Wageningen University - Department of Social Sciences

Chair Group Disaster Studies

Christian aid in the post-disaster Haitian state

A study on the Christian identity of Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs in a state at risk of failing

August 2012

MSc International Development Studies Linda Koenders

Disaster Studies Supervisor: Dr. Jeroen Warner

RDS 80733

Abstract

On January 12, 2010, Haiti was struck by an earthquake resulting in an immense number of people killed, injured or displaced, and many houses destroyed or damaged. This shed the light again at a country perceived as a fragile state. The focus of this research is the interplay between the Haitian state, church and NGOs. The fragility of the Haitian state and the importance of religion in Haiti are researched. As subpopulation five Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs are chosen (ICCO, Medair, Tear, Woord en Daad, and ZOA) in order to find out how their Christian identity become manifested in post-earthquake Haiti, given its political and religious context. By means of literature review, interviews and participant observation data was gathered. Throughout history three main factors are considered to explain why Haiti is what it is today. These are: 1) the presence of armed forces, whether to liberate Haiti from slavery or to oppress the population, 2) influence and interference of foreign powers, 3) deeply rooted inequality between the elites and the majority of the population. Haiti’s state has not always been able to carry out its state functions (such as providing security, promoting economic growth, making law and policy, and delivering social services). The picture that the literature gives of the Haitian state is shared by the representatives of the Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs. They perceive that their organizations fill in the gap of the Haitian state by providing basic social services to the population. Religion is important in the lives of Haitians; everything in Haiti is somehow related to God. At the same time, the state positions itself distant from any church. Regarding the Christian identity of NGOs, the thesis shows that there is no one clear Christian identity, because all five organizations express it differently. The Bible though can be reckoned as the main foundation of a Christian identity for almost all organizations. Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs are mainly focused on executing their own projects, but they hardly engage in political affairs to strengthen the state institutions. The religious context makes it easy for Christian NGOs to accommodate, because they have shared ideas with many people of the population. There is no difference what-so-ever that makes these NGOs more preferred by the Haitian state than non-Christian NGOs. To conclude, the Christian identity of the NGOs becomes manifested in the organization’s focus, the constituency background, partner organizations and the recruited international staff. However, the first priority of the NGOs is to help the ones in need, but where possible they will share the Gospel.

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Acknowledgments

There are many people to be thankful to when I look back to the last year, but I think it suits best if I start to thank my heavenly Father for His mercy and presence all the time of my student life. I have been able to make it, and that is a huge blessing. All praise and glory be to Him!

I think Jeroen Warner is the one who helped me most throughout the long process of writing this thesis. All his comments, commitment and time he has given to me are so much appreciated and also countless. That is why I was even thinking that he should be nominated for 'Teacher of the year' at Wageningen University.

Cordaid has hosted me in Haiti, which I am also very much thankful for. The opportunity that I had to stay and live in Haiti for two months would not have been able without Cordaid. Being at a site like that was a wish coming true. I could stay in the guest house in Port-au-Prince, the office in Léogâne, make use of the cars and was helped by the staff. Many thanks! Also, the many respondents in Lompré I would like to thank, because they were willing to help me and provide me with information I could not have retrieved without their help. It was always special to see the hospitality of the people. Last but not least, I want to mention one Haitian in particular: my translator. It was so pleasant to spend my days with him, besides the work he did for me. Singing while walking through the fields, giving English classes in his school and having dinner at his house, this all made my stay very nice.

Lastly, my personal contacts have supported me, stimulated me, prayed for me, and helped me throughout the process. Now I finally do not need to bother them again and again with stories about my thesis. Special thanks to my boyfriend for his prayers, encouragement and patience, to my closest friends for their prayers and support, and to all the others who expressed in a certain way their concern for me.

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Abbreviations

ACT Actions by Churches Together CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DFID Department for International Development DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies DMT Disaster Management Team EU European Union FSI Failed State Index HNP Haitian National Police IHRC Interim Haiti Recovery Commission NGO Non-Governmental Organization OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development SHO Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties US(A) United States (of America) UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme

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Table of Contents

Abstract ii Acknowledgments iii Abbreviations iv

1. Introduction 1 1.1 Background information 1 1.2 Problem statement 1 1.3 Research objectives 3 1.4 Research questions 3 1.5 Relevance 3 1.6 Outline thesis 4

2. Theoretical framework 5 2.1 Fragility of states 5 2.1.1 State and statehood 5 2.1.2 Emergence of the concept of state failure 7 2.1.3 Defining the nature of states 8 2.1.4 Factors and indicators of state failure 10 2.2 Religion and disaster 12 2.3 (Faith-based) Non-Governmental Organizations 14 2.3.1 Concept of Non-Governmental Organizations 14 2.3.2 Faith-based NGOs 14 2.3.3 Christian faith-based NGOs 15 2.3.4 Operationalization of identity of Christian faith-based NGOs 17 2.3.5 Taxonomy of Christian faith-based NGOs 18 2.4 Church – state models 19 2.5 Delineation for this research 22

3. Methodology 24 3.1 Research paradigm 24 3.2 Research methodology 25 3.3 Research topic 25 3.4 Research methods 26 3.5 Research population 27 3.6 Data analysis 28 3.7 Ethical considerations 29

4. History and context of Haiti 30 4.1 Colonialism, independence, and isolation 30 4.2 Price of independence 31 4.3 After independence 32

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4.4 The American interference 33 4.5 Era of the Duvaliers 33 4.6 Post-Duvalier era 34 4.7 Civil society 36 4.8 International community and NGOs 37 4.9 Concluding remarks 40

5. Fragility of the Haitian state 41 5.1 Literature review 41 5.2 Empirical results 46 5.3 Concluding remarks 49

6. Religion and state in Haiti 51 6.1 Religious landscape of Haiti 51 6.2 Church and state 55 6.3 Concluding remarks 56

7. Representation of the identity of Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs 57 7.1 ICCO 57 7.2 Medair 59 7.3 Tear 61 7.4 Woord en Daad 63 7.5 ZOA 65 7.6 Comparing dimensions 66 7.7 Christian faith-based NGOs and the state 68

8. Conclusions, discussion, and recommendations 71 8.1 Conclusions 71 8.2 Discussion 73 8.3 Recommendations and limitations 75

References 76

Appendix 1 Taxonomy of Christian faith-based humanitarianism 83

Appendix 2 Extensive review on Christian faith-based NGOs 84

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background information

Two years ago, on Tuesday January 12, 2010, an earthquake of the magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale struck the land of Haiti, a country situated in the Caribbean region. The consequences of the earthquake were immense, which I will shortly list now. According to USGS (2011a) the official estimates identify 316,000 people killed (although other sources (like Pierre-Louis 2011) speak about around 220,000 people killed), 300,000 people injured, 1.3 million people displaced, 97,294 houses destroyed, and 188,383 houses damaged in the area of Port-au-Prince and in the southern part of Haiti. The epicentre of the earthquake was around 25 km of Port-au-Prince (USGS 2011b). Port-au- Prince is a crowded city with around 1 million inhabitants and with poorly constructed houses, which caused among others this much damage (Nature news, 2010). Furthermore, 59 aftershocks were registered in the period after January 12 until February 23, 2011 (USGS 2011a). Economic damage is expected to be around US$7.2 to US$8.1 billion (Cavallo et al. 2010: 299).

After this “most dramatic and unimaginable catastrophe” (Pierre-Louis 2011: 187) the Haitian government of president René Préval lost 17 of its 18 ministries, and was unable to communicate with the population or provide any form of assistance (Government of Haiti 2010). Besides, other extensive losses for the Haitian government were the death of thousands of civil servants, destruction of landmarks in Port-au-Prince and basic infrastructure (Klasing et al. 2011: 1). Three days after the earthquake international aid started to enter Haiti (Pierre-Louis 2011: 198, 199), and Haiti experienced a new influx of humanitarian organizations (Klasing et al. 2011: 1). On the 31 st of March 2010 international donors held a conference. The amount of promised aid by the international donors was more than US$ 5 billion to help the beginning of post-earthquake rebuilding (Government of Haiti 2010).

The ongoing issue for years already is resolving the ‘Haitian tragedy’, as Gros (2011) has called it. The Haitian state is not the only actor which tries to escape that tragedy. The two other primary actors besides the state involved in the intervention and the reconstruction of Haiti are Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the international community (Beckett 2010). Due to the limited capacity of the Haitian state, the delivery of basic social services is mainly administered and delivered by NGOs or other agencies, as noted above. Many essential services in Haiti, like health care, education and job creation, are provided by NGOs. Their capacity is greater and their funding is more than the Haitian government. The financial and material assistance from foreign donors seem to be funnelled through NGOs, so bypassing Haitian state structures, which is due to fears of corruption (USIP 2010: 1). State and civil society seem to be ignored for many years and are seen as obstacles for the international relief operation, as was also the case for Nicaragua after hurricane Mitch in 1998 (Christoplos et al. 2009: 14). The devastating earthquake brings that issue for Haiti to light.

1.2 Problem statement

On the one hand there seems to be a shared agreement around the world that Haiti is a fragile state, where interventions from outside the country are necessary to strengthen its state

1 institutions. Without that assistance the country would be unable to provide security and basic services, and at the same time Haiti is assisted in building state capacity. According to the World Bank (2006: i) there is “widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline and unemployment, poor governance, and violence” in Haiti, just like in any other fragile state. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008) lists Haiti also as one of the world’s fragile states. Since Haiti’s state institutions were (seen as) incapable of dealing with ongoing crises, the international community has intervened for many years. The United Nations (UN) for example has intervened over the past two decades to restore security and provide certain core services to Haitians (Muggah 2010: 445).

On the other hand there is the comment stating that the interventions of NGOs and the international community have influenced the (in)capacity of Haiti’s institutions, which perhaps made it impossible that a working state emerged. Gros (2011: 134) is for instance not talking about rebuilding Haiti’s state, but building it. Beckett (2010) suggests that the interventions of the international community just resulted in (often short-lived) political stability and security, while the underlying structural problems of the Haitian society persisted. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (in Pierre- Louis 2011: 90) state that “the decision by the donor states to bypass the Haitian government and work with the international NGOs has set precedent in the country that no successive government has been able to reverse”, when they discuss the period in the 1980s and later on.

The focus of this research is the interplay between the Haitian state and NGOs regarding the relationship between the presence of NGOs and the state's ability to carry out its functions, as aforementioned. Haiti’s history of state development and the role that international NGOs have played will be studied to gain understanding about the main factors throughout Haiti’s history that still have an impact on the state, NGOs, daily lives of people and their communities in Haiti. A third actor is added in this thesis, which is the church (be it Catholic or Protestant). I assume that religion is important in Haiti (CIA Factbook (2011) shows the religious demographics of Haiti as follows: Roman Catholic 80%, Protestant 16%, none 1%, other 3%; and roughly half of the population practices vodou), and that it is interwoven in many ways in Haiti. By studying the church – state model of Haiti the role of religion in the Haitian state will be identified, as well as the role of religion in the lives of the Haitians themselves. Besides, own fieldwork makes it possible to add some observations with Haitians themselves. This means that within this thesis the triangle below will play a central role.

Church

State NGOs

It is impossible to research all NGOs working in Haiti, so a subpopulation should be chosen. The present research will narrow down to Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs. I assume that their Christian identity shapes their way of acting towards the state and beneficiaries throughout their projects in Haiti.

This thesis will compare the gathered literature data with own material, which is gathered in interviews with representatives of five Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs. These results can support or deny the general picture about the Haitian state. By studying several Dutch Christian faith-based

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NGOs, I will also try to figure out how they deal with Haiti of today while directing attention to sets of Christian identity elements; if their distinct background may become manifested in the interaction with the Haitian state, if their identity which is most probably shared in Haiti give them a different position, and what the effects of their Christian identity is in Haiti, a religious country where the state seems to be fragile in its nature, in order to extract some learning points for these NGOs.

1.3 Research objectives

The present research aims firstly to provide insight into the historical, political and social context of Haiti to gain insight into the fragile nature of Haiti.

The second objective of this research is to gain more insight into how Dutch Christian faith- based organizations, which intervene in post-disaster Haiti, in practice act according to their Christian identity.

1.4 Research questions

From the aforementioned problem statement and objectives, the main research question leading this research is:

How does the Christian identity of Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs become manifested in post-earthquake Haiti, given its political and religious context?

To answer this main question, it has been divided into sub questions:

Sub question 1: To what extent the Haitian state can be characterized as fragile?

Sub question 2: What role does religion play in the state of Haiti and its citizens?

Sub question 3: What does a Christian identity include for Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs?

1.5 Relevance

Although the research on Christian faith-based NGOs is also chosen due to personal interest, it appeared that there is a knowledge gap when it comes to faith-based NGOs. To mention some scholars: “faith-based NGOs are hardly studied in the development literature” (Tefferan 2007: 888) and “neither is much literature available in the social and political science about faith-based or religious NGOs, because of the long-standing trend to overlook the role of religious actors in the public sphere” (Berger 2003: 17). Others state that “the work of faith-based NGOs, however, is under-researched” (Green et al. 2002; Kurti et al. 2004 in Kurti 2005: 60). Another side of the debates claims that “little is known about how Christian beliefs shape the principle and activity of faith-based agencies, how they are distinct from secular agencies, and whether such a distinction is important?” (Thaut 2008: 1). Therefore, this research project tries to add and emphasize this category of organizations in order to extend the literature.

This research aims to be worthwhile for NGOs which work in Haiti to make them aware of the fragile nature of the Haitian state where they are working in. For an NGO it is always important to

3 have an idea of the state of a country, especially when an NGO does not have experience in a certain country, in order to be well-prepared for the context they are going to be part of. In specific, this research is written for Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs. They can gain an understanding of how their colleagues from other NGOs deal with their Christian identity in the working field. They can learn from each other or about themselves, since through the interviews they were questioned about their own identity. So this thesis can add to the debate among Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs on their performance and the distinctiveness of their Christian identity.

1.6 Outline thesis

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two presents the theoretical framework. The concepts and theories which form the foundation of this research are introduced. The first part of chapter two elaborates on state fragility and defining the nature of states, including the indicators for state failure. The second part deals with religion, identity and Christian faith-based NGOs. In the third chapter the research design, methodologies and research population are presented. Chapter four continues with an overview of Haiti’s history and the influx of foreign aid agencies to show the main factors of Haiti’s history that impacts Haiti even to this day. In the fifth chapter the fragility of the Haitian state will be defined based on both theoretical background and empirical results. In chapter six the religious aspect of this thesis is explored by determining the religious landscape of Haiti, the connection between church and state, and the interplay between Christian faith-based NGOs and the state. The dimensions of identity of each Christian faith-based NGO are presented in chapter seven, and a comparison of these dimensions is made in order to enrich the prior discussion of the results. It also discusses the main representations of the Christian identity by the NGOs in question. The final chapter presents an overview of the main conclusions. Hence, the chapter attempts to answer the sub questions, leading to the main research question. Furthermore, a discussion and recommendations are added.

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2. Theoretical framework

This chapter aims at giving the theoretical framework of this research. If offers a framework for the analysis of the condition of the Haitian state and the analysis of the aid interventions that are carried out by Dutch Christian Faith-Based NGOs. I will start in section 2.1 with a review on the literature about state, fragility and weakness of states. Since the discussion in the literature about this theme is extensive I will give an overview of the main debates. This is relevant in the case of Haiti framed as a fragile state. Besides, some important related concepts will be discussed: legitimacy, capacity, effectiveness, security and social contract. As my assumption is that the church plays an important role in the Haitian society I will elaborate as well on the relation of church and state. Furthermore, in this chapter I want to operationalize identity for Christian Faith-Based NGOs in order to be able to understand how identity shapes the activities and interventions in aid interventions such as in Haiti (section 2.3). Lastly, I will present some different church – state models (section 2.4).

2.1 Fragility of states

2.1.1 State and statehood The classical definition of modern statehood introduced by the sociologist Max Weber should be mentioned first here, since the understanding of the state in international politics is rooted in his definition (Jung in DISS 2008: 34). He defined the central feature of modern statehood as follows: “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1991: 78 in Miettunen: no date). The keywords of the Weberian sense of a state are: territory, polity, authority backed by the monopolistic control of the legitimate means of coercion, and recognition at home and abroad (Gros 1996: 456). However, contemporary scholars stress also different functions of a state in order to be more nuanced. Migdal (1988: 19) follows Max Weber in an ideal-type definition of a state: “it is an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way”.

Since the sixteenth century a state’s ability to survive has rested on a number of factors, including the organizational capabilities of its leader, population size, potential material and human resources available, ability to mobilize the society’s population. Mobilizing involves channeling people into specialized organizational frameworks that enable state leaders to build stronger armies, collect more taxes, and complete any other number of complicated tasks. The key to the increased capabilities in the international arena was the drive to establish state social control within society. This could provide the human and material machinery to fight for survival among political entities that were sharpening their claws on their neighbours (Migdal 1988: 20 – 23). Internal weakness has continued to invite international aggression ( Ibid. : 24).

Gros (1996: 456) emphasizes the change over time since Weber, so a modern state has also become “responsible for the delivery and / or strict regulation of a wide range of services of such significant externalities and economies of scale as to make their provision in less than optimal quantities by the market highly likely”. The activities of the state may be broadly included in the

5 following categories: extractive, protective / regulatory and redistributive ( Ibid. ). Gros (2011: 148) sees as the primary duty of any state protecting its citizens from each other, its territory from other states, and both from the hazards of Nature.

According to Rotberg (2003: 2) nation-states exist to provide certain political goods or services to persons living within appointed borders. According to the performance of delivering the most crucial of these goods strong states can be distinguished from weak states, and weak states from failed or collapsed states ( Ibid. ). “Political goods (…) together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interaction” (Rotberg 2003: 3). The function of the state can be ranked, and the supply of security is the most critical political good, especially human security ( Ibid. ). Human security does not only refer to physical security, but also to social, economic and political security (Cristoplos & Hilhorst 2009: 6). So the state’s prime function is providing security, and other desirable political goods can be delivered after having sustained a reasonable measure of security. Other political goods are rule of law, security of property and inviolable contracts, a judicial system, a set of values for fair play, medical and health care, freedom, education, infrastructure, banking system, beneficent fiscal and institutional context, promotion of civil society, and methods of regulating the sharing of the environmental commons (Rotberg 2003: 3, 4). The bundle of these political goods constitute together a set of criteria according to which modern nation-states may be judged strong, weak or failed ( Ibid. ).

Contrasted with the state, civil society is understood as a realm of social life – charitable groups, clubs and voluntary associations, independent churches and publishing houses – institutionally separated from territorial state institutions. “Civil society both describes and anticipates a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected nongovernmental institutions that tend to be nonviolent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension, both with each other and with the governmental institutions that ‘frame’, constrict and enable their activities” (Keane 2009: 1). Lewin defines civil society as “the aggregate of networks and institutions that either exist and act independently of the state or are official organizations capable of developing their own, spontaneous views on national or local issues and then impressing these views on their members, on small groups and, finally, on authorities” (Lewin 1988 in: Fatton 2002: 8).

States can face some difficulty in achieving their aspirations of predominance. In the first place, attention should be paid to the sources of resistance to the state’s efforts at achieving predominance. Within a society the rules of the game have been made and maintained. Informal and formal organizations have exercised social control to induce people to behave in their interactions according to certain rules or norms. Social control has not been one piece, instead it has been frequently been highly fragmented throughout the territory. The society’s landscape consists of the state and organizations allied with it, and other social organizations. A battle between state leaders who want ultimate uniform social control and heads of other organizations who strive maintenance of their prerogatives (Migdal 1988: 24 – 28).

Migdal's model (1988: 28) does not suggest that society has a dichotomous structure, but is a mélange of social organizations (states, ethnic groups, the institutions of particular social classes, villages, and any others enforcing rules of the game). Two facets of the model are: the groups exercising social control in a society may be heterogeneous both in the form they take and in the rules they apply; the distribution of social control in society may be among numerous, fairly

6 autonomous groups rather than concentrated largely in the state. Exercising that autonomy may be fragmented, in which the state has been one organization among many. Survival strategies for individuals have been developed by the material incentives and coercion of the organizations. However, the state can overcome resistance by enforcing the society as in a totalitarian state, or it may choose to delegate some of that authority to other mechanisms, such as the church, in a liberal democratic state. Other societies, however, have to cope with conflicts among social organizations in proposing different rules of the game (Migdal 1988: 29). High levels of social control, states can mobilize their populations, removing surpluses effectively from society and gaining tremendous strength in facing external enemies. Internally, state personnel can gain autonomy, can build complex, coordinated bureaus, and can monopolize coercive means in the society. There are three indicators to reflect the level of social control: compliance (with the use of the most basic of sanctions, force), participation (leaders of state organizations want to gain strength by organizing the population for specialized tasks in the institutional components of the state organization), and legitimation (acceptance, even approbation, of the state’s rules of the game, its social control, as true and right) (Migdal 1988: 32, 33).

2.1.2 Emergence of the concept of state failure As a response to what seemed to be new sorts of armed conflicts and problems in the wake of the Cold War the term ‘failed states’ emerged (Call 2010: 305). Helman and Ratner (1992-1993: 3) also refer to a “disturbing new phenomenon”, which is the failed nation-state, characterized by civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation. The phenomenon has its roots in the proliferation of nation-states since the end of World War II. The world changed from a pre-war colonial world to a world with independent states. At that time the primary goal of the United Nations (UN) and its member states was self-determination of peoples, and that was given more attention than long-term survivability of these new states. Economic assistance was necessary, and state failure “was anathema to the raison d’être of decolonization and offensive to the notion of self- determination” (Helman and Ratner 1992-1993: 4). Newly independent and Third World states received infusions of aid from their former colonial masters and from the two superpowers the Soviet Union and the United States of America (USA). After the fall of the Berlin Wall the support of the superpowers fell away which resulted in state failure, failing or states will fail later (Carment 2003: 406). Over time the new countries faced overwhelming hurdles, and the assistance cuts brought into light a lot of shortcomings. Powerful insurgencies resulted in civil strife which is “disrupting essential governmental services, destroying food supplies and distribution networks, and bringing economies to a virtual standstill; corrupt and criminal public officials only exacerbate the human misery" (Helman and Ratner 1992-1993: 5). As a result the term ‘failed states’ emerged where the nation state ceased to function altogether. First writers put the attention on Somalia and Yugoslavia, but later on the term was also applied to an array of countries such as Rwanda, Colombia and Haiti (Call 2010: 305).

The events of 11 September 2001 and the strategy of USA’s former president George W. Bush in September 2002 resulted in state failure again taking stage in world politics (Carment 2003: 407). In USA’s National Security Strategy of 2002 it was written: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” and “to forestall or prevent...hostile acts...the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively” ( The Economist , 2002). Call (2010: 304) believes that the terms ‘failed state’ or ‘fragile state’ are strategically developed by the West, especially the USA, “to

7 justify intervention in areas previously deemed sovereign, generally through perceived links to transnational security threats like terrorism and drug trafficking”. This section showed the emergence and usage of some terms related to state failure, and the next section will continue on clarifying these and other terms.

2.1.3 Defining the nature of states Strong and weak states As stated by Rotberg (2003: 4) strong states are known by control of their territories and deliver a full range and a high quality of political goods to their citizens. Characteristics are high levels of security, political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. In essence, “strong states are places of enviable peace and order” (Rotberg 2003: 4). On the other side there are weak states. Rotberg (2003: 4) lists some characteristics of these states: they are inherently weak due to geographical, physical or fundamental economic constraints; or basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks; or a mixture of these two. Furthermore, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions exist also, but these tensions did not yet result in violence. Besides, the provision of other political goods is diminished or is diminishing.

Failed states Rotberg (2003: 5) defines failed states as “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions”. This definition does not refer to absolute violence, but to the enduring character of violence, the fact that much of the violence is directed against the existing government or regime. “Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens” (Rotberg 2003: 1). Rotberg (2003: 5-9) continues by mentioning a long list of characteristics of failed states: civil wars rooted in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity; disharmonies between communities; loss of authority over sections of territory; inability to establish atmosphere of security nation-wide; regimes prey on their own constituents; growth of criminal violence; limited quantities of other essential political goods; exhibition of flawed institutions (which have executive functions); deteriorating or destroying infrastructures; the effective educational and health systems are privatized or the public facilities become increasingly decrepit and neglected; unparalleled economic opportunity, but only for a privileged few; corruption on an unusually destructive scale; overall worsening GDP figures, slim year-to-year growth rates, and great disparities of income between the wealthiest and poorest fifths of the population; sometimes regular food shortages and widespread hunger, and the population, which lived for long time on the edge of endurance, is driven into starvation, while state provide no safety nets; and loss of legitimacy. Gros (2011: 456) identifies failed states as “those in which public authorities are either unable or unwilling to carry out their (…) social contract, but which now includes more than maintaining the peace among society’s many factions and interests”. The degree of stateness might be assessed by the question: does the state have any influence at all on legal private sector activities? (Gros 2011: 457)

Gros (1996: 458-461) observes five types of failed states. The first one concerns anarchic states, which do not centralize their government. The second one is phantom states, which are

8 characterized by a semblance of authority that shows its efficacy in certain limited areas but in all others it is completely invisible. Third, there are anaemic states resulting from two reasons: their energy has been sapped by counter-insurgency groups seeking to take the place of the formal authority; or the engines of modernity were never put in place (due to increasing demands archaic structures are not functional anymore). Fourth, there are captured states. A strong centralized authority is captured by members of insecure elites to frustrate rival elites. The last type of states is called aborted states, “meaning that they experienced failure even before the process of state formation was consolidated” ( Ibid. ).

