A Two-Sided Fight for Freedom and a One-Sided Fight for Democracy:

The Vietnam War

Interviewer: Hope Harrison

Interviewee: William H. Pickle

Instructor: Mr. Alex Haight

Due Date: February 10, 2016

Table of Contents

Interviewee Release Form…………………………….....……………………………....2

Interviewer Release Form………………………………….....………………………....3

Statement of Purpose……………………………………………………..……….……..4

Biography...... 5

Historical Context- The Road and Rational that Led to the Vietnam War………....6

Interview Transcription...... 28

Interview Analysis………………………………………………………………………63

Appendix...... 68

Works Consulted……………………………………………..…………………………71

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this Oral History Project is to identify the causes and justifications

of the Vietnam War and analyze their validity and impact on history. The North

Vietnamese and the Americans were both fighting for the ideals of unity and freedom, yet

a conflict between democratic and communist ideologies ensued, leading to an extended,

brutal war to determine Vietnam’s fate as a country. William Pickle provides a detailed

account of his daily life and experiences in Vietnam as an American soldier, and he helps

to dissect the extent to which America was involved in South Vietnam's future. The

Vietnam War has particular relevance to United States foreign policy today since

American troops are involved in war everyday against people who are fighting for

different values and cultural norms. It is well known that history tends to repeat itself, so

it is critical that history is revisited through multiple lenses to get a comprehensive view

of the entire situation and learn from the past in order to create a more well rounded

future for all.

Biography

William H. Pickle was born in 1950 in Roanoke, Virginia and was the second

oldest out of five children. Immediately after graduating from high school, Mr. Pickle

enlisted himself in the U.S. Army and served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1970. He spent

time in cavalry and infantry regimens while in Vietnam, acting as an infantry sergeant

and Medevac helicopter door gunner. Among his awards for his service are the Purple

Heart, Bronze Star, and the Cross of Gallantry. After returning home from Vietnam, he

was assigned to a base in Fort Carson, Colorado where he was part of the 5th Mechanized

Unit, which dealt with tanks. At the age of 20, Mr. Pickle was honorably discharged from

the Army, and he relocated to Washington, D.C. to earn his BA in political sciences from

American University. He has held the position of the 37th U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms,

Deputy Assistant Director for the U.S. Secret Service, Special Agent in Charge of the

Vice Presidential Protective Division, and the first Federal Security Director of the TSA.

For most of his adult life he has lived in D.C., but now he commutes back and forth from

his home in Colorado and our nation’s capital. Mr. Pickle is married and has two kids.

The Road and Rational that Led to the Vietnam War

The statement that all men are, "endowed by their Creator with certain

unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”

(“The Declaration of Independence”) is easily recognizable as a quote of the Declaration

of Independence of the United States of America. When Ho Chi Minh used these same

words in 1945 in Vietnam’s Declaration of Independence he most likely never imagined

that a war was going to break out between his army and that of the United States 20 years

later. The Vietnam War is considered the most controversial war in United States history,

dividing the American people and their government over the morality of intervening in

Vietnam. The rational behind the war was very different for the Vietnamese, who wanted

independence and unity, and the United States, that sought to prevent the spread of

Communism. The cultural divisions and histories of these countries led them to clash in a

brutal war of wills. Therefore, in order to better understand the Vietnam War, it is

important to talk to people who were involved in this time period to gain insight into the

details of the war and the trends of the time in the hope that history will not repeat itself.

The more traditional inhabitants of Vietnam often studied from Confucian texts,

which were used to govern the daily lives of the people and power of the government.

The founder of Confucianism was Kong Qui, otherwise known as Confucius, who was

born in China in 551 BCE and died in 479 BCE. Confucianism stressed two main ideas:

“rituals” and “humanness”. Confucius saw the concept of rituals not only as special

religious sacrifices; he saw rituals as sacrifices combined with daily, respected standards

of behavior. Also, Confucius preached that traditional rituals are the foundation for a

“civilized” society; therefore, in order to maintain a secure and unified community, all

citizens had to be devoted to their ways of life and religion. Many leaders interpreted this

to mean that all the country’s inhabitants should be loyal to the government and content

with one’s place in the social order, and this was true in Vietnam, as well (FitzGerald 12).

During the 15th and 16th centuries, European powers were very competitive with

their acquisition of new territory and westward expansion. One of the countries that were

most successful with their westward expansion was Portugal. The Portuguese made a

series of important discoveries and conquests within this time period. The event of most

interest to the history of Vietnam, however, is when Vasco De Gama reached India in

1498. After Gama’s historic landing in India, the Portuguese continued to consolidate

land to the east, including Indian territories, the Molucca Islands, and China. As a

consequence, a base was built at Macao in 1557, which permitted Portuguese explorers to

travel to Vietnam and make a port in what is now the city of Danang (Karnow 70). In

addition, the Portuguese proceeded to rename Vietnam as “Cauchichina” and add it to

their list of colonies.

A century after Portuguese expansion was at its strongest, the Portuguese lost

control of the majority of the land they had gained due to corruption and a general

depression happening in Europe. Subsequently, European powers acted to obtain the area

Portugal had lost; however, Vietnam was an unpopular location for European powers to

try and assert their dominance (Karnow 70).

During that time period, the efforts of the merchants paled in comparison to the

impact that the Catholic Church had on the country. As a result of poverty and fierce

resistance, “merchants failed to establish themselves… But the catholic fathers persisted

and founded a strong mission in Vietnam” (FitzGerald 51). Catholic missionaries had

spread their beliefs successfully to a wide population of Vietnamese, and the faith was to

remain popular from the 17th century and on. This religion particularly appealed to the

peasants and native merchants of the time. Peasants saw Christianity as an opportunity to

gain freedom from the traditional Confucian system and the Mandarins, who were loyal

to the system of hierarchy. Meanwhile, the native merchants saw missionaries as a means

by which they could learn more about the traders in the west and get connections to them.

While many districts completely converted to Christianity, the older members in

Vietnamese communities and Vietnamese emperors did not feel the same way about

Christianity. Although emperors sought and appreciated the advice and connections that

missionaries often provided them, which resulted in better economic and societal

positions, they were perturbed by the idea that Christianity would undermine the

authoritative position that the system of Confucianism had provided them (Karnow 71).

In fact, rulers were unpredictable in the sense that sometimes Catholics were tolerated,

and other times Catholics were persecuted. As expected, this division between the rulers

of Vietnam and the country’s inhabitants was bound to produce conflict.

The individual who can claim responsibility for a portion of the massive

spreading of Christianity and French influence in Vietnam is Alexandre de Rhodes, who

was born in the town of Avignon. Rhodes baptized about 6,700 Vietnamese citizens and

apparently delivered six sermons a day to spread his beliefs. After the emperors delivered

a series of hostile decrees against what Rhodes was preaching, Rhodes appealed to the

French government. In order for Rhodes to succeed in his mission of reforming Vietnam,

he would have to convince both the leaders of commerce and religion to support him. He

appealed that Vietnam was easy to convert and possessed great natural resources that the

French could exploit (Karnow 73). Therefore, in the year 1664, the French developed the

Society of Foreign Missions to Advance Christianity, as well as the East India Company,

with the aims of trade and religious propaganda.

As the role of France was increasing, the Tayson Rebellion erupted in 1772,

which pitted the Nguyen rulers against a populist movement. Over the course of three

years, the Tayson army captured Saigon, began agrarian reform, and permitted Catholic

missionaries the ability to preach in the open without fear. After this, the army marched

north, and the people were able to unify Vietnam. On the contrary, Nguyen Anh, a

descendant of the Nguyen emperors was determined to take back his power, and he chose

Pigneau de Béhaine, a well-known French priest, to aid him. Pigneau was previously

involved in Vietnam when he trained individuals to be native missionaries. During the

Tayson rebellion, Pigneau hid Nguyen Anh from the Tayson army and later filled the role

of advisor to him. Eventually, Nguyen reclaimed Saigon, but when he was defeated for a

second time, he was in a very desperate position. Pigneau persuaded Nguyen Anh to ask

for French assistance in his plight. A compromise was made supplying Nguyen Anh

soldiers, weapons, and ammunition in exchange for secession of land and commercial

entitlement. Overall, Louis XVI had not kept all his promises to Anh, yet Pigneau

secured him the resources necessary to retake his throne. “The Tayson forces staged their

last desperate defense in 1799 at Quinhon, a coastal town, where they were defeated by

Nguyen Anh’s nineteen-year-old son Canh” (Karnow 77); therefore, Nguyen Anh had the

ability to declare himself emperor in 1802.

Although Nguyen Anh had succeeded in getting his crown back, he did not give

France any favors and continued to persecute Christians because he believed it would

pose a threat to his rule and authority. As Vietnam’s policies got harsher on the topic of

religion, French policy was headed in the opposite direction. The secular nature that

prevailed during the Napoleonic eras had produced a religious vigor in the French

population during the following period. This strong revival of religious sentiment once

again caused an interest in intervening in Vietnam. A series of Vietnamese rulers took

power, and each one imposed more intense and prejudiced policies than the previous one.

In particular, there were multiple disputes concerning Dominique Lefébvre, a young

missionary, who had been imprisoned and released at a later date, which France was very

concerned over (Karnow 82). The French took advantage of every opportunity to over

exaggerate and justify intervention in Vietnam, as they believed that intervention would

bring economic prosperity and restore its reputation.

When Napoléon III was pressured by the people of France and government

officials to intervene in Vietnam, dignitaries agreed that France must uphold the right to

punish Vietnam for its persecution of French missionaries and take action immediately.

The plan of attack was to occupy Tourane and surrounding territories until Tu Duc, the

emperor at the time, agreed to give France control of Vietnam. The French Navy

approached Tourane in August of 1858, and although they gained control of the port

without much effort, the French were going to struggle as their fight went on (Karnow

23). The French thought the Catholics would treat them as liberators, but their

expectations were incorrect, so they had no internal supporters in the country. Cholera

and typhus epidemics broke out in 1859; thus, all the soldiers were uninspired and

returned home. Yet, when the French government was facing strong pressure from their

own countrymen, with the rational of educating the “backwards” people in Vietnam, the

French were forced to intervene in Vietnam once again.

In 1861, French Admiral Charner entered Saigon and successfully claimed the

city for France. All of Charner’s successors were able to push deeper into the land, all

while killing massive numbers of Vietnamese that had fiercely resisted their expansion.

