THE YALE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
YRIS IS AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL DEDICATED TO PUBLISHING SCHOLARSHIP ON CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ISSUES: THEIR ORIGINS, THEIR PRESENT EFFECTS, AND THE FUTURE THEY WILL SHAPE. FIND US ONLINE AT HTTP://YRIS.YIRA.ORG/
ESSAYS
The End of War and Peace: The Thesis of Frédéric Gros and the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro Vitória Alves
Can Bullets Kill Soft Power?: The National Rifle Association as a Threat to America’s Attractiveness Abroad Darcy Taylor
Reconciliation in Settler-Colonial States: A Study of the Political Apology Hannah Chong
Slovak Insecurity and Europeanization: IN THIS ISSUE: Ontological (In)security in Slovak Foreign Policy Kamila Potocarova CAN BULLETS KILL SOFT POWER?: THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION AS A THREAT TO The Yale Review of International Studies is a student AMERICA’S ATTRACTIVENESS ABROAD publication and a constituent organization of the Yale International Relations Association. The Review is published by Yale College students and Yale University is not responsible for its contents.
GLOBAL ISSUE 2018 | YRIS.YIRA.ORG 3 Editor's Letter
ESSAYS
5 The End of War and Peace: The Thesis of Frédéric Gros and the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro VITORIA ALVES
12 Can Bullets Kill Soft Power?: The National Rifle Association as a Threat to America’s Attractiveness Abroad DARCY TAYLOR
31 Reconciliation in Settler-Colonial States: A Study of the Political Apology HANNAH CHONG
66 Slovak Insecurity and The Yale Europeanization: Ontological (In)security in Slovak Foreign Review of Policy KAMILA POTOCAROVA International Studies Global Issue 2018
1 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Staff Elisabeth Siegel
MANAGING EDITORS
Jake Mezey Qusay Omran
SENIOR EDITORS
Yoojin Han Muriel Wang
EDITORS
Michael Borger Sophia Carpentier Qusay Omran Juan Otoya-Vanini Henry Suckow-Ziemer Daniel Yadin
GRAPHIC DESIGN
Elisabeth Siegel
CONTRIBUTORS
Vitoria Alves Hannah Chong Kamila Potocarova Darcy Taylor
2 Dear Reader, Welcome to the Global Issue of the Yale Review of International Studies.
As YRIS begins a new year, we are turning over a new leaf with a revamped issue structure. The Global Issue supplants the Intercollegiate Issue and allows submissions from students at universities based outside of the United States. As part of this change, our Winter and Spring issues have been opened to all undergraduates’ submissions, while the fourth and final issue of each academic year, our Acheson Prize issue, remains Yale-only.
The YRIS executive board made this change after much deliberation due to a desire to expose our readership to perspectives beyond the thus far U.S.-centric norm of our publishing. This summer, we put decided effort in solicitations to international universities to remedy the current lack of essays from Asian, African, South American, and Central and Eastern European countries. We solicited papers from students in 400 universities around the world, and we received nearly 100 individual essay submissions. The quality of work that we were privileged to receive underscores the necessity of taking up this endeavor: topics ranged from a comparative analysis of the ethnopolitics in Chittagong Hill Tract, Bangladesh to an examination of checks and balances in Zimbabwe. Our goal of “stimulating broad and multi-faceted debate” and “addressing questions of international interest” could not be achieved without expanding the range of voices that we publish.
We picked four outstanding works to be featured in our print issue as well as online, and around 24 works total from were selected to be published on our website, yris.yira.org.
As always, thank you for reading. We couldn't do this without your support. We are, as ever, humbled by the wonderful work of our contributors. Best, Elisabeth Siegel Editor-in-Chief (2018-2019)
3 Essays
VITÓRIA ALVES DARCY TAYLOR HANNAH CHONG KAMILA POTOCAROVA
4 Vitória Alves University of Sao Paolo, Brazil The End of War and Peace: The Thesis of Frédéric Gros and the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro
The war as ‘armed, public and just con- and is expected to remain so until the end flict,’ slowly disappears, with its lies and of the year.3 Temer named Army General its nobilities, its atrocities and its con- Walter Souza Braga Netto as Interven- solations. The future of the states of vi- tor Federal [loosely translated to Federal olence, regulated by security procedures Interventionist], who in practice assumes promising to reduce its risks, stand be- the powers of the State Secretary of Pub- fore us, requiring thought to inspire new lic Security. Also according to the decree, attention and to invent new hopes.1 “the position of Interventor is of a mili- Such is how Frédéric Gros, French tary nature.”4 It is important to note that political philosopher and professor at the Interventor is not a regular political the Institut d’études politiques de Paris nor military position in Brazil. It is put in (SciencesPo), concludes his well-received practice only in special or urgent contexts, book States of Violence: An Essay on the and appointing one is a power vested End of War.2 Assuming that the dichot- upon the President by the Constitution omy between national and international (art. 84, caput, X).5 studies is innocuous insofar as these fields It is within this context that Gros’ are evidently intertwined, Gros’ work can argument about the intriguing diversity help us critically understand the current of actors involved in the sphere of con- situation in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. temporary violence becomes relevant. In At the request of governor Luiz Fer- “classical conflicts,” soldiers of a given nando ‘Pezão’ de Souza to “put an end country would confront each other on to serious compromise of public order,” President Michel Temer placed the state 3 Michel Temer et al, “Decree No. 9.288,” February 16th under federal intervention in the sphere 2018, accessed May 3, 2018, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/decreto/D9288.htm. of public security since February 2018 4 João Paulo Charleaux, “Intervenção federal no Rio: as justificativas e as contestações [Federal intervention in Rio: justifications and contestations],” Nexo newspaper, 1 Frédéric Gros, Estados de violência: ensaio sobre o fim February 16, 2018, accessed May 3, 2018, https://www. da guerra [States of Violence: An Essay on the End of War] nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2018/02/16/Intervenção-fed- (São Paulo: Ideias e Letras, 2009), 254. eral-no-Rio-as-justificativas-e-as-contestações. 2 Information about the author’s current academic posi- 5 Brazil. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil tion was found in É Realizações (Editora, Espaço Cultural de 1988 [Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil e Livraria – Publisher, Cultural Space and Bookshop – au- of 1988], 1988, accessed May 3, 2018, http://www.planalto. thor’s translation). gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm
5 a particular battlefield. That is, the ones violence today, the former with its formal who would fight were considerably easier temporality (e.g. declaration of war, mobi- to identify, usually unified under a clear- lization of armies, ceasefires, etc.) and the er motto and confronting each other at a latter converging with Gros’ concept of pre-determined space. On the other hand, perpetuation of tension, where a dispute in the case of Rio de Janeiro, violence em- can continue to occur (and take victims) braces multiple actors, starting with the over an indefinite period. State itself, consisting of various entities Thereby, just by deducing from Bra- such as the Army troops, the Interventor zilian political history and recent coverage Braga Netto, President Temer himself, by national newspapers, one can expect the state’s governor, and the police. In as an immediate result the imprisonment this cloudy battlefield, private actors gain and death of those marginalized by this prominence, just as Gros predicts as a security system: black, poor, and young global trend, with local criminal factions population of the local favelas. This ex- such as the famous Comando Vermel- pectation is, unfortunately, corroborated ho (Red Command) active in the favel- by the law approved by Temer last year, as, or shantytown communities, which which guarantees that violations com- are not only populated by criminals but mitted by military officers will be judged also by a resounding number of families only in military courts, rather than in civil (women, children, elderly, etc.). Here, we courts.6 Enabling impunity of common can observe how the frontiers of conflicts military and police violence with a ten- become less predictable, once one’s own dency towards serious humanitarian costs neighborhood can be classified as a po- under this law correlates with another tential area of war. The national media is point by Gros: the barbarization of con- also a separate and private actor, serving flicts. as an important influencer and articulator A study conducted by the Obser- of political narratives. vatory of the Intervention, arranged by Another, perhaps more cruel, problem Candido Mendes University’s Center highlighted by the French political phi- for Studies of Security and Citizenship, losopher is the perpetuation of this sce- shows little to no significant improvement nario, which can even extend to the point in state security resulting from the inter- where the security system and the recent vention.7 For instance, two months prior intervention regulate (and do not com- to the intervention, 1,299 shootings oc- bat) the states of violence in Rio de Ja- curred in the city of Rio and in the Met- neiro. This framework can be understood ropolitan Region, while two months after as a result of faulty, overly bureaucratic, the intervention, this number increased and corrupt security and justice systems, making it clear that federal intervention 6 Michel Temer and Raul Jungmann, “Law No. 13.491, is aimed at maintaining the political sta- October 13th 2017,” accessed May 3, 2018, http://www. tus quo, ignoring the urgency of structur- planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2017/lei/L13491. htm. al reforms (e.g. investments in education 7 Silvia Ramos, À deriva: sem programa, sem resultado, and health) that could bring more positive sem rumo [Adrift: no program, no result, aimless] (Rio de Janeiro: Observatory of the Intervention, Center for Stud- changes to the state of Rio in the long run. ies of Security and Citizenship of the Candido Mendes Again, there is a noticeable contrast be- University, 2018), https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/wp-con- tween conventional forms of violence and tent/uploads/2018/04/Relatório-01-Observatório-da-Inter- venção_final.pdf.
6 "The Worker’s Party is enced the public’s per- ception of violence. As looking toward various also identified in the Observatory’s report, judicial avenues to media coverage has been often sensation- confirm Lula’s detention alist or simply incom- plete; for instance, it would merely highlight as unconstitutional and increased robbery rates while neglecting his- is reinforcing the idea of torical police violence. Indeed, according to his participation in the the aforementioned re- port, 87 percent of the upcoming elections." residents of the city of Rio “are afraid” of be- ing murdered and 92 to 1,502 shootings. Between February percent “are afraid” of being hit by a stray 16 and April 1, 2018, there were twelve bullet. The media’s articulation of expec- cases of homicide with fifty-two victims; tations as well as its biased approach are according to Nexo, during the equivalent dangerous given the persistent sociopolit- period last year, six cases were registered 8 ical narratives disseminated in the coun- with twenty-seven people killed in total. try by the conservative elite. The coverage The latest report also indicates that after even provides a pretext for the federal five months, the number of shootings rose intervention with an army general as the to 4,005, including the death of a four- Interventor. In practical terms, this trend teen year-old boy who was on his way to in the media may influence the popula- school and shot from behind by the police tion (or electorate) to approve “military in a helicopter during an “operation” at a 10 9 in politics” (again). This media influence community known as “Maré.” is particularly pertinent this year with The “mediatization” of the violence, as the upcoming Brazilian election and the articulated by Gros, is also an important presidential candidacy of current Feder- component in Rio’s case. The press’ treat- al Deputy Jair Bolsonaro (Social Liberal ment appears to have potentially influ- Party, Rio de Janeiro) and his radically
8 André Cabette Fábio, “A situação do Rio após dois conservative agenda defending the former meses de intervenção, segundo este relatório [The situation military dictatorship (1964-1985) and of Rio after two months of intervention, according to this citing torture as a legitimate practice.11 report],” Nexo newspaper, April 27, 2018, accessed May 3, 2018, https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2018/04/27/ On June 28, 2018, the Brazilian Institute A-situação-do-Rio-após-dois-meses-de-intervenção-segun- of Public Opinion and Statistics disclosed do-este-relatório. 9 Silvia Ramos, Cinco Meses de Intervenção Federal: that, without Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Sil- Muito Tiroteio, Pouca Inteligência [Five Months of Federal Intervention: Too Much Shooting, Little Intelligence] (Rio 10 Ibid. de Janeiro: Observatory of the Intervention and Center for 11 “Perfil: Jair Bolsonaro, deputado federal, PSL [Profile: Studies of Security and Citizenship of the Candido Mendes Jair Bolsonaro, Federal Deputy, PSL],” Gazeta do Povo, ac- University, 2018), http://observatoriodaintervencao.com.br/ cessed in May 3, 2018, http://especiais.gazetadopovo.com. wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CINCO-MESES.pdf br/eleicoes/2018/candidatos/presidente/jair-bolsonaro.
7 va (former President of Brazil from the approval of the federal intervention in- Worker’s Party, 2003-2010) running as a clude recent cases of corruption in Rio, candidate, Bolsonaro is expected to be the involving high political positions and leading candidate in the first round with state bankruptcy. Such misconduct high- a margin of 17 percent points.12 Lula has lights the idea that the Armed Forces are been in prison since April 7, 2018, accused not corrupted by regional crime and thus of passive corruption and money launder- would be able to “solve the problem.”14 ing in the Triplex Case (bribes to Petro- This context is also problematic in the bras, the state’s oil company, through the field of constitutionality: according to purchase of the apartment/triplex). The Eloísa Machado, professor of Constitu- Worker’s Party is looking toward various tional Law at Getulio Vargas Foundation/ judicial avenues to confirm Lula’s deten- Sao Paulo, the military nature of Rio’s tion as unconstitutional and is reinforcing Interventor who only responds to Temer, the idea of him participating in the up- is unconstitutional because such a “posi- coming elections (or nominating an ally/ tion of Interventor is imminently civil.15 substitute).13 Moreover, albeit restricted to the area of Other factors that fuel the popular public security, Braga Netto has the pow- er to sanction gov- ernmental action; "Indeed, according to the however, according to Eloísa, the Con- aforementioned report, 87 stitution of 1988, that marked the percent of the residents re-democratization of Brazil, such gov- of the city of Rio are afraid ernmental action should only be civil and non-military. of being murdered and 92 Thus, we see the end of the war percent are afraid of being in its “classical” sense, with a sig- hit by a stray bullet.” nificant nebulos- ity of actors and interests. We also 12 Alessandra Modzeleski. “Lula tem 33%, Bolsonaro, 15%, Marina, 7%, e Ciro, 4%, aponta pesquisa Ibope [Lula has 33%, Bolsonaro, 15%, Marina, 7%, and Ciro, 4%, Ibope 14 André Cabette Fábio, “A situação do Rio após dois research points out],” G1 Globo, June 28, 2018, accessed meses de intervenção, segundo este relatório [The situation July 18, 2018, https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/ of Rio after two months of intervention, according to this noticia/lula-tem-33-bolsonaro-15-marina-7-e-ciro-4-apon- report].” Nexo newspaper. April 27, 2018. Accessed May 3, ta-pesquisa-ibope.ghtml 2018. https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2018/04/27/ 13 Conrado Corsalette and Olívia Fraga. “Por que um A-situação-do-Rio-após-dois-meses-de-intervenção-segun- desembargador mandou soltar Lula agora. E por que ele do-este-relatório. continua preso [Why an appeals court judge ordered Lula 15 João Paulo Charleaux, “Intervenção federal no Rio: to be released now. And why is he still in prison?],” Nexo as justificativas e as contestações [Federal intervention in newspaper, July 8, 2018, accessed July 18, 2018, https:// Rio: justifications and contestations],” Nexo newspaper, www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2018/07/08/Por-que-um- February 16, 2018, accessed May 3, 2018, https://www. desembargador-mandou-soltar-Lula-agora.-E-por-que-ele- nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2018/02/16/Intervenção-feder- continua-preso al-no-Rio-as-justificativas-e-as-contestações.
8 observe the end of peace with a full-func- lence is articulated nowadays, intertwined tioning political system of security and in- with narratives and sometimes seemingly tervention enacted by Temer in February, too complex for a quick understanding. In which has historically proven important this sense, such systematization of social in Rio for regulating and perpetuating and political phenomena can be translated intrastate violence. Finally, beyond pon- from its initially global terms to national dering the morality of the violence—both or even state contexts. This transferability those in classical terms during the 1500s ultimately strengthens the social function by the great powers that colonized Lat- of International Relations by recognizing in America, and cases of contemporary the complexity, potential scope and socio- violence across the world—States of political contribution of its studies. Violence: An Essay on the End of War proposes a systematic analysis of how vio-
About the Author: Vitória Alves is from São José dos Campos, Brazil. Currently in her fourth year, she is an undergraduate student of International Relations at the University of São Paulo. International Politics and Law are her main areas of interest, even before going to university, given her personal experience of four years living in East Timor, at the time, facing post-independence tension. Recently, she's been focusing on the analysis of Brazilian politics, nevertheless, bringing her International Studies' background.
