2016 Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report

Africa-Frontex 2016 Intelligence Community Joint Report

Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report 2016 Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.

Plac Europejski 6 00-844 Warsaw, Poland T +48 22 205 95 00 F +48 22 205 95 01 [email protected] www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, April 2017 Risk Analysis Unit Frontex reference number: 1485 / 2017

OPOCE Catalogue number TT-AL-17-001-EN-N ISBN 978-92-95205-73-4 ISSN 2529-4369 doi:10.2819/606438

Cover photo shows a group of African migrants a few nautical miles south of the Sicilian coast after being rescued in the framework of the Frontex- coordinated Joint Operation Triton in February 2015. © Francesco Malavolta, 2015. All rights reserved.

DISCLAIMERS This is a Frontex staff working document. Its contents do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is prohibited.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report 2016 has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Table of contents

Executive summary 6

1. Introduction 8

2. Methodology 9

3. Irregular migratory movements affecting AFIC countries and EU Member States 11 3.1. Routes in Africa 11 3.2. Profiles of African migrants 19 3.3. Entry to Europe 22 3.4. Document fraud in relation to AFIC countries and AFIC country nationals 25 3.5. Preventive measures by AFIC countries 29 3.6. Persistent issues and vulnerabilities affecting migratory movements from West Africa to the EU 33

4. Regional security threats 36 4.1. Focus on Boko Haram 36

5. Cross-border criminality: drug trafficking 42 5.1. Morocco as a hub for cannabis trafficking towards the EU and local markets 42 5.2. Cocaine and heroin 42 5.3. Drug trafficking cases reported by AFIC partners 43

CAVEAT Please note the report was originally finalised in October 2016, therefore all the presented data and figures reflect the situation up to the end of September 2016. The original data scope was not extended when the report was made public in April 2017; however, the analysis remains valid.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 List of abbreviations used

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project AFIC Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community AI EIO Amnesty International European Institutions Office AIRE Centre Advice on Individual Rights in Europe Centre ALUG Analytical Layer User Group AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb BCP border crossing point CCME Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe COD Democratic Republic of the Congo CoE Council of Europe COM European Commission Daesh Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant DST Niger’s Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire DTM IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix EaP Eastern Partnership EaP-RAN Eastern Partnership Risk Analysis Network (formerly Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network) EASO European Asylum Support Office ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECRE European Council for Refugees and Exiles EDF-RAN European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network EPN European Patrols Network EU European Union EUNAVFOR Med European Naval Force Mediterranean EUR euro FLM Macina Liberation Front FRA Fundamental Rights Agency FRAN Frontex Risk Analysis Network Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency (formerly European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) GDND Togo’s General Directorate of National Documentation GDSN Togo’s General Directorate of Seal and Nationality GIS Ghana Immigration Service ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICJ International Commission of Jurists ICT information and communications technology ID identification document ILO International Liaison Officer Interpol International Criminal Police Organization IOM International Organization for Migration JO Joint Operation JRS Jesuit Refugee Service Europe MIDAS Migration Information and Data Analysis System MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali MNJTF Multinational Joint Task Force MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad) MS EU Member State MRCTDs Machine Readable Convention Travel Documents NAPTIP Nigeria’s National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons NDMO Ghana’s National Disaster Management Organization NSC Ghana’s National Security Council

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 NGO non-governmental organisation OSCE ODIHR Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights PICUM Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants PISCES Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System POI point of interest RAU Risk Analysis Unit RFI Request for Information RMMS Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat SAC Schengen Associated Country Sahel G5 Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad THB trafficking in human beings TOCU Sierra Leone's Transnational Organised Crime Unit TU-RAN Turkey-Frontex Risk Analysis Network UAE United Arab Emirates UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UMCC Benin’s Unité Mixte de Contrôle des Conteneurs US United States of America USSF Benin’s Unités Spéciales de Surveillance des Frontières USD United States dollar WB-RAN Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Executive summary

AFIC consolidation, geographical ble trend in relation to the same period increased in 2016, further boosting the expansion, product portfolio in 2015, when around 116 000 migrants profits of Libyan smugglers. and support from the European were apprehended. Commission In 2016, Egypt became an alternative From Agadez in Niger to Libya to Libya as the departure point towards In 2016, the AFIC successfully extended Italy for migrants from Horn of African Agadez remains the key transit hub for its geographical coverage and now also countries and Sudan (nearly 12 000 in migratory movements towards Libya includes several countries from East January–August 2016). with many smuggling networks oper- Africa. Moreover, the Community im- The number of migrants arriving from ating in the city. The networks' structure plemented one of the recommenda- West and Central African countries con- is hierarchical with the so-called ghetto tions from previous annual reports and tinued to increase in relation to the same boss at the top. He owns one or more started issuing a new monthly report period last year. West African migrants ghetto compounds where migrants are during 2016. mainly came from Nigeria, the Gambia, lodged, as well as a number of vehicles It also strengthened a sense of African Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mali. (either stolen or purchased) – typically ownership of the Community by organis- white Toyota Hilux cars and military- ing two workshops in Africa, conducting Shift from land to sea in the style cargo trucks from Libya. expert field visits in the continent (Aflao Western Mediterranean The ghetto boss may sometimes act as border post between Ghana and Togo and the driver, but typically he is responsible new airport in Nouakchott) and captur- In the first half of 2016, the trend on the for logistics and financial arrangements ing greater attention from the key policy Western Mediterranean land and sea to keep the entire network operational. makers in Europe and Africa. routes followed a different pattern, i.e. an almost 55% rise in the apprehensions Southern Libya Irregular migration in the on the sea route and a decrease of nearly Central Mediterranean at record 43% in detections of illegal border-cross- The rival tribes of Toubou and Tuareg levels ing at the land borders. have been in sporadic armed conflict As regards clandestine entries to the with each other over portions of south- In 2015 and early 2016, the irregular mi- Spanish territories, an increase in the ern Libyan territory, natural resources, gration issue dominated the political number of migrants detected hiding in and control of smuggling routes. As a re- agenda of the EU as hundreds of thou- cars and trucks (often in secret compart- sult, the Toubou tribesmen control the sands of migrants and people in need of ments constructed for that purpose by traffic flow across Libya’s southern bor- international protection started to move the smuggling networks operating in der from their capital in Murzuq, while via Turkey, across Greece and the West- Morocco) was also noted. the Tuareg control the Algerian border ern Balkans, towards their desired des- region. tination countries, such as Germany, Shorter distances, more profit Sweden and Finland. for Libyan smugglers Document fraud However, after the crisis in Greece was addressed with a set of measures Human smugglers in Libya capitalise on In 2015, there were almost 3 000 AFIC and agreements, starting from March the fact that they need to provide less fuel country nationals detected with fraud- 2016, the Central Mediterranean once and basic supplies for the migrants to ulent travel document in the EU/Schen- again became the main entry point for make it to Europe as the average length gen area, i.e. 6% less than in 2014. The thousands of migrants. of the sea crossing is constantly decreas- above mentioned figure comprises de- Between 1 January and 31 August ing due to the presence of EU maritime tections both at the EU's external bor- 2016, some 117 000 irregular migrants assets. Moreover, it should be noted that, der as well as on the intra-EU/Schengen were intercepted in the Central Medi- as in the case of rubber dinghies, the av- movements. terranean, which represents a very sta- erage number of migrants per boat also

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Data from the first half of 2016 show Taking into account the clauses of the ments at various checkpoints between that this downward trend continued. ECOWAS protocol, the Ghana Immigra- Niamey, Agadez and Dirkou. However, the rising trend of illegal bor- tion Service (GIS) developed a preventive The authorities also introduced lim- der-crossings in the Central Mediterra- strategy aiming to curb the current mi- its of movement for the nationals of nean involving AFIC country nationals gration trend. The GIS set up a Migration ECOWAS. Namely, all passengers from is likely to translate into an increased Information Bureau that organises infor- ECOWAS countries are now systemati- demand for fraudulent EU travel docu- mation campaigns across the country to cally driven back to Agadez if they are ments used for secondary movements. alert potential migrants to the dangers detected above Séguédine-Dirkou line. of irregular travel. Counter measures by AFIC countries In Kenya, in response to security Other topics threats at the border with Somalia (at- Togo has been tackling the phenomenon tacks by al-Shabaab), the authorities in- This report provides an update on de- of document and identity fraud for more creased the number of military patrols velopments regarding regional security than a decade and could certainly serve and security operations at the common threats and cross-border criminality. It as an example of good practices in the border, while also building walls at cer- also offers an overview of alternative AFIC region. The country has put in place tain sections in order to prevent terror- routes through Mali and provides ex- an integrated centralised document is- ist movements/infiltrations. amples of geospatial analysis. suance system that enables the authori- Between 1 August and 31 October 2016, ties to limit opportunities for fraudsters the authorities in Niger reported at least and criminals to use and produce forged 55 vehicles seized and almost 1 700 mi- documents. grants intercepted without travel docu-

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 1. Introduction

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Commu- work (FRAN) and the two already estab- ticipation, flexibility, cooperation based nity (AFIC) was set up in 2010 to provide lished regional risk analysis networks on mutual benefit and trust among par- a framework for regular knowledge and (the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Net- ticipants) remain unchanged, it has now intelligence sharing in the field of bor- work – WB-RAN and the Eastern Partner- reached an enhanced level of maturity. der security between Frontex and Af- ship [formerly Eastern European Borders] This is mostly evident in the Commu- rican countries. The concept of this Risk Analysis Network – EaP-RAN). nity’s capacity to generate analysis and collaboration was broadly based on the While the basic principles of the AFIC knowledge, build trust between its par- model of the Frontex Risk Analysis Net- (e.g. informal nature, expert-level par- ticipating partners, expand geographi- cally and extend its product portfolio. Figure 1. The initial geographical focus of AFIC on West Africa, parts of Sahel It also strengthened a sense of African and Morocco is being gradually extended to the eastern and northern part of ownership of the Community by organ- the continent ising two workshops in Africa (see Chap- Different regional risk analysis networks and communities managed and supported by the Frontex ter 2. Methodology), conducted expert Risk Analysis Unit field visits on the continent (Aflao border post between Ghana and Togo and new airport in Nouakchott) and captured further attention from the key policy makers in Europe and Africa. The Community has also gained more visibility among other stakeholders in the region, in particular several regional initiatives such as the Rabat and Khar- Risk Analysis Networks with MS/SAC toum Processes and the Sahel G5. FRAN, EDF-RAN, THB Experts, ALUG These developments and a growing Regional Risk Analysis Networks recognition of the Community (already EaP countries echoed in the ‘EU Action Plan against WB-RAN migrant smuggling’; COM(2015) 285 fi- TU-RAN nal) has further positioned the AFIC as AFIC participants an unparalleled platform for informa- AFIC observers tion-sharing and joint analysis with Af- rican countries.

Disclaimer: Frontex, disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used on the map.

Source: Esri data; Map No. 4136 Rev. 11, United Nations, August 2013

Frontex, RAU Analytics, August 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 2. Methodology

As in previous years, this issue of the Other relevant sources, among oth- Each chairing country prepared a annual AFIC Joint Report was prepared ers reporting from Frontex Joint Opera- short opening statement about the top- by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) tions, the IOM, ACLED, UNHCR, RMMS, ics discussed while other panellists later drawing extensively on the knowledge were also consulted and taken into con- provided a structured response. Frontex generated by the Community within the sideration. A draft of this report was moderated discussions that followed. scope of its regular activities. These in- reviewed by the Frontex Consultative Irregular migratory movements, cluded workshops, field visits, regular Forum on Fundamental Rights1 and its cross-border criminality and regional information exchange and replies to Re- comments have been incorporated in the security/terrorism threats continued to quests for Information (RFI). final report. dominate the discussions and information exchange during 2016. Workshop discussions Both AFIC events in Africa generated a great deal of interest among local au- 1 The forum serves as an independent body The two workshops in Africa, one organ- thorities, the EU Delegation and local which advises the Agency’s Management ised in Ghana (March 2016) and the other media. The workshop in Accra, Ghana, Board as well as its Executive Director in Mauritania (June 2016), were struc- was opened by the new Ghanaian Min- on all fundamental rights matters. tured in the form of panel discussions. ister of the Interior Prosper Bani. In his The forum is comprised of 15 members. As a sign of greater engagement by the opening deliberations, the minister even The European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the Fundamental Rights Agency African partners themselves, all panel proposed that ‘AFIC members look into (FRA) and the United Nations High discussions were chaired by a different the future and transform the Commu- Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) African country. Both workshops were nity into a global body of immigration are explicitly mentioned in the Frontex also attended by several EU Member and border-control agencies.’ Regulation and considered permanent States’ ILOs. members. The Council of Europe (CoE), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) have renewed their membership by an exchange of letters between Frontex and the executive management of the three organisations following an invitation from the Frontex Management Board. In addition, nine civil society organisations have been selected on the basis of a public and open call for expression of interest to become members. These are: the Advice on Individual Rights in Europe Centre (AIRE Centre), Amnesty International European Institutions Office (AI EIO), Caritas Europa, European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME), International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Jesuit Refugee Service Europe (JRS), Platform for International Cooperation on © Frontex Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), and Figure 2. Opening panel with Ghanaian Minister of the Interior Mr Bani the Red Cross EU Office. delivering his speech

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 © Frontex

Figure 3. AFIC Workshop held on 19–21 September 2016 at Frontex Headquarters in Warsaw

