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Home , Brinkmanship, Carter Doctrine, Containment, Geopolitics, Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Triumph of : , and the Demise of Détente

by

Kevin Embick

A Submitted to the Faculty of

The Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Arts

Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, Florida

December 2008

VITA

Kevin Embick, son of William and Lillian Embick, was born December 30, 1979 in

Fort. Lauderdale, Florida. He graduated from William T. Dwyer High School in

1999. He attended Ferrum College in Ferrum, for four years graduating cum

laude in December of 2003 with a degree (History). He married Ann

Marie Daniels in June of 2005. He began teaching History and at

Jupiter High School in Jupiter, Florida in August of 2005 and continues to do so. In

May of 2008, his wife gave birth to a son, Andrew Graydon Embick.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express a sincere thanks to the research assistants and at the Jimmy Carter Library in , . Their efforts in helping a novice researcher access the relevant source material needed proved pivotal in making this project a reality. Their recommendations on new approaches to writing about the Carter administration were of tremendous help as well.

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ABSTRACT

Author: Kevin S. Embick

Title: The Triumph of Containment: Zbigneiw Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter and the Demise of Détente

Institution: Florida Atlantic University

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Kenneth Osgood

Degree Masters of Arts

Year 2008

President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy changed significantly and

progressively over the course of his four year term. What began as a liberal-

internationalist approach to foreign policy ended in a traditional Cold stalemate

with the . There are many causes for this shift: changes in the

international environment, shifting public opinion, and other domestic-political

pressures. One of the most consistently undervalued causes for Carter’s overall

foreign policy shift was the personal influence of his Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski. Through a variety of advocacy pressures and framing tactics,

Brzezinski was able to utilize the changes in the international system, and especially,

changes within domestic-political environment to convince Carter of an extensive reformation of his foreign policy perspective and priorities.

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Table of Contents Chapters

1. Carter’s First Two Years—a Divided Liberal Internationalist Perspective...... 1

Demonstrating Change—Notre Dame Speech to the Carter ...... 3

Literature Review ...... 9

Brzezinski’s Role and the Domestic-Political Connection ...... 13

The Carter Administration’s Trilaterialist Thought ...... 19

The Carter Administration’s Philosophical Divisions ...... 22

Carter’s First Two Years—Liberal Internationalism ...... 30

Human Rights ...... 31

The Strategic Arms Limitation ...... 34

The ...... 35

Middle East ...... 38

Normalization with ...... 39

2. and the Seeds of Discord ...... 42

Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Soviet Union ...... 44

Vance and Brzezinski’s Conflicting Interpretations ...... 47

Linkage ...... 52

Brzezinski’s Initial Policy of Containment (Reciprocity and ) . . . . 55

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3. Domestic Opposition and Foreign Policy Transition ...... 58

Domestic/Political changes (78-79) ...... 59

Conservative Mobilization ...... 60

Media Criticism: Vance/Brzezinski Divide, Africa and Linkage, the , Carter’s Growing Image Problem ...... 63

The Conceptual Foundation of Brzezinski’s Policy of Containment ...... 74

The Domestic Backdrop of Brzezinski’s Policy of Containment ...... 75

Brzezinski’s Lobbies for Policy Change ...... 78

4. The Soviet Brigade in Cuba ...... 96

The Announcement of the Brigade ...... 97

Differing Positions of Vance and Brzezinski ...... 98

Solidifying of Brzezinski’s Policy of Containment ...... 103

5. , and the Triumph of Containment ...... 114

Background on Afghanistan and Iran ...... 114

The Soviet of Afghanistan ...... 119

Revolution in Iran ...... 122

Brzezinski, Carter, and the Case for Foreign Policy Reform ...... 125

The Immediate Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan ...... 130

Brzezinski and the Long-Term Response to Instability . . . . . 133

Carter’s Containment Conversion ...... 136

The , Strategic Renewal, and a New China Relationship . . 143

Conclusion: Brzezinski’s Advocacy Strategy in Retrospect ...... 147

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Introduction

To many Americans in the 1970’s, the traumatic events that ended both the

Vietnam War and the Nixon presidency provoked serious questions regarding the

overall direction of American foreign policy and the proper use of American power.

Jimmy Carter spoke to such concerns with his new, timely portrayal of an American

and an American foreign policy as “good as its people.” Carter was an

outsider who defied much of the conventional political wisdom. He was a democratic

governor of a fairly conservative southern ; he talked eloquently and openly about his Christian faith and moral values. He spoke of the need to make racial equality a reality and in the same breath he criticized government spending as wasteful and inefficient. His foreign policy ideals, much like his domestic , were unconventional as well. He rejected the containment of as the guiding principle of American foreign policy. He was openly critical of past U.S. interventions, especially the “moral poverty” of Vietnam. He spoke of the need to place the U.S. on the right side of history as an advocate of universal .

He viewed the international arena not as a strategic chessboard but as a global community of which the U.S. was just one member. The changing tide of public opinion in the mid-70s brought an individual to the presidency with a truly unique

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perspective. That perspective, in turn, brought about an unprecedented foreign policy

agenda.1

The Carter administration pursued a vigorous and comprehensive policy

agenda throughout its first year in office. In retrospect, the issues being

simultaneously pursued were staggering: implementing a new, reformed détente

policy, pursuing comprehensive arms cuts and limitations, drafting peace proposals, negotiating the controversial Treaty, pursuing majority rule in Africa, and applying a comprehensive human rights policy. The pace and level of activity, especially in Carter’s first year but also throughout the administration’s term was unprecedented.2

The Carter administration’s early foreign policy agenda, while unique, lent

itself to confusion and criticism. The sheer range of activity and divergent policies

that were being simultaneously pursued were daunting.3 This range of activity was a

natural outgrowth of an administration that rejected the conventional view of the

international system—namely, a bipolar, east-west perspective that relied on the

containment of communism as the unifying theme. In its place, the Carter

administration substituted a complex, interdependent, global view of the international

system that tended to downplay the threat of the Soviet Union and the utility of force.

1 For the most recent general accounts of Carter’s foreign policy see: Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007). 2 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American in the Carter Years, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 7-8. 3 Michael Mandelbaum and William Scneider, “The New Internationalisms: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy”, in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, Eagle Entangled (New York: Longman Inc., 1979).

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Carter attempted to legitimize this new foreign policy stance by emphasizing the

moral character of the U.S. and the role that it might play in promoting human rights.

For a variety of reasons, however, Carter’s foreign policy agenda would be

challenged both internally and externally. Domestic critics, both inside of his party

and from without, lambasted the administration for its inconsistency and weakness.

Externally, the Soviet Union was perceived as having exploited a weak and naïve

administration in places like and Afghanistan. Carter’s critics claimed

that the USSR was challenging U.S. resolve. As a result of the internal and external

pressures on Carter personally and on the overall administration, a dramatic shift of

goals, tactics and image occurred over the span of 1978 -1980. Explaining this shift

and the question of why and how it occurred will be the principle task of this study.

One only has to contrast Carter’s public pronouncements early on in the

presidential term with those after the foreign policy shift occurs to get a sense for how

dramatic of a conversion actually took place. For instance, in June of 1977, Carter

used a commencement address at the University of Notre Dame to proclaim a new

American foreign policy identity abroad: “Democracy’s great recent successes — in

India, Portugal, Spain, and Greece— show that our confidence in this system is not

misplaced. Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear

of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.

I’m glad that that’s being changed.”4 Carter’s declaration of freedom from fear of

communism was a watershed event. Never before had an American president taken

4 Jimmy Carter, “Address at the Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame,” 22 May 1977, Public Papers of the President.

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such a stance toward the ; it seemed Carter sought to win the war or at least

bring it to an end by exposing the frailty of its justification.

Carter went on to condemn the philosophy and tactics of past administrations. In

doing so, he attempted to ground his new foreign policy perspective in those lessons:

“For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles

and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs.

We’ve fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water.”

Carter dealt head on with what he perceived as the best example of applying such

flawed policies and perspectives: “This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence.”5 Never had a modern president made such a public acknowledgement of

past folly. It seemed Carter was declaring the whole of Cold War containment a

misguided adventure. In that same speech, Carter specifically rejected the image of

the Soviet Union that past administrations possessed. Here, Carter’s departure was

most distinct; he fundamentally rejected the idea that the Soviet threat was all- inclusive and sought to adjust that image:

Our policy during this period was guided by two principles: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained, and the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic. That system could not last forever unchanged. Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The

5 Ibid

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unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive, even though the competition has become more extensive.6

It was this paradox that Carter was working hard to undue. He, along with most

members of the administration, adopted a status-quo view of the Soviet Union—that

is a view that Soviet aims were limited; that it was not seeking world domination.

Carter was clearly suggesting that a relative peace between the two was possible, even likely. This adjusted image of the Soviet Union lay at the heart of

Carter’s optimism and lead him shortly after the Notre Dame speech to publicly state it: “Beyond all the disagreements between us—and beyond the cool calculations of mutual self interest that our two countries bring to the negotiating table—is the invisible human reality that must bring us closer together. I mean the yearning for peace, real peace that is in the very bones of us all.” Carter went on to quote Soviet

Premier , “Mr. Brezhnev said something very interesting recently . .

. “it is our belief, our firm belief . . . that realism in politics and the will for détente

and progress will ultimately triumph and mankind will be able to step into the 21st

century in conditions of peace stable as never before.”7 Carter was clearly attempting

to root the U.S.-Soviet relationship on new grounds. He endorsed an optimistic image

of the Soviet Union and the possibility that the two could work together

in an effort to create global peace. There is little doubt that Carter’s perspective on the

Cold War differed radically from that of his predecessors.

6 Ibid 7 Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter administration’s quest for global community: beliefs and their impact on behavior (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 54.

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Carter’s initial image of the Soviet Union and that of the international system

was clear—he sought to reign in a new era of international cooperation by

deemphasizing the traditional conflicts that the Soviet Union and the U.S. had by

fully extending an olive branch to the Soviets. He proposed to diminish commitments

abroad thus salvaging what limited resources the U.S. still possessed.8 He would

place the U.S. on sound moral footing once again, by incorporating human rights into the very fabric of American identify abroad; he would reject past foreign policy concepts, and tactics as archaic and not reflective of the new, complex international system; in short, Carter sought to abandon the traditional game of cold war diplomacy and in its place offer a new, refreshing era of healthy “cooperation” with the world.

Carter actively pursued peace and remained hopeful, even confident of its

attainability. His national security advisor, however, had a different perspective.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was hopeful of an era of greater cooperation, but was skeptical

that it could be quickly attained. He had serious doubts about the image of the Soviet

Union adopted by both Carter and Vance. Over the course of Carter’s presidency,

Brzezinski worked behind the scenes to readjust the administration’s priorities,

perspective, and tactics. By 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski

had succeeded in doing just that. Carter’s view of the Soviet Union and of the

international environment had fundamentally changed. In the face of a pending arms

agreement and shortly after the , the Soviet Union intervened and

8 For instance, by granting back the Panama Canal and advocating a withdraw of troops from .

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eventually invaded the nation of Afghanistan. For Brzezinski, the invasion of

Afghanistan was merely a reaffirmation of the image of the Soviet Union that he had

adopted long before December of 1979. For Carter, the invasion proved to be a very

personal, final blow to his optimistic image of the Soviet Union and his overall view

of the international system. As a result, and with no small amount of persuasion by

Brzezinski, Carter chose the issue of Afghanistan to create an activist, combative

foreign policy that differentiates substantially if not wholly from his early agenda and

foreign policy goals.

Carter used the address, less than one month after the Soviet

invasion, to unveil a new, tougher foreign policy. He argued that the Soviet Union

had taken a “radical and an aggressive new step” by using its massive

prowess against a “relatively defenseless nation.” In an extreme statement, Carter

went on to argue that the invasion of Afghanistan “could pose the most serious threat

to the peace since the Second .” Clearly, Carter was drawing the

proverbial line in the sand. He was choosing this moment, this Soviet action, to unveil a new American foreign policy. That foreign policy was intended to be a long-term approach to containing Soviet expansion especially in the Persian Gulf . In a calculated reference to the , Carter declared, “any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the of America, and such an assault will be

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repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”9 The same president who had two years earlier cautioned about “an inordinate fear of communism,” now found himself trumpeting the very former causes and devices he once deplored.

By Carter’s foreign policy conversion had come full circle.

Having witnessed Soviet intervention in yet another , coming to a realization that the prospects for SALT ratification were grim, and having the extra domestic pressures associated with the revolution and hostage crisis in Iran, Carter was forced to abandon his initial image of global community and cooperation and in its place implement what appeared to be a return of traditional containment and cold war. There are multiple reasons for this strategic adjustment, but the key to understanding his overall transition lies with the immense, personal influence of

Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the advisory tactics he employed.

It has been argued by historians and by administrative officials that the overall philosophy of Carter’s foreign policy is best understood by weighing the competing attributes of principle and power. Using this backdrop one can divide the administration’s evolution into four stages. The first two years of Carter’s presidency were more associated with and characterized by principle and it was in these years that Secretary Vance seemed to have the most sway over Carter and the overall foreign policy agenda. The most important early objectives of the administration fit quite nicely under the “principle” banner: Human Rights, Panama Canal Treaty,

9 Jimmy Carter, State of the Union address, 23 January 1980, Public Papers of the President.

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pursuance of the Middle East peace process, and serious efforts at an arms reduction

treaty. The third year, 1979, was characterized by both power and principle. It in

many ways was a transitional period, attempting to combat the forces, both domestic

and international, eliciting foreign policy change. For instance, it was during 1979

that the administration was simultaneously engaged in finalizing the

Accords, responding to the revolution in Iran and the ensuing hostage crisis,

achieving mutual agreement on SALT, attempting to minimize the fallout from the

so-called Soviet brigade in Cuba, and of course, developing an initial response to the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is not surprising that it is during the waning months

of 1979 and the first few of 1980 that the conflict within the administration is at its height. The last year, 1980, appears to be the resolution of the dilemma facing the

Carter administration in the previous year. The early emphasis on principle not having the impact so desired, Carter, encouraged by a dangerous international environment, a hostile domestic-political situation, and increasingly turning to

Brzezinski for advice, abandoned what little remnants still existed of his original perspective and was persuaded to develop a reformed concept of containment.

Carter’s foreign policy has attracted much attention by scholars. They have debated the true nature of the administration’s worldview, the practicality of their goals, the consistency of their policies, and the relative merit of their performance.

While large disagreements continue to exist over these questions, one observation is accepted virtually without question—Carter’s foreign policy changed significantly over the course of his presidency. The nature of this foreign policy change and the

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competing explanations as to why the shift in foreign policy priorities occurred, are

important questions still in need of clarification. The question as to why Carter’s

initial world-order image of the international environment and his overall foreign

policy agenda shifted so dramatically has been heavily debated. Among the most

widely circulated arguments is one that seemed evident at the time and centers around

the conflict between Secretary of State and National Security Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski. The conflict between Vance and Brzezinski will be explored

much more deeply later, but the general disagreement hinged on the appropriate

balance between power and principle in foreign policy.10 Vance made “principle,”

which he broadly defined as a dedication to exhaustive diplomacy, arms limitation

and reduction, human rights, and previously neglected global humanitarian issues, the

first priority. Brzezinski sought to use “appropriate” demonstrations of American

power, while making certain not to neglect traditional American values, in an effort to

find a proper balance. Initially, Vance’s perspective seemed to define the

administration’s character, but as the international environment changed, Brzezinski

was able to utilize Soviet involvement in Africa and in the Persian Gulf to elevate his

personal role as the principal advisor to the president. Carter slowly, but pivotally

after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, became a willing convert to Brzezinski’s

worldview. He came to adopt Brzezinski’s traditional power-politics approach to

international affairs.11

10 The phrase “power and principle” is used as the title of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s memoirs as National Security Advisor. 11 See, Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations From Nixon To Reagan,(Washington, D.C.: The , 1985), 966-971; Gaddis Smith, Morality,

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Others have argued Carter’s response stemmed primarily from fundamental

changes within the international system. The changes included an overall decline in

U.S. power and ability to control the international system, Soviet intervention and

“meddling” in the third world (especially North Africa), an aggressive Soviet policy

of expansion toward the Persian Gulf, and the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Many scholars have argued, and the conventional wisdom has become, that these international changes represented a geopolitical shift which required a forceful U.S. response. According to this interpretation, it was the change in the international

system, most notably an overly-aggressive Soviet Union that precipitated Carter’s

reversal of foreign policy perspective.12

Others find the catalyst for Carter’s foreign policy change a progressive one

brought on by constraints within the domestic realm. According to this view, Carter

was forced by domestic pressures to mold his original world-order foreign policy perspective into one of old fashion “containment .”13 Domestic pressures

were brought about by a multitude of private groups, most notably the Committee on

the Present Danger (CPD) and the American Conservative Union (ACU), which

focused public attention on the failures of the Carter Administration to successfully deter a Soviet buildup of “overwhelming” strength. These private organizations were

Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 215-216, 245. 12 While many scholars have articulated this interpretation, Gaddis Smith’s analysis continues to be the broadest and most compelling discussion of the variety of reasons that Carter’s foreign policy took such dramatic turns in the waning months of his administration. See, Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986). 13 The term is a forceful one used time and again in Jerry Sanders’ Peddlers of Crisis. See, Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment, (Boston: , 1983).

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buttressed by a growing ideological shift in the public and among political elites. The

“neo-conservative” realignment of the 70s spawned a formidable series of

publications which promoted its major tenets: Encounter Magazine, Commentary

Magazine, and The Weekly Standard.14 These publications, combined with an

increase in neo-conservative interest groups and think tanks, helped place a significant amount of pressure on the administration to alter its foreign policy agenda and to implement containment-based policies.15

More recent interpretations have continued to focus on the domestic political influences of Carter’s foreign policy change. According to this interpretation, Carter

initially overestimated the existing levels for liberal foreign policy reform. Pursuing

an agenda to reduce commitments abroad and maximize resources at home, Carter

proclaimed a foreign policy agenda that, in the long run, was out-of-touch with a

majority of Americans, even after the trauma of Vietnam. As David Skidmore

charged, Carter proved incapable of “managing the political costs of change” and

therefore was left, by 1980, to abandon his early reformist agenda and “reverse

course” in an attempt to “salvage his dwindling popularity.”16

Still others side-step the question of change and argue instead that the apparent

Carter conversion was merely a temporary expedient and did not reflect a serious

14 The term neoconservative originated in the late 60’s and sought to describe a right-wing political philosophy that rejected the counterculture of social and moral relativism. The basic tenets of neo-conservatism can be broadly described as: social conservative values, dedication to free market solutions, limited welfare and social infrastructure, and a tendency to support a proactive approach to international affairs. See, John Ehrman, The Rise of Neo-conservatism: Intellectuals and , 1945-1994, (Yale University Press, 1995). 15 Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment, (Boston: South End Press, 1983). 16 David Skidmore, Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Foreign Policy Reform, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), 67, 84.

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ideological shift. Rather, for electoral purposes, and to placate to domestic critics, the

change was used by Carter and his advisors for molding together a foreign policy

image that would earn them another term to return to a center-left orientation. Some historians avoid the possibility of a plausible explanation for foreign policy

reformulation and instead find solace in extreme criticism of Carter personally and

the administration collectively. Lacking any “sophisticated knowledge about how

nations behaved” the administration is characterized as bumbling through episode

after episode without a guiding theme or overarching goals. The change in the latter

two years was merely a natural byproduct of “amateurish” diplomacy.17

Each of these arguments has merit. And some attempt to acknowledge the

varied influences that played a role in Carter’s foreign policy adjustment, but,

unfortunately, only as an aside. Each explanation is diminished by an overly-

exclusive portrayal of foreign policy change. Carter’s foreign policy is discussed, by-

and-large, as if it were taking place in a vacuum. Those stressing international factors

pay scant attention to the all-important domestic-political context. And those arguing

the imperative of the domestic pressures on Carter fail to acknowledge the fact that

the changes in the international environment are what empower the pressures and

groups within the domestic-political realm. What all are guilty of is not focusing

enough on the element of the equation that pulled both international and domestic

pressures together. The missing piece of the equation is literally the medium through

17 Donald S. Spencer, The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur of Diplomacy, (New York: Praeger, 1988).

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which the pressures were expressed to the president—his National Security Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Although scholars heavily disagree over what the core of Carter’s foreign

policy perspective was, virtually all agree that it went through significant alterations

over the course of the administration’s four years in office. The central questions that

need to be addressed regarding this change include: How did the administration’s worldview change over time? What are the underlying causes of that change? What

factors appear to be the most important in bringing about policy and perspective

adjustment? What elements of the change equation have been undervalued, ignored,

or misrepresented? What is the proper combination of influences that brought about

Carter’s dramatic foreign policy conversion?

For clarity, the host of factors that brought about Carter’s foreign policy

conversion can be summed up in three broad categories: international constraints,

domestic constraints, and advisory pressures. Weighing these relative factors and

acknowledging that all three had significant, simultaneous influences is the key to

understanding Carter’s foreign policy change.

The truth about Carter’s transition lies in a hybrid analysis that gives due

credence to both domestic and international constraints while also emphasizing the

internal dynamics within the administration. While international constraints and

actions, particularly regarding Iran and the Soviet Union, certainly helped bring about

Carter’s fairly dramatic foreign policy conversion, outside events cannot be the only

form of analysis. That is not to argue that Carter and the administration were not

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affected by the changing international environment; obviously they were. Soviet

activities in Africa and Cuba, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the revolution and subsequent hostage crisis in Teheran helped sober administration officials to the reality of power and the vulnerabilities of the third world and the middle

East. But isolating the changes in the international system from other factors is an unrealistic portrayal of foreign policy change. Likewise, the personal impact of administrative officials, the domestic pressures placed upon the administration, and the need for domestic legitimization of Carter’s foreign policy leading into the 1980 election year cannot be artificially extracted from the equation.

The domestic-political context of Carter’s foreign policy conversion is crucial for developing a full and comprehensive understanding of Carter’s transition from liberal internationalist to cold warrior. Without making attempts to understand the changing public mood towards Carter’s foreign policy or the intense amount of public conservative criticism regarding Carter’s early agenda and performance, one loses sight of the full context from which foreign policy decisions were made and framed.

Still, the domestic explanation for why Carter’s foreign policy changed requires a full appreciation of the international environment that made the criticism possible.

Explanations that rely exclusively on a domestic analysis, such as historian David

Skidmore who emphatically states that “the source of . . . turnabout lay primarily in the domestic arena, rather than the international sphere” neglect the comprehensiveness of foreign policy change.18 One would be hard pressed to prove

18 Skidmore, Reversing Course, 27.

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that Carter arranged the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan solely as a

way to appease conservative critics or placate a changing public mood. In fact, Carter

did genuinely believe that a strong response to Soviet aggression was necessary and

the change in Soviet behavior demanded it. However, as will be demonstrated,

domestic politics and criticism from domestic opponents (both inside the Democratic

Party and out), did impact the presentation and possibly implementation of foreign policy objectives, including the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The third essential analysis component of Carter’s changing foreign policy

during the latter two years of his presidency lie in analyzing his principal foreign

policy advisor—Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski’s personal influence, his suspicions

of Soviet goals, and his keen understanding and desire for domestic legitimization of

Carter’s overall foreign policy proved crucial in facilitating the striking, yet

progressive, conversion of Carter’s final two years. It is this component of the

analysis, along with the domestic pressures, that have been undervalued and

misunderstood. Many historians have argued that Brzezinski’s influence was an

important determinant in Carter’s abandonment of his original foreign policy goals.

But there has been no systematic analysis of how Brzezinski was able to pull Carter’s

foreign policy in line with the realities of a changing international environment and in

current with the prevailing public sentiment over 1979 and 1980. Recently released

documents from the Carter Library now make that assessment possible. The change

in the international environment was crucial and in many ways “caused” the changes

we see during the last two years of Carter’s term. The pressures coming from

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conservative critics and the change in public opinion about Carter and his foreign policy performance placed added emphasis on the need for reform. But Brzezinski’s personal influence and his ability to fuse a new foreign policy image that would help alleviate both the international and domestic pressures proved pivotal in bringing about Carter’s wholesale reevaluation of the international environment and his adoption of a policy of containment.

Zbigniew Brzezinski never used the phrase containment when describing the policy he advocated. In fact, he gave various names to the overall policy he supported during different times of his tenure: “activist détente,” “comprehensive détente,” and

“reciprocal accommodation.” The point is that the policy approach Brzezinski advocated for was dynamic and progressive; it changed in significant ways along with changes in the international system and in the domestic-political situation at home.

Yet, it also grew progressively tougher and strategically more ideologically driven as the administration’s first term progressed. By the time of the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, Brzezinski was pressing for a wholesale transition of both form and substance to combat Soviet aggression and a hostile domestic-political environment.

His solution was a reformed concept of traditional Cold War containment that utilized the changing domestic-political mood for validation. His approach was reminiscent of past eras of traditional containment, but also included significant nuances to warrant a

“reformed” status.19 Brzezinski’s dramatic success in changing Carter’s foreign

19 The evolution of Brzezinski’s perspective and a full exploration of his policy of containment that came into full development only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will be explored in detail later.

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policy perspective was largely the result of the way in which he framed his advice.

Brzezinski combined a compelling strategic vision for Carter. But this was not enough to fully persuade the president. Brzezinski’s keen understanding and utilization of Carter’s dire need for domestic support of his overall foreign policy proved pivotal.

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Chapter 1—The Carter Administration’s First Two Years—a Divided Liberal Internationalist Perspective

Carter came to the presidency with relatively little foreign policy experience.