9 Works Cited Alessandra Modzeleski. "Lula tem 33%, about Frédéric Gros - author's transla- Bolsonaro, 15%, Marina, 7%, e Ciro, 4%, tion].” Editora, Espaço Cultural e Livraria. aponta pesquisa Ibope [Lula has 33%, Accessed May 3, 2018. http://www.ereal- Bolsonaro, 15%, Marina, 7%, and Ciro, izacoes.com.br/autor/frederic-gros. 4%, Ibope research points out]," G1 Fábio, André Cabette. “A situação do Rio após Globo, June 28, 2018, accessed July 18, dois meses de intervenção, segundo este 2018, https://g1.globo.com/politica/ relatório [The situation of Rio after two eleicoes/2018/noticia/lula-tem-33-bol- months of intervention, according to this sonaro-15-marina-7-e-ciro-4-aponta- report].” Nexo newspaper. April 27, 2018. pesquisa-ibope.ghtml Accessed May 3, 2018. https://www.nex- Brazil. Constituição da República Federativa ojornal.com.br/expresso/2018/04/27/ do Brasil de 1988 [Constitution of the A-situação-do-Rio-após-dois-meses-de- Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988], intervenção-segundo-este-relatório. 1988, accessed May 3, 2018, http://www. Gros, Frédéric. Estados de violência: ensaio planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/ sobre o fim da guerra [States of Violence: constituicao.htm An Essay on the End of War]. São Paulo: Bretas, Valéria. “Sem Lula, Bolsonaro lidera Ideias e Letras, 2009. intenção de voto para presidente, diz Mauro Pimentel (Agence France-Presse). pesquisa [Without Lula, Bolsonaro Photo found in Felipe Betim (El País). leads voting intentions for the Presiden- Exército começa a sair da ‘favela teste’ cy].” Exame newspaper. May 3, 2018. Vila Kennedy após um mês de inter- Accessed May 3, 2018. https://exame. venção e poucos resultados (Army abril.com.br/brasil/sem-lula-bolsona- begins to leave the 'test favela' Vila ro-lidera-intencao-de-voto-para-presi- Kennedy after a month of intervention dente-diz-pesquisa/. and few results - author's translation). Charleaux, João Paulo. “Intervenção federal no 3/20/18. Available in:
10 Ramos, Silvia (coord.). Cinco Meses de Inter- D9288.htm. venção Federal: Muito Tiroteio, Pouca Temer, Michel, and Raul Jungmann. "Law No. Inteligência [Five Months of Federal 13.491, October 13th 2017." Accessed Intervention: Too Much Shooting, Little May 3, 2018. http://www.planalto.gov. Intelligence] (Rio de Janeiro: Observa- br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2017/lei/ tory of the Intervention and Center for L13491.htm. Studies of Security and Citizenship of Tom Phillips. "Trump of the tropics: the the Candido Mendes University, 2018), 'dangerous' candidate leading Brazil's http://observatoriodaintervencao.com. presidential race", The Guardian, April 19, br/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CIN- 2018, accessed July 28, 2018, https:// CO-MESES.pdf www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ Temer, Michel, et al. “Decree No. 9.288, apr/19/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-presiden- February 16th 2018.” Accessed May tial-candidate-trump-parallels 3, 2018. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/decreto/
11 Darcy Taylor University of Toronto, Canada Can Bullets Kill Soft Power?: The National Rifle Association as a Threat to America’s Attractiveness Abroad
Introduction words perfectly illustrate the longstand- On March 5th, 2018, a threatening ing reality of the NRA as a radical non- video made headlines throughout the state actor that aggressively influences United States and gained international America’s gun control debate. attention. With Wild West music play- Gun control remains one of the most ing in the background, a woman wear- polarizing issues in American politics.3 ing all black sits in a dark room with an This public and political debate is primar- hour glass. After listing enemies of “in- ily focused on the potential for Congress dividual liberty in America,” including to take modest action in order to reduce the New York Times and Washington gun violence. It has gained significant at- Post, she flips the hour glass and warns, tention in recent years, considering the “Your time is running out.”1 The woman number of high profile, and deadly, mass featured in the video was Dana Loesch, shootings.4 Advocates of gun control point official spokesperson for the National to measures such as banning semi-auto- Rifle Association. The video was released matic rifles and increasing background in response to highly publicized calls for checks for firearms purchases. While they gun control from American students. This push for restrictions on gun ownership movement emerged in wake of a horrif- (for mentally ill people, wanted terrorists, ic mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman etc.), they usually refrain from opposing Douglas High School in Florida.2 Ms. the fundamental right to bear arms. Loesch’s combative tone and threatening This paper analyzes the NRA as a
1 See, for example, Alina Polianskaya, “NRA issues 3 For more on the gun control debate in recent years, threatening video warning journalists ‘your time is run- see, Sabrina Siddiqui, “’Shameful day in Washington’: ning out’,” The Independent, March 5, 2018. https://www. five years after gun reform failed, is change coming?” The independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/nra-video-threat- Guardian, April 17th, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/ ens-journalists-gun-laws-us-florida-shooting-twitter-dana- us-news/2018/apr/17/us-gun-control-sandy-hook-five- loesch-a8240341.html ; Nicole Gaudiano, “NRA spokes- years-later ; Michael Jones and George Stone, “The U.S. woman warns media, Hollywood and athletes ‘time is Gun-Control Paradox: Gun Buyer Response to Congressio- running out’,” USA Today, March 5, 2018. nal Gun-Control Initiatives,” Journal of Business & Eco- 2 See, Richard Luscombe, “Florida students try to re- nomics Research (Online) 13:4 (2015), 167-168. build their lives – but they won’t stop pushing for gun 4 CNN Library, “Deadliest Mass Shootings in Modern control.” The Guardian, February 24th, 2018. https:// US History Fast Facts,” April 1, 2018. https://edition.cnn. www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/24/florida-park- com/2013/09/16/us/20-deadliest-mass-shootings-in-u-s- land-school-shooting-survivors history-fast-facts/index.html
12 controversial non-state actor in the con- democracy, ‘city on a hill,’ and symbol of text of the gun control debate within the progress around the world. United States. It first provides background information on the organization, then The National Rifle Association: proceeds to emphasize the sources of its General Background influence in American politics and society. The NRA proudly describes itself as It contends that the group is a remarkably “America’s longest-standing civil rights powerful actor that serves as a leading ob- organization.”6 According to their official stacle to gun control legislation in the US. website, members are “proud defenders of The paper subsequently considers the po- history’s patriots and diligent protectors of tential for the NRA to have consequences the Second Amendment.”7 With roughly for the US beyond the domestic realm. It five million members and revenues ex- specifically argues that due to its promi- ceeding 200 million dollars annually, the nent role as the leading opponent to any non-state actor is well known for lobbying form of gun control, the NRA serves as against gun control not only in Congress, a threat to American soft power, broadly but also in state legislatures and local defined as the ability to exert internation- counties.8 This crucial work is primarily al influence through attraction as opposed carried out through the NRA Institute for to coercion.5 In this light, the NRA is not Legislative Action and the Political Vic- only indirectly killing Americans through tory Fund.9 It is important to note, how- its role in opposing gun control, but also ever, that the association is involved in a killing America’s influence as an effective much wider variety of activities, ranging from firearm train- ing programs to "In this light, the NRA is producing its own television station.10 not only indirectly killing In contempo- rary American so- Americans through its role ciety, particularly among Democrats, in opposing gun control, the NRA is often
6 National Rifle Asso- but also killing America’s ciation, Official Website. https://home.nra.org/ 7 Ibid. influence as an effective 8 For membership num- bers, see NRA official website; for revenue, see Jones and Stone, “The U.S. democracy, ‘city on a hill,’ Gun-Control Paradox,” 168. 9 Scott Melzer, Gun Cru- saders: The NRA’S Culture and symbol of progress War (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 225. 10 Laura Reston, “The around the world." NRA’S New Scare Tactics,” The New Republic, October 3, 2017. https://newrepublic. 5 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, No. 80, com/article/145001/nra-new-scare-tactic-gun-lobby-remak- Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), 166-168. ing-itself-arm-alt-right
13 associated with an extreme glorification guns and restrain individual liberty.13 One of the Second Amendment and is viewed of their most famous arguments against as an uncompromising force against any gun control, “the only thing that stops a form of gun control.11 When mass shoot- bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a ings trigger debates about the need to gun,” ironically calls for more firearms in regulate automatic weapons, for example, order to address gun violence.14 Anoth- the NRA responds to counter the move- er well-known talking point, “guns don’t kill people, people "Ultimately, it is clear that kill people,” attempts to shift blame away from guns, and to- broad public support for wards “monsters” and “lunatics.”15 Vice moderate gun control Executive President Wayne LaPierre has remains frustratingly claimed that dan- gerous, crazy peo- ineffective in the face ple are roaming the streets, and believes that all Americans of the NRA’s financial deserve the right to defend themselves influence, aggressive using whatever fire- arm they chose.16 advocacy, and ubiquitous Founded in 1871, the NRA was simply political capital." a recreational group whose objective was to “promote and encourage rifle ment.12 The group embraces the slippery shooting on a scientific basis.”17 For much slope logic, essentially contending that of its history, the organization was largely any form of gun control is the first step in a government plan to confiscate all 13 Jones and Stone, “The U.S. Gun-Control Paradox,” 168. 14 Chad Kautzer, “Good Guys with Guns: From Popular Sovereignty to Self-Defensive Subjectivity,” Law Critique 11 See, for example, Tim Dickinson, “How the NRA 26 (2015), 176. Paved the Way for Mass Shootings,” Rolling Stone, June 15 Robert Richards, “The Role of Interest Groups and 15, 2016. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how- Group Interests on Gun Legislation in the U.S. House”, the-nra-paved-the-way-for-the-orlando-shooting-20160615 Social Science Quarterly 98:2 (2017), 471; The Economist, ; Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, “Statement on Repub- “The curious strength of the NRA,” March 16th, 2013. licans Advancing NRA’s Toothless Gun Legislation,” July https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21573545- 1, 2016. https://www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/ americas-gun-lobby-beating-back-post-newtown-push- pelosi-statement-on-republicans-advancing-nras-tooth- gun-controls-curious. less-gun-legislation/ 16 The Economist, “The curious strength of the NRA.” 12 See, for example, The Guardian, “NRA: full state- 17 British Broadcasting Corporation, “US gun con- ment by Wayne LaPierre in response to Newtown shoot- trol: What is the NRA and why is it so powerful?” Janu- ings,” December 21, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/ ary 8, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-cana- world/2012/dec/21/nra-full-statement-lapierre-newtown da-35261394
14 indifferent to political advocates of second This political environment sheds light amendment rights. The group even offi- on the power of the NRA. Despite statis- cially supported gun control laws in 1934 tical evidence linking the number of guns and as recently as 1968.18 Nevertheless, in America to significant rates of violence, the NRA became increasingly political and widespread public support for reform, in the 1970s, institutionalizing lobbying any sort of legislative change remains out efforts and moving towards their current of reach.24 To be clear, the NRA is not the position as absolute defenders of the sec- only reason why gun control remains un- ond amendment.19 At present, it would be thinkable in Congress. First of all, it is part impossible to have any political discus- of a wider gun lobby.25 Secondly, factors sion regarding guns in America without that include a highly partisan political cli- confronting this increasingly ubiquitous, mate as well as historically ingrained pro- vocal, and relentless pro-gun organization. gun values among many lawmakers have also influenced the debate independently The Power of the NRA as a Non- of the NRA. Nevertheless, it is well doc- State Actor in the United States umented that the NRA is the single most Following a mass shooting in San powerful component of the gun lobby and Bernardino in 2015, Senator Dianne that it has played the leading role over the Feinstein introduced a bill to prohibit past several decades in blocking measures individuals on the Federal Bureau of In- that would have controlled or restricted vestigation’s Terrorist Watch List from the sale or use of firearms in the US.26 As purchasing guns.20 After the proposal was the upcoming section will illustrate, it has defeated, she stated, “If you need proof done so through its ability to raise money, that Congress is a hostage to the gun lob- lobby, create a pro-gun culture, and mobi- by, look no further than today’s vote.”21 In lize supporters. this context, gun control remains a po- litical issue where any progress appears Direct Political Power: Congress, impossible. Even when public pressure Elections, and Lobbying and Democratic legislative initiative In a surprisingly explicit illustra- have gained momentum following mass tion of NRA influence, Senate Majority shootings in recent years, laws remain un- Leader Mitch McConnell told reporters changed.22 Notwithstanding widespread in 2016 that he “couldn’t imagine” his Re- public support for minor reforms (such as publican-controlled Senate confirming universal background checks), Congress any Supreme Court nominee who lacked consistently fails to act.23 the support of the NRA.27 His comment reveals the pervasive influence of the or-
18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. See also, Melzer, 73 24 For more on the relationship between the number of 20 Dickinson, “How the NRA Paved the Way for Mass guns and gun violence, see: Harvard Injury Control Re- Shootings.” search Center, “Firearms Research: Homicides.” https:// 21 Ibid. www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/firearms-research/guns-and- 22 Richards, “The Role of Interest Groups and Group In- death/ terests on Gun Legislation in the U.S. House,” 471. 25 See, for example, Gun Owners of America (https:// 23 Baxter Oliphant, “Bipartisan support for some gun pro- gunowners.org/), National Association for Gun Rights posals, stark partisan divisions on many others,” Pew Re- (https://nationalgunrights.org/). search Center, June 23, 2017.http://www.pewresearch.org/ 26 See for example, Jones and Stone, 168. fact-tank/2017/06/23/bipartisan-support-for-some-gun-pro- 27 Dickinson, “How the NRA Paved the Way for Mass posals-stark-partisan-divisions-on-many-others/ Shootings.”
15 ganization, not to mention the deepening for Donald Trump, and contributed thir- politicization of the Supreme Court by an ty million dollars to his campaign over- increasingly partisan Senate, which ap- all.33 LaPierre and his team spent millions pears to take its cue from this omnipresent more helping win five key Senate races lobby group. Beyond efforts to block gun in 2016.34 The NRA outspends all other control, the group appears to be a consis- gun-related organizations when it comes tent political consideration for Senators, to supporting or opposing candidates.35 even when considering appointments for Beyond the campaign trail, it also serves the highest judicial office in the land. as a significant political force for elected This type of influence is hardly sur- officials to contend with. This was illus- prising considering the increased polit- trated by the rapid mobilization of lobby- ical involvement of the NRA in recent ists to the Connecticut State Legislature decades. For example, research has con- to counter gun control efforts following nected NRA advocacy to the Republican the slaughter of 20 children at Sandy takeover of the House of Representa- Hook Elementary School.36 Ultimately, tives in 1994.28 With a Republican back it is clear that broad public support for in the White House in 2000, the group moderate gun control remains frustrat- supported two major pieces of pro-gun ingly ineffective in the face of the NRA’s legislation that were adopted by the Bush financial influence, aggressive advocacy, administration.29 In the 2004 national and ubiquitous political capital. However, elections, the Director of the NRA Insti- the contribution of the NRA to the lack tute for Legislative Action boasted about of gun control in America goes beyond the group’s 6.5 million endorsement post- direct political activity. cards and letters, 2.4 million endorse- ment phone calls, and 28,000 television Beyond Money and Lobbying: advertisements.30 Campaign donations, Fostering a Pro-Gun Culture overwhelmingly directed to Republicans, In a recent article, Bill Scher convinc- have served as a critical tool. In the 2016 ingly argues that the NRA “has built a elections, Republican Speaker Paul Ryan movement that has convinced its followers received over $170,000 from the group.31 that gun ownership is a way of life, central Even at the state level, the NRA recent- to one’s freedom and safety, that must be ly funneled over $400,000 to its chosen defended on a daily basis.”37 He contends candidates in Colorado in order to defeat 33 Bill Scher, “Why the NRA Always Wins: It’s not the two incumbent Senators who had sup- money. It’s the culture,” Politico, February 19, 2018. https:// ported minor gun control policies includ- www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/19/why-the- 32 nra-always-wins-217028 ; Lynda Kinkade, “Activists, NRA ing universal background checks. At the wage ad war over gun reform,” CNN, March 24th, 2018. Presidential level, the NRA became the https://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2018/03/24/gun-laws-ad- second highest funder of advertisements wars-kinkade-pkg.cnn 34 Note post Parkland shooting- Scher, “Why the NRA Always Wins.” 28 Melzer, 237. 35 Jones and Stone, “The U.S. Gun-Control Paradox,” 29 Ibid., 238. 169. 30 Ibid., 230. Note this was in 2013. 36 The Economist, “The curious strength of the NRA,”; 31 Tyler Fisher, Sarah Frostenson, and Lily Mihalik. “The Jonathan Freeland, “Washington DC shootings: Ameri- gun lobby: See how much your representative gets,” Polit- ca’s gun disease diminishes its soft power,” The Guardian, ico, February 21st, 2018. https://www.politico.com/inter- September 17, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/com- actives/2017/gun-lobbying-spending-in-america-congress/ mentisfree/2013/sep/17/washington-dc-shootings-ameri- 32 Jones and Stone, “The U.S. Gun-Control Paradox,” ca-gun-disease 169-170. 37 Scher, “Why the NRA Always Wins.”
16 "In this context, the NRA that this cultural influence is thehas become part of the primary source of the NRA’s political power. broader conservative Numerous oth- er scholars and movement...one that commentators have similarly prioritizes individualism claimed that the NRA thrives on over interventionist creating a cul- ture of fear.38 In order to promote liberal ideas ranging from the rights of citizens to own universal health care to firearms with as few restrictions progressive taxation." as possible, the association at- owners list protection as a main reason for tempts to appeal to the public through possessing a firearm, this culture of fear various warnings that emphasize the ne- appears to have a receptive audience.42 cessity of their second-amendment rights. Not only does the NRA warn the As the Economist noted in 2013, the public about ‘bad guys with guns,’ but group provides an “alternative narrative also about politicians in Washington, who about America as an exceptionally violent allegedly want to prohibit citizens from dystopia,” featuring dangerous individuals 39 defending themselves. In this light, the who liberals allow to roam free. Follow- culture of fear is amplified by portrayals ing this logic, the NRA publically argues of an intrusive federal government that that “good citizens need semi-automat- threatens individual freedom. In an ex- ics” to defend themselves from potential 40 plicit and inaccurate claim, the NRA threats. LaPierre made this idea clear in warned “Obama will take our guns.”43 This 2012, arguing that arming ‘good guys’ at narrative has proved appealing to cer- schools was, “the only way to stop a mon- 41 tain Americans, especially in the context ster from killing our kids.” Considering of broader conservative culture, and has the fact that two-thirds of American gun therefore provided the NRA with a high degree of grassroots support and popular 38 See Melzer, 11. legitimacy. 39 The Economist, “The curious strength of the NRA,”; Luigi Esposito and Laura Finley, “Beyond Gun Control: Ex- amining Neoliberalism, Pro-Gun Politics and Gun Violence 42 Ruth Igielnik and Anna Brown, “Key takeaways on in the United States,” Theory in Action 7:2 (2014), 91. Americans’ views of guns and gun ownership,” Pew Re- 40 The Economist, “The curious strength of the NRA,” search Center, June 22, 2017. http://www.pewresearch.org/ note LaPierre remarks post Newtown. fact-tank/2017/06/22/key-takeaways-on-americans-views- 41 Ibid. Note also, Chad Kautzer, “Good Guys with Guns: of-guns-and-gun-ownership/ From Popular Sovereignty to Self-Defensive Subjectivi- 43 Esposito and Finley, “Beyond Gun Control: Examining ty,” 176, LaPierre remarks regarding NRA’s new ‘National Neoliberalism, Pro-Gun Politics and Gun Violence in the School Shield Program.’ United States,” 82.