After one year, Tu Duc finally submitted; he gave three provinces to the French,

permitted Catholic missionaries the ability to preach and recruit, opened three ports to

commerce with European powers, and allowed France to monopolize Vietnamese

territory. Tu Duc’s surrender was unexpected to both his people and the Frenchmen in his

country; however, since he simultaneously had lost most of the agricultural land that

provided food to his armies, was fighting rebels in the north, and could not turn to other

countries for aid, his best choice was to forgo some of his land and power (Karnow 89).

In the following twenty years, Vietnam would face considerable struggles. Pirates

and bandits, who killed many and stole wealth, had created much fear in the country and

plagued Vietnam. Another important problem for Vietnam was its relationship with the

French, who were becoming ever more greedy in their want to be involved in Vietnam.

Frenchmen went on journeys through the region and occupied much of Vietnam’s

territory between the city of Hanoi and the sea in 1874, and in 1883 French parliament

approved an expedition to impose a “protectorate” on Vietnam. Finally, in 1887, the

Indochinese Union was made, which was comprised of Vietnam, Annam, Tonkin,

Cambodia, and Laos (FitzGerald 52).

The French made drastic changes to the structure of Vietnam’s society, economy,

and culture during the time period in which they were in power; however, a nationalistic

revival occurred for the inhabitants of Vietnam, who were determined to fight against

their disrespectful oppressors. Firstly, the French remodeled the system of education in

Vietnam, destroying the teaching of Chinese ideographs and replacing them with the

French alphabet. Although about 80% of Vietnamese were literate in the Chinese

characters, that language represented dominance of another country besides France and

was a characteristic of Vietnamese culture, thus the French took it as a threat and banned

it. The native inhabitants of Vietnam also lost their social standing when the French took

power, and many of them received menial work and never had wages greater than or

equal to that of the Frenchman with the lowest social standing. The most significant

change, however, was the economic development that took place. Paul Doumer can be

said to have transformed Vietnam into a profitable possession for France, as opposed to a

financial devastation. Among his many successes, Doumer introduced an income tax,

dissolved the traditional Cabinet of Mandarins and replaced it with a body of French

advisors, created a system that transferred duties and taxes into a central treasury, and

exploited natural resources and created large markets for them internationally. Doumer

had official monopolies on the alcohol, salt, and opium markets (Karnow 128).

In the past, the Vietnamese had faced similar challenges from great powers such

as China. As China put pressure on Vietnam, the Vietnamese adopted many of their

values and cultural norms, yet they refused to allow China to destroy their fundamental

ethnicity. When the Chinese would attack their country, the Vietnamese would utilize

guerilla tactics, which they used later on, to defend themselves effectively. In addition,

many legends of warriors who fought for Vietnam and its honor were revived during this

time period due to the fact that people were trying to arouse strong nationalist sentiment.

In order to understand Vietnam’s next step in its history, one must first analyze

the role of Ho Chi Minh, who would lead Vietnam’s plight to be considered an

independent country. Ho Chi Minh was born in the village of Nghe An, in central

Vietnam, in the year 1890. In his youth, Vietnam was in a tough position considering that

Emperor Thai was removed from the throne in 1907 and later sent to exile, and tax

revolts became a major disturbance in the country. When Ho Chi Minh had reached the

age of 19, he boarded a French ship to Europe and would not return to his homeland for

approximately 30 years. Over the course of his time spend abroad, Ho would travel to

numerous countries and learn countless new concepts and ideas; yet, he never forgot

about his suffering countrymen in Vietnam and sought to find ways to help them escape

the injustice they were experiencing. For instance, Ho wrote for a few editorials in Paris

and became fascinated in Lenin’s idea that revolution and anticolonial resistance must

arise together, and his work on this theme was circulated undercover in Vietnam. Another

significant part of Ho’s development into a revolutionary was his time in Moscow, where

he deepened his understanding of how to undertake starting a revolution. He became well

versed in propaganda and the idea of revolution being launched under favorable

conditions. In 1925 Ho founded the Revolutionary Youth League, and it was to be the

central agent of the later Indochinese Communist Party. In 1940, the Japanese gained

control of France by a diplomatic decree due to the fall of France in World War Two.

However, “the Vichyite governor sent by Paris to Saigon agreed to continue to administer

the territory while the Japanese used its ports for military bases and its raw materials for

trade within the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” (FitzGerald 62). Early in the

year 1941, Ho returned for the first time to his homeland since when he left decades ago,

where he was quickly accepted as an elder and a patriot. The same year, Ho founded the

Vietnam Independence League, soon to be widely accepted and known as the Vietminh.

Ho Chi Minh employed Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong to aid him in

organizing revolution. When France had fallen to the Germans, Ho had sent Giap to trek

through the country and find individuals who were willing to join guerilla bands,

ultimately to comprise an army. Giap and the groups he recruited were often chased by

French patrols in the area; however, to combat this, Giap taught band members to cover

their tracks, speak in secretive ways, and ration (Karnow 157). Giap constantly feared

that the natives would be unwilling to fight, yet he was pleasantly surprised that the

guerilla units continued to increase in size; this mass appeal was due to the opposition to

both French and Japanese rule.

In 1944, Ho was finally satisfied with the forces he had accumulated to back his

cause, and he proposed a countrywide rebellion with confidence stemming from

Roosevelt’s denouncement of colonialism and his belief that America would win World

War II (Karnow 158). The same year, overpowering garrisons and raiding forts

substantially invigorated the guerillas, and they continued to push stealthily for their

independence.

The turning point in the struggle for independence arrived for the Vietnamese

when the allied forces fought in the Battle of Normandy, galvanizing the end of Nazi

party dominance in France. Since Japan and France were both members of the axis

powers, Japan had lost faith in France’s military prowess after its devastating defeat.

Japan took control of Indochina officially in 1945, 9 months after Normandy, and they

ceased to cooperate with the French (Owens 34). Directly after Japan claimed control of

the land, Emperor Bao Dai declared Vietnam’s independence. In tandem with this event,

Cambodia and Laos gained their independence, yet all three countries remained “puppet

states” to the Japanese Government (Owens 34). On August 16, Ho Chi Minh summoned

his peers to express his wish to seize power promptly, and he also formed the National

Liberation Committee, declared himself the president, and claimed it to be essentially a

provisional government (Karnow 161). As World War II was waning, Ho Chi Minh

declared Vietnam’s independence on September 2, 1945. He listed the grievances against

the French and asserted, “The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common

purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French

colonialists to reconquer their country” (Minh).

France was determined to reclaim its authority in Vietnam, so fighting ensued

between the French and Vietnamese, which signified the First Indochina War. In 1947,

Boa Dai, who was in exile, created a deal with France in which Vietnam was granted

limited independence because the Vietminh were not as successful as they had hoped in

inspiring a thorough revolution (Owens 35). Ho and his group were unwilling to accept

surrender to the French, yet they were in a difficult situation because the Soviet Union

was not willing to be involved in Ho’s fight. Likewise, the Truman administration was

not supportive of Ho Chi Minh because, although he was a nationalist, he was very

intrigued by communist ideals and intended to implement them.

In 1950, China went through a revolution as well, and Mao’s Chinese Communist

Legions conquered all of China and had reached Vietnam’s boundary. This development

spurred China and the Soviet Union to recognize Ho Chi Minh’s regime, named the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Karnow 190). The Democratic Republic of Vietnam

was to be considered North Vietnam, and South Vietnam was still hesitant to unify under

Ho Chi Minh at the time because he supported Communism.

Due to the heightened political atmosphere, the United States found Vietnam on

its radar; consequently, it is essential to delve into the American ways of society and its

prior international relationships to understand how America became entangled in

Vietnam’s future. America fought in the Cold War from 1947 to 1991, which was chiefly

a battle of Democracy against Communism. In 1947, as the British announced their

withdraw of aid to Greece and Turkey, United States officials were deeply troubled. They

had vigilantly monitored Greece’s political and financial wellbeing and were dismayed to

see both countries showing signs of distress. They were even more startled by the

advancement of the National Liberation Front Ho had started, and the fact it was being

supported by the Soviet Union. Seeing that Great Britain had stepped away from its

traditional role as moderator of world powers, the United States took charge of defending

the Mediterranean. The Undersecretary of State during Truman’s term was Dean

Acheson, who developed and described his theory that, “if Greece and Turkey fell to the

forces of Totalitarianism, as represented in International Communism, the conquest

would soon spread to adjoining countries” (Owens 43). This concept, later to be coined

the “domino theory”, popularized by Eisenhower, pushed the United States to support

Turkish and Greek governments, or any other country that plead for help against

Communism. This policy of helping any country fight in the name of Democracy was to

adopt the name the Truman Doctrine, and would insight further conflict with the Soviet

Union.

During the first Indochina War, the provisional government in Vietnam and the

Vietminh became allied with communist Laos and Cambodia, and France was backed by

the United States (Owens 54). The United States gave support to France in 1951 because

the American leaders saw this intervention as a portion of the Cold War. One noteworthy

event that took place in 1954 was the Geneva conference. Held in Switzerland, the

conference intended to find a method of ending the war that was still raging in Vietnam.

The agreement that was reached between the Vietminh and France included: a temporary

division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel pending the nationwide election of 1956,

withdraw of the French from the north, and Vietminh members leaving the south

(Karnow 218).

Ngo Dinh Diem was the prime minister to Bao Dai at the time of the Geneva

Conference, and his contempt and rebellion against the conference’s conclusion made

him an important player in South Vietnam (Karnow218). The United States, comparably,

was not satisfied with the proceedings in Switzerland, and the Americans were able to

increase their sphere of influence in Vietnam through their support of Diem. Ngo Dinh

Diem was born into a Catholic family and was educated in law and administration in

France. When Diem returned to Vietnam, he received a job in the government; yet, when

he realized the French did not really care about his homeland and people, Diem quit and

preached for independence instead (Karnow 232).

Prior to the 1956 elections, when the Vietnamese would be able to decide their

own government, Diem made clear his desire to replace French influence with United

States sentiment. Also, Diem convinced the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to

defend the region and place South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos under their protection.

The Americans were not prepared to put troops into South Vietnam until they were able

to determine that Diem had a strong foundation of people who supported him. The

Americans were unhappy that they had to work with Diem, but it was challenging to find

another individual of his position fighting for democratic ideals. Some problems with

Diem were that he was not a people’s man and his background isolated him from the

people to whom he was trying to appeal to. In 1955, Diem, instead of holding an election

for Vietnamese reunification, held a referendum in South Vietnam only. The referendum

would determine if Bao Dai would continue to rule or if Diem would replace him; Diem

had his activists pressure the voters, which swayed the vote so that Diem won by 98.2%.

With this result, Diem promoted himself to the rank of Chief of State (Karnow 239). The

United States had supported this action that Diem had taken, and with this new

reassurance, the United States started to give aid to South Vietnam.