Collapsed states Rotberg (2003: 9, 10) defines a collapsed state as a state where the political goods are obtained by private or ad hoc means. There is a vacuum of authority, a mere geographical expression. When collapses occurred in for example Somalia, Afghanistan, and Bosnia, substate actors take over when prime polity disappears ( Ibid. ). Zartman’s (2005:7 in Miettunen no date: 2) definition of state collapse is as follows: “state collapse is both the cause and the result of internal or civil wars, as weak and illegitimate order permits violence and violence consumes legitimacy and order”.

Fragile states and state fragility The debate around fragile states concerns a broad spectrum, and there is a broad consensus that addressing state fragility is one of the most pressing policy questions of our time (Andersen in DIIS 2008: 7). At the same time some contradictory perceptions of the nature of the problem and appropriate solutions linger. The debate on fragile states brings to bear different aspects, which will be discussed in the sections below, while taking into account that “there is no authoritative definition of state fragility, nor is there an agreed list of fragile states” (Andersen in DIIS 2008: 8).

Nevertheless, this section continues with the discussion in literature on definitions of state fragility. To start with, Goldstone (2008: 286, 287) provides an overview of several different approaches to identifying the social conditions that lie behind state failures (including revolutions, civil wars, and economic decay). The first approach is focused on long-term, deeply rooted characteristics of a society, which includes the degree of trust or social capital, the degree of economic inequality sustained over decades or centuries, whether there are long-standing ethnic or religious fault-lines dividing a society, or structural conditions that lead to conflicts between the state and its own elites. A second approach is produced by The Fund for Peace, "an independent, nonpartisan, non-profit research and educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security" (The Fund for Peace 2012), which is published by the US Foreign Policy. A large number of discrete variables are tried to be identified, which contributes to vulnerability to state failure. The Failed States Index serves mainly as a checklist of items to be considered, and it has limited value to use as a guide of what changes or processes to look for or respond to in developing policies to strengthen or cope with states in the process of failing. The last approach mentioned by Goldstone focuses on the impact of institutions on the current behaviour. Changing institutions can, in relatively short order, lead to changes in behaviour for good or for ill by incentives to individuals and groups to pursue certain activities.

An overview of working definitions of fragile states within the aid community is given in the report of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) by Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen

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(2008) and in an Overview of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) by Stewart and Brown (2010). The DIIS report states that there is a certain consensus around the definition used in the OECD/DAC (Development Assistance Committee): “those where the state power is unable and / or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property, basic public services and essential infrastructure” (DIIS 2008: 22). Furthermore, the DIIS report (2008: 22) states that most definitions by different governmental and intergovernmental agencies and ministries tend to emphasize either the functionality of states, i.e. the will and capacity to perform the functions necessary for the security and well-being of their populations; the effects of state fragility, which means emphasizing potential threats relating to states that lack control over their territories and populations; or the relationship between donors and the governments in question. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) uses the following definition: “fragile states are countries where the government cannot or will not deliver its basic functions to the majority of its people, including the poor” (DFID 2010 in CRISE 2010: 8). Canada’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) includes in it definition political legitimacy. Fragile states are those that: “lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and / or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad” (CIFP 2006 in CRISE 2010: 9). The World Bank uses the term 'fragile states' for countries that are: “facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict. Ongoing armed conflicts affect three out of four fragile states” (World Bank 2009).

The Overview by CRISE (2010: 9) proposes a broad approach which encompasses all the definitions mentioned in the section above. Fragile states are defined as “states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive basic service provision, or legitimacy”.

2.1.4 Factors and indicators of state failure Fragility according to CRISE (2010: 10) consists of three dimensions: authority failures, service failures, and legitimacy failures. Authority failures refer to cases where the state lacks the authority to protect its citizens from violence of various kinds. Service failures mean situations where the state fails to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services. Legitimacy failures occur when the state lacks legitimacy, so it is characterized by limited support among the people, no democracy, and military play a role in ruling or support and dominate the government. CRISE does not count every service deficiency as state failure, since it could be a developmental failure as well. Therefore two additional criteria are added for service deficiencies to count as state failure: if service coverage is significantly below average, and if delivery involves sharp horizontal inequalities and social exclusion.

Gros (1996: 462) identifies five internal factors which appear to correlate strongly with failed states: economic malperformance, lack of social synergy, authoritarianism, militarism and environmental degradation caused by rampant population growth.

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Another dominant explanation of what causes state fragility is provided by the security- development nexus. Simultaneous broadening of both security and development has implied that these policy fields were connected, because many issues are now falling within the domains of both policy fields. On the one hand this framework claims that “security is fundamental for reducing poverty; and on the other hand, that a lack of development causes conflict. It suggests that development and security are inherently related” (Engberg-Pedersen in DIIS 2008:10). Without going into too much detail about this nexus, the general concern is how values (as human rights, participation, accountability) and international standards, which these values constitute, can be put in practice in fragile states ( Ibid. ). Besides this, the nexus claims that poor governance is a root cause of state fragility. This is based on Rotberg’s (2003: in Ibid. : 11) explanation “that it is because the domestic institutions of public authority are not working as they are supposed to that some states are fragile”. “State fragility is seen as the result of internal malfunctions” ( Ibid. ). Examples of these internal ‘flaws’ are repression and corruption, which in turn to “self-serving elites that have ‘captured’ the state and created state institutions that benefit only themselves and their clients” (S Ørensen 2008: in Ibid. : 11). As a consequence, “the social contract that is supposed to secure a dual bond of rights and obligations between the people and the state is broken. The state does not deliver to its people, and the people accordingly have to turn to non-state communities (ethnic groups, clans, tribes, religion) for the satisfaction of their material and non material needs” ( Ibid. ). In this context, the OECD emphasizes the expectations between citizens and states and vice versa . The OECD (2008: 17) argues that the social contract emerges from the interaction between a) expectations that a given society has of a given state; b) state capacity to provide services and to secure revenue from its population and territory to provide these services; c) elite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfil social expectations; d) mediated by the existence of political processes; and e) legitimacy plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations and facilitating political process.

The notion of the social contract plays an important role in the framework of Pelling and Dill (2009), which guides their analysis of processes of political change associated with disaster. The authors (2009: 5) have evidence that temporary breaks in dominant political and social systems post- disaster open space for alternative social and political organization to emerge. USAID (2002 in: Pelling & Dill 2009: 3) describes post-disaster political spaces as “moments when underlying causes [of conflict] can come together in a brief window, a window ideally suited for mobilizing broader violence. But such events can also have extremely positive outcomes if the tensions … are recognized and handled well”. The social contract is held in the social and spatial distribution of rights and responsibilities between citizens and the state ( Ibid. : 7). Where the social contract is contested post- disaster by the state, citizenry or subgroups, regime instability opens up ( Ibid. ). The moments that rights are claimed or denied can be seen as potential tipping points for political change ( Ibid. : 14). Disasters thus test the resilience of the social contract, and a resilient social contract allows disaster- affected people to ‘talk back’ to their protectors and call them to account. In many disaster situations predominantly social behaviour and social cohesion can be found (Warner 2013).

As reported by Goldstone (2008: 285) a stable state needs to have two general qualities: effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness reflects how well the state carries out state functions such as providing security, promoting economic growth, making law and policy, and delivering social services. Legitimacy reflects whether state actions are perceived by elites and the population as ‘just’

11 or ‘reasonable’ in terms of prevailing social norms. When a state is both effective and legitimate the state is usually resistant to failure. States with either effectiveness or legitimacy are unstable and prone to failure under changing circumstances. Failed states then are those states “that have lost both effectiveness and legitimacy” (Goldstone 2008: 286). Goldstone (2008: 288) continues his paper suggesting five major pathways that comprise the most common processes leading to state failure: escalation of communal group (ethnic or religious); state predation (corrupt or crony corralling of resources at the expense of other groups); regional or guerrilla rebellion; democratic collapse; and succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states. These pathways are signals from the state to the society that the effectiveness or legitimacy of the government is changing dramatically, or is about to change. “To avoid or respond to state failures, and to establish the foundations of strong and resilient states, state institutions with strong legitimacy and effectiveness must be developed” (Goldstone, 2008: 295).

Additionally, Call (2010: 306) recognizes the focus on legitimacy and capacity / effectiveness. He disputes the utility of ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ states and proposes that “discrete categories of analysis can better identify specific problems whose solutions are both more apparent and more contextually appropriate” (Call 2010: 304). He argues that three crucial gaps – capacity, security, and legitimacy – provide a tool by which supposedly failed states can be sorted, a useful lens through which to analyse the challenges faced by states, and to formulate policy (Call 2010: 306, 309).

Finally, Rotberg (2003: 14) seems to have a counter-intuitive view since he believes that failing is not that easy. Both will and neglect are necessary to cross from weakness into failure. Failed states do not respond effectively on popular discontent nor accommodate effectively dissident political challenges (Rotberg 2003: 21). Three kinds of signals (economic, political and deaths in combat) for impending failure provide clear, timely, and actionable warnings. However, certain evidence that a state will fail cannot be given by a single indicator, but a judicious assessment of several available indicators should provide both quantifiable and qualitative warnings. This can be followed by avoidance manoeuvres and efforts at prevention can be mounted (Rotberg 2003: 22). In addition, Rotberg ( Ibid. ) believes that state failure is largely man-made, not accidental. Deficiencies mostly hark back to decisions or actions made by men (rarely women).

2.2 Religion and disasters

In the late 1970s scholars argued that people’s behaviour in the face of natural hazards is contextual and constrained by social, economic and political forces (political neglect, social marginalization and limited access to livelihoods), which compel helpless people to live and work in hazard-prone areas. This perspective emphasizes people’s vulnerability. Recommendation to mitigate the vulnerabilities are poverty reduction, fair access to land and resources, greater government investments in social services, and so on. In addition, community-based disaster risk reduction is emphasized, which underscores peoples’ participation in hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment (Gaillard & Texier 2010: 82).

Disasters basically result from the conjunction between the occurrence of a harmful natural hazard (such as earthquake, volcanic eruption, floods, and cyclone) and a vulnerable human society. Overall, the assertion is that the occurrence of disasters is increasing. In times of disasters, religion attracts attention of the media, who eagerly cover alleged ‘acts of God’ or fatalistic attitudes of

12 victims. Furthermore, within the tradition of the three major monotheist religions (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity) disaster stories are omnipresent (Gaillard & Texier 2010: 81).

This concept of religion, natural hazards, and disasters looks to disasters as acts of God and the punishment of deities. It emphasizes victims' guilt and sinfulness, which is to be punished by nature’s extremes. There are noticeable changes in Christian attitudes towards victims. This means that in the vast majority of cases relief can proceed without the need to reconcile concepts of a loving God with the reality of human suffering, because the divine presence is to be found in the distress of victims and is not viewed as a function of the physical processes that trigger disaster

The aforementioned conception allegedly leads to inappropriate or helpless behaviours in the face of natural disasters. Significant shortcomings of this conception are first that it fails to consider the diversity of religious beliefs throughout the world and basically follows the concept of (non-universal) deities’ command over and punishment of sinful people. Religions are always embedded in local cultural contexts, for example Christian conceptions of disasters which differ around the world. They can never be separated from the larger picture, as it always interacts with social, economic and political constraints in the construction of people’s vulnerability in the face of natural hazards. People’s assessment always balances a large array of losses and benefits for their everyday life. Furthermore, religion can lead to discrimination, which in turn may lead to greater vulnerability and unequal access to aid in the aftermath of disasters. Similarly, religion may hinder quick recovery (if a religion for instance prohibits to keep savings in interest-based bank accounts), and also as coping strategy in the face of recurring hazards or disasters in religious communities. Referring to Gods is a convenient and rational way of pointing to someone or something that is out of people’s reach. Prayer has also been considered to be both mentally and socially effective in coping with disastrous situations (Gaillard & Texier 2010: 82, 83).

The case of Buddhist communities of Southern Thailand demonstrates that resorting to religious practices in a time of hardship should be seen as a potential resource (Lindberg-Falk 2010 in: Gaillard & Texier 2010: 81). The case of Venezuela shows the power of religious rhetoric. In 1999 torrential rains in Caracas and a neighbouring region were followed by massive landslides, destroying entire neighbourhoods and created a national emergency. The Venezuelan Parliament declared a state of emergency and gave full executive powers to President Chavez. The disaster combined two phenomena: communion in misfortune, because it struck all categories of society indiscriminately; triggering a national response that momentarily unites the nation in a common effort, seems to suspend ordinary social hierarchies and class distinctions. “The humanitarian principle according to which all lives are equal seemed to prevail over the injustice of social inequality” (Guilhot 2012: 96). A powerful religious rhetoric was used by Chavez, and he offered the wounded and divided nation a prospect of atonement. The state of emergency was the price to pay for it (Fassin & Vasquez 2005: 394). The disaster was depicted as a moment of redemption and rebirth for the nation (Guilhot 2012: 96), and was experienced as a trial making it possible to reconstruct national unity (Fassin & Vasquez 2005: 402).

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2.3 (Faith-Based) Non-Governmental Organizations

2.3.1 Concept of Non-Governmental Organizations The term Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) was initially invented by the United Nations (UN). In article 71 of the UN charter in 1945 the NGOs it was stipulated that NGOs could be accredited to the UN for consulting purposes. So first the term NGO was applied when referring to those societal actors which are international bodies and engage in the UN context. Especially since the 1980s NGOs have also started to be used as societal actors in all sorts engaged outside the UN framework, internationally and nationally, and academics and activists have adopted the term as well (Martens 2002: 271, 272). Nowadays it is impossible to count the number of NGOs in existence due to the rapid proliferation of NGOs in the last decade and the transient nature of many local level operations (Berger 2003: 19).

“There is no agreed-upon common NGO definition in sociological studies” (Martens 2002: 277). Princen and Finger (1994 in Martens 2002: 277) assign the difficulty of characterizing NGOs to the diversity found in the global NGO community, like differences in size, duration, range, ideologies, cultural background and organizational culture. Sociological academic works have developed a couple of characteristics to circumscribe NGOs: non-governmental, non-profit making entities, having non-lucrative claims, non-professionalized societal groups, having a nonviolent character, non- uninational, without governmental representatives, financial and moral support of government to limited extent, not seeking governmental power, and a less permanent organizational structure.

One of the proposed definitions for NGOs including all relevant ideal-typical characteristics is as follows: “NGOs are formal (professionalised) independent societal organisations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level” (Martens 2002: 282). They are formal because NGOs have a minimal organizational structure which allows them to provide for continuous work. They can be professionalised entities because NGO may have paid staff with specifically trained skills, such as fund raising skills, though they remain non-profit-oriented. NGOs are independent since funding should primarily come from donors and membership fees, so they originate from the private sphere ( Ibid. ). According to McCarthy (1992 in Berger 2003: 19) the aim of NGOs is to “serve underserved or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people, to engage in advocacy for social change, and to provide services”.

2.3.2 Faith-based NGOs Among the many NGOs in existence nowadays, an increasingly visible number of organizations are defining themselves in religious terms, referring to themselves as ‘religious’, ‘spiritual’, or ‘faith-based’ (Berger 2003: 16). As Thaut (2008: 3) also notes “faith-based humanitarian agencies are on the rise”, particularly since the 1990s. Christian faith-based agencies are major players in international humanitarianism ( Ibid. 2008: 4), since this growth in number coincided with a “rapid and dramatic expansion in the role, scope and financial power of [NGOs]” in the 1980s (Barrow & Jennings 2001 in Thaut 2008: 4).

The existence of Religious NGOs (RNGOs) is not new in contrast to secular NGOs. Many RNGOs represent new incarnations of previously established religious organizations (Berger 2003: 19, 20). RNGOs are defined as “formal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operates on a

14 non-profit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level” (Ibid. : 16). These NGOs seek to fulfil explicitly public missions, representing a unique mixture of religious beliefs and socio-political activism at all levels of society ( Ibid. ). “The starting point of religious NGOs is the duty-oriented language of religion characterized by obligations toward the divine and others, by a belief in transformative capacities, and a concern for justice and reconciliation” (Falk 2001 in Berger 2003: 19). Stoddard (2003 in Thaut 2008: 4) argues that RNGOs “combine religious values with secular goals”. Indeed in practice the difference between secular and faith-based organizations can be blurred, since secularism is not a clear-cut concept and some parts of it go back to Judeo-Christian origins (Keane 2002 in Benedetti 2006: 851). Besides, as Thaut (2008: 5) recognizes, it may be difficult to distinguish some faith-based agencies from secular agencies beyond their foundation rooted in a certain religious tradition. RNGOs’ activities can be similar in appearance to those of nonreligious NGOs (Berger 2003: 35). In an attempt to understand the differences between these two kinds of agencies, religiosity is defined in degree or pervasiveness. This means that “faith-based agencies reflect secular agencies to a greater or lesser degree based on the extent to which religion informs the organization, mission, and the operations of the agencies” (Thaut 2008: 5).

2.3.3 Christian faith-based NGOs Nineteenth century Christian thought with its emphasis on charity towards others was the precursor of modern humanitarism. Not just spiritual needs were to be met, but also the physical needs of the audience of Christian humanitarian agencies. Barnett and Weiss (2008 in Thaut 2008: 2, 3) note that “it is Christianity and Christian faith-based organizations that so far have had the most significant influence on contemporary humanitarian action”. The main feature of Christian involvement in disaster relief is their provision of funds and direct help. Christians are called to love God and neighbour and to see Christ in all who suffer (Chester & Duncan 2010: 92).

Berger (2003: 23, 33, 34) has executed a sample among 263 RNGOs from two UN bodies which reveals some salient characteristics about Christian NGOs. They tend to focus on their mission on charity and emphasize concepts of “God” and “faith”. Furthermore, they tend to be connected to denominational structures and religious leadership. A characteristic for RNGOs is the enduring extensive networks of congregations, affiliates, organizations, and individuals, which comprise the larger RNGO community. Moreover, RNGOs are able to fuel a sense of moral duty, indignation or outrage, which makes change possible. They appeal to people on that level rather than pure rationality (Berger 2003: 34, 35).

There are two main traditions of Christian faith-based NGOs: the Protestant (the main actors are World Vision, World Council of Churches, Lutheran World Federation etc.) and the Catholic (the main actors are Caritas, CRS etc.) (Benedetti 2006: 852). Protestant and Catholic theology is distinctive in many ways. Walton's chart (1986) provides a reference guide to the major differences between Catholic and Protestant theology. Elements as authority, Bible, free will, divine grace, salvation, sacraments, transubstantiation, and prayer to saints. Protestants believe in the authority of the Bible, Sola Scripture; the Word (Bible) as the sole source of God's revelation to mankind, while Catholics believe both the Bible and the sacred Roman Catholic tradition are equally binding upon the Christian. For example, praying to saints and purgatory is based on the traditions. The authority for the church differs as well. Protestants believe that the Bible teaches that all believers are enabled

15 to understand the message of the Bible, while Catholics believe in apostolic succession, so subsitutes of Christ (the Pope).

The spectrum of faith-based humanitarianism is broad. Christians can come to a different conclusion on the necessity for a humanitarian ethic (Thaut 2008: 12). Pervasiveness for example varies considerably among Christian NGOs. In other words, NGOs differ in how their Christian character is expressed. When a NGO identifies itself with a religious tradition, still staff or membership is mainly composed of non-practising Christians (Benedetti 2006: 852). “The religious roots of Christian faith-based agencies may have very little influence on their structure and programs, while in other cases the religious tradition underlying some agencies may be essential to the character of the organization” (Thaut 2008: 6). Therefore, Benedetti (2006: 852, 853) conceptualises a polarisation among Christian NGOs, while acknowledging that there is not a clear cut divide in reality. He makes a subdivision into two ideal types of Christian faith-based organizations (CFBOs): secular and militant CFBOs. These CFBOs differ in terms of their degree of religiosity. Secular CFBOs have a low religious pervasiveness in membership and mission, resulting in similar language as secular NGOs. Nonetheless, “their mission still uses Christianity as a reference point and ideology”, so they do not fit into the approach of secular NGOs ( Ibid. : 853). The underlying process governing includes spiritual guidance, which goes beyond social responsibility, asserting ‘Rights’ and ‘Wrongs’, ‘Truths’ and ‘Untruths’ (Berger 2003: 31). The other type, militant CFBOs, refers to NGOs with high religious pervasiveness both in membership (which might require high religious motivations) and mission (Benedetti 2006: 853). The Gospel is actively sought to be spread (Ghandour in Benedetti 2006: 853).

CFBOs can create some tensions and advantages in international humanitarianism. Especially Evangelistic-humanitarian agencies engaged in evangelism may compromise the very principles of humanitarianism, complicate the delivery of assistance and for other aid agencies, and raise ethical concerns (Thaut 2008: 36). Furthermore, Thaut (2008: 38) raises the tension whether contemporary humanitarianism has truly broken with its roots in nineteenth century colonialism and Christian missions. Another tension is the relationship between secular and faith-based agencies, because partnership between the two may not be a viable option or desire of either type of agency ( Ibid. 39). As advantages of CFBOs which Thaut ( Ibid. : 40) notes, is firstly their ability to provide humanitarian assistance through channels not necessarily open to secular agencies. Secondly, besides connecting with local churches, these agencies are also able to bring local churches together across denominations to meet the needs of the local community. They are also more sensitive to the intersection of spirituality and science in traditional communities and therefore they have the advantage to navigate and understand the relationship and its implications for humanitarianism (Ibid. : 41, 42).

Thaut (2008: 42 – 44) also notes four justifications of the faith-based approach from the perspective of aid agencies. The first one is the right they have to discuss their faith. Second, the theological roots of the agencies are used as defence, such as obeying God rather than men (according Acts 5:29 NIV). Third, the Christian message is considered integral to the success of relief and development projects. The humanitarianism that incorporates the Christian message is essential to the long-term success of community aid projects, since by offering the Christian message to a community that contrasts the disempowering aspects of the local spirituality or religion. The final

16 response embraces interfaith dialogue, welcoming collaboration with secular agencies and those of non-Christian religions. CFBOs role is curtailing rather than creating tensions.

2.3.4 Operationalization of identity of Christian faith-based NGOs Jochemsen (2010 in: Westerveld 2011: 34) distinguished identity into formal (confessed) and factual (expressed). Formal identity forms the identity “as it is formulated in the formal documents like regulations, identity documents, visions. This is the identity of the ‘structure’”. Factual identity “is the whole of characterizing manners by which the institution functions in practice and wherein faith and worldviews are determining elements” ( Ibid. ).

Four important dimensions (Buijs et al. 2003 in: Westerveld 2011: 35) for illustrating that differences between formal and factual identities can occur, are: 1) Constituency identity: organizations can be connected to a specific group / denomination that gives them right to exist and also provides certain viewpoints. 2) Content identity: the organization, in its approach, tries to give an account for that what drives its founders and its members and employees. In general Christian development aid, visions, approaches, strategies and instruments have to serve a transformation of persons and / or communities “that leads people from outside the Kingdom inside the sphere of its influence” (Van der Lee 2003 in: Ibid. ). 3) Target group identity: cooperation with local partners that uphold comparable views of life. 4) Personnel / employee identity: identity is concretised in the actions of people, they give meaning to an identity of their own background as perspective.

Table 1. Operationalization of the concept identity. Formal identi ty Factual identity Constituencies

Content

Target group

Personnel

Westerveld (2011: 14) adds in his research three components of Christian development aid: 1) Missionary works: sending of the people to tell about the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the possible reconciliation between humans and God. 2) (World)diaconate: the Christian servitude to people that are in (material) need. Focus on deed component. 3) Development cooperation: structural combat against poverty and reinforcement of the development possibilities of marginalized population groups.

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2.3.5 Taxonomy of Christian faith-based NGOs Thaut (2008: 9 – 12) sets up another taxonomy of Christian faith-based humanitarianism. Agencies will be examined across four categories – mission, source of legitimacy or authority, donor support and staff environment – aiming to understand the significance of religion to the humanitarianism of faith-based agencies. The RNGOs’ mission can reflect varying degrees of religiosity; some indistinguishable from secular NGOs and some actively seeking to spread Christ’s message. “Christian beliefs may shape both the mission of the humanitarian agency and its operations” ( Ibid. : 10). The source of an agency’s authority or legitimacy has its influence when agencies are formally affiliated with a particular religious denomination. Agencies which accept government funds may struggle to maintain the values and goals of the agency. (Eade 2001 in Thaut 2008: 11). Faith-based agencies rely less on government funds to maintain organizational independence and are mostly privately funded from within the religion itself (Berger 2003: 28). Finally, the working culture or staff policies of faith-based agencies can require staff to confirm their Christian faith or they do not distinguish on religious beliefs (Thaut 2008: 11).