The opening ceremony in Maurita- tance of the AFIC for regional security nia was attended by several government and stressed Mauritania’s commitment ministers and the EU Special Represent- to this common endeavour. Both Mr Lo- ative for Sahel Mr Angel Losada. sada and Mr Abdallah praised the AFIC The opening speech was delivered by as an example of an effective coopera- the Minister of the Interior and Decen- tion model. tralisation Mr Ahmedou Ould Abdallah. The minister emphasised the impor-

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 3. Irregular migratory movements affecting AFIC countries and EU Member States

In 2015 and early 2016, the irregular mi- while they wait for the trip to the bor- The ghetto boss is at the top of the net- gration issue dominated the political der. Running a ghetto is regarded as one work’s hierarchy and owns one or more agenda of the EU as hundreds of thou- of the few business activities which can ghetto compounds where migrants are sands of migrants and people in need of be highly profitable in Agadez, alongside lodged, as well as a number of vehicles international protection started to move artisanal gold mining and smuggling it- (either stolen or purchased) – typically via Turkey, across Greece and the West- self. Already in 2013, there were an esti- white Toyota Hilux cars and military- ern Balkans, towards their desired des- mated 70 ghettos in Agadez; considering style cargo trucks from Libya. The ghetto tination countries, such as Germany, the volume of current migrant flows, it boss may sometimes act as the driver, but Sweden and Finland. can be assumed that far more were op- typically he is responsible for logistics It was, therefore, hardly a surprise erating in 2016. Ghettos are typically red and financial arrangements to keep the that the Central Mediterranean route mud-walled and gated compounds. Once entire network operational. Most net- was somehow eclipsed by the human there are enough migrants in one com- works in Agadez enjoy the support of the drama occurring elsewhere in the EU. pound to fill a truck, the ghetto boss com- local community. However, after the crisis was ad- municates with a driver to pick up the Other components of the smuggling dressed with a set of measures and group and move across the border. operation include chasseurs, fixers, and agreements, from March 2016 the Cen- tral Mediterranean once again became Figure 4. Smuggling operations in Agadez: process flow the main entry point for thousands of migrants. Border crossing

3.1. Routes in Africa Fixer Driver Fixers accompany – usually Many drivers are former tour 3.1.1. Niger on a motorbike – and trail guides and have their own vehicles larger caravans. They are for smuggling operations. Drivers responsible for paying the are associated with the ghetto From Agadez in Niger to Libya bribes and extortion fees at bosses and handle transportation various checkpoints on the between the city centre and journey. border/cross-border destination. Niger can be considered the main transit country for large-scale smuggling activi- Ghetto boss Ghetto ties across the Sahara desert towards the Ghetto bosses are trusted Ghettos serve as a community North African coast. Among the many agents and advisors for the centre and secure location for migrants; many were migrants transiting the area. hubs located in the country, the city of involved in the tourism Each ghetto is managed by a industry and are ghetto boss. Agadez is by far the most important with accustomed to interacting numerous well organised networks capa- with foreigners. ble of providing the infrastructure and facilitation services for transiting mi- Chasseur Legal Transport grants (see Fig. 4). Chasseurs attempt to The vast majority of migrants recruit or divert migrants; travel to Agadez using legal The moment migrants arrive at the they are motivated by the transportation. percentage received from bus station in Agadez, they become part the ghetto bosses. of the thriving market of human smuggling services. The ghettos in Agadez provide migrants with housing, often based Source: DigitalGlobe, Niger: The Sojourn State, October 2016 on their country of origin or ethnicity,

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 5. Satellite imagery showing tracks diverting off the main road while ap- proaching Madama, a settlement at Niger's northeast frontier with Libya

N drivers. Chasseurs serve as facilitators and attempt to recruit arriving migrants into the compound of their boss from the bus station, especially if the arriving migrants do not already have the contact information of a particular smuggling network. Once in the ghetto compound, travel arrangements and money trans- fers are made. The fixers travel behind the smuggling convoy and are known to pay off officials at checkpoints on be- half of their boss.

Monday convoys from Agadez to

Primary Road southern Libya

After a sufficient number of migrants is gathered, they are dispatched either Madama in large weekly or smaller daily convoys heading towards Libya. Toyota Hilux cars or large military-style trucks are used for Agadez transportation and carry both smuggled goods and migrants. Niamey It was observed that smugglers tend to move between Agadez and the Libyan border on Mondays, when the weekly military convoys usually leave to provide Source: DigitalGlobe, Niger: The Sojourn State, October 2016 supplies to bases in northern Niger. The presence of the military offers additional Figure 6. The number of trucks transiting Agadez increased steadily protection to the smugglers. GeoHIVE: time series of trucks in Agadez (2014–2016) Once the military convoy leaves Agadez, it heads just south of the Aïr Mountains to a military checkpoint in Toureyet. From Toureyet, the convoy heads to Dirkou, where the vehicles carrying migrants must continue by themselves through the desert relying on their knowledge of the region. Often, migrants in Dirkou are required to wait several days to be transferred to vehicles operated by a new smuggler who can take them to Madama. In Madama, they have to bypass a military checkpoint in order to make it to the Tumo border post between Niger and Libya. French and Nigerien military presence in the area has contributed to some smugglers’ preference to use the Salva- dor Pass, located close to the northern tip of the Nigerien border; however, most smugglers travel to al-Wigh and then to al-Qaturm en route to Sabha. Source: DigitalGlobe

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 7. A clear increase in truck activity in Agadez area can be observed in Q1 2016 Presence of trucks in Agadez: heat map comparison between Q1 2014 and Q1 2016

More trucks, buses and migrants moving through Agadez, mostly towards Libya

The AFIC Joint Report 2015 already pointed out the importance of Agadez as the main transit hub in Niger and this was valid also for 2016. Furthermore, IOM’s NIGER Flow Monitoring Points (issued from March 2016) provides ample information in this regard, reporting a steady weekly flow through Agadez of between 5 000 and 17 000 migrants per week en route towards Libya. Unsurprisingly, a GeoHIVE crowd- sourcing campaign, which used Digital- Globe imagery to tag trucks in Agadez over time, suggests a likewise increase. The Source: DigitalGlobe campaign was intended to find a corre- lation between vehicle activity in Agadez with the increased transit of migrants Transport, GIAS 13 Transport, Azawad, Af- and known smuggling trends. A random through the city. rica Assalam TV, 3S TV, SOTRAV SOUNNA, sampling of imagery for each quarter There are also more and more bus Star TV, and STM Ténéré. since January 2014 was analysed by 260 companies operating in Niger. In 2016, Migration through Libya (see Section participants. Over the course of eight at least 15 reputable private and govern- 3.1.3) is far more common than through days, the campaign tagged nearly 14 000 ment-owned bus operators were identi- Algeria, due to increased security and fre- trucks; data accuracy was subsequently fied in the country. quent arrests that occur at the Algerian evaluated through CrowdRank®, a Dig- This proliferation of bus operators and border. Inadequate Libyan border secu- italGlobe proprietary algorithm. the mentioned increase in truck presence rity, unpatrolled desert expanses, and The campaign and time series analy- within Agadez give migrants many op- the comparatively shorter trip across the sis depict a noticeable increase in truck tions for national, international, and in- desert (3 to 6 days from Agadez to Sabha) presence and movement within Agadez terurban transport. The bus companies make the crossing easier. over the past two years; this coincides include: SNTV, SOTRUNI, SONEF, Rimbo, Niger has been tightening the security SONITRAV, Air Transport, EHGM, Nijma at its border with Algeria over the past few

Figure 8. Altered routes following the construction of a wall at the Algerian border with Niger

all

Border W

Tire Tracks Tire Tracks

all Border W

November 26th, 2014 | WorldView-2 September 4th, 2016 | WorldView-3

TransSaharan Border Crossing between Algeria and Niger TransSaharan Border Crossing between Algeria and Niger

Source: DigitalGlobe, Niger: The Sojourn State, October 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 9. Ethnic boundaries in the region extend beyond national borders, greatly facilitating cross-border smuggling activities Ethnicity and tribal landscape of Niger

LIBYA LIBYA ! Tuareg ! Salvador Pass Salvador Pass Toubou

ALGERIA Copernicus Trade Marks are owned Songhai ALGERIA by the EU. European Commission is the programme manager of the Copernicus programme. Kanuri

Fulani *#Djado Plateau *#Djado Plateau Niger Ethnicities Niger Hausa N Tuareg Smuggling Routes Hausa-Fulani

Toubou ! Smuggling POI Moor Song!hai *# Djado Plateau ! Dirkou Dirkou Gurma Kanuri

Fulani Bornu MALI Tuareg Tuareg Toubou Hausa Toubou Manding Hausa-Fulani Mossi ! Agadez ! Agadez Moor Gurma Smuggling Routes NIGER NIGER Bornu ! Smuggling POI Manding 10°E 15°E *# Djado Plateau

N Mossi LIBYA ! Kanuri Kanuri SonHgahuasia Salvador Pass CHAD ´ CHAD Hausa ! Niamey 1:5,500,000 Copernicus Trade Marks are owned 0 50 100 by th2e 0E0U. Europea3n 0C0ommission4 i0s0 the programme manager of the 0 50 CKoilpoermniecutse prrsogramme. BURKINA FASO Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 32N Coordi Projection: Transverse Mercator Project *#Djado Plateau Datum: WGS 1984 BENIN NIGERIA Datum NIGERIA Niger Ethnicities Sources: Murdock, George, "Africa: Its peoples and Their Culture History", 1959; DigitalGlobe Anthromapper, 2016. Source: DigitalGlobe, Niger: The Sojourn State, October 2016 Sources: Murdock, George, "Africa: Its peoples and Their Culture H Tuareg Smuggling Routes

Toubou ! Smuggling POI

Songhai *# Djado Plateau ! Dirkou Kanuri

Fulani

yearsTuare ing order to disrupt organised crime sonsTou arebou more vulnerable, theseHausa migrants 3.1.2. Mali and smuggling activities. The tightening are more likely to be taken advantageHausa-Fulani of includes the! militarisationAgadez of the border or to become victims of trafficking.Moor With illicit migration patterns showing through zoning, monitoring sites, and Gurma no signs of slowing down, Mali contin- patrolling (see Fig.NIG 8).ER Security forces on Involvement of the majorB oethnicrnu ues to serve as an alternative transit hub. the Nigerien and Algerian side have been groups in human smugglingManding Available reporting indicates that there cooperating to intercept migrants; mass Mossi are at least three primary routes for in- arrests have been publicised as a means Transportation is most commonly pro- dividuals leaving the country. Reporting of deterring illegal border-crossing.Kanuri Fig- vided by Tuareg, Toubou and Arab tribes- further indicates that there are multiple Hausa CHAD ´ ure 8 depicts a newly-built wall at a sec- men who have been operating across routes and methods that migrants use to tion of the Algerian border and how it the Sahara for generations. It should be get to the North African coast. As regards changed the routes. stressed that the territories occupied by Mali, smuggling operations mostly take As in previous years, the route these ethnic groups extend across country place once migrants reach Gao. through Arlit into Algeria tends to be borders, which means that tribesmen are Prior to reaching this point, many mi- used by poorer migrants and is more capable of providing the necessary trans- grants travel using legitimate means, dangerous than that leading through port connections for movement of people whereas those travelling out of Gao usu- Libya. Due to the danger involved and and goods across the desert. ally travel via well-established smuggling the likelihood that migrants choosing to routes (historically utilised for weapons, travel through Algeria for financial rea- drugs and cigarettes).

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 10. Mali remains an important transit country on the way to Europe Main migration flows and routes running through Mali

Source: DigitalGlobe, Migration for Ransom, Human Smuggling Facilitation in Mali, 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Smuggling networks in Mali ing sold into prostitution. Migrants who As of August 2016, the primary ex- prefer to continue on their own travel by tremist and criminal groups with asso- Similar to Niger, the human smuggling bus to Niger, where they meet similar fa- ciations to human smuggling in Mali are networks operating in Mali also appear cilitators touting alternative routes. AQIM, Ansar Al Dine, Al-Mourabitoun, to be based on an intricate web of indi- Macina Liberation Front (FLM), and the viduals and groups linked together by Extremist groups and their National Movement for the Liberation of financial gain and deeply rooted busi- involvement in human smuggling Alzawad (MNLA). AQIM’s primary source ness relationships. These networks are of income remains kidnapping and extor- comprised of a mix of violent extremist The informal relationship between ex- tion, but this model has been adjusted groups, disenfranchised ethnic minori- tremist groups and ethnic minorities also to profit from human smuggling. ties, political players, and entrepreneurs is enhanced by the shortcomings in re- all vying for a bigger portion of the prof- gional services and security provided by Pit stops in facilitation hubs its. The smuggling networks in Mali and the official Malian government. In some its neighbouring countries have similar places, violent extremist groups are seen Local businesses in each facilitation hub structures and the area of influence of as the primary providers of security and help to provide shelter and basic neces- any given group extends across borders, they collect protection fees in the form of sities for migrants who are delayed, ensuring the success of the network as taxes on goods being smuggled through stranded or sent back from the borders. a whole. their areas of influence. The disenfranchisement, poverty and lack Within this industry, the opportun- For the extremist groups, payoffs and of opportunities faced by the residents of istic structure and competition amongst ‘taxes’ have become a source of revenue northern Mali are likely to breed empa- networks lead to the victimisation of mi- and function as the motivator for main- thy with migrants moving through the grants who are treated as commodities. taining control over the area. Collecting area. Irregular migration is accepted and The form of exploitation which voluntary ‘taxes’ is a steady source of income and encouraged as a journey to a better life, migrants are exposed to both en route requires less effort than other forms of thus making it more likely for residents and upon arrival in their destination var- extortion, such as kidnapping for ran- who would not engage in arms or drug ies greatly, ranging from financial ex- som. Radical groups still make money smuggling to get involved in human tortion (i.e. bribes or ‘taxes’), through from the drug and arms trade but they smuggling activities. trafficking (for sexual exploitation or oth- discovered that gaining profit from hu- As in Agadez, the extent of local in- erwise), to debt bondage. man smuggling activities is more mor- volvement in smuggling networks re- Before migrants reach Gao, they begin ally acceptable for the local population. sults in a higher level of difficulty in to receive ‘sales pitches’ from individu- The 'taxes' extorted for transiting the ter- identifying routes, hubs, or key play- als advertising their facilitation services. ritory controlled by extremist groups of- ers and makes it almost impossible to ‘Coaxers’ bribe the bus drivers to stop so ten depletes migrants' funds, leaving effectively put an end to such activities. they can board the bus about 20 kilome- them unexpectedly stranded in Mali. Migrants who failed to cross the tres outside of Gao. Once on board, they border take up temporary residence in make it clear to everyone that they have been sent to take care of the migrants' onward journey. Some travellers may have bought tickets from Bamako all the way to Niamey or Arlit but they have to change buses in Gao, which is another opportunity for the coaxers to try and convince them that they have a better way for them to get across the desert. Migrants usually meet facilitators at markets, which function as prime facilitation hubs in cities such as Kidal and Gao, as they are located in the centre and offer anonymity. Coaxers who recruit migrants to choose particular smugglers or ghetto bosses frequently exploit migrants'

ignorance of the local language and geog- © DigitalGlobe raphy. Female migrants run a risk of be- Figure 11. Satellite image of SONEF Bus Station in Bamako, Mali

