement dit est properly speaking, is the greatest. It is evil, insofar le plus grand. C'est le mal, en tant qu'il a raison de as it has the character of misery, which would be misère, qui serait le mobile de la plénitude de la the motive of the plentitude of mercy, of mercy miséricorde, de la miséricorde victorieuse du malb: victorious over evil;b “the motive for (this) mercy is "le motif à (cette) miséricorde, c'est le mal".c evil.”c a “Il est nécessaire que dans toute oeuvre de Dieu se a “Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God’s rencontrent la miséricorde et la vérité; si, toutefois, la works, provided mercy be taken to mean removal of any miséricode s'entend de l'action d'écarter quelque défaut, kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly quoique tout défaut ne puisse pas être appelé proprement be called a misery, but only defect in a rational nature une misère, mais seulement le défaut dans la nature whose lot it is to be happy; for misery is opposed to raisonnable, qui est susceptible de félicité: car la misère happiness.” “…Although creation presupposes nothing in s'oppose à la félicité.” “...Bien que rien, dans la nature the universe, yet it does presuppose something in the des choses, ne soit présupposé à la création, cependant knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is quelque chose est présupposé dans la connaissance de preserved in creation, inasmuch as things are brought Dieu. Et sous ce rapport, même la création comporte into being in a manner that accords with the divine raison de justice, en tant que l'être des choses est produit wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy is also selon qu'il convient à la sagesse et à la bonté divines. Elle preserved in the transition of creatures from nonbeing to comporte aussi, en quelque sorte, raison de miséricorde, being” (STh Ia, q21 a4 c.; ad4). en tant que les choses passent du non-être à l'être." S. Thomas, Ia P., q. 21, a. 4, c. et ad 4. b “Il est de la raison de la faute (culpa) qu'elle soit b “It belongs to the nature of fault (culpa) that it be volontaire. Et sous ce rapport, elle n'est pas digne de voluntary. And in this respect, it is not worthy of pity, but pitié, mais plutôt de châtiment. Mais parce que la faute rather of chastisement. But because the fault can, in a peut, d'une certaine façon, être une peine, à savoir en tant certain way, be a punishment, that is, inasmuch as qu'elle comporte quelque chose de contraire à la volonté something belongs to it that is contrary to the will of the de celui qui pèche, sous ce rapport elle peut avoir raison sinner, in this respect it can have the account of misery. de misère. Et c'est en cela que nous avons pitié et And it is in this way that we have pity and compassion compassion de ceux qui pèchent. Comme le dit S. for those who sin. As St. Gregory says in a homily, ‘true Grégoire dans une homélie, ‘la vraie justice n'a pas de justice is not disdainful,’ that is to say, of sinners, ‘but dédain’, c'est-à-dire pour les pécheurs, ‘mais de la has compassion for them.’ And in Matthew it is written: compassion’. Et dans Matth. il est écrit: Or, en voyant ‘Now, in seeing this multitude of men, (Jesus) was cette multitude d'hommes, (Jésus) fut mû de compassion moved with compassion for them, because they were pour eux, parce qu'ils étaient harassés et abattus, comme weary and dejected, like sheep without a Shepherd’ (Mt. des brebis sans Pasteur (Matth. IX, 36).” S. Thomas, 9:36)” (STh IIa IIae, q30 a1 ad1). IIa-IIae, q. 30, a. 1, ad. 1. c S. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 1: sed contra: motivum ad c STh IIa IIae, q30 a1 s.c.: “The motive of mercy is misericordiam est malum.—Et, ad 1 du même article, le evil”—And, ad1 of the same article, the text cited above: texte déjà cité: de ratione culpae est quod sit voluntaria. “It is essential to fault (culpa) that it be voluntary; and in Et quantum ad hoc non habet rationem miserabilis, sed this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. magis rationem puniendi. Sed quia culpa potest esse Since, however, fault may be in a way punishment, aliquomodo poena, in quantum scilicet habet aliquid through having something connected with it that is annexum quod est contra voluntatem peccantis, against the sinner’s will, it may, in this respect, call for secundum hoc potest habere rationem miserabilis. Et mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and have secundum hoc miseremur et compatimur peccantibus: compassion for sinners. Thus Gregory says, in a certain sicut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, quod vera homily (Hom. in Ev. XXXIV), that ‘true justice is not justitia non habet dedignationem, scilicet ad peccatores, disdainful,’ that is, to sinners, ‘but compassionate.’ And sed compassionem. Et Matth. IX dicitur: Videns Jesus it is said (Mt. 9:36): ‘Jesus, seeing the crowd, had turbas misertus est eis; quia erant vexati, et jacentes compassion on them: because they were distressed, and sicut oves non habentes pastorem. lying like sheep that had no shepherd.”

199 Chapters 17-18: Mercy at the Root of God’s Works Ad Extra

De Koninck immediately introduces the central theme of the second part, which provides the key to the relationship between Mary’s beauty and her lowliness. “To understand the nature of this connection, we will have to go back to the first motive and the universal manner of God’s communication outside of

Himself—ad extra.”323 De Koninck continues, “that motive is nothing other than the divine goodness inasmuch as it is diffusive of itself.”324 Where could God find another motive for His actions? He Himself is that goodness of which all other goodness is only a participation. He adds, “inasmuch as it is diffusive of itself,” to show the way in which goodness is a motive. It is not in order to increase or acquire

His own goodness that God acts, but rather to communicate it. “God is the essence of good, and the essence of good is to communicate.”325 Of course, this communication to creatures remains perfectly free in God.

Not only does God exhaust goodness, but He is the essence of goodness: the fullness of good in causando. Does it follow that God must necessarily create? No. This would contradict the nature of the divine Good itself: it would mean that the divine Good is not perfect.326

323 Ego Sapientia, 17.2. 324 Ego Sapientia, 17.2. 325 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Dieu étant l’essence du Bien, et l’essence du Bien étant de communiquer.” 326 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Non seulement Dieu épuise la bonté, mais Il est de l’essence de la bonté: plénitude de bien in causando. S’ensuit-il que Dieu doive nécessairement créer? Non. Ce serait contraire à la nature du Bien divine lui-même: cela signifierait que le Bien divin n’est pas parfait.”

200 So the reason for the communication of goodness is goodness itself, which needs nothing but causes by perfecting others like a fountain overflowing into a stream, yet this communication is not a necessity but a gift.327

De Koninck further specifies that “the root and first way of this diffusion and of this manifestation outside of Himself is mercy.”328 He distinguishes the mode of the diffusion of goodness outside of God because there is also a communication of being and perfection within God. The diffusion of the divine goodness takes place pre-eminently in the processions of the divine Persons, in which the divine nature itself is given.329 Mercy adds to the notion of the diffusive good the poverty of the

327 Cf. In I Sent., q45 a2 co. 328 Ego Sapientia, 17.2. 329 “On the contrary, as Dionysius says, the good is self-communicative. But God is supremely good. Therefore he will communicate himself supremely. But in creatures he does not communicate himself supremely because they do not receive his whole goodness. Therefore there must be a perfect communication so that he communicates his whole goodness to another. This, however, cannot be in the diversity of essence. Therefore there must be many who are distinct in the unity of the divine essence” (In I Sent. d2 q1 a4 s.c. 1). “Sicut dicit Dionysius, bonum est communicativum sui. Sed deus est summe bonus. Ergo summe se communicabit. Sed in creaturis non summe se communicat, quia non recipiunt totam bonitatem suam. Ergo oportet quod sit communicatio perfecta, ut scilicet totam suam bonitatem alii communicet. Hoc autem non potest esse in diversitate essentiae. Ergo oportet esse plures distinctos in unitate divinae essentiae.” “I answer that it is in the nature of every act to communicate itself as, far as possible. Wherefore every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: while to act is nothing else than to communicate as far as possible that whereby the agent is in act. Now the divine nature is supreme and most pure act: wherefore it communicates itself as far as possible. It communicates itself to creatures by likeness only: this is clear to anyone, since every creature is a being according to its likeness to it. The Catholic Faith, moreover, asserts another mode of communication of the divine nature, in that it is communicated by a quasi-natural communication: so that just as one to whom the human nature is communicated is a man, so one to whom the Godhead is communicated is not merely like God, but is truly God” (De Pot. q2 a1 co.). “Dicendum, quod natura cuiuslibet actus est, quod seipsum communicet quantum possibile est. Unde unumquodque agens agit secundum quod in actu est. Agere vero nihil aliud est quam communicare illud per quod agens est actu, secundum quod est possibile. Natura autem divina maxime et purissime actus est. Unde et ipsa seipsam communicat quantum possibile est. Communicat autem se ipsam per solam similitudinem creaturis, quod omnibus patet; nam quaelibet creatura est ens secundum similitudinem ad ipsam. Sed fides Catholica etiam alium modum communicationis ipsius ponit, prout ipsamet communicatur communicatione quasi naturali: ut sicut ille cui communicatur humanitas, est homo, ita ille cui communicatur deitas, non solum sit Deo similis, sed vere sit Deus.”

201 recipient.330 Mercy addresses a need, the absence of some perfection or good, thereby raising up the one who receives it from a condition of relative misery. The diffusion of goodness that takes place outside of God can therefore be distinguished from the communication that takes place within the unity of God Himself because the latter communication involves neither potency nor inequality. But outside of

God there is no question of equality, or even of any actuality of any kind. For “the being which things would hold from themselves would be nothingness.”331 Since nothing whatever is presupposed to the act of creation on the side of the creature,

God addresses the most radical poverty by calling things into being. For this reason, mercy is the root of every work of God ad extra, even of creation.

Mercy is therefore even more universal than justice. “Justice implies something that is already given. It is after the gift that an obligation may arise between God and the creature,” De Koninck writes. “Mercy is a little ‘eccentric,’” that is, it does not follow a strict proportion, as justice does; it is spontaneous. “‘It transcends justice,’ says St. James.”

The principle must be an absolutely free gift: the effect of mercy. Thus, mercy is the root of every work, it is consequently the cause of what is owed in justice itself. In justice itself, there is more mercy than justice. If works are attributed to the justice of God, it is because justice is more apparent. But at

330 “Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod ratio misericordiae et bonitatis differunt in tribus. Primo in hoc quod misericordia respicit terminum a quo, sed bonitas magis terminum ad quem. Ille enim cui deus beneficia largitur, fit de deficiente perfectus. Bonitas ergo respicit communicationem perfectionis, quia bonum est diffusivum sui esse; sed misericordia respicit remotionem defectus” (In IV Sent., d46 q2 a1 q2 c). “The accounts of mercy and goodness differ in three ways. First, because mercy regards the term from which, but goodness regards more the term toward which. For one to whom God bestows benefits is made perfect from deficiency. Goodness therefore regards the communication of perfection because the good is diffusive of itself; but mercy regards the removal of a defect.” 331 Ego Sapientia, 10.1.

202 the same time and always, these works are even more deeply works of mercy.332

The gratuity of mercy is a clear sign of a superior good. In fact it corresponds to the chief marks of the common good, as we saw in the commentary on in the first part: communicability and superabundance.

The power to communicate itself without presupposing or depending on any previously existing being is proper to the supreme Good. There is also this distinctiveness in the supreme Good. Formally, the good causes in the manner of an end, and is diffusive by being the reason or cause of movement in another by its desirability. “[B]onum dicitur diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo finis dicitur movere.”333 The divine good, however, in order to be diffusive in the manner of an end, must also communicate itself in an efficient mode, precisely because there is nothing presupposed to its action. God is not an end for anything without also being at the same time its origin. The diffusion of good in God is therefore always circular, entailing both a procession and a return, by the order to God as end in whatever manner He has determined for each being.

“The divine omnipotence goes beyond what is owed. Hence, mercy is that which most manifests (maxime) the omnipotence of God.”334 It belongs properly to

332 “Mercy and Redemption;” emphasis in the original. “La miséricorde est un peu « excentrique » . « Superexaltat judicium », dit saint Jacques. La justice implique quelque chose de donné. C’est après le don que peut surgir une obligation entre Dieu et la créature. Il faut au principe un don absolument gratuit : effet de miséricorde. Donc, la miséricorde est racine de toute œuvre, est cause tout autant de ce qui est dû que la justice elle-même. Dans la justice elle-même, il y a plus de miséricorde que de justice. Si l’on attribue des œuvres à la justice de Dieu, c’est que la justice est plus apparente, mais, en même temps et toujours, ces œuvres sont encore plus profondément œuvres de miséricorde.” 333 STh Ia, q5 a4 ad2. 334 “Mercy and Redemption.” “La toute-puissance divine va au-delà de ce qui est dû. D’où la miséricorde est ce qui manifeste surtout (maxime) la toute-puissance de Dieu. ”

203 the superior as such to give freely to the one who is in need. In the one who is truly highest, mercy is the most perfect disposition in his actions toward others.335 For the lowly one, it is better to be united to what is above than to communicate its own finite good, and this is realized in its order to the common good, and in particular through charity. But the transcendent goodness of the one who is above shows itself in being perfective of others, in pouring itself out. “If God wishes to reveal His omnipotence to a greater extent, His work will be bursting with mercy.”336

“If God wishes,” De Koninck writes. The poverty of the recipient shows the infinity of the power at work, but mercy is a motive for creation and redemption only inasmuch as it expresses the love of God. “Mercy is a little ‘eccentric,’” De

Koninck said in a text already quoted. The first sense of these words is the eccentricity of sponteneity, one who does not act according to a pre-set measure.

But they can equally mean eccentric in the sense of an eliptical movement. Love turns toward the other: the merciful one responds to another’s need as though it were his own, and God, who in His own being is impassible, nevertheless is able to make man’s suffering “His own” because of love.

It is an imperfection to need in some way to suffer miseries in order to pity those who suffer. God is not merciful by imperfection but by love. He will produce the effects of mercy because of his intimate union with us. Because

335 Pope John Paul II repeats with approval the judgment that mercy is the highest virtue in God in his encyclical on the mercy of God. “Some theologians affirm that mercy is the greatest of the attributes and perfections of God, and the , Tradition and the whole faith life of the People of God provide particular proofs of this” (John Paul II, Dives in Misericordia, 13). “Si autem theologi nonnulli adseverant misericordiam esse summam attributorum perfectionumque Dei, Biblia et Traditio et fidei vita tota Populi Dei praebent singulares rei probationes.” 336 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Si Dieu veut manifester davantage sa toute-puissance, son œuvre sera éclatante de miséricorde.”

204 God is more united to us than we are to ourselves, God loves us more than we love ourselves.337

In the encyclical Dives in Misericordia, Pope John Paul II looks closely at the particular power of mercy to reveal God’s love. Mercy, he explains, is nothing other than the mode that love takes when the beloved suffers. But this mode has a special aptitude to make that love known more deeply than any other.

This love makes itself particularly noticed in contact with suffering, injustice and poverty—in contact with the whole historical ‘human condition,’ which in various ways manifests man’s limitations and frailty, both physical and moral. It is precisely the mode and sphere in which love manifests itself that in biblical language is called ‘mercy.’338

Without the experience of suffering, the divine love might have seemed remote from man, however benevolent. Mercy has the power to reveal something more about that love.

De Koninck frequently refers to the manifestation of the omnipotence of God, but he connects the revelation of this power through mercy with an astounding tenderness towards man.

If God had not become incarnate, we could be in considerable confusion about the manifestations of God toward us, because they would not be proportionate to us. We would therefore have had far too great a terror of the power of the devil. God would have been too distant. No doubt we would have known that He is omnipotent, but He would have remained for us so transcendent. God in His very humiliation, in human nature itself, in this

337 “Mercy and Redemption;” emphasis in original. “C’est une faiblesse d’avoir besoin en quelque sorte de subir les misères pour avoir pitié de ceux qui les souffrent. Dieu n’est pas miséricordieux par faiblesse mais par amour. Il va produire les effets de la miséricorde à cause de son intime union à nous. Parce que Dieu est plus uni à nous que nous ne le sommes à nous-mêmes, Dieu nous aime plus que nous ne nous aimons nous-mêmes.” 338 Dives in Misericordia, 3. “Talis vero amor vehementer percipitur quotiescumque aegrituclo iniuria egestas attingitur—quin immo tota historica illa ‘condicio humana’, quae variis rationibus designat angustias hominis ac fragilitatem tum physicam eius tum moralem. Atqui ipse modus ille et ambitus, quo amor ostenditur, lingua biblica ‘misericordia’ nominatur.”

205 flesh, rises above His enemies. He shows how much He can do, and with how little!339

Mercy is solicitous to make the divine power known in a way that allows man to trust. In this very solicitude, and proportioning to man, mercy reveals not only the divine power, but the divine love.

In considering the revelatory power of mercy, John Paul turns to the parable of the prodigal son. Christ, whose mission is to reveal “the mystery of the Father and his love,”340 uses this parable to show how God’s mercy springs from a love that is fundamentally paternal. That love is marked by fidelity and affection, and a particular solicitude for the dignity of the beloved. When the beloved son has lost the good of sonship, of his relation to his father, the father’s love works to restore the son, to raise him up again. “[O]ne can therefore say that the love for the son, the love that springs from the very essence of fatherhood, in a way obliges the father to be concerned about his son's dignity. This concern is the measure of his love….”341

While the parable is meant to speak directly about the love of God, it does not of course imply that God is bound to man by any need in Himself. Rather, the gift of such love is a free commitment on the part of God. “It is love which not only creates

339 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Si Dieu ne s’était pas incarné, nous aurions pu être dans une très grande confusion au sujet des manifestations de Dieu à notre égard, parce que non proportionnées à nous. Nous aurons donc eu une beaucoup trop grande terreur de la puissance de diable. Dieu aurait été trop loin. Sans doute nous aurions su qu’il est tout-puissant, mais Il serait resté pour nous si transcendant. Dieu dans son humiliation même, dans la nature humaine elle-même, dans cette chair, s’élève au-dessus de son ennemi. Il montre combien Il peut faire, et avec combien peu!” 340 Dives in Misericordia, 1, quoting Gaudium et Spes 22:1. 341 Dives in Misericordia, 6. “Ulterius vero amorem adversus filium, amorem nempe qui ex ipsa oriatur paternitatis natura, dici licet patrem ferme praefinivisse, ut filii dignitatis gereret curam. Nam sollicitudo ista modum statuit eius amoris….”

206 the good but also grants participation in the very life of God: Father, Son and Holy

Spirit. For he who loves desires to give himself.”342

If, as De Koninck argued in the first part, God wishes to draw creation into a circular movement that is like that which exists between the Father and Son, it will have to be by way of mercy. Mercy names the motive of the revelation of the Trinity and the gift of grace. It names the divine love as extended to creatures, which at the same time has the power to make that love known in its inner character. It is an expression in the finite sphere of the Father’s unlimited love for the Son. This is the reason that mercy manifests God, that it is the very mode of the diffusion of the divine goodness ad extra.

While Chapter 17 introduces mercy as the first and universal principle of the divine action in the world, Chapter 18 adds a key premise for discovering the manifestation of mercy in Mary in particular. Mercy is the communication of some perfection, which can be considered in the negative sense as the removal of any defect whatever, and in the positive sense as the raising up of the lowly. So there are two terms to any act of mercy, the lowliness or poverty in which the recipient of mercy begins, and the height or perfection to which he is lifted.343 These are the terms indicated by the title of the second part: Nigra Sum sed Formosa. The degree

342 Dives in Misericordia, 7. “Quippe: amor est qui non sola efficit bona sed perficit etiam, ut participatio contingat ipsius Dei vitae: Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Qui enim diligit, donare se ipsum concupiscit.” It is helpful to keep this comparison with paternal love in mind when considering the account of the lowliness of human nature that follows. It is not the debasement of man but the love of God that is meant to appear in that analysis. 343 Of course in the case of creation ex nihilo, there is no underlying subject to which the two terms can be applied as a change. The first term is the pure absence of being. Yet in the rational creature, as in God, there is an awareness of the transition from non-being to being. We as subjects can look back at our nothingness.

207 of mercy, and therefore the manifestation of divine power and love, will therefore correspond to the distance between these terms: the lower the first term, and the higher the second, the greater the mercy. “In other words, we can judge the extent to which God wanted to manifest Himself by the degree of merciful elevation He chose to realize.”344

Commentary on Chapters 19-34

In the first part of Ego Sapientia we saw the height to which God chose to raise the whole universe through Jesus and Mary. By the divine maternity, a creature touches the very frontiers of the divinity, and through this unique elevation, all believers are brought into intimate union with God and made partakers of the divine life. The extreme height Mary reaches is a return to her

Principle that unites her to that very Principle as co-principle. For a created person, there could not be a higher raising up than that which the divine goodness realizes in Mary.

[I]t would be necessary that she be herself united to the divinity in order to conceive a greater grace than that according to which that which is united to Him is drawn from her: that is to say that except being God Himself it is impossible to conceive a greater grace than that of being the mother of God.345

This is the formositas to which the words of the bride refer when they are placed on

Mary’s lips. What then is the depth, the nigra sum, from which this soaring height is attained?

344 Ego Sapientia, 18.1. We might add that correlative to this measure is the degree of condescension of the one who is above. In uniting himself to the miserable one by mercy, he lowers himself to the level of the poor one. De Koninck does not consider this aspect a second measure of mercy, but rather refers to it in unfolding the first, as we will see below. 345 Pseudo-Albert, Mariale, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 6.2.

208 Already at the end of Chapter 18 De Koninck identifies the absolute depth.

“Now, among defects, evil, properly speaking, is the greatest.”346 But Chapters 19-30 will consider four distinct senses of the nigra sum which can be found in Mary.

These can be divided into those that arise from her nature as a human being simply, on the one hand, and those that are the consequence of sin, on the other. Although

Mary herself is without fault of any kind, she is not removed from the misery that follows from the fall of Adam. Each of the two aspects of “blackness” is further divided into the objective condition, which is ineluctable and applies also to every other human being, and a subjective aspect, which is proper to Mary. De Koninck explains each of these senses, afterward showing the way in which divine Mercy is manifest precisely in and through each one, hence giving a distinct sense to the phrase, “nigra sum sed formosa.” It is the final sense, the beauty of Mary in her experience of and response to sin, that contains the most profound meaning of these words. Chapters 31-34 expand this deepest sense, showing it to be the meaning of her title, Queen of Mercy, while Chapters 35-42 show the full realization of that queenship, her most proper formositas, in her victory over evil.

Chapters 19-25: The Nigra Sum as Applied to Human nature

346 Ego Sapientia, 18.2.

209 CHAPTER 19 ANGELI FORTITUDINE, ET VIRTUTE CUM SINT MAJORES... (2 PETER 2:11)

Puisque par leur force et leur vertu les Because by their strength and their power the anges sont plus grands… angels are the greatest… Pour entrevoir l'altitude et la profondeur de la To catch a glimpse of the height and depth of the manifestation que Dieu a choisi d'accomplir au manifestation God has chosen to accomplish dehors, il nous faut voir la bassesse de la nature outside Himself, we must see the lowliness of the qu'il a élevée au-dessus de toutes les créatures. nature He has elevated above all creatures. It is C'est en cela même qu'éclate proprement la toute- precisely in this very elevation that the merciful puissance miséricordieuse. Considérons d'abord la omnipotence bursts forth most properly. Let us hiérarchie des choses créées dans la perfection qui consider first the hierarchy of created things leur convient par nature. according to the perfection which is proper to them by nature. Au sommet de la création envisagée au point de At the peak of creation, seen from the purely vue purement naturel se trouvent les anges, esprits natural point of view, one finds the angels, pure purs, êtres très parfaits quant à la substance et quant spirits, beings very perfect according to substance à l'opération. Leur essence étant simple, chacun and operation. Their essence being simple, each d'eux constitue à lui seul une espèce complète et one of them constitutes in himself a complete and individuelle subsistant en dehors de tout genre individual species subsisting outside of every naturel commun. Chacun d'eux épuise un degré common natural genus. Each exhausts a degree of d'être. Radicalement hiérarchisé, chacun des anges being. Radically hierarchised, each angel occupies occupe dans cette hiérarchie un lieu absolument an absolutely determined place in this hierarchy. déterminé. Même l'esprit pur le plus inférieur Even the most inferior pure spirit constitutes in constitue à lui seul un univers himself a universe incomparably more perfect than incommensurablement plus parfait que le cosmos et the cosmos and humanity together. l'humanité tout ensemble. Le cosmos et son terme intérieur le plus parfait, The cosmos and humanity, its most perfect interior l'humanité, ne sont qu'un écho lointain de l'univers limit, are but as distant echoes of the spiritual spirituel: ‘quaedam resonantia’.a On peut le montrer universe: “quaedam resonantia.”a We can show en considérant de manière dialectique la hiérarchie this by considering dialectically the angelic angélique dans le sens de sa limite inférieure. A hierarchy in the direction of its lowest limit. To the proportion que les anges sont éloignés de l'Acte extent that the angels are removed from Pure Act, Pur, la simplicité de leur essence se trouve the simplicity of their essence is diminished. The diminuée. La limite de cet éloignement selon la limit of this removal, with respect to simplicity, is raison de simplicité, est une essence composée de an essence composed of matter, form, and matière, de forme et de privation. Alors que les privation. While the pure spirits were immutable in esprits purs étaient immuables dans leur substance their substance and absolutely necessary, in the et absolument nécessaires, en ce sens qu'ils ne sense that they did not contain in themselves any contenaient en eux-mêmes aucun principe de non- principle of nonbeing,b the essences that include être,b les essences qui comportent privation privation carry with them, so to speak, their own entraînent pour ainsi dire leur propre négation. A ce proper negation. At this level, the species, diffused niveau, l'espèce, diffusée en individus, n'est in individuals, can only be maintained by their maintenue que par leur génération et leur generation and corruption. It is, again, to matter corruption. C'est encore à la matière, en tant qu'elle insofar as it is deprived of form, that we must est privée de forme, qu'il faut attribuer l'existence attribute the existence here below of chance and of ici-bas du hasard et du désordre, privation qui disorder, privation which is expressive of our exprime notre éloignement du premier principe qui distance from the first principle which is in itself est en lui-même toujours uniforme (‘semper eodem always uniform (“semper eodem modo se modo se habente’).c Et ce hasard ne fait que doubler habente”).c And this chance only doubles the le fortuit. Nous vivons aux confins de l'univers où fortuitous. We are living at the border of the nous sommes diffusés, et quant à la substance selon universe in which we are diffused, both as regards

210 la quantité, et quant à la durée selon le temps. substance according to quantity, and duration according to time. Nos jours et nos lieux sont incertains. Tout ici-bas Our days and places are uncertain. All here below est variable et caduc, et ce n'est que par un grand is variable and precarious, and it is only by great effort que nous réussissons parfois à imprimer aux effort that we sometimes succeed in impressing a choses une direction momentanée. Ce n'est que par momentary direction upon things. It is only by a une habitude qui nous aveugle et une sorte de habituation that blinds us and by a kind of animal résignation animale que nous sommes devenus resignation that we have become unconscious of inconscients de l'immense confusion où nous the immense confusion in which we live, and to vivons et à laquelle seule la violence semble which violence alone seems capable of awakening pouvoir nous éveiller. Notre sùbstance est vraiment us. Our substance is truly at the border of being. aux confins de l'être. Envisagée dans sa condition de nature, Considered in its natural condition, the intellect of l'intelligence des substances séparées est toujours separated substances is always in act. It judges en acte. Elle juge sans composition ni division; elle without composition and division; it knows the connaît les raisons des choses les unes dans les reasons for things, some as depending upon others, autres sans discours; elle saisit intuitivement dans without discourse; it grasps intuitively in a quasi un mouvement quasi circulaire l'essence d'où elle circular movement the essence from which it émane et à la lumière de laquelle elle voit. Parce emanates and the light by which it sees. Because que l'ange est trop parfait pour subir les autres the angel is too perfect to submit to other creatures creatures dans la connaissance, Dieu lui a infusé in his knowing, God, from the morning of his depuis le matin de son existence des espèces existence, infused in him intelligible species intelligibles représentatives de l'univers qu'il avait representative of the universe that he had chosen to choisi de former, espèces antérieures aux choses form, species prior to things themselves. Imitating elles-mêmes. Imitant Dieu qui connaît toutes God who knows all things through a unique choses dans une espèce universelle unique, les universal species, the pure spirits, in proportion as esprits purs, à proportion qu'ils sont plus rapprochés they are closer to Him, know this universe by way de Lui, connaissent cet univers au moyen d'un of an always smaller number of species. But when nombre d'espèces toujours plus petit. Mais quand we look at the angelic hierarchy in its increasing nous regardons la hiérarchie angélique dans le sens distance from the first intelligence, the intuition de son éloignement de l'intelligence première, belonging to the essence becomes poorer according l'intuition de l'essence s'appauvrit selon to the very imperfection of this essence and of the l'imperfection même de cette essence et de intellect which emanates from it. To know other l'intelligence qui en émane. Pour connaître les things, this intelligence needs more and more autres choses, cette intelligence a besoin d'idées de numerous ideas, its activity is more and more plus en plus nombreuses, son activité est de plus en fragmented; discrete time constituted by a train of plus morcelée; le temps discret constitué par la always increasing thoughts and acts of will is more suite toujours croissante de pensées et de vouloirs and more atomized, the present is diffused, est de plus en plus atomisé, le présent se diffuse, dispersed in a past and future always more distant. s'éparpille en passé et avenir toujours plus distants. The intelligence is more and more distant from L'intelligence est de plus en plus éloignée d'elle- itself and from the other things it knows. At the même et des autres choses qu'elle connaît. A la limit of this degradation rises an intelligence turned limite de cette dégradation surgit une intelligence outside itself, in pure potency, resembling prime versée hors d'elle-même, en pure puissance, matter, a tabula rasa, a non-intuitive intelligence semblable à la matière première, tabula rasa, which will not be able to awaken itself to its own intelligence non-intuitive qui ne pourra s'éveiller à proper act except by means of the sensible singular, son acte propre qu'au moyen du singulier sensible, intelligible only potentially. “Ratio oritur in umbra intelligible en puissance seulement. “Ratio oritur in intelligentiae: Human reason arises in the shadow umbra intelligentiae: La raison humaine surgit dans of intelligence.”d It can know itself only in l'ombre de l'intelligence.”d Elle ne peut se connaître dependence on a species representative of qu'en dépendance d'une espèce représentative something other than itself. To know things in their d'autre chose que soi. Pour connaître les choses own nature, it needs a number of intelligible dans leur nature propre, il lui faut un nombre species equal to the number of natures it knows; it d'espèces intelligibles égal au nombre des natures puts itself in dependence on the senses, which need qu'elle connaît; elle se met sous la dépendance des as many species as there are singular forms which

211 sens auxquels il faut autant d'espèces qu'il existe de are known. Knowledge requires, at this level, not formes singulières connues. La connaissance only a great number of internal and external senses, requiert, à ce niveau, non seulement un grand but also a doubling of the intellectual power in an nombre de facultés sensibles internes et externes, intellect which anticipates knowledge by mais aussi un dédoublement de la puissance penetrating the semidarkness of the sensible world intellectuelle en un intellect qui devance la to enlighten its objects in order to render them connaissance en pénétrant dans la pénombre du assimilable, and another intellect which properly monde sensible pour éclairer les objets afin de les knows things and expresses them for itself. Our rendre assimilables, et un intellect qui connaît intelligence can live only in semidarkness. The proprement les choses et qui se les dit. Notre need of shadows of the sensible world originates in intelligence ne peut vivre que dans la pénombre. La the weakness of our intelligence. By nature our nécessité des ténèbres du monde sensible prend rational life is the least perfect intellectual life origine dans la faiblesse de notre intelligence. Par conceivable. nature, notre vie raisonnable est la vie intellectuelle la moins parfaite qui se puisse concevoir. L'union de la nature intellectuelle et de la nature The union of intellectual nature and sensible nature sensible assujettit l'homme à une certaine subjects man to a certain contrariety. Sensible contrariéte. La nature sensible nous porte vers le nature takes us towards the sensible and private bien sensible et privé, la nature intellectuelle a pour good, while intellectual nature has as its object the objet l'universel et le bien sous la raison même de universal and the good under the very notion of bien, laquelle se trouve principalement dans le bien good, which is principally found in the common commun. good. Or, la vie sensitive est en nous la première: nous ne Now in us the sensible life is first; we cannot attain pouvons atteindre aux actes de la raison qu'en to the acts of reason except by passing through passant par le sens qui, sous ce rapport, a raison de sense which, in this respect, has the account of principe. Tant que l'homme n'est pas rectifié par les principle. As long as man is not rectified by the vertus cardinales, il est tiré principalement vers le , he is drawn mostly towards the bien sensible contre le bien de l'intelligence. sensible good against the good of intelligence. “...homo est ex duabus contrariis naturis, quarum “…homo est ex duabus contrariis naturis, quarum una retrahitur ab alia a suo corpore.”e Pour la una retrahitur ab alia a suo corpore.”e Men, for the plupart, les hommes succombent à cette attraction, most part, succumb to this attraction, and for two et cela pour deux raisons connexes. Le bien, en related reasons. The good, indeed, demands a effet, demande une parfaite intégrité; le mal, au perfect integrity; evil, on the contrary, is the result contraire, résulte de n'importe quel défaut.f Or, tant of any kind of fault.f Now, as long as man has not que l'homme n'a pas acquis les vertus qui le acquired the virtues, which determine him “ad déterminent ‘ad unum’, à la droite intégrité unum,” to the correct integrity conformed to conforme à la raison, son action est incertaine et reason, his action is uncertain and easily deviates s'écarte facilement du bien véritable. D'où l'adage: from the true good. From this comes the adage: ‘le mal a lieu le plus souvent dans l'espèce “evil takes place most often in the human species.”g humaine’.g La plupart des hommes suivent l'inclination vers le Most men follow the inclination towards the bien sensible et se laissent conduire par lui contre sensible good and let themselves be led by it l'ordre de la raison.h against the order of reason.h Dès lors, envisagés dans notre condition de nature, Consequently, seen in our natural condition, and et comparés aux esprits purs qui sont toujours en compared to the pure spirits who are always in act, acte, qui sont immuables et incapables d'erreur ou who are immutable and incapable of error or any de faute dans l'ordre naturel, nous sommes déjà fault in the natural order, we are already truly vraiment noirs: dans la substance, à cause de la black: in substance, because of matter and matière et de la privation; dans la connaissance, à privation; in knowledge, because of the nocturnal cause de la potentialité nocturne de l'intelligence et potentiality of the intelligence and the opacity of de l'opacité du sens; dans l'ordre de l'agir, à cause the senses; in the order of action, because of the de la contrariété de notre nature composée. contrariety of our composite nature. Voilà l'ordre des choses envisagées dans leur nature This is the order of things seen in their nature and

212 et la place qui nous revient dans cet ordre. Si nous the place we occupy in that order. If we run great courons de grands risques, nous avons pourtant risks, we have yet every reason for rejoicing over toutes raisons de nous réjouir de cette existence que this existence the divine mercy deigned to confer la miséricorde divine a daigné nous conférer. “Quel on us. “Who is the one who has not received this est celui qui n'a pas reçu cette miséricorde de Dieu, mercy from God,” says St. Augustine; “first to dit saint Augustin, d'abord pour exister, pour être exist, to be separated from the brute animals, to be mis à part des brutes, pour être un animal a reasonable animal who can know God, and, then, raisonnable qui peut connaître Dieu, et, ensuite, to enjoy this light, this air, the rain, fruits, the pour jouir de cette lumière, de cet air, de la pluie, seasons, the charms of the earth, the health of the des fruits, des saisons, des charmes de la terre, de la body, the affection of friends, and the well-being of santé du corps, de l'affection des amis, ou du bien- his home?”i être de sa maison?”i a S. Thomas, In de Divinis Nominibus, c. 7, lect. 2. a Thomas Aquinas, In Div. Nom., c. 7, lectio 2. b S. Thomas, II Contra Gentes, c. 30. b Thomas Aquinas, SCG II, c. 30. c S. Thomas, In XII Metaph., lect. 12, n. 2637: Est ergo c “The answer briefly stated, then, is that order requires summa solutionis, quod ordo duo requirit, scilicet two things: namely, a distinction among the things ordinatorum distinctionem et communicantiam ordered, and the agreement of the distinct things with the distinctorum ad totum. Quantum autem ad primum whole. As regard the first of these, order is found in all indeficienter est ordo in omnibus; quantum autem ad things without fail; but as regards the second, this order secundum est quidem ordo indeficienter in aliquibus, is found without fail in some things, which are highest quae sunt suprema et proxima primo principio, sicut and closest to the first principle, as the separate substantiae separatae et corpora caelestia, in quibus nihil substances and the heavenly bodies, in which there is casualiter accidit et praeter naturam: in aliquibus autem nothing caused by chance or contrary to their nature. But deficit, scilicet corporibus, in quibus interdum aliquid order is lacking in some things, namely, in which accidit casualiter praeter naturam. Et hoc propter sometimes something is caused by chance and contrary remotionem a primo principio semper eodem modo se to nature. And this is because of their distance from the habente. first principle, which is always the same” (Thomas Aquinas, In XII Meta., lectio 12, n. 2637). d Apud S. Thomam, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, c. d Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., d3 q1 a6 c. e S. Thomas, In Matth., c. XXV, vers. 15. e Thomas Aquinas, In Matth., 25:15 “…man is from two contrary natures, one of which is drawn back by the other from his body.” f S. Thomas, In II Ethic., lect. 7, nn. 319-321. f Thomas Aquinas, In II Ethic., lectio 7, nn. 319-21. g S.Thomas, In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2. c.: ... in natura g “…in human nature, the good seems to be in the few, humana bonum videtur esse ut in paucioribus, et and a twofold reason can be given for this. One is on hujusmodi ratio potest assignari dupliciter. Una est account of the corruption of human nature from original propter corruptionem humanae natùrae ex peccato sin …The other reason we can give is from the condition originali ... Alia ratio sumi potest ex ipsa natura of human nature itself” (Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d39 conditionis humanae. Sur cette question, voir Jean de S. q2 a2 c.). On this question, see John of St. Thomas, Thomas, Curs. Theol., T. VI, q. 109, dd. 19 et 20. Cursus theologicus, t. 6, q. 109, dd. 19 and 20). h S. Thomas, la IIae, q. 71, a. 2, ad 3:.. in homine est h STh Ia IIae, q71 a2 ad3. “There is a twofold nature in duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et sensitiva. Et quia per man, the rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus rationis, ideo since it is through the operation of his senses that man plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae quam accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who ordinem rationis. Plures enim sunt qui assequuntur follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who principium rei, quam qui ad consummationem follow the order of reason: because more reach the perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et peccata in hominibus beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationes naturae the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact sensitivae contra ordinem rationis. that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason.” i S. Augustin, In Ps. XXXV, vers. 6, T. V., col. 346: Quis i St. Augustine, In Psalm 35, verse 6 (t. 5, col. 346). non habet istam misericordiam Dei, primo ut sit, ut “Who does not possess that mercy of God, first to be, to discernatur a pecoribus, ut rationale sit animal, qui possit differ from dumb animals, to be a rational animal, who is Deum intelligere, deinde frui ista luce, isto aere, pluvia, able to know God, then to enjoy the light, the air, rain, fructibus, diversitate temporum, solatiis terrenis, salute fruits, various season, earthly comforts, health of body, corporis, affectu amicorum, salute domus suae. the affection of friends, and the well-being of his house?”

213 Chapter 19: The objective lowliness of human nature

The first sense of blackness De Koninck considers is human nature itself. By calling human nature “black,” he does not mean that it is something bad. The chapter concludes with a text from Augustine expressing joy in the goodness of human nature.

“Who is the one who did not receive this mercy from God,” says St. Augustine; “first to exist, to be separated from the brute animals, to be a reasonable animal who can know God, and, then, to enjoy this light, this air, the rain, the fruits, the seasons, the charms of the earth, the health of the body, the affection of friends, and the well-being of his home?”347

To speak about the poverty of human nature is not to condemn it, but to recognize man’s place in the hierarchy of being.

Certainly within the material cosmos man occupies the upper limit. And because man is more easily aware of the visible world than the spiritual, since his road to knowledge is through the senses, it is not difficult for him to believe in the superiority of his nature over all others. But this conviction fails to recognize that the entire material cosmos stands at the lowest extremity of existence. De Koninck approaches this point by comparing man with the angels as to substance and operation, the latter being further divided into knowledge and the order of action.

All three aspects reveal the superiority of the angels to man in the order of nature.

“From the point of view of nature,” he writes, “mercy was extended further to the angels. We, compared to the angels, we are so little a thing: we are not even

347 Ego Sapientia, 19.9.

214 among the [purely] intellectual natures.”348 Creatures differ in perfection on the natural level in accordance with their relative nearness to God, who is pure act. The angels are immaterial, pure intelligences. Although they do not exist through themselves, there is no composition of act and potency in the essence itself.

Moreover, each one is his own species, so perfectly is he identified with his own pure form. “Even the most inferior pure spirit constitutes in himself a universe incomparably more perfect than the cosmos and humanity together.”349

Man, on the other hand, as a material being, is composed of matter, form, and privation.350 “The imperfection of the form itself is the reason for the necessity of matter. The fact that we have a body is a sign of the very imperfection of our soul.”351

Because he is composed, he is impermanent; he tends toward non-being. “Matter is characteristic of the lower limits of being. Matter makes us black according to our

348 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Au point de vue de la nature, la miséricorde s’est étendue davantage aux anges. Nous, comparés aux anges, nous sommes si peu de chose : nous ne sommes même pas des natures intellectuelles.” 349 Ego Sapientia, 19.2. 350 “Therefore there are three principles of nature: matter, form and privation. One of these, form, is that towards which generation takes place; the other two are found on the part of that from which there is generation. Hence matter and privation are the same in subject but they differ in definition, because bronze and what is shapeless are the same before the advent of the form; but for one reason it is called bronze and for another reason it is called shapeless. Wherefore, privation is not said to be a per se principle, but rather a per accidens principle; because it is coincident with matter. For example we say that it is per accidens that the doctor builds, because he does not do this in so far as he is a doctor but in so far as he is a builder, which is coincident with the doctor in the same subject” (Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae, cap. 2) “Sunt igitur tria principia naturae, scilicet materia, forma et privatio; quorum alterum, scilicet forma, est id ad quod est generatio; alia duo sunt ex parte eius ex quo est generatio. Unde materia et privatio sunt idem subiecto, sed differunt ratione. Illud enim idem quod est aes est infiguratum ante adventum formae; sed ex alia ratione dicitur aes, et ex alia infiguratum. Unde privatio dicitur esse principium non per se, sed per accidens, quia scilicet concidit cum materia; sicut dicimus quod hoc est per accidens: medicus aedificat: non enim ex eo quod medicus, sed ex eo quod aedificator, quod concidit medico in uno subiecto.” 351 “Mercy and Redemption;” emphasis in the original. “L’imperfection de la forme elle-même est la raison de la nécessité de la matière. Le fait que nous avons un corps est un signe de l’imperfection même de notre âme.”

215 substance. We are black inasmuch as our complete being is transient.”352 Man comes into being and passes away in virtue of this composition with matter and privation, and so the very continuation of the species depends on the succession of birth and death. “At this level, the species, diffused in individuals, can only be maintained by their generation and corruption.”353

The succession of generation and corruption shows the contingency to which man as a material being is subject.

And with generation and corruption, we have contingency properly speaking. Now see how very humble our being, my being is. …My substance is objectively dark. My matter is dark because it is deprived of other forms that it will in fact have, e.g. by my death.354

Contingency in turn subjects man to vicissitude. “Our days and places are uncertain.

All here below is variable and precarious….”355 This contingency is important to De

Koninck’s account of sin, and also of the devotion of slavery to Mary and of her universal Queenship, which we will discuss in some detail in the excursus on slavery below. De Koninck in fact interprets the fall of Adam and Eve as a rebellion against the state of contingency.

To be born subject to contingency, and therefore apparently to chance and fortune, is to lack the ability to control what will happen. A tremendous amount of human life is beyond the control of the one who lives it. De Koninck enumerates

352 “Mercy and Redemption.” “La matière est caractéristique de la limite inférieure des êtres. La matière nous rend noirs selon la substance. Nous sommes noirs en tant que notre être complet est caduc. ” 353 Ego Sapientia, 19.3. 354 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Et avec la génération et la corruption, nous avons la contingence proprement dite. Voyez alors combien notre être, mon être est humble. … Ma substance est objectivement obscure. Ma matière est obscure en tant que privée d’autres formes qu’effectivement elle aura, v.g. à ma mort.” 355 Ego Sapientia, 19.4.

216 these conditions as including man’s origin, talents, parents, social status, nationality, religion, the time and place in which he is born, the people around him with whom he interacts, and his early education.356 It was this lack of control, according to De

Koninck, against which the serpent tempted Eve to rebel.