The framework of Richard Niebuhr of 1951 also serves as a useful framework for analysing CFBOs, most closely associated with Protestant Christianity with the liberal tradition, which according to conservative Protestant dominations in the U.S. conflate Christian life with the secular culture (Thaut 2008: 15). Niebuhr presents five ‘Christ and culture’ paradigms which try to capture Christians’ understanding of their relationship with Christ determines how they perceive their relationship with and obligation to culture (society) and its institutions. This framework is transposed and expanded by Thaut (2008: 13) to the level of Christian agencies of humanitarianism, to illuminate how Christian beliefs may translate into a humanitarian obligation to respond in particular ways to the suffering and the needs of others in the world. Put in other words: “each category of the taxonomy is not necessarily all encompassing but provides a general framework for understanding how the foundational theology of faith-based organizations informs their humanitarianisms” ( Ibid. : 33). The paradigms and their contribution to classifying a particular type of Christian humanitarianism will be explored now. Appendix 1 summarizes the taxonomy in a table, showing for each group characteristics related to its type, mission, authority / legitimacy, working culture, financial support and examples of aid agencies in the particular group.

Accommodative humanitarianism (Christ of culture) Christ’s life serves as the model for living the Christian life in the world. Cultural Christians must serve Christ by participating in secular culture and in a language that it understands. This faith- based humanitarianism, also known as secular-oriented or ‘accommodative humanitarianism’, has religious roots, but its operations are not designed to meet a religious goal. Its religiosity is less pronounced in its mission and operations. An explicitly faith-based mission is not emphasized, but instead these kind of agencies is centred on assistance as their chief end (Thaut 2008: 17, 18).

Synthesis humanitarianism (Christ above culture) The Christian must live with high moral standards as Christ did, but God extends his grace and love to humans by conveying it through the great social institutions of family, state and church (Thaut 2008: 21). “Social institutions and their construction of moral standards help order society” (Ibid. ). The synthesist affirms both Christ and culture without making Christ relative to the views of time. Christian engagement in social engagement is essential. The synthesist also tries to maintain a more distinctive demarcation between what is of Christ and what is of the social order. So there is

18 room for cooperation with the secular world, but believers must maintain their Christian distinctiveness ( Ibid. : 22, 23). The mission of synthesis humanitarianism is serving others as an expression of Christian love and faith, which reflects God’s divine order for peaceful societies. “Christ must be central to any perceived solution” ( Ibid. : 23). Catholic agencies are particularly illustrative which reflect a Synthesis-humanitarianism ( Ibid. : 24).

Evangelistic humanitarianism (Transformer of culture + Christ and culture) According to the transformer of culture paradigm humanity’s essential problem is “that its good nature is inherently corrupted by sin, which hampers efforts to create a good society” (Thaut 2008: 27). Spiritual transformation through Christ changes society for the better, and it is the antidote to the brokenness or suffering of the world. Since Christ is a transformer of human spirits, it is not at its core evil or unredeemable. There is a possibility for social renewal or restoration. So the tone of the conversionist is clearly positive and shows hopefulness that society can be transformed as human lives are transformed ( Ibid. : 27, 28).

The second paradigm, Christ and culture in paradox, includes the theology of apostle Paul with a view of “Christian and secular establishments as useful merely in their ability to restrain and expose sin rather than to guide men to divine righteousness” (Thaut 2008: 28). Only acceptance of Jesus Christ 1 can bring spiritual and subsequently social transformation. Moreover, this dualists view tends towards “a conservative Christianity that is largely concerned with the spiritual condition of the church, a focus on eternal rather than temporal goals” ( Ibid. : 29).

These two paradigms merge together into the Evangelistic humanitarianism, since they both hold on to spiritual transformation as the only force which can truly change and create a godly or just society. “The most important work of Christians is to spread the Christian gospel in order to bring the spiritual transformation that society needs and that advances the kingdom of God on earth” (Thaut 2008: 29). The paradigms define together Evangelistic humanitarianism, which has as primary mission to “meet the needs of and expand the fellowship of Christian believers” ( Ibid. : 30). The combination of Christian witnessing within the operations of humanitarianism can bring the spiritual transformation which is at the root of the world’s problems ( Ibid. ).

Radical non-engagement (Christ against culture) Unfortunately Thaut (2008) did not elaborate on this type of Christian humanitarianism, except what is written in the table of Appendix 2. However, the name of this type shows the meaning of it already: humanitarian non-engagement and the focus on Christian fellowship (Thaut 2008: 14).

2.4 Church – state models

Brugger (2011: 2) sketches in his article about church – state models the minimal requirements of or distinction between the spheres of church and states, based on modern constitutional law and human rights treaties, including the guarantee of freedom of religion and equality of religions. In this section church stands for a “religious organization in general, regardless

1 Accepting Jesus Christ is hard to explain, since it is a common term used in Christianity, but academiccally difficult to grasp. Within this thesis I mean that a person is dedicated to Jesus Christ, which means that someone wants to live his / her life for the sake of Jesus Christ according to His example.

19 of whether they are loosely or strongly organized, or formally or informally recognized by law” ( Ibid. : 2).

Nowadays modern institutions prescribe the framework in which we operate, as well as fundamental rights in modern right treaties. “In modern constitutional law and human rights treaties the range of acceptable church-state relations is based on respect for three conditions: some separation or distance or division and basic respect for liberty and equality in religious affairs” (Brugger 2011: 3). This raises questions about the extent of nearness, convergence or even cooperation between church and state is conceivable. Brugger ( Ibid. : 1, 2) then discusses three models of church-state interaction entitled as separation / distance, equality, and nearness, with respect to their advantages and shortfalls to freedom and religion and equality of religion. Each of these models position themselves in the framework of modern constitutionalism and human rights law ( Ibid. : 3, 4). The range of flexibility with regard to church – state relations differ. To illustrate one can look to France and Turkey, since there exists a great distance between church and state.

Freedom of religion from state through great distance and strict separation The starting point of this separationist approach is that the fundamental right of freedom of religion means the greatest distance between church and state, as well as between government and individual religions. Only by this great distance from the power of the state believers and their churches can develop, without being molested from the encroachment of the power of the state. This is how religions can purely develop their doctrine and formulate and enact their own rules. In principle, all religions profit in this approach, although minority religions are the real winners since “the legal order will not favour that they be observed, scorned, or antagonised by the ruling powers in politics or from mainstream religions” (Brugger 2011: 5). The state does not notion nor action, and religions are “competitors in a vast, uninhibited marketplace of transcendence” ( Ibid. ). The government concentrates on protecting the secular interests of material well-being and freedom from violence ( Ibid. ). The French state can be regarded “as a political and legal model with a high degree of separation – based on legal regulation – between religions and political power in order to preserve and enhance individual freedom in the domain of religious and non-religious beliefs” (Beaufort et al. 2008: 3).

However, the distance model also puts certain things into perspective. In case the state wishes to control the inner relationships of a religious community in order to protect individuals from discrimination, ‘too much’ religion, ‘false’ religion, ‘illegal coercion’, or ‘forbidden force’, this model is naturally fractured and loses the claim of giving distance the highest priority (Brugger 2011: 6).

Examples of concrete situations to explain this model are for example state subsidy for buses which brings students from home to school and back home again (Brugger 2011: 7). Not just to public schools, but also to private and religious schools. Seen from the vantage point of maximum possible distance of strict distance, the separation between church and state is weakened by the transport subsidy. Another example concerns placing a Christmas tree during the Christmas season on public property, such as a city park ( Ibid. ). Seen through the lens of the distance model, “use of the word ‘Christ’ in ‘Christmas tree’ is already an impermissible mixture and would lead to the appearance of one-sidedness on the part of state power” ( Ibid. : 8).

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Advantages of this model are the guarantee of maximum purity and freedom of religious doctrine as opposed to state regulation, and state power simply stays away from the spectrum of religious thought or organization (Brugger 2011: 8). As disadvantages Brugger ( Ibid. ) notes the unclear relationship between state or constitutional morals opposite religious morals, and the question whether or not the task of eliminating coercion by the state should extend only to the external relationship of communities of faith or also to their intra-community relationships.

Equality of religions as the overriding virtue This model propagates the assurance of equality. The proximity of church to state does not matter, or at least not as much, as long as no forbidden material union between the two exists (Brugger 2011: 9). Equality is seen as strict demand, and often includes prescriptions of special protection and equal opportunities for non-dominating churches and believers. “Losses with regard to keeping a great distance between the worldly and spiritual powers are inevitable, but seen as an appropriate price to pay for substantive equality or equalization” ( Ibid. ).

Examples of concrete situations to explain this model is displaying a symbol of the majority religion in a public school. It depends primarily on whether the religious symbols of the minority religions are also displayed, as well as for those who practice no religious belief or symbols of a secular nature. In the previously mentioned example of the school bus, transport subsidy is no problem, so long as equality of all students is protected (Burger 2011: 9, 10).

The equality approach, within the framework of basic, although not strict, separation certainly has advantages in line with the political goal of integrating minority religions. Conversely, privileged help for minority religions can also lead to a loss of legitimacy and integrative effect on the side of believers from majority religions (Brugger 2011: 11). “Members of mainstream beliefs or citizens generally could come to the conclusion that states and law would no longer be generally valid and in that sense ‘neutral’, but would create a special status for minorities and their sensibilities” ( Ibid. : 11). A blending of church and state occurs, together with ‘impurities’ in the secular and spiritual spheres, seen from the perspective of the distance theory. “An increase in demands of equal treatment or special facilitation of all possible religions and churches, up to the smallest communities, is also probable” ( Ibid. : 12).

Integration through a rapprochement of civil religion and constitutional ethics This model works towards an approximation between civil religion and state, or rather constitutional, ethics. The motto of this model is rather convergence, “a mutual complementation of the two powers to the point of cooperation with regard to the pool of morals or public spirit, on which the entire social order is dependent” (Brugger 2011: 12). Convergence in this case does not mean equalization or total identification between a religion and governmental structures. “Despite constitutive differences, a certain level of connectedness can also legitimately exist so that such a convergence is not merely an expression of power-politics controlled by the majority on one side or the other” ( Ibid. : 13).

Concerning the complementary relationship of public and religious morality, Brugger (2011: 13) refers to the fact that engaged citizens are not only shaped by the state or state schools, but rather also with the help and support of their families, religions, and communities of faith. These are called ‘core communities’. “It has the character of a structural analogy. In all three spheres

21 characterized as core groups, the family, the church, and the political community, an appropriate understanding of public welfare is the goal (albeit not always achieved). Welfare in these communities encompasses the well-being of the individual yet also moulds and is open to the ideals of the good life as interpreted in these broader communities. Thus, the occasionally fragile individual personality can find orientation, direction and substantive goals as more or less binding offers for himself or herself” ( Ibid. 13).

“The concept of nearness refers to a historical weight in certain areas in which a meaningful part of the community’s shared morals are heavily formed by and lean toward a particular, majority religious tradition, such as Christianity in Europe in general” (Brugger 2011: 14). According to Burger (Ibid. ) the moral and political identity of a country consists of a particular mix of habitualized and institutionalized mindsets and valuations which have transformed over time into a certain set of individual, societal, and political characteristics that reach beyond any attribute of ‘individual, society, and polity’. Civil religion came into existence when a country has been especially influenced by a particular religion, like Christianity in the West. This religion has usually worked itself into some or even many aspects of public and constitutional morality. Civil religion connotes the expansion of an original genuine, religious valuation into the public value system; and the ethical judgments still enshrine the depth and bindingness of genuine religious commands ( Ibid. ).

Depending on the historical situation, the following advantage can emerge: the identity and normative unity of a country can view state, family, and religion(s) as worthy of recognition and support. This is possible when the identity and normative unity centre around a common core of civil religion, to which state, family, and religion(s) have all contributed. This basic advantage also brings along possible disadvantages. Nearness, which for example results to stronger recognition of religious powers, leads to strong regard and recognition of the reigning cultural, political, and religious persuasions, insofar as it exists in the relevant country or continent. Critics suspect “on the part of minority religions concerning paternalism, unequal treatment, and discrimination, as well as an unhealthy intermixture of religion and politics” (Brugger 2011: 17).

2.5 Delineation for this research

In this thesis the state is understood in its broader sense, namely the deliverance of public goods to the state’s people (economic and social security); not just guaranteeing (physical) security to its citizens (Leininger 2006: 471). The differences in the nature of the states have been explored by explaining different typologies, which is useful for indicating the nature of the Haitian state. The overall definition of CRISE for a fragile state will be the point of departure for analysing the Haitian state. As indicators for state failure the three dimensions of CRISE (authority failures, service failures, and legitimacy failures) will be used. Thereby, the social contract within Haiti will be taken into account as well.

In this thesis I will just concentrate on international NGOs working in the humanitarian / relief sector. These NGOs have an office in the Netherlands, which made it possible for me to conduct interviews. This means that a wide range of NGOs, such as Haitian NGOs and departments of international NGOs, are not taken into account in this research. The Christian faith-based NGOs which are involved in this research will be examined across several factors – their constituencies, mission, target groups and personnel – that determine the Christian identity. Differences exist

22 regarding the religious roots of Christian faith-based agencies. Within some agencies these roots may have very little influence on their structure and programs (i.e. more secular in nature), while within other agencies the religious tradition may be essential to the character of the organization (Thaut 2008: 6). Being a missionary, diaconal or development cooperation organization influences the identity of an organization. The taxonomy of Thaut (2008) will be used as a framework to understand the significance of putting Christ in the fore of the organization.

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3. Methodology

In this chapter the methods I used during the research will be elaborated. Before doing that, it is important to first reflect on what research paradigm is chosen in the research (3.1), followed by a section on what research methodology is used (3.2). Then the modification of the research topic is explained (3.3). The research methods are presented in section 3.4, and the research population is explained in section 3.5. The way the gathered data has been analysed you can find in 3.6. Finally, the research limitations and the research ethics are discussed in the last two sections (respectively 3.7 and 3.8). 3.1 Research paradigm

In their second chapter of the book Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences Porta and Keating (2008: 19) note that scientists have different views on paradigms in social sciences. Some scientists insist there is just one approach, the scientific approach, while others think that the social world is a multiparadigmatic. Porta and Keating ( Ibid. : 21) constructed some simplified ideal types of rival approaches in order to explain their inherent logic. They discuss issues which provide relevant guidelines for methodological choices often made in research.

Competing approaches in the social sciences are among others contrasted on their epistemological base (Porta & Keating 2008: 21). This is about how we know the things ( Ibid. ). It is about how we come to know the world, and have faith in the truth, or validity, of that knowledge. Different epistemological traditions imply different ways of ‘knowing’ the world, and rather different accounts of the status of that knowledge (Green & Thorogood 2010: 11) As Porta and Keating (2008: 21) state, it is important to be clear which epistemological assumptions one makes in his / her research. The traditional approach of epistemology is positivism, which sees the world as an objective entity, outside of the mind of the observer, and in principle it is knowable in its entirety. The researcher has to describe and analyse this reality. The researcher can be separated from the object of his / her research, so observe in a neutral way, and without affecting the observed object (Porta and Keating 2008: 23). Neo-positivism and post-positivism relaxed these assumptions in that reality is only imperfectly knowable. Constructivism claims that the researcher puts order onto the physical world. Classifications are convenient ways to represent the world; classifications are not determined by the world, as noted by Hacking (1999: Ibid. : 24). “Knowledge is filtered through the theory the researcher adopts” ( Ibid. ). Within the interpretivist approach objective and subjective meanings are deeply intertwined. Rather than relying on universal laws external to the actors, scholars must aim at discovering the meanings that motivate their actions. “Subjective meaning is at the core of this knowledge” ( Ibid. ).

This research is based both on constructivist and interpretative epistemology, since I also question the positivist view that says that “there is one stable, pre-existing reality ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered” (Green & Thorogood 2010: 15). “Knowledge is established through the meanings attached to the phenomena studied. (…) There is no objective reality. Rather, there are multiple realities constructed by human beings who experience a phenomenon of interest” (Krauss 2005: 759, 760). This research has the perspective to find out how phenomena are constructed. Interpretative research should aim to understand human behaviour (Green & Thorogood 2010: 13). Besides, in human life the role of meaning is of paramount importance (Frankl 1963 in Ibid. : 762), as the

24 interpretivist approach also stresses. Since historical events or social phenomena are impossible to understand without looking at the perceptions individuals have from the world outside (Porta & Keating 2008: 24), this research is aimed at discovering and understanding the Haitian context, and the meanings of NGOs’ actions, as ‘meaningful’ actors, and their motivations.

3.2 Research methodology

The methodological question refers to the instruments and techniques scientists use to acquire knowledge (Porta & Keating 2008: 25). Interpretive research lends itself more for qualitative research, “aiming at understanding events by discovering the meanings human beings attribute to their behaviour and the external world” ( Ibid. : 25). Qualitative research adopts an interpretative approach to data, since it “studies ‘things’ within their context and considers the subjective meanings that people bring to their situation” (De Vauss 2008: 10). Research focuses on understanding the world from the point of view of the participants of the study (Green & Thorogood 2010: 25), in this case the Haitian history and context, and Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs. Put in other words, research aims at understanding the human nature, including the diversity of society and cultures (Porta & Keating 2008: 26). Explanations for social outcome comes from the interpretation of people’s motives for their actions ( Ibid. : 27).

3.3 Research topic

Around one year ago I was able to go to Haiti. I stayed in Haiti in November and December 2011, mainly in the Léogâne area. That was possible, since the Dutch NGO Cordaid (at that time executing shelter project in Haiti) provided some places for students of Wageningen University, Delft university and Tilburg university. We as students were allowed to stay in their guest house in Port-au- Prince or in one of the shelters besides the office in Léogâne, a rural area west of Port-au-Prince.

Beforehand my research proposal was entitled ‘the role of religion in aid-interventions in communities of disaster-prone Haiti’. I wanted to gain insight in the community’s social capital, its vulnerabilities and capacities, and the role of religion in aid acceptance. The information I wanted to gather would help me to learn to know the people, the activities, and the structures of the community. Furthermore, it would tell me how the people live, what problems they have and how they react to that. I also wanted to find out what natural hazards threaten the community, or in a broader sense the whole area the communities are part of, in order to find out whether or not there is a potential for community-based interventions on disaster preparedness. Special reference I wanted to make towards religion, because of personal interest and of expected importance within the Haitian society.

I conducted my research in Lompré, commune of Léogâne. This area consisted of around 12 small villages, and I visited in particular 4 villages thereof. It turned out that in the settlements the residents were aware of the main hazards in their areas: floods and hurricanes. Again and again people told me about their lack of money and tools to prevent damage, and they complained the government was not doing anything. When I came back in the Netherlands, I was not satisfied with my own result. It did not seem I had gathered some new insights for Cordaid, nor that I was able to complete my research with the gathered information. That is why I decided to modify my topic into the issues I described in the previous two chapters.

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When I was living in Haiti I heard a lot of dissatisfaction from the side of the residents in Lompré towards the government. The government was hardly doing anything from them. When I visited a training of the German Red Cross for community representatives, I met a local government official. I had the chance to meet him and together with some of his colleagues in the town hall of Léogâne, who were working for the committee ‘communal de la protection civile’. The officials seemed to be well-informed about the hazards in the area. Moreover, they told me that they were working on sensitization among the people of the hazards and trying to strengthen them. I do not know anymore what exactly else, but still I got the impression that the government is present in a certain way in Haiti. That was contradicting to the image I got when I read the international media, which characterize Haiti as a fragile state with a corrupt government. I wanted to know the real, complete picture of this. At the same time, my personal interest in Christian faith-based NGOs was still there, and that is why I sought the way to incorporate them as well in my research. Due to the modification of my topic I did not add much of my field results in this research.

3.4 Research methods

The research consisted of two parts: field research in Haiti and desk study back home in the Netherlands. During these two phases I made use of method triangulation, meaning that data, produced by different data collection techniques, are compared (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007: 184). The combination of different kinds of data is one thing, but rather it is an attempt to relate different sorts of data in such a way as to counteract various possible threats to the validity of the analysis (Ibid. ). The methods used in this research are literature review, interviews, and participant observation.

Literature review The literature I reviewed was mainly scientific literature which allowed me to write the theoretical framework. I did not only study scientific literature, but also used grey literature, like news websites, websites of ministries and websites of organizations. Scientific literature clarified the terminology used in this research, showed the main debates about state fragility, and provided me information about the historical, political and social context of Haiti. Besides, I also conducted the desk study to find out classifications of Christian faith-based NGOs, and what is known already about these NGOs. It appeared that scholars underscored my own expectation that these NGOs are under- researched. I also collected information about the NGOs I interviewed to be able to understand what kind of Christian faith-based NGOs they are.

Interviews Both during my time in Haiti and in the Netherlands I was able to derive data through interviews. In Haiti I hired a translator who could speak French, Creole and English. During these interviews I made as many notes as possible, simply because I did not have a voice recorder. In the Netherlands I did bring a voice recorder with me. Before the interview started I asked the interviewee for permission to record the interview, and no one had any objection. Since I recorded the interview, I hardly made notes, but I just wrote down some keywords to remind for further questions. After the interview I asked the interviewees if it would be possible to contact them later if I would have follow up questions. That was fine for them, so I made use of that as well by sending some specific questions via email.

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I held the interviews in a semi-structured way. This means that beforehand I prepared some open-ended questions which would cover the scope of my research. During the interview I stirred the interviewee in such a way that all topics would be addressed (DeWalt & DeWalt 2002: 122). Sometimes this was not easy due to limited time or extensive answers of the interviewee on other questions.

Participant observation During my field work in Haiti I made use of the method participant observation. For DeWalt and DeWalt (2002: 2) this “is a way to collect data in naturalistic settings by ethnographers who observe and / or take part in the common and uncommon activities of the people being studied”. Since I lived on the Cordaid base I took part in the daily activities of Cordaid employees in the field and in the office. I joined them while they were delivering materials, holding a committee meeting, and working in the office. Moreover, I visited almost on a daily basis local Haitians in their own settings. All these moments together gave me insight into the activities of Cordaid’s people and the Haitians who live in Lompré.

3.5 Research population

In order to collect field data I interviewed local people, in specific those who were living in Lompré. I chose for this location, since I learned from other Dutch students (at that time also working in Haiti) that this area is disaster prone. I was advised by one of the staff of Cordaid to go to Kafou ti Kalbas, because there would be quite some necessities and disasters happening in the past. Lompré was quite a large area, and Cordaid went there with just one car. Sometimes I could not reach the settlement I wanted, so I was dropped somewhere else. If possible I interviewed the leaders of these settlements, but sometimes just other inhabitants were present. Mostly I came more than once to one settlement to gain more knowledge and meet particular residents who are important according to others.

I changed my topic after my return from Haiti, but still I wanted to know more about Christian faith-based NGOs, and their work in Haiti. Therefore, I chose Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs, because these were easy to reach. I searched on the website of Prisma, an association of a large number of Christian development organizations (Prisma 2012). On that website I could search NGOs which are working on emergency aid. I first selected the NGOs which work on that topic in Haiti, while having in mind that probably more NGOs could be interviewed later if I would have time. The NGOs which I found via this way were Tear, ZOA, Woord en Daad, and World Vision. Cordaid, Medair and ICCO I knew myself, so I approached these three organizations as well. I talked to (ex-) employees of the different NGOs in their office or in their own houses. These persons had visited or lived in Haiti, or they are working in Haiti for their own organization.

The organizations Tear, Woord en Daad, ZOA, Medair and ICCO were chosen, because they clearly state on their website, in their mission or name that they have Christian roots, or refer to their faith as motivation to help people. Another criterion for these organizations was that they work in Haiti, so that the interviewees could share out of their own working experience. The reason that the NGOs are all Dutch is that I just could interview NGOs in the Netherlands. There are some differences in the organization. For example, Woord en Daad is working in Haiti for around 25 years already, while Medair arrived in Haiti after the earthquake of 2010. Also, I expected that there would

27 be some difference in how the organization expresses the Christian faith-based identity within and outside their organization. Moreover, there are differences in foci as well. Woord en Daad is mainly supporting schools in all the years they are working in Haiti, while Medair Haiti is just after the earthquake supporting communities with shelters, water, sanitation etc. In the process of making interview appointments, World Vision refused to cooperate due to personal circumstances of the representative. I also held an interview with an expert, who worked for almost 30 years in Haiti for two Christian NGOs. Out of his experiences he answered my questions. Concerning Tear, I interviewed the interim area coordinator of Léogâne from Tearfund UK in Haiti, while I interviewed one of the staff from the office of Tear in the Netherlands as well. Unfortunately, I was not able anymore to include Cordaid. Communication with Cordaid was sought, but only in the last weeks it was possible to be really in touch with the employees of Cordaid The Hague. Therefore, time constraints made it impossible for me to include Cordaid into the research population.

3.6 Data analysis

During my field work in Haiti I processed the data from the interviews into a summary document with the main findings. Before that, I had transcribed all the interviews. After my research in Haiti I started the literature study for the theoretical background of this thesis, and the history of Haiti. At the same time I started to do interviews with NGOs, which I all transcribed. I read all my interviews again, and after that I summarized my interview data into different topics shown in the table below. By categorizing my interviews into different themes, I was able to make comparisons between the NGOs, but also for example on their views on the Haitian state. The analysis of my data will be discussed in chapters 5 to 7.

Table 2. Topic list for research analysis Topics Perceptions of NGOs on Haitian state

Perceived problems with the Haitian government

Relation government – NGOs

Relation church – state Haiti

Characteristics of NGOs

Church and Chri stian organizations of Haiti

3.7 Ethical considerations

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“There are ethical issues surrounding social research, just as there are with any other form of human activity” (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007: 209). Five headings are to be considered: informed consent, privacy, harm, exploitation, and consequences for future research ( Ibid. ).

