Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law

Thomas Stephan Eder Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law

Muslim religious life in China’s Xinjiang province and the Uyghur pro- independence movement were radicalized through PRC Criminal Law. The latter shifted from criminalizing so-called counterrevolutionary oﬀenses, to punishing oﬀenses that «endanger national security» (i.e. «terrorism») or «endanger public order». Within both phases, such norms were used to penalize regular religious activity. Regional regulations» further weakening of procedural safeguards and the common use of administrative measures like «Reeducation Through Labor» for «minor terrorists» exponentially increased the restrictive nature of the law.

Das religiöse Leben und die Unabhängigkeitsbewegung der Uiguren in der Prov- inz Xinjiang wurden durch die Strafrechtspraxis der VRCh radikalisiert. Sowohl die früheren konterrevolutionären Delikte, als auch die neuen Tatbestände der «Gefährdung der nationalen Sicherheit» (d.h. Terrorismus) und «Gefährdung der öﬀentlichen Ordnung» wurden zur Kriminalisierung regulären religiösen Lebens verwendet. Die weitere Schwächung von Verfahrensgarantien durch Verordnun- gen auf Provinzebene und das regelmässige Ausweichen auf Verwaltungsstrafen wie «Umerziehung durch Arbeit» für «unbedeutendere Terroristen» haben die restriktive Rechtslage noch verschärft.

Le droit pénal appliqué par la RPC a conduit à une radicalisation de la vie religieuse et du mouvement indépendant des Ouïgours du Xinjiang. Aussi bien les délits contre-révolutionnaires passés que les nouveaux cas de « menace pour la sécurité nationale » (c.-à-d. le terrorisme) et de « menace pour l’ordre public » ont été utilisés pour criminaliser la vie religieuse régulière. Le nouvel aﬀaiblisse- ment des garanties procédurales par le biais d’ordonnances adoptées au niveau provincial et le recours à des peines administratives comme la « rééducation par le travail » pour de « petits terroristes » ont aggravé la situation juridique restrictive. (nse)

Domaines juridiques: Droit chinois; Droit pénal; Eglises. Religions; Infractions contre l’Etat, la force publique; Infractions contre la santé publique, les transports publics et la paix publique Kategorie: Beiträge

Proposition de citation: Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015

ISSN 1424-7410, http://jusletter.weblaw.ch, Weblaw AG, [email protected], T +41 31 380 57 77 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015

Contents Introduction 1. Muslim Religious Life in Xinjiang and Separatist Organizations 2. From Counterrevolution to National Security – Shifts in Chinese Criminal Law 3. Uyghur Ethnic Uprisings – 2009 and Root Causes 3.1. The Path to 2009 – Uyghur Ethnic Unrest since 1990 3.2. The Riots – Urumqi 2009 and the Aftermath 4. National Security and Public Order Oﬀenses and Religious Life in Xinjiang 4.1. Religious Freedom and Terrorism in China and the XUAR 4.2. «Religious Terrorists» and Re-education Through Labor Conclusion

Introduction

[Rz 1] The first part of this paper will examine Muslim religious life in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the nature and religiosity of Uyghur pro-independence organizations and provide a short overview of the region’s history. The second chapter will deal with the major shift from the criminalizing counterrevolutionary (CR) offenses in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s 1979 Criminal Law (CL) to punishing actions that supposedly constitute «endangering national security» (i.e. «terrorism») or «endangering public order» in the 1997 amendment. [Rz 2] After outlining the Uyghur ethnic uprisings in 2009 in the third chapter, this paper’s fourth part will expound the application of the new rules – which have been tightened considerably since the events of 9/11 – on religious life in Xinjiang. The adoption of specific regional norms and their expansive application, the weakening of procedural safeguards and the common use of administrative measures, esp. Re-education Through Labor (RETL), for «minor terrorists», will all be discussed. Some concluding remarks will complete this paper.

1. Muslim Religious Life in Xinjiang and Separatist Organizations

[Rz 3] The Uyghurs are Turkic people living in the XUAR in the PRC’s northwest, as well as the neighboring countries of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and are overwhelmingly Muslim. The variation of Islam common among Uyghurs is a moderate, traditional Sunni Islam that has over time incorporated regional folklore, and brought forth a rich tradition of literature and music. It is a rather open and tolerant form of Islam, with relative freedom for women, and it has a strong mystical strain, with important Sufi traditions.1 Salafism, Wahhabism and other radical strands have not made real inroads, representing only a tiny fraction of believers.2 [Rz 4] Imams are often central figures in village life, acting as mediators in all manner of disputes. Additionally, Sufi masters are respected figures around which disciples gather and of which some are revered as saints after their death. Pilgrimages to the graves of past Sufi masters are common.3

1 See Human Rights Watch, «Devastating Blows. Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang»,(2009a) 17 (2), 10 (http://hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405text.pdf). See also Dana Carver Boehm, «China’s Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flamesof Uighur Separatist Violence», (2009) 2 Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law 98. 2 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 11; See also Boehm (2009) n 1, 98. 3 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 10.

