DISASTERS EMERGENCY COMMITTEE Kosovo Crisis: Lesson Learning Study Phase I

Preliminary analysis and findings

Discussion Paper - August 16, 1999

VALID INTERNATIONAL

1 CONTENTS 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 3 2 Introduction ...... 5 3 The humanitarian response ...... 7 3.1 An Overview ...... 7 3.2 The role of host governments ...... 8 3.3 The role of NATO governments ...... 8 3.4 The role of UNHCR ...... 9 3.5 The role of NGOs ...... 10 4 Key issues ...... 12 4.1 Maintaining the independence of the humanitarian response ...... 12 4.2 Co-ordination ...... 13 a. Overall co-ordination ...... 13 b. Site planning ...... 14 c. Standardisation of service provision ...... 14 d. Standardisation across population groups ...... 15 e. Human Rights Interviewing ...... 16 f. Uneven levels of competence ...... 16 4.3 Protection of Refugees ...... 17 a. UNHCR ...... 17 b. Women and sexual violence ...... 19 c. NATO ...... 20 d. Humanitarian Evacuation Program and movement of population ...... 20 4.4 Staffing ...... 21 4.5 Longer-term development in Albania ...... 21 5 Issues for Phase II ...... 22 5.1 Main points ...... 22 5.2 Information Gaps to be filled in Phase II ...... 23

2 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY If the international system's response to the Great Lakes tragedy in 1994 reflected a policy vacuum, the response in the Balkans reflected quite the opposite - the extensive involvement of a number of world powers in the military, political and humanitarian spheres. The political capital invested in the Balkans by these powers led to an enormously well-resourced response driven along with great determination.

While many may have felt that the NATO campaign in the Balkans was a just war, fought for humanitarian reasons, the fact that NATO governments were also major humanitarian donors and their military contingents actively involved in the humanitarian response as well as in the conflict, has inevitably raised questions about the independence of the NGOs and UN agencies present. Organisational independence is vital if humanitarian organisations are to operate according to the principles of neutrality and impartiality. It is also imperative, for the success of the humanitarian endeavour throughout the world, that even the perception of a loss of independence be avoided. The presence of a strong UN co-ordination body for the humanitarian response - in a situation where NGOs received funding from NATO governments and worked alongside NATO military contingents in the camps - would have greatly helped those involved to protect their reputation for independence.

UNHCR, with the mandate to assume a co-ordination role in the Balkans was unable to fulfil such a role, revealing itself as weak and unprepared for the crisis. A key issue for further exploration is whether such weakness was due to internal problems within UNHCR, or the result of the deliberate undermining of the organisations by the major donors.

The failure of UNHCR to take a leadership role in the management of the response, and the subsequent management of much of the response by NATO governments, not only raised concerns about the actual or perceived neutrality and independence of the humanitarian operation, it also resulted in a response with very uneven co-ordination. While ad-hoc NGO co-ordination structures were set-up and functioned well in some places, in others humanitarian actors scrambled for territory, vastly different standards of care were provided to the affected population and there was an unnecessary degree of waste and duplication of activities.

UNHCR exists not only as a co-ordination body but as the agency mandated by the international community to protect refugees. UNHCR's weakness in responding to the crisis in the Balkans meant that it was unable to adequately fulfil this role. During the ten weeks in which refugees fled Kosovo, UNHCR was unable to carry-out a registration of those present in Macedonia and Albania.

In some ways, it might appear perverse to find fault with the emergency response in the Balkans: there was no malnutrition; there were no epidemics of communicable diseases; mortality was low. Indeed, in many ways, the response demonstrated that where there is the will, an impressive humanitarian logistical capacity exists. Despite the many successes of the response, however, the Balkans experience also revealed that many problems still exist. Shortcomings in co-ordination and a lack of competence by some of 3 those involved were, to a degree, masked by the huge volumes of funding available. Questions about the sustainability of the humanitarian programme were left unanswered due to the rapid return of refugees to Kosovo. Despite the many successes, there are still lessons to be learnt.

4 2 INTRODUCTION

In June 1999, Valid International were contracted to carry-out a lesson-learning study in the Balkans, on behalf of the DEC. Given the speed at which events on the ground were progressing, a decision was taken to send out data collectors to the region as soon as possible. On June 21st, two data collectors - Tania Kelly and Debora Kleyn - left London for Tirana. After approximately two weeks together in Albania, talking to DEC and partner agencies, other NGOs, UN agencies and government officials, visiting project sites and collecting documentation, the data collectors split up, one finishing interviews in Albania, the other visiting Macedonia, where interviews and site visits were also held. Both data collectors met up again to travel together into Kosovo.

The experience of using data-collectors as a way of quickly gathering information in the field - through interviews with key contacts and the collection of reports - is a new one. It appears to have been very fruitful: over 2,000 documents were collected; interviews with NGO, UN, donor and government representatives throughout the region were held and written-up; and, a small beneficiary survey carried-out. This represents a significant resource for further work. Much of this information could have been lost, had the lesson- learning exercise been delayed, as operations in Albania and Macedonia were closing down and staff moving on to Kosovo or out of the region. Unfortunately, the plan to interview 1,000 refugee families in both Macedonia and Albania was not possible, as refugees were too anxious to return and unwilling to spend the time filling in the questionnaire. Only 71 questionnaires were completed in Kukes.

This document brings together the findings of Phase I, highlighting key issues around the response to the Balkans crisis, and identifying potential areas for further work in Phase II. It is not the final report. Phase II will commence once the DEC agencies have responded to the findings of Phase I as outlined in this draft. The specific area(s) of focus for Phase II will be dictated by agency responses.