The serpent said to Eve that if she and Adam ate the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of paradise, …your eyes shall be opened: and you shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil (Genesis 3:3-5). The tempter implied, according to Augustine and Aquinas, that they would thereby become a kind of universal providence unto themselves, enjoying perfect security, and thus be confirmed in the good. When they had succumbed to the temptation, God said, in irony: Behold Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil (Gen. 3:22).357

The unwillingness to depend on God, to live in the will of God, is a rebellion against the blackness, the littleness and poverty of man’s nature. “Wanting to be oneself the cause of one's security, of one's confirmation in good: [is this not] the sin of pride?”358

The inordinate desire for divine knowledge points us to the second aspect of the “blackness” of human nature. It is once more in comparison with the angels that this blackness emerges. The angelic intellect is always in act, understanding itself not discursively but intuitively, by a “quasi-circular movement.”359 The understanding immediately grasps the essence from which it springs. “The first object of the angel’s knowledge is the angel himself, and this without succession. It is

356 “Our Condition of Subject,” unpublished outline, handwritten in English (Maritain Center archives: 8/34). 357 “The Knowledge of Good and Evil,” unpublished notes, typewritten in English (Maritain Center archives: 8/33). 358 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Vouloir être soi-même la cause de sa sécurité, de sa confirmation dans le bien: péché d’orgueil?” 359 Ego Sapientia, 19.5.

217 in the created order that which looks most like eternity. This object is the light in which the angel sees everything he sees.”360 The angel is more like God too in the power of insight, whereby he knows many things by a single intellectual species.

“As for our intellect, in terms of its concepts, it is fractured (pulvérisée) in every direction.”361 Not only does it require countless distinct ideas, but these ideas are obtained only indirectly, by the mediation of the senses. Even to know itself, the intellect must be stirred by the experience of external reality.

Man is not made to see his soul. The separated soul longs for its body. We are naturally incorporated ... Hence, the poverty of our intelligence. In short, the ‘intellectus’ is that only for first principles. As soon as we want to know something worthwhile, we must reason: and this is very imperfect. Even demonstrations are very rare.362

“Our faculty of knowledge is like a fraction of the debris of an angelic intellect!”363 In its emptiness (as a tabula rasa) and dependence on things beneath itself to arrive at its own proper act, the human intellect is black.

There is a further consequence of the composition in human nature in order of operation, one that only appears in relation to the much greater darkness already hinted at above in the discussion of contingency. Because of his sensible nature, man has sensible appetible powers in addition to the rational appetite that is the will.

360 “Mercy and Redemption;” emphasis in original. “Le premier objet de la connaissance de l’ange c’est lui-même, et cela sans succession. C’est dans l’ordre crée ce qui ressemble le plus à l’éternité. Cet objet est la lumière sous laquelle l’ange voit tout ce qu’il voit.” 361 “Mercy and Redemption;” emphasis in original. “Quant à notre intelligence, au point de vue de ses concepts, elle est pulvérisée de quelque manière.” 362 “Mercy and Redemption.” “L’homme n’est pas fait pour voir son âme. L’âme séparée languit après son corps. Nous sommes naturellement incorporés… Donc, pauvreté de notre intelligence. En somme l’ « intellectus » n’est que pour les premiers principes. Aussitôt que nous voulons connaître ce qui vaut la peine, il faut raisonner : et cela est très imparfait. Encore les démonstrations sont-elles très rares.” 363 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Notre faculté de connaissance est comme un multiple de débris d’une intelligence angélique!”

218 While these appetites can function in harmony when the human person is integrated by the cardinal virtues, they nevertheless hold the seeds of conflict.364

The object of the sensible appetites are material, and therefore private goods, while the natural object of the rational appetite is “the universal and the good under the very notion of good, which is principally found in the common good.”365 Through sin and the consequent loss of integrity, these lower appetites tend toward their objects in opposition to reason, opening the way to an array of evil acts. In the grip of concupiscence, man even tends toward such disintegrated action.

As long as man is not rectified by the cardinal virtues, by which he does on a consistent basis what he should do, he is drawn mainly to the sensible good against the good of the intellect. Sensible goods are so close to us. It must not be forgotten that the object of the intellect is sensible quiddity.366

Given the disorder resulting from the Fall, to remain on the level of the sensible good is easier than to rise to the good that is in itself first for man.367

364 Of course the angelic will is fallible as well. Yet, the composite nature of man allows for a kind of internal contrariety with regard to his desires and consequent actions, following the loss of integrity, that the angel cannot experience. 365 Ego Sapientia, 19.6. 366 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Tant que l’homme n’est pas rectifié par les vertus cardinales au moyen desquelles il fait d’une manière constante ce qu’il doit faire, il est tire principalement vers le bien sensible contre le bien de l’intelligence. Les biens sensibles sont si près de nous. Il ne faut pas oublier que l’objet de l’intelligence c’est la quiddité sensible.” 367 De Koninck in fact goes a step further, seeing the seeds of contrariety in the very composition of nature rather than in the effects of sin. For example, he writes, “The good of the intellect, from which man receives his dignity as man, is not assured by man's own nature. The sensitive life is first in us; we cannot attain to acts of reason except by passing through the senses which, considered in this way, are a principle. As long as man is not rectified by the cardinal virtues which must be acquired, he is drawn principally towards the private good against the good of the intellect. For man there exists, even in the purely natural order, a liberty of contrariety which makes him fallible per se in relation to the attainment of his end. To achieve his dignity, he must submit his private good to the common good” (Common Good, 46). “Le bien de l’intelligence d’où l’homme tire sa dignité d’homme, n’est pas assuré par la nature même de l’homme. La vie sensitive est en nous la première: nous ne pouvons atteindre aux actes de la raison qu’en passant par le sens qui, sous ce rapport, a raison de principe. Tant que l’homme n’est pas rectifié par les vertus cardinals qu’il doit acquérir, il est tiré principalement vers le bien privé contre le bien de l’intelligence. Il existe pour l’homme, envisagé même dans l’ordre purement naturel,

219 Human nature is black in substance, black in knowledge, and black in the order of action, all of which emerges when we consider his place in the hierarchy of beings, so far below the angels that in comparison even the intellect of man is like a shadow. This reflection is not meant to incite a Manichean disgust. “God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good” (Gen. 1:31). Yet the tendency in the modern era is rather in the opposite direction, toward a humanism that denies the characteristics of createdness and dependence, let alone the humility

une liberté de contrariété qui le rend par soi défectible par rapport à sa fin purement naturelle. Pour faire valoir sa dignité, il doit soumettre son bien privé au bien commun” (Bien Commun, 137). In this view, he follows St. Thomas. “But over and above this help [i.e. the grace necessary for attaining the vision of God], another supernatural help was necessary for man because of his composite nature. For man is made up of soul and body and of an intellectual and sense nature, which compositions so to speak, if left to their own nature, burden and impede the intellect so that it cannot freely arrive at the heights of contemplation. Now this help was original justice, by which the mind of man would be subject to God in such a way that the lower powers and even the body itself would be totally subject to it, and reason would not be impeded from tending to God. And just as the body is for the sake of the soul and the sense powers for the sake of the intellect, so this help by which the body remains under the control of the soul and the sense powers under the control of the intellectual mind is, as it were, a certain disposition for that help (i.e., grace) by which the human mind is ordered to seeing God and to enjoying Him. But owing to original sin this help of original justice is taken away, as was said above” (De Malo, q5 a1 co.). “Sed praeter hoc auxilium necessarium fuit homini aliud supernaturale auxilium, ratione suae compositionis. Est enim homo compositus ex anima et corpore, et ex natura intellectuali et sensibili; quae quodammodo si suae naturae relinquantur, intellectum aggravant et impediunt, ne libere ad summum fastigium contemplationis pervenire possit. Hoc autem auxilium fuit originalis iustitia, per quam mens hominis si subderetur Deo, ei subderentur totaliter inferiores vires et ipsum corpus, neque ratio impediretur quo minus posset in Deum tendere. Et sicut corpus est propter animam, et sensus propter intellectum; ita hoc auxilium, quo continetur corpus sub anima, et vires sensitivae sub mente intellectuali, est quasi dispositio quaedam ad illud auxilium quo mens humana ordinatur ad videndum Deum et ad fruendum ipso. Hoc autem auxilium originalis iustitiae subtrahitur per peccatum originale, ut supra ostensum est.” Thomas does not here suggest that the composite nature is as such disordered, or that the lower powers themselves are disordered. The burdening and impeding he speaks of arise from the difference of the objects of the sensitive and intellectual powers. This difference is the reason that an excess of the sensible can overpower the reason. The need for the rectifying virtues is simply a consequence of composition. Nevertheless, as man was created with such virtue by the gift of grace (original justice), original sin is at fault in historical man’s tendency to sin, insofar as it resulted both in the loss of that original grace and in the additional wounds to the nature by which man is inclined to evil. “Concupiscence stems from the disobedience of the first sin. It unsettles man’s moral faculties and, without being in itself an offense, inclines man to commit sins. Because man is a composite being, spirit and body, there already exists a certain tension in him; a certain struggle of tendencies between “spirit” and “flesh” develops. But in fact this struggle belongs to the heritage of sin. It is a consequence of sin and at the same time a confirmation of it. It is part of the daily experience of the spiritual battle” (Catechism of the , 2515-2516).

220 of the human being in particular. It is well worth considering the littleness of man, because it is in this littleness that the splendor of divine love in the Incarnation, and in Mary, appears.

221

CHAPTER 20 ORIRETUR IN TENEBRIS LUX TUA, ET TENEBRAE TUAE ERUNT SICUT MERIDIES (IS. 58:10)

Ta lumière se lèvera au sein de l'obscurité, Your light will rise in the darkness, and your et tes ténèbres brilleront comme le midi. darkness will shine forth like mid-day. Néanmoins, dans sa pure libéralité, Dieu a choisi de Nevertheless, in His pure liberality, God chose to se manifester d'une manière incomparablement plus manifest Himself in a way incomparably more profonde en élevant l'intelligence créée à une fin profound by elevating created intelligence to an end qui surpasse infiniment la nature active de cette which surpasses infinitely the active nature of this intelligence, à la vie surnaturelle, qui a pour terme intelligence, to the supernatural life which has as its la vision de Dieu tel qu'il est en lui-même. Mais les end the vision of God as He is in Himself. But the voies par lesquelles Dieu peut réaliser ce retour à ways God can bring about this return to Himself lui sous la raison même de sa déité, sont encore under the very aspect of His deity are still many, multiples, les unes plus profondes et plus some more profound and more manifestive of His manifestatives de sa miséricorde que les autres. mercy than others. L'élévation à la vie de Dieu peut se faire The elevation to the life of God can be affected immédiatement et sans autre condition immediately and without any other intermediary intermédiaire que l'acceptation de la gloire promise, condition than the acceptance of the promised comme ce fut le cas des anges. Mais cette élévation glory, as was the case of the angels. But this peut s'accomplir aussi d'une manière beaucoup plus elevation can also be accomplished in a much more éclatante, à savoir par la mission visible d'une astonishing way: namely by the visible mission of a personne divine grâce à l'union hypostatique à une divine person by means of a hypostatic union with nature créée. Descendant ainsi dans sa création a created nature. Descending to His creation to pour l'élever du dedans à l'ordre proprement divin, elevate it from within to the properly divine order, Dieu manifesterait déjà la miséricorde de sa toute- God would manifest already the mercy of His puissance dans une mesure infiniment plus omnipotence in a measure infinitely more profound profonde que dans la seule création d'êtres than by the creation of intellectual beings alone, intellectuels si parfaits soient-ils; ou dans leur however perfect they may be, or in their immediate élévation immédiate. elevation. Or, cette même union hypostatique peut à son tour Now, this same hypostatic union can in its turn be s'accomplir de diverses manières, l'une étant plus accomplished in a variety of ways, one being more miséricordieuse que l'autre, et par conséquent plus merciful than the others, and consequently more profonde, selon qu'elle élève advantage l'inférieur. profound according as it further elevates the Elle pourrait s'accomplir dans l'assomption d'une inferior. It could be accomplished in the nature angélique. Puisque cette nature est de toutes assumption of an angelic nature. Since this nature les natures intellectuelles créées la plus parfait et la is of all created intellectual natures the most perfect plus digne, n'est-elle pas la mieux disposée à cette and most worthy, would it not be better disposed sublime élévation? Et, n'est-ce pas cette apparente for this sublime elevation? And is it not this convenance qui a trompé les princes des ténèbres? apparent fittingness which deceived the princes of darkness? L'union hypostatique peut se réaliser d'une manière The hypostatic union can be accomplished in a yet plus admirable dans l'assomption de la nature more admirable way in the assumption of that inférieure qu'est la nature humaine, la moins digne inferior nature which is human nature, the least de toutes les natures intellectuelles. La sagesse et la worthy of all intellectual natures. The divine puissance divines confondent les esprits les plus wisdom and power confound the most powerful puissants. spirits. L'assomption de la nature humaine peut, elle aussi, The assumption of human nature can also be

222 s'accomplir de deux manières: soit immédiatement accomplished in two ways: either immediately and et sans condition préalable, tel serait le cas si Dieu without any preliminary conditions, as would be formait immédiatement la nature assumée; soit en the case if God immediately formed the assumed assumant la nature humaine par voie de naissance, nature, or in assuming human nature by way of Dieu se mettant ainsi dans la dépendance de nativity; God thus placing Himself in dependence l'homme et procédant par là, dans l'univers même, as it were on man and proceeding thereby into the par voie d'origination. Et l'être même d'où il naît universe itself by way of origination. And the being devient par là proprement origine de Dieu. itself from which He is born becomes thereby Remarquons tout de suite que cette communication properly the origin of God. Let us notice right away très radicale n'aurait été nullement possible dans that this very radical communication would not in l'assomption d'une nature angélique. Dieu ne any way have been possible in the assumption of an pourrait procéder d'une nature angélique, car cette angelic nature. God could not proceed from an nature est, d'une part, trop parfaite pour engendrer angelic nature, since that nature is, on the one hand, comme les êtres naturels, et, d'autre part, trop too perfect to engender as do natural beings, and on imparfaite pour engendrer comme Dieu. ‘Perfecta the other hand, too imperfect to engender as does imperfecte, imperfecta perfecte’. C'est donc grâce à God. “Perfecta imperfecte, imperfecta perfecte.”368 la potentialité de la matière, voire à la matière en It is thus thanks to the potentiality of matter, taking tant qu'elle est privée de forme, donc à la privation matter insofar as it is deprived of form, therefore to qui est la réalité la plus débile, que le Fils de Dieu the privation which is the weakest reality, that the peut procéder du dedans même de sa création, Son of God can proceed from the very inside of His imitant ainsi d'une manière très profonde sa creation, thus imitating in a very profound manner generation du Père éternel. Infixus sum in limo His generation from the eternal Father. “Infixus profundi: et non est substantia — Je suis enfoncé sum in limo profundi: et non est substantia—I am dans la profondeur limoneuse, où il n'y a point thrust in the depth of slime, where there is no point d'appui. (Ps. LXVIII, 3) Heureuse imperfection de of support” (Ps. 68:3). Happy imperfection of la matière qui permet une telle information! matter which allows such an informing! Ce même Fils surgit aux deux extrémités de This same Son appears at the two extremes of the l'univers, réunissant notre bassesse avec sa suprême universe, uniting our lowliness with His supreme grandeur — ima summis. Voilà le degré de grandeur—ima summis.369 Here is the degree of communication et d'élévation miséricordieuses qu'il communication and of merciful elevation it has a plu à Dieu d'accomplir. Ecce virgo concipiet, et pleased God to accomplish. “Ecce virgo concipiet, pariet filium: et vocabitur nomen ejus Emmanuel — et pariet filium: et vocabitur nomen ejus Voici qu'une vierge concevra, et elle enfantera un Emmanuel—Behold a virgin will conceive, and she fils: et on l'appellera le ‘Tout-Puissant avec nous’. will give birth to a son: and they will call him (Is. VII, 14) Dieu se suscite et se fait engendrer aux ‘Emmanuel’” (Is. 7:14). God makes Himself arise confins les plus éloignés de sa création: Que la and causes Himself to be begotten at the most terre s'ouvre, et qu'elle germe le Sauveur-Aperiatur distant confines of His creation: “May the earth terra, et germinet Salvatorem. (Is. XLV, 8) open itself, and may it sprout the Savior— Aperiatur terra, et germenet Salvatorem” (Is. 45:8). Ici dans l'ordre substantiel peut s'appliquer déjà le Here, in the substantial order, the nigra sum, sed nigra sum, sed formosa: Marie est belle par la formosa can already be applied: Mary is beautiful maternité divine; mais, de la part de la créature by the divine maternity; but, on the part of the elle-même, cette maternité n'est possible que grâce creature itself, this maternity is only possible due to à la noirceur de la potentialité et de la privation. the darkness of potentiality and privation. It is C'est donc grâce à cette noirceur que Dieu peut lui- therefore due to this darkness that God can Himself même procéder d'un principe créé et qu'une pure proceed from a created principle and that a pure créature pourra se dire sagesse. Marquons cet creature will be able to call itself wisdom. Mark intime rapprochement de Dieu que permet la this intimate proximity to God which the maternity maternité en vertu même de sa passivité dans la permits in virtue of its very passivity in conception. conception. Dieu ne peut procéder ici-bas d'un God cannot proceed here below from an active principe qui est actif dans la fécondation. Ce principle of fecundation. For this principle would

368 “Imperfectly perfect; perfectly imperfect.” 369 “The lowest with the highest.”

223 principe, en effet, devrait lui-même revêtir la raison itself have to assume the nature of passive de principe passif.a Ce n'est que dans le principe qui principle.a It is only in the passive principle of est passif dans la génération, le principe qui a generation, the principle that has the nature of raison de matière malléable, que la fécondité de malleable matter, that the fecundity of Pure Act can l'Acte Pur peut trouver son écho selon un mode find its echo according to a mode which is entitatif et substantiel. ‘Imperfecta perfecte’. Seule entitative and substantial. “Imperfecta perfecte.” la femme peut avoir avec Dieu raison de principe Only the woman can have with God the nature of premier dans l'origination de Dieu. Si l'homme first principle in the origination of God. If a man pouvait être père de Dieu, non seulement la could be the father of God, not only would the generation serait moins parfaite; la paternité ne generation be less perfect; the paternity would only serait possible qu'en tant qu'elle imiterait la be possible insofar as it would imitate maternity: it maternité: c'est la maternité de la femme, et non pas is the maternity of the woman, and not the Paternity la Paternité de Dieu, qui en serait l'original. of God, which would be the model. a S. Albert, Mariale, c. 141, T. 37, p. 200: Quod non a “That a man is not able to be the father of God is shown posset homo esse pater Dei, sic probatur: Dicit as follows: According to the Philosopher, it is the male Philosophus, quod masculus est, qui generat in alio: ergo who generates in another; therefore, he who would be the ille qui esset pater Dei, aut generaret in alio, aut in father of God would have to beget either in another or in seipso. Si in alio: ergo duo, unus generans in alio, et unus himself. If in another, there would be two, one begetting vel una ab altero generans: ergo esset ibi masculus et in another, and one, male or female, begetting from the femina. Si autem ille pater generaret in se: ergo non esset other, in which case there would be male and female. But masculus: ergo non esset pater.—Item quae est ratio if that father should beget in himself, he would not be quare plus diceretur pater quam mater? ...Esset nec pater male, and hence not a father. So for what reason should nec mater. he be called father rather than mother? …He would be neither father nor mother.” (St. Albert, Mariale, c. 141 [t. 37, p. 200]).

224 Chapter 20: The beauty realized through the objective lowliness of human nature

“Happy imperfection of matter,” De Koninck writes, playing on the Easter exultet,370 “which merits such an informing!”371 De Koninck begins his argument by showing that the Incarnation by way of birth is the most merciful way in which God could raise man to a share in the divine life. In this portion of the argument we see more clearly how the depth of the descent, the self-emptying of the one who is All- powerful belongs to the measure of mercy. He then shows that the divine nativity itself is made possible by the composition of matter, form, and privation in man. It is the very imperfection of human nature that makes it receptive of the greatest act of divine mercy.

That God chose to offer supernatural life to the rational creature is already a tremendous mercy, but there are a variety of ways in which God could have extended this gift to man. He could have done so immediately, as with the angels.

Instead, he chose to do so by the mission of a divine Person through the hypostatic union. By such a choice, God involves his creation in the attainment of its end.

Descending to His creation to elevate it from within to the properly divine order, God would manifest already the mercy of His omnipotence in a measure infinitely more profound than by the creation of intellectual beings alone, however perfect they may be, or in their immediate elevation.372

That creature, moreover, could have been one of the highest intellectual creatures.

God could have taken an angelic nature to Himself. God would already traverse an

370 “O truly necessary sin of Adam, which is blotted out by the death of Christ! O happy fault, which merited for us such and so great a Redeemer!” “O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est! O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!” 371 Ego Sapientia, 20.5. 372 Ego Sapientia, 20.2.

225 infinite distance in uniting such a nature to a divine Person. Instead, He chose to take a human nature, which in comparison to the angels is so poor.

In his lecture notes, De Koninck points out the gentleness and solicitude of divine love in choosing this humiliation.

Here the Word (Verbe) of God comes assuming a sensible nature, and the word (parole) becomes a word proportionate to us. There is no way more fitting to us to tell us the things of faith. The men who heard him had a certitude quite proportionate to them. The certainty of faith and the certainty of man, i.e. that of the senses, are found in those who listen to Christ. Faith concerns Christ himself, and so [it concerns] this very union. There is a certain sapiential return. Besides, it is this very Word to whom we adhere. This also increases our hope. Since He comes so close to us, this gives us great hope that He will give us the good that He promises.373

The Incarnation considered in this way especially reveals the character of mercy as the mode of love when it comes into contact with poverty or imperfection of any kind. The paternal love of God expresses itself as mercy in having so great a care to make Himself known to man in a manner so well proportioned to him.

God becomes visible. The One who is the Light can be illuminated by the sun… by the weak light of a matchstick! The invisible God becomes visible. The Goodness of God becomes visible to the senses: you could point it out with your finger. He manifests the divine wisdom in a visible manner. …It is He who makes all things, who holds all things, and who gives Himself this nature by which He is visible! What wonder and transcendence of mercy!” 374

373 “Mercy and Redemption;” emphasis in the original. “Ici le Verbe de Dieu vient assumer une nature sensible, et la parole devient parole proportionnée à nous. Il n’y a pas de moyen plus convenable de nous dire les choses de la foi. Les hommes qui l’entendaient avaient une certitude tout à fait proportionnée à eux. La certitude de foi et la certitude de l’homme, i.e. celle du sens, se rencontrent dans ceux qui écoutent le Christ. La foi porte sur le Christ même, donc sur cette union même. Il y a un certain retour sapiential. D’ailleurs c’est ce même Verbe qui nous fait adhérer. Cela accroît aussi notre espérance. Puisqu’il vient si près de nous, cela nous donne une grande espérance qu’il va nous donner le Bien qu’il promet.” 374 “Mercy and Redemption;” emphasis in the original. “Dieu devient visible. Celui qui est la Lumière peut être éclairé par le soleil…, par une allumette fragile lumière! Le Dieu invisible devient visible. La Bonté de Dieu devient visible au sens : on pouvait l’indiquer de doigt. Il manifeste la

226

Nevertheless, even granting the choice to become man, it would be possible for God to create a human nature for Himself directly, a nature already at the perfect age, rather than allowing Himself to begin in the least perfect state, through the mediation of another creature. He chose to enter the world by being born. The dignity that He thereby gives to His creation is almost unthinkable. God showed His mercy “in assuming human nature by way of nativity; God thus placing Himself in dependence as it were on man and proceeding thereby into the universe itself by way of origination.”375 God Himself proceeds from within His creation, from the lowest part of that creation, from a material creature. God lowers Himself so far that

He can receive from His creature its own nature. And by this very fact, this creature becomes the highest of the works of God. This is truly the extreme of mercy.

But this dignity could not be given to creation apart from the composition of matter and form in the creature. An angel cannot give birth, and hence, an angel cannot become the Mother of God. Generation, as we saw above, is a consequence of the transient nature of material living beings.

It is thus thanks to the potentiality of matter, taking matter insofar as it is deprived of form, therefore to the privation which is the weakest reality, that the Son of God can proceed from the very inside of His creation, thus imitating in a very profound manner His generation from the eternal Father.376

The imperfection, the poverty of the human form at the same time renders it receptive of this intimacy with the eternal processions. This is the first sense of

Sagesse divine d’une manière visible. …C’est Lui qui fait tout, qui tient tout et qui se donne cette nature par laquelle Il est là visible…! Quelle merveille et transcendance de miséricorde!” 375 Ego Sapientia, 20.5. 376 Ego Sapientia, 20.5.

227 nigra sum sed formosa—that the substantial imperfection of human nature opens

Mary to becoming the Mother of God.

Although De Koninck does not return directly to the poverty of man in knowledge and in the contrariety of his composed nature here, we find in Chapter

26 that the redemptive Incarnation depends on this human blackness as well. The separated intelligences are not capable of conversion because of their very perfection.377 “For the angel, when his will pursues an apparent good, it is entirely from within, so committed that somehow he cannot regret it: he is confirmed in evil.”378 But man, because of the very darkness of his understanding and the complexity of his nature, can change his mind and his heart. “For us, the root of the possibility of mercy, forgiveness, redemption is in the imperfection of our intellect.”379

Chapters 21-25: Humility as the Subjective Lowliness of Man

Chapters 21-25 consider the lowliness proper to human nature from a subjective perspective. That is, they consider the disposition, the virtue that corresponds most properly to the natural lowliness or “blackness” of man. De

Koninck presents humility as the fundamental way in which so small a creature should relate himself to the order of the whole and to God. Humility therefore

377 “This is because angelic intelligence is so perfect that it grasps without composition and division and without discourse all that we know by simple apprehension, by the understanding of principles and by a science very difficult to acquire: it grasps its object in an immutable manner, and the adhesion of the will is also fixed and immutable” (Ego Sapientia, 26.3). 378 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Pour l’ange, quand sa volonté poursuit un bien apparent, elle est entièrement dedans, tellement engagée qu’en quelque sorte il ne peut regretter, il est confirmé dans le mal.” 379 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Pour nous, c’est dans l’imperfection de notre intelligence qu’est la racine de la possibilité de la miséricorde, du pardon, de la rédemption. (Cf. Ia, q64 a2 ; De Malo q16 a5)."

228 regards two terms: the created person in whom it resides, and God—the principle from whom he comes and on whom he depends. De Koninck considers the relationship of humility and mercy in light of each term, showing at each step how the humility of Mary is the greatest possible, and how God accomplishes the greatest work of mercy through this humility. This is the second sense of nigra sum sed formosa. Chapters 21-23 in general consider the attitude of humility toward man’s own natural condition, while Chapters 24-25 consider the attitude of humility toward the divine goodness and power.

229 CHAPTER 21 ABYSSUS ABYSSUM INVOCAT (PS. 42:8)

L'abîme appelle l'abîme. Deep calls to deep. Nigra sum, sed formosa. Cette proposition exprime Nigra sum, sed formosa. This statement expresses en même temps les deux vertus extrêmes du règne at the same time the two virtues most removed de l'esprit: l'humilité, la vertu la plus fondamentale from one another in the realm of the spirit: pour l'homme, la créature intellectuelle la moins humility, the most fundamental virtue for man, the parfaite possible, la plus faible de toutes; la least perfect intellectual creature possible, the miséricorde, la vertu propre du Tout-Puissant. weakest of all; and mercy, the virtue proper to the Sapientia illius eruperunt abyssi — Sa Sagesse a Almighty. “Sapientia illius eruperunt abyssi—His fait s'ouvrir les abîmes l'un sur l'autre. (Prov. III, wisdom opened the abysses” (Prov. 3:20) one upon 20) L'abîme de plénitude invoque l'abime de the other. “The abyss of fullness calls upon the vacuité— Abyssus abyssum invocat. (Ps. XLI, 8) abyss of emptiness—Abyssus abyssum invocat” C'est par son humilité que la Sainte Vierge fut (Ps. 41:8). It is by her humility that the Blessed agréable à Dieu. Quia respexit humilitatem ancillae Virgin was pleasing to God. “Quia respexit suae: ecce enim ex hoc beatam me dicent omnes humilitatem ancillae suae: ecce enim ex hoc generationes—Parce qu'il a jeté les yeux sur la beatam me dicent omnes generationes—Because he bassesse de sa servante. (Luc. I, 48) looked on the lowliness of His servant” (Lk. 1:48). L'humilité de la Très Sainte Vierge ne peut The humility of the Most Blessed Virgin can in no nullement se comparer à l'acte d'humilité que fait way be compared to the act of humility the most l'ange très parfait devant Dieu. Sa condition de perfect angel makes before God. His natural nature étant très supérieure, il n'a pas autant raison condition being so superior, he does not have as de s'humilier, bien que lui aussi tienne de Dieu tout much reason to humiliate himself, even though he ce qu'il est. too possesses all that he is from God. Notons qu'il y a parmi les commentateurs du Let us note that there is a divergence among the Cantique de Marie une divergence sur la commentators on the Canticle of Mary concerning signification du terme ‘humilitas’. Les uns y voient the significance of the term “humilitas.” Some see, exprimée la condition de nature; les autres expressed in it the condition of nature; others l'entendent de la vertu d'humilité. Le texte grec du understand it as the virtue of humility. The Greek semble donner raison aux premiers, car text of the Magnificat seems to agree with the first ταπείνωσις signifie ‘abaissement’, tandis que group of commentators, because tapeinosis means a l'humilité proprement dite est signifiée par le terme “lowering,” while humility properly so called is ταπεινωφροσύνη.a Toutefois, ces opinions ne signified by the term tapeinophrosune.a However, s'excluent pas, au contraire, elles se complètent these opinions do not exclude one another; on the l'une l'autre. Marie reconnaît devant Dieu la contrary, they complement each other. Mary bassesse de sa condition, et c'est en cela même que recognizes the lowliness of her condition before consiste son acte de vertu d'humilité. Elle ne voit God, and it is in this that her act of the virtue of pas l'abaissement où elle se trouvait comme un état humility consists. She does not see the abasement contraire à sa dignité, comme une humiliation dont in which she finds herself as a state contrary to her on l'avait affligée et dont elle louerait le Seigneur dignity, a humiliation with which she is afflicted pour l'en avoir libérée. Voilà pourquoi l'acte and from which she praised the Lord for having d'humilité de la Servante du Seigneur atteint au delivered her. This is why the act of humility of the plus sublime: il atteint les deux extrémités de Servant of the Lord attains the highest sublimity: it l'univers. L'ange n'a pas en lui la substance qui attains the two extremes of the universe. The angel permettrait un acte aussi profond qui atteint d'un does not have within him the substance that would bout à l'autre. (Sap. VIII, 1) permit an act so profound, which “reaches from one end to the other” (Wis. 8:1). a Corneille de la Pierre, In Lucam, c. 1, vers. 48, au mot a Cornelius a Lapide, In Lucam, 1:48, on the word ‘humilitatem’, T. 16, p. 36; In Proverbia Salomonis, c. 'humilitatem,' t. 16, p. 36; In Proverbia Salomonis, 8:13, VIII, vers. 13. T. V, p. 210b. t. 5, p. 210b.

230 CHAPTER 22 QUIA RESPEXIT HUMILITATEM ANCILLAE SUAE (LK. 1:48)

Parce qu'il a jeté les yeux sur la bassesse Because He has looked on the lowliness of his servant. de sa servante. Parmi toutes les vertus, seule l'humilité s'ignore, et Among all the virtues, humility alone is not aware celui qui vanterait son humilité serait orgeuilleux. of itself; one who would boast of his humility Effacement total de soi, c'est en cela même que would be proud. Complete self-effacement—in this consiste son caractère à la fois radical et universel. consists its character, at the same time radical and Or, ne peut-on pas voir dans le Cantique de Marie universal. Now, can we not see in the Canticle of un enseignement et une exaltation de l'humilité? Mary a teaching on humility, and an exaltation of it Mais il nous faut bien remarquer que la Sainte as well? But we must carefully note that the Vierge ne glorifie pas l'humilité d'une manière Blessed Virgin does not glorify humility absolutely, absolue comme si l'exaltation de l'humilité était un as if the exaltation of humility were a debt founded dû fondé absolument sur cette vertu. La Sainte absolutely on this virtue. The Blessed Virgin refers Vierge s'en remet entièrement à la toute-puissance it completely to the omnipotence and mercy of the et la miséricorde du Seigneur: son âme magnifie le Lord: “her soul magnifies the Lord, and her spirit Seigneur, et son esprit est transporté de joie en exults in God her Savior, in the one who is Dieu son Sauveur, en Celui qui est puissant, et dont powerful, and whose name is holy, and whose le nom est saint, et dont la miséricorde s'étend mercy reaches from age to age” (Lk. 1:46-50). It is d'âge en âge. (Luc. 1,46-50) Ce n'est pas en elle- not in herself that she exalts humility, but in God, même qu'elle exalte l'humilité, mais en Dieu. Car il for it has now been given to the one who is “the fut maintenant donné à celle qui est la voie immaculate way” (Ps. 17:33), “the way God dug in immaculée (Ps. XVII, 33), la voie que Dieu a the desert” (Is. 13:19), “the holy way which is for creusée dans le désert (Is. XLIII, 19), la voie sainte us the straight way” (Is. 35:8), to understand the qui est pour nous la voie droite (Is. XXXV, 8), de hidden and truly divine ways of mercy. God has comprendre les voies cachées et proprement given her to know that she is “at the origin of all his divines de la miséricorde. Dieu lui a donné de ways” (Prov. 8:22): “Viam sapientiae monstrabo savoir qu'elle est au principe de toutes ses voies tibi—I will show you the way of Wisdom” (Prov. (Prov. VIII, 22): Viam sapientiae monstrabo tibi— 4:1). She who understood so perfectly that “all the Je vous montrerai la voie de la Sagesse. (Prov. IV, ways of the Lord are mercy” (Ps. 24:10), how could 11) Elle qui comprenait si parfaitement que toutes she have exalted humility in herself? It is for the les voies du Seigneur sont miséricorde (Ps. XXIV, Almighty to “exalt the humble” (Lk. 1:52), and for 10), comment aurait-elle pu exalter l'humilité en the humble to exalt humility only in the Almighty. elle-même? C'est au Tout-Puissant d'exalter les humbles (Luc. 1, 52), et les humbles n'exaltent l'humilité que dans le Tout-Puissant. Bien qu'elle ne soit pas la plus grande des vertus, Although it is not the greatest of the virtues, l'humilité n'en est pas moins en nous condition de humility is in us the condition for all the virtues: it toute vertu: elle rend malléable pour des perfections renders us malleable for superior perfections. It has supérieures. Elle a, par rapport aux autres vertus, the nature of maternity with respect to the other raison de maternité. La personne en qui cette vertu- virtues. The person in whom this mother-virtue was mère était la plus profonde a été choisie mère de the most profound was chosen to be the mother of Dieu. “La bienheureuse Vierge, dit Cajetan, God. “The Blessed Virgin,” says Cajetan, “reminds rappelle que le Seigneur a regardé son humilité us that the Lord regarded her humility as a comme une vertu universelle qui était le plus universal virtue that was the most broadly and largement et le plus profondément ouverte (patula) profoundly open (patula) to the reception of the à la réception de l'influence céleste de la largesse heavenly influence of the divine bounty.”a “He divins.”a “Il a regardé la bassesse de sa servante, dit regarded the lowliness of His servant,” says John of Jean de saint Thomas, c'est-à-dire que pour St. Thomas, “that is to say that to pour out a répandre une plénitude de grâce aussi grande que fullness of grace as vast as the Blessed Virgin celle qu'a reçue la Sainte Vierge, Dieu n'a pas received, God did not look at anything other than regardé autre chose que la profondeur de son the depth of her humility by which she had been

231 humilité par laquelle elle a été rendue capable de rendered capable of receiving, as in a very deep recevoir, comme dans une concavité très profonde, concavity, the immense grandeur of grace.”b It is la grandeur immense de la grâce.”b C'est l'humilité humility which is the truly freeing virtue, and qui est la vertu vraiment libératrice, et qui est au which is at the very foundation of the dignity to principe même de la dignité à laquelle Dieu a which God has deigned to call us. “Humility is like daigné nous appeler. “L'humilité est comme une a certain disposition for man’s free access to certaine disposition au libre accès de l'homme aux spiritual and divine goods.”c By her act of humility, biens spirituels et divins.”c Par son acte d'humilité, Mary completely divested herself, she liberated Marie s'est entièrement dépouillée d'elle-même, elle herself from herself in a total conversion to God. s'est libérée d'elle-même dans une conversion totale vers Dieu. a Cajetan, In IIam IIae, q. 161, a. 5, n. xxv: Unde beata a Cajetan, In IIamIIae, q. 161, a. 5, n. xxv. “Thus the Virgo humilitatem suam Dominum respexisse Blessed Virgin recalls that the Lord regarded her commemorat, tanquam universalem virtutem, quae ad humility, a sort of universal virtue, which was most supernum suscipiendum divinae largitatis influxum broadly and deeply opened to receiving the heavenly latissime ac profundissime patula erat. inflowing of the divine bounty and which bounty had flowed thereinto in the widest and deepest manner possible.” b Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Theol., T. VIII, d. 19, a. 6, n. b John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, t. 8, d. 19, a. 6, 27, p. 700a: Respexit humilitatem ancillae, quia videlicet n. 27, p. 700a. “He regarded the humility of his ... ad tantam plenitudinem gratiae infundendam, quanta handmaid, because… in infusing such a fullness of grace fuit in B. Virgine nihil aliud respexit Deus, quam as He did in the Blessed Virgin, God had regard for profunditatem humilitatis ejus, qua reddita est nothing else but the depth of her humility, by which she capacissima ad suscipiendam quasi in concavitate was made most capable for receiving, as into a vast maxima immensam gratiae magnitudinem. cavern, the immense magnitude of grace.” c S. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 161, a. 5, ad 4: Humilitas est c STh IIa IIae, q161 a5 ad4. “Humility is, as it were, a quasi quaedam dispositio ad liberum accessum hominis disposition to man's unrestricted access to spiritual and in spiritualia et divina bona. divine goods.”

CHAPTER 23 HUMILIAVIT SEMETIPSUM (PHIL. 2:8)

Il s'est humilié lui-même. He has humbled himself. Voici que vous concevrez dans votre sein. Dans sa “Behold, you will conceive in your womb” (Lk. parfait humilité, fondée sur la droite intelligence de 1:31). In her perfect humility, founded on the right sa condition humaine, Marie comprit l'humiliation understanding of her human condition, Mary à laquelle Dieu voulut se soumettre en elle. understood the humiliation to which God wanted to “Cependant, dit saint Bernard, de toutes les submit Himself in her. “However,” says St. infirmités ou de toutes les injures humaines qu'a Bernard, “of all the infirmities or of all the human subies pour nous la bonté divine, la première dans injuries that divine Goodness suffered for us, the l'ordre du temps et presque la plus grande par first in the order of time and almost the greatest rapport à son abaissement, c'est que sa majesté with respect to his abasement, is the fact that His infinie asouffert d'être conçue dans le sein d'une infinite majesty suffered to be conceived in the femme et d'y être renfermée durant l'espace de neuf womb of a woman and was enclosed there for nine mois. En effet, à quel moment Dieu s'est-il jamais months. Indeed, at what moment has God ever dépouillé de la sorte, ou quand l'a-t-on jamais vu se divested Himself in this manner, or when have we détourner aussi complètement de lui-même? Tout seen Him so completely turn away from Himself? ce temps, cette sagesse ne profère aucune parole, All this time, this wisdom utters no word, this cette puissance ne fait rien qui paraisse: cette power does nothing which becomes visible: this majesté enfermée et cachée ne se manifeste par enclosed and hidden majesty does not manifest aucun signe visible. Dieu n'a pas paru aussi faible itself by any visible sign. God did not appear as sur la croix où ce qu'il y avait de faible en lui s'est weak on the cross where that which was weak

232 montré tout à coup plus fort que ce qu'il y a de plus within Him suddenly appeared stronger than that puissant parmi tous les hommes: quand, mourant, il which is most powerful among men: when, dying, glorifie le larron, et, expirant, il inspire le He glorifies the thief, and, expiring, He inspires the centurion; sa confiance d'une heure excita la centurion; His confidence of an hour aroused the passion des créatures, et, ce qui est plus encore, passion of creatures, and what is more, submitted soumit ses ennemis à d'éternelles douleurs. Dans le His enemies to eternal grief. In the womb of his sein de sa mère, (Celui-Qui-Est) est comme s'il mother, (The One Who Is) is as if he were not: thus n'était pas: ainsi sommeille la toute-puissance sleeps the almighty as if he was impotent, and the comme si elle était impuissance, et le Verbe éternel eternal Word holds itself in silence.”a Yet, in this se retient dans le silence.”a Et pourtant, dans ce silence is hidden the most powerful manifestation silence est cachée la plus puissante manifestation of the Word: by this silence in the womb of the du Verbe: par ce silence dans le sein de la mère, le mother, the Word imitates at the same time in a Verbe imite en même temps d'une manière très very striking manner His silent procession in the éclatante sa procession silencieuse dans le sein du bosom of the Father. Père. a S. Bernard, In Annuntiatione Dominica, Sermo III, n. 4, a St. Bernard, In Annunciatione Domini, sermo III, n. 4, t. T. VII, p. 452a: Omnium tamen humanarum infirmitatum 7, p. 452a. “But of all the human infirmities and injuries vel injuriarum quas pro nobis pertulit divina dignatio, that the divine dignity bore for us, the first in time, and I sicut tempore primam, sic etiam humilitate fere think also nearly the greatest in humility, was that He maximum existimo, quod in utero concipi, in utero was conceived in a womb, in the womb for nine months novem mensium tempore majestas illa incircumscripta His majesty allowed itself to be contained. For where has passa est contineri. Ubi enim sic se exinanivit, aut He so emptied Himself, or when was He seen to have quando ita penitus a semetipso defecisse visus fuit? turned so completely away from Himself? For so long a Tanto tempore nihil illa sapientia loquitur, nihil illa virtus time that wisdom did not speak, that power showed no manifestum operatur: nullo signo visibili majestas quae works: the concealed majesty produced no visible sign. clausa latet, proditur. Non sic in cruce visus est infirmus, He did not appear so weak on the cross, where what was ubi quod infirmum ipsius fuit, statim apparuit fortius weak in Him suddenly appeared stronger than all the omnibus hominibus: quando et moriens glorificat power of men: when dying He glorified the thief, and latronem, et expirans inspirat Centurionem: quando breathing His last He breathed new life into the horarius dolor passionis ei non solum compati fecit Centurion: when the sorrow of the hour of His passion elementa creaturarum, sed etiam contrarias fortitudines not only made the created elements suffer with Him, but subigit aeternorum passioni dolorum. In utero autem sic also subjected the contrary powers to suffer eternal est quasi non sit: sic omnipotens virtus vacat, quasi nihil sorrow. But in the womb it was as if He were not: thus possit, et Verbum aeternum sub silentio se premit. the Almighty emptied His strength, as if it could do nothing, and the eternal Word kept Himself in silence.”

233 Chapters 21-23: Humility as the subjective recognition of human littleness

De Koninck begins the section on humility by comparing humility to mercy.

The phrase nigra sum sed formosa contains both mercy and humility, the two virtues that are in a way farthest removed from one another. Mercy is the virtue proper to

God as superior to all things, while humility is the most fundamental virtue for man.

But the bounty of the superior and the openness of the inferior are intrinsically connected. “‘The abyss of fullness calls upon the abyss of emptiness—Abyssus abyssum invocat’ (Ps. 41:8).”380 Not only does the mercy of God entail an aspect of self-emptying, but the humility of man is what opens the way for him to the heart of mercy. De Koninck will return to this point in Chapter 25, after considering the character of mercy in the intervening chapters.

But why should the virtue of humility be particularly human? All creatures are nothing before God, and the angels who are confirmed in goodness must certainly possess a fitting humility. “Quis ut Deus?” the Michael is said to have rhetorically asked. In respect of the divine term, humility in angels and in men is the same. But with respect to the subject of humility, there is a difference that springs from the difference of nature. As we saw above, it belongs to man, as a material being, to be subject to change and contingency. Because of his lowly nature, man lives in great uncertainty, and is powerless over many of the conditions of his own life. In comparison with that of the angels, man’s experience is marked by undergoing.

380 Ego Sapientia, 21.1.

234 In the face of this vulnerability, according to De Koninck, the first man and woman responded not with submission and trust but by grasping at the power which is proper to God. “For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:5). This sin is a properly human sin because it is the response to the particularly human condition of contingency. “Wanting to be oneself the cause of one's security, of one's confirmation in good: [is this not] the sin of pride? Eve desired this knowledge and did not have it. The Blessed Virgin has possessed it in her humility.”381

The second Eve, unlike the first, “does not see the abasement in which she finds herself as a state contrary to her dignity, a humiliation with which she is afflicted and from which she praised the Lord for having delivered her.”382 The virtue of humility in Mary is both a recognition and an embrace of the nature she has received from God in common with all men. It is her clear-sighted knowledge of the littleness of this nature, and her sinless receptivity toward the gift of her being that raises Mary’s humility above that of other men and of angels.

