82
I~KRlJ"WW ' S SOCIALISM: A ffPPPRAISAL
by
Kwarre A. Ninsin
Introduction
Stu:lies of Glanaian p:>litics during the tenure of the Convention People' s Party (CPP) goveD'li!eilt tend to focus pri marily on the role of such variables as personality, charisma, ideology, and so on. Genotrl and others, for exarrple, see the economic policies of the CPP governrrent in terms of economic nationalism, while Fitch and Oppenheiner' s characterisation of them may best be surrmarised as petty bourgeois socialism or liberal reformism.! 'lb Bretton, Nkrumah built a personalised p:>litical machine. And in the opinion of Apter, Nkrumah 's charisma was the central integrative factor in Ghanaian poli tics. 'nlough such approaches do contribute in sone significant ways to our understanding of p:>litics in Ghana, they nonethe less fail to grapple fully with the central stuff of politics; narrely, p:>litical p::Mer. 2 The limitation of such studies is precisely that "power" is relegated to a secondary position. On the whole, there has been the tendency to see it ITDre as the effect than the cause in politics.
'!he purpose of this paper is therefore to draw atten tion to the primacy of political po.ver in determining policy op tions in Ghanaian politics. It will be argued that p::Mer con siderations, that is, the need to conserve or consolidate p::Mer and increase its scope, was central to the CPP governrrent' s policies toNard various social forces operating in the Ghanaian society. In other words, the CPP elite were determined to ensure their undisputed control of the state apparatus which, for a nurber of reasons was rightly perceived as crucial in any internal political conflict. Ancillary to the po.Yer thesis is the other submission that the CPP governrrent was not socialist. In other words, they were concerned ITDre with protecting and enhancing their p::Mer position than the building of a socialist society.
As t-Dtt p:>ints out, "power is an integral part in the functioning of any hlD'lla!l organisation", 3 thereby rraking it the central phenorrenon of ITDst hlD'lla!l interactions and endeavours. It is admitted that very profound differences exist over the ITDst acceptable definition of power. Yet, it would appear that any enquiry into its uses would have to take cognisance of the - 83
follc:Ming. First, power is not the rrere possession of va1~4 such as wealth, status, university degrees, an i.rrportant organ isational position, hereditary title, and so on. Such values are power resources, the possession of which has to be regard ed as a power potential or power position. Havever, not all power resources are either relevant or critical in a political cx:mflict situation. Therefore a second .inportant considera tion in this connection is the strategic nature of the reso~ ces one controls or possesses. 5 Third, if the nere possession of certain power resources Cbes not confer power, then power l::lecx::J!Tes manifest only in a situation where an actor is able skilfully to utilise his or her resources to advantage. ~r therefore has to be created by an actor in an action situation. It beoorres live only if an actor is able to rrobilise available resources - either by with-holding them from the use of others, or rewarding others - to cx:npel d:>edience.
It must be stressed that the foregoing ffi A fourth point to consider is that the exercise of power does not occur in a vacuum: it is only possible over fellCM rren. ~ in this sense is then intrinsically politi cal, and may be distinguished from other forms of ~r , espec ially that which is exercised over inanimate things. 6 'Ibis distinction errphasises the essentially relational nature of political power. If political payer is relational, then sorre kind of exchange occurs between the parties involved in the process. Another ingredient in such a structure of relation ship is therefore that of reciprocity which is of two main types: material and psychological or rroral. Finally, pcMer may be considered either as an indiv idual or group attribute, or an organisational property that rrerrbers of the organisation exercise by virtue of their posi tions within the organisation. It must be errphasised that the CPP leaders could exercise pc:Mer largely because of their control of the state apparatus. Socialism, the Bane of Indigenous Entrepreneurs? There have been few stu:lies of the policies of the CPP 84 regirre toward the Qumaian business One author who cares closer to the pc7Ner thesis is perhaps Esseks. In his view the CPP goveD"'T!ent 1 s policies toward the G'lanaian business cx:mnunity were designed to pre errpt the rise of a ~rful indigerous business class which might "undennine his (Nkrumah 1 s) preeminence in Ghanaian pol itics. "8 But even Esseks 1 principal concern is with the gov e:r:rurent 1 s efforts to decolonise the Ghanaian ecol'l011¥. One tacit assurrpti.on runs through all these positions. '!hat is, the CPP goveD"'T!ent was socialist and pursued a social ist economic progranne. It is the claim of the present writer that the ideological thesis is a spurious one: it is based rore on official rhetoric than the record of the governnent. To sustain II¥ stand, I intend first to examine briefly the facts of Ghanaian political history (1949-1965) within the context of Ma.rxist-IJ:minist dogma. '!hen I will appraise the oontent of the CPP gOVeD"'T!ent 1 s econanic p::>licies as well as their relations with the Ghanaian entrepreneural class as revealed in their fiscal and budgetary policies. National Front Poli t i cs Acoording to Marxist-IJ:minist theory, a state is poised for socialist transformation only after the victory of the proletarian revolution. 9 That is, it is only when the revolutionary party of the workers has succeeded in seizing the existing state apparatus that the pc::Mer of the proletariat can be utilised to destroy the existing capitalist production rela tions, and replace them with the socialist. 'Ihe political rev- olution that installs the dictatorship of the proletariat is therefore a necessary prerequisite for the socialist transfor mation of society. Official claims non-ri.thstanding, the CPP was neither a working class party nor a vanguard party for the workers of Ghana. It was nothing nore than an amalgam of heterogenous social forces whose sole unifying bond was the bounty pranised - by the prospect of independence. Nkrunah himself later admit- 85 ted this fact rather bluntly when he declared: The circumstances under which the CPP was formed resulted in it being a com promise organisation composed of some genuine revolutionaries but containing many of those who are interested in independence only so as to better them selves and to take the place of the previous colonial traders and business men.lO '!he party itself grew from the youth faction of the united Gold Coast Convention, the Cormri.ttee on Youth Association (CY'O) - to rrcbilise the growing disrontent of the rcr:.nent. '!he CY'O was itself a oonp:>site organisation enbracing both functional and ethnic-based associations. The rrenbership of its cx:mfederate units spanned a cross-section of the Ghanaian society; there were literates and illiterates; lawyers, journalists, traders and teachers; artisans, semi-industrial workers, farrrers and the lunpenproletariat. 'lhe leadership was of a similar social and occupational mix. And p:>litically, they constituted an even nore bizarre collecticn. It incltrled .z:arantic socialists (oonprising primarily a section of the intelligentsia and trade unionists), petty-bourgeois elenents (of the cx:mrerc:ial elite) , traditionalists and p:>litical ' yo-yos' . All of them were united by a camon enemy: the colonial state which had rele gated them socially, economically and politically to a subor dinate position in their own society. '!hey wanted to be free so that they could rise to the preeminent social position which had been denied them by that system. 