It is anticipated that Phase II will involve discussions between the lesson-learning team and the DEC to take forward the agreed issues, as well as follow-up interviews with key actors involved in the Balkans response, notably personnel from UNHCR and the principal NATO governments involved. (See the methodology section at the end of the document for detail.)

Many of the issues identified are predominantly system-wide, such as the involvement of NATO governments and military contingents in humanitarian delivery and the weak co- ordination of the humanitarian response. They are not within the power of the DEC agencies alone to resolve. However, the DEC agencies constitute an important sub-group of the humanitarian system (particularly if one takes into account DEC sister organisations and partners), and do have the power to lobby for change, particularly with the British Government, one of the most influential humanitarian donors.

The document starts with an overview of the humanitarian response, and, in particular, the involvement of host governments, NATO and UNHCR. Key issues are then presented starting with a discussion on maintaining the independence of the humanitarian 5 response before moving to co-ordination, protection, staffing and longer-term development in Albania. The paper concludes with a summary of possible issues for Phase II and the proposed methodology for this second phase. While the focus of the lesson-learning study was co-ordination, other issues identified by the data collection process are also outlined. These can either be followed-up in Phase II, or left for the main evaluation to consider.

The lesson-learning team members wish to extend their thanks to all of the DEC agency staff who gave up time to be interviewed, and who provided logistical and other support to the team in the field.

6 3 THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

3.1 An Overview

Maps of the region to be inserted here.

The recent conflict in the Balkans is the latest episode in a long history of instability in the region. The roots of the current crisis can be found in the process of the disintegration of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia that followed the ending of the Cold War, the ethnic conflict in Kosovo following that in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina.

On Saturday, March 20th, 1999, following the breakdown in negotiations between President Milosevic and NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Kosovo left the province. Most international NGOs left the province at the same time. The first NATO bombs were dropped on Belgrade on March 24th. Within just a few weeks, over one million ethnic Albanians were forced to flee their homes, with over 800,000 fleeing the province. Most travelled to Albania (460,000), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (250,000) and Montenegro (70,000).

The international community was unprepared for the scale of the exodus from Kosovo and conditions for the refugees were initially extremely difficult. There was massive media interest sparked by: • The involvement of NATO troops • The possibility that violence would spread to other areas, • The potential military involvement of the Russian Federation, • The plight of the refugees, all in a European context.

Against this background, the DEC, on 6th April, 1999, launched what would become its most successful appeal ever, raising over £40 million in pooled funds. These funds have been disbursed amongst the 12 DEC agencies that participated in the appeal.

DEC agencies played an important role in the response, working in the refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania as well as with local communities hosting refugees. DEC agencies operated directly and through local partners, supporting activities in the sectors of medicine and health care, water and sanitation, clothing and household items, pre- school activities, education and family tracing.

Following the signing of a peace deal on 13th June, 1999, the refugees started to return to Kosovo. DEC agencies have been amongst those who first (re-)opened programmes in the province to support the reintegration of returnees and the rehabilitation of the province.

The humanitarian response has been unique in a number of important ways: • the heavy involvement of foreign governments in the response - through their aid departments and the sending of military contingents;

7 • the almost unlimited amounts of money available for the response, both as a result of public generosity and government funding.

3.2 The role of host governments Most of the refugees that fled Kosovo entered Macedonia or Albania. The context in which humanitarian operations took place in these two countries differed significantly. The Albanian government warmly welcomed the refugees, and went out of its way to facilitate the humanitarian operation. Macedonia, on the other hand, was much more reluctant to accept the refugees. Many Macedonians were sympathetic to the Serb position, while the Government feared that a large influx of Kosovo Albanians would upset the delicate ethnic balance in the country and be a threat to its stability. The result was an initial refusal to allow the refugees to cross into the country, creating enormous hardships for those caught in no-man's land between the province and Macedonia. Once refugees were admitted, a significant proportion was sent on to third countries, while many that remained were kept in closely guarded camps.

Table 1 Differences between Albania and Macedonia as countries of asylum

ALBANIA MACEDONIA Welcoming Hostile Poor infrastructure Developed infrastructure Weak central control Strong central control Difficult terrain Easier terrain Most refugees stayed in Albania Many refugees forcible relocated to third countries Sympathetic to NATO position Sympathetic to Serb position

In both countries, significant numbers of refugees were looked after by ethnic Albanian families who opened their doors to the refugees. Approximately two thirds (300, 000 people) of the Kosovo Albanians were housed with Albanian households. At first this was known as refugees staying with host families. The term then shifted to those in “private accommodation” in recognition of the commercial nature of the arrangement in a large proportion of the cases, with many refugees paying approximately 250 Deutsche Marks per month.

3.3 The role of NATO governments NATO countries had a dual role in the Balkans crisis - as promoters of war in the region and as major humanitarian actors in the region. This has had a profound influence on the shape and nature of the response. The war was presented as necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, yet the bombing led to a rapid increase in the rate of exodus of ethnic Albanians leaving Kosovo (a process that had started several years earlier in response to ethnic cleansing in the province). In the weeks after NATO bombing began,

8 almost a million people fled their homes in the province. The response was a huge allocation of resources by NATO governments to meeting the emergency needs of the refugees. Many donors were authorised to spend large sums with minimal checks. OFDA were approving proposals in 48 hours, while DFID and ECHO also had large sums available, and were prepared to make funding decisions within days.

