CHAPTER 9

RETREAT FROM

F TER taking over the divisional medical command from Colone l A Disher on 10th March, Colonel Furnell proceeded to Agedabia and found the advanced headquarters of the 9th Australian Division about to move to a safer location . There was considerable air activity ; road convoys were suffering attack, and the forward headquarters site wa s bombed and machine-gunned both before and after the move . The only Australian medical unit in the area was Hanson's 2/8th Field Ambulance, but for the time being Furnell was acting also as A .D.M.S. of the 2nd British Armoured Division pending the arrival of Colonel Godding . THE THREATENED GERMAN ATTAC K Though the other two field ambulances of the division, the 2/3rd an d the 2/11th, had not arrived, the 2/1st Field Ambulance had begun t o move back to Egypt on 4th March, and the 2/7th Field Ambulanc e by 12th March had handed over their hospital to the 2/4th A .G.H. at Barce and had reached Ain el Gazala . During the period of change over from the to the , that is, the first two weeks of March, no great difficulties arose, as for the most part medical commit- ments were light . Nevertheless the general situation was causing anxiety . The German air force had been attacking since the Britis h occupation, and towards the end of February the Royal Navy could no t accept further risks in bringing in shipping to the harbour. Sea-borne traffic westward therefore ended at , which had a serious effect on moto r transport . The force covering Benghazi was 150 miles south of the town , and its vehicles were in poor mechanical condition. When the 9th Division arrived similar transport difficulties forced one brigade to remain i n Tobruk, and no armoured reinforcements to the 2nd British Armoure d Division were yet in sight. On 20th March the headquarters of the divisio n was relatively well forward, seventeen and a half miles south of Agedabia , and the was in the Marsa Brega area, in the neighbourhoo d of El Agheila. Neither the 24th nor 26th Brigade was then in Cyrenaica . The 2nd British Armoured Division was at El Agheila and was looke d after medically by the 3rd British Light Field Ambulance, while th e Australian brigade depended on the 2/8th Australian Field Ambulance . At that time this ambulance was not at full strength, as its "A" Compan y had not arrived . The main dressing station was working near Magrum, while the advanced dressing station of "B" Company was over seventy miles farther on. A mobile section from the M.D.S. was near the 20t h Brigade headquarters, south of Agedabia; it was some ninety-three miles away from the M .D.S. All ordinary treatment could be given in th e forward areas, and any emergency surgery performed ; but for further hospital attention it was necessary to send patients by motor ambulance

178 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T convoy along the main road to Barce, where the 2/4th Australian Genera l Hospital was established comfortably in barracks. As has been previousl y told, the 2/1st C .C.S. had been withdrawn to El Coefia near Benghazi, and on the same site the light section of the 15th British C .C.S . was now working, with its main body in Derna . This state of affairs could not last long, as there were signs of comin g pressure from the south . It was known that German armoured units wer e in Tripolitania, and that they were advancing around the Gulf of Sirte; it was evident that the forward British forces would have to withdraw . At a conference of the British High Command it was agreed that the 20th Australian Brigade would also have to move back, as with its incomplet e transport and armament it would hamper the movements of the Britis h armour. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENT S On 22nd March Furnell was informed that the 20th Brigade woul d move back, and with two battalions of the 26th Brigade now availabl e would hold the escarpment from Regima to Barce and the road thence to the north. This withdrawal affected the 2/8th Field Ambulance also, but Colonel Walker D .D.M.S ., Cyrcom, felt that the 3rd Light Field Ambulance alone would be insufficient if the Australian field ambulanc e withdrew at once from the area . Accordingly he had issued an order that the 2/8th Field Ambulance should remain temporarily where it was . This raised some difficulty, as the agreed principle of autonomy was concerned , whereby Australian troops were looked after by Australian medical units . This was pointed out by General Morshead, and on 23rd March Furnel l discussed the matter with the D.D.M.S. : both agreed that "B" Company of the 2/8th Field Ambulance should provide a staging party at th e M.D.S. site, while other moves were taking place . The light section o f the 215th British C.C.S. moved south to an area north of Agedabia . On the 24th British patrols withdrew from El Agheila as the stronger German forces entered it . The 2/8th Ambulance withdrew to El Abiar and ther e it was joined by its "A" Company, and left behind three motor ambulance s on loan to the British light field ambulance to work back to the staging post. Meanwhile the 2/3rd Field Ambulance had arrived at Ain el Gazal a with the 26th Brigade and in addition to opening a camp hospital fo r the brigade troops, began intensive training. On 25th March no news had been received forward of the whereabouts of the rear headquarters of th e 9th Division, the , or of the 2/11th Field Ambulance, bu t on the following day they were expected at Tobruk . The 2/1 1th Ambulance arrived on the 27th in a violent dust storm, camped near the beach and began to make arrangements for serving neighbouring areas. At the end of March the 9th Division, represented by only two brigades, was in a defensive position not far inland from Benghazi, while one o f its three field ambulances, the 2/8th, was disposed well forward, and th e other two were farther back, the 2/11th in Tobruk and the 2/3rd at Ai n el Gazala. Major A . W. Robertson's company of the 2/3rd Ambulance