Concerning informed consent I can say that both to Haitians and to employees of NGOs I explained the objective of my research. They were also cooperating voluntarily with me. For example, respondents in Lompré were waiting for me when I had an appointment. Especially when they knew me a bit better, they were more talkative, and one respondent said she felt it to be an honour to be interviewed by me. The NGOs I contacted via email, in which I explained what I wanted and I asked them if they were willing to help me by talking to me. Mostly people were willing to find a spot in their tight schedule just before the summer holidays.

The interviewees’ privacy is guaranteed, because I do not mention the names of them in this research, but just the names of the organizations. Neither I spread the transcriptions of my interviews on the internet or anywhere else.

I do not think that I created harm to anyone by executing my research. Employees of NGOs were rather enthusiastic about it. However, talking about Cordaid with the local people in Haiti sometimes triggered some feelings. Apparently considerable emotion, like dissatisfaction, mistrust, frustration, was the result of discussing Cordaid. Hopefully the relationship between these people and Cordaid did not worsen after my interviews.

I felt however like I was exploiting the people of Lompré. I discussed sometimes with Cordaid staff the answers of people, but I could not do anything for them. I was just there for my own purpose, and they supplied me with information which I can use, but I had hardly given anything in return. Some persons even told me: you are not the first here to ask us questions, and then leave without hearing any more from you. I could fully understand that, but still was there with empty hands. However, I tried to satisfy them through some ways: providing water and cake, buying dinner from them for quite much, and buying a meal for one respondent without a job. Concerning the interviewees of the NGOs, I hardly felt the same, because they have more economic security than me. I felt less bad to 'use' them for my research, although I used quite some hours of valuable time. I gave them a small acknowledgment of appreciation.

Lastly, I think that my research does not contain information which people are not allowed to see. Refusing access in the future or clashes of interests I do not expect.

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4. History and context of Haiti

A well-grounded account of the earthquake must go deep into the history of Haiti to explain what caused the country's chronic disabilities. “The decades preceding the earthquake set the stage not only for what occurred during the acute event but also for the challenge of reconstruction” (Farmer, 2011: 4). This is shared by Fatton (2011: 158): “It is impossible to understand Haiti’s political and economic predicament in the aftermath of the catastrophic earthquake of January 12, 2010, without analysing the relatively distant past of the late 18th century”. This chapter puts the research findings in an appropriate perspective by providing a brief review of Haitian history to show the main factors throughout Haiti’s history that still have an impact on Haiti as it is today.

4.1 Colonialism, independence and isolation

In 1492 Christopher Columbus landed on the island of Hispaniola and founded the first Spanish settlement in the New World. Hispaniola is one of the Antillean islands, located about 600 miles from Florida. Haiti is the western third of it, while the Dominican Republic is on the rest of the island. When Columbus arrived with some of his family, they intended to set up a plantation economy for the settlement based on the cultivation of sugar cane. The original slaves on the sugar plantations were the native Arawak (Caribe) Indians. Due to maltreatment, overwork, and infectious diseases they soon began to succumb. To replace the rapidly declining Arawak population, African slaves began to be transported to Hispaniola around 1513 (Miller 2000: 205).

French pirates used the northern part of the island as a base for operations. In 1603 the Spanish administration forcibly evacuated the population of that part of Hispaniola due to the vulnerability of the area to attacks. Spain recognized in 1697 French rule of the complete western part of Hispaniola, which received the name Saint Dominique (Miller 2000: 205). “It rapidly became France’s richest colony, furnishing two thirds of France’s overseas trade and supplying around half of Europe’s tropical produce” (Abbott 1988 in: Miller 2000: 205). The combination of cheap land, African labor and European capital was richly productive. By 1791 more than 864,000 enslaved Africans were imported into the colony. The Saint Dominque trade, consisting of sugar, molasses, rum and coffee, was astonishing (Mintz 1995: 75). Mintz (1995: 75) calls the French Saint Dominique ‘the zenith of the Atlantic slave system’ by the mid-eighteenth century. It was also called ‘La perle des Antilles’, meaning ‘Jewel of the Caribbean’, due to the wealth the country provided to France (Pierre-Louis 2011: 188).

The plantation colony in Saint Dominique developed a distinctive social structure of its own. Three classes of people emerged. The first class emerged swiftly, and was the spirited, vigorous and clever free people ( gens de couleur) and their descendants. This group was intermediate in colour, status, and power, and socially situated between the large planters ( grands blancs) on the one hand, and the vast mass of enslaved Africans ( affranchis) on the other. The last group is called ‘freed people’ ( affranchise) , while many were the second- or third-generation descendants of freed slaves, and the majority is African-born. The number of people living in Saint Dominque in 1790 was slightly more than half a million, of whom 452,000 slaves, 40,000 were whites (planters and tradespeople and menials of limited means), and 28,000 were gens de couleur or affranchis . These gens de couleur were mostly the children (and descendents) of the unions of planters with their female slaves. Mostly

30 the children were sent to France to be educated and empowered to inherit. They often became owner of great quantities of land and slaves. These affranchis were true Creoles; neither Europeans, nor Africans; slave-owning; and power-holding people (Mintz 1995: 76).

Religious gatherings were advantageous for revolutionaries to fight colonial oppression, because these were used as a unifying force as escaped slaves infiltrated the religious meetings with messages of uprising. The general slave revolt and freedom occurred in 1804 (Miller 2000: 206). The French were driven out, and nearly all Europeans went with them. On January 1, 1804, general Jean Jacques Dessalines proclaimed victory (Mintz 1995: 77). The kingdom was renamed Haiti, meaning ‘mountainous land’ in the Arawak Indian language (Courlander 1966 in Miller 2000: 206). “No other nation in world history has ever been created by slaves. They wrested their weapons from the hands of their masters and then threw the masters out” (Mintz 1995: 73).

4.2 Price of independence

There were two warring parties that divided Haiti in two parts after the revolution in 1804: the mulattoes ( gens de couleur) in the south, and the black in the north. The mulatto state was led by general Pétion, and later on by soldier Boyer. (Nowadays you still find in Port-au-Prince the district Pétion-Ville and the square Place Boyer.) The black kingdom was led by Dessalines and later Christophe; both took a militaristic stance. Christophe capitulated after several years and Haiti became reunified (Schuller 2007a: 71).

By the time the Haitian revolution ended, the plantation system lay nearly in ruins, and thousands of people had died or had fled. Haiti’s resources were largely limited to the land itself (Mintz 1995: 80). At the same time, the sovereignty of the country was not recognized neither by the Catholic Church nor by most of the nations that controlled Atlantic foreign trade (USA, France, Spain, and most of Europe). The period between 1804 and 1858 marked the dawn of relative cultural, economic, and religious isolation, in which vodou flourished and spread as the dominant belief system (Miller 2000: 206).

According to Pierre-Louis (2011: 188) Haiti was immediately isolated by the international community due to pressure of Napoleon and French colonialists who ended up in the USA. There were no members of the European nobility who rushed to Saint Dominique to stand on the side of the revolutionary leaders. As Mintz (1995: 77, 78) argues, the Haitian slaves were interested in less stirring issues, but in more personal issues. The Haitian revolution did not have a position in Europe. Most leaders could not write well (if at all), and few had any formal education. They could not appeal to someone (like friends or political ally) in Europe. So the result was that slave-holding states were appropriately delicate in their dealings with Haiti (Ibid. : 78).

The boycott from 1804 to 1825 devastated the country’s economy, which was primarily based on commodities export. Important commodities as cotton, sugarcane, and banana plantations were destroyed by the revolutionary war. Furthermore, Haiti’s infrastructure (such as the education system, roads and ports) collapsed, because the country had to rely on the informal market to trade its goods. The country had also no access to foreign technology to improve its agriculture and economic systems. The educational development was affected most by the economic destruction. Haiti had also to pay for its independence. The destruction of commodities and the indemnities

31 sapped the country’s national treasury and caused a chronic lack of sufficient funds for education (Pierre-Louis 2011: 188).

Haiti was launched in a sea full of the colonies of white European slave-holding states, among them the most powerful nations in the world. The Haitian people had to be punished, to wit by paying substantial indemnities to be paid to France, in exchange for acknowledgement of Haiti’s independence (Mintz 1995: 78). Boyer negotiated France’s recognitions of Haitian independence in 1825 (Schuller 2007a: 71). In 1825 Haiti’s independence was recognized on the condition that it assumed all the losses that the colonialists and French citizens suffered because of the revolution (Pierre-Louis 2011: 188). The Haitian government had to pay France $21 billion, which it has to borrow from foreign banks (Ibid. : 189), since the country was bankrupted by the civil war (Schuller 2007a: 71). 80 percent of all the state’s customs revenue for almost one century (80 years) was required to pay off the loan. An indirect tax on peasantry was implemented, because most revenues were garnered from coffee (Trouillot 1990 in Schuller 2007a: 71). So instead of using state revenues for building school and roads and developing the country’s economy, Haiti had to buy its independence from France. The new nation could not improve its economic situation and fell further behind. Haitian leaders had to govern although constant revolutions, military coups, and social, economic, and political instability occurred (Pierre-Louis 2011: 189). Due to Haiti’s debt service the divisions between the Creole-speaking majority and the French-speaking elites were solidified. French (spoken by 10 percent of Haiti’s educated elite and middle classes) was learned on private schools, and the language of government and business, although Creole was granted official status in the 1987 constitution (Schuller 2007a: 71).

4.3 After independence

The newly emancipated population had to become a servile class of workers, and Haitian rulers used harsh labour discipline on the plantations. Haitian rulers have historically tended to transform themselves into ‘big men’, using corruption. The form of governability is also referred to as ‘the politics of the belly’ ( la politique du ventre ), based on the acquisition of personal wealth through the conquest of state offices. Politics became an entrepreneurial vocation, virtually the sole means of material and social advancement for those not born into wealth and privilege. Controlling the state became a fight to the death to monopolize the sinecures of political power. The presidential monarch uses state power to extract the resources from the popular masses to nourish the political class. The newly freed Haitians just simply wanted to own some land. Haiti evolved into a republic of peasant proprietors who bent mostly on subsistence production, while basic patterns of inequities and power persisted (Fatton 2011: 162, 163). The majority of Haitian people is rural, agricultural, illiterate and speak Creole. Less than 10 percent of the Haitians, a modest minority, speak and write some French, have some education, live in cities, work in professions, service trades, and the government. This is the class of predominantly mulatto property owners who originated from the affranchis class of ‘freemen’ (Dupuy 2007: 25). “The life and fate of Hatians varies from quite rarefied luxury to terrible misery and suffering” (Mintz 1995: 83).

Freedom in Haiti faced severe material constraints that have nurtured brutal processes of class formation in a context of racial divisions. The ones holding political power have used everything to maintain their position of privilege and authority. Also, differences between whites, blacks and mulattoes (in-between people) persisted (Fatton 2011: 162, 163). Fatton agues thus that “the

32 dominant class has controlled the state for its exclusive benefit, using it to extract resources from the poor majority” ( Ibid. : 164). Dupuy (2007: 25) underscores the same by arguing that “rather than serving as an instrument for the development of commodity production and of the economy, and hence of both the economic ruling class and the working classes as a whole, the state became a primary site for the promotion of the interests of a fraction of the dominant classes that would use the state as a source of private enrichment”.

4.4 The American interference

In its history Haiti never had a long period when national interests supported individual ambition. That is why the country several times got occupied in the past two centuries (Pierre-Louis (2011: 189). In 1915 the USA took over, which lasted 19 years. According to Pierre-Louis ( Ibid. ) this had to deal with preventing of Germany to take over. The U.S. army created a new political and economic class, a semblance of political stability and some development, but failed to produce a more responsive system. They dissolved the Haitian parliament in 1917, rewrote the Haitian constitution, centralized power in Port-au-Prince, promoted the expansion of a technocratic, largely black, middle class, organized regular elections at which figureheads presidents were chosen, and formed new armed forces of the state to safeguard new institutions (Gélin-Adams & Malone 2003: 292). The Haitian army failed to maintain law and order impartially, but suppressed political opposition while serving the interests of the business elite, which remained the two primary tasks until its demise in 1994 ( Ibid. ). The Americans improved the health, education and infrastructures, but nevertheless the occupation further deepened the wide economic disparities in Haitian society. Primarily foreign investors, proxies, state officials and elite groups benefited. Gélin-Adams & Malone (Ibid. : 293) state that the American economic policy was never primarily intended to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. A wage earning proletariat came into existence, since the state which forced many small landholders to sell their land to foreign companies. The Haitian working class resisted to such policies due to the exploitative conditions. The catholic church initially welcomed the Americans, who supported the eradication of vodou. In sum, the occupation caused authoritarian regimes who kept on relying upon repression, coercion, and political machination to maintain their monopoly on power and the country’s resources ( Ibid. ).

4.5 Era of the Duvaliers

The period between 1934 and 1957 is marked by many regime changes. Presidents of both the mulatto group and the black group were leading alternately the country for years or months. These presidents favoured their own group in the administration. In 1957 Fancois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier was elected, which marked the beginning of a new era of enforced stability and the transformation of the state into a tool of personal power (Gélin-Adams & Malone 2003: 294). He established an authoritarian system, based on personalized, centralized power and the systematic repression of the population, mainly by his paramilitary, presidential guard ( Tonton Macoutes ) (Leininger 2006: 490). Duvalier favoured the black bourgeoisie and middle class as a counterweight to the mulatto bourgeoisie’s economic dominance. He wanted to share power with the mulatto bourgeoisie. To achieve this, the latter had to be removed from positions of power or authority in agencies of the state, especially the military. The repressive measures during the regime of Duvalier included all opposition or potential opposition, and it could know no bounds (Dupuy 2007: 32, 33). The regime

33 distinguished itself from all previous governments in its unlimited and indiscriminate use of violence (Pierre-Charles 1973 in: Ibid. : 35). Besides, the Haitian economy was regressing. In all sectors (agricultural, industrial, service, and tourism), Haiti experienced a market decrease in productivity and investments, both domestically and foreign (Dupuy 2007: 39). Duvalier managed to win the support of the USA by clever exploitation of the USA’s fear of communism and Haiti’s proximity to Cuba ( Ibid. : 41).

After a constitutional amendment (to lower the age requirement for the presidency) the son of Duvalier, Jean-Cluade ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier, succeeded his father upon his death in 1971 (Dupuy 2001: 42). He embraced his father’s policies, even though he introduced milder political repression in the hope of obtaining increased foreign assistance. The USA endorsed the new regime and significantly augmented development assistance to Haiti, up to 40 percent of national budget revenues in 1982. However, the strategies of Duvalier could not control the growing discontent. Economic stagnation, oppression and corruption contributed to state weakness. Demonstrations, violent outbursts throughout the country, and an escalating flow of refugees persuaded the USA to invite Duvalier to leave. He left to France in 1986 (Gélin-Adams & Malone 2003: 295).

4.6 Post-Duvalier era

After Duvalier’s downfall opponents of Duvalier and his supporters polarized the country (Leininger 2006: 491). Haiti experienced a political crisis from 1986 to 1990 marked by the rise and fall of four military-dominated governments (Dupuy 2007: 57). In 1987 though, an overwhelming majority of Haitians voted for a new liberal and democratic constitution. The political climate deteriorated, since military juntas took over again and again (Fatton 2002: 66 – 68). In November 1990 the first democratic elections took place, under intense observation of the international community, especially the United Nations (UN) (Leininger 2006: 491).

Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former priest, declared his own candidacy for the presidency, because in his own sense it was his theological duty to do so (Dupuy 2007: 86) and to stop reactionary forces from legitimizing their continued hold on privilege and to empower the marginalized poor (Fatton: 2002: 77). He confronted the military and Duvalierists in an effort to establish a democratic government, modelled on ‘liberation theology’ 2 (Buss & Gardner 2006: 4). He was elected, but in 1991 a military coup against Aristide put his presidency to an end, installing yet another dictatorship. The military became even more repressive ( Ibid. ). The U.S. policy was to take military action against Haiti’s ruling junta and launch Operation Uphold Democracy (Fatton 2002: 92). Aristide was restored to power, but he was compelled to rely on U.S. militarism for his own survival. Shortly after his return, new elections were held (in 1995), since he had only a year left on his term (Buss & Gardner 2006: 4). His former prime-minister, Rene Préval, was elected as president. The next elections took place in 2000, with an overwhelming victory for Aristide, but the elections were farcical (Fatton 2002: 141) and fraudulent (Leininger 2006: 493). Only 5% of the registered voters participated (Buss & Gardner 2006: 4). He believed that he was left with little choice but to rely on his mass base, especially armed gangs, for his support (Dupuy 2007: 143). The legitimacy of Aristide

2 This Christian movement developed in Latin America in the 1950s as a reaction to the conservative approach of the Roman Catholic Church, which for too long had been the church of the wealthy, towards the growing social inequalities and injustices in the region (Steinke 2010: 5).

34 was at stake, and the polarization between him and his political opponents increased further because the latter did not accept the electoral results and therefore rejected Aristide’s presidency. In 2004 the conflict worsened significantly. Aristide’s resignation was demanded by armed rebel groups by extortion. Aristide failed to regain control over the state’s territory, and the rebel groups occupied half of the country. Finally, Aristide renounced the presidency and fled the country (Leininger 2006: 499, 500). After ousting Aristide, MINUSTAH (the UN stabilization mission in Haiti) was constituted since the situation in Haiti threatened international peace and security and stability in the Caribbean (Ibid. : 514). A transition government replaced Aritstide, until the elections in 2006 (Buss & Gardner 2006: 4). Préval was elected again as president after the second overthrow of Aristide in 2004 (Pierre-Louis 2011: 193). After the earthquake of 2010 he resigned, and Michel Martelly succeeded him as the new president. Both Aristide and Baby Doc’ returned to Haiti after respectively 7 years and 25 years in exile (Le Figaro 2011).

In the aftermath of the earthquake a civilian supranational body called the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) displaced the Haitian government. The Haitian parliament dissolved itself in April 2010 and voted for a state of emergency law giving the IHRC complete authority to determine the country’s future over the next 18 months. The mandate of the IHRC is conducting strategic planning and coordination and implementing resources, developing and refining development plans for Haiti, and the Commission is unaccountable to any Haitian representative body (Fatton 2011: 165). The IHRC is co-chaired by both the Haitian Prime Minister and former US President Clinton (Bolton 2011: 13). Its board includes Haitian government officials and appointees from local business and civil society, as well as bilateral and multilateral officials and the Caribbean Community. The IHRC has not been without controversy. Fatton (2011: 166) describes it as an urban, elite, and a foreign phenomenon pretending to speak for the countryside and the poor. Moreover, the Haitian members of the Commission have been nominated through doubtful constitutional means and by a government with limited popular support ( Ibid. ). Oxfam (2011 in: Bolton 2011: 13) criticizes the Commission by describing it as a ‘lacklustre’ and having ‘failed’ in its coordination responsibilities. According to Bolton ( Ibid. : 14) the global relief system in Haiti, embodied in IHRC and the cluster system (see 4.8), represents a form of trusteeship, rather than democratic representation. The international aid agencies do not derive their legitimacy from selection by the people they serve, but from their global standing and their ability to disperse funds, according to Bolton ( Ibid. ).

In November 2010 and March 2011 two rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections took place, and Michel Martelly was elected as new president. Martelly, also known as ‘Sweet Micky’, is a well-known artist and Kompa singer (Kompa is the typical Haitian music genre). He managed to transform his musical popularity into votes (Fatton 2011: 166, 169). He is popular with young voters (Taft-Morales 2011:4). His motto was “to bring joy, to bring music, to bring love, to bring peace, prosperity, development and change in every corner of the country of Haiti” (Charles 2011). Critics raised concern about his lack of education and political or institutional management experience, and his personal financial problems (Taft-Morales 2011:6). Martelly has many plans to reform Haiti, but history has many times shown political instability, so the future will tell what this President is able to achieve.

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4.7 Civil society

According to Schuller (2007: 70), Haiti has a long tradition of civil society or resistance, expressed in African-derived ritual (vodou), storytelling and literature and composed-on-the-spot songs critical of those in power. These forms of civil society were rejected by a variety of sources, such as the Catholic church. According to several scholars the opposition of state and society and the oppression of civil society result from a collusion of internal and external forces ( Ibid. ).

During the authoritarian Duvalier regimes there were two major trends in community development work. The first was that national and international organizations pursued welfare and limited developmental strategies focused on community development, that worked through community structures put in place and controlled by the regime. The second was that of some Haitian NGOs and the church which aimed at social change and an end of the regime (Mangones 2001: 53).

The fall of the dictatorship of Duvalier in 1986 marked the beginning of breaking the silence of the civil society (Fatton 2002: 27). The marginalized classes ( moun andeyo ) demanded their humanity, and claimed their rights to be full citizens, encapsulated in the slogan ‘ tout moun se moun ’ (every human being is a human being). It was the vocal awakening of the ones who had been excluded from the political, social, and economic game ( Ibid. : 27, 28). The Haitian civil society organizations are described by Mangones (2001: 53) as “a myriad collection that reflects the diversity of Haitian organizational expression and commitment to social change”. Civil society organisations were founded, such as neighbourhood associations, women’s organizations, youth groups, and student unions. They are characterized by their main focus on protest, and the call for social change and the construction of a just and democratic society (Mangones 2001: 53, 54). “Small, informal organizations ( organizations populaires ) emerged to defend their communities and to help arrange some of the basic social services that the state was unwilling or unable to provide” (Hallward 2007 in: Lessard 2010: 27). In the countryside, the popular organizations formed farming cooperatives, literacy programs and rural development projects. Churches nurtured this movement. In urban areas organizations broadened rapidly as well. A vibrant press emerged for example. The civil society of Haiti was remarkably advanced, having the strength in its breadth and diversity. This allowed Haitians to have a considerable voice in local affairs (Americas Watch 1993: 3, 4).

In 1990 Aristide became the first democratically elected president in Haiti’s history, so greater democratic space and basic civil liberties was gained by civil society organizations (Mangones 2001: 53, 54). However, the popular civil society could not prevent the military coup in 1991, so the Haitian army forced the constitutional president into exile (Fatton 2002: 84). The coup undertook a systematic campaign of repression against civil society organizations and the democratic movement. This was followed by massive human rights violations. The military attempted to dismantle the local organizations and destroy them. Despite the efforts of the coup, the organizations developed a dynamic resistance. They revised their strategies, adapted to the political context, and supported their members or partners (for example by purchasing seeds and tools, and replanting destroyed fields) (Ibid. : 54, 55). After the election of Préval in 1996 the peasant associations and neighbourhood associations revitalized again (Schuller 2007a: 72).

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In 2000, the Civil Society Initiative (ISC) was founded by the business elite of Haiti, and defined itself as the authentic representatives of the civil society. Though they did not have legitimacy, but represented only the bourgeois interests (Jean 2002 in Schuller 2007a: 73). As a reaction, the Group of 184 was founded in 2002. The difference was that the Groupe of 184 included women’s organizations, labour unions, peasants’ organizations, and human rights groups. Many of these organizations received U.S. funding. In 2003, USAID allocated $2.9 million for ‘Democracy and Governance’, and claimed success in supporting the empowerment of the civil society (Schuller 2007a: 73).

Despite the violence of the crisis period (2003 – 2006) and the city’s size and anonymity and the commonly held belief that nothing works, neighbourhood groups have complete minor infrastructure projects. They fixed sewer systems while asking contribution to passersby until they had enough funds for materials and a common meal. One also has to look to a tradition of ‘sòl’ – organically organized, zero-interest solidarity lending. This means that a small group of people (six to twelve) pools their resources so that every sixth to twelfth month they can pay their annual rent or school fees. Furthermore, civil society does not need to involve money, but could be storytelling as well as exemplified before (Schuller 2007a: 80).

4.8 International community and NGOs

The number of NGOs working in Haiti increased after the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986. Estimates note 200 to 300 NGOs in 1984; 10 years later the number had increased to 800; by 2010 no official number can be given, although the estimated number is 10,000 and only 500 are officially registered with the government ( The Economist in Pierre-Louis 2011: 190). In January 2010, Dr. Paul Farmer (United Nations Deputy Special Envoy for Haiti) said in his testimony to the United States (US) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that in Haiti there are more NGOs per capita than in any other country in the hemisphere. Therefore, the comment of the USIP (United States Institute of Peace) (2010: 1) to define Haiti as a ‘republic of NGOs’, due to the proliferation of organizations in Haiti, seems to be a well-chosen term to reflect the enormous presence of NGOs in Haiti.

The Haitian government’s ministry of planning is responsible for monitoring and licensing all foreign NGOs that work in the country. However, according to Pierre-Louis (2011: 197), this unit does not have any idea how many NGOs are operating in the country and the scope of their activities. Lack of coordination and planning is a frustration both from the side of the government and the population. On the one hand for example, a regional planning director of the ministry of planning gets frustrated, because a number of foreign NGOs were operating in his department without his knowledge, sometimes doing the same activities. On the other hand, the population holds the government accountable, and blames it for its ineptitude and the work NGOs are doing, which was considered to contribute to the destruction in the case of the hurricanes in 2008 ( Ibid. : 197, 198).