NATO governments (the 'bilaterals') not only provided vast financial resources for the aid effort, they also opened offices in the region, advised on site planning, set up refugee camps, designed intervention strategies, provided logistical services and assigned their military contingents to humanitarian duties. The scale of military involvement in humanitarian work in the Balkans was unprecedented. In Albania, the head of AFOR (Lt General John Reith) emphasised that for the first time in NATO’s history, their role was exclusively humanitarian, “to assist in energising international efforts in response to the refugee crisis in support of UNHCR”. NATO contingents built and initially managed the refugee camps. Throughout the crisis, these remained known as 'the Greek Camp', 'the Italian Camp', 'the US camp', etc.. Military contingents also became involved in the delivery of aid into the country. (The Albanian Government ‘invited’ NATO to run the port at Durres and the airport in Tirana.) NATO seconded staff to UNHCR to assist in logistics.

3.4 The role of UNHCR It is widely acknowledged, including by the organisation itself, that UNHCR was ill- prepared for the Balkans crisis despite it having drawn-up contingency plans some five years earlier. The number of UNHCR staff on the ground was inadequate, those that were present often lacking appropriate experience. Staff turn-over was high, making continuity difficult. Internal communication within the organisation was also weak, and the organisation lacked a clear focus and strong leadership. The lack of an effective HCR led to poor co-ordination of the response and the loss of an opportunity to ensure that powerful bilateral actors worked together to enhance the effectiveness of the humanitarian programme.

At the beginning of the crisis, UNHCR was, apparently, ‘technically broke’ with a bank balance of $-40 million. UNHCR received no cash pledges for its Kosovo appeal, everything having been donated in kind. It has been reported (but not confirmed) that a number of influential donors blocked all cash contributions to UNHCR for work in the region, that DFID, for example, only gave UNHCR £1.5 million for the period March 1998 to March 1999 - a tiny amount covering barely a few days of operation. Individuals in the US government and within ECHO also apparently refused to fund the organisation, and there are reports that the USAID administrator admitted in one meeting that the US and other bilaterals were responsible for weakening UNHCR. Interviews have not been held with policy makers in the donor countries, nor with senior HCR figures in Geneva, so the reasons for the antipathy between the bilaterals and HCR remains unclear. Whether it was due to exasperation by bilateral governments with the initial failings of HCR, or to their desire to maintain a high degree of visibility for their humanitarian programmes is not known. The result was a vicious circle - as donors criticised HCR and withdrew funding, the agency found it harder to co-ordinate effectively and so even more criticisms were made.

9 The sidelining of HCR was all too clear: one NGO, assessing a site at the request of US NATO/OFDA, found that the head of the local UNHCR office was not even aware that the site existed. On another occasion, both HCR and NATO set-up competing reception centres on either side of the railhead at Skhodrer to process the 1,000 refugees arriving daily by truck from Kukes and being transported south.

UNHCR appeared to be well aware of their shortfalls in staffing, expertise and capacity. As the crisis progressed, they did manage to place more people in the region, which improved their co-ordination capacity. NGOs in Albania reported that, once HCR personnel were in place, field level co-ordination improved considerably, though regional HCR representatives were not kept informed of information available and decisions made in Tirana. All the NGOs in Kukes, for example, required their Tirana offices to attend HCR meetings there, so that they could find out what decisions had been made.

3.5 The role of NGOs NGOs from around the world converged on the Balkans in the first few weeks after NATO commenced the bombing of Yugoslavia. Over 180 NGOs arrived in Albania alone to participate in the humanitarian programme there. In the early days of the response, given the absence of a clear and functioning co-ordination system, NGOs employed a variety of methods to establish where to work and in which sectors. For example, in Macedonia, where few NGOs were operational in the first week of the crisis, those that were present divided the main tasks between them: MSF-H with the provision of health care; OXFAM with the establishment of water supply systems; etc.. Where agencies had clear sectoral competencies, it seems that such arrangements worked well.

Later, as more NGOs arrived, co-ordination became more problematic, particularly in Albania where refugees were scattered across the country in hundreds of camps and collective centres. There were reports of NGOs competing with each other to gain a foothold in some of the camps. For example, so many NGOs were trying to become involved in the high profile Tirana Swimming Pool Collective Centre that one DEC agency withdrew, rather than fight for space.

In other parts of Albania, there were reports of NGOs making direct contact with local administrations and 'outbidding' other NGOs to ensure that they were able to open programmes in the area. The very large sums available to NGOs from official donors as well as the general public in their own countries, and the weakness of UNHCR, meant that there was little opportunity to control the activities of NGOs.

In the main camps, co-ordination was effectively provided by the bilaterals 'in charge', who decided which NGOs should open programmes in 'their' camps. Such NGO selection was often carried out on the basis of the nationality of the NGO. In the US camp for example, US NGOs were funded. While a reasonably effective way of avoiding duplication or gaps in coverage, this manner of co-ordination led to very different standards of care in the various camps, depending on the levels of funding available and the expertise and wishes of the bilaterals concerned. It also raised questions of the independence of the NGOs concerned (discussed elsewhere).

10 In Kukes, in northern Albania, an 'NGO Council' was formed, which led to good NGO co-ordination. Different agencies (UN and NGO) took the lead for different sectors and hosted the co-ordination meetings. Agreements as to which NGOs operated where were arranged by consensus. This was helped by the fact that the agency representatives were experienced emergency personnel. Once these were replaced, co-ordination became more difficult. (It was reported, however, that Kukes was over-served with NGOs - some 50+ at the height of the response - compared with other areas.)