RETREAT FROM CYRENAICA 179 was established in scrub at Barraca by 30th March, and there served th e 26th Brigade in the Wadi Cuff area. The 2/2nd C.C.S. commanded by Lieut-Colonel K . J. G. Wilson was in active work in Barce, after it s exchange on 30th March with the 2/4th A.G.H. which had then returned to Tobruk. Barce had for some time been an important medical and surgical centre, but now the trend of events was mirrored in the selection of a hospital site in the defended town of Tobruk . The had passed through the phases of attack, pursuit and temporar y stabilisation, and now the phase of counter-attack was threatening . Fortunately there was not much medical work in forward areas where there was little sickness and the only battle casualties were from air attacks. An ambulance train ran from Benghazi to Barce daily wit h accommodation for twenty-four stretcher cases : a British motor ambulanc e company was also available for road transport. Some operative work had been done at the M .D.S. of the 2/8th Field Ambulance while on th e south side of Benghazi twelve miles beyond Ghemines . This dressing station had been taken over from the 2/2nd Field Ambulance with som e vehicles and a quantity of medical stores, chiefly of Italian origin. There was little protection for the M .D.S. on a bare rocky plain ; operating and resuscitation were carried out in tents, and an Italian mobile ambulance had been converted into a dental surgery . Equally gaunt were the sites o f the advanced posts on sandy desert country, with a single "R .D." tent as a medical centre, while the men lived in bivouacs . A large white stone cross had been constructed at the M.D.S. and this emblem, 40 feet long , with conspicuous red earth between the stones, afforded protection, for , though German planes were machine-gunning the roads, the dressin g station was never molested . After the 2/8th Field Ambulance moved to El Abiar it establishe d its M.D.S. in less forbidding country, but the cover was still far from adequate ; though the site was in a bushy valley the bush was low and not up to tent level. Mobile sections, one in a limestone cave, served th e 2/17th and 2/13th Battalions of the 20th Brigade. There was, however, only a semblance of settlement in those arrangements. "B" Company of the unit which was under control of the 9th Division was notified by the A.D.M.S. of the 2nd British Armoured Division that little warning might be possible if a withdrawal took place, and therefore was instructed to move without orders should circumstances warrant it. On 29th March, Hanson and his quartermaster were sent to make a reconnaissance of evacuation routes up the escarpment . The 16th C .C.S. relieved the com- pany, which then rejoined its headquarters . The medical units with the 9th Division were at this time divided into three parts, one with the 20th Brigade in contact with the enemy, on e with the 26th Brigade in what had been intended as a holding and trainin g area, and one in Tobruk . Between the first two areas lay the large promontory of the North African coast, some 200 miles in extent, com- prising all manner of country, both green and fertile, and stony and barren . Between the forward areas and Tobruk stretched over 300 miles of road ;

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® Aust. General Hospita l O Casualty Clearing Station Field Ambulance Main Dressing Station © Advanced Dressing Sta . + Regimental Aid Pos t