'lherefore, the party's success in the 1951 national election could oot be said to represent a victory for the nascent proletarian foroes of this country. It was sinply a victory for the independence ooali ticn. Even so, the fruits of that victory went to that faction of the petty- bourgeoisie* through wrose intellectual and organ isational leadership the novenent had succeeded. 'lhe masses * The petty-bourgeoisie are neni::!ers of the middle class which in other countries has produced the bourgeoisie - the owners of finance and industrial capital. 'lhey may be distinguished from the latter by the fact that they cb not own capital of their own; nor are they owners of industrial production units. '!hey are dependent primarily on the bourgeoisie of the rrore advanced industrial countries for capital and leadership in the industrial and cx:>mrercial fields. '!hey are interrrediar ies for this latter group. I am using the term petty-bourg eoisie, therefore, to describe the Ghanaian middle class which is active - in the role just defined. 86 were ~ately after 1957 virtually defrandrised, as further electioos becane farcical. 01 the other hand, the petty-bour geoisie continued to enjoy the poNer and wealth bestowed by independence. Subsequent political oonflicts in tba a::>l.D'ltry were therefore internal fights within the petty-bourgeoisie (between the 1 ins 1 and 1 outs' ) over who should control the state apparatus in order to enjoy the fruits of~ rather than a struggle between the pros and the oons of socialism. At that stage of the a::>l.D'ltry 1 s material develq:m:mt, it appears that national front politics was inevitable. Indus try was least developed and so there was no bourgeoisie and no proletariat proper to engage in the revolutionary dialectic that Marx had perceived and prophesied. 'Dle 1948 Census of Pot: ulation Report* offers sare inpressions about labour and indus trial oonditions in the a::>l.D'ltry . It puts the labour force at 194, 227. OUt of this 31,800 were in manufacturing, and 9 , 768 in the building and oonstruction industry. Apart fran the cen tral governrrent service and the fanning (a:x::x:>a) sectors, the first two oonstituted the major productive sectors of the eoon ~ · Yet a breakdown of these two sectors reveals a perverse state: manufacturing sinply meant ~rk, kente weaving (textile production) , auto repair work, food and beverage pre paration (largely the production of local staples like kenkey, and soft drinks, akpeteshi) , carpentary, masonry, and painting. In other words there were no industrial l.D'li ts and therefore no bourgeoisie, and no industrial workers. There were ordinary workers and a grc:Ming middle class which was also very active in cx::rmerce and the profes sions. '!he middle class, the working class, and the fanrers nursed a coonon grievance against the system that retarded their free developrent. 'lherefore when the UGO:** (which was suspected of elitist tendencies and an inclination to win power for itself and the chiefs) appeared to be dragging its feet over the independence issre, one faction of the middle class broke * The figures reported by that exercise were based on a sampl• of about one sixth of the total population. ** '!he United Gold ship to ASK for it, because independence held prospects of wealth and p:::Mer for them. It is conceivable for a national front roalition to wage a revolutionary struggle against their owressors or ex ploiters as was the case in the USSR and the People •s Repub lic of Clrina.ll But a revolutionary struggle was possible in trose rountries sinply because they l'iad revolutionary parties, with revolutionary ideologies, to offer leadership in their respective struggles against the established order. The ron trary happened in Ghana. "The CPP was the party, not of social revolution, but of self-governrrent. ool2 It was therefore log ical for the CPP to negotiate the transfer of power from a departing rolonial oligarchy onto itself. 3 In the process, the party 1 s leadership fot.md it prudent to purge their ranks of the so-called milltants within the party. Some of th:>se purged, like Anthony W:x>d and Turkson-0cran, happened to be trade unionists while they retained, and even elevated to higher positions in part-y and govenment ~tty-bourgeois pol iticians like Krobo Edusei, A.Y.K. Djin,l and Halm and Ayeh Kumi. Tactical Action, the purge of party militants, and the support for men like Edusei and Djin were affirmations of the CPP 1 s essentially petty-bourgeois character, and those rroves were necessary to ensure that the political advantage which the governing petty-bourgeois faction has secured since 1951 would not slip by. After independence in 1957, they had to ronsolidate power against potential and real contenders both within and outside the Party. 'lb this end the petty bourgeois owosition was effectively checked and the Trade 15 union Congress and chiefs were brought under party rontrol. "But this entailed accormodation, not revolutioo";l6 beeause the interest of the principal rontenders for power lay in preserving the neo-rolonial political and eronomic structures. The dividing issue was contr0l of the neorolonial state, and the CPP won it intact. As Nkrumah hirrself reminisced later in 1963, Two courses of action lay open to me and my party. we could boycott the existing colonial government machinery. e or t"e could co-operate with it, mean while strengthening the position of my self and my colleagues in the cabinet and so advance the date for full inde pendence. (They decided to win the "existing colonial government machinery" .in order to consolidate their position against their opponents). 88 In choosing the second, we did not forget, but tried to bury, past dif ferences and sought co-operation t"ith the existing machinery of government .... My keenest anxiety was to avoid any dislocation of government ...... (author ' s empbasis) .!1 That was tactical action! To this end the party' s leadership astutely staged a public oonmitlrent to the nost sacred of the principles of denocracy, narrely, the po..~er of the people as expressed through the ballot box. But that too was for purely tactical reasons. For the party' s leadership nursed a derW"" seated distrust for the political maturity of the masses . 'lhi.s probia was further strengthened by the realisation that their principal opponents could rrobilise the formar to chal lenge their rronopoly of po..~er . 19 In fine, the CPP leadership outwitted its polltical opponents, wro were rrerrbers of the sarre class as theirs, in co-operation with certain strategic social forces. '!his neo-colonial political accormodation by the petty-bourgeois l eadership of the CPP was anply derronstra ted in their economic policies. Economic Nationalism: A Retreat From Socialism* In the light of the above, could the CPP governrrent have pursued a socialist eoonomi.c programre? Again, a reap praisal of the regi.ne ' s economic policies since 1951 would provide the answer. But before that l et rre briefly review sane aspects of the political econoit¥ of socialist construc tion. The principal task of a governing revolutionacy par ty is the elimination of the economic bases of the exploiting class. This is irrperative for it would ensure the developrren1 of an autononous national econorey, and the free developrrent oJ the hitherto exploited and enCI.l!Tbered working masses. It w"'uJ require agrarian reforms to wipe the social slate clean of thE last vestiges of feudalism because the private ownership of land prevents the free flow of capital into industry, and re tards the free developrrent of agriculture. In the Ghanaian setting it would i.rrply the expropriation of chiefs, the growi.J class of absentee landlords, and rural capitalists. It would * It is this author's view that the.re is only one socialism which is scientific (i.e. Marxian) socialism; all the other. are either adumbrations or aberrations of it . ...... 