In Chapter 22 De Koninck considers the role of humility in man more directly. It is not the highest virtue, but rather the foundation of all virtues for man because it opens him to what is above. Man’s very being is eccentric, flowing from

God and ordered to God. The disordered preference for what is from man himself closes him to the very source of his own being and perfection. Closed off and turned in on himself in this way, man returns to the nothingness that he would be from

381 “Mercy and Redemption.” “Vouloir être soi-même la cause de sa sécurité, de sa confirmation dans le bien: péché d’orgueil ? Eve a désiré cette science et ne l’a pas eue. La Sainte Vierge l’a eue dans son humilité.” 382 Ego Sapientia, 21.3.

235 himself.383 Humility opens the way to the love of the common good as common, because the latter presupposes a recognition that man is not the highest or best thing, even for himself.

In this way, humility is totally self-effacing. While it is occasioned by the great dignity that Mary received at the Annunciation—“from now on all generations will call me blessed” (Lk. 1:48)—the Canticle of Mary is centered on the divine mercy whose gift that dignity is. The whole canticle demonstrates how the self-knowledge of humility makes the power of mercy visible.384 Mary knows, through the testimony of the angel, “that she is at the origin of all his ways.”385 But because of her humility,

Mary can see this strange happening for what it is, a union of the highest with the lowest, a sheer gratuitous manifestation of love. She can see that “all the ways of the

Lord are mercy (Ps. 24:10).”386

In her humble knowledge of the blackness of human nature, Mary not only sees that the gift of God is due rather to mercy than to anything intrinsic to human nature; she also sees the depth of humiliation God embraces in uniting Himself to that nature. This is the aspect of humility to which De Koninck draws attention in

Chapter 23. In the discussion of the objective blackness of human nature, we saw that the mercy of God is supremely manifested by raising man to supernatural life by an Incarnation through nativity. Such a procession from within the world raises creation to a level otherwise unthinkable. A material creature is the principle of God,

383 “In effect, the being which things would hold from themselves would be nothingness” (Ego Sapientia, 10.2). 384 “The Blessed Virgin reminds us that the Lord regarded her humility as a universal virtue that was the most broadly and profoundly open (patula) to the reception of the heavenly influence of the divine bounty” (Cajetan, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 22.2). 385 Ego Sapientia, 22.1. 386 Ego Sapientia, 22.1.

236 and that through the very materiality of her nature, by giving birth to Him. The correlative aspect of this mystery is the depth to which God in His love bends down in allowing Himself to be born.387

To be formed in the womb, St. Bernard argues, is the greatest abasement God undergoes—even greater in a way than that of the Cross. In the womb, Christ is wholly passive, and not only passive, but unknown. 388 “In the womb of his mother,

(The One Who Is) is as if he were not: thus sleeps the almighty as if he was impotent, and the eternal Word holds itself in silence.”389 It is the humility of Mary that is able to perceive this event for what it is, and so to sense the love that such a free turning away from Himself represents, the degree of mercy it shows forth. In this way, the very hiddenness of the womb becomes the moment of revelation. “[I]n this silence is hidden the most powerful manifestation of the Word: by this silence in the womb of the mother, the Word imitates at the same time in a very striking manner His silent

387 “Mercy and Redemption.” “He is near us: because he comes among us, as low as we are; because he has become visible and tangible. He comes to reunite us to the principle of all certitude: we are able to touch it. He came to be united to us in our condition by taking a true body. This is a very great mercy. And we know this ... He did not come to join us because it is glorious to have a body, but it is glorious that He did so because glory is in the exaltation following this abasement, this condescension. It is not because of a hidden dignity of our nature, but because of the merciful elevation of our nature that one can speak of exaltation.” “Il est près de nous : parce qu’il vient parmi nous, si bas que nous soyons ; parce qu’il est devenu visible et tangible. Il vient nous rejoindre au principe de toute certitude : nous pouvons le toucher. Il est venu nous rejoindre dans notre condition en prenant un corps véritable. C’est là une très grande miséricorde. Et nous savons cela… Il n’est pas venu nous rejoindre parce que c’est glorieux d’avoir un corps, mais c’est glorieux qu’il l’ait fait parce que la gloire est dans l’exaltation qui suit cet abaissement, cette condescendance. Ce n’est pas en raison de la dignité cachée de notre nature, mais en raison de l’élévation miséricordieuse de notre nature qu’on peut parler d’exaltation.” 388 “Indeed, at what moment has God ever divested Himself in this manner, or when have we seen Him so completely turn away from Himself? All this time, this wisdom utters no word, this power does nothing which becomes visible: this enclosed and hidden majesty does not manifest itself by any visible sign” (St. Bernard, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 23.1). 389 St. Bernard, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 23.1.

237 procession in the bosom of the Father.”390 At that moment, known by no one but

Mary, God extended into creation the eternal procession of the Son.

390 Ego Sapientia, 23.1.

238 CHAPTER 24 UBI HUMILITAS, IBI SAPIENTIA (PROV. 11:2)

Là où est l'humilité, là est la sagesse. Where there is humility, there is wisdom. Ubi humilitas, ibi Sapientia — Où est l'humilité, là “Ubi humilitas, ibi Sapientia—Where there is est la sagesse. (Prov. XI,2) “Cette proposition, dit humility, there is wisdom” (Prov. 11:2). “This saint Albert, est en théologie une proposition proposition,” says St. Albert, “is a self-evident connue par soi: donc, plus grande est l'humilité, proposition in theology: Therefore, the greater the plus grande est la sagesse, et là où il y a humilité humility, the greater the wisdom, and where there parfaite, il y a sagesse parfaite. Or, chez la Sainte is perfect humility, there is perfect wisdom. Now, Vierge, l'humilité a été incommensurable; donc, sa in the Blessed Virgin, humility was sagesse est incommensurable. La mineure est incommensurable; therefore, her wisdom is rendue évidente par ce passage de l'Evangile: Celui incommensurable. The minor is rendered evident qui s'humilie sera exalté. (Matth. XXIII,12; Luc. by this passage in the Gospel: “The one who XIV,11) Cette proposition est également une humbles himself will be exalted” (Mt. 23:12; Lk. proposition connue par soi: donc, celui qui est 14: 11). This proposition is equally self-evident: exalté au-dessus des autres créatures d'une manière therefore, the one who is exalted above other incommensurable, apparaît du coup creatures in an incommensurable manner is shown incommensurablement plus humble qu'elles; or, to be incommensurably more humble than they. exaltée au-dessus de tous les choeurs des Anges Now, according to St. Jerome, the Blessed Virgin, jusqu'à la quatrième hiérarchie, la Bienheureuse who is exalted above all the choirs of Angels even Vierge, selon saint Jérôme, s'élève to the fourth hierarchy, is elevated incommensurablement au-dessus des autres incommensurably above other creatures; therefore, créatures: donc, elle a été la plus humble parmi les she was the most humble among men and angels. hommes et les anges: donc, elle les dépasse tous en Therefore, she surpasses all in wisdom.”a sagesse.”a L'humilité touche à la racine même qu'est la Humility touches the very root that is mercy. For miséricorde. La miséricorde, en effet, regarde mercy looks at the inferior as such. Now, “God l'inférieur comme tel. Or, Dieu résiste aux resists the proud, and gives grace to the humble— orgueilleux, et il accorde sa grâce aux humbles — Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam” (James 4:6; Prov. 3:34). Mercy only gratiam. (Jac. IV,6; Prov. III, 34) La miséricorde ne lavishes its bounty over the inferior who recognizes répand ses largesses que sur l'inférieur qui se himself as such, and the more inferior he is, the reconnaît tel, et plus il sera inférieur, plus il aura more reason he has to humble himself. But, this raison de s'humilier. Mais cette humilité ne sera humility will only be fertile if it is rooted in a féconde que si elle est enracinée dans une knowledge wherein we see at the same time how connaissance où l'on voit en même temps combien we are not, and how powerful is the One who is nous ne sommes pas et combien est puissant celui Lord. The very great humility of the Blessed Virgin qui est le Seigneur. La très grande humilité de la must rest on faith in the omnipotence of God. “Et Sainte Vierge doit s'appuyer sur la foi dans la toute- beata, quae crededisti, quoniam perficientur ea, puissance de Dieu. Et beata, quae credidisti, quae dicta sunt tibi a Domino—Happy is she who quoniam perficientur ea, quae dicta sunt tibi a believed!” cries St. Elizabeth, “for the promises Domino — Heureuse celle qui a cru! s'écrie sainte made her by the Lord will be fulfilled” (Lk. 1:45). Elisabeth, car elles seront accomplies les choses qui lui ont été dites de la part du Seigneur! (Luc. I, 45) a S. Albert, Mariale, q. 63, p. 119a: Ubi humilitas, ibi a St. Albert, Mariale, q. 63, p. 119a. “‘Where there is sapientia. Prov. XI, 2. Haec propositio, est per se in humility, there too is wisdom’ (Prov. 9:2). This theologia: ergo ubi major humilitas, ibi major est proposition is self-evident in theology. Therefore, sapientia: ubi summa, ibi summa. Sed in beatissima where humility is greater, there wisdom is greater; Virgine improportionabilis fuit humilitas: ergo and where perfect, there perfect. But in the most improportionabilis sapientia. Minor patet in Evangelio, blessed Virgin there was humility beyond all

239 ubi dicitur: Qui se humiliat exaltabitur. Quae similiter est proportion: therefore, there was also wisdom beyond per se: ergo qui improportionabiliter aliis exaltatur, etiam all proportion. The minor premise is shown in the aliis improportionabiliter demonstratur humilis: sed Gospel where it is said: ‘He who humbles himself will beatissima Virgo super omnes choros Angelorum in be exalted.’ This is likewise self-evident: therefore, the quartam hierarchiam secundum Hieronymum exaltata, one who is exalted above others disproportionately is improportionabiliter aliis ascendit: ergo omnium shown also to be disproportionately humbler than all hominum et Angelorum humillima fuit: ergo et omnes in others. But the most blessed Virgin, who according to sapientia transcendit. Jerome is exalted above all the choirs of angels, even to the fourth heirarchy, ascends above all others surpassing all proportion. Therefore, she is the most humble of all men and angels. And therefore, she transcends all in wisdom.”

CHAPTER 25 DOMINUS TECUM (LK. 1:28)

Le Puissant est avec vous. The Mighty One is with you. Le Seigneur est avec vous (Luc. I, 28), c'est-à-dire “The Lord is with you” (Lk. 1:28), that is to say, le Tout-Puissant, celui qui est purement et the Almighty, the One who is purely and simply simplement Seigneur. Celui devant lequel Marie Lord. The One before whom Mary humbles herself s'humilie est en même temps celui qui peut faire les is at the same time the One who can do the most choses les plus étonnantes. " ... parce que c'est la foi astonishing things. “…because it is faith that best qui dispose le mieux à consentir aux choses disposes to consent to marvelous things, and merveilleuses, et surtout la foi en la toute- especially faith in omnipotence: and because the puissance: et parce que celui qui croit et se one who believes and is convinced that God can do convainc que Dieu peut faire toutes choses, admet all things admits that He can also change natures qu'Il peut aussi changer les natures et leur and command them. So that, since what was here commander. De sorte que, comme c'est la chose la announced to the Blessed Virgin was a most plus inattendue des choses inattendues (omnium unexpected thing of all unexpected things (omnium novorum novissimum) qui est ici annoncée à la novorum novissimum), it is most fitting Bienheureuse Vierge, c'est de toute convenance (congruentissime) that here is employed the name (congruentissime) qu'est employé ici le nom de of the Lord, which denotes in an absolute manner Seigneur, qui désigne de manière absolue la toute- the omnipotence of God.”a The faith of the Servant puissance de Dieu.”a La foi de la Servante dans la in the Almighty had to be greater in the same Toute-Puissance devait être d'autant plus grande proportion as there was question of elevating a qu'il s'agissait d'élever une nature plus humble dans nature more humble in its condition of nature. St. sa condition de nature. “O Vierge, s'écrie saint Bernard cries out: “O Virgin, sublime palm, you Bernard, rameau sublime, vous vous élevez jusqu'à elevate yourself to the highest peak of holiness, to la cime la plus sainte, jusqu'à Celui qui est assis sur the One who is seated on the throne, to the majesty le trône, jusqu'à la majesté du Seigneur même! Et of the Lord Himself! And why would this astonish pourquoi s'en étonnerait-on, quand vous enfouissez us, when you bury so high (in altum) the roots of si haut (in altum)391 les racines de l'humilité.b O humility.”b “O humility, by which the woman humilité, par laquelle la femme est devenue mère became the mother of God, by which God de Dieu, par laquelle Dieu est descendu du ciel sur descended from heaven to earth, by which souls la terre, par laquelle les âmes ont été transportées were transported from the places of torment to des enfers au ciel. Voilà l'échelle que Dieu vous heaven. There is the ladder God proposes to you propose et par laquelle on monte de la terre au ciel. and by which one climbs from the earth to heaven (Gen. XXVIII, 12) C'est par cette échelle que nos (Gen. 28:12). It is by this ladder that our fathers pères sont montés aux cieux, et c'est par elle aussi ascended to heaven, and it is also by it that we must

391 ‘Altum’ can mean either deep or high, while ‘haut’ is unambiguous. Bernard may have intended the more obvious sense of “buried so deep,” but De Koninck, at any rate, clearly wishes to capitalize on the ambiguity of the term to highlight the paradox of the mystery of elevation in lowliness.

240 qu'il nous faut y monter, autrement nous n'y ascend, for otherwise we will not ascend.”c monterons pas.”c Seul l'abime d'humilité peut envelopper l'Infini sans Only the abyss of humility can envelop the Infinite le borner et être dans le monde une inébranlable without confining Him, and can be in the world an fondation pour l'Immuable. “Si (la Sagesse) a été unshakable foundation for the Immutable. “If conçue de toute éternité, se demande saint (Wisdom) was conceived from all eternity,” St. Bonaventure, comment a-t-elle pu, après plusieurs Bonaventure asks himself, “how can it, after many siècles, prendre naissance de la Vierge Marie? Si, centuries, take birth in the Virgin Mary? If, indeed, en effet, elle était éternelle, elle était donc it was eternal, it was therefore immutable, and immuable, donc elle ne pouvait être embrassée could not therefore be encompassed (incomprehensibilis), donc elle ne pouvait être (incomprehensibilis), and could not therefore be circonscrite (interminabilis). Comment donc, ne circumscribed (interminabilis). How, then, not pouvant être circonscrite, a-t-elle pu être renfermée being able to be circumscribed, could it be enclosed dans le sein d'une jeune fille? Comment, étant sans in the womb of a young girl? How, being without limite possible, a-t-elle pu être conçue d’une petite possible limits, was it conceived by a little girl? fille? Comment, étant immuable, a-t-elle pu être How, being immutable, was it conceived by a conçue d'une enfant fragile et délicate? Et pourtant, fragile and delicate child? And yet, it is indeed such c'est bien une telle Sagesse, et aussi grande, que la and so great a Wisdom which the Virgin conceived Vierge a conçue, selon le témoignage angélique. according to the angelic attestation. At the Au début de saint Luc, l'Ange dit à la Vierge: Voici beginning of St. Luke, the Angel tells the Virgin: que vous concevrez dans votre sein et que vous ‘Behold! You will conceive in your womb, and you enfanterez un Fils, etc.; ensuite il décrit ce Fils: will give birth to a Son,’ etc.; and he then describes Celui-ci sera grand, à savoir par son infinité; et that Son: ‘He will be great,’ namely by His infinity; sera appelé le Fils du Très-Haut, à cause de ‘and He will be called the son of the Most High,’ l'immutabilité de son essence; et son règne n'aura because of the immutability of His essence; ‘and pas de fin, parce qu'il ne peut être limité. Aussi, la His reign will have no end,’ because He cannot be Majesté divine, dans cette conception, est-elle limited. Also, the divine Majesty is, in this humiliée d'une façon étonnante, et l'humilité conception, humbled in an astonishing manner, and virginale exaltée d'une façon admirable.”d C'est the virginal humility exalted in an admirable way.”d pourquoi Bernard s'écrie: “Admirez ces deux This is why St. Bernard cries out: “Admire these choses, et dites-moi ce dont il faut le plus s'étonner, two things, and tell me which should most astonish de la faveur très bienveillante du Fils, ou de la us, the most benevolent favor of the Son, or the dignité très excellente de la Mère! De part et d'autre most excellent dignity of the Mother! On the one on est stupéfié, de part et d'autre on touche au side as well as on the other we are stupefied, on one miracle; et que Dieu soit soumis à une femme, c'est side or the other we touch upon a miracle; and that d'une humilité sans exemple; et qu'une femme God should be subordinated to a woman, that is commande à Dieu, c'est d'une sublimité sans humility without example; and that a woman égale.”e command God, that is sublime without equal.”e a S. Albert, Mariale, q. 165, p. 247b: quia ad a St. Albert, Mariale, q. 165, p. 247b. “because faith consentiendum in mirabilia maxime disponit fides, et disposes to consenting to the greatest wonders, and the maxime fides de omnipotentia: quia qui credit et advertit greatest faith to omnipotence: because he who believes Deum omnia posse facere, acquiescit ipsum posse and recognizes that God can do all things, admits that He naturas mutare, et naturis imperare. Unde cum hic is able to alter natures, and to command them. So, since omnium novorum novissimum nuntietur beatissimae what was announced to the most blessed Virgin was of Virgini... all unexpected things the most unexpected…” b S. Bernard, In Adventu Domini, Sermo II, T. II, p. 571b: b St. Bernard, In Adventu Domini, sermo II, t. 2, p. 571b. O Virgo, virga sublimis, in quam sublime verticem “O Virgin, sublime branch, to what sublime peaks of sanctum erigis! usque ad sedentem in throno, usque ad holiness you ascend! to the One sitting on the throne, to Dominum majestatis. Neque enim id mirum quoniam in the Lord of majesty. But it is not extraordinary seeing altum mittis radices humilitatis. that you sent the roots of humility into the heights [depths].” c S. Bernard, Tractatus de statu virtutum, Ia Pars, c. 13, c St. Bernard, Tractatus de statu virtutum, Ia, c. 13, t. 6, T. VI, p. 314a: O humilitas, per quam femina mater Dei p. 314a. “O humility, through which a woman was made effecta est, per quam Deus de coelo descendit ad terras, the mother of God, through which God came down to per quam animae de ad coelum translatae sunt. earth from the heavens, through which souls are carried

241 Haec est scala proposita vobis a Deo, per quam from the inferno into the heavens. This is the ladder ascenditur de terris ad coelum. Per hanc ascenderunt proposed to you by God, by which one climbs from earth patres nostri, per hanc et nos ascendere oportet, alioquin to heaven. Our fathers ascended by it, and it is necessary non ascendemus. for us too to ascend by it, or else we do not ascend.” d S. Bonaventure, De Annuntiatione B.V.M., Sermo II, d St. Bonaventure, De Annuntiatione B.V.M., sermon II, Opera Omnia (Quaracchi), T. IX, p. 664a: Si ab aeterno Opera Omnia (Quaracchi), t. 9, p. 664a. “If He had been fuit concepta, quomodo concipi potuit in fine saeculurum conceived from eternity, how could He have been a Virgine Maria? Si enim aeterna erat, ergo immutabilis, conceived at the end of the ages by the Virgin Mary? For ergo incomprehensibilis, ergo interminabilis. Quomodo if He was eternal, He was therefore unchangeable, ergo Interminabilis concipi potuit a juvencula? therefore unable to be comprehended, and therefore Quomodo Incomprehensibilis a parvula? Quomodo without limit. So how could the Unlimited be conceived Immutabilis a fragili et tenella? Et tamen talem et tantum by a young woman? How the Incomprehensible by a concepit, secundum testimonium angelicum; Lucae little girl? How the Immutable by one who is fragile and primo (vers. 31 sqq.), inquit Angelus ad Virginem: Ecce, delicate? But such and so great a one she did conceive, concipies in utero et paries Filium, etc.; et post describit according to the testimony of the angel; at the beginning eum: Hic erit Magnus, scilicet incomprehensione; et of Luke (verse 31 ff.), the Angel says to the Virgin: ‘See, Filius Altissimi vocabitur, suae essentiae immutabilitate; you will conceive in your womb and bear a Son,’ etc.; et regni ejus non erit finis, sua interminabilitate. Unde in and afterward he describes Him: ‘He will be Great,’ that hoc conceptu est divina Majestas mirabiliter humiliata, et is, incomprehensible; ‘and He will be called the Son of virginalis humilitas mirabiliter exaltata. the Most High,’ because of His immutable essence; ‘and there will be no end of His reign,’ because He is without end. Thus, in this conception the divine Majesty is wondrously humbled, and the virginal humility wondrously exalted.” e S. Bernard, Super Missus est, hom. I, n. 7, T. II, p. e St. Bernard, Super Missus est, hom. I, n. 7, t. 2, p. 591b. 591b: Mirare ergo utrumlibet, et elige quid amplius “Wonder, therefore, at either one, and choose which you mireris, sive Filii benignissimam dignationem, sive will wonder at more, whether at the most gracious Matris excellentissimam dignitatem. Utrinque stupor, dignity of the Son or at the most excellent dignity of the utrinque miraculum. Et quod Deus feminae obtemperet, Mother. Each one astonishes, each one is a miracle. That humilitas absque exemplo; et quod Deo femina God should obey a woman, this is humility without principetur, sublimitas sine socio. precedent; and that a woman should rule over God, this is sublimity without like.”

Hom. II, n. 9, p. 597b: Porro ibi agnoscitur longitudo Hom. II, n. 9, p. 597b. “But there is recognized length brevis, latitudo angusta, altitudo subdita, profunditas shortened, breadth narrowed, height subdued, depth plena. Ibi agnoscitur lux non lucens, verbum infans, aqua filled. There is recognized light not shining, a speechless sitiens, panis esuriens. Videas, si attendas, potentiam word, water thirsting, bread hungry. You will see, if you regi, sapientiam instrui, virtutem sustentari; Deum attend, power ruled, wisdom taught, strength sustained; denique lactantem, sed angelos reficientem; vagientem, and finally God nursing, but refreshing angels; crying, sed miseros consolantem. Videas, si attendas, tristari but consoling the miserable. You will see, if you look, laetitiam, pavere fiduciam, salutem pati, vitam mori, joy sorrowing, trust fearing, health suffering, life dying, fortitudinem infirmari. Sed, quod non minus mirandum strength made weak. But, what is not less to be wondered est, ipsa ibi cernitur tristitia laetificans, pavor confortans, at, there she is discerned, a sadness giving joy, fear passio salvans, mors vivificans, infirmitas roborans. Cui comforting, vulnerability making safe, death giving life, jam illud quoque non occurrat, quod quaerebam? weakness making strong. To whom now does it not Numquid non facile tibi est inter haec feminam appear, that which I was seeking? Is it not easy for you to agnoscere virum circumdantem, cum Mariam videas recognize among these things a woman enveloping a virum approbatum a Deo Jesum suo utero man, since you see Mary enveloping Jesus, the man circumplectentem? approved by God, in her womb?”

242 Chapters 24-25: Humility as the subjective recognition of the divine power

De Koninck begins Chapter 24 with an argument from the Mariale showing that Mary, the most exalted creature, is also the humblest, and therefore the wisest.392 Although the exaltation that follows humility flows from divine mercy, rather than from humility itself, there is a sense in which humility already contains the height together with the depth. Humility is not merely a recognition of one’s own poverty—such a partial perspective could lead to despair. Even more essential to it is the recognition of the divine fullness. Humility is centered not on oneself, or even on one’s poverty but on the goodness of God; it is like wisdom because it sees all things, even the least, contained in their root. Because humility opens the mind to see mercy, it leads directly to wisdom. Moreover, it attracts mercy itself. God only raises up those who desire to be raised up, who realize their dependence on God.

The kind of humility that calls out to mercy is a humility enlightened by the recognition of God’s power to carry out what He has promised. Faith is therefore essential to humility.

The nature of Mary’s faith was fittingly signified by the words the angel spoke to her at the Annunciation, De Koninck points out in Chapter 25. The angel said to her, “‘The Lord is with you’ (Lk. 1:28), that is to say, the Almighty, the One who is purely and simply Lord. The One before whom Mary humbles herself is at the

392 De Koninck, following pseudo-Albert, writes that both of the following propositions are self- evident for theology: that wisdom is found with humility, and that one who humbles himself will be exalted. The first principles of reason are self-evident because they are known to us immediately through themselves. This certainly cannot be the sense in which the propositions regarding humility, the latter in particular, can be called self-evident. Rather, in light of the whole body of Revelation, it cannot be doubted that these principles govern the whole of the divine economy. The Canticle of Mary gives voice to what could already be called the bedrock theme of the entire Old Testament.

243 same time the One who can do the most astonishing things.”393 At that moment, God proposed to do something that at the same time is a work proper to omnipotence, manifesting transcendent love: omnipotence because only one who can command natures could do what He proposed to do in Mary, and love because such an act could never have been owed or anticipated. It was purely and radically a gift, “the most unexpected thing of all unexpected things (omnium novorum novissimum).”394

It is in this sense that humility already contains within itself both the height and the depth, because by its two terms it holds together the nothingness of the creature and the superabundance of divine good.395

Nevertheless, the true formositas found in the nigra sum of Mary’s humility is not Mary’s faith itself, high as that faith reaches, but the response of divine mercy.

This is the real point of Mary’s Magnificat: “For the Mighty One,” she says, “has done great things for me” (Lk. 1:49). Mary’s humility opens her up to receive the divine gift. Her humility is like a vessel, and because it is total in the sense that it contains no reservations either through pride or doubt in the divine power, it can in a sense receive even the infinite. “Only the abyss of humility can envelop the Infinite without confining Him.”396 The humility of Mary, through her Fiat, becomes a cause of the

Incarnation—a gift infinite in worth, because it is the gift of a divine Person. The dignity and beauty that is given to Mary through her perfect humility is so great that the wonder we experience in seeing this elevation is like the wonder we experience

393 Ego Sapientia, 15.1. 394 Pseudo-Albert, quoted in Ego Sapientia xv, 1. 395 “O Virgin, sublime palm, you elevate yourself to the highest peak of holiness, to the One who is seated on the throne, to the majesty of the Lord Himself! And why would this astonish us, when you bury so high (in altum) the roots of humility” (St. Bernard, quoted in Ego Sapientia 15.1). 396 Ego Sapientia, 15.2.

244 in gazing at the merciful humility of Christ. “Admire these two things, and tell me which should most astonish us… On the one side as well as on the other we are stupefied.”397

Chapters 26-30: The Nigra Sum as Applied to Sin

De Koninck has been describing mercy as regarding a defect in being of any kind. Even creation is a work of mercy inasmuch as it is totally gratuitous, an unmerited outpouring of the fullness of Being in God to that which of itself is not.

Even the gift of supernatural life to man, which is accomplished in the most extraordinary way when a human being becomes the Mother of God, is the free elevation of something that is already good, of a nature created by God. Now we turn to the most proper object of mercy, which is sin. While “all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth” (Ps. 25:10), De Koninck noted in Chapter 18 that it would be defect

“insofar as it has the account of misery, which would be the motive of the plentitude of mercy, of mercy victorious over evil.”398 It is therefore in conquering sin that the greatest manifestation of mercy, and hence the strongest sense of nigra sum sed formosa will appear.

397 Ego Sapientia, 15.2. 398 Ego Sapientia, 18.2.

245 CHAPTER 26 FELIX CULPA! (EXULTET OF THE EASTER VIGIL)

Heureuse faute! Happy fault! Nigra sum, sed formosa. En fait, la miséricorde Nigra sum, sed formosa. In fact, mercy manifested s'est manifestée même au-delà de la seule itself even beyond the assumption of human nature assomption de la nature humaine par voie de by means of birth. Man, whom God had established naissance. L'homme, que Dieu avait établi dans in a state of original justice infinitely superior to all l'état de justice originelle infiniment supérieur à that could belong to him by nature, had succumbed tout ce qui lui peut convenir par nature, avait to the temptation of being himself the origin of the succombé à la tentation d'être lui-même l'origine de dignity to which God deigned to elevate him. “Et la dignité à laquelle Dieu daigna l'élever. Et homo homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit: cum in honore esset, non intellexit: comparatus est comparatus est jumentis insipientibus, et similis jumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis—Et factus est illis—And man, while he was in his l'homme, alors qu'il était dans la splendeur, n'a pas splendor, did not understand: he became compris: il est devenu comparable aux bêtes comparable to the stupid beasts, and he became like stupides, et il leur est devenu semblable. (Ps. them” (Ps. 48:13,21). By original sin, human nature XLVIII, 13, 21) Par le péché originel, cette nature became vulnerable. We are born in a state of humaine est devenue passible. Nous naissons dans misery properly speaking. “Ecce enim in un état de misère proprement dite. Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum: et in peccatis concepit iniquitatibus conceptus sum: et in peccatis concepit me mater mea—Behold I was born in iniquity and me mater mea—Voici que je suis né dans l'iniquité, my mother conceived me in sin” (Ps. 50:7). et ma mère m'a conçu dans le péché. (Ps. L,7) Or, le péché n'est pas un défaut quelconque: il est Now sin is not just any kind of fault: it is that fault cela même qui est le plus éloigné de Dieu. Le mal which is furthest from God. Evil properly speaking proprement dit n'est pas simple privation, il est is not simple privation, it is opposed to good as a opposé au bien comme un contraire. Par contrary. Consequently, the mercy which will come conséquent, la miséricorde qui fera face au mal, qui face to face with evil, which will be victorious over sera victorieuse du mal, sera aussi, en un sens, la evil, will also be, in a sense, the greatest possible. plus grande possible. La manifestation de la toute- The manifestation of the divine omnipotence will puissance divine fera, ici, dans l'univers même, make here, within the universe itself, a sort of comme un retour à soi: elle sera comme la return to itself: it will be like the plentitude of plénitude de la miséricorde. Le mal (malum mercy. Evil (malum poenae) was ordered to the poenae) a été ordonné à la plus grande greatest manifestation of mercy conceivable. “O manifestation de miséricorde qui se puisse felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere concevoir. O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum Redemptorem — O happy fault which merited for meruit habere Redemptorem! — O heureuse faute us such and so great a Redeemer” (Office of Holy qui nous a valu un tel et si grand Rédempteur. Saturday). (Office du Samedi Saint) Si, selon la puissance ordinaire de Dieu, seul If, according to the ordinary power of God, man l'homme pouvait être racheté, cela ne tient-il pas à alone could be redeemed, is this not due to the very l'imperfection même de notre intelligence, laquelle imperfection of our intelligence, which is also the était aussi racine de la contrariété des deux natures? root of the contrariety of the two natures? The L'ange déchu, au contraire, était aussitôt obstiné et fallen angel, on the contrary, was immediately confirmé dans le mal. C'est que l'intelligence obstinate and confirmed in evil. This is because angélique est si parfaite qu'elle saisit sans angelic intelligence is so perfect that it grasps composition ni division et sans discours, tout ce without composition and division and without que nous connaissons par la simple appréhension, discourse all that we know by simple apprehension, par l'intelligence des principes et par une science by the understanding of principles and by a science très difficile à acquérir: elle saisit son objet d'une very difficult to acquire: it grasps its object in an manière immuable, et l'adhésion de la volonté, elle immutable manner, and the adhesion of the will is aussi, est fixe et immuable. L'homme est par also fixed and immutable. Man is as a consequence

246 conséquent plus ouvert à la miséricorde par son more open to mercy by his very imperfection. The imperfection même. Le libre arbitre de l'homme free will of man remains as flexible after choice as demeure flexible tant après l'élection qu'avant cette it was before this choice; on the contrary, the free élection; celui de l'ange, au contraire, flexible avant will of the angel, flexible before the choice, l'élection, devient, après cette élection, becomes, after this choice, immutably fixed.a immuablement fixé.a a S. Thomas, Ia Pars, q. 64, a. 2, c.; Q.D. de Malo, q. a STh Ia, q64 a2 co.; Q.D. de Malo, q16 a5. XVI, a. 5.

247 Chapter 26: Mercy in Relation to Evil

“Evil properly speaking is not simple privation, it is opposed to good as a contrary.”399 To be turned against God, and also to suffer the corruption of the natural good that follows from severing oneself from the source of being and good, is to be black in a much deeper way than simply to be a little one. But it is from deep within this darkness that the light appears most powerfully. “The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it” (Jn. 1:5). “The manifestation of the divine omnipotence will make here, within the universe itself, a sort of return to itself: it will be like the plentitude of mercy.”400 Now, creation demands an infinite power, and in this way it already properly manifests the divine omnipotence as well as the divine generosity. In what sense then is there a “return” only in the mercy that conquers sin?

In the encyclical on divine mercy discussed above, John Paul II observes that it is really in the face of suffering that the mystery of the Father and His love fully appears. In the face of evil, the divine love shows itself as paternal in a particular way, by its faithfulness and solicitude, by binding itself freely to man. This revelation of the Father and His love is the return that divine omnipotence makes on itself in mercy. On the one hand, “it is precisely because sin exists in the world, which ‘God so loved...that he gave his only Son,’ that God, who ‘is love,’ cannot reveal Himself otherwise than as mercy.” 401 But on the other hand, it is precisely by being merciful to the greatest possible extent that the love of God makes itself fully known.

399 Ego Sapientia, 26.2. 400 Ego Sapientia, 26.2. 401 Dives in Misericordia, 13.

248 CHAPTER 27 QUID MIHI ET TIBI EST, MULIER? (JN. 2:4)

Femme, qu'est-ce que cela pour moi et Woman, what is that to me and to you? vous? Le miséricordieux prend sur soi la misère d'autrui The one who is merciful takes upon himself the comme si elle était la sienne propre. Or, cela peut misery of others as if it were his own. Now this can se faire de deux manières. On peut prendre sur soi be done in two ways. One can take to himself the la misère d'autrui selon une union d'affection. C'est misery of others by way of a union of affection. It ainsi que nous souffrons du mal qui afflige l'ami is thus that we suffer from the evil that afflicts a comme si ce mal nous affligeait nous-mêmes. Mais friend, as if it afflicted us. But one can also take on peut aussi prendre sur soi la misère d'autrui upon himself the misery of others according to a selon une union réelle en subissant cette misère de real union, in suffering the misery in the way it la manière dont elle affecte l'objet de compassion. affects the object of compassion. It is thus that man C'est ainsi qu'un homme peut s'exposer à la maladie can expose himself to sickness in order to console en vue de soulager ou de guérir la maladie de son or to cure the sickness of his neighbor. But this prochain. Mais cela même suppose une proximité, supposes a proximity, a similitude of nature such as une similitude de nature telle, qu'elle permette de allows the taking upon oneself, in a physical prendre ainsi sur soi, d'une manière physique, la manner, the misery of others.a In this way there is misère d'autrui.a Il s'accomplit de cette manière une accomplished a real union in misery. Now, God union réelle dans la misère. Or, Dieu a assumé la assumed a human nature with its liability, taking nature humaine avec sa passibilité, prenant ainsi sur upon Himself our misery in the way it affects us, soi notre misère de la manière dont elle nous that is to say, physically; assuming in this way evil affecte, c'est-à-dire physiquement; assumant par là (malum poenae)—a darkness infinitely more le mal (malum poenae)—une noirceur infiniment profound than the one which was owing to us by plus profonde que celle qui nous revenait par nature: the most profound God could have nature: la plus profonde que Dieu pouvait assumer. assumed. “Although He was in the form of God, He Bien qu'il fût dans la forme de Dieu, il n'a pas did not eagerly retain His equality with God; but retenu avidement son égalité avec Dieu; mais il He emptied Himself (semetipsum exinanivit),b by s'est anéanti lui-même (semetipsum exinanivit)b, en taking the form of a slave, by making Himself like prenant la forme de l'esclave, en se rendant man, and recognized as a man by all that was semblable aux hommes, et reconnu pour homme apparent about Him; He lowered Himself, making par tout ce qui a paru de lui; il s'est abaissé lui- Himself obedient unto death, a death on the cross” même, se faisant obéissant jusqu'à la mort, et à la (Phil. 2:6). mort de la croix. (Phil. II, 6) Le principe d'où le Christ a reçu cette passibilité The origin from which Christ received this liability dans laquelle s'est accomplie la passion in which was accomplished the redemptive passion, rédemptrice, et grâce à laquelle Dieu est devenu and thanks to which God became our brother in notre frère dans la misère, ce principe c'est encore misery, this origin is again the Blessed Virgin. As la Sainte Vierge. Comme Notre Seigneur sembla our Lord seemed to insinuate at the wedding feast l'insinuer aux noces de Cana, la mère de of Cana, the mother of mercy would be manifested miséricorde serait manifestée dans la passion même in the very passion of Christ. “What have you to do du Christ. “Qu'y a-t-il entre toi et moi, femme? Mon with me, woman? My hour has not yet come” (Jn. heure n'est pas encore venue (Jo. II, 4) ... comme 2:4) …as if he were saying: That which in me s'il disait: Ce qui en moi accomplit le miracle tu ne accomplishes the miracle, you did not beget, you l'as pas engendré, tu n'as pas engendré ma divinité: did not beget my divinity: but because you begot mais parce que tu as engendré mon infirmité, je te my infirmity, I will know you when this infirmity reconnaîtrai alors que cette infirmité sera will be hanging on the cross” (St. Augustine).c In suspendue à la croix.” (S. Augustin).c En cela, Dieu this, God placed the Blessed Virgin at the very a placé la Sainte Vierge au principe même de son foundation of his work of mercy, thus all at once oeuvre de miséricorde, où éclatent à la fois la bursting the darkness, communicative of noirceur, communicative de la passibilité, et la vulnerability, and making shine forth the

249 formositas, instrument de la grâce rédemptrice. formositas, instrument of redemptive grace. a S. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 2, c.: ... cum misericordia a STh IIa lIae, q30 a2 c. “Since pity is grief for another's sit compassio super miseria aliena, ut dictum est, ex hoc distress, as stated above, from the very fact that a person contingit quod aliquis misereatur ex quo contingit quod takes pity on anyone, it follows that another's distress de miseria aliena doleat. Quia autem tristitia seu dolor est grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one's own de proprio malo, intantum aliquis de miseria aliena ills, one grieves or sorrows for another's distress, in so far tristatur aut dolet inquantum miseriam alienam as one looks upon another's distress as one's own. Now apprehendit ut suam. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Uno this happens in two ways: first, through union of the modo, secundum unionem affectus, quod fit per amorem. affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who Quia enim amans reputat amicum tanquam seipsum, loves another looks upon his friend as another self, he malum ipsius reputat tanquam suum malum, et ideo dolet counts his friend's hurt as his own, so that he grieves for de malo amici sicut de suo. Et inde est quod Philosophus, his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence in IX Ethic., inter alla amicabilia point hoc quod est the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with condolere amico. Et Apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XII: one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and Gaudere cum gaudentibus, flere cum flentibus.—Alio the Apostle says (Rm. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that modo contingit secundum unionem realem: utpote cum rejoice, weep with them that weep." Secondly, it happens malum aliquorum propinquum est ut ab eis ad nos through real union, for instance when another's evil transeat. Et ideo Philosophus dicit, in Il Rhet.: Homines comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the miserentur super illos qui sunt eis conjuncti et similes, Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are quia per hoc fit eis aestimatio quod ipsi etiam possint akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize similia pati. Et inde est etiam quod senes et sapientes, qui that the same may happen to themselves. This also considerant se posse in mala incidere, et debiles et explains why the old and the wise who consider that they formidolosi magis sunt misericordes. E contrario autem may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous alli, qui reptutant se esse felices et intantum potentes persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who quod nihil mali putant se posse pati, non ita deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think miserentur.—Sic igitur semper defectus est ratio themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so miserendi; vel inquantum aliquis defectum alicujus inclined to pity. Accordingly a defect is always the reputat suum, propter unionem amoris; vel propter reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon possibilitatem similia patiendi. another's defect as one's own, through being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way” b “C'est fort bien (pulchre) que l'Apôtre dit: Il s'est vide b “It is very good (pulchre) that the apostle says: ‘He (exinanivit). En effet, le vide s'oppose au plein. Or, la emptied himself (exinanivit).’ For the empty is opposed nature divine est toute pleine, parce qu'en elle se trouve to the full. Now, the divine nature is completely full, toute la perfection du bien. Je te montrerai tout bien. because there is found in it the whole perfection of good. Mais la nature humaine, et l'âme, n'est pas pleine, elle “I will show you all good” (Ex. 33:19). But human n'est qu'en puissance pour la plénitude; car elle a été nature, the soul, is not full; it is only in potency to créée comme une table rase. La nature humaine est donc fullness. For it was created as a blank tablet. Human vide. C'est pourquoi l'Apôtre dit: Il s'est vidé, parce qu'il nature is thus empty. This is why the Apostle says: “He a assumé la nature humaine. Il parle donc, d'abord, de emptied himself,” because he assumed human nature. He l'assomption de la nature humaine, quand il dit: Prenant speaks thus first of the assumption of human nature when la forme de l'esclave. En effet, l'homme, de par sa he says: “Taking the form of a slave” (Phil. 2:7). For création, est l'esclave de Dieu, et la nature humaine est la man, by his creation, is a slave of God, and human nature forme d'un esclave. ” S. Thomas.* is the form of a slave” (St. Thomas).* * S. Thomas, Super Epist. ad Philippenses Expositio, c. * Thomas Aquinas, Super Epist. ad Philippenses II, lect. 2: Deinde cum dicit (Apostolus): Sed Expositio, c. II, lect. 2: “Then when he says, but emptied semetipsum, etc., humilitatem Christi commendat. Primo himself, he commends Christ’s humility: first, as to the quantum ad mysterium incarnationis; secundo quantum a mystery of the incarnation; secondly, as to the mystery of mysterium passionis, ibi: Humiliavit se, etc.,... Pulchre the passion. In regard to the first: He humbled himself, autem dicit: Exinanivit. Inane enim opponitur pleno. etc. …How beautiful to say that He emptied himself, for Natura autem divina satis plena est, quia ibi est omnis the empty is opposed to the full! For the divine nature is bonitatis perfectio. Ostendam tibi omne bonum. Natura sufficiently full, because every perfection of goodness is autem humana, et anima non est plena, sed in potentia ad there. But human nature and the soul are not full, but plenitudinem; quia est facta quasi tabula rasa. Est ergo capable of fulness, because it was made as a slate not natura humana inanis. Dicit ergo: Exinanivit, quia written upon. Therefore, human nature is empty. Hence naturam humanam assumpsit. Tangit ergo primo naturae he says, He emptied himself, because He assumed a humanae assumptionem, dicens: Formam servi human nature. First, he touches on the assumption of accipiens. Homo enim ex sua creatione est servus Dei, et human nature when he says, taking the form of a servant. natura humana est forma servi. For by reason of his creation man is a servant, and human nature is the form of a servant.”

250 c S. Augustin, In Joannem, Tract. VIII, c. 9, T. IV, col. c St. Augustine, In Ioannem, tract. VIII, c.9, t. 4, col. 1455: Quid mihi et tibi est, mulier? nondum venit hora 1455. “‘What is it to me and to you, woman? My hour is mea ... tanquam dicens: Quod de me facit miraculum, not yet come…’ as though saying: What works a miracle non tu genuisti, divinitatem meam non tu genuisti: sed in me you did not beget; my divinity you did not beget: quia genuisti infirmitatem meam, tunc te cognoscam, but because you begot my weakness, I will recognize you cum ipsa infirmitas pendebit in cruce. then, when this weakness will hang on the cross.”