His baptism into the realm of international diplomacy and foreign affairs came when he was invited to join the , a private organization founded in July of 1973 to foster closer ties between the U.S., , and . Carter jumped at the invitation to join. The experience had a profound impact on the development of his overall foreign policy perspective. Once in the presidency, Carter drew on his connections with the trilateral commission to fill some twenty-six senior positions within the administration including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National

Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Carter and his two principal foreign policy advisors (Vance and Brzezinski) shared an initial worldview that stemmed from their collective experiences with the trilateral commission.20 The philosophy of the Trilateral Commission, and eventually the Carter Administration, had several components. Trilateral philosophy contained an admittance and realization that the era of U.S. dominance at the end of WWII and in the early years of the Cold War had ended. In its place a dynamic arrangement sometimes referred to as “complex interdependence” arose. This system of complex

20 Brzezinski, however, did seem to differ from the beginning over the status and proper image of the Soviet Union. While his early objections remained muted, as the first months of the administration progressed, his disagreement became more pronounced.

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interdependence was characterized by an increasing number of players or actors with increasingly divergent goals. For trilaterialists, and eventually for Carter as well, the goal was to manipulate the change that was inherent in this system, rather than, as had been done during the bipolar era of containment, to create the change through interventionist policies. A key to bringing about the positive change the trilateralists sought was to work in unison with the other two points of the trilaterialist triangle—

Japan and Western Europe.21

The second philosophical tenet, which is closely related to the first, was the

Commission’s rejection of the utility of military power and the use of force (covert or overt) especially regarding the third world. Here, the “lessons of Vietnam” had a tremendous impact on the collective psyche of trilateralists and eventual administration officials. These lessons largely centered on the limitations of military power to achieve to objectives that had significant social and political components; for example, the prevention of the spread of communism and the development of long-term democratic institutions and culture.

Thirdly, the belief that the world had become fundamentally more unstable as a result of the arms buildup and the proliferation of nuclear material and weaponry was also a major tenet of trilateralist thought. Trilateralists believed that immediate efforts towards arms reduction should be the cornerstone of the next administration’s foreign policy. Reducing the threat of nuclear war and the spread of nuclear material

21 Richard A. Mealanson, American Foreign Policy Since The : The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), 96.

20

was the single most important priority. As such, an immediate effort towards arms

reduction (a “strategic arms limitation treaty” for instance) would be necessary.

Trilateralist members also believed that certain “global” issues were

beginning to dominate the international agenda. These issues would compel nations

of all cultures, creeds, and interests to a common table for the betterment of the

human condition. Trilateralists worked to elevate human rights issues as a major

global priority. Once in office, the Carter Administration adopted the emphasis that

trilaterialist gave human rights and made in a major part of their early foreign policy

agenda. Other issues, however, were also important: resource depletion (water, soil,

essential crops), environmental damage, and the failures or inequalities of the global economy (whether related to trade imbalances or global ) all posed serious questions and potential threats to the “world community.”

Finally, the Trilateral Commission revised traditional assessments of the

Soviet Union. In contrast to earlier estimates, which had stressed the Soviet aim of world domination, Trilateralists posited that the USSR was a diminishing threat that need not distract the focus of American foreign policy on other global concerns.

Commission members argued that the USSR was essentially a “status-quo” power.

Despite the USSR’s military build-up and efforts to project itself into the third world,

it was beset by serious internal problems and the Soviet brand of Marxist ideology

21

was increasingly unattractive. This perspective implied that the Cold War

was dead or dying.22

Several terms have been used to describe the foreign policy of Carter’s first

two years. The two most prevalent in the existing literature are “world-order politics” and “liberal-internationalism.”23 Both terms, in a general sense, speak to Carter

Administration’s initial belief in the possibility of global community, a re-emphasis

on issues not directly related to Western Europe and the Soviets, an increased concern

for human rights, an acknowledgement of a diminishing threat posed by the Soviet

Union and the communist ideology, a sincere effort to curb the proliferation of

nuclear- technology and, by with the Soviet Union, an effort to

reduce the danger of nuclear war.

If the Carter Administration largely agreed on the first four precepts of

Trilateral and liberal internationalist thought, it was sharply divided on the fifth—the

notion that the USSR was a status quo power. Much of the divide between Vance and

Brzezinski lie in their instinctive feelings regarding the nature of the continuing threat

that the Soviet Union posed and its ability to further destabilize the international

environment. Of all the principles associated with the underlying philosophy of the

22 Richard A. Mealanson, American Foreign Policy Since The Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), 96-97. 23 The phrase “world-order politics” has come to define efforts in the foreign policy arena that at their core have global concerns in focus. Its use is usually in contrast to what is perceived as a narrow, national self-interest emphasis of foreign policy formulation. “Liberal internationalism,” while usually part of a world-order perspective, has come to describe an emphasis on certain global issues as part of a comprehensive foreign policy perspective. Those issues include: human rights, third world development, arms reduction, and a general reorientation of perspective away from the more traditional “east-west” dialogue. See, Michael Mandelbaum and William Schneider, “The New Internationalisms: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy”, in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, Eagle Entangled (New York: Longman Inc., 1979).

22

trilateral commission, Brzezinski was most skeptical of the benign, status quo perception of the Soviet Union. This was a critical exception, of course, but it is worth noting that on the other four major philosophical points of trilateralist thought,

Brzezinski was on board.

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s image of the Soviet Union and of the international system can be contrasted from President Carter’s and Secretary Vance’s from the administration’s outset. Brzezinski rejected the Nixon/Kissinger policy of détente as lacking “comprehensiveness and reciprocity.” Brzezinski used these phrases constantly in recommending early alterations to Carter’s initial view of détente.

These “code words” later revealed significant ideological and philosophical divisions between Brzezinski and Vance. Brzezinski’s view of détente was that it had become increasingly uneven. He argued that the Soviets felt that they could exploit détente to their own ends and become increasingly assertive in particular areas that were

“historically ripe” for revolution without damaging the overall concept of détente. As a result of this growing Soviet “assertiveness,” Brzezinski felt the prospects for global community or anything resembling it were unrealistic in the short term. He felt that the Soviets were still on the geopolitical ascent and continued to possess substantial power to disrupt the international scene. This is why, even initially, he argued for an altered form of détente that stressed both reciprocity and comprehensiveness. What

Brzezinski meant by reciprocity was that the Soviets should expect a relative equivalency of action and reaction from the United States. For instance, if the Soviets were to intervene in a conflict involving two third world countries that had no

23

plausible direct impact on either the United States or the Soviets, as was the case with

the in 1977 in the Horn of Africa, the Soviets should understand that the

United States reserved the right to respond through varying forms of intervention as

well.24 Brzezinski sometimes referred to this initial reformed concept of détente as

“activist” in nature. And he began arguing for just such a policy when the Soviets

began intervening in North Africa.25

Brzezinski used the phrase “comprehensiveness” to mean linkage. He thought

it important to convince the Soviets that the United States would associate and link

Soviet actions in places like Africa with the larger strategic relationship. For instance,

it was his belief that the Soviets must believe that their collective efforts on SALT

were intimately connected to Soviet activities in Cuba, Africa and Afghanistan.

Without linkage, the Soviets might well surmise that something as menacing as the

eventual invasion of Afghanistan would not necessarily damage the overall fabric of

détente, at least not in the long run. Brzezinski was clear on this point: if the Soviets were to engage in a policy of “selective détente” the United States would have to do

the same. That meant the United States should be willing to go on the or at

least emphasize the more competitive aspects of the relationship.26

24 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 147-148. 25 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 146-148. Brzezinski’s definition of an “activist” form of détente seems vague at this early juncture, but several generalizations can be made. He wanted to see human rights used as a wedge issue with the Soviets, he wanted diplomatic and international pressures maximized in response to Soviet meddling in Africa, and he wanted to present SALT domestically as a way to contain Soviet growth. In short, he sought to expand the traditional rules of détente in ways that would prove advantageous to the United States. 26 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 188.

24

Both Vance and Carter had a different concept of détente. For one, Vance all but rejected Brzezinski’s concept of linkage. It was his view, and at least initially

Carter’s as well, that cooperation with the Soviet Union in a limited sense (arms reduction) need not be sacrificed because of an artificial concept of comprehensives or linkage. The stakes were simply too high to dramatize and elevate every possible source of friction between the US and the Soviet Union to a level that would undermine the possibility of cooperation on those crucial, limited areas of agreement.

Carter, at this early juncture, appeared to be on board with Vance.27

Vance and Brzezinski had a more basic foreign policy difference as well.

They possessed a core difference in the way they viewed the geopolitical world.

While both Vance and Brzezinski rejected the traditional concept of containment and a strict bi-polar view of the international system, Brzezinski was far more likely to think in East-West terms. Brzezinski rejected the idea that Soviets could achieve a

“Pax Sovietica” and supplant the United States and its leading role on the international stage, but he continued to fear the Soviet’s enduring ability to disrupt and manipulate the system to their advantage. In fact, what initially liberated

Brzezinski from the traditional containment mindset was his belief that the Soviet system was so internally and ideologically flawed that it was essentially self- defeating. He seriously doubted the Soviet Union’s ability to “transform” the anarchy caused by intervention “to its own enduring advantage.”28 However, he did believe that their continued capacity to cause anarchy was the most serious threat the United

27 Vance, Hard Choices, 27. 28 Brzezinski, Power and Principle,148.

25

States still faced, at least in the short term. 29 This is why he consistently supported forceful policies aimed at disrupting Soviet actions in places like Africa and later

Afghanistan.

Vance, on the other hand, felt that America’s foreign policy had been and

currently was “too narrowly rooted in the concept of an overarching US-Soviet

geopolitical struggle.”30 While he realized that struggle still existed, he felt it

irresponsible to make it the focal point. There were other developments that simply

did not “fit neatly into an East-West context” and therefore were being warped or

neglected. Vance, instead, argued for a reevaluation of the United States’ usual

priorities. He advocated for a “North-South” focus. These issues were of a different

sort. They relied less on geopolitics and more on understanding and anticipating the

economic and political developments in the third world; as a result, traditional

doctrines and perspectives would lose their relevance and no one overarching strategy

would suffice. Rather, these issues needed to be met practically—head on, and one-

by-one—with extreme sensitivity to the particular history, culture, and customs of the

relevant region; then, and only then, would the United States be able to affect change

in constructive manners for the global community.31

Temporarily, however, Brzezinski sought a middle ground. What he wanted

was a policy that would allow a practical and healthy amount of both cooperation

(détente) and competition (containment). If he could convince the public of the

29 Ibid 30 Vance, Hard Choices,27. 31 Ibid

26

difference and could avoid being condemned by liberals and conservatives alike, his proposed activist form of détente (which resembled more a policy of containment than of détente) could win domestic support and foster a new foreign policy consensus. However, initially, Brzezinski was in no position to significantly alter the foreign policy perspective of the Carter administration. Carter and Vance, as the other two key players in foreign policy formulation, were devoted to liberal internationalism and would not be moved. It would take a fairly dramatic change in the international system as well as the domestic-political situation at home for

Brzezinski to acquire the leverage he needed. The initial conceptual differences between Vance and Brzezinski were muted early under their shared liberal internationalist perspective. Little dispute arose over human rights objectives, the

Panama Canal , or the Middle East peace process. While disagreement did exist over how to initially pursue SALT, Brzezinski allowed himself to play a secondary role to Vance because of the obvious importance an arms reduction treaty had with both Vance and Carter. However, when Soviet activities in the third world, most notably in North Africa, began to escalate, Brzezinski’s perspective began to change.

Carter, Vance and Brzezinski realized early on that their unique foreign policy agenda would have to be rooted with solid public support. As a result of public distrust associated with the Vietnam War, Watergate and CIA abuses foreign policy issues would have to be debated openly and truthfully with Congress and with the

American people. It was a difficult situation for the Carter administration. At a time

27

when there was dramatic change in the international system and while the United

States was adjusting its role within that system, they were expected to involve an ever-increasing number of people and to conduct foreign affairs in an ever- increasingly public fashion. Vance and Brzezinski would later admit that one of the biggest failures of the administration was its inability to garner public support for its foreign policies. An inherent problem in this task was that over its four years the administration shifted policies frequently and seemed to lack an overall vision. But efforts were made to legitimize the Carter foreign policy and both Vance and

Brzezinski understood the necessity to do so. As part of his initial presentation to the president about the administration’s overall foreign policy goals, Vance included the provision “First, our foreign policy should be understood and supported by the

American people and the Congress. Our recent experience had shown that without a broad base of support in the Senate and the House and among the American people, policies were vulnerable to misunderstanding, public disillusionment, and repudiation.”32 Vance and Carter, more so than Brzezinski, seemed reluctant to tie

domestic-political needs and realities to the administration’s foreign policy agenda

and approach. Even though Vietnam laid out an important example of the need for

domestic legitimization of foreign policy goals, the president and the secretary

ultimately undervalued the connection. Where they lacked understanding and

possibly will, Brzezinski surely did not.

32 Vance, Hard Choices, 28.

28

Brzezinski understood the imperative of rooting foreign policies goals and

strategy in a domestic-political context. He sharply criticized the Nixon

administration for overselling of détente. He believed that the public had unrealistic

expectations about the possible dividends that detente would yield. “The result of this

oversell,” he wrote in his memoirs, “has been rising domestic disappointment with

détente, prompting now a tendency to the other extreme, namely to reject détente as a

whole.”33 And, so, Brzezinski rejected not only the traditional concept of détente, but

the administrations’ newly acquired version of détente as well. Here is another crucial

difference between Vance and Carter. Vance was steadfastly devoted to preserving

détente and building domestic support on its foundation. Brzezinski was dedicated to

transforming détente in ways that would be advantageous to the United States

strategic position in the world. This transformation would coincide, not coincidently,

with shifts in public opinion towards a more aggressive foreign policy regarding the

Soviet Union. As the trends of public opinion and Soviet foreign policy grew simultaneously more assertive so to did Brzezinski’s advice to the president.

Evidence of Brzezinski’s early attempts at foreign policy reform abound. The two themes Brzezinski focused on were increasing Soviet assertiveness and decreasing public support for Carter’s foreign policy. In April of 1977, Brzezinski

warned about Soviet aggression in Africa and petitioned the present for a different

policy: “we should press the Soviets to desist.” In that same month, Brzezinski

warned Carter that the administration’s objectives were politically “clear” but “tactics

33 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 150.

29

and strategy” were “running out.” In October of 1977, Brzezinski predicts to Carter that his “foreign policy will be judged on how the Soviet connection is managed.”

And in November of 1977, Brzezinski informed and advised the president that public

perception of his foreign policy was that it was essentially “soft” and that he should

“consider making some ‘tough’ decisions.” He also advised Carter to address

“European security” by considering the deployment of the neutron bomb, “reasserting

human rights,” and combining “realism and idealism” on issues like the Panama

Canal, SALT, and Middle East peace in order to generate public support.34 The early

advice that Brzezinski provides were part of a strategic effort to slowly and cautiously

reform the administration’s concept of détente. At this early stage he was not

petitioning for a strict policy of containment, but as Moscow’s actions reinforced

Brzezinski’s beliefs regarding Soviet overall ambition, his advice would grow

increasingly containment oriented.

Carter’s first two years in office reflected Vance’s liberal-internationalist

orientation towards foreign affairs. While Brzezinski had reservations over Vance’s

perspective, his advice remained subtle and on the periphery until the Soviets

intervened in North Africa. Part of Vance and Carter’s liberal-internationalist

orientation was the effort to re-root American foreign policy in traditional democratic

values and therefore Carter promised to lead the country in an open, honest, and

moral direction. The centerpiece of this morality-based foreign policy image was the

issue of human rights. Carter let it be known that his administration would be

34 Quotes from this paragraph were taken from Brzezinski’s memoirs. See, Brzezinski, Power and Principle, Annex II, p. 556-560.

30

absolutely committed to the pursuance of those rights worldwide. The

administration’s policy of pursing human rights was broad and bold. The administration decided upon a human rights agenda that was multifaceted. Carter

established the parameters of this approach by dedicated the United States to reducing

“worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person . . . to enhance civil

and political liberties. . . and to promote basic economic and social rights”.35 The administration planned on enticing authoritarian with the “allocation of

U.S. foreign assistance.”36 While giving “due consideration to the cultural, political

and historical characteristics of each individual nation” the Carter administration

pursued this policy with few exceptions.37

Within the first three months of office Carter cancelled foreign aid to several

countries in response to human rights abuses: Argentina, Uruguay, Ethiopia,

Nicaragua, , , Laos, Vietnam, Mozambique, El Salvador,

Guatemala and the .38 The Carter administration also used the issue of

human rights as an agitant and as against the Soviet Union. Carter made

it a habit to publicize human rights violations and elevate Soviet , going so

far as to even personally meet with them. One of the most prominent episodes of the

conflict stemming from the human rights issue between the Soviet Union and the

United States during Carter’s term came over Soviet and physicist Andrei

Sakharov. Carter chose to send Sakharov a direct and open letter pledging support to

35 Memo, 1-2, 4-63, Box 100, Carter Library. 36 Ibid 37 Ibid 38 Jerel Rosati, The Carter administration’s quest for global community: beliefs and their impact on behavior (University of South Carolina Press, 1987), Appendix D, 208.

31

him and his cause of exposing human rights violations within the Soviet Union

Human rights was also applied in the developing world. Carter frequently criticized

and withheld financial aid to authoritarian Latin American regimes who were committing human rights violations. The policy was also used as a way to appeal to the people of in hopes of contrasting a democratic America with their principal adversaries—authoritarian regimes in the region and the Soviet Union more generally.

Carter also approached for majority rule in South Africa through the human rights prism. U.S. Ambassador to the worked vigorously to publicize the abuses in South Africa and across Africa more generally as part of Carter’s comprehensive human rights agenda. Brzezinski shared a common belief in the importance of human rights, going so far as to declare Carter’s policy the

“wave of the future.” He “shared fully the president’s commitment to weave the defense of human rights throughout the fabric of American foreign policy” and particularly wanted to emphasize its “universal application.”39 But as the administration’s term progressed, subtle differences seemed to surface. More so than

Vance, Young , or Carter, Brzezinski viewed the human rights issue as a wedge that could divide the United States from the Soviet Union on the international stage. If played properly, he believed, the issue of human rights could be the “best way to answer the Soviet ideological challenge” and would fuse U.S. foreign policy with a

39 Vance, Hard Choices, 46.

32

“concept which most reflected America’s very essence.”40 While technically in support of Carter’s human rights agenda, Brzezinski tended to view it as another way to bolster an activist détente policy. And Brzezinski’s hope that Carter’s human rights policy would provide the necessary domestic support proved unfounded.

The application of a broad, global policy of human rights at home and abroad proved very tricky for several reasons. First, the administration underestimated the level of agitation that their human rights policy would provoke within the Soviet

Union and the personal offense that Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev would take.

Second, one of the largest problems for the administration was achieving real domestic support for the policy. For a variety of reasons, human rights, ultimately, did not provide the unifying element to Carter’s overall foreign policy agenda that the administration had hoped for. Part of the difficulties that Carter’s human rights agenda ran into stem from the administration’s complex, world-order perspective.

What Carter was asking the American people to do was too look at the world in a different way than they previously had; this new perspective, which rejected simplistic doctrines or singular guiding principles (containment), required patience and resolve. Rather than denying aid or placing sanctions on countries as part of a clear definition of national interest associated with the Cold War, Carter was unveiling human rights abuses for friends and foes alike. Ultimately, the staying power of human rights as a unifying theme proved superficial. While Americans in the 70s genuinely cared about “human rights” the issue remained too remote and the

40 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 124.

33

cost of a broad human rights policy appeared too high to rally the public. Whereas

anti-communism suggested an unambiguous threat with clear implications for U.S.

security, a human rights policy required a much more broad, human, and global

justification. No direct threat was implicit for failure to act and therefore the public,

by-and-large, rejected the issue as a new consensus builder.41 By late 1978, weighted

down by other more pressing national security needs, the Carter administration’s

efforts at pushing a rigorous human rights agenda moved to the rear and Brzezinski

went searching for new domestic legitimization techniques.

While human rights were a prime consideration during the first two years of the Carter administration, they were pursued alongside several other foreign policy goals in line with Carter/Vance’s genuine liberal-internationalist perspective.

Brzezinski, time and again, would find himself in subtle disagreement. Upon taking office, Carter immediately began a dialogue with the Soviet Union for comprehensive arms reduction. The Carter administration understood very well the how difficult it was for the Soviets to participate in comprehensive, long-term arms reduction talks a

task complicated by the frequent transition of presidential administrations. And,

therefore, Secretary of State Vance decided to begin from the Vladivostok Accords

that President Ford and Premier Brezhnev had reached in November of 1974.42 In conjunction with , chief Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiator and director of the and Disarmament Agency, and Cyrus

Vance, President Carter decided upon a bold initial approach; he would go beyond the

41 Skidmore, Reversing Course, 93-94. 42 Vance, Hard Choices, 47.

34

Vladivostok agreement and offer deep cuts in armaments. Brzezinski was not

enthusiastic about the idea. Feeling that the Soviets do not respond well to surprises,

he cautioned that they might be taken back by the rapidity and extent to which Carter

was willing to go. Brzezinski was proven right. Carter’s initial offer, which was

formally discussed between the Soviets representatives and Secretary Vance in March

of 1977, was rejected as “unconstructive”, “one-sided” and “harmful to Soviet

security.”43 The ensuing months were a whirlwind of negotiations, prodding, and

sometimes pandering in an effort to reach a constructive, consistent dialogue

regarding arms limitation. Finally, in September a tentative agreement had been

reached regarding SALT II.44 Over the next sixteen months the Carter administration was able to keep the provisional agreement intact all-the-while managing substantial criticism of possible treaty ratification at home. In June of 1979 Brezhnev and Carter sat down in to formally sign the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Its

Senate confirmation, even at this early stage was in-question, but by the end of 1979, with the unfortunate events in Iran and Afghanistan, its prospects seemed all but dead.

Another issue which the administration began pursing swiftly in an effort to maximize the honeymoon period afforded presidents in their first year was the fate of the Panama Canal. In order to have a positive influence over the development of

43 Vance, Hard Choices, 54. 44 The initial agreement set broad limitations on nuclear and conventional arms, tentatively agreed upon a nuclear test ban treaty, non-proliferation efforts, reduction of conventional arms transfers, preventative measures regarding the spread of chemical weapons and radiological weapons information and materials and general matters of continued bilateral cooperation. See, Jimmy Carter, Leonid Brezhnev “ Meeting Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiqué,” 18 .

35

Latin American political and economic infrastructure the old irritant, a constant reminder of U.S. colonial influence in the region, needed to be removed. The Carter administration argued that the returning of the Panama Canal, while still reserving the right of use for commercial and “national security” purposes, remained crucial in order to establish a different relationship with Latin American countries. By giving up the canal, Carter argued, the US would deny radical nationalists in the region much of the colonial propagandist rhetoric which empowered them and exploited the conscious of the Latin American masses. Carter also argued that the altruistic act of giving up the canal would send an international message and reinforce the new image of a reformed United States.

While Carter was able to get the treaties signed they represented a pyrrhic victory at best. The efforts at turning over the Panama Canal did, initially, provided the Carter administration with leverage and credibility in Latin America. It came, however, with a severe political cost. Conservative political groups, such as the

American Conservative Union, mobilized heavy opposition to the treaty. According to historian David Skidmore, the American Conservative Union, as the most prominent critic of the treaties, spent nearly 1.5 million dollars in oppositional activities in an effort to undermine the ratification process. The effort was massive. It included millions of mailers, a thirty-minute informative and argumentative broadcast condemning the treaty, newspaper ads, a billboard campaign, radio ads, “fact finding missions” to Panama, “truth squad” speaking tours of major , and constituent

36

phone call/letter writing campaigns to relevant congressmen. 45 The reach of the

effort was impressive. In some form or another, tens of millions of Americans were

exposed to the costs of Carter’s supposed mismanagement of U.S. resources and

strategic interest. The president’s attempts at dampening the concern over the treaties

were largely to no avail. Being outspent 10-1, and on the wrong side of the

“weakness” argument, Carter’s justifications for the treaties rang hollow for many

Americans.46 Most important of all, however, was the early opportunity the Panama

Canal treaties provided conservatives to mobilize against the Carter administration’s

policies.

The efforts of the ACU and other conservative groups seem, on first

impression, disproportional to the cause (the granting of the canal back to the

Panamanians). After all the United States reserved usage and defensive rights of the

canal. But, if viewed in a larger light as part of an initial strategy to undermine the

whole of Carter’s new foreign policy perspective, their efforts seem quite shrewd. If a

long, drawn out over ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty could be created

then Carter would be forced to use up what little political capitol he had on the hill.

The ACU and especially the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a conservative think tank and interest group that sought to mobilize public opinion behind a containment-based foreign policy, knew very well that an arms reduction and limitation treaty debate was on the horizon. And so, in many ways, the effort to prolong the senate ratification of the treaty was instrumental in laying the foundation

45 Skidmore, Reversing Course, 114-115. 46 Skidmore, Reversing Course, 115.

37

for opposition to the SALT II Treaties. Admitting that patriotism is the “issue we do

best with” the ACU and later the CPD sought to paint Carter as naïve and weak.

Portraying the Panama Canal Treaty as a “giveaway” and suggesting that Carter was irresponsibly ushering in an era of unwarranted U.S. decline, they successfully broadened the otherwise limited debate to include negotiations with the Soviet Union

over arms limitation and even the essential character and goals of U.S. foreign policy

itself.47 These groups would use the same tactics when Carter finds himself in a

position to make tough decisions in Africa, Cuba, , Afghanistan and Iran.

Carter would have to overcome the image of weakness if his efforts at establishing a

new foreign policy consensus were to be realized.

Shortly after Senate ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, the Carter

administration focused in on Middle East peace. Carter attempted to mediate the

long-held dispute between and over the Sinai Peninsula. This effort and

it paid off in September of 1978 with the signing of the . Peace

between the and the was also vigorously pursued, but this proved

elusive for Carter and after months of intense personal involvement the issue was

handed over to assistants.