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 facilitation hubs while they are earn- namely the Tuareg and Toubou tribes. border from their stronghold in Murzuq ing money to continue their journey. It should be emphasised that these eth- in southern Libya. Migrants often consider it shameful to nic groups also play a crucial role in the Since the overthrow of the Gaddafi re- return to their country of origin because movement of migrants across Niger’s gime, Libya’s border security posts along their communities may have made huge borders. the border with Niger have largely re- economic sacrifices to collect funds for Indeed, the majority of drivers are ei- mained unprotected. The void has since their journey. Often entire families get ther Nigerien or Libyan and, since they been filled along most of the border by stuck in Mali, squatting in designated were born in the area, they know the ter- Toubou militia members, who have es- spaces alongside their fellow country- rain extremely well. For example, smug- tablished control over most areas provid- men. They face serious challenges, as glers driving from Dirkou to Sabha are ing access to southern Libya. The Toubou the language barrier hinders their so- almost exclusively from the Libyan Tou- are a nomadic group who live in a harsh cial integration. Individual migrants and bou tribe. environment and their allegiance to Ni- whole families may spend protracted pe- The Tuareg and Toubou groups dom- ger is fragile as they show disregard for riods stranded in Malian cities, which inate the local human smuggling national law. exposes them to a growing risk of mal- business thanks to the fact that their The Toubou control the smuggling nutrition, disease and victimisation. clansmen are spread on both sides of routes up to Sabha in Libya, where mi- the border. grants are transferred to the Arab Aw- 3.1.3. Libya The two rival tribes have been in spo- lad Suleiman tribe. Although the two radic armed conflict with each other tribes have had a tumultuous relation- Southern Libya over portions of southern Libyan terri- ship, they are currently cooperating due tory, natural resources, and control of to the financial incentives each tribe Historically, most of the trade and smug- smuggling routes. As a result, the Tu- has in maintaining smooth smuggling gling traffic across the ancient caravan areg control the Algerian border region, operations. trading routes in the Saharan desert has while the Toubou tribesmen control the been operated by two nomadic groups, smuggling routes across Libya’s southern

Figure 12. Locations of interest in Sabha (believed to be a major migration hub)

Pléiades, Jun

Nine Victor Two

Three

Xray Whiskey

Mike Delta Alpha Seven © Tom Wescott/irinnews.org © Tom Golf One Bravo November Eight Tango Six Foxtrot Charlie Sierra Echo

Hotel Zulu India Lima Romeo Uniform Four Oscar Papa Juliet

Quebec Road blocks Refuelling stations Five Transport hubs Military activity Gathering places Yankee POL depot 0 1,000 2,000 metres Checkpoint

Source: EU SATCEN, Pre-Frontier Monitoring: Period from 15 March 2016 to 1 June 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Sabha hub General are believed to be involved at As evidenced by Figure 13, in 2015– different stages of the smuggling oper- 2016 an overwhelming majority of the Given the ongoing turmoil in Libya, it is ations. This alleged involvement seems migrants from the Horn of Africa reached very difficult to obtain any credible in- to be confirmed by information gathered Europe on the Central Mediterranean formation from areas in the south of the by Frontex during migrant interviews. route, with the exception of Somalis, country. Therefore, an analysis of sat- who used the Eastern Mediterranean ellite imagery in and around the city 3.1.4. Migration flows from the route to a larger extent than other re- of Sabha was attempted to identify the Horn of Africa to the EU gional nationalities. This is especially current level of activities that could be true for the second half of 2015, when linked to smuggling and irregular migra- In 2016, irregular migration flows of 34% of Somali migrants were detected on tion from Niger towards Libya’s coastal nationals from countries of the Horn the Eastern Mediterranean route. regions. of Africa to the EU followed an overall The overall decrease in the number Figure 12 provides an overview of the decreasing trend compared with 2015. of migrants from the Horn of Africa ob- locations which were analysed during While these flows amounted to just over served in the first half of 2016 on the the monitoring period from 15 March 70 000 individuals in 2015 (nearly 34 000 Central Mediterranean route can be ex- 2016 to 1 June 2016. These locations were in the first half alone), they hardly ex- plained in several ways, which should categorised according to the main type of ceeded 21 000 individuals in the first be seen as complementary rather than activity occurring in the area: transport six months of 2016. The decrease can be competing. hubs, military compounds, gathering mainly accounted for by the lower num- First, it is worth noting that in 2015 places, road blocks, refuelling stations bers of apprehended Somali and Eritrean most of migrants from the Horn of Af- and a petroleum, oils and lubricants de- nationals. The number of Sudanese de- rica used Libya as their last country of pot (POL depot). tected in the first half of 2016 increased departure towards Italy. However, Libya The analysis of the main transport ar- by 20% and the number of Ethiopians is losing its appeal among Horn of Af- eas shows indications of possible smug- by 18%, compared with the same period ricans, many of whom are Christians, gling activities in at least ten sites in the in 2015. due to the protracting instability and the Sabha area. The imagery confirms very dynamic vehicle activity in these loca- Figure 13. Central Mediterranean route remains by far the most commonly tions changing on a daily basis with the used pathway to Europe for Horn of African nationals arrival and departure of trucks. Detections of Eritreans, Somalis, Sudanese and Ethiopians in 2015–2016, by half-year periods and top routes Libyan coast Eritreans Somalis The militia’s ‘commanding officer’ in the region is the head of the network. Some militia members are Sudanese nationals who liaise with networks operating in Khartoum in order to facilitate the transfer of migrants through Libya and further on to Italy. The network uses a number of safe houses to accommodate H H H H H H the migrants before they are sent to Eu- rope by sea. These safe houses are located Sudanese Ethiopians in Sabratha and usually belong to one of the network’s members. On a more general note, gathered information suggests also that high- ranking officers of different Libyan -mil itary formations may be linked to the smuggling of irregular migrants from the western coast of Libya towards It- H H H H H H aly. More specifically, military officers Central Mediterranean route Eastern Mediterranean route Western Balkan route between the ranks of Lieutenant and Source: FRAN data as of 11 August 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 presence of Daesh in some of the transit with the same period of 2015. More than Gambia and Burkina Faso. The inter- areas. Many Horn of African migrants 7 000 Gambians had already completed viewee rejected the offer since he knew are in fact opting for Egypt as a depar- the journey from the Gambia to Italy in that paying small bribes at the Gambian- ture country. In the first half of 2016, the first seven months of 2016. Burkinabe border instead would allow the number of those reaching Italy from A typical migration movement from him to cross, thus reducing the risk of Egypt increased by ~230% in relation to the Gambia is illustrated by the below being returned. the same period of 2015. The main na- described journey of a Gambian migrant When the bus entered Burkina Faso, tionalities were Sudanese, Eritrean and interviewed by Frontex in Italy. it was stopped at every checkpoint where Somali. everybody had to get off the bus and pay According to the information gath- Bad economic situation, advice mandatory bribes from EUR 3 up to EUR ered through debriefing activities, many from relatives and peer pressure 30 in the local currency. The amount was of the migrants stated that whilst travel- based on the nationality of the passen- ling on the Central Mediterranean route The interviewee was born and lived in gers and on the fact whether they were they applied for refugee status in Sudan a small village where he was working in possession of valid travel documents and Egypt hoping to avoid being repat- as a taxi driver, earning around EUR or not. riated to Eritrea or Somalia. 42 per month (in the local currency). Once in Niger, he travelled from Nia- The debriefed migrants also stated His decision to move towards Italy was mey to Agadez on a regular minibus, pay- that they avoided being arrested and prompted by advice of his cousin (living ing around EUR 40 in the local currency. returned by the Egyptian authorities in Germany) and the fact that one of his In Agadez, however, having run out of since they were in possession of a ref- friends who was willing to leave towards money, he spent two weeks waiting for ugee status document. In this regard, Italy pressed him to do so.2 his family to wire EUR 150 for the trip to it should be emphasised that according Unsurprisingly, the interviewee tried Libya. From Agadez he travelled towards to the information provided by the mi- to obtain a Schengen visa but his appli- the Libyan border in a pickup truck, to- grants, it takes about three months to cation was rejected. It should be stressed gether with other 26 people, mostly from obtain refugee status. However, a high that visa rejection rates for West African the Gambia, Senegal and Mali. They were number of Horn of African migrants who countries range from 30% to 50%. stopped at three checkpoints manned by applied for this status after arriving in Nigerien authorities. All were searched Egypt (through Sudan) led to delays in Using regular bus lines and paying for weapons and had to pay bribes of the processing of their applications. As bribes up to the equivalent of EUR 20 in Lib- a consequence, migrants may be tem- yan dinars. The driver deliberately drove porarily stranded in transit areas. Thus, His journey started in March 2016 on a directly through each checkpoint, even the decrease in the number of Horn of regular bus. He bought tickets from Bri- though he could have easily bypassed African nationals apprehended on the kama in the Gambia to Niamey in Niger them. At the Libyan border, each migrant Central Mediterranean route could be di- for which he paid EUR 140 in the local had to give another bribe (of around EUR rectly related to this very delay. currency. As the direct line bus to Nia- 25) to be allowed into Libya. mey was leaving in two days, he accepted an offer from the bus company to take 3.2.2. Eritrean and Somali him to Bamako in Mali and from there migrants 3.2. Profiles of African to Niamey in Niger (for the same price). migrants The ride to Bamako lasted for 25 hours. Between January and June 2016, 9 382 When he arrived at Bamako bus station, Eritrean and 5 000 Somali irregular 3.2.1. Gambians the interviewee was approached by indi- migrants were detected while they at- viduals who offered to sell him a Senega- tempted to reach the EU, in great ma- A typical journey from West Africa lese ID card, which allows for an easier jority across the Central Mediterranean to Libya – the story of a Gambian access to Burkina Faso and prevents pos- route and, to a lesser extent, across the who arrived in Italy in July 2016 sible return from this country. In fact, Eastern Mediterranean one. there is a return agreement between the The improved weather conditions Nationals of the Gambia are among the in March 2016 led to an increase in the top three nationalities of those who ar- 2 According to the Frontex Consultative number of migrants from Eritrea and So- rived in Italy from Libya in 2016. In fact, Forum, these reasons do not apply to malia detected on the Central Mediter- their numbers increased during the first all citizens from the Gambia. Some of ranean route, in line with the patterns them do leave their country because of seven months of 2016 by 45% compared observed in 2014 and 2015. A similar rise persecution.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 14. Most interviewed Gambians in Italy chose the route through Agadez and Libya because of well-established facilitation services, favourable border topography (easy to cross borders), low cost and low risk of detection. Their decision to choose the EU was largely driven by economic opportunities Main reasons declared by Gambians for leaving the country to get to the EU (left) and for choosing the route through Agadez in 2016 (right)

Price Low risk of detection Support from diaspora % Asylum policy % % Border topography Family reuniﬁcation policy % % % Possibility to legalise stay %