CHAPTER 28 ET MACULA NON ES IN TE (SONGS 4:7)

Et il n'y a point de tache en vous. And there is no stain in you. Pourquoi, se demande saint Albert, la généalogie de Why, St. Albert asks himself, does the genealogy Notre-Dame contient-elle non seulement les of Our Lady contain not only good, but wicked ancêtres bons, mais aussi les mauvais? Assurément ancestors as well? Surely because the comparison parce que la comparaison exalte davantage l'un des exalts one of the extremes—“like a lily in the midst extrêmes— comme un lis au milieu des épines. of thorns” (Songs 2:2). This genealogy mentions (Cant. II, 2) Cette généalogie mentionne des wicked ancestors “so that the wisdom of God might ancêtres mauvais, “pour que la sagesse de Dieu appear more merciful. Now, there is the origination apparût plus miséricordieuse. En effet, il y a (exitus) by which good comes out of good, and the l'origination (exitus) par laquelle le bien sort du origination by which evil comes out of evil. bien, et l'origination par laquelle le mal sort du mal. Following the first, “God saw all the things he had Suivant la première, Dieu vit toutes les choses qu'il made, and they were good” (Gen. 1:31). Following avait faites; et elles étaient très bonnes. (Gen. I, 31) the second, “the principle of all sin is pride” (Sir. Suivant la deuxième, le principe de tout péché est 10:15). There is a third origination, according to l'orgueil. (Eccli. X, 15) Il y a une troisième which evil proceeds from good, like the woman origination, selon laquelle le mal procède du bien, from whom comes the beginning of sin (Gen. 3:6). comme la femme d'où provient le commencement There exists a fourth origination by which good du péché. (Gen. III, 6) Il existe une quatrième comes out of evil, and this one is the property of origination, par laquelle le bien sort du mal, et God alone, whose wisdom conquers all malice, celle-là est le propre de Dieu seul dont la sagesse because “it attains all things in their principle and l'emporte sur toute malice, parce qu'elle atteint their term—attingens a fine usque ad finem” (Wis. toutes choses dans leur principe et leur terme— 8:1).a Now, is it not by a sovereignly merciful attingens a fine usque ad finem.”a (Sap. VIII, 1) Or, privilege that Mary was conceived without the stain n'est-ce pas par un privilège souverainement of original sin? “Et macula non est in te” (Songs miséricordieux que Marie a été conçue sans la 4:7). This very fact must “increase the sinners’ tache du péché originel? Et macula non est in te. confidence because their mediatrix unites the two (Cant. IV, 7) Cela même doit “augmenter la extremes in one and the same kinship, namely, just confiance chez les pécheurs, du fait que leur as she is mother and daughter of God, she is médiatrice unit les deux extrêmes dans une même likewise our mother and our sister, and she is parenté, à savoir, de même qu'elle est mère et fille thereby, by nature, inclined to have pity on the de Dieu, de même elle est notre mère et notre sinner.”b The condition to which she would have soeur, et elle est ainsi, par nature, inclinée à avoir herself been submitted if she had not been pitié du pécheur.”b La condition à laquelle elle eût preserved brings her all the closer to us, and this été elle-même soumise si elle n'avait été préservée, intimacy is that much deeper and more efficacious la rapproche advantage de nous; et ce insofar as Mary herself assumes the grandeur of rapprochement est d'autant plus profond et efficace this mercy which preserved her. In this respect, que Marie revêt elle-même la grandeur de cette “the Blessed Virgin was not black in herself, but in miséricorde qui l'a préservée. Sous ce rapport, “la her father Adam who sinned, and who by his sin Bienheureuse Vierge a été noire non pas en soi, contaminated all his posterity—with the exception mais dans son père Adam qui pécha, et qui par son of the Blessed Virgin. Again, she is said to be black péché contamina toute sa postérité—à l'exception by extrinsic denomination, because she is the de la Bienheureuse Vierge. Derechef, elle est dite daughter of a sinner; but in herself she is beautiful noire par dénomination extrinsèque, parce que fille by the fullness of grace which is in her.”c

251 de pécheur; mais en soi elle est belle, par la plénitude de grâce qui est en elle.”c a S. Albert, Mariale, q. 24, p. 53a: ut sapientia Dei a St. Albert, Mariale, q. 24, p. 53a. “…in order that he misericordior appareret. Est enim exitus quo de bono wisdom of God might appear more mercifully. For there bonum, et exitus est quo de malo malum. De primo: Vidit is a coming forth by which good is from good, and there Deus cuncta quae fecerat: et erant valde bona. De is a coming forth by which evil is from evil. Regarding secundo: Initium omnis peccati est superbia, etc. Tertius the first: ‘God saw all that he had made: and it was very exitus est, ut de bono malum, ut de muliere initium good.’ Concerning the second: ‘The beginning of all sin peccati. Quartus exitus est, ut de malo bonum, et hoc is pride,’ etc. There is a third coming forth, as of evil solius Dei est proprium, cujus sapientia vincit malitiam, from good, as the beginning of sin from the woman. attingens a fine usque ad finem. There is a fourth coming forth, as of good from evil, and this is proper to God alone, whose wisdom conquers malice, reaching from end to end.” b Ibid.: ut confidentiam peccatoribus augmentaret, per b Ibid. “…in order to increase the trust of sinners, in that quod mediatrix eorum eadem propinquitate utramque their mediatrix might join both extremes in the same extremitatem conjungeret, ut sicut mater esset et filia relationship, that just as she is mother and daughter of Dei, sic esset mater et soror nostra, et sic a natura God, so she is our mother and sister, and thus by nature is inclinaretur ad miserendum peccatori. inclined to be merciful to the sinner.” c Corneille de la Pierre, In Canticum Canticorum, c. I, c Cornelius a Lapide, In Canticum Canticorum, 1:4, t. 7, vers. 4, T. VII, p. 495b: Beata virgo nigra fuit non in se, p. 495b. “The Blessed Virgin was not black in herself, sed in patre suo Adam, qui peccavit et peccato totam but in her father Adam, who sinned and by his sin suam posteritatem (excepta B. Virgine) infecit. Est ergo infected his whole posterity (except the Blessed Virgin). ipsa nigra per denominationem extrinsecam, quia filia She herself is therefore black by extrinsic denomination, peccatoris; in se tamen est formosa per gratiae because she is the daughter of a sinner; but in herself she plenitudinem. is beautiful through the fullness of grace.”

252 Chapters 27-28: Mary’s relation to the darkness of sin on the level of nature

Mary bears a unique relationship to the darkness of sin. On the one hand, she lives together with all other human beings in a world marked by the radical break with God. She knows immense suffering. On the other hand, God dwells in her heart from the first moment of her existence. She is born immaculate within a fallen world and as a member of a fallen race. Both aspects of her relationship lead to a particular beauty realized in her.

As we discussed in the first part, Mary’s sanctifying grace, though it preserves her from any separation from God, is nevertheless redemptive. This point is important if we are to see how the nature that she possesses, and that she gives to her Son, is one with our own. We do not speak of being saved from something concerning which there is no danger. We might equally say that a man is saved from falling into a well when he is caught before going over the edge as when he is pulled up after falling in. But we do not say that a man is saved from falling into a well when he is miles away and in no danger of ever falling in. Mary is saved from original sin because, without a special intervention from God, the nature she received through her parents would have been subject to it. She belongs by nature to the line of Adam. “The Blessed Virgin could say: ‘Nigra Sum,’ because, if she had not enjoyed the privilege of the Immaculate Conception, she would have had original sin like the rest.”402

402 “Mercy and Redemption.” “La Sainte Vierge pouvait dire : « Nigra Sum », parce que si elle n’avait pas joui du privilège de l’Immaculée conception, elle aurait eu le péché originel comme les autres.”

253 Mary is free from original sin itself, from the deprivation of sanctifying grace, and also from the tendency toward moral disintegration that follows from it, that is, concupiscence. Yet the nature she receives is still subject to some of the consequences of sin—mortality and passibility—as is the nature that her Son receives from her. Thomas says of Christ that the first reason that He assumed the defects of the body is that He might undergo the punishment for sin.

It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the human race that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. Now one satisfies for another's sin by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, to wit, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin, which was brought into the world by Adam, according to Rm. 5:12: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death."403

The same can be said by extension of Mary herself. She is black with the consequences of sin for the sake of her role in the Redemption, which first of all consists in giving to Christ the body in which He would suffer for sin.

De Koninck distinguishes two ways in which one who is merciful takes on the suffering of another. The first is by a union of affection, to feel for the other as though his suffering were one’s own. The second is by real union—that is, by actually undergoing the suffering of another in the same manner in which he himself suffers. But this latter union requires that the merciful one possess the same

403 STh IIIa, q14 a1 co. “Respondeo dicendum conveniens fuisse corpus assumptum a filio Dei humanis infirmitatibus et defectibus subiacere, et praecipue propter tria. Primo quidem, quia ad hoc filius Dei, carne assumpta, venit in mundum, ut pro peccato humani generis satisfaceret. Unus autem pro peccato alterius satisfacit dum poenam peccato alterius debitam in seipsum suscipit. Huiusmodi autem defectus corporales, scilicet mors, fames et sitis, et huiusmodi, sunt poena peccati, quod est in mundum per Adam introductum, secundum illud Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors.”

254 susceptibility to the evil in question as the sufferer, that he have a nature capable of undergoing the other’s suffering in a like way.

God assumed a human nature with its liability, taking upon Himself our misery in the way it affects us, that is to say, physically; assuming in this way evil (malum poenae)—a darkness infinitely more profound than the one which was owing to us by nature: the most profound God could have assumed.404

The Incarnation involves the Son in an even greater descent because it is a union with a race black with sin, a union that has as its end the definitive removal of that blackness. It was Mary who gave this nature to Christ. One could say that she gives

Him the “power” to suffer: redemptive passibility. “In this, God placed the Blessed

Virgin at the very foundation of his work of mercy, thus all at once bursting the darkness, communicative of vulnerability, and making shine forth the formositas, instrument of redemptive grace.”405

Yet, the preservation of Mary from original sin by the grace of the

Immaculate Conception manifests the divine mercy in its own right, as De Koninck explains in Chapter 28. Certainly the beauty of her purity is more astounding by comparison with the moral blackness of humanity. But there is a further sense in which Mary’s preservation from sin manifests the divine power in a particular way.

De Koninck draws on the Mariale to make this point. It is not surprising, the latter argues, when good comes from good or evil from evil.406 God creates a good world, and pride leads to sin. It is also possible for evil to begin where there was only good

404 Ego Sapientia, 27.1. 405 Ego Sapientia, 27.2. 406 Evil of course does not produce anything as such, being itself only a deprivation and not a being. Yet a corrupt being produces a corrupt effect. Thus Christ says, “each tree is known by its own fruit” (Lk. 6:44).

255 before, since evil is really a corruption of the good. Thus Eve, created good, became the origin of sin. But to bring good out of evil is another matter. It is to draw wholeness out of corruption. Like creation, which draws being from non-being, to draw good from evil is proper to God alone. Moreover, it is the sign of divine wisdom. As the origin and end of all things, God orders everything in an ultimate way to Himself. Nothing, not even evil, can escape this ordination.

Mary’s preservation from sin is a proper sign of divine mercy, precisely because she is of the line of Adam according to the flesh. But we should not think of this expression of mercy as directed at her at the expense of sinners. By the very fact that Mary is made the Mother of God, she is also given to the faithful as their Mother.

She is not only the object of properly divine mercy but the instrument of it. “Mary herself assumes the grandeur of this mercy which preserved her.”407 This is the second sense in which the blackness of sin is the occasion of a superior beauty in

Mary. First, by her subjection to the punishment of original sin, she communicates to her Son the passibility in which He redeems the world. But second, by her preservation from original sin itself, Mary reveals and communicates the properly divine mercy that brings good from evil.

407 Ego Sapientia, 28.1.

256 CHAPTER 29 DISCITE A ME, QUIA MITIS SUM, ET HUMILIS CORDE (MT. 11:29)

Apprenez de moi, car je suis doux et Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart. humble de coeur. Communiquant à son Fils la nature humaine avec Communicating human nature with its vulnerability sa passibilité, Marie est au principe de l'humble to her Son, Mary is at the very foundation of condition du Christ. Mais sa gracieuse humilité est Christ’s humble condition. But her gracious en même temps au principe de l'humilité de ce Fils, humility is at the same time at the foundation of the de cette Sagesse qui dit désormais: Apprenez de humility of that Son, of that Wisdom who moi, car je suis doux et humble de coeur. (Matth. henceforth says: “Learn from me for I am meek and XI, 29) “Elle savait, dit Corneille de la Pierre, que humble of heart” (Mt. 11:29). Cornelius a Lapide son Fils devait restaurer le monde au prix de la plus says, “She knew that her Son had to restore the grande humilité, et qu'il devait abaisser sa déité world at the price of the greatest humility, and that jusqu'à prendre une chair mortelle, bien plus, He had to lower His deity even unto taking mortal jusqu'à subir le supplice du fouet, de la croix et de flesh, even more, to submitting to the torment of la mort. Elle dut donc s'adapter à cette condition the whip, of the cross, and of death. She therefore future de son Fils, et même la devancer en quelque had to adapt herself to her Son’s future condition, sorte, et lui préparer la voie: surtout parce que, de and even to anticipate it in some way, and to même que les mères orgueilleuses inculquent à prepare the way for Him: above all because, just as leurs fils de l'orgueil et un esprit superbe, de même proud mothers impress pride and a haughty spirit les mères humbles inculquent aux leurs un esprit upon their sons, so likewise humble mothers doux et soumis. C'est pourquoi notre Canisius dit, impress upon their sons a meek and submissive au livre IV de sa Mariologie, c. VIII: ‘La mère n'a, spirit. This is why Canisius says, in the fourth book en aucune façon, dégénéré de son Fils, au contraire, of his Mariology, c. 8: ‘The mother has, in no way, le Fils a reproduit plutôt le caractère et la nature de degenerated from her Son; on the contrary, the Son sa mère’. En effet, les enfants ont l'habitude de has instead reproduced the character and nature of tenir de leur mère plus que de leur père. A ce sujet his mother.’ Indeed, children tend to take after their saint Ambroise fait remarquer: ‘Ayant à enfanter le mother more than their father. On the subject, St. Christ humble et doux, Marie a dû préférer remarks: ‘Having to give birth to the l'humilité’. Elle savait que la tête du démon, à meek and humble Christ, Mary had to prefer savoir son orgueil, serait écrasée par son humilité, humility.’ She knew that the head of the devil, that selon ce passage de la Genèse: Elle t'écrasera la is, his pride, would be crushed by her humility, tête. (Gen. III, 15) Aussi bien, saint Ildephonse according to the passage in Genesis: “She will déclare, dans son deuxième sermon sur crush your head” (Gen. 3:15). St. Alphonsus as l'Assomption: ‘C'est pourquoi le Christ humble est well declares, in his second sermon on the venu à la Vierge humble, pour que des profondeurs Assumption: ‘This is why the humble Christ came d'une telle humilité il fit se lever la victoire du to the humble Virgin, so that from the depths of salut’.”a such a humility He could raise up the victory of salvation.’”a a Corneille de la Pierre, In Proverbia Salomonis, c. VIII, a Cornelius of Lapide, In Proverbia Solomonis, 8:13, t. 5, vers. 13, T. V, p. 210a: “Sciebat filium per humilitatem p. 210a. “She knew that her Son would restore the world summam reparaturum mundum, ideoque deitatem suam through the utmost humility, and for that reason would inclinaturum usque ad carnem mortalem, imo usque ad bend his deity to mortal flesh, indeed, to the whip, the flagella, crucem et mortem. Huic ergo ipsa se adaptare, et cross, and death. It was therefore right that she adapt quasi praeire viamque sternere debuit: praesertim quia, herself to this, and in a sense to go before Him and sicut superbae matres filiis ingenerant superbiam spread out the path: especially because, as proud mothers altosque spiritus, sic humiles suis ingenerant spiritus instill pride and a haughty spirit in their sons, so humble placidos et submissos. Unde noster Canisius, lib. IV mothers instill a peaceful and submissive spirit in theirs. Marial., cap. VIII: ‘Mater, ait, a filio haud quaquam So our Canisius says (IV Marial., cap. VIII), ‘The degeneravit, sed filius potius matris indolem ac naturam mother by no means degenerated from her Son, but the expressit.’ Solent enim infantes magis matrissare quam Son expressed more strongly the character and nature of

257 patrissare, i.e. magis matrem referre et sequi quam His mother.’ For it is usual for children to imitate their patrem. Quocirca S. Ambrosius: ‘Humilem, ait, et mitem mothers more than their fathers, i.e. to advert to and paritura, humilitatem debuit ipsa praeferre’. Sciebat ipsa follow the mother more than the father. Following this diaboli caput, i.e. superbiam conterendam esse sua St. Ambrose says: ‘Having given birth to the humble and humilitate, juxta illud. Genes., cap. III, 15: Ipsa conteret gentle one, it was fitting that she prefer humility.’ She caput tuum. Unde S. Ildephonsus, serm. 2 de knew the head of Satan, i.e. pride, was to be crushed by Assumptione: ‘Ideo, ait, Christus humilis ad humilem her humility, according to Gen. 3:15: ‘She will crush Virginem venit, ut de tam profunda humilitate your head.’ So St. Alphonsus says (serm. 2 de triumphum extolleret salutis’ ...” Assumptione): ‘Therefore the humble Christ comes to the humble Virgin, so that from such a depth of humility he might exalt the triumph of salvation.’”

CHAPTER 30 ET TUAM IPSIUS ANIMAM PERTRANSIBIT GLADIUS (LK. 2:35)

Vous-même, un glaive transpercera votre And your own soul a sword will pierce. âme. Vous-même, un glaive transpercera votre âme afin “A sword will pierce through your own soul, that que soient révélées les pensées cachées dans le thoughts hidden in the heart of a great number may coeur d'un grand nombre. (Luc. II, 35) Dans cette be revealed” (Luke 2:35). In this participation in participation à la passion rédemptrice, où elle est the redemptive passion, where she is established as établie premier principe avec son Fils pour first principle with her Son to “suppress the misery ‘supprimer la misère d'autrui comme si cette misère of others as if this misery were her own,” Mary is était la sienne propre’, Marie est encore, et au sens again, and in the profoundest sense, “black, but le plus profond, noire, mais belle: noire dans la beautiful”: black in compassion and in sorrow, compassion et la douleur, belle dans l'ineffable beautiful in the ineffable merit of this mérite de cette compassion.a1,2 Remarquons, en compassion.a1,2 Let us note that, indeed, all our effet, que toute notre grâce est essentiellement grace is essentially redemptive. Now, as Christ is rédemptrice. Or, de même que le Christ est notre our head in that He communicates to us the grace chef en tant qu'il nous communique la grâce merited by His passion—whereas in relationship to méritée par sa passion—alors que par rapport à la the substantial grace and glory of the angels He is grâce et la gloire substantielles des anges il n'est head only by His own authority, as John of St. chef que par son autorité, comme dit Jean de S. Thomas says;b so the Most Blessed Virgin is not Thomas;b de même la Très Sainte Vierge non only our queen by her dignity, as she is queen of seulement est notre reine de par sa dignité, comme the angels, but, even more is she our mother with elle est aussi celle des anges, mais elle est, de plus, regards to the generation of redemptive grace. notre mère quant à la génération de la grâce Mater divinae gratiae. rédemptrice. Mater divinae gratiae. a1 “Je suis noire, mais je suis belle. En effet, O Vierge a1 “‘I am black but beautiful.’ Indeed, O most sweet très suave, vous avez été, dans la nuit de votre Virgin, you have been, in the night of your compassion, compassion très douloureuse, de votre tristesse et de very sorrowful, from your sadness and your affliction, in votre affliction, dans toute la passion rédemptrice de the whole redemptive passion of your well beloved votre Fils bien-aimé, vous avez, dis-je, été cachée, Son—you have, I say, been hidden, filled and penetrated, remplie et pénétrée, bien plus, transpercée d'un glaive de even more, pierced with a sword of sorrow; you felt the douleur; vous ressentiez en vous la douleur d'un double sorrow of a double begetting. And unless the enfantement. Et à moins que la toute-puissance de votre omnipotence of your Son had maintained you, under the Fils ne vous eût conservée, sous la véhémence de la force of your grief your heart would have been broken, douleur votre coeur se fût rompu, et vous eussiez expiré and you would have died at once; but your Son was aussitôt; mais votre Fils vous réservait à son Église pour keeping you for His Church, for the spiritual l'avancement spirituel des croyants. Et pourtant, au advancement of believers. And nevertheless, in the midst milieu de tant de tribulations et de douleurs, de tant de of such trials and griefs, of so much discomfort and so gêne et de fardeaux, vous êtes restée belle; parce qu'une many burdens, you have remained beautiful, because telle compassion et une telle affliction furent cause pour such a compassion and affliction were the cause for you

258 vous de mérites ineffables, et par elles vous avez obtenu of ineffable merits, and by them you have attained the la puissance et l'efficacité de nous secourir tous. Ainsi power and the efficacy to help us all. So, if the Apostle donc, si l'Apôtre Paul a pu dire: Ce qui manque à la Paul was able to say: ‘I accomplish in my flesh that passion du Christ je l'accomplis dans ma chair, pour son which is missing in the passion of Christ, for His body, corps qui est l'Eglise, à combien plus forte raison cela which is the Church,’ for how much stronger a reason is n'est-il permis à la très sainte Mère du Christ? O très the same permitted to the most holy Mother of Christ? O heureuse Reine, votre beauté, le charme de votre most happy Queen, your beauty, the charm of your douceur, l'éclat de votre patience, votre très profonde sweetness, the brightness of your patience, your most humilité et la sainteté de votre charité ont resplendi en profound humility and the holiness of your love have ceci que, dans toute la passion très douloureuse et très blazed forth in this, that in all the very sorrowful and ignominieuse de votre Fils unique et très aimé, vous shameful passion of your only and very beloved Son, you n'avez pas été mue par le moindre sursaut d'indignation, were not moved by the least beginnings of indignation, of d'aversion et d'impatience envers les persécuteurs et les aversion or of impatience towards the persecutors and bourreaux très cruels et très criminels de votre très most cruel and criminal executioners of your most précieux Fils, lesquels vous regardaient comme vile, precious Son, who regarded you as vile, iniquitous, inique, difforme, comme le tabernacle de Cédar, à deformed, ‘like the tents of Kedar’ (Songs 1:5), that is, as savoir, comme la mère malheureuse du séducteur le plus the unhappy mother of the most impious seducer, while impie, alors que votre âme était belle comme la tente de your soul was as beautiful as ’s tent, while it Salomon, qu'elle était ornée d'une beauté céleste was ornamented with a celestial beauty like the semblable à l'éclat du vrai Pacifique, qui déploie le brightness of the true Peaceful One, who unfolds the firmament comme une tente.”—DENIS LE firmament like a tent.” –Denis the Carthusian* CHARTREUX* *Denis le Chartreux, Enarratio in Canticum Canticorum * Denis le Chartreux, Enarratio in Canticum Canticorum Salomonis, c. I, a. 5, édit. de Cologne, T. VII, p. 324 D’: Salomonis, c. I, a. 5, ed. Cologne, t. 7, p. 324 D’: “‘I am Nigra sum, sed formosa. Fuisti enim, o suavissima Virgo, dark, but beautiful.’ For you have been, O most sweet nubilo dolorosissimae compassionis, tristitiae ac Virgin, covered, filled, and penetrated with clouds of moeroris, in omni dilectissimi Filii tui passione salvifica, most sorrowful compassion, sadness, and grief, in the cooperta, impleta ac penetrata, imo doloris gladio whole salvific passion of your most beloved Son, indeed perforata; eratque tunc in te duplicatus parturientium pierced by a sword of sorrow; and there was then in you dolor. Et nisi te omnipotentia Filli tui conservasset, prae a double sorrow of giving birth. And unless the doloris vehementia, rupto (ut creditur) corde, mox omnipotence of your Son preserved you, by the force of expirasses; sed reservavit te Filius tuus Ecclesiae suae in your grief, your heart (one must suppose) would have magnum profectum credentium. Verumtamen in tot been broken; you would soon have died. But your Son tribulationibus atque doloribus, in tantis angustiis ac kept you for His Church, for the great advance of pressuris, mansisti formosa; quia et haec tanta compassio believers. And yet, in so many trials and sorrows, in such et afflictio tua, fuit ipsi ineffabiliter meritoria, et per eam difficulties and burdens, you remained beautiful; because promeruisti facultatem efficaciamque praecipuam this great compassion and affliction of yours was succurrendi omnibus nobis. Nempe si Paulo Apostolo indescribably meritorious, and through it you acquired in dicere licuit, Adimpleo quae desunt passionum Christi, in particular the capacity and efficacy to aid all of us. carne mea, pro corpore ejus quod est Ecclesia: quanto Certainly, if the Apostle Paul is allowed to say: ‘I fill up plus sacratissimae Matri Christi hoc dicere fas est? In hoc what is lacking in the passion of Christ in my flesh for quoque resplenduit, o felicissima Domina, formositas His body, which is the Church,’ how much more is it tua, decor mansuetudinis tuae, claritas patientiae tuae, right for the most holy Mother of Christ to say this? In profundissima tua humilitas, ac tuae sanctitas caritatis this also, O happiest Lady, your beauty shone forth, the quod in tota tui unici praedilectissimi Filii amarissima et lovliness of your gentleness, the brightness of your ignominiosissima passione, nullatenus mota est aliqua patience, the extreme depth of your humility, and the indignatione, aversione, impatientia adversus holiness of your love in the whole most bitter and crudelissimos sceleratissimosque tui pretiosissimi Filii disgraceful passion of your one most beloved Son. You persecutores et crucifixores: a quibus et tu reputabaris were not at all moved to any anger, aversion, or vilis, iniqua, deformis, sicut tabernacula Cedar, videlicet impatience against the most cruel and criminal ut impiissimi seductoris mater infelix, quum esses persecutors and executioners of your most precious Son: pulchra in anima instar pellium Salomonis, et coeliformi by whom you also were considered to be vile, sinful, pulchritudine perornata, assimilate decori veri Pacifici, deformed, ‘like the tents of Kedar,’ that is, the unhappy qui extendit coelum sicut pellem. mother of the most wicked seducer, when you were beautiful in your soul like the curtains of Solomon, and ornamented with heavenly lovliness, like the beauty of the true Peaceful One, who stretches out the heavens like a curtain.” a2 “De même que le Fils mourant, non misérablement a2 “Just as the dying Son, not wretchedly but by mercy, mais par miséricorde, n'avait que dédain pour le deuil had only disdin for the shameful and unbecoming indigne et messéant qu'on lui témoignait, de même sa très mourning which they displayed toward him, so also had

259 heureuse mère, partageant par amour la mort de son Fils, his most happy Mother, sharing by love the death of her et en quelque sorte mourant en Lui, paree qu'Il était os de Son, and in a certain way dying in Him, because He was ses os, et chair de sa chair: ‘Pourquoi, nous dit-elle, bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh. ‘Why,’ she says pleurez-vous sur moi, comme sur une femme misérable, to us, ‘do you cry over me as over a miserable woman, et mère d'un homme misérable? A cette heure, je suis and mother of a miserable man? In this hour, I am black, noire, parce qu'il faut qu'avec mon Fils méprisé je sois because it is necessary that with my despised Son I be méprisée, et qu'avec celui qu'on considère comme un despised, and that with Him who is considered a leper, I lépreux je sois aussi réputée lépreuse. Il est, selon le be regarded as leprous. He is, according to the , Prophète, mon soleil, maintenant devenu comme un sac my sun, now having become as a sack of hair to your de crin à vos yeux, et en qui il ne se trouve aucune eyes, and in whom there is found no appearance of apparence ni beauté; il convient que je sois aussi beauty; it is fitting that I be also conformed to Him, and conforme à Lui, et que je Lui sois semblable par l'aspect that I be like Him in the sad and somber aspect of the triste et sombre des accusés: comme le tabernacle de accused: like the tent of Kedar, like a sinner among the Cédar, comme une pécheresse parmi les pécheresses, dit sinners,’ says Honorius.’” –Cornelius a Lapide** Honorius’.”—CORNEILLE DE LA PIERRE.** **Corneille de La Pierre, In Canticum Canticorum, c. I., ** Cornelius a Lapide, In Canticum Canticorum, c. I., vers. 4, T. VII, p. 496a: Sicut filius non misere, sed vers. 4, t. 7, p. 496a “Just as the Son, not miserably but misericorditer moriens, hunc indignum et indecorum sibi mercifully dying, disdained this unworthy and improper luctum dedignabatur impendi: sic et mater felicissima pro mourning spent on Him, so also the most happy mother, affectu commoriens filio, et quodam modo in ipso sharing by affection the death of her Son, and in a sense moriens, quia os ex ossibus ejus, et caro ex carne ejus dying with Him because He is bone of her bone and flesh ipse: Quid, ait, fletis super me, quasi supra miseram of her flesh, he says: Why do you weep for me, as though mulierem, et matrem miseri hominis? Nigra nunc sum, for a wretched woman, and the mother of a wretched quia oportet me cum filio despecto despici, et cum man? I am now black, because it belongs to me to be reputato leproso leprosam reputari. Ille juxta Prophetam despised with my despised Son, and to be thought sol meus, nunc factus quasi saccus cilicinus in oculis leprous with Him who is reputed a leper. He, my son, vestris, et cui non est species neque decor; me quoque now is made, according to the Prophet, like a hair-sack in decet illi conformari, et pullo atroque habitu reorum your eyes, and there is no lovliness or beauty in Him; and assimilari: sicut tabernacula Cedar, quasi aliqua de I also should be conformed to Him, and be likened to the peccatricibus, ait Honorius. black and mourning appearance of the accused: like a tent of Kedar, as one among sinners,’ says Honorius.” b Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Theol., T. VIII, d. 10, a. 3, p. b John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, t. 8, d. 10, a. 3, 272. p. 272.

260 Chapters 29-30: Mary’s relation to the darkness of sin on the subjective level

In the case of evil, as in the case of the natural lowliness of man, De Koninck considers both the objective reality as it relates to Mary, and the subjective response to that reality in Mary’s soul. The profound humility of her Magnificat corresponds to the poverty of human nature before the omnipotence and love of God. Likewise, the compassion of Mary corresponds to the evil of sin and its consequences.

Chapter 29 continues into the spiritual sphere what Chapter 27 began in the physical sphere. Mary gives to her Son a passible nature for the sake of the

Redemption, but motherhood entails giving more to a child than bodily existence. By

His education at the side of Mary, Christ has “reproduced the character and nature of his mother.”408 All mothers educate their children by example and instruction. But

Mary also knew that her Son, in becoming man, lowered Himself infinitely out of love. As the prophesy of assured, she also knew that He would suffer in the world. Being in her whole person the Mother of this Son, Mary was first conformed to the mission of her Son so that her Son could be conformed to her in humility. In other words, the very virtue of humility in Mary took on a special character. Not only does she recognize her own littleness before the greatness of God, but she possesses too the readiness to lower herself for the sake of sinners—the humility of the merciful one who bends down to the needy. Hers is the humility not only of the suppliant, but of a co-Redeemer.

Exactly here, in the role of Mary as principle of mercy in the face of the evil of sin, the high-point of the account of nigra sum sed formosa emerges. Already a great

408 Canisius, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 29.1.

261 beauty arises from the lowliness of Mary inasmuch as she gives that lowliness to

Christ, in the form of a vulnerable human nature and a life shaped by humility and mercy. But in the consideration of the common good in Chapters 11-13 of the first part, we saw that Mary’s role as principle does not end even with the education of

Christ. She remains as principle with Him in the whole work of redemption. Chapter

30 therefore directs our attention to the beauty that is Mary’s by her participation in the redemptive Passion.

Mary herself experiences the evil of sin in a way that she and her Son alone are prepared to do because of their innocence. The interior response to this evil, and to the consequent suffering of her Son, is neither rebellion against the divine will nor even hatred of those who commit it. In the lengthy text contained in the footnote, Denis the Carthusian writes, “[Y]ou were not moved by the least beginnings of indignation, of aversion or of impatience towards the persecutors and most cruel and criminal executioners of your most precious Son.”409 Mary willingly gives her Son for the sake of sinners, “to suppress the misery of others as if it were her own.”410 Her inner disposition is so submissive to the divine will that it takes on the very attitude of the divine will toward sinners: Mary’s soul is alight with the divine mercy itself. Her soul takes on “a celestial beauty similar to the brightness of the true Peaceful One, who unfolds the firmament like a tent.”411 This is the final and strongest sense of the words of the bride in the Song of Songs. “Mary is again, and in

409 Denis the Carthusian, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 30, footnote 1. 410 Denis the Carthusian, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 30.1. 411 Denis the Carthusian, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 30, footnote 1.

262 the profoundest sense, ‘black, but beautiful’: black in compassion and in sorrow, beautiful in the ineffable merit of this compassion.”412

412 Ego Sapientia, 30.1; emphasis added.

263 CHAPTER 31 MATER MISERICORDIAE

Mère de la miséricorde. Mother of mercy. Quand nous disons la Sainte Vierge mère de When we call the Blessed Virgin mother of mercy, miséricorde, nous n'entendons pas uniquement la we do not understand only the mercy that is in her miséricorde qui est en elle par mode accidentel et by an accidental mode and by inherence, but we d'inhérence, mais nous entendons aussi sa maternité understand also her maternity as an essential origin origine essentielle de la miséricorde: “Selon l'usage of mercy: “According to the universal usage of the universel de l'Église, dit saint Albert, la Church,” says St. Albert, “the Blessed Virgin is Bienheureuse Vierge est appelée, et est en fait, called, and indeed is, mother of mercy, which does mère de miséricorde, ce qui ne convient proprement not belong properly to any other creature. Some à aucune autre créature. Des hommes sont appelés men are sometimes called men of mercy, that is to quelquefois hommes de miséricorde, c'est-à-dire say, men who are humble by mercy, and thus all hommes humbles par miséricorde, et ainsi tous les other men maintain a certain relationship with autres entretiennent avec la miséricorde un certain mercy, whether in a principal or accidental manner; rapport, soit par mode principal soit par mode but, the relationship that she has with mercy is by accidentel; mais le rapport qu'elle a avec la way of essential origin, because it is by way of miséricorde en est un par mode d'origine generation (per modum matris). Now, essential essentièlle, parce que par mode de génération (per conformity surpasses without any possible modum matris). Or, la conformité essentielle proportion the mode of inherence and the dépasse sans proportion possible le mode accidental mode; therefore the Blessed Virgin d'inhérence et le mode accidentel; donc la surpasses all created persons in mercy, and this Bienheureuse Vierge surpasse en miséricorde surpassing is beyond all proportion.”a toutes les personnes créées, et cela au delà de toute proportion.”a a S. Albert, Mariale, q. 75, p. 131a: Beata Virgo a St. Albert, Mariale, q. 75, p. 131a. “The Blessed Virgin, secundum universalem usum Ecclesiae appellatur et est according to the universal practice of the Church, is mater misecordiae, quod non convenit proprie alicui called mother of mercy, which does not belong properly alteri creaturae. Dicuntur autem et aliquando viri to any other creature. Some men, however, are called misericordiae, id est viri humiles misericordia, et sic men of mercy, that is, men humble by mercy, and in this habent omnes alii comparationem ad misericordiam per way all others are related to mercy in a principal way and modum principalem et per modum accidentalem, ipsa in an accidental way. But she has a relationship to mercy vero habet comparationem ad misericordiam per modum by way of essential origin, because in the way of a originis essentialis, quia per modum matris: convenientia mother. But essential agreement exceeds the mode of autem essentialis improportionabiliter excellit modum inherence and the accidental mode beyond all proportion; inhaerentiae et modum accidentalem: ergo beatissima therefore, the most blessed Virgin exceeds all in mercy Virgo improportionabiliter excedit in misericordia beyond all proportion.” universos.

CHAPTER 32 REGINA MISERICORDIAE

Reine de miséricorde. Queen of mercy. Reine de miséricorde, elle est si profondément Queen of mercy, she is so profoundly rooted in the enracinée dans la ‘causalissima causarum’, qu'elle y “causalissima causarum” that she takes from it the prend la raison même de ‘racine première’, et par very character of “first principle,” and conséquent son empire sur l'oeuvre de Dieu est consequently, her dominion over God’s work is absolument universel. De même que Dieu est absolutely universal. In the same way that God is miséricordieux, même par rapport à ceux qui sont merciful, even in relationship to those who are confirmés dans le mal, de même Marie est reine confirmed in evil, Mary is likewise queen not only non seulement des anges bienheureux, mais aussi of the blessed angels but also of all those that are in de tous ceux qui sont dans la géhenne éternelle. eternal gehenna. Again St. Albert says: “All those

264 “Tous ceux qui sont sous le règne de Dieu, dit who are under the reign of God are under His encore saint Albert, sont sous sa miséricorde; mais mercy; but all those who are under the reign of God tous ceux qui sont sous le règne de Dieu ne do not share in His glory, His grace, or His justice; partagent pas sa gloire, sa grâce ou sa justice; donc therefore mercy alone encompasses His whole seule la miséricorde embrasse son règne tout entier; reign; therefore, the one who reigns over the whole donc, celle qui règne sur tout le royaume de Dieu kingdom of God will be called before all else queen sera dite avant tout reine de miséricorde.”a of mercy.”a Marie n'est pas seulement Reine de miséricorde en Mary is not only Queen of mercy in that she is the ce qu'elle est cause de toute miséricorde que Dieu a cause of all the mercy God deigned to manifest, daigné manifester, mais, comme nous l'avons vu, but, as we have seen, we can attribute mercy to her on peut lui attribuer la miséricordè comme prédicat as a substantial predicate. “If we construct this substantiel. “Si l'on construit cette proposition proposition in an intransitive manner,” says St. d'une manière intransitive, dit saint Albert, le sens Albert, “the meaning will be as follows: she is en sera: elle est reine de la miséricorde, c'est-à-dire queen of mercy, that is to say, mercy itself; but then la miséricorde elle-même; mais alors, c'est she is truly called queen of mercy, whence Esther, véritablement qu'elle est dite reine de la who is the figure of the Blessed Virgin, is also miséricorde, d'où Esther, qui est la figure de la called Edissa, which means mercy. Likewise Bienheureuse Vierge, est aussi appelée du nom Isaiah: ‘And a throne will be prepared in mercy.’ d'Edissa, qui signifie miséricorde. De même Isaïe: Now, the proper place of the throne is the proper Et un trône sera préparé dans la miséricorde; or, le place of the kingdom; therefore mercy is the proper lieu propre du trône est le lieu propre du royaume; place of the kingdom. Now, in the womb of the donc la miséricorde est le lieu propre du royaume. Blessed Virgin, a womb prepared by the Holy Or, dans le sein de la Bienheureuse Vierge, sein Spirit, all the divinity and all the humanity of Christ préparé par le Saint-Esprit, toute la divinité et toute rested and were established. She was therefore the l'humanité du Christ se sont reposées et établies; proper place of the kingdom; therefore, she was elle a donc été le lieu propre du royaume; donc, elle mercy itself, and at the same time she was, not a été la miséricorde même, et en même temps elle a without reason, queen of mercy because, été, non sans raison, reine de la miséricorde, parce possessing herself perfectly, she always governed que, se possédant elle-même parfaitement, elle a well, for nothing that ever came out of her was toujours bien gouverné, car jamais rien de ce qui without direction.”b This is why, according to her est sorti d'elle n'a été sans direction.”b C'est dignity, Queen of Mercy is the most proper name pourquoi Reine de miséricorde est le nom le plus of the Blessed Virgin.c proper dé la Sainte Vierge selon sa dignité.c a Ibid., q. 162, p. 236a: Omnis qui est in regno Dei est in a St. Albert, Mariale, q. 162, p. 236a. “All that is in the misericordia: sed non omnis qui est in regno, est in kingdom of God is in mercy: but not everything that is in gloria, vel in gratia, vel in justitia: ergo sola misericordia the kingdom is in glory, or in grace, or in jutice. comprehendit totum regnum: ergo regina super totum Therefore, mercy alone comprehends the whoe kingdom: regnum potissime dicetur regina misericordiae. therefore, the queen over the whole kingdom is most of all called queen of mercy.” b Ibid., p. 236b: Si construitur intransitive, sensus erit: b Ibid., p. 236b. “If it is constructed intransitively, the ipsa est regina misericordiae, id est, ipsa misericordia: sense will be: she is the queen of mercy, that is, she is sed adhuc dicitur vere regina misericordiae: unde et mercy itself: but still she is truly called queen of mercy: Esther quae est in figura beatae Virginis, alio nomine whence also Esther, who is a figure of the Blessed Edissa vocatur, quod est interpretatum misericordia. Virgin, is called by the other name of Edissa, which is Item, Isa. XVI, 5: Et praeparabitur in misericordia interpreted as mercy. Thus also Isaiah (16:5): ‘And a solium: sed solium proprie est in proprio loco regni: ergo throne will be prepared in mercy’; but the proper place misericordia est proprius locus regni: sed in utero beatae for the throne is in the proper place of the kingdom: Virginis vere et proprie requievit et collocata fuit tota therefore, mercy is the proper place of the kingdom. But divinitas et humanitas ipsi per Spiritum sanctum in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, prepared by the Holy praeparato: ergo ipsa proprius locus fuit regni: ergo ipsa Spirit, the whole divinity and humanity of Him truly and fuit misericordia, et cum hoc non immerito regina properly rested and was established. She was therefore misericordiae: quia ipsa seipsam perfecte possidendo the proper place of the kingdom: therefore she was semper bene rexit, nam ab ipsa numquam aliquid mercy, and so she is not called queen of mercy without indirectum processit. reason, because, perfectly possessing herself, she always ruled well, for nothing undirected ever proceeded from her. ”

265 c Ibid., p. 237a: ... propriissimum nomen quod c Ibid., p. 237a. “The most proper name which should be beatissimae Virgini secundum suam dignitatem summam given to the most blessed Virgin according to her debetur, est regina misericordiae ... Nec dicitur proprie consummate dignity is Queen of Mercy …For she is not regina pacis et dilectionis: quia nec hoc est omnibus sui properly called queen of peace and of love, because this regni universale. Melius dicitur regina misericordiae does not include all things under her universal reign. She quam regina potentiae vel sapientiae. In sapientia enim is also better called queen of mercy than queen of power intelligitur potentia, et non e converso. In misericordia or of wisdom. For in wisdom is understood in power and sapientia et potentia, et non e converso: unde not vice versa, while in mercy there is found wisdom and misericordia illa omnia tria claudit in se: unde regina power, but not vice versa. So mercy carries all three with misericordiae et regina potentiae et sapientiae, et non e it, and so the queen of mercy is also the queen of power converso. and wisdom, and not vice versa. ”

CHAPTER 33 NIGRA SUM, SED FORMOSA (SONGS 1:5)

Je suis noire, mais je suis belle. I am black, but I am beautiful. Vu l'immensité de la miséricorde que le Tout- Seeing the immensity of the mercy that the Puissant avait choisi de manifester, il était de toute Almighty chose to manifest, it was eminently convenance que la royauté universelle du Christ et fitting that the universal sovereignty of Christ and de sa mère fût manifestée dans la passion. Pilate lui of His mother be manifested in the passion. Pilate dit alors: Tu es donc roi? Jésus répondit: Tu le dis, said to Him: “You are then a king? Jesus answered: je suis roi. (Jo. XVIII, 37) C'est le même Christ qui It is you who say that I am a king” (Jn. 18:37). It is dit: Je suis un ver, et non un homme, l'opprobre des the same Christ who says: “I am a worm and not a hommes et le rebut du peuple, (Ps. XXI, 7) et: Je man, the shame of men and the outcast of the suis roi, Roi des rois et Seigneur des seigneurs. people” (Ps. 21:7), and: “I am a king, King of (Apoc. XIX, 16) C'est dans la passion qu'éclate kings, and Lord of lords” (Rev. 19:16). It is in the dans toute sa profondeur et toute son étendue le passion that the nigra sum, sed formosa shows nigra sum, sed formosa. forth in all its profundity and to its fullest extent. Reine de miséricorde, la Sainte Vierge est si Queen of mercy, the Blessed Virgin is so profondément enracinée dans la toute-puissance profoundly rooted in the divine omnipotence that in divine, que dans son issue, dans sa procession de her issue, in her procession from that power, she cette puissance, elle participe pour ainsi dire à participates, so to speak, in the incomprehensibility l'incompréhensibilité de cette même puissance. Sol of that same power. “Sol in aspectu annuncians in in aspectu annuncians in exitu, vas admirabile opus exitu, vas admirablile opus excelsi” (Sir. 43:2). — excelsi (Eccli. XLIII, 2)—sortant de Dieu elle Coming out of God she announces the sun in its annonce le soleil dans sa gloire: quel vase glory: what an admirable vessel is this work of the admirable est cette oeuvre du Très-Haut. Ne fut- Most High. Was she not herself troubled at first elle pas d'abord troublée elle-même devant la before the proximity to God, which Gabriel proximité de Dieu, que lui annonçait Gabriel? Elle announced to her? “She was troubled by his words” fut troublée de ses paroles. (Luc. I, 29) Si les anges (Lk. 1:29). If the most powerful of the blessed bienheureux les plus puissants tremblent et angels tremble and humble themselves before the s'humilient devant la puissance qui les élève si haut power which elevates them so high above the au-dessus de la dignité leur convenant par nature,a dignity that is appropriate to them by nature,a how combien plus profonds seront l'étonnement et much more profound will be the astonishment and l'humilité de la Sainte Vierge appelée à la dignité the humility of the Blessed Virgin called to the souveraine. Totam habet potestatem—Elle possède sovereign dignity. “Totam habet potestatem—She toute la puissance. Cet étonnement, cette possessed all power.”413 This astonishment, this connaissance imparfaite de la cause, demeurera imperfect knowledge of the cause, will remain for pour nous au terme. Admirabilis ero—Je serai us to the end. “Admirabilis ero—I will be étonnante. (Sap. VIII, 11) In plenitudine sancta astounding” (Wis. 8:11). “In plenitudine sancta

413 De Koninck is evidently quoting St. Albert: “…totam autem habet beatissima Virgo potestatem in coelo, in , et in inferno” (Mariale, p. 87b). This text is not previously cited in Ego Sapientia.