In line with his liberal internationalist agenda, Carter also made overtures

towards historically disassociated . In March of 1977 Carter held the first

public talks with Cuba. In June of that same year he conducted the first mid-level

47 Ibid, 116, 117.

38

diplomat exchange in nearly two decades.48 The Carter Administration also sought to

relax tensions in Vietnam and in Korea. In early 1977 Carter spoke openly about the possibility removing troops from Korea and he eased the trade embargo on

Vietnam.49

Efforts at normalization with the People’s Republic of China were also undertaken early on in Carter’s term. It was not until December of 1978 that normalization actually occurred and a month later that visited

Washington, but far before those momentous occasions Carter dedicated himself to cultivating a new, genuine relationship with China. In April of 1977 a formal memorandum was sent to China explaining the existing relationship and laying out some possible areas for improvement. Shortly thereafter a congressional delegation went to visit China and President Carter added his son Chip as a gesture towards the

Chinese revealing his personal interest in the situation.50 The key for the Carter

administration was to promote an authentic reciprocal relationship; not, as some

critics would later view it, a mere relationship of convenience in an attempt to

instigate the Soviets.

There were many other actions undertaken in the first two years of the Carter

administration that revealed a genuine liberal-internationalist shift in priorities:

cancellation of the B1 bomber production, cancellations of advanced sales to

Israel, cancellation of CIA payments to Jordan, hesitation of deployment of neutron

48 Rosati, Appendix D. 49 Ibid 50 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 197.

39

bomb in Europe, and emergency medical airlifts to Zaire and Cambodia. Suffice it to

say that there can be little doubt that Carter’s first two years represented a dramatic

shift in Cold War foreign policy.

Brzezinski was largely on board, but did distinguish himself in several

important ways. First, he never accepted the image of the Soviet Union as a status-

quo power. Instead, he emphasized the continued threat that Moscow posed. Second,

he rejected the Nixon-Kissinger concept of détente which, by and large, Carter and

Vance seemed to champion. Brzezinski argued for a competitive, but not

confrontational, form of détente whereby the United States would pursue its interest

and the interest of the global community even if it was at the expense of Moscow’s.

Finally, Brzezinski’s support of Carter’s human rights agenda contained an important

qualification. He believed it should be used as an ideological tool against the Soviet

Union in an attempt to put international pressure on an already decaying power.

These differences remained relatively muted over the first year of Carter’s

presidency, but would grow substantially as his term progressed.

Carter’s liberal-internationalist approach to foreign affairs would be seriously

challenged by the end of 1978. Far from confirming his instinctive views about the

direction of change in the third world and the essential nature of the Soviet Union, his

perspective seemed to fail to accurately combat the direction and rapidity of change.

As the international scene soured with Soviet meddling in the third world, Cuban

proxy fighting in Africa, a revolution in Iran, the resulting hostage crisis, and finally

the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Carter was susceptible to change

40

himself. The direction and subsequent nature of change would come from his closest

foreign policy advisor and his Zbigniew Brzezinski who had from the beginning had serious reservations about Carter’s foreign policy perspective. The issue which

Brzezinski chose to first formally assert his differing concept of détente, however, was over Soviet intervention in North Africa in 1978.

41

Chapter 2—Africa and the Seeds of Discord

Outside observers have puzzled over why Brzezinski chose to make a stand over Soviet intervention in North Africa, a seemingly remote affair involving few vital American interests. At that time it was virtually impossible to make the case that

Soviet meddling in Africa represented a grave national security threat to the United

States. It now seems clear, however, that Soviet actions exposed the major fault line within the administration—disputes over the essential nature of Soviet ambitions and the proper U.S. response to Soviet assertiveness. This issue would arise again and again over Yemen, over Afghanistan, and over the Persian Gulf region in general. For

Brzezinski, responding properly to Soviet assertiveness meant sending the right message to both the Soviet Union and to the American public. Vance, and to a lesser to extent Carter, chose to ignore Soviet assertiveness. They viewed events in the Horn as a local conflict, and did not perceive Soviet meddling as disrupting détente. These differing instinctive and conceptual approaches brought serious disagreement within the administration.

Three separate episodes of Soviet intervention in Africa highlighted the differing perspectives of Vance, Carter and Brzezinski. The first issue involved

42

Zimbabwe. It was of only marginal significance, but it did reveal Soviet willingness

to engage the continent. Great Britain, supported by the Unite States, was making a

major effort to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the on-going civil conflict in

Zimbabwe. The Soviets, for their part, were providing moral support, low-grade

weaponry, and training to guerilla opposition groups in an effort to complicate

Britain’s effort and to elevate those groups that were most sympathetic to

communism and the Soviet Union. The conflict was resolved when a UN Security

Council Resolution laid out a plan that would serve as the basis for peaceful resolution.51 The Zimbabwe affair highlighted Soviet assertiveness in the third world

and caught Brzezinski’s attention.

The second issue involving Soviet involvement on the continent was more

significant. It involved the use of Cuban proxy troops as surrogates to inflame a

conflict which stemmed from the on-going Angolan . In March of 1977,

exile invaders from raided a disputed region of Zaire called the Shaba in of its reincorporation into that country. They were mobilized and trained by

the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) with the assistance of

Cuban troops. President of Zaire appealed to the international

community for assistance. The French air force transported Moroccan troops to Zaire

to repel the invasion. 52 Soviet Premier Brezhnev, seeing the possibility of western

intervention into Zaire, warned against any additional western involvement in the

51 See Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 577-578. It also worth noting that the Soviets did not veto the UN resolution, thus paving the way for a peaceful resolution. 52 See, Vance, Hard Choices, 272-276.

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region. 53 Vance viewed the issue as a local one and did not want to exacerbate cold

war tensions over Soviet interventionism. He was more concerned over the larger

issues: seeking majority rule in South Africa and preserving the possibility of SALT.

Brzezinski viewed things differently. The Soviets had now intervened twice in Africa

since the beginning of Carter’s presidency. In his mind, Vance and his counterparts in the State Department were taking an “excessively benign” view of the situation. After returning from a trip to China, Brzezinski was asked by the press directly whether or not the administration had evidence of Cuban and Soviet involvement in the conflict.

His beliefs were unwavering: “It [the invasion of Zaire] could not have taken place without the invading parties having been armed and trained by the Cubans.” He went on to assert that “Cuba” (and indirectly the Soviet Union) “shares the political and moral responsibility for the invasion.”54 Whether the administration in fact had actual

evidence to support their assertion of Cuban responsibility and their implication of

Soviet involvement is still unknown.55 For the first time, a member of the Carter

administration was drawing public attention to Soviet “aggression.” For Brzezinski,

the stakes were clear; the use of Cuban proxy forces and Brezhnev’s statements about

western intervention represented an escalation of Soviet assertiveness and required a

firm U.S. response.

By far the most significant point of departure between Brzezinski and Vance took place over how best to respond, or whether to respond at all, to the escalating

53 See, Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 578. 54 Interview: National Security Advisor on ‘,’” May 28, State Bulletin, vol. 78 (July 1978), p. 26. 55 Destler, Our Own Worst Enemy, 74-75.

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conflict in the Horn of East Africa, particularly in Somalia and Ethiopia. The conflict

itself was essentially local. A frustrated Somali government run by General Mohamed

Siad Barre began to act on historical and ethnic claims to portions of the Ogaden

desert in southern Ethiopia. Bolstered by years of military aid from the Soviets and

emboldened by a new government coming to power as a result of internal struggle

within Ethiopia, Barre and the Somalis took their gamble. In July of 1977 Somali troops poured into the Ogaden and pushed Ethiopians back. The Soviets, and the

Americans, urged the Somalis to desist, but it was to no avail. As a result, a low-grade

conflict involving Cuban proxy troops occurred in the third world that threatened to

seriously exacerbate relations between the superpowers.

Typical of the Cold War alliance system, the Soviets had provided aid in the

preceding decade before the Ogaden War (July 1977 – March 1978) actually broke

out to both the Somalis and the Ethiopians. The United States was initially an ally of

Ethiopia, but as a part of Carter’s human rights policies, fell out of favor. The Carter administration began to support the Somalis when the Soviets made it clear they were trying to make long-term inroads into Ethiopia. To make matters more complicated,

some 12-17,000 Cuban troops, several hundred Cuban military advisors, and eventually three top commanding Soviet generals entered the foray on behalf of

Ethiopia and their supposed Marxist cause.56

Over the course of the conflict the Somali’s repeatedly requested U.S. aid.

The State Department was unclear about the possibility of giving aid, initially telling

56 It is estimated that over one billion dollars in military equipment and aid was sent to Ethiopia by the Soviet Union over the course of the war. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 638.

45

the Somalis “we are not averse to further guerilla pressure in the Ogaden.”57

Secretary of State Vance admitted publicly the possibility of sending aid, “they [the

Somalis] indicated they wished to have an alternate source of supply to meet their

defensive needs. . . insofar as military assistance is concerned, we have indicated that,

in principle, we would be prepared to consider the furnishing of some military

assistance for defensive arms. . .”58 However, later, in his memoirs, Vance would

claim that privately the Somalis were consistently told any aid would be conditioned

upon withdrawal from the Ogaden regions.59 Whatever the case may be, the Somalis certainly acted as if they were anticipating new sources of military aid from the

United States. In November of 1977, Siad Barre broke all diplomatic relations with

Cuba and the Soviets, expelled over 1500 Soviet advisers, and abrogated the Somali-

Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1974, which granted the Soviets use of its naval facilities

at Berbera.60 Sending a clear signal to the United States the Somalis cut all ties with

the Soviets and were fully open to a U.S. partnership. That partnership, at least during

the conflict, never fully materialized. For a variety of reasons, the United States chose

not to fund the Somalis or provide them with any military equipment. It did not take

long for Ethiopia’s newly acquired military prowess to run its course. The eight

month conflict eventually came to an end when Ethiopian troops, bolstered by Cuban

manpower and over a billion dollars in Soviet aid, overpowered the beleaguered

Somali troops in the occupied Ogaden regions. To the Carter administration’s great

57 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 635. 58 Ibid, 635. 59 See Vance, Hard Choices, 72-75. 60 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 639.

46

relief, the Ethiopians stopped at the and did not invade Somali territory. The

Ogaden was back in Ethiopian hands and the Soviets/Cubans had achieved the

influence and outcome they originally sought.61

The conflicts throughout Africa and especially in the Horn revealed deep

divisions within the Carter administration about the meaning of détente, the true

intentions of the Soviet Union, and the possibility for continued, constructive

relations between the superpowers. The Ethiopian-Somali clash was especially

perplexing for the administration. The Carter administration found itself on the side

of the aggressor nation—Somalia had, after all, initiated the conflict with the invasion

of the Ogaden desert. The conflict also revealed some of the difficulties associated

with the administration’s human rights commitment. Carter had, in fact, formally

removed Ethiopia from their foreign aid list. He also was an outspoken critic of

human rights abuses taking place there in early 1977. As a result, the administration

may have taken part in pushing the Ethiopians to find new solace, and to seek aid

from the Soviets. This in turn led the administration to revaluate its relationship with the Somali .

Having declared itself free of the “inordinate fear” of communism, the Carter

administration now faced a situation where they were seriously considering aiding a

dictator for no other plausible reason than to deter Soviet expansion. Possible U.S. aid

61 The victory was not a total one for the Soviets. What they actually sought was to facilitate the development of Soviet style Marxist systems in both Somalia and in Ethiopia. They made great efforts at the beginning of the conflict to persuade Somalia and Ethiopia to end the conflict and resolve the irredentist conflict with a pragmatic compromise of a Federalist union of the two states. Castro personally went to the region to present his proposals, but it was to no avail; the parties were not receptive. See Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 195.

47

and or military action would also contradict Carter’s own sense of legal and personal

moralism. The principle of territorial integrity, which was highly prized in Africa’s

post-colonial age, was to compelling a deterrent for Carter to fully subscribe too an

interventionist policy on his own. Carter was also much persuaded by Vance’s idea of

working with and through allies as a prerequisite for increased US involvement in the

region. When the United States engaged in a major diplomatic efforts to persuade

other African and Middle Eastern nations (with the exception of Egypt who long opposed an aggressive Ethiopia) to condemn Soviet and Cuban aggression fell on deaf ears. Carter and Vance’s belief of marginal U.S. involvement was cemented.

Carter also was concerned that an overly-activist policy would damage the prospects for SALT and therefore remained fairly passive on the Horn issue letting his two principal advisors do much of the debating.

The State Department took an even bolder line in objecting to an activist policy in the region. Vance admitted that the situation in the Horn was “complex and shifting,” and that arguments could be made for increased involvement, but ultimately came to the conclusion that adopting a position of “open hostility” to the Ethiopians or “uncritical support” for the Somalis was “short-sided” and “naïve.”62 Vance and

his subordinates in the State Department took the view that the conflict in the Horn

was a “textbook case of Soviet exploitation of a local conflict.”63 Vance was

adamantly opposed to viewing the various conflicts taking place across Northern

Africa as part of a “grand Soviet plan” and as such they should not be viewed in East-

62 Vance, Hard Choices, 72. 63 Ibid, 74.

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West terms.64 If the conflict was viewed in local terms, and the Cuban and Soviet involvement simply a matter of an opportunistic policy, a clearer, more realistic, and more mature U.S. policy could be formulated. That policy should privilege the United

States’ true priorities in the region: self-determination of the African people, the development of sophisticated nation-states capable of providing basic necessities for their people, and a transition to majority-rule in South Africa. If the United States were to seriously engage itself on behalf of the Somalis, U.S. standing in the region would be seriously diminished. For Vance, these were the priorities. Cuban and

Soviet meddling in yet another third-world irredentist conflict was merely a

distraction.65

Brzezinski’s view was substantially different. Viewing the situation as more

than a border conflict, Brzezinski sought to tie Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia

with expansion elsewhere—Yemen and Angola. Taken as a whole, Soviet presence in

these regions represented a “potentially grave threat to our [the U.S.] position in the

Middle East.”66 Brzezinski realized his was a minority view within the

administration. Vance vehemently disagreed. Carter was more responsive, but was

dedicated to SALT and other priorities in Africa (majority rule). Secretary of Defense

Harold Brown was sympathetic to Brzezinski’s views, but felt that a hard stance

toward the Soviets could only be constructive if, in fact, the administration was

willing to follow through—and obviously it was not.

64 Ibid, 83. 65Ibid, 84-92. 66 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 178.

49

The extent of Brzezinski’s hard-line became apparent at a Special

Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting held in December of 1977. Here Brzezinski

proposed several options to actively counter the Soviets in Ethiopia. He argued for

“more direct action” in an effort to “make it impossible for the Soviets and Cubans . .

. to transform Ethiopia into a Soviet associate . . . and to wage more effect warfare

against Somalia.”67 Presumably this “direct action” would come in the form of direct

or indirect military aid and or intelligence to the Somalis. At that same meeting, he

also recommended the deployment of an aircraft carrier to the region (for both symbolic value and to provide air cover for the Somalis if Ethiopian forces were to ever cross the border).68 Brzezinski left the meeting disturbed and wrote: “Everyone

is afraid of getting into a crisis, and hence the general tendency is to downplay the

seriousness of the issue. . . . This is something we simply cannot ignore, however

uncomfortable the thought may be.”69

Brzezinski decided to petition the president directly. On January 18th,

Brzezinski made his case in a memorandum to Carter: “Soviet leaders may be acting

merely in response to an apparent opportunity, or the Soviet action may be part of a

wider strategic design. In either case, the Soviets probably calculate, as previously in

Angola, they can later adopt a more conciliatory attitude and that the US will simply

again adjust to the consolidation of Soviet presence in yet another African country.”70

Cleary, Brzezinski was attempting to persuade Carter to adopt his recommendations

67 Ibid, 181. 68 Vance, Hard Choices, 86. 69 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 181. 70 Ibid, 178.

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from the previous SCC meeting. If nothing else, he was attempting to push Carter towards a more forceful policy line. Brzezinski also referred to those allies in support of his preferred perspective—Iran, , , and Egypt. While

Brzezinski, at this early stage, was not able to achieve the policy shift towards a more muscular foreign policy stance he envisioned or hoped for, he did make significant

headway in persuading Carter. He managed to insert forceful wording included a

veiled threat into Carter’s official correspondence with Brezhnev. The left

little doubt that Soviet activities in Africa were having significant repercussions: “I

would also hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in

making certain that regional African disputed do not escalate into major international

conflicts. The fighting that has developed between Ethiopia and Somalia is a

regrettable development, which should be contained and terminated before it spreads

further.”71 Carter began showing signs of sympathy towards Brzezinski’s hard-line views in public. In November of 1978 in a speech at , Carter toughened his tone towards the Soviet Union reverting back to more traditional cold

war rhetoric: “adequate and capable military forces are still an essential element of

our national security. We, like our ancestors, have the obligation to maintain strength

equal to the challenges of the world in which we live, and we Americans will

continue to do so.”72 Carter also drew attention to the Ethiopian/Somali issue

specifically: “There also has been an ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet

71Ibid, 180. 72 Jimmy Carter, Speech at Wake Forest University, The American Presidency Project, Public Papers of the President, Book 1, 17 March 1978.

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Union to use its military power—to intervene in local conflicts, with advisers, with

equipment, and with full logistical support and encouragement for mercenaries from

other Communist countries, as we can observe today in Africa.”73 Carter finished by

listing areas of vital interest to reassure allies of the U.S.’ resolve:

“We do not desire to intervene militarily in the internal domestic affairs of other countries, nor to aggravate regional conflicts. And we shall oppose intervention by others. We have important historical responsibilities to enhance peace in East , in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, and throughout our own hemisphere. . . . we have the will, and we will also maintain the capacity, to honor our commitments and to protect our interests in those critical areas.”74

These sentiments reflect an on-going theme throughout Carter’s foreign

policy—his continuing effort to balance the discordant voices of his two major

foreign policy advisors. We can see an effort to heighten the rhetoric in order to

demonstrate the administration’s sensitivities on the African issue, but we also see a commitment to international agreements and the reduction of arms. We see cautious wording such as “our preference in all these areas” and “we do not desire to intervene” at the same time we see implied threats if vaguely stated conditions are not met: “we shall oppose intervention by others” and we will “honor our commitments to protect our interest.” These are the words of an administration divided. Divided over Soviet intentions, divided over how to best respond to Soviet assertiveness, and most of all, divided over whether or not to link Soviet aggression in the third world to the larger, general relationship between the superpowers.

73 Ibid 74 Ibid

52

The concept of linkage (what Brzezinski refers to as reciprocity) was the

crucial dividing point between he and Vance over the African issue. While Vance

would initially outright reject any linkage of the African issue to the larger priorities

between the Soviet Union and the Untied States (namely SALT), a subtle, default

linkage logically existed. Brzezinski, on the other hand, sought to directly link Soviet activities in Africa and elsewhere to the relationship as a whole as a way to reign in

Soviet assertiveness. He was forced out of this position, but it did not stop a “linkage- wars” of sorts from developing within the administration. On February 24, Brezhnev gave a speech in which he tied the prospects for SALT to specific U.S. actions: delay on SALT talks, the possible neutron bomb deployment, and a host of others. The following day, the State Department responded with a “linkage” of its own stating that the nature of Soviet-American relationship is dependent upon “restraint and constructive efforts to help resolve local conflicts, such as the Horn of Africa.”75

Brzezinski took this exchange as an acknowledgement of linkage between the issues and chose to expound upon it. In March, when asked about possible linkage between the SALT talks and activities in the Horn, Brzezinski replied, “We are not imposing any linkage, but linkages may be imposed by unwarranted exploitation of local conflict for larger international purposes. . . . [and] it is only a matter of realistic judgment to conclude that if tensions were to rise . . . [it] will inevitably complicate the context not only of the negotiating process itself but also of any ratification that

75 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 185.

53

would follow successful conclusion of .”76 Vance remained emphatic on

the issue stating, “There is no linkage between the SALT negotiations and the

situation in Ethiopia.”77 The dispute irritated Vance immeasurably and fully exposed

the growing friction between the two advisers. Later, in his memoirs, Vance placed

much of the blame for public criticism on the administration’s African policy and

even SALT itself at Brzezinski’s feet:

“Brzezinski’s public statement implied that he would deliberately slow down the SALT negotiations unless the Soviets showed more restraint in Africa. . . . . We were shooting ourselves in the foot. By casting the complex Horn situation in East-West terms, and by setting impossible objectives for US policy—elimination of Soviet and Cuban influence in Ethiopia—we were creating a perception that we were defeated when, in fact, we were achieving a successful outcome. . . . We needed to be more consistent in explaining the purpose of our policies or we would end in creating public uncertainly and confusion. . . . There was an important lesson for the administration in this: good policies would not ensure public support and understanding if we tolerated diverse and discordant voice who made us appear to be the loser.”78

Both Vance and Brzezinski attempt to justify their different views of linkage by quoting Carter. Carter, in reality, took a pragmatic view of the situation, not far enough for Brzezinski’s liking but too bold for Vance: “The Soviets violating these principles would cause a concern to me, would lessen the confidence of the American people in the world and peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union, would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement or comprehensive test ban agreement if concluded, and therefore the two are linked because of actions by the Soviets. We

76 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 185. 77 Ibid, 185. 78 Vance, Hard Choices, 88-92.

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don’t initiate the linkage.”79 Carter was split. He was more sympathetic to Vance’s

view of the local origins of the conflict, and certainly did not buy into the real

possibility that Soviet intervention in Ethiopia unlocked a for regional

expansion. Yet, he realized the prospects for SALT were dim if the Soviets were viewed by the American public as increasingly and successfully assertive. He chose a temporary centrist approach attempting to quiet the discord and obvious contradictions within the administration over crucial issues. He would not have that

luxury in the future.80

For Brzezinski the external realities of Soviet aggression and the internal

conflict that developed within the administration proved to be a personal turning

point. Brzezinski “strongly believed that a show of force was necessary,” that “allies would welcome it,” and that it would finally “convince the Soviets” that “détente” was “both reciprocal and based on restraint.”81 He also believed that Vance’s determination to push SALT through, even during times of high tension with the

Soviet Union, was foolhardy. Brzezinski stated openly, “I was convinced for political reasons that SALT would be damaged if we did not react strongly, for the American pubic was prepared to support détente only in the context of genuine reciprocity in the

79 Quoted verbatim in both Vance, Hard Choices, 88 and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 185. 80 The conflict in the Horn of Africa does not play a prominent role in Carter’s memoirs. He does briefly mention the overall policy and describes the U.S.’ basic approach: “Our policy of resolving regional disputes through negotiation and our unequivocal commitment to nuclear arms control, combined with a quiet, steady, and well-planned strengthening of our military capability, would signal that America was a peaceful and reliable country which would never let itself become vulnerable to threat or attack.” Again, both Brzezinski and Vance’s views of linkage can be partially found in Carter’s response. See, Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, (Fayetteville, Arkansas: The Press, 1995), 228. 81 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 186.

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American—Soviet relationship.”82 Brzezinski goes so far as to hypothesize about

what might have been, “Had we conveyed our determination sooner, perhaps the

Soviets would have desisted, and we might have avoided the later chain of events

which ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the suspension of SALT.”83

This, however, was not to be. Brzezinski was left with a hostile State Department, a

reluctant Secretary of Defense, and a tepid president. He would, however, keep

pushing. After realizing his preferred policy approach to the Soviets in Ethiopia had

failed, Brzezinski became even more blunt with his advice. He informed the president

in one of many of his weekly reports that he was “deeply troubled” by the consequences of Soviet success in the Horn. He went on to argue that success for the

Soviets would demonstrate “to all concerned” that the USSR had “the will and capacity to assert itself in the Third World.” Furthermore, Brzezinski claimed that

Libya, Algeria and Cuba may take US reluctance as a sign to act “even more aggressively” and that “in effect, first through a proxy (as in Angola) and now more directly (as in Ethiopia), the Soviet Union will be demonstrating that containment has bow been fully breached.”84 In this context, not only would SALT “not have a

chance” but the US’ “ability to deal with other issues would be severely

handicapped.”85 By this time Brzezinski was fully committed to developing an

adjusted policy of containment to combat Soviet assertiveness. Brzezinski also

believed that if Carter was to achieve legitimization of his foreign policy at home he

82 Ibid 83 Brzezinski, Power and Principle,186. 84 Ibid, 187. 85 Ibid

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needed to prove his resolve in the face of Soviet aggression. Having failed to convince Carter to adjust policy on geo-strategic terms alone, Brzezinski increasingly turned to Carter’s vulnerable domestic-political situation in an effort to adjust the administration’s détente policy. Brzezinski believed that without this necessary domestic legitimization, SALT would be doomed, Carter’s other foreign policy objectives would be undermined, and the prospects of a second term would become increasingly dim.

The conflict in the Horn is only truly significant when viewed in retrospect.

The dormant, instinctive divide between Vance and Brzezinski was first fully exposed over this issue. Vance’s reluctance to reconcile Soviet intervention in Africa with détente revealed the extent of his dedication to SALT and liberal internationalism.

For Brzezinski, Soviet aggression in the Horn solidified his belief that nothing short of a serious reconsideration of détente and the possible adoption of a containment strategy would both deter the Soviets and legitimize Carter’s foreign policy image.

Brzezinski’s concept of reciprocity and linkage applied to Soviet activities in the Horn necessitated a change in administrative policy. Initially Carter hesitated.

Vance and other administrative officials, who did not share Brzezinski’s image of the

Soviet Union, nor his penchant for linkage and reciprocity, rejected his advice and policy prescriptions. Seeing neither a direct national interest in North Africa, nor the evidence of growing Soviet assertiveness elsewhere, administrative officials largely ignored Brzezinski’s sounding of the horn. Brzezinski’s early emphasis on the need for domestic legitimization of Carter’s overall foreign policy seemed hollow as well.

57

Later, when both public opinion and Soviet actions would reinforce Brzezinski’s early claims, Carter, Vance and other administration officials would concede the

necessity of a more muscular foreign policy stance.

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Chapter 3—Domestic Opposition

1978 and 1979 was a discordant and transitional period for the Carter administration. Whereas throughout 1977 the administration shared a common worldview by 1979 it had all but completely fragmented. Serious divisions within the administration began to solidify and Carter’s managerial image was suffered as a result. For the first time, Brzezinski seriously broke with the administration over the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The divide, however, was deeper than any single issue.