English language %

Facilitation %

Economic/ work possibilities %

Source: Frontex interviews in the context of JO Triton 2016

was observed with regard to Eritreans routes via Khartoum and the same peo- Alternative routes through Nairobi, in April and May 2016, before a notice- ple smuggling networks are used to reach Khartoum, Tehran and Dubai able decrease (from 4 299 to 2 515 detec- Libya from Sudan. A certain number of tions) was observed in June. By contrast, Somali and Eritrean migrants, however, An alternative route to reach Khartoum the number of detections of Somalis re- prefer to travel from Sudan to Egypt in (Sudan) runs through Nairobi (Kenya) mained stable between March and May order to depart African shores from and South Sudan. Once in Khartoum, 2016 (slightly above 1 000 detections per Alexandria. the migrants travel in groups of 50– month) but sharply declined in June 2016 The average cost for a Somali migrant 60 people, using a land route to Aswan (600 detections). who would try to reach Italy via Alexan- (Egypt) aboard Toyota pick-up trucks. dria is between USD 4 000 and 5 000. According to information from migrant Khartoum remains a key transit hub Migrants from the Horn of Africa using interviews, migrants taking this route Egypt as their last departure country are sometimes use counterfeit Sudanese The information obtained from inter- choosing the land route from Somalia passports to cross the Egyptian-Suda- views conducted with Somali and Eri- or Eritrea to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and nese border, since it is easier for Suda- trean migrants suggests that the same from there on to Khartoum (Sudan). nese nationals to enter Egypt.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Aswan has been confirmed as one of regarding the camps they transited on people smuggling services to Khartoum the main transit points on the route from their way to Europe. It should also be (Sudan), Libya or even all the way to It- the Horn of Africa to Egypt. For this leg of noted that screening activities in Sicily aly, depending on how much the mi- the journey smugglers charge migrants revealed that many Ethiopian and Suda- grants are willing to pay for the trip. about USD 600. From Aswan migrants nese migrants claimed to be Eritrean to At night, people smugglers gather mi- use public transport to reach Cairo. Once increase their chance of being granted grants in the outskirts of Metema be- there, they contact smuggling networks asylum. fore helping them to cross the border which charge between USD 2 000 and to Sudan illegally. Once on the other 3 000 for the transfer to a safe house near 3.2.3. Ethiopian and Sudanese side, they are transported in trucks to Alexandria. From there they are trans- migrants Khartoum, where they either end their ported to Italy by boat. journey or continue being smuggled to Somali migrants who choose to reach Between January and June 2016, 1 780 Libya, mainly through Ajdabiya, depend- Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean Ethiopians and 5 113 Sudanese irregu- ing on their agreement with the smug- route travel more and more by air from larly reached the EU, in great majority gling network. Hargeisa or Mogadishu (Somalia) to across the Central Mediterranean route According to information gathered Tehran (Iran) via Dubai (UAE), before and, to a lesser extent, across the East- during interviews, the price paid for peo- reaching the Turkish border by car and ern Mediterranean one. Additionally, de- ple smuggling services from Metema to crossing it on foot, with the assistance spite the dire situation in war-torn South Italy ranges from USD 3 000 to 3 500 per of Iranian smugglers. Sudan, one migrant of this nationality person. Migrants have to pay a part of Once in Turkey, migrants reach Istan- was reported on the Western Mediterra- the total amount after each leg of the bul by public transport. When they get nean route in January 2016. This number trip, i.e. upon arrival in Khartoum (Su- there, they use Turkish smuggling net- is as negligible as that reported in 2015 dan), Ajdabiya (Libya), Tripoli (Libya) works to reach the points of departure, (12 South Sudanese migrants, all detected and Italy. namely Izmir, Bodrum and Antalya be- on the Western Mediterranean route). Information provided by Ethiopian fore sailing to Greece and then to Italy (or In contrast to what was observed with migrants suggests that in order to avoid directly to Italy). On this last leg of the regard to Somalis and Eritreans, im- road checkpoints between Ajdabiya and journey, migrants travel in small groups proved weather conditions since March Tripoli some people smuggling networks in order to avoid being detected by the 2016 resulted in a steady increase in the use a scout vehicle that monitors the Turkish, Greek or Italian authorities. The number of Ethiopian and Sudanese ir- route. smugglers come from Eastern European regular migrants detected on the Central Interviews with various nationali- countries or, to a lesser extent, Greece. Mediterranean route. For Sudanese, the ties indicate that some migrants who monthly increases ranged between 30% used the Khartoum route were smug- Nationality swapping and 50% while it showed more fluctua- gled through Sudan or Chad directly to tion in the case of Ethiopians. Sabha (Libya) in order to avoid Ajdabiya. The information provided by the newly As regards the route followed by Ethi- The fact that troops from the internation- arrived Eritrean migrants does not sug- opian migrants, they travel from differ- ally recognised Government of Tobruk gest any changes in the approach of the ent locations in the country to the border were confronting Daesh groups in the Eritrean government as regards their sta- area of Metema (land border between areas of Benghazi and Ajdabiya forced tus. Generally, Eritrean migrants when Ethiopia and Sudan). Once in Metema people smuggling networks to look for debriefed do not offer much information they are approached by locals who offer safer alternative routes.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 3.3. Entry to Europe Figure 15. Maritime arrivals from Africa to Italy continue at historic highs Comparison of historical data on illegal border-crossing on the Central Mediterranean route in 3.3.1. Italy – Central 2007–2016 (January-August) Mediterranean route

EUNAVFOR MED Between 1 January and 31 August 2016, JO Triton launched on launched on June 117 000 irregular migrants were inter- November cepted in the Central Mediterranean, Mare Nostrum which represents a very stable trend in launched on relation to the same period in 2015, when October 116 000 migrants were apprehended. Historic record numbers caused This number is still almost double that by Arab Spring surge in early of the previous record of 2011, i.e. the year of the Arab Spring. The alarming trend started in 2014, coinciding with the launching of the Italian ‘Mare Nos- JanAug JanAug JanAug JanAug JanAug JanAug JanAug JanAug JanAug JanAug trum’ operation. Source: Frontex data as of 23 September 2016 The majority of migrants detected on the Central Mediterranean route are African country citizens. No substantial increase is visible in the detections of persons coming from the Middle East (there beset with instability, which makes the in the area. This is related to the fact is no evidence of a shift from the East- country unsafe and thereby less attrac- that there are often multiple detections ern Mediterranean to the Central Med- tive for Horn of African migrants and per- made at the same time, which compli- iterranean route). sons seeking international protection. cates search and rescue efforts. In 2016, Egypt became an alternative Moreover, human smugglers capital- to Libya as the departure point towards Fatalities increasing despite more ise on the fact that they need to provide Italy for migrants from the Horn of Africa operational resources less fuel and basic supplies for the mi- and Sudan. Indeed, this route is safer grants to make it to Europe as the average and cheaper for migrants than that lead- The International Organization for Mi- length of the sea voyage is constantly de- ing through Libya. Nevertheless, the lat- gration (IOM) is regularly updating its creasing (see Fig. 16) due to the presence ter country remains the main departure ‘Missing Migrants Project’ that tracks of EU maritime assets. This also impacts point on this route. fatalities among the migrants. The ma- the quality of the rubber dinghies, as the Most of the incidents on the Central jority of fatalities occur in the Central smugglers increasingly use cheaper and Mediterranean route involve boats de- Mediterranean, which saw a year-on- flimsier ones. As a result, the expenses parting from the Libyan coast towards year increase of 21%, i.e. 3 054 in 2016 that human smugglers incur are lower, Italy. However, it should also be pointed (as of 25 September) from 2 622 in 2015 thus allowing them to make a greater out that the migration flow from Egypt (30 September). profit per boat. towards Italy continued to surge in 2016 The death toll is constantly growing Migrant deaths are mainly caused by (1 January–14 August), compared with despite the proliferation of the EU’s rubber dinghies sinking. In some cases, the same period of 2015. and EU Member States’ operational ef- the migrants attempt to take out the wa- From 1 January to 14 August 2015, a to- forts in the Central Mediterranean, i.e. ter leaking into the dinghy, which may tal of 6 021 migrants were apprehended JO Triton, Mare Sicuro3 and EUNAVFOR lead to the involuntary puncturing of while trying to reach Italy from Egypt. Med Operation Sophia and the rise in the rubber and cause its deflating and During the same period in 2016, this the number of NGOs’ vessels operating sinking. number increased by ~96% to 11 801, con- Moreover, the wooden planks used firming Egypt as the main alternative 3 Mare Sicuro (Safe Seas) was launched to reinforce the floor of the rubber din- route to Italy. This route is mainly used on 12 March 2016 by the Italian Navy ghies are so roughly cut that, on several by nationals from the Horn of Africa, Su- (Marina Militare) to surveil the seas off overcrowded boats, they broke under the the Libyan coast as part of a security dan and Egypt, due to the efficiency and migrants’ weight and punctured the rub- and counter-terrorism effort. The assets enhanced coordination of the smuggling deployed have also been used for search- ber causing the boat to sink. Smugglers networks operating in Egypt. Another and-rescue purposes at the request of have also increased the number of mi- factor here is the fact that Libya has been the Rescue and Coordination Centre in grants crowded onto each dinghy, thus Rome.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 16. Over the past three years the rescue/detection of migrants has Increasing number of been moving closer to Libyan shores Egyptians Locations of incidents reported in the Mediterranean Sea in the framework of the JO Hermes and Triton in 2013–2016 In the first half of 2016, the number EPN Hermes & Triton of Egyptians arriving in Italy by boat 2013–2016 increased by about 580% in relation to Illegal border-crossing the same period of 2015, to the effect 01 Jan–25 Aug 2016 01 Jan–25 Aug 2015 that Egyptians are now one of the top 01 Jan–25 Aug 2014 ten nationalities detected in the Cen- Triton operational areas tral Mediterranean. It should be noted Territorial waters Search and Rescue areas that most of the Egyptian migrants arriving in Italy are unaccompanied minors (~64% of the total). Arguably, this could be a consequence of the effectiveness of the bilateral agreement between Italy and Egypt, which allows the Italian authorities to return adult Egyptian migrants using a fast-track procedure. Tunisia

Tripoli Tajurah Zuwarah Qarqarish For this reason, most of the Egyp- Incidents reported within EPN Hermes & Triton Sabratah Gasr Garabulli tians arriving in Italy try to conceal 2013–2016 Frontex, RAU Analytics 2016 Libya Al Khums their true nationality and claim to be Syrian, Palestinian, Moroccan or Lib- Source: Frontex yan in order to avoid being returned to Egypt. During the screening phase, the migrants sailing on different vessels the expertise of Italian screeners and to transfer to a bigger wooden/iron fish- cultural mediators enables the Ital- ing boat, also known as a ‘mother boat’. ian authorities to identify Egyptians If the migrants show reluctance to be

who pose as nationals of other Arab transferred to the ‘mother boat’ because © Frontex countries. there is not enough room for all of them to sail in safe conditions, they are for- cibly transferred by the smugglers who, raising the average number of persons due to the fact that migrants are highly aboard from 100–115 reported in 2015 to vulnerable on the high seas, leave them 130–150 in 2016. By increasing the num- no choice but to go aboard the ‘mother ber of migrants per boat, smuggling net- boat’. works are clearly putting the lives of the Most of the incidents leading to death migrants at an even greater risk. of migrants sailing aboard wooden boats

On the other hand, when it comes were related to overcrowding. Moreover, © Frontex to wooden boats, most of the fatal inci- it should be noted that, as in the case of Figure 17. Overcrowded and partially dents are either caused by asphyxia and rubber dinghies, the average number of deflated rubber boat made of thin suffocation aboard overcrowded vessels or migrants per boat also increased in 2016, fabric their capsizing. Most wooden boats de- compared with 2015. Wooden boats car- parting from Egypt collect migrants from ried an average of 298 migrants between a number of locations along the Egyptian 1 January and 31 July 2015, while the av- and/or Libyan coast on the way to Italy. erage number of migrants per boat in Once on the high seas, smugglers force the same period of 2016 was 324. © Frontex Figure 18. Capsizing of a wooden boat

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 19. The number of sea detections on the Western Mediterranean route increased considerably in 2016 Overview of historical data on detections on the Western Mediterranean route in 2013–2016 3.3.2. Spain – Western (January-July), by border type Mediterranean route Land Sea

Situation in the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla In the first half of 2016, the trend on the Western Mediterranean land and sea routes followed a different pattern, i.e. an almost 55% rise in the apprehensions on the sea route and a decrease of nearly 43% in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land borders.4 In the case of Ceuta and Melilla, the continuous cooperation between Spain and Morocco helped to reduce the number of irregular migrants, forcing many sub-Saharans to change their modus operandi and take the sea route towards JanuaryJuly Spain. In fact, several actions taken Source: FRAN data as of 15 August 2016 by the respective border authorities reduced the number of attempts at scaling the border fence. During the first seven months of 2016, the Spanish authorities recorded 2 863 attempts, compared to 6 208 attempts recorded in all 2015.5 As regards clandestine entries to the Spanish territories, there was an increase in the number of migrants detected hiding in vehicles (often in secret com- partments specially constructed by the smuggling networks operating in Mo- rocco). In fact, 271 detections were made from 1 January to 1 August 2016, com-

pared with 231 detections in the whole © Twitter of 2015.6 An increase was also observed in Figure 20. One of makeshift camps dismantled in Morocco the number of migrants who successfully entered the territory of Ceuta and Me- lilla using the maritime route as 421 mi- Health risks: Algeria’s view grants (from 1 January to 1 August 2016) were detected, compared with 209 in the The public health risk is inherent in migration phenomena. As reported by Al- whole of 2015. geria, many migrants who entered the country clandestinely were found car- In addition, Morocco continued to dis- rying various tropical diseases. For instance, 150 cases of malaria (of which five mantle migrant makeshift camps located proved fatal) were detected among migrants in the northern part of the country. in different forests around the cities of It is worth noting that the Algerian authorities are fully committed to provid- Ceuta and Melilla. In 2016, the Moroccan ing afflicted migrants with the necessary medical care before repatriating them. Gendarmerie carried out many actions of this kind. On 22 July, the Moroccan au-

thorities arrested seven sub-Saharan mi- to divert attention from their planned 4 FRAN data grants suspected of deliberately setting attempt to cross illegally into Melilla. 5 According to data provided by the Spanish Guardia Civil fire to a forest on Mount Gurugú allegedly 6 Idem