89 also rrean the expropriation of mining, tinDer and banking inter ests, the i.JTport- eJq?Ort trade, the distribution and transpor tation services, and whatever industry exists. To cmplenent all this, it is also i.nperative to organise worker's control of the production units of the econoTI¥· For "true nationali sation can only be achieved by a socialist state. Nationali sation of the rreans of production under socialism (enhances workers poNer only if it) is related to the direct participa tion of the workers in managarent. " Even so, the proletariat would manage the eoonOI'C¥ "not as ~ers but as trustees of the property of society as a whole. ,2 'llle CPP regirre 1 s economic policies during the 1951-65 period contained very few of these elenents in the socialist strategy for social reconstruction. 21 It is this which reveals the true character of the 1951 coali tion. Essentially, the regirre 1 s economic policies took the form of co-existence with international capital through guaran tees of hlghly liberal fiscal privileges. This was coupled with a policy of leaving industrialisation to the initiative of for eign private capital. 22 '!he Seven Year Developrrent Plan (1963/ 64 - 1969/70) marked the apogee of this. During the launching of this programre in 1964, the President could enthusiastically welcorre "foreign investrrent in the private sector of our indus trial developrrent. n23 But as far back as 1953, Nkrumah 's (then the Prirre Minister) statenent on foreign investrrent not only gave full proof of his governrrent 1 s faith in international capital. It further assured potential foreign investors of full protection against nationalisation - a promise which was faithfully kept till the regirre was overthrown in February 1966. And it was in furtherance of this that the Pioneer Industries Act (1959) which was later inrorporated in the Capital Invest rrent Act of 1963 was finally enacted. '!he Capital Invest:rrent Ibard was set up to administer the protection acrorded foreign capital under that act. It was natural therefore for the CPP governm:mt to acrord high priority to foreign private capital in the Seven Year Developrrent Plan . .d But the p::>licy inmlved rrore than the granting of assurances of fiscal security to foreign capital. To maintain a high rreasure of economic credibility arrong the Western indus trial nations, the CPP governrrent faithfully followed the Bri t ish rolonial policy of investing the rountry ' s surpluses from cocoa in IDndon securities. M::>reover, the governrrent would not set up a bank capable of effectively regulating the roun try' s cbrrestic and international currency flows. They main tained the local currency's affinity with the British I.XJund, and rontin~.ed to give the colonial banks operating in the coun s try freedom to manipulate the rountry 1 s foreign reserves in their favour. Similarly, the governrrent followed such a:>nser- 90 vative btrlgetary and invest:Irent policies as those of which the rolonial administration has been accused. 24 '!he net effect of these policies was the loss of vital surplus capital which rould have been used to lay the basis for the industrial developrrent of the rountry. At the SCliTe tirre, the lewis strategy also failed to attract foreign capital as expected. But so long as those policies assured the petty- bourgeoisie of rontrol over the state apparatus the: were vigorously pursued even if it rreant jeopardising the int· erest of sorce rrerrbers of their ONn class. 25 In the non-agricultural sector, the.refore, the gov ernrrent left intact the various corrrrercial, industrial and mining interests. Yet apart fran being the dominant ONners o capital, these interests also acrounted for a sizeable percen tage of the gross national product. In 1961, mining, manufac uring, and "other rerorded private industries" acrounted for 23.1% of Gross National Product. It is even more significant to note that between 1955 and 1961 wanufacturing was one of the two fastest grOI.'ing sectors of the eronO!To/ , having increa ed by 267%,26 and rontinued to enjoy very modest increases between 1960 and 1965. 27 Finally, the manufacturing sector, though still srrall, was dominated throughout this period by foreign private capital. 28 The follOI.'ing statistics clearly establish this fact: TABLE 1 PATTERN OF OWNERSHI P OF MANUFACTURING BY SECTORS 1962 1964 1965 State 11.8% 13.9% 17.2% Joint 7. 1% 7.3% 10.0% Cooperative 0. 1% 0.6% 0.3% Private 81.0% 78.2% 72 . 5% 'IOTAL 100. 0% 100.0% 100.0% Source: A.N. Hakam, "Inpedi.ments to the GrcMth of Indigenow Entrepreneurship in Ghana, 1946-1968," The Economi c Bulleti n of Gh ana 2, 2 (1972), Table 4. 91 TABLE 2 PATTERN OF OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE MANUFACTURING BY NATIONALITY 1962 1964 1965 G'lanaian 20.8% 23.2% 26.6% N:m- TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100. 0% f Source: Ibid. t- TABLE 3 s- VALUES OF INVESTMENTS IN FIXED ASSETS IN 1966 BY NATIONALITY AND SECTOR Private Indigenous 7. 9% Private Non-G'lanaian 50.2% State 32. 9% Mixed 9.0% 'IDI'AL 100.0% Source: Ibid. The govenurent' s policy tcMard the mining industry is illustrative of the general orientation of public policy at the ti.ne which continued to sustain and enoourage the private sector. Mining is arrong the heavily capitalised sectors of the econaey, and a najor foreign exchange earner. It also accounts for a disproportionately high fraction of the total skilled labour force in both the private and public sectors. 29 It was therefore in the interest of the national e<:x:ll'lOiey to nationalise the mining industry. But this was not done. '!he govenment felt cbliged to buy, in 1961, five of the seven gold mines operating in the country in order only to save them from closing down their operations. For their closure would have aggravated the unenploynent situation. And rrore signifi cantly, these five gold mines were incuring increasing oper ating costs and happened to be the poorest in the country as 92 they together accounted for less than 50% of the total output of A similar retreat was evident in the agricultural sector. In 1955 agriculture (whidl incltrles cocoa, food pro duction and distribution) contributed 50. 4% ~f the GOP . By 1961, its share had increased to only 51.4%. 2 It was also the largest employer of labour even as late as 1970.33 Yet this lead was maintained without the application of nodern farming techniques partly because of the conservatism of the rural capitalist who is apt to invest rrore in real estate and spend lavishly on luxury goods than in the rrodernisation of his instrurrents of production,34 and partly because of Furthenrore, the The Building of State Capitalism The preceding analysis would seem to contradict claims that the CPP governrrent pursued socialist policies. E let us pursue the analysis even further. The lc:M material developrrent of the colony by 1951 made it i.rrperative that thE cpverrurent initiate a social developrent programre that woulc €11i>hasise the creation of an autononous industrial base. 'Ihl would call for the establishment of a capital tural rrodernisation in the Seven Year Developrent Plan. In this blue-print, invest.rrent allocations to agriculture, muu.ng and industrial developm:mt were raised oonsiderably from 27% e and 20% in the ho1o preceding development plans, respectively, to 39% . 