By 1979 Brzezinski had all but abandoned the idea that genuine cooperation with the

Soviet Union was possible. He was suspicious of the prospects of SALT. He rejected the precedent of “selective détente” that American inaction in Africa seemed to validate. And he began to anticipate further aggression from the Soviet Union in places like Iran, Yemen, and Afghanistan. As a result of his experiences with the

African conflict, Brzezinski came to believe that in order counter the Soviets effectively the administration needed to enact serious organizational, ideological, and tactical changes. And he realized the only way to convince Carter to adjust policy would be to utilize his growing domestic vulnerabilities.

Brzezinski’s strategic misgivings about the administration’s handling of the conflict in the Horn and his feelings about policy adjustment were amplified by a change in the domestic political situation. The public and the international community were developing a damaging perception of an administration in turmoil, conflicting in

59

policy, and ameutrish in performance. The Soviet Union’s continued interference in

Africa, the USSR’s incessant demands on SALT, the neutron bomb debacle, and the

growing divisions within the administration projected upon Carter an increasingly

powerful image of inconsistency and weakness. As elite and media criticism

mounted, the public’s confidence in the administration began to erode. The shifting domestic-political landscape coupled with changes in the international system undermined Carter’s original liberal internationalist approach to foreign policy.

In 1976 and 1977 public opinion was confused, unfocused and severely split.

Divided over the lessons of Vietnam, Americans debated whether détente was in the interest of the United States. It stayed this way through Carter’s first year in office with minor exceptions. Heading into Carter’s mid-term, however, public opinion began shifting to the right. The public seemed to be developing a more ominous view of the Soviet Union; there was also a greater tendency to view Soviet power on the ascendancy. As a result, Americans in large numbers confessed a greater willingness to support increases in U.S. military buildup.86 Responding to basic questions about when and where the United States should act, a majority of Americans demonstrated

a basic support for a more aggressive and tough foreign policy.87 These shifts

emboldened Carter’s critics, put his supporters on the defensive, and laid the

groundwork for his own rightward transition.

86 Skidmore, Reversing Course, 69, 74-76, 107, 87 See also, Michael Mandelbaum and William Scneider, “The New Internationalisms: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy”, in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, Eagle Entangled (New York: Longman Inc., 1979) 41-42. See also, Spencer S. Donald, The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy, (New York: Praeger, 1988), 117.

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The shifting public mood regarding Carter and the administration’s outlook

and early performance can be traced back to the clamor over the Panama Canal

Treaties. Having in 1977 successfully organized a broad coalition of Americans

opposed to Carter’s policy toward Panama, Conservative pressure groups had fine-

tuned their capabilities for mobilizing public opinion on national security issues. They

now began focusing on other components of Carter’s foreign policy agenda. These

groups continued their organized pressure on the Carter Administration throughout

1978 and into 1979. SALT, in particular, proved a prominent issue as it highlighted

the very reason these groups came into existence—combating the Soviet threat.

SALT, however, was not the only issue of interest. During 1978 and into 1979 several

other issues found themselves on the agenda: continued Soviet intervention in Africa,

word of Soviet interference in Afghanistan, the breakdown of support for the Shah in

Iran, leftist leanings of various Latin American regimes, and the increasing

abrasiveness of Communist Cuba.

The leaders of the CPD disdain for the Carter administration was obvious and

evident early. In July of 1977, Eugene Rostow, eventual director of the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency under Reagan and co-founder of the CPD, let his feelings

on the newly formed administration be known: “On Carter’s appointments, my views

are unprintable.”88 As 1977 came to a close and 1978 began, the leaders of the CPD realized public opinion was shifting to their advantage. In an exchange with Norman

Podhoretz, editor-in-chief of Commentary magazine and co-founder of the CPD,

88 Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 191.

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Rostow announced: “Slowly, gradually, and almost without political leadership, the

American public opinion has come to realize that the Cold War is far from over.”89

Rostow’s early statements laid the foundation for the CPD’s mission. It would seek to convert what they correctly perceived as a shift in public opinion about American foreign policy and the performance of the Carter Administration into policy change.

If policy change could not be brought about within the Carter administration, at least they would have ripened the electorate for the 1980 election where foreign policy issues would predominate.

The CPD and the ACU proved to be especially effective. They avoided more traditional means of lobbying and instead focused on mass publications and pronouncements in hopes of swaying the largest possible segments of elite and public opinion.90 Contrary to the Carter Administration’s complex and difficult to grasp

assessments of geopolitics and global change, the CPD specialized in reducing its

purpose and the function of American foreign policy to an easily consumable and

highly effective charge: “The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the

cease of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an

unparalleled military buildup.”91 The Carter administration, which had abandoned

traditional Cold War rhetoric in favor of the more murky “complex and

interdependent world” concept found itself with little tools to garner public support

for its foreign policy agenda. In contrast, the CPD was relying not only on the

89 Ibid, 195. 90 Skidmore, 130. See also, Jerry Sanders’ Peddlers of Crisis. See, Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment, (Boston: South End Press, 1983). 91 Ibid

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infrastructure they had created during the ratification debate over the Panama Canal

Treaties, but, in many ways, they were merely tapping into the rhetoric, ideology,

vested interests, and organized institutions of the containment era.92 Their criticism of the Carter administration was as clear and straightforward as their stated purpose. By

Carter’s mid-term the CPD condemned the Carter’s outlook towards the Soviets as a

“policy built on illusion” and argued that the administration had been “adrift and uncertain” while the USSR “expanded its power and empire on every continent and on all the seas.”93

It is difficult to quantify the impact of these pressure groups had. If money spent is any indication then the literal millions dedicated to derail the Panama Canal

and SALT II treaties should be persuasive. In addition to funds spent, the CPD also

testified seventeen times in Senate committee hearings on SALT, sent out hundreds

of thousands of informative mailers, and produced several television and radio ads

reaching millions.94 While one should not oversell the impact of conservative interest

groups, there can be little doubt that their pressure tactics, combined with the

resulting changing public opinion of Carter and his foreign policy performance, had a

significant impact in impressing upon the administration—and Brzezinski in

particular—the dire need for change.95

92 Skidmore, 148. 93 Skidmore, 134 94 Ibid, 134. 95 Both Skidmore and Sanders make the claim that domestic politics and in particular actions from groups such as the CPD account for the prime and fundamental reason that Carter’s foreign policy reverted to a form of containment. They, however, undervalue the importance that a changing international environment and an activist foreign policy advisor played in Carter’s transition.

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For a year and a half, the principal criticism of the Carter administration

centered around three issues—the Panama Canal Treaties, the African conflict in the

Horn, and the SALT negotiations. The Panama Canal Treaty dispute was facilitated

by organized conservative interest and while the criticism did have a political toll on

the Carter Administration, at this early stage, it did not permanently hamper their

efforts to effectively conduct foreign policy. The African conflict, however, exposed

some interesting divides and questions about the Carter administration. For one, it

exposed the divide between Brzezinski and Vance’s perspectives. In addition, it raised the issue of linkage and whether or not the United States could sustain a credible image on the larger issue of relations without seriously responding to Soviet and Cuban activities in the Third World. While the administration did suffer public opinion setbacks in 1977 and early 1978, it was able to contain the damage. There are a number of possible reasons for this: the nature of the press and publics’ disposition toward a newly elected president (honeymoon period tends to engender not only more open attitudes in Congress, but less critical attitudes in the press and public), administrative officials disciplined themselves to mute major differences, and international events presented fewer opportunities for severe criticism.

These conditions, however, changed rapidly throughout 1978 and 1979.

Criticism of the Carter administration in major newspapers proved widespread and mounting. The criticism centered around a number of common themes which

Furthermore, Carter’s containment was, in many ways, substantially different than containment policies of earlier years.

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undermined the public’s perception of the administration. One of the first issues

seized upon by the press proved an unfortunate mainstay for the administration. The

so-called Vance/Brzezinski divide found its way onto editorial and feature pages from

the administration’s onset, but by Carter’s mid-term the conflict between the State

Department and the National Security Council was being portrayed as all- encompassing. Sometimes the divide between Vance and Brzezinski was the subject of the article itself; other times the split played prominent in articles addressing the administration’s difficulties in Africa or on Salt. Frequently the issue was used to reveal Carter’s managerial deficiencies or lack of consistent foreign policy goals. At times the divide was used as an entry point to explore and critique the internal mechanisms of Carter’s foreign policy decision-making process. No matter the form, the negative public exposure of a that apparently could not decide upon a single foreign policy spokesman, let alone a singular foreign policy line, proved damaging.

At its core, the debate revealed a conflict over very structure of the Carter administration’s foreign policy decision-making process. Vance and Brzezinski battled for influence from the administration’s onset. The source of the contention stemmed from the assignment of priority over arms control and crisis management and whether or not both Vance and Brzezinski would have adequate direct access to the president. Shortly after inauguration, Brzezinski offered up a table of organization which consisted of several committees chaired by the secretary of state, secretary of defense, the vice president and the national security advisor. Carter rejected the

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proposal as too complex. Brzezinski then substituted a “cleaner” system that

comprised of two main committees: the Policy Review Committee (chaired by the

secretary of state and when issues dictated the secretary of defense) and the Special

Coordination Committee (chaired by Brzezinski himself). Matters not requiring the

specific attention of the PRC or the SCC would be sent to lower-level

interdepartmental groups for discussion. Brzezinski seems to have gotten the upper

hand in the organization of the policymaking structure. Not only did his SCC gain the

right to formally discuss and operate arms control, intelligence issues, and crisis

management, Brzezinski also convinced Carter of the right to review summaries of

the PRC and SCC before they went to the president. This essentially provided the

national security advisor with the power to frame disagreements amongst committee

members.96 While Carter assured Vance that Brzezinski would not have

disproportionate influence over the foreign policy making process, in effect, he did.

Brzezinski’s ability to gain significant bureaucratic advantages over his counterparts

in the State Department proved crucial in lobbying the president for change.

The press speculated on the conflict between Vance and Brzezinski, State and the NSC, from the beginning of the administration. Talk inside Washington foreign policy circles centered on whether “Mr. Brzezinski . . . [would] eventually . . .

encroach on Cyrus Vance’s preserve as Mr. Carter’s no. 1 foreign policy adviser.”97

Other articles dealt with the extent to which Brzezinski would be advising the

96 See Vance, Hard Choices, 34-39, and Brzezinski, Principle and Power, 57-63 for a discussion of Carter’s foreign policy making structure. 97 Bernard Gwertzman, “Brzezinski Revamps Security Unit Staff,” New York Times, 16 January 1977.

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president in the same dominating manner as previous national security advisors who

were viewed as usurping too much power, “Will Brzezinski, like Kissinger, gradually

establish control over the entire foreign policy apparatus of government.”98 Articles

steadily, adeptly, and almost presciently, exposed one of the central conflicts of the

administration as a whole—whether or not Carter would be able to manage the

division between Vance and Brzezinski: “Why should it seem so remarkable that two

advisers in the same field could coexist and serve one president, if that president

knows what he wants,” asked .99

Carter’s handling of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict served to initially undermine Carter’s public image and provoked substantial press criticism over the

course of 1978. The basic approach that Vance, Brzezinski, and Carter sought regarding the conflict has already been outlined, but the press’s portrayal of the issue

and the resulting image it depicted of Carter needs further exploration. With Vance

and Brzezinski publically tussling over linkage between Africa and SALT, the press

seized upon the episode as confirmation of a White House in disarray. Carter

appeared in the media as a president without the resolve to put his own house in

order. By March of 1978, internal divisions were become “increasingly visible” to the

public.100 Making matters worse, those divisions were not over peripheral, fleeting

issues, they pertained to the heart of Carter’s foreign policy—an effective détente

strategy. The disagreement over linkage, and the failure of Carter to do more than

98 , “Vance and Brzezinski: or Guerilla War,” New York Times, 13 February 1977 99 Ibid 100 Murrey Marder, “Linkage Rift Exposes a Split at Heart of Détente Strategy,” Washington Post, 6 March 1978.

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blend the arguments of his top foreign policy advisers was far from lost on his critics.

In fact, American strategy was presented as “totally confused” and derided as “about as effective as shooting yourself in the foot.”101 For months the press stood by

debating “whether Brzezinski or Vance is closer to the president’s overall

intentions.”102 Some making the case for Vance’s position argued that making the

SALT talks contingent upon particular actions regarding Africa was nothing more

than a “visceral reaction”, that it would do nothing to improve the prospects of either

a resolution to the Horn conflict or increase the likelihood of positive concessions on

SALT.103 Others made the case for Brzezinski, arguing that he is “right about the

seriousness of the Soviet threat in the Horn, and about the need to do something about

it.” 104 Journalists who obviously leaned towards Brzezinski’s hard-line approach

with the Soviets used the dispute over Africa to expose supposed flaws within

Carter’s détente strategy, namely, the lack of effective deterrence: “The Kremlin is

establishing a pattern, and a principle” that if undeterred it would move on South

African gold, uranium, and “highly developed industrial assets.”105

One of the more problematic issues for the Carter Administration centered around the development of a totally new “enhanced radiation weapon,” more often referred to as the ERW or the neutron bomb. The possible development of the ERW first became an issue under the Ford Administration, but, ultimately, was never produced and distributed. When Washington Post columnist Walter Pincus broke the

101 Ibid 102 Ibid 103 David Shipler, “The Salt Dilemma and the Horn,” New York Times, 8 March 1978. 104 Victor Zorza, “Time to Check the Kremlin’s African Adventure,” Washington Post¸ 8 March 1978. 105 Ibid

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story106(uncovering the existence of the ERW through reading congressional testimonies that left the phrase “ERW” in by mistake) it set off a political firestorm that the Carter administration was admittedly unprepared to deal with.107 The press

and the public developed a particular fascination with the discussion; it focused on

whether or not Carter would develop and deploy the “bomb that destroys people and

not property.”108 The ERW was an intriguing and plausible weapon because of its

accuracy and its ability to minimize collateral damage. Critics of the ERW

deployment argued that public knowledge of the decision to defer production could

be used by Carter to gain similar concessions of deferment or removal from the

Soviets (for example on the Soviet SS-20 which was deployed within months of the neutron bomb controversy). The neutron bomb deployment required the support of traditional NATO members in Western Europe, especially West Germany. If a collective front could be created amongst United States’ and NATO members it would blunt any domestic, political flak received whether the decision was one of deployment, postponement, or cancellation. Initially, Carter was persuaded to produce and deploy the weapon by his principal foreign policy advisors (Vance,

Brzezinski, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown all agreed). But as the issue gained traction and Carter realized that he would have to make an actual decision about whether deploy a totally novel weapon of mass destruction he became

106 Walter Pincus, “Carter is Weighing Radiation Warhead,” Washington Post, 7 June 1977. 107 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 301. 108 Ibid

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extremely uncomfortable. By March of 1978, Carter made the unpopular and

confusing decision to defer deployment of the ERW.

Having already cancelled the production of the B-1 bomber, Carter’s deferral

of the neutron bomb provided a rallying cry for his critics. It also focused media attention on his leadership and judgment. Press coverage focused on several components of the issue. First it highlighted that President Carter acted against the

advice of his top foreign policy advisors. Apparently his personal dedication to the

goals of nuclear disarmament pushed Carter to make the controversial decision

despite his advisors reservations.109 Second, Carter delayed production of the bomb

in hopes of creating an allied front (for deployment or deferment), but obviously that

effort had failed dismally. Third, was the damage Carter’s decision created with

Congress. Applicable committees in the House and Senate demonstrated an early,

overwhelming support for production of the ERW. Leaders of the House Armed

Services Committee went so far as to draft a letter arguing against a ban on

production.110 Senate Majority Leader reportedly told Carter at a morning congressional breakfast at the White House that “he believed the weapons should be built.” And Republican Bob Wilson of California, ranking GOP member on the Armed Services panel, commented publicly “Carter would be mistaken to abandon the neutron [bomb] at this late date.”111 Finally, the press’s overall coverage

was extremely negative. Most labeled his handling of the issue an utter failure. Carter

109 Richard Burt, “Aides Report Carter Bans Neutron Bomb,” New York Times, 4 April 1978. 110 Walter Pincus, “Carter Given Alternatives To Barring Neutron Arms,” Washington Post, 6 April 1978. 111 Ibid

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was originally indecisive, for months delayed a decision, failed to gain significant

NATO support, and ended up deferring production with “no more than a pious wish that the Russians would follow suit.”112 In fact, Moscow was heralded as having conducted the “most successful” propagandizing campaign in postwar history.113

And, even worse, Carter appeared to have reneged on an earlier pledge to demand

“tit-for-tat concessions from Moscow.” Other assessments of the situation summed up the whole of the difficulties to Carter’s personal “emotional quest for a nuclear-free world.”114 No matter the debate of Carter’s purpose, the consequences were clear: the president was left “facing disorder, disillusionment and incredulity” from his own advisers, from Congress, from desperately needed allies, and, most important of all, from the public at large.

While Brzezinski and Vance each had defenders and advocates in the press,

Carter was criticized for mismanagement, inconsistency, and even incompetence from both ends of the political spectrum. Simply put, Carter took the heat. The press reported on meetings Carter scheduled with his top foreign policy advisors in an effort to “urge them to be more self-disciplined in their public comments.”115 And, yet, in the immediate days after Carter’s managerial efforts, the administration is once again accused of “running around and popping off.”116 Carter created an impression of a president who vacillated on substantial issues, lacked the ability to quiet internal

112 Norman Podhoretz, “The Carter Stalemate,” New York Times, 9, July, 1978. 113 Rowland Evans and , “Behind the Neutron Decision,” Washington Post, 10 April 1978. 114 Ibid 115 Hedrick Smith, “And Word Power in Washington is Misfiring,” New York Times, 25 June 1978. 116 James Reston, “The New Diplomacy,” New York Times, 28 June 1978.

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dissent, and proved incapable of decisive leadership. As one “old Washington hand

with experience in past democratic administrations” put it, “This is non-decision

making . . . it is no way to make foreign policy. It makes him look weak and it

confuses our friends abroad.”117 And, he might have added, it also confused the

public at home. Apparently the criticism and impressions of Carter had reached such

a height that the First Lady felt compelled to set the record straight herself: “They think he’s incompetent, he is not incompetent. They think he’s indecisive. He’s not indecisive, he’s strong, he’s very strong, he’s very determined, he knows what he wants and doesn’t back down, but he knows that in politics you have to compromise.”

She went on to address the Vance-Brzezinski split directly: “what the press portrays as dissention is usually just normal debate.”118

By mid-1978, the criticism of the administration broadened even further. It

seemed the whole of Carter’s foreign policy perspective was under attack. Norman

Podhoretz, founding member of the CPD, and contributing columnist to the New York

Times, unleashed a of condemnation that appeared to represent the core of

Carter’s image dilemma. Podhoretz derides Carter’s overall foreign policy by quoting

a an American expert on Soviet relations who said “he felt sorry for his counterparts

in Moscow whose job it is to make sense of American foreign policy.” Podhoretz went on to label Carter’s human rights policy as nothing more than “international political philanthropy,” his defense posture retreatist because of cancellations of “one

117 Hedrick Smith, “And Word Power in Washington is Misfiring,” New York Times, 25 June 1978. 118 Steven Roberts, “Mrs. Carter Defends President, Calling Poor Image Undeserved,” New York Times, 25 July 1978.

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weapon system after another” (B-1 bomber, cruise missile, neutron bomb) without

even a single similar concessions by “the Russians”, and finally, his African policy as

contradictory and naïve.119 Most damaging of all, he suggested Carter was

purposefully ambiguous with his policies because the “deeper truth is that the

administration is irresolute because the nation over which it presides has still not

decided, three years after leaving Vietnam, what if anything it wishes to contribute . .

. to the struggle against Soviet in particular and Communist in general.” Podhoretz undermined the legitimacy of Carter’s foreign policy perspective by declaring that “we know from polls that popular sentiment leans very strongly toward playing an active role in this struggle [the Cold War] once again. . . the record low rating he [Carter] has been scoring in the polls for handling of foreign affairs indicate that the American people are not content to go on living in so stagnant and irresolute a state. . . If Mr. Carter were a true leader, he would be working toward the resolution of this conflict and the formation of a new consensus.

Instead he appears content to go representing a perfect embodiment of the stalemate in the general of public opinion.”120 One would be hard pressed to find

tougher media criticism of a sitting president.

Carter, more and more, was presented as a “victim of his own intentions.” 121

Having reacted to the experiences of the Nixon-Ford period, and the lone-ranger

decision making process under , Carter was portrayed as creating a

119 Norman Podhoretz, “The Carter Stalemate,” New York Times, 9 July 1978. 120 Ibid 121 Richard Burt, “Leaks May be Inevitable in the Ship of State,” New York Times, 18 .

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decision making process that was so diffused as to make consistent policy-making impossible. One State Department official summed up the difficulties: The problem is

not that we don’t support administration policies; its that it isn’t always clear what the

policies are.” Further, the administration was characterized as being stricken with a

form of top-down paralysis. The Vance-Brzezinski divide was more reflective of

Carter’s basic inability to “set a course and stick to it.” Thus, the president actually

facilitated the press’s obsession with the NSC and State divide. New York Times

columnist Richard Burt’s apocalyptic portrayal of Carter’s advisors was typical: they

are “locked in a struggle for Mr. Carter’s soul on critical problems.”122 Burt depicted

Vance as a “cool rational force urging restraint and caution” while Brzezinski was

painted as a “tough-minded, slightly impulsive character, inclined . . . to look for

every opportunity to tweak the nose of the bear.” In many ways Carter’s propensity to

hear advice from all angles proved problematic. This is not to argue that other

president’s did not involve these varied components into their decision-making

process, obviously they did, but Carter appears to have sincerely attempted to incorporate and judiciously weigh each aspect of the varied advice he was receiving.

The result was a bewildering collection of recommendations and a slow, reactionary,

and fragmented decision-making process that was highly subject to criticism of

inconsistency and incoherence.123

122 Ibid 123 For a full critique of Carter’s inconsistency and perception dilemma see, Stanley Hoffman, “The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: The Perils of Incoherence,” Foreign Affairs, America and the World (1978, Volume 57, Number 3).

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As the internal discord and dissension within the administration swelled and

as domestic pressures accumulated, Carter found his principal foreign policy advisor,

Zbigniew Brzezinski, pushing especially hard for foreign policy adjustment.

Brzezinski’s arguments, through personal memorandum and at times in public statements and appearances, touched upon many of the contentious issues of 1978

already laid out in this chapter: the proper US-Soviet relationship, the neutron bomb

debacle, the Brzezinski/Vance divide, the Horn conflict, and the administration’s

increasing perception of disarray. Brzezinski addressed these issues in the context of

the Soviet-American relationship, and pulled together the common themes which he

felt were most damaging to the administration’s image. The advice he gives to Carter

over the course of 1978 and 1979 amounted to a wholesale redefinition of the Carter

Administration's relationship with the Soviet Union and the administration’s foreign policy image. Brzezinski’s tactics for persuading Carter were clear: in order to convince Carter to abandon the administration’s détente strategy, he had to prove the domestic-political imperative of doing so.

Brzezinski and Carter discussed the administration’s foreign policy daily. In addition to formal PRC and SCC meetings, Brzezinski briefed the president first thing in the morning each and every day. They of course worked in close proximity to each other, had daily phone conversations, and face-to-face discussions whenever necessary. Brzezinski also took it upon himself to send President Carter weekly

reports which often contained “opinion” pieces of varying length. These reports,

which in typical Brzezinski fashion were blunt and at times quite critical of the

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administration’s performance, represent rich source material that provide insight into the inner-workings and policy formation of the Carter administration. What they also reveal, time and time again, is a concerted effort on behalf of Brzezinski to convince

Carter to toughen his foreign policy. And the argumentative avenue that Brzezinski found most effective with was to frame his advice in line with Carter’s growing domestic vulnerability.

As the domestic-political situation turned sour over the course of 1978,

Brzezinski’s substantive and procedural advice to President Carter grew more pointed. Reacting in direct relation to public anxiety that the administration lacks an

“overall scheme” and is “no longer prepared to use . . . power to protects its interest or to impose its will on the flow of history” Brzezinski begins an active attempt to

redefine Carter’s policy toward the Soviets.124 In a memo to the president in

December of 1978, in preparation for an upcoming meeting of Western European

leaders, Brzezinski advised Carter that it is “quite critical” to provide a “sense of

your strategic direction” regarding the US-Soviet relationship. Brzezinski heightens

the stakes of the upcoming meeting and attempts to focus the President on the

importance of refining the administration’s Soviet policy in the second half of his

term: “I believe that as we enter 1979, you, quite literally, have a historic chance to

start shaping a new global system, with the United States as its predominant

coordinator if no longer the paramount power.”125 Quite literally, Brzezinski was

124 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 28 December 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library. 125 Ibid

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attempting to push Carter to redefine not only the U.S.-Soviet relationship, but

America’s role in the world as well. Brzezinski proceeds to explain his own

conception of the US-Soviet relationship. He does this by first listing the analogies

and attributes that should be rejected as definitions of US-Soviet relations: “Your

policy, as it has evolved through your speeches and actions, is quite distinctive and I

believe historically more relevant. It is NOT . . . Confrontation or renewed Cold

War,” Brzezinski wanted to make certain that western leaders, the international

community, and the public at home did not view the shifting of Carter’s Soviet policy

as a return to traditional containment. Brzezinski felt that besides the obvious dangers

of actual confrontation, this analogy was of little practical use. For Brzezinski, a

return to traditional containment would needlessly alienate European allies and was

“far too simplistic an image” to manage an “increasingly complex world.” He also

sought to reassure Carter that the nuanced position he himself was advocating was not

confrontational. Brzezinski strove to distinguish the Carter conception of the U.S.-

Soviet relationship from the Nixon/Kissinger concept of détente. He argued that a

relation of “condominium” was based on a “pessimistic view that the West is in

decline,” that the best we can do is “prevent change in the central areas,” and that

détente was essentially a “reactionary balance-of-power policy” which abandons any

form of deterrent whatsoever. Finally, Brzezinski wanted to assure that Carter had no

misgivings about the possibility of a genuine “partnership” with the Soviets.126 And

in this analysis, although Brzezinski does not explicitly state it, there is a hint of

126 Ibid

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frustration for Vance’s perspective. Brzezinski argued that viewing the US-Soviet

relationship as a “partnership on a broad front, starting with SALT” as the “basis for

world peace” is altogether faulty. Its weaknesses are obvious: it would “frighten our

friends and allies,” it can easily be “translated into ,” and would “elevate

the USSR into a global partner of the US, while leaving the Soviets a hunting license

to exploit global turbulence too their advantage.”127 At this crucial juncture in the

Carter presidency, Brzezinski was attempting to re-root Carter’s perspective regarding the Soviet Union. So often criticized for inconsistency and lack of an overall vision in dealing with Soviet aggression Brzezinski wanted to make clear to

Carter, before his trip with Western leaders, that he not mislead crucial allies into thinking the U.S. policy toward the Soviets was one of reckless confrontation, fruitless condominium, or naïve partnership.