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[Rz 5] The Qing Dynasty conquered the territory of today’s XUAR, which had been part of China in earlier eras (e.g. Han, Tang, Yuan Dynasties) in the 18th century. In 1884 it was formally integrated as a province. The Soviet Union (SU) mainly controlled the province during the 1930s and 1940s, while some prefectures split off as two short-lived republics – the «East Turkestan Republic» (1933–1934) and the «Second East Turkestan Republic» (1944–1949). The province was restored to the control of Beijing under the new PRC in 1949 and became an «Autonomous Region» in 1955. Early on, socio-economically or ethnically motivated rebellions troubled China’s rule – from the Qing Dynasty to the PRC. These movements had been largely secular, while feuding between different Islamic sects in the region actually aided Chinese dominance.4 [Rz 6] Indeed it was only the combination of the harsh oppression of religion during the first thirty years of the PRC and the ensuing transitional period with a modicum of political openness that ensued under Deng Xiaoping, which led to a sort of «Islamic revivalism». Over time, «the practice of Islam has become a strongly symbolic means of confronting the Chinese state», Islamic piety becoming a «new focus of anti-Chinese unity.»5 [Rz 7] Complicated through religious sub-identities, geography (i.e. «oasis subidentities») and language barriers between Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Mongols, Tajiks and Hui, however, no unified Mus- lim movement for autonomy or independence can be discerned.6 The existing small opposition movements can mostly be found in either the Yining and Yili valley in western Xinjiang near Kazakhstan or Kashgar and Hetian in southern Xinjiang. Groups in the latter region are more prone to including religious ideals, but generally pro-independence groups remain rather ethnona- tionalistic.7 [Rz 8] Such pro-independence groups, of which there is a large variety with no discernable unity, are overwhelmingly ethnically Uyghur. Most of them claim to advocate for a peaceful struggle, while many have been listed as «terrorist» by the PRC8 – one, the «East Turkestan Independence Movement» (ETIM), also by the US.9 In Dana Carver Boehm’s long list of organizations and activists, one can find inter alia Rebiya Kadeer of the «World Uyghur Congress» (WUC); Erken Alptekin – son of one of the elected leaders of the short-lived «Eastern Turkestan Republic», Isa Yusuf Alptekin –; the «East Turkestan Information Center» (ETIC), led by Abdujelil Karakash; the «World Uyghur Youth Congress» (WUYC), led by Dolkun Isa; the «Committee for Eastern Turkestan»; the «Wolves of Lop Nor»; the «Organization for East Turkestan Freedom», which claimed responsibility for bus bombings in Beijing in 1997; the «East Turkestan Liberation Orga- nization» (ETLO), led by Mehmet Emin Hezrat; and the above-mentioned ETIM, led by Hahsan Mahsum.10 Other names for ETIM are thought to be «East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah» (ETIP), prominent for separatist activities in the 1990s, and «Turkestan Islamic Party» (TIP),

4 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 89–91. 5 Ibid. 90–92. 6 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 11–12. 7 Ibid. 12. 8 See Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, «Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China» (2008) 35 (1)Asian Aﬀairs: An American Review 21. 9 See Fu Hualing, «Responses to Terrorism in China», in Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, inVictor v Ramraj, Michael Hor, Kent Roach and George Williams (eds.) (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2012), 347; See also Davis (2008) n 8, 21. Washington refused, however, to do thesame with the other organizations on Beijing’s list and also refused to extradite Uyghur inmates of theGuantanamo prison to China. 10 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 103–107; See also Davis (2008) n 8, 22.

3 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 which claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in 2008.11 [Rz 9] Most of these groups deny China’s allegations of striving for independence with violent means.12 ETIM though, although denying organizational links to Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Tal- iban, has openly justiﬁed a violent struggle and issued statements like: «Any rational human being has the duty to ﬁght against invaders to protect his homeland.»13

2. From Counterrevolution to National Security – Shifts in Chinese Crim- inal Law

«Internationally, we are beginning to see the increasing use of what I call the «T-word» – terrorism – to demonise political opponents, to throttle freedom of speech and the press, and to delegitimize legitimate political grievances.»(Kofi Annan)14 [Rz 10] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who had itself made use of terrorist tactics against the Guomindang government, was the victim of terrorist attacks immediately after coming to power. Correspondingly, the first (and for thirty years seminal) law the PRC passed in the realm of criminal law was the «Regulations for the Suppression of Counterrevolution» (1951) – essentially a piece of counter-terrorism legislation.15 The 1979 CL – based on a draft from 1963 very similar to the Soviet 1960 CL16 – retained a chapter on «CR offenses». The latter were defined in the «catch-all provision»17 of Art 90, as «[a]ll acts endangering the [PRC] committed with the goal of overthrowing the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system […].»18 [Rz 11] The subjective element of CR purpose was central, while the majority of cases were expression-based offenses, in what Fu Hualing calls the «era of sedition» (1980s).19 Punished as CR were inter alia reactionary sects, reactionary religion, reactionary speech, CR propaganda and «using superstition for CR purposes» (changed 1997 to «using superstition to disturb social order»).20 Although action-based offenses and «politically motivated sabotage» were also categories of CR crime, they were not as prevalent, and «terrorism» was neither defined nor even mentioned.21 [Rz 12] A first shift toward action-based offenses happened in the «era of subversion» (late 1980s,

11 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 104–105. 12 See eg See Boehm (2009) n 1, 103–104; See also Davis (2008) n 8, 22. 13 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 104; See also Davis (2008) n 8, 22. 14 See T. M. A. Luey, «Deﬁning «Terrorism» in South and East Asia», (2008) 38 Hong Kong LawJournal, 129. 15 See Fu (2012) n 9, 335–336; See also Ian Dobinson, «The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic ofChina (1997): Real Change or Rhetoric?», (2002) 11 (1) Paciﬁc Rim Law & Policy Journal, 6. 16 See Dobinson (2002) n 15, 10. 17 See Daniel C. K. Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (St. Paul, MN: West,2009), 322. 18 See Fu Hualing, «Counter-revolutionaries, subversives and terrorists: China’s evolving National Security Law», in Fu Hualing, Carole J. Petersen and Simon N.M. Young (eds.), National security and fundamental freedoms: Hong Kong’s Article 23 under scrutiny (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005a), Chapter 2, 65; See Dobinson (2002) n 15, 12–13. 19 Ibid. 65–66. 20 Ibid. 66, 68. 21 See Fu (2012) n 9, 336.