11 4 KEY ISSUES

4.1 Maintaining the independence of the humanitarian response

The massive involvement of NATO countries in the humanitarian response, in terms of funding as well as in the role played by NATO military contingents, was crucial to the successful reception of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who entered Macedonia and Albania at a time when NGOs and UN agencies were still gearing-up. Military contingents set-up many of the refugee camps and provided logistical support to the relief effort. While the bilaterals were undoubtedly motivated by compassion for the refugees, the scale of response was also determined by the need to preserve the political capital invested in the conflict by NATO leaders, humanitarian aims becoming rapidly indivisible from other political (and military) objectives.

It is essential that NGOs involved in a humanitarian response maintain, and are shown to be maintaining, their independence. NGOs were aware of the dilemmas presented by the massive involvement of NATO governments and military contingents in the response. Mike Aaronson, of Save the Children, in evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee, talked of the need "to distinguish between logistical support to humanitarian operations which is fine, and military co-ordination of a humanitarian operation, which is not fine". The reality of this emergency response was that such a distinction was not always clear. NGOs found themselves providing services in camps set up by NATO; taking over responsibilities from military contingents when these withdrew; and, using NATO helicopters and planes for travel.

Some of the risks inherent in NGOs working side-by-side with NATO governments at war could have been reduced by a strong, powerful and independent UNHCR - able to counter the strength of the bilaterals and stand-up for humanitarian principles and minimum standards. Unfortunately, as described above, UNHCR was weak and ill- prepared to assume a leadership role in the emergency. The sidelining of UNHCR, and the direct arrangements made between NGOs and donors without consultation with UNHCR, left the NGO community vulnerable to the perception of partiality. It is reported that ICRC, unlike many NGOs, refused to use military transport and logistics capacity precisely in order to maintain its strict neutrality.

12 4.2 Co-ordination a. Overall co-ordination Whether as a consequence of the weakness of UNHCR (discussed above), or whether as a deliberate policy, NATO governments sidelined the organisation, reaching agreements about the location of camps directly with the host government concerned, making arrangements directly with local contractors for the provision of services and dealing directly with NGOs on the ground. Apart from the risks this created for the (perceived) neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian programme, this policy also left the operation without an established and strong co-ordination focal point. UNHCR did still set-up co-ordination structures, holding daily agency meetings and sectoral meetings in both Macedonia and Albania. However, the poor performance of some of the UNHCR representatives chairing these meetings and the fact that many of the principal donors were making decisions and allocating funds outside of these meetings clearly reduced their value. (The fact that there were also a huge number of NGOs present, a proportion of which had little or no emergency experience, added to the difficulties of co- ordination.)

For co-ordination to be effective, a 'critical mass' of organisations (ref: v.Brabant) needs to take part. The donors themselves could, arguably, have created such a critical co- ordination mass. Indeed, the fact that there were relatively few major bilateral actors should have greatly facilitated co-ordination. It appears, however, that the political imperative to demonstrate action left them little incentive to co-ordinate amongst themselves. Many direct arrangements were made between the bilaterals and the Governments of Albania and Macedonia and between the bilaterals and NGOs (often from the same country as the donor). While the bilaterals did meet amongst themselves, this was more for information sharing than for genuine co-ordination. In Albania, for example, the ambassadors of donor nations came together on a daily basis, in a meeting organised by the Government of Albania, and attended by a representative of UNHCR. NGOs reported that information rarely trickled down to them, however. The fact that many arrangements between NGOs and donors were organised along national lines increased the degree of compartmentalisation of information, further complicating overall co-ordination.

Over time, co-ordination did improve. UNHCR increased the number and quality of staff present in the region, and local co-ordination fora were established outside of the capitals, for example, in Kukes, in Northern Albania, which reportedly worked very well. At a local level, there were fewer NGOs, the problems were both more tangible and more easily defined and there was a greater opportunity for agency staff to establish good personal relationships, greatly facilitating the co-ordination process. (At the same time, local structures suffered from a lack of clear communication with central co-ordination structures.)

In Albania, the Government set-up a co-ordination structure called the Emergency Management Group (EMG) in the Prime Minister's Office. This body included Albanian ministry officials, UN and other international representatives, and NATO officers sitting

13 together in one office. UNHCR staff (seconded by OCHA) participated in the EMG. The EMG was made up of 6 'desks': shelter, food, logistics, information, security and health. Different organisations were involved at each desk (for example, WFP with food, WHO with health, the Albanian Ministry of Public Order with security). Daily meetings were held in the Prime Minister's office, where plans and operations would be discussed. Donors would also meet here, though it was reported that this was more for exchange of information on plans rather than discussion on policy and strategy.

The relationship between the EMG and UNHCR was reportedly difficult, despite the involvement of HCR individuals in the EMG. It was reported on more than one occasion that HCR felt that their co-ordination role was threatened by the EMG and tried to undermine its effectiveness by refusing to participate in meetings or by sending the wrong staff to attend. (An evaluation will take place of the EMG at some stage, which should be of use to the main evaluation team.)