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 3.4. Document fraud in gen area in 2016. Dakar, along with gos towards the EU. The first half of 2016 relation to AFIC countries Casablanca airport (Morocco), saw the saw a further decrease on the routes from and AFIC country nationals fastest increase in such detections. In- Lagos to the UK and almost no detections deed, after a 30% increase recorded in on connections to Italy were recorded. In 2015, there were almost 3 000 AFIC 2015, a significant rise can be expected Air routes originating in AFIC coun- country nationals detected with fraud- also in 2016. Apart from Senegalese, the tries were also used by non-AFIC country ulent travel documents in the EU/Schen- most detected document fraudsters ar- nationals. At the same time, however, gen area, which is 6% less compared riving from Dakar were Sri Lankans and nationals of AFIC countries were detected with 2014. The above mentioned figure Guineans. on transit routes via Turkey and the Rus- includes detections both at the EU's ex- Casablanca international airport was sian Federation, rather than just on the ternal border as well as on the intra-EU/ the second most reported last departure direct flights from AFIC countries to the Schengen movements. airport from Africa towards the EU/ EU/Schengen area. Data from the first half of 2016 show Schengen area. The most targeted des- that this downward trend persisted. tinations were Lisbon, Milan, Rome and 3.4.2. Most detected AFIC However, the increasing trend of illegal Frankfurt, mostly chosen by Moroccan, country nationalities using border-crossings in the Central Mediter- Senegalese, Ivorian, Ghanaian, Sri Lan- fraudulent documents ranean involving AFIC country nationals kan and Congolese nationals. is likely to translate into an increased Whilst the number of document fraud Moroccan nationals represented the big- demand for fraudulent EU travel docu- cases from Lagos (Nigeria) increased gest group abusing travel documents. ments for secondary movements. steeply at the beginning of 2015, mostly There were almost 950 Moroccan na- Almost 70% of all document fraud due to increased detections at Rome Fiu- tionals detected with fraudulent docu- cases involving AFIC country nationals micino, this trend reversed after Alitalia ments in 2015, i.e. 15% more compared was detected on entry to the EU/SAC from withdrew its Accra–Lagos–Rome service with 2014. In the first half of 2016, the third countries (see Fig. 21). at the end of March 2015. London Heath- situation remained stable and compara- In the first half of 2016, a drop in the row also reported a 55% decrease com- ble to the first half of 2015, when fewer number of detections on the routes be- pared with 2014. than 400 Moroccans with fraudulent doc- tween Lagos and Italy, the UK and be- Nigerian nationals were the most uments were detected. tween Spain and Morocco was noticed. reported offenders abusing fraudulent The vast majority of Moroccans with On the other hand, in line with increas- travel documents on the routes from La- fraudulent documents was detected on ing number of illegal border-crossings into Italy, the number of detections on Figure 21. In January–June 2016, around 70% of all document fraud cases was intra-EU/Schengen movements started detected on entry to the EU/SAC from third countries to increase. Detections of AFIC country nationals detected using fraudulent documents, by travel type AFIC country nationals mostly opted in January 2013–June 2016 for using someone else's authentic passport issued by an AFIC country and containing a genuine EU residence permit. They also tried to abuse authentic EU passports, predominately issued by JanJun Entry from third country France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. Intra EU/Schengen

On intra-EU/Schengen movements, Exit to third country the use of French, Italian, Spanish and Transit Belgian passports and ID cards was most common.

3.4.1. Main routes involving last departure airports in AFIC countries

Dakar international airport (Senegal) became the most common last departure airport of document fraudsters arriving from AFIC countries in the EU/Schen- Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 August 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 entry to the EU/Schengen area from Figure 22. After the Lagos-Rome and Bamako-Lisbon connections were closed, third countries, in particular from Mo- a visible displacement of document fraud users to other airports in the rocco to Spain in Ceuta and Melilla. Ferry region was observed, with Dakar becoming the most reported last departure routes between Morocco (Tangier) and airport Spain (Tarifa and Algeciras) were used Main routes used by AFIC country nationals detected using fraudulent documents on flights from to a certain extent in 2015, as well. The third countries towards and within the EU/Schengen area in 2015 and 2016 latest findings, however, show a significant decrease in detections on the above Main routes O! Air BCPs United mentioned ferry connections. A certain Ireland Kingdom Air routes London (Heathrow) Poland Belarus amount of Moroccan nationals was de- !O Germany Suspended ﬂights by Brussels tected also on air routes between Casa- TAP Portugal and Alitalia !O Ukraine blanca and Rome Fiumicino or Istanbul Sea BCPs Slovakia Atatürk airports and many other EU des- Land BCP Austria tinations. Nevertheless, even here, the France Milan Hungary Romania number of detections dropped signifi- !O cantly in the first half of 2016. Italy Most of the detections involving Mo- Spain Rome Kapitan-Andreevo Barcelona !O roccan nationals on intra-EU/Schen- Madrid !O Portugal !O gen movements were reported between Lisbon !O Greece Greece and Italy, France and the UK, !O Turkey however, the overall figure was very low. Athens Moroccan nationals were often us- !O ing Spanish and, to a lesser extent, Tangier !O also French, Belgian and Italian docu- Casablanca ments (ID cards, residence permits, pass- Morocco ports) or Moroccan passports. Most of the Algeria Libya Egypt abovementioned documents were abused by Moroccan impostors, using genuine United documents of someone else. Kingdom Nigerian nationals formed the sec-

Dover @ Calais ond biggest group reported for document Bruxelles fraud in the EU/Schengen area. In 2015, Cheriton Mauritania Coquelles Belgium around 520 Nigerians were detected with Mali Lille fraudulent documents, representing a Eurostar Niger 34% decrease compared with 2014. A declining trend was also observed in the !O France Dakar Senegal Paris first half of 2016, mostly because a very !O !O Burkina Banjul low number of detections was reported Bamako Faso Guinea from Italy. This mostly resulted from the Nigeria Spain suspension of flights between Rome and Cote d’Ivoire Algeciras Lagos (Nigeria) and fewer detections re- Ghana !O Tarifa ported by the UK and Spain. !O Lagos Accra Whilst the number of Nigerians at- Ceuta Melilla Algeria tempting to cross the EU's external bor- Morocco Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 August 2016 ders with fraudulent documents was decreasing, detections on intra-EU/ Schengen movements remained stable. This was connected with a high number wards their desired final destinations. It gen area from third countries. Most of of Nigerians illegally crossing the EU's is important to add that the number of the Nigerians on the intra-EU/Schen- external borders via Central Mediterra- detections involving Nigerian nationals gen movements intended to reach the nean sea with or without documents, on the intra-EU/Schengen movements UK and Ireland. to subsequently use fraudulent EU doc- for the first time exceeded the number Nigerian nationals often used authen- uments on the secondary movements to- of detections on entry to the EU/Schen- tic Nigerian passports (sometimes also

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016

Figure 23. Moroccan and Nigerian nationals were the AFIC country nationals most detected for document fraud. Almost 70% of these document fraud cases were detected on entry to the EU/SAC from third countries despite a decreasing trend observed since 2013 Detections of AFIC country nationals presenting fraudulent documents, by nationality of the holder in January 2014–June 2016

JanJul

Marocco Nigeria COD Senegal Ghana Cameroon Guinea Côte d'Ivoire Gambia Mali Benin Mauritania Liberia Sierra Leone Togo Cape Verde Kenya Niger Burkina Faso Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 August 2016

Figure 24. Passports were the most common AFIC country documents abused, again mostly by AFIC country nationals Detections of fraudulent AFIC passports, by country of issuance in January 2014–June 2016

JanJul

Senegal Guinea Nigeria Marocco Gambia Ghana COD Côte d'Ivoire Mali Cameroon Mauritania Sierra Leone Liberia Benin Togo Niger Burkina Faso Cape Verde Kenya

Source: EDF-RAN data as of 5 August 2016

EU residence permits) as impostors. Ni- movements. EDF-RAN members re- Unlike Nigerian, Moroccan and Sene- gerians also used a wide range of fraud- ported a total of 225 Congolese nation- galese nationals, Congolese nationals of- ulent Italian travel documents. als detected with fraudulent documents ten targeted the EU/Schengen area from Congolese (the Democratic Republic in 2014 and 239 in 2015. Figures for the countries other than their country of ori- of the Congo – COD) nationals were of- first half of 2016 do not show any signif- gin. Taking 2015 and the first half of 2016 ten spotted on arrival from third coun- icant changes in the trend. into consideration, most of them were de- tries but also on the intra-EU/Schengen tected on entry to the EU/Schengen area

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Document fraud in Ghana Document fraud in Sierra Leone Document fraud in Kenya

According to the Ghanian authorities, Case 1: A Sierra Leonean national was In terms of document fraud cases, there are well-organised crime groups arrested at Freetown International Kenya is mostly confronted with the responsible for producing documents Airport (Sierra Leone) on 23 April 2016. use of forged passports from Middle and/or facilitating air travel to Europe. The individual, holder of a Sierra Leo- Eastern countries, especially Yemen, nean passport, attempted to travel to Syria and Lebanon but also forged ref- Most of the document fraud in Ghana Spain via Casablanca (Morocco). For ugee documents. These perpetrators involves: that purpose, he used a Schengen visa are generally prosecuted and then ex- ▪▪ Forged biodata pages of Ghanaian issued to another Sierra Leonean na- pelled from the territory. and Indian passports; tional, whom the suspect tried to im- ▪▪ Counterfeit embarkation/disem- personate. The suspect was charged Kenya also took steps towards en- barkation stamps (Ghana, Togo, and remanded pending trial. hancing the security features of its Nigeria and Malaysia); travel documents by introducing e- ▪▪ Forged visas (Ghana, India, Schen- Case 2: A Nigerian national was inter- passports for their own citizens and gen and Canada). cepted at Freetown International Air- Machine Readable Convention Travel port on 1 June 2016. The individual was Documents (MRCTDs) for the recog- The travel routes where these fraud planning to travel to Canada via Brus- nised refugees residing in the coun- cases occurred are Europe, Asia, Amer- sels (Belgium). He attempted to board try. Both document types comply with icas and the Gulf Countries. a SN Brussels Airlines flight using a ICAO standards. forged Canadian residence permit. Most of the arrested persons were The suspect was remanded pending Ghanaian, Nigerian, Guinean, Syr- trial and the case was handed over to ian, Bangladeshi, Indian and Paki- the Transnational Organised Crime ber of document fraud cases was observed stani nationals. Unit (TOCU) for further investigation. in relation to 2014. In 2014 and 2015, there were 200 Ghanaian nationals detected, on average, with fraudulent documents from the Russian Federation, in particu- third countries, in particular from Da- and this trend continued in the first half lar from Moscow airport of Sheremetyevo kar (DKR). However, many last departure of 2016. Ghanaian nationals, however, and Vnukovo to Germany, Estonia and places were reported as unknown. Most were involved in slightly more cases on Latvia, followed by arrivals from Nigeria of the Senegalese attempted to reach ei- intra-EU/SAC movements than on arrival (recently dropped to zero due to the sus- ther Spanish international airports of from third countries. pension of flights between Rome Fium- Madrid (MAD) and Barcelona (BCN), Most detections involving Ghanaian icino and Lagos), Morocco and Senegal. the Portuguese airport in Lisbon (LIS) or nationals were thus detected on the air On intra-EU/Schengen movements, most French international airports. Recently, routes between Italy and Germany or on Congolese nationals were reported mov- some detections were observed on arrival the land/sea routes between France and ing both between France and the UK, and from Casablanca (CAS) as well. On the the UK. On entry to the EU/Schengen between Greece and France, Belgium, intra-EU/Schengen movements, these area from third countries, most Ghana- Germany. were mostly reported between France ians arrived in Italy, Spain or the UK from Congolese nationals were often de- and the UK. Accra airport (ACC). tected presenting fraudulent Congolese They were often detected travelling Ghanaian nationals were often de- passports combined with Belgian and with their national passports (using tected presenting authentic Ghanaian French counterfeit residence permits. someone else's genuine documents as impostor passports accompanied by re- Senegalese nationals ranked fourth impostors or documents with altered lated authentic Italian and German res- among the AFIC country nationals abus- biodata pages), French authentic pass- idence permits or counterfeit Italian ID ing travel documents. The overall num- ports and ID cards, Italian counterfeit ID cards. ber of detections dropped from 300 cases cards and residence permits. in 2014 to 200 in 2015. The number of de- Ghanaian nationals ranked fifth tections in the first half of 2016 remained among AFIC country nationals reported relatively stable. Senegalese were mostly within the EDF-RAN for abusing travel detected on entry to the EU/SAC from documents. No visible shift in the num-

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 3.4.3. Most abused travel documents issued by AFIC countries

On the whole, there were approximately 1 560 fraudulent travel documents issued by AFIC countries reported within the EDF-RAN in 2014. This figure decreased by 14% and reached 1 340 cases in 2015. This decrease was also visible in the data for the beginning of 2016. The declining trend in the use of fraudulent travel documents, in particular passports issued by AFIC countries, is mostly caused by

a steep decrease related to Syrians who authorities © Togolese used authentic Moroccan passports in Figure 25. Three types of Togolese passports 2014 and at the beginning of 2015. With the change of main migratory routes, the number of Syrians attempting to cross the EU's external borders between Spain and Morocco decreased accordingly. The most abused AFIC documents were Senegalese, Guinean and Nige- rian passports. The number of abused Malian passports decreased as a result of the closure of the air connection between Bamako and Lisbon.