In 1955, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group replaced mobile units from

the French Armed forces in Saigon with members of the American Infantry Division. The

Navy and Air Force were to follow close behind, so all elements of the American Army

were involved in Vietnam, although, there was no official war going on (FitzGerald 121).

While Diem continued to strengthen his connections with America, undercover

communist activity grew in South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh trail, a series of roads to

connect North and South Vietnam, which passed through Laos and Cambodia, was

commonly used to carry war supplies and infiltrate South Vietnam.

In 1960, a group of Vietminh veterans, such as Tran Van Bo, organized the

National Liberation Front. South Vietnamese Communists developed the National

Liberation Front, and they assumed the name Vietcong; the main goal of this group was

to overtake and liberate the people living in South Vietnam (Karnow 245). There was a

great following for this group, since its members actively made connections with people

and had wide support from the peasants in the country that sought change in their daily

lives (Zinn 350).

President Kennedy took office in 1961 and pursued the same policies as his

predecessors, Truman and Eisenhower, with regard to the situation in Vietnam. In 1961,

American officials gave Diem a list of demands to reform the economic, political, and

military organization that was set up. Diem had failed to implement the desired changes.

Consequently, the Military Assistance Advisory Group that the United States had in

South Vietnam, developed into the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam in 1962.

The United States started to push for more power in Vietnam to make sure their agenda

was being followed (FitzGerald 123). Within the two years after his election, Kennedy

posted sixteen thousand soldiers with the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam

(ARVN).

Soon enough, Kennedy became, “frustrated by Diem’s inability to conciliate

dissident groups in the face of the growing Communist challenge”, and he decided to let

Henry Cabot Lodge deal with the situation instead (Karnow 263). Henry Cabot Lodge,

the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, coaxed Diem’s senior officials to stage a coup d’état

against Diem. This uprising from within Diem’s trusted ranks lead to Diem’s

assassination, which would greatly disturb some high U.S. officials in the long run. Three

weeks after Diem’s death, Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963; therefore,

Lyndon B. Johnson took over the role of President (Karnow 264).

In less than one year after Johnson took office, the Golf of Tonkin Incident of

1964 pushed the United States to officially intervene in Vietnam’s affairs. Operation Plan

34A was initiated by both the United States and South Vietnamese, and it called for raids

against costal and island areas possessed by the North Vietnamese, which eventually

gave way to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Operation Plan 34A permitted Captain John J.

Herrick to steer the Maddox in Vietnamese waters with the intent to intercept communist

ships. Early in the morning on August 2, 1964, the Maddox had run across a multitude of

North Vietnamese junks, so Herrick steered his ship within ten miles of the Red River

Delta, and was apparently attacked by three patrol boats run by the Communists. The

actual fighting took less than twenty minutes, and was a major success for the Americans.

The Maddox had no casualties and did extremely well when compared to the communist

boats, one of which sunk, and the remaining two, which underwent severe damage

(Karnow 383). Although high United States officials said that the incident was

unprovoked, it was later revealed that the Maddox was in territorial waters and that no

torpedoes were fired at it. When the truth was revealed backlash from the American

public ensued (Zinn 352). Nevertheless, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed with

support from all the House representatives and all but two in the Senate, which permitted

the President to take whatever action necessary to protect U.S. troops. Although a

declaration of war from Congress is needed to go to war legally, the Supreme Court and

the government failed to address this issue (Zinn 253).

In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and other revolutionaries stood together, ready to risk

all they had accomplished and initiate a state of total war. As of December 1964, the

guerillas had evolved and expanded to comprise an army of troops numbering at least

56,000. On the 31st of December a battalion of elite Saigon Marines were attacked,

leaving two thirds of the South Vietnamese troops dead or in bad condition (Sheehan

381). The collapse of the Saigon regime was imminent, so the United States had no

option but to interpose. The American response was Operation Rolling Thunder, started

by Johnson in 1965, with intent to viciously bomb North Vietnam (Sheehan 501). The

operation would last for approximately three years, and an estimated eight hundred tons

of bombs, rockets, and missiles were dropped daily (Karnow 468).

The North Vietnamese had set up an “Iron Triangle” in the northwest of Saigon,

which was a stronghold for Communists (Karnow 477) In order to penetrate the “Iron

Triangle”, Operation Cedar Falls commenced in 1967, which flattened villages that were

highly populated, bulldozed miles of tunnels, and destroyed the jungle which allowed for

Vietminh soldiers to go unseen (FitzGerald 344). The Americans called the operation a

success; yet, by the end of the year, the Communists had returned to their destroyed land

and were adamant about retribution. On January 31, 1968, the first night of the

Vietnamese New Year, the Vietminh and Vietcong attacked with a, “surprise offensive

against installations in cities and towns throughout the country, penetrating even the U.S.

Embassy compound in the middle of Saigon” (Sheehan 6). The walls of the American

Embassy in Saigon were destroyed and nearly every critical American base was attacked.

The “Tet offensive” was a surprise to the Allied command, which was celebrating the

holiday and had a delayed reaction to the attacks (FitzGerald 388). A major battle was

fought at the town of Hué; the Communists had unleashed a bloodbath and killed three

thousand people. After 26 days, the United States was able to get control of Hué, yet the

battle was an emotional victory for the other side (Karnow 543). The Tet offensive was

broadcasted to the American public and is one of the major components that lead to the

massive lack of support for the fighting; it was unfathomable to the people, prior to the

battle, that the troops could be so unprepared and take a long time to regain their territory.

On March 31st, Johnson announced that he would not run for a second term as President

and that air strikes were being restricted to below the twentieth parallel, leaving only 10%

of North Vietnamese territory to attack. Johnson planned to talk and fight simultaneously

with the North Vietnamese to try and resolve the fighting (Karnow 580).

President Nixon was elected to office in 1969, and with him came a new method

of dealing with the situation in Vietnam called “Vietnamization”. John Paul Vann, a

senior official and representative of America in Vietnam, helped to create this policy of

expanding and training South Vietnamese forces while carefully reducing the number of

U.S. combat troops. For instance, by the end of 1969, 200,000 more Vietnamese were

fighting as a cause of a General Mobilization Law (Sheehan 731). In part, this was

implemented to help assuage the anger of the American public. Within a year, Americans

and South Vietnamese were sent across the Cambodian border to destroy North

Vietnamese bases. Nixon presented the attacks in 1970 as a necessary step to prevent the

growth of the Vietminh, yet the public was disturbed by American troops going into

another country yet again (FitzGerald 414). Operations continued in Laos in 1971, as

American troops, planes, and helicopters were attempting to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail to

prevent North Vietnamese movement in other countries. The North Vietnamese

possessed tanks, heavy rockets, and four ground divisions who were well versed with the

land; consequently, the operation was considered a loss for America (FitzGerald 416).

By early 1972, the Communists were ready to take action in ending the war, but

first they would have to inflict more damage to convince the U.S. that the only way to

escape the war would be through peace talks. This plan was governed by the belief that

military success dictates diplomatic success. In March, the North Vietnamese and the

Vietcong struck in three successive waves over South Vietnam (Karnow 654). In

response, Nixon ordered B-52s and several other U.S. aircrafts to hit targets in North

Vietnam, such as Hanoi and Haiphong. The initiative taken by the United States worried

Thieu, the president of South Vietnam, that if the they lost U.S. support his country

would be vulnerable, yet Nixon’s actions were taken to reassure Thieu that he would

defend him during times of need (Karnow 658).

The bombing stopped on December 30th, and the North Vietnamese were ready to

begin talks with the Americans. By the time the fighting stopped the United States had

lost planes and pilots, and they practically had no more targets left to bomb. Similarly,

the North Vietnamese supply of surface-to-air missiles was depleted and a sizable amount

of land was lost (Karnow 668). On January 27, 1973 a peace agreement was formally

signed in Paris. The Peace Accords of Paris ended the Vietnam War and was supposed to

restore peace to the country. It was written and signed under Article 22 that:

“The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam, and the strict

implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal

and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic

Republic of Viet-Nam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and

sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time

this will ensure stable peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the preservation of lasting

peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia” (Rogers).

All of the American troops were removed following the peace accords, yet

Communism continued to thrive. The United States did give aid to the Saigon

government to rebuild their strength; nevertheless, North Vietnamese troops stormed

Saigon in April 1975, and were successful in capturing it. The staff of the American

embassy and other South Vietnamese ran away in the panic for fear of communist rule

(Zinn 366). Following the invasion, the North Vietnamese officially named the city of

Saigon “Ho Chi Minh City”, and subsequently North and South Vietnam unified as the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Over the course of the Vietnam War public opinion began to shift with a negative

implication for the government. It was apparent that people started to question the

validity of what the government told them and often times looked to the media to uncover

the truth. In particular, on August 7, 1964 the New York Times published an article

entitled American Moves in Gulf of Tonkin Draw Mixed Reactions Throughout the World

to show the controversy the United States inspired. It was written that both communist

and neutral countries “charged that United States warships had no business in the Gulf of

Tonkin. They termed the presence of the vessels a provocation because of their proximity

to Communist territory” ("American Moves in Gulf of Tonkin Draw Mixed Reactions”).

The article sheds light on the fact that although some countries tried to cover up what

took place, much of the world was in an uproar over the incident, thus the American

public became agitated, as well. Another example of how the media aided people in

sharing their thoughts during the time was the article South Vietnamese, Formally at

Peace, Find Cease-Fire Accord a Mockery, by Fox Butterfield. Writing about the

perspective of the South Vietnamese, Butterfield wrote, "President Nixon and other

United States leaders have repeatedly declared that the war is over. But to Vietnamese

peasants in their villages and soldiers in their bunkers, the cease-fire agreement has not

worked” (Butterfield). This newspaper spread the message of discontent by the South

Vietnamese and told of a newfound hostility toward the U.S. Government. The news at

the time was therefore a crucial part of spreading international awareness and a manner

through which people could formulate their own opinions.

To continue, Larry Hutchens was a Vietnam War Veteran who was interviewed

by John Taylor in 2006. He was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1968, and although he was

nervous to go to Vietnam, he described his younger self as a “brainwashed

patriot” who “didn’t really question” the fact that he had to fight to fulfill his duty to his

country (Taylor 21). Mr. Hutchens experienced a change of heart during his time in

Vietnam and witnessing the deaths of so many individuals. He expressed, "I understood

the fact that we were protecting their freedom and trying to make the South Vietnamese

free, but it started really hitting home then that people are dying… South Vietnamese

guys were dying too… I think at that point you question, what is this going to

accomplish?” (Taylor 28) After returning home from the war he realized that more and

more individuals were starting to speak up about the injustices happening in Vietnam and

the role of the media on shedding a new light on the conflict going on outside of the

country. When asked about why the United States did not pull out of Vietnam, he replied,

"You got to play the macho part, ‘we’re the US, we’re the strongest nation in the world,

and we’re going to make you do this.’ Then they got a hold of something they couldn’t

handle” (Taylor 45). Overall, once Hutchens went to war he saw

the government’s actions as unacceptable and had a complete change of heart.