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1990s), when esp. people involved in the 1989 Democracy Movement were convicted of subversion, i.e. «plotting to overthrow the government» (see Art 92 1979 CL).22 Although the division remained unclear, subversion, other than sedition, required some measure of active participation rather than incitement23; violence, though, was not required – «indeed, the subversion offence is specifically designed for non-violent overthrow.»24 [Rz 13] Terrorism and explicit «terrorist offences» were only introduced with the revised 1997 CL, which marks both a shift from expression-based to action-based offenses and from the concept of CR crimes to «crimes endangering state security»25 – as well as the gradual beginning of the «era of terrorism».26 CR offenses were 1) renamed – the action-based offenses are now «national security» offenses –, 2) depoliticized27 – «politically motivated sabotage» is now «endangering public order» – or even abolished, like several expression-based offenses (e.g. CR propaganda). Moreover, a CR purpose is no longer required.28 Renaming, re-designating as ordinary criminal offenses, and even abolishing CR offenses while the crime is absorbed by other offenses, did not, however, change the fact that the same actions are being prosecuted.29 «CR propaganda» was simply replaced by «inciting treason, secession and subversion», an almost identically worded norm (see Art 105 1997 CL).30 Neither did the number of CR/national security cases change.31 [Rz 14] Consequently, there was much debate about whether the reforms away from CR offenses were mere «window-dressing».32 According to Daniel C. K. Chow the reform reflects the general trend to a more legalistic, and less political, approach, as well as more specificity, but not a change in attitude.33 In the words of Ian Dobinson, «[t]he actual changes, however, are superficial. Many of the crimes of counterrevolution have simply been reclassified as crimes endangering national security» (e.g. Art 103, 105, 106 1997 CL).34 Most crimes have been retained, with or without a new name, and the range of offenses has actually been expanded.35 [Rz 15] A further amendment in 200136 mainly increased punishments, criminalized the funding of terrorism and added new offenses. A new «Anti-Terrorism Law» is also being drafted, which will likely further erode procedural restraints. At the moment there are four explicit terrorism offenses. Those are: «organizing, leading or participating in a terrorist organization» (Art 120 (1) 1997 CL), «financing terrorist organizations or individual terrorists» (Art 120 (2) 1997 CL), «hiding

22 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 78–79. 23 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 80–81. 24 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 82. 25 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 64, 74 et seq.; See also Chow (2009) n 17, 323; See also Dobinson (2002) n 15, 2 and Jaques deLisle, «Security First? Patterns and Lessons from China’s Use of Law to Address National Security Threats», in (2010) 4 Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 401. 26 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 83 et seq. 27 Depoliticization was a major goal in the 1997 revision of the CL, which should repudiate the classstruggle nature of criminal law in the PRC. See also Chow (2009) n 17, 318; See also Dobinson (2002) n 15, 24–26. 28 See deLisle (2010) n 25, 401. 29 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 66–67. 30 Ibid. 76; See also Fu (2012) n 9, 348–349. 31 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 67. 32 See Luey (2008) n 14, 181. 33 See Chow (2009) n 17, 324. 34 See Dobinson (2002) n 15, 26. 35 Ibid. 58–59. 36 See deLisle (2010) n 25, 406–407.

5 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 or concealing proceeds of terrorism» (Art 191 1997 CL) and «falsifying terrorist information or knowingly disseminating false terrorist information» (Art 291 1997 CL).37 All of these are mainly aimed at prevention, and terrorism in China is «essentially a membership offense», as offenders are usually tried for murder, kidnapping or other offenses after an attack has been carried out.38 [Rz 16] The 1997 CL, again, does neither define «terrorism» nor «terrorist organization».39 The resulting ambiguity has troubling consequences. Firstly, it gives authorities wide discretion.40 Secondly, because it has to be seen in context with the concept of the «three evils» (i.e. «the three types of threats to national security»41, i.e. violent terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious fundamentalism), which Beijing professes to combat and which are used to «keep ethnic demands on the defensive, dismiss foreign scrutiny, encouragement or support for the causes of Chinese minorities, and perhaps most importantly, sustain the unity of China’s dominant Han Chinese majority».42 With separatism as the ultimate goal, the government claims that «religious fundamentalism lays a cultural foundation and terrorism is the instrument to achieve the ultimate goal.»43 Taking into account that the Chinese government now equates growing practice of the Muslim faith with growing religious fundamentalism44, «a net has been cast so wide as to cover all cultural and religious affairs. The government is able to treat religion as the cause of terrorism in Xinjiang and to treat religious groups as potential terrorist organizations.»45 [Rz 17] On the basis of what has been explained in the previous paragraphs, it seems only consistent that those who practice «unlawful religion» – e.g. «preaching and teaching Islam without the authorization of the government»46 – are now viewed as «terrorists». After the 1979 CL came into force, those punished for «reactionary religion», were viewed as CR guilty of sedition. In a second phase, the CR crime of «subversion» was intended for non-violent actions perceived as aimed at regime change. In the current phase of criminal law development the described CR offenses became national security offenses, those guilty of such (often political) offenses now being viewed as «terrorists».47 [Rz 18] Such an understanding of terrorism obviously conflicts starkly with the definition that has been proposed by the UN. The latter describes terrorism as «any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants», with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government to act in a certain way.48

37 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 84–85; See also deLisle (2010) n 25, 401–402. 38 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 84–85. 39 See Fu (2012) n 9, 336–337; See Fu (2005a) n 18, 76; See also Chien-Peng Chung, «Confrontingterrorism and other evils in China: all quiet on the western front?» (2006) 4 (2) China and EurasiaForum Quarterly 76 and deLisle (2010) n 25, 402; See also Luey (2008) n 14, 160. Luey questionswhether the standard of nullem crimen sine lege is met. 40 See deLisle (2010) n 25, 401. 41 See Fu Hualing, «Re-education through Labour in Historical Perspective», in (2005b) The ChinaQuarterly, 828. 42 See Chung (2006) n 39, 78. 43 See Fu (2012) n 9, 344–345. 44 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 86, See also Fu (2005b) n 41, 828. 45 See Fu (2012) n 9, 345 46 See Fu (2005a) n 18, 86; See also Fu (2005b) n 41, 828. 47 See e.g. Fu (2005b) n 41, 828. 48 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 68.