39 Specifically, this plan enphasised the following four priority areas in its overall industrial pmgranrre: i . the production of oonsumer i tars to reduce the oountry' s dependence on foreign sources of supply, and to oonserve foreign exchange; ii. the processing of local agricul tural and mineral products; iii. netal and chemical technology; and i v. capital goods industries, electronics, machinery and electrical equipnent industries. 40 In the agricultural sector, the plan's goal was to initiate an is agricultural revolution to create surplus capital and free )f labour for an industrial revolution. 41 j But three observations have to be made in oonnecti0n ) with this enphasis. First, while it is probably t.nE that the 'I need for industrialisation was quite high in official thinking as far back as 194 7 when the Industrial Development Co:rporation s (IOC) was established, this was oonceived as a gradual process e requiring leadership from extemal capital. Nevertheless the r idea remained in gestation until the 1960' s . 42 A casual read ing of the developrent plans that preceeded the Seven Year Developnent Plan fully attests to this parad::>x. In the First Five Year Developnent Plan, 1951- 57, industry and CXJ!l1rerce received a rather low attention. '!hey occupied tl1e ninth place in the overall ranking of developrent oornnitnents, and were allocated just 4. 6% of the total expenditure for the period. '!he enpasis was on the provision of social services and indus IUt trial infrastructure. Similarly, industrialisation was de errphasised in the Consolidation Plan, 1957-59. And not even the Seoond Five Year Development Plan, which seemingly reflec ted a change of enphasis, oould be said to have pioneered new .s directions in socialist industrialisation. Seoond, true to the principles of socialist eoonomics, the type of industrialisa tion and agricultural rrodernisation which was envisaged becane primarily a state responsibility. But as Lange points out,43 state capitalism is not necessarily socialism. A critical index of socialism is workers participation in the managerrent of industrial units. Yet the CPP governrrent was rrore concerned with asserting oontrol over the oountry' s labour force than .11- 94 enhancing \>lOrkers' paver. '!his ooncem is the real notive behind the passage of the Industrial Relations Act of 1958,44 and the extractive and regulatory role that the United Ghana Farrrers' Cooperative Cbmcil (UGFCC) was made to play. Nationalisation of certain sectors of the ec:xmoii¥ , and state participation in the ecx:many in oonjmction with private investors may thus be viewed sinply as nedlan:isrrs for the oonsolidation of state capitalism rather than the sociali sation of the neans of production. State capitalism afforded the CPP leadership an excellent ~rt\mity to create a 'new class' through the rrediun of the state. '!he state then becarre the creator of a new class of exploiters rather than the crea ture of one class for the domination of another. The reoord of the tX;FCC is a remarkable exarrple of a popular administra tive ethic45 that enphasised domination and exploitation of the majority rather than mass mobilisation for social develop nent. With their nonopoly of both political and eoonomic power of the state, this ne.~ class oould effectively subordin ate their owcments to their rule; and only military action oould dislodge them from power. 'Ihird, despite the enphasis on industrialisation, and the capital goods sector in particular, the governnent did not depart awreciably from its traditional policy of co-exist ence of the state and the joint state/private sectors with the private sector. This policy oonstituted a blatant violation of the principles of socialist planning. For it integrated the public sector into the open market eoollOI'l¥, and subordinated the farner to the moontrolled eoonomic laws of the latter. Cbnse:JUE!11tly, production was not for social wants as it was detenni.ned largely by the needs of private capital, which is profit. In a socialist society, on the other hand, the "organ ised society shapes in a oonscious , purposive way the circum stances which determine"46 the operation of such eoonomic laws. Above all the drive to capture the c::amending heights of the eoonC>I'ey was neant to be gradual and peaceful. '!he governnent' s eoonorrd.c policies were therefore those of surrender to the mplanned forces of the capitalist economy rather than a terrp orary acoormodation with them. In the light of all this, one cannot help but agree with Genou:14 7 that the CPP governrrent' s ideology, if it had any at all, may best be described as eoonoori.c nationalism rather than socialism; that is, a policy of eoonomic deooloni sation nore than socialist oonstruction. It was for this reason that centralised control of the "major rreans of produc tion, distribution, and exchange" becane necessary. 95 Elite Power Versus Local Business Power 'Ihis is the crux of the matter: if centralisation of power was the sine qua non of successful eronomic develop nent of Ghana, 48 then all tlx>se who stood in the way of this pursuit nust be checked. Ghanaian entrepreneurs becane an easy target because they constituted a group that had the poten tial to build an independent p:::JWer base to dlallenge the gover nnent 1 s rronopoly of fOWer. And as I will sketch below, there was rrmmting evidence that this group, either through its representatives in parlianent or within the CPP itself, was preparing for a rr.ajor sl:1c:Mda;.om with the governnent. 1960 was a decisive year. While prior to this date nention of the private sector included Ghanaian entrepreneurs, thereafter the pararreters were narrowed to excl\Xle them. 'lh\:.S in the 1960 Republic Day Broadcast,49 which outlined the gov- ernnent 1 s economic priorities, the President assigned no .rcle to private Ghanaian entrepreneurs. Although they were rein stated two year later,50 they were assigned the last spot in the list of inp:>rtant agents of industrialisation. Furthenrore, they were not only barred from buying private enterprises but they were also not allowed to enter into partnership with foreign private business ooncerns. '!he IDC which had l::een established to assist local business people with financial and technical aid was also dissolved in 1962. And by 1965 the govemrrent had found it necessary to rebuke the National Invest.rra".t Ear.k for giving loans to private Ghanaian business people. 51 Thenceforth it was to oonoentrate nore on financing the public sector. In the coooa trade, the goverrment had taken similar rreasures to exclude aspiring Ghanaian entrepreneurs from par ticipation. Taking a cue from the sporadic outbreak of exxx>a farrrers 1 agitation of the 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s as well as the pivotal role ooooa plays in the Ghanaian eoonomy, the CPP governnent had taken swift rtEa.Sures to annend the Gold Cbast Cocoa Marketing Board Ordinance of 1947, and further given itself legal p:::JWerS to inp:>se extra tax on exxx>a fanrers. 52 While the first gave them greater oontrol over the Cocoa Marketing Board (Cl1B) and its accunulated funds, the seoond enabled them to extract nore and nore surplus direct from the farrrers. 'lhese two rreasures oonstituted a direct attack on the eoonomic base of farrrers, and effectively neutralised their p:>tential for political action. '!he establishrrent of the Cocoa Purchasing Cbnpany (CPC) , and later the Onited Ghana Farrrers 1 Coot-erative Cbtmcil (UGFCC) oonsumated the drive to cripple, not cnly farrrers , but also those engaged in the inter nal marketing cf ooooa. 