3.5. Preventive measures by AFIC countries

3.5.1. Combating document and identity fraud across the AFIC region

Document and identity fraud is closely knit with the phenomenon of irregular © Togolese authorities © Togolese migration across the AFIC region. There- fore, AFIC partners strive to curb this Figure 26. Sample Togolese certificate of nationality type of fraud through a series of measures that aim to address the issue at dif- The General Directorate of National Doc- of nationality is also subject to a mod- ferent stages. umentation (GDND) under the Ministry ernisation process. In this respect, the Togo has been tackling the phenome- of Security has been tasked with the pro- General Directorate of Seal and National- non of document and identity fraud for duction and the issuance of all travel and ity (GDSN) under the Ministry of Justice more than a decade and could certainly identity documents. set out to ultimately register all Togo- serve as an example of good practices in In addition, the GDND also deals with lese citizens. the AFIC region. The country has put in producing and issuing most of other offi- Togo has enhanced efforts to ensure place an integrated centralised document cial documents, including residence per- efficient border control, both at airports issuance system that enables the author- mits, driving licences, car registration and the main land BCPs. This system ities to limit opportunities for fraudsters documents, police badges, etc. In paris connected with relevant Interpol to produce and use forged documents. allel, the system of issuing certificates and security services' databases as well

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 as with the national database of travel documents, which limits the use of forged Togolese documents. In addition, any travel document is automatically checked against surveillance lists and passengers are registered with their biometric data (pictures and fingerprints). High-quality standards among the staff are being maintained through regular training sessions and the enforcement of anti-corruption measures. Other AFIC partners attempt to address the challenges posed by document and identity fraud. Burkina Faso, for instance, resorts to using a biometric national ID card and a machine-readable © Ghana Immigration Service passport. The country also contemplates Figure 27. Ghanaian returnees from Libya the introduction of an e-passport and it has already installed at BCPs the IOM-de- try as the name suggest. These registries The ECOWAS protocol allows citizens veloped border management information have their own security features embed- of member states to enter other ECOWAS system known as the Migration Informa- ded in various documents used to safe- member states visa free and to stay as a tion and Data Analysis System (MIDAS). guard identity fraud. visitor for the period of up to 90 days. These efforts are unfortunately under- Thus, Ghanaian nationals who travel to a mined by obsolete (not computerised) 3.5.2. Ghana transit country that is an ECOWAS mem- registers of births, marriages and deaths ber state, such as Togo or Niger, travel as well as by legal shortcomings allow- Preventing irregular migration legally as long as they do not overstay or ing the intervention of intermediaries through the Central Mediterranean attempt to enter other states illegally. within the document issuance process. route from Ghana’s perspective Migrants departing Ghana follow ei- To a certain extent, Mali is faced with ther the northern route through Bur- similar problems in its efforts to curb doc- Although they are not among the pri- kina Faso and Mali or the eastern route ument and identity fraud. mary nationalities of migrants who through Togo and Benin. Both routes The country envisages the implemen- attempted to enter Europe via the Cen- lead migrants to Niger and further on tation of biometric passports, a connec- tral Mediterranean route in 2016, Gha- to Libya, but the eastern route is cur- tion with relevant Interpol databases, the naians are well-represented among the rently favoured. installation of MIDAS at BCPs as well as migrants who have been identified by Taking the clauses of the ECOWAS pro- the development of the Personal Identi- IOM as currently residing in Libya.7 A tocol into account, the Ghana Immigra- fication Secure Comparison and Evalua- very small number of these migrants tion Service (GIS) developed a preventive tion System (PISCES) at Bamako airport. return to Ghana from Libya. Between strategy aiming to curb the current mi- In the case of Ghana, the authori- January and May 2016, the Ghanaian gration trend. The GIS set up a Migration ties are addressing document and iden- authorities recorded a total number of Information Bureau that organises infor- tity fraud by introducing biometric 1 558 ‘returnees’.8 mation campaigns across the country to passports, birth and death certificates, alert potential migrants to the dangers and more effective arrest and prosecu- 7 Third nationality after Niger and Egypt – of irregular travel. tion of offenders. data for March–April 2016 – Displacement Furthermore, the GIS focuses more The country’s main civil registries in- Tracking Matrix (DTM), Libya, Round 3, specifically on the region of Brong Ahafo IOM. So far IOM has identified through clude the Registrar General Department from which most of the migrants come. the DTM tool almost 235 000 migrants and the Births and Death Registry. The residing in Libya, but assesses that the It established a migration consultation Registrar General Department are in total number of migrants currently in centre in Sunyani, the main city of the charge of the registration of marriages Libya amounts to between 700 000 and region, created with the support of the (customary and ordinance) and com- 1 million. IOM and the EU. 8 Ghana Immigration Service, panies. Whereas the Births and Death The IOM has also been providing re- presentation at the AFIC Workshop in Registry is also responsible for the regis- Nouakchott, Mauritania, 31 May–2 June turn support through covering tuition tration of births and deaths in the coun- 2016 fees for those seeking education and pay-

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 ing for apprenticeship for those desir- ing to become technicians. Nigerian THB victims travelling to the Russian Federation on Furthermore, the GIS strives to de- student visas velop pre-departure strategies ensuring that only Ghanaians in possession of a According to some Moscow-based NGOs focusing on preventing human traffick- valid passport and able to justify their ing, around 2 000–3 000 Nigerian girls – many from poor and remote villages – travel with a reasonable purpose effec- are brought to the Russian Federation every year for prostitution. Criminal groups tively depart the country. appear to be taking advantage of Russian student visas, which are not easy to In addition, the Ghanaian Border Pa- obtain as universities must provide supporting documents for the applications. trol Unit makes sure that travellers only Nigerians come to the Russian Federation officially to study but then disappear make use of legal BCPs. It is also worth into the sex business for years and the authorities are unable to track them. noting that the Ghanaian authorities Nigerian girls are lured by a promise of a well-paid job in the Russian Federa- promote collaboration between send- tion allowing them later to reimburse the costs of the visa and the journey (es- ing and receiving countries. timated at the level of USD 40 000). Surprisingly, even illiterate teenagers were The National Disaster Management being trafficked to the Russian Federation on the basis of student visas. The Organization (NDMO) also pays transpor- Head of Mission at the Nigerian Embassy in Moscow indicated that the num- tation fees to returnees who are subject to ber of Nigerians trafficked for sex to the Russian Federation has been growing mass repatriations (since these individ- over the past few years. uals usually come back empty-handed), to help them reach their families. ugee status and care are to be granted by purposes are forced to pay EUR 40 000– 3.5.3. Nigeria the Red Cross at any stage of the jour- 50 000 to their madam9 to regain their ney. Traffickers further mislead their vic- freedom. Trafficking and smuggling of tims by telling them that the Red Cross Nigerians into Spain offers additional privileges to pregnant 3.5.4. Kenya girls and nursing mothers. This ma- According to data provided by the Nige- noeuvre aims at enabling the traffick- Kenya remained a transit but also des- rian National Agency for the Prohibition ers to impregnate their victims, which tination country mostly for nationals of of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), it is offers them a means to further pressurise the East African Community. The main estimated that about 2 000 Nigerians them. The traffickers usually recommend routes across the country lead north- were smuggled into Spain in 2015. The that their victims tell the authorities that wards towards Egypt, from where mi- kingpins of the involved criminal net- they are in search of employment or ed- grants hope to reach the EU or Israel, as works are reported to be Nigerians with ucation opportunities, or even apply for well as eastwards towards Djibouti and a residency status (or even citizenship) in political asylum in the event that they Yemen (even though this route is less Spain or other EU Member States. Prac- are detected in the EU. appealing to migrants due to the raging tically all victims were women aged be- The route followed by the smugglers conflict in Yemen). At times migrants ap- tween 14 and 30 years and destined to be and their victims passes through Burkina ply for asylum as a way to temporarily coerced into prostitution. Most were re- Faso, Mali and Morocco before reaching legalise their stay while preparing for on- cruited in the southern and south-east- Spain. Spain should be regarded mainly ward movements for which they some- ern parts of the country. as a country of destination but also, to times pay USD 1 000–3 000 to facilitators. The modus operandi used by traffickers some extent, as a transit hub. Other In order to tackle these issues, Kenya to attract and entrap their victims is very countries of destination within the EU implemented measures to enhance bor- much in line with the one described in are: Italy, Germany, the UK, France, the der and migration management ca- the AFIC Joint Report 2015. Victims are Netherlands, Ireland and Finland. pacities (enhanced border control and deceived and lured through false prom- It is worth noting that a small pro- regional cooperation, increased recep- ises of lucrative employment or enhanced portion of the Nigerians smuggled into tion capacities, use of ICT tools for bet- education opportunities in the country Spain are ‘freelance’ migrants who pay ter monitoring migration, etc.). of destination. In addition, both traffick- EUR 3 000–4 000 for the journey while ers and victims seem to believe that ref- those who are trafficked for prostitution 9 The ‘madam’ is usually an older woman and a former victim now engaging in criminal dealings herself for financial gain. Madams can be involved at almost all stages of the trafficking process.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Additionally, in response to security Drug trafficking cases were also re- More precisely, the measures taken threats at the border with Somalia (at- ported by the authorities, as Kenya is ei- by Niger consist in reinforced road con- tacks by al-Shabaab), the Kenyan author- ther a destination or transit country for trols and limiting movement of ECOWAS ities increased the number of military such products. Drug seizures occurred in country nationals. The first measure patrols and security operations at the Kenyan high seas or on ships docking in implies the reinforcement of existing common border, while also building the Mombasa port. checkpoints and the enhancement of the walls at certain sections in order to pre- effectiveness of the regional offices of vent terrorist movements/infiltrations. 3.5.5. Niger the DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Moreover, during their activities, the Territoire). The second measure puts re- authorities also detected a number of Between 1 August and 31 October 2016, strictions on the movement of ECOWAS Foreign Terrorist Fighters who joined the authorities in Niger reported at least country nationals. Indeed, passengers al-Shabaab either from the EU (i.e. from 55 vehicles seized and almost 1 700 mi- from these countries are systematically the UK or Scandinavian countries) and grants intercepted without travel docu- driven back to Agadez if they are detected from the United States. ments at various checkpoints between above the Séguédine-Dirkou line. Niamey, Agadez and Dirkou.

Figure 28. Areas with the highest probability of future smuggling activities: potential smuggling hubs and major transit hotspots

Source: DigitalGlobe, Niger: The Sojourn State, October 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Likely future smuggling hubs and major transit hotspots

Given the measures taken by the authorities in Niger, transit routes and migrant hubs are likely to change in the future. In trying to predict these changes, a software tool has been used (e.g. Sig- nature Analyst) and the known smuggling hubs and transit points have been highlighted in order to train the model. As depicted in Figure 28, hotspots were identified along the current smuggling routes. Any future change to the smuggling hubs will most likely occur as a result of pressure from local or regional authorities. Furthermore, attempts to patrol, police or eradicate smuggling in

one transit point may result in a shift authorities © Moroccan to a neighbouring town or village along Figure 29. X-ray container check in Tangier the same route. Any potential future hubs and tran- The modernisation of BCPs aims at to scale the fences surrounding the ex- sit points will likely be close to travers- combating both document fraud and claves were foiled. able paths and secondary roads, as well illegal border-crossings. For these pur- It is worth underlining that Morocco as water wells. Highlighted areas along poses, BCPs have implemented profil- has also made significant efforts to reg- Niger’s border with Mali are also logi- ing techniques and have been equipped ularise the situation of numerous mi- cal, considering Algeria’s increased ef- with modern detection instruments (in- grants staying illegally in the country forts to secure its borders. Assamakka, cluding container scanners and biome- as well as to foster their integration into along the Algerian border, may also grow tric tools). society or to encourage their voluntary into a smuggling centre as migrants at- Maritime surveillance is conducted return. tempt to take the Algerian route in the by the Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie and hope to bypass the Trans-Sahara High- Royal Navy, while internal surveillance is way border wall. intelligence-based and aims at preventing and deterring irregular migration. 3.6. Persistent issues and 3.5.6. Morocco Forests that serve as hideouts for irregu- vulnerabilities affecting lar migrants are also monitored. migratory movements Morocco set up a national strategy to This national strategy led to a drop of from West Africa to the EU combat cross-border crime. Part of the 92% in 2016 in the number of migrants strategy is related to the fight against ir- arriving from Morocco on the shores of 3.6.1. Lack of proper regular migration. The country has de- Europe compared with 2005 (55% in 2015). implementation of ECOWAS veloped a four-pronged approach aiming 95 criminal networks active in the traf- free-movement protocols to reinforce the protection of shores and ficking of human beings were disman- still a hindrance to regional land borders, the maritime surveillance, tled in 2015 (3 075 since 2002). In 2015, integration and mobility the internal surveillance as well as to en- 35 484 attempts to migrate irregularly sure the modernisation of BCPs. were thwarted (of which 28 211 involved A study on intra-regional labour migra- The protection of 3 446 kilometres of foreign nationals) and 38 attempts to tion in ECOWAS published in July 2016, shores alone mobilises some 13 000 staff. storm the fences protecting Melilla and conducted by a team of researchers at These measures come on top of the bur- Ceuta exclaves were foiled. By the end the Centre for Migration Studies, Uni- den of monitoring 1 400 kilometres of of August 2016, 23 541 attempts to mi- versity of Ghana, revealed that ECOWAS land border that remains under strong grate irregularly were thwarted (18 870 member states still apply many restric- migratory pressure. involved foreigners), 32 criminal net- tive policies to protect their economies. works were dismantled and 23 attempts

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 In practice, this means that the Pro- Africa Visa Openness Report 2016 tocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment African countries are in general more closed off than open to one another, mak- along with the Supplementary Protocols ing travel within the continent difficult: continue to be only partially applied. ▪▪ Africans need visas to travel to 55% of other countries; This finding contrasts with the study’s ▪▪ Africans can get visas on arrival in 25% of other African countries; affirmation that ECOWAS member states ▪▪ Africans do not need a visa to travel to 20% of other African countries. are determined to promote intra-regional movement and prevent harassment at Global comparisons show that North Americans (US and Canadian citizens) have the borders. easier travel access to the continent than Africans themselves. North Americans The issue seems to largely result from require a visa to travel to 45% of African countries, can get visas on arrival in 35% a lack of communication among differ- of African countries and do not need a visa in 20% of African countries. ent authorities in individual ECOWAS member states. The study recommended Free movement of people is not a reality across Africa. Central Africa and North the deepening of dialogue with national Africa are the most closed off regions. authorities to ensure the application of all phases of the protocol and the related In the top 20 most visa-open countries, only one is in North Africa and none are national laws. in Central Africa. 75% of countries in the top 20 most visa-open countries are in Finally, the study states that there is West Africa or East Africa. the need to transform the role of border Source: Regional Integration and Trade African Development Bank control and security officials into that of migration management agents.