266 admirabitur—Elle étonnera l'assemblée des saints. admirabitur—She will astound the assembly of (Eccli. XXIV, 3) saints” (Sir. 24:3). a “Un grand frein est imposé à notre appétit lorsqu'il tend a “A considerable curb is imposed on our appetite when it vers un objet qui dépasse notre dignité, et qui ne peut être tends toward an object which surpasses our dignity, and atteint et conservé que par un secours étranger et gratuit. which cannot be attained and kept except by an D'où la raison pour laquelle nous chantons au sujet des extraneous and gratuitous assistance. Hence the reason saints anges: Tremunt Protestates—Les Puissances for which we sing with regard to the blessed angels: tremblent. Car, lorsque ce don qu'ils ont reçu de Dieu, et “Tremunt Potestates—The Powers tremble.” For insofar qu'ils sont certains de conserver éternellement, est as the gift they have received from God, and which they envisagé en rapport avec ce qu'ils ont par eux-mêmes, are certain of retaining eternally, is seen in relation to pour autant qu'ils ont été tirés du néant, etc., alors on peut what they have of themselves, inasmuch as they were dire qu'un tremblement s'élève en eux, parce qu'on ne drawn from nothingness, etc., then one can say that a voit rien en eux qui les rende dignes de ce don; on voit au trembling is aroused in them, because one sees nothing in contraire qu'ils peuvent en être privés, et que ce don leur them which renders them worthy of this gift; one sees on est fait tout entier gratuitement et sans mérite de leur the contrary that they could be deprived of it, and that part."-CAJETAN* this gift is given them in complete gratuity and without merit on their part.”—Cajetan.* *Cajetan, In IIam IIae, q. 161, a. 1, n. IV: Magnum * Cajetan, In IIam IIae, q.161, a.1, n. 4. “For indeed a namque frenum appetitui nostro imponitur cum ad great bridle is placed on our appetite when it tends objectum tenditur ut nostram superans dignitatem, et per toward an object that exceeds our dignity, and is to be alienum gratuitumque auxilium habendum aut received or retained by an external and gratuitous aid. conservandum. Unde et de sanctis angelis hac ratione This is why we also sing this account of the holy angels: canimus: Tremunt potestates. Relato namque Dei dono ‘The powers tremble.’ For through the relation of the gift quod habent, et de cujus aeterna conservatione sunt certi, they have received from God, whose eternal preservation ad id quod ex parte angelorum se tenet, pro quanto sunt is assured, to that which, on the part of the angels, they ex nihilo, etc., tremor insurgere dicitur: quia ex parte hold from themselves, inasmuch as thay are nothing from nulla condignitas, sed possibilis defectus patet, totumque themselves, etc., a trembling is said to arise, because alieno ac gratuito auxilio tribuitur. there appears no worthiness on their part, but rather the possibility of defect, and the whole is granted by an external and gratuitous aid.”

CHAPTER 34 NONNE STULTAM FECIT DEUS SAPIENTIAM HUJUS MUNDI? (1 COR. 1:20)

Dieu n'a-t-il pas convaincu de folie la Has not God made the wisdom of the world sagesse du monde ? foolishness? Puisqu’elle procède si admirablement de Since she proceeds so admirably from the l'incompréhensible abîme de la sagesse et de la incomprehensible abyss of divine wisdom and toute-puissance divines, est-il étonnant que le omnipotence, is it surprising that the world finds so monde trouve si dure toute parole qui magnifie la difficult every word which exalts the greatness and grandeur et la gloire de Marie? Dieu n'a-t-il pas the glory of Mary? “Did not God render foolish the rendu stupide la sagesse de ce monde? (I Cor. I, wisdom of this world? …Indeed, the wisdom of 20) En effet, la sagesse de ce monde est stupidité this world is foolishness to God” (1 Cor. 1:30; 1 auprès de Dieu. (I Cor. III, 19) Comment cette pure Cor. 3:19). How can this pure creature, so weak in créature, si faible dans sa nature, peut-elle être her nature, be clothed with all of the power that revêtue de toute la puissance que Dieu a daigné God deigned to manifest? “That which is God’s manifester? Ce qui est folie de Dieu est plus folly is wiser than the wisdom of men, and that sage que la sagesse des hommes, et ce qui est which is God’s weakness is stronger than the faiblesse de Dieu est plus fort que la force des strength of men” (1 Cor. 1:25). Is not the Blessed hommes. (I Cor. I, 25) La Sainte Vierge n'est-elle Virgin, in her darkness and in her beauty, the pas pour nous, dans sa noirceur et dans sa beauté, la touchstone for us of divine Wisdom? “Cunctas pierre de touche de la Sagesse divine? Cunctas haereses sola interemisti—By yourself, you have haereses sola interemisti—Vous avez anéanti à annihilated all heresies”a (From the Mass of Salve

267 vous seule toutes les hérésies.a (Trait de la Messe Sancta Parens). Salve sancta parens) a “Tous les vrais enfants de Dieu et prédestinés ont Dieu a “All the true children of God and the predestined have pour père et Marie pour mère; et qui n'a pas Marie pour God for their father and Mary for their mother; and who mère, n'a pas Dieu pour père. C'est pourquoi les does not have Mary for his mother does not have God for réprouvés comme les hérétiques, les schismatiques, etc., his father. That is why the damned as well as the heretics, qui haïssent ou regardent avec mépris ou indifférence la the schismatics, etc., who detest or regard with scorn or Très Sainte Vierge, n'ont point Dieu pour père, quoiqu'ils indifference the Most Blessed Virgin, do not have God s'en glorifient, parce qu'ils n'ont point Marie pour mère: for their father, even though they glorify themselves, car s'il l'avaient pour mère, ils l'aimeraient et because they do not have Mary for their mother; for if l'honoreraient comme un vrai et bon enfant aime they had her for their mother, they would love her and naturellement sa mère qui lui a donné la vie. Le signe le honor her as a true and good child naturally loves his plus infaillible et le plus indubitable pour distinguer un mother who has given him life. The most infallible and hérétique, un homme de mauvaise doctrine, un réprouvé, indubitable sign to distinguish a heretic, a man of bad d'avec un prédestiné, c'est que l'hérétique et le réprouvé doctrine, a reprobate, from one predestined, it is that the n'ont que du mépris ou de l'indifférence pour la Très heretic and the reprobate have nothing but scorn or Sainte Vierge, tâchant, par leurs paroles et exemples, d'en indifference for the Most Blessed Virgin, attempting, by diminuer le culte et l'amour, ouvertement ou en cachette, their words and example, to diminish her cult and the quelquefois sous de beaux prétextes. Hélas! Dieu le Père love of her, openly or in secret, sometimes under n'a point dit à Marie de faire sa demeure en eux parce pleasing pretexts. Alas! God the Father has not told Mary qu'ils sont des Esaüs." -DE MONTFORT.* to make her home in them because they are Esaus.”—De Montfort* *Grignion de Montfort, op. cit., n. 30, pp. 19-20. *St. Louis de Montfort, True Devotion, n. 30.

268 Chapters 31-34: Unfolding the Most Profound Sense of Nigra Sum sed

Formosa

Chapter 30 concludes the unfolding of the series of senses of “black but beautiful,” which follows a division of the kinds of privation or misery in the world, the greatest being the evil of sin. This is the fullest realization of divine mercy, and thus also the deepest sense of “black but beautiful:” Mary is born from the line of

Adam in order to participate in the redemption of Adam’s sin and all the sins of her own race. In her blackness she becomes beautiful with the beauty of mercy itself.

Chapters 31-33 further unfold this highest expression of mercy in Mary, which consists in being made a principle of mercy.

Chapter 31 considers the unique relationship that Mary has to the principle of mercy. “When we call the Blessed Virgin mother of mercy,” De Koninck writes, “we do not understand only the mercy that is in her by an accidental mode and by inherence, but we understand also her maternity as an essential origin of mercy.”414

The title names not simply the virtue of mercy in Mary’s soul, but the fact that by her maternity Mary is a principle of the mercy that God shows to man in the ways discussed above—namely, by inviting the divine mercy and receiving it for the whole world through her humility, by giving a passible human nature to her Son, by educating Him in preparation for the fulfillment of His mission in the world, and by participating in that fulfillment.

414 Ego Sapientia, 31.1.

269 Chapter 32 takes us a step further: Mary is not only the Mother of mercy but the Queen of Mercy. The motherhood of Mary is tied to the gift of redemptive grace, by which human beings are spiritually reborn.415 It is universal with respect to redeemed humanity, but it is not universal simply speaking. Mary’s queenship, on the other hand, extends to all angels and saints, and even to all creatures, including those who have fallen away from God. The reason for this universality is the universality proper to mercy. Mercy is the first principle of the divine works ad extra; it orders all things toward the manifestation and diffusion of divine goodness, not even excluding sin.416 But why does Mary participate in this universality?

In the preceding chapter, De Koninck wrote that Mary is not only mother of mercy because she herself is merciful, but because she is the cause and origin of the mercy God manifests, above all in giving the Son to the world. Here De Koninck adds that “Mary is not only queen of mercy in that she is the cause of all the mercy God deigned to manifest, but, as we have seen, we can attribute mercy to her as a substantial predicate.” Mary can be identified with the first principle, with mercy itself.

No explicit argument has been made that mercy can be predicated substantially of Mary. The conclusion seems to be an application of the argument of

415 “Let us note that, indeed, all our grace is essentially redemptive. Now, as Christ is our head in that He communicates to us the grace merited by His passion—whereas in relationship to the substantial grace and glory of the angels He is head only by His own authority, as John of St. Thomas says: so the Most Blessed Virgin is not only our queen by her dignity, as she is queen of the angels, but, even more is she our mother with regards to the generation of redemptive grace. Mater divinae gratiae” (Ego Sapientia, 30.1). 416 “There exists a fourth origination by which good comes out of evil, and this one is the property of God alone whose wisdom conquers all malice, because it attains all things in their principle and their term—attingens a fine usque ad finem (Wis. 8:1)” (Pseudo-Albert, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 28.1).

270 the first part, which saw Mary as the final cause, and therefore first principle of the divine works. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, uses the phrase causa causarum to refer to the end or the good, because the end is that for the sake of which the agent acts at all; it has priority and is most powerful because it leads the other causes to cause.417 Now, Mary is the final cause of creation with Christ in the ways discussed in the first part. She is a separated common good, a principle of the return of all creatures to God, a principle of the diffusion of divine goodness by attaining this goodness herself in a pre-eminent way.

St. Bernard, as De Koninck tells us at the outset of the second part, calls mercy the causalissima causarum, that which is most of all cause of causes.418 Within

God Himself, who is pure act, there can be no causality. There is no cause of the Son, no final cause of the processions. All causality refers (on the side of the thing caused) to that which depends on another for some actuality, and therefore, all causality refers (again, as to the effect) to what is outside of God Himself. The divine goodness as diffusive of itself is the end of all things, and as De Koninck argues, mercy is the primary mode of the diffusion of goodness outside of God. Among final causes, the divine goodness, in the mode of mercy, is most of all cause of causes. In

417 “Another meaning of cause is found in other causes, i.e., insofar as the end or the good has the nature [ratio] of a cause. And this species of cause is the most powerful of all the causes, for the final cause is the cause of the other causes. For it is clear that the agent acts for the sake of the end. And likewise it was shown above in regard to artificial things that the form is ordered to use as to an end, and matter is ordered to form as to an end. And to this extent the end is called the cause of causes” (In Physic., lib. 2 l. 5 n. 11). “In aliis vero causis invenitur alia ratio causae, secundum scilicet quod finis vel bonum habet rationem causae. Et haec species causae potissima est inter alias causas: est enim causa finalis aliarum causarum causa. Manifestum est enim quod agens agit propter finem; et similiter ostensum est supra in artificialibus, quod formae ordinantur ad usum sicut ad finem, et materiae in formas sicut in finem: et pro tanto dicitur finis causa causarum.” 418 “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth (Ps. 24:10). This is why St. Bernard calls the mercy of God ‘causalissima causarum’—that which is preeminently cause of all the causes” (St. Bernard, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 17.2).

271 Mary the internal term or end of creation, the manifestation of God ad extra, is most fully accomplished. Therefore, Mary is the measure of all the other works of divine mercy—not only the salvation of the saints, but the order of all creatures, even of the angels and the demons.

In a lecture on “The Nature of Mary’s Universal Queenship,” De Koninck repeats this distinction between Mary as mother and as queen, and then adds a second distinction, closely connected to the first. “The concept of Mother naturally evokes that of generation, and that of family,” De Koninck writes, “whereas the concept of Queen suggests to our mind the idea of a political society.”419 Parents bring the child into existence and educate him to maturity as a member of the family. But only in his maturity can the child himself act within society as a whole.

Civil society—being, precisely, a perfect society—has the mission of endowing the citizen, already mature, with esse perfectum: that is to say, with the perfection of his activity, with freedom (causa sui), as incorporated in the perfection of political life.420

419 “Universal Queenship.” 420 “Universal Queenship,” citing Aquinas, In I Ethic., lect. 1, n. 4: “It must be understood that, because man is by nature a social animal, needing many things to live which he cannot get for himself if alone, he naturally is a part of a community that furnishes him help to live well. He needs this help for two reasons. First, to have what is necessary for life, without which he cannot live the present life; and for this, man is helped by the domestic community of which he is a part. For every man is indebted to his parents for his generation and his nourishment and instruction. Likewise individuals, who are members of the family, help one another to procure the necessities of life. In another way, man receives help from the community of which he is a part to have a perfect sufficiency for life; namely, that man may not only live but live well, having everything sufficient for life; and in this way man is helped by the civic group, of which he is a member, not only in regard to bodily needs—as certainly in the city there are many crafts which a single household cannot provide—but also in regard to right conduct, inasmuch as public authority restrains with fear of punishment delinquent young men whom paternal admonition is not able to correct.” “Sciendum est autem, quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; consequens est, quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicuius multitudinis, per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum. Quo quidem auxilio indiget ad duo. Primo quidem ad ea quae sunt vitae necessaria, sine quibus praesens vita transigi non potest: et ad hoc auxiliatur homini domestica multitudo, cuius est pars. Nam quilibet homo a parentibus habet generationem et nutrimentum et disciplinam et similiter etiam singuli, qui sunt partes domesticae familiae, seinvicem iuvant ad necessaria vitae. Alio modo iuvatur homo a multitudine, cuius est pars, ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et

272

Queenship pertains in a particular way to the relation of each part to the perfect society, to the City. Because the governance of mercy extends to all things, it pertains to the highest order of each thing to God. Mary, who as a separated common good is compared to the City of God itself because she pre-contains the whole in a higher way, is fittingly also the Queen of this City because she communicates that good knowingly to the parts. “She was mercy itself,” says the author of the Mariale, “and at the same time she was, not without reason, queen of mercy because, possessing herself perfectly, she always governed well, for nothing that ever came out of her was without direction.”421

De Koninck concludes Chapter 32 by identifying the title “Queen of Mercy” as

“the most proper name of the Blessed Virgin,” according to her dignity.422 This dignity of Mary is the union with and consequent power to reveal the divine goodness, the formositas, about which we have been speaking throughout the second part.423 Chapter 33 considers this peak of beauty more closely in relation to the moment in which the darkness of sin is also most evident. The Passion of Christ is the moment at which that darkness is both fully exposed and definitively overcome, and so “it was eminently fitting that the universal sovereignty of Christ and of His mother be manifested” at the same hour.424

bene vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt ad vitam: et sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis, cuius ipse est pars, non solum quantum ad corporalia, prout scilicet in civitate sunt multa artificia, ad quae una domus sufficere non potest, sed etiam quantum ad moralia; inquantum scilicet per publicam potestatem coercentur insolentes iuvenes metu poenae, quos paterna monitio corrigere non valet.” 421 Pseudo-Albert, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 32.2. 422 Ego Sapientia, 32.2. 423 Cf. the discussion of wisdom and beauty in footnote 311. 424 Ego Sapientia, 33.1.

273 In his lecture on the queenship of Mary, De Koninck offers three ways in which the proximate cause of her queenship can be considered, all of which derive from the Kingship of her Son. First, Mary is Queen by grace. Her unique graces, above all the Immaculate Conception, as we saw in the first part, are proportioned to her role as the Mother of the one whose Kingdom will be without end. “By her

Immaculate Conception she was made to be the ‘worthy dwelling-place’ of this her

Son even as He is Savior and King.”425 Secondly, Mary is Queen by divine relationship, by her intimate relationship with the Persons of the Trinity. This is an argument of fittingness. This relationship does not constitute, but calls for the dignity of queenship.

But the dignity which is hers by reason of the unique relationship with the Blessed Trinity—as daughter of the Father, mother of the Son, and spouse of the Holy Ghost—would be diminished in its effect if she did not deserve a corresponding and therefore supreme authority in the Kingdom of her Son.426

In both cases, by grace and by divine relationship, Mary’s role is proportioned to being Mother of the Son as King.

The third proximate cause of Mary’s queenship, however, brings her much closer to Christ’s Kingship itself. It is at the Passion that Christ definitively establishes His reign and it is her participation in that redemptive work that most directly establishes Mary as Queen. “Like her Son who is King, Mary is Queen ‘by right of conquest,’” De Koninck writes. Then, quoting the words of Pope Pius XII, he says, “she was ‘associated with the King of Martyrs in the ineffable work of human

425 “Universal Queenship.” 426 “Universal Queenship.”

274 Redemption as Mother and Cooperatrix.’”427 As we saw in the first part, it belongs to

Mary’s role as a common good that she is a principle in the work of redemption.

Because this work is also the way in which Christ enters into His reign, she is a co- principle of His Kingship.428 The height of beauty in Mary, as Queen of Mercy, appears most completely at the hour that the divine Mercy conquers sin and death.

Thus, De Koninck repeats here the assertion of Chapter 30, that “it is in the passion that the nigra sum, sed formosa shows forth in all its profundity and to its fullest extent.”429

The second half of Chapter 33, together with Chapter 34, hearkens back to the first part of Ego Sapientia.

Queen of mercy, the Blessed Virgin is so profoundly rooted in the divine omnipotence that in her issue, in her procession from that power, she participates, so to speak, in the incomprehensibility of that same power. Sol in aspectu annuncians in exitu, vas admirablile opus excelsi (Sir. 43:2)— Coming out of God she announces the sun in its glory.430

The language of rootedness echoes the theological high point in Chapter 10:

“Daughter of the eternal Father, mother of the Son, spouse of the Holy Spirit, she is

427 De Koninck identifies this text in “Universal Queenship” as coming from “an allocution of His Holiness Pius XII, intended for the pilgrims to Fatima in 1946.” It is this text on which he has been commenting in giving the three reasons for Mary’s queenship. The full block of text he provides from the Holy Father’s talk is as follows: “He, the Son of God, reflects on His heavenly Mother the glory, the majesty and the dominion of His Kingship; for, having been associated with the King of Martyrs in the ineffable work of human Redemption as Mother and Cooperatrix, she remains for ever associated to Him, with an almost unlimited power, in the dispensation of graces which flow from the Redemption. Jesus is King throughout all eternity by nature and by right of conquest; through Him with Him and subordinate to Him, Mary is Queen by grace, by divine relationship, by right of conquest and by singular election. And her kingdom is as vast as that of her Son and God, since nothing is excluded from her dominion.” 428 We should add, as De Koninck does, that Christ is already King by nature, because He is a divine Person, though His kingship is proper to His humanity, since the King is most properly of one nature with His subjects. By giving birth to the divine Person in His humanity, Mary is a principle of His kingship in this sense as well. But the reign of Christ is set up when He establishes the new order of grace, and Mary is complicit in this establishment. 429 Ego Sapientia, 33.1. 430 Ego Sapientia, 33.2.

275 rooted in the Trinity, and she ties up the order of the universe, in a radically new way, with the order that is in God according to the processions.”431 Procession itself is a second point of contact. In Chapter 13 De Koninck connected the circular order that God communicates to creation through Mary with the procession of the Son.

That circularity reappears here from the perspective of Mary’s procession from the divine power. She makes so perfect a return in her coming forth that she even participates in the transcendence of her origin.

The absolute peak has been touched when we say of Mary, “Totam habet potestatem—She possesses all power.”432 The maximal manifestation of the omnipotence of God is to bring a creature to such an intimacy with Himself that she enters into every movement of this very power. “She participates, so to speak, in the incomprehensibility of that same power.”433 This return also shows the perfection and uniqueness of the return God accomplishes in Mary, who stands in a sense between the perfect unity of the Father and Son in essence and in love, and the union of the rational creature with the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit. The beauty of Mary as Queen of Mercy, is deeply connected to the divine processions, in which she is rooted and which she has been chosen to communicate to the world.

Chapter 34 picks up the final thought of the preceding chapter, that Mary will always remain a cause of wonder to us, and even to the angels. We experience wonder when we see something and cannot understand what makes it to be as it is,

431 Ego Sapientia, 10.1; emphasis added. 432 Ego Sapientia, 33.2. 433 Ego Sapientia, 33.2.

276 when we see something surpassing the power of any known cause.434 De Koninck argues that Mary so perfectly manifests the divine power, which cannot be fully grasped by any finite understanding, that she will always necessarily remain a cause of wonder. Our finite minds, and even the finite minds of the angels, will be unable to fully grasp her glory.435

This conclusion of the deepest sense of the nigra sum, sed formosa parallels the conclusion of the first part of the work. Chapter 16 began:

Do we marvel at the supereminent ‘formositas’ of this pure creature, of this wholly created wisdom? Has not she been called “Admirable mother,” that is to say, mother, principle, of which the cause is unfathomable? The most marvelous of all God’s purely created works, Mary causes us to better glimpse the incomprehensibility of the Wisdom which precedes all things.436

In Chapter 34, De Koninck brings together the themes of the wisdom and power of

God which Mary manifests, repeating the question above in a somewhat sharper form. “Since she proceeds so admirably from the incomprehensible abyss of divine wisdom and omnipotence, is it surprising that the world finds so difficult the language which magnifies the greatness and the glory of Mary?”437

The opening mottos of Ego Sapientia affirm that it is not possible to praise

Mary enough. “The excellence of the glorious Virgin is so great that all language is

434 “Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding” (STh Ia IIae, q32 a8 co.). “Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius.” 435 Mary herself remains finite, as does even the humanity of her Son. Yet just as the death of the Son in the flesh does not cease to produce awe in the one who contemplates it because of the Love it lays bare, so the splendor of Mary is an inexhaustible cause of wonder because the same divine Love appears so powerfully by it. 436 Ego Sapientia, 16.1. 437 Ego Sapientia, 34.1.

277 powerless to give an account of it and to praise it: the Scriptures are powerless, the prophecies are powerless, and the parabolic images are as well.”438 Mary’s participation in the very incomprehensibility of her cause is the reason that all finite conceptions, and a fortiori, all expressions of Mary’s dignity will be incomplete. This point was already made in Chapter 16, but when it reappears at the apex of the nigra sum, sed formosa, it carries with it an essential nuance: Mary is wisdom and mercy precisely as a creature—she is beautiful with divine gifts not despite but through her very blackness.

We have already mentioned several times De Koninck’s phrase, that “the being which things would hold from themselves would be nothingness.”439 This point touches on the distinction between the divine being and creaturely being. The divine being subsists in and through itself: God’s essence is identical with His existence. The creature’s essence, on the other hand, is distinct from its existence.

This is true from the lowest created being to the highest angel. Or we could say from the other side that created esse does not subsist at all, but is a principle whereby the creature subsists.

Because there is nothing more fundamental to the creature than this received way of being, every perfection that God gives to the creature, while a likeness and an effect of His own simple perfection, is infinitely removed from God. Certainly many qualities entail a certain imperfection in themselves, and it is clear that these attributes cannot belong to God as they do to creatures. God cannot be smooth or red as creatures are, because these characteristics entail materiality. But even in the

438 St. Bonaventure, quoted in Ego Sapientia, second motto. 439 Ego Sapientia, 10.1.

278 case of perfections that do not imply any finitude in themselves, such as wisdom, we cannot say that they are the same in the creature as in God, because it is the creature’s very being that is not in its own right.440

The very being of a creature entails a certain coming together of opposites, of not being from itself, and of received being and perfection. This is true of Mary as it is of every creature. The doctrine of the primacy of mercy contains this very coincidence of opposites. Speaking about the supernatural elevation of man in general, De Koninck writes:

Here the creature is raised up to God. But the distance between the creature and God is infinitely greater than the distance between the creature and nothingness. The creature is near the void, and infinitely distant from God as He is in Himself. So when we talk about the supernatural order, we must insist on the divine transcendence. He is utterly other. This is where we have to see by the via negationis.441

440 “Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term ‘wise’ applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term ‘wise’ applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures” (STh Ia, q13 a5 co.). “Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.” 441 “Mercy and Redemption. ” “Ici la créature est élevée à Dieu. Or la distance entre la créature et Dieu est infiniment plus grande que la distance entre la créature et le néant. La créature est toute proche du néant, mais infiniment distante de Dieu tel qu’i est en Lui-même. C’est pourquoi lorsque nous parlons de l’ordre surnaturel, il faut tant insister sur la transcendance divine. Il est tellement autre. C’est ici qu’il faut voir la via negationis.”

279 The argument only takes on an additional poignancy when we speak about Mary in particular. When De Koninck calls her wisdom itself and claims that she possesses all power, he does not mean that she is wisdom as He is wisdom, or that she is all- powerful from herself, as God is. God makes Mary, with Himself, a principle of the effects proper to wisdom and mercy, in their entirety. Mary is nothing from herself: the mysterious thing is that God can make that very nothing a principle. It is precisely this that manifests His transcendence.

Essential to this transcendence is God’s proper way of causing. To better grasp this nuance, we might formulate an additional objection to calling Mary, a mere creature, Wisdom and Mercy, in the form of a general principle of Luther’s theory of justification. He writes:

This doctrine of grace gives all glory and everything to God alone and nothing to human beings… The doctrine of the Gospel takes away all glory, wisdom, justice, etc., from human beings and gives it to the Creator alone… My doctrine is one that preaches and worships God alone, and it condemns the justice and the wisdom of all human beings.442

Applying this principle to the text from the Song of Songs, we would have to say that

Mary is black in herself, while God, who is in her, is beautiful. We could call her a vessel of the Trinity, but we could not apply to her proper person, to her own being, the attributes of Wisdom and Mercy, except perhaps by a kind of hyperbole or metaphor.443

442 , Lectures on Galatians in Luther’s Works, vol. 26, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), 66. 443 The argument is not intended to confront Luther’s own explicit Mariology, but is a general objection derived from his view of grace and divine causality.

280 But this principle seems to show a misguided jealousy for the divine causality, a jealousy that in truth lowers the divine power to the kind of power exercised by creatures in a competitive way. Mercy manifests the divine omnipotence precisely because it is proper to the one who is higher to raise up the lowly, proper to the Almighty to create being out of nothing, proper to the divine goodness to bring good out of evil. It is proper to divine power to invest “this pure creature” with “all of the power that God deigned to manifest.”444 The wisdom of

God, Chapter 34 concludes, seems like foolishness to men. We do not have the humility to understand mercy, as Mary did, and this will be the theme of the final section of Ego Sapientia, which reveals the order that mercy realizes in creation in contrast to the order that the proud would have imposed.

Excursus on St. Louis de Montfort and Slavery to Mary

The Connection between Ego Sapientia and the Devotion of Slavery to Mary

At the end of Chapter 34, at the conclusion of the section on Mary’s queenship, De Koninck places a text from St. Louis de Montfort.445 Though de

Montfort is only directly quoted six times in Ego Sapientia, the indications of his influence are nevertheless substantial. Direct signs within the text include the choice to bookend the entire work with his words—the final introductory motto, immediately before the foreword, and the concluding words of the last chapter are

444 Ego Sapientia, 34.1. 445 This quote from de Montfort is contained in a footnote on the same page as the chapter to which it is appended, unlike the majority of notes, which appear at the end of the work.

281 both de Montfort’s—and the reference to his doctrine in the foreword.446 This reference is ambiguous, as it is not clear in the text what doctrine of de Montfort had particular influence. But the same idea is repeated and unfolded in De Koninck’s private correspondence, especially with the Montfortian priest, Fr. Henri-Marie

Guindon, who wrote him after reading Ego Sapientia. In these letters De Koninck calls de Montfort’s book, True Devotion to Mary, the “thunderbolt” behind the writing of Ego Sapientia.447 He also says that he would withdraw from it any word of which de Montfort would not approve.448

The influence of the latter is therefore beyond question, but what is the primary content of that influence? True Devotion, as the title indicates, concerns the practice of devotion to Mary, while De Koninck’s book is speculative and doctrinal, explaining the place of Mary in the divine economy and the order of the universe. It is worth repeating here the thesis of Fr. Romanus Cessario quoted in the introduction, which suggests the link between these works:

I would say that De Koninck shows the authentic Thomist philosophical undergirding of Saint Louis Marie Grignion de Montfort’s True Devotion. In other words, De Koninck explains the speculative underpinnings of de Montfort’s Marian and Christological blueprint for Christian living. Ad Iesum per Mariam.449

446 “How can I express my gratitude to all of my friends who, not always realizing it, collaborated on this book? It is Jacques de Monléon who first introduced me to the role of mercy; it is an American Jew who taught me the doctrine of the Blessed de Montfort” (Ego Sapientia, foreword, 2). 447 “It was the reading of True Devotion that was the thunderbolt for me—in 1941” (De Koninck to Guindon, June 11, 1943). “C’est la lecture de la Vraie Dévotion qui a été pour moi le coup de foudre___ en 1941.” 448 “If there was in what I wrote only the shadow of an idea contrary to a single word of Grignon de Montfort, I repudiate it readily” (De Koninck to Guindon, June 11, 1943). “S’il y avait dans ce que j’ai écrit seulement l’ombre d’une idée contraire à une seule parole de Grignon de Montfort, je la répudierais avec empressement.” 449 Fr. Romanus Cessario O.P., “Ego Sapientia: The Mariology of Laval Thomism,” paper presented at the conference, Philosophy in Theological Education: A Conference in Honor of Ralph McInerny, Center for the Renewal of Catholic Theology & Aquinas Center, Ave Maria University, Ave Maria, FL,

282

By showing the objective place of Mary in the divine plan, and her objective relationship to all men and to believers in particular, De Koninck shows the reason for the subjective attitude toward Mary that should mark the spiritual life of the believer.

De Koninck’s letters to the Montfortian priest refer to this devotion specifically under the aspect of holy slavery. This theme continued to occupy De

Koninck, resulting in an article a few years later that directly defends the use of the language of slavery to Mary.450 The notion of slavery provides a transition between

Mary as Queen of Mercy and the final section of the work, which looks at the rejection of mercy from the fall of the angels to the last days of this world—to which

Mary herself is God’s answer. This last section deals in particular with the evil tendencies of our own time, and the so-called personalist principle about which he speaks at length in his work On the Primacy of the Common Good.

In one of his letters to De Koninck, Guindon mentions that he has been reading both works simultaneously, and has seen a deep connection between the need to love Mary more than ourselves and the rejection of personalism expressed in the Common Good.451 De Koninck replies:

Feb. 11, 2011. 450 “Une Question du mot ou La perfection de la liberté,” Revue Dominicaine 53, no. 2 (1947): 3- 12, 275-283. Hereafter, “Question du mot” or “Perfection de la liberté” (the second part of the article is designated by the second title). 451 “‘…Just as we must love Christ more than ourselves, we must love the Virgin Mary more than ourselves’ (Ego Sapientia, 52). How strong and moving this is. It is in radical opposition to the personalism, unconscious or not, of so many individuals. ‘The pure I. The I with all it has most from itself as subject, willed, this time, as an end’ (Bien Commun, 114). The consecration to which Montfort leads us, is it not immediately directed against this tendency to the exaltation of the self?451 And to be consecrated to Mary as a slave in order to better belong through her to Jesus, Incarnate Wisdom, is this not to love them both more than self? And the term ‘consecration’ as used univocally for both,

283 You have well understood that Ego Sapientia is a much more radical attack against personalism than the Common Good. And I must admit that my certainty of the absolute incompatibility between personalism and slavery to Mary was the deepest principle of my attack against the personalists.452

In the excursus on personalism, we will look more closely at what De Koninck means by this term, and its relationship to the primacy of the common good and to mercy. Here we simply note that in De Koninck’s mind, personalism is closely connected, and opposed, to the devotion of slavery to Mary. In the post-scriptum of this same letter, De Koninck likewise connects holy slavery directly with the queenship of Mary.

If I understand correctly, the holy slavery of Mary is absolutely inseparable from the recognition of her titles of Mother and of Queen of mercy. I mean that everyone must recognize this slavery, at least implicitly, as an essential condition for any participation in the kingdom of God. …In short, since the kingdom of God is based on mercy as such, and since Mary is Queen of this kingdom, it is impossible to be chosen for this kingdom without being a slave of this Queen.453

does it not have here alone its whole strength and its real signification?” (Guindon to De Koninck, June 15, 1943). “«…De même qu’il faut aimer le Christ plus que soi-même, il faut aimer la Sainte Vierge plus que soi-même. » (p. 52) Comme cela est fort et touchant. Opposition radical au personnalisme inconscient ou non de tant d’individus. « Le pur moi. Le moi avec tout ce qu’il tient le plus de lui-même comme sujet, voulu, cette fois, comme fin. » (Bien Commun, 114) La consécration à laquelle nous conduit Montfort n’est-elle pas directement dirigée contre cette tendance à l’exaltation du moi? Et se consacrer à Marie comme esclave pour mieux appartenir par elle à Jésus, Sagesse Incarnée, n’est-ce pas les aimer tous deux plus que soi? Et le terme « consécration » employé univoquement pour les deux n’a-t-il pas ici seulement toute sa force et sa réelle signification?” 452 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “Vous avez bien compris que « Ego Sapientia » est une attaque beaucoup plus radicale contre le personnalisme que le « Bien Commun. » Et je dois reconnaître que ma certitude de l’incompatibilité absolue entre le personnalisme et l’esclavage de Marie a été le principe le plus profond de mon attaque contre les personnalistes.” (Emphasis added). 453 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “Si j’ai bien compris, le saint esclavage de Marie est absolument inséparable de la reconnaissance de ses titres de Mère et de Reine de miséricorde. Je veux dire que tous doivent reconnaître, au moins implicitement, cet esclavage comme condition essentielle de toute participation au règne de Dieu. … Bref, puisque le royaume de Dieu est fondé sur la miséricorde comme telle et, puisque Marie est Reine de ce royaume, il est impossible d’être élu de ce royaume sans être esclave de cette Reine.”

284 The devotion of slavery is the Montfortian doctrine that most clearly influenced De

Koninck’s Mariology, and the doctrine for which Ego Sapientia provides the speculative underpinnings, relating in a particular way to the two final parts of the work. We will therefore pause here to look at De Koninck’s account of holy slavery in its own right and in its relation to Mary’s queenship. Afterward we will see more directly how it relates to the question of personalism in our consideration of the final part of the book.

Holy Slavery and Human Freedom

De Koninck introduces his article on the devotion of slavery to Mary with the objection that the term “slave” seems contrary to the dignity of the human person, and especially to the dignity of the children of God. He readily concedes that any devotion that implies “a state of degradation” or “a renunciation of the freedom of the children of God” must be rejected as unworthy of the Christian.454 This cannot be the meaning of the doctrine of de Montfort, which is approved and commended by the Church, he continues. The difficulty arises, De Koninck says, from a failure to understand slavery as an analogous term, to distinguish between the sense according to which it was first imposed, and what belongs to it properly.

The term was used first with respect to slavery within human societies: the belonging of one man to another, unconditionally and for life, in all external things, including the bodily life of the slave. This slavery generally entails coercion and abjection. Yet it is not the belonging as such, nor the totality of belonging that brings

454 “Question du mot,” 5. “Mais d’abord nous n’hésiterons pas un instant à dire qu’il faudrait rejeter plus que le mot s’il devait signifier un état d’avilissement, un renoncement à la liberté de enfants de Dieu, citoyens des saints, et membres de la famille de Dieu.”

285 with it these negative aspects, De Koninck says. In fact, what makes human slavery degrading is the very thing that makes it, at the same time, only partial—limited to what is external.

Such belonging, total in some respects, was nevertheless restricted spiritually. "He is wrong," said Seneca quoted by St. Thomas, "who thinks that slavery takes possession of the whole man. The best part of himself escapes it. The body is undoubtedly in dependence on master and belongs to him; but the soul is the master of itself (sui juris)."455

The master in the human institution of slavery lacks authority over the inner man.

This limitation is a consequence of the nobility of the human person, who never ceases to govern his own actions at least inwardly, and therefore cannot be compelled by any created power in the interior act of his will. Yet, it is precisely because of the disjunction between external and internal that slavery in human society entails a certain coercion and abjection.

If the will of a slave is contrary to his master’s command, he acts under a certain compulsion. The citizen, on the other hand, retains “a certain ‘potentia contradictionis.’”456 To be denied the power to act externally in accord with one’s

455 “Question du mot,” 8. “Toutefois, cette appartenance, totale à certains égards, n’en restait pas moins spirituellement restreinte. « Il se trompe, disait Sénèque cité par S. Thomas, celui qui pense que l’esclavage s’empare de l’homme tout entier. La meilleure partie de lui-même y échappe. Le corps est sans doute dans la dépendance du maître et lui appartient ; mais l’âme est maîtresse d’elle-même (sui juris),»” quoting III de Beneficiis, c. 20 ; IIaIIae, q104 a5 co. “Errat si quis existimat servitutem in totum hominem descendere. Pars eius melior excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt et adscripta dominis, mens quidem est sui iuris. Et ideo in his quae pertinent ad interiorem motum voluntatis, homo non tenetur homini obedire, sed solum Deo”(STh IIa IIae, q104 a5 co.). “Errat, si quis existimat servitutem in totum hominem descendere. Pars melior eius excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt et adscripta dominis; mens quidem sui iuris, quae adeo libera et vaga est, ut ne ab hoc quidem carcere, cui inclusa est, teneri queat, quominus impetu suo utatur et ingentia agat et in infinitum comes caelestibus exeat. Corpus itaque est, quod domino fortuna tradidit; hoc emit, hoc vendit; interior illa pars mancipio dari non potest. Ab hac quidquid venit, liberum est; nec enim aut nos omnia iubere possumus aut in omnia servi parere coguntur; contra rem publicam imperata non facient, nulli sceleri manus commodabunt” (Seneca, De Beneficiis, III c. 20). 456 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943.

286 inner judgment is also no doubt a debasement. The slave is ordered in a total way to the good of his master, as other; slavery among men denotes an alienation from the good. Thus, “in the purely human order, the citizen participates much more deeply and much more directly in the common good than the slave.”457

There is, on the other hand, a kind of belonging that comprehends the whole man. This sense of slavery, De Koninck argues, is more perfect in what is essential, namely, in totality of belonging, and at the same time is free of the accidental aspects of coercion and abjection. All men by nature belong in this total sense to God, who is the final and true common good of all creatures. “Being fully of God, as to being and as to act, belonging to God in all that he is, man is by His very nature a slave of

God.”458

But, De Koninck raises the objection, isn’t slavery contrary as such to the dignity of the human person? After all, rational creatures are far above the irrational in dignity because they are self-directing; they are free agents! Doesn’t all slavery necessarily entail a debasement of the rational creature to the level of a mere, unthinking “thing?” De Koninck replies that this objection itself already contains a certain reduction of the dignity of the person. “The person is not of a nature so poor that his prerogative is reduced to a simple, albeit lofty, elevation above irrational things.”459 The dignity of the rational nature is in its power to attain things higher and nobler than itself. And yet, the capacity is only that; it does not guarantee that a

457 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “Dans l’ordre purement humain, le citoyen participe beaucoup plus profondément et plus directement au bien commun que l’esclave.” 458 “Question du mot,” 9. “Etant entièrement de Dieu, quant à l’être et quant à l’agir ; appartenant à Dieu selon tout ce qu’il est, l’homme est par sa nature même esclave de Dieu.” 459 “Perfection de la liberté,” 276. “Mais cette personne n'est pas d'une nature si médiocre que son apanage se réduise à une simple encore que grande élévation au-dessus des choses irraisonnables.”

287 man actually turns himself toward these higher things. “The knowledge of his capacity for higher goods, which constitutes his real dignity, is hardly an advantage when it is used by men to assert themselves against each other, even to applaud themselves, and to eat the cake before it is cooked.”460 Thus man’s highest dignity is not found in his nature as such, or even as capacity, but in the actual attainment of his true end.

The derived and dependent nature of this dignity shows us that belonging to another in a radical way, so far from being contrary to our dignity as persons, is essential to it. “We are persons who belong to another in all that they are,” De

Koninck writes, “who have from another and for another their livelihood, their being as persons, their being itself as their being-for-itself, their free action even as to its mode. This is our complete belonging of nature.”461 In speaking about the received mode of free action, De Koninck returns us to the issue of divine transcendence, and the causality proper to God mentioned in the preceding section. Every human act depends on the divine movement. Thus, the condition of slavery “is prior to and interior to our will.”462 Not only do we depend on God for a rational nature, but this dependence reaches the very exercise and act of that nature. “Whether we like it or not, and even by not wanting it, nothing can escape the influence of the universal

460 “Perfection de la liberté,” 276. “Du reste, la connaissance de son aptitude aux biens supérieurs qui font sa réelle dignité est à peine un avantage quand elle ne sert aux hommes qu'à s'affirmer les uns contre les autres, à s'applaudir même, et à manger le gâteau avant qu'il ne soit cuit.” 461 “Perfection de la liberté,” 277. “nous sommes des personnes qui appartiennent à autrui par tout ce qu'elles sont; qui tiennent d'autrui et pour autrui leur subsistance, leur être-personne, leur être-soi-même comme leur être-pour-soi, leur libre agir même quant à son mode. C'est notre appartenance entière de nature.” 462 “Perfection de la liberté,” 277. “Elle est antérieure et intérieure à notre volonté.”

288 cause that overcomes the persecutor by the patience of the martyr. From the slavery of nature there is no freedom except in non-being.”463

463 “Perfection de la liberté,” 277. “Que nous le voulions ou non, et meme en ne le voulant pas, rien ne peut se soustraire à l'emprise de la cause universelle qui triomphe du persécuteur par la patience du martyr. De l'esclavage de nature il n'y a de liberté que dans le néant.” St. Thomas gives a general account of the non-competitive but necessary divine causality in SCG III c.70: “However, these points present no difficulty, provided the things previously established be considered. In every agent, in fact, there are two things to consider: namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power by which it acts. Fire, for instance, heats by means of heat. But the power of a lower agent depends on the power of the superior agent, according as the superior agent gives this power to the lower agent whereby it may act; or preserves it; or even applies it to the action, as the artisan applies an instrument to its proper effect, though he neither gives the form whereby the instrument works, nor preserves it, but simply gives it motion. So, it is necessary for the action of a lower agent to result not only from the agent by its own power, but also from the power of all higher agents; it acts, therefore, through the power of all. And just as the lowest agent is found immediately active, so also is the power of the primary agent found immediate in the production of the effect. For the power of the lower agent is not adequate to produce this effect of itself, but from the power of the next higher agent; and the power of the next one gets this ability from the power of the next higher one; and thus the power of the highest agent is discovered to be of itself productive of the effect, as an immediate cause. This is evident in the case of the principles of demonstration, the first of which is immediate. So, just as it is not unfitting for one action to be produced by an agent and its power, so it is not inappropriate for the same effect to be produced by a lower agent and God: by both immediately, though in different ways.” “Haec autem difficultatem non afferunt si praemissa considerentur. In quolibet enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet rem ipsam quae agit, et virtutem qua agit: sicut ignis calefacit per calorem. Virtus autem inferioris agentis dependet a virtute superioris agentis, inquantum superius agens dat virtutem ipsam inferiori agenti per quam agit; vel conservat eam; aut etiam applicat eam ad agendum, sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad proprium effectum; cui tamen non dat formam per quam agit instrumentum, nec conservat, sed dat ei solum motum. Oportet ergo quod actio inferioris agentis non solum sit ab eo per virtutem proprium, sed per virtutem omnium superiorum agentium; agit enim in virtute omnium. Et sicut agens infimum invenitur immediatum activum; ita virtus primi agentis invenitur immediata ad producendum effectum: nam virtus infimi agentis non habet quod producat hunc effectum ex se, sed ex virtute proximi superioris; et virtus illius hoc habet ex virtute superioris; et sic virtus supremi agentis invenitur ex se productiva effectus, quasi causa immediata; sicut patet in principiis demonstrationum, quorum primum est immediatum. Sicut igitur non est inconveniens quod una actio producatur ex aliquo agente et eius virtute, ita non est inconveniens quod producatur idem effectus ab inferiori agente et Deo: ab utroque immediate, licet alio et alio modo.” That St. Thomas applies the same reasoning to free human acts can also be seen in his reading of Sir. 15:14. “When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: ‘In the hand of his own counsel.’ But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause” (STh Ia q22 a2 ad4). “Ad quartum dicendum quod in hoc quod dicitur Deum hominem sibi reliquisse, non excluditur homo a divina providentia, sed ostenditur quod non praefigitur ei virtus operativa determinata ad

289 Our very freedom as created persons is a dependency, and the reverse side of this truth is that our dependency is the font of more and more perfect freedom. The fullest freedom for a human being derives from the most complete belonging, the most perfect form of slavery to God. This slavery goes beyond that of nature, touching the inner disposition of the heart. “The person who does the will of God for love of His goodness belongs more to God than one who submits by self-love and fear of punishment that he dreads.”464 Although all human acts depend on the divine power, it is possible to return to that power, to have recourse to it knowingly and willingly, in a sense to be moved even more interiorly by God. In doing so, a man aligns his will with the divine will, so that he is not only subject to it but in accord with it at the deepest level: God wills in him.465

This harmony between the divine and created will is the deepest form of human freedom. But this harmony will be immeasurably greater when man knows and loves God as He is in Himself. “Through grace God gives the creature the power to belong to Him according to deity itself. Since it is a power to give oneself, it is

unum, sicut rebus naturalibus; quae aguntur tantum, quasi ab altero directae in finem, non autem seipsa agunt, quasi se dirigentia in finem, ut creaturae rationales per liberum arbitrium, quo consiliantur et eligunt. Unde signanter dicit, in manu consilii sui. Sed quia ipse actus liberi arbitrii reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, necesse est ut ea quae ex libero arbitrio fiunt, divinae providentiae subdantur, providentia enim hominis continetur sub providentia Dei, sicut causa particularis sub causa universali.” (Cf. Steven A. Long, “Providence, Freedom, and ,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2006): 557–606.) 464 “Question du mot,” 9. “[L]a personne, qui fait la volonté de Dieu par amour de sa bonté, appartient davantage à Dieu que celui qui se soumet par amour de soi et par crainte des peines qu’il redoute.” 465 “For it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for his good pleasure” (Phil. 2:13).