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RETREAT FROM CYRENAICA 181 medical planning was affected by these considerations. The 20th and 26th Australian Brigades could take up defensive positions east of Benghazi , but this area could not be adequately defended by a force deficient in mobility, nor could the civil population of Benghazi be cleared from th e area. The immediate problems of clearing casualties from a forwar d brigade with mobile sections of part of the 2/8th Field Ambulance coul d be solved for the time being, with an M .D .S. and C.C.S. in the back- ground to take and pass on the patients . The 2/3rd Field Ambulance ha d a more static role, and, should retirement to a strongly defended are a be necessary, it could bud off self-contained sections as required . GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE The position in the forward area was not long in doubt, as on 31st March the German counter-offensive began . General Wavell had though t from the limited information available that this might not have occurre d till the middle of April or even the beginning of May, but armoured an d motorised forces now began to press from the south . Mechanical break - downs had so reduced the power of the British armoured division that it was compelled to withdraw, and unfortunately through mistaken informa- tion, a great part of its petrol supply was destroyed . THE WITHDRAWA L By 3rd April the position had become serious . In the neighbourhood of Barce, transport difficulties were already evident ; the 2/24th Battalion had been in position for several days, but when the 26th Brigade began to move up from Gazala it was hampered by its lack of vehicles . Hanson was ordered to move his M .D.S. to Lamluda, between Cyrene and Dema . Colonel Walker took steps to ensure the evacuation of all patients from the 2/2nd C.C.S. at Barce for although few casualties were arriving, the position of the unit had become untenable . Opportunity was taken to sen d several patients by air to Cairo, including two suffering from fracture d femur. Even after two convoys of patients left for Derna, 353 were still left in hospitals at Barce, including 56 lying patients . The remaining lying patients were taken by motor ambulances, the others by motor lorries . Only essential equipment could be taken, the rest had to be sacrificed . At eight o'clock on the night of 4th April telephonic communicatio n ceased, and signals brought only meagre information . Between 10 p .m. and 3 a.m. all the patients were despatched from Barce with 130 men, including 40 who had been left as a rear party of the 2/4th A.G.H., most of the light section equipment, X-ray plant and instruments, orderly roo m gear and papers. Through the dark to the west could be seen the glow o f fires, assumed to be due to destruction of stores during retirement . The hurriedly assembled convoy went straight on to Tobruk, and arrived there by the evening of the same day . Quarters were found for the C .C.S. which had made a prompt and most successful emergency evacuation, despit e the loss of almost all of the ordnance equipment, and some valuabl e possessions, such as the heavier parts of the X-ray plant, the autoclave, generator and lighting set.

182 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T Furnell was fully aware of the difficulty of giving medical care to a retreating force . Despite the existence of alternative roads passing through Cyrene from Barce, retirement of the forward forces must inevitably cause great traffic congestion, particularly along the latter stages of the coast road leading to Tobruk. It must be remembered that the 2/8th an d 2/3rd Field Ambulances, now involved in the difficult task of servic e during withdrawal of a force, had not had the personal experiences o f those working with the 6th Division . However, the lessons had been assimilated, and Furnell, who had the advantage of commanding th e 2/2nd Field Ambulance during the advance, was thoroughly familiar with local conditions . On the morning of 4th April a conference was called at 9th Divisio n headquarters at 0030 hours . The position was rapidly becoming involve d and dangerous. An attack by 3,000 Germans with tanks was expected on the Benina Pass where the 2/13th Australian Battalion had taken up a defensive position . Already communications were very poor, and could only be made personally by road, but they were to become even worse . On the 5th Furnell drove 250 miles in order to make contact with his men and keep in touch with the situation. The advanced headquarter s of the 9th Division was retiring to D'Annunzio and the rear headquarter s of the division moved back to a point east of Derna . Major J . S . Peters , who had arrived a few days earlier to take up the position of D .A.D.M.S. of the 9th Division, was sent back with the rear headquarters, an d instructed to warn medical units of their immediate moves . The 2/4th Field Hygiene Section was sent back to headquarters, the movement of the C.C.S. verified, and arrangements made for mobile sections of the field ambulances to move so as to supply service to the combatant forma- tions and units. The M.D.S. of the 2/8th Field Ambulance had to pack at short notice for the move to Lamluda, and with part of "B" Compan y opened there while small detachments served the 26th Brigade. The 9th Division was assigned the role of defence of the Tolmeta - Tocra Pass-Er Regima line . On the right the incomplete 26th Brigade was without the 2/48th Battalion which was on its way . On the left was the fairly complete 20th Brigade, and a regiment of British artillery was i n support. After the withdrawal of the British armoured division the 9t h Division had to carry out a delaying action . The 2/13th Battalion stayed on for a time at Er Regima as a rearguard after the division had move d on, and with this unit was Gold's mobile section awaiting orders to leave . During the night an action took place at the Benina Pass, with over forty casualties. Instructions sent for the evacuation of these men were delayed in reaching the medical post, but Captain Gold, with Captain P . C. Goode, the R.M.O., energetically pressed on with this task . With the aid of various vehicles all the patients were collected, the last under machine-gun fire in the darkness, and were safely despatched . Furnell was unable to communicate with Walker of Cyrcom by tele- phone, and left headquarters before dawn on 4th April on the way to Barce. The traffic was densely crowded and in a state of indescribable