17 Sociologist Scott Melzer has high- vative movement in the US, one that pri- lighted how this culture of individual oritizes individualism over interventionist freedom resonates particularly well with liberal ideas ranging from universal health a core base of NRA supporters- older care to progressive taxation.47 Pointing to conservative white men, who believe that NRA coverage of non-traditional issues government should refrain from intruding such as immigration, University of Cal- in their lives.44 Considering the normative ifornia Professor Adam Winkler argues power of the Second Amendment, and that “We’re seeing the NRA become an the historical American narrative that extreme right-wing media outlet, not just the Federal government has the potential a protector of guns.”48 Through association to inappropriately infringe on individ- with a larger political ideology, one that is ual liberty, the NRA finds listening ears rooted in the core national value of indi- among many of America’s conservatives. vidual liberty and that is championed by In fact, Pew Research Centre has found the Republican Party, the NRA has clearly that nearly 75% of gun owners believe developed a degree of normative political that the right to bear arms is “essential to power that helps its pro-gun message res- their sense of personal freedom.”45 Cer- onate with those on the American right. tain scholars have persuasively connected In summary, the NRA has attempt- the NRA’s popular appeal and successful ed to foster a pro-gun culture in the US, grassroots mobilization to neoliberal ide- telling citizens to fear dangerous monsters als that have dominated American society with guns, as well as Washington liberals since the 1980s. They specifically relate who allegedly want to strip them of their the gun control de- bate to negative per- "Through public ceptions of govern- ment intervention, and highlight how diplomacy tools, American “rugged individual- ism” is positively as- soft power contributed sociated with “virtue and responsibility,” to destabilization of the according to neolib- eral thinking.46 In this Soviet Union, and to context, the NRA has become part of the broader conser- ultimate victory in the
44 Melzer, 2; Brown and Cold War." Igielnik, “Key takeaways on Americans’ views of guns and gun ownership,” Pew Research Center, note white men are actually twice as likely to own a gun than white woman as second amendment rights. It has done so well as nonwhite men. through its public statements, television 45 Brown and Igielnik, “Key takeaways on Americans’ views of guns and gun ownership,” Pew Research Center. network, national magazine, annual na- 46 Esposito and Finley, “Beyond Gun Control: Examining Neoliberalism, Pro-Gun Politics and Gun Violence in the 47 See Melzer, 8. United States,” 76-80. 48 Reston, “The NRA’S New Scare Tactics.”
18 tional meeting, and media spokespeople, er of the NRA will likely argue that the among other avenues. The essential point group simply acts on behalf of Amer- to note, however, is that this culture has icans who have always valued the sec- facilitated the political mobilization of ond amendment, or that it's campaign followers. By appealing to certain Ameri- contributions remain relatively modest.54 cans’ fears and their love for individual lib- What remains clear, however, is that the erty, the NRA can subsequently influence NRA has served as the most prominent, politics through its members and support- organized, and holistic actor speaking on ers. Through voting information packages, behalf of gun rights. Perhaps they repeat ratings of candidates, and endorsements, a pro-gun message that numerous con- the NRA effectively encourages civic par- servative citizens and politicians already ticipation.49 Noting this influence, Melzer agree with, but they consistently make has claimed that the NRA’s powerful lob- that message loud, clear, and uncompro- bying status is “a reflection of the group’s mising. influence at the polls,” and that its “big Gun violence in America is the worst stick” is members who base voting on the among any developed nation.55 With al- issue of guns.50 Negatively incorporating most as many guns in the country as peo- Democrats into their culture of fear, the ple, the country has the most firearms per NRA consistently calls on Americans population in the world.56 Whether its re- to engage in political action at the local, lated to gangs in inner cities, domestic vi- state, and national level.51 Considering the olence at home, or mass murder at schools fact that 46% of NRA gun owners “have and churches, gun violence has touched contacted a public official to express their countless lives in America and has con- opinion on gun policy,” their mobilization sistently raised questions about legisla- strategy appears effective.52 Examining tive reforms. It is in this context that the data since the 1970s, researchers have NRA should be viewed as an extremely found that “gun owners are developing a influential non-state actor that has been power political identity” that is increas- a key player in preventing any sort of gun ingly associated with predictable voting control measures. Through funding cam- behavior.53 In this context, it appears as paigns, lobbying in Congress, supporting though there is always an inspired group a culture of fear, and appealing to propo- of citizens for the NRA to stir up. nents of individual liberty, the NRA sup- ports a political agenda where major gun Is the NRA Really That Powerful? control is inconceivable, even in wake of Critics seeking to downplay the pow- tragedies.
49 BBC, “US gun control: What is the NRA and why is it so powerful?” 50 Melzer, 234-235. 51 See, Eric Lipton and Alexander Burns, “The True 54 See, for example, Richards, “The Role of Interest Source of the N.R.A.’s Clout: Mobilization, Not Donation,” Groups and Group Interests on Gun Legislation in the U.S. New York Times, February 24, 2018. https://www.nytimes. House,”471-472. com/2018/02/24/us/politics/nra-gun-control-florida.html 55 Jonathan Masters, “U.S. Gun Policy: Global Com- 52 See, Kim Parker, “Among gun owners, NRA members parisons,” Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, have a unique set of views and experiences." November 14, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ 53 See, Mark Joslyn, Donald Haider-Markel, Michael us-gun-policy-global-comparisons Baggs, and Andrew Bilbo, “Emerging Political Identities? 56 British Broadcasting Corporation, “America’s gun Gun Ownership and Voting in Presidential Elections,” So- culture in 10 charts,” March 21, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/ cial Science Quarterly 98:2 (2017). news/world-us-canada-41488081
19 Soft Power in International world in terms of hard power resources Relations: An Essential American since the second half of the 21st century, Consideration it has also been an effective utilizer of soft The term ‘soft power’ (also referred to power. It is important to note that historic as co-optive power) was famously coined national identity has played a major role by Joseph Nye nearly three decades ago. in this area. Many Americans have viewed In an international environment featuring their country as an effective democratic economic interdependence, new technol- experiment, “city on a hill,” champion of ogies, an increase in transnational actors, individual liberty, and symbol of progress and new cross-border challenges ranging around the world.63 This was especially im- from climate change to global health, this portant during the Cold War, when the Harvard professor explained how power promotion of American culture and po- might be more complex than a country’s litical values helped support the strategic military arsenal or gross domestic prod- goal of increasing the attractiveness of uct.57 Soft power, Nye says, means “getting the US system vis à vis the communist others to want what you want” when it Soviet Union. Through radio broadcasts, comes to foreign policy.58 Whereas hard touring jazz groups, the promotion of hu- power involves the use of strong-arm tools man rights, academic exchanges, and oth- such as military might in order to achieve er public diplomacy tools, American soft a foreign policy goal, soft power relies on power contributed to destabilization of attraction and/or non-coercive persua- the Soviet Union, and to ultimate victory sion.59 Using soft power resources includ- in the Cold War.64 ing culture, political values, and foreign In more recent decades, the US has policies, states can influence foreign opin- continued to use soft power in order to ions in order to make their own foreign facilitate its international agenda and to policy objectives attractive to strategic tar- legitimize its position as the world’s ma- gets.60 This allows states to work towards jor superpower. For example, in speech- their goals in a more legitimate and less es aiming to reach out to the ‘Muslim contested manner.61 It is essential to note, world,’ President Obama stated that US however, that soft power is dependent on interests are “essential to peoples’ hopes,” the perception of qualities including com- and that the country “has been one of petence as well as beauty. Beauty refers to the greatest sources of progress that the the credibility and legitimacy that an ac- tor is granted as a result of living up to its 63 See, for example, President Truman claiming that self-proclaimed values and ideals.62 “the free people of the world” were depending on Ameri- ca to support them in the early Cold War. President Harry While the US has evidently led the S. Truman, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress,” (March 12, 1947), quoted in Dennis Merrill and Thomas 57 See, Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), 153 – 171. vol. II (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2009), 200 – 202. 58 Nye, “Soft Power,” 167. Also, Ronald Reagan, “Election Eve Address “A Vision for 59 Ibid. America”,” November 3, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters 60 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Poli- and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. cy,” Political Science Quarterly 119:2 (Summer, 2004) 256, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85199. 266. 64 See, for example, James Critchlow, “Public Diploma- 61 Nye, “Soft Power,” 167. cy during the Cold War: The Record and Its Implications,” 62 Alexander L. Vuving, “How Soft Power Works,” Pa- Journal of Cold War Studies 6:1 (2004): 75-89; Joseph Nye, per presented at the panel “Soft Power and Smart Power,” “Why military power is no longer enough,” The Guardian, (Toronto: American Political Science Association Annual March 31, 2002. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/ Meeting, 2009), 11. mar/31/1
20 world has ever known.”65 Framing the US progressive ideas of human rights. After as a champion of freedom and a leader for all, half a century earlier, national security global stability, Obama aimed to increase officials argued that the American value of the attractiveness of his country in regions freedom was “the most contagious idea in where anti-American sentiment threat- history.”67 Combining this moral authori- ened national security. More generally, the ty with unprecedented economic prosper- Obama administration evidently demon- ity, popular culture, and its historical nar- strated the US desire to be viewed as a rative as a former colony that transformed moral international actor whose leader- itself into a world power, it is no surprise ship is essential for international prosper- that American leaders have viewed their ity and progress. An obvious example was country as a noble international leader for a 2013 speech by Secretary of State Hil- others to follow. These leaders have un- ary Clinton in Geneva. Asking countries derstood the coercive power at their dis- to join the US on “the right side of histo- posal, but have not forgotten their unique ry,” she boldly proclaimed that “gay rights attractive power. are human rights and human rights are gay rights.”66 Following this logic, the US The Land of the Free or a serves as a model for the world through Warzone? Gun Control, the NRA, and Endangered Soft Power "After all, half a century This section ex- amines how inter- earlier, national security national perceptions of under regulated officials argued that the and seemingly out of control gun violence in America, threatens American value of freedom the country’s attrac- tive power as a safe was 'the most contagious land of opportunity, respecter of human idea in history.'" rights, and symbol of progress. It is es- sential to note that international coverage of mass shootings
65 Barack Obama: “Remarks in Cairo,” June 4, 2009. plays a primary role in informing foreign Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The Amer- publics about American gun issues and ican Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ therefore in creating negative percep- ws/?pid=86221. ; The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East tions of American society. Mass murder and North Africa,” May 19, 2011. https://obamawhitehouse. of innocent students from Columbine to archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-presi- dent-middle-east-and-north-africa Parkland has left no shortage of media 66 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on LGBT Rights,” Palais des Nations, Geneva, December 6, 2011, 67 United States Department of State Policy Planning Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Staff, NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for United Nations and Other International Organizations in National Security (Washington D.C., Executive Office of Geneva. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/12/06/free- the President, 1950), 8. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. and-equal/. org/document/116191
21 "In a contemporary pears “incapable of environment...the issue of protecting the lives of innocent Ameri- minimal gun regulations cans at home,” and argues that gun vi- olence “makes the facilitating mass murder country seem less like a model and certainly appeals to more like a basket case.”68 Freeland governments anxious goes on to claim that every time for- to increase their own eigners hear about Americans killing each other with attractive power relative to automatic weap- ons, “the power of the U.S." America’s exam- ple fades a little 69 coverage sparking shock, fear, and fierce more.” Consid- debates over the normalcy of firearms in ering the fact that research has shown American society. This section specifical- foreigners to perceive Americans as vio- ly illustrates how the NRA contributes to lent, Freeland’s argument certainly car- 70 problems of legitimacy for American soft ries weight. Additionally, the fact that power in two ways. First and foremost, gun-related homicide rates are roughly 19 in light of negative international percep- times higher in the US than in 23 other tions of gun violence, the NRA indirect- ‘high income’ countries further illustrates ly contributes to deteriorating American problems for the American reputation as soft power through its role as the primary a free and safe society where everyone can non-state actor fighting in the anti-gun pursue opportunity while enjoying funda- 71 control arena. Secondly, the international mental rights. As previously explained, reputation of the NRA itself risks nega- soft power legitimacy depends on beauty, tively portraying ordinary American citi- or how well an actor relates to its ideals. zens as radical gun-lovers and its democ- When American citizens lose their lives racy as compromised by special interests. in schools and movie theatres, it undoubt- edly becomes harder for America to con- vincingly champion human rights and Gun Violence and Negative the importance of individual freedom to Perceptions of America: Indirect Consequences of the NRA 68 Freeland, “America’s gun disease diminishes its soft power.” In 2013, British journalist Jonathan 69 Ibid. Freeland clearly articulated the potential 70 See, Jami Fullerton and Alice Kendrick, “Perceptions of Gun Violence in the US as a Moderator of International for gun violence to harm America’s in- Tourism Advertising Effectiveness,” Place Branding and ternational reputation. Writing for The Public Diplomacy 11:2 (2015), 103. 71 Jones and Stone, “The U.S. Gun-Control Paradox,” Guardian, he points out that America ap- 167.
22 pursue one’s dreams. By fighting against neighbor. He even points to a recent poll common-sense gun control measures that illustrating that “gun control constitutes would almost certainly reduce deadly one of the biggest differences between shootings (such as increased background Canada and the US,” according to roughly checks, banning automatic weapons, and 66% of Canadians.75 Ultimately, the US preventing wanted terrorists from pur- has a unique pro-gun society and his- chasing firearms) the NRA is indirectly tory that few in other countries can un- buttressing the negative unfavorable in- derstand. News of mass shootings have ternational perception of American so- reached increasingly larger international ciety. In doing so, it makes it harder for audiences, especially as the two deadliest America to exercise co-optive influence in incidents in American history have taken the world. place within the past two years.76 Con- Gun violence risks decreasing the at- sidering this media landscape, as well as tractive power of the US among foreign the fact that America has frequently been publics, even American allies. While there criticized for hypocrisy regarding human doesn’t appear to be significant research rights, strong potential exists for gun vio- on foreign perceptions of gun violence lence to further erode American influence in America, anecdotal evidence from the as a safe and prosperous country with a media provides important insights on mission of world leadership. In this re- the danger concerning soft power ero- gard, the NRA’s counter intuitive message sion. In the United Kingdom, the media of less gun control and more armed civil- has frequently portrayed mass shootings ians is likely to hinder America’s image in in America as a reflection of “too many the international arena. guns,” an incomprehensible gun culture, One notable example of academic re- and consistent tragedy.72 Following the search on the issue of gun violence and at- Charleston church shooting in 2015, the tractive power comes from Australia. Ex- front page of The Independent tellingly amining American tourist advertisements read, “America’s Shame.”73 Similarly, a re- targeting Australians in 2013, researchers searcher at the University of Sydney has found that numerous respondents men- stated that Australians “don’t understand tioned guns in the context of the US, America’s need for guns,” and that the and that the positive tourism commercial strong pro-gun culture is mystifying for could not easily counter perceptions of those outside of the country.74 Following America as a violent place.77 The results the most recent mass shooting in Park- indicate that views toward gun violence land, a Canadian columnist and political had the potential to negatively impact the strategist wrote that Canadians feel a de- success of tourism campaigns, as well as gree of “smugness” when mass shootings “general attitudes towards the US govern- expose the horrific violence that differen- tiates the United States from its northern 75 Peter Donolo, “Canada Shouldn’t be Smug When It 72 Christopher Bodeen, “The world is ‘mystified’ by Comes to Guns,” The Globe and Mail, February 22, 2018. America’s enduring racism and ‘bizarre’ gun laws,” Busi- https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/canada-should- ness Insider France, June 19, 2015. http://www.businessin- nt-be-smug-when-it-comes-to-guns/article38064169/ sider.fr/us/the-world-is-mystified-by-americas-enduring- 76 CNN Library, “Deadliest Mass Shootings in Modern racism-and-bizarre-gun-laws-2015-6 US.” 73 Ibid. 77 See, Fullerton and Kendrick, “Perceptions of Gun Vi- 74 Bodeen, “The world is ‘mystified’ by America’s endur- olence in the US as a Moderator of International Tourism ing racism and ‘bizarre’ gun laws.” Advertising Effectiveness.”