Example of a local initiative: Dissuading young Somalis from 3.6.2. Unrealistic expectations migrating to Europe regarding life in Europe

Tahribi, the Arabic word for ‘smuggle’ Consequently, parents are trying to dis- Migration from West Africa to Europe has come to mean illegal emigration suade their children from dangerous ir- is also a cultural phenomenon and not in the Somali language. According to regular migration to Europe by buying just a livelihood strategy. The decision a researcher at the School of Oriental them second-hand cars that can be con- to migrate is often based on false expec- and African Studies in London, the flood verted into taxis. These cabs are now very tations and many migrants leave West of young people attempting to leave for much visible everywhere in Hargeisa, Africa without a concrete project or a pre- Europe is considered a national disas- Somaliland’s capital. They are known cise idea of what they can expect once ter for Somaliland.* locally as hooyo ha tahriibin, which roughly they arrive in Europe. means ‘my son, do not tahriib (emigrate).’ According to the Frontex Consultative This goes against the common assump- In fact, by spending between USD 2 000 Forum on Human Rights, there are also tion that families encourage emigration and 3 000 on a second-hand car, families those who leave West Africa because they as a way of broadening their sources of hope to give their children a source of are in need of international protection, income. In fact, what the researcher income and, therefore, a reason to stay. or for other purposes, such as family suggests is that, in Somaliland, young reunification. men leave on their own without their Migrants in Europe are also reluctant family’s approval or knowledge. to share news of their desperate circum- stances in fear of being seen as failures, especially by their families, who often * Somaliland, officially the Republic of Somaliland, is a self-declared state make large financial sacrifices to get internationally recognised as an autonomous region of Somalia. The government them there. Migrants increasingly use of Somaliland regards itself as the successor state to the former British Somaliland protectorate, which as the State of Somaliland united as scheduled on 1 July 1960 social media platforms to present their with the Trust Territory of Somaliland (the former Italian Somaliland) to form the migration experience as a success story, Somali Republic. Somaliland lies in north-western Somalia, on the southern coast of while in fact their living conditions in the Gulf of Aden. the EU are at times desperate.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 3.6.3. Very limited number of Figure 30. Effective returns remained basically at the same monthly level returns of irregular migrants to ever since the migration crisis started in 2015 West Africa Monthly developments with regards to effective returns and illegal border-crossings as reported by FRAN members It seems that the overall situation regarding effective returns performed by EU Member States did not change sig- Illegal bordercrossings nificantly. As indicated by Figure 30, de- E ective returns spite the massive irregular movements into the EU (blue bars), the number of people effectively removed from the EU remained flat at around 15 500 on average per month between May 2015 and June 2016 (green bars). In addition, the monthly figures did not show any rising trend at the beginning of 2016, when May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun many of the migrants or asylum seekers Source: Frontex data as of 5 August 2016 who had arrived in 2015 became eligible for return (due to a failed asylum claim or irregular stay). By looking at a particular example Figure 31. Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing by migrants from of irregular migrants from West Africa West Africa increased significantly in the first half of 2016; however, no whose asylum recognition rates are very increase was recorded in the number of effectively returned West African low, this point becomes even clearer. countries' citizens Namely, during the period between Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing by West African migrants and effective returns of West March and June 2016 there was a grad- African country nationals in May 2015–June 2016 ual decrease in the number of effectively returned persons from West Africa. At Illegal bordercrossings the same time, the arrivals from West Af- Eective returns rica on the Central Mediterranean route (Libya-Italy) grew exponentially.

May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Source: Frontex data as of 5 August 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 4. Regional security threats

4.1. Focus on Boko Haram Figure 32. The number of violent conflicts involving political militias decreased, suggesting that the conflict in Libya become less fragmented Following the creation of the task force Change in the number of parties engaged in Libya by type, in June 2014–May 2016 and increased commitment by the four most affected regional countries (Nige- % ria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon) to counter Type its actions, Boko Haram found itself in- Military Forces creasingly embattled throughout 2015 % Political Militias and in the first half of 2016. Communal Militias In this context, according to ACLED External Militias data, the number of violent events re- % lated to the group’s activities rose from below 300 during 2014, to roughly 362 % in 2015 as a result of more actions being conducted against it at the regional level, but also due to its attempts to expand/ % redirect focus or hold on to previously conquered territory. Tragically, along with the increase in the number of violent events, the number of fatalities also JunAug JunAug SepNov SepNov MarMay MarMay MarMay surged from about 5 000 in 2014 to over Dec Feb Dec Feb 8 000 in the following year. This impacted the group as apparently Source: ACLED Conflict Trends (No. 49), Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, June 2016 it reduced its capacity to produce fatalities in civilian-oriented violence. Specif- ically, in the first half of 2016, although Figure 33. The number of fatalities soared as Boko Haram attempted to the number of incidents targeting civil- hold on to its territory / resist counteractions by the military forces of the ians remained high, the number of re- countries of the region ported fatalities decreased, most likely Number of fatalities associated with violent events involving Boko Haram in 2010–2016 (H1), by as a result of the group's refocusing on country more remote and less populated areas in an attempt to avoid direct military con- frontation with the authorities. Moreover, its initial tactics of con- Cameroon fronting government forces militar- Chad ily and holding on to territory proved Niger Nigeria detrimental to the group, resulting in a high number of fatalities in general Total fatalities and also in its ranks (see Fig. 34 – Septem- ber 2014–March 2015). In consequence, the militants apparently refocused to hit-and-run or controlled-retreat tac- H tics, which yielded less casualties and Source: ACLED data as of June 2016 offered the opportunity to remain active even though at a smaller scale.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Figure 34. Due to increased military responses, the group’s ability to perform attacks on civilians slowly diminished (top). Most events took place in Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger (bottom) Number of battles and violent attacks against civilians and fatalities in each such event involving Boko Haram and the military forces of Nigeria, Niger, Chad in all of these countries (top); Violent attacks in 2014, 2015 and the first half of 2016, by country (bottom)

No. of violent attacks against civilians right axis Fatalities resulting from violence against civilians

No. of battles right axis Fatalities in battles

Tactics leading to high number of fatalities

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

Battles involving military forces and Boko Haram Violence by Boko Haram against civilians

H H Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria

Source: ACLED data as of June 2016

Nevertheless, the group showed flex- of 80 000 Nigerian refugees present in den among refugees with the inten- ibility as it was able to shift focus and Cameroon’s Extreme North due to attacks tion of committing terrorist attacks in exploit vulnerabilities by projecting ter- by Boko Haram in Nigeria’s north-east- Cameroon. The agreement, which was ror on soft targets by mounting surprise ern Borno State.10 reached when Cameroon’s president vis- attacks against military forces through Previous attempts to agree upon an ited Nigeria in early May 2016 to discuss hit-and-run tactics. orderly repatriation of up to 300 000 ref- ways to improve bilateral cooperation, ugees from Cameroon to Nigeria had points to the increase in coordination Fewer options available for Boko been unsuccessful, leading to forced between Cameroon and Nigeria in their Haram due to a better coordinated repatriations by Cameroonian author- efforts against Boko Haram, lowering response in Nigeria ities, which often complained that the threat posed by the Islamist mili- Boko Haram militants may have hid- tant group in the Cameroonian-Nige- Cameroon and Nigeria, together with rian border region. UNHCR, signed an agreement on 12 10 http://dailypost.ng/2016/06/13/fg-unhcr- June 2016 to facilitate the repatriation cameroon-sign-agreement-to-return- nigerian-refugees/

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Apparent shift of focus to statement covered an attack in northern a sign of increasing activity in this area. Nigeria-Niger border areas Nigeria, also close to the border with Ni- With this in mind, the group’s capability ger (Kanamma, Yobe State, Nigeria). Ac- to command resources despite pressure Joint operations between Nigerian and cording to the reports, militants attacked and setbacks elsewhere indicates contin- Cameroonian forces under the umbrella a police station and military base, killing ued security risks posed by the Daesh-af- of the Multinational Joint Task Force seven security force personnel and seizing filiated militants. (MNJTF), previously a rare occurrence, two 4x4 vehicles and assorted weaponry. increased significantly, leading to Boko Photos released two days later depicted The situation in Mali Haram losing more than 95% of territory the ‘spoils’ of the attack, seemingly vali- it previously held in north-eastern Nige- dating the claims of seized weapons and The overall trend described by ACLED data ria. Since February 2015, Boko Haram has vehicles. appears encouraging, especially consid- come under significant pressure from the Interestingly, the second attack oc- ering that the first six months of 2016 combined forces of Cameroon, Chad, Ni- curred along the border with Niger, and were characterised by a relative stabil- ger, and Nigeria. also in the same general area as Bosso ity. The total number of violent events Boko Haram, however, was attempt- (Niger). Earlier in 2016, Boko Haram vi- registered between January and June ing to reduce the impact of its recent olence in Yobe State was mainly confined 2016 remained below the levels seen in losses of territory in north-eastern Ni- to the southern portion of the state, near each first half of the previous four years geria by demonstrating the capability of reported former strongholds in Gujba and (with the exception of 2014, which was attacking military posts in neighbour- Gulani local government areas. At the the calmest since the beginning of the ing countries. same time, violence in Borno State fol- insurgency in 2012). On 4 June 2016, Daesh and its affili- lowed a similar pattern, being mainly Importantly, some observers on the ated news agencies released statements confined to the southern part of the state. ground reported that the improvement and video footage of an attack carried out However, on 18 April, Boko Haram mili- of the security situation could result in by Boko Haram in Bosso (Niger), north of tants launched a massive assault on Ni- the re-opening of some migrant smug- the Borno State (Nigeria). The attack tar- gerian security forces in Kareto, which is gling routes connecting northern Mali to geted a military base hosting Nigerien and located in the north. Algeria. These routes would enable mi- Nigerian military forces, resulting in 35 The attacks did not seem to indicate a grants to reach Libya without passing soldiers killed and 70 soldiers wounded. resurgence of Boko Haram’s military capa- through Niger. Moreover, militants looted the base tak- bilities to levels seen prior to March 2015, Nevertheless, groups such as AQIM ing weapons and supplies and withdrew when it controlled towns and established have always attempted to integrate with several hours later. Boko Haram’s last sig- a caliphate in Borno State, applying the local communities in the Sahel, in order nificant attack against a Nigerien mili- maintain-and-expand tactics. to expand their support base. For this rea- tary target occurred in April 2015 on a Lake Nevertheless, the reported develop- son, they turned to various ethnic groups Chad island. ments indicate a significant militant exploiting local grievances to create new On 7 June 2016, Daesh published its sec- presence in the Nigeria-Niger border recruitment drives. These tactics is likely ond statement in less than a week con- area, while the attacks like the ones in to prove more advantageous for militant cerning a Boko Haram operation. This Bosso, Kanamma, and even Kareto may be groups, as the population levels in ma-

Boko Haram media tactics – propaganda points dia tactic used in the past) countering narratives of it being weakened by con- The media releases appeared to contain Moreover, the ability to carry out a major certed regional actions. propaganda points that served to high- operation in Niger confirmed the group's light advances made by Boko Haram commitment to cross-border operations Indeed, a growing number of the group’s despite a period of territorial losses and was meant to prove it was a West attacks in the preceding 12 months were over the previous 12 months. For ex- African militant group not confined to conducted in neighbouring Cameroon, ample, the attack in Bosso (Niger) dem- Nigeria. Chad, and Niger, although this was as onstrated the group’s ability to gather much a reflection of the increasing pres- an attack force, thus countering other The reporting about weapons capturing sure it was facing in north-eastern Ni- narratives that the recent regional ac- fit into the narrative as it served as a geria as of a rise in capabilities and tions reduced it to a scattered and dec- suggestion that the group was expand- operational scope. imated force. ing its capacities and resources (a me-

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Fences flourish in some AFIC countries as response to security filtrations of Tunisian territory by threats Daesh, the authorities of this country decided to build a 170-kilometre Some fences have been in existence for sponse to the conflict with Sahrawis fence along its border with Libya to decades. However, some AFIC countries and their claims to obtain the inde- tackle the terrorist threat and other have more recently taken to the build- pendence of Western Sahara. This security risks. This increase in sur- ing of new fences to tackle migratory corridor is heavily protected by land- veillance, troops and the construc- activities and security threats such as mine fields and surveillance towers. tion of the fence also affects the organised crime, drug smuggling or Due to its path along the Moroccan migratory movements. terrorism. Thus, a glance at the whole borders with Algeria and Maurita- 5. Fence between Niger and Nigeria: region shows the existence of some fric- nia, this artificial border also af- In September 2015, media reported tion points or areas of conflict where fects the migratory movements to on the presence of US soldiers help- the construction of fences is seen as a the northern shores of Morocco to- ing with the construction of a fence solution to the regional threats. wards Spain. in the area of Diffa, south-eastern 1. Ceuta and Melilla: The well-known 3. Fence between Morocco and Algeria: Niger, at the border with Nigeria. fences which separate the only two According to the Moroccan author- According to the information, it is Spanish exclaves in Africa from Mo- ities, this fence (covering just 140 being built to neutralise the terror- rocco. These two fences come under kilometres of the border) is being ist infiltrations of Nigerien territory constant migratory pressure as they constructed as a means to counter by Boko Haram. are stormed by migrants (mainly sub- smuggling, trafficking and terrorist 6. Fence between Kenya and Somalia: Saharans) trying to reach Spanish activities as well as to curb the ir- As Niger intends to build a fence to soil. The Moroccan authorities main- regular migration flows from Alge- prevent Boko Haram’s infiltrations tain an effective cooperation with the ria. Thus, the reinforcement of the of Diffa region, Kenya also plans to Spanish authorities in preventing il- border between Morocco and Algeria begin the construction of a 700-kil- legal border-crossing from Moroccan might significantly reduce the flow ometre fence between the villages of territory. of migrants trying to reach Libya or Mandera and Kiunga along the bor- 2. The Moroccan Wall (berm): A the EU via Morocco. der with Somalia in order to curb the 2 700-kilometre fence built by Mo- 4. Fence between Tunisia and Libya: terrorist infiltrations by the terror- rocco between 1980 and 1987 as a re- After several attacks and terrorist in- ist group al-Shabaab.