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3. Uyghur Ethnic Uprisings – 2009 and Root Causes 3.1. The Path to 2009 – Uyghur Ethnic Unrest since 1990

«We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich.» (Mao Zedong)49 [Rz 19] In fact, areas with large minority populations, although minorities only constitute 8.5% of the population, occupy about two thirds of China’s territory and «90 per cent of China’s border regions.»50 What is more, immense resource riches make esp. Xinjiang a crucial asset in the PRC’s modernization and economic development. The province holds 30% of China’s oil, 35% of its coal reserves and 40% of its natural gas. Since 2007 it is the leading province in both oil and gas production.51 Furthermore, Xinjiang is a pathway to extending Chinese influence to Central Asia and the Middle East and is central to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operations, e.g. nuclear testing, maneuvers.52 [Rz 20] This has been the pretext for massive government-sponsored ethnic Han immigration to this region. The immigration process has happened in two waves, one under Mao’s leadership up to 1976 and one starting in the 1990s, and is clearly intended to solidify Beijing’s control.53 In fact, though, conflict over scarce land and water resources54, an often-unmitigated language barrier and the fact that ethnic Han in the province profit much more from the economic development have led to increased tension and volatility. Unemployment among Uyghurs remains much higher, the poverty rate among Uyghurs is much higher – and not decreasing despite economic development, i.e. the wealth gap grows further55 –, and the life expectancy decidedly lower. According to Chung this is partially due to informal job discrimination through language requirements, an urban bias and individual prejudices.56 Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Boehm have also underlined that the bifurcation is exacerbated by the fact that almost all ethnic Han (98%) live in urban areas and the majority of Uyghurs (90%) live in rural parts of the province, while the income disparity between city and country has grown markedly in the last two decades.57 Moreover, a cycle of protests and crackdowns has constantly reinforced mutually negative stereotypes.58 An informally segregated society contributes to further estrangement and a growing urge to seek «refuge in [one’s] own culture and identity».59 Against this backdrop, protests against a perceived marginalization of Uyghur culture have intensified.

49 See Michael Clarke, «China’s Internal Security Dilemma and the «Great Western Development»:The Dy- namics of Integration, Ethnic Nationalism and Terrorism in Xinjiang», (2007) 31 Asian StudiesReview, 323. 50 See Clarke (2007) n 49, 325. 51 See Human Rights Watch, We are afraid to even look for them. Enforced Disappearances in theWake of Xin- jiang’s Protests (2009b), 9 FN 2 (http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/10/22/we-are-afraid-even-look-them- 0); See also Boehm (2009) n 1, 73. 52 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 75. 53 Ibid. 84–85. In 1949 Xinjiang’s population was 5% Han, in 2009 it was 40% (about equal toUyghur’s share) and rising. 54 See HRW (2009b) n 51, 10. 55 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 88–89. 56 See Chung (2006) n 39, 84. 57 See HRW (2009b) n 51, 9–10; See Boehm (2009) n 1, 86–89; See HRW (2009a) n 1, 10. 58 See HRW (2009b) n 51, 10. 59 See Chung (2006) n 39, 85.

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[Rz 21] Another argument for a more recognizable dissent can be found in a more open political climate after 1978 under Deng Xiaoping’s «reform and opening»-policy, where minorities had a chance to voice their misgivings.60 In fact, Fu Hualing argues that violent protests in Xinjiang already «re-emerged» in the 1980s, although he too dates the beginning of «frequent terrorist attacks» only to the mid-1990s.61 [Rz 22] A trigger of sorts, both for larger integration efforts and emboldened dissent, can be found in the collapse of the SU and the independence of several independent Muslim and ethnic Turkic republics in Central Asia. A first insurrection in Baren County near Kashgar in April 1990 was not a coincidence.62 Neither was its reason, a demonstration against the closing of a mosque just ahead of a festival had been violently broken up by the police, who shot dead over 50 peaceful protesters.63 [Rz 23] Several larger demonstrations followed in 1991. In 1992 and 1993 a series of bombings, targeting buses and government buildings, rocked the Autonomous Region.64 In 1996 the «United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan» (UNRF) assassinated a pro-PRC imam in Kashgar65, and a new series of bombings – including civilian targets – hit Xinjiang.66 On February 5th 1997 a peaceful large-scale demonstration – organized by ETIP – was held in Yining to demand the release of religious leaders and a jobs program for a region plagued by unemployment. A violent crackdown by paramilitary police forces ended in chaos, where after 300 Uyghurs and 10 Han lay dead.67 In the following month three bombs detonated on Urumqi buses, nine people were killed and 68 injured.68 [Rz 24] According to HRW these were the only (!) Uyghur terrorist attacks on civilians, with all later attacks targeting police stations, military installations, political leaders, «collaborators» and prisons.69 HRW claims that overall incidents were not larger or more threatening in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Moreover, since 1998 there were few at all and none targeting civilians.70 Dana Carver Boehm, however, tells a different story and mentions bombings of civilian targets in 1992, 1993, 1996 and a bus bombing in March 2008 in Shanghai, which TIP claimed responsibility for, in addition to the bombings mentioned by HRW – one bus bombing in the Xidan area and a car bomb in Chaoyang district, both Beijing, in March 1997.71 She too, though, sees an end to attacks in Xinjiang between 1998 and 200072, explains that traditional targets of Uyghur secessionist violence were not civilian, but military or police targets, and that outlawing peaceful opposition –

60 See Davis (2008) n 8, 17; See also Fu (2012) n 9, 340. Fu argues that «rightful resistance» in thesense of «legally sanctioned actions taken to protect one’s legal rights» could only arise because ofgrowing political opportunities. 61 See Fu (2012) n 9, 343. 62 See Davis (2008) n 8, 15–16; See also HRW (2009a) n 1, 13; See also Chung (2006) n 39, 77. 63 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 107. 64 Ibid. 107–109. 65 See Davis (2008) n 8, 21. 66 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 109. 67 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 109–110; See also Davis (2008) n 8, 21; HRW (2009a) n 1, 13; HRW(2009b) n 51, 10 and Chung (2006) n 39, 77. 68 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 108–109; See also HRW (2009a) n 1, 14 and HRW (2009b) n 51, 10. 69 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 14. 70 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 14. 71 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 107–112. 72 Ibid. 110.