The Vietnam War is often considered one of the most controversial wars in

America; the vast majority of people were opposed to military intervention in Vietnam.

Historian Howard Zinn feels that the United States, “...made a maximum military effort,

with everything short of atomic bombs, to defeat a nationalist revolutionary movement in

a tiny, peasant country—and failed” (Zinn 347). When analyzing the social effects of the

Vietnam War, Zinn did not neglect to comment that the majority of the population was in

opposition to the fighting. Although veteran soldiers had expressed their disapproval of

wars in the past, "Vietnam produced opposition by soldiers and veterans on a scale, and

with a fervor, never seen before” (Zinn 362). In fact, a group called the Vietnam Veterans

Against the War was formed and by May 1971, 61% of the U.S. population thought

American involvement in Vietnam was “wrong” (Zinn 362). Howard Zinn concludes that

the United States government had alienated its people and still had a loss; therefore, the

war was an overall loss for the United States. On the other hand, Robert R. Owens, PH.D,

who is a teacher of history, political science, religion, and leadership courses, believes

that America won the Vietnam War. He finds that the public at that time did not

understand the goal of the United States, and that people today have accepted the

viewpoint that the U.S. lost the war because that idea has been repeated continuously.

Owens explains that the masses have a fundamental misunderstanding of America’s

departure from Vietnam, he writes:

“First, this delusion builds upon the absolute necessity of forcing Vietnam out of its

proper Cold War context. Once this was accomplished it was no longer a battle in a

larger war it became instead a singular event, which it never was. Secondly, keep

people ignorant of the fact that American forces withdrew in 1973, not in retreat or

defeat but in accordance with a negotiated agreement, which left South Vietnam free

and intact. Thirdly, the media and academia ignore the reality that for two years

North Vietnam appeared to abide by the Accords and South Vietnam continued to

exist AFTER American forces left thus fulfilling the stated American goals” (Owens

225-226).

Ultimately, it is up to each person to examine the evidence for him or herself, and make

the most educated decision about what power won the war based on their opinions and

research.

Overall, it is possible to say that America lost the war just as much as the

Vietnamese people did. No one ever really wins a war because involvement in conflict

comes at the price of lives, time, and money. It is incorrect to fault either the U.S. or the

Vietnamese as being on the “wrong” side because each was fighting for their own values

and cultural ideals. At the end of the day societal divisions and lack of historical

knowledge led to the long, grueling, and disenchanting war known as the Vietnam War.

Especially in this day and age, it is important to be aware that other communities have

drastically different lifestyles and that learning about them and their pasts is the best way

to make educated decisions regarding how to coexist as peaceful nations.

Interview Transcription

Interviewee/Narrator: William H. Pickle Interviewer: Hope Harrison Location of interview: Harrison household, Bethesda, MD Date: December 19, 2015

Hope Harrison: This is Hope Harrison, and I am interviewing William Pickle as part of

the American Century Oral History Project on December 19, 2015 at 6:11 PM. What was

your childhood like?

William Pickle: I came from a middle class family in the south, in the Roanoke, Virginia

area. I’m from the southwestern part of Virginia near Shenandoah Valley. My father

worked for DuPont. There were five kids. I was the second oldest. My mother stayed at

home, that was enough of a job. I went to public schools, (cough) but it was a typical

childhood for someone from the south. Do you think I’m loud enough for that (points at

computer)?

HH: Definitely.

WP: Ok. It was a typical childhood. I lived in a small town of about 20,000 people at the

most. I come from a very conservative background. In the south everyone’s a patriot.

They all go into the military. They all salute the flag. That’s pretty much the period I

grew up in, the 50’s, and that’s what it was like, so its stereotypical of what you would

expect.

HH: I know you lived all around the country, so what was that experience like?

WP: (Clears throat) It really started when I left home. I had to decide when I was 18,

when I came out of high school. I was going to go to college. I was going to go to the

University of Tennessee, but the Vietnam War was going on. I had seen too many John

Wayne movies, I guess, as a kid, and I really wanted to go into the military, and I was

afraid the war was going to end, so I ended up enlisting and that’s really what started my

travels. It was a big mistake in hindsight to go into that young, but of course I was in the

military, and I traveled. I spent a year in Vietnam in the 60’s during the war, came back, I

was assigned to an army base in Colorado where I got out of the army, and I spent about

a year and a half there. I came back to DC, went to American University, worked here for

about three years, didn’t like it here (laughs), went back to Colorado, which I loved, spent

time there, and then from there I went to the secret service in 1975 and became an agent.

I lived in California for a number of years, came back to Washington, did time at the

White House, went back to what we call the field, went back out west, went back to New

Mexico and worked in the secret service office covering New Mexico, that state, (clears

throat) came back to Washington, and I spent most of my career in Washington after that.

I spent most of my adult life here in Washington, I would say, but I live in Denver now,

so I just commute back and forth.

HH: Got it.

WP: I can’t get away from Colorado.

HH: What can you tell me about your role models when you were growing up?

WP: (Coughs) My role models were always military guys, military guys or sports

figures, which is typical of a boy. I have great admiration for every American soldier that

ever fought and all the superstars. I idolize guys like Robert E. Lee, who had been a

southern gentleman and a general who made the tough decision to leave the Union or

Federal Army to go to the south and fight for his home state, Virginia, after being offered

command of the Union army, and it was a tough decision. Military figures and sports

figures: people like Mickey Mantle, Yogi Berra, and great baseball players because as a

kid, every kid wants to grow up to be an athlete, but that is just not going to happen.

HH: Mm-hmm

WP: I really didn’t have any people outside those two arenas to be quite honest with you

because again, men mature a lot slower than women. I think that’s pretty much proven

now. So guys don’t look at people they admire outside of a couple of fields, and I think I

was pretty much like most kids at that time. So, I would say I’m a sports figure guy and a

military guy.

HH: You were not drafted into the Vietnam War, but you decided to enlist.

WP: Yeah.

HH: Can you explain to me a little bit more about your motivations for enlisting in the

army during such a volatile time period?

(5 minutes 3 seconds)

WP: There are two things there. Again, I am going back to human behavior. Young men

are, for lack of a better term, you hear it frequently, are testosterone-laden. They want to

do things that are fun. They want to do things that are action-packed. I had been a great

admirer of the military, and I had really gone in without knowing much about the

military. I just knew my father had served in World War II, my grandfather in WWI, my

great-great-grandfather was in the Civil War, so I knew my heritage. (Cough) But I also

served and went to Vietnam because I felt it was a duty, and again there is a difference in

kids who grow up in the south and the ones who grow up north of here. Again, the south

is very tradition bound. The majority of the people in the military today are from the

south, or from rural areas, and it was that way when I went in. I just felt I had a duty to

go. I can’t say I would have made that choice again if it had been given to me, but I knew

it was the right thing to do. I didn’t want to be drafted. I wanted to go.

HH: Can you tell me a little bit about your experience in boot camp?

WP: Oh yeah, it was awful (laughs). Boot camp in the military, and its that way today, I

believe, what they try to do is completely break you down and make you get rid of all

habits and beliefs which are contrary to the military because the only way the military

can be successful is if everyone operates as a single entity. So, if you have 200 soldiers in

a company, you can’t have independent thinkers. Everyone has to go follow orders and

be in step, so boot camp was how they started. Very, very, very tough discipline. At that

time they would physically abuse you, they would hit you, and push you, and slap you.

They don’t do that now, it’s a much kinder, friendlier military, but they instill confidence,

you’re in great shape. They force you to do P.T. You may never have done a single thing

physical in your life, but after 12 or 16 weeks you are going to be in pretty good shape

because you don’t have a choice. Peer pressure is tremendous. It’s also difficult because

most people, no matter what their socioeconomic background, most people have never

lived in a barracks with 50, 60, 100 guys before. You learn what people are truly like.

You learn different races, ethnic groups, and religions. It’s a fast period in your life of

growing up and maturing. So, there is a saying that you will hear a lot of times, and I

think it is true in my case and certainly true in the way I evaluate people when I hire

them. If a man has been in the military, or a woman, I will normally pick them for a

tough job over the person who hasn’t been. Not because they are smarter, but because

they’re used to tough conditions, they’re used to not questioning their orders and

authority, and are used to really getting the job done. They may not have been like that

prior to the military, but the military adds a dimension it to your life, which is hard to

articulate unless you have been there.

HH: In the Vietnam War, there were certain cases when people would be dismissed with

less than honorable discharges. What would you say about that in terms of the training

people underwent in boot camp?

WP: During the Vietnam War, I am going to give you an approximation of a figure here,

I think about 80% of those who served in the military were draftees. They were drafted;

they didn’t want to go. Only 20% enlisted. During the 60’s it was really a turbulent time.

Things were changing because society was changing. That old term “hippies” came out,

people began using drugs freely, the morals of the country changed, it became more of

the “me” generation. I guess we were the baby-boomers. It was a selfish generation. A lot

of young people used the excuse they wanted world peace, they wanted people to get

along, as an excuse to do whatever they wanted without any controls, rules, or discipline.

Those same people were drafted into the military, and many of them didn’t feel like they

had to adhere to military discipline or follow the law. They would do things, often times

intentional, to get a dishonorable discharge because they didn’t want to serve. No one

wants to go into combat, but I can think of numerous instances where people would

desert, they would leave, others would bring them back, and they would desert again.

They were insubordinate. I can think of many cases where they actually injured

themselves intentionally. They would shoot themselves in the foot or cut their wrist in an

attempted suicide, which really wasn’t an attempt, but they just wanted to have their

mental state tested so they could be discharged.

HH: Hmm.

WP: Dishonorable discharges or general discharges were much more frequent then

because we did not have the same kind of military we have today. Today you have a

military where everyone’s a volunteer, everyone enlists, and it’s the best military we’ve

ever had. Look, in every study that comes out, and I’m really quoting the Washington

Post here, today’s military’s IQ is higher than the public sector, and the education level is

much higher than the public sector. You are getting really ambitious, aggressive,

intelligent people who want to serve. They have a different mentality today than the

military I was in; the one I was in wasn’t a very good military. We had 500,000 people in

Vietnam, we were drafting thousands every month, and you are bound to get people who

just can’t adjust to military life or don’t want to be there, so it’s not unusual that we had a

lot of dishonorable or general discharges at that time. It’s to be expected.