What, then, was Brzezinski’s conception of the proper U.S.-Soviet relationship? Brzezinski personally advocated and lobbied Carter for a policy of

“reciprocal accommodation.” He often used these cumbersome phrases to describe the proper strategy the United States should undertake toward the issue. Initially, he advocated for an “activist, reciprocal and comprehensive” form of détente. However, using the hesitant, limited policy in Africa and the slow, tedious negotiations on

SALT as guides, it is impossible to make the case that the administration accepted his original conception. Realizing that in order to gain the upper hand on the Soviets in

1979 and 1980 serious adjustment would be necessary, Brzezinski unveiled his latest

127 Ibid

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rhetorical concoction—“reciprocal accommodation.” For Brzezinski the major tenets

of reciprocal accommodation were: containment, resistance to indirect expansion,

ideological competition, and triangulation.

The three most important non-domestic issues that precipitated Brzezinski’s

mid-term push for a new concept of detente remained the ongoing negotiations with

SALT, the conflict in Africa, and indirect expansion of the Soviet Union into the

Persian Gulf. On all three issues Brzezinski believed that the United States had lost

credibility and initiative. On SALT, Brzezinski pushed Carter for a more forceful approach. He argued that “we have been dribbling our concessions” to the Soviets and “asserting from time to time that we would go no further” and then “time after time we would then make additional concessions.” In Africa, Brzezinski believed a show of force, in some manner or another, was necessary; if détente was going to be based on “reciprocity” the administration had to be prepared to “assert. . . [its] interests”. 128 Brzezinski believed that because of this dual loss of credibility the

United States had lost all possibility of effective deterrent and, therefore, the

possibility of adequate containment. An essential step towards creating a new policy

of reciprocal accommodation was to regain the credibility (at home, in the Soviets

eyes, and with traditional allies) that created the possibility for actual deterrence.

Brzezinski viewed the subtle, indirect expansion of the Soviet Union as a

serious threat not only to global stability, but to Carter’s domestic-political situation

as well. Besides in Africa, where his views on linkage and his support for covert aid

128 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 28 December 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library.

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and a larger direct involvement have already been mentioned, Brzezinski felt the

Soviets were indirectly threatening other areas as well: Iran, Afghanistan, and the surrounding Persian Gulf region. Brzezinski alerted Carter to intelligence reports that suggested the Soviets were up to something in Afghanistan: “Soviet activities in

Afghanistan have increased significantly in recent months. The Soviet presence has more than doubled . . . Soviet military advisors are now occupying positions in the ministry of Defense.”129 Brzezinski attempted to focus Carter’s attention on the wider, long-term implications of destabilization in Iran and Afghanistan:

There is no question in my mind that we are confronting the beginning of a major crisis, in some ways similar to the one in Europe in the late 40’s. Fragile social and political structures of vital importance to us are threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political vacuum might well be filled by elements more sympathetic to the Soviet Union. This is especially likely since there is a pervasive feeling in the area that the US is no longer in a position to offer political and military protection.130

In Brzezinski’s mind, if Carter’s foreign policy was going to be salvaged, a show of resolve was necessary on Salt, in Africa, and in response to Soviet expansion into the

Persian Gulf. Carter, at least at this early juncture, seemed unwilling to adopt a more confrontation stance toward Soviet expansion in fear of losing SALT and unnecessarily sacrificing détente.

Brzezinski also pressed Carter to exploit opportunities that allowed for ideological competition with the Soviet Union. In particular, Brzezinski was frustrated that the general issue of “human rights” was not used more effectively as a

129 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 3 November 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library. 130 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 2 December 1978, Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library.

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strategy of explicit competition with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski would often reassure Carter of the centrality of the human rights issue to their foreign policy. He frequently referred to human rights as “the genuine wave of the future” and emphasized it as a central, advantageous component of U.S. competition with the

Soviet Union. Brzezinski argued that because “increased literacy and political activism makes the demand for human rights a growing political force in the world”

U.S. standing and influence would inevitably increase if it were seen as the major advocate for universal human rights. Brzezinski advises the President that it would be

“good politics” and “historically and morally right” for him to “reaffirm . . . [his] general commitment.” Because Carter was hesitant to fully apply the logic of his human rights policy to the Soviet Union, especially during sensitive periods of SALT negotiation, Brzezinski was keen to guise his advice for increased ideological competition with the Soviets in more passive rhetoric than he probably intended: “I realize that some would prefer us to be silent on this matter, but it seems to me that we need not be provocative in being true to ourselves.”131 Brzezinski advises Carter

that “affirming our commitments on human rights . . . greatly increases the moral

appeal of the US and provides an effective response to Soviet ideology.”132 And in

just the sort of flowery rhetoric that might persuade Carter to increase the tactical use

of human rights issues against Soviet propaganda Brzezinski writes, “There is no

doubt the global yearning for human rights is ready to be tapped. . .”.133

131 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, October 27 1978, Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library. 132 Ibid 133 Ibid

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Finally, and for Brzezinski most importantly, if Carter’s foreign policy at the end of his first term was going to be viewed successfully the administration needed to create an international framework that would compel the Soviets to seek accommodation. For Brzezinski, in a post-Vietnam context, the only way to

fundamentally change Soviet behavior was to either prove that the United States still

had the will to prevent Soviet expansion or to create an international system that

would envelope or triangulate the Soviets into a demeanor of accommodation. As it

became quite obvious that the rest of the administration would not support a show of

force in Africa against the Cuban/Soviet front, he concentrated his efforts on

convincing Carter to establish an international framework which would force the

Soviets to adjust policy.

The “international framework” that Brzezinski felt would be ideal consisted of

the traditional trilateral members of the United States, European nations, and Japan. A

diplomatic effort would need to be made to solidly support from Europe and Japan on

a number of important broad fronts including: Soviet military buildup, Soviet

expansion in Africa, and Soviet expansion in the Persian Gulf. If a united front could

be created amongst these traditional allies of the United States, the Soviets would be

less able to alter the balances of power world-wide. The wild card for Brzezinski, and

the component that would most antagonize the Soviets, was the possible

incorporation of the China into a U.S., European, and Japanese common anti-Soviet

relationship.

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While there were non-Soviet related reasons for U.S. normalization with

China, it is hard to come to the conclusion that competition with the Soviet Union

was not the paramount reason for the timing. Brzezinski knew that “publicly one had

to make pious noises to the effect that U.S.—Chinese normalization had nothing to do

with [the] U.S.—Soviet rivalry.” However, a “Soviet disregard” for US concerns in

Yemen, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf made Brzezinski feel that the

United States “should not be excessively deferential to Soviet sensitivities about

U.S.—Chinese collaboration.”134 Brzezinski argued further that if the United States

was forbidden from linking African issues to SALT then the Soviets, as well, should

be expected to keep U.S.—Chinese relations from affecting the talks.135

If the United States could foster such an international operating framework for

the Soviet Union they may very well be able to force them to accommodation on

several key issues. For example, if the Soviets felt threatened by encirclement, they

may wish to refine their relationship in positive directions with Europe, Japan, and

the PRC. The United States would also be in a much better bargaining position. When

the Soviets solicit assurances regarding the U.S.-Chinese relationship, Brzezinski

advised Carter to respond by saying that “we do not intend to exploit China against

the Soviet Union, but couple that with a pointed request for the withdrawal of Cubans

from Africa and for halt to Soviet activities in the Persian Gulf.”136

134 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 196. 135 Ibid 136 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 27 October 1978, Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter library.

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One the eve of the meeting of western leaders at Guadeloupe Brzezinski was pressing Carter for a significant refinement of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the strategy for combating Soviet aggression. He sought to focus Carter’s attention on how specifically the United States could: contain and deter the Soviet Union, resist their indirect expansion into important regions, succeed in maximizing the U.S.’s natural advantage in ideological competition, and how the United States could force the Soviets into accommodation or face the prospect of global isolation.137

Brzezinski’s policy of reciprocal accommodation amounts in effect to a policy of reformed containment. His proposals to President Carter cannot simply be characterizes as a return to traditional containment because Brzezinski was prepared to accept “genuine global cooperation” with the Soviets on the basis of “genuine reciprocity.”138 He was not arguing for a concrete policy of containment that permanently demonized either the Soviets or their ideology as an end in itself. And

Brzezinski rejected the politics that built its foundation on such an approach (i.e.

Reagan). Brzezinski’s was a complex world that did not hinge on anticommunism alone; he attempted to incorporate Japan and especially China into the framework of

U.S.-Soviet relations and his view that North-South and Third World issues were of paramount significance to American foreign policy. This rejection of the primacy of

East-West, containment-based thinking is markedly different from American foreign policy of the previous thirty years. He was willing to accept a competitive Soviet

Union that maintained its own so long as its relationship with the

137 Ibid 138 Ibid

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United States was based on reciprocity and an effort to achieve relative cooperation and detente.

Brzezinski also advocated for a reformed policy of containment because it made good domestic political sense. To a surprising degree, Brzezinski’s attempts to reform Carter’s perspective were framed in overtly political terms. Brzezinski believed creating effective geopolitical countermeasures to the indirect expansion of the Soviet Union was crucial to shore up domestic support at home. This dual framework—a realist view of geopolitical behavior and a keen sense of the domestic- political backdrop of foreign policy decision making—is what made Brzezinski’s advice increasingly compelling for Carter. As Soviet behavior reinforced Brzezinski’s conception of détente and as the domestic-political environment began to demand a more muscular foreign policy, Carter began to convert to Brzezinski’s worldview.

The Carter administration was attempting to combat criticism from a broad range of directions. From conservative foreign policy interest groups the administration saw the pitfalls of being labeled weak and naïve. From the pages of

America’s newspapers the administration was deflecting accusations of inner discord, incompetence, and mismanagement. From Congress, leading Republicans and

Democrats, found Carter’s first two years riddled with inconsistencies and lacking on a number of fronts. And from the pages of the nation’s most elite journals and magazines the administration performance and policies were labeled incoherent, fragmented and even submissive. Brzezinski understood the perils of such criticism.

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Brzezinski also realized that if anything could alter Carter’s foreign policy approach it was the president’s domestic-political vulnerabilities.

In a memo sent to President Carter in , Brzezinski brought up an issue that undoubtedly had been discussed between the two before. In his personal

“mid-term assessment” of the administration’s performance, Brzezinski raised a problem that was becomingly painfully aware to him—the administration’s “deep- seated perception” of “disarray.” His argument to the president was that the press and

Carter’s domestic critics had succeeded in painting the administration as

“amateurish,” “disorganized,” “uncertain,” and “irresolute.”139 Brzezinski complimented Carter personally on dispelling the “popular impression” that he is “not skilled in foreign policy,” but he also makes the case that the way in which the administration conducts its collective foreign policy is undermining Carter’s message.

The frequent accusations of inconsistency and disarray, he warned, were becoming

“the conventional wisdom.”140

Brzezinski’s explanations for the negative public perceptions are instructive.

He first turns his attention to what he believes are actual problems of inconsistency and distortions stemming from the administration’s policy process. He informs Carter that much of the perception is the “direct result not of our policies but of the way in which almost anyone in the bureaucracy feels free to talk to the press, discuss and distort the most intimate decision-making processes, and generally promote

139 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 26 January 1979, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File Weekly Reports to president, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library. 140 Ibid

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themselves or their personal policy preferences. It is extremely destructive, not only

of our foreign policy but of political support for this administration.”141 While

Brzezinski initially couched his criticism for the bureaucracy as a whole, it did not

take long for him to focus attention on the State Department as the essence of the

problem: “I am afraid I see no remedy to this problem short of a significant shake-up, particularly in the State Department. There are faults here in the White House, in the

NSC, and certainly in Defense. But one cannot have a discussion with any journalist in this without gaining the very clear impression that the leaks and misinformation coming out of the State Department are of unprecedented proportions.”142 Realizing that his advice may be interpreted as self-serving, which it

was, Brzezinski withdrew himself from offering any additional suggestions.

However, he ends the memo by rooting his criticism in the political imperatives of the

coming year: “In sum, if our foreign policy efforts are not only to be successful but be

perceived as such so as to contribute to your political strength in 1980, it is necessary

to focus on those few issues which will come to fruition at that time. And it is

important that we do so with a genuine sense of cohesion and loyalty.”143

Brzezinski understood that the press’s tendency to focus on his struggle with

Vance created a liability for Carter. It was a “genuine problem,” he conceded in a

February 1979 memorandum to the president. The “press’s fascination, exploitation and magnification of the so-called Vance-Brzezinski rivalry” has seriously

141 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 26 January 1979, Brzezinski Collection Subject File Weekly Reports to president, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library. 142 Ibid 143 Ibid

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undermined the substantive thrust of Carter’s overall agenda.144 The way in which

Brzezinski frames the issue to president Carter is worth stating and may provide

outside observers a glimpse at the reality of policy formation in the first two years of

Carter’s presidency: “To be sure, some differences do exist and you are not only

aware of them, but you have often said, you . . . want divergent viewpoints presented

to you. At the same time, the fact is that on most matters Cy and I are in basic

agreement, and there has been no underhanded maneuvering to have one’s point of

view prevail.”145 Brzezinski fought the perception that he and Vance were in

perpetual disagreement. When he realized that it was affecting the public’s perception

of Carter’s overall foreign policy he made efforts to minimize the collateral damage.

He deferred to Vance on issues that he felt were of nominal importance. He

purposefully exchanged drafts of speeches with Vance and often inserted or omitted

phrases in compromise. He even sought to contact the press directly when he felt

characterizations of the administration were off course. But the significant

differences, which Brzezinski would later admit to, were far from fleeting, temporary

disparities. Brzezinski often stated that he and Vance were in “basic agreement” on

most issues, but the reality was that the basic agreement may have covered 90% of

the “issues,” but in terms of crisis response, in terms of tactics, and in terms of a conceptual view of the world he and Vance were miles apart.146

144 Ibid 145 Ibid 146 See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 36-44.

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Pointedly, Brzezinski, implies that the real problem with the perception of division among he and Vance lay, ironically, with the President himself. In a weekly report, Brzezinski argued that the problem with the “so-called Vance/Brzezinski divide” is related more to the “tone and orchestration” of Carter’s foreign policy.

Brzezinski’s subtle emphasis on tone (which implies someone who sets the attitude

and character of the foreign policy) and orchestration (which implies someone who

organizes and accounts for different actors) is crucial to understanding the means by

which a possible solution could be found. The solution does not lie in the actions of

Vance, Brzezinski or other subordinates, but rather in the president himself.

Brzezinski chose to draw a historical parallel to make the point to the president:

as one looks back on previous administrations, one can see similar divergences, and in the case of FDR they were certainly much wider philosophically and more intense. The real difference is that FDR was seen as orchestrating and deliberately exploiting such differences whereas the press is now creating the impression that you’re buffeted by them. You know and we know that this is not so, but it is the perception that is damaging.147

Brzezinski went searching for examples to reinforce his major point. In March of 1979, he attaches excerpts from two articles to a presidential memo, one in the

Daily Telegraph the other in The Economist that further reinforced Carter’s negative public image. Brzezinski, perhaps realizing the mounting frustration on Carter’s behalf, chose not to write a formal opinion piece this particular week: “Since you have enough to do this week, the following two British comments might be more

147 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 24 February 1979, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File Weekly Reports to president, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library.

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useful than to be burdened further with my opinions.”148 The two pieces, once again, emphasized Carter’s growing image dilemma. In it, the columnists write, “All to frequently . . . I have found myself criticizing President Carter fore being weak and vacillating, for preaching too much and acting too little . . . Nor am I alone. Such complaints are widespread throughout Europe. . . America must rise from her

Watergate-Vietnamese’s convalescence and resume the preponderant role in the world leadership which is her due and her duty.” And in the Economist, Brzezinski excerpts articles that refer to “the potential irrelevance of American power” if the

U.S. cannot “manage to deter the Russians” from taking actions in retaliation to U.S.-

Chinese encroachment. These were the challenges of the day as Brzezinski saw them.

Conveniently, the Economist and the Daily Telegraph made the argument on his behalf.

Brzezinski wanted to make certain that Carter understood the magnitude of their and his image problem: “it is a fact that both abroad and increasingly at home the United States is seen as indecisive, vacillating, and pursuing a policy of acquiescence. We are perceived as neither responding effectively to Soviet assertiveness and as unable to generate a board strategy that is relevant to the times.”149 Having established the direness of the situation and having explained why he believes the image problem to exist, Brzezinski began slowly laying out a path to validation of Carter’s foreign policy and the possibility of electoral success in 1980.

148 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 2 , Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library. 149 Ibid

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Starting most notably in December of 1978 and January of 1979 Brzezinski

began offering President Carter specific advice on how to legitimize his foreign

policy image in an effort to bolster his political appeal for the coming election year.

In January he sent the president a “frank and personal midterm assessment” which operated to a surprising degree within a domestic-political framework. More than a year away from the first caucus and twenty-two months before the general election,

Brzezinski was directing interesting questions to the president: “What will be your

principal foreign policy success in 1980? What can be done to our national security

process to overcome a deep-seated perception that we are in disarray—an image

which gravely undermines the very real substantive successes of this administration?”

These questions are key to understanding how Brzezinski believed Carter could

achieve success and legitimacy in the latter half of his term. Perhaps they are also

crucial for explaining why Brzezinski’s influence was increasing and Vance’s waning

as Carter’s first term progressed. First, he advocated for an activist foreign policy that

would seek out issues that could help Carter achieve the public support he so

desperately needed. Brzezinski anticipates a successful signing of the Camp David

Accords, but implies that this is not enough to garner sufficient public support to

overcome existing negative perceptions. He worries that a “bitter and potentially

inconclusive ratification debate” on SALT could have serious political ramifications.

Brzezinski goes on to question whether even a confirmed SALT agreement would

posses political efficacy for Carter in 1980: “While ratification itself will be an

achievement, it is hard to believe it will provide much political momentum for the

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campaign of 1980, especially if the Soviets in the meantime . . . do something that

generates further public concerns about their motives and actions . . .”.150 Two years

before the general election and eleven months before the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, it seemed Brzezinski had presciently mapped out the coming challenges and opportunities.

Brzezinski felt there were several possible opportunities for political

momentum, or as he put it, an “encore” to Camp David, that needed attention: a

successful outcome to the “delicate balancing act” of U.S., Chinese and Soviet relations, a possible breakthrough in Middle East peace (which came with the Israeli-

Egyptian peace treaty), the implementation of an effective deterrence/containment

policy against the Soviet Union, or a significant change in the public’s perception that

Carter was unable to effectively manage divergent views within his administration.

Brzezinski gives specific advice on the last of his recommendations. He encourages

Carter to take “tight personal control of all actions affecting our relationship with the

Soviet Union.”151 He advises Carter to take “deliberate steps to demonstrate that.. . .

[he was] exploiting the differences while pursuing a steady course.” Brzezinski also

suggests sending Cy to China to alter the perception that Brzezinski was the sole

player in normalization efforts. Brzezinski requests that he himself be sent to Moscow

to conduct “tough-minded consultations” with the Soviets. He argued this could be

effective because tough minded talks with the Soviets have not taken place (implying

150 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 26 January 1979, Brzezinski Collection Subject File Weekly Reports to president, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library. 151 Ibid

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that Vance was incapable of conducting them) and because a majority of the public did not have confidence in the U.S. to gain the upper hand in the negotiations.

Brzezinski felt that his more hawkish image, which so often had been presented in the

press, could alter perceptions about the progress and potential result of the SALT

talks. Brzezinski further advises Carter to have Vance give a foreign policy speech

that stressed themes that are usually reserved to describe his own outlook: “the

importance of power” and an open recognition by Vance “that relations with the

Soviet Union may require from time to tome a forceful American reaffirmation of our

interest.”152

These efforts by Brzezinski reveal an active attempt to mold the administration’s image and perception of performance in line with the prevailing

public mood. For the issues that the administration had control over (State

Departmental leaks, internal debate, foreign visits, public appearances, and speeches)

Brzezinski argued the president should actively seek to understand and operate within

the trends of public opinion. The key was to identify the actions in which the

administration had a reasonable opportunity of success that would also maximize the

potential political benefit it brought the president. Issues and outcomes that the administration had less direct control over, (SALT negotiations, successfully playing the “China card”) were more dangerous, but if implemented correctly could prove politically effective as well. Getting the president to fully understand and operate

152 Ibid

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within the nexus of domestic politics and foreign policy was of prime importance to

Brzezinski.

By April of 1979, Brzezinski was advising the president about how to shore

up domestic support and maximize his position as a world leader to gain an advantage

in the coming primary and general elections. He argues directly to the president, “it is

important that in 1980 you be recognized as the President both of peace and of

resolve. Both dimensions are important to the American people, and the public wants reassurance on both scores.”153 Brzezinski argues passionately to Carter that he must

be “very conscious of the symbolic significance of presidential involvement in world

affairs.” And while the “mass media have stimulated the widespread perception of

this administration as being indecisive” regarding foreign policy issues, the “basic fact is that the country wants the president to be a successful world leader” and to the extent that Carter could utilize that opportunity, would pay tremendous domestic and electoral dividends. Brzezinski was attempting to convince Carter to “deliberately counter the impression that American leadership is not firm” by emphasizing “US strength and resolve” in “public statements and in particular in public speeches.”

Specifically, he recommends that Carter “say from time to time that the US is willing to use its force to protect its interest and those of our allies.” “Conversely,”

Brzezinski suggests, “you should emphasize less often the notion that we no longer have the capacity to interfere in the affairs of other countries (factually correct but inferentially an admission of weakness), and you should also not hesitate to stress the

153 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 12 April 1979, Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library

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need to counter forcefully Soviet ambitions or aggressiveness.” Quite directly and

with telling specificity, Brzezinski informs the president that “it is not necessary

always to couple the word ‘competition’ with ‘peaceful’ when you speak of the

realities of the American-Soviet competition.”

Brzezinski also recommended that Carter emphasize his role as commander in

chief more explicitly. He argued that the president should emphasize this role both

abroad and at home. For instance, abroad, in places like Korea, and in official visits to

China and Moscow, he advises Carter to maximize these opportunities even if they

are purely ceremonial in purpose. At home, Brzezinski recommends a

commencement address at a service academy on “the continued importance of

national defense”, “on the value of patriotism” and on the “significance of loyalty and

devotion.” 154 These themes and pronouncements, in Brzezinski’s mind, “offer useful opportunity to project the image of a leader who responsibly recognizes not only the

limits but also the uses of military power in a complex age.” Finally, Brzezinski

advises Carter that:

given the inevitable domestic time pressures you will need to discriminate very carefully in the future between the things you must do in order to maintain momentum in your foreign policy and to shore up your important tangible accomplishments; the things that you should do because of their potentially positive impact on both foreign policy and domestic politics; and things that you should not do because they either detract from your foreign policy accomplishments or because they would complicate your domestic political situation.155

154 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 12 April 1979, Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library 155 Ibid

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As 1979 progressed, Carter would be given substantial opportunity to put

Brzezinski’s advice into practice. In a matter of four short months (September-

December), the administration was hit with a barrage of crisis situations that required

executive action and the effective management of Carter’s image dilemma. In early

September, Soviet brigade troops were spotted in Cuba and the issue became a

serious political football. In November, the American embassy in was

overrun. And, of course, in late December, the Soviets decided to launch a full

invasion of Afghanistan sparking a brutal dispute within the administration over the

appropriate American response. All this was taking place amidst Senate debate over

ratification of Carter’s principal foreign policy endeavor—the Strategic Arms

Limitation Treaty. The opportunity for executive action and for the alleviation of

Carter’s image dilemma abounded. For Brzezinski, these combined events marked the

final turning point. If the administration’s policy were to be viewed with any success,

and if Carter were to have a chance at a second term, the triumph of a foreign policy

of containment would have to become a reality.

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Chapter 4—The Soviet Brigade In Cuba

As 1979 progressed, Brzezinski found few reasons to be optimistic. Although there were several tangible accomplishments—PRC normalization, Egyptian-Israeli

Peace Treaty, and in June the long-awaited signing of the SALT II Treaty in

Vienna—these were drowned out by a steady chorus of criticism and a growing perception of Carter’s helplessness. Many of Carter’s largest obstacles were domestic: the energy crisis, unemployment, and inflation. These issues, as many presidents have learned, do not lend themselves to quick and easy solutions. Carter, perhaps, made matters worse as he challenged Americans to help overcome these problems in their own personal lives. After the much criticized June “malaise” speech where he proclaimed that the real threat to the nation was a “crisis of confidence” in the American people, the tide truly began to turn against him. After a series of cabinet and senior staff resignations, including Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young, Carter inherited a foreign policy issue that would become a political nightmare for the administration.

Just five weeks after the signing of the SALT II treaties, Carter was informed of a potentially dangerous situation developing in Cuba. Throughout 1979 fragmentary intelligence reports indicated that the “Soviet presence” in Cuba was escalating. Increases in the number of Soviet MiGs were reported as well as the possible presence of Soviet military officials working with the Cubans for training

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purposes.156 In mid-August, more concrete evidenced surfaced. Intelligence provided to Vance and Brzezinski indicated that an actual Soviet brigade and possibly a Soviet base were stationed in Cuba. Brzezinski immediately realized what was at stake. He informed the president that the issue must be managed correctly or it could “most adversely affect SALT.” Brzezinski advised Carter to sit on the issue until more evidence could be attained and private negotiations with the Soviets/Cubans could be pursued.157 Carter, however, would not be that lucky. Through a disastrous set of events, the public learned of the brigade before the administration could develop a proper response.