8 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 i.e. describing peaceful demonstrations on socio-economic issues as «secessionism» and resistance against violent police crackdowns as «terrorism» – brought about a radicalization.73 [Rz 25] After the supposed end of attacks inside the XUAR, some Uyghur fighters joined the Taliban in the Afghanistan War in 2001 and several were captured and brought to Guantanamo Bay. Furthermore, Uyghur militants allegedly killed two Chinese diplomats in Bishkek in 2002.74 In 2006 the first video to ever call for a jihad in Xinjiang surfaced online.75 According to Boehm, attacks on military or police targets intensified in 2008. Militants increasingly made use of «improvised explosive devices» (IEDs) and suicide bombers.76 In January 2007 police forces stormed a training camp, allegedly run by ETIM, killing 18 suspected terrorists.77 A similar raid was carried out in Urumqi in 2008.78 At the same time, peaceful protests were again violently broken up in Hetian.79

3.2. The Riots – Urumqi 2009 and the Aftermath

[Rz 26] On July 5th 2009 thousands of ethnic Uyghurs gathered in Urumqi’s People’s Square for a peaceful demonstration. Several Uyghur migrant factory workers had been killed in a toy factory in Guangdong and the protesters demanded an investigation. Police forces, trying to disperse the demonstration, clashed with protesters and arrested dozens.80 Angry protests then spread, however, and riots started around Urumqi’s bazaar and in ethnically mixed neighborhoods. Ethnic Han were attacked and killed in great numbers. Uyghurs claim that protesters had been enraged by the police’s brutal crackdown, while Chinese authorities allege premeditated attacks.81 It took the police hours to control the situation, the final number of arrests, which was revised on multiple occasions, is likely over 1’000.82 [Rz 27] In the following two days massive police operations were carried out. Entire neighborhoods (esp. predominantly Uyghur Erdaoqiao and Saimachang) were sealed off and all young men were interrogated. The police arrested those with unconvincing stories or suspicious wounds or even everybody there. Smaller-scale operations in a similar vein carried on at least until mid-August.83 [Rz 28] On July 7th ethnic Han started retaliatory attacks on the Uyghur population of the city, with the number of people killed being highly debated.84 The official data for the entire riots states the number of people killed as 197, with 1’600 people injured. Of the dead, 134 were said to have been Han «civilians» and only 12 people to have been shot by the police.85 Several Uyghur groups in- and outside the PRC have claimed that during the riots 400 ethnic Uyghurs were killed

73 Ibid. 68–70. 74 Ibid 110. 75 Ibid. 101–102, 111. 76 Ibid. 112–113. 77 See Davis (2008) n 8, 15, 21; see also See Boehm (2009) n 1, 111. 78 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 111. 79 See HRW (2009b) n 51, 10–11. 80 Ibid. 12. 81 Ibid. 2–4, 12. 82 Ibid. 2–4. 83 Ibid. 5–6, 22. 84 Ibid. 4. 85 Ibid. 4, 13.

9 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 by police forces and in retaliatory Han attacks in Urumqi and 100 in Kashgar, overall the number of Uyghurs killed is given as 800.86 [Rz 29] Authorities in Beijing claim that Uyghur activists and NGOs orchestrated the protests from the outside – esp. Rebiya Kadeer –, although no supporting evidence was presented.87 Journalists were allowed to cover the protests, though not the arrests, while for the populace, internet access, international phone lines and text messaging services were shut down and later heavily censored.88 [Rz 30] During the campaign of mass arrests in the aftermath of the riots, the phenomenon of «enforced disappearances»89 was prevalent – i.e. the police either denied that someone had been detained or arrested or refused to inform relatives about the reasons for a detention and the whereabouts of the detainee.90 Prosecution proceeded under the «three fast»-policy (), i.e. fast review, fast arrest, fast prosecution, and reviewed thousands of cases within two weeks. Judges received a «Propaganda Education Manual on the Truth about the July 5th Incident in Urumqi» from central Party authorities.91 On October 12th 2009 the ﬁrst judgment was rendered, six Uyghurs were sentenced to death and one to life in prison.92

4. National Security and Public Order Offenses and Religious Life in Xin- jiang

«Indeed, in the minds of most Han Chinese, if the Miao or Hmong people of the ancient Chu culture in south-central China and the Malayo-Polynesian Yue or Viet people of the south China coast could eventually become acculturated into the Chinese family, why not the ethnic minorities of today?»93

4.1. Religious Freedom and Terrorism in China and the XUAR

[Rz 31] According to Art 36 of the 1982 Constitution, «[c]itizens of the [PRC] enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious aﬀairs are not

86 Ibid. 13. 87 Ibid. 4. 88 Ibid. 4. 89 Deﬁnition in «International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from EnforcedDisappearance»: «arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents ofthe State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence ofthe State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fateor whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of thelaw.», See HRW (2009b) n 51, 33. 90 Ibid. 5. Such conduct violates both Chinese domestic and international law in a myriad of ways. 91 Ibid. 19–20. 92 Ibid. 4. 93 See Chung (2006) n 39, 86.