HH: What do you remember hearing about the Gulf of Tonkin incident right after it

happened?

(11 minutes 51 seconds)

WP: You’re talking about really the start of the war?

HH: Right.

WP: Its very vague to me. I know that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution came out after that.

Some say it was a provocation by us to go into South Vietnam. I don’t remember much of

the details at this point. I think the thinking not only of Lyndon Johnson, who greatly

expanded the war, but John Kennedy is… Leaders at that time seemed to me as a kid, to

have a greater sense of duty and principle. John Kennedy believed in SEATO, you know

the South East Asia Treaty Organization?

HH: Right.

WP: (Coughs) John Kennedy and this country had given his word, and that meant

something to John Kennedy, I think. (Cough) Lyndon Johnson, that meant something to

him, and to Richard Nixon. Unfortunately, we fought that war in the worst way possible.

I’m kind of going to get off topic for a moment.

HH: That’s all right.

WP: We haven’t won a war since WWII. We had a truce in Korea. We did not win

Vietnam, we lost, or it was really a truce. We didn’t lose it; the politicians had us

withdraw. We’ve never won anything. When you think about every… Desert Storm, we

withdrew before going into Iraq, Bagdad. Even this long war in Afghanistan and Iraq we

haven’t won it because we don’t know how to win. There was a different kind of leaders.

Vietnam, (coughs) is where, and I’m sure its probably several years have gone by or

different decades, but as a kid I can remember the politicians lost the war for us. We had

(clears throat) very weak politicians who did not want to fight. They were more interested

in being reelected. In principle they said, “Yes, let’s do what we are placed to do”, but

politicians are great for gaging the wind; they put their finger in the wind and whichever

the way the wind blows, they change their positions. It’s just a way of life. We could

have easily won the Vietnam War. We could have won every war we’ve been in, but we

don’t seem to have the will to win, and I think that’s what you see a lot of people,

especially conservatives, feel today. We’ll sacrifice thousands of men and women’s lives

in battle but not win because we want to be almost politically correct in the way we’re

perceived in the world. We are the only country that does that, certainly the only one in

the western world that does it.

HH: Right. That’s really interesting. Were you able to gage at all the opinion of the

general public on military involvement in Vietnam?

(14 minutes 49 seconds)

WP: Oh yeah, they were all against it. Well no, I take that back, it depends on where you

went. My sister was, when I went to Vietnam in ‘68, she was a junior at Berkley, and I

remember spending a few days at Berkley with her. Berkley was a hot bed of radicalism

in the 60’s, and you couldn’t wear a uniform there, but for every person who was against

it, usually it was young people who were against it, not the older folks. Older folks had

grown up during the Depression. They had been in WWII, many of them, so these were

tough guys, and these men and women had had a tough life. I think that that generation

got us, my generation the baby-boomers, and I think they made a terrible mistake. I think

they wanted my generation, the young people in the 60’s, to have a better life than they

had in the 30’s and 40’s, and so they spoiled the baby-boomers. There’s a whole wave of

thought, belief, and practices that came about in the 60’s. There was a famous Dr. Spock

who believed you should never spank a child or punish a child. The thoughts among the

parents at that time were “get my kid and make his life better than my life was”, and I

think that we- The “greatest generation” as Tom Brokaw called them got my generation,

the baby-boomers, and then we were the fathers and mothers of the generation “Nexters”

and the “Millennials”, and I think we have all done a very bad job because we don’t hold

our kids accountable. There are not the same morals we grew up with. There are not the

same values. Education doesn’t mean as much as everyone articulates it does, but it really

doesn’t. There was a (clear throat) news clip on the news today that showed a reporter

asking a question at Yale to the students. Did you see that?

HH: No, I have not.

WP: (Coughs) They were showing just how, and this is at Yale, the questions were

around doing away with the first amendment. To the students they were saying, “People

are allowed to say things, which just hurt us, and we need to do away with the first

amendment”, and you had students at Yale saying, “I’m with you. We need get rid of the

first amendment.” It’s an ignorance of, really, what this country’s all about. Even in

academics I don’t think the kids are as smart as we like to think they are, the average kid,

but can you change it? No, because its human behavior. You know every great

civilization has had those peaks where you start off impoverished, poor, and you build it

up. Its human nature that when you have everything and you want for nothing, you’re not

hungry, you become bored, and you have other people doing your work for you. Its

human nature these great civilizations fell; it kind of eventually evolved into chaos. I

know you’ve heard the stories; the Rome was the longest alive republic ever, probably

about 500 years, and when you look at what the Romans were able to do, it is just simply

amazing. But you had other great empires after that; you had the Greeks, the Ottomans,

the Turks, the British Empire, and now America. I think we are going there, too. I just

think some of your questions make me think more about this breakdown we have in our

country.

HH: Mm-hmm. In January 1968, the Tet Offensive began and caught the Americans who

were stationed in Vietnam off guard. How do you think the Tet Offensive influenced

your experience fighting?

WP: (Cough) I got there after Tet in ’68. It really didn’t influence it. (Cough) I think the

influence was for soldiers, soldiers don’t get involved in politics, they fight, and they kill

the bad guy. That’s what your role is. (Cough) I think the influence the influence was in

our political realm back here because you had 435 congressmen and 100 senators saw

that during that period of Tet in 1968 we had five or six hundred Americans killed in a

two to three day period. I think they gaged the public’s response, and that’s when you

started hearing more and more uproar from the public about “we need to end the war and

bring people home”. For the guy on the ground, the guy in combat, we were too busy

fighting to be worried about arguments and bickering here. We had a one year tour, and

we wanted to get that one year over and get out of there.

HH: Right. In some of my research I saw that parts of the Tet Offensive were

broadcasted to the American public, and it really aroused very negative sentiment

towards to war, so do you think there was an increased pressure to fight more

aggressively or to change your missions?

(20 minutes 6 seconds)

WP: (Coughs) No, I think the military response under General Westmorland, I think was

the commanding general of American forces, and Secretary of Defense I believe was

McNamara, what you saw was an increase in number of personnel and resources sent to

Vietnam. We sent another hundred thousand people probably. The problem is that while

the executive branch and the military guys knew how to win and they got what they

wanted, they sent people over there, the politicians, it’s kind of a circle, the politicians,

members of the House and Senate, even the president, they gaged the public response, as

you indicated. They saw that there was an undercurrent of people who were beginning to

be against the war and said, “we have to win it quickly, let’s throw the resources in.”

HH: Mm-hmm

WP: But you throw the resources in, but then you say, “don’t really fight that hard, don’t

go into Cambodia, don’t shoot towards the west into Cambodia, don’t shoot towards the

northwest, towards Laos, you can only bomb the open areas in North Vietnam. It was a

war that was fought by troops who were handcuffed, so there were all kinds of dynamics

going on. There was an undercurrent to end the war, but we knew we couldn’t win it

because we weren’t allowed to fight it.

HH: Speaking about ending the war and not fighting as hard as you possibly can, when

Johnson announced that bombing would be restricted to below the 20th parallel in March

1968, which limited only 10% of North Vietnamese territory to bombing, to what extent

did it impact your attacks on the North Vietnamese?

WP: It was devastating to the troops on the ground because you’ll hear about something

called the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and what the Ho Chi Minh Trail was, if this is North

Vietnam in the north (moves his hand in front of him), here’s Cambodia (moves hand to

the side), and here’s South Vietnam (moves hand downward), the Ho Chi Minh Trail

wasn’t a single trail, there were hundreds or thousands of little trails, we call them

trotters, beautiful little paths that came through the jungle. When you limit the bombing

to south of that parallel, what you did effectively was allow them to continue to build

their war machine and simply circumvent it. It’s similar to what you hear of the criticism

of Obama; you have ISIS with oil tankers, but we won’t bomb them because there is

some issue with politics. When you get into war you need to decide if you’re going to

win. If you’re not going to win it you need to quit and get out. So our American troops

were being told to win a war but win it with one hand tied behind your back. That was a

bad move on Johnson. I don’t think any military man would say it was a good move.

HH: Did your role in the war change when Nixon was elected in 1969 or did the policy

stay similar?

WP: (Cough) No, it changed. Nixon reinstated the bombing. We were elated because for

a guy like me who was an infantry guy in the field the whole time, you may not realize

this, but only one in ten troops in Vietnam were ever in combat. Most of them, nine out

of ten were support troops: truck drivers, quartermasters, clerks, cooks, morticians, air

conditioner repairmen, or mechanics. Only one in ten really carried a weapon, and

unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, I was in a combat unit, an infantry unit. For a guy

like me who was digging a hole every night out there, ambushing them at night, and they

would ambush us during the day, it was great because what it meant was that there would

be less of the enemy out there for us to fight, there would be less resources coming south

to resupply those NBA shoulders, who were the South Vietnamese. So, Nixon’s

reinstatement of bombing in North Vietnam was great.

HH: The policy of “Vietnamization” was made to increase and train South Vietnamese

forces while carefully reducing the number of U.S. combat troops. How did you feel

about that policy?

WP: Even as a young kid, because I was over there when I was 18 and 19, it was a

failure. (Clears throat) If you were to look at that war, the Americans at the height of the

war, we had 5,000 troops; the South Vietnamese probably had 1 million troops or more in

uniform. They did very little fighting. Why should they fight when the Americans were

over there? (Clears throat) And when they did fight they didn’t perform very well. The

best soldier out of everybody in Vietnam was the North Vietnamese soldier. He was

better than the American soldier and tougher than the South Vietnamese soldier.

“Vietnamization” was pouring money down a rat hole. It was money being sent to

Vietnam that was training soldiers that didn’t want to fight because they knew that the

Americans would fight for them. The Americans thought they would fight, but we

couldn’t because leaders here said, “you know, we don’t want you to fight as hard as you

want to fight.” It was destined. We were destined to lose that war.

HH: What were your interactions like with the South Vietnamese?