History shows that in the beginning of the 1970s Haiti was becoming more dependent on foreign NGOs to feed its population, because the country’s economic conditions had worsened. At that time Jean-Claude Duvalier took over the presidency from his father. In 1971 the international community began to outsource direct aid to NGOs instead of to the government as a way to combat corruption (Pierre-Louis 2011: 189, 190). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (1988 in: Ibid. : 190) note that “most external agencies in Haiti in the 1970s and 1980s chose to work around the central

37 administration, either by collaborating with NGOs or by setting up autonomous public bodies over which they could exercise close oversight”. After the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986 donor states decided to continue negotiating with NGOs because of the chaos that arose (Pierre-Louis 2011: 190).

The international community’s response to the situation of the military repression in the early 1990s was often ambiguous and contradictory for many Haitians. On the one hand economic sanctions were imposed on the country and its people in an effort to force the military to relinquish power. On the other hand humanitarian assistance programs were developed to provide help for the victims of the coup. That is why, according to the Haitians, the international community prolonged the crisis and sometimes strengthened the position of the regime (Mangones 2001: 55). In the three years following the coup d’état, the international community was obliged to define the nature of humanitarian assistance. Discrepancies appeared, and the developed guidelines did not have an impact on the programming of the international community. The form and content of humanitarian assistance programs in Haiti during the coup were primarily designed by the international community (Ibid. : 56).

During the presidency of Préval $1.8 billion of international aid was poured into Haiti from 1995 – 1999 (Schuller 2007a: 72), which was directly funding NGOs, fuelling a ‘cold war’ between cash-starved government and the well-funded NGO sector (Morton 1997 in Ibid. : 73). The consequence was that nearly all ‘development’ occurred through the many NGOs that exist in Haiti. Since 1995, USAID has been prevented from supporting the Haitian government, and other donors followed suit. Officially, the reason was that the Préval government presided over a collapse of the Parliament. The unprecedented outpouring of aid was ended after Aristide’s return to Haiti (Schuller 2007b: 100).

USAID is the biggest donor in Haiti. It is involved in every sector in which the Haitian government should be engaged in: schools, health care, preventing HIV. Often USAID invites NGOs to apply for these grants and provide these services on behalf of the Haitian government. These NGOs often do not often feel accountable to the government because their funding is received from the USAID. The government has authorized the NGOs to operate, so it has little oversight of them. After the election of Préval in 2006 the new prime minister decided to engage a new paradigm regarding the way international aid is given and administered in Haiti. This included more governmental oversight of the aid holding NGOs accountable to projects that have been signed on by the government; gradual transfer of project implementation from NGO to state agencies; the reinforcement of state agencies; and the alignment of projects with the government’s budgetary and development priorities. In 2007, USAID committed to invest $245 million in Haiti. USAID is involved in all sectors of the country and works with the key ministries of the country. For every ministry there is also a parallel NGO that executes the program (Pierre-Louis 2011: 193). Two other big donors are the Canadian government and the European Union (EU). The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is the Canadians agency of the government to distribute, monitor, and supervise the aid. Canadian public officials firmly stated after the presidency of Préval in 2006 that Canada wanted to commit to help stabilize Haiti by providing money for good governance and combat corruption. The Canadian government gave aid to reform public administration, and also for education, road building, and health. The administrators of the CIDA aid are not obligated to report to Haitian officials how they use their funds and whether the projects are implemented. The EU resumed its aid after

38 the departure of Aristide in 2004. The aid consisted primarily of money to support the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006 (Ibid. : 197).

On the 31 st of March 2010 international donors held a conference. The amount of promised aid of the international donors was more than $5 billion to help the beginning of port-earthquake rebuilding (Government of Haiti 2010). Besides, $10 billion was raised for long-term reconstruction assistance over the next decade, and this was on top of almost $1 billion raised through the United Nations flash appeal (Klasing et al. 2011: 1), which represents the estimation of required funding to address humanitarian needs (Bolton 2011: 11).

Three days after the earthquake the international aid began to appear in the streets of Port- au-Prince (Pierre-Louis 2011: 199). International donors provided the basic survival requirements, and Haiti experienced a new influx of humanitarian organisations. As Bolton (2011: 11) states, hundreds of agencies have rushed into the vacuum left by the Haitian government to provide a vast array of services. The areas clustered in the urbanized corridor around Port-au-Prince have seen the greatest concentration of NGOs, due both to their ease of access and proximity to the earthquake’s epicentre ( Ibid. : 31). Generally, NGOs intervened in food aid and nutrition, water and sanitation, housing and shelter, health care and psychosocial support, education and camp management (Klasing et al. 2011: 1). Health care assistance for example was delivered by the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders. However, they could not address the other needs of the population such as establishing order, distributing food, and ensuring citizens’ safety (Pierre-Louis 2011: 199). Bolton (2011: 11) criticizes the relief efforts of the agencies: The revenues came in the form of public foreign aid and private donations, rather than internal taxation; the top managers of the agencies are more often than not expatriates who rarely speak Creole, but may speak French; international companies are more awarded for reconstruction contracts than Haitian companies. Especially in the first months of the earthquake response the international governance system in Haiti was confusing, uncertain, fragmented and shifting. People needed constancy, steadiness and stable commitment (a social contract), not an escalation and de-escalation of international attention ( Ibid. : 28, 30).

The system to coordinate all the actors is called the ‘Cluster System’. This system was formed after a UN review of humanitarian responses to major emergencies after the Tsunami (UN OCHA 2005 in: Bolton 2011: 12), consisting of UN agencies, NGOs and other international organizations (Ibid. ). The intent of this system has been to achieve more strategic responses and better prioritization of available resources, better defining the roles and responsibilities, and providing the Humanitarian Coordinator with first and last call in all key sectors. The system is divided into sectoral clusters (like education, health, protection), led by ‘cluster lead’ (usually UN agency) and assisted by a ‘co-chair’ (usually a large international NGO). The clusters are responsible for needs assessment, planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation, advocacy and resource mobilization ( Ibid. ).

The cluster system has not been without controversy. The head of Doctors Without Borders criticized in December 2010 the cluster system, arguing that it had failed to coordinate response effectively, and that it at best seems capable of passing basic information and delivering few concrete results. Furthermore, the International Committee of the Red Cross did not participate, since it was afraid to compromise its principles of neutrality and operational independence. The cluster meetings are chaired, dominated and populated largely by foreigners who mostly have not spent much time in Haiti. The meetings are often held in spaces controlled by the UN, which are

39 difficult to enter for ordinary Haitians. Also, the languages spoken are French and English, which means that few Haitians of the educational elite can participate (Bolton 2011: 12 – 14). The globalized system of relief in Haiti represents a form of trusteeship, rather than democratic representation. “The international aid agencies derive legitimacy from their global standing and their ability to disperse funds, not from selection by the people they serve”, according to Bolton (2011: 14).

Many of the NGOs in Haiti are not registered with the Haitian government. Among the NGO there is a wide range of qualities and abilities. A few of them hold considerable authority over the earthquake response, influencing the coordination, funding and management of the relief and reconstruction process. Sometimes the literature on Haitian politics call this ‘NGOism’, a system of non-governmental sovereignty, whose legitimacy and power largely derives from agencies’ ability to raise funds, usually from outside the country, rather than any social contract with the local people (Bolton 2011: 16, 17). As an example Bolton (2011: 17) mentions NGO banners hanging over displacement camps, branding on sacks and cloths, and agency flags.

4.9 Concluding remarks

Throughout history three main factors are considered to explain why Haiti is what it is today. These are: 1) the presence of armed forces, whether to liberate Haiti from slavery or to oppress the population, 2) influence and interference of foreign powers, 3) deeply rooted inequality between the elites and the majority of the population. The presence of the international community has been an important factor and has made Haiti both vulnerable to and suspicious of all (aid) interventions that have been taken place. These three factors represent three different power structures that have been, and sometimes still are influential (as described by Van Schagen 2012: 13, 16 as well). These factors should be taken into account when continuing reading the next chapters.

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5. Fragility of the Haitian state

This chapter will describe the fragility of the Haitian state, realated to the first sub question: ‘To what extent the Haitian state can be characterized as fragile?’ The complex political and class dynamics of present-day Haiti have been shown in the previous chapter, which are necessary to understand the contemporary situation (Laguarta Ramírez 2008:7). The international donor community classifies Haiti for example as a fragile state, predatory state, post-conflict state, or a failed state (Buss & Gardner 2006: 3). I will give insight into the reasons for defining Haiti like that (section 5.1). In section 5.2 I will use the empirical results from the interviews to give an overview of the perceptions of the representatives of the different NGOs towards the Haitian state. I have not been able to speak in Haiti to officials about this topic, since during my stay I was not yet planning to research this topic.

5.1 Literature review

There are several indexes to rank states according to their fragility. In chapter 2 the Failed States Index (FSI) is mentioned. In 2009 Haiti ranked 12 th out of 177 countries of this index, and 129 th out of 144 countries (meaning critically weak state) according to the State Weakness in the Developing World (Funds for Peace 2009; Rice and Patrick 2008 in: ANLAP 2010: 8). Criteria for the FSI are among others: pressures deriving from high population density, ‘brain drain’, drop in GNP, increased corruption, higher poverty rates for some ethnic groups and human rights violations (Call 2008: 1495).

According to Rotberg (2002: 91) Haiti is an endemically and perpetually weak state. It has always been on the edge of failure, particularly during the 19 th and 20 th centuries. However, the weakness does not include ethnic, religious, or other communal cleavages, no insurgent movement, no radical or rapid deflation in standards of living and national expectations. At the same time, Haiti’s national capacity to provide political goods has gradually been compromised by autocratic and corrupt leadership, weak institutions, an intimidated civil society, high levels of crime, low GDP levels per capita, high rates of infant mortality, suspicions from or outright hostility by its neighbours, and many other deficiencies. There is very limited organized internal dissidence and almost no internal ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages within the Haitian society, except a deep mistrust by the majority of the upper classes, and of mulattoes because of their historic class affiliations. Still Rotberg (2004: 19) thinks the ingredients for major civil strife are absent. Failure demands communal differences capable of being transformed into consuming cross-group violence. Thus, Rotberg (2004: 20) defines Haiti as weak, but without failing.

Demographic and socio-economic factors The Human Development Index (HDI), indicator developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income (UNDP 2011). Haiti ranks 149 th of 182 countries in 2009 (UNDP 2009 in: ANLAP 2010: 10). The proportion of the population living on less than US$1 is 56 percent in 2005, and Haiti has the highest poverty rate in Latin America and the Caribbean (WFP 2010). International flows are significant, with remittance inflows representing almost one-fifth of Haiti’s GDP in 2007. The small Haitian private sector is fragmented, so that the majority of Haitians

41 has to survive in the informal sector, without guarantee of employment, income or access to capital. Public goods are expensive, and mistrust exists between the Haitian public and private sectors (ANLAP 2010: 10).

Around one quarter of Haiti’s population of around 10 million lives in Port-au-Prince. The percentage of people living in urban centres has more than doubled in 2007, up to 45.6 percent since 1982. The rapid urbanization has a negative environment on the local environment. Vulnerable populations live in high-density and often appalling living conditions in slums, triggering public health and other problems (UNFPA 2010, Groupe URD 2004 in: ANLAP 2010: 12). An unequal rural-urban divide exists in terms of access to services, such as safe drinking water, electricity, health care and education (Van Schagen 2012: 9).

After years of uncontrolled tree-cutting, there is little topsoil left to reinvigorate agriculture in the short term so as to make the country self-sufficient in food production (Gros 1996: 464). Junior state employees take government jobs in order to gain enough experience to work for NGOs, which pay them better and also provide material and career advancement. Canada offers people with valid university degree residence, so several state employees have emigrated to Canada (brain drain). The Haitian government was further depleted of its manpower (Pierre-Louis 2011: 198).

Haiti is the world’s most remittance-dependent country. Social protection in Haiti is highly dependent on remittances from Diaspora (Van Schagen 2012: 9). Almost 20% of Haitians now live outside the country, and use their wealth and influence obtained overseas to finance political factions and lobby for their host countries’ support for particular Haitian policies. Indicating the scale of resources wielded by the Diaspora, remittances equalled some $800 million in 2004, “double the budget of the State” (Faubert 2004 in: Bolton 2011: 11). The remittances they send are accountable for 30% of all household income. Moreover, it comes mostly from highly qualified people who have left Haiti and thus not supporting Haitian’s economy directly (Van Schagen 2012: 9).

The USIP (2010: 7), considering the economic challenge of Haiti, blames the protracted economic decline to rapacious governments and well-intentioned but damaging foreign interventions. Beginning at the end of the 19 th century, imported sugar cane was replaced by beet sugar of the America and Europe. Sugar cane was Haiti’s primary export crop which started to face trade barriers and constantly shrinking foreign markets. At the same time, successive Haitian governments failed to support the development of alternative agricultural or industrial sources of income. Later on, by 1984, it appeared that the Haitian assembly industry, a development strategy promoted by IFIs, did not provide long-term benefits to the country. Materials were imported for assembly, while finished products were exported and consumed abroad. The skills of the country’s workforce were not improved, and did nothing to stimulate technology transfer. The Finance Ministry under the interim government after 2004 imposed fiscal discipline, established a transparent budget, met International Monetary Fund (IMF) criteria for loan financing and put in place a policy framework. During 2006, the economy of Haiti registered 2.5 percent growth. There are some first signs of economic revival, since more economic growth was expected, and a decline in inflation. Notwithstanding, Haiti’s government institutions remain weak and require external assistance to perform essential functions and implement forms. Most Haitian institutions lack the appropriately educated and technically skilled human resources to operate modern systems for management and administration of government programs, which has been a significant factor in the

42 slow disbursement of the financial assistance pledged by international donors. There are not enough qualified Haitian bureaucrats (USIP 2010: 8).

Some positive remarks can be made as well. Crime in Haiti has decreased over recent years, and there is a marked improvement in confidence in the HNP. Increased political and economic stability since Préval, improved security situation and a steadily rising GDP have contributed to a growing sense of optimism for Haiti’s progress (Muggah 2009 in: ANLAP 2010: 10).

Powerful actors and state institutions After the earthquake, a vast complex of global public and private actors rushed into Haiti after the vacuum left by the state apparatus. There was a sudden collapse of Haiti’s state infrastructure (Bolton 2011: 3). The government lost 17 of its 18 ministries (Pierre-Louis 2011: 199). Besides, most of the media were affected (Pierre-Louis 2011: 199), sexual violence, the collapse of a major prison, political demonstrations, and rumours of potential coups occurred. The government failed in its responsibility to protect people from their own buildings (through lack of attention to enforce building codes) (Bolton 2011: 6). Foreign donors had implemented the policy of ‘less government is better’, according to Pierre-Louis (2011: 198), so the staff who was used to supervise construction were stripped off. It also failed to provide an adequate safety net for the millions of people without shelter, food, sanitation or medical attention (Bolton 2011: 6). Pierre-Louis (2011: 199) blames the President’s lack of leadership for failing to communicate with the population, and the fact that the government had no contingency plan to address any catastrophe in the country.

Fatton’s (2011: 158) analysis of Haiti’s political and economic predicament in the aftermath of the earthquake starts with the distant past of the late 18 th century. He is pointing at the material and historical inheritance of the colonial period and the slave’s struggle for emancipation. He believes that French colonialism has generated an authoritarian tradition rooted in the legacy of the plantation system, which in turn shaped and constrained the political economy of Haiti. Although the Haitian revolution was fought in the name of liberty and equality, a legacy of authoritarian politics was left. According to Fatton (2011: 159) this is rooted in both the global and domestic historical and material structures within which Haiti gained and preserved its independence. He uses the concept of habitus of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990), defined as the system of “dispositions acquired through experience”, that shapes particular types of behaviour at particular historical moments (Bourdieu in: Fatton 2011: 159). The authoritarian habitus is decisively shaped by the conflicts in the colonial society: the profound antagonism between slave and master, the huge chasm between whites, blacks, and mulattoes, and a deep divide within these groups themselves. Haiti had to deal with the wounds of racial and class enmity. Moreover, for more than a century Haiti had to face the unmitigated hatred of white supremacist powers, because their global system of exploitation was disturbed by the Haitian revolutionaries. Haiti became besieged by militarization, but also the economy collapsed, and huge numbers of people died. Fatton (2011: 161) states that the authoritarian habitus is nurtured by colonial despotism and barbarism, foreign threats of occupation, racial and class tensions, insurrectionary violence, economic disintegration, and political reflexes of command and control. Another point that Fatton (2011: 161) makes, is that Haitian rulers came to conceive of governance as a zero-sum game, meaning that almost all of them looked at political power as a brutal, indivisible quantity that could be won collectively but had to be kept individually and exercised absolutely, reflecting a long history of violence born in the unforgiving realities and requirements of the colonial economy. Also, widespread corruption has been generated, as powerful

43 public officials have historically tended to transform themselves into an embezzling class of ‘big men’ (Ibid. : 162). However, Fatton ( Ibid. : 172) emphasizes that attributing the impoverished condition of the country to corruption is mistaken, because for decades a very limited amount of the foreign assistance has in fact ended up in governmental hands. Therefore, Fatton’s ( Ibid. : 163 – 164) main point is that Haiti’s political history reflects the predatory nature of the dominant class that has persistently refused to ground its rule in a meaningful system of accountability. The dominant class has controlled the state for its exclusive benefit, using it to extract resources from the poor majority. Two elite groups (black military leaders and lighter-skinned group) oppressed and excluded the mass of rural (and later urban) labourers and peasants from power and traditionally competed for control. This competition generated constant social and political instability.

Bolton (2010: 6, 7) underscores the suffering of Haiti under a succession of authoritarian and violent leaders that used state and paramilitary structures to terrorize and intimidate actual and perceived opponents. In the period of military juntas the state has been the primary source of insecurity, but also criminal gangs and private militias have become increasingly powerful. The slum Cite Soleil of Port-au-Prince is often considered a ‘black hole’ of insecurity. The level of sexual violence to women is shocking. In short, Haiti’s crisis demonstrates a complexity of security landscapes. Together with non-state actors and non-human elements, the state itself is a source of insecurity for many Haitians ( Ibid. : 8). Today, UN soldiers and police remain the only security force in Haiti. In 2006 the UN military forces began an effort to control the armed gangs that operated from Cite Soleil and the other slums in the capital. These gangs had been engaging in kidnapping, rape, and murder. The operations of the UN took place in these slums, and they arrested hundreds of gang members, and seized weapons, but also Haitian and some MINUSTAH soldiers and police died (USIP 2007: 3, 4). Criminal violence continues to pose the greatest threat to the stability of Haiti. Armed gangs still operate in Port-au-Prince, drug and human trafficking is conducted with virtual impunity, street crime increased, and sexual assaults soared, according to the USIP (2007: 4). The Haitian judicial and corrections systems are not well: Haitian courts are in disrepair; judges are untrained, inept, and corrupt; case management is basic; records are not kept; evidence is lost; few, if any, criminal cases are brought to trial. The USIP (2007: 4) thinks that a major reason for Haiti’s crime problems is the slow pace of the UN effort to reform and reconstitute the Haitian National Police (HNP). The police engaged in criminal activities, not all officers are present for duty, political manipulation, corruption, and narcotics trafficking.

The problems around physical security and the judicial system is noted by Leininger (2006: 491 – 492) as well. Haiti is categorized as failing due to its very limited ability to provide physical and human security to its nation (Gélin-Adams 2003 in: Ibid. : 491) due to a lack of resources and functioning state institutions. There is a lack of an adequate number of trained police forces throughout the country, but where police are present, they very often create violence and fear instead of security (Mendelsson-Forman 2006 in: Ibid. : 491). Due to an absence of an effective justice system, including a court system and functioning systems, rule of law is scarcely apparent. 45,000 public servants are badly paid or even not paid at all, hence, corruption has been pervading public service as well as the police, who are linked to the increasing drug trafficking activities in Haiti (Fatton 2002: 109). Leininger (2006: 492) continues with marking the lack of functioning telecommunication, electricity, road system, health and social system. Unimplemented and weak democratic institutions

44 prevail (especially the Parliament and the elected local institutions), the authoritarian behaviour of the political elite and the alienation of the population from politics ( Ibid. : 495).

Legitimization of power in Haitian politics was obtained for first time through elections in 1990. The population accepted the election, but it was restricted by the political elite, and subject to internal conflict, mostly amongst the political elite. When fraudulent elections had taken place, this acceptance declined. Haiti experienced repeated elections. Only in 2006 the results of national elections were widely accepted for the first time by both the population and the political elite. Altogether the elections were strongly supported by the international community, because the country lacks the administrative institutions and knowledge to organize regular elections (Leininger 2006: 493). In general, the parliamentary system of Haiti is ineffective. No party had a parliamentary majority after the elections of Préval in 2006 (USIP 2010: 5). The USIP ( Ibid. ) summarizes Haiti’s bureaucracy in that period as “largely corrupt and dysfunctional, lacking a cadre of competent personnel and the means to effectively administer government programs”. The democratic system for appointing officials at every level of government is complex. From local level up to national level there are several assemblies, which oversee the other councils and elect members to similar assemblies. However, the assemblies and councils are without budget, and neither it is clear what their duties and responsibilities are (USIP 2010: 5, 6).

Foreign interference and influence Haiti has a long history of external involvement in its affairs. It started with the colonizers, followed by the interference of France and the USA, and the American occupation. UN troops entered in 1994, having a significant political impact on the country. Multinational organizations had significant influence over the national economy (Bolton 2011: 11).

Haiti is governed by a complex system of local and international actors that provide security and public services. The aftermath of the earthquake resulted in the globalization of governance in Haiti, as hundreds of agencies have rushed into the vacuum left by the Haitian government to provide a vast array of services, with the clusters as key governance structures. Global actors hold unprecedented sovereignty over the Haitian people’s lives (Bolton 2011: 11, 12). Discontent with the situation can hardly be expressed by Haitians, since the global governance system is largely beyond the control of the Haitian electorate ( Ibid. : 14). This gives the international governance system the opportunity to evade accountability for its actions, but also reduces the reliable information it receives. Many political demonstrations against the international community’s presence in Haiti were the consequence ( Ibid. : 15). Just two Haitian political leaders served their full term (Schuller 2007a).

Foreign donors have bypassed the state and emphasized NGO-led development. This is due to fears of corruption and a blind ideological commitment to the market. State corruption is a problem, but for decades only a very limited amount of foreign assistance has in fact ended up in governmental hands (Fatton 2011: 172). Therefore Fatton’s ( Ibid. : 173) opinion is that the international community must shift its priorities and concentrate on helping Haitians build durable state institutions. The emasculation of the state is no accident, but partly the result of the policies implanted in the country by major International Financial Institutions (IFIs). His critique is that IFIs’ policies have contributed to an economic, political and social disaster, because they advocate the withdrawal of the state. Their programs of reconstruction pay lip service to building state capacity,

45 since in reality continue to privilege the development of the assembly industry sector ( Ibid. : 174). The point Fatton wants to make, is that the state should be placed at the centre of any strategy of reconstruction, to avoid unending dependence on the international community for Haiti’s survival. Its duty is to nurture and institutionalize the peaceful resilience and dignified strength that the overwhelming majority of the population has shown throughout the disaster ( Ibid. : 175 – 176).

5.2 Empirical results

This section reflects the empirical findings which I retrieved from the interviews with representatives of the Christian faith-based NGOs and with Haitians in Lompré, so this section shows the perceptions and experiences of aid workers and Haitians. Between brackets I have written down the dates of the interviews. I have incorporated the results of the interviews into three topics: problems of the states, external involvement and reflections on Haiti.

Problems of the state In most of the interviews with the representatives they mentioned that the state of Haiti is weak (and weaker after earthquake), absent, hardly working, or limited. The reasons for these qualifications are mostly in accordance with each other. One interviewee starts listing the political goods a state should deliver, as Rotberg (2003) does, and he believes that the government is hardly doing anything. He wondered what the government is doing. For instance, roads are sponsored, health care is poor, and just 10 percent of all schools are public schools. Furthermore, the interviewees list: the government does not have monitoring, for example on buildings or education, while during the Duvalier regime monitoring took place; there is a lack of sense of responsibility; the state is not able to rebuild the country, they need help for that; the police is very corrupt and gives no security, generally speaking, since it is hardly present in the rural areas; the tax system is not strong; there is a lot of corruption; and the government seems not to have a lot of money. According to a calculation of one interviewee, just 25 percent of all the money that goes to Haiti is ‘real economy’. The remaining 75 percent is divided into 50 percent to NGOs and 25 percent remittances of other countries. Haiti has to deal with a huge ‘brain drain’: skill-talented people moved away.

The state has guidelines for building schools, such as the amount of space a classroom should have and separate toilets for boys and girls. However, schools in Port-au-Prince cannot comply with these rules, even not public schools, due to limited space. The problem is just that no one complies with guidelines. Haitians are not used to go to the Ministry to ask permission to build a school. In general, they are not used to expecting anything from the government, they just start building. Another example is that people have to pay retirement fee, but they do not even expect they will get their money back. They rather pay that on the account of an organization than to the government (expert, June 20, 2012).

Furthermore, according to ICCO's representative (July 9, 2012), the government was centralized in Port-au-Prince, and a constant succession of governments took place. The country has a complicated electoral system, and elections are costly. Haitians do not choose the Senate in one time, but piece by piece. Often elections take place, while the majority of the people is illiterate.

Most interviewees agree on the fact that the governmental structures are present in Haiti, but these do not seem powerful enough to do all the work. For example, in the southeastern

46 department in Haiti there is one representative of the Ministry of Health. When an outbreak of cholera takes place, that single person cannot arrange clean water for all the people. So the government is present, but often does not have sufficient capacity. In this situation the government and NGOs have to find a balance and a way of working together.