10 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 subject to any foreign domination.»94 [Rz 32] It is important, however, how the government interprets this provision (see «National Conference on Religious Work» 2000). Firstly, freedom to «believe in, or not to believe in any religion» means that believers can pray at state-approved places of worship, but only there, while missionary work is strictly forbidden.95 Secondly, «non-interference» means protection from foreign religious institutions not from state control.96 Thirdly, in the PRC the «separation of church and state» means that religious leaders and their followers may not criticize the political system. Fourthly, religious activities are only «normal» and «lawful» (hefa ), if officially accredited personnel of one of the five recognized religions carry them out within fixed ideological bounds in a government-approved site.97 Even then there is broad discretion to determine that public order is disturbed, public health impaired or the educational system98 being interfered with (see also Art 11 «Law on Regional National Autonomy»).99 [Rz 33] The situation is different in the XUAR, however, where regulations and implementation are even harsher. Chinese authorities reacted to increasing unrest by adopting ever stricter policies, among them the notorious «strike hard»-campaigns (yanda – ),100 which are usually harshest in Xinjiang, specifically target religious activity as «separatist» and included over 200 death sentences between 1997 and 2003.101 Such policies intensified after the foundation of the «Shanghai Five»102 in 1996 and even more after 9/11.103 Beijing made use of the shift in world public opinion and the US’s declaration of a «global war on terror», to label several Uyghur organizations as «terrorist». A link between these groups and international terrorism was alleged for the first time in 2001.104 Just to give an idea of the scope of these police actions, the state-run «Xinjiang Daily» reported that in the year 2005 18’227 people were arrested for «endangering state security» in the XUAR. According to Chung Chien-peng that «could be anything from terrorism to talking with western reporters.»105 [Rz 34] These actions by the government in Beijing fueled mistrust and ingrained the feeling of

94 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 24. 95 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 24. 96 See Boehm (2009) n 1, 93. 97 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 24–25. 98 For special regulations on religion in the education system in Xinjiang See HRW (2009a) n 1, 56–63;See also Boehm (2009) n 1, 95. Boehm describes how beards are prohibited for school personnel andhow teachers en- courage children to eat in class during Ramadan. 99 See HRW (2009a) n 1, 25. 100See Fu (2012) n 9, 344; For a definition See deLisle (2010) n 25, 408–409: «a recurring anti-crimetactic that entails directives to devote extra resources and zeal to enforcing ordinary criminal lawsagainst an identified, ostensibly especially dangerous target for a limited time.» 101See HRW (2009a) n 1, 3–4, 64; See also Boehm (2009) n 1, 82–83. Other «strike hard»-activitiesinclude inter alia: burning Uyghur literature, imprisoning Uyghur authors, banning Uyghur music withreligious references, banning Uyghur language studies at Xinjiang University. 102The «Shanghai Five», which later developed into the «Shanghai Cooperation Organization» (SCO),are a regional club – the members being China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan andUzbekistan – intent on delimiting borders and combatting terrorism. 103See Davis (2008) n 8, 17; See also Fu (2012) n 9, 345–347, See also Fu (2005b) n 41, 828 and Fu(2005a) n 18, 84. Fu mentions that especially the penalty for the offense of «membership in a terroristorganization» has been increased. 104See HRW (2009a) n 1, 14–15; See also HRW (2009b) n 51, 10. 105See Chung (2006) n 39, 75.

11 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 being treated unjustly in the Uyghur population and actually contributed to growing dissent.106 Michael Clarke describes the concept of «societal security» as opposed to «state security».107 He argues that an over-emphasis on «state security» combined with a lack of sensitivity towards the «societal security» of minority societies in the PRC leads to an internal «security dilemma» between the two. Uyghurs feel threatened in their «we»-identity through e.g. «control or closure of places of education and worship, deportation or killing of members of the community [and] state-induced population change.»108 Policies intended to increase «security» in the XUAR, thus lead to insecurity in the Uyghur population.109 If you add Fu Hualing’s assessment that «the harsh treatment may have [also] had a brutalizing impact on some dissidents»110, insecurity and brutalization are likely to lead to more not less violence. All the more so, as Islam teaches that there are only three options for believers who are a minority in their state and are disallowed from worshipping: worshipping in secret, emigrating and holy war (i.e. jihad). Most Uyghurs now worship in secret, though the crackdown on such «illegal religious activities» is getting ever harsher. Serious restrictions on emigration will eventually present Muslim Uyghurs with only one option: jihad.111 [Rz 35] According to HRW, «[t]here has been no sign of any attempt by the Chinese authorities to distinguish between peaceful political activists, peaceful separatists, and those advocating or using violence»112, as practice of Islam is increasingly equated with «separatism», which is in turn equated with «terrorism».113 Government reports routinely suggest «that all Uighur (sic!) opposition to Chinese domination, including non-violent resistance, is connected to international radical- Islamic terrorism.»114 Ironically, as Fu Hualing states that it’s often the younger Uyghurs, who are both more secular and have a weaker Uyghur identity than the prior generation, who advocate for independence. They are economically and socially frustrated, perceive a gaping difference between officially provided rights and a «lack of effective redress» in practice, and do not fear change, because they did not experience the pre-1978 period.115 Nonetheless, «separatist thought» (fenlie sixiang ), «expression of dissatisfaction» (buman qingxu ) and «spreading rumors» (zaoyao ) are even said to be the new weapons of choice, the new tactics of «terrorist forces», and they are supposedly being spread through literature, art and «popular cultural activities» (minjian wenhua huodong ).116 [Rz 36] Therefore, regulating religion in Xinjiang is now synonymous with the fight against «terrorism».117 HRW has obtained «internal materials» (neibu ), which differ starkly from inter-

106See Davis (2008) n 8, 16. 107See Clarke (2007) n 49, 325. 108Ibid. 326. 109Ibid. 324. 110See Fu (2012) n 9, 350. 111See Boehm (2009) n 1, 98. 112See HRW (2009a) n 1, 17; See also Boehm (2009) n 1, 88–89, who argues that economicdevelopment and Han immigration lead to growing secessionist sentiment and radicalization. 113See HRW (2009a) n 1, 1. 114See HRW (2009a) n 1, 17. 115See Fu (2012) n 9, 352–353. 116See HRW (2009a) n 1, 17–19. 117Ibid. 26.