53 96 Also, by 1960 the CPP leadership had pushed Ghanaian tirrber merchants out of the tirrber trade. During the 1950' s , pressures from the parliarrentary spokesnen of the tirrber rrer chants had produced goo In the ocmrercial sectc.r too, a similar reaction was occuring. The g;:>vemnent r.ad partially nationalised the irrp:)rtation of a wice range of ronsUITer items, and established the Ghana National Trc.ding Corporation (Qne) as the principal irrporter and distri.bt.Ltcr of those items. Strict i.nport licenc ing controls had also been instituted to ensure the efficient utilisaticn of the rotmtry' s dwindling foreign exchange reser ves. '!he effect of these measures on Ghanaian businessnen was further to redu::e them to a dependency of the petty-bourgeois state of the CPP.57 These anti-business policies of the regirre cowd not have been inspired by socialist ideals for socialist ideology admits a tenporary acCO!l1lcdation of the allies of the revoh..tion, via the petty-bourgeoisie. In the Ghanian situation, this class would be the local entrepreneurs whom the regirre was persecuting. But it wouJd be naive tc. assure the~t the regime' s policies posed a fundarrental contradiction, for there was none. By their definition of the urgent issues of politics, the business 'class' , rather than international capital was the major threat. This was quite logical because the CPP was not a workers' party. It was a roalition of very disparate social forces, organised and led by the less wealthy fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie to fight for independence. lind once in pc:Mer, this fraction sought relentlessly to per petuate itself in pc:Mer at the expense of its opponents who would resist all efforts to suppress them. 58 Consequently, the policies of the CPP regime tc:Mard the ootmtry ' s entrepreneurs should be seen rightly in the context of the tmfolding pc:Mer struggle between the effective leadership of the party on the one hand, and their nore business minded oolleagues and oppon ents on the other. In other words, it was a struggle within a class, i.e. the petty- bourgeoisie. If on the oontrary, the party was oonmitted to build ing a socialist society, it would have imrediately and directly confronted international capital rather than flirt with it. 97 Official pronouncerrents on socialism were however rrere slogans, and this is evidenced by the fact that the govcrnrrent cxnscieot iously pursued a policy of praroting a dynamic sector for pri vate capital in the internal econorry. As indicated above, (Tabla 1) , the private sector, exchrling the rocoa industry, was by 1966 far larger than the public sector. 'Ibis was pos sible because of official enoouragerrent to private capital. For instance, in a stat:.enent on industrial prarotion in In sum, if ~r is relational and i.nplies sone form of exchange beb.veen the parties involved in the interaction, then it was politically prudent for the CPP leadership to en large the scope of the strategic pc:Mer resources they oontrol led. In the case of the business entrepreneurs, it rreant goverilirel'lt nonopoly of all existing charmels for oormercial and industrial activity, and the denial of capital or access to it. By tightly oontrolling credit and other ocmnercial facilities the CPP leadership was able to destroy their oppon ents' rreans for independent political action. As shcJ..m in Table 2, the cumnulative effect of g::>vernrrent policy on the Ghanaian business camunity was virtual stagnation. '1he total values of their investrrents in fixed assets ~indled from its substantial level in 195762 to just 7. 9% in 1966 as shcJ..m in Table 3. All this would seem to give credence to Ayeh Kuni. ' s allegation that Nkrumah' s antipathy tavard Ghanaian business people was rooted in his ooncern that if the latter were enoour aged to grow, they would becxrre "a rival pc:wer to his and the party' s . ... n63 'Ihis change in official policy tcward the local entrepreneural class was not accidental! It marked the end of an era during which the CPP elite had barely survived a deadly st:nqgle with the United Party and was bracing itself for a seoond phase. 64 Just about this tine the representatives of the business oonmunity within the ruling party were beoorning increasingly restless, intractable and anbitious in their polltical and eoonornic behaviour. Signs of si.mrering oonflict I were given by the President in a speech he delivered in 1961 at the foundation laying cererrony for the Kwarre Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba. He had deplored the invasion 98 of the party by petty-bourgeois elerrents and warned of the dangers in accorrrrodating them. '!hereafter the great schism - between the left and right of the party - oould no longer be oontained. That oonflict centered ar01.md the so-called ideolog ical purists of the ~, on the one hand, and their opponents on the other. '!he left, which was heavily represented in the party's intellectual wing, the National k3sociation of Social ist St\Xlents Organisatioos (NASSO) , and on its theoretical weekly, The Spark , was unalterably opposed to capitalist tendencies within the party, and zealously espoused a Marxist approach to the polltical and economic mmagerrent of society. The business oriented elenents were, on the other hand, in favour of a capitalist approach to politics and economics. The events of 1961 indicate that the left had gained the upper hand in getting the President to rebuke their opponents publicly, and purge six nerrbers of the "new rich", alias the "bureaucra tic or administrative bourgeoisie" of the party. But I would argue that that group was attacked and sorre eliminated from the party, or reduced to inp:>tence within it, not because of their ideological backwardness but for the threat they posed to the party leadership.65 Even so the Dawn Broadcast (April 18, 1961) was a clear admission of failure to resolve the oonflict peacefully within the party. In that broadcast, the !?resident had also spurned the acquisition of excessive property, and urged a greater oonrnitirent to the i deals of socialism. The left wing of the party seized upon the OFPQrtunity to assail the "new rich" within it, the opposition United Party, and their capita list allies. 66 But the reports of the Abraham, Akainyah, and Ollenu Conmissions totally i.npugn the credibility of the ideo logical argurrent. '!hey suggest that, despite their ideologi cal pron01.mcerrents, the party leadership faithfully enoouraged those nerrbers of the petty-bourgeois class who were prepared to be oonpliant by giving them generous financial and colllTer cial favours. Also, the reports of the Jiagge, So.Yah and Manyo-Plange Conrnissions are replete with evidence that the party in fact retained several nerrbers of the so-called new rich within its ranks. I would therefore argue that the purges that follo,..red the Dawn Broadcast were aimed partly at those rrem- * I am using the term left to refer to intellectual ideologues like Kofi Batsa 1 and pretenders like Tawia Adamafio; that is 1 all those groups and individuals of the CPP who either sincerely did or rrerely pretended to oppose so-called cap italist tendencies within the party and in the larger society. 99 bers of the petty-bourgeoisie wm were becoming a political nenace, and partly a political ritual to appease public ron science. Conclusion '!he CPP The neo-oolonialist state is a shaky state, for it lacks a definitive class of its own, and so thrives on shifting ooalitions. unlike the capitalist state which materialised through the industcy of its architects, the bourgeoisie, the state of independent Ghana is a oolonial legacy inherited by an arrbigious class - the petty-bourgeoisie. 