290 more ours and freer as it is more divine and as it leads us, very surely, to God in his life as God.”466 This is why De Koninck says of Mary’s Fiat,

The fullness of grace in Mary became then the root of her consenting to maternity, of the most free and liberal act a pure creature could perform, of the most radical human act upon which are suspended all God’s works.467

That act is consummately free because it is totally received from above. “The completeness of belonging is simultaneously the freedom of the children of God.”468

In his letter of June 20, 1943 to Fr. Guindon, De Koninck compares this freedom to the freedom that a man has in a human society. Among men, as we noted, the slave is beneath the citizen, sharing less directly and less perfectly in the common good. But, De Koninck argues,

in the order of mercy, thus in the order that is the most universal that can be conceived, slavery is infinitely deeper and brings us closer to the principle, to the point that any condition of citizenship must be rooted in the condition of slavery, which remains radical.469

466 “Perfection de la liberté,” 280. “Par la grâce, Dieu confère à la créature le pouvoir de Lui appartenir selon la déité même. Dès lors qu'il s'agit d'un pouvoir de se donner, celui-ci est d'autant plus nôtre et plus libre qu'il est plus divin et qu'il nous porte, très sûrement, vers Dieu dans sa vie de Dieu.” 467 Ego Sapientia, 7.2. 468 “Question du mot,” 9. “La totalité de l’appartenance est en même temps sa liberté d’enfant de Dieu.” This is how we are to understand the saying, “I do not call you slaves any longer, because the slave does not know what the master is doing; but I have called you friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard from my Father” (Jn. 15:15). Christ is distinguishing in effect between the slavery of nature and the more perfect slavery of the one who is intimate with God by grace and charity. It is the more perfect kind of slavery that allows man to transcend the less perfect. De Koninck points out that a sign of this is the continued use of the term “slave” (δοῦλος) both used by Christ immediately after the words quoted above, and employed by the evangelist to describe the saints in glory. “The slave (δοῦλος) is not greater than the master. If they have persecuted me, they will persecute you” (Jn. 15:20); “His slaves (δοῦλοι) shall serve Him, and they shall see his face, and his name shall be on their foreheads… and they will reign forever and ever” (Rev. 22:3-5). 469 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “Mais, dans l’ordre de la miséricorde, donc dans l’ordre le plus universel qui se puisse concevoir, l’esclavage est infiniment plus profond et nous rapproche davantage du principe, à tel point que toute condition de citoyen doit être enracinée dans la condition d’esclave qui demeure radicale.”

291 The utter dependence of a slave effectively buries his roots deep in the source of all things, in the heart of mercy. “One cannot reach the Heart of mercy…without taking on the form of a slave.”470 It is by humility that a man conforms himself to mercy, both by opening himself to receive and by recognizing the very nature of mercy more perfectly: he touches the principle to which he belongs, and acts from it not only by necessity but with love. “So here is the principle of the difference between the freedom of the children of God and human freedom,” De Koninck continues.

The first is infinitely more profound (and I take the term "infinite" in the proper sense), because in the slavery that conditions it and from which it proceeds (in a manner that ensures in advance perfect conformity with this freedom in its root) we immediately touch mercy in its rightful priority. In this freedom of the children of God the ineffable union of mercy and divine justice breaks forth.471

Slavery to Mary

Where does Mary enter into this relationship of total belonging to the

Principle? We have argued that the freedom of man as a child of God is founded in a total and unconditional belonging which we call “holy slavery.” But if one does not object to the term slavery as such, there is still room for a second objection. Mary is a creature. “Being herself a created person,” the objection runs, “she cannot assume the dignity of having subjects who give themselves to her as slaves.”472

470 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “On ne peut atteindre au Cœur de la miséricorde… sans revêtir la condition d’esclave.” 471 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “Voilà donc le principe de la différence entre la liberté des enfants de Dieu et la liberté de l’homme. La première est infiniment plus profonde (et je prends le terme « infini » au sens propre), parce que dans l’esclavage qui la conditionne et dont elle procède (d’une manière qui assure d’avance la parfaite conformité de cette liberté à sa racine) nous touchons immédiatement la miséricorde dans sa priorité au droit. Dans cette liberté des enfants de Dieu éclate l’ineffable union de la miséricorde et de la justice divines.” 472 “Question du mot,” 12. “N’étant elle-même qu’une personne créée, elle ne saurait revêtir cette dignité d’avoir des sujets qui se donnent à elle en qualité d’esclaves.”

292 This objection comes very near to one we have seen before. It objects to the dignity attributed to Mary on the grounds that it destroys the distinction between

God and His creature. But this objection itself, De Koninck insists, fails to grasp the true transcendence of God.473 One who makes this objection does not understand the divine power as the humble Mary did.

Indeed, the Blessed Virgin is so ordered from the principle that unless we have a great faith in the transcendence of God himself to every creature, including his Mother, in his wisdom and omnipotence—he has done great things for me, He who is powerful—we cannot recognize the incomparable superiority of the Virgin, or the extent of her power over us; we can no longer see to what extent we should place ourselves in subjection to Mary in order to access God more surely and fully in the infinite transcendence that He has over this universal Mediatrix.474

To deny that God has elevated a creature to a participation in being a principle of all

God’s works is ultimately to deny the greatest sign of His transcendence over His creatures.

In the letter to Guindon already quoted several times, De Koninck argued that, “since the kingdom of God is based on mercy as such, and since Mary is Queen of this kingdom, it is impossible to be chosen for this kingdom without being a slave

473 “What confusion such an objection presupposes, and, ultimately—it must be said—it reduces the sovereign transcendence of the divine personality itself!” (“Question du mot,” 12). “Que de confusions suppose une telle objection ! et, en fin de compte, —il faut le dire—comme elle réduit la souveraine transcendance de la personnalité divine elle-même!” 474 “Perfection de la liberté,” 275. “En effet, la Sainte Vierge est à ce point ordonnée depuis le principe, qu'à moins d'avoir une foi très grande dans la transcendance même de Dieu à toute créature y compris sa Mère, dans sa sagesse et sa toute-puissance— il a fait en moi de grandes choses, Celui qui est puissant — on ne peut reconnaître l'incomparable supériorité de la Vierge, ni l'étendue de sa puissance sur nous; on ne pourra voir non plus, dans quelle mesure l'on doit se mettre sous la dependence de Marie pour accéder plus sûrement et parfaitement à Dieu dans la transcendance infinie qu'il a sur cette Médiatrice universelle.”

293 of this Queen.”475 Here we find the basic principle connecting Mary to the sweet and willing slavery of the child of God. The utmost work of divine mercy, according to the argument of Ego Sapientia, is the association of Mary in all the works of God, in all the exercise of His power in the world, as a co-principle. The ways in which this takes place, by her divine maternity, by her co-redemptive gift of her Son for the salvation of man, and by her role as a final cause together with her Son, have been discussed above.

As we saw in the first part—and understand still more deeply from the radical dependence of the creature in the most free of its acts—God gave Mary the gift of giving herself to Him as the one who gives Him to the world.476 This is the work of mercy that demands the greatest faith in the divine transcendence. This is the root of Mary’s universal authority, the cause of her association with her Son in

His reign, and the reason that submission to God in all things is at the same time and inseparably (at least implicitly) submission to Mary. Chapter 34 concluded the consideration of Mary’s beauty and dignity with a reference to those who are offended by this claim, and the reassurance that in its otherness, the wisdom of God always appears foolish to human wisdom. It is this same note with which he begins his article on holy slavery.

This doctrine—so deep that it cannot tickle the ears—so touches the mystery of the foolishness of God that it cannot fail to offend the wisdom of men. It has,

475 De Koninck to Guindon, June 20, 1943. “[P]uisque le royaume de Dieu est fondé sur la miséricorde comme telle et, puisque Marie est Reine de ce royaume, il est impossible d’être élu de ce royaume sans être esclave de cette Reine.” 476 “It is God, the origin of all things, Who gives it to her to give herself to being the origin of God” (Ego Sapientia, 7.3).

294 indeed, its principle in the truths which God has hidden from the understanding of the wise and prudent to reveal them to the small.477

477 “Question du mot,” 4. “Cette doctrine—si profonde qu’elle ne saurait chatouiller les oreilles— tient à ce point du mystère de la folie de Dieu qu’elle ne peut manquer de heurter la sagesse des hommes (I Cor. 1 :25). Elle prend, en effet, son principe dans les vérités dont Dieu a caché l’intelligence aux sages et aux prudents pour les révéler aux petits (Mt. 1 :25).”

295 CHAPTER 35 TERRIBILIS UT CASTRORUM ACIES ORDINATA (SONGS 6:10)

Terrible comme une armée rangée en Terrible as an army arrayed for battle. bataille. Cette sagesse purement créée qui se dit Mater This purely created wisdom called “Mater timoris, timoris, et agnitionis (Eccli. XXIV, 24) — Mère de et agnitionis—Mother of filial fear and initiation crainte filiale et d'initiation à la connaissance, est into knowledge” (Sir. 24:24) is for us the beginning pour nous commencement de la sagesse. Initium of wisdom. “Initium sapientiae timor Domini” (Ps. sapientiae timor Domini. (Ps. CX, 10) Mais, celle- 110:10). But she herself, who had received là même qui avait tout reçu dans l'humilité, devient everything in humility, also becomes, by her aussi, par sa sagesse, par sa sagesse pratique, sa wisdom, by her practical wisdom, her prudence, prudence, et par sa puissance, l'ennemie terrible de and by her power, the terrible enemy of the creature la créature que Dieu avait créée la plus sublime et whom God had created the most sublime and la plus puissante dans sa nature et qui fut par son powerful in his nature and who was, by his pride, orgueil le principe de tout mal. Pour celui qui est la the principle of all evil. For the one who is at the tête même de tous les maux, celle qui a reçu la very head of all evil, the one who received the plénitude de la puissance est terrible comme une fullness of power is “terrible like an army arrayed armée rangée pour la bataille. (Cant. VI, 3) for battle” (Songs 6:3). “Never had God made and “Jamais Dieu n'a fait et formé qu'une inimitié, dit le formed but one enmity,” says Blessed Gringnon de bienheureux Grignion de Montfort, mais Montfort, “but irreconcilable, which will last and irréconciliable, qui durera et augmentera même grow even until the end.”a And in this enmity, it is jusques à la fin.”a Et dans cette inimitié, c'est la the most humble Virgin, the gentlest of all mothers, Vierge très humble, la plus douce des mères, qui who will conquer. “She will crush your head” vaincra. Elle t'écrasera la tête. (Gen. III, 15) (Gen. 3:5). a Grignion de Montfort, op. cit., n. 52, p. 37. a St. Louis de Montfort, True Devotion, n. 52.

296 Commentary on Chapters 35-42

Mary “is for us the beginning of wisdom. ‘Initium sapientiae timor Domini’

(Ps. 110:10),” De Koninck writes in Chapter 35.

By this superabundance of grace and glory expressed in her, the most blessed Virgin brings about the return to the principle understood as principle of all grace and all glory. It is to her, in her quality as wisdom, that it belongs to send forth into the chosen the principle of this conversion to God, the divine roots.478

But the domain of mercy is truly universal, and thus the Queen of Mercy not only orders the elect, but establishes the universal order. This means that she is also the one who by God’s design confronts evil in its root. “But she herself, who had received everything in humility also becomes, by her wisdom, by her practical wisdom, her prudence, and by her power, the terrible enemy of the creature …who was, by his pride, the principle of all evil.”479

These three, wisdom, prudence, and power, correspond to the three aspects of Mary’s enmity with Satan which St. Louis de Montfort lists in the very paragraph which De Koninck quotes in Chapter 35. De Montfort speaks about her hatred of the enemy, her ingenuity in exposing evil, and her power of overthrowing.

Thus the most fearful enemy that God has set up against the devil is Mary, his holy Mother. From the time of the earthly paradise, although she existed then only in his mind, he gave her such a hatred for his accursed enemy, such ingenuity in exposing the wickedness of the ancient serpent and such power to defeat, overthrow and crush this proud rebel, that Satan fears her not only more than angels and men but in a certain sense more than God himself. This does not mean that the anger, hatred and power of God are not infinitely greater than the Blessed Virgin's, since her attributes are limited. It simply means that Satan, being so proud, suffers infinitely more in being vanquished

478 Ego Sapientia, 8.1. 479 Ego Sapientia, 35.1.

297 and punished by a lowly and humble , for her humility humiliates him more than the power of God.480

A particular hatred of the cause of evil is an immediate consequence of wisdom because it is the root of defect from the Good and of disorder. We have seen that

Mary’s sinlessness and humility give her an understanding of the evil of sin, and therefore of the mercy of God, that surpasses all others. Ingenuity more obviously corresponds to prudence as a principle of practical action, and both authors refer to the third aspect as power.

In what do the prudence and power of Mary consist? De Montfort specifies this quality as ingenuity specifically in manifesting evil for what it is. De Koninck frequently refers to the power of Mary to manifest her cause—this is why he calls her an inexhaustible and proper cause of wonder, even for the angels.481 To make known the mercy of God and to uncover the evil of pride are one and the same, because the darkness is made known by the light, deprivation of good by comparison with the Good. But the references to practical wisdom and to ingenuity also point us toward the mediatory role of Mary. When discussing Mary’s role as an extrinsic common good, we noted that, pre-containing all the goodness God chooses to communicate to the world in a preeminent way, and enjoying a unique consummation of grace in the beatific vision, Mary knows how to order each particular creature to God, as a participation in her own ordering, and does so by

480 De Montfort, True Devotion, n. 52. 481 “Do we marvel at the supereminent ‘formositas’ of this pure creature, of this wholly created wisdom? Has not she been called “Admirable mother,” that is to say, mother, principle, of which the cause is unfathomable? The most marvelous of all God’s purely created works, Mary causes us to better glimpse the incomprehensibility of the Wisdom which precedes all things” (Ego Sapientia, 16.1).

298 her intercession. She actively works by her prudence to communicate to particulars the order of which she is already a substantial principle.

Finally, power refers to a principle and cause. Behind this claim stands the whole account of Mary as principle of the Son, and with Him of redemption. In his lecture on the queenship of Mary, De Koninck writes, “And Mary is the Woman who, in compassion with the fruit of her womb, crushed the head (Gen. 3:15) of this same king over all the children of pride ( 12:25).”482 In this way, the final section of the second part, which focuses on the contrast and the enmity between Mary and Satan, simply continues to unfold the strongest sense of nigra sum sed formosa. The highest dignity of Mary is named by the title “Queen of Mercy,” and this dignity appears in all its radiance not only in contrast with sin, but in its power to overcome it.

To deserve the right and title of Queen, what greater might should this woman have displayed than that by which she vanquished the evil one of whom it had been said that there is no power upon earth that can be compared with him who was made to fear no one; he beholdeth everything; he is king over all the children of pride (Job 41:24).483

Chapters 36-39: The Rejection of Mercy

De Koninck’s correspondence with Fr. Guindon indicated two points of contact between de Montfort’s doctrine of slavery to Mary and Ego Sapientia. The first point, the queenship of Mary, we have discussed in the preceding sections. The second is personalism.

You have well understood that Ego Sapientia is a much more radical attack against personalism than the Common Good. And I must admit that my

482 “Universal Queenship.” 483 “Universal Queenship.”

299 certainty of the absolute incompatibility between personalism and slavery to Mary was the deepest principle of my attack against the personalists.484

In discussing holy slavery we have already been introduced to De Koninck’s positive account of the dignity of the created person, which lies not in the person considered absolutely and in isolation, but in his ordination, in his belonging to another. The reverse side of this doctrine, that view of the dignity of the person which De Koninck calls personalism, emerges with particular poignancy in De Koninck’s account of the fall of Satan and the resistance to mercy characteristic of the present day, which he unfolds in the following chapters.

484 De Koninck to Fr. Guindon, June 20, 1943. “Vous avez bien compris que « Ego Sapientia » est une attaque beaucoup plus radicale contre le personnalisme que le « Bien Commun. » Et je dois reconnaître que ma certitude de l’incompatibilité absolue entre le personnalisme et l’esclavage de Marie a été le principe le plus profond de mon attaque contre les personnalistes.”

300 CHAPTER 36 NON SERVIAM! (JER. 2:20)

Je ne servirai pas! I will not serve! A fin de mieux voir la grandeur et la puissance de In order to better see the splendor and the power of la Femme, considérons un moment la taille de celui the Woman, let us consider for a moment the qui est tête et roi de tous les fils de l'orgueil. (Job stature of the one who is “head and king of all the XLI, 25) Le Seigneur lui-même l'a appelé Principe sons of pride” (Job 41:25). The Lord Himself des voies de Dieu — Ipse est principium viarum called him “Principle of the ways of God—Ipse est Dei. (Job XL, 14) En effet, il fut établi au principium viarum Dei” (Job 40:14). For he was commencement la première et la plus sublime de established in the beginning as the first and most toutes les créatures, non seulement quant à la sublime of all creatures, not only as to nature, but nature, mais aussi quant à la grâce, car les also with regard to grace, because the separated intelligences séparées reçoivent une grâce intelligences receive a grace proportional to the proportionnelle à la perfection de leur nature. Tu perfection of their nature. “You were the seal of étais le sceau de la perfection, plein de sagesse et perfection, full of wisdom and beauty. You were de beauté. Tu fus parfait dans tes voies depuis le perfect in your ways from the day you were jour où tu fus créé. (Ezech. XXVIII, 12, 15) C'est created” (Ezek. 28:12,15). It is he who carried the lui qui portait la lumière—lucifer. (Is. XIV, 12) light—“lucifer” (Is. 14:12). In all of creation “there Dans toute la création il n'y avait pas de puissance was no power comparable to his, he was created to comparable à la sienne, il a été créé pour ne rien fear nothing” (Job 41:24). He was like “a cedar of craindre. (Job XLI, 24) Il était comme un cèdre sur Lebanon, with beautiful boughs, with thick shade, le Liban, à la belle ramure, à l'ombrage épais, à la tall, with his crown in the clouds.” He who was taille élevée, et ayant sa cime dans les nues. Lui qui already so sublime in his nature, “the waters made était déjà si sublime dans sa nature, les eaux him sprout, the abyss made him grow by making l'avaient fait croître, l'abîme l'avait fait grandir, en the rivers flow around the place where he was faisant couler ses fleuves autour du lieu où il était planted and by sending the streams to all the trees planté et en envoyant ses ruisseaux à tous les in the fields” (Ezek. 31:3-8). The principle who arbres des champs. Principe qui portait la lumière, carried the light, he could enlighten all the il pouvait éclairer toutes les intelligences de son intelligences of his kingdom, and these saw in him royaume, et celles-ci voyaient en lui l'image la plus the most perfect image of their God. “This is why parfaite de leur Dieu. C'est pourquoi sa taille his stature was above all the other trees of the s'élevait plus haute que les arbres des champs. Il fields.” He could reach from one end of the pouvait atteindre d'un bout de l'univers à l'autre. Il universe to the other. “He was handsome because était beau par sa grandeur, par la longueur de ses of his size, because of the length of his branches, branches, car ses racines plongeaient dans des because his roots were immersed in the abundant eaux abondantes. Aucun arbre dans le jardin de waters. None of the trees in God’s garden equaled Dieu ne l'égalait en beauté. him in beauty.” Mais, voici que la plus sublime des intelligences But, behold how the most sublime of the s'étonne d'un nouveau dessein de Dieu: dessein intelligences was astonished by a new plan of God: nouveau qui était aussi le plus ancien. Ecce ego a new plan that was also the most ancient plan. facio nova—Voici que je vais faire une merveille “Ecce ego facio nova—Behold! I will make a new nouvelle; elle est près d'éclore; ne la reconnaîtrez- wonder; it is close to blooming; will you not vous pas? Je mettrai un chemin, non pas dans les recognize it? I will put a road” not in heaven, but cieux, mais dans le désert, et des fleuves dans la “in the desert, and the rivers in the arid soil …to terre aride ... pour abreuver mon peuple, mon élu, refresh my people, my elect, the people I formed le peuple que j'ai formé pour moi. (Is. XLIII, 19- for myself” (Is. 13:19-21). 21) La grâce, ces eaux abondantes qui faisaient croître Grace, those abundant waters that made the cedar le cèdre du Liban, n'a pas pour fin ultime of Lebanon sprout, does not have as its ultimate d'accroître l'excellence de la nature angélique. end the increase of the excellence of angelic nature. Principe seulement de mérite, elle ordonne à une Principle only of merit, it ordains to a new life, a

301 vie nouvelle, à la vie surnaturelle où l'on ne peut supernatural life where nothing is possible solely rien par les seules forces qui nous conviennent par by the strength given by nature. A purely gratuitous nature. Bienfait purement gratuit, il doit être favor, it must be recognized as such. Without this reconnu tel. Sans cette reconnaissance pratique, la practical recognition, the grace that is the principle grâce principe de mérite ne peut conduire à la grâce of merit cannot lead to the grace of glory. de gloire. Comparé à l'ordre de nature, l'ordre de Compared to the order of nature, the order of grace grâce est radicalement nouveau. Dans le premier, is radically new. In the first, every intellectual chaque créature intellectuelle se porte elle-même et creature moves itself, by itself, towards its singular par elle-même vers son bien singulier et vers son good and towards its natural common good, in a bien commun naturel, de la façon qui convient à sa way appropriate to its own nature. In the new order, propre nature. Dans l'ordre nouveau, cette même this same creature must place itself in dependence créature doit se mettre sous la dépendance d'une upon a power completely exterior to its nature: puissance tout extérieure à sa nature: la nature n'y nature does not suffice; it must let itself be drawn suffit pas; elle doit se laisser tirer au-dessus d'elle- beyond itself from above. In the order of nature, the même. Dans l'ordre de nature, l'ange a un droit à la angel has a right to natural beatitude by the fact of béatitude naturelle en vertu même de sa création; his very creation; grace is not owed to him. Even dans l'ordre de grâce il est soumis à la pure more, grace ordains so perfectly to the most libéralité: la grâce ne lui est pas due. De plus, la universal good that the creature least deserving in grâce ordonne si parfaitement au bien le plus his nature can participate in it in a much more universel que la créature la moins digne dans sa abundant manner than the most perfect creature: nature peut en participer d'une manière plus grace is not tied to the order of natures.a abondante que la créature la plus parfaite: la grâce n'est pas liée à l'ordre des natures.a Parce qu'il était déjà élevé à l'ordre surnaturel par la Because he was already elevated to the supernatural grâce principe de mérite, l'ange pouvait établir une order by the grace that is principle of merit, the comparaison entre les deux ordres. Il voyait ainsi sa angel could establish a comparison between the two condition de nature sous un jour qu'il n'aurait orders. He thus saw his condition of nature in a jamais connu s'il n'avait été élevé. Et il jeta un light he could never have known if he had not been regard nouveau sur sa grande dignité et sur la exalted. And he cast a new look upon his great singularité qui était sienne en face de son bien dignity and upon the singularity which was his in naturel. Tout ce qui lui convenait dans cet ordre lui view of his natural good. All that belonged to him convenait de droit. Sous ce jour nouveau il fit la in this order belonged to him by right. In the light découverte de soi-même. Le premier des anges n'a- of this new day, he made the discovery of himself. t-il pas raison de premier principe, de principe des The first of the angels, has he not the account of voies de Dieu, et n'est-ce pas en cela même qu'il est first principle, of “the principle of the ways of le plus semblable à Lui? Dans l'ordre nouveau je God,” and is it not in this very way that he is the serais détrôné et je devrais communiquer avec des most like to Him? In the new order I would be inférieurs à moi comme avec des égaux et même dethroned and I would have to communicate with des supérieurs; j'y perdrais ma singularité, et ma those inferior to myself as with equals and even as dignité serait contournée;b l'amour n'y serait plus superiors. I would lose my singularity and my mon droit. Dans ce retour sur soi délibéré surgissait dignity would be distorted;b love would no longer en lui l'appétit désordonné de sa proper excellence. be my right. In this deliberate turning toward self, Et il se dit: Je suis un dieu, je siège sur un trône de there arose in him the disordered desire of his own dieu au milieu des mers. (Ezech. XXVIII, 2) Et son excellence. And he tells himself: “I am a god, I sit coeur s'est élevé à cause de sa beauté. (Ezech. on a godly throne in the middle of the seas” (Ezek. XXVIII, 17) Je monterai dans les cieux; au-dessus 28:2). “And his heart was exalted because of his des étoiles de Dieu, j'élèverai mon trône; je beauty” (Ezek. 28:17). I will climb into the heavens m'assiérai sur la montagne de l'assemblée, dans les above the stars of God, I will lift up my throne, I profondeurs du septentrion; je monterai sur les will sit on the mountain of the assembly, in the sommets des nues, je serai semblable au Très-Haut. farthest reaches of the North, I will climb to the top (Is. XIV, 13-14) Je suis le principe des voies de of the clouds, I will be as the Most High” (Is. Dieu, et dans cet ordre je serai toujours le principe 14:13-14). I am the principle of the ways of God, de toutes ses voies, et il y serait contraire à la and in this order I will always be the principle of all dignité où Dieu lui-même m'a établi, de servir His ways, and it would be contrary to the dignity quiconque est au-dessous de moi. Dans l'ordre wherein God Himself established me to serve

302 nouveau, Celui par lequel toutes choses ont été anyone who is below me. In the new order, the One faites ne s'unit pas à la nature la plus splendide et la by whom all things were made does not unite plus digne, mais à celle qui est la plus éloignée de himself to the most splendid and most worthy moi. Et son cou se raidit dans sa puissance, et il nature, but to the one which is the most distant décréta: Non serviam — Je ne servirai pas!c (Jerem. from me. And his neck stiffened in his power, and II, 30) he decreed: “Non serviam—I will not serve!”c (Jer. 2:30). a L'ange reçoit une grâce proportionnelle à la perfection a The angel receives grace proportional to the perfection de sa nature: S. Thomas, Ia Pars. q. 62, a. 6. Il en est of his nature: Thomas Aquinas, STh Ia, q62 a6. It is autrement de l'homme: IIa IIae, q. 24, a. 3. otherwise with man, IIa IIae, q24 a3. b Jean de S. Thomas, Curs. Theol., T. IV, d. 23, a. 3, nn. b John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, t. 4, d. 23, a. 3, XVII-XLI, pp. 940 et sqq. nn.,xvii-xli, pp. 940ff. c Jean de S. Thomas, ibid., n. XXVII-XXIX, pp. 946-8. c John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, t. 4, d. 23, a. 3, nn. xxvii-xxix, pp. 946-8.

303 Chapter 36: The Fall of Satan

The title of Chapter 36, “Non Serviam,” taken from 2:20—“For long ago you broke your yoke and burst your bonds, and you said, ‘I will not serve!’”— expresses the antithetical attitude to that which underlies the doctrine of holy slavery. Because he was the first to turn against God in this way, Lucifer, to whom these words are traditionally ascribed, is the principle—the beginning—of evil. 485

This fact makes the fall of Satan the proper foil against which to contrast the Blessed

Virgin. Continuing the argument begun in the preceding chapters, De Koninck presents Satan first in the glory of his nature, and then in the misery of his end. He is beautiful, but in his beauty he makes himself black.

The formositas of Lucifer is first of all the perfection of the pure intellectual nature with which human nature was contrasted at the beginning of the second part. Being immaterial, angelic natures are not composed, except insofar as they do not exist through themselves and thus the angel’s nature can be distinguished from his existence. Among such natures, which are not individuated by matter, there is a radical hierarchy, since each angel is a unique species. Lucifer, says De Koninck, pointing to the Wisdom literature and the prophets, was the highest among these species, and therefore the most perfect created nature. De Koninck does not, however, restrict this beauty to nature, but adds that Lucifer, like Adam, was created

485 The association of these words with the fall of Satan has become commonplace, but its origin is difficult to find. Ludwig Ott writes, for example, “The Fathers and theologians generally refer to the fall of the devil through sin with the words of Jer. 2:20, which the recusant Israel speaks to its God: ‘I will not serve,’ as well as the prophecy of the Prophet Is. 14:12 et seq., on the king of Babylon: ‘How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning (lucifer, qui mane oriebaris)!’” (Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, [St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1957], 119). Milton (1608-74) famously uses the similar expression, “Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven,” in Satan’s account of his rebellion in , I. 263.

304 in grace.486 Further, he adds, “the separated intelligences receive a grace proportional to the perfection of their nature.”487 Even as to grace Lucifer was the most perfect creature in existence. He was, in the first order of creation, says De

Koninck, the principle of God’s ways, the most perfect image of God among

486 St. Thomas expresses the same opinion, though only as the more probable case. “That opinion which holds that the angels were created in a state of pure nature agrees with the opinion that all matter was created at once but not in distinct created species: because as matter holds itself toward material forms, so the angelic nature toward grace. But the opinion that holds that the angels were created in grace agrees more with the opinion that holds all things to come forth in the created order according to distinct species: which opinion is more pleasing to me” (In II Sent., d4 q1 a3 co.). “Illa enim opinio quae ponit Angelos in naturalibus tantum creatos, consonat illi opinioni quae ponit omnia simul in materia, non autem per species distinctas creata: quia sicut se habet materia informis ad formas corporales, ita natura angelica ad gratiam. Illa autem opinio quae ponit Angelos in gratia creatos, magis consonat illi opinioni quae ponit omnia in exordio creationis per species distincta: quae opinio mihi magis placet.” Cf. STh Ia, q62 a3. 487 Ego Sapientia, 36.1. Again, De Koninck follows St. Thomas in this opinion. “It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature. Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and glory” (STh Ia, q62 a6 co.). “Respondeo dicendum quod rationabile est quod secundum gradum naturalium Angelis data sint dona gratiarum et perfectio beatitudinis. Cuius quidem ratio ex duobus accipi potest. Primo quidem ex parte ipsius Dei, qui per ordinem suae sapientiae diversos gradus in angelica natura constituit. Sicut autem natura angelica facta est a Deo ad gratiam et beatitudinem consequendam, ita etiam gradus naturae angelicae ad diversos gradus gratiae et gloriae ordinari videntur, ut puta, si aedificator lapides polit ad construendam domum, ex hoc ipso quod aliquos pulchrius et decentius aptat, videtur eos ad honoratiorem partem domus ordinare. Sic igitur videtur quod Deus Angelos quos altioris naturae fecit, ad maiora gratiarum dona et ampliorem beatitudinem ordinaverit. Secundo apparet idem ex parte ipsius Angeli. Non enim Angelus est compositus ex diversis naturis, ut inclinatio unius naturae impetum alterius impediat aut retardet; sicut in homine accidit, in quo motus intellectivae partis aut retardatur aut impeditur ex inclinatione partis sensitivae. Quando autem non est aliquid quod retardet aut impediat, natura secundum totam suam virtutem movetur. Et ideo rationabile est quod Angeli qui meliorem naturam habuerunt, etiam fortius et efficacius ad Deum sint conversi. Hoc autem etiam in hominibus contingit, quod secundum intensionem conversionis in Deum datur maior gratia et gloria. Unde videtur quod Angeli qui habuerunt meliora naturalia, habuerunt plus de gratia et gloria.”

305 creatures, comprehending in himself the perfection of the whole. He was most worthy of love of all creatures according to what he received from God in his very creation.

The motive of rebellion is apparent when this early primacy is compared to what was to follow. Lucifer’s role as first among God’s works was to be usurped in the new order instituted by the Incarnation. Even if, as De Koninck holds, grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natures, grace is not bound to nature. It is not due to any nature but has the character of a gift freely given, gratis. It is a principle that directs the recipient to an end that surpasses the nature entirely. The creature in his own nature already comes from another and is ordered to another.488

Yet, when a created nature is ordained to a supernatural end, the principle of the acts by which it attains that end is no longer found within it, but is received.489 For

488 St. Thomas makes this point in the one place in which he speaks about a circular movement within God. “Accordingly both in us and in God there is a certain rotation in the acts of the intellect and will: for the will returns to that whence came the beginning of understanding: but in us the circle ends in that which is external, the external good moving the intellect and the intellect moving the will, and the will by appetite and love tending to the external good. Now the order of understanding and willing is not the same in God as in us. We receive our intellective knowledge from external things: and by our will we tend to something external as an end. … On the other hand God does not acquire knowledge from things, but by his knowledge is the cause of things: nor by his will does he tend to anything external as his end, but he directs all external things to himself as their end” (De pot. q9 a9 co.). “Est ergo tam in nobis quam in Deo circulatio quaedam in operibus intellectus et voluntatis; nam voluntas redit in id a quo fuit principium intelligendi: sed in nobis concluditur circulus ad id quod est extra, dum bonum exterius movet intellectum nostrum, et intellectus movet voluntatem, et voluntas tendit per appetitum et amorem in exterius bonum. Ordo autem intelligendi et volendi aliter se habet in Deo et nobis. Nos enim cognitionem intellectivam a rebus exterioribus accipimus; per voluntatem vero nostram in aliquid exterius tendimus tamquam in finem. Et ideo intelligere nostrum est secundum motum a rebus in animam; velle vero secundum motum ab anima ad res. Deus autem non accipit scientiam a rebus, sed per scientiam suam causat res; nec per voluntatem suam tendit in aliquid exterius sicut in finem, sed omnia exteriora ordinat in se sicut in finem.” 489 “Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above. Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works

306 this reason, grace can order a lower nature more perfectly to the supernatural end than a higher creature. “In the new order, this same creature must place itself in dependence upon a power completely exterior to its nature: nature does not suffice; it must let itself be drawn beyond itself from above.”490

It is this eccentricity of grace that opens the way for angelic rebellion. There is a difference between the angels and man in fallibility, as noted above in the discussion of the blackness of composite natures. Because of his complexity, man can fail in attaining his end because he does not rule the lower appetites by the higher. The angel is not liable to this kind of error due to his simplicity; he cannot fail with respect to his natural end.491 According to De Koninck, it is only in relation to a higher order that the angel can sin.

proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life” (STh Ia IIae, q109 a5 co.). “Respondeo dicendum quod actus perducentes ad finem oportet esse fini proportionatos. Nullus autem actus excedit proportionem principii activi. Et ideo videmus in rebus naturalibus quod nulla res potest perficere effectum per suam operationem qui excedat virtutem activam, sed solum potest producere per operationem suam effectum suae virtuti proportionatum. Vita autem aeterna est finis excedens proportionem naturae humanae, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo homo per sua naturalia non potest producere opera meritoria proportionata vitae aeternae, sed ad hoc exigitur altior virtus, quae est virtus gratiae. Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam.” 490 Ego Sapientia, 36.3. 491 De Koninck quotes St. Thomas in making this argument. “There is this difference between man and the separated substances, that the same individual has several appetitive powers, of which some are subordinated to others; this does not occur at all in the separated substances, although the separated substances are subordinated one to another. But sin occurs in the will whenever the inferior appetite deviates in any way. Therefore just as sin in separated substances would occur if one deviated from the Divine order, or if an inferior deviated from the order of a superior while the latter remained in the Divine order; thus also in one man there are two ways in which sin may occur. First man may sin when the human will does not order its proper good to God; this way man has in common with the separated substances. In another way man may sin if the good of the inferior appetite is not ruled according to the superior; as when the pleasures of the flesh, which are the object of the concupiscible appetite, are not sought observing the order of reason. This latter kind of sin does not occur in separated substances” (III Contra Gentiles, c. 109, quoted in Common Good, 45; Bien Commun, 136-137). “Hoc autem differt inter hominem et substantiam separatam, quod in uno homine sunt plures appetitivae virtutes, quarum una sub altera ordinatur. Quod quidem in substantiis separatis non contingit: una tamen earum est sub altera. Peccatum autem in voluntate contingit qualitercumque appetitus inferior deflectatur. Sicut igitur peccatum in substantiis separatis esset vel per hoc quod

307 An angel cannot by itself fail to attain the end of its person or the common good proper to its nature. But the good of the angelic nature is not the highest good which is God as He is in Himself. But God commanded that the angels should order themselves to this highest good. Since the proper end of the angelic nature bears in this respect the character of an end which is to be ordered to a higher end, which ordering is not assured by the nature of the agent, its will can fail to attain to the higher end, and, by way of consequence, it can fail also to attain its proper end.492

Given that the supernatural order introduces the possibility of rebellion, the motive for this rebellion concerns the very content of this new order, in which the first place belongs to another, but more deeply, the motive is hatred of the very dependence implied in this further ordination.

Excursus on Personalism

In the foreword to the Common Good De Koninck writes, “The sin of the angels was practically a personalist error: they preferred the dignity of their own person to the dignity which they would receive through their subordination to a good which was superior but common in its very superiority.”493 The “personalist error” is a place of close contact between the Common Good and Ego Sapientia. It

deflecteretur ab ordine divino, vel per hoc quod aliqua earum inferior deflecteretur ab ordine alicujus superioris sub ordine divino manentis, ita in homine uno contingit peccatum dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod voluntas humana bonum proprium non ordinat in Deum: quod quidem peccatum est commune et sibi et substantiae separatae. Alio modo, per hoc quod bonum inferioris appetitus non regulatur secundum superiorem: puta quando delectabilia carnis, in quae concupiscibilis tendit, volumus non secundum ordinem rationis. Hujusmodi autem peccatum non contingit in substantiis separatis esse.” 492 Common Good, 44. “L’ange ne peut déchoir par soi de la fin de sa personne et du bien commun propre de sa nature. Mais le bien de la nature angélique n’est pas le bien suprême qui est Dieu tel qu’il est en Lui-même. Or, Dieu lui a prescrit de s’ordonner à ce bien souverain. Comme la fin propre de la nature angélique revêt sous ce rapport le caractère d’une fin à ordonner à une fin supérieure, ce qui n’est pas assuré par la nature de l’agent, sa volonté peut déchoir de cette fin, et, par voie de conséquence, elle peut déchoir aussi de sa fin propre” (Bien Commun, 136). 493 Common Good, 13. “Le péché des anges fut une erreur pratiquement personnaliste : ils ont préféré la dignité de leur propre personne à la dignité qui leur serait venue dans la subordination à un bien supérieur mais commun dans sa supériorité même” (Bien Commun, 118).

308 was this error against which De Koninck said Ego Sapientia was the stronger attack, as we saw above. What is this error, which has its primordial roots in the non serviam of Lucifer?

In support of the devotion of slavery to Mary, De Koninck argued that the highest dignity of the created person is not found in itself absolutely, but in its relation to its origin and end. In considering Mary as a common good of the universe in the first part, the same principle appeared in terms of the relation of the individual to the common good. In his order to the common good, the individual attains a perfection surpassing that which is proportionate to himself merely as an individual. The sin of Lucifer consists in a love of his own good as particular and private, and the consequent refusal of any good to which that private good is subordinated. “The fallen angels did not refuse the perfection of the good which was offered to them; they refused the fact of its being common, and they despised this community.”494 The perversion of this refusal is clearest when we realize that the whole of which the angels should have been the chief part would have been a lesser good than the whole crowned by Christ and Mary. Lucifer would have increased in beauty and glory by submitting himself to this good as a part in comparison with what he could have claimed for himself apart from it.495

494 Common Good, 24-25. “Les anges déchus n’ont pas refusé la perfection du bien qui leur était offert, ils ont refusé sa communauté et ils ont méprisé cette communauté.” (Bien Commun, 124). 495 “... Although the (fallen) Angel was really abased by this abandonment of superior goods, although he was, as St. Augustine says, fallen to the level of his proper good, nonetheless he elevated himself in his own eyes, and he forced himself, by mighty arguments (magna negotiatione) to prove completely to others that he aimed in this only at a greater resemblance with God, because thus he proceeded with less dependence on His grace and His favors, and in a more personal manner (magis singulariter), and also by not communicating with inferiors” (John of St. Thomas, On the Evil of the Angels, quoted in Common Good, 14; Bien Commun, 107).

309 The disorder in Satan’s will is the placing of the private good of his person ahead of the supernatural common good to which he is ordered objectively and should have ordered himself in freedom. This inversion of the order of goods on the part of Satan is the first sin. It is not a mistake in reasoning but a practical evil. But,

De Koninck argues, the same inversion of the relationship between the person and the common good has been transformed into a speculative error among men. This is the fundamental tenet of the philosophy De Koninck calls personalism. It claims that the person’s dignity considered in himself as a whole is greater than the dignity he has as a part ordered to the common good, even that “the dignity of the person is opposed to the notion of part and to this ordering to the common good.” 496

According to this view, the person simply as person possesses a certain absolute value in comparison with which subordination is a kind of debasement.

De Koninck does not name the personalists directly, and this decision ignited a heated controversy over the precise target of his criticism.497 Part of the reason for

496 Common Good, 38. “…la dignité de la personne s’oppose à la raison de partie et à cette ordination au bien commun” (Bien Commun, 133). 497 It was widely assumed that De Koninck had Jacques Maritain in mind. “As far as I can see, the whole world believes, whether rightly or wrongly, that your work is a pamphlet against Maritain” (Yves Simon to De Koninck, May 31, 1943. [Correspondence with Simon collected and translated by Michael Waldstein]). A vitriolic exchange ensued in print between Fr. Thomas Eschmann, a would-be defender of Maritain, and De Koninck. (Cf. T. Eschmann, In Defense of Jacques Maritain and De Koninck’s reply, In Defense of St. Thomas.) Eschmann readily identified Maritain’s position with the personalist view as presented by De Koninck. Yves Simon and others held that Maritain’s view of the person and the common good was compatible with De Koninck’s and rejected Eschmann’s account as alien to Maritain’s thought. “[T]hese ideas which you describe as personalist are, with few exceptions and perhaps without exception, as odious to Maritain as they are to you and me; and the beautiful things you say about the common good are as dear to him as they are to you and me” (Yves Simon to De Koninck, May 31, 1943). However that may be, De Koninck’s intention was not, apparently, to lay out a complete doctrine of a particular thinker, but to show the logical consequences of holding the primacy of the person over the common good, whether or not any of those who espouse the principle actually embrace the consequent beliefs. In a letter to Maritain, Simon reports the following words of De Koninck in a personal conversation: “[T]he opinions which you say I attribute to the personalists are, for the most part, conclusions I infer from their common position, namely, that the human person has greater dignity as a whole than as a part. It is in this way that we say the Molinists confer

310 the controversy, as well as for the urgency of De Koninck’s book, is that the principle of the primacy of the person had been adopted among Catholics and others of good will who desired to defend the dignity of the person against the abuses of modern totalitarian states. In the preface to the Common Good, J.M. Cardinal Villeneuve writes:

Currently, it is personalism which has become fashionable. Very sincere minds advocate it. The dignity of the human person is exalted; respect for the human person is desired; authors write to defend a personalist order, and one works to create a civilization which is for man.... That is all very well, but too simple, for the person, man, is not ordered to himself as his end, nor is he the end of everything.498

De Koninck’s work on the common good makes explicit the connection between the speculative position held, it may well be with the best intentions, by modern personalists499 and the pernicious root of the doctrine, in order that both its error and the danger it poses to the true good of man might appear.500

on the creature a creative power, or that they make the divine truth depend on created truth” (Simon to Maritain, May 31, 1946). 498 J.M. Cardinal Villeneuve, archbishop of Québec, preface to Common Good. “Présentement, c’est le personnalisme qui est devenu à la mode. Des esprits très sincères le préconisent. On exalte la dignité de la personne humaine, on veut le respect de la personne, on écrit pour un ordre personnaliste, on travaille à créer une civilisation qui serait pour l’homme… Tout cela est très bien, mais trop court, car la personne, l’homme, n’est pas sa fin à elle-même ni la fin de tout” (Bien Commun, 110). 499 At the end of this excursus, we will consider briefly the distinction between those who adhere to the personalist principle articulated by De Koninck, and others to whom the term personalism is applied or who apply it to themselves, but for other reasons. 500 “We do not mean to claim that the error of those who today call themselves personalists is anything more than speculative. Let there be no ambiguity about this. Undoubtedly our insistence could injure those personalists who have identified themselves with what they hold. That is their own very personal responsibility. But we have our responsibility as well—and we judge this doctrine to be pernicious in the extreme” (Common Good, foreword). “Nous n’entendons pas soutenir ici que l’erreur de tous ceux qui se disent aujourd’hui personnalistes est plus que spéculative. Qu’il n’y ait là-dessus aucune ambiguïté. Sans doute notre insistance pourra-t-elle blesser ceux des personnalistes qui ont identifié cette doctrine à leur personne. C’est là leur responsabilité très personnelle. Mais il y a aussi la nôtre – nous jugeons cette doctrine pernicieuse à l’extrême.”