Co-ordination between military contingents and humanitarian organisations was sometimes lacking. In one camp in Kukes, the Italian contingent pulled out taking their portaloos with them, having given only one day's notice. This left refugees without latrines until OXFAM and CARE were able to build pit latrines. In some camps, there was no UNHCR involvement or co-ordination, the bilateral contingent 'in charge' making all decisions as to what was required. On some occasions, military officials prevented HCR personnel from even visiting the camps.

b. Site planning Locating sites for refugees camps was a complex issue in Albania, due to uncertainty about land ownership in many areas, and the lack of suitable state-owned land. However, the process was not made any easier by the uncoordinated actions of 'bilaterals' who started opening sites without discussion with either HCR or other bilaterals. There are reports that some sites were so poor that donors with experienced personnel in country could see that they were unsuitable, and rejected them, only to find that other donors, offered the same sites, later built camps there. Camp Hope, at Fier in Albania, built by the Americans on clay at considerable cost, flooded shortly after completion. Yet, it is reported (though not verified), that this site had already been turned down by DFID. c. Standardisation of service provision The levels of service available in the camps varied considerably. (This is not only a co- ordination issue, it is also related to the levels of competence of those involved and their experience of refugee programmes. These issues are considered below.) It seems that at no point did donors or implementing agencies meet together to discuss what levels of service provision were appropriate. Furthermore, contrary to the principle that relief funds should be spent according to need, the 'bilaterals' poured money into 'their' camps, regardless of the needs elsewhere. As each 'bilateral' had vastly different levels of funding available for its work and different levels of expertise, so camp standards varied enormously. As a result, while some camps had hot showers, street lighting and food served by Italian chefs, the refugees in other camps had barely minimal conditions. One infamous site (the Tobacco Factory) with 6,000 residents, had only 6 taps and no toilets. 14 There were many other reports of camps with inappropriate sanitation. ‘Quarry Camp’ in Skhodrer was built by the Danish Refugee Council in a quarry where the heat was unbearable because of the sun's reflection from the white stones onto the tents. Refugees transported there from another camp simply refused to get off the bus because of the poor conditions (an event captured live on Danish TV).

In Radusa Camp in Macedonia, the Governments of Bulgaria and Macedonia made a bilateral agreement whereby the Bulgarian Military would open a clinic. UNHCR were not involved. The staff in the clinic was predominantly male and uniformed, resulting in a less than hospitable environment for women refugees traumatised by Serb paramilitaries in Kosovo. At one point, this camp also had an MSF-Holland health team, a team from a local Macedonian NGO called Health Skopje, and a Taiwanese health team - all for a population of 1500 people.

Neither very high nor very low standards should be acceptable. Low standards deny the refugees the right to a decent level of care, while very high standards are unsustainable. Only the fact that the refugees returned to Kosovo so quickly meant that the spectacle of funds drying up and services being dramatically cut back was not witnessed. Very high standards create: • the possibility of conflict when they are withdrawn, • tension between refugees in camps with very different levels of services, • tensions between refugees and local people, They also represent a cost-ineffective use of aid resources – particularly depressing when one thinks of the standards in other refugee camps around the world. d. Standardisation across population groups As world attention focused on the plight of the refugees in the camps, so too did the humanitarian response. Yet, many refugees were being looked after by local families. On May 8th, it was estimated that of the 230,900 refugees thought to be in Macedonia by UNHCR, some 93,000 were living in host families, while in Albania it was thought that over 300,000 refugees were in host families compared to only 100,000 in the camps. Many of the host families, particularly in Albania, were poor, with limited resources and facilities to accommodate refugee families for a long period of time.

The fact that refugees sometimes moved from host to camp, camp to camp and camp to third countries, and that no comprehensive registration of refugees was carried out, meant that finding and identifying those most in need of support was difficult. Nonetheless, despite the difficulties, agencies were generally slow to turn their attention towards the needs of those residing with host families.

A WHO survey (WHO Health Survey 1999) of refugees with host families in Macedonia found that while access to water and sanitation was adequate, access to food remained problematic. The worst affected area was Skopje where more than 60% of families complained of insufficient food, though even in the better areas, more than 25% of families complained that food was insufficient for the family. In Albania, a household 15 survey carried-out by a local NGO found that the refugees staying with host families felt “more vulnerable than those living in refugee camps because they received little services from the agencies in both food and non food items”. In addition, security problems were apparently more of an issue in host communities than in the camps, where NATO troops often guarded the perimeter.

While some agencies were involved in the distribution of food and non-food items to host families, this started late and coverage was patchy. Rent was often high (an average of 250 DM per month) and refugees were forced to spend scarce savings on commodities that were distributed for free in the camps. In addition, families were reported to be living in crowded living conditions (average 13 refugees per hosted family: MSF-Survey). However, those agencies already working with the communities that hosted refugees were reportedly some of the most effective in terms of the support they provided. These agencies were joined by others who had arrived too late in the region to find a role in the camps.

That many host families received payment from the refugees seemed to create some confusion as to whether they deserved support from the international community. While the issue of host family support is complex, the fact remains that refugees in camps received free food, health care and other services, while those in host families did not. e. Human Rights Interviewing There were a large number of organisations carrying out human rights interviewing of refugees. In response to reports of gross human rights violations in connection with the crisis in Kosovo, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) dispatched a special mission in early April to the primary refugee-receiving countries and regions. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International staff were also present and carrying out human rights interviews, as were OSCE officers in military uniform. In addition agencies reported victims of violence, on occasion, being hounded by the press.

Reports were received of refugees being taken away by individuals to be interviewed on extremely traumatic events (such as witnessing the murder of family members in Kosovo) without knowing for which organisation the interviewers worked, without understanding the process of the documentation of human right violations, and without any associated back-up and support.