'nle state the.:refo:re had to create its own ' class' of adherents. This was inpera tive in order to assure the state of a stable socio-ecxmomic base. 'As the reports of the o::mni.ssions of enquiry cited above indicate, the class that cane to be the fo:reitOSt adherents of the state had been created alnost out of nothing, and derived its livelihx>d from the state and party bureaucratic machine. They were also in the service sector. And as this faction of the petty-bourgeoisie sought to unite both political and eoono mic power ~mder its exclusive oontrol, a struggle between them and those who had been exclu:ied becarre inevitable. 'J.hls w~ l.IDavoidable. Benjamin Watkins Leigh explains power and property may be separated for a time .. . but divorced never. For so soon as the pang of separation is felt ... pro perty will purchase power, or power will take over property . . . 61 '!he latter occurred in Ghana. Therefore' the CPP ary policies. In that process ideology assl.l!TV!!d a purely sym bolic role69 in order to obscure social reality. Footnotes 1. Genoud, Roger. Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana {New York: Frederick Prageger Publisher, 1969); Colin Legum, "Socialism in G'lana: A Political Interpre tation," in William Friedland and carl Rosberg Jr., eds., African Socialism {Standford california: Stanford Univer sity Press, 1964); Bob Fitch and N. OH?enhei.ner, Ghana: End of an Illusion {New York: M:Jnthly Review Press, 1966); Henry Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah {Freder ick Praeger, 1966); and David Apter, Ghana in Transition {New York: Atheneum, 1963). 2. There are few exceptions to this. Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana {IDncbn: Oxford University Press, 1964); Ma:xwell Chrosu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power {Oricago: Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1970); C.L.R. Janes, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution {IDndon: Allison and Busby, 1977); and Richard Wright, Black Power {New York: Harper & Bro thers, 1954). But with the possible exception of Austin who deals to a cx:>nsiderable extent with the post-independ ence era, and Owusu who argues that the pursuit of politi cal power in Ghana, before and after independence, was rrotivated by the desire to enhance one's material and status opporttmi.ties, the rest focus their attention on the dynamics of the pre-independence period. 3. MJtt, Paul, E., "Power, Authority and Influence," in Mich ael Aiken and Paul E. MJtt, eds., The Structure of Commun ity Power (New York: Rancbm lbuse, 1970): p. 6. 4. Sinon, Herbert, "Notes on the Observation and Measurercent of Power," Journal of Politics XV {Novenber 1953) : 500- 516. 5. The roncept of strategic resources is discussed by MJtt, "Power, Authority and Influence". 6. Lasswell, Harold and Abraham Kaplan. Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) : p. 75 . 7. Garlick, Peter. African Traders and Economic Development in Ghana (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); C. r:orm .Adzobu, "The State and Industrial Developnent in Ghana," Ghana Social Science Journal 1, 1 {1971); and A.N. Hakarn, "Ircped- 101 irrents to the GrcMth of Indigenous Industrial Entrepreneur ship in Ghana, 1946-1968," Economic Bulletin o£ Ghana 2 , 2 (1972). 8. Esseks, John D., "Political Independence and Eronani.c De oolonisation: the case of G'lana \IDder Nk.rumah, II Western Political Quarterly XXIV, 1 (March 1971) . See also his "Governnent and Indigenous Private Enterprise in G'lana," Journal o£ Modern African Studies 9, 1 (1971) in which he attributes the failure of the Ghanaian entrepreneurs to becxxre industrialists to their weak eoonomic position via that of the state. 9. Lange, Oscar, "Basic Problems of Socialist Construction, " in 0. Lange, ed., Problems o£ Political Economy of Social ism (New Delhi: People' s Publishing lbuse, 1962) : 31-56. 10. Dark Days in Ghana (New York: International Publishers, 1968): p. 71. It has also been oonfirned through indep endent research that prospects for self-enrichrrent in an independent Qlana played a great part in nobilising people for the independent struggle. See Mcu 11. In the USSR, lenin remained a oonsistent advocate of an alliance of workers and peasants for 16 years. See his Alliance o£ the Working Class and the Peasantry (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959). On the eve of the Russian revolution he tactically admitted the anny into this alliance. For his position on this see lenin, The April Thesis (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing lbuse, n.d. ) • For an analysis of the influence of soldiers ' representa tives on the Soviets during the crucial nonths of 1917 see Askar Anewider, "'!be Political Ideology of the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet in the Spring of 1917," in Richard Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia: A Symposium (Garden City, NewYork: IbubledayandConpany, Inc., 1969) . '1he position of the Chinese is surmed up in the fol.lcMing staterrent by Mao Tse-Tung: "'lhe leading force in our rev- olution is the industrial proletariat. Our closest friends are the entire semi-proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie." See his "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", in 102 selected works of Mao Tse-Tung 1 (Peking: Foreign Lang uage Press, 1964) . But the facts of Chinese politics since Yenan strongly affirm the irrportant role of the Chi nese peasantry in the Chinese revolution. See for exanple, Mark selden, "'lhe Yenan Legacy: 'lhe Mass Line, II in A. Doak Barnett, ed. , Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969) and William Hinton, Fanshen (New York: Random House, 1966) for a grassroot perspective on the active role of the peasantry in consumating the revolution. 12. MJhan, J., "Nkrumah and Nkrumahisrn," in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds., The Socialist Register, 1967 (London: 'lhe Merlin Press, 1967) : p. 199. 13. This strategy which was basically one of retreat from the earlier phase of militant nationalist politics, and euphemistically called Tactical Action, was later acclaimr ed by the party leadership for being one of the 'revolu tionary' strategies that won independence for the people of Ghana. On the contrary, it neant anything but oo-oper ation with the colonial administration in order to ensure a peaceful transfer of power to a national elite that would protect the econc:rnic interests of the departing irrperial pa-ler. 14. Both A.Y.K. Djin and Krooo Edusie had had adverse findings made against them by the Conrnissions of EfxiW.r.y . See, respectively, Report of the Comndssion of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company Limited (Accra, 1956): p . 41 and the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Mr. Braimah's Resignation and Allegations Arising Therefrom (Accra, 1954) : p . 32 . 15. Austin, Politics in Ghana, Chapter VIII for details of the rreasures which were taken. 16. MJhan, "Nkrumah and Nkrumahisrn," p. 200. 17. Nkrumah, Kwarre. Africa Must Unite (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1963): r::p. 88-89. 18. "Presumably, ' socialist consciousness' would drive CMay the party's petty oourgeois supporters' who were inter ested only in self-govenment .... ", M:>han, "Nkrumah and Nkrumahisrn," p . 198. 'lhat fear persisted well into the post-independence period. '!his answers the paradox in Nkrumah ' s Dawn Broadcast of 1961 in which he rebuked the "new ruling class of self-seekers and careerists"; warned the TOC against "unbridled militant trade unionism in our country . .. "; and further announced rreasures airred at bring- 103 ing ancillary organs of the party finnly under party con trol. It is for the sane reason that the opposition was suppressed. 