The current Haitian President, Martelly, promised that all children will go to school, but in practice that promise seems not to be fulfilled yet. Also, it is not clear where that money should come from. One interviewee expects that no one will ever see figures on where the money is going to (Woord en Daad, July 12, 2012).

An example of the lack of means is illustrated by the Ministry of Education. Woord en Daad went there with drawings to ask if they could build a school. The officials were sitting in an office, but that was a dark place, with a desk and three chairs turned upside down in a corner. The person with whom they had an appointment was not there, and the receptionist did not have credit anymore on her phone to call that person. That was very bad. Later, when Woord en Daad came back with the drawings, the plans were approved, but the responsible person honestly said that they would not go and check it. They do not have cars nor personnel (Woord en Daad, July 12, 2012). ICCO (July 9, 2012) experienced pretty much the same when visiting the office for human rights. The man was sitting behind an empty desk without a computer, filing cabinet and files. He did not have any money, so the human rights judge cannot do anything.

I had a similar experience while visiting the town hall of Léogâne, November 2011. I had an appointment with one of the members of the Comunal Committee for Civil Protection. When I arrived at the town hall at eleven o'clock in the morning, the 'guard' told me that the official was not there yet. Later on, when I wanted to leave, the Committee member arrived, and took me to an office in the town hall. When I looked around me it was a building not looking like a town hall; big empty spaces,no computers, and no files in a file cabinet. Moreover, the persons I talked with (some other members of the Committee joined the conversation) gave me the impression of having knowlegde of their responsible area, but not being able to change much about the disaster risk situation.

Haitians themselves are sceptical about the government. During the interviews with local people in the rural areas of Léogâne, I asked them about the government, and the most common answer was that the government is not working. To get things done is difficult. People feel as if the government do not give importance and do not care about them. Sometimes community members wrote letters, but nothing was done about it nor did they receive answers. This is confirmed by Molenaar (2012: 56), who researched the Haitian population in the Léogâne area. She received the same response from them: they never see the anyone from the government, they do not know what the government does, and the government does not anything for them. There is a very low level of trust in local and national government.

External involvement After the earthquake NGOs rushed in which had an enormous influence, like taking over the country, especially the first months after the earthquake. The local partners of ICCO were saying all the time that they should listen to them and the government as well, even though it is weak. ‘You cannot just enter and do what you want’. Donors do not have a lot of confidence in the government,

47 but mainly support NGOs. The result is that NGOs are strong and make decisions, while the government is without money. ICCO (July 9, 2012) calls it a big disadvantage of restorating Haiti that non-organized Haitians are sidelined. The UN took over a lot of work from the local organizations. That is a big critique. President Martelly said that it has more slowed down the development of Haiti instead of forming it. ICCO works with partner organizations and claims to put them in the driver’s seat. ICCO provides them trainings to learn to know how to spend money.

According to one interviewee (expert, June 20, 2012) NGOs are all small kingdoms, also before the earthquake. They work in their own world, and find it easy that the Haitian government does not interfere in their affairs. 'You can do everything yourself'. On the other hand of course there are Haitians who constantly ask for help. For example, the interviewee received letters with requests for support. So it is not the case that NGOs do something what the people do not want. Besides, the interviewee states that Haitians do not go to the government to ask help for their school; they just go to NGOs.

On the local level the NGOs cooperate with the local government people. Medair (June 27, 2012) cooperates with them, because Medair is a guest in the country: Haiti is from the Haitians. Medair mainly has to deal with the mayor and the delegate of the department they are working in. There is interaction with each other, mainly by meetings. Woord en Daad also works together with the government. The government is the only party who can take responsibility. The government has to have control. But cooperation is difficult, because the state is weak, often absent. The interviewee believes that much is possible if the government receives money, but that does not happen. He describes Haiti as a huge project without a project manager. Tear tries to strengthen the systems to stop the expectations from Haitians towards NGOs of just giving. Tear tries to connect, so that the regular system starts working. ICCO will not give its money to the Haitian government to support its structures, because ICCO is not allowed to. The money ICCO received for its projects in Haiti can only be spent on rehabilitation projects.

Reflections on Haiti The country is called aid-addicted by the representative of Woord en Daad (July 12, 2012). This is felt when Woord en Daad is working with schools, but also with Haitians themselves. For example, Woord en Daad supported schools with starting a course about using an administrative and financial system, but most schools just wanted to participate in the course when that was a requisite for acquiring funding. Woord en Daad wants to support the government whenever it is possible, such as by giving this course to schools. Now the government is not doing these kind of things, but hopefully in future Haiti will be able to do that by itself. An individual Haitian can have the attitude like ‘we will wait for an NGO, next week there will be one which is willing to pay’. This is acknowledged by the interviewee of Tear (July 18, 2012). He calls it the sickness of 50 years of NGOs in Haiti. Haitians will wait for the next NGO if another one just left. Throughout the years the system that Haitians take the responsibility for themselves has been broken. The government should do its duty, that system should be strengthened, and the responsibility should not be taken away.

A remarkable comment is done by the interviewee of Woord en Daad (July 12, 2012). He thinks that it is strange that Haiti is so poor; there are not so many reasons to think of. It is close to the USA, does not have natural resources, nor ethical conflicts, though there is corruption. Another comment that came up is the vodou way of thinking of Haitians, their cultural values which originate

48 from their religion (expert, June 20, 2012). For example, his view is that people do not trust each other due to their vodou background. He says this because of his Christian view on Haiti. Furthermore, the leadership of Haitian rulers is characterized by their interest in power, not in how they can serve the people. Haiti is also a country which became independent very early. They just automatically started to organize as they were used to do in Africa. The interviewee states that their agricultural practices resembled African practices of slash-and-burn. Their African value-system completely continued in Haiti. Haiti did not receive education as their neighbouring countries received from the colonizers. What others say is that the Haitian culture is not aimed at cooperation. Probably this has to deal with the Haitian history: Haitians do not tolerate a boss and have difficulty with authority and central government. In the end everyone is dependent on him or herself. On the other hand, there is no government which does anything for you. A Haitian completely depends on his or her network. There is a culture of taking care for each other, since there is no system which fills that gap. This is also reflected in passing the ball to each other; nepotism.

The interviewee of ZOA (July 20, 2012) though is quite positive about Haiti. He thinks that slowly the situation in Haiti improved in the last two years. He also thinks that the population listens more to the voice of the government (via communication tools). After some time people start to listen, for example regarding cleaning up waste. That is a positive response to the current president. Since the earthquake there has been a fresh impetus from the west, requirements from the west, and a lot of money. Jobs were created by necessity. He also noticed that the national government comes more and more to grips with whom are investing, the costs, the loss, and the benefit. The central government learned to use forms by westerners. The municipalities want to learn, administer and exploit the systems for future.

5.3 Concluding remarks

Haiti’s state has not always been able to carry out its state functions (such as providing security, promoting economic growth, making law and policy, and delivering social services). Security is provided by the international stabilization force MINUSTAH. The Haitian police is engaged in criminal activities, is hardly present in the rural areas, and there is a lack of adequately trained policemen. Judicial systems seem not be working well, the rule of law is scarcely apparent. Economic growth has been made difficult by former governments and foreign intervention. Social services are mainly delivered by NGOs, as shown in chapter 4. An overall problem is corruption, especially at governmental level and by the police. Fear of corruption made NGOs decide to bypass state structures.

The picture that the literature gives of the Haitian state is shared by the representatives of the Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs. They perceive that their organizations fill in the gap of the Haitian state by providing basic social services to the population. What appears though, is that they do see governmental structures in Haiti. On the local level the NGOs try to cooperate with the government. However, these are not powerful enough to do all the work, mainly limited by money, means and people.

This section showed that in Haiti many problems exist, which are acknowledged by the interviewees. On the other hand, both Rotberg (2003) and some interviewees reflect a more positive opinion, since they look to either absence of major strife or notice slight improvements in Haiti.

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However, the other problems are still present, which are blamed by one interviewee on vodou. It should be taken into account that such comments of interviewees are not based on scientific evidence, but on their own (Christian) view.

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6. Religion and state in Haiti

This chapter aims at understanding the importance of religion in Haiti, and its relation with the state, as an answer to sub question 2 ‘What role religion plays in the state of Haiti and its citizens?’. Therefore, section 6.1 first illustrates the religious landscape of Haiti. Section 6.2 continues with the relation between church and state, referring to the church – state models provided in section 2.4.

6.1 Religious landscape of Haiti

In 1990 the Haitian population was subdivided as follows: 85% Catholic, 15% Protestant, and 100% Vodouist (Trouillot 1990 in: Germain 2011: 251). The duality in Haitian religious history has never been confrontation between two separate groups of people. Almost all vodou adherents would call themselves Catholics, and the other way around (Nicholls 1970: 400). Vodou is practiced by the majority of Haitians (Métraux 1972 in: Rey 2006: 230). The lower class of the Haitian society (85% of the population) is more likely to acknowledge belief and practice of vodou, but in times of stress members of other classes may also turn to vodou for help (Desrosiers & Fleurose 2002: 509). Most practitioners of vodou are also Catholics, who do not see a contradiction in being bi-religious. Furthermore, vodouists have long ‘greedily adopted’ Catholic forms in which they find cognate expressions of the original African forms (Métraux 1972 in: Rey 2006: 230).

Catholicism The establishment of the Catholic faith was mandatory in the Haitian area during the colonialism. New colonial regulations were designed to curb the buccaneer spirit and bring the people into the fold of the church, for example by making it mandatory that all marriages be celebrated in the church. Louis XIV found it unbelievable that a person who worshipped God in a different way could be a good subject. Moreover, religious unity was regarded as essential to political unity (Breathett 1988: 1, 2).

The Vatican at that time legitimated the transatlantic slave trade through the requirement of baptizing African slaves into the ‘single divine fold’. For most of its history, the Haitian Catholic hierarchy has conspired with the nation’s economic and political elite to demonize, marginalize, and even eliminate vodou. Catholicism provided for elites a legitimating power to some of the most oppressive political regimes that have ruled Haiti and its people in the struggle over religious capital (religious symbols, doctrines, and decrees) and the lay audience (Rey 2006: 230, 231). Catholicism was the authorized religion throughout the French colonial period. The decree edited by the French monarch Louis XIV, Code Noir, was instituted in 1685, obligating to evangelize within one year of arrival in a French colony (Thomas 1997 in: Miller 2000: 205). This mandate was carried out loosely by the planters, mainly through songs, tales from the lives of saints and scraps of the litanies. The first eight articles enforced Catholic domination of the colony’s religious field, including something of the slaves’ right to Catholic sacraments (Courlander 1966 and others in Miller 2000: 232). The church empowered the colonial administration to formally prohibit Africans and their offspring from practicing any religion other than Catholicism. Unintentionally, this facilitated clandestine preservation of the slaves’ West African religious systems under the guise of Catholicism by giving the slaves from different African nations a chance to mix and form a social structure centred around

51 a community spiritual gathering. Africans drew upon their traditional religions for inspiration for resistance against bondage and oppression. By identifying their deities with the saints of the Catholic Church, the slaves tried to hide outlawed African religious practices. Preservation of the basic structure common to West African religious systems was enabled, while the slaves still appeared nominally Catholic ( Ibid. : 205).

After independence the Haitian state was interested in the legitimate power of the Vatican. Formally, the church was 54 years absent in Haiti, and in the meanwhile the stage was set on the right to freely practice the religion of one’s choice. On three separate occasions (in 1898, 1913, and 1941-1942), the church coordinated ‘antisuperstitious’ campaigns to suppress vodou in alliance with the state and the economic elite. After the last campaign, when the priesthood consisted of mainly indigenous priests, the church surrendered in the struggle to destroy vodou, though without giving up the de facto domination of the Haitian religious field (Rey 2006: 238).

In 1860 an agreement was signed between the mulatto elite and the Vatican. At that time the cult of vodou was openly practised, and the mulattoes urgent need to act. Ecclesiastical appointments were to be made by the pope on the nomination of the president of the republic. It contained a Concordat with the Vatican which guaranteed the free exercise of ecclesiastical powers by church authorities. This meant a century of foreign domination in ecclesiastical affairs (Nicholls 1988: 404). Van Schagen (2012: 46) adds that the Concordat provided for the appointment of an archbishop in Port-au-Prince, designated dioceses, and established an annual government subsidy for the church. An amendment to the Concordat in 1862 assigned the Roman Catholic Church an important role in secular education.

The achievements of the Roman Catholic Church were principally among the elite group. The best schools in Haiti were run by the church. “Nationalist writers interpreted the attack upon vodou by the church as the attempt by a foreign-dominated body to undermine the folklore tradition which was one of the things binding together the great mass of Haitians” (Nicholls 1988: 404). They suspect that the foreigners came in Haiti not in the first place for the purpose of evangelization but rather to prolong the French influence ( Ibid. ).

Religion was a significant factor in the 1957 election campaign (Nicholls 1988: 407). The Roman Catholic Church clearly favoured Déjoie, while a large number of vodou priests threw their support behind Duvalier. In October 1957, a Roman Catholic priest was included in the cabinet as secretary of state for education. It demonstrated Duvalier’s support for the growing number of Haitian priests in the church. After two years a first blow in the battle between church and state was struck. Duvalier banned a teachers’ union, and the secretary and another priest were expelled from Haiti. This was followed by more incidents and more priests being expelled ( Ibid. : 408). By 1965 Duvalier felt enough had been done to reduce the political power of the Roman Catholic Church, and of any other religious body which appeared to have political pretensions. The Catholic Church started to choose local men to lead the church in places where this was possible, rather than perpetuating ecclesiastical colonialism. Native bishops were appointed in the place of missionary bishops. Duvalier’s policy had become the church’s own ( Ibid. : 411).

Submission to Duvalierist absolutism was a strong notion of the regime of Duvalier (‘Papa Doc’). His attitude towards Catholicism was quite ambiguous, because he presented himself as a

52 good, practicing Catholic, while he went to extreme in efforts to humiliate the church. Still the church provided Duvalier legitimized power, and did not raise any voice of resistance to the regime’s abuses (Rey 2006: 239, 240). “Duvalier’s policy towards religious groups has been dominated by an insistence that the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church should no longer be foreign-dominated, combined with the determination to secure the political neutrality or support of the religious bodies in the country” (Nicholls 1988: 413). Suspicion of religion is characteristic for many nationalist movements, whose leaders associate the churches with the old colonial system ( Ibid. ). Duvalier has continued to recognize the Roman Catholic Church as the ‘established’ church, but his informal support for vodou is clearly an astute political move. According to Nichols (Ibid. : 414) vodou is very powerful in Haiti, priests are influential on a local level, and it is not expected that it would form a basis of any dangerous political opposition to the government. It is a loosely organized national religion, contrary to the international, hierarchically organized Catholic Church.

In the mid-1980s the church’s stance changed into a unique institute that offered space for democratic development, and against the at that time ruling dictatorship. Roman Catholic clergy and lay workers called for improved human rights. The Bishops Conference condemned poverty and inequality in Haiti publicly. On local level priests setup development and alphabetisation programmes for grass roots groups in great solidarity with the majority of the population. The grass roots movement of the Church was gaining more and more popularity, called “Ti Legliz” (small Church). This Church enjoyed a lot of respect from the population and became widely known. Salesian father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was its most visible symbol and charismatic leader. The bishops actively denounced Duvalierist repression and human-rights violations. Promotion of justice and human rights for people expressed the liberation theology in Haiti, gathered in ‘ Tilegliz’ (Creole for ‘little church’). One of the most significant achievements of the liberation theology is the presidency of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. The coup of 1991 was heavily destructive for Tilegliz due to leaders being tortured, raped, murdered, or driven into exile or hiding (Rey 2006: 241 – 244). “The liberation theology had lost much of its force throughout the Americas, in part due to political repression and the murder of many of its adherents” (Ibid. : 245). The Catholic Charismatic Renewal has also contributed to the decline of liberation theology. It encourages inward spiritual transformation as the means to improve the lives of the poor, instead of political engagement and street protests. Poor Haitian Catholics were easily depoliticized by both the Renewal’s conservative, apocalyptic theology (Rey 2006: 246).

The positive image of the Church changed after 1986 when the Church did not condemn the hunt for (Catholic) farmer’s organizations in times of attacks by the army and paramilitary forces. They became target both of the Catholic hierarchy and the political groups that made the coup of 1991. The Church was not there to protect them, nor to condemn the violence. Neither the Church has proven to be strong enough to influence Aristides’ armed behaviour later on. Aristide is blamed for having abused his religious power in favour of his political career (Van Schagen 2012: 43, 46, 47).

Protestantism From the 19 th century onwards, members of different Protestant churches have created schools, distributed food, and opened clinics, hospitals for the poor, and helped restructure social relations. They helped legitimize Creole as the national language. In the 1960s and the 1970s American missionaries quickly understood that Creole was the medium through which they could reach the masses (Germain 2011: 249). The Protestant communities in Haiti avoided to interfere with

53 the political process, but they actively participated in the process of development, especially in health and education. The priorities are bringing God and material help to Haitians and therefore they chose to operate within the available channels of operations offered by various regimes ( Ibid. : 250). The schools and orphanages in particular became a breeding ground for creating new and faithful children of God, who completely rejected vodou (Ibid. : 253). In the post-Duvalier era, the strategy and resources of the Christian missionaries intensified the conversion process, and changed the religious landscape by giving birth to a new and younger ‘army of God’ ( Ibid. : 254).

Most Protestant groups avoided interfering in politics during the regime of Duvalier, and were thus welcomed by the Haitian government. They did have their dealings with the government from time to time. They awee inevitably affected by the government’s policy at certain points. The government seemed to ignore the Protestant zeal to even burn their cultic vodou objects in a public ceremony. Particularly, the contribution of Protestant churches to public health care is appreciated (Nicholls 1988: 412).

There is some criticism on the Protestant missionaries’ willingness to sacrifice their lives, because it is for the sake of uplifting African ‘savages’, according to Mazrui (1991 in: Germain 2011: 250). Also, Germain (2011: 251) states that Protestant missions discredit and often vilify the indigenous belief systems, which in this case means demonizing vodou. Evangelists also inflict guilt and doubt on vodou practitioners; claiming the nation can be saved from future disasters by relinquishing ‘evil’ practices and ‘accepting Jesus’ ( Ibid. : 254). After the earthquake mainly the new Haitian Protestant believers have increased the anti-vodou campaign in intensity. They strongly believe that vodou is the religion of the devil, promotes fatalism, and caused the death of a quarter million people ( Ibid. ).

Vodou There are some essential characteristics in the psychological make-up of the Haitian people. They are usually a complex mixture of courage, optimism, pride, and shame. They have a deep faith that the future will be better, and for them education equals success. Also, the belief in vodou contributes to the sense of optimism, because it provides many Haitians with a sense of control over their destiny (Desrosiers & Fleurose 2002: 508, 509).

Most Haitians believe in the supernatural, which is expressed in vodou. The Haitians’ concept of the real world consists both of the visible and the invisible or spiritual world. The invisible world is made up of good and evil spirits, of the dead and many deities. Vodou ceremonies are devoted to the worship and invocation of the invisible world. This belief promotes a sense of superstition and mistrust of others. At any time one’s enemy may attempt to use the supernatural to cause harm (Desrosiers & Fleurose 2002: 509).

Vodou is a religion of African origins and some contribution of the Native Indians who lived on the island prior to the arrival of the Hispanic population. The Gods of vodou, called Loas, are spirits of African ancestors, deceased family members and Biblical figures (Christianity was incorporated into the vodou belief system). The believers can call upon the Loas for help in time of distress. The Loas provide them information and can intervene to change a situation. In order to express themselves, they are channelled through human beings. The spirit must inhabit a person’s body by displacing ‘the self’; possession. When someone is possessed, he/she loses control

54 completely, is able to perform extraordinary feats, often loses consciousness, falls to the ground writhing and moaning, and is resistant to being constrained. After a brief period of time, the person regains consciousness. The Loa is then able to use the person as a medium to communicate with humans. Vodou priests, called Houngan, and priestesses, called Mambo, are the conduits to the Loas. They possess the knowledge of the tradition, are endowed with power and are well-respected by the community. The Loas will take care of all devotees, but in return the devotees must also take care for the Loas. Certain rituals must be observed to satisfy them. Misfortune, divorce, poor physical health, and mental illness are often attributed to neglect of the Loas. The vodou’s reputation has been tarnished by the association with magic and evil. Generally, vodou is not used by its practitioners to do harm, but to worship the Loas and to gain protection and strength. However, ‘the professional magician’ usually do buy spirits to send curses and to achieve personal aims (Desrosiers & Fleurose 2002: 509 – 511).

When I was in Lompré I asked the local people about their religion, and quite often people were willing to talk about vodou (which was unexpected due to the common assumption that it is practiced secretly). One lady shared the principle of the yearly ceremony in which the lady was the 'servant'. She is able to ask spirits to enter someone's head. Someone else shared the usage of vodou in lottery games. Spirits are called so that Haitians get money. Within someone is sleeping, the spirits will tell what to play in the lottery game, but also the purpose of that money. There is always one condition: obediance to the spirits. When a priest is involved in receiving information about lottery numbers, the priest has to be repayed.

The successful overthrow of the colonizers is the source of pride, encouragement, hope and motivation for Haitians. Surely, other difficulties can be successfully overcome also. “Faith in vodou gods and their desire for freedom inspired the slaves to believe that they could successfully oust the oppressors” (Desrosiers & Fleurose 2002: 511). The vodou gods were, and continue to be, perceived as powerful and protective, since they intervene quickly and efficiently on behalf of their worshippers ( Ibid. ).

6.2 Church and state

The previous section has shown that the role of the Catholic Church always has been a dominating one in state affairs, especially during colonialism. After that, it lost its power, but the Church tried to regain its control in the late 19 th century. The connection between state and church was loosened again during the regime of Duvalier, and the power of the Roman Catholic Church was reduced. Aristide’s drive to come up for the poor was based on his religious beliefs, but he used armed gangs later on during his presidency.

An example of religious involvement in politics: In 1994 the military-backed president Emil Jonassaint made speeches that Haiti’s African inspired traditional religion would provide the government with protection against the Americans. He said that Haitians would return to the worthy heritage of the famous maroons (runaway slaves). He also told businessmen privately that he saw his destiny in religious terms. Some reports say that some of the generals in the Haitian regime of that time had also been consulting with vodou priests for advice and protection (Beck & Hendon 1994: 887).

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Out of the interviews that were conducted with expatriates of the NGOs some information was retrieved about the relation between church and state nowadays. Formally the church and the state are not connected. The state is neutral. However, the Roman Catholic Church is more closely connected to the state than other churches, but churches are separate from politics. In the Netherlands for example, there are several political parties, but in Haiti Protestants nor Catholics nor vodouists do gather themselves in one party. People who are part of the government or the Senate are elected on personal basis. Haiti does not know yet what it is to be represented through a party. One interviewee said that he never noticed that a candidate explicitly referred to his Christian vision of life or supporters. Christians personally do not always vote for someone out of religious motive, but out of social justice.

6.3 Concluding remarks

This chapter has shown the importance of religion in the lives of Haitians; everything in Haiti is somehow related to God. These are just a few examples to illustrate that: when there is a meeting with an NGO, one can start with a prayer, while people of different religions are together; the inauguration of the President is officially inaugurated during a Catholic service; and Catholic schools receive some subsidy from the government. When I was in Haiti, I was overwhelmed by the many buses which had written names for God on their buses, and also by the many different churches. At the same time, the state positions itself distant from any church.

The next chapter will elaborate on the identity of Christian faith-based NGOs, while taking into account the religious landscape of Haiti.

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7. Representation of the identity of Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs

This chapter aims at giving an answer to the sub question ‘What does a Christian identity include for Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs?’ In Appendix 2 an extensive review is given, while this chapter highlights the general characteristics. There are five NGOs included in this thesis: ICCO, Medair, Tear, Woord en Daad, and ZOA. For each of these NGOs, a brief description is added along the four dimensions of the operationalization of section 2.3.4. During the interviews the dimensions of identity from the NGOs have been discussed, so those empirical results are presented in this chapter. Moreover, additional information is retrieved from the websites of these NGOs and added as well. Whenever a source is mentioned in round brackets, the information is retrieved from a website; all other information is based on results from the interviews.

7.1 ICCO

ICCO itself does not execute projects in Haiti, but give institutional support to its partner organizations in Haiti. After the earthquake ICCO mainly supported relief aid and rehabilitation. However, in 2014 ICCO decided to stop completely working in Haiti, because ICCO has to economize a lot. Formal identity Factual identity Constituencies ICCO’s origins are the There are no specific Protestant-Christian tradition, constituencies of ICCO. They but is not directly affiliated receive their funds from the anymore with a particular Dutch government, and have to church. inform them about their projects.

Content ICCO has three core values: ICCO supported Haitian compassion, justice, and care organizations, primarily for the earth. Every human institutionally. Until some years being deserves respect and ago ICCO was able to say to equal treatment, and has the organizations that it supports responsibility to act in the same the partner organizations, and way towards others (ICCO they themselves could decide 2012a). on what projects they would spend the money. ICCO wants to be the link between entrepreneurs and In Haiti group trainings were companies here (in the North) given to some partners about and over there (in the South). different subjects (for example Their business is to connect gender or fundraising, but also people, organizations, personal training among local knowledge and innovative partners). ideas (ICCO 2012b).