311 The personalist principle in effect re-centers the cosmos. If the personalist view is right that the dignity of the person is found in itself in an absolute and private way, the ultimate consequence is that all goods in which man participates must be understood as ordered to him. Man’s world becomes “egocentric.” “If the human person were really what the personalists say,” De Koninck writes,

man should be able to find in himself a lovableness which would be his own in the face of his end; the self would be alone the principle of the person's destiny; it would also be the term; it would not subordinate itself to any other end than itself, except in order to subordinate that end to itself; it would not turn towards things other than self except in view of this same end of making them its own.501

This view of man, if not knowingly supported by personalists, is perfectly consonant with the movement of modern philosophy. This is in fact what Kant in the speculative realm, and, in the practical realm, Marx, insist upon.

In the mind of Kant, the root of all evils is heteronomy, and to be ordered to anything extrinsic is to be ruled and governed by another. His moral thought takes particular aim at the idea that man’s goodness finds an extrinsic measure in God. To posit a divine law as an external rule, ordering man to a good that also lies outside of himself, is for Kant to reduce man to the animal level. Any law that does not arise from reason itself, or that is ordered toward anything apart from the goodness of the will itself, is an enslavement. 502 The Kantian ethical view takes what was for

501 Common Good, 41-42. “Si vraiment la personne humaine était ce qu’en disent les personnalistes, l’homme devrait pouvoir trouver en lui-même une amabilité qui serait sienne en face de sa fin : le soi serait à lui-même le principe de sa destinée ; il en serait aussi le terme ; il ne se subordonnerait à une fin autre que soi que pour la subordonner à soi ; il ne se porterait vers des choses autres que soi que pour se les faire siennes comme fin” (Bien Commun, 135). 502 See Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, especially section II, and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, especially section IV. For example: “Autonomy then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature. …If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere

312 Lucifer a sheer choice, a deliberate rejection of the Good, and builds it into a alternative account of reality. It makes a speculative error of the demonic sin. But this characteristically modern philosophy, and even Kant himself is only a certain culmination of a corrosion with older roots.

One must go back to the Averroism which seeks emancipation from the natural order, to voluntarism which tends towards the emancipation of desire, to nominalism which conduces towards emancipation of human discourse, to the moralism of good will which seeks the emancipation of sentiment, to methodic and pretended skepticism which seeks the emancipation of purely human thought, to Kantian subjectivism which tends towards the emancipation of reason against understanding and of rights against the common good.503

Without being able to enter here into a complete analysis of the genesis of modern philosophy, we note that Cardinal Villeneuve expresses all the intellectual shifts as the consequence of a desire for freedom from order. It is human nature, complex as it is, that can force such a darkness upon its own understanding. But this darkness easily deceives many who did not share the original motive.

We have said that Kant gave the purest speculative expression to the practical rebellion from the objectivity of an ordered and created world. Yet there is a certain return to the practical level in the progeny of Kantian thought. It is not

‘merely’ practical in the sense of a return to the clear-sightedness of the angels else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy. The will in that case does not give itself the law, but it is given by the object through its relation to the will.” Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Thomas Abbot (Ak. 4:436; 441). 503 Cardinal Villeneuve, Common Good, preface. “Il faut remonter à l’averroïsme qui veut l’émancipation de l’ordre naturel, au volontarisme qui tend à l’émancipation de l’appétit, au nominalisme qui conduit vers l’émancipation de la parole humaine, au moralisme de bonne volonté qui veut l’émancipation du sentiment, au scepticisme poseur et méthodique qui veut l’émancipation de la pensée purement humaine, au subjectivisme kantien qui tend vers l’émancipation de la raison contre l’intelligence et du droit contre le bien commun” (Bien Commun, 110).

313 which leaves room only for submission or knowing rebellion, but the imposition of the intellectual rejection of order onto the political sphere. Placing man’s destiny in what will emerge in purity from man alone, Karl Marx urges the destruction of order on the concrete level, the conflict that will reduce man to a state of nakedness from which his own interior richness will emerge. “Once man has broken all ties with anything at all, he will be able to move ‘around himself, his true sun.’”504 De Koninck traces this perverted circular movement to its origin, beginning by quoting Marx’s allusion to the rebellion of Prometheus: “'You may be sure that I will never exchange my miserable lot for being a servant to you. I would rather be bound to this rock than be the faithful valet and messenger of Zeus the Father...' There is what Marx says following Feuerbach, Feuerbach the descendent of Hegel, Hegel the descendent of Fichte and Kant, Kant the descendent of ...Non serviam!”505

There is a tragic irony in the lineage De Koninck attaches to the personalists.

The latter are motivated by abuses committed against the dignity of the human person. They declare that dignity to be something absolute in order to demonstrate that it cannot be sacrificed to some “higher cause.” Yet they hold in common with

Marxist and Fascist totalitarians the belief that to order the person to the common good is to sacrifice the person’s own good—that the common good is something alien to the person, rather than the proper and better good of each one who shares in it. “By their false notion of the common good, the personalists are fundamentally

504 Common Good, 222; quoting Karl Marx, Morceaux choisis. “Une fois que l’homme aura brisé tous ses liens avec quoi que ce soit, il pourra se mouvoir ‘autour de lui-même, de son véritable soleil’” (Bien Commun, 170). 505 Common Good, 221-3, 237; quoting Karl Marx, Morceaux choisis. “‘Je n’échangerai jamais, sois- en sûr, contre ton servage, mon misérable sort. J’aime mieux être rivé à ce rocher que d’être le fidèle valet, le messager de Zeus le Père...’ Voilà ce que dit Marx après Feuerbach, Feuerbach issu de Hegel, Hegel issu de Fichte et Kant, Kant issu de … Non Serviam!” (Bien Commun, 171).

314 in accord with those whose errors they suppose they are fighting.”506 The response to the inhuman regimes of the modern era must do more than reject the reductive

“use” of persons; it must protect the order of man to the true common good, in relation to which he finds his highest dignity.

A Broader View of Personalism

Throughout this excursus we have been taking the term ‘personalists’ simply to mean those who embrace the principle of the primacy of the person over the common good, because this is the meaning with which De Koninck employs the term. Nevertheless, the uses of the term found in contemporary philosophy and theology are many and varied.507 While all these instances have in common a particular attention to the unique value of the person, not all consider this value absolute. Should we understand the foregoing argument as a valid critique of every form of personalism?

What would De Koninck say, for example, about the assertion of Karol

Wojtyla’s (Pope John Paul II) that the only response to utilitarianism is “the personalistic principle and the personalistic norm”? Wojtyla explains that norm as follows:

This norm, in its negative aspect, states that the person is the kind of good which does not admit of use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as

506 Common Good, 66. “Par leur fausse notion du bien commun, les personnalistes sont, au fond, d’accord avec ceux dont ils prétendent combattre les erreurs” (Bien Commun, 149). 507 De Koninck himself realizes that personalism is employed more broadly, but he thinks it unwise for those who do not hold to the primacy of the person over the common good to adopt the term. “He who rightly believes that every human being is a person capable of, and immediately ordained to the supreme immutable common good and that in this consists his dignity, let him not assume that he must therefore call himself a personalist—sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Equivocation implies a grave risk” (In Defense of St. Thomas, 336). The question of terminology, however, is a distinct, and secondary question.

315 such the means to an end. In its positive form the personalistic norm confirms this: the person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.508

With the Marxist image of man as orbiting in a closed circle around himself, “his true sun,” and Kant’s moral theory, at the heart of which stands the categorical imperative,509 fresh in our minds, should we conclude that John Paul is an adherent of the “pernicious doctrine” De Koninck is so concerned to expose?

It is not possible to make a deep study of Wojtyla’s thought here.510 Yet, if we make no further clarifications, we run the risk of distorting De Koninck’s own account of man. If, for example, we are left with the impression that for De Koninck the created person is something of little consequence, something of no intrinsic worth, we have missed the real point. Likewise, if we think that every attention to the good that the person himself is becomes individualistic and egocentric, we have missed the point. Just as the common good, rightly understood, does not annihilate but rather ennobles the one who shares in it, so the doctrine of the primacy of the common good does not destroy the uniqueness and importance of the created person but gives it its true foundation.

508 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, trans. H.T. Willetts (San Francisco, Igantius Press: 1981), 41. 509 The second formulation of the categorical imperative is: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 4:429). 510 Such an analysis has been thoroughly made by Michael Waldstein in his substantial introduction to the English translation of Pope John Paul II’s Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body. He argues that the root of John Paul’s personalism is not the anti-teleological philosophy of Kant and his successors, but the spiritual theology of . John Paul’s attention to the person does not preclude the person’s order to a higher good, but examines that very ordering on the side of the experience of the person, and especially in terms of the metaphor of spousal love and the analogical principle of the gift of self.

316 One of the fundamental texts for John Paul is a passage from Gaudium et Spes that, building on the likeness between man and the Trinity, culminates in the dual claim that man is “willed for his own sake,” and is ordered to a “sincere gift of self.”511 A remarkably similar pair of principles appears in De Koninck’s notes on

Mercy and Redemption, expressed as two aspects or sides of human dignity. “The dignity of human nature can be understood in two ways: Man was created for his own sake, i.e. he is able to order himself to God. It is because of this return that he has dignity.”512 De Koninck uses the same phrase which the Council fathers later chose: “for his own sake,” adding to it the aspect of his actual return to God. Let us consider the relation of these aspects more closely.

In the Common Good, De Koninck draws on St. Thomas to explain the two- sided dignity proper to the intelligent creature, i.e. the created person:

Intellectual and rational creatures exceed other creatures both by the perfection of their nature, and by the dignity of their end. By the perfection of their nature, because the rational creature is the only one which is master of its acts and freely determines itself to operate as it does, whereas the other creatures are rather more moved to action than agents themselves. By the dignity of their end, because only the intellectual creature attains by its own operation the very ultimate end of the universe, namely, by knowing God and loving Him; whereas other creatures cannot attain to this end except by a certain participation in His likeness.513

511 “Indeed the Lord Jesus, when he prayed to the Father that ‘all may be one… as we are one,’ and thus opened vistas closed to human reason, indicated a likeness between the union of the divine Persons and the union of God’s sons in truth and love. This likeness shows that man, who is the only creature on earth that God willed for its own sake, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self” (Gaudium et Spes, 24:3). 512 “Mercy and Redemption.” “La dignité de la nature humaine peut s’entendre de deux façons : L’homme a été créé pour lui-même, i.e. il peut s’ordonner à Dieu. C’est en raison de ce retour qu’il a de le dignité.” 513 III Contra Gentiles, c. 111; quoted in Common Good, 39. “Praecellunt enim (intellectuales et rationales naturae) alias creaturas et in perfectione naturae et in dignitate finis. In perfectione quidem naturae, quia sola creatura rationalis habet dominium sui actus, libere se agens ad operandum; dum caeterae vero creaturae ad opera propria magis aguntur quam agant... In dignitate

317

To be willed for one’s own sake means to be one who can really possess the highest good, who can know it as such and love it for itself. But in order to actually receive that good, the person must turn his heart and mind to it; he must order himself to the good. “The being-for-self of each created person is for the person's end which is

God. Nothing is anterior to this being-for-self-for-God. Nothing can dissolve it except evil.”514

This “being-for-self-for-God” (être-pour-soi-pour-Dieu) not only summarizes the relative character of the dignity that man has as a creature who is capax Dei, but also brings together the two parts of the conclusion of Gaudium et Spes 24:3 (man as

“the only creature on earth that God willed for its own sake,” and as finding his perfection “through a sincere gift of self”). The doctrine of holy slavery, which we have already carefully examined, helps to make the connection between self-gift and the order of man to God clear. At the beginning of his article on slavery to Mary, De

Koninck describes the core doctrine of Louis de Montfort as follows: “this very perfect devotion consists first of all in giving oneself entirely, as a slave, to Mary and to Jesus through her.”515

De Koninck describes this devotion as giving oneself because it is the completion of a perfect belonging, the belonging that springs not only from the dependency of nature, but from the freedom of the one who knows and loves the autem finis, quia sola creatura intellectualis ad ipsum finem ultimum universi sua operatione pertingit, scilicet cognoscendo et amando Deum: aliae vero creaturae ad finem ultimum pertingere non possunt nisi per aliqualem similitudinis ipsius participationem.” 514 Common Good, 41. “L’être-pour-soi de toute personne créée est pour sa fin qui est Dieu. Rien n’est antérieur à cet indissoluble être-pour-soi-pour-Dieu. Rien ne peut le dissoudre si ce n’est le mal” (Bien Commun, 135). 515 “Question du mot,” 5; emphasis in the original. “…cette dévotion très parfaite consiste d’abord à se donner tout entier, en qualité d’esclave, à Marie et à Jésus par elle.”

318 true good. One who orders himself to God gives himself to God. “[J]ust as the slave of a good master belongs to him even more perfectly in that he gives more to master because of the goodness of the latter so that a relation of friendship can be established between them, so too the person who does the will of God for love of His goodness belongs more to God than one who submits by self-love and fear of punishment that he dreads.”516

The text from Gaudium et Spes which we have already quoted concludes that man “cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self.” De Koninck is making in essence the same argument when he claims that the freedom and dignity proper to man is only fully realized when man willingly and freely gives himself to

God. “Through grace God gives the creature the power to belong to Him according to deity itself. Since it is a power to give oneself, it is more ours and freer as it is more divine and as it leads us, very surely, to God in his life as God.”517

The papal motto chosen by John Paul II comes from the total consecration to

Mary taught by St. Louis de Montfort. “—totally yours.” In these words, in the love of Mary, we find that the fundamental convictions about the person held by the Holy Father and De Koninck coincide. The attention to the unique value of the person which we find in the language of Gaudium et Spes, and which was so

516 “Question du mot,” 9; citing Aristote, I Polit., c. 2, 1255b. 10-15. “[D]e même que l’esclave d’un maître bon lui appartient d’autant plus parfaitement qu’il se donne davantage au maître à cause de la bonté de celui-ci, en sorte qu’il peut s’établir entre eux des rapports d’amitié, de même la personne, qui fait la volonté de Dieu par amour de sa bonté, appartient davantage à Dieu que celui qui se soumet par amour de soi et par crainte des peines qu’il redoute.” 517 “Perfection de la liberté,” 280; emphasis added. “Par la grâce, Dieu confère à la créature le pouvoir de Lui appartenir selon la déité même. Dès lors qu'il s'agit d'un pouvoir de se donner, celui-ci est d'autant plus nôtre et plus libre qu'il est plus divin et qu'il nous porte, très sûrement, vers Dieu dans sa vie de Dieu.”

319 important to the thought of John Paul II, is deeply allied at its root to De Koninck’s account of human dignity as deriving from the order to the common good.

320 CHAPTER 37 MICHAEL?! (JUDE 1:9, REV. 12:7)

Qui est comme Dieu ?! Who is like God?! Or, une intelligence très inférieure au premier des Now, an intelligence very inferior to the first of the anges se révolta contre ce décret du principe des angels revolted against this decree “of the principle voies de Dieu, du chef des hiérarchies célestes, et of the ways of God,” from the head of the celestial elle cria d'un cri qui est aussi son nom: Michael — hierarchies, and he cried a cry that is also his name: Qui est comme Dieu? Dans ce cri éclata la “Michael—Who is like God?” In this cry there transcendance absolue de Celui qui est au-dessus de shines forth the absolute transcendence of the One toutes les voies. Ce cri, écho de l'humilité, entonna who is above all ways. That cry, the echo of le cantique nouveau, et il mérita à Michel d'être la humility, began to sing the “new canticle,” and by tête de la milice céleste. (Ps. XXXII, 3; Apoc. V, 9) it Michael deserved to be the head of the host of Ce fut, dans l'ordre du temps, le premier éclat de la heaven (Ps. 32:3; Rev. 5:9). It is, in the order of cité nouvelle où les miséricordes sont au-dessus de time, the first glimmer of the “new city” where “the toutes les oeuvres. (Ps. CXLIV, 9) Et celui qui fut mercies are above all the works” (Ps. 144:9). And le principe des voies de Dieu pervertit sa sagesse the one who was the principle of the ways of God par l'effet de sa splendeur (Ezech. XXVIII, 17), Il “perverted his wisdom because of his splendor” tomba du ciel comme la foudre. (Luc. X, 18) C'est (Ezek. 28:17); “he fell from heaven like a pourquoi ainsi parle le Seigneur Yahweh: Parce thunderbolt” (Lk. 10:18). “This is why the Lord qu'il s'est élevé en hauteur, parce qu'il a porté sa Yahweh speaks thus: Because he elevated himself cime jusque dans les nues, et que son coeur s'est in arrogance, because he carried his crown up in the enorgueilli de son élévation, je l'ai livré à celui qui clouds, and because his heart became proud of his est le plus puissant sur tous les peuples, qui le exaltation, I delivered him to the one who is the traitera à sa guise. (Ezech. XXXI, 10-11) Lui qui most powerful over all of the people, who will treat ne voulait pas servir la créature, sera vaincu par la him in his own manner” (Ezek. 31:10-11). He who servitude de Diéu qui s'est abaissé lui-même, se did not want to serve the creature will be conquered faisant obéissant jusqu'à la mort, et à la mort de la by the servitude of God “who humbled Himself, croix. Et c'est pourquoi aussi Dieu l'a making Himself obedient unto death, a death upon souverainement élevé, et lui a donné le nom qui est a cross. And this is also why God raised Him high, au-dessus de tout nom. (Phil. II, 8-9) Lui qui faisait and gave Him the name which is above all names” retentir le Non serviam! et qui niait, non pas (Phil. 2:8-9). He who caused to reverberate the Non directement la négation où il est devant Dieu, mais serviam! and who denied, not directly the negation la négation où il devait se mettre en face de la grâce which he is before God, but the negation in which et en face d'une nature en elle-même très inférieure he would have to place himself before grace and à la sienne, sera vaincu par la négation des choses before a nature in itself much inferior to his own, qui sont, par la ‘via negationis’ que Jésus a lui- will be conquered by the negation of things which même vécue: il a choisi les choses qui ne sont pas, are, by the “via negationis” which Jesus Himself afin de détruire celles qui sont—et ignobilia mundi, lived: “He chose the things that are not in order to et contemptibilia elegit Deus, et ea, quae non sunt, destroy the things that are—et ignobilia mundi, et ut ea quae sunt destrueret. (I Cor. I, 28) Tout ce qui contemptibilia elegit Deus, et ea, quae non sunt, ut véritablement sera, est désormais lié à ce qui n'est ea quae sunt destrueret” (1 Cor, 1:28). All that will pas. really be, is from now on bound to that which is not. Béhémoth fut le principe des voies de Dieu, mais Behemoth “was the principle of the ways of God, celui qui l'a fait, celui par lequel toutes choses ont but the One who made him,” the One by which all été faites, tournera contre lui son glaive. (Job XL, things were made, “will turn his sword against 14) Ce qui fut depuis le principe l'instrument de la him” (Job 40:14). That which was from the révolte contre Dieu, sera en même temps le glaive beginning the instrument of a revolt against God, qui transpercera l'âme de la plus humble de toutes will be at the same time “the sword that will pierce les pures créatures. Marie fut aussi l'original the soul” of the most humble of all pure creatures. purement créé que Dieu avait conçu avant de faire Mary was also the purely created original which

321 quoi que ce soit, et elle vaincra dans sa douleur God “had conceived before making anything celui qui pécha depuis le commencement (I Joan. whatever,” and she will conquer in her sorrow the III, 8) et qui est l'original qu'imitent tous ceux qui one who “sinned from the beginning” (1 Jn. 3:8) se rallient à lui. (Sap. II, 25) and who is “the original which all imitate who rally to him” (Wis. 2:25).

CHAPTER 38518 NOVISSIMI PRIMI, ET PRIMI NOVISSIMI (MT. 19:30; 20:16, MK. 10:31, LK. 13:30)

Les derniers seront les premiers, et les The last will be first, and the first, last. premiers, les derniers. Dans l'ordre nouveau, l'ordre de la plénitude de la In the new order, the order of the fullness of mercy, miséricorde, voici que les derniers seront les “behold the last will be first, and the first will be premiers, et les premiers seront les derniers. (Luc. last” (Lk. 13:30). “It is also with reason,” says St. XIII, 30) “Aussi est-ce avec raison, dit saint Bernard, “that Mary who had made herself last of Bernard, que Marie qui s'était faite la dernière de all when she was the first, was elevated from the tous quand elle était la première, fût élevée du last rank to the first; it is with reason that she dernier rang au premier; c'est avec raison qu'elle becomes the mistress of all, as she had made devint la maîtresse de tous, comme elle s'était faite herself the servant of all; with good reason she was la servante de tous; c'est à bon droit qu'elle fût elevated above the very angels, after having placed élevée au-dessus des anges mêmes, après s'être herself, with ineffable gentleness, below the placée avec une ineffable douceur, au-dessous des widows and the penitent sinners, below even the veuves et des pécheresses pénitentes, au-dessous one from whom seven demons were expelled.”a In même de celle d'où sept démons avaient été the new hierarchy, the most humble creature in the chassés.”a Dans cette hiérarchie nouvelle, la condition of nature is carried to the summit of the créature la plus humble dans sa condition de nature, universal order. “Quoniam excelsus Dominus, est portée au sommet de l'ordre universel. Quoniam humilia respicit: et alta a longe cognoscit—The excelsus Dominus, humilia respicit: et alta a longe Lord being so exalted, considers the humble and He cognoscit—Le Seigneur étant très élevé, il regarde knows the proud from afar” (Ps. 137:6). The very les humbles, et il connaît de loin les orgueilleux. imperfection of human nature has rendered it open (Ps. CXXXVII, 6) L'imperfection même de la to a greater elevation. In its dignity as image of the nature humaine a rendu celle-ci ouverte à une plus Most Holy Trinity, it is capable of being elevated to grande élévation. Dans sa dignité d'image de la the order of grace. It is true that the angels are more Très Sainte Trinité, elle est élevable à l'ordre de la worthy by nature, and “the image of creation,” that grâce. Il est vrai que les anges sont plus dignes par which is in all intellectual creatures before any nature, et l'‘image de création’, celle qui est en elevation and which is in us the reason for the toute créature intellectuelle avant toute élévation et possibility of being elevated, is more perfect in qui est en nous la raison de l'élévabilité, est en eux them. But, it remains that man is more malleable to plus parfaite. Mais il reste que l'homme est plus supernatural dignity, to the image of grace and malléable à la dignité surnaturelle, à l'image de glory, not because of a natural dignity hidden under grâce et de gloire, non pas à cause d'une dignité his infirmity, but because of the incommensurable naturelle cachée sous son infirmité, mais à cause de mercy of God. “That which the world holds as l'incommensurable miséricorde de Dieu. Ce que le nonsense, that is what God chose to confound the monde tient pour insensé, c'est ce que Dieu a choisi wise; and that which the world holds as weak is pour confondre les sages; et ce que le monde tient what God chose to confound the strong” (1 Cor. pour faible, c'est ce que Dieu a choisi pour 1:27). The excess of power rejoins itself most confondre les forts. (I Cor. I, 27) L'excès de perfectly in the excess of impotence. But, if it is puissance se rejoint le plus parfaitement dans true that the very formlessness of human nature l'excès d'impuissance. Mais, s'il est vrai que establishes it in a most singular affinity to its l'informité même de la nature humaine établit celle- creator, it is only the excess of the divine power

518 This chapter is mistakenly numbered XXXVII in the original French.

322 ci dans une affinité à son créateur tout à fait overflowing with mercy that can realize that particulière, il n'y a que l'excès de la puissance affinity. “Wisdom reaches from one extreme to the divine débordant en miséricorde, qui peut faire other.” It is in the world of mercy that the abyss of valoir cette affinité. La Sagesse atteint d'une fullness calls to the abyss of emptiness, indeed, of extrémité à l'autre. C'est dans la terre de misery. miséricorde que l'abîme de plénitude appelle l'abîme de vacuité, voire de misère. a S. Bernard, Sermo in Dominica infra Octavam a St. Bernard, Sermo in Dominica infra Octavam Assumptionis B. V.M., n. 11, T. III, p. 400a: Merito facta Assumptionis B. V.M., n. 11, t. 3, p. 400a. “Rightly is the est novissima prima, quae cum prima esset omnium, sese last made first, who when she was first of all made novissimam faciebat. Merito facta est omnium domina, herself last. Rightly is she made mistress of all, who quae se omnium exhibebat ancillam. Merito denique showed herself the slave of all. Rightly, finally, is she super angelos exaltata est quae et infra viduas et exalted above the angels who placed herself with poenitentes, infra eam de qua ejecta fuerant septem ineffable gentleness below the widows and penitents, daemonia; ineffabili sese mansuetudine inclinabat. below the one from whom the seven demons were ejected.”

CHAPTER 39 ATTENDITE A FALSIS PROPHETIS (MT. 7:15)

Gardez-vous des faux prophètes. Beware of false prophets. Or, cette affinité sera pour l'homme l'objet d'une Now this affinity will be, for man, the object of a tentation qui grandira au cours des temps. N'est-ce temptation which will grow with the passing of pas de toute convenance que le démon qui pécha time. Is it not entirely fitting that the devil who nonobstant la perfection et l'infaillibilité de sa sinned, notwithstanding the perfection and connaissance spéculative, qui pervertit sa sagesse infallibility of his speculative knowledge, “who par l'effet de sa splendeur, attaque l'ordre nouveau perverted his wisdom because of his splendor,” en éveillant dans l'homme si faillible dans son attacks the new order by awakening in man, so intelligence spéculative, un orgueil très ignoble qui weak in his speculative intelligence, a very ignoble aurait pour objet la noirceur même de sa nature, pride that would have as object the very darkness of sous prétexte que celle-ci a été assumée par le Fils his nature, under pretext that this darkness was de Dieu? Il poussera l'homme à se saisir de soi- assumed by the Son of God? He will push man to même, à se replier sur soi, à identifier la force du take possession of himself, to retire within himself, faible avec la faiblesse de celui-ci et à voir dans sa to identify the strength of the weak with its nature un droit à l'amour suprême et une exigence, weakness, and to see in his nature a right to alors qu'en vérité la force du faible n'est autre chose supreme love and a claim upon it, while in truth, que la miséricordieuse toute-puissance de Dieu. the strength of the weak is nothing other than the L'homme cherchera dans cette prise de conscience all-powerful mercy of God. In this consciousness of de sa singularité et dans sa faiblesse même, un bien his singularity and in his very weakness, man will en soi et pour soi en vertu duquel il aurait été jugé search for a good in himself and for himself in digne d'un amour jusqu'à l'abaissement de Dieu. virtue of which he would have been judged L'homme tournerait ainsi la nature en laquelle Dieu deserving of a love even unto the debasement of s'est incarné, contre Dieu attaqué dans sa condition God. Man would thus turn the nature in which God d'humiliation. Le démon accomplirait ainsi la incarnated Himself, against God, attacked in His promesse qu'il s'était faite dans la méchanceté de condition of humiliation. The devil would thus son coeur: Sedebo in monte testamenti—je accomplish the promise he made to himself in the m'assiérai sur la montagne qui est le Christ. (Is. malice of his heart: “Sedebo in monte testamenti—I XIV, 13) Car le fils de la perdition ira jusqu'à will sit on the mountain” that is Christ (Is. 14:13). s'asseoir dans le sanctuaire de Dieu, et à se For “the son of perdition will go so far as to sit in présenter comme s'il était Dieu. (II Thess. II, 4) Le the sanctuary of God, and will present himself as if chef de cette simulation d'un ordre nouveau sera he were God” (2 Thes. 2:4). The head of this annoncé par des hommes qui se couvriront de simulation of a new order will be announced by

323 l'Incarnation: Car il s'élèvera de faux Christs et de men who will clothe themselves with the faux prophètes, et ils feront de grands prodiges et Incarnation: “For there will arise false Christs and des choses extraordinaires, jusqu'à séduire, s'il se false prophets, and they will perform great deeds pouvait, les élus mêmes. (Matth. XXIV, 24) Ils and extraordinary things, even to the point of seront d'autant plus insidieux qu'ils auront seducing, if possible, the elect themselves” (Mt. l'apparence de la piété. (II Tim. III, 5) Ceux qui 24:24). They will be so much the more insidious s'insurgeront ouvertement contre Dieu ne seront pas because “they will have the appearance of piety” (2 les plus dangereux, mais ceux qui viendront sous le Tim. 3:5). Those who will rebel openly against God nom du Christ: Prenez garde qu'on ne vous séduise, will not be the most dangerous, but rather those car plusieurs viendront sous mon nom. (Luc. XXI, who will come in the name of Christ: “take care not 8) Ils ne voudront pas croire qu'en devenant to be seduced, because many will come in my homme, la majesté de Dieu s'est anéantie name” (Lk. 21:8). They will not want to believe (exinanivit) et que ce sont les choses qui ne sont that, in becoming man, God’s majesty was reduced pas (ea quae non sunt) qui ont été choisies. “Il est to nothing (exinanivit) and that it is the things that d'une intolérable impudence, dit saint Bernard pour are not (ea quae non sunt) that were chosen. “It is un misérable ver de terre (vermiculus), de s'enfler an intolerable impudence,” says St. Bernard, “for a et de se grandir quand la majesté de Dieu même se miserable worm of the earth (vermiculus), to puff réduit à néant.”a Existimasti inique quod ero tui himself up and magnify himself when the very similis: arguam te, et statuam contra faciem majesty of God becomes nothing.”a “Existimasti tuam—Vous avez cru, méchant, que je serais inique quod ero tui similis: arguam te, et statuam semblable à vous: je vous châtierai, et vous ferai contra faciem tuam—You believed, wicked one, voir à vous-même, dans toute votre laideur. (Ps. that I would be like you: I will punish you and XLIX, 21) make you see yourself in all your ugliness” (Ps. 49:21). On pourra reconnaître ces faux prophètes à ce We will be able to recognize those false prophets signe: ils prêcheront la grande prostituée qui est by this sign: they will preach “the great prostitute assise sur les grandes eaux, la femme qui, elle who is sitting on the great waters,” the woman who aussi, est appelée une grande cite—la grande cité is also called a great city—“the great city which has qui a la royauté sur les rois de la terre. (Apoc. the dominion over all the kings of the earth” (Rev. XVII, 1-18) 17:1-18). a S. Bernard, In Nativitate Domini, Sermo I, T. III, p. 33b: aSt. Bernard, In Nativitate Domini, sermo 1, t. 3, p. 33b. Intolerabilis impudentiae est, ut ubi sese exinanivit “It is unbearable impudence that where Majesty empties Majestas, vermiculus infletur et intumescat. itself, a worm swells up and is inflated.”

324 Chapters 37-39: The New Order and Renewed Resistance

Chapters 37 through 39 consider the new order, the order God establishes by the victory of the lowly, first in its earliest foreshadowing, then in its full realization, and finally in the perverted approximation of that order with which Satan tries to subvert it. The first creature traditionally attributed with the response of humility to the pride of Satan is the archangel Michael. The meaning of the Hebrew name

‘Michael’ is often interpreted as a rhetorical question: “Who is like God?” It is a rebuke to the fallen angels who make themselves the equal of God by seeking to be the principle of their own dignity. De Koninck takes this rebuke as “the first glimmer of the ‘new city’ where ‘the mercies are above all the works’ (Ps. 144:9)” because it represents the overthrowing of the highest angel by one who is his inferior according to nature. 519 It is the first example of the principle that the mighty will be overthrown, and evil conquered by the lowly.

This is the first note in time of the pattern God would follow in the whole economy, a pattern whose center is the God-man who conquers sin and death by His obedience and suffering. But in a way the whole pattern is also contained in Mary, because He Who Is makes the creature that is nothing from itself the principle of all.

“All that will really be is from now on bound to that which is not.”520 Here De

Koninck reiterates in the context of this new order the thesis that Mary is the final cause of God’s works, adding the aspect that in the unfolding of that order, Mary’s place at the height of elevated creation is to overcome evil, as we saw in Chapter 35.

519 Ego Sapientia, 37.1. 520 Ego Sapientia, 37.1.

325 The rebellion of Satan wounds Mary’s soul because of her love for God and man, but

“she will conquer in her sorrow the one who ‘sinned from the beginning’ (1 Jn.

3:8).”521

God’s determination to unite Himself intimately to human nature, and to be in that nature victor over evil, even causing a pure creature to be His mother and to exercise that victory with Him, manifests mercy in a maximal degree. The last is made first and the first last—such is the work characteristic of transcendent power and love. “In the new hierarchy, the most humble creature in the condition of nature is carried to the summit of the universal order.”522 But, De Koninck warns, we should not be led by this mystery into believing that there is some secret glory hidden in the poverty of human nature itself. The blackness which belongs to human nature makes man malleable to divine mercy, but it is the glory of mercy that shines out in the elevation itself.

He is near us: because he comes among us, as low as we are; because he has become visible and tangible. He comes to reunite us to the principle of all certitude: we are able to touch it. He came to be united to us in our condition by taking a true body. This is a very great mercy. And we know this ... He did not come to join us because it is glorious to have a body, but it is glorious that He did so because glory is in the exaltation following this abasement, this condescension. It is not because of a hidden dignity of our nature, but because of the merciful elevation of our nature that one can speak of exaltation.523

521 Ego Sapientia, 37.2. 522 Ego Sapientia, 38.1. 523 “Mercy and Redemption,” commenting on STh IIIa, q5 a1-2. “Il est près de nous : parce qu’il vient parmi nous, si bas que nous soyons ; parce qu’il est devenu visible et tangible. Il vient nous rejoindre au principe de toute certitude : nous pouvons le toucher. Il est venu nous rejoindre dans notre condition en prenant un corps véritable. C’est là une très grande miséricorde. Et nous savons cela… Il n’est pas venu nous rejoindre parce que c’est glorieux d’avoir un corps, mais c’est glorieux qu’il l’ait fait parce que la gloire est dans l’exaltation qui suit cet abaissement, cette condescendance. Ce n’est pas en raison de la dignité cachée de notre nature, mais en raison de l’élévation miséricordieuse de notre nature qu’on peut parler d’exaltation.”

326

Certainly the rational nature, through which man is in the image of the Triune God, makes man capable with an obediential potency of being elevated to the order of grace. But if there is a capacity in man that disposes him toward an even greater elevation that that of the angels, it is found in those things which make him the least of the intelligent creatures. This capacity is not like a seed that only wants time to develop itself, it is an emptiness that, rightly disposed, becomes receptivity. It is mercy that realizes the divine goodness in man in and through this emptiness.

The perversion in which the very lowliness of man is considered through itself the root of his elevation is, according to De Koninck, a particular revenge of

Satan on man. If something in man, some intrinsic affinity to God were the reason for the Incarnation, then the Incarnation would be something due to him, an almost

“natural” eventuality springing from justice, and thus crowding out the role of mercy. Contrary to the impulse of a return to the principle of Mercy, Satan “will push man to take possession of himself, to retire within himself, to identify the strength of the weak with its weakness, and to see in his nature a right to supreme love and a claim upon it.”524

In a footnote to the section on Feuerbach in the Common Good, De Koninck writes: “In Ego Sapientia (Second Part) I insisted on the perverse interpretation one could give to the doctrine of the power of the weak.” But, he continues, “I did not know then, not having yet read this work of Feuerbach in the complete text, that

524 Ego Sapientia, 39.1.

327 modern philosophy had really done this in such an elaborate way.”525 In light of De

Koninck’s ignorance of Feuerbach in composing it, Chapter 39 has an uncanny similitude to the following passage:

The uplifting effect of the Incarnation consists in just that: the highest being, who knows no need, humiliates himself, lowers himself for man. Thus in God I see the vision of my proper being; I have value for God; the divine meaning of my proper being is thus revealed. How could one express the value of man in a higher manner than this: God becomes man for man, man is the end, the object of divine love? The love of God for man is an essential determination of divine being. God is a God who loves me, who loves man above all.526

In a dramatic reversal of the eccentric movement of man from and back to God,

Feuerbach imagines the divinity orbiting around man. God’s choice to unite Himself to human nature is taken as an indication of the power of man’s proper goodness to draw God out of Himself and into the world. Rather than the diffusiveness of a good perfect and superabundant in itself, which the images of radiating light and flowing waters indicated in the first part, the divine love is compared to the love proper to the inferior for the superior. The divine love for man, the Incarnation itself, is in this account no more than man’s due. In Feuerbach’s vision there is room neither for humility nor mercy. This surely is an example of the “false Christs and false

525 Common Good, footnote 132. “Dans Ego Sapientia (IIe partie) j’ai insisté sur l’interprétation perverse à laquelle on pourrait soumettre la doctrine de la puissance des faibles. Je ne savais pas, n’ayant pas encore lu cet ouvrage de Feuerbach dans son texte complet, que la philosophie moderne l’avait réellement faite d’une manière aussi élaborée” (Bien Commun, footnote 134). 526 Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums; quoted in Common Good, 117; emphasis added. “Voilà en quoi consiste l’effet élévateur de l’Incarnation : l’être le plus élevé, qui ne connaît aucun besoin, s’humilie, s’abaisse pour l’homme. En Dieu m’apparaît ainsi la vision de mon propre être ; j’ai valeur pour Dieu ; le sens divin de mon être propre m’est ainsi révélé. Comment exprimer d’une manière plus élevée la valeur de l’homme : Dieu devient homme pour l’homme, l’homme est la fin, l’objet de l’amour divin ? L’amour de Dieu pour l’homme est une détermination essentielle de l’être divin. Dieu est un Dieu qui m’aime, qui aime l’homme avant tout” (Bien Commun, 189).

328 prophets” who, De Koninck warns, will promote a simulation and perversion of the new order clothed in the mystery of the Incarnation.527

527 Ego Sapientia, 39.1.

329

CHAPTER 40 CANTATE CANTICUM NOVUM (PS. 96:1)

Chantez le Cantique nouveau. Sing a new song. Opposons à “ces vieux cantiques de Lucifer, Let us contrast “those old canticles of Lucifer, the cantique de l'orgueil, cantique de la détraction, canticle of pride, the canticle of detraction, the cantique du doute, cantique du mensonge et canticle of doubt, the canticle of the lie and the cantique d'excuse”, le cantique nouveau que chanta canticle of excuse,” with “the new canticle” the la mère du Christ. “Élevée, poursuit un auteur, et mother of Christ will sing. “Exalted,” says an plus qu'il n'est possible de le dire ou de le penser, author, “more than it is possible to say or to think, mise audessus de tout le monde et de tous les cieux, set above the whole world and all the heavens, she elle ne s'élève pas au-dessus d'elle, mais elle chante does not lift herself up, but she sings the canticle of le cantique de l'humilité, qui est aussi le cantique de humility, which is also the canticle of charity, la charité, parce que la charité ne s'enfle pas. Elle because charity does not puff itself up. She took tira de son coeur saintement enivré une parole from her heart blessedly elated, a word good and bonne et suave, le cantique nouveau que doivent sweet, the new canticle that virgins must repeat redire les vierges après elle. Et que dit-elle? Mon after her. And what does she say? ‘My soul âme magnifie le Seigneur. Voyez combien ce magnifies the Lord.’ See how much this canticle is cantique est opposé à celui que chantait l'ange àu opposed to the one the angel sang at the brink of bord de l'abîme. L'un débuta très haut, aussi il ne the abyss. The one began from a very high place; descendit pas, mais il tomba dans les gouffres he did not descend but fell into a deep pit. Mary profonds. Marie commence par ce qui est bas, pour begins by what is low to raise herself to what is s'élever à ce qui est en haut. Elle magnifie le high. She magnifies the Lord, she does not magnify Seigneur, elle ne se magnifie pas elle-même, bien herself, even though she is incomparably exalted, qu'elle soit exaltée d'une façon incomparable, observing what is written: ‘The more you are great, observant ce qui est écrit: Plus vous êtes grand, the more humble you are in all things’ (Sir. 3:20). plus humiliez-vous en toutes choses. Aussi, mérite- Also, she deserves to be placed above the choirs of t-elle d'être placée au-dessus des choeurs de tous all the angels. Satan exalted himself above the les anges. Satan s'éleva au-dessus du Seigneur, Lord; he was, therefore, justly hurled below all that aussi fut-il justement précipité au-dessous de tout exists. The spirit of the humble Virgin Mary ce qui existe. L'esprit de l'humble Vierge Marie trembled in Jesus her Lord, thereby receiving more tressaillit en Jésus son Seigneur, aussi elle reçut abundantly than her companions the unction of the avec plus d'abondance que ses compagnes l'onction oil of joy. The foolish angel exalted himself in de l'huile de la joie. L'ange insensé s'exalta en lui- himself; thus was he justly condemned to perpetual même; aussi fut-il justement condamné à un deuil mourning. Mary gloried in that her humility was perpétuel. Marie se glorifie de ce que son humilité regarded; thus she will have a reward at the a été regardée, aussi aura-t-elle une récompense judgment that will be made of the blessed souls. dans le jugement qui sera fait des saintes âmes: The angel glorified himself in the brilliance of his l'ange se glorifiait dans l’éclat de sa force, aussi a-t- strength, thus has he secured the chastisement of an il encouru le châtiment d'un mépris éternel.”a eternal contempt.”a a Additamentum IV ad Opusculum S. Bonaventurae, Vitis a Additamentum IV ad Opusculum St. Bonaventurae, mystica, cc. XXV-XXVI, Opera Omnia (Quaracchi), T. Vita mystica, cc. xxv-xxvi, Opera Omnia (Quarrachi), t. VIII, p. 203: Carissimi, vetera cantica sunt haec, 8, p. 203. “Dearest ones, these are ancient songs, the canticum superbiae, canticum detractionis, canticum song of pride, the song of detraction, the song of doubt, dubitationis, canticum mendacii, et canticum the song of lies, and the song of excuse …Not so did the excusationis ... Non ita cantavit novi cantici imitatrix Mother of Christ sing, the imitator of the new song, the mater Christi, verum lilium vere viridantibus foliis true lily truly crowned with green leaves. Do you wish to redimitum. Vis videre folia ejus? Vis audire canticum see her leaves? Do you want to hear her song? Exalted, ejus? Exaltata, et supra quam dici aut cogitari potest, toti and above what can be said of thought, carried above the mundo coelisque praelata, non ascendit supra se, sed whole world and the heavens, she did not rise above cantavit canticum humilitatis, quod et charitatis est, quia herself, but sang the song of humility, which is also that

330 charitas non inflatur. Eructavit de corde suo inebriato of love because love is not inflated. She drew from her verbum bonum et suave, canticum novum virginibus inebriated heart a word good and sweet, the new song cantandum. Et quid ait? Magnificat anima mea that the virgins are to sing. And what did she say? ‘My Dominum. Vide, quam contrarium est canticum hoc soul glorifies the Lord.’ See how contrary is this song to cantico angeli ruituri. Incoepit ille in alto, ac proinde in the song of the angel about to fall. That one began on ima non descendit, sed corruit. Incoepit Maria ab imo, ut high, and therefore did not descend but fell from there in altum sublevaretur. Magnificat haec Dominum, non into the depths. Mary began from below, and thus was se; licet inaestimabiliter exaltata, servans quod scriptum lifted to the height. This one glorifies the Lord, not est: Quanto major es, humilia te in omnibus. Unde et herself; though she was inestimably exalted, she super omnes choros angelorum meruit elevari. observed what is written: ‘As you are greater, humble Magnificavit se ille supra Dominum, unde infra omne yourself in all things’ Thus she also deserved to be raised quod est, meruit praecipitari. Exultavit spiritus humilis above all the choirs of angels. He glorified himself above Mariae in Domino Jesu suo, unde oleo laetitiae prae the Lord, and thus he deserved to be cast below all that consortibus suis iniungi promeruit: exultavit stultus ille is. The humble spirit of Mary exulted in Jesus her Lord, angelus in se, unde luctu perpetuo meruit condemnari. and so deserved to be anointed with the oil of gladness Gloriatur ista humilitatem suam esse respectam, unde before her companions: the foolish angel exulted in habebit fructum in respectione animarum sanctarum: himself, and so deserved to be condemned to eternal gloriabatur ille in multitudine virtutis suae, unde grief. She rejoiced that her humility had been regarded, perpetuam despectionem incurrit. so she will have fruit in the regard of holy souls: he was rejoicing in the vastness of his power, and so he incurred eternal contempt.”