23 ment.”78 The article concludes by claiming Life, Personal Security.”83 This message that public diplomacy (a key component has also appeared in Chinese media. In of soft power) was one reason to “re-think 2018, a Global Times article called the US US gun laws.”79 In other words, regulat- “inhumane,” and claimed that there is an ing firearms to decrease violence could “urgent need for the US to impose harsh help improve the international image of restrictions on gun purchases.” It subse- America. This idea clearly sheds light on quently argued that the country can “learn the role of the NRA as not simply an op- from China and genuinely protect human ponent of gun control, but also as a voice rights.”84 While these statements have not whose policy agenda undermines Ameri- explicitly mentioned the NRA by name, ca’s international status. it is practically impossible to discuss gun The incredulous reaction of other violence in America without considering major powers to mass shootings provides the radical non-state actor that advocates further tangible evidence confirming that absolute gun-rights over any sort of gun gun violence undermines US soft power. reforms aimed at public safety. In a con- As the Washington Post reported follow- temporary environment where American ing a mass shooting at a navy base, the leadership appears to be fading, this issue Kremlin intended to take advantage of of minimal gun regulations facilitating the incident in order to attack the attrac- mass murder certainly appeals to govern- tive power of America.80 A senior Russian ments anxious to increase their own at- foreign affairs official ironically tweeted tractive power relative to the US. that the tragedy was “clear confirmation Finally, one should consider the po- of American exceptionalism.”81 Diplomats tential for American guns to be used by at the American Embassy clearly noticed actors outside of the country. This issue this attempt to attack their country’s im- risks exacerbating negative foreign atti- age, tweeting back “Why use a tragedy to tudes towards American’s lax gun policy score political points?”82 Russia isn’t the and, thus, to a further decline in its soft only rival power that has pointed to gun power. For example, a recent article by violence in order to challenge the norma- Chelsea Parsons of the Centre for Amer- tive power of America. In a 2016 report ican Progress is titled, “American guns discussing human rights in the US, Chi- are killing our neighbors in Canada and na’s Foreign Ministry stated that gunshots Mexico.” Highlighting how 98% of the were “lingering in people’s ears behind the guns used in Canadian crimes originate Statue of Liberty.” The report contends from the US (and 70% for Mexico), she that the US has demonstrated hypocrisy argues that America’s moral standing may when it comes to human rights, and men- be delegitimized if its own “inaction on tions gun violence in the very first section, gun violence redounds to the detriment of titled “Serious Infringements on Right to the safety and security of our international
78 Ibid., 107. 79 Ibid., 108. 83 The State Council: The People’s Republic of China, 80 The Washington Post, “Foreigners say they are no lon- “Human Rights Record of the United States in 2016: State ger surprised by gun violence,” September 17, 2013. https:// Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of Chi- www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreigners-say-they- na,” http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/03/09/ are-no-longer-surprised-at-us-gun-violence/2013/09/17/ content_281475589785800.htm efa00d2e-1f8a-11e3-9ad0-96244100e647_story.html 84 Yu Ning, “China can offer lessons to US in protecting 81 Ibid. human rights,” Global Times, February 22, 2018. ”http:// 82 Ibid. www.globaltimes.cn/content/1090293.shtml
24 "Can America ever be a community.”85 Ad- ditionally, terrorist safe, secure and attractive organizations such as Al Qaeda have country if the terrorists urged followers to take advantage of America’s abun- that it strives to defeat dance of “easily ob- tainable firearms.”86 can readily purchase In this light, not only are Americans assault weapons within the killing each oth- er, but their guns country?" risk being used for violent crimes Beyond Indirect Consequences: transnationally. International Perceptions of the Can America ever be a safe, secure and NRA attractive country if the terrorists that it strives to defeat can readily purchase as- While the paper has emphasized the sault weapons within the country?87 Once indirect impact of the NRA on American again, on the surface, the NRA’s role in soft power, it now briefly turns to consider undermining American soft power may the potential for the organization to have appear nebulous. However, the fact is that a more direct effect. It is essential to note the NRA’s uncompromisingly extreme that the NRA is known outside of Amer- laissez faire approach to this issue has fa- ica. In addition to general gun violence, cilitated the abundance of American guns, the international reputation of the NRA and in turn the opportunity for those guns itself risks negatively portraying sensible to be obtained by criminals and terrorists and effective American governance as in other countries. As described earlier in hampered by an extremist non-state actor. the paper, the NRA’s relentless and mul- In a recent video explaining the issue of tifaceted promotion of pro-gun culture gun violence in America, Le Monde de- along with its richly funded direct polit- scribed the NRA as the primary reason ical advocacy, has played an indispensable for the lack of gun control in America, and claimed that the group was controlled role in the maintenance of an American 88 society lacking effective and widespread by “a radical fringe.” For the world at gun control regulations. large, the US is unlikely to be celebrat- ed as the inspirational democracy that it claims to be if the gun lobby is viewed as having control of a majority of its politi- 85 Chelsea Parsons, “American guns are killing our cians and in turn the government’s ability neighbors in Canada and Mexico,” Los Angeles Times,
February 6, 2018. http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/ 88 Le Monde, “Etats-Unis: la NRA, lobby des armes, la-oe-parsons-us-guns-abroad-20180206-story.html dénonce la « politisation honteuse » de la tuerie en 86 Dickinson, “How the NRA Paved the Way for Mass Floride,” Feburary 22, 2018. http://www.lemonde.fr/don- Shootings.” ald-trump/article/2018/02/22/etats-unis-la-nra-lobby-des- 87 Ibid. Note Senator Feinstein’s gun control proposal re- armes-denonce-la-politisation-honteuse-de-la-tuerie-en- garding the terrorist watch list. floride_5261092_4853715.html
25 to implement basic and broadly supported Conclusion public safety measures. In 2016, the Brit- In a political environment where fre- ish Broadcasting Corporation turned its quent mass shootings spark increasingly attention to the NRA when it published strong calls for gun control, the NRA may an article exploring its powerful influ- appear to be an organization on the de- ence on America’s gun control debate. By fensive. However, this paper has illustrat- highlighting the group’s “disputed inter- ed the significant power of the non-state pretation of the Second Amendment,” actor in the American political sphere. the BBC underlined its skepticism re- Not only does it control the gun-control garding the NRA’s political position.89 In debate by engaging in campaign financ- international and US media, the NRA is ing and lobbying, but also by promoting frequently portrayed as an extreme and an extreme pro-gun ideology throughout non-empathetic group that buys politi- American society. cians and aggressively promotes an un- Ultimately, however, the paper sheds constrained, pro-gun culture throughout light on the NRA as a domestically fo- the country. Outlandish claims and insen- cused non-state actor with international sitive statements often reinforce this per- implications for the United States. Its ception. In response to the recent “March ability to limit gun control, combined for Our Lives” protest, for example, the with the association’s generally unfavor- group claimed that student protestors able international reputation, represents a were “manipulated by gun-hating billion- troubling obstacle to those policymakers aires and Hollywood elites” in their effort seeking to enhance and legitimize Ameri- to “destroy the Second Amendment.”90 can soft power. If the US wants to use at- This type of exaggerated, paranoia-driven traction to get others to follow its lead in claim is likely to further depict the NRA foreign affairs, then it must address some as a radical organization that lowers the tough questions: Can you be a champion quality of political debates regarding gun of human rights if you can’t protect the control. Furthermore, the NRA has been basic safety of children in your schools? associated with support for President Can you be a legitimate and effective Trump in recent years. This is likely to representative democracy if the NRA ap- further damage its international reputa- pears more influential than public opinion tion, considering negative views of Trump when it comes to gun control? Can Amer- around the world and the concomitant icans be viewed in a positive light if the decline in American attractiveness.91 rest of the world view them as irrational gun-obsessed fanatics who believe they have a God-given right to own automatic assault weapons?
89 BBC, “US gun control: What is the NRA and why is The NRA is central to these questions it so powerful?” and must be recognized as a significant 90 Brandon Griggs, “Here’s what the NRA had to say to- obstacle to America’s desire to wield inter- day about the March for Our Lives,” CNN, March 25, 2018. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/24/us/nra-march-response- national influence through the power of trnd/index.html attraction. Nevertheless, the organization 91 See, Pew Research Center, “U.S. Image Suffers as Publics Around World Question Trump’s Leadership,” June should be viewed within a broader context 26th, 2017. http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/u-s-im- when considering America’s ongoing abil- age-suffers-as-publics-around-world-question-trumps-lead- ership/ ity to be a leading and effective actor in
26 the application of soft power. For exam- and cooperation.92 While the NRA may ple, there are increasing questions about appear to be a single-issue non-state actor America’s ability to effectively use soft in domestic politics, scholars of interna- power to influence world affairs as a direct tional relations must assess its role in this consequence of the election of its current broader context in order to fully under- President. Many view the new President stand challenges impacting American soft as not only unqualified for the office, but power moving forward. disturbingly disengaged in the interna- 92 See, for example, Council on Foreign Relations, tional arena and openly contemptuous of “Walking Away From World Order: Weighing Trump’s First international organizations, relationships Year of Foreign Policy,” February 13th, 2018. https://www. cfr.org/news-releases/walking-away-world-order-weigh- ing-trumps-first-year-foreign-policy
About the Author: Darcy Taylor is a fourth-year student at the University of Toronto as a Redknee Loran Scholar. He specializes in International Relations with a focus in International Law and Human Rights. A former Intern in United States Congress, Darcy has research interests surrounding American foreign policy and soft power.
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30 Hannah Chong National University of Singapore
Reconciliation in Settler-Colonial States: A Study of the Political Apology
Abstract political apology opens dialogue through Symbolic gestures have been dis- the three notions of acknowledgement, missed in current literature as lacking symbolic breaking, and inclusion, this efficacy in addressing historical injustices. article will demonstrate how it addresses This article corrects this misunderstand- settler-colonial implications through cre- ing by studying the political apology as a ating symbolic equity and representing a form of symbolic reparation. Rather than commitment to an end of injustice. The misconstrue these acts as being less effi- political apology is future-oriented; while cacious than their material counterparts, it does not result in the immediate dis- this article understands both as being continuation of dominance, it symboliz- equally necessary in bringing about a es the guarantee that such circumstances holistic outcome. Analysing the role that are temporal. Building on that premise, the political apology plays in the recon- it encourages other settler-colonial gov- ciliation process, this article will rely on ernments to utilise the political apology interdisciplinary scholarship and empir- among other forms of symbolic repara- ical examples drawn from Australia and tions in bringing about non-assimilatory Canada, two settler-colonial states that reconciliation between settler and indige- have employed this symbolic gesture in nous communities. addressing past injustices. This article will first discuss settler-colonial historical in- Introduction justices, drawing attention to their twin In a 2016 speech in Hiroshima, for- implications of irreversibility and conti- mer United States President Obama nuity. Then, it will argue for the normative brought a message of peace and a call importance of non-assimilatory reconcil- for a “moral awakening” for humanity. 1 iation in settler-colonial states and claim However, for a trip laden with symbolic that it is a better alternative as compared gestures, such as the laying of a wreath to the complete decolonization proposed memorializing Japanese nuclear bomb by post-colonial scholars. It then concep- victims, a political apology was conspic- tualises the political apology in terms of its goals and the relevant yardsticks for 1 Gardiner Harris, “At Hiroshima Memorial, Obama says appraising its efficacy. Arguing that the Nuclear Arms Require ‘Moral Revolution’,” The New York Times, May 27, 2016.
31 uously missing; prior to the trip, it was Cynics decry the political apology made clear that Obama would not be as “mere ritual,” citing its impracticality apologising for his country dropping an in mending intergroup relations, since it atomic bomb on the city.2 The stubborn often lacks a material dimension.7 Stories maintenance of a non-apologetic stance like this remind us otherwise: in politics, despite demands from Japanese nuclear symbolic gestures matter. Hence, rath- survivors hints at the significance attached er than accept the principle that polit- to this symbolic gesture.3 ical apologies are ineffective, this piece Despite a well-deserved reputation questions the role that political apologies for being stingy with apologies, the U.S. congress did "Cynics decry the political issue one in 2009. Buried in a 67-page apology as 'mere ritual,' defence appropri- ation spending bill citing its impracticality was an “apology” towards particular American indige- in mending intergroup nous communities “for the many in- relations, since it often stances of violence, maltreatment, and lacks a material dimension. neglect inflicted” on them.4 Under- Stories like this remind standaby, members of the Navajo Na- tion were unim- us otherwise: in politics, pressed with the “apology,” citing symbolic gestures matter." its lack of publicity and open acknowl- edgement.5 This episode further illustrates play in the reconciliation process in set- the importance of not only an apology, tler-colonial states. With this as my pri- but also a proper apology to indigenous mary research question, I demonstrate victims of settler-colonial violence. The the symbolic contributions of the political Obama administration eventually ended apology towards achieving holistic recon- in January 2017 without any significant ciliation. mention of this “apology.”6 The Argument 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. I will first make the case for the 4 Robert Longley, “Did You Know the US Apologized to Native Americans?,” ThoughtCo., April 26, 2017, https:// terion. This criterion will be expounded on in Chapter 4. www.thoughtco.com/the-us-apologized-to-native-ameri- 7 Danielle Celermajer, “Mere Ritual? Displacing the cans-3974561. Myth of Sincerity in Transitional Rituals,” The Interna- 5 Ibid. tional Journal of Transitional Justice 7, (2013): 286-305, 6 In other words, one that fulfils the non-assimilatory cri- doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijt003.
32 normative importance of reconciliation states, this paper will draw heavily on in settler-colonial states. To redress set- examples from Australia and Canada as tler-colonial injustices, scholars have pro- both governments have successfully made posed different approaches. Some argue non-assimilatory apologies to their indig- for decolonization, claiming that recon- enous communities for similar cultural ciliation acts as a façade for assimilation, policies. I will examine these apologies as indigenous communities are forcibly and study indigenous reactions found in co-opted into the existing status quo.8 secondary scholarship to ascertain their However, by adopting a conceptualisation symbolic contributions to the reconcilia- of reconciliation as a state of “mutual re- tion process. spect,”9 I will illustrate how assimilation is not an inevitable outcome of this process. Definitions The second part of my argument To make sense of my argument, it is details how the political apology acts as first necessary to define some of the key a reconciliatory tool. Through acts of ac- terms. Settler-colonial states, the universe knowledgement, symbolic breaking, and within which my argument operates, refer inclusion, I argue that the political apol- to countries where white settlers histori- ogy contributes symbolically to the rec- cally displaced and eliminated indigenous onciliation process between settler and communities to ensure their own survival indigenous communities. While I do not and reproduction.10 In response to the his- dispute that material reparations are im- torical legacy of the injustices committed portant in addressing settler-colonial in- against the indigenous people, I propose justices, I assert that such symbolic repa- that reconciliation is a desirable approach. rations are equally necessary for a holistic While some define it as complete in- outcome. I argue that the political apolo- tergroup harmony, this article will use a gy creates symbolic equity and represents third-way approach where reconciliation a commitment to ending injustice, thus is conceived as a state of “mutual respect.”11 addressing the implications of settler-co- This conceptualisation acknowledges that lonialism in part and facilitating non-as- while disagreements might remain, there similatory reconciliation. can still be space for dialogue between for- mer adversaries as long as reconciliation Methods takes place on mutually agreed terms. The Through conducting a detailed tex- political apology is thus useful in facilitat- tual analysis of theoretical and empirical ing this process. This paper conceives of studies, this paper will identify some of the political apology as a ritual:12 while it the broad disagreements in the field to does not strictly take a textual format, it propose empirically-grounded conceptu- does not include actions such as monetary alisations of reconciliation and the polit- compensation. This definition allows us to ical apology. Focusing on settler-colonial capture the symbolic value of the political apology independent of other material di- 8 Penelope Edmonds, Settler Colonialism and (Re)Con- ciliation: Frontier Violence, Affective Performances, and Imaginative Refoundings (London: Palgrave Macmillan 10 Lorenzo Veracini, Settler-Colonialism: A Theoretical UK, 2016), 11. Overview (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 8-9. 9 Ernesto Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolo- 11 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- nial Settler Societies,” International Political Science Re- tler Societies,” 228. view 38, no.2 (2017): 227-241, 228. 12 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?”, 286-305.
33 mensions.13 through addressing settler-colonial impli- cations. Structure The second chapter will begin with a Literature Review critical examination of existing literature The scholarship that informs my ar- to understand what other scholars have gument can be broadly categorised into said about settler-colonialism, the norma- three themes. Constituting the context tive importance of reconciliation, and the of my paper, the first section will discuss use of the political apology in this process. the characteristics of settler-colonialism As current scholarship has largely ignored and the type of policies that have been the normative importance of reconcili- implemented by settler governments on ation in favour of post-colonial theories the indigenous community. The second that support decolonization,14 this paper section will elaborate on the different rec- will attempt to correct this misunder- onciliation theories posited by scholars standing. Beyond that, I will also assert in addressing indigenous grievances and the claim that the political apology is discuss the disagreements in the field on valuable even if it does not lead to mate- the need for settler governments to adopt rial outcomes as scholars tend to overlook such an approach. Lastly, the third section its symbolic contributions.15 will illustrate some of the common argu- The third chapter will then set the ments used both in support and opposi- context of settler-colonialism by going tion of the political apology, critique the over the type of policies instituted by set- disparate definitions employed by various tler governments and the grievances faced scholars, and from there distil an appro- by indigenous peoples under settler colo- priate understanding of it. nialism. It will explain why reconciliation is not only an appropriate, but also a de- On Settler-Colonialism sirable response to these injustices. Hav- Contemporary scholarship describes ing established reconciliation’s normative settler-colonialism as an institution that importance in settler-colonial states, the was built on a policy of dispossession;16 fourth chapter will delve deeper into the settlers dispossessed the indigenous peo- definition and characteristics of the polit- ple of their land through violent tactics ical apology. This chapter will synthesise that have been described as “genocidal,”17 varied findings into a coherent framework and they have replaced them with their and illustrate the differences between own colonies. LeFevre differentiates set- intergroup and interpersonal apologies, tler-colonialism from colonialism, arguing which I argue are key to understanding that the former is “premised on occupa- the symbolic utility of the political apolo- tion,” while the latter is about “conquest.”18 gy. The fifth chapter will further expound Wolfe terms this process as the “elimina- on this insight and tie the preceding tion of the native,”19 but goes deeper by chapters together by demonstrating how 16 Tate A. LeFevre, Settler Colonialism (Oxford Univer- political apologies facilitate reconciliation sity Press, 2015), doi:10.1093/obo/9780199766567-0125. 17 Aimee Carrillo Rowe and Eve Tuck, “Settler Colo- nialism and Cultural Studies: Ongoing Settlement, Cultural 13 Ibid. Production, and Resistance,” Cultural Studies & Critical 14 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- Methodologies 17, no.1 (2017): 3-13, 6. tler Societies,” 227-241. 18 LeFevre, Settler Colonialism. 15 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?”, 287. 19 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimina-
34 "I argue that the political sequences of such apology creates symbolic policies continue to be experienced today. Altogether, equity and represents a these studies pro- vide a greater un- commitment to ending derstanding of the policies employed injustice, thus addressing by settler govern- ments and the implications of settler- ongoing nature of settler colonialism. colonialism and facilitating On Reconciliation non-assimilatory The scholar- ship on reconcil- reconciliation." iation is divided. Critics claim that reconciliation does expounding on the “positive” dimensions 20 not better the conditions of indigenous of this elimination: it does not merely communities but perpetuates the domina- destroy indigenous societies, it also builds tion of settlers under the guise of promot- “a new colonial society on expropriated 21 ing indigenous welfare. Edmonds terms land base.” Such settler-colonial poli- 24 22 this the “cunning of reconciliation,” cies are culturally consistent, and they drawing upon the example of Australia include, but are not limited, to territorial where she claims indigenous people were removal and religious conversion. coerced into reconciling with the settlers Additionally, some scholars have not- despite not receiving “substantial land ed the enduring nature of settler-colonial- 25 rights” among other demands. Moses ism as an institution. Bonds and Inwood acknowledges this post-colonial critique argue that settler colonialism is an “on- where reconciliation is viewed as a “sin- going historicized process rather than an 23 ister attempt to integrate Aborigines into historical fact,” suggesting that the con- 26 the broader national community.” While indeed reconciliation can be tion of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no.4 (2006): 387-409. used for hegemonic purposes, these cri- 20 Through the use of the term “positive”, Wolfe demon- tiques often fail to acknowledge that strates that settler-colonialism did not only remove indige- reconciliation is desirable for two groups nous foundations, but also built new structures in place of 27 them. that must share a political space, par- 21 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism,” 388. 22 Patrick Wolfe, “Race and the Trace of History for Hen- 24 Edmonds, Settler Colonialism and (Re)Conciliation, ry Reynolds,” in Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, 11. Identity and Culture, ed. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilk- 25 Ibid., 15. ington, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 272-296. 26 A. Dirk Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, 23 Anne Bonds and Joshua Inwood, “Beyond White Priv- and Settler Colonialism: Australian Indigenous Alterity and ilege: Geographies of White Supremacy and Settler Colo- Political Agency,” Citizenship Studies 15, no.2 (2011): 145- nialism,” Progress in Human Geography 40, no.6 (2016): 159, 146. 715-733, 722. 27 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set-
35 "While indeed nists towards com- reconciliation can be used munitarian recon- ciliation but also disagrees with their for hegemonic purposes, overt emphasis on power relations, these critiques often which he claims reduces “norms and fail to acknowledge that values to expres- sions of power” and reconciliation is desirable “risks undermin- ing the possibility of defending any for two groups that must normative criteria for political recon- share a political space." ciliation.”32 Thus, Verdeja proposes ticularly in settler-colonial states where “mutual respect” as cultures have hybridized and produced a criterion to “distinguish between nor- new shared identities. Verdeja begins with matively defensible versions of reconcili- this normative premise and identifies the ation that advance the claims of indige- nous groups versus those that privilege various theories on reconciliation as pro- 33 moting a “morally acceptable coexistence” state power and majority culture.” My among perpetrator and victim groups.28 argument for reconciliation derives from He highlights communitarian and ago- Verdeja’s measured approach, as he con- nist approaches: the former conceives of siders both the normative importance of reconciliation as an apolitical socially har- reconciliation and its practical limits. monious order where former adversaries On Political Apologies agree on shared values,29 while the latter is more pessimistic about complete social Some scholars argue that the polit- harmony but argues that conflictual rela- ical apology, a symbolic reparation, can tions can be transformed through a recon- be instrumental in facilitating reconcil- ciliation process that is not based on con- iation between settlers and indigenous sensus, but instead on “contestation” over people. For example, Murphy insists on shared discourses and identities.30 the utility of the apology in mending Verdeja puts forth his own third-way the divide between different commu- nities and providing an opportunity for approach to reconciliation as a state of 34 mutual respect “that does not simply rein- reconciliation. Similarly, Andrieu also 31 posits that an apology that is followed by force the values” of the majority culture. 35 He acknowledges the scepticism of ago- forgiveness will lead to reconciliation.