RETREAT FROM CYRENAICA 18 3 confusion, through which many vehicles, disregarding security, drove with lights. At Barce the hospital was deserted ; all heavy equipment had been abandoned, as well as most of the personal belongings of the staff of the C.C.S. The office of the D.D.M.S. was likewise deserted, and farther o n no one was found at the divisional rendezvous . Major S . L. Seymour of the 2/8th Field Ambulance had a well set up A .D.S. in a bushy plac e near the road, in close contact with 26th Brigade, and the forward battalion, the 2/48th, was now in position, with its aid post working. Next morning, after spending the night by the roadside Furnell returned to Lamluda to find the headquarters of the 2/8th Field Ambulance ha d already set up a good main dressing station. Here he met Walker and they discussed the situation and decided to open a staging post at Slont a as an aid to the ambulance convoy working along the Derna road . Here Major A. D. Byrne and "B" Company of the 2/8th Field Ambulance were sent and during the day treated over 100 patients . It will be seen once again how constant personal contact was essential to integrate the work in hand . To illustrate the same point, Furnell on visiting the A .D.S. working with the 2/ 15th and the 2/ 17th Battalions, thought this was to o far forward, and by arrangement with the brigade command selected a better site. A suitable cross-country track was also found for moto r ambulances from the north to the main road . The previous day, enemy armoured cars and tanks approached E r Regima from Benina and attacked the pass, but accounts of the move- ments of enemy motorised forces later proved to be inaccurate . It was thought from reports of air reconnaissance that enemy armoured vehicle s were moving across the coastal plain, and along the El Abiar road, but these proved later to be elements of the British armoured division . Actually columns of the German armour followed the inland roads across th e desert, and unexpectedly appeared at Mechili . It then became clear that the escarpment at Derna and the positions at Slonta could no longer b e held, owing to the danger of their being cut off, and further withdrawa l of 9th Australian Division was necessary. There was no alternative to withdrawal to Tobruk ; the forces retreating along the main routes wer e exposed to threat from the south, but the extent of this was obscure, a s the movements and dispositions of the German and Italian armoured and motorised forces were not clearly known . Pending further withdrawal all patients were to be staged at Slonta where Byrne and his party continue d the work of the post they had set up ; the motor ambulance convoy ha d originally been assigned this task, but on arrival had insufficient equip- ment. On Sunday 6th April, Furnell instructed the officers in charge of section s with 2/48th and 2/24th Battalions of the 26th Brigade to move with thes e units if they were withdrawn. The 2/8th Field Ambulance main dressing station was still working busily in tents at Lamluda well concealed amon g the rocks and bushes ; some of the patients needed operations and bloo d transfusions . At 5 p.m. that day an order was received to pack at once and move eastward along the desert road towards Tobruk. A.A.M.C.

184 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T and R.A.M.C. ambulances had arrived throughout the day at the dressin g station and these now undertook transport of the patients . By dusk the 2/8th Field Ambulance was moving towards Derna . The smaller ambulance detachments with 20th and 26th Brigades were notified wha t moves were being made in case of further withdrawal, and it was arrange d that final notification of moves would be left to brigade commands . While the main body of Hanson's field ambulance was moving on, in spite of measures taken to divert traffic to alternative tracks there was a grea t jam of vehicles on the roads . The slow pace, steep hills and poor coolin g from strong dusty tail winds caused many radiators to boil, intensifyin g delays and crowding . Hanson, going ahead of the convoy, found aban- doned and broken down vehicles also helping to block the roads. Amongs t those held up by boiling radiators was Major R . T. Binns of the head- quarters of the 2/8th Field Ambulance and his party . The road led through the village of Giovanni Berta not far from Derna , and here the desert road branched from the main road to Derna; this was badly blocked, so the party took the other road. It was rough and hilly and the darkness became denser when a dusty wind arose ; vehicles found it impossible to keep together, and units became separated . By midnight at the junction of the desert roads running from Mechili to Derna and t o Tobruk, the stream of traffic divided, some vehicles went to Tobruk an d reached there safely . Others turned towards Derna aerodrome, an d amongst these were twelve vehicles of the 2/8th Field Ambulance . Binns, finding a man dressed as an Australian with a "digger" hat at this spot enquired which way the convoy had gone and was directed along th e Derna road . The road ran north into a wadi, El Fetei, a few miles eas t of Derna where in a depression was a German party armed with small arms, machine-guns and 2-pounders . As each car turned into this basin it was captured . During the night and the next two days many captures were thus made, including Generals Neame and O'Connor and Lieut- Colonel Combe of the 11th Hussars . Major Binns, Captain G . Gilbert (quartermaster) and thirty-nine men of the 2/8th Field Ambulance wer e taken prisoner. Most of the medical equipment of the unit headquarter s was with them in their vehicles, also the records and secret files, includin g the war diary . All records were destroyed by Gilbert, and did not fall into enemy hands . Among the party were all the highly trained orderlies , including the theatre staff. Despite this loss, Captain R. H. Formby reorganised the theatre department the next day; this was a difficult task , as casualties kept coming in, and no quartermaster was to hand to hel p with securing new stores, but the work went on. It is of interest that th e only ambulance waggons of the 2/8th Field Ambulance which arrived back at Tobruk were those which had been loaned to the British ligh t field ambulance two weeks before . Their escape was due to the individual initiative of the drivers who travelled at different times by different routes .