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Target group ICCO is a member of several ICCO works in Haiti with local alliances. The first one is partners. These are part of Samenwerkende several alliances, such as ACT Hulporganisaties (SHO) Alliance. The other alliances are (Cooperating Aid also Christian alliances. In the Organizations), and ACT past ICCO had projects with Alliance (Actions by Churches churches, but now not Together). SHO obligates ICCO anymore. Some problems came to spend the money within a up, because the local churches certain time frame and to use wanted to interfere in the its funds just for reconstruction projects. Besides, one strict projects. ACT is the rule of the Dutch government is international ecumenical that ICCO is allowed to support alliance for relief aid (ACT ecclesiastical organizations, but Alliance no date). The vision of the money should not only be ACT Alliance is working used for an ecclesiastical target “towards a world community group. ICCO also works where all God’s creation lives together with organizations with dignity, justice, peace and which have another religious full respect for human rights foundation; it is not a requisite and the environment” ( Ibid. ). that the partner organization is Christian. ICCO’s cooperation Institutional donors support with these organizations rests the work of ICCO. The most on the shared drive with other important donors are the organizations. It does not Ministry of Foreign Affairs of matter to what religion the The Netherlands, the European organization belongs. ICCO Union, and the Nationale does not want to limit itself, so Postcode Loterij (Dutch ICCO does not ask any special National Postal Code Lottery) faith criteria towards its (ICCO 2012c). partner organisations.

Personnel Th e personnel of ICCO’s office The direct personnel of the in Utrecht should have an Haitian office of ICCO it is not affinity with Christianity, but commanded to be Christian. should also be open to other They are asked for a positive religions. ICCO does not want attitude towards the Protestant their personnel to be character of ICCO and Kerk in missionary, because they want Actie. In the contract of the to keep an open dialogue and ICCO's headoffice in Utrecht understanding. So not all the there is nothing written on personnel is Christian. that.

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7.2 Medair

Medair arrived in Haiti after the earthquake in 2012. Their head office in Switzerland decided to send a team to Port-au-Prince to inventory the situation, the possibilities for Medair, and what suits with Medair’s mandate. The main projects were reconstruction, rubble removal, building transitional shelters, and WASH. Formal identity Factual identity

Constituencies The constituencies of Medair It seems that Medair does not are not related to specific involve its constituencies, but churches or denominations. Medair does work with Medair receives institutional volunteers for assistance on funding, but also depend fundraising and publicity heavily on the additional activities. support of private donors for funding needs not met by institutional donors (Medair 2011a). General funding has been performed among the general public in Christian magazines, on Christian websites and festivals etc.

Content The Christian identity and The work in Haiti is done out of inspiration of Medair is very Christian compassion, and clear: “motivated by their Medair reaches out at difficult Christian faith” (Medair 2011b). places. It was the aim to relieve people who are affected by the The mission of Medair is “to earthquake. There is not an seek out and serve the explicit way of evangelism, nor vulnerable women, children, the need to say that Medair is a and men in crisis who live in Christian organization. This will often difficult-to-access regions not be hidden, but just shared in Africa and Asia, and other when it fits in the conversation. areas with extraordinary need” But sometimes people can see (Medair 2011b). Medair’s work in the way Medair acts there is is “compassionate and a difference with other NGOs. practical, providing life-saving care and support that upholds The international staff will the dignity and independence share their Christian inspiration of every person, regardless of when it comes to the fore, but race, religion, or politics” the main point for them is to (Ibid. ). help, not to spread the Gospel. On the one hand it is hoped Medair’s five values are: that the beneficiary does not

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integrity , h ope , c ompassion , see that the international staff dignity, and faith (Medair is different, but on the other 2011c). hand it is hoped that people feel the difference in the way the work is done, how is dealth with difficulties, how is dealt with people.

Target group The partners of Medair are Medair Haiti works closely with divided in four groups: United the local government of Jacmel Nations, Government, and its department, and Institutional and Corporate particularly with the (Medair 2011d). For most of communities and their these partners Christian (informal) leaders (CASEC and inspiration is not present. ASECs). Medair also works with the NGOs which are working in the same area. The work could be done in accordance with them. There are no criteria for partner organizations.

Personnel New staff has to follow a relief The international staff in Haiti and rehabilitation orientation has devotions daily, and once a course to see if the person and week with the national staff as Medair match up with each well, on voluntary basis. Two of other. One requirement for the international staff are recruited international staff is Roman Catholic. to be a committed Christian. They have to agree with the In the field Medair Christian inspiration. For characterizes itself by national staff it is different. It respecting the local culture, the does not matter what religion local belief and how people the person has. The work needs position themselves. For to be done, so any person from example, in Somaliland female a country can become staff. So international Medair staff wore in Somaliland just the a scarf and loose clothing. international staff was

Christian, and the national staff Muslim.

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7.3 Tear

TEAR Netherlands was not responsible for any project executed in Haiti after the earthquake, but they supported the British chapter of Tear, Tearfund UK. Tearfund UK sent a team to Haiti, which did programs on shelter, schools, seed banks, disaster risk reduction, psychological support and youth program. That is why in this section Tear and Tearfund UK will be taken together. Formal identity Factual identity Constituenc ies The constituencies of T ear are There is a department which is mainly the churches and concerned with campaigns, individual Christians in the events, volunteers, fundraising countries where the offices are etc. Volunteers are asked to situated. It is not related to a join in their awareness specific church. Tear calls the campaigns, to gather money for churches to connect with Tear, to pray, to sponsor churches across the world, and communities. Also there are to get involved. two music bands ambassadors of Tear, which pays in their concerts attention to the projects of Tear and the lives of people all over the world.

Content Tearfund is a Christian In Haiti there were two distinct organization, which is strands to Tearfund's work: passionate about "living out (...) Firstly the Disaster values of love, hope and Management Team (DMT transformation" (Tearfund UK Team) which responded in a 2011a). The vision of Tearfund time-limited way to support the worldwide is: “Our vision is to post-earthquake response, and see 50 million people released secondly the 'Country team' from spiritual and material who had been in Haiti for over poverty through a worldwide 30 years working with local network of 100,000 local churches in supporting those in churches” (Tearfund UK long term need in Haiti. 2011b). Tearfund helps communities Tear has as its mission to be based on their level of need actively involved in a rather than whether they were worldwide Christian movement Christian or not. In this vein which does not put up with Tearfund did not engage in poverty and injustice. Within evangelism, nor did it provide that movement the mission for aid with the prospect of being Tear is to connect churches and able to convert people to Christians in the Netherlands Christianity. However if anyone with churches in different asked Tearfund would have

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continents (Tear 2012 a). been delighted to have shared their faith. Tearfund UK mentions as core to their Christian values: the The Country team belief that aid must be given concentrated on working with regardless of race, religion, the local churches to mobilise nationality or gender, and them in response to supporting never be used for a particular their fellow Haitians but in a political or religious standpoint much more evangelical way. (Tearfund UK 2011a).

Target group Tear is a member of several Tear uses the local churches networks, because it attaches across the world. It is a unique great value to cooperation. instrument against poverty. These networks are all Christian The local churches are networks. anchored in the local language and culture. Moreover, the Tear works with local partner church is everywhere. In the organizations, but does not most remote villages, in the execute the projects itself. dirtiest slum etc.: everywhere a When starting a relationship church can be found. Also, the with a partner, Tear seeks church withdraws itself from contact with Christian dangerous situations. To love, organizatons and churches being faithful and do justice which have similar aims as belong to the heart of the Tear. Mostly these church (Tear 2012b). organizations are local organizations. Occasionally, The DMT team of Tearfund that is not possible, for Haiti did not have restrictions example in complex situations in awarding contracts or (Afghanistan) or temporal working with partners other interventions (Somalia). than those in line with their quality standards and legal requirements.

Personnel All international staff are In the office there is daily required to sign an agreement prayer and devotion. It is part with Tearfund's Statement of of the working day. They pray Faith. Tearfund would employ for the program, for each national staff who did not sign other, for coming meetings etc. up to this statement or who In the office a song hang on the came from a different faith file cabinet, which is sung background, as long as they during the morning devotions. adhered to the general In the community there is also principles of Tearfund's work. space for prayer.

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Photo taken by author on one of the base camps of Tearfund UK in Haiti; The Tearfund values are written both in Creole and in English.

7.4 Woord en Daad

The relief projects in Haiti that started after the earthquake were mainly aimed at cash for work, rebuilding, building schools, shelters, and livelihoods. But the main focus of Woord en Daad in Haiti is building schools in partnership with their local partner NGOs.

Formal identity Factual identity Constituencies The constituencies of Woord en A specific department is Daad can be found in the concerned with the reformed churches, but it is not constituencies and it concerns: related to a particular church. awareness creation, education, The reformed background sharing information, originates from the founders fundraising etc. Moreover, who mainly participate in the there are committees of reformed church volunteers and platforms for denominations. Also, in the companies and entrepreneurs. articles of association reference Committees are involved in is made to reformed policy and vision making and confessions of faith are asked to give input on (Westerveld 2011: 56, 57). specific themes and topics as well (Westerveld 2011: 56, 57).

Content Woord en Daad has as its In the school project in Haiti mission: “Woord en Daad, as a mainly the Protestant schools Dutch Christian foundation, are supported, just a few connects people worldwide in Catholic schools are supported.

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their fight against poverty. (...) Woord en Daad worked on the Woord en Daad seeks to curriculum of schools, which contribute towards a had specific Christian values, sustainable transformation such as hygiene (family both in the North and the planning, HIV/AIDS), South” (Woord en Daad 2011: environmental education 32, 33). (creation, stewardship). This was accompanied with texts The five core values Woord en from the Bible. Woord en Daad Daad upholds are (Ibid. : 33,34): also supported summer camps. co-creature, co-responsibility, Besides creative activities, compassion, stewardship, and Biblical elements were added interdependent. on these camps as well. Target group In order to have partners that Woord en Daad does not suit Woord en Daad, mostly strictly search for partners that partners are sought that have a resemble with their own clear Christian vision on their background. It is about work and strongly draw accepting the Bible as the Word inspiration from the Bible. of God and as guidance, and people have to administer the Because of the mandate to Bible in a balanced way and offer development aid that need to be approachable for it finds its origin in a biblical (Westerveld 2011: 60). exhortation and perspective, regions that demonstrate no Woord en Daad does not seek possibilities for Christianity at direct cooperation with all, do not share in the focus of churches due to the Woord en Daad. It is important hierarchical structures and lack to create an environment of transparency that (can) whereby Christianity can be give(s) rise to imposed and are conveyed (Westerveld decisions of church leaders 2011: 60, 61). (Ibid. ). Personnel For the employees of Woord en Within Haiti the network of the Daad, endorsement of the partner organizations is very articles of association is large. Their network consists of demanded (Westerveld 2011: churches and pastors, so it is 57). easy to find Christian people.

Partner organizations make The staff in the Netherlands are their own decisions with all Christians, of different respect to employment reformed churches. Their requirement ( Ibid. : 61). motivation is rooted in Biblical principles as justice and help to poor people.

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7.5 ZOA

ZOA’s projects were concentrated on water, sanitation and the construction of houses. Later on a project for agriculture and food security started, which will end in 2014. Formal identity Factual identity

Constituencies ZOA is supported by individuals, churches, schools and companies, but not to any in specific.

Content ZOA states that it is non - ZOA does not evangelize . It has political and non-religious (in to be possible for employees to expressing and requirements read Bible, to have meetings in towards beneficiaries). ZOA their own environment supports people who suffer due to an armed conflict or natural disaster by helping them to rebuild their lives. Their mission can be summarized into three words: help, hope, rehabilitation. ZOA offers help to people who are affected by an armed conflict or natural disaster. ZOA contributes to a new perspective of hope wherein people collaborate on their future in dignity and trust. ZOA works on rehabilitation, until the victims can provide themselves with their own living (ZOA 2012a).

Target group ZOA always works with local, The Haitian partners are all Protestant churches and Christian. organizations. Though local organizations have to comply with the national laws in its country, but ZOA would like to express a Christian compassion to testify of its faith.

Personne l The international staff is Christian. The national staff that ZOA recruits is a reflection of the population living in the

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country , so non -Christian people can become staff member as well. For example, in Afghanistan the national staff consist of Muslims. The purpose of ZOA’s presence is more important than the religion of the national staff. Though, the national staff knew othat if they would work for ZOA, they have to respect their religion.

7.6 Comparing dimensions

In this section the results of the previous sections are further elaborated by comparing the organizations along the four dimensions (constituency, content, target group, and personnel) of the operationalization in order to enrich the prior discussion of the results.

Comparing constituencies The constituencies of the five organizations differ in the way they are built up. The main distinction is the origin of the respective organization: is it related to a church or does it form a civil- initiative organization? None of the organizations is related to a specific church denomination, though the constituencies of some organizations just belong to reformed churches. For civil society organizations, the tradition with its founding principles forms a main factor for the mandate and approach that are employed. An overall characteristic of the organizations is that the Protestant- Christian tradition forms the basis for their constituences.

There are differences in the way the organizations are built up. Medair and Tear are network members in their own international network and the network therefore constitutes a background against which the visions and approaches of the organizations are adjusted, especially in the case of Medair. Woord en Daad though is a pure civil-initiative organization, just as ZOA and ICCO.

Regarding the interaction with constituencies, almost all the organizations put effort in informing and involving their constituences. This is performed by brochures, e-mails, leaflets, prayer requests, visit events, etc. to show what is going on in the projects. Woord en Daad is the only organization that involves its constituencies through the establishment of platforms, committees and ambassadors. ICCO does not have interaction with constituencies in particular, but via Kerk in Actie ICCO tries to get a closer connection with them.

Comparing content There are quite some differences among the organizations about the three components of Christian development aid; missionary works, (world)diaconate, and development cooperation. However, none of the organizations is just involved in missionary works. Medair is mainly active in diaconal works, which are strongly based on Christian compassion. Missionary works can form an

66 element of it, but development cooperation does not fall into its focus in Haiti. Tear is much more involved in missionary works, since it mobilizes local churches to release people out of spiritual and material poverty. At the same time, (world)diaconate was the main priority of the Disaster Management team in Haiti, while the Country team is focusing on development cooperation. Woord en Daad tries to maintain a separation between missionary works on the one hand and diaconate and development cooperation on the other hand (no pure development cooperation), and it tries not to be involved in pure missionary works (Westerveld 2011: 72). ICCO is mainly active in development cooperation, while (world)diaconate is another important component. ZOA’s main component is (world)diaconate to help those who suffer. Missionary works can become part of that, but not necessarily. Development cooperation is important as well in their work.

Comparing target groups Partnerships are in all organizations present. Tear, Woord en Daad and ZOA cooperate with local churches. Tear defines local churches as a unique instrument against poverty. Woord en Daad does not seek direct cooperation with churches as it does not want to get caught in hierarchical church decision-making processes. ICCO works with local partners, but it worked with churches before. However, ICCO stopped working with them, because the problem was that the synod of the respective church wanted to be involved in decisions as well, which may turn out wrong.

In general Christian partners are preferred and demanded. Woord en Daad wants partners to have a clear Christian vision, and cannot work in a region where there is no similar organization to work with. Tear wants that local partner organizations share the same purpose, and are Christian. All ZOA’s partners in Haiti are Christian. ZOA likes to express the Christian compassion through the organizations they locally work with.

Comparing personnel Medair, Tear, Woord en Daad, and ZOA demand their employees to be a committed Christian. Medair asks the employee to have faith in Jesus Christ. Tearfund UK demand of all their employees to sign the statement of faith. Woord en Daad asks their employees to be Christian and to be motivated by the Bible roots. ICCO does not have explicit requirements towards their employees, but demands them to have affinity with Christianity, so not all employees are Christian.

For some organizations the rules for national staff in other countries are not the same as for the international staff. The purpose of the project is more important than to what religion the national staff belongs to. So Medair, Tearfund, and ZOA also work in countries where their national staff is non-Christian.

Taxonomy The taxonomy of section 2.3.5 is presented here, in which the third column represents the five Christian faith-based NGOs discussed in this chapter. ICCO is distinct from the other four NGOs, because even though ICCO has religious roots, its operations are not designed to meet a religious goal. Its religiosity is less pronounced in its mission and operations. That is why ICCO is put in the category Accommodative humanitarianism. The four other NGOs have in common that Christian engagement in social engagement is essential. So for these NGOs there is room for cooperation with the secular world, but believers must maintain their Christian distinctiveness. These Synthesis

67 humanitarian NGOs are serving others as an expression of Christian love and faith, which reflects God’s divine order for peaceful societies.

Table 3. Taxonomy of Christian faith-based NGOs.

Taxonomy of Type of Christian Christian humanitarianism faith-based humanitarianism NGO

Accommodative Blurs line between ICCO humanitarianism secular and (Christ of culture) religious nature of work Synthesis Attempts to Medair, Tear, humanitarianism balance Christian Woord en (Christ above orientation and Daad, ZOA culture) secular goals

Evangelistic Humanitarianism humanitarianism for the sake of (Christ transformer evangelism of culture) + (Christ humanitarianism & culture in paradox) Radical non- Humanitarian non- engagement engagement; (Christ against church missions as culture) central goal

7.7 Christian faith-based NGOs and the state

This section deals with an element that throughout the interviews was discussed as well, namely the relation between being a Christian organization and the Haitian state. This section thus follows up section 6.2 and elaborates on the empirical results from the NGOs about their perceptions on characteristics of the Haitian state and their own position towards the state. The assumption hereby was that the Bible commands its believers to be subjected unto the higher powers, which are ordained of God (King James Version; Romans 13:1).

Traditionally, the Protestant churches have stayed out of the politics, or sometimes just supported strong leaders - many traditional Protestant leaders in the 1960s and 1970s thought of Papa Doc as a good, strong leader, according to the African leadership model. According to one interviewee (expert, August 9, 2012) Protestant Christians in Haiti have been always a bit afraid of politics and the government. When the evangelical (mostly baptist) missionaries worked in Haiti in the 1950s – 1970s, they worked in a situation where Papa Doc and Baby Doc were in power. They had to stay out of politics, otherwise they would be kicked out of the country. Evangelicals were only interested in personal conversion, so changing the country / the politics / the government was not their priority. Also, in the 1980s and the 1990s the wave of Pentecostals came and the newer churches were mostly Pentecostal, and also not interested in politics. It was mainly thanks to the Catholic Church and the liberation theology priests that the Duvaliers were ousted. Still the

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Protestant Christian organizations (both relief and development) work mostly through the churches and see them as best as the development agent in the community.

The idea that the government is a servant of God is not recognized by any interviewee, but on the contrary, it is seen as bad and corrupt, so ‘stay away from it, otherwise you get dirty too’. Protestants have formed political parties and candidates for the presidency, but their religion has not changed much the vision on the government - corruption has only increased since Aristide came in power. Woord en Daad's interviewee (August 8, 2012) responded that within a Christian NGO in Haiti the attitude is dualistic: deeply rooted mistrust towards the government, but also the notion that the government is God given. According to him, Haitians are convinced that nothing can be expected from the government and that officials just enrich themselves.

Globally, the Protestant sector take the lead in reinforcing governments and transforming in a positive way by movements as Micah Challenge, a movement mostly supported out of the evangelical / Protestant churches (with Tearfund UK as motor) which tries to mobilize churches to put pressure on their governments (both national and local) to respect the Millenium Goals to reduce poverty. Regarding Haiti, most of the support of the government and empowerment of governmental agencies comes from bilateral aid; the Christian organizations stay normally far from it. Woord en Daad encounters two positions in Haiti: some organizations would like to cooperate with the government, while others just want to stay far away from the government. The interviewee did not notice any intentional policy to strengthen the efforts of the government.

ICCO’s policy is aimed at reinforcing the Haitian state through the activities and programmes of their parner organizations, especially because the government is weak and NGOs have to do everything. Their Christian partner organizations are too small regarding their executing capacity, so as far as the interviewee (August 9, 2012) knows those organizations are not actively involved in reinforcing the state. Other partners try to strengthen the state, for example by organizing trainings for the police.

The government of Haiti is really weak and its agencies (especially in the health and education sector) do not give much services to the people. They need the NGOs (Christian and non- Christian) to realize basic services for the population; especially in the schools, clinics, and hospitals of which most of the services are given by the Catholic and Protestant organizations. So NGOs and other church organizations have a lot of freedom in Haiti, partly because of the absence of control by the government and partly because they provide services that the Haitian government cannot provide.

Haiti and Haitians consider themself nearly all Christian. 'If you say to a Haitian that he is not a Christian, he will be very angry, and react - you say that I am an animal?' So being a Christian, praying before a meeting in a community, etc. is the norm for all Haitians, which makes it easy for Christian organizations to work in Haiti. So, Christian NGOs seem to be able to work more easily than a non-Christian NGO (expert, August 9, 2012). Additionally, there are strong networks between all the Christian organizations. The interviewee of ZOA (August 17, 2012) adds the recognition Christians have among each other about the Word of God, and especially the Holy Spirit. There are many similarities between the organizations and the population, such as forgiveness, comfort and

69 diaconate. However, since the state does not have a clear Christian identity, the interviewee of ICCO thinks it does not make a difference of being a Christian NGO or a non-Christian NGO.

No interviewee noticed any difference in attitude from the government towards them as Christian NGOs. All NGOs got treated the same. Everyone with money was invited after the earthquake. Probably bigger NGOs got treated better, because of their size, or if they are funded by a powerful country, like USAID.

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8. Conclusions, discussion and recommendations

When an NGO works in a country to provide relief aid, such as after Haiti’s earthquake, it has to deal with many actors and difficulties. In every country the situation is different, and the NGO has to find its way. This study has explored the context of Haiti, in which Christian faith-based NGOs are working according to their own mission.

This chapter will focus in section 8.1 on answering the main question ‘How does the Christian identity of Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs become manifested in post-earthquake Haiti, given its political and religious context?’, while answering the sub questions first. Section 8.2 contains the discussion, while section 8.3 presents the recommendations.

8.1 Conclusions

Sub question 1: To what extent the Haitian state can be characterized as fragile? The starting point of this sub question was to gain understanding of the fragile nature of the Haitian state, complicated by the earthquake of 2010, in the light of its troubled history. The presence of armed forces, the influence and interference of foreign powers, and the deeply rooted inequality between the elites and the majority of the population are three recurring themes in the history, having consequences on many areas in Haiti. The history has learned that it is not only about a lack of social contract between the state and its population, it is a broad and complete absence of communication and trust of people in their government and their institutions. The international agencies are mainly exercising social control in Port-au-Prince, while in the area of Léogâne for example there seems not to be a clear group that exercises social control. The aid received by NGOs and the help of people within their own network seem to be the two most important factors to survive for the people living near Léogâne.

The CRISE indicators – authority, service and legitimacy failures – are used as indicators in this thesis. The authority failure that is present in Haiti is the high level of criminality with almost no state action to control it; there is virtually no working justice system. However, communal, ethnic or religious violence, civil violence are not present. When looking to the service failures, Haiti fails to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services. Especially the rural area suffer from lack of access. NGOs are the main actors who are provide the basic services to the population. In the past legitimacy failures certainly occurred in Haiti. The Duvalier regime is associated with indiscriminate repression and martial law. Also, for a long time there were no free elections and there was a strong role for the military, while suppressing the opposition. It is hard to say that the legitimacy failures are still present. Free elections have taken place more than once, and suppression is not taking place, as far as this study showed. Next to this literature indication, Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs were asked about their experiences with the Haitian state. They reflected the shortcomings as presented above, and summarized these in a lack of money, capacity (skilled people) and means. However, in their direct contact with the local government, these NGOs do discover that governmental structures are present in Haiti.

There is, however, not a shared agreement for defining the Haitian state as fragile. It depends on what indicators are used for defining a state as fragile, so Haiti is defined as weak as well

71 by some scholars. However, Haiti does fulfil many of the indicators attributed to fragile states, but it is different from fragile contexts such as in Afghanistan and in South Sudan that suffered violent conflicts for many years. These things taken together, I would suggest to define Haiti as a state at risk of failing. Service and authority failures are pretty much present, but in the field of legitimacy failures the situation seemed to be improved.

Sub question 2: What role does religion play in the state of Haiti and its citizens? Religion and Haiti are two intermingled things. Especially vodou and Catholicism have their place in the lives of Haitians due to respectively legacy of their African roots and due to colonialism. There is no strict separation between church and state in Haiti, nor is the state working hard for equal positions of all religions. This means that the Haitian church – state model can be characterized as 'Integration through a rapprochement of civil religion and constitutional ethics'. The majority of the Haitians, some say all, believe in vodou and this can be considered as the civil religion. The state does not explicitly keep itself away from religion. A certain level of connectedness can legitimately exist, both in the case of vodou and in the case of Roman Catholicism. Within society there is no clear-cut conception of public morality, but the partial autonomy of the different spheres and the tension between them are preserved.

Sub question 3: What does a Christian identity include for Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs? This thesis has researched five Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs along four dimensions (constituencies, content, target group, and personnel) to understand their formal and factual identity. There is no one clear Christian identity, because all five organizations express it differently. The Bible though can be reckoned as the main foundation of a Christian identity for almost all organizations (content dimension). When an organization has a less clear relation with biblical notions, it appears to me that the other dimensions are also less related to Christian roots. The constituencies of most organizations are mainly grounded in Dutch churches or individual Christians. Moreover, there are three development component which bear a strong distinctive influence on Christian identity: missionary work, (world)diaconate (meaning serving people in need), and development cooperation.