(25 minutes 37 seconds)

WP: I didn’t have a lot with them because of the areas I was in. I was up in the jungle on

the Cambodian border in the northwest part of Vietnam. I left the field, I had been in the

infantry unit for seven months when I was injured, or wounded, and then I went over, and

I flew as a door gunner on a helicopter for about four and a half months. I saw more of

the South Vietnamese soldiers then because we would support them, not just the

American troops, as well. And I saw just how poorly they performed. For instance,

there’d be an ARVN. ARVN is “Army of Republic of Vietnam”, the South Vietnamese

Army. They would be in a firefight. They would have some wounded and killed, they

would call for Medevac, and our little helicopter would come flying in and usually it was

a pretty hot LZ, or landing zone. There were a lot of bullets flying. You’d get down under

the trees where the helicopter could hover, where we could throw the wounded or dead

on, and the helicopter would be swarmed by ARVN soldiers trying to jump on the

helicopter because they didn’t want to fight. You’d literally have to beat them with a rifle

and sometimes point the rifle at them to get them to leave because they were scared. It

was not a very oppressive military. Now, I’ve heard some people, especially special-

forces guys who trained them, who will defend them. I would say if they had units they

could defend, good for them, but by and large the regular ARVN or South Vietnamese

soldier was not a good soldier.

HH: Wow. That’s really interesting. (WP laughs) In 1970, troops were sent into

Cambodia to destroy communist bases. Can you tell me anything about the impact of

that?

WP: Yeah. It should have been done years before. You have to remember the Cambodian

border, where that invasion went in, North Vietnam, from north to south, was divided up

into four areas of operation. Up north on the North Vietnam border it was ICOR they

called it, Central Highlands was IICOR, and then IIICOR was about 100 to 150 miles

north of Saigon from the Pacific Ocean all the way over to Cambodia. The American

invasions led by the first Calvary division went in, and I had been in the first Cavalry

Division, that’s why I know it so well. After I left, they went in up around what’s called

the parrot’s beak and the elephant ear, its all the jungle triple canopy. Major battles up

there because for years Cambodia, that part of the area of Cambodia west of South

Vietnam, had been off limits to Americans shooting, or bombing, or fighting there. The

North Vietnamese, as I had mentioned, would use the Ho Chi Minh Trail to take supplies

down, come right up to the Vietnamese border in Cambodia, and just set up their base

camps. We had never been able to attack them there. That’s where their supplies were.

That’s where their logistics were, so when Nixon made the decision to go in, it was a big

decision and we killed thousands of them, and they killed a lot of us, but we destroyed

their infrastructure there, which saved American lives. It was a good move, but it should

have been done years before. Again, it goes back to my point, we let politicians fight that

war, not the military, and politicians caused a lot of deaths.

HH: Can you describe your typical day during the time when you were at war?

(29 minutes 22 seconds)

WP: Oh gosh. (Clears throat) I’ll give you two ways. (Clears throat) As an infantryman,

and remember the infantryman is the lowest of the low, he’s the rifle of the guy that

fights, he is the tip of the spear. (Cough) You (laughs), its kind of primitive if you think

about it, there was about 100 men in the field, it was a company-size operation. We each

carried a rucksack that weighed about 100 pounds with ammo, food, and water. (Clear

throat) During the day we would get a direction because we would be looking for a North

Vietnamese bunker complex toward where the enemy was supposed to be. (Cough) We

would start humping toward that direction. The North Vietnamese normally did not move

during the day because we had air support, and we had helicopters and aircraft looking

for them. They hunkered down during the day went in their bunkers or under the trees

and blended in with the jungle, but that’s when they would set their ambushes up for us,

so we would walk into an ambush, and we’d have a big a firefight. (Cough) We’d call in

air support or artillery from a nearby landing zone, and after the firefight you go out to do

a body count. If you have any wounded or dead they’re collected, and medevac comes

out and flies them off. At night it’s kind of like a wagon train movie. I don’t know if you

ever saw any old west movies where the settlers, as their going west, there are these

Conestoga wagons and at night they put them in a circle. (Clears throat) That way when

the Indians when they attacked they can’t get through. Well that’s what the infantry does.

(Hope sneezes) There’re four of us to a hole. We dug a hole like a grate, about the size of

a grate, in a circle, and at night we would put our claymore mines out in front, about 30

feet in front of us, and in front of those we would put trip flares, which are essentially a

little flare and a piece of wire that will run to a tree, tied to a tree. There’s a pin in the

flare, so if someone’s walking or touches it, the pin comes out of the flare, releases the

flare when it explodes and lights up this phosphorus light, and then we blow our mines,

which have about 720 ball bearings in it. (Clears throat) So, you dig your hole, you

hunker down that night, and as many times as not you would ambush them. We would

catch them because we would always set up an ambush on a trail, and we would get them

coming and going out of Cambodia. In the morning you saddle up, put your gear on, and

you start off again, and you do that for a year.

HH: I know you have won many awards for your service in Vietnam. Can you tell me the

stories behind your awards?

WP: (Cough) I don’t remember most of them. The ones I got from flying, I was shot

down three times, I can’t remember because it really is hazy. Someone else, well, let me

take a step back- you know when you watch a crime program and you say, “well, there’s

eye witnesses, but this guy was not convicted. People saw him do what he did”? An

eyewitness is usually the worst witness because you, and I, and your father, and your

mother can see something happen out here (points out the window), and each of us is

going to see it completely differently. It’s going to be amazing how different it is. The

officers that wrote us up for those metals, I just don’t remember some of it. I just

remember shooting, I remember getting shot down. I remember people dying, but it was

50 years ago for me. I just don’t remember it. I just remember you live with a constant

fear is what I do remember because (cough) when you tell people, and it seems a little

cool now, and it seems harsh to me, the greatest pleasure you had, and this sounds really

rough, as a grunt or combat guy is when your unit killed those guys because it was a

feeling of elation, not because you wanted to take a life. You didn’t view them as human

because after being over there for months there’s none of this “you’re a person”; it’s the

enemy.

HH: Mm-hmm.

WP: What it really meant to us was it’s another day we’re going to live. Its either we kill

them or they would kill us. But as far as my awards, I was with a lot of really brave

people, and I’ll send you a video of one of the firefights. It was on the news, and I just

got it. We had a reunion at Nantucket, and all the six of us who were still alive. We were

overrun on a firebase on the Cambodian border of March of ’69 by three regimens of

North Vietnamese soldiers. NBC flew out there and CBS the next morning. They did a

film, interviewed some of lieutenants and officers, and had all the bodies piled up. I’ll

send it to you. It will give you an idea of what the evening news looked like in 1969 and

how the war is reported. It’s totally different than what you see now. I’ll send it to you;

it’s just about a two-minute video, or three minutes.

HH: That would be great. After you came home from Vietnam what was your next step?

What were you planning to do after that?

(34 minutes 55 seconds)

WP: (Cough) If I had extended in Vietnam another 30 days I would have been

discharged. I could have had an early out. The rule was that if you had less than five

months on your tour for the military to do they would discharge you when you came

home. I had six months and I didn’t want to stay an extra 30 days in Vietnam. I was just

too scared, (phone goes off) so I came home, and I was assigned it to Fort Carson,

Colorado, to what was called then the Fifth Mechanized Infantry, it was a tank unit. I did

five, six months there, and I was discharged. (Cough) I went to school. I was only 20

when I got out of the Army, so I went to school in Colorado for a year, then I came back

here and became a policeman, and I’ll tell you why I became a policeman. You’re going

to think this is crazy. I was in school in Colorado. Now here I am, we didn’t know

anything about PTSD; that had never been talked about, it just didn’t exist. I think it’s an

abused diagnosis anyways. I remember watching the evening news in college, and

watching kids here in D.C. burn the American flag. The demonstrations were called

“mayday demonstrations” in 1970. They had put buses completely around the

Whitehouse, end-to-end buses to keep demonstrators from getting on the Whitehouse

grounds. (Clears throat) When I saw American kids burning the American flag, the flag at

that we’d all fought for and so many people died for, I was so angry, and I saw those cops

hitting these kids in the head and people fighting and I said, “I’m going to go back there”.

I actually was so angry with my generation I came back here and became a cop and went

to AU and did it for three years. So I guess I had a lot of anger, but my anger was never

with military, military has always stood by civilians. My anger was with my generation

and because they were really dumb, and my anger was with the politicians who sold us

out. They never let us win.

HH: During my research I ran across this picture. When you came home from Vietnam,

from the Vietnam War, did you experience any negative feelings towards you for

participating in the war? (Pass picture) … And beneath the “hell” it says “-icopters” (see

Appendix A).

WP: I’ll tell you, I didn’t personally, but that’s because I was very cautious. As I had

mentioned my sister was a student at Berkeley, which was the hotbed of radicalism, and

they were always protesting and rioting. When I went to Vietnam from Berkeley, I knew

not to wear my uniform on campus. In fact, I remember some of the students, a male

student, a friend of hers, and I found it shocking a kid from the south was telling me,

“You don’t have to Vietnam. You can go to Canada. You know, every week we have a

bus full of kids that we sent to Canada. We don’t let them go into the military. They don’t

show up for their drafting.” I’m thinking, “God, that’s like a felony. Its against the law

what you’re doing, telling them to do.” When I came back from Vietnam I stopped at

Berkeley and stayed with my sister for three days, too. It was the same thing; I took my

uniform off right away. I just didn’t wear it because there’s no need to get in a fight or get

emotional when these kids really don’t know what they’re talking about. They have

opinions, which are OK, but they haven’t had experience. Opinions are good, but

experience is better, so I just ignored those groups even when I was assigned to Fort

Carson. Colorado was a very conservative state at that time, and Fort Carson is a military

base, so we didn’t have many demonstrations there. Jane Fonda marched through there

one time. They let her march. But I was never exposed to a lot of that.

HH: I think one thing that’s really fascinating about the response to the Vietnam War is

that a lot of veterans came home and they formed groups of veterans against the war

because they were so distraught about what had proceeded. So why do you think you

never had the same reaction?

(39 minutes 29 seconds)

WP: This is going to be a real general statement. I look at the people I knew, well, let’s

take a step back- when you have 2 million men and women in uniform, you’re going to

have every personality under the sun represented. You’re going to every belief

represented. You’re going to have people who are emotionally strong and emotionally

weak. You’re going to have people who are troubled and people who are prone to crime

and drug use. Military is just like the general population. When I came back from

Vietnam and as I grew older and the war was still going on, I always found that those

men who had been in combat, and this is a general rule, those men who had been in

combat units, that means infantry, artillery, armor, special forces, the guys that actually

did the fighting were the more normal people. Those were the guys who you didn’t see

doing this. The guys who you saw doing it were the ones who had never really

experienced it, but it, for whatever reason, meant more to them. And they’re the ones

who, today its called PTSD, and those are the guys who will show up at the Vietnam

wall. You won’t recognize this, but years ago when the Vietnam wall was built you could

go down there and you’d see all these guys walking around with all these ribbons and

patches, and they looked like they came right out of central casting. When you started

looking at them for a military guy you could tell they were all frauds. They had a military

ribbons and unit patches from units that weren’t there or units that were not part of the

army or marine cor. There is a lot of fraud out there. There are though, like you see, there

are people who genuinely were against the war, and they felt betrayed. I don’t disagree

with them if that’s their personal opinion. I disagree with those who didn’t serve or didn’t

want to go not because “the war is wrong” but because they were spoiled and didn’t want

to go.