RETREAT FROM CYRENAICA 185 BACK AT TOBRUK At morning light on 7th April the 20th Brigade was found ready t o hold Gazala, a little east of which was the headquarters of the 9t h Division. Cyrenaica Command was now established at Tobruk . It will be seen how the rapid advance of the German mobile forces across the deser t had forced this withdrawal : they arrived at Mechili on 6th April, an d later surrounded the defenders, though the main part of the defending force succeeded in breaking away. The remainder, including most of the headquarters of the 2nd Armoured Division, were taken prisoner on 8th April. During the day the divisional headquarters moved back toward s Tobruk, and by that night was established in Wadi Sehel, inside th e perimeter, the most extensive of the deep clefts running in from the coast . Fumell had arranged for seventeen casualties held in the 2/8th Fiel d Ambulance M.D.S. to be taken into Tobruk, and then instructed the commander to pack and move at once to the site of the Italian tente d hospital near the town . An ambulance post was left at the old M .D.S. to pick up patients from the mobile sections . Next day Colonel Walker, D.D.M.S., arrived and handed over to the Australian A.D.M.S. his command of the various medical units in the area, as he was leaving for Matruh . Furnell decided to organise th e medical arrangements in the Tobruk area on the basis of a mobile sectio n to each battalion, without any advanced dressing stations . This was done with the help of extra mobile sections from the 2/3rd and 2/11th Fiel d Ambulances, and an extra medical officer from the 2/11th Ambulance , thus making available six mobile sections . Additional motor ambulance s were available too, as an ambulance had been allotted to each unit medica l officer during the retreat, and some of these were now used for routin e purposes. The same day, 8th April, the hospital ship Vita was in Tobru k harbour, emptying the hospital and C .C.S. of patients and taking back all the nurses in the area. The , sent to reinforce the division in Tobruk, arrived also, with most of the 2/5th Field Ambulance . On 9th April, there were two air raids on Tobruk, one early in th e morning, and a heavy one later in the day . The divisional headquarters was heavily machine-gunned, but only one casualty resulted . This head- quarters moved during the day and occupied Fort Solaro in the Tobru k area : this and other movements were rather favoured by a dust storm . Thus ended the phase of retreat from Cyrenaica . Though complicate d in some details, the general pattern of the movement was simple. The 9th Division never really settled in completely to its defensive role, a s delays due to inadequate transport and insufficient equipment limited its functions. The growth of enemy strength in Tripolitania made withdrawal inevitable, especially in view of the sending of a force to Greece, an d once the enemy seized his opportunity his thrust after a slow and tentativ e beginning forced a continuously accelerated pace on the defenders . The medical story is mainly that of a brief but well planned tactical use o f one field ambulance in small mobile sections .

186 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T Had it been possible to view simultaneously the ebb and flow of th e tide of war on various fronts some curious contrasts would have been seen . On the morning of 8th April, when part of the British armoured forc e was lost in Cyrenaica, Addis Ababa was occupied by British troops, an d Massawa was entered, German forces had invaded Yugoslavia and Greece , and were then rapidly advancing on Salonika, a hospital ship was empty- ing hospitals in Tobruk, and taking nurses back to Alexandria, and th e British and Australian troops that had but a few days earlier hel d Benghazi were concentrating on the Mediterranean fortress town o f Tobruk which it was their duty to hold .

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