19. During a ~r struggle between the CPP and the OWosi tion at cape Coast (1954/56) which was precipitated by a decision of the cape Coast Municipal Council to inpose direct taxation on the people, the CPP found itself al I!Ost eclipsed because its opponents had effectively nobil ised their grassroot support to confront it. In the event the party leadership effectively used the state apparatus, via the police and the legislature, to cripple their oppon ents. For a detailed analysis of that conflict, see the author' s Ph.D dissertation, Politics, Local Administration and Community Development in Ghana, 1951-1966. 20. Lange, "Basic Problens". 21. For a detailed appraisal of the economic policies of CPP administration see Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Devel opment in Ghana, and AndrejKrassowski, Development and the Debt Trap (london: '!he OVerseas Developrent Institu te, 1974). 22. '!he laissez-faire eoonomics of Sir w. Authur lewis, quite logically, reinforced the petty-bourgeois proclivities of the CPP leadership. See lewis' Report on Industriali sation and the Gold Coast (Accra: GoveD'l!lellt Printer, 1953). 23. Speech by Osagyefo on laundring the seven Year Developrrent Plan (March 11, 1964). 24. Contrast N.A. Co~George, Finance end Development, The Gold Coast (Ghana) Experience 1914-1950 (london: Dennis [k)bson, 1973). 25. '!he representatives of the entrepreneural class within the party cxxrplained bitterly against the neo-colonialist economic policies of the party they were supporting. Fit ch and Oppenheiner, Ghana: End of an Illusion, Chapter 5 and M::>han, "Nkrumah and Nkrumahism", f.n. 40; also Esseks, Economic Independence in a New African State, 1956-65 (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University, canbridge, USA, 1967) . 26. Szereszewski, lbbe1.t, "'!he Perfo:rmance of the Econoit!i," in Walter Birmingham, I. Newstadt and E.N. Omaboe, eds., A Study of Contemporary Ghana (Evanston: Nortl:Mestem University Press, 1966). 104 27. Ahmad, Naseem. Deficit Financing and Capital Formation, The Ghanaian Experience, 1960-65 (Munich: Weltforun Verlag, 1970): p. 88. Even though the share of the pri vate sector experienced a progressive decline during this period (see Table 1) it nonetheless CXlntinued to be the largest producer of manufactured camodity. A USA Depart rrent of Conrrerce docunent, for exanple, put its share at about 68% as late as 1968. USA Departrrent of Cormerce, "Basic Data on the Ecoilon!i of G'lana, " in Overseas Bus iness Reports (Washington, July 1968) • Qooted by Jean M. Due, "Agricultural Developrent in the Ivory Coast and Ghana, " Journal of Modern African Studies 7, 4 (1969) : p. 641. 28. 'Ihe growth rate for this period is put at about 4.4% per annum. See A. N. Hakam, "Inpedirrents to the Gr<:7.oTth of Indigenous Industrial Entrepreneurship in Ghana, 1946- 1968." 29. Killick, 'Ibnny, "Mining, " in Binni.ngham et. al., A Study of Contemporary Ghana, p. 31. 30. Ibid., pp. 251-259. 31. As part of the strategy for socialist construction, such sources of p:>tential "social surplus" as foreign private industry or capital has to be socialised to enable the socialist state to finance its progranne of building the bases for autonarous industrialisation. 'Ihe a~sition of the capacity to produce the neans for producing con surrer goods is inperative for a successful industrial developren.t. FOr a detailed discussion of the socialist strategy for disengaging the neo-colonialist econort!i from the capitalist narket, see Clive Y. 'lhanas, Dependence and Transformation (New York: M:>nthly Review Press, 1974), Part II. 32. Szereszewski, "'Ihe Performance of the Ecol'lOil¥. " 33. Ghana: 1970 Census Report II (Accra: Census Office, 1972): p. xxvii. 'Ihe exact figure was 57. 2% of the total labour force arployed in all branches of industry. ('Ihe rep:>rt defines agriculture to include forestry, htmting, and fishing). 'Ihe figure for 1960 was 61. 8%. 34. Hill, Polly, "Serre Olaracteristics of Indigenous West African Economic Entrepreneurs," The Economic Bulletin of Ghana 1 (1962). 35. State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) . 'Ihis act vested in the President the legal right to a~re land, by executive 105 instrurrent, for public \\Urks or purposes without any inhibitions. 36. Contrary to socialist practice, the rural capitalist far mer was regarded as the backbone of Ghana's eoo:l'laT!f. 'lherefore, it becarre an official policy not to antag:>nise him throl.kJh the socialisation of this vital sector of the eoonaey. Instead he was to be alla.ved to perpetuate him self and his I!Dde of prcx:luctian. See Marvin P. Miracle and Ann Siedman, "Agricultural Co-operatives and Quasi co-operatives in <1'lana, 1951-1965," (Unpublished article, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA, 1968), f.n. 120. 37. ~omas, Dependence and Transformation . 38 . Speech by Osagyefo on latmching the Seven Year Develop nent Plan (March 11, 1964). 39. KrasSCMSki, Development and the Debt Trap, p. 63. See also the whole of Chapter 4 for a CXX!prehensive discus sion of the regine' s developtent priorities. 40. Seven Year Development Plan, 1963/64 - 69/70 (Office of the Planning Comnission, Accra, 1964): p. 93. 41. Ibid. , 42. '!he major cause for the late translation of this idea into policy was the influence of W. Arthur Lewis. See his Report on Industrialisation in the Gold Coast (Accra: Q:>vernnent Printing Departnent, 1953). In this documant, Arthur lew'is urged the goverrurent to play a very marginal role in the industrialisation of the cotmtry. '!hat is apart from pioneering in certain areas like providing p\blic utilities, and engaging in certain critically unavoidable industrial activities, the ~rnnent was to CXlOSider industrialisation as the responsibility of for eign private capital. 43. Lange, "Basic Problems," w. 42-45. 44. I \\Uuld argue that the proliferation of integral wings of the party, and attenpts during the sane period to spread the party's presence to all parts of the country should be tmderstood as a major aspect of the drive to accunu late p<::Jo>Jer. I have argued this point at length elsewhere. See author's Cbctoral dissertation, Politics, Local Admin istration and Community Development in Ghana, 1951-1966, pp. 172-75. 106 45 . '!he reports of the oonm.issions appointed to erquire into the assets of the CPP elite provide us with uninpeadlable evidence about the new class which the state created duz ing the .regine of the CPP. See Report of the Jiagge Com mmission Appointed .... to Enquire into the Assets of Cer tain Specified Persons (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1968); Report of the Sowah Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Assets of Certain Specified Persons (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1968); and the Report of the Manyo-Plange (Assets) Commission Appointed .. . . to Enquire into the Assets of Certain Specified Persons (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1969). FOr information about the dlaracter and activities of this class as they pen etrated the najor arteries of the social system see the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Trade Malprac tices in Ghana (Accra: Office of the President, 1965). Hereafter it is referred to as the Abraham Comnission Report (Chairnan: W.E. Abraham). Report of the Commis sion Appointed to Enquire into the Affairs of the Ghana Timber Board and the Ghana Timber Co-operative Union (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1968). Hereafter it is referred to as the B1ay Ccmnission Report (Chairnan: R.S. B1ay). Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Local Purchasing of Cocoa (Accra: Ministry of Information, 1966). Hereafter it is referred to as the de Graft Johnson Com mittee Report (Cllairnan: J .c. de Graft Johnson). For a specific case study of the rise of this ne..r class, see Bjom Beckman, Organising the Farmers (Uppssla: the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), espec ially Olapters V and VI. 46. Lange, "Basic Problems, II p. 5; but the wrole of Chapter I is illuminating for the distinction it draws between socialist and capitalist eoonani.cs. 47. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana . Eoonanic nationalism, during this period, should be under stood as the progressive drive by the state to assert greater control of the eooncmy through direct ownership and joint state-private ownership, rather than a novement ained at enoouraging Qlanaians to take over the ea::>ncJ'I¥ fran ~atriate interests. 48. The need for centralisation of power during the period of socialist planning was enphasised by President Nkrumah in 1961. See Osagyefo Dr. I 49. Broadcast by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana (Accra: Goverrurent Printer, 1960). 107 50. See Speech by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana at the laying of the Foundation Stone of the City lbtel, K'Uil'aSi (Accra: Governnent Prin ter, 1962). 51. See Republic of Ghana: 'lhe Booget, 1965. 52. '!he G:>ld Coast Coma Marketing Board (Anend!rent) Ordinance, 1951 and the Cocoa Duty and Developrrent Funds Ordianance 1951. 53. See the Report of Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company Limited; The de Graft Johnson Committee Report; and BeCkman , Organising the Farmers, Cllapter IV. 54. Apart from the establishr!ent of the Ghana Tirrber Market ing Corporation, the governnent also voted substantial sums of money to aid them. In addition, governnent spoke srren continually affinned the governnent' s determination to support Ghanaian tirrber merchants in their bid to sup plant expatriate fi:rrrs. See Ghana: National Assembly Debates 8 (1957): pp. 449 and 501-502; and 9 (1958): p. 307. 55. 'lhe governnent had quietly shelved the Report of the Com mission of Enquiry into Concessions, 1958 which had among other things urged the government to give more aid to Ghanaian Tirrber ~rchants. See also Esseks, Economic Independence in a New African State; for the reaction of the tirrber merchants, see National Assembly Debates 23 (1961): p. 610. 56. Esseks, Ibid., p. 105. 57. For evidence of the power of the CPP leaders - the "bureau cratic or administrative bourgeoisie" - see the following: Report of the Commission on Enquiry into .... the Issue of Import Licences (Cllainnan: A.A. Akainyah), (Accra: Min istry of Information, 1964); The Abraham Commission Report; the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Irregulari ties and Malpractices in the Grant of Import Licences (Cllainnan: N.A. Ollennu), (Accra: Ministry of Informa tion, 1967); and The Blay Commission Report. 58. 'lhe warning that the petty-bourgeois opposition was ready to resist the CPP's designs to destroy them politically was tersely stated by Alhaji Yakubu (Talon Na), then mem ber of the parliamentary Opposition during the debate on '!he Drergency Pav1ers Bill, 1958: "Where force or might is used to suppress a movement or an idea that movement 108 or idea finds a vent tmdergrmmd. 'Ihat is nore serious and nore dangerous than allowing it to shCM itself on the surface." National Assembly Debates 8 {1957-58): p. 250. 59. Industrial Promotion in Ghana {Accra: Ministry of Trade and Industries, n. d. ) . 60. Government Policy on the Promotion of Ghanaian Business Enterprises {Accra: Qlana Info:r:ma.tion Services, 1958). 61. Progress Report on the Implementation of Industrial Pro jects in the Public and Joint Public-Private Sectors Being Handled by the Ministry of Industries {Accra: Ministry of Industries, 1964) , Introduction. 62. Hakam, "Irrpediments to the GrCMth of Indigenous Industrial Entrepreneurship in Ghana, 1946-1968," Table 2. 63. Kurni, Ayi. The Rebirth of Ghana {Accra : Ministry of Info:r:ma.tion, n.d.). 64. In his Republic Day broadcast of July 1, 1960, the Pres ident declared: "{'lhe political revolution) ended with the passing of yesterday. Today, we have entered upon a new life and a new revolution: the national revolution for economic and social reoonstruction. " For a descrip tive definition of the structure of the conflict, see Austin, Politics in Ghana, Olapters V-VII. 65. For gli.npses of the structure of that conflict, see the following: Julius Sago, "lhe Anaton¥ of Cotmter Revolu tion," The Spark, August 2, 1963; "lhe Politics of the Treason Trial," The Spark, Deoerrber 11, 1963; J. Sag:>, "Cotmter Revolutionaries Declare War," The Spark, Janu ary 3, 1964; J. Sag:>, "'Ihe Mechanics of Cotmter Revolu tion," The Spark, Novenber 20, 1964; J . Sago, "In Search of a New Economic Policy," The Spark, Septerrber 17, 1965; and Ghana: Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, First Series, 34, {October 15, 1963 - February 21, 1964) {Accra: Cbvernnent Printer, 1964) : pp. 310- 414. It has to be enphasised that the postion of the left-wing of the party, as emmciated by J. Sago in his articles, is that the conflict was purely ideological. That is, it was between the socialists and the capitalists. Yet, in a lengthy editorial in their nouthpiece, The Spark {March 5, 1965) entitled, "'I'oNards Ideological Unity Within the Party," it was revealed rather poignantly, that the party had never been a class party, that the party had rejected the class approach to politics and econani.cs. Consequent ly, the contradictions in the Chanaian society were those between the positive {progressive) forces and the negative 109 (reactionary) forces. It is patently irrpossible to sus tain a Marxist position without admitting the notion of the class struggle in politics and economics. Uncbl.btedly the CI?P leadership was caught in a mire of ideological fussiness as the editorial of The Spark itself admitted. It was logical therefore for the leadership to retreat fran a class war even after the Dawn Broadcast. 66. The attacks, euphemistically called The Rectification canpaign in a poor irnitation of the Clri.nese, were led by the Party organ, Evening News . See its April, 1961 issues, for exarrple. Its Septerrber 30, 1961 issue laun ched a virulent attack on the "leading capitalist" of the new rich, K.A. GJedenah. This and subsequent issues, which defined the "bourgeois counter-revolutionary" group to include the new rich (both within and outside the party), the Opposition United Party elerrents, and their capitalist allies overseas, and further launched a veri table witch-hunt for them, should enable us to see beyond the thin ideological veil. 67. Quoted from Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975): p . 66. 68. Similar neasures had been inplerrented to eliminate the organised political oppostion. They included the fol l~g laws which were passed between 1957 and 1958: The Deportation Act, The Ertergency Pa.Yers Act, and The Preven tive Detention Act. 69. Ideology asstnres a purely syni:x)lic role in societies where the ruling elite perceives a system of stable pc:Mer relationships between them and the counter-elite, espec ially after the fomer had succeeded in effectively consolidating paYer. The result is a kind of patron client relationship between the elite and the masses. See author' s doctoral dissertation, Politics, Local Admin istration, and Community Development in Ghana, 1951-1966, 01apter 4, for a detailed discussion of this process in politics. * * * *