CHAPTER 41 INFIRMA ELEGIT, ET EA QUAE NON SUNT (1 COR. 1:27-28)

Il a choisi les choses faibles, et celles qui He has chosen the things that are weak, and those ne sont pas. that are not. Dieu a choisi de réaliser la limite de la miséricorde: God chose to realize the limit of mercy. He chose il a choisi les choses qui ne sont pas: il a exalté les the things that are not: “He has exalted the humbles. On voit par là combien tous ceux qui humble.” We see by this how all those who would voudraient que l'homme soit par nature au moins wish man to be by nature at least the equal of l'égal des anges et la femme en tout l'égale de angels and woman to be in everything equal to l'homme, diminuent la véritable taille que Dieu a man, diminish the true stature that God deigned to daigné donner à son oeuvre de prédilection, où la give to his work of predilection, where the Woman Femme est Reine des anges. C'est une injure à is Queen of angels. It is an insult to the sublime l’humilité sublime de la Servante de Dieu. Quae humility of the Servant of God. “Quae cum cum audisset, turbata est in sermone ejus, et audisset, turbata est in sermone ejus, et cogitabat cogitabat qualis esset ista salutatio—Ayant entendu qualis esset ista salutatio—Having heard these ces choses, elle fut troublée des paroles (de l'ange things, she was troubled by the words (of the angel Gabriel)—, et elle se demandait ce que pouvait Gabriel)—, and she asked herself what could this signifier cette salutation. (Luc. I, 29) “Elle méditait greeting mean” (Lk. 1:29). “She meditated within en elle-même, commente Corneille: Je me vois herself,” comments Cornelius: “I see myself indigne de toute grâce; comment donc l'ange peut-il unworthy of all grace; how then can the angel call m'appeler pleine de grâce? Pauvrette (paupercula), me full of grace? A poor thing (paupercula), I je passe ma vie avec de pauvres vierges; d'où vient spend my life with poor virgins; from whence donc que l'ange me dit: le Seigneur est avec vous? comes it that the angel tells me: the Lord is with J'estime que je suis la moindre et la plus vile thee? I consider myself to be the least and the most (minimam et vilissimam)a de toutes les femmes: vile (minimum et vilissimam)a of all women: How comment donc se fait-il que l'ange fait retentir à then can it be that the angel makes resound in my mon oreille: Vous êtes bénie entre toutes les ear: You are blessed among all women?”b femmes?”b a Comment la très Sainte Vierge pouvait-elle s'humilier à a How could the Blessed Virgin humiliate herself to this ce point? Cela n'était-il pas contraire à la vérité? Nous extent? Was it not contrary to truth? We will find in St. trouvons dans saint Thomas (IIa, IIae, q. 161, a. 6, ad 1) Thomas (IIa IIae, q161 a6 ad1) an answer to this

331 une réponse à cette difficulté. “ ... Quelqu'un peut, sans difficulty. “…Someone can without error, think and fausseté, croire et affirmer qu'il est le plus vil des affirm that he is the most vile of men, because of the hommes, en raison des défauts cachés qu'il reconnaît être hidden faults he recognizes in himself, and the gifts of en lui, et des dons de Dieu qui existent d'une façon God which exist in a secret way in others. This is why occulte chez les autres. C'est pourquoi Augustin dit, dans Augustine says, in his book On Virginity: ‘Be convinced son livre De la virginité: Soyez convaincus que certains, that some, who are externally your inferiors, are your qui vous sont inférieurs au-dehors, vous sont supérieurs superiors internally.’” See also, in the same place, the au-dedans.” Voir aussi, au même endroit, le commentaire commentary of Cajetan. de Cajetan. b Corneille de la Pierre, In Lucam, c. I, vers 29, T. XVI, b Cornelius of Lapide, In Lucam, 1:29, t. 16, p. 19a. “For p. 19a: Cogitabat enim intra se: Ego mihi videor indigna she thought within herself: I seem to myself to be omnis gratiae, quomodo ergo angelus me vocat gratia unworthy of all grace, so how can the angel call me full plenam? ego paupercula cum pauperibus virginibus dego of grace? I, a poor one, go about and speak with poor et conversor, quomodo ergo angelus mihi insonat virgins, so how can the angel proclaim the Lord is with Dominus tecum? Ego aestimo me feminarum omnium you? I judge myself to be the least and basest of all minimam et vilissimam, quomodo ergo angelus mihi ait: women, so how can the angel say to me: Blessed are you Benedicta tu inter mulieres? among women?”

332 Chapters 40-42: The Beauty of Mary in Humility

Chapters 40-42 conclude the reflection on the beauty of Mary in her victory over Satan from the perspective of the sharpening conflict in the last period of history, from the present time until the end of the world. At the same time they conclude the second part, which considers Mary in her relation to the manifestation of mercy, and the work as a whole, which offers us a view of Mary’s proper place in the divine economy, as a principle by which the whole returns to God, and as the created wisdom that directs all things in accord with divine mercy.

The whole of Chapter 40 is a single text of St. Bonaventure which reiterates the height to which Mary is raised through humility in contrast to the depth to which Satan falls through pride. The quote begins with the exaltation of Mary, which is characterized by her exaltation of God and profound humility. Satan, on the other hand, praises himself because of his natural gifts, and consequently “fell into a deep pit.”528 These two movements expand in a sense the extremes of the created order.

Through mercy, Mary is raised above the highest point of the created order according to nature, while through sin, Lucifer falls to a place “below all that exists.”529 They not only exchange places with one another, but Mary rises above the height Lucifer once occupied as a separated intellect, and the latter in turn descends below the depth Mary naturally occupies as a material being.

528 St. Bonaventure, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 40.1. 529 St. Bonaventure, quoted in Ego Sapientia, 40.1.

333 This reversal expresses the mystery of the new order in which mercy is most fully manifested. “God chose to realize the limit of mercy.”530 In light of this principle, De Koninck argues in Chapter 41, we see the wrong-headedness of those who try preserve the dignity of the lowly by claiming there is complete equality among all. The elevation of Mary “more than it is possible to say or to think”531 glorifies God because Mary claims nothing for herself. De Koninck points to the wonder Mary expresses at the Annunciation as evidence that she would not sympathize in any way with the humanism that considers the Incarnation no more than fitting.

The beauty of Mary is characterized by her humility. De Koninck began the second part by asking, “Why does the Blessed Virgin tell us ‘I am black but beautiful’

…Would there not be a very intimate connection between this blackness the mother of God attributes to herself and her very character as first principle?”532 Now it is evident that her beauty, the beauty of divine mercy in its fullest manifestation, the beauty of a creature raised to the level of a principle, is unthinkable apart from the the “blackness” of humility.

530 Ego Sapientia, 41.1. 531 St. Bonaventure, quoted in Ego Sapientia 40.1. 532 Ego Sapientia, 17.1.

334 CHAPTER 42 CIVITAS DEI (REV. 21)

Vu la grandissante misère de ce monde et les peines Seeing the growing misery of this world and the auxquelles est soumise notre mère la Sainte Église, pains to which our mother the Holy Church is on conviendra qu'il est très opportun de redire ces submitted, it happens that it is very opportune to vérités. La misère intellectuelle et morale du monde repeat these truths. The intellectual and moral contemporain révèle plus que jamais la noirceur de misery of the contemporary world more than ever l'homme, une noirceur qu'on ignorera toujours reveals the baseness of man, a baseness that we will davantage. Et nescis quia tu es miser, et more and more ignore. “Et nescis quia tu es miser, miserabilis, et pauper, et caecus, et nudus—Et tu ne et miserabilis, et pauper, et caecus, et nudus—And sais pas que tu es un malheureux, un misérable, you do not know that you are an unhappy one, one pauvre, aveugle et nu. (Apoc. III, 17) Jamais miserable, poor, blind, and naked” (Rev. 3:17). l'humanité n'a été aussi dépourvue de ses vertus Never has humanity been so deprived of its purely purement humaines de sagesse et de prudence. human virtues of wisdom and prudence. Never has Jamais elle n'a autant méprisé cette nature qu'elle it so mistaken this nature it exalts. Men retain only exalte. Les hommes ne retiennent de la science que the name of science; research becomes more and le nom; la recherche devient de plus en plus une fin more an end in itself; we become similar to the men en soi; nous devenons semblables à ces hommes of the last times, “who always learn but cannot des derniers temps, qui toujours apprennent sans attain to knowledge of truth” (2 Tim. 3:7). pouvoir jamais arriver à la connaissance de la vérité. (II Tim. III, 7) Jamais plus ni plus profondément que dans notre Never more nor more profoundly than in our time, temps, comme le dit l'encyclique Divini as the encyclical Divini Redemptoris states, has the Redemptoris, on n'a attaqué l'oeuvre de la work of Redemption been attacked. And this attack Rédemption. Et cette attaque est radicale. Elle is radical. It touches the work of Redemption in its touche l'oeuvre de la Rédemption à sa racine—la root: mercy. This very insidious attack takes on the miséricorde. Très insidieuse, elle revêt les appearance of charity. It converges on the apparences de la charité. Elle converge vers la foule multitude which attracts the mercy of the Savior. “I qui attire la miséricorde du Sauveur. J'ai have compassion on this multitude” (Mk. 8:2). compassion de cette foule. (Marc VIII, 2) Craignez- “Stand in awe of him, Israel’s posterity: because he le, postérité d'Israël: car il n'a pas méprisé ni rejeté has not despised nor rejected the supplication of the la supplication du pauvre! (Ps. XXI, 25) Les uns poor!” (Ps. 21:25). Some attack this mercy by attaquent cette miséricorde en poussant la masse pushing the masses into an extreme necessity dans une nécessité extrême où elle perd elle-même wherein they themselves lose all sense of mercy. tout sentiment de miséricorde. “Ceux qui ont déjà “Those who have already reached the limit of atteint la limite de la misère, ne craignent plus de misery, are not afraid any longer of suffering more; souffrir davantage; c'est pourquoi ils sont sans this is why they are without pity.”a Others, instead pitié.”a Les autres, au lieu de prêcher et d'établir la of preaching and establishing justice, try to raise up justice, essayent de soulever dans les misérables pride in the wretched, this false power of the weak. l'orgueil, fausse puissance des faibles. Or, personne Now, nobody is more unworthy of mercy than the n'est plus indigne de miséricorde que le misérable wretched proud. orgueilleux. Mais l'Église nous enseigne que parallèlement à But the Church teaches us that parallel to this cette grandissante noirceur, la miséricorde divine se growing baseness, divine mercy will manifest itself manifestera davantage au cours des temps, et cela more and more through the ages, and particularly in tout particulièrement dans une révélation de plus en the more and more explicit revelation of the plus explicitée des mystères de Marie, Mère de mysteries of Mary, Mother of Mercy. “The Lord,” Miséricorde. Le Seigneur, dit le Ps. LVIII, règnera says Psalm 58, “will reign in Jacob and in all the dans Jacob et dans toute la terre; ils se world; they will return in the evening, and they will convertiront sur le soir, et ils souffriront la faim suffer hunger like dogs, and they will go through comme des chiens, et ils iront autour de la ville the city to find something to eat.” “This city,” adds

335 pour trouver de quoi manger. “Cette ville, ajoute le blessed Grignon de Montfort, “that men will find at Bx Grignion de Montfort, que les hommes the end of times, to convert themselves and to trouveront à la fin du monde pour se convertir et recover the hunger they will have for justice, is the pour rassasier la faim qu'ils auront de la justice, est Most Blessed Virgin, who is called by the Holy la très Sainte Vierge, qui est appellee par le Saint- Spirit: town and city of God.”b Esprit, ville et cité de Dieu.”b a S. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 2, ad 2: Illi qui jam sunt in a STh IIa IIae, q30 a2 ad2. “Those who are in the worst infimis malis non timent se ulterius pati aliquid: et ideo evils do not fear any further suffering, and therefore they non miserentur. are without compassion.” b Grignion de Montfort, op. cit., n. 48, p. 33. b St. Grignion de Montfort, True Devotion, n. 48.

FIN The End IN LAUDEM DEIPARAE VIRGINIS In Laudem Deipare Virginis QUAE NON TANTUM OPPORTUNE, Quae Non Tantum Opportune, SED ETIAM IMPORTUNE Sed Etiam Importune INTERPELLAT PRO NOBIS.a Interpellat Pro Nobis.a a S. Bonaventure: “La sainte Vierge intercède pour nous, a St. Bonaventure, De nativitate B. V.M., sermo 3, t. 9, p. non seulement à temps mais à contretemps”. De nocte 713a. “The Blessed Virgin intercedes for us, not only at surrexit deditque praedam domesticis suis, etc. (Prov. certain times but always.” “‘She arose in the night and XXXI, 15) Hoc recte competit Virgini, quae non tantum gave food to the household,’ etc. (Prov. 31:15). This opportune, sed etiam importune interpellat pro nobis, rightly befits the Virgin, who not only when it is quod designatum fuit Joannis secundo: Deficiente vino, convenient, but also when it is inconvenient intercedes dicit Mater Jesu ad eum. Vinum non habent. Et dicit ei for us, which was indicated in the second chapter of Jesus: quid mihi et tibi est, mulier? (Jo. II, 3-4) in quo John: ‘As they lacked wine, the Mother of Jesus said to insinuatur nimia officiositas et sollicitudo, quam Him: They have no wine. And Jesus said to her: what is beatissima Virgo habet pro genere humano. De Nativitate this to me and to you, woman?’ (Jn. 2:3-4), in which is B.V.M., Sermo III, T. IX, p. 713a. implied the excessive anxiety and solicitude that the most blessed Virgin has for the human race.”

336 Chapter 42: The Formositas of Mary and the End Times

We have been considering Mary as the final cause of God’s works, and so as being present in some way at the very beginning (the wisdom playing before God in eternity) and at the very end in her glorious queenship. Here we return to the concreteness of modernity. We have already had a hint of this in our discussion of the temptations to pride and vanity with which Satan appeals to the human race, but now we enter more directly into the historical concerns that occupy De Koninck so intensely in his more polemical writings. There seem to be two reasons for doing so.

The first belongs to the argument itself. In looking at the epoch that extends from the present until the end times, De Koninck manifests the ultimate victory of Mary with Christ in history; the full realization of the victory already won on the Cross.

The second is external to the argument, providing an important aspect of the motive and the relevance of Ego Sapientia. But the two reasons are closely connected, one might even say as universal and particular. If Mary is a universal cause of victory over evil, then we will find in her a particular answer to the evils of the present time as well.

De Koninck begins the chapter by referring to a double poverty, intellectual and moral. The intellectual misery of the modern world is the loss of wisdom, and the moral, the loss of prudence. In the Common Good, De Koninck argues that there is an immediate connection between the two. He begins with the loss of wisdom.

Modern philosophy, he says, considers speculative knowledge unworthy of man, both because it takes him away from himself in the contemplation of higher things,

337 and because it distracts him from his practical efforts to dominate the earth. Both aspects tend to displace the absolute lordship of man.

In speculative knowledge the intellect is measured by the object, and in speculative wisdom we are principally concerned with things better than ourselves. It is impossible to consider these objects without feeling at the same time our condition of inferiority, both as regards our nature and as regards our mode of knowing. In practical knowledge, insofar as it is practical, the intellect is itself measure.533

The same pride that places man absolutely at the center must therefore lead to the displacement of speculative knowledge in favor of practical knowledge at the peak of human knowing.

It would seem that prudence, which concerns only those things that lie within man’s power—wisdom with regard to action—would replace speculative wisdom at the head of man’s knowledge. But, De Koninck argues, the rejection of wisdom is at the same time and necessarily the destruction of prudence as well.

For political science and prudence are practical in that they direct towards an end in conformity with right reason. But that presupposes that we know in some way the nature of the thing to direct and of the end; which is to say that the rectitude of practical rule presupposes the rectification of the speculative intellect.534

Practical reason liberated from speculative knowledge could only direct things in accord with what is in man, with his will. In effect, it would determine what things

533 Common Good, 75-76. “Dans le savoir spéculatif l’intelligence est mesurée par l’objet, et, dans la sagesse spéculative nous avons affaire principalement à des choses meilleures que nous. Il n’est pas possible de considérer ces objets sans éprouver en même temps notre condition d’infériorité, et quant à notre nature, et quant à notre mode de connaître. Dans le savoir pratique, pour autant qu’il est pratique, l’intelligence elle-même est mesure” (Bien Commun, 157). 534 Common Good, 73. “En effet, la science et la prudence politiques sont pratiques en ce qu’elles dirigent vers une fin conformément à la droite raison. Mais cela présuppose que nous connaissons en quelque façon la nature de la chose à diriger et de la fin, c’est-à-dire que la rectitude de la régulation pratique présuppose la rectification de l’intelligence spéculative” (Bien Commun, 155).

338 are and what they are for by directing them to this or that purpose. Moreover, separated from truth, goodness could only be judged by the relative success of a means in attaining whatever end is proposed. Prudence is destroyed when the primacy of the speculative is denied.

What is left is art.535 Unlike prudence, art, the practical knowledge governing the external production of things, proposes the end to be attained. While prudence directs things well or badly in accord with the end that is given by the order of things, art directs them well or badly in view of a much narrower goal.

One is tempted to prefer art to prudence because truth in art is not conditioned by the conformity of the appetite to the good but uniquely to the chosen work, whether the latter be good or bad. And the end of art is this particular work, this machine, this statue; but the goodness of this prudential act depends on its conformity to the good life considered in its totality.536

The ultimate outcome of according art the first place in knowledge would be that both speculative knowledge (philosophy and science in the modern sense) and the governance of human affairs (politics and ethics) will be reconceived along the model of art.537 In this case, the principal measure will be power.

535 “That is how one accomplishes the emancipation of man as pure artifex. This emancipation would respond to a desire entirely characteristic of man. There is in man a tendency to accord the primacy to the practical over the speculative, and to art over prudence” (Common Good, 75). “Voilà qui ferait l’émancipation de l’homme pur artifex. Cette emancipation répondrait à un désir tout caractéristique de l’homme. Il y a dans l’homme une tendance à accorder la primauté au pratique sur le spéculatif, et à l’art sur la prudence” (Bien Commun, 156). 536 Common Good, 76. “On sera tenté de préférer l’art à la prudence parce que la vérité dans l’art n’est pas conditionnée par la conformité de l’appétit au bien mais uniquement à l’oeuvre choisie, que celle-ci soit bonne ou mauvaise. Et la fin de l’art est cette oeuvre particulière, cette machine, cette statue ; mais la bonté de l’acte prudentiel dépend de sa conformité à la bonne vie prise dans sa totalité” (Bien Commun, 157). 537 In fact, De Koninck writes elsewhere, even art is not as it ought to be for those who want man to be himself really the origin and measure of everything. “Strictly speaking, the modern mind does not even believe in art, for art implies mimèsis, and mimèsis implies some pure object. (That is mimèsis of nature; nature as a work of divine art is a mimèsis of divine nature which is the object). The art the modern mind has in view is one completely affranchised from nature, as in dialectical

339 This is the reason that De Koninck writes, in Chapter 42, “Men retain only the name of science; research becomes more and more an end in itself; we become similar to the men of the last times, ‘who always learn but cannot attain to knowledge of truth’ (2 Tim. 3:7).”538 “Science” here should be taken in the general philosophical sense of conclusions built soundly on things that are known first and through themselves: real knowledge of things in their causes. Insofar as knowledge of things is reduced to utility (art taken as the lord of reason), it does not really yield scientia, it produces something. The same is true of prudence, which will not really know the good life. Precisely because man is not the origin and end of all things, he must be concerned first of all with what is received, with reality, with the natures and order of things as they are, in order to possess truth.539

What we are describing is the principle of pride in its extreme consequences; it is not in fact the case that everyone who holds any one of the connected tenets discussed above (for example, the primacy of the person over the common good) also embraces the others. Nevertheless, these ideas are not meant as purely hypothetical projections. Modern philosophy and the rise of totalitarian regimes have explicitly embraced the primacy of man and the consequent primacy of power, as we saw in our brief discussion of Kant, Feuerbach, and Marx above. “Modern materialism. Such a conception alone is compatible with pure freedom” (Letter to Mortimer Adler, June 15, 1938). 538 Ego Sapientia, 42.1. 539 This argument takes the principle in its extreme form: knowledge for the sake of power. It is not necessary to deny that modern science, for example, is real knowledge of things as they are in themselves, but only to affirm that insofar as such knowledge is solely sought and solely ordained to the exercise of power over nature without regard for the order of nature itself, it does not deserve the name of science. De Koninck has written in several places (for example, his letter of June 15, 1938 to Mortimer Adler) about modern experimental science and its relation to natural philosophy. This is a complex question, but we need not settle it in order to understand the point at hand: when man places himself at the center and origin of all things, his will also becomes the sole measure, thereby excluding truth, which is the measure of the human intellect.

340 history of philosophy shows that all of these consequences have really occurred, and that they have been erected into a doctrine.”540 This is why De Koninck claims that the present times witness the greatest moral and intellectual misery. “Never has humanity been so deprived of its purely human virtues of wisdom and prudence.”541

The reference, in the second paragraph of Chapter 42, to the encyclical Divini

Redemptoris, directs us to atheistic communism in particular. Pope Pius XI argues that Satan’s efforts to resist the work of redemption have continued and grown until, in our own time, there seems to be a new zenith of evil among men.

This modern revolution, it may be said, has actually broken out or threatens everywhere, and it exceeds in amplitude and violence anything yet experienced in the preceding persecutions launched against the Church. Entire peoples find themselves in danger of falling back into a barbarism worse than that which oppressed the greater part of the world at the coming of the Redeemer.542

De Koninck argues that the enormity of the attack on redemption arises from the fact that it is directed at the very root, that is, at mercy itself.

De Koninck unfolds this argument further in the section of the Common Good entitled Et Facta Est Nox. Mercy is attacked in its root, he argues, by an inversion or mockery of the principle of the elevation of the lowly. Marxist ideology is pre- occupied with the masses, with the lowly and oppressed, but it is not out of pity; it is not in order to show them mercy. “Far from wishing to smother the conflict by a just

540 Common Good, 78. “L’histoire de la philosophie moderne nous montre que toutes ces consequences ont été vécues et qu’elles ont été érigées en doctrine” (Bien Commun, 159). 541 Ego Sapientia, 42.1. 542 Pope Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris: Encyclical On Atheistic Communism (1937). “Quapropter per aetatis decursum alia aliam excepit perturbatio, donec ad praesentem rerum conversionem ventum est, quae, fere ubique terrarum, vel iam saevit, vel formidolose minitatur; quaeque insectationes omnes, quas Ecclesia perpessa est, vi magnitudineque excedere videtur. Ita quidem ut populi in id discriminis agantur, ut in barbariem recidant, deteriorem utique quam eam, in qua longe maxima pars gentium ante Divini Redemptoris adventum versarentur.”

341 distribution of goods, far from having recourse to an ‘eternal justice’ to which every man must conform, we must, on the contrary, encourage struggle and push conflict to the point of exasperation.”543 Following the Hegelian principle of progress through conflict and negation, it is not order, not peace, but the destructive motion of conflicting forces that is fruitful. For this reason, the misery of the poor must be allowed to increase until they have reached the point of desperation, and therefore of revolution. In this way, victory arises from the depths, from the poverty of the lowly.

Here we find the subtle perversion of the principle of mercy itself. It is not the Mighty One who looks with love on the misery of the lowly and freely raises him up, but the pitiless hunger of the lowly that drives him to drag down the mighty and to seize what good he can by force. The cruelty with which the lowly are treated, on the one hand, teaches them to despair of mercy, while on the other hand, they are instilled with a sickening pride in their own power, and so taught not to desire mercy.

Some attack this mercy by pushing the masses into an extreme necessity wherein they themselves lose all sense of mercy…. Others, instead of preaching and establishing justice, try to raise up pride in the wretched, this false power of the weak.544

The perversion attempts to rob mercy of its power, and God of His victory, and it does so by uprooting that human wisdom which recognizes and receives mercy: humility.

543 Common Good, 96. “Loin de vouloir étouffer le conflit par une juste répartition des biens, loin de recourir à une « justice éternelle » à laquelle tout homme doit se conformer, il faut, au contraire, encourager la lutte, il faut pousser le conflit à l’exaspération” (Bien Commun, 170). 544 Ego Sapientia, 42.2.

342 We witness here the supreme effort to attack the work of God. There is a desire to take the humble away from Him, those who are most powerful before the All-Powerful—the true power of the weak. They shall be tempted to pride, because no one is more unworthy of mercy than he who is both proud and miserable.545

The victory of the weak without humility is the most precise contrary of the victory of the Queen of Mercy. “That the victory should be the work of the weak is a monstrous caricature of the Woman who, from the beginning, was destined to crush the head of the master of all pride.”546

The final words of Ego Sapientia, like the motto that immediately precedes the first, are de Montfort’s. The motto read: “Mary must shine forth more than ever in these latter times, in mercy, in strength, and in grace.” The descent into modern ideologies and the ongoing struggle of Satan against the principle of mercy returns here again to the divine plan in its entirety. The arch of history concludes with a victory to be realized in Mary in such a way that she is the cause of conversion (“It is to her, in her quality as wisdom, that it belongs to send forth into the chosen the principle of this conversion to God”547) and the place into which the redeemed are gathered into communion with God. She is the principle of the realization of the order of mercy, of the share in the order of the Trinitarian life in all God’s works.

“This very tabernacle of the Holy Trinity, this dwelling built by Wisdom, this holy

545 Common Good, 101. “Voici que nous assistons à l’effort suprême pour attaquer l’oeuvre de Dieu. On veut Lui soustraire les humbles, qui sont les plus puissants auprès du Tout- Puissant – la puissance véritable des faibles. On soulèvera en eux l’orgueil, car personne n’est moins digne de miséricorde que le misérable orgueilleux” (Bien Commun, 173). 546 Common Good, 103. “Que la victoire doive être l’oeuvre des faibles est une caricature monstrueuse de la Femme qui, dès le début, fut destinée à écraser la tête du chef de tout orgueil” (Common Good, 174). 547 Ego Sapientia, 8.1.

343 city, this new Jerusalem, this new heaven which renews the earth, becomes the tabernacle of God with men: “Ecce tabernaculum Dei cum hominibus” (Rev. 21: 3).”548

548 Ego Sapientia, 9.2.

344 Conclusion

Blessed John Paul II begins his encyclical on Mary: “The Mother of the

Redeemer has a precise place in the plan of salvation.” He then quotes the words of

St. Paul which also introduce the section on Mary in Lumen Gentium.

When the fullness of time had come, God sent His Son, born of a woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons.6 And because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, “Abba! Father!” (Gal. 4:4-6).

The Holy Father adds that he wants to begin in the same way,

For they are words which celebrate together the love of the Father, the mission of the Son, the gift of the Spirit, the role of the woman from whom the Redeemer was born, and our own divine filiation, in the mystery of the fullness of time.549

He begins with “the love of the Father,” communicated by the extension of the eternal processions into the world in the divine missions, with the purpose of drawing men into the very relationship of the Son to the Father. Mary appears in this Trinitarian mystery between the communication of the divine life and man, as principle of the temporal procession of the Son as Redeemer, by which our return to

God as sons is made possible. Though written 44 years later, this summary of the unique place of Mary in the divine economy in light of its Trinitarian character is a perfect parallel of the theological heart of Ego Sapientia.

In the first part of Ego Sapientia, we find, behind the circular order that Mary imparts to the world, a “circular movement between the Father and the perfect and

549 John Paul II, Redemptoris Mater (1987), 1.

345 consubstantial image of the Father.”550 The eternal processions—the procession of the Son, which is the archetype of every subsequent procession, and the procession of the Spirit, in which the Father and the Son are united as if a second time, and which is the reason for every gift given to creatures—are the causa et ratio of creation and redemption. In the second part, we approach the same root from the perspective of mercy. Mercy is the expression in the finite sphere of the same divine, paternal love of the Father for the Son. This love stands behind all that God does, and all that God does reveals and communicates this love.

Mary receives the gift of the divine Persons in an altogether unique way,551 becoming herself a universal principle of the same communication—a separated common good—and manifests this love in to an unfathomable degree by the super- eminent beauty realized in her poverty. Filled with God to a surpassing degree, “the most Blessed Virgin is ‘the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of

God’s majesty, and the image of his goodness—Candor lucis aeternae, speculum sine macula Dei majestatis, et imago bonitatis illius’ (Wis. 7:26).”552 She has the place of a cause in the divine plan by receiving, revealing, and communicating the whole of

God’s gift of Himself ad extra.

This account is objective rather than devotional, in the sense that it explains how God orders all things through her, rather than the subjective relationship each of the faithful ought to cultivate with her. Making use, according to the best of the

Thomisitic tradition, of the full spectrum of causal reason found in the natural

550 Ego Sapientia, 2.2. 551 Cf. the summary of the first part in the commentary on Chapter 15. 552 Ego Sapientia, 9.1.

346 philosophy and metaphysics of the ancients, De Koninck shows us the place that

Mary holds in the whole economy of creation and redemption. But this objective, ontological account is at the same time the foundation for the devotion of the believer to the Blessed Virgin. She is, with her Son, the source of all good for us. She is a truly common good, beautiful with the splendor of the Father’s own love. She is therefore to be loved more than ourselves, and we will find our possession of God and our intimacy with the Trinity in our very order to her.

O House, full of light and splendor! I have loved your beauty, and the place of the dwelling of the glory of my Lord, your builder and owner. Let my wandering sigh after you; and I speak to Him who made you, that He may possess me also in you, seeing He has made me likewise.553

553 Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, 15 [21]. “O domus luminosa et speciosa, dilexi decorem tuum et locum habitationis gloriae domini mei, fabricatoris et possessoris tui! tibi suspiret peregrinatio mea, et dico ei qui fecit te, ut possideat et me in te, quia fecit et me.”

347 Divisio Textus

348

Bibliography

French and English Versions of Ego Sapientia

Ego Sapientia… La Sagesse qui est Marie. Québec: Éditions de l’Université Laval,

1943.

“The Wisdom that is Mary.” The Thomist 6, no. 1 (1943): 1-18.

Ego Sapientia. Unpublished translation by Ronald P. McArthur, made available online by

The Aquinas Review. http://ldataworks.com/aqr/imwisdom.pdf.

Ego Sapientia: The Wisdom that is Mary. In The Writings of Charles De Koninck, vol. 1,

edited and translated by Ralph McInerny, 1-62. Notre Dame: University of

Notre Dame Press, 2009.

Other published Marian works by Charles De Koninck

(Chronological)

“Quaestiunculae: Utrum Mater Dei possit dici causa Dei?—Sanctifying Grace and Common

Good.—A propos de l’expression ‘communisme chrétien.’” In Laval théologique et

philosophique 2, no. 1 (1946): 173-177.

“Une question du mot ou La perfection de la liberté.” In Revue Dominicaine 53, no. 2 (1947):

3-12, 275-283.

“Quaestiunculae: Sciences des bienheureux et subsalternation—La définibilité de

l’Assomption.” In Laval théologique et philosophique 3, no. 2 (1947): 303-304.

“The Compassion of the Virgin Mother and the Prophecy of Simeon.” In Laval théologique et

349 philosophique 6, no. 2 (1950): 314-327.

“The Person of Mary and the Dogma of the Assumption.” In Laval théologique et

philosophique 6, no. 2 (1950): 357-361.

“Le Coeur douloureux et immaculé de Marie.” In Annales de Notre-Dame-du-Cap 36, no. 12

(1951): 2-4.

“La mort de la Trѐs Sainte Vierge.” Response to the article of R. P. Louis-Marie Simon, O.M.I.,

in Semaine religieuse de Québec 66 (1954): 664-668, 678-683, 694-697, 710-712,

728-731, 742-747.

La piété du Fils: études sur l’Assomption. Preface by Msgr. Maurice Roy, archbishop of

Québec. Québec: Presses universitaires Laval: 1954.

Includes the following previously published articles:

“La perfection de l’Incarnation et l’autorité du Soverain Pontifie” (1-8),

“La personne de Marie dans le culte de l’Église” (9-21),

“La piété du Fils” (23-37),

“La certitude de l’Assomption avant et aprѐs la definition” (39-49),

“La trépas de la Vierge d’aprѐs la bulle de l’Assomption” (51-96),

“La ‘mort glorieuse’ de la Trѐs Sainte Vierge” (97-158).

“The Immaculate Conception and the Divine Motherhood, Assumption, and Co-

redemption.” In The Dogma of the Immaculate Conception; History and Significance,

edited by Edward D. O’Connor, C.S.C., 363-412. Notre Dame: University of Notre

Dame Press, 1958.

Le scandale de la médiation. Paris: Nouvelles Editions latines: 1962.

350 Includes the following previously published articles:

“Pour nos frѐres éloignés” (9-24),

“La perfection de l’Incarnation et l’autorité du Souverain Pontife” (25-35),

“Le sacrament du mystѐre de la foi” (37-53),

“Le scandale de la mediation” (55-126),

“La part de la personne humaine dans l’oeuvre de redemption” (127-145),

“La ‘Plenissima Glorificatio’ de la personne de Marie” (147-180),

“Dieu parmi nous en ses saintes” (181-186),

“Réponse à une demande de precision” (189-212),

“Note sur la ‘mort glorieuse’ de la Vierge Marie” (213-219).

Works of De Koninck and Replies on the Common Good

De Koninck, Charles. De La Primauté du Bien Commun Contre Les Personnalistes; Le

Principe de L’Ordre Nouveau. In Oeuvres de Charles de Koninck, vol. 2, edited

by Thomas de Koninck, 107-184. Quebéc: Les Presses de l’Université Laval,

2010.

______.Translated into English by Sean Collins as On the Primacy of the Common Good

Against the Personalists and the Principle of the New Order. In The Aquinas

Review 4, no. 1 (1997): 1-132.

______. Pour la défense de Saint Thomas: Réponse aux objections du Père Eschmann

contre La primauté du bien commun. In Oeuvres de Charles De Koninck, vol. 2,

edited by Thomas De Koninck, 227-403. Quebéc: Les Presses de l’Université

Laval, 2010.

351 ______.Translated into English by Sean Collins as In Defense of St. Thomas: A Reply to

Fr. Eschmann’s Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good. In The Aquinas

Review 4, no. 1 (1997): 171-349.

Eschmann, Ignatius Theodore. “In Defense of Jacques Maritain,” The Modern

Schoolman 22, no.4 (May 1945): 183-208.

Secondary writings on De Koninck’s Mariology

Cessario, Fr. Romanus O.P., “Ego Sapientia: The Mariology of Laval Thomism.” A

paper presented at Philosophy in Theological Education: A Conference in

Honor of Ralph McInerny. Ave Maria University: Ave Maria, Feb. 11, 2011.

Kuebler, Jared. “The Mariological Wisdom of Charles De Koninck.” A paper

presented at Philosophy in Theological Education: A Conference in Honor of

Ralph McInerny. Ave Maria University: Ave Maria, Feb. 10, 2011).

Waldstein, Michael. “Personalism, the Common Good and Mary's Fiat: De Koninck,

Maritain, Simon, and Wojtyła.” Unpublished lecture, delivered at a meeting of

the Maritain Association, 2003.

Magisterial

(Chronological)

All Latin texts and English translations of Magisterial documents were taken from the official website of the Vatican: http://www.vatican.va/, with the exception of Ineffabilis Deus and A Theology of the Body.

Pope Pius IX. Ineffabilis Deus. Apostolic constitution on the Immaculate Conception

(1854).

352 Latin text taken from The Bull “Ineffabilis” in Four Languages. Edited and Translated

(into Irish, French, and English) by Rev. Ulick J. Bourke. Dublin: published by

John Mullany, 1868.

English translation http://www.newadvent.org/library/docs_pi09id.htm.

Pope Leo XII. Octobri Mense. Encyclical on the Rosary (1891).

Pope Pius X. Ad Diem Illum Laetissimum. Encyclical on the Immaculate Conception

(1904).

Pope Pius XI. Miserentissimus Redemptor. Encyclical on reparation to the Sacred

Heart (1928).

Pope Pius XI. Divini Redemptoris. Encyclical on atheistic communism (1937).

Pope Pius XII. Mystici Corporis Christi. Encyclical on the Mystical Body of Christ

(1943).

Pope Pius XII. Munificentissimus Deus. Apostolic constitution defining the dogma of

the Assumption (1950).

Second Vatican Council. Dogmatic Constitution on the Church: Lumen Gentium

(1964).

______.Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et Spes

(1965).

Pope John Paul II. Dives in Misericordia. Encyclical on the mercy of God (1980).

Pope John Paul II. Redemptoris Mater: On the Blessed Virgin Mary in the Life of the

Pilgrim Church. Encyclical (1987).

Pope John Paul II. Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body,

translated by Michael Waldstein. Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006.

353 Unpublished Manuscripts

Texts by Charles De Koninck were gathered from the archives kept by the Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame. These files are copies of the original archive of De Koninck’s documents at the University of Laval in Québec, made by David Quackenbush at the request of Ralph McInerny. Quackenbush also created a digital version of the archives, but the contents are ordered and categorized in an system unrelated to those at the Maritain Center. Texts found in the Maritain Center archives are identified by file, folder, and document number. Texts found on the digital archive are identified by folder, part, and page number of the pdf file. Where possible, the file identity in both systems is given. Only those items actually cited are included.

Lectures and Notes:

De Koninck, Charles. “The Knowledge of Good and Evil.” Notes typewritten in

English. Maritain Center archives: 8/33. Digital archives: folder 29, part 1,

45-47.

______. “Mercy and Redemption.” Unpublished, typewritten lecture notes. Maritain

Center archives: 9/27. Digital archives: folder 11, part 1, 47-68.

______. “The Nature of Mary’s Universal Queenship.” Maritain Center archives: 8/11.

Digital archives: folder 8, part 1, 10-32.

______. “Our Condition of Subject.” Outline, handwritten in English. Maritain Center

archives: 8/34. Digital archives: folder 29, part 5, 7-9.

______. “The Role of Woman in the Work of Redemption.” Lecture, typewritten in

English. Maritain Center archives: 8/36. Digital archives: folder 19, part 7, 1-

15.

Guindon, Henri-Marie, s.m.m. “Ego Sapientia.” Type-written article, enclosed in a

letter sent to De Koninck by the author Sept. 28, 1943. Guindon states in the

354 letter that the article was published in Revue des Prêtres Adorateurs. Maritain

Center archives: 15/15.04. Digital archives: folder 27, part 3, 9-13.

Correspondence:

(Chronological)

Charles De Koninck to Mortimer Adler. June 15, 1938. Maritain Center archives:

14/01.02. Digital archives: folder 32, part 6, 1-26. Also publically available

online, http://www.scribd.com/doc/7815329/folder-32-part-6.

Charles De Koninck to Fr. Henri-Marie Guindon, s.m.m. June 11, 1943. Maritain

Center archives: 15/15.01. Digital archives: folder 27, part 3, 1-2.

Fr. Henri-Marie Guindon, s.m.m. to Charles De Koninck. June 15, 1943. Maritain

Center archives: 15/15.02. Digital archives: folder 27, part 3, 3-4.

Charles De Koninck to Fr. Henri-Marie Guindon, s.m.m. June 20, 1943. Maritain

Center archives: 15/15.03. Digital archives: folder 27, part 3, 5-7.

Charles De Koninck to Jacques de Monléon. Jan. 3, 1945. Maritain Center archives:

14/17.07. Digital archives: folder 6, part 5, 23-24.

Fr. Anthony Durand to Charles De Koninck. December 9, 1946, Maritain Center

archives: 15/02.08. Digital archives: folder 27, part 4, 18-19.

General

Albert the Great (Pseudo-Albert). Mariale. In Opera Omnia, volume 37, edited by

Émile Borgnet. Paris: Víves, 1898.

Aquinas, Thomas. De principiis naturae ad fratrem Sylvestrum. All Latin texts of

Aquinas are taken from the Corpus Thomisticum

(http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/), except when contained in a text

355 quoted by another author. When available, English translations have been

adapted (with changes for content and style) from those of the Dominicans

(http://dhspriory.org/thomas/). Other translations are my own, with the

exception of De Malo, as noted below.

______.Expositio in evangelium Joannis.

______.Expositio in s. Pauli Epistolas.

______.In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio.

______.In octo libros Physicorum exposition.

______.Lectura Romana in primum sententiarum petri Lombardi.

______.Questiones disputatae de malo.

______.On Evil. Translated by Jean Oesterle. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

Press, 1995.

______.Questiones disputates de potentia.

______.Questiones disputatae de veritate.

______.Quaestiones disputatae de unione Verbi incarnati

______.Scriptum super sententiis magistri petri Lombardi.

______.Summa contra gentiles.

______.Summa theologiae.

Augustine. Confessions. Edited by G.P. Goold, with an English translation by William

Watts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. English used in text

adapted from translation by Henry Chadwick. New York: Oxford University

Press, 2008.

356 ______.The City of God against the Pagans. Edited by E.H. Warmington, with an English

translation by David Wiesen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

English used in text adapted from translation by Henry Bettenson. New York:

Penguin Books, 1979.

Berquist, Marcus. “Common Good and Private Good.” Unpublished, undated

manuscript, made available online by Pater Edmund Waldstein, O.Cist.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/61181449/Marcus-Berquist-Common-Good-

and-Private-Good.

Dante Alighieri. The : Paradiso. Translated by Allen Mandelbaum. New

York: Bantam, 1986. http://dante.ilt.columbia.edu/comedy/.

De Koninck, Thomas. “In Memoriam: Jacques de Monléon.” Laval théologique et

philosophique 39, no. 3 (1983): 361-362.

De Montfort, Louis-Marie Grignion. Traité de La Vraie Dévotion a la Sainte Vierge.

Canadian edition. Ottawa: Librairie mariale du “Messager,” 1940.

English translation adapted from True Devotion to Mary. Translated by Fr. Frederick

William Faber, D.D. Rockford: Tan Books and Publications, 1941.

Dionne, Msgr. Maurice, “La grâce de Marie est d’ordre hypostatique,” Laval

théologique et philosophique 10, no. 2 (1954): 141-5.

Dionysius the Areopagite. De Divini Nominibus. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 2

Emery, Gilles O.P. Trinity in Aquinas. Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2006.

Emery, Gilles O.P. Trinity, Church, and the Human Person. Naples, FL: Sapientia Press,

2011.

357 Feingold, Lawrence. Mariology. Working manuscript, distributed as course notes for

the Institute for Pastoral Studies, Ave Maria University, Fall, 2011

Froelich, Gregory. “On The Common Goods.” In The Aquinas Review 15 (2008).

http://ldataorks.com/aqr/FroelichOnTheCommonGoodsLargePrint.pdf.

Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, O.P. Christ the Savior: A Commentary on the Third Part

of St Thomas' Theological Summa. Translated by Dom Bede Rose. B. Herder

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Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, O.P. The Mother of the Savior and Our Interior Life.

Translated by Bernard Kelly. Rockford: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 1993.

Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, O.P. The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Prelude of

Eternal Life, vol. 1. Translated by Sr. M. Timothea Doyle. St Louis: B. Herder

Book Co., 1949.

Hugon, Edouard, O.P. Marie, Pleine de Grâce, 5th edition. Paris: Lethielleux, 1926.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur

Metaphysik der Sitten). Ak. 4:387-463. English translation by Thomas Abbot.

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Kant, Immanuel. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (Die Religion innerhalb

der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft). Ak. 6:3-202.

Korošak, Bruno, O.F.M. Mariologia: S. Alberti Magni Eiusque Coaequalium, vol. 8 of

Bibliotheca Mariana Medii Aevi. Rome: Academia Mariana Internationalis,

1954.

358 Lamb, Matthew. “St. Augustine on Memoria and Commemoratio.” In Philosophy and

Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, edited by

Kent Emery Jr. et al. 237-248. Boston: Brill, 2011.

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Pelikan. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963.

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1957.

Papillon, Antonin, O.P.. “Charles De Koninck—Ego Sapientia… La Sagesse qui est

Marie,” Revue Dominicaine 49, no. 2 (1943): 118

Ratzinger, Joseph Cardinal. Daughter Zion: Meditations on the Church’s Marian

Beliefs, translated by John M. McDermott, S.J. San Francisco: Igantius Press,

1983.

Scheeben, Matthias, Mariology, translated by Rev. TLMJ Geukers. New York: B.

Herder Book Co., 1946.

Scotus, Duns. Ordinatio. In Opera Omnia, vol. 9. Vatican City, 2005.

Second Letter of Cyril to Nestorius. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 77, 44-50. English

translation: http://patristica.net/431_nestor2&e.

Second Letter of Nestorius to Cyril. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 77, 49 ff. English

translation: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3810.htm.

359