The lack of co-ordination amongst human-rights agencies and between human-rights and humanitarian agencies offering psycho-social counselling increased the levels of trauma suffered by refugees and represented a lost opportunity to link important human rights work with support for those who had lived through extremely traumatic events. f. Uneven levels of competence Amongst NGOs, there was a wide variation in competence and experience, with the result that standards of aid delivery differed widely. Little or no reference was made to common standards, and a number of interviewees reported that they were not aware of the existence of the Sphere Minimum Standards. Problems also arose as a result of the involvement of military contingents in camp construction and design. While their

16 logistical capacity was impressive, many contingents had no experience of preparing sites for refugees and, inevitably, mistakes were made: tents too close together; inappropriate location of toilet blocks; etc..

Failings were particularly in evidence in the area of sanitation. Reports were received of women being harassed in latrine areas due to inappropriate design and location and poor construction. Some cubicle toilets consisted of plastic sheeting pinned to wooden frames, the doorway made from a piece of plastic sheeting which was impossible to close. In one Macedonian camp, portaloos situated just three metres from tents were overflowing. (Though this was partly a result of chronic overcrowding.) In the Italian camp, in Albania, the portaloos could not be used by the elderly or young children, and constituted a health hazard.

Another sector where standards varied enormously was that of community services/psycho-social. It is an area of emergency response where increasingly large sums are being spent, with no minimum standards and very different conceptions of how such programmes should be implemented. Many agencies established programmes without experienced staff in-country or experience in the sector. As a result, the impact and appropriateness of some of these programs was highly questionable.

The way in which agencies became involved in the implementation of sectoral projects provided no guarantee that they would have competence in these areas. In the early days of the response, there was a type of bidding process whereby NGOs would meet to agree who would take responsibility for providing certain services in certain camps. It was left entirely up to the agencies concerned to determine whether or not they had sufficient experience or capacity to take on the tasks for which they bid. The lesson-learning team found several examples of NGOs making promises without having the necessary capacity. For example, one agency took responsibility for managing way stations for returning refugees but due to its lack of capacity was unable to provide the relief items needed. In the hectic period at the beginning of the crisis some agencies (concerned that they would not otherwise have a role) promised to take on certain work for which they were not prepared. There were a number of instances where such promises were not fulfilled, leading to an absence or delay in service provision for the refugees.

4.3 Protection of Refugees a. UNHCR UNHCR has a key role to play in the protection of refugees. Its weak performance in the Balkans meant that it was unable to undertake protection activities commensurate with its international mandate. The threats to the refugees were various. In Albania, there were threats to the refugees from local Mafia elements.

In Macedonia, the Government did not wish to accept them and closed the border between Macedonia and Kosovo on several occasions leaving thousands of refugees abandoned in the no-man's land of Blace without adequate water, food, shelter or health provision. Conditions were extremely poor, with some refugees having only standing

17 room, and people forced to defecate in the only stream that ran through the area. Reports were received of the beating of refugees by Macedonian police. Many refugees were bussed straight from Blace to the airport and placed on planes to third countries, some families being split up during this process.

Conditions for those transferred to the camps were poor, as the Macedonian Government was not willing to provide sufficient land for camps, leading to extreme overcrowding. Initial figures indicated that the average area per person in five of the six sites ranged from 12 to 23 m2/ person - below the WHO standard of 30 m2/person and well below the SPHERE standard of 45 m2/person. More refugees were forced into already overcrowded camps with 70 people accommodated in the larger tents, close together, with no privacy. The overcrowding meant that many of the minimum standards of protection and humanitarian assistance were not met.

All movement of refugees between the camps in Macedonia was forbidden at the height of the crisis. Access to the camps was controlled by the Macedonian authorities and at certain times denied to humanitarian organisations. Elaborate fencing surrounded the camps (provided by NATO on request of the Government of Macedonia) and the camps were guarded day and night. While some agencies welcomed the measure as a form of protection for the refugees, others advocated the right of refugees to be able to move freely and privately condemned the fencing, stating that the camps were in effect “concentration camps”.

Protection is the responsibility of host governments. However, UNHCR has a role to play in lobbying to ensure that such protection is adequate. In the refugee camps in Macedonia, refugees expressed concern to UNHCR over security and a lack of confidence in the local police force. UNHCR recognised that security was an issue of concern but did not have the resources to improve on the situation. On April 24th, UNHCR stated that it was unable to provide 24 hour presence in the camps. (UNHCR Internal Reports). In some camps, agencies hired their own security companies, with little co-ordination and exchange of information. Indeed, it is reported that there were cases of two agencies in the same camp hiring separate security companies. Different salaries were paid and no common procedures were used to manage the security guards.

There were insufficient UNHCR protection officers to cover the needs of all the refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania. In May, in Macedonia, for example, there was only one UNHCR protection officer covering Cegrane and 4 other camps and the border crossing. UNHCR admitted that new staff were slow to be assigned. In addition, support to protection staff was said to be “irregular” and “not acceptable”. Evidence suggests that protection issues were dealt with on a case-by-case basis on the initiative of individual protection officers, and that there was no common or co-ordinated approach to problems. UNHCR does not seem to have given the priority to protection commensurate with its internationally-recognised mandate.

Registration of refugees is the responsibility of UNHCR and is a process that should normally be carried out early in a response. However, in Albania and Macedonia no official and comprehensive registration took place. (The GoA on May 21 approved the initiation of the registration process and offered assistance to UNHCR by recruiting, 18 training and hiring staff. In addition to this, the OSCE registration of refugees commenced in the beginning of May in Macedonia. (This apparently caused additional delays for UNHCR's own registration plans - the reasons are not understood).

Sadako Ogata told the United Nations Security Council on May 5th that the registration of the refugees was a “priority”1 but that “logistical problems” had hampered progress in the registration of the refugees. Many refugees spent their entire time in countries of asylum without being registered and hence without the protection afforded by UNHCR identification papers.