32 Ibid. tler Societies,” 228. 33 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- 28 Ibid. tler Societies,” 231. 29 Ibid, 229. 34 Michael Murphy, “Apology, Recognition, and Recon- 30 Ibid. ciliation,” Human Rights Review 12, no.1 (2011): 47-69. 31 Ibid., 237. 35 Kora Andrieu, “’Sorry for the Genocide’: How Public
36 However, some disagree. One common argue that the apology includes acts of accusation is that the political apology is material reparations that follow, since it a “mere ritual”36 that does not address the is only these actions that can “render the true concerns of indigenous people which words” of an apology “meaningful.”43 Both are material in nature, such as the return definitions are flawed; the latter conflates of their territory.37 Another concern sim- symbolic and material reparations, mak- ilar to the criticisms levelled against the ing it difficult to distil the apology’s sym- notion of reconciliation claims that the bolic contribution to reconciliation, while apology is a “monologue”38 that does not the former excludes the performative as- consider indigenous desires and coerces pects of the apology by only considering forgiveness.39 Importantly, these disagree- its textual content.44 Furthermore, it has ments take place at the theoretical level. the potential to be too unwieldy, with Empirically, most studies concur on the more criteria added to determine its effec- utility of the political apology in facilitat- tiveness.45 Hence, I will employ Celerma- ing reconciliation. For instance, Mellor et jer’s definition of the apology as a “ritual al. found, through conducting interviews performance,”46 since it captures its sym- with indigenous people, that an apology bolic essence but does not reduce it to its was important to them as the first step of textual content. reconciliation,40 giving us ground to be- lieve that the political apology contributes Settler-Colonialism and the positively to this process despite the lack Normative Desirability of of a material dimension. Reconciliation Secondly, scholars also disagree on This chapter will explore the set- what constitutes the political apology. For tler-colonial conceptual universe with- some, especially those with a linguistics in which my argument operates. Using background, the apology is merely a speech Wolfe’s conception of this institution as act.41 Hence, to determine the effectiveness one built on the “elimination of the na- of an apology in facilitating reconciliation, tive,”47 core settler-colonial policies will be one only needs to look at its content, such categorized broadly into physical and cul- as whether the transgressor has acknowl- tural elimination. Drawing examples from edged the wrong committed.42 Others Australia and Canada, I posit that the two key implications of these policies are the Apologies can Help Promote National Reconciliation,” Mil- irreversibility of past grievances and the lennium – Journal of International Studies 38, no.1 (2009): 3-23. continuation of the domination of the 36 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?”, 286-305. indigenous community. Then, building 37 Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Settler Colonialism,” 149. on the premise that decolonization is an 38 Edmonds, Settler Colonialism and (Re)Conciliation, 15. (2007): 75-105. 39 Edmonds, Settler Colonialism and (Re)Conciliation, 43 Janna Thompson, “Is Political Apology a Sorry Af- 15. fair?,” Social & Legal Affairs 21, no.2 (2012): 215-225, 40 David Mellor, Di Bretherton, and Lucy Firth, “Aborig- 220. inal and Non-Aboriginal Australia: The Dilemma of Apolo- 44 The dramatized side of the political apology. This will gies: Forgiveness, and Reconciliation,” Peace and Conflict: be elaborated on in Chapter 4. Journal of Peace Psychology 13, no.1 (2007): 11-36. 45 Renee Jeffery, “When is an Apology Not an Apolo- 41 For an example, refer to Adina Abida, “The Speech Act gy? Contrition Chic and Japan’s (Un)Apologetic Politics,” of Apology in Political Life,” Journal of Pragmatics 14, no.3 Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no.5 (2011): (1990): 467-471. 607-617, 615. 42 Michael R. Marrus, “Official Apologies and the Quest 46 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?,” 288. for Historical Justice,” Journal of Human Rights 6, no.1 47 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism,” 387-409.
37 inappropriate response, I will demonstrate permanent migration not only results in reconciliation’s normative importance by different forms of subjugation due to its considering cultural factors. Finally, I will pursuit of territory rather than labour, but also illustrate how this process does not also means that is an ongoing process.54 In necessarily lead to assimilation. Wolfe’s terms, for the indigenous people who live in settler-colonial states, their Settler-Colonialism colonizers “never went home.”55 in pur- One might ask what differentiates sued policies is that decolonisation never settler-colonialism from colonialism since occurred for settler-colonial states and is both involve an “exogenous domination”48 unlikely to occur in the future. The indige- of the indigenous community. There are nous people in places such as Australia and two ways to perceive their differences. Canada continue to live together with, or The first conceptualisation of settler-colo- rather, under them. This complicates the nialism highlights its “territorial”49 nature. redress of settler-colonial injustices since LeFevre describes settler-colonialism as it is not merely a historical injustice, but a “distinct imperial formation”50 that has also an ongoing part of the indigenous the goal of finding new territories for its community’s present reality. colonies to take root. Colonialism, on Settler-Colonial Policies: Physical and the other hand, relies largely on labour Cultural Elimination to maintain extractive industries for the purposes of the home colony.51 Although As opposed to colonialism, which both engage in some form of indigenous required the maintenance and reproduc- 56 domination, their dependence on territo- tion of the indigenous community, the ry and labour, respectively, results in dif- territorial character of settler-colonialism ferent relationships being formed with resulted in a project of replacement rather indigenous peoples; while colonialism ex- than exploitation. Physical elimination in ploits indigenous people for their labour, the form of frontier violence thus followed settler-colonialism actively seeks to elim- as the indigenous people were displaced inate them for their land.52 Domination and, in many cases, murdered for their is hence manifested in vastly differently land. These acts can even be described as 57 policies under both institutions. This will tantamount to genocide; for instance, be elaborated on in following paragraphs. Bain and Rogers claim that the violence Another way of studying settler-co- that occurred in Tasmania, Australia in the lonialism is to perceive it as a combina- Nineteenth century was genocidal, point- tion of migration and colonialism;53 unlike ing to evidence that showed the rapid de- colonisers, settlers permanently migrate cline of the local aboriginal community to these lands without any intention of with the emergence of a settler policy that returning to their home countries. This aimed to remove these indigenous people
48 LeFevre, Settler Colonialism. 54 Bonds and Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege,” 718. 49 Wolfe, “Race and the Trace of History for Henry Reyn- 55 Wolfe, “Race and the Trace of History for Henry Reyn- olds,” 272. olds,” 272. 50 LeFevre, Settler Colonialism. 56 Veracini, Settler-Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 51 Veracini, Settler-Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 8-9. 3. 57 Thomas James Rogers and Stephen Bain, “Geno- 52 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism,” 387-409. cide and Frontier Violence in Australia,” Journal of 53 Veracini, Settler-Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Genocide Research 18, no.1 (2016): 83-100, DOI: 3. 10.1080/14623528.2016.1120466.
38 from their land.58 Additionally, a study by However, this claim fails to consider that the University of Newcastle provides de- there would be no cause for conflict if the tails on the 150 massacres that occurred,59 settlers did not first invade the indigenous showing the extent of frontier violence in land and force them to change their tra- Australia.60 Researchers found that these ditional modes of living.63 Furthermore, it were often planned events as the settlers would be wrong to depict these conflicts intended to “destroy or eradicate the vic- as an equal war on both fronts as the Eu- tims or force them into submission.”61 ropeans possessed weaponry far superior This lends weight to the description of to those owned by the indigenous people,64 settler-colonial policies as genocidal. resulting in greater causalities suffered by Some skeptics raise doubts on these the aborigines. This can be seen from how statistics presented, claiming that it would over 20,000 indigenous people in Austra- be mistaken to characterise it as an act lia died in these frontier conflicts, while of elimination as some of these conflicts settler deaths only comprise 10 percent of were two-sided or even initiated by the that number.65 66 indigenous communities themselves.62 Even after frontier violence "Another concern similar ended, elimina- tion continued to the criticisms levelled Helen Davidson, “John Howard: there was no against the notion of genocide against in- digenous Australians,” The Guardian, Septem- reconciliation claims ber 22, 2014, https:// www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/sep/22/ john-howard-there- that the apology is a was-no-genocide- against-indigenous- australians. 'monologue' that does 63 “Lest we forget, wars undeclared,” The Sydney Morn- not consider indigenous ing Herald, April 25, 2014, https://www. smh.com.au/national/ desires and coerces lest-we-forget-wars- undeclared-20140424- 376r3.html. forgiveness." 64 Francis Firebrace Jones, June E. Barker, and Pauline E. Mcleod, Gadi Mirrabooka: Aus- 58 Ibid, p.86 tralian Aboriginal Tales from the Dreaming (World Folklore 59 A rough estimate. Series) (Englewood, Colorado: Libraries Unlimited, 2001), 60 “Colonial Frontier Massacres in Eastern Australia 30. 1788-1872,” The University of Newcastle, Australia, ac- 65 A conservative estimate. cessed March 20, 2018, https://c21ch.newcastle.edu.au/ 66 Paul Daley, “Why the number of Indigenous deaths colonialmassacres/map.php. in the frontier wars matters,” The Guardian, July 15, 2014, 61 Ibid. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/15/ 62 For example, former Australian Prime Minister John why-the-number-of-indigenous-deaths-in-the-frontier- Howard denies that genocide took place. For reference, read wars-matters.
39 insidiously. Beyond "It is impossible to physically invading the indigenous ter- restore lost lives, and for ritories, there was a cultural affront,the stolen generation, a too. As the settlers eventually gained nearly unattainable task more territories, there was an at- tempt to culturally of returning the heritage “eliminate the na- tive”67 and create a that they lost...a whole good citizen in its place through im- generation of indigenous plementing assim- ilationist policies. people have already lost The most notorious cases took place in Australia and Can- touch with their families ada where indige- nous children were and heritage." removed from their families against Demonstrating the cross-cultural their will and placed in settler households. consistency of these policies, Canada also In Australia, these aboriginal children practised cultural elimination. To abolish are referred to as the “stolen generation,” indigenous traditions and force indige- the term reflecting not merely the act of nous children to adopt settler practices, removal from their families, but also the Canada had a policy of “where an esti- theft of their indigenous heritage. Under mated 150,000 indigenous children were this policy that aimed to “breed out the forced to attend the residential school black,”68 these children had their names system where they were taught English changed and were not allowed to speak and learnt about Christianity.71 In the their indigenous languages.69 Further- same vein as Australia’s policy, they were more, they were forbidden from contact- also prevented from using their own tra- ing their families,70 and instead had to ditional languages in a bid to break their learn what was to be their new normal as connection with their heritage for the a part of the settler community. purposes of “assimilation” into settler so- ciety.72 Although they were allowed to re- 67 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism,” 387-409. turn to their families during school breaks, 68 “Caught up in a scientific racism designed to breed most children found themselves unable to out the black,” The Sydney Morning Herald, February 14, 2008, http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/caught- speak their indigenous languages, and by up-in-a-scientific-racism-designed-to-breed-out-the- black/2008/02/13/1202760399034.html. 69 “The Stolen Generations,” Australians Together, ac- 71 “A history of residential schools in Canada,” CBC- cessed March 20, 2018, https://www.australianstogether. news, May 16, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/a-his- org.au/discover/australian-history/stolen-generations. tory-of-residential-schools-in-canada-1.702280. 70 Ibid. 72 Ibid.
40 extension, unable to communicate with appears to have permanently placed the their families.73 Cultural elimination was, indigenous community in a subjugated thus, brought to its completion as the in- position. digenous person lost their connection to Besides its irreversibility, this histor- indigeneity. ical legacy of mistreatment continues to have a profound negative impact on pres- Implications: Irreversibility and ent indigenous communities in both ma- Continuation 79 terial and symbolic ways. For example, Acts of physical and cultural elimina- 60 percent of indigenous children in Can- 74 tion are largely irreversible. It is impossi- ada live in poverty, a figure that is double ble to restore lost lives, and for the stolen that of their non-indigenous counter- generation, a nearly unattainable task of parts.80 Continued land expropriation de- returning the heritage that they lost; even stroyed traditional indigenous “modes of as cultural assimilation policies have been production.”81 With European encroach- discontinued, a whole generation of indig- ment, the indigenous people had less land enous people have already lost touch with to support their subsistence-based econ- their families and heritage. Alfred Calma, omy. 82 Over the years, this created a situ- who was part of the stolen generation, ation where settler economies flourished describes himself as “neither white nor at the expense of indigenous ones as they 75 black,” which is emblematic of the cul- had access to their land and resources. tural confusion experienced by those who Coupled with poor access to education,83 were torn from their indigenous heritage indigenous people also found themselves but had problems integrating into settler unable to integrate into more modern society. As these policies were relatively forms of production propagated by the 76 recent, several organizations have deter- settlers.84 As a result, unemployment mined that many members of the stolen among Aboriginal Australians is approx- generation still suffer from some form imately two times greater than among 77 of mental stress today. Furthermore, as the non-indigenous community.85 Beyond many did not receive proper education these material issues, less obvious is the and were treated as menial labour by the intangible continuation of settler-colo- 78 white households that adopted them, nialism. National narratives have been they are also trapped in a limbo between white-washed of settler violence, ignoring both communities since they are unable to fully integrate with the settlers even if 79 “Indigenous disadvantage in Australia,” Australians they chose to do so. Settler-colonialism Together, accessed March 20, 2018. 80 Kristy Kirkup, “60% of First Nations children on re- serve live in poverty, institute says,” CBC news, May 17, 73 Ibid. 2016. 74 Marrus, “Official Apologies and the Quest for Histor- 81 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism”, 395. ical Justice,” 93. 82 Jon C. Altman, “The Aboriginal Economy,” in North- 75 Evelyn Nieves, “Australia’s ‘Stolen Generations’ Tell ern Australia: Options and Implications, ed. Rhys Jones Their Stories,” The New York Times, May 24, 2017. (Australia: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian 76 The policy that led to the stolen generation was only National University, 1980), 87-107, discontinued in 1970, while the Canadian residential school 83 As of 2014, only 59% of Aboriginal children managed programme only ended in 1996. to complete their twelfth year of compulsory education as 77 “Mental Health and Aboriginal People,” Creative Spir- compared to 84% of non-indigenous children “Aboriginal its, accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.creativespirits. education,” Creative Spirits, accessed March 22, 2018. info/aboriginalculture/health/mental-health-and-aborigi- 84 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism”, 395. nal-people. 85 “Indigenous disadvantage in Australia,” Australians 78 “The Stolen Generations,” Australians Together. Together.
41 indigenous grievances and suffering over the importance of “self-determination” the years. The lack of historical records on in helping Aboriginals “meet their social, the number of indigenous deaths in fron- cultural and economic needs.”89 However, tier wars affirm this symbolic continua- that pronouncement came with a caveat: tion of settler-colonial domination by rel- “it is not about creating a separate indig- egating this community to the side-lines enous ‘state.’”90 Although pro-decoloni- of official memory.86 Even as eliminatory zation activists perceive this as the only policies have been discontinued, indig- option that allows for a clean “from the enous people remain dominated in both historical legacy of settler-colonialism, tangible and intangible ways. they face government reluctance in its materialization. The Normative Importance of Behind this issue of feasibility lies Reconciliation a more deep-seated cultural factor that better explains government reluctance in Decolonization: An Appropriate pursuing decolonization. As an institution Response? that combines colonialism and migra- Scholars, governments, and activists tion,91 the need to distinguish itself as a alike have proposed two contrasting ap- sovereign entity separate from the home proaches in addressing indigenous griev- colony led original settler governments to ances, the first of which is decolonization. incorporate indigenous motifs in building In its most complete form, decoloniza- a new distinct identity. For instance, these tion, referring to a return of sovereignty states often privilege narratives that em- 87 to the indigenous community, has been phasise the indigenous character of their suggested as a possible response to set- territories to “express its difference from tler-colonial atrocities. The Native Amer- the home colony.”92 Common traits shared ican scholar Taiaiake Alfred even claims by such narratives include depictions of that it is the only option that sufficiently “wild, untamed frontiers, and rugged addresses the excesses of settler-colonial- white individualism,”93 and representa- ism as “reconciliation would permanently tions of their new territories as “hard-won 88 enshrine colonial injustices.” While de- through the taming of savages.”94 This colonization could be a possible response appropriation of indigeneity for iden- to addressing past injustices, two overlap- tity-building purposes continue today; ping factors prevent this option from be- Qantas, the national carrier of Australia, ing an appropriate response for settler-co- continues to use indigenous symbols as lonial states. The first reason is feasibility. The -lan guage of decolonization has already been 89 “Right to self-determination,” Australian Human widely used in government policies: the Rights Commission, accessed March 20, 2018, https:// www.humanrights.gov.au/right-self-determination. Australian Government issued a state- 90 Ibid. ment indicating that they acknowledge 91 Veracini, Settler-Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 3. 92 Lorenzo Veracini, “Telling the End of the Settler Colo- 86 “Colonial Frontier Massacres in Eastern Australia nial Story,” in Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Iden- 1788-1872,” The University of Newcastle, Australia, ac- tity and Culture, ed. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington, cessed March 20, 2018. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 204-218, 215. 87 Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Settler 93 Bonds and Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege,” 723. Colonialism,” 157. 94 Rowe and Tuck, “Settler Colonialism and Cultural 88 Ibid, 149. Studies,” 6.