On August 30th, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman held a press conference at his home. Church, a democrat, was in a tough political battle to keep his Senate seat in Idaho. He was under fire from the American

Conservative Action Coalition in part for his support of the Panama Canal Treaty which was widely unpopular in Idaho. To make matters worse, Church was photographed with on a recent visit to Cuba. The images were used by conservative groups in Idaho to paint Church as dovish and soft on defense. Because of his position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Church attracted opposition from within Washington as well. The National Conservative Political

Action Committee formed the “ABC” or “Anybody But Church” committee. As a result of Church’s own tenuous political position, he used the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, and the information from a State brief he received, to shore up his

156 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 346. 157 Ibid, 347.

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own political vulnerabilities.158 At the hastily arranged press conference, Church

called on the president to demand an “immediate withdrawal of all Russian combat

troops from Cuba” and dramatically declared that “the United States cannot permit

the island to became a Russian military base . . . nor can we allow Cuba to be used as

a springboard for Russian military intervention in the .”159

Church’s theatrical public revelations and his private statements to State Department

officials suggesting that the brigade would “sink SALT” were serious setbacks for the administration.160 A public hard line was drawn on the issue and the administration

was left with little positive avenues to pursue a resolution. Carter had been broadsided

by his own party.

The impact of the discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba was made worse

on September 5. In a press conference, Secretary of State Vance stated: “We regard this as a very serious matter affecting our relations with the Soviet Union” and “I will not be satisfied with maintenance of the status quo.”161 Then Vance dropped a bomb.

He informed the room that the Soviet unit had been in Cuba, undetected, since “at

least the mid-,” well before President Carter took office.162 Vance’s statements were immediately seized upon by the press. The basic questions which begged to be

158 Undersecretary of State David Newsome briefed Senator Church on the brigade a day before his public statements on the issue. There is some disagreement between Vance and Brzezinski on the instructions that were supposedly provided. Brzezinski claims Newsome mistakenly neglected to mention to Church that he should keep this information from the press whereas Vance claims that Church was persuaded against making any public comments, but did so anyway. See Vance, Hard Choices, 359-361 and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 346-348. 159 “Senator Church Chargers Moscow Has a Brigade of Troops in Cuba,” New York Times, 31 August 1979. 160 Vance, Hard Choices, 361. 161 Dan Oberdorfer, “Soviets in Cuba Called Threat to SALT Approval,” Washington Post, 6 . 162 Ibid

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answered were: “what does the administration mean to do to alter the status quo” and

“what kind of alteration would be pursued?” Vance later admitted that his choice

phraseology (change in status quo), which he had apparently cleared the night before

with Carter, was disastrous.163 The press was now in frenzied form speculating about

the administration’s possible courses of action. Vance’s statements opened the

administration to questioning about hypothetical scenarios. For instance, would

Carter consider “reinforcing U.S. units at Guantanamo Bay?”164 Vance downplayed

the possibility of sending troops into the area. When asked what then would be done

to alleviate the status quo, Vance openly admitted he had no specifics. When asked

about the nature and purpose of the Soviet unit in Cuba, Vance remained guarded. He

asked for patience while the appropriate channels were being tapped. Vance ended

the press conference by reinforcing the “seriousness” of the brigades presence but,

somewhat contradictory, rejected the idea that it had a direct link on the pending

SALT agreement.165

In the ensuing days, parallels to the 1962 became

commonplace. The potential ramifications of a “combat-ready” Soviet brigade ninety

miles of the coast of the continental United States began to galvanize public

discourse. Democratic senators, particularly those who sat on committees involved in

discussing arms limitation, began linking the Soviet brigade to SALT and to U.S.-

Soviet relations more broadly. Senator Henry Jackson, a democrat from Washington

163 Ibid, 362. 164 Dan Oberdorfer, “Soviets in Cuba Called Threat to SALT Approval,” Washington Post, 6 September 1979. 165 Ibid

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State who ran against Carter in the primary of 1976, was particularly forceful in his

public statements and demands. Jackson made several rash comments. He openly

questioned the intelligence about the brigades’ capabilities, speculating that it could

in fact be a serious threat to U.S. national security, and demanded not only the

removal of Soviet troops from Cuba, but also the MiG-23s which were provided by

the Soviets in 1978.166 Senator Richard Stone of Florida (also a vulnerable democrat) immediately criticized the president on the issue. Stone stated that the brigade issue was “a test of firmness or lack of it.”167 As a result, the administration was put on the

defensive by their own democratic allies in the Senate.

Republicans in Congress were quick to criticize Carter’s handling of the

brigade issue. summed up Republican opposition well when he stated:

“We need a call for leadership and a sense that the president is prepared to respond. . .

. The president reacted slowly, almost passively.” Lugar went on to argue that he

wanted and expected “bold leadership,” but Carter demonstrated an utter lack of

perspective on the issue. Senator argued that Carter should have engaged

in some “big stick” diplomacy. He stated bluntly, “I think the president ought to have said to the Soviets, calmly, ‘Get the troops out or no on SALT II’ I think Jack

Kennedy would have . . . told the Soviets, ‘Get the troops out or no on SALT II.’”168

As both Democratic and Republican criticism mounted in the days after the

166 “Jackson Insists Soviet Withdraw Planes in Cuba,” New York Times, 12 September 1979. 167 “Senator Church Chargers Moscow Has a Brigade of Troops in Cuba,” New York Times, 31 August 1979. 168 Martin Schram, “Talks Planned On Soviet Unit,” Washington Post, 8 September 1979.

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recognition of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the administration found itself in a situation, once again, where the whole of their Soviet policy was in question.

Had the administration brought the brigade issue to the press with a united front behind some concrete information as to what the brigade’s function was and how long it had been in Cuba, it might have averted such a serious political backlash.

But, because Church had made the “surprise” announcement and other congressmen were given the opportunity to inject their own policy proscriptions and stances, the administration was put on the defensive. Because of the press coverage and the fact that the issue reflected two of the administration’s growing priorities—clarifying the general U.S.-Soviet relationship and alleviating Carter’s image dilemma—the administration chose to fully engage the Soviet Brigade “crisis.” Characteristically, however, it did so on a divided front.

Vance and Carter both took a surprisingly hard line on the brigade. Privately,

Vance argued that “if it is a base” then “we must have withdrawal.” Part of the reasoning for their tough stance was that the Soviet brigade so directly threatened

SALT. For Vance and for Carter, it was imperative that a quick resolution be found.

After Vance’s “status quo” ultimatum and the ensuing press and congressional speculation, Carter felt the need to clarify the administration’s position in a speech to the nation. Unfortunately, he chose to double-down on Vance’s original framing of the issue: “The purpose of this combat unit is not yet clear. However, the secretary of state spoke for me and for our nation on Wednesday when he said that we consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter and that

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this status quo is not acceptable.”169 While President Carter did not articulate specific

actions at this early stage, he did assert his confidence in the country’s “ability to

defend . . . [itself] from external aggression.” He informed the nation that the

administration was consulting Moscow and working closely with Congress on the

issue. Finally, he assured the American people that “our nation as a whole must

respond, not only with firmness and strength, but also with a calm and sense of

proportion.”170

Both Vance and Carter chose to heighten the situation’s importance by demanding a change in the “status-quo.” Yet, neither offered any serious indication about what would be a satisfactory change or how they would go about compelling the Soviets to make that change.”171 Both Vance and Carter declared the issue a

“serious” matter requiring a “firm” response, yet, no specific response was laid out in

the weeks after the discovery. To make matters worse, Vance and Carter rejected the

linkage of the brigade with SALT ratification, to the confusion and frustration of

congressional and public observers. Brzezinski usually associated with a strict, forceful approach to dealing with the Soviets, offered advice to Carter that varied

from Vance’s in important, yet subtle ways.

Brzezinski’s advice on the Soviet brigade in Cuba was intimately connected to

his more general feelings about Soviet growing assertiveness and his personal beliefs

169 Jimmy Carter, Speech, Washington Post, 8 September 1979. 170 Ibid 171In his memoirs, Vance never claims he advocated for a policy of complete withdrawal. Brzezinski, however, quotes Vance at a PRC meeting on September 4th as demanding a withdrawal of the base (and possibly the brigade) because that will be what the senate demands. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 348.

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about the prospects of SALT ratification. Brzezinski had for some time been arguing that ratification of the SALT II treaties would be doubtful if the public’s insecurities about the Soviets growing power were not reduced. Taken in combination with real or perceived acts of Soviet aggression over the course of 1978 and 1979 the revelation of a Soviet brigade stationed in Cuba was an all but fatal blow to realistic prospects of

SALT ratification. As such, Brzezinski considered the brigade another opportunity to shift Carter’s entire foreign policy approach and image.

In order to combat the negative perception being created as a result of the

Soviet brigade, Brzezinski felt it imperative to change the public narrative. The parallels to Kennedy’s thirteen days and the policy of that was deployed needed to be extinguished. Brzezinski felt the comparison was faulty on multiple levels. With the president’s permission, Brzezinski began arguing that if a parallel is to be made, the current dilemma facing Carter was more analogous to the situation Kennedy faced when the was erected. Kennedy’s problem then, like Carter’s in 79, was a political one. The issue was not the immediate security of the United States, but how best to combat Soviet actions that were viewed as undesirable. If Brzezinski could get the public and Congress to accept this analogy as the historical framework from which to compare Carter’s eventual response, it would substantially widen Carter’s and Brzezinski’s strategic options.172

Brzezinski successfully supplanted the 1962 analogy in public, but questions about the administration’s policy still lingered. Brzezinski worked behind the scenes

172 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 13 September 1979, Brzezinski Donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library.

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in an effort to influence Carter’s approach to the brigade. Brzezinski did not disagree with taking a hard line against the Soviets on the brigade issue. But he felt the strategy that Vance and Carter had adopted was hopeless and unwise. Vance’s original ultimatum had set the administration up for exactly the kind of situation which needed to be avoided. Brzezinski felt Vance’s private arguments for withdrawal were preposterous. By focusing the nation’s attention on one particular outcome (changing the status quo, possible withdrawal) Vance had created completely unrealistic expectations. Short of a stand-off of the 1962 type, forcing the

Soviets to withdrawal a brigade from Cuba which had existed on the island for seventeen years was simply not practical. Rather, Brzezinski argued for using the brigade in Cuba in unison with the blatant past acts of Soviet aggression as

justification for implementing the policy of containment he laid out to the president almost a year ago. As such, Brzezinski argued for (1) a congressional campaign to prove that a more forceful policy toward the Soviets was being implemented “on its own merits [and] not simply [as] a means of buying SALT. . .” (2) “less hesitation in explicitly condemning Soviet/Cuban exploitation of Third World turbulence (3) the

adoption of a “forceful policy of ostracizing Cuba” (4) further developing the

“Chinese relationship” on its own right and as a “counterweight to the Soviets” (5)

“exploit Soviet minorities” by setting up radio free broadcast especially in

Afghanistan (6) “press reciprocal restraint” and finally (7) convey to the Soviets that

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“we are prepared to take steps they do not like, and after two and a half years of making that point we should actually take some such steps.”173

Most important of all for Brzezinski, however, was fashioning a response that would not further undermine Carter’s image. Once again he framed his foreign policy advice in a domestic-political context: “failure to cope with it [brigade in Cuba] can have the effect of vitiating your foreign policy accomplishments and conclusively stamping this administration as weak.” Again, Brzezinski fused his strategic vision of a more forceful policy of containment toward the Soviets with the domestic-political imperative of demonstrating strong leadership. Brzezinski’s policies, however, did not win out. Over the course of the month-long negotiations with Moscow, Carter became painfully aware that there were no grounds demanding a change in the status quo. Moscow did not feel compelled to give anything up because, as chief negotiator for the Soviets Adrei Gromyko stated, the “issue was a phony one.”174 Vance and

Carter’s efforts to separate the Brigade issue from SALT ratification proved futile. By the end of the crisis, when it became clear that no significant alterations in the “status- quo” would be achieved, Carter’s image as a passive, indecisive leader had all but solidified. A critique from an article in sums up the damage best—“Accidents, miscalculations and, much more appalling to old

173 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 13 September 1979, Brzezinski Donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library.

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hands, the seeming lack of any sophisticated calculation, contributed to the result. . .

‘a self-inflicted technical knockout.’”175

The uproar over the Soviet Brigade in Cuba delayed if not derailed Senate

ratification of SALT. It further reflected an administration that once again had proven

inept at managing public relations and altering public opinion. Carter’s relationship

with Congress became even more strained. Vance and Carter’s publicly combative

anti-Soviet rhetoric did nothing to comfort proponents of a more aggressive foreign

policy. In part, no doubt, because it had been ineffective. Ironically, Republicans and

hawkish Democrats were more inclined to view Carter’s tough stance as a temporary

ploy to garner bipartisan support for SALT. Moscow’s view was that Carter had

intentionally stimulated an atmosphere of crisis and had made unreasonable demands.

Whereas in 1962 the United States was justified in their actions because of a “sudden

threatening action” by the Soviets, in 1979 during a period of acknowledged relative

parity, the US was demanding a one-sided retreat from a “long-standing and non

threatening status quo.”176 By all accounts, the handling of the “Soviet brigade crisis”

was an utter failure.

Brzezinski’s frustration with the administration’s performance had reached an all-time high. It was the only time during Brzezinski’s tenure with Carter that he gave serious thought to resigning.177 Carter had obviously sided with Vance on the Soviet

brigade issue and Brzezinski was fearful that his policy of containment would be

175 Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, “Cuban Crisis Mishandled, Insiders and Outsiders Agree”, 16 October 1979. 176 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 841. 177 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 351.

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pushed permanently aside. It was during these months between the public recognition

of the Soviet brigade in Cuba in September and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

December that Brzezinski’s advice became its most stern and forceful. Brzezinski

firmly believed that time and again Carter and Vance, blinded by an unhealthy

devotion to SALT and détente, chose to ignore the long-term implications of Soviet

aggression and the shifts in public opinion. Brzezinski lamented that the

administration was being perceived both domestically and internationally as

“increasingly acquiescent.”178 According to Brzezinski, the perception of

acquiescence could be fatally damaging on two fronts. First, the Soviets could

“miscalculate.” Acting on previous signs of weakness from the administration, it was

plausible to Brzezinski that the Soviets would push the envelope too far (for instance

by invading Afghanistan). Second, that even substantial foreign or domestic policy

successes would not be able to penetrate the deep perception of Carter’s timidity,

weakness, and indecisiveness as a result of not firmly responding to multiple

occasions of Soviet aggression. Brzezinski laid these possibilities out to Carter in

plain terms and in a surprisingly forceful tone.179

Brzezinski downplayed Carter and Vance’s views that the administration was not receiving the credit it deserved. Vance and Carter often cited an “excessively critical” and “even prejudiced” Washington press corps for the reason they were saddled with these negative stereotypes.180 Carter was also critical of Congress,

178 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 13 September 1979, Brzezinski donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library. 179 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 351. 180 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 13 September 1979, Brzezinski donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library.

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especially his democratic allies, as bending with the popular winds in times of crisis.

Vance often criticized the short-sightedness that foreign policy observers

demonstrated, choosing to, for instance, elevate the Soviet brigade issue to a crisis

state.181 Brzezinski, however, found the origin of the administration’s perception

problems elsewhere. In addressing the issue with the president, Brzezinski argued: “to find a more complete explanation one has to take a closer look at the increasingly

pervasive feeling in the country and abroad that in the U.S.-Soviet relationship the

Soviet side increasingly is the assertive party and the U.S. side is more

acquiescent.”182

According to Brzezinski, this devastating perception developed as a result the

administration’s inability to properly calculate the domestic-political context of

foreign policy formulation and implementation. The decisions in themselves were not

necessarily faulty. But the manner in which the policies were formulated and

implemented was often politically disastrous. Moreover, the articulation and defense

of the policies were excessively fragmented and at times contradictory or incoherent.

What was in dire need was a uniform strategic vision provided by the firm public leadership of the president. Brzezinski realized this would be the only way to salvage

Carter’s foreign policy.

Brzezinski often said the worse thing you could say to President Carter was that “it would be good for us politically.” Yet, this is exactly the approach Brzezinski

took. It was a tough sell and ultimately required the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to

181 Vance, Hard Choices, 361. 182 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 13 September 1979, Brzezinski donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library.

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close the deal. But Brzezinski knew there was no other way. If he were to argue on

strategic terms alone, as he did in response to Soviet intervention in Africa, Carter’s

liberal internationalist instincts would prevail. Brzezinski was betting on an

increasingly hostile domestic environment (a safe bet to be sure) and further

aggression by the Soviet Union. His only concern was that Carter would be persuaded

too late.

Carter’s inhibition to acknowledge the domestic-political foundation of

foreign policy is one of his central weaknesses. For Carter, it was almost immoral to

take domestic-political considerations into account when formulating foreign policy.

For Brzezinski, it was reality. Slowly and painfully, Brzezinski worked to make the president more aware of the need for domestic legitimization of his overall foreign policy. Carter was a problem solver and seemed to approach every problem on a case- by-case basis. There are obvious merits to such an approach, but there are downfalls as well. As a result of Carter’s “ad hoc-ism”183 mentality, he often lost sight of the

larger picture, including both the geopolitical reaction and domestic-political impact

of his policies. Brzezinski pressed the president not to dismiss the political foundation

of the administration’s foreign policy. He also hammered away at the importance of

public perception: “the decisions you took . . . have been interpreted as primarily motivated by the desire either to compensate for past weaknesses . . . or to obtain

183 Stanley Hoffman was the first to use the term in describing Carter’s foreign policy approach. See Stanley Hoffman, “The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: The Perils of Incoherence,” Foreign Affairs, America and the World (1978, Volume 57, Number 3).

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some other desired result (to obtain SALT ratification). These perceptions, you and I

know, are not correct – but they are part of the political reality. . .”.184

Shortly after the Cuban brigade fiasco, Brzezinski attempted to heighten

Carter’s understanding of the administration’s political vulnerabilities:

the neutron bomb debacle certainly did lasting damage in Europe and today much of the world is still watching to see how we will behave on the Soviet/Cuban issue. None of the above is designed to suggest that we should somehow adopt a reckless policy of confrontationalism, nor is it meant to hint that our policy has been one of appeasement. But it is meant to suggest that both in tone and occasionally in substance, we have been excessively acquiescent, and that the country craves, and our national security needs, both a more assertive tone and a more assertive substance to our foreign policy.185

Brzezinski’s solution was to begin implementing a policy of containment with the

Soviet Union. This policy, as laid out previously, would reassure allies, potentially deter the Soviet Union from additional aggressive actions, and provide the administration (and Carter personally) with the political support that was desperately needed. Brzezinski pushed his foreign policy approach by arguing simultaneously that both domestic politics and national security required a significant change in foreign policy.

Brzezinski not only wanted the president to adopt a new strategic policy, he wanted him to reform his own style of leadership as well. He argued that Carter was viewed as overly-defensive, indecisive, and a foreign policy novice. Brzezinski believed that no matter the quality of policy if these stereotypes were not conclusively overcome the substantial accomplishments of the administration might be forever

184 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 13 September 1979, Brzezinski donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library. 185 Ibid

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stained with faulty perceptions. In a September 1979 opinion piece written directly to the president, Brzezinski argued, “the country associates assertiveness with leadership, and the world at large expects American leadership insofar as the Soviet challenge is concerned.” Both for “international reasons” and for “domestic political reasons” Brzezinski argued that the president should “deliberately toughen both the tone and substance” of his foreign policy. Brzezinski was keen to reassure Carter’s concerns as well: “That challenge [Soviet threat] is real, and a recognition of it does not mean that we have to abandon such positive objectives as arms control and notably SALT II. We should be mature enough to be able to seek, all at the same time, SALT II; and more defense efforts; and pursue a more assertive foreign policy.”186

Brzezinski had to be careful not to be viewed by Carter as attempting to usurp an excessive amount power and influence within the national security policymaking process, but he also had to make sure that opponents of his policy of containment would be neutralized. Therefore, he argued to the president that

the time has come to adopt a more assertive posture. Adopting such a posture will require some specific decisions, thereby prodding those parts of the government [Vance and State] which have contributed so much to the image of an acquiescent administration. . . We all want to follow as closely as possible the direction and the tone that you set, and now may be the moment for a review and some appropriate signals.187

The policy that Brzezinski advocated and its central tenets had been known to the president for many months. As of yet, however, the president chose only to make

186 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 13 September 1979, Brzezinski donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library. 187 Ibid

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token gestures toward Brzezinski’s containment perspective. After the Soviet brigade

“crisis,” however, circumstances were rapidly changing. The domestic-political

conditions were becoming increasingly hostile to Carter’s early foreign policy

perspective and the international environment seemed to be demanding a more active

and resolute U.S. foreign policy posture. In previous memos Brzezinski laid out

possible foreign policy opportunities that the administration could capitalize on

thereby allowing for a demonstration of Carter’s leadership qualities (and potentially

an unveiling of the sort of policy Brzezinski advocated). In September of 1979

Brzezinski wanted to reemphasize that point to Carter: “there is no doubt in my mind

that the country will rally behind the President as he responds firmly to a foreign challenge. Truman gained enormously from being perceived as tough and assertive— and undercutting a president engaged in a vigorous assertion of national security is usually seen as unpatriotic and divisive.”188 The two principal regions where

Brzezinski felt Carter might have that opportunity were in Iran and Afghanistan

where evidence of destabilization and possible Soviet intervention were become

increasingly clear. Brzezinski went to work arguing for the implementation of a new

strategic foreign policy as applied to these regions. His hope would be that Carter

would relent to his demands and begin employing a more assertive foreign policy

tone and presidential image.

188 Ibid

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Chapter 5—Afghanistan, Iran, and the Triumph of Containment

In April of 1978, to the surprise of both Washington and Moscow, a Marxist

coup took place in Afghanistan resulting in the overthrow of the previously neutral

Daoud regime.189 Moscow immediately began sending aid and advisors to implement land reform, secular education programs, and a campaign for limited women’s rights.

The unexpected Marxist coup and the limited Soviet involvement developing in

Afghanistan during the latter half of 1978 were unfortunate setbacks for the U.S. It only became a serious strategic concern for the administration, however, when events in Iran spiraled out of control. In January, 1979, long-time U.S. ally, Shah Reza

Pahlavi, was forced into exile and replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Shortly thereafter, some 500 Iranian students from varying groups stormed the American embassy taking over sixty embassy workers hostage. Then in mid-march a violent uprising took place in Herat, an Afghan town close to the Iranian border, resulting in

the death of some 5,000 people. It soon became clear to Soviet and American

observers that the developments in Iran and Afghanistan threatened the stability of the

Persian Gulf and would require long-term strategic responses.

189 For a detailed account of the Daoud regime and its eventual replacement by the pro-Soviet PDPA Marxist-Leninist government see Jeffery J. Roberts, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan, (Westport, Connecticut London: Praeger, 2003), ch. 14; see also Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), ch. 7,8. For a summary of regime changes and general events leading up to Soviet intervention see Steve Galster, Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990, (National Security Archive microfiche collection, 1990).

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While the United States had little or no evidence to suggest that the Marxist

coup in Afghanistan was sponsored by the Soviets, it nonetheless faced a serious

strategic dilemma. The predicament is summed up well in a memorandum that

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sent to State Department subordinates: “Anti-regime

elements in Afghanistan will be watching us carefully to see if we acquiesce . . . or

accept the communist takeover. . . , Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others of our

friends in the area will see the situation clearly as a Soviet coup. On the domestic

front, many Americans will see this as an extension of Soviet power and draw the

parallel with Angola, Ethiopia etc.”190 Vance informed the president that “the

removal of Iran from the ranks of America’s allies” would be a “blow to our political

and security interests.”191 He argued that the loss of intelligence collection capabilities in the Persian Gulf alone might be sufficient to derail SALT. Without

those strategic outposts, congressional support would dwindle out of fear of the

U.S.’s diminished capacity to verify arms reductions. He also agued that the fall of

the Shah was probably as disturbing to Moscow as it was to Washington.192 Always

sensitive to turmoil and instability on its , the Soviets would not be looking at

the Iranian revolution as a positive development. And, so, even Vance, who avoided

policy linkage and viewed global occurrences as locally caused, could not help but

admit the strategic obstacles that developments in Iran and Afghanistan posed to the

administration’s conduct of foreign policy.

190 Memo, Vance to State Department officials, United States Department of State, The Afghan Coup, April 30, 1978. 191 Vance, Hard Choices, 347. 192 Ibid, 346.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski, for his part, was quick to warn President Carter of the

changing dynamics in the Persian Gulf and their potential long-term impact: “The

disintegration of Iran, with Iran repeating the same experience of Afghanistan, would

be the most massive America defeat since the beginning of the Cold War,

overshadowing in its real consequences the setback in Vietnam.”193 Brzezinski’s

tough language was designed with the intention of finally convincing Carter to

implement truly tough foreign policy reforms. His challenge would be to convince the

president that both the international and domestic scene required a dramatic reversal

of course. Destabilization in Iran, and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, provided

Brzezinski just the persuasive evidence he needed.

While Moscow welcomed the loss of US influence in Iran, it too was weary of

regional instability proliferated by Islamic fundamentalism and sought to shore up

support for Afghanistan’s fledging socialist regime. Soviet leaders were not exactly

exited about the possibility of a regional religious wave of Islamic extremism

spreading to its sensitive minority Muslim populations. The logic of Moscow’s policy

was two fold: prevent the further spread of a politically charged Islam into its

territories and to support an infant socialist regime.

The coup in Afghanistan caused an uproar in Washington as well. On the floor

of the House of Representatives, Republican Congressmen Robert Sikes of Florida

made his personal animosity toward the Carter Administration’s passivity known to

all his colleagues:

193 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 28 December 1978, Brzezinski collection, subject file weekly reports to President, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library.