HH: Do you think most of the disapproval arose out of dislike of Government actions, of

the way the government was handling it, or the cultural differences between Vietnam and

the United States?

WP: (Cough) I don’t really know how to answer that. I think that most of the

disagreements, if I just wear to guess, I believe that you have to look at that age group.

That was a young war. Like I said, I was in an infantry unit and the average age was

probably 19. We were 18, 19, and 20. Our leaders were 21 and 22. We weren’t as smart

as we thought we were, but then neither were the people who demonstrated. I think

people have a tendency to always pick what’s best for them personally, and sometimes

politics is a good way to reach that goal. To articulate a policy even though you don’t

agree on it, it’s going to save your bacon. I was disillusioned with the war, but I wasn’t

disillusioned with the military. I was disillusioned with the generation I was a part of,

which I saw as a weak generation because we had been mollycoddled, and I knew that as

a kid that we never had it as tough as my parents had it. It’s just a personal opinion, I

guess. You could talk to someone else who would say, “oh no, we had some real strong

beliefs about it, and studied it and it was a corrupt war”, and that’s okay if they can

articulate it, but I always give more due or respect to someone who’s experienced it.

Those are the guys I’ll listen to, not to a guy back here who from day one had selfish

reasons for opposing the war.

HH: Okay. Historian Howard Zinn feels that the United States “made a maximum

military effort with everything a short of atomic bombs to defeat a nationalist,

revolutionary movement in a tiny peasant country and failed.” What do you think about

this statement?

WP: That is just a boldfaced inaccuracy, a lie on its face. We did not make every effort to

win. We made very little effort to win that war. (Cough) The resources that we had, the

airpower we had, the military might we had: we could have won that war, and this is not

myself talking; this is historians and real military men who have been there. We could

have won that war in a matter of months, but we were never allowed to turn loose. We

were never allowed to go into North Vietnam. Never once did we go in physically, only

airpower, kind of like what the president is doing with ISIS now. Unless you are going to

fight to win, don’t fight. The American military has been in a terrible predicament. Go

out and do tit for tat, trade punches, and if you win, great. They just outlasted us. I can’t

believe he’s quoted as saying that. That’s really wrong.

HH: Robert Owens, who’s a Ph.D., argued that America did win the war, but that people

don’t believe that we won because their “delusion builds upon the absolute necessity of

forcing Vietnam out of its proper Cold War context. Once this was accomplished it was

no longer a battle in a larger war, it became instead a singular event, which it never was.”

(45 minutes 20 seconds)

WP: I can’t disagree with that. I understand what he’s saying. Yeah, it’s not an absolute

war such as World War II when we destroyed Germany, and we went and occupied them.

That’s a complete war. Then in WWI when we defeated Germany, but we didn’t occupy

them. We learned our lesson this time, we occupied Germany and we’re still there. So it’s

not a complete and utter victory, it is a victory only in the way he says it that we left

there, we changed Communism, and it didn’t spread it to the other countries. There’s too

much there to debate with this guy, so I’m not going to disagree with him entirely, but I

think there’s more to it. It’s pretty simplistic.

HH: One of the other things that he argued was obviously the Paris Peace Accords; we

did leave on-

WP: Our terms.

HH: -our terms. Would you consider that a win for us?

WP: No, I don’t. We didn’t really leave on our terms. We left because- we negotiated.

Kissinger is brilliant, brilliant guy, brilliant negotiator, but he could only do so much. We

saved face if that’s what he’s talking about by calling it basically making it a truce, and

saying, kind of the way we have done with Iraq, and we obviously haven’t learned our

lesson. We’re going to give Iraq all the money and airplanes and aircraft, and their going

to now fight to defend themselves because we feel comfortable with the position we’ve

left them in. That’s what we said about the South Vietnamese, and we knew they couldn’t

fight or win. After we pulled out they were destroyed so quickly it was unbelievable.

HH: Larry Hutchens, who was interviewed in a past oral history project, was asked why

the United States did not leave Vietnam sooner, and he replied that, “you have to play the

macho part. ‘We’re the US. We are the strongest nation in the world, and we’re going to

make you do this. Then they got a hold of something they couldn’t handle”. What are

your thoughts about the way the government was controlling Vietnam. Do you think they

had control over the situation?

WP: Well, I think (cough), I think in simplistic terms he’s right. When we went to war,

we were the big dog. We were the most powerful nation, and when this little country

challenges us, and we should have been able to win quickly, and I keep saying we could

have won quickly. Well, we didn’t have our heart in it, so we stepped into quicksand, and

we didn’t know what to do. We kept standing there and sinking slower and slower and

slower. If anything we’ve learned, I think he’s alluding to that, if you’re going to go to

war, then go to war to win. All out destruction, do whatever it takes to win, then come

home, and do it for peace, but please don’t drag it out like a cancer patient going through

chemo for years. That’s what we’ve done to ourselves. Our resolve is what bothers me as

a country. We don’t seem to have the will to close the deal. No one likes war. In fact, the

biggest proponents, and they’ll probably agree with some of the things I’m saying, are the

ones who had been in combat, and I think once you see and have been involved in people

dying you never want to see war. War is brutal. It’s not like watching it on TV and then

getting up and pausing the movie, then going to get a Coke and a sandwich and coming

back and sitting down. It’s real, and when you kill someone they don’t get up. There’s

blood everywhere and human body parts lying around. It’s not like, “well, everything will

be okay tomorrow.” So, military guys don’t like war, but they also know you have to end

it quickly or it will be a sustained problem.

HH: How would you say your thoughts on the Vietnam War have changed over the years

since you’ve left?

(49 minutes 35 seconds)

WP: I would say, if anything, I would still remain most angry with civilian leadership.

I’m angry with them because we made the decision to go there, and rather than make a

decisive decision to either win or withdraw they dillydallied. They dillydallied the way

this president’s doing it in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’re letting people die. We’re

spending billions of dollars, and we’re not accomplishing anything, so either win or die.

My disgust comes from all politicians. I’ve been part of the political scene for 40 years.

I’ve dealt with those guys. I’m not sure if they’re any better today. I don’t think they are,

but I know then it was certainly of indecisive conscience they fought that war. The

presidents we had didn’t have the strength, both Johnson and Nixon, to win it.

HH: What was it like to know that two years after America signed the Paris Peace

Accords the Communists in North Vietnam took over South Vietnam?

WP: (Cough) We could predict that was going to happen. Again, the parallels are so

clear. We learned nothing in Vietnam, as you can see in Iraq. Anyone who has interaction

with people and has had conflict knows that once you surrender a position of strength

you’re going to lose. As we started drawing down military to 100,000 and 50,000, North

Vietnamese tanks just rolled across and their troops came forward into the country. And

it’s poorly lead and poor performing South Vietnamese army just capitulated.

HH: One of the primary reasons that United States got involved in Vietnam was the

“domino theory”, which was the idea that by going into Vietnam we would be able to

prevent the spread of Communism to other countries. Do you think this was a valid

reason to go to war?

WP: (Cough) I don’t know. I think that going back to that South East Asia Treaty

Organization, which we were a part of, we had committed. Kind of like today you have

NATO, there’s a commitment there. Going back to Eisenhower we first started sending

some support there and advisors, to Kennedy who put the first combat people in, to

Johnson. I think each president understood that it was American prestige on the line. If

you make a commitment to your allies you have to live up to it. So, did they do the right

thing? Yeah, I think they did. They simply lived up to the principles of “do what you say

you’re going to do” and “stand by your friends”. Whether that old domino theory really

applied, whether all of Southeast Asia was going to go, I don’t know. You have to

remember China was really strongly behind the North Vietnamese, and in firefights we

used to kill Chinese regularly, Chinese advisors. I think the fear was always if they took

over South Vietnam without a fight you would then spread into Malaysia, Singapore,

over in Burma, and Thailand. Instead of having a small area to deal with, if you let it

spread it becomes a massive problem. I have no idea what their strategy was other than

the fact that that was a commitment the United States made with SEATO, and we lived

up to it.

HH: Many Vietnam War veterans do not have any desire to go back to Vietnam. Have

you gone back to Vietnam and how do you feel about it?

WP: I’ve been back three times. I loved it. When I came back as a kid I hated the

Vietnamese. I can tell you, I, ugh, the thought of eating Vietnamese food or smelling

anything from Vietnam, or rice. It was just- eew. I couldn’t stand it, and I always had

dreams as a kid from the time I came back right up until the time I went back to Vietnam

for the first time in 1995. I would have dreams about Vietnam every night. It was always

the same kind of dreams: I’d be in a firefight and every time I’d pull the trigger my rifle

wouldn’t fire, it just would never fire, it was just the same thing. I went back with 12

other veterans. It was still a closed country, and we spent three weeks there and went

back to the old areas we had been in. Of course, then the North Vietnamese had to escort

you. Then I went up to Hanoi, great trip. It was very cathartic. I went back again twice. I

went in ’95, ’04, then again in ’07. The reason it’s so cathartic is it’s not the same

country. 85% of the people alive there today were not alive during that war. They don’t

know that war. They’re all very pro-American. They’re capitalists. They want to be like

Americans, they want to talk English. They’re friendly. It’s just, its like watching black

and white TV your whole life, and you wake up one day and everything is in color. I just

saw it a different way. I like it. I’d go back again. In fact, we’re talking about going back

next year, a group of us.

HH: Did it change your perspective on the war to see how friendly the North Vietnamese

are now?

(55 minutes 40 seconds)

WP: No, I can separate the two because actually the South Vietnamese and the North

Vietnamese are still totally different people. The north is great. They’re very solemn,

kind of like an eastern block country. The South Vietnamese and South Vietnam is really

booming. The economy is booming. Korean money, Japanese money, (clears throat)

Germans, they are all throwing money in there, and the economy is just booming

compared to what it used to be. No, because I separate today from Vietnam. Then it was a

war. We were fighting against them, an evil country; they were fighting us, an evil

country. I see no relationship between the two. I just have a warmer feeling about the

people now than I did.

HH: Do you think any of the people there harbor any bitterness?

WP: Oh yeah.

HH: I know I looked at some newspaper articles after the Paris Peace Accords, and all

the South Vietnamese were very hostile towards the Americans because they thought that

they had been abandoned.