Registration that was carried out by agencies/UN delivering aid commodities tended to list family members, head of household and location of tent (in the camps). However, total population figures disaggregated by gender and age, or numbers of people with particular protection needs such as women on their own, with or without children, disabled, old and sick people, and victims of torture did not exist. Accurate registration records are essential to adequately plan and co-ordinate a humanitarian response.

b. Women and sexual violence Despite the well-documented evidence of the problems of sexual violence in other emergency situations, the issue was not adequately dealt with by those planning refugee programmes. It is reported that little attention was given to the issue in official co- ordination meetings in either Macedonia or Albania. Reports were received of latrine blocks offering no privacy for women, and sited at the edge of camps with no lighting provided. Harassment of women was reported at these sites.

Although the recently published report by UNFPA uncovered evidence of sexual violence (likely to have been under-reported due to cultural reasons) many NGOs were not aware of violations against women in the camps in which they worked. Reports were also received that the trafficking of young women overseas for prostitution was occurring on the outside of some of the camps in Albania.

As with other aspects of the response, the levels of security provision varied considerably throughout the region, and depended upon whether refugees were in camps or with host families. Women living in trucks and tractors surrounding the refugee camps, in Kukes town and even inside the Greek camp from which forces were abruptly withdrawn, stated that they were very afraid for their safety. Violence and cases of rape inside the camps in Macedonia was also reported by a few agencies. In addition, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, pointed out during her stay in Albania that her office was concerned about the reports of abduction of women and children and recruitment by the KLA.

1 Briefing by Mrs Sadako Ogata, UNHCR to the Security Council (Kosovo: the crisis, the response, the future), 5th May 1999, p3. 19 c. NATO Complimentary reports were received about the action of NATO troops in protecting refugee camps, and in ensuring security and stability in Kosovo. In one survey, women in camps with a visible military police presence were reporting as feeling safe, describing the soldiers and police around the camp as “kind, sympathetic and polite”. The Italian and German forces received particular praise in Kukes while British and German troops in Kosovo were singled out for praise partly for their manner and behaviour toward the population and agencies and partly for their outward appearance. (eg: wearing soft beret hats, and mixing with the population on the ground rather than sitting in tanks all day as was the practice with some contingents).

However, despite the good performance of NATO troop contingents, co-ordination between them and the humanitarian agencies was sometimes poor. On Friday June 4th, the 153 US Marines guarding Camp Hope deployed back to their ship without any warning being given to the camp management. These Marines were replaced with 30 US Air Force personnel who had been sent from Rina Airport. d. Humanitarian Evacuation Program and movement of population Information on the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme (whereby refugees in Macedonia were transferred to third countries) and transfer programs to other camps/ countries was poorly disseminated. Severe logistical constraints were reported to have prevented the thorough dissemination of information on the HEP to all populations in the camps and hampered equitable access to the registration procedure. Initial bilateral efforts to assist the Government of Macedonia in the allotment of places for evacuation were reportedly not co-ordinated with UNHCR/IOM, complicating arrangements on the ground. There was also a lack of clear procedures for the evacuation programme on the ground. The lists of refugees due to go to specified countries on specified days did not always correspond with the flight lists, creating confusion and leading to some families being separated. Some Macedonia nationals also received asylum in third countries by faking refugee status.

The lack of clear information on the evacuation programme raises doubts as to whether the evacuations and relocations were voluntary. Family members were reported to have been pushed in different directions and sent to different camps without being informed of the process and subsequently, with no choice. UNHCR did express its serious concern over the HEP program movements and the “forcible movement” of refugees across the border to Albania.

Despite the problems, few agencies appear to have joined with UNHCR to lobby the Government of Macedonia and bilaterals to improve the evacuation strategy to third countries and prevent the forcible movement of refugees to Albania. It is also not clear what efforts were made by camp managers and agencies to ensure that families were not separated during evacuation and relocation, though this would have presented significant challenges as even UNHCR was not fully aware of the Government's plan to move the refugees to other areas. (In one case, HCR's special envoy was reported to have prevented the forcible movement of refugees from no-man's land to third countries only by standing

20 in front of the buses and calling journalists on his mobile phone to witness the attempted evacuation.)

4.4 Staffing In Macedonia, many of the staff working with the NGOs had been evacuated from Kosovo. Despite being exhausted and sometimes traumatised by their experiences, they were still expected to carry on working in an emergency setting. A number had little emergency experience, having been employed on non-emergency programmes in Kosovo.

A number of agencies had problems integrating existing teams with new emergency programme staff. Existing management structures were not always appropriate for the new context, and lines of authority became unclear, causing rifts within teams.

In Albania, it was reported that there was a very high turnover of inexperienced staff, or staff with no knowledge of the region. Certainly, the response severely stretched the capacity of a number of agencies. The high turnover of staff caused problems of continuity of decision-making and complicated co-ordination arrangements, which depend greatly upon personal contacts.

4.5 Longer-term development in Albania While outside the scope of the Terms of Reference for this study, the issue of the longer- term development needs in Albania were raised by a number of those interviewed, who suggested that there was a need to ensure that the emergency programmes undertaken to meet the needs of the refugees in Albania were integrated into longer term development plans for national development. Those agencies present in Albania prior to the crisis are planning to remain, and are now building on their emergency programmes. Donors such as ECHO are allowing money meant for the emergency to be used for the longer term development of the country. DFID has asked one agency to undertake an assessment of the whole of Albania in terms of water needs. It was noted by the lesson-learning team that many NGOs in Albania rapidly closed their emergency programmes as soon as the refugees started to return to Kosovo, losing an opportunity to build on what was achieved in Albania. It appears that the DEC agencies figure strongly amongst those agencies that are not leaving the country, and are staying to implement development programmes.