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Mr. Speaker, of Afghanistan, Kabul, was rocked with revolt last week. The President and many of the leaders were killed and a new Communist regime has seized power . . . will be quick to cement the standing of the new government with money and weapons. The fact remains another nation has slipped behind the . . . What will Washington do? Nothing. It is too late.194

It was clear at this early stage that the Carter Administration faced serious strategic

obstacles, both internationally and domestically, with the dual trends of growing

Soviet assertiveness and general Persian Gulf instability.

Those international and domestic problems would only intensify with events

taking place in the last months of 1979. The new socialist government in Afghanistan

(the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan—DRA) was experiencing growing domestic opposition. Many of the social reforms enacted by the DRA ignited strong opposition from an assortment of groups: traditional religious leaders, disenfranchised landowners, and tribal clansmen who, under the previous regime, maintained substantial authority over the regulation of commercial and social activity within their

tribal lands.195 The growing domestic opposition was compounded by calls for jihad

from Afghan dissidents. They fled to the mountainous Pakistani border regions after

the DRA takeover. From there they would mount a concerted against the

regime in Kabul. Now, for the first time, a Marxist regime was competing against a

regional, religious movement. The usual Soviet propagandist themes of class warfare,

capitalist exploitation, and heightened class consciousness proved insufficient

194Comments on the House floor, Robert Lee Fulton Sikes to House members, 8 May 1978, “White House Central File,” Box C0-9, Jimmy Carter Library. 195 Steve Galster, Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990, (National Security Archive microfiche collection, 1990).

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ideological tools in competition with Afghanistan’s nationalistic brand of radical

Islam. Moscow began considering other options.

Moscow was dedicated to preserve in Afghanistan and to protect its border from both the development of a new, possibly pro-western regime. Taken in coordination with the developments in Iran, the growing disruption in Afghanistan all but demanded action from the Soviet perspective. As a result, the Soviets began sending additional advisors and military aid to the infant Marxist regime, although they declined direct intervention at this early juncture for a variety of reasons.196 In the ensuing months, Moscow attempted to pacify the Afghan opposition through indirect means. They placed their trust in the PDA’s top leader Nur Mohammad

Taraki who was invited to Moscow to participate in discussions of socialist-aligned world leaders. Upon returning to Afghanistan in October, however, Taraki was arrested and assassinated by his associate and political rival Hafizullah Amin. This development severely disturbed the Soviets and provided the justification needed for an invasion. Brezhnev and the politburo had worked closely were with Taraki before his assassination. They provided him specific directions to work in unison with Soviet advisors already on the ground in Afghanistan to quell the growing insurgency. That, obviously, could not happen now. With Amin head of the PDA, the situation grew increasingly dangerous. To Moscow, Amin was a less known and less trusted figure.

There was even speculation from Moscow that he maintained ties to Pakistan and

196 The Vienna Summit was approaching, NATO was considering deploying the Pershing missile system, Moscow was preparing for the summer Olympics, in short, détente was still alive.

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even the U.S. intelligence services. 197 As anxiety over an Afghanistan tilt to the west grew and with real possibilities of Afghanistan erupting into (or at least following the trend developing in Iran) the Politburo began making preparations for direct intervention.

As the year came to a close, momentum solidified within the politburo for immediate direct action to save socialism in Afghanistan. Brzezinski began pressing

Carter for preventative action. He argued that the events in Afghanistan, taken in coordination with the trend in Iran, represented a “wider regional crisis” that required a firm U.S. response. As early as April, Brzezinski chaired SCC meetings where decisions were being “pushed” through “to be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country’s independence.”198 One can only guess at the nature of the support for the anti-Soviet Afghan rebels in April.199

However, in July of 1979, Carter, apparently persuaded by Brzezinski’s prognostications, agreed to begin an aid program through Pakistan in an effort to undermine the DRA and forestall Soviet intervention.200 This action represented a

197 Amin began open dialogue with President Zia of Pakistan even going so far as to schedule a visit with Zia’s national security adviser Agha Shhahi on December 22nd. Amin was unable to make the trip because of bad weather. The Soviets were also terribly concerned with the possibility that Amin could approach the U.S. (he went to school at Columbia and undoubtedly still had some contacts) or other allies in the West creating a fundamental turn in traditional Afghani-Soviet relations. This possibility was all the more plausible after Anwar ’s surprise union with the west. See, Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations From Nixon To Reagan,(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 910; Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), 123-24. 198 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 427. 199 Documents from this SCC meetings remain classified. The only discussion of the issue is found in Brzezinski’s memoirs. 200 Carter spells out the nature of the covert program in a letter sent to Congressman Edward Boland. The aid came in the form of: “non-attributable propaganda” seeking to “expose the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and its leadership as despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union” to “publicize efforts by the Afghan insurgents to regain their country’s ” to “support

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significant turning point for Carter. He was allowing for indirect aid to Afghan insurgents that could be used against a Soviet sponsored government, and in the event of an invasion from Moscow, Soviet troops .

A few months later, in November, the Politburo decided to replace Amin. But that action would be irrelevant if the new puppet regime could not pacify the Afghan insurgency (by this time the PDA had lost control of twenty three of Afghanistan’s twenty-eight provinces to various rebel forces).201 The decision was made that a mere coup would not guarantee a high likelihood of long-term success. As a result, in order to replace Amin, control the growing insurgency, and assure the deterrence of outside intervention from “imperialist” powers, the Politburo reversed its original decision and made plans for direct invasion.202

The multitude of reasons Moscow ultimately made the decision to intervene are too numerous and too unsettled to rehash here.203 The one obvious component of the

insurgent propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan; establish radio access to the Afghan population through third country facilities” and to “provide unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to Afghan insurgents.” Letter, Jimmy Carter to Edward Boland, “Staff Offices Counsel Cutler,” CIA Charter, July, 1979, Box 60, Jimmy Carter Library. Other historians have written in greater detail about the beginning of the Carter Administration’s covert aid program to the Mujahedeen. See, , Ghost Wars, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2004), 46. 201 Steve Galster, Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990, (National Security Archive microfiche collection, 1990). 202 Moscow began a propaganda campaign to justify its eventual invasion. Administration officials claimed that the US and other “imperialist” powers were facilitating the chaos in Afghanistan. See, Directive N 3/12/12/001, December 24th, 1979, CWIHP. 203 It has been argued that Soviet leaders simultaneous wanted: to save Marxist regime in Afghanistan, to preserve Soviet influence over Afghanistan, to protect the “territorial security and political stability of the Soviet Central Asian Muslim republics against a spillover of the revolutionary and anticommunist Islamic in Afghanistan,” to deter outside aggressors from attempting to gain influence in the region (there were rumors that the U.S. was going to move on Iran), to “achieve a strategic advantage” in the ongoing rivalry with China and the U.S., and finally because they, mistakenly, did not anticipate serious, long-term negative reaction from the U.S. and world community to sufficiently deter them from action. See, Minton F. Goldman, Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan: Roots and Causes, (Polity, Vol. 16, No. 3, Spring, 1984).

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Soviet decision to intervene was that the nature and context of the U.S.-Soviet

relationship shifted in significant ways from April, 1979, shortly after the original

Marxist coup, to December, 1979, amidst a growing Afghan insurgency. By the time of Taraki’s assassination, the Vienna Summit had been held, tensions over the Soviet brigade in Cuba were high, the prospects for SALT ratification were fading, and, from the Soviet perspective, the Carter administration was adopting a tougher demeanor to prepare for the coming presidential primaries and election in the fall.

The Politburo persuaded Brezhnev not to worry about U.S. reaction to an invasion.

Brezhnev informed Soviet ambassador Dobyrnin: “it will all be over in three to four weeks.”204 Breshnev was comforted by his minister of foreign affairs Adrei Gromyko and others who compared a possible invasion of Afghanistan with the

Czechoslovakian uprising in 1968. In 1968, the west neglected to respond to blatant

Soviet aggression in any meaningful way. It was assumed that the Carter administration would do what it had done over the past two years—condemn Soviet actions, but take no significant response. Believing the risks of inaction outweighed the risks of action, the Soviet Union moved troops to the Russian-Afghan border in late November.

The invasion began with careless timing. On Christmas day, 1979 some 50,000

Soviet troops riding in tanks and armored personal carriers stormed across the rugged

Afghan countryside. Thousands more flew into Kabul. They brought with them a host of exiled leaders, including Barbak Karmal, founding member of the People’s

204 Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’ Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents, (1962- 1986), (New York: Times Books, 1995) 440.

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Democratic Party of Afghanistan and hand-picked Prime Minister of the newly created Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. By December 27, Amin had barricaded himself within the Tajbeg Palace in the interior of the heavily fortified Darulaman complex. His efforts at resistance and self-preservation were futile. Moscow had decided upon regime change. Twenty Soviet KGB officers perished in the frontal assault on the palace, but in the end Amin lay dead. Barbak Karmal became the new head of state. The Soviet occupation had begun.

In hindsight, the Soviet invasion revealed the limits of Moscow’s power. Unable to stabilize Afghanistan through indirect political tactics, the Soviets resorted to brute force, a situation all too reminiscent of Vietnam. To Washington observer at the time, however, the invasion appeared ominous indeed. Many perceived it as symptomatic of the Carter administration’s weaknesses and a direct consequence of past missed opportunities. And Brzezinski had in fact warned Carter of the possibility of just such a Soviet “miscalculation.” In Angola, Ethiopia and in Nicaragua, where leftist regimes came to power, the administration seemed incapable or unwilling to alter the negative trends. Cuban proxy troops were at work in multiple third world hot spots and Moscow seemed more than willing to exploit the administration’s supposed naivety to intervene wherever they chose. The significance of these events and the criticisms of the Carter administration, were amplified by both the revolution in Iran, which by this time was accompanied by a hostage crisis, and the blatant Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Correctly or incorrectly, these dual events were viewed as the natural consequence of the Carter administration’s foreign policy shortcomings.

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By January 1980, the Carter administration was left scrambling to regain lost credibility. This would take a significant remaking of both Carter’s foreign policy and his image. Carter, however, did not have to look far for advice. Brzezinski had long ago mapped out the blueprint for just such an occasion.

It was clear to all from the beginning of the crisis that the invasion of Afghanistan was a major watershed in the American-Soviet relationship. For Vance and Carter it meant the failure of détente and the likely demise of SALT. For Brzezinski it was more. Moscow’s brazen aggression was a vindication of his belief that the administration had not done enough to deter the Soviets. The Soviets became emboldened by a lack of response over Ethiopia and viewed Carter as excessively passive. They grew to believe that the invasion of Afghanistan would cause little more than a manageable and fleeting tension between the superpowers. Brzezinski, however, was determined to prove Soviet expectations faulty. He sought to use the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a final belated opportunity to implement his containment policy. To his surprise, the president now proved very receptive indeed.

Carter’s transformation, however, cannot be attributed to developments in

Afghanistan alone. The Iranian revolution was pivotal. In November of 1979 radical

Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy taking hostage dozens of American citizens to protest Carter’s decision to admit the Shah into the U.S. for medical treatment. Western observers and American citizens found the scene inexplicably barbaric. Yet, few outside observers at the time, however, could recite the unfortunate events in the early 1950s that actually brought the Shah to power. It was the CIA,

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after all, that played a pivotal role in the 1953 coup in Iran that gave Mohammad

Reza Shah the chance to become dictator. And from an Iranian perspective, the U.S.

decision to admit the Shah under the perceived pretense of medical treatment was just

the first step toward a second U.S. sponsored coup. Iranians desperately feared that history was about to repeat itself.205

The fall of the Shah and the ensuing hostage crisis focused the Carter

administration on the Persian Gulf region. Ironically, the taking of American

hostages, provided some political benefits. Political advisor and

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski shared the sentiment that a quick resolution of the hostage crisis might be just the sort of boost necessary to gain momentum back from Senator Edward Kennedy who was leading in the nomination battle against President Carter. And, in fact, Brzezinski and Jordan had reason to be optimistic. Carter did receive a significant “rally around the flag” boost from the immediate attention afforded the crisis. But, as is the case with most foreign conflicts, the public’s support will significantly wane if the status quo is not changed and especially if the president is perceived as not willing or able to defend the nation’s most precious resource—its people. To make matters worse, as the conflict progressed, the hostage story became a near national obsession. Ted Koppel, a relatively unknown journalist who predicted the crisis would last only a few days, began a nightly program called “America Held Hostage” (the show later became

Nightline) that would average an audience of 12 million viewers. Indeed, by the end

205 Stephen, Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons), 202.

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of the affair the Iranian hostage crisis received more media coverage than any other event since World War II.206

In the midst of the Iranian hostage crisis, the administration debated about how to affect change in a post-Shah Iran. They also debated the appropriate response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For Brzezinski, the issues had become entangled. He immediately petitioned the president for a forceful response to the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Brzezinski argued that the immediate response should be a statement telling the Russians that “SALT was now in jeopardy and that the scope of our relationship with the Chinese would be affected.”207 While Vance remained resistant, Brzezinski pushed the president hard arguing “we are facing a regional crisis. . . both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil . . . Pakistan is both unstable internally and extremely apprehensive externally. If the Soviets succeed in

Afghanistan, and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the will have been fulfilled . . . Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically.”208

Taken together, developments in Afghanistan and Iran had the potential of completely undermining Carter’s foreign policy. The issues played too easily into the stereotypes and caricatures already established by conservative interest groups and the mainstream media. Brzezinski realized the administration’s proverbial back was

206 Scott, Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration, (Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press) 196-199. 207 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 429. 208 Memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 26 December 1979, “Afghanistan,” Box 1, Jimmy Carter Library.

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against the wall. As a result, he stressed the severity of the situation to Carter.

Regardless of the “subjective reasons” for Soviet intervention, Brzezinski argued, the invasion presented the administration with serious domestic and international

“objective consequences.”209 As a domestic-political and geo-political realist,

Brzezinski felt the administration had little choice. The Soviet invasion would likely

further stimulate the public’s demand for action regarding Iran. He argued that

“Soviet decisiveness [in Afghanistan] will be contrasted with our restraint [in Iran].”

210 Most important of all for Brzezinski was his belief that “Soviet military

aggressiveness will have been so naked” that the whole of the administration’s Soviet

policy would be “attacked by both the Right and the Left.”211 This would be a blow

from which Carter could not recover.

Emphasizing the “profound implications” of the situation, Brzezinski sought

to place the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in both a domestic-political as well as

geo-strategic context. He stressed the symbolism of the situation; Moscow chose the

first week of a new decade to send a message to the world that it was willing to go on

the offensive to not only assure the consolidation of the old Soviet bloc, but to

reinforce new regions sympathetic to communism (Africa and the Persian Gulf). If

the administration was going to properly respond to this new Soviet “initiative,”

Brzezinski argued, they would have to “generate wider domestic consensus”

209 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 435. 210 Memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 26 December 1979, “Afghanistan,” Box 1, Jimmy Carter Library. 211 Ibid

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sponsoring new strategic policies.212 Anything less than a full-throated counter initiative would cause “vacillation and accommodation by our allies and by states within the Persian Gulf region.”213 What Brzezinski did not want was a series of

“short-term measures” and sharp messages that would act as a temporary bandage on an open and irritated wound. If the administration was going to see a second term, and if Brzezinski was going to be afforded the opportunity to implement the kinds of foreign policy reforms he had so passionately advocated, the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran would have to be forceful, strategic, long-term and politically relevant.

A heated debate occurred within the administration about three central questions: (1) Why did Moscow decide to intervene in such an overwhelming fashion? (2) What should be the nature of the administration’s response to the invasion? (3) What, if anything, could be done to reverse the trend in Iran and save the hostages? For Vance and initially for Carter, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented first and foremost an effort to preserve socialism in Afghanistan and to dilute the growing threat of fundamentalist Islam evidenced by the neighboring revolution in Iran. The decision was made easier for the Soviets because of the perceived “downward spiral of U.S.-Soviet relations” and fundamental miscalculations about the extent of domestic (Afghani) and international resistance.214 In Iran, Vance felt the only reasonable approach would be to “come to

212 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 1/9/1980, “Afghanistan,” Box 1, Jimmy Carter Library. 213 Ibid 214 Vance, Hard Choices, 388.

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terms with the revolution” and attempt to mediate local disputes between those loyal

to the army, the old establishment (Shah), and Khomeini.215

For Brzezinski, however, the objective threat posed by the Soviet presence in

Afghanistan trumped any esoteric discussion of their intentions:

We do not know precisely what motivated the Soviet decision to enter Afghanistan; one cannot read the minds of distant policy makers . . . . Some see it as a local affair, others attach wider, more strategic objectives to that decision. Ultimately, we will never know. But what is important is not the motives of the Soviet decision, but its political consequences. . . We feel, therefore, quite strongly that we are not confronted by a local issue nor by passing phenomenon, but by a more enduring manifestation to which a sustained response has to be mounted.216

Brzezinski was literally stating that Soviet intent did not matter. What mattered was

the opportunity that the Soviet miscalculation provided. Brzezinski made the

objective consequences of the Soviet invasion clear: “We feel the perpetuation of

Soviet control over Afghanistan and the use of Afghanistan as a wedge for splitting

Iran and Pakistan apart . . . would bring Soviet power to the edge of the Persian Gulf

right next to the most vital . . . resources on which the West depends.”217 Brzezinski

sought to link the Iranian and Afghani issues. He argued that the challenges posed by

Moscow’s aggression in Afghanistan and the illegal detention of Americans embassy officials in Iran had become “intertwined” both in terms of a regional strategic threat and a domestic-political obstacle for the administration. Therefore, decisions could not be made on a “case-by-case approach.” Rather, they would have to be “strategic

215 Vance, Hard Choices, 347. 216 State briefing at Luncheon for National Opinion Leaders, comments of Zbigniew Brzezinski, 11 January 1980, “Al McDonald Afghanistan File,” Box 8, Jimmy Carter Library. 217 Ibid

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in nature.”218 Brzezinski argued that the immediate response to the Soviet invasion and, more importantly, the long-term counter initiative could “determine the

character” of the ensuing decade.219 Brzezinski’s subtleties should not go unnoticed.

Quite explicitly he was informing Carter of both the opportunity that the

administration had and the long-term consequences of inaction. His argument was

that both for international reasons and because it would be politically effective on the home front, Carter had little choice but to adopt his policy of reformed containment.

The cost of not doing so would be devastating on both fronts. The Soviet Union would make Afghanistan a satellite and be closer to the West’s most precious resource and, as a result of the assumed election of Reagan; the U.S. would find itself in a weaker and more dangerous position.

Brzezinski went to work convincing Carter of the need for a long-term containment-oriented counter initiative. When Carter expressed reservations about

postponing SALT, Brzezinski replied, “the Soviet move was the most direct case of

Soviet military aggression since 1945.” He implied that removal of SALT from the

Senate was more than justified.220 Here, Brzezinski disagreed vehemently with

Vance. Any positive overtures toward the Soviets regarding SALT in the aftermath of

the invasion of Afghanistan would be crippling domestically. What little opportunity

there was left for ratification after the Soviet brigade flap, the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan had smothered completely.

218 Ibid 219 Ibid 220 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 432.

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Brzezinski argued directly to the president that confining the administration’s

response to words would be a serious mistake. The problem with forming a proper

response to the invasion for Brzezinski was that the U.S. had no credibility in doing

so. Having allowed for Soviet and Cuban aggression to go virtually unimpeded in

Africa, proving to the Soviets the measure of the administration’s resolve would take action, not more rhetoric. He wanted Carter to understand the severity of the situation.

In a memo titled “Strategic Reaction to the Afghanistan Problem,” Brzezinski wrote,

“The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is the first time since 1945 that the Soviet

Union used its military forces directly to expand its power. This took place even though we warned the Soviet Union of adverse consequences. Moreover, Afghanistan is the seventh state since 1975 in which communist parties have come to power with

Soviet guns and tanks . . . . Four of these takeovers occurred since January 1977.”221

Warning Carter that the Soviets have “discounted our likely reaction” Brzezinski advocated a “genuinely punitive approach.”222

Brzezinski proposed a multifaceted response to the invasion. First, a statement

was issued highlighting the geopolitical significance of the Soviet invasion.

Brzezinski felt it crucial to incorporate SALT and the U.S.-Chinese relationship into

their immediate condemnation. He argued that the administration should inform

Moscow that the invasion was “placing SALT in jeopardy” and that it would

221 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, 3 January 1979, “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection Donated, Geographic File Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf,” Box 17, Jimmy Carter Library. 222 Ibid

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“influence the substance” of the U.S.’s relationship with China.223 Specifically,

Brzezinski argued for the sale of “over-the-horizon radar” and “anti-tank

weaponry.”224 As a result of the “scale” and “boldness” of the Soviet move,

Brzezinski assured Carter these actions were both “needed and hardly excessive.”225

Brzezinski also advocated increased assistance to the on-going insurgency in

Afghanistan (which the administration had been aiding since at least July of 1979) with “more money as well as arms shipments . . . and some technical advice.”226 This

aid would be funneled through Pakistan, a crucial ally in the region. The covert

program would also require placing concern over Pakistan’s development of nuclear

capability on the back burner. The overall goal was to punish the Soviets and keep

them “bogged down” for as long as possible.227

Brzezinski then provided President Carter with a “menu of actions” from

which the administration could choose to indicate its “displeasure with Moscow.”228

Typically, Brzezinski argued that forceful words and deeds would be helpful “both

for domestic and for international reasons”229 He listed a wide range of possible actions:

- reduction in the number of permanently assigned official Soviet personnel in the U.S.

223 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, 26 December 1979, “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection Donated, Geographic File Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf,” Box 17, Jimmy Carter Library. 224 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, 3 January 1979, “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection Donated, Geographic File Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf,” Box 17, Jimmy Carter Library. 225 Ibid 226 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, 26 December 1979, “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection Donated, Geographic File Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf,” Box 17, Jimmy Carter Library. 227 Ibid 228Ibid 229 Ibid

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- announcing administration decision to withdraw SALT II from senate consideration - restriction of social and official contacts with Soviet representatives to a minimum - suspension of the work on new consulates in Kiev and New York - expulsion of all known Soviet intelligence agents from US - raising level of human rights criticism of the Soviet Union - stepping up Radio Free Europe broadcasts - delay or permanently postpone recognition of New Afghan regime/ suspend or permanently break off official relations - refuse or delay issuance of visas to selected Soviet officials seeking U.S. entry - reduction of “Soviet media representation” in the U.S. to achieve parity with U.S. representation in the USSR - cancel or defer existing and new exchange agreement negotiations - increase “U.S. arms supplies to Soviet periphery” - offer increased assistance and or military/political ties to: Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, Pakistan, and China - withdrawal embassy from Afghanistan - supply insurgents in Afghanistan (through Pakistan) - revocation of Soviet fishing rights of the coast of New - prohibition of the sale of “high technology” to the Soviet Union - the cancellation of American participation in the 1980 summer Olympic Games in Moscow - limits or suspension of U.S. grain sales to Russia 230

This was a defining moment for the administration. Brzezinski stressed to

Carter that “the form as well as the substance. . . [of the U.S. response] could have the most fateful domestic and international consequences.”231 He argued that

administration’s approach to the official response would either reinforce the

president’s “image as a resourceful and firm leader or shatter it.”232 A hasty decision

that lacked sufficient forcefulness and strategy could have “devastating political

230 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, 29 December 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection Donated, “Geographic File Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf, Box 17. Jimmy Carter Library 231 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 28 December 1979, Brzezinski Donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library. 232 Ibid

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consequences.”233 He warned Carter with a dramatic personal statement of concern—

“I shudder to think of the impact this could have [public perception of a “weak”

response] in Congress and in the mass media, and how it would be used by our

political opponents.”234 On the eve of the unveiling of the official response to the

Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski argued directly to the President that “a major historical turning point has been reached. You have the opportunity to do what President Truman did on Greece and Turkey. 235 Like Truman, Brzezinski

wanted Carter to build a new domestic foreign policy consensus. The rallying call

would be to prevent further Soviet aggression into a region not historically part of the

Soviet sphere of influence—the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski reassured Carter that “the

country will respond to a firm call for measured . . . [and] sustained action” and that

the “Congressional leadership will support” administration initiatives.236

By January 4th President Carter decided on an assortment of immediate

actions. The most important of which included: the withdrawal of SALT II from the

Senate, the decision to implement a grain embargo on Russia (which with the coming

Iowa caucus was an especially difficult and potentially costly decision), assistance to

bolster Pakistan, aid to the Afghan insurgency, and, finally, the decision to strengthen

both political and military ties to China. The administration’s decision to boycott the

summer Olympic Games and attempts to forge a common allied front of non-

participation were also significant symbolic measures attempting to focus

233 Ibid 234 Ibid 235 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, 3 January 1979, “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection Donated, Geographic File Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf,” Box 17, Jimmy Carter Library. 236 Ibid

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international attention on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Brzezinski felt this immediate combination would be “both sufficiently punitive and strategically significant.”237

Brzezinski knew that while the immediate response would send the appropriate signal to the Soviet Union, the task of containing Moscow in the long- term and fashioning a new domestically viable foreign policy consensus would be a much more difficult task. In the long term, Brzezinski wanted to protect against spreading Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and to create a containment-style that would tie U.S. security interests to the region. Brzezinski believed a “Carter Doctrine” was needed not just for strategic reasons. It would serve to help consolidate domestic and international support around a new clearly defied security arrangement. For Brzezinski, the time had finally come. The Soviet miscalculation in Afghanistan provided an undeniable pretext for a redefinition of

U.S. foreign policy objectives and strategy.

More than a year before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski referred to the Persian Gulf region as an “arc of crisis.”238 As early as December of

1978, Brzezinski warned the president “we are confronting the beginning of a major crisis, in some ways similar to the one in Europe in the late 40s. Fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us are threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political vacuum might well be filled by elements more

237 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 431. 238 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 2 December 1978, Brzezinski collection, Subject file weekly reports to the President, Box 42.