12 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 nationally public materials on this matter.118 Regulations in the XUAR have been amended in 2001, which was not publicized. «Protection of normal religious activities», as in Art 36 of the Constitution has been deleted, while the phrase «guide religion to adapt to socialist society» was added.119 Not only clergy, but all «citizens who profess a religion» must «oppose national split- tism and illegal religious activities», which is interpreted very broadly and subjectively.120 No one may teach «scripture students» before prior approval – i.e. village elders may not instruct children ahead of ceremonies – and all pilgrimages are prohibited – i.e. former Sufi masters cannot be worshipped anymore by visiting their graves and even visiting mosques in other localities is outlawed.121 Increasingly, children are not even allowed to enter mosques or to keep fast during Ramadan, as such actions could be interpreted to either violate their «freedom not to believe» or to interfere with the education system.122 Religious publications have to come exclusively from publishers on the provincial level, i.e. only such that are situated in Urumqi, and all publications (even leaflets) have to be approved in advance.123 [Rz 37] The control of religious organizations and clergy has also been tightened. The former are usually denied registration and raise suspicion by even applying. Therefore, they refrain from doing so and are «illegal organizations».124 «Democratic management teams» are sent to every mosque by the Religious Affairs Bureau to determine their status as «conforming» (hege ) or «nonconforming» (bu hege ).125 Once a year every imam – all of whom are graduates from one single staterun Islamic seminary126 and already undergo regular «political education»127 – above township level must now visit «exchange of experience» sessions (huxiang jingyan huiyi ), regularly compared to Maoist forced self-criticism in the Cultural Revolution, where it is safest to invent minor mistakes.128 Additionally, no new mosques may be built, only officially designated ones may be renovated, and only a government-approved version of the Koran may be used.129 Finally, in an example published by the XUAR CCP Committee in 2001, «extremism» by clergy is equated with raising «hot social issues» or «spurring feelings of dissatisfaction» – in the case in question, the imam talked about the unemployment issue before a large and partly agitated crowd.130

118Ibid. 28–29. 119Ibid. 31–32. 120Ibid. 35. 121Ibid. 35–37. 122See Chung (2006) n 39, 80. According to Chung it is children as well as party members who arespecifically targeted for «Hanification» or «Sinicization.» He also holds that the CCP’s policy regardingits members is much harsher than those of the Communist parties in Vietnam and Cuba; See alsoBoehm (2009) n 1, 95–96. 123See Chung (2006) n 39, 80; See also HRW (2009a) n 1, 38–39, 44–45. 124See HRW (2009a) n 1, 46–47. 125See HRW (2009a) n 1, 43. 126See Chung (2006) n 39, 80. 127See Boehm (2009) n 1, 95. 128See HRW (2009a) n 1, 48–50. 129See HRW (2009a) n 1, 51, 53–55. The official Koran is called «New Edition of Selections from theKoran» (Xinbian Kuerlan bian ). 130See HRW (2009a) n 1, 55.

13 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015

4.2. «Religious Terrorists» and Re-education Through Labor

[Rz 38] When it comes to the trials of those arrested in connection with alleged «separatism» or «terrorism» in Xinjiang, procedural rights are violated, torture is employed and the death penalty is used to a much higher degree than the already troubling norm in the PRC as a whole.131 In general, officers of the Ministry of State Security and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) enjoy «special powers over targets suspected of committing offenses against state security.» 132 During practically constant «strike hard»-campaigns, procedural restraints are weakened further. The «two basics» (liang ge jiben ) – «basic truth» and «basic evidence» – are considered enough for «prompt approval of arrest, prosecution, and court decisions», practically nullifying procedural protections.133 Officials are pressured to comply with such procedures and judges threatened with «investigation and rectification» if they «waver at the critical moment» and «do not want to shoulder responsibilities.»134 Suspects are mostly found guilty of either «disrupting public order» or «endangering state security» through «illegal religious activity» and are mostly fined; a process often described as blackmail.135 [Rz 39] Although the measures prescribed by the 1997 CL and the CPL, taken together with specific Regulations and Interpretations, appear severe and convenient enough, authorities increasingly prefer to use extra-judicial measures. Administrative penalties now include massive fines that can exceed the average annual income, «criticism and education» and «cancellation of registration» for clergy.136 If a violation is «grave» – entirely within the discretion of the «Xinjiang Religious Affairs Bureau» – it may now constitute «endangering state security», whereas before the 2001 amendment there had only been public order offenses.137 [Rz 40] Of those thusly determined «terrorists» – in fact often «religion/ethnicity-based dissidents»138 –, such considered «minor», are often sent to «Re-education Through Labor» (RETL) (laodong jiaoyang ) camps.139 This administrative procedure allows the police to «bypass the criminal process and summarily subject a person [suspected of committing] «minor offenses» to a maximum of three years» incarceration.»140 It is important to read this together with Art 13 1997 CL, which states: «if the circumstances are obviously minor and the harm done is not serious, the act shall not be considered a crime.» Correspondingly, the act in question will be considered to «minor» for criminal punishment, and thus subjected to administrative procedures. The latter, however, can take the form of RETL, which would be considered a very severe punishment in Western jurisdictions. Exactly because RETL is only an administrative punishment, there will be no procedural safeguards (e.g. hearing141, review or appeal), the Public Security Bureaus will