21 5 Issues for Phase II

5.1 Main points • NGOs and humanitarian actors have, in the past, criticised the international community's use of humanitarian aid as a substitute for political engagement in conflict situations. In the case of the Balkans, there was no such lack of engagement - quite the opposite. This has raised questions for the humanitarian agencies about how to maintain independence and neutrality. Did the co-operation with NATO military contingents put humanitarian principles at risk? How could this be avoided in the future? How can DEC agencies - collectively or individually - most effectively lobby for improved UN co- ordination in humanitarian crises? How can they ensure that co-ordination is carried out, not by the military, but by the humanitarian community?

• NGOs need to support UN co-ordination structures. In the absence of a strong UN co-ordination body, the NGOs are relatively powerless, in the face of committed bilateral involvement, to ensure that the response is as effective as possible, in terms of avoiding duplication and filling gaps. A strong co-ordination body is required to ensure adherence to humanitarian principles, and to ensure respect of minimum (and maximum) standards. Is there a role for DEC agencies in supporting the co-ordination role of UNHCR? Perhaps through funding for the organisation or the secondment of staff? Did any of the DEC agencies offer support to UNHCR during the Balkans crisis? Could the DEC agencies have created a 'critical mass' of organisations prepared to co-ordinate and thereby filled the vacuum left by UNHCR? Would the lobbying of governments have produced more support for UNHCR and its co-ordination role?

• Despite the work carried out on the SPHERE Project, there is still a long way to go to ensure that minimum standards are met in humanitarian response programmes. The problem of maximum standards also needs addressing, in terms of its sustainability, and the possibility that widely differing standards will create tension and conflict. There is a need to extend the work on standards to include the area of community services/psycho- social programmes. Should there be a system of accreditation to supplement the work carried-out on minimum standards, to demonstrate that agencies have the required level of competence?

• There is a need for a strong and independent UNHCR to represent the protection needs of refugees. This appears to have been lacking in the Balkans response. This issue is partly one of UNHCR capacity, but also reflects the fact that the organisation seems unsure as to its appropriate focus in emergencies. While others can carry out the operational tasks associated with refugee influxes, UNHCR has a unique role with respect to protection. There is concern that the organisation has focused too much on the delivery of commodity aid at the expense of its protection mandate. What can the DEC agencies do to lobby for a greater UNHCR commitment to protection? Is the undermining of UNHCR's protection role a result of pressures being exerted by members of UNHCR's Executive Committee (including the UK Government)?

22 • Appropriate procedures for carrying-out human rights work need reviewing. It should be considered whether intensive interviewing should be allowed without the availability of support to traumatised individuals. There is an apparent need to co- ordinate the work of human rights groups to avoid the spectacle of numerous groups appearing at the same sites to undertake broadly comparable work. Further work could be undertaken to see what are the options for co-ordination amongst human-rights agencies, and how such agencies can best work alongside a humanitarian operation.

• There needs to be a co-ordinated approach by military, UN and NGOs to the provision of security for refugees. This is particularly important where agencies are employing private security companies.

• Could the DEC agencies work more closely together to improve overall preparedness? Setting up country offices, and investing in preparedness measures is expensive. Are there areas where DEC agencies can combine to ensure the optimum response to a crisis: setting up a common logistical cell in certain areas, with knowledge of import and export procedures, with fax and email established, with stand-by arrangements made with transport companies, etc.?

• Could the DEC agencies do more to ensure that UNHCR is better prepared for future emergencies? Or that an alternative co-ordination structure is functioning?

• The huge sums of money available for the response meant that standards of care were generally much higher than for emergency responses in Africa and other parts of the world. The UN is appealing to donors to make up the funding shortfall for African emergencies. Can DEC agencies do anything to address the vastly different levels of humanitarian provision in Europe and Africa?

5.2 Information Gaps to be filled in Phase II

• Was the sidelining of UNHCR by the bilaterals deliberate, or were they just frustrated with the organisation's performance?

• Why was UNHCR so ill-prepared for the crisis? Has it focused too much on operational issues at the expense of protection? Does it need to change priorities

METHODOLOGY FOR PHASE 2 This draft will be circulated to DEC agencies for comments. Once the draft has been read, and preliminary comments received, these will be analysed and summarised. A plenary meeting of DEC agencies will provide input prior to the commencement of work in Phase II. Interviews will then be held with DEC agency staff in the UK and Ireland, and with other key players, in particular UNHCR, ICRC, OCHA and DFID. Telephone interviews will be held, if possible, with US government figures. Further time will be needed to read the many documents collected during the field visit.

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A final draft report will be prepared and circulated for comments at the end of Phase 2 to allow discussion on findings and implementation of lessons.

It is estimated that 15 days input is required to complete Phase II.

Proposed Schedule

Date Activity 16.8.99 Circulate document 27.8.99 Deadline for comments from agencies 28.8.99 - 31.8.99 Summary and analysis of comments re focus for Phase II 1.9.99 Meeting of DEC agencies to discuss Phase II - policy and operational/ emergency personnel 6 days ** Interviewing of DEC agencies 5 days ** Other interviews and relevant documents obtained and analysed 5 days ** Circulate draft final report for comments ** Presentation of final Phase II report and discussion re implementation of lessons learnt

** Approximate time needed in number of days is given as, due to holidays of consultant in September, precise dates cannot be given.

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