Location of built and planned border fences in AFIC countries

3 Ceuta Melilla Saidia Tunisia Jerada Ras Jedir 1 Morocco Dhehiba Algeria Libya Tindouf Al Mahbes Egypt 4 2 Guerguerat

Mauritania Mali Chad Niger Sudan Eritrea Dia

5 Nigeria Somalia Built/in progress South Ethiopia Sudan Planned Mandera Migratory routes aected Kenya Source: Frontex Uganda Kiunga 6

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 jor cities in the Sahel continue to grow In this context, it is worth noting Terror threat levels rise in while economic growth and job oppor- some actions conducted by AQIM at Ghana tunities remain limited. the end of 2015 and in early 2016 highlighted its intention to act outside the In March 2016, Ghana’s National Se- Militant shift of focus in traditional strongholds in northern Mali curity Council (NSC) disclosed that the response to stronger security and Algeria, likely due to increased dif- country was facing a credible terror- ficulties created by the ongoing security ist threat following deadly attacks in The downward trend of violent activi- operations. neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. ties in Mali can be mainly linked to the One attack was carried out in Novem- fact that ever since 2014 the jihadist mi- ber 2015, against the Radisson Blu Ho- According to the Council, on the basis litias’ capacities were severely limited by tel in Bamako (Mali), where 170 people of information from the intelligence the government and international ac- were taken hostage and 21 killed. The agencies and allied partners, it had tions in the country and Sahel region in following attack was perpetrated on the determined that there was a credible general (i.e. UN Multidimensional Inte- Cappuccino Café and Splendid Hotel in terrorist threat to all countries in the grated Stabilisation Mission in Mali – MI- Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), where sub-region. NUSMA, operations Berkane and Serval). other 170 hostages were taken and 30 persons were killed. More recently, in

Figure 35. Increased coordination leads to government forces regaining territory from Boko Haram Battles by type in Nigeria (Boko Haram-only held territory in Nigeria) in January 2014–June 2016

Battle Government regains territory Battle No change of territory Battle Nonstate group overtakes territory Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Source: ACLED data as of June 2016

Figure 36. Overall decreasing trend of violent events in Mali can be observed despite periods of recurring attacks and violent clashes; Nevertheless, the detections of illegal border-crossing to the EU by Malians were on the rise Number of violent events in Mali by type, in January 2014–June 2016

Battle Government regains territory Battle No change of territory Battle Nonstate group overtakes territory Remote violence Violence against civilians Total number of violent events Linear total violent events Illegal bordercrossings by Malians in the EU righthand axis Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun

Source: ACLED data, FRAN and JORA data as of 12 July 2016

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 March 2016 the group claimed responsi- territories.11 The perceived expansion of arate itself from the bloodier tactics of bility for an attack in the touristic town Daesh and its affiliates in Africa is an- Daesh while still gaining publicity. of Grand Bassam (Côte d'Ivoire) which other highly motivating factor for AQIM Similarly, the porosity of the ECOWAS resulted in 19 fatalities. to shift its strategy and carry out attacks borders can be a factor facilitating the The terrorist group stated that the on targets which attract publicity (in or- extremists' movements through the re- attacks were perpetrated as a response der to attract more adherents, increase gion and, consequently, also easing the to the affected countries’ participation cooperation with other regional terrorist group's preparations (e.g. the Grand Bas- and support for the security operations in groups and reduce deflections to Daesh). sam attack was carried out by fighters Mali and Sahel (MINUSMA and French- Apparently, the choice of soft targets who entered Côte d’Ivoire from Mali driv- led military operations Berkane and Ser- and the low number of fatalities in rela- ing Niger-registered vehicles). val) and threatened other similar actions tion to the hostages taken could be in- in West Africa. terpreted as a lack of experience by the Military and security experts also perpetrators. However, this could also catalogue these events as a shift of fo- represent an attempt by the group to sep- cus by AQIM forced by hardships in its traditional operation area rather than 11 https://janes.ihs.com/ an increased capacity to capture new TerrorismInsurgencyCentre/ Display/1771713

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 5. Cross-border criminality: drug trafficking

5.1. Morocco as a hub for to the southern coast of Spain. As a gen- 2016, more than 31 000 kg of hashish cannabis trafficking eral rule, the farther the drug is trans- were confiscated by the Spanish author- towards the EU and local ported, the higher the price becomes ities in cooperation with Frontex-de- markets (e.g. in northern Spain or France the ployed assets in four different incidents. selling price of one kilogram is around The biggest seizure of 14 480 kg on a lei- Drug smuggling represents the most EUR 2 200). sure boat was made at the moment the profitable activity for organised crime Hashish is transported from the Mo- drugs were being transferred from sev- groups active in northern Morocco. As roccan coast on different types of vessels: eral fast boats coming from Morocco. long as the smuggling of hashish is con- inflatable boats, speed boats with three From the beginning of the Joint Op- sidered as a ‘low-risk high-profit’ busi- or four outboard engines, fishing vessels, eration Indalo on 26 July till 31 August ness, the smuggling of migrants will jet-skis and even aeroplanes. In the event 2016, 38 841 kg of hashish were seized always be perceived as a secondary ac- of a possible interception by the Spanish with an estimated street value of EUR tivity. In fact, the proceeds from drug authorities, the drugs are thrown over- 60 million. smuggling are significantly higher than board and dumped into the water. For those obtained from people smuggling. this reason, hashish is often discovered For example, the selling price of a in bundles floating on the sea surface. kilogram of medium-quality hashish Although small quantities are seized 5.2. Cocaine and heroin is around EUR 600 in Morocco but it in- almost on a daily basis, during the eight- creases to about EUR 1 400 once delivered day period between 2 and 10 September Cocaine trafficking via Africa continues to maintain its importance as the main stop-over towards the EU market. Like- wise, illicit production and distribution centres have emerged in Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Guinea and Nigeria. Heroin and cocaine criminal networks are also targeting the growing African middle class to raise the consumption of these narcotics and boost the proceeds from the African market. The largest quantity of cocaine seized in West African countries was reported by Cape Verde, followed by the Gambia, Nigeria and Ghana. Africa continues being supplied with cocaine departing from Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Chile. UNODC reported that the African country most frequently mentioned (by other African countries) as a country of departure or transit concerning shipments of © Frontex Figure 37. Fast boats used to transfer hashish from Morocco spotted during cocaine within Africa was Nigeria, fol- the JO Indalo lowed by Ghana, Mali and Guinea.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 5.3. Drug trafficking cases to seize more than 62 tonnes of Trama- from the national bank. However, cases reported by AFIC partners dol. Another success of the UMCC was violating this requirement are reported the detection and seizure of 70 kg of pure on a regular basis. Individuals involved Benin: Indian hemp and cocaine on 4 August 2016. in this type of offence are usually local prescription drugs businessmen as well as Nigerian, Chi- Cape Verde: Gold and currency nese and Portuguese nationals. Money Benin is facing various challenges in smuggling is often hidden inside a suitcase, under the field of narcotics. Its proximity to clothes or even inside food. Offenders Nigeria brings about insecurity in the Gold smuggling is an illegal activity that usually travel to Dakar, Lisbon or Boston. border area. More specifically, local pop- is becoming more and more frequently The amounts detected can be substantial ulations living in the vicinity of the bor- detected by Cape Verdean border author- (i.e. four seizures of around USD 500 000 der are keen to grow and consume Indian ities. Cape Verde's legislation requires to were made). If the origin of the money is hemp. Benin's authorities have estab- obtain a ministerial authorisation in or- legal, the person is merely fined. Other- lished border surveillance special units der to be allowed to travel with a quan- wise, the money is confiscated. (Unités Spéciales de Surveillance des Frontières – tity of gold exceeding the value of EUR USSF) dedicated to combating drug traf- 5 000. In many cases, travellers are de- Reported by AFIC experts from ficking. These dedicated units can boast tected at the airport carrying a quantity Senegal some successful operations, including of gold that exceeds the authorised limit. the seizure of two tonnes of Indian hemp In most cases, the offenders are Sene- In November 2015, the Senegalese au- carried by Nigerian nationals in Iwoyé galese or young Cape Verdean women. thorities uncovered a case in which a near the border with Nigeria in 2016. Gold is usually hidden inside the Ghanaian man wanted to smuggle 66 Another source of concern for the Be- luggage, in electronic devices or under pellets of cocaine amounting to 0.91 kg, ninese authorities in the field of narcot- clothes. The most frequent destination on a Turkish Airlines flight from Dakar ics is the abuse of Tramadol, an opioid of the offenders is Dakar and further on to Istanbul. The arrest was made after a pain medication. To address this phe- Dubai. The likely consequence for the of- tip-off, and a urine test that confirmed nomenon, a dedicated unit has been fender is the confiscation of the gold, suspicions that the man was carrying established to monitor the flow of con- usually seized by customs, and the im- drugs in his stomach. tainers in the port of Cotonou. In the position of a fine. first half of 2016, this unit (Unité Mixte de Travelling with hard cash (i.e. more Contrôle des Conteneurs – UMCC) managed than EUR 9 000) requires a permission © Beninese authorities © Senegalese authorities Figure 38. Seizure of two tonnes of Indian hemp in Iwoyé by the USSF Figure 39. About one kilogram of cocaine seized by the Senegalese authorities in November 2015

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 © Togolese authorities © Togolese Figure 40. Shipment consisting of three tonnes of cannabis seized by the Togolese authorities in July 2016

Reported by AFIC experts from Reported by AFIC experts from (Portuguese for 'sweet almond oil'), Togo Cape Verde which were found to contain cocaine. The woman was arrested and put in pre- On 23 July 2016, a truck transporting tim- A 30-year old Cape Verdean female was ventive custody pending court proceed- ber logs was intercepted and after search- arrested arriving on a TACV Cabo Verde ings in Praia. ing activities three tonnes of cannabis Airlines flight from Bissau to Praia in De- carefully hidden in different packages cember 2016. She carried fifteen 200-mil- were seized by the Togolese authorities. lilitre bottles labelled Oléo Amêndoas Doce © Cape Verdean authorities Verdean © Cape Figure 41. Three litres of cocaine seized by Cape Verdean authorities in December 2015

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 © Sierra Leonean authorities © Cape Verdean authorities Verdean © Cape Figure 42. Cocaine pellets seized by the Cape Verdean authorities in February 2016

On 8 February 2016, a citizen (aged 40) Reported by AFIC experts from of Guinea Bissau, a resident of Sao Paulo Sierra Leone

(Brazil), was arrested after he arrived on © Sierra Leonean authorities a TACV Cabo Verde Airlines flight from On 29 January 2016, two Sierra Leoneans, Figure 43. Two suspects arrested Recife (Brazil) to Sal-Praia (Cape Verde). both from the northern part of the coun- for smuggling cannabis seized by He was detected carrying almost 0.9 kg try, were arrested on the Liberian side of the Sierra Leonean authorities in of cocaine in his stomach. In this spe- the border with 33 bundles of cannabis. January 2016 cific case, the suspect was arrested and The two suspects are alleged to have trav- put in preventive custody pending final elled from northern Sierra Leone, and court trial in Praia. crossed through the Mano Kpende River on the Sierra Leone side of the border into Liberia.

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Frontex · AFIC Report 2016 Plac Europejski 6 For Public Release 00-844 Warsaw, Poland Risk Analysis Unit T +48 22 205 95 00 F +48 22 205 95 01 Reference number: 1485 / 2017 [email protected] TT-AL-17-001-EN-N www.frontex.europa.eu ISBN 978-92-95205-73-4 ISSN 2529-4369 doi:10.2819/606438

Warsaw, April 2017