42 "In this light, reconciliation argument that it is “no longer is seen to possess a 98 evident” that redressing set- coercive flavour as it takes tler-colonial in- justices requires place on the government’s complete decol- onization where terms – indigenous sovereignty is re- turned to the in- communities are left digenous people. Reconciliation with no choice but to Given that decolonization participate." might not be an appropriate ap- part of their airplane livery.95 proach towards However, there is reason to believe addressing settler-colonial injustices, I ar- that what began as selfish appropriation gue that reconciliation should instead be on the part of the settlers has unwitting- viewed as a viable alternative. In this sec- ly produced a hybrid of the two cultures, tion, I will address concerns that postco- upon which the national identity of a set- lonial scholars have towards this approach tler-colonial state is premised. Through and demonstrate how reconciliation can the intermix of cultures over the years, allow for both communities to learn to evidence suggests that the indigenous live together in a shared political space. community has also bought into this no- I will be using Verdeja’s conceptualisa- tion of a shared national identity.96 For tion of reconciliation as a state of mutual instance, interviews conducted with Aus- respect to make a case for its normative tralian aboriginal people demonstrated importance. implicit support for a common Austra- A State of Mutual Respect lian citizenship, regardless of one’s settler or indigenous background.97 Given these The debate on reconciliation occurs strong feelings of national consciousness, most frequently over its definition. As stud- a decolonization policy that results in the ied in the literature review, reconciliation formation of a sovereign indigenous en- theories can be broadly categorised into tity would be overlooking these factors. communitarian and agonist approaches. Hence, I am keen to concur with Moses’ Although both make an argument for the desirability of reconciliation in post-con- flict states, the former makes a “non-polit- 95 “Flying Art,” Qantas, accessed March 23, 2018, https://www.qantas.com/travel/airlines/flyingart/global/en. ical account of co-existence” that empha- 99 96 In interviews conducted with Australian indigenous sises ultimate “social harmony.” The lat- people, Moses found that many of them referred to them- selves as part of a larder Australian national community. Refer to Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and 98 Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Settler Settler Colonialism,” 145-159. Colonialism,” 157. 97 Ibid, 152. 99 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set-
43 "The result is not ter conceptualises reconciliation consensus, but an ongoing thinly by perceiv- ing it as a state project that continuously where divisions between former adversaries do not debates political identities hamper but in- stead encourage and narratives." vibrant debate in which conflict is is seen to possess a coercive flavour as it handled through the democratic pro- takes place on the government’s terms – cess.100 Verdeja critiques both and puts indigenous communities are left with no forth his own notion of reconciliation as choice but to participate. While I do not a state of mutual respect.101 He describes dispute that reconciliation is a top-down it as the acknowledgement of the “equal initiative, I disagree that it is inherently moral status”102 of others and built on assimilatory. However, this comes with reciprocity; while we can provide justifi- a caveat: for reconciliation to be non-as- cations for our own actions, we also have similatory, it should not “simply reinforce to accept the claims of others to “judge, the values and self-understanding of the 106 respond, and act.”103 This means that our majority culture.” Verdeja side-steps the truth-claims are subjected to the critical assimilatory potential of reconciliation examination of others; in other words, though emphasising mutual respect. As adopting mutual respect means that “we mentioned earlier, this strong emphasis cannot assume, a priori, that our values on the moral equality of others provides are universal, or our practices justified.”104 us a framework within which indigenous This section will show that by adopting truth-claims are not merely glossed over this notion of mutual respect, the pitfall of but taken seriously in the reconciliation assimilation can be avoided. process. The result is not consensus, but an ongoing project that continuously de- Reconciliation: Assimilatory? bates political identities and narratives. Reconciliation has drawn flak for its Arguing that an “inter-subjective recog- 107 assimilatory potential. Some claim that nition of the moral worth of other” is such a policy only legitimizes “the pri- important for non-assimilatory reconcil- mary structures of the settler state” and iation, Verdeja identifies three elements as perpetuates “colonial patterns of dom- critical to ensuring that it does not merely inance.”105 In this light, reconciliation reflect the wishes of the settler majority. What Constitutes Non-Assimilatory tler Societies,” 229. Reconciliation? 100 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- tler Societies,” 229. Firstly, he argues for a critical re- 101 Ibid, 231. 102 Ibid. flection of the past that is not aimed at 103 Ibid. 104 Edmonds, Settler Colonialism and (Re)Conciliation, 15. 106 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- 105 Edmonds, Settler Colonialism and (Re)Conciliation, tler Societies,” 237. 15. 107 Ibid., 231.
44 achieving consensus but at “exposing vi- and yardstick for appraising the politi- olent histories and their impact today to cal apology before discussing how such a further mutual respect.”108 Through this conceptualisation allows us to observe its reflection, “past injustices” and their “pres- symbolic contributions to the reconcilia- ent legacies” should be thoroughly inves- tion process. The first section will discuss tigated. In other words, the irreversibility the significance of symbolic reparations and the continuation of settler-colonial- in addressing settler-colonial injustices ism’s physical and cultural elimination and how it can facilitate reconciliation in policies should be clearly examined. This a non-assimilatory manner. Then, I will has the function of acting as a truth claim, assert that the political apology should exposing discarded elements of history be conceptualised as an intergroup act as that do not fit into the settler’s narrative. it partakes in the transformation of col- The second step is tightly linked to the lectives, not individuals. Building on that first, and Verdeja terms it as “symbolic premise, I will argue that its goal is not and material recognition.”109 After exam- forgiveness but opening dialogue and that ining these grievances, this stage involves we should assess its efficacy through using acknowledging them. Through acknowl- the non-assimilatory principle detailed in edgment, one recognizes the moral worth Verdeja’s theory of reconciliation. of the indigenous community as their truth-claims are accepted into a narrative Symbolic Reparations: Significance that was previously dominated by the set- in Settler-Colonialism tler community. This avoids the pitfalls of Reparations have gained internation- assimilation that still sees the indigenous al recognition as a legal response to past community as inferior and in-need of wrongs. The Office of the United Nations forcible reintegration into wider society. High Commissioner for Human Rights The third stage of reconciliation is then (OHCHR) codified specific guidelines on allowing for previously-subjugated groups what entails a reparative act, under what to participate meaningfully in the polit- circumstances it should be used, and how ical process. He argues that such actions it should be appropriately executed.111 The are necessary to move beyond “politically document discusses reparations as a way palatable”110 expressions of remorse that to address “gross violations of internation- do not substantially redistribute power in al human rights law and serious violations favour of the subjugated group. of international humanitarian laws.”112 Such definitions emphasise the magni- Symbolic Reparations: Studying tude of the injustice that reparations at- the Political Apology tempt to correct. Additionally, Ferstman’s As a reconciliatory tool, the polit- definition of the reparation as a potential ical apology symbolically addresses the “vehicle for reconciliation”113 also proves irreversibility and continuation of set- useful for our purposes. In response to tler-colonialism in part. Drawing on in- large-scale settler-colonial injustices, this terdisciplinary scholarship and empirical research, I first conceptualise the goal 111 “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission, accessed March 20, 2018 108 Ibid., 232. 112 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 113 Carla Ferstman, Reparations (Oxford University 110 Ibid., 236. Press, 2012), doi:10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0003.
45 section will study how symbolic repara- tance of offering “something concrete to tions can play a role in repairing relations repair a specific harm or to compensate between settlers and indigenous commu- for the damage or loss associated with that nities. I will first address some of the crit- harm,”116 this often comes hand in hand icisms of symbolic reparations in relation with symbolic reparations; both types of to material reparations before discussing reparations are necessary in redressing how they contribute to the reconciliation grievances holistically. While material process as theorised by Verdeja. reparations provide some form of tangible response such as the return of territory, Symbolic Reparations: No Independent symbolic reparations directly address the Value? 117 “wrongness” of the injustice committed. Broadly speaking, reparations can Sharpe describes its function as “enabling be either material or symbolic in nature. a victim to recover from the effects of a Wolfe describes the reparation as a form crime.”118 Thus, it would be a mistake to of material-symbolic compensation, “for measure its efficacy through judging that which could not be returned, such whether it is able to improve the materi- as human life, a flourishing culture, a al conditions of the victim since it plays a 114 strong economy, and cultural identity.” more psychological role in the reparation The main difference between the two process. lies in the type of redress it provides: the Victim concerns should not be dis- former is tangible while the latter is not. tilled to material needs alone as they Examples of material reparations include also encompass a “need for recognition, monetary compensation and the return of respect, dignity, and hope for a safe fu- territory, while symbolic reparations could ture.”119 Corroborating this, some empir- refer to truth commissions and political ical studies have even shown that such apologies, the latter of which are the sub- symbolic reparations are more important ject of inquiry for this piece. While many to victims than material reparations.120 For scholars have acknowledged that both instance, Australian indigenous peoples perform different functions and are nec- have been outspoken about their demand essary in addressing grievances, disputes for an apology despite it lacking a material remain over the effectiveness of symbolic dimension.121 Speaking about how much reparations. Most commonly, critics lam- the apology would mean to her, aboriginal bast its inefficacy in improving the ma- activist Rhonda Dixon-Grovernor said, terial conditions of the victim, justifying their argument that material reparations more substantially address the needs and 116 Susan Sharpe, “The idea of reparation,” in Handbook 115 of Restorative Justice, eds. Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. desires of the injured party. Van Ness (United Kingdom: Taylor and Francis Ltd, 2006), By making a claim for symbolic rep- 24-40, 27. 117 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- arations I am not disregarding the utili- tler Societies,” 234. ty and normative desirability of material 118 Sharpe, “The idea of reparation,” 27. reparations in responding to grave injus- 119 Ron Dudai, “Closing the Gap: Symbolic Reparations and Armed Groups,” International Review of the Red Cross tices. While I acknowledge the impor- 93, no.883 (2011): 783-808, 788. 120 Sharpe, “The idea of reparation,” 28. 121 Robert Manne, “The sorry history of Australia’s apol- 114 Stephanie Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and ogy,” The Guardian, May 26, 2013, https://www.theguard- Apologies (New York: Springer, 2014), 5. ian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/26/sorry-history-austra- 115 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?”, 286-305. lia-apology-indigenous.
46 "When violence has indigenous com- munity but failed occurred on such a large to recognise that they had an scale, symbolic reparations equally import- ant psychological return some of the power role to play. When Kevin Rudd apol- ogised in the ca- lost when the offense pacity of Prime Minister several was committed through years later, there was an outpour- admissions of guilt." ing of support from indigenous 126 “Sorry heals the heart, and it goes deep.”122 communities. Another example that shows the im- In Sydney, hundreds of aboriginal people portance of symbolic reparations to these braved the rain to watch the broadcast of communities was the indigenous outrage Rudd’s parliamentary speech and were re- ported to have “cheered each of the three that followed when former Australian 127 Prime Minister John Howard refused to times Rudd said ‘sorry.’” These examples issue an apology, choosing to focus on the remind us that material reparations alone more “practical” aspect of “reconciliation” are insufficient in holistically addressing such as reducing “indigenous disadvan- injustices and that symbolic acts should tage” in “employment, health, education, not be overlooked. 123 and housing." As a result of this po- Providing Grounds for Non-Assimilatory litical miscalculation, Ogla Havnen, an Reconciliation aboriginal activist, even named Howard as the person “who effectively derailed Moving beyond a general argument reconciliation.”124 Howard criticised the for the significance of symbolic repara- insufficiency of “symbolic gestures” in tions in addressing past injustices, it is addressing the “practical needs”125 of the also important to discuss its potential to facilitate reconciliation. As mentioned
122 James Grubel, “Australia says sorry to Stolen Genera- previously, Verdeja’s emphasis on mutual tions,” Reuters, February 13, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/ respect provides a way in which reconcili- article/us-australia-politics-aborigines/australia-says-sor- ation can avoid being assimilatory.128 Here, ry-to-stolen-generations-idUSSYD9123020080213. 123 Andrew Richard Gunstone, “The failure of the How- I have identified two broad ways in which ard Government’s ‘practical’ reconciliation policy,” in The symbolic reparations can aid the repair of Complexities of Racism: Proceedings of the Second Inter- national Conference on ‘Racisms in the New World Order, relations between former adversaries as eds. Hurriyet Babacan and Narayan Gopalkrishan (Caloun- aligned with this theory; through symbol- dra Old Australia: University of the Sunshine Coast, 2008), 48-57, 49. ically reducing inequity and acknowledg- 124 Nakari Thorpe, “7 legacies of John Howard’s gov- ernment,” NITV, March 3, 2016, https://www.sbs.com.au/ nitv/the-point-with-stan-grant/article/2016/03/03/7-lega- 126 Grubel, “Australia says sorry to Stolen Generations,” cies-john-howards-government. 127 Ibid. 125 Gunstone, “The failure of the Howard Government’s 128 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- ‘practical’ reconciliation policy,” 50. tler Societies,” 228.
47 ing past injustices, such forms of repara- between settlers and indigenous commu- tions fulfil the condition of mutual respect nities. by including the indigenous community as partners rather than subjects in the rec- Acknowledging Past Injustices onciliation process. Secondly, such reparations also em- phasise the symbolic act of acknowledge- Reducing Inequity ment, the second stage of Verdeja’s theory, Firstly, symbolic reparations provide by rewriting old historical narratives that a redress mechanism that can “reduce the have privileged the settler’s perception of inequity”129 between settler and indige- reality.132 Through recognising the griev- nous communities. When violence has ances suffered by the indigenous commu- occurred on such a large scale, symbolic nity, this sets the groundwork for future reparations return some of the power lost reconciliatory work by first including the when the offense was committed through indigenous person’s narrative in the pro- admissions of guilt.130 Fault is clearly de- cess. Furthermore, this directly addresses lineated, pushing the burden of guilt from the assimilatory concern that many cri- the indigenous community to the settler tiques hold: the acknowledgement of the community. In this, through admitting victim’s understanding of reality includes past mistakes, the offender “assumes a them as partners rather than subjects in position of vulnerability”131 that was pre- the reconciliation process. Aligned with viously occupied by the victim, thus sym- Verdeja’s theory of reconciliation that calls bolically reducing the power differentials for mutual respect, the moral worth of between both groups. The argument here the indigenous community is recognised is not that symbolic reparations alone are as their grievances are validated through enough in address- ing power inequal- "Through recognising the ity, but that it has value independent of other material grievances suffered by the actions such as the return of lost terri- indigenous community, tory. Drawing this back to Verdeja’s this sets the groundwork theory, through reducing power for future reconciliatory inequity, symbolic reparations provide the groundwork work by first including for non-assimila- tory reconciliation the indigenous person’s to take place on more equal terms narrative in the process."
129 Sharpe, “The idea of reparation,” 26. 130 Ibid., 29. 132 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- 131 Ibid. tler Societies,” 234.
48 such symbolic acts.133 Old narratives are yond the textual content of the political replaced with new ones, proceeding on apology in considering its symbolic con- the terms of both the settlers and the in- tributions to the reconciliation process. digenous community. Furthermore, Celermajer’s definition is aligned with the importance that this ar- Conceptualising the Political ticle has placed on acknowledging the sig- Apology nificance of symbolism in politics; mean- Celermajer describes the political ing does not only lie in words, and rather, apology as the “purest” form of a sym- it can be found in gestures, too. bolic reparation as it does not include a Hence, this article cautions one from material dimension.134 In recent years, it utilising a narrow definition of the apolo- has gained traction among governments gy by reducing it to its spoken or written in addressing historical injustices, par- content, as that neglects the potential per- ticularly in settler-colonial states such as formative aspects that also contribute to Australia and Canada.135 However, there facilitating reconciliation.140 For instance, remains much needed clarification over by restricting the definition to its content, how it should be conceptualised. By us- arguably one of the most famous apolo- ing Celermajer’s definition of the polit- getic performances where Willy Brandt, ical apology as a “pure or unmixed form then-Chancellor of Germany, knelt in of ritual performance,”136 this section will front of the Holocaust memorial would delve into its characteristics and goals, and scarcely be considered an apology since it follow that discussion with an argument did not have any textual content.141 about the relevant standards in identifying On the other end of the spectrum, an effective apology. there are scholars that eschew narrow definitions for an expansive one that en- Definitions and Characteristics compasses material reparations, such as monetary compensation, that come af- Definition ter.142 However, such an expansive defini- Describing the political apology as tion not only dilutes our understanding of a ritual, Celermajer means to emphasise the symbolic contributions of the apology, its “dramatic”137 and ceremonial nature; it but it also suggests that the apology is per is a grand gesture that requires a “mem- se inefficacious and requires material rep- orable public display.”138 By providing a arations for it to be useful in addressing supplementary definition that describes it past injustices.143 Thus, I propose that we as a “symbolic action that ‘alludes to more should go beyond a textual focus of the than it says,’”139 she pushes us to think be- apology but limit ourselves from studying the material actions that follow. Concep- tualising it as a ritual captures both the 133 Ibid. 134 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?,” 288. 135 The Canadian and Australian examples were chosen 140 Or in other words, dramatized aspects. as they were not only widely reported on but also considered 141 Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and Apologies, breakthrough moments in each of their respective countries. 137. 136 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?,” 288. 142 For an example, refer to Thompson, “Is Political 137 Ibid., 292. Apology a Sorry Affair?,” 220. She claims that the politi- 138 Michael Tager, “Apologies to Indigenous Peoples in cal apology itself is insufficient, and more concrete politi- Comparative Perspective,” The International Indigenous cal and social processes are needed to render the apology Policy Journal 5, no.4 (2014):1-18, 6. meaningful. 139 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?,” 292. 143 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?,” 287.