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sympathetic to the Soviet Union.”239 In order to prevent a “fundamental shift in the

global structure of power,” Brzezinski argued the administration needed “political

initiatives” as well as “more direct security arrangements” much like President

Truman implemented in Western Europe during the late 40s. Brzezinski added

domestic politics to his comparison. He argued that for Carter, as for Truman,

“internal weaknesses. . . interacted with an external challenge.”240 Brzezinski’s tying

of the domestic-political situation within the U.S. to the twin external challenges posed by Soviet aggression and Iranian instability proved crucial for winning over

Carter. In order to successfully respond to these challenges a long-term solution was

in need of fashioning.

As the situation in Iran and Afghanistan worsened, Brzezinski’s

recommendations became more distinct. By the time the revolution in Iran erupted

and the Soviets had invaded and occupied Afghanistan, the international, domestic,

and inner-administrative conditions favored serious foreign policy reform. Early on in his presidential term, Carter adopted a hybrid approach to the international system, one that blended liberal internationalism with token gestures towards Brzezinski hard- line, anti-Soviet views. After years of pressure from Brzezinski to toughen up the overall foreign policy posture, Carter was finally convinced that the adoption of a containment perspective was the only way to salvage his image at home while deterring the Soviets from future aggressive action.

239 Ibid 240 Ibid

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From the beginning of the U.S. response to the invasion, evidence of Carter’s

newfound Cold Warrior mentality was on display. Carter first officially response to

the invasion on December 26th with a public condemnation of “blatant military

interference into the affairs of an independent sovereign state.”241 The following day

the Soviets made available a brief statement outlining their reasoning for intervention

in Afghanistan to Carter and the administration. According to the Politburo the

reasons for intervention were to counter the “armed interference of imperialist and

reactionary forces”—the US, China, and others who the Soviets believed were

undermining the socialist revolution in Afghanistan—and to remove Amin from

power.242 By doing this, it was suggested, the Soviets would also be curbing the

“terror” Amin unleashed, preserving the April revolution, and defending the

“independence of Afghanistan.”243 This was all claimed to be at the request of the

“new Afghan leadership.”244 Upon reading the Soviet justification, President Carter was outraged. In the margins of Brezhnev’s rebuttal he wrote several comments including a somewhat sarcastic response to the assertion that the Soviet’s were invited

in by Afghan leaders—“the leaders who requested Soviet presence were

assassinated.”245 As it turned out, Brzezinski’s fear that Carter would again view

Soviet aggression, as he did in Africa and Cuba, as an isolated occurrence detracted

from larger goals within the Cold War proved to be unfounded.

241 AFP, 1977-1980, Document 406. 242 In fact the US and China were supplying the insurgency with support. US support at that point is thought to have been limiting their offerings to non-lethal weaponry and other auxiliary support. The nature of Chinese support before the invasion still remains somewhat of a mystery. 243 Politburo Decree, P177/151, Cold War International History Project. 244 Ibid, 245 Brzezinski, Principle, 429.

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On December 31st, four days after receiving Brezhnev’s “devious” 246

explanation, Carter told ABC correspondent Frank Reynolds that the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan had changed his opinion about the ultimate goals of the Soviet Union

more drastically than anything he had witnessed since coming to office. Carter

continued, “It is only now dawning upon the world the magnitude of the action that

the Soviets undertook in invading Afghanistan.”247 Carter portrayed the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan as a “radical” departure of their previous foreign policy goals

and unlike anything undertaken by the Soviets since WWII.248 Less than a week after

the invasion, Carter was publicly discussing the possibility of further Soviet

expansion: “if the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if

they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to

adjacent countries—the stable, strategic peaceful balance of the entire world will be

changed. This would threaten the security of all nations.”249

Clearly, Carter’s conversion had come full circle and he seemed quite comfortable in his newfound role. Part of Brzezinski’s concept of containment had always been to heighten the global ideological and propaganda competition with the

Soviet Union. What better time to go on the offensive then when the Soviets found

themselves bogged down in Afghanistan? After the invasion, Carter declared the

Soviet move on Afghanistan “the most serious threat to peace since the Second World

War,” a dramatic overstatement that neglected the , the Cuban Missile

246 Carter, Keeping the Faith, 481. 247 American Foreign Policy, 1977-1980, Document 409. 248 AFP, 1977-1980, Document 438. 249 AFP, 1977-1980, Document 411.

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Crisis, and repeated conflicts over the status of Berlin. Carter would use such

overblown and alarmist rhetoric repeatedly in the months that followed. He often

characterized the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as the “most serious, long-term

strategic challenge since the cold war began.”250 The exaggerated nature of these

statements did not go unnoticed within the administration itself. Chief

Rick Hertzberg could not help but acknowledge the shift in Carter’s public

statements. Writing to White House Staff Director Al McDonald, Hertzberg

criticized the new approach, “The invasion of Afghanistan is a serious threat to peace, but it is nothing like the most serious threat since World War II. . . . By overstating the seriousness of the threat, we invite the criticism that our response is insufficient.”251 Carter’s statements were part hyperbole, but they nonetheless

effectively drew attention to an untenable situation for the Soviets. Equally important

from Brzezinski and Carter’s perspective, the statements began laying the domestic

foundation needed for the possible success of Brzezinski’s containment-oriented

foreign policy.

If Brzezinski’s policy was to be both long-term and comprehensive, it needed

to address the extremely sensitive situation in Iran. Brzezinski felt the

administration’s options in Iran were severely limited. Any military action or rescue

attempt might very well push the new regime into the hands of the Soviets. This

development, coupled with a long-term Soviet occupation and subjugation of

250 AFP, 1977-1980, Document 450. 251 Memo, Rick Hertzberg to Al McDonald, 9 January 1980, “Al McDonald Afghanistan (Olympic Games),” Box 8, Jimmy Carter Library.

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Afghanistan, would be a monumental setback for the United States. As such,

Brzezinski convinced Carter that the had no other option than to counter the loss of influence in Iran and Soviet gains in Afghanistan with an aggressive, clear defense policy for the region.

By the State of the Union address on January 23rd it was clear that the “grand- design” perception of Soviet intentions won out and Carter had become a convert to

Brzezinski’s containment perspective. The president used the address to unveil the

Carter Doctrine, which linked the security of the Persian Gulf with that of the United

States. Brzezinski had for some time argued that the administration desperately needed a unifying theme. In fact, for more than a year, Brzezinski had advocated a policy that would formally recognize the “interdependence” of the Middle East, the

Far East, and Western Europe.252 He wanted a formal statement linking U.S. national interests to the Persian Gulf region. To see that policy finally come to fruition represented a “particularly gratifying moment” for Brzezinski.253 It should also be viewed as a final point of departure for Carter. From this moment on, Carter was fully in Brzezinski’s camp.

The events of November and December of 1979 provided just the geopolitical shift Brzezinski needed to justify an integration of Carter’s overall foreign policy themes around the Soviet invasion. That integration would focus on two major goals: Persian Gulf instability, as evidenced by the Iranian revolution, and the dire need to contain the Soviet Union, which the invasion of Afghanistan made

252 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 443. 253 Ibid

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blatantly obvious. Brzezinski sought to rally domestic and international support by

drawing attention to the threats that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed not only for the U.S. but for all western nations. The focus of this effort would be to paint

Afghanistan as the central battlefront, not because of its strategic importance per se, but because the invasion of Afghanistan was the first signal to the western world that the resource from which it gains much of its political and military strength was within

Soviet reach—Middle Eastern oil. Carter declared that “the Soviet effort to dominate

Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz—a waterway through which most of the world’s oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.”254

The Soviets by this time were developing impressions of their own. In a

politburo meeting on January 27, a report was presented by Gromyko, Andropov, and

other top Soviet officials that presented the Carter doctrine, not as a defensive

maneuver in response to their own action, but as a long-term foreign policy goal

justified under the pretext of Soviet aggression.255 The Soviets viewed the Carter

Doctrine as blatant provocation. From their perspective, the “imperialists” instigated

the unrest in Afghanistan and then launched a campaign of virulent, relentless anti-

sovietism. The Carter Doctrine seemed to take it one step further. By increasing its

own strategic position in areas vital to Soviet interest, namely the Persian Gulf region,

254 Jimmy Carter, 23 January 1980, State of the Union Address. 255 CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980. Cold War International History Project.

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the US was threatening to fundamentally alter the “balance of power.”256 Carter’s foreign policy shift was obvious to Moscow. They knew very well what was at stake.

Afghanistan had become the central battlefield in a renewed Cold War.

Some domestic critics dismissed the Carter Doctrine as empty rhetoric. It soon became clear, however, for perceptive observers that Carter’s newly declared foreign policy was legitimate. In the initial months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Carter agreed to a multitude of , containment-based policies: a hefty set of sanctions on the Soviet Union, a withdrawal of SALT II from the Senate, an Olympic boycott, millions in aid to Pakistan, a diplomatic tilt towards China, the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force designed specifically for the Persian Gulf, the issuing of a presidential directive (PD 59) which allowed for greater flexibility in the conduct of a protracted nuclear war, and the formulation of a hostage rescue mission in Iran. These policies, all developed within three months of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, represented an undeniable foreign policy transition.

Carter did not come to this conversion easily and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s advice was not the only motivating factor. The confluence of international and domestic impulses demanding foreign policy adjustment, if not wholesale reform, were too strong for Carter to maintain his original liberal internationalist perspective.

Soviet and Cuban assertiveness in Africa demonstrated early evidence that the post-

Vietnam international system was still a hostile one. The revolution in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan were twin blows to Carter’s foreign policy perspective. They

256 CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980. Cold War International History Project.

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seemed to authenticate Brzezinski’s fears and predictions of regional instability and

escalating Soviet aggression. After American Embassy workers in Iran were taken

hostage in November of 1979, the domestic scene grew increasingly hostile. Painted

by the press and his critics as weak and indecisive, Carter’s foreign policy image

suffered. With the prospects for SALT effectively dashed and in the midst of a

presidential primary season, Carter made what in hindsight appears a natural decision;

having for so long disregarded the major thrust of his national security advisors

conceptual and strategic advice, Carter made the belated decision to fully adopt

Brzezinski’s containment perspective. Having failed to covert the public to his liberal

internationalist vision, Carter calculated that he needed a tough foreign policy image for domestic-political reasons. As a result, the strategic reigns of Carter’s foreign policy were fully turned over to Brzezinski.

The April 21 resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance provides perhaps

the best indication that Brzezinski’s containment policy had in fact won out. Vance,

technically, resigned over the decision to attempt the failed rescue mission in Iran, but

few doubted Carter’s newfound allegiance to Brzezinski was a decisive factor. The battle for influence between Carter’s principal foreign policy advisors had come to an

abrupt end. Brzezinski alone was left to guide Carter’s thinking. Brzezinski took full

advantage unleashing what can arguably be called the most profound overall foreign

policy reversal in American history.

Brzezinski’s tough policy increased Moscow’s stakes in Afghanistan. He

argued that the right U.S. policy in Afghanistan could turn the occupation into the

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“Soviet’s Vietnam,” a quagmire that would consume Soviet lives and treasure.

Toward this end, Brzezinski persuaded Carter to demand not only a full withdrawal of

Soviet forces, but the installation of a “neutral, nonaligned, Afghan government.”257

Discussions with the administration centered on making the Soviets “pay a prolonged,

painful, [and] discouraging price for their action.”258 By demanding neutrality and nonalignment Carter signaled his rejection of the status quo ante bellum. He would

not accept an Afghanistan leader allied with the Soviet Union. By making such

demands and providing millions to the Afghan resistance, Carter raised the stakes and

encouraged the Soviets to “dig in.”

Brzezinski illuminates the rationale for the administration’s policy in an

interview conducted in the late 1990s. Asked about the actual timing of U.S. aid to

the Afghan insurgency, Brzezinski revealed the “secretly guarded until now”

presidential finding from that initially authorized support to the

Mujahedeen. Astonishingly, he claimed that “aid [through Pakistan to the

Mujahedeen and other insurgency groups] was going to induce a Soviet military

intervention.” Brzezinski quickly qualified his statement, “We didn’t push the

Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.”

Brzezinski referred to the secret operation to draw the Soviets into the “Afghan trap”

as an “excellent idea.” At the end of the interview he justified the overall policy of

provocation towards the Soviets by stating, “What is more important to the history of

257American Foreign Policy, 1977-1980, Document 437, also Document 440. Both Vance and Carter used the phrase as early as 13 . 258 Memo, Hodding Carter III to Direct Line Afghanistan Speakers, “NSA Brzezinski Security Affairs, Aaron, David 8/78-10/79, Afghanistan,” Box 1.

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the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up

Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?”259 This

interview, conducted almost twenty years after the actual invasion, reveals the extent

of Brzezinski’s anti-sovietism. He sought a preemptive, confrontational, containment- based approach in dealing with the Soviet Union. That opportunity only presented

itself, however, in conjunction with a dramatic change in both the domestic and

international scene. By 1980, the conditions for foreign policy reform were in place

and Brzezinski utilized them effectively.

In addition to Carter’s provocative doctrine, the administration also took

controversial steps to normalize its relationship with China altering the longstanding

policy of evenhandedness between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of

China. This policy had always been a major lynchpin in Brzezinski’s policy of containment. Normalization efforts began far before the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, beginning in earnest in January of 1979, with the visit of Deng Xiaoping

to Washington. This new U.S.-Sino relationship improved throughout 1979 and by

July had become productive enough for discussions about the potential sale of

“advanced imaging systems” as well as jets with sophisticated navigational

equipment to China. At the same time an official visit by Secretary of Defense Brown

was being scheduled for January of 1980.

Many within the Carter administration, including Cyrus Vance, had serious

reservations about normalizing relations with China at a time of heightened tensions

259 Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Le Nouvel Observateur, 15-21 (November 1998).

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with the Soviet Union. At the time the Brown trip was being planned, the Soviet

brigade in Cuba was receiving some of its highest publicity. Vance expressed concern

over demonstrating a “tilt” toward China at the very time the Soviet’s would interpret

it as an offensive action.260 Weeks before both the scheduled Brown trip to China and

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vance made one last plea to the president to

reconsider the nature of the trip. Vance argued, “the implied security aspect of our

relationship (with its unspoken threat of greater development) has been an important

factor in deterring Soviet adventurism. But developing it is less likely to produce

moderation in Soviet behavior.”261 Brown and Brzezinski responded to Vance’s

memo with the argument that Soviet insecurities should not prevent the U.S. from

achieving a “strong, secure and friendly” relationship with China. 262 Brzezinski argued that the Soviets forced the United States and China into a “posture in which they see the world in the same way.”263 The President initially was inclined to

compromise on the issue, but the Soviet invasion in late December changed all that.

Amidst criticism from the state department of the trip as inopportune, Brown was sent

anyway. He went, however, with an unanticipated issue of common concern—the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. What in 1978 began as an exercise of impartiality

between the Soviets and the PRC, had by the invasion of Afghanistan, become a

definite “tilt, driven by stark strategic realities.”264

260 Vance, Hard Choices, 390. 261 Brzezinski, Power, 423. 262 Ibid 263 Richard Burt, “U.S. Looks to China for Aid to Pakistan,” New York Times, 3 January 1980. 264 Brzezinski, Power, 425.

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In addition to the Chinese rapprochement and the issuing of the Carter

Doctrine, Brzezinski supported restoring compulsory draft registration and increased military spending by five percent per year over the next five years.265 Brzezinski also

initiated a “strategic renewal” of the armed forces. Such policies were under

discussion before the Afghan crisis, but it was the invasion that tipped the scales

within the administration. The cornerstone of this new strategic renewal was a

presidential directive signed in July of 1980 (PD 59) which was designed to “rapidly

project American power into areas where American forces were not permanently

stationed.”266 This “Rapid Deployment Force” was just one component of a larger

renewal process that grew out of perceived deficiencies in the traditional way of

viewing potential nuclear engagement with the Soviets—MAD. The impetus for

change came mostly from Brzezinski. From his perspective, it was crucial that the

United States plan to facilitate protracted nuclear war. Strategic renewal added a new

dimension to the Carter Doctrine. No longer could its critics claim simple empty

rhetoric. Here was concrete evidence that the United States was taking tangible steps

to enforce the protection of the Persian Gulf should it be threatened. Brzezinski hoped these strategic reforms would bolster the Carter Doctrine, deter further Soviet

aggression, and consolidate support at home.

The Carter Doctrine with its attached strategic renewal of the armed forces

represented a turning point in Carter’s foreign policy. From the State of the Union

265This five percent was an increase in real dollars adjusted to inflation and in addition to previous agreements on the standard increase of military expenditures. See. Smith, Morality, 230. 266 Brzezinski, Power, 456.

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address, Carter adopted a containment-oriented foreign policy approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. It was a simple realization for Brzezinski that under the pressure of events in Iran and Afghanistan that the administration was forced to

abandon their original foreign policy perspective and goals. However, the reality was that Carter’s foreign policy had always been forged in a divided house. It was in a

constant state of flux and as events seemed to validate Brzezinski’s perspective,

especially regarding the behavior of the Soviet Union, Carter’s foreign policy

transition was accelerated. Add to this a hostile domestic environment and the need to

seek legitimization of Carter’s foreign policy during intense primary and general

election campaigns, serious foreign policy reform seemed unavoidable.

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CONCLUSION

One important question remains—how, specifically, was Brzezinski able to convince Carter to change his policies so dramatically? Historians and political scientist have argued convincingly that the domestic-political situation provoked and shaped much of Carter’s attempts at foreign policy reform. Other historians have stressed the drastic changes in the international environment, placing particular emphasis on changes in the behavior of the Soviet Union in the third world and the destabilizing events of the Iranian revolution and subsequent hostage crisis. The changes in the international system, absent of the both the hostile domestic-political environment and the personal influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski, may well have brought about significant foreign policy adjustment. But in the case of Carter’s particular foreign policy transition, one his hard pressed at explaining the nature of his foreign policy change without considerable deference to both the domestic- political situation and the unique advocacy techniques Brzezinski employed.

A crucial and undervalued component of Carter’s foreign policy conversion, as has been argued in the preceding pages, lies in the differing and highly effective advocacy strategies that Zbigniew Brzezinski utilized. Some of these strategies have been briefly explored in other works. For instance, Jean Garrison lays out several strategies that foreign policy advisors under President Nixon and Carter employed.

While Garrison concentrated most on exploring Brzezinski’ early role in framing the

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debate on SALT, much of her theoretical framework is helpful in explaining

Brzezinski’s overall advisory success.

Brzezinski utilized well the traditional methods of national security advocacy.

He knew how to build coalitions and support within the foreign policy making bureaucracy. Brzezinski frequently tapped Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to validate claims and help bolster potential policy initiatives. Brzezinski’s use of the

CIA, especially for determining the extent of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf, helped build a case for the Carter Doctrine long before the actual invasion of

Afghanistan. Because of Carter’s notoriously bad relationship with Congress,

Brzezinski also found leverage by tapping into representatives and senators who shared his penchant for reform. Brzezinski also was able to consolidate a significant procedural advantage within the policy making process as chair of the SCC crisis committees and with his exclusive power to review consensus reports from PRC committees. This provided him with a unique opportunity to shape Carter’s thinking and ultimately his decision-making on vital issues. Brzezinski was also a skilful case- builder had a long memory and often laboriously detailed how the administration found itself in the positions they did. This is most notable in his efforts to adjust

Carter’s overall policy with Moscow. Whether it was in reference to the administration’s endless concessions on SALT or chronicling the various episodes of

Soviet and Cuban exploitation in the third world, Brzezinski knew how to build a case for a particular argument. He would approach the policy objective judiciously, selecting evidence, framing the issue appropriately, building coalitions, managing the

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foreign policy making bureaucracy, and identifying angles that would be most effective with Carter.

What Brzezinski seemed especially effective at was providing a strategic framework for the administration’s thinking. So often criticized for lacking strategic vision, Carter may well have been overly-susceptible to the impressive (and exhausting) strategic dimensions to Brzezinski’s thinking. Vance, like Carter, tended to advocate solving problems in a vacuum. Each situation had a local origin and the traditional, east-west, containment strategy did little to alleviate the source of the problem (whether in Africa, Iran or Afghanistan). Brzezinski, on the other hand, had an instinctive ability to provide an increasingly attractive strategic context to Carter’s thinking. Partially, in an effort to respond to the domestic criticism mentioned above,

Brzezinski tended to utilize Carter’s strategic vulnerabilities. After all, this was the reason that Brzezinski was picked as National Security Advisor going back to the days that he shared with Carter as part of the Trilateral Commission—he had a knack for strategy. Brzezinski use of strategic thinking as an advisory tool was probably most prominent in his constant criticism of the administration’s overall policy with

Moscow. Brzezinski’s attempts at “linking” Soviet involvement in Angola, Yemen,

Ethiopia, and Somalia to SALT negations and the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship was early evidence of this type of advisory method. Later, when Soviet aggression became more blatant with Cuba and in Afghanistan, Brzezinski was relentless in arguing for an overall strategic refinement of Carter’s policy. “Reciprocal accommodation” was the conceptual framework he advocated, and by the time of the

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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, accommodation gave way to containment. As the

international scene seemed to make Brzezinski prophetic Carter relented and turned

over the strategic reigns.

Brzezinski’s most effective method of facilitating Carter’s foreign policy

transition was his framing of advice in domestic and political dimensions. It was

slightly ironic that Brzezinski would have such a keen awareness of American domestic politics and their impact on foreign policy formation and implementation; after all he was Polish born. But what is undeniable was Brzezinski’s overt attempts at using Carter’s difficulties with the press, with conservative organized interest, and the public at large to guide his thinking and policy decisions. Brzezinski utilized well the political uproar over both the cancellation of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon and the Soviet brigade in Cuba to toughen on-going negotiations of SALT. Brzezinski petitioned Carter to present SALT not as altruistic act by a president seeking the security of future generations, but rather, and in line with the prevailing public opinion at the time, an aggressive measure designed to limit Soviet military capabilities. Brzezinski used the press’s caricatures of Carter as weak, vacillating, and indecisive in an effort to convince Carter of the need to take a harder, more decisive line with the Soviets. He drew Carter’s attention to portrayals of the administration as lacking a strategic vision, even subscribing personally to some of the criticism, as a way to convince Carter of the dire need for more consistency (not a mere middle route between he and Vance’s positions). As the domestic and international scene adjusted, Brzezinski argued, so to should the administration’s policy. As a result, he

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was able to convince Carter of the fact that “the country craves, and our national

security needs, both a more assertive tone and a more assertive substance to our

foreign policy.”267 Brzezinski’s keen political radar and his ability to frame issues in

ways that coincided with changes in the public mood was instrumental in the elevation of the policies he petitioned for. Where Brzezinski’s use of the domestic- political context is most pronounced was the consistent pressure he put on Carter to remake his image. Time and again, Brzezinski hammered the point home that policy and presidential style/form can be as or more important than substance. Carter was slow to fully accept that reality, but by the end of his term, Brzezinski had made his point (albeit too late).

Brzezinski also had a way of reassuring Carter’s reservations about foreign policy reform. From the beginning, Brzezinski pushed for a more forceful foreign policy and he made specific efforts to assure Carter that the policy he was advocating for was not “a reckless policy of confrontationism.” Brzezinski was quick to convince

Carter that he, unlike conservative critics in the press, did not view the administration’s initial Soviet policy as one of “appeasement.” He went to great lengths to convince Carter that his policy of containment was distinct from Reagan’s

“militarist” perspective. He made the not so subtle distinction between Reagan’s

policy of confrontationalism, which he described as “an escape from reality,”

“nostalgic for the past,” “dangerous,” “unrealistic,” “simplistic,” and “extreme” from

267 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 13 September 1979, ZB Donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library.

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his own: strategic, calibrated, proportional and complex approach.268. Brzezinski knew that Carter was reluctant to make the final turn towards a policy of containment, even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and so these nuanced variations, while probably undetectable to the non-foreign policy elites, were important distinctions for

Carter personally.

Perhaps the biggest reason Brzezinski had as much success as he did stemmed from Carter’s own perspective of the foreign policymaking process. Carter was a president that wanted it both ways. He instinctively sided with Vance’s liberal internationalist, soft-power perspective, but knew that sometimes the application of practical power-politics was necessary. Carter had an amazingly inclusive and open foreign policymaking process. Carter was not only open to differing views, it seemed he tolerated, sometimes even facilitated, divisive competition. Competition can be healthy. It can also work to undermine and in the final analysis Carter proved ill- equipped at managing the central foreign policy division of his administration. In an effort to get President Carter to take greater control (or at least be perceived as doing so) Brzezinski used yet another historic analogy; he provided Carter with examples from President Roosevelt’s (FDR) advisory system and how he was able to manage and sometimes play off of the diverging views of his policy advisors.269 The problem, as is evidenced by a National Security Advisor offering this type of advice to his own president, Carter was no Roosevelt. He simply did not trust his own ability to make

268 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 7 , Brzezinski Donated, Box 2, Jimmy Carter Library. 269 Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, 24 February 1979, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File Weekly Reports to president, Box 42, Jimmy Carter Library.

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tough decisions. Where Roosevelt thrived by skillfully using and manipulating his

own advisory system, Carter floundered. In the end, he became dependent upon

Brzezinski’s perspective.

Unknowingly, Brzezinski himself provided perhaps the best explanation for

Carter’s dramatic foreign policy conversion. In an interview in November of 1979,

just one month before the Afghan crisis, Brzezinski admitted that he had a distinct

“peculiarity” in his personality that led him to be “very achievement oriented.” He continued on the same vein, “by a very large margin, I prefer winning over losing— and although I do not say this immodestly, I’m pretty good at winning. I win a great deal. I seldom lose, very seldom.”270 Apparently, like most other things in his life,

Zbigniew Brzezinski was simply too good at playing “the game.”271

270 J. Wooton, “Here comes Zbig,” Esquire, November, 1979, pp. 118-119. 271 This same quote and the reference to “playing the game” are used in Jean Garrison’s Games advisors play: foreign policy in the Nixon and Carter administrations, ( A&M University Press College Station, 1999) 3.

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