WP: Yeah, well they should. We committed to them that we were going to stay and win

that war. They were hostile because they knew they were going to lose and they were

going to become Communists. That’s why they were upset, but they also should have

looked inward and said, “Look, the Americans have given us a trillion dollars for our

military. Our military can’t do anything, same way the Iraq army can’t do anything,

because we don’t have to fight: the Americans will fight for us”. That reaction is to be

expected by people who have something to lose. I don’t know. I can remember the

Vietnamese people when I went back in ’95. I remember we went up to Hué. Hué was

were they had a big battle during Tet, and (cough) some of the older Vietnamese who

were my age, when you go into a little stall to buy a souvenir or something they didn’t

want to see you. They were very cold, but they probably lost family members. I have a

friend now, probably a number of friends over there. His name is Wong, you see Wong

and I are the same age, and he’s a very wealthy Vietnamese industrialist. When I talk to

Wong and I say, “You know Wong, so I fought against you, right”, he says, “oh, no, no, I

was a student”, which means he was VC. He was a Vietcong, and he’s now prospered

because that’s the only way you could prosper in a communist society is to be one of

them, but we’re great friends. They say the best friends are old warriors who used to

oppose each other because they both understand what the other one went through.

HH: Wow. That’s interesting. It’s nice that there can be more of a friendship now than

there was back then.

WP: Oh yeah, its always been that way. You’ll see the old newsreels and the programs

today where the former enemies in all these wars are together now. Going back to WWII,

you see the Japanese and the American troops visiting Iwo Jima together and visiting

some battlefields in the South Pacific together. See, you have to bury the hatchet. It

wasn’t you fighting individually, but its really country against country. When you kill

these guys, and they would kill us, I’m sure we go through their packs and their gear and

we would burn everything, but I’m sure you would find pictures of their children, and

their wives, and their love letters. There’s a human side to war, and it’s a horrible thing.

Its not lost on any of us.

HH: Is there anything that I haven’t mentioned you would like to talk about?

WP: I don’t know. I think (clears throat) if I were to leave you with something, which

concerns me- this is history. I’m sure not if even your teacher was alive then, when this

war took place. I’m concerned with the direction of the country. I’m concerned that we

haven’t learned from our mistakes in the past. I’m concerned that we don’t have… while

we have the capability, and we have the intelligence, and we have young men and women

who can do anything, I’m concerned that we’re going to lose this all because our fabric is

so torn and so weak and our… I just think we’ve become a nation that is very indecisive.

I’ve watched it now, not only in Vietnam, but I’ve watched it now in Dessert Storm,

where we did great, but we didn’t close the deal. I’ve watched it as I said in Iraq, and I

watched it in Afghanistan. I’ve watched it in the Middle East. Israel is a good example.

Israel is totally abandoned now. We have the Israelis not dealing with us. Israel is dealing

with Putin. They’ve actually gone to Putin because they can’t trust our country, our

president.

HH: Do you think there’s anyway that we can rebuild the fabric of our country?

(1 hours 0 minutes 55 seconds)

WP: I don’t know. I’ve been to Israel so many times. The Israelis don’t trust us, and they

have every right not to. Our military is a great ally. Our military and the Israelis can do

anything, but our leaders don’t have the courage and they don’t have the perspective of

history. Human behavior is one of the most predictable parts of our lives. You can predict

up human behavior because you’ll really always perform the same way for the most part;

there will be aberration. Down through history people behave the same way generation

after generation. You know, you can read a manuscript that’s three or four thousand years

old from India, or China, or the Middle East, and you can read the words and their

thoughts, and you can read up something written today, and there’s no difference really.

People think the same way. Their values are the same, so you can predict as we start

sliding into certain directions how the country is going to perform and what’s going to

happen in the world. I just hope our next batch of leaders in this country don’t have to

learn through some difficult times to lead, but someday you’ll be a professor or

something and you’ll be asking someone about the next war.

HH: Mm-hmm.

WP: Yeah.

HH: All right. That’s it.

WP: That’s it. Well, that was easy.

HH: Thank you very much.

WP: Thank you. I’m not sure if I gave you anything you can work with.

HH: No, that was perfect. It was great.

Interview Analysis

Philosopher Søren Kierkegaard once said, “Life can only be understood

backwards; but it must be lived forwards” (Hereford). Progress and the lure of the future

dominate people’s thoughts, so it is easy to overlook important parts of America’s past

that could help inform one’s decisions and inspire him or her to be positive influence in

society. One of the most meaningful methods of exploring history is through oral history,

which is a collection of thoughts from people who have witnessed or been a part of

historical events, thereby offering a different perspective than a traditional textbook.

History is constantly changing, can be interpreted multiple ways, and has a profound

effect on people’s lives, and the future. Oral history is a beneficial source that provides

valuable lessons and wisdom to prevent past mistakes from being repeated. Since each

person sees history in a different light, it is crucial to examine all possible perspectives in

order to get the most comprehensive understanding of the past and be able to understand

daily life during certain time periods. Also, traditional history is typically impersonal and

often is seen as facts to memorize; however, hearing about personal experiences and

memories makes the past come alive in a more meaningful way. Pertaining to

controversial events such as the Vietnam War, it is especially important to hear from

people who actually witnessed these events to explore a genuine, realistic version of the

past. From his personal experience, Mr. William Pickle supports the idea that America

lost the Vietnam War, yet, unlike others, he finds that politics, not the military, lead to

America’s defeat.

Mr. William Pickle was a typical Southern young man during the time that the

Vietnam War broke out. Instead of being drafted, Mr. Pickle enlisted into the U.S. Army

because for generations the men in his family had been in the Army and he thought it was

a responsibility he had to his country. The morals and culture of the United States were in

a period of transition because of the emergence of hippies and the upbringing of the

baby-boomers; consequently, the majority of young individuals in America did not

support the fighting. Boot camp was grueling and was designed make sure people could

follow orders and act in accordance with military guidelines because the frontline was a

dangerous and frightful place to be. Once in the field, days were spent looking for North

Vietnamese and engaging in firefights, and nights were spend sleeping behind the

security of claymore mines. It was easy for Mr. Pickle to recognize that there is a human

side to war, yet death was a daily occurrence because it meant, “another day we’re going

to live” (Harrison 47). The aspect of the war that most frustrates Mr. Pickle is that the

leaders of the United States were not decisive in either winning or withdrawing, and that,

“we learned nothing in Vietnam” (Harrison 56), as can be seen in United States foreign

policy today. As the war came to a close, the South Vietnamese were abandoned because

the United States was eager to leave and restore peace within its own communities. The

policy of Vietnamization was a failure, and the South Vietnamese were bad warriors who

sought to take advantage of the U.S, which they presumed would continue to fight their

battles. Mr. Pickle’s message is that the current fabric of the United States “is so torn and

so weak” (Harrison 60), and that to strengthen the country leaders must not overlook

history and let mistakes be repeated.

Even today the interpretation of the Vietnam War is not concrete, and historians

continue to debate whether or not America won the war, the vast majority of people

coming to the conclusion that the U.S. had been defeated. It is true that America left

Vietnam following the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 in a technical truce, but the North

Vietnamese captured South Vietnam and became a communist country only a few years

later. The American public had expected Vietnam to be a weak, unknown country that

would succumb with minimal time and effort. Unlike many others, Robert Owens PH.D

believes that America won the Vietnam War, and he uses the Paris Peace Accords and the

containment of communism to justify his claims. On the subject of people believing

America lost the war, he writes, “Secondly, keep people ignorant of the fact that

American forces withdrew in 1973, not in retreat or defeat but in accordance with a

negotiated agreement, which left South Vietnam free and intact” (Owens 225). When

asked if the truce qualified as a technical win for the United States, Mr. Pickle disagreed.

He said the United States made it appear like they had compromised and left the South

Koreans in a good position when he articulated, “That’s what we said about the South

Vietnamese, and we knew they couldn’t fight or win. After we pulled out they were

destroyed so quickly it was unbelievable” (Harrison 54). While Owens finds the Paris

Peace Accords a success for the United States, William Pickle’s interpretation takes

account for the consequences that would come out of that agreement. Mr. Pickle’s

witness reinforces the idea that America lost the war because in the long run the United

States did not set up a system for South Vietnam to maintain their government and

independence by themselves, and were quickly taken over, although many troops had

fought to prevent that event from happening.

Furthermore, most of the historians that have argued that America lost the war

blame defeat on the U.S. military. America employed extensive bombing and more than 8

million GI’s were on active duty during the war. It is true, however, that for the majority

of the war American troops were not allowed to intervene in other countries that operated

with North Vietnam and for a period of time bombing areas were restricted to below the

20th parallel due to peace talks between powers, which severely limited the impact troops

could play. Howard Zinn argues, "From 1964 to 1972, the wealthiest and most powerful

nation in the history of the world made a maximum military effort, with everything short

of atomic bombs, to defeat a nationalist revolutionary country in a tiny, peasant country-

and failed" (Zinn 347). On the other hand Mr. Pickle finds that, “We had very weak

politicians who did not want to fight. They were more interested in being reelected… We

could have easily won the Vietnam War” (Harrison 36). William Pickle asserted that the

politicians simultaneously were too invested in Vietnam to leave, yet were experiencing

tremendous pressure from the public to stop fighting and therefore could not be as

aggressive. Different lenses can be used to explain the contradictions in these arguments.

Howard Zinn sees the issue from a military standpoint by describing guerillas

overpowering the modern U.S. military, and Mr. Pickle sees the issue as a political issue

dictating the quality of fighting.

Overall, I am glad that I had the opportunity to participate in the Oral History

Project, and I feel as though I learned many valuable lessons through this process. Prior

to this assignment I had limited knowledge about the Vietnam War; however, now I have

a thorough understanding of what took place in Vietnam and am able to analyze and

interpret events in greater depth. As a result of this project, I feel prepared to do extensive

research and writing in the future, and I was able to improve my speaking skills by

interviewing someone whom I had not met prior to the interview. Since this project was a

long-term assignment, I feel as though my knowledge of the Vietnam War was

strengthened and significantly expanded after each step of the process, allowing me to

make connections between this event and America as it is today. Even more meaningful

than the educational value of this project are the connections and stories that I was able to

gather. Re-reading my transcription I realized how powerful the memories and life-

lessons I recorded truly are, and I was finally able to comprehend how certain events

have the power to change our lives and create a lasting effect throughout time. On a day-

to-day basis we do not think about the fact that we are living and creating history, and I

think that this project has spurred me to be cognizant of my impact on society and strive

to be someone who strengthens American history.

Appendix A

Appendix B

Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War.

Appendix C

Henry Kissinger signing the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973 in Paris,

France.

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