49 content and the dramatized nature of the past and present generations of his or her political apology.144 community in apologising to the victim group. This representative capacity of the Intergroup Apologies apologiser derives from his or her public The key characteristic that distin- office.147 For instance, Kevin Rudd was guishes political apologies from interper- authorized to apologise “on behalf of a sonal ones is that it takes place between nation”148 only because he was the prime collectives and not individuals.145 Firstly, minister at that time. This is particularly the political apology is usually offered relevant to settler-colonialism as the insti- by a representative on behalf of a wider tution spans several centuries and mem- community and does not take place be- bers of the present-day settler generation tween the perpetrator and victim direct- are not the actual perpetrators of those in- ly. For example, when former Australian justices. Furthermore, it also acknowledg- Prime Minister Kevin Rudd apologised es the government’s complicity in allow- to the stolen generation for the injustice ing, and even facilitating, the occurrence that was committed against them, he was of these atrocities. representing the settler community, and Some critics might then use this as the apology was directed towards the in- a reason to argue against the need for an digenous community. The language of his apology since it does not make sense to apology made that clear: apologise for something that one did not “Mr Speaker, I move: That today we commit.149 However, settler-colonialism is honour the Indigenous peoples of this embedded in a wider social context. For land, the oldest continuing cultures in hu- instance, while the current settler gener- man history. We reflect on their past mis- ation did not perpetrate those injustices, treatment. We reflect in particular on the they continue to benefit from the land mistreatment of those who were Stolen that has been taken away from the ab- Generations – this blemished chapter in original community.150 In the same vein, our nation’s history.”146 the indigenous community experiences a Rudd directed the apology at the continuation of those policies as they re- “indigenous peoples,” not specific indi- main disadvantaged in both tangible and viduals, and used collective rather than intangible ways.151 singular pronouns, showing that he was apologising as a representative of a wid- Goals and Yardsticks er community. Beyond these linguistic An understanding of the political specificities, the notion of apologising apology as occurring between communi- for past injustices that were not actually ties suggests that we should also concep- committed by the apologiser only makes tualise its goals and the yardsticks used to theoretical sense if it takes place between assess its efficacy in relation to this inter- collectives rather than individuals. The group nature. Hence, instead of concepts apologiser would then be representing 147 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?,” 293. 148 Ibid. 144 Ibid, 292. 149 “Nothing to say sorry for: Howard,” The Sydney 145 Ibid, 288. Morning Herald, March 12, 2008. 146 “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous peoples,” Aus- 150 Mellor et al., “Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Aus- tralia Government, accessed March 22, 2018, https://www. tralia,” 19. australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people/ 151 Refer to Chapter 3 for examples of indigenous dis- apology-to-australias-indigenous-peoples. advantage.
50 "While the notion of an such as forgive- ness and sincerity¸ apology featured strongly one should look at the notions of in many of these interviews opening dialogue and non-assimila- and how it could possibly tion to study the political apolo- 'help' victims, forgiveness gy. Furthermore, this would also be more relevant to was scarcely mentioned." our understanding of reconciliation as and is a misconception of what non-as- a state of mutual respect rather than the similatory reconciliation entails. socially harmonious outcome proposed by Firstly, several empirical studies have communitarian theorists. proven that the idea of forgiveness does not weigh significantly on the minds of Goal: Opening Dialogue victims. Qualitative interviews conducted Andrieu is not alone in arguing that with Aboriginal Australians found that the “primary object of an apology is for- “forgiveness was not a topic that partic- giveness.”152 Other scholars have made ipants engaged with or discussed when similar claims, romanticising the notion thinking of the potential benefits of an of the apology and disregarding the in- apology.”156 An interviewee whose father herent differences between political apol- was part of the stolen generation remarked ogies and interpersonal apologies. Even [the interview has been edited for clarity]: on the topic of reconciliation, some argue “I am closest with my dad – he’s been sto- that forgiveness is essential to achieving len. He told me his stories and how they a reconciled state.153 Mellor et al., for ex- affected him. And, also, how sorry would ample, assert the importance of both the help him in a way.”157 apology and forgiveness in achieving rec- While the notion of an apology fea- onciliation.154 Communitarian theories of tured strongly in many of these interviews reconciliation emphasise forgiveness as an and how it could possibly “help” victims, integral component of this process; this forgiveness was scarcely mentioned. This perspective suggests that apologies result suggests that victims themselves do not in “healing and reciprocal acceptance”155 relate their desire for an apology to for- that generate a socially harmonious or- giveness as an outcome. Secondly, it re- der between former adversaries. However, mains suspect whether forgiveness can be I argue that the link between a political realized in the first place. Another study apology and forgiveness is tenuous at best found that even when prompted, victims
156 Michael Wenzel, Tyler G. Okimoto, Matthew J. Horn- 152 Andrieu, “’Sorry for the Genocide’,” 5. sey, Ellie Lawrence-Wood, and Anne-Marie Coughlin, “The 153 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- Mandate of the Collective: Apology Representativeness De- tler Societies,” 228. termines Perceived Sincerity and Forgiveness in Intergroup 154 Mellor et al., “Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Aus- Contexts,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 43, tralia,” 11. no. 6 (2017): 758-771, 759. 155 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- 157 Mellor et al., “Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Aus- tler Societies,” 229. tralia,” 25.
51 " As a type of symbolic parties should be reparation, through involved in this process. The goal reducing inequity between of the political apology is then to the injurer and the injured, create a means for dialogue; it first it has the goal of opening acknowledges the grievances held by the indigenous dialogue." community, so that they might of past injustices and even the general agree to join the population do not believe that forgive- reconciliation process. Unlike forgiveness, ness could be achieved through political the goal of opening dialogue takes serious- apologies.158 Such empirical evidence ly indigenous perspectives and agency and corroborates my claim that forgiveness is does not perceive reconciliation as a one- a peculiar goal for an intergroup apolo- off event but rather as an ongoing proj- gy. Furthermore, this mistaken emphasis ect. This way, reconciliation is no longer 161 on forgiveness also runs the risk of being a monologue by the settler community, assimilatory;159 by misconstruing it as an but instead includes indigenous peoples integral component of reconciliation, the in a mutual exchange. A comment made onus is placed on the indigenous commu- by a member of the indigenous commu- nity to forgive even when they have no nity supports this claim: “Before this rec- desire to do so. In a process that is tanta- onciliation thing comes about, there’s an mount to existing forms of settler domi- apology. It’s as simple as that and if they nation, indigenous agency is brushed off can’t see it, well I don’t know what they’re 162 in a hasty pursuit of “harmony” and con- doing then.” sensus. The apology acts as a precursor to One might ask what should the goal reconciliation, and through acknowledg- of the political apology be then? As a type ing past injustices, opens the opportunity of symbolic reparation, through reduc- for the indigenous community to join the ing inequity between the injurer and the larger reconciliation debate as their griev- injured, it has the goal of opening dia- ances are recognised. logue. Aligning this with Verdeja’s theory Yardstick: Non-Assimilatory of reconciliation that emphasises mutual respect,160 this mutuality means that both Using efficacy to gauge how well something can achieve its aim, tied to- 158 Manuel Cárdenas, Darío Páez, Bernard Rimé, and gether with the goal of forgiveness is the Maitane Arnoso, “How Transitional Justice Processes and notion of “sincerity” as a benchmark in Official Apologies Influence Reconciliation: The Case of the Chilean ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ and ‘Political Im- assessing the effectiveness of an apology. prisonment and Torture’ Commissions: Transitional Justice Although there is no consensus as to what and Apologies in Chile,” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 25, no. 6 (2015): 515-530, 525. 159 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- 161 Espindola, “An Apology for Public Apologies?,” 328. tler Societies,” 229. 162 Mellor et al., “Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Aus- 160 Ibid, 228. tralia,” 27.
52 constitutes “sincerity,” popular definitions that the type of “sincerity” that one should emphasise the need for genuineness and be concerned about is not whether the the lack of hypocrisy.163 While I do not “words spoken” match with the “speaker’s dispute the common logic that a sincere inner intention,”166 but whether subse- apology makes victims more willing to ac- quent policy actions match the “semantic cept it (and perhaps even forgive), I posit content” of the apology. In this way, Thaler that we should not view an apology that is appears to avoid making the problemat- seemingly insincere as an ineffective one. ic assumption that public roles can have The political apology takes place between feelings and resurrects the viability of us- collectives and not individuals; since for- ing “sincerity” as a criterion in appraising giveness, while very much noble, is not efficacy. However, this train of thought the goal of an intergroup apology, then invites another incorrect assumption as it similarly, “sincerity,” although certainly a recouples the apology, a symbolic gesture, valuable addition, should not be used as with material policy actions, thus wrongly the main yardstick in assessing its effec- suggesting that the symbolic nature of the tiveness. apology itself has no value independent of Firstly, “sincerity” is a personal quality concrete action.167 that is attached to the apologiser and not If the political apology, which is in- the apology itself. Building on that prem- tergroup in nature, is to open dialogue ise, the notion that a person can sincerely to facilitate reconciliation, then its effi- apologise in his or her public capacity as cacy should be appraised by how well it a representative of a community makes is able to achieve this goal. According to the problematic assumption that a pub- Verdeja’s theory, mutual respect is key to lic role can have “feelings.”164 Referencing ensuring that the indigenous people are Rudd’s apology to the stolen generations, not perceived as subjects that are about to it was only made significant because he be forcibly conciliated.168 169 Only by estab- held public office at that point of time and lishing their status as equal to the settlers, was representing the government and the then would they be more willing to join settler community in apologising to the the reconciliation dialogue. Hence, the indigenous people. In other words, the political apology first and foremost needs significance of the apology was not a re- to be non-assimilatory; it needs to take se- sult of Rudd’s personal qualities. Thus, the riously indigenous concerns, and perhaps use of sincerity as a yardstick for assessing even include them in the process of craft- the efficacy of a political apology fails to ing the apology. A good example would “distinguish the conditions appropriate be Rudd’s apology to the stolen genera- to the transformation of individuals from tion as the indigenous community was those appropriate to the transformation of actively consulted before the apology was collectives.”165 delivered, ensuring that it proceeded on In response to this criticism, Thal- their terms.170 Therefore, I argue that this er proposes another way of assessing the 166 Ibid., 293. sincerity of a political apology. He argues 167 Ibid. 168 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- 163 “Sincerity,” Merriam-Webster, accessed March 22, tler Societies,” 228. 2018, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sincer- 169 Edmonds, Settler Colonialism and (Re)Conciliation. ity. 170 “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples,” Austra- 164 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?,” 293. lian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Poli- 165 Ibid, 288. cies, accessed March 29, 2018.
53 is a more relevant yardstick than sincerity stolen generation, and former Canadian in assessing whether a political apology is Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s apology efficacious or not. to members of the residential school pro- An example of an apology that failed gramme.173 the assimilatory measure was introduced Through this, I will first develop a earlier in Chapter 1. Unceremoniously framework that details how the political attached as part of an unrelated defence apology acknowledges injustices, symbol- spending bill,171 the United States Con- ically breaks from the past, and includes gress showed little regard for indigenous the indigenous people in new conver- concerns in the deliverance of their “apol- sations. Importantly, to adhere to the ogy.” The lack of fanfare was a direct con- non-assimilatory principle, I will also in- tradiction of the indigenous community’s clude indigenous responses to show how understandable desire for widespread ac- these apologies did not merely proceed knowledgement. One indigenous person on the settler’s terms. Then, I will explain commented: “There were no public an- how this framework symbolically creates nouncements, there were no press confer- a state of equity and commits to ending ences, there was no national attention (…) domination, thus addressing the twin im- what kind of an apology is it when they plications of settler-colonialism in part. don’t tell the people they are apologizing As former adversaries become more equal to?”172 partners, this social transformation allows This apology took place on the terms for the move towards a reconciliation of the settler without considering the based on mutual respect. needs of the indigenous community, thus violating the principle of non-assimilation An Apologetic Framework for and was inevitably unsuccessful in open- Reconciliation ing dialogue. Acknowledging the Past As studied previously, various schol- The Political Apology: Facilitating ars have indicated the acknowledgement Reconciliation in Settler-Colonial of past injustices as an integral feature of States any political apology.174 By recognizing 175 Having established the context of the “moral wrongness” of the acts com- settler-colonialism and conceptualised mitted, the apologiser validates an indige- the political apology, this section will syn- nous perception of reality. In his apology, thesise these two discussions and explore
how the political apology can address the 173 Studied earlier in Chapter 3, these apologies are made irreversibility and continuation of set- to the victims of cultural eliminatory policies: the stolen tler-colonialism. I will be studying two generation refers to indigenous children (in Australia) who were forcibly removed from their families and subsequent- apologies that fulfil Verdeja’s non-assim- ly adopted by white settler families. The residential school ilatory criterion: former Australian Prime programme (in Canada) was conducted in a similar vein as in indigenous children were removed from their fami- Minister Kevin Rudd’s apology to the lies and placed in boarding schools where they were taught mainstream Canadian culture in a bit to cut them off from their indigenous heritage. 171 Longley, “Did You Know the US Apologized to Na- 174 Marrus, “Official Apologies and the Quest for Histor- tive Americans?" ical Justice,” 79. 172 Tager, “Apologies to Indigenous Peoples in Compar- 175 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- ative Perspective,” 6. tler Societies,” 234.
54 "There were no public Rudd acknowl- edged the injus- announcements, there tices experienced by the indige- were no press conferences, nous community through elimina- there was no national tory policies, spe- cifically address- ing the stolen attention ... what kind of generation and the suffering they an apology is it when they endured through their forced re- don’t tell the people they moval from the aboriginal com- are apologizing to?" munity:
We apologise 179 culture.” It creates an opportunity for for the laws and policies of successive long-neglected indigenous suffering to Parliaments and governments that have appear publicly before both communi- inflicted profound grief, suffering and 180 ties. The apology performed by Harper loss on these our fellow Australians. We towards the First Nations similarly ac- apologise especially for the removal of knowledged indigenous suffering: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island- The government now recognizes that the er children from their families, their consequences of the Indian Residential communities and their country. For the Schools policy were profoundly negative pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen and that this policy has had a lasting Generations, their descendants and for 176 and damaging impact on Aboriginal their families left behind, we say sorry. 181 culture, heritage and language. Indigenous reactions were large- 177 Significantly, both apologies did not ly supportive of Rudd’s apology. Ernie merely scrape the surface of past injustices Dingo, an aboriginal actor, commented: but exposed in detail the atrocities that “(It is) a chance to rejoice, rebirth (…) were committed against the indigenous knowing that what has happened over the community. Beyond this excerpt, Harper last 80 years has not been swept under the 178 confronted the specifics of the residential carpet.” school programme by openly addressing Dingo’s emphasis on how the truth was revealed highlights how acknowl- edgement allows the apology to proceed 179 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- tler Societies,” 237. on the terms of the indigenous com- 180 Here, one can refer to the American example in the munity as it does not simply “reinforce” introductory paragraph. While the “apology” acknowledged indigenous suffering, the lack of publicity was equivalent the “self-understanding of the majority to a continuation of having the truth being “swept under the carpet”, thus understandably drawing the ire of indigenous 176 “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples,” Austra- communities. lian Government. 181 “Statement of apology to former students of Indian 177 Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Set- Residential Schools,” Indigenous and Northern Affairs Can- tler Colonialism,” 145-159. ada, accessed March 22, 2018, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc. 178 Ibid, 154. ca/eng/1100100015644/1100100015649.
55 the number of indigenous people that end of one chapter, referring to the legacy were affected and making clear its con- of settler-colonialism: the political apol- tinued negative impact on the communi- ogy itself is a symbolic turning point in ty. This acknowledgement of indigenous a history dominated by settler-colonial grievances is not merely an act of recog- injustices.185 In the latter half of Rudd’s nition, but an endorsement of the histor- apology, he states: “We reflect on their ical truth of these claims.182 Eliminatory past mistreatment. We reflect in partic- policies that have been glossed over or ular on the mistreatment of those who forgotten as once part of the settler-co- were Stolen Generations – this blemished lonial state’s history are now brought to chapter in our nation’s history.”186 the forefront. By doing so, the political Similarly, in former Canadian Prime apology sets the stage for a wider dialogue Minister Stephen Harper’s apology to the First Nations, this symbolic break "By recognizing the “moral was echoed in his assertion that such wrongness” of the acts injustices will no longer “prevail” in committed, the apologiser Canada: “There is no place in Cana- validates an indigenous da for the attitudes that inspired the Indian Residen- perception of reality." tial Schools sys- tem to ever prevail again.”187 that includes both groups as history is no Such themes were also mentioned in longer “sanitized” of settler-colonial injus- interviews that were conducted with in- tices.183 digenous people, validating this function Symbolic Break from the Past played by the political apology. Chris- tine Fejo-King, an Australian aborigine, Political apologies also perform a claimed: “It was a proud moment when symbolic break from the past by “ritual- we, as a country, were mature enough to 184 ising closure.” To open dialogue, there is recognise a dark chapter of our history, first the need to distance oneself from a face it, and look towards a better future past dominated by the settler’s mono- for all.”188 logue – one which neglected indigenous Demonstrating cross-cultural consis- grievances. This symbolic act of breaking tency, a member of the First Nations in is often reflected in these apologies as the 185 Murphy, “Apology, Recognition, and Reconcilia- 182 Darío Páez, “Official Or Political Apologies and Im- tion,” 50. provement of Intergroup Relations: A Neo-Durkheimian 186 “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples,” Austra- Approach to Official Apologies as Rituals.” Revista De Psi- lian Government. cología Social 25, no. 1 (2010): 101-115, 109. 187 “Statement of apology to former students of Indian 183 Bonds and Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege,” 723. Residential Schools,” Indigenous and Northern Affairs Can- 184 Kris Brown, “Commemoration as Symbolic Repara- ada. tion: New Narratives Or Spaces of Conflict?” Human Rights 188 Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Set- Review 14, no. 3 (2013): 273-289, 275. tler Colonialism,” 153.