131See Fu (2012) n 9, 344. 132See deLisle (2010) n 25, 404, 407. The PAP was given additional powers in investigation anddetention with the 2009 «People’s Armed Police Law». 133See HRW (2009a) n 1, 65. 134Ibid. 65–66. 135Ibid. 68. 136Ibid. 39. 137Ibid. 39. 138See Fu (2005a) n 18, 87. 139See Fu (2012) n 9, 345. 140See also Fu (2005b) n 41, 811. 141See Dobinson (2002) n 15, 53–54. Dobinson explains that while the 1996 «Administrative PenaltyLaw» (APL) did in fact introduce some procedural safeguards (see e.g. Art 32 on the right to be heard),the latter

14 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 determine offense and punishment without any involvement of the court system.142 [Rz 41] The RETL is built on the official philosophy of reforming and rehabilitating offenders – with roots in both Confucian and Marxist legal theory.143 Importantly it has no foundation in either the PRC Constitution or PRC laws adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC). It was created in 1955 through a Party Directive, and sanctioned by a State Council Decision in 1957, to advance political control through the suppression of CR forces and heavily expanded in the anti-rightist campaign in 1958.144 While considered «too soft» during the Cultural Revolution, the system expanded again after being approved by the NPC’s Standing Committee in 1979 and esp. with the onset of «strike hard»-campaigns in 1983.145 Eligible offenses and their scope were expanded by central and regional authorities to have RETL fulfill a multitude of functions, inter alia crime control, drug control, investigative detention, maintaining social order and political control.146 [Rz 42] The last two functions have made RETL a common penalty for offenders against «state and social order.»147 While «organizers and principals» receive harsh criminal penalties148, more and more «followers and sympathizers» of «illegal religious activity» – who are mainly punished for being involved with «unlawful organizations and religion», «unlawful propaganda» and «aiding unlawful organizations» – are subject to RETL.149 Suspects are normally very young, uneducated and highly religious.150 In RETL camps, these detainees are openly called the «three types» (san lei renyuan ) or the «three categories» (san zhong ren ), meaning that they have «harmed state security, joined illegal organizations, or distributed illegal religious material» and «endangered state security, committed crimes with a view toward endangering state security, or are reactionary religious students or religious fanatics» respectively. 151 The percentage of state security offenses in Xinjiang is exceptionally high (9.2% in 2001) and since 2001 camps have been overflowing with inmates detained, because of «joining illegal organizations and engaging in religious activities» as well as «printing or distributing periodicals».152

Conclusion

[Rz 43] It has been shown that Uyghur independence movements have traditionally been secular and ethnicity-based. The prevalent form of Islam is still a moderate, traditional version of Sunni Islam. The rich resource base and strategically important position of Xinjiang, combined with the

are still much weaker than the ones in the CPL and that there remains «considerablediscretion and scope for abuse.» 142See Dobinson (2002) n 15, 53; See also Fu (2005a) n 18, 87 and and HRW (2009a) n 1, 71, FN 191. 143See Fu (2005b) n 41, 811–812. 144Ibid. 813–816. 145Ibid. 811, 816–820. 146Ibid. 820–827. 147See deLisle (2010) n 25, 404. 148See also Fu (2005b) n 41, 828. 149See Fu (2005a) n 18, 87; See also HRW (2009a) n 1, 73. 150See Fu (2005a) n 18, 87. 151See HRW (2009a) n 1, 70. 152See HRW (2009a) n 1, 72.

15 Thomas Stephan Eder, Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law, in : Jusletter 22 juin 2015 conviction that economic development and a higher percentage of ethnic Han population will lead to a stronger hold on the province, have led to a massive influx of Han immigrants and dramatic alteration of the socio-economic make-up of the region. [Rz 44] This in turn has resulted in rising dissent among the native Uyghurs, whose poverty levels remained the same despite economic development. Moreover, ever harsher limitations of the freedom of religion have led to an «Islamic revivalism», with Islam becoming a symbol of confronting Chinese oppression. Pro-independence groups are part of this trend toward a more religion-based identity. Restrictions on standard religious practices are contributing to underground «illegal religious activity», and brutal crackdowns on peaceful dissent make it impossible for Uyghurs to vent their frustrations. It has been explained how Chinese authorities, through several steps of reform to Chinese criminal law and separate provisions in the XUAR, now equate Uyghurs» Muslim religious practice with «terrorism». In the prosecution of thusly-identified «offenders» procedural safeguards are considerably weakened or completely unhinged by using extra-judicial measures like RETL. [Rz 45] Through this process Beijing has brought about massive «societal insecurity» (see Michael Clarke) among Uyghurs and has had a brutalizing effect on dissenters (see Fu Hualing). While the Chinese government can today feel more secure in its permanent hold on Xinjiang, it can also rest more assured than ever that it will face bloody resistance to its rule. [Rz 46] In order to change this situation, Dana Carver Boehm has formulated a small catalogue of recommendations to the CCP leadership. According to her, the government should moderate «strike hard»-campaigns, define «terrorism» – in a way that is commensurate with the proposed UN definition – and find ways to allow peaceful dissent.153 It should also change its CL accordingly, and demonstrate enforcement that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.154 «Illegal religious activities» should be redefined to allow a somewhat normal Muslim religious life, e.g. allow non- government-sanctioned mosques, fasting at school, children to enter mosques. At the same time some restrictions, e.g. pilgrimages to Mecca under age of 50 or studying in the Middle East, could still be upheld.155 Additionally, Han immigration to Xinjiang should not be encouraged anymore, which might at least slow it down, PRC state employers in the XUAR should reserve jobs for minorities, and «affirmative action» in the education system should be retained.156 Such measures could deflate anger in the Uyghur populace, weaken unity in the separatist movement, strengthen moderates and eventually draw in Uyghur Muslims into the Chinese state.

Mag. Thomas Stephan Eder, LL.M., Bakk., MA, is project assistant with Prof. Kiebaum at the Section for International Law and International Relations at the University of Vienna as well as Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna.

153See Boehm (2009) n 1, 117–119. 154Ibid. 123–124. 155See Boehm (2009) n 1, 113–115. 156See Boehm (2009) n 1, 120–124.