Main question: How does the Christian identity of Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs become manifested in post-earthquake Haiti, given its political and religious context? Within this thesis I have tried to research several expectations regarding the Haitian state, church and faith-based NGOs. The first was that the Haitian state is not that fragile as described in the international media. The second one is that Christianity is reflected in the Haitian state. The third was that I expected some relation between the religious landscape of Haiti and the position that Christian faith-based NGOs would have. The fourth was that Christian faith-based NGOs will clearly show their Christian identity to beneficiaries, but also that this identity would be reflected in their position towards the Haitian state (namely by active support). I tried to combine all these expectations into one thesis, which was not that easy. Still I will have a try.

Regarding the political context (sub question 1), the NGOs are aware of the problems that occur, but they hardly engage in political affairs to strengthen the state institutions. From the side of some Haitian partner organizations there is a deep mistrust, but also the will to be strengthened institutionally, while the Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs are mainly focused on executing their own projects. The religious context (sub question 2) makes it easy for Christian NGOs to accommodate,

72 because they have shared ideas with many people of the population. There is no difference what-so- ever that makes these NGOs more preferred by the Haitian state than non-Christian NGOs. Also, the few Haitians I have spoken to did not express any preference for what type of NGOs would help them. But the large amount of local churches make it for some NGOs easy to give expression to their vision to transform people by helping them spiritually as well.

The Christian identity of the NGOs becomes manifested in the organization’s focus, the constituency background, partner organizations and the recruited international staff. However, the first priority of the NGOs is to help the ones in need, but where possible they will share the Gospel. Their focus is to help the most vulnerable people out of their biblical mandate to 'love your neighbour as you love yourself'. The NGOs which are researched in this thesis mainly use churches or local Christian organizations as their development agencies in the communities, sometimes with the goal of transforming the whole community according to Christian values. Recruited international staff is Christian in almost every organization, but mostly there are no requirements for national staff. So Christian identity is not always demanded by all the personnel within the local organizations. Taken all these elements together, it appeared that the main focus of these NGOs is to provide (world)diaconate, and if possible missionary work. A Christian relief worker of these NGOs acts visibly recognizable (language and prayer), and mainly diaconal. Explicit expressions of the Christian identity is not manifested, but in more private spheres, such as during devotions with the international staff and Bible studies in nights or weekend.

8.2 Discussion

Taken those conclusions into account it becomes clear that while the context of Haiti is a complex one, state building is not directly addressed by the NGOs working in Haiti. Although the interviewees reflect the poor image of the Haitian state from the literature, the involvement in state affairs is modest, namely in the form of cooperation, but is also intentionally low sometimes. Some Christian NGOs choose not to work with the state, because they say that at that time they have to pay people to get things arranged (corruption). At the same time, their own donors do not allow them to support the Haitian government, because that is not perceived as the right purpose for the donations. This is a tension which is difficult to solve.

Before starting this study, my assumption was that the Dutch Christian faith-based NGO would show clearly to the beneficiaries their Christian identity, and in that way would also focus strongly on missionary works. Whenever I visited websites of these kind of NGOs the Christian motivation is always shown clearly. However, now I can see that in practice (world)diaconate is a much larger aspect of their work. It made me realize the difficulty of expressing it, especially in countries where you cannot enter when you express the Christian identity. It is a choice you make as organization between going there and help, or not going there and leave it for secular organizations. In both cases the question is: How to testify of the Gospel (without Christian staff)? This is a tension I came accross in this research as well.

This thesis has only incorporated the trust that Haitians have towards their state. It has shown the deep mistrust, which can be put in context by looking to its history. Out of the interviews with the NGOs it appeared also that there is a deep mistrust among the Haitians themselves. When I was talking to the rural population of Léogâne, a lack of trust existed as well towards Cordaid and its

73 shelter programme. If people do not have confidence in each other and in organizations / institutions, it will be really difficult to build up a country. I hope that the current Haitian government can keep acting legitimately and when time passes it can start delivering the services and security that the Haitians need.

A contradicting view of the cause of this earthquake comes from Reverend Pat Robinson from the US. He states that it showed God’s wrath for the satanic orientation of the Haitians (Gros 2011: 132). He thinks that the Haitians made a pact with the devil, which allowed enslaved Haitians to be freed from their French slave-owners and from slavery in 1791 (Bellegarde-Smith 2010: 267). No Dutch Christian faith-based NGO, though they are different from each other, are taking this much strong opinion as Robinson does. When I talked with the representative of Woord en Daad, he replied on this matter something like: so the earthquake of Japan and Chili is not a punishment of God?

8.3 Recommendations and limitations

The context analysis has shown that the deeply rooted inequality, being preserved by the ruling elite, until this day has blocked any development benefiting the majority of the population. This decisive factor of inequality is a factor that should be taken into account when formulating new programmes and partnerships. At least being aware of the existing power structures could prevent organisations to strengthen the imbalances that exist amongst the population. Not taking these structures into account risks not only to strengthen the unbalances but also to contribute to internal conflict, and to jeopardise initial objectives of a given intervention.

The NGOs showed all that they cooperate as much as possible with the local government of the area they are working in, and also with the local representatives: CASEC (Communal Section Administrator; this person has an administrative role in each communal section and reports to the mayor) and ASEC (Communal Section Assembly Member; this person has the responsibility of counselling the CASECs and acts as their budget watchdog) (Molenaar 2012: 26). While contact and cooperation on the national level is not sought, the NGOs are making very conscious choices to involve the government and local representatives, introduce themselves to them, keep them updated etc. It is comprehensible that the main duty of NGOs is to support the local people, but I would like to see that NGOs take part in helping the state to deliver the services before they are gone. I think that in the longer run it should be taken over by the state, so actively supporting the state structures would be necessary. This thesis just showed an indication that the degree of cooperation between NGOs and the state on both local and national level differs. To what extent cooperation is exactly happening on which level, and in what way cooperation can improve requires further research.

My research is limited to a certain number and type of Christian faith-based NGOs. In Dutch one could say the NGOs which cover the right wing of the Christian faith-based NGO spectrum. There are many more though, all different in their mission statement. Now I have just interviewed the NGOs whom I knew before I started the research, because of my own background. So the result is that mainly militant Christian faith-based NGOs, as Berger (2003) would say, have been interviewed. It would have been interesting to compare Christian and non-Christian NGOs, but also to include

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Christian faith-based NGOs which originate from another country. For example, in Haiti a lot of American Christian organizations were working.

Another limitation is that this thesis just could give a broad answer to the main question. It was difficult to operationalize identity, and to make it concrete in formal and factual identity. The challenge for Dutch Christian faith-based NGOs is to manifest its Christian identity as noted in its formal identity into its factual identity. Also, it is a challenge to give substance to manifesting the Christian identity while working in several areas in the world.

During my field work I had to make use of an interpreter of my interviews, since I am not able to speak Creole and my French was just enough to handle daily things. This means that I could not hear the information directly from the respondents, but that I heard the answers in his way of talking. There is a certain kind of influence in that. I sometimes noticed my interpreter was translating in a way that characterized himself, so I got the idea he made a tall story or added some sentences. I knew he also had knowledge, which was often useful, but still his duty was just to translate. Another point of consideration is that his presence could have influenced the answers.

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Appendix 1 Taxonomy of Christian faith-based humanitarianism

Taxonomy of Type of Mission Authority/ Working Financial Example Christian humanitarianism legitimacy culture support agencies humanitarianism

Accommodative Blurs line between Absent strictly Unlikely to be tied Christian faith Funding not Christian aid humanitarianism secular and religious goals to a not required dependent Heifer (Christ of culture) religious nature of denomination or of staff upon religious international work to legitimate work sources in religious language Synthesis Attempts to Emphasizes More likely to be More likely to Appeal for CRS humanitarianism balance Christian goals of just and tied to a have Christian funding to CAFOD (Christ above orientation and peaceful denomination & working Christian Church World culture) secular goals legitimate work environment religious base Service with explicit (staff culture) and secular American religious language institutions Friends Service committee Evangelistic Humanitarianism First, spiritual Legitimacy Christian faith Funding appeals Samaritan humanitarianism for the sake of transformation termed in likely a primarily Purse (Christ transformer evangelism Second, focused explicitly religious requirement directed to World Vision of culture) + (Christ humanitarianism mainly on language & more of the staff Christian based & culture in Christian likely to be tied to and Mission Board paradox) fellowship a religious denomination denomination Radical non- Humanitarian non- Engages in Tied to a Christians Funding for N/A engagement engagement; religious social denomination or within the missions from (Christ against church missions as institutions for religious authority denomination local culture) central goal evangelism denomination purposes or denominational head body Source: Thaut 2008: 14. Based on Richard Niebuhr ‘s Christ & Culture (1951).

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Appendix 2 Extensive review on Christian faith-based NGOs

ICCO Formal identity Factual identity Constituencies ICCO has existed since 1964. There are no specific During that year several constituencies of ICCO. They Protestant Churches in the receive their funds from the Netherlands decided to Dutch government, and have to cooperate in development inform them about their activities. ICCO’s origins are the projects. Protestant-Christian tradition, but is not directly affiliated anymore with a particular church. Though, ICCO works in close cooperation with Kerk in Actie (Church in Action), another Dutch organization of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands. Content ICCO has three core values: ICCO supported Haitian compassion, justice, and care organizations, primarily for the earth. Every human institutionally. Until some years being deserves respect and ago ICCO was able to say to equal treatment, and has the organizations that it supports responsibility to act in the same the partner organizations, and way towards others (ICCO they themselves could decide 2012a). on what projects they would spend the money. ICCO wants to be the link between entrepreneurs and In Haiti group trainings were companies here (in the North) given to some partners about and over there (in the South). different subjects (for example Their business is to connect gender or fundraising, but also people, organizations, personal training among local knowledge and innovative partners). When less money ideas (ICCO 2012b). was available, ICCO decided to support human rights organizations instead of food security organizations, because ICCO expected that for that kind of practical programme budgets could be found more easily. However, at the

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mom ent there is just money to support projects on reconstruction.

Target group ICCO is a member of several ICCO works in Haiti with local alliances. The first one is partners. These are part of Samenwerkende several alliances, such as ACT Hulporganisaties (SHO) Alliance. The other alliances are (Cooperating Aid also Christian alliances. In the Organizations), and ACT past ICCO had projects with Alliance (Actions by Churches churches, but now not Together). anymore. Some problems came up, because the local churches SHO obligates ICCO to spend wanted to interfere in the the money within a certain projects. Besides, one strict time frame and to use its funds rule of the Dutch government is just for reconstruction projects. that ICCO is allowed to support ecclesiastical organizations, but ACT is the international the money should not only be ecumenical alliance for relief used for an ecclesiastical target aid. “Members of the alliance group. ICCO also works work together for positive and together with organizations sustainable change in the lives which have another religious of people affected by poverty foundation; it is not a requisite and injustice through that the partner organization is coordinated and effective Christian. ICCO’s cooperation humanitarian, development with these organizations rests and advocacy work. We work on the shared drive with other with and for people of all faiths organizations. It does not and none” (ACT Alliance no matter to what religion the date). Subsequently, the vision organization belongs. ICCO of ACT Alliance is working does not want to limit itself, so “towards a world community ICCO does not ask any special where all God’s creation lives faith criteria towards its with dignity, justice, peace and partner organisations. full respect for human rights and the environment” ( Ibid. ).

Institutional donors support the work of ICCO. The most important donors are the ministry of foreign affairs of The Netherlands, the European Union, and the Nationale Postcode Loterij (Dutch National Postal Code Lottery)

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(ICCO 2012c).

Personnel The personnel of ICCO’s office The direct personnel of the in Utrecht should have an Haitian office of ICCO it is not affinity with Christianity, but commanded to be Christian. should also be open to other They are asked for a positive religions. ICCO does not want attitude towards the Protestant their personnel to be character of ICCO and Kerk in missionary, because they want Actie. In the contract of the to keep an open dialogue and ICCO's headoffice in Utrecht understanding. So not all the there is nothing written on personnel is Christian. that.

Medair Formal identity Factual identity

Constituencies The constituencies of Medair It seems that Medair does not are not related to specific involve its constituencies, but churches or denominations. Medair does work with Medair receives institutional volunteers for assistance on funding, but also depend fundraising and publicity heavily on the additional activities. support of private donors for funding needs not met by institutional donors (Medair 2011a). General funding has been performed among the general public in Christian magazines, on Christian websites and festivals etc.

Medair mostly attracts Christians. In general, most of the constituencies originate from the Protestant-Christian corners, but in its communication this is not reflected by Medair.

Medair The Netherlands is part of a larger network of Medair departments in other European countries. The headquarters is

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in Switzerland, which provide leadership and support all country programmes all over the world (Medair 2011a).

Content The Christian identity and Medair Haiti started to work in inspiration of Medair is very southern Haiti, where not much clear: “motivated by their NGOs were working to Christian faith” (Medair 2011b). resonding to the earthquake. That was a conscious decision; The mission of Medair is “to to be at the places where it is seek out and serve the more difficult to reach out, vulnerable women, children, such as in Jacmel, LaMontagne and men in crisis who live in and Cotes-de-Fer. These people often difficult-to-access regions are the most vulnerable. in Africa and Asia, and other areas with extraordinary need” The work in Haiti is done out of (Medair 2011b). Medair’s work Christian compassion. It was is “compassionate and the aim to relieve people who practical, providing life-saving are affected by the earthquake. care and support that upholds There is not an explicit way of the dignity and independence evangelism, nor the need to say of every person, regardless of that Medair is a Christian race, religion, or politics” organization.This will not be (Ibid. ). hidden, but just shared when it fits in the conversation. But Medair’s five values are: sometimes people can see in Integrity: living out the values the way Medair acts there is a and principles consistently difference with other NGOs. Hope: seeking to bring hope to The international staff will people devastated by crisis and share their Christian inspiration caught in apparently hopeless when it comes to the fore, but situations the main point for them is to Compassion: desire of relieving help, not to spread the Gospel. human suffering in times of On the one hand it is hoped crisis, disaster, and conflict that the beneficiary does not Dignity: each person has been see that the international staff made in God’s image and is is different, because they are therefore uniquely valuable given just what they need. On and worthy of the highest the other hand it is hoped that respect, so Medair reaches out people feel the difference in to all in need the way the work is done, how Faith: motivation to care for is dealth with difficulties, how those who suffer, because of is dealt with people. faith in Jesus Christ

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(Medair 2011c). Target group The partners of Medair are Medair Haiti works closely with divided in four groups: United the local government of Jacmel Nations, Government, and its department, and Institutional and Corporate particularly with the (Medair 2011d). For most of communities and their these partners Christian (informal) leaders (CASEC and inspiration is not present. ASECs). Medair also works with the NGOs which are working in the same area. The work could be done in accordance with them. There are no criteria for partner organizations.

Personnel Medair’s team spirit, consists of The international staff in Haiti diverse cultural, racial, and has devotions daily, and once a linguistic backgrounds, united week with the national staff as by a set of common values, well, on voluntary basis. Two of shared by all of our the international staff are Internationally Recruited Staff Roman Catholic. (Medair 2011e). In the field Medair New staff has to follow a relief characterizes itself by and rehabilitation orientation respecting the local culture, the course to see if the person and local belief and how people Medair match up with each position themselves. For other. One requirement for example, in Somaliland female recruited international staff is international Medair staff wore to be a committed Christian. It a scarf and loose clothing. does not matter from which domination, but the international staff are required to have accepted Jesus Christ. They have to agree with the Christian inspiration. For national staff it is different. It does not matter what religion the person has. The work needs to be done, so any person from a country can become staff. So in Somaliland just the international staff was Christian, and the national staff

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Muslim.

Tear Formal identi ty Factual identity Constituencies The constituencies of Tear are There is a department which is mainly the churches and concerned with campaigns, individual Christians in the events, volunteers, fundraising countries where the offices are etc. Volunteers are asked to situated. It is not related to a join in their awareness specific church. Tear calls the campaigns, to gather money for churches to connect with Tear, to pray, to sponsor churches across the world, and communities. Also there are to get involved. two music bands ambassadors of Tear, which pays in their concerts attention to the projects of Tear and the lives of people all over the world.

Content Tearfund is a Christian In Haiti there were two distinct organization, which is strands to Tearfund's work: passionate about "living out Firstly the Disaster God’s kingdom values of love, Management Team which hope and transformation" responded in a time-limited (Tearfund UK 2011a). The way to support the post- vision of Tearfund worldwide earthquake response, and is: “Our vision is to see 50 secondly the 'Country team' million people released from who had been in Haiti for over spiritual and material poverty 30 years working with local through a worldwide network churches in supporting those in of 100,000 local churches” long term need in Haiti. The (Tearfund UK 2011b). DMT side focussed solely on the response to the Tear has as its mission to be catastrophe i.e. they applied actively involved in a practical programme work to worldwide Christian movement provide water, sanitation, which does not put up with shelter and so on to poverty and injustice. It is a communities in need. In line movement which fights for with the core values Tearfund justice, dignity and hope for the did not show favouritism in poorest and most vulnerable whom it helped - Tearfund communities in this world. helped communities based on Within that movement the their level of need rather than mission for Tear is to connect whether they were Christian or churches and Christians in the not. In this vein Tearfund did

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Netherlands with churches in not engage in evangelism, nor different continents. In that did it provide aid with the way the church can support prospect of being able to each other, learn from each convert people to Christianity. other and encourage each Tearfund simply responded to other in their efforts against the poor and needy which is a poverty and for righteous, biblical principle. Therefore sustainable relationships and there were no Bible texts on restoration of relationships display, no biblical references within their community (Tear in any documentation, and no 2012a). overt declaration of tearfund as a 'Christian' organization. Tearfund UK mentions as core However if anyone asked to their Christian values: the Tearfund would have been belief that aid must be given delighted to have shared their regardless of race, religion, faith. (This would be different nationality or gender, and in Muslim countries where the never be used for a particular consequences of evangelising political or religious standpoint could be severe - e.g.Tearfund (Tearfund UK 2011a). could be thrown out the country). In essence therefore Tearfund expressed its Christian identity through its application of its values and quality standards.

The Country team concentrated on working with the local churches to mobilise them in response to supporting their fellow Haitians but in a much more evangelical way. This response was long term and not solely in response to the consequences of the earthquake. It included advocacy as an important component, harnessing the churches to be a voice against corruption and poverty, hence how the team has had a presence in Haiti for so many years. Target group Tear is a member of several Tear uses the local churches networks, because it attaches across the world. It is a unique

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great value to cooperation. instrument against poverty. These networks are all Christian The local churches are networks. anchored in the local language and culture. They know the Tear works with local partner community and understand organization, but does not what are the needs. Churches execute the projects itself. can give answers to these When starting a relationship needs which aim at all with a partner, Tear seeks dimensions of the human contact with Christian being: physically, socially and organizatons and churches spiritually. Moreover, the which have similar aims as church is everywhere. In the Tear. Mostly these most remote villages, in the organizations are local dirtiest slum etc.: everywhere a organizations. Occasionally, church can be found. Also, the that is not possible, for church withdraws itself from example in complex situations dangerous situations. To love, (Afghanistan) or temporal being faithful and do justice interventions (Somalia). belong to the heart of the church (Tear 2012b).

The DMT team of Tearfund Haiti did not have restrictions in awarding contracts or working with partners other than those in line with their quality standards and legal requirements.

Pers onnel All international staff are In the office the re is prayer and required to sign an agreement devotion every morning. It is with Tearfund's Statement of part of the working day, so Faith. Tearfund would employ personnel receive loan for that. national staff who did not sign They pray for the program, for up to this statement or who each other, for coming came from a different faith meetings etc. In the office a background, as long as they song hang on the file cabinet, adhered to the general which is sung during the principles of Tearfund's work. morning devotions. In the Clearly this would be community there is also space particularly important in non- for prayer. Christian countries such as Sudan where national staff would be almost entirely Muslim, and without whom

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Tearfund could not deliver their programmes.

Woord en Daad Formal identity Factual identity Constituencies The constituencies of Woord en A specific department is Daad can be found in the concerned with the reformed churches, but it is not constituencies and it concerns: related to a particular church. awareness creation, education, The reformed background sharing information, originates from the founders fundraising etc. Moreover, who mainly participate in the there are committees of reformed church volunteers and platforms for denominations. Also, in the companies and entrepreneurs. articles of association reference Committees are involved in is made to reformed policy and vision making and confessions of faith are asked to give input on (Westerveld 2011: 56, 57). specific themes and topics as well (Westerveld 2011: 56, 57).

The possibilities for conveying Christian principles differ per context, which mostly has to do with the traditions, culture and governmental regulations that are present in a particular country ( Ibid. : 57).

Content Woord en Daad has as its In the school project in Haiti mission: “Woord en Daad, as a mainly the Protestant schools Dutch Christian foundation, are supported, just a few connects people worldwide in Catholic schools are supported. their fight against poverty. Woord en Daad worked on the Together with partner curriculum of schools, which organisations in Africa, Asia and had specific Christian values, Central and South America and such as hygiene (family relevant actors and sectors, planning, HIV/AIDS), Woord en Daad seeks to environmental education contribute towards a (creation, stewardship). This sustainable transformation was accompanied with texts both in the North and the from the Bible. Woord en Daad South”. Several elements for also supported summer camps.

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their vision are: Christian Besides creative activities, foundation, connects people Biblical elements were added worldwide, together with on these camps as well. partner organizations, through local organizations, and The basis of all this is to give contribute towards a support those who are in need. sustainable change and This means that Woord en transformation both in the Daad employees apply the North and the South (Woord en Biblical values in practice, and Daad 2011: 32, 33). act of out that. If you do not, The five core values Woord en then you cannot represent the Daad upholds are ( Ibid. : 33,34): Biblical message. It is Co-creature: “Every human noticeable in what the being is created to be an organization does, that it image-bearer of the Creator. In comes forth from the Christian this they are all equal, while foundation. This is mainly also diverse and unique”. expressed in trainings (ethical Co-responsibility: “Every issues). However, not every human being is created as a time there is a clear link to the responsible creature, Biblical message, especially not responsible for answering to in relief efforts. These efforts is God’s call”. Christian, but not in an explicit Compassion: We are demanded sense. Then Woord en Daad to demonstrate a biblical just has to help everyone. In compassion to those who are most cases that is a testimony suffering”. in itself. Stewardship: “As Christian organisations, we also take the element of co-responsibility and apply it to our organization”. Interdependent: “Interdependency means both independent and dependent combined”. Target group In order to have partners that Woord en Daad does not suit Woord en Daad, mostly strictly search for partners that partners are sought that have a resemble with their own clear Christian vision on their background. It is about work and strongly draw accepting the Bible as the Word inspiration from the Bible. of God and as guidance, and Because of the mandate to people have to administer the offer development aid that Bible in a balanced way and finds its origin in a biblical need to be approachable for it exhortation and perspective,

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regions that demonstrate no (Westerveld 2011: 60). possibilities for Christianity at all, do not share in the focus of Woord en Daad does not seek Woord en Daad. It is important direct cooperation with to create an environment churches due to the whereby Christianity can be hierarchical structures and lack and are conveyed (Westerveld of transparency that (can) 2011: 60, 61). give(s) rise to imposed decisions of church leaders (Ibid. ).

Woord en Daad works in Haiti with mainly three partners, of which Parole et Action (the literal translation of Word and Deed in French) is the largest. It has also worked with CRWRC, an organization which is of the Canadian Christian Reformed Church. Personnel For the employees of Woord en Within Haiti the network of the Daad, endorsement of the partner organizations is very articles of association is large. Their network consists of demanded (Westerveld 2011: churches and pastors, so it is 57). easy to find Christian people.

Partner organizations make The staff in the Netherlands are their own decisions with all Christians, of different respect to employment reformed churches. Their requirement ( Ibid. : 61). motivation is rooted in Biblical principles as justice and help to poor people.

ZOA Formal identity Factual identity

Constituencies ZOA is supported by individuals, churches, schools and companies, but not to any in specific.

Content ZOA states that it is non - ZOA does not evangelize. It has political and non-religious (in to be possible for employees to expressing and requirements read Bible, to have meetings in towards beneficiaries). ZOA

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supports people who suffer due their own environment to an armed conflict or natural disaster by helping them to rebuild their lives. Their mission can be summarized into three words: help, hope, rehabilitation. ZOA offers help to people who are affected by an armed conflict or natural disaster. ZOA contributes to a new perspective of hope wherein people collaborate on their future in dignity and trust. ZOA works on rehabilitation, until the victims can provide themselves with their own living (ZOA 2012a). ZOA acts according to and contributes to the Biblical perspective of Gods kingdom, which shall bring reconciliation and restoration.

Target group ZOA always works with local, The Haitian partners are all Protestant churches and Christian. organizations. Though local organizations have to comply with the national laws in its country, but ZOA would like to express a Christian compassion to testify of its faith.

Personnel The international staff is Christian. The national staff that ZOA recruits is a reflection of the population living in the country, so non-Christian people can become staff member as well. For example, in Afghanistan the national staff consist of Muslims. The purpose of ZOA’s presence is more important than the religion of the national staff. Though, the national staff knew othat if they would work for

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ZOA, they have to respect their religion.

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