56 Canada similarly remarked: “I am also sire to move forward together with a re- filled with optimism that this action by newed understanding that strong fam- the government of Canada and the gen- ilies, strong communities and vibrant erosity in the words chosen to convey this cultures and traditions will contribute to apology will help us all mark the end of a stronger Canada for all of us.191 this dark period in the collective history Indigenous reactions to the apology as a nation.”189 support the claim that it plays an inclusive For many indigenous people, the po- function. Brian Butler, a member of the litical apology symbolically guaranteed aboriginal community, stated that with the eventual end of settler-colonial injus- the apology, “we can feel that we part of tices. Even though their material condi- Australia. We are part of society.”192 An- tions remained temporarily unchanged, other comment made by Noel Tovey, who the apology was a promise that settler-co- was forcibly removed from his family un- lonial injustices would not dictate the der cultural eliminatory policies, shares future chapters of their shared political this sentiment: “It wasn’t just saying sorry history. for what happened, but I’m sorry for 200 years, and now we are all part of Austra- Inclusion in a New Dialogue lia.”193 After making a symbolic break with By including dominated narratives the past, this part of the political apolo- into dominant ones, the political apology gy looks to the future and discusses a post opens opportunities for reconciliation to settler-colonial “new chapter” in history occur in a non-assimilatory manner. The where the indigenous community finds dialogue takes place as both parties recon- itself as having more equal stakes in de- struct history together in a way that not termining the outcome of their shared po- only acknowledges the domination of the litical space. Rudd’s apology concluded: indigenous community but also discusses “A future where all Australians, whatever how best to move forward. their origins, are truly equal partners, with equal opportunities and with an equal Addressing Settler-Colonial stake in shaping the next chapter in the Implications history of this great country, Australia.”190 The three notions of acknowledge- Harper’s apology for the residential ment, symbolic break, and inclusion sat- school programme similarly proclaimed isfy the non-assimilatory principle and a new future with new alliances formed lead to the opening of dialogue between between the two communities: the settler and indigenous communities, It will be a positive step in forging a new thus facilitating a reconciliation based on relationship between Aboriginal peoples mutual respect. This section will demon- and other Canadians, a relationship strate how these three notions represent based on the knowledge of our shared a commitment to ending settler-colonial history, a respect for each other and a de- domination and the creation of a state of
189 “Aboriginal leaders look to future after historic 191 “Statement of apology to former students of Indian apology,” CBC News, June 11, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/ Residential Schools,” Indigenous and Northern Affairs Can- news/canada/aboriginal-leaders-look-to-future-after-histor- ada. ic-apology-1.700098. 192 Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Set- 190 “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples,” Austra- tler Colonialism,” 153. lian Government. 193 Ibid.
57 equity, thus symbolically addressing the sised the Canadian government’s con- irreversibility and continuation of set- tinued commitment to the Indian Resi- tler-colonialism. dential Schools Settlement Agreement which provides monetary compensation Commitment to Ending Domination to survivors of the residential school pro- Despite the termination of eliminato- gramme.197 ry policies, the effects of settler-colonial- ism continue to be experienced by the in- Creating A State of Equity digenous community. While these effects Eliminatory policies employed by the 194 can also be material in nature, this piece settler government led to the loss of cul- focuses on the immaterial impact of set- ture and life – both for which restitution tler-colonialism as seen in the indigenous is impossible.198 The political apology ad- community’s symbolic exclusion from dresses this irreversibility by firstly recog- national narratives and conversations. nising the impossibility of restoring a per- In addressing this, the political apology son or a community to a pre-settler-colo- commits to an end of this exclusion. The nial state.199 It then focuses on the social political apology not only ritualises the relations between settlers and indigenous closure of a period marked by settler-co- communities; through acknowledgement, 195 lonial injustices, it also promises to end the performance of a symbolic break, a settler-dominated soliloquy. and inclusion, the political apology re- The political apology is future-ori- stores social relations “to what they might ented; it commits the nation to a trajec- have been if the injustice had not taken tory where the indigenous community place."200 For our purposes, this means is no longer subjugated. While it might that it symbolically creates relative equity not be an immediate discontinuation of between the two communities, such that settler dominance, it looks towards the it approaches a state where it is as if they future through pronouncing the start of have not been subjected to settler dom- a “new chapter” – a theme that was pres- ination. By “redirecting blame towards ent in both the apologies that we studied perpetrators and relieving the moral am- earlier. Furthermore, the political apology biguity”201 experienced by the victims, the can also lead to more tangible conclusions political apology allows the indigenous and address the material backwardness of community to gain power symbolical- 196 the indigenous community. As a public ly together with the validation of their statement, the political apology enshrines truth-claims. the commitment made by the govern- ment to improve the material conditions Beyond acknowledgement, the po- of the indigenous community in national litical apology also distances itself from memory. For instance, the apology made by Harper to the First Nations empha- 197 “Statement of apology to former students of Indian Residential Schools,” Indigenous and Northern Affairs Can- 194 Such as high poverty rates and low education levels. ada. Refer to “Indigenous disadvantage in Australia,” https:// 198 Marrus, “Official Apologies and the Quest for Histor- www.australianstogether.org.au/discover/the-wound/indig- ical Justice,” 93. enous-disadvantage-in-australia/ for more examples. 199 Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and Apologies, 5. 195 Brown, “Commemoration as Symbolic Reparation,” 200 Marrus, “Official Apologies and the Quest for Histor- 275. ical Justice,” 93. 196 Murphy, “Apology, Recognition, and Reconcilia- 201 Brown, “Commemoration as Symbolic Reparation,” tion,” 63. 275.
58 settler-colonial inequality and commits not dispute that material reparations are to a “new chapter” where both communi- important in providing redress for set- ties are seen as having equal stakes in the tler-colonial injustices, but rather, empha- nation. While previously indigenous con- sise the importance of the symbolic di- cerns have been ignored in favour of an mension in achieving a holistic outcome. overwhelming settler voice, the political Hence, the lack of material change, while apology creates a space for the indigenous disappointing, does not subtract from the community in the wider national fabric by utility of the political apology in facilitat- giving weight to their grievances. Looking ing reconciliation. at the indigenous responses that we have Settler-colonial injustices are ad- studied previously, this aspect is captured dressed in part as inequity is symbolically in repeated claims of how with the apolo- reduced between the two communities. gy, they are no longer subjects but an offi- Thus, the political apology itself is valu- cial “part” of their country. able independent of material actions. Although alone it is unable to achieve Social Transformation? complete social transformation in terms Critics of my argument might point of constructing complete equity, judging to the lacklustre results in both Australia from the overwhelming demands for an and Canada, where despite the apology, apology in both Australia and Canada, its efforts to improve the material condi- importance in the reconciliation process tions of the indigenous community have should not be understated. Drawing back stagnated.202 Indeed, the lack of empirical to previous chapter, it plays a specific func- examples appear antithetical to my con- tion by directly responding to the “moral clusion. However, these critiques address wrongness”203 of the acts committed, thus the material dimension of reconciliation. contributing to the process of addressing As asserted in the previous chapter, I do settler-colonial implications holistically. Even though the scale of power "Eliminatory policies that is still tipped in fa- vour of the settlers, have been glossed over or both communi- ties are officially and publicly rec- forgotten as once part of ognised as having equal ownership the settler-colonial state’s over a shared his- torical narrative history are now brought to through the polit- ical apology. This the forefront." dialogue then can result in more material changes; 202 Calla Wahlquist, “Rudd’s apology, 10 years on: the elusive hope of a ‘breakthrough moment’,” The Guard- as suggested by ian, Feb 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/austra- lia-news/2018/feb/12/looking-back-at-rudds-apology-the- 203 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- shining-hope-of-a-breakthrough-moment. tler Societies,” 234.
59 Verdeja as the third step of reconcilia- Conclusion tion, the dialogue opened by the political Reconciliation does not necessarily apology can lead to further inclusion of have to be assimilatory; considering prac- the indigenous community in the deci- tical and cultural factors, it even appears sion-making institutions of the country.204 to be a more viable response than decolo- Succinctly capturing the symbolic contri- nization to settler-colonial ills. Its norma- butions of the political apology and the tive importance rests in its transformation ongoing nature of reconciliation, Ti Han- of social relations between both settler and nah, a member of the Gunditjmara indig- indigenous communities as they continue enous community in Australia comment- to occupy the same political space and ed: “We’re not going to stop suffering just share a similar national identity. While scholars have fo- cused mostly on " Even though their the role of mate- rial reparations in material conditions realizing success- ful reconciliation, remained temporarily they have largely ignored the impor- unchanged, the apology tance of symbol- ism in achieving a holistic outcome. was a promise that settler- By studying the political apology, colonial injustices would this article demon- strated how such not dictate the future reparations can be valuable despite the lack of a mate- chapters of their shared 206 rial dimension. Through de- political history." veloping a concep- tualisation of the political apology because of what was said today but, we as intergroup in nature, I further assert- still are suffering. It’s just good to know ed that it can facilitate a reconciliation of that the Government and the nation have “mutual respect” that does not violate the seen what has gone wrong and are trying non-assimilatory principle. Anchoring to move forward and rectify that.”205 these theoretical ideas in real examples, the official apologies made by the Austra- lian and Canadian government illustrated how the three themes of acknowledge-
204 Verdeja, “Political Reconciliation in Postcolonial Set- ment, symbolic breaking, and inclusion tler Societies,” 236. 205 “Thousands greet Stolen Generations apology,” ABC, February 13, 2008. 206 Celermajer, “Mere Ritual?”, 286-305.
60 facilitated a reconciliatory process that latter, and the next step for these govern- took into account indigenous concerns. ments is to ensure the former. Synthesizing these different discussions, Politics is more than a culmination we also discussed how it represents a of material factors; the importance that commitment to ending domination and these indigenous communities place on creates symbolic equity, thus closing the receiving an official apology demonstrate circle and addressing settler-colonial im- how symbolic gestures are integral to any plications. human society. From dramatic rituals that Nevertheless, complete social trans- celebrate life and death, to the practice formation remains elusive for both Aus- of singing the national anthem, politics tralia and Canada despite these apologies. is also symbolic in nature. In addressing Indigenous communities remain dis- injustices, the political apology is but one advantaged as compared to their settler option in a larger symbolic toolkit that in- counterparts; true mutuality and equal- cludes truth commissions, memorials, and ity have yet to been achieved. However, even seemingly cosmetic gestures such as rather than see this as a contradiction to moments of silence. Governments should earlier claims, this merely suggests that take care in giving symbolism its due at- the political apology itself is insufficient tention. Returning to the half-hearted for complete reconciliation. As empha- “apology” offered by the United States sised both in my work and by Verdeja, for government to the indigenous communi- reconciliation to occur holistically, both ty, perhaps they should take a leaf from material and symbolic change is needed. the Australian and Canadian examples in The political apology has provided for the moving towards reconciliation.
About the Author: Hannah Chong reads Political Science at the National University of Singapore. Her academic interests lie in political philosophy and labor politics. She enjoys learning and reading about migration issues and spends her time offline advocating for marginalized migrant workers in Singapore.
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64 Kamila Potočárová Comenius University, Bratislava Slovak Anxiety and Europeanization: Ontological (In)security in Slovak Foreign Policy
Abstract Preface The thesis focuses on the Europeani- Threat or a great opportunity — that sation and insecurity in Slovakia’s foreign is how globalization has been presented policy discourse in between the 2015 and to us. 2017. Using ontological (in)security as a Today, globalization and responses to theoretical framework, I contextualized processes connected with it are dividing Slovak history and society to recent po- the people and their perspectives on our litical developments. In the thesis I argue future. Strong voices of nationalism, an- that the foreign policy is driven by the ti-liberalism and other simplistic explana- double insecurity: the fear of the other and tions driven by identity are heard all over the fear of being left behind. The fear of the world. Given the inter-dependence of the other illustrates how and why the ref- all actors, these narratives in the hands of ugees were securitized in Slovakia during the populist parties are threatening inter- the parliamentary elections in 2016 and national peace and security. Wanting to how, in context of the Visegrad Group make sense of the world that surrounds (V4), the anti-migration populist narra- me, I decided to research the motives and tive contributed to the negative percep- reasons of Slovak foreign policy concern- tion of the Central Europe as an opposing ing Europeanisation. bloc to Brussels. Nevertheless, following I got interested in Slovak foreign pol- Brexit and the Slovak Presidency of the icy because this case showed how identity Council of the European Union (EU), could be challenged by globalisation and the V4 countries had diverse perceptions even cause anxiety. This close connection about the future of the EU. Accordingly, of globalisation with insecurity was ap- the fear of being left behind shows why parent in 2015 when the migration crisis Slovakia abandoned its regional rhetoric, emerged (Kern, 2017). Populist parties as the country wanted to belong to the securitised migrants, asylum seekers, and core of the EU decision-making process. refugees across Visegrad Group countries. The thesis concludes that while European Meaning that migrants became politi- migration policy drove identity insecurity cized matters of security. Although they during the migration crisis, the EU and did not necessarily pose an existential Europeanisation remain to be the core of threat to the objective survival of a state, security of Slovak foreign policy. the political discourse was constructed as
65 if they did (Buzan et al.,1998). Migrants when paralyzing uncertainty captures a were represented as a threat to our eco- society’s imagination. nomic and social systems as well as to the (Krastev, 2017, p. 5) culture what contributed to the image of Despite the negative position of Slo- illiberal Central Europe. In this sense, il- vakia towards the European Union’s mi- liberalism is regarded as democratic back- gration policy during the migration cri- sliding and deliberation or restricting of sis, in 2016 Slovakia suddenly aligned its the liberal democratic institutions by foreign policy strategy to the core of the – centralization of power, control of the EU. Wanting to make sense of this turn in electoral process, state capture, and lim- Slovak foreign policy I posed a question: iting civil society (Sitter, 2018). In addi- what drives the discourse of Slovak foreign tion, this also shows how former foreign policy? By contextualizing Slovak history policy agenda became domesticated and and society to recent political develop- anti-immigration rhetoric became a norm ments, in my thesis, I deconstruct Slovak foreign policy dis- course in between "Slovak foreign policy 2015 and 2017. For the discourse discourse encompasses analysis, I used Jutta Weldes’ in- tertextuality, which two fears: the fear of the illustrates how cultural meanings other and the fear of being are produced and understood (Wel- left behind." des, 2006). Using ontological (in)se- curity as the main with an aim of voter mobilisation (Bal- theoretical framework, I argue that Slovak four, 2016). Although populists did not foreign policy discourse encompasses two succeed everywhere in winning elections, fears: the fear of the other and the fear their strategy of fear and dividing society of being left behind. This, what I call the to “us” and “them” challenged our think- double insecurity of Slovak foreign poli- ing about ourselves and our identity. cy, should help us to better understand As the trend of identity politics is the relationship between Slovakia’s iden- likely to continue, I find it essential to tity and (in)security in today’s globalized contribute to better understanding of world, which result in states that are more identity, insecurity and globalisation pro- prone to anxieties. cesses because as Timothy Snyder put it: The migration crisis has completely “People who assure you that you can only changed the political ambience in Europe. gain security at the price of liberty usually The populists gained momentum and the want to deny you both” (Snyder, 2017). question of (cultural) identity became of the highest importance. In 2016 after Introduction the Brexit referendum, Donald Trump Europeans today are living at a moment winning elections in the US and the up-
66 coming French election involving Marine politics and distancing from the anti-EU Le Pen’s National Front, plagued doubts rhetoric, Slovakia’s prime minister, Robert about the future of the EU (Krastev, Fico, accented that Slovakia wants to be- 2017). It created the feeling of anxi- long to the core of the EU. The term core ety. Anxiety meaning that something is of the EU and what it means began to changing, but not knowing what is going crystallize only after the French presiden- to change and how it is going to change. tial elections and after the White paper However, the interpretation of current was published by the European Commis- crises varies across Europe as it had been sion. Yet, the sudden shift from regional heavily influenced by different historical anti-EU politics to the European politics experience. While the Western Euro- was rather unexpected. pean countries believed that everything The paper begins with examination would work out well, Eastern Europeans of ontological security as a theoretical often felt anxious and neglected (Krastev, framework for looking at relations be- 2017). The feeling of anxiety was strongly tween insecurity and Slovakia’s foreign present in Slovakia and it reflected itself policy outcomes. Within this framework, in foreign policy. In 2016, Slovakia had I focus particularly on the role of critical been closely cooperating with the Viseg- situations and narratives in ontological se- rad Group states on the migration issue. curity seeking. Then, I focused on the glo- The V4 strongly opposed the controversial balisation as one of the drivers of insecuri- compulsory quota system proposed by the ty and connected it with Europeanisation. EC. The aim of the proposal was to re- Lastly, I examined criticism towards the allocate incoming migrants based on the ontological security and its implications corrective allocation mechanism to take for this paper. the pressure off the frontier countries. Following the methodological part, I Thanks to the anti-immigration foreign begin with the empirical analysis. The fear policy of the regions’ leaders, the narra- of the other illustrates how and why mi- tive of populist Central Europe emerged. grants were securitized by the mainstream It was mainly Hungarian Prime Min- political parties during Slovak parliamen- ister, Victor Orbán, who often spoke on tary elections and how arguments about behalf of the whole group, imagining the national security were used to legitimize Visegrad Group to become an opposing the actions in foreign policy. Consequent- block against the EU (Nič, 2017). Never- ly, highlighting the role of domestic poli- theless, to Slovakia, the Visegrad Group cy in foreign policy shaping, I look at the was acting only as an amplifier reinforcing Visegrad Group as a tool for foreign pol- regional positions within the EU where icy enforcement of Bratislava for fighting they had already existed (Nič, 2016). Then, some aspects of Europeanisation. after Brexit and as the Slovak presidency In the last chapter, I focus on the of the Council of EU was approaching, empirical analysis of fear of being left be- discrepancies within the V4 started to hind. This part puts more light on the firm appear. And while Hungary and Poland stance of Slovakia to belong to the core of created an illiberal axis, Slovakia together the EU. For that, with the Czech Republic took more of a I reconstructed the broader cultural pragmatic attitude towards the EU (Nič, and historical context to demonstrate how 2016). Gradually abandoning the regional the fear of being left behind influenced
67 the Slovak foreign policy, which needs to (Steele, 2008; Mitzen, 2006). articulate its identity as a part of a bigger Drawing on the work of Giddens entity. Finally, I looked at the economic (1991), ontological security is defined as and political aspects of Europeanisation “person’s fundamental sense of safety in in foreign policy discourse in 2016 and the world and includes a basic trust of onwards. other people. Obtaining such trust be- comes necessary in order for a person to Theoretical Framework: maintain a sense of psychological well-be- Ontological (In)security ing and avoid existential anxiety” (Gid- Ontological (in)security and Anxiety dens, 1991). The definition that was also Ontological security is a relatively used by Steele (2008) refers to ontological new theory in international relations. It security as a “sense of continuity and order has been developed in the past decades in events” (Giddens, 1991). Here Giddens by various scholars from sociology and stressed social actors’ need for “predictabil- psychoanalysis before it got adopted to ity of routine” and biographical continuity, international relations. Among scholars especially during “critical situations” that that significantly contributed to the de- disrupt the routine as well as the system of velopment of the theory in international trust. Forming his theory, Giddens based relations belong Brent J. Steele, Catherina his theory on Erik Erikson’s perception Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen and other of identity (Erikson, 1950 in Giddens, scholars who have found this theory to 1991). In his work, identity represented be “productive lens for thinking about re- “anxiety-controlling mechanism rein- lationship between security and identity, forcing a sense of trust, predictability, and and between identity and important out- control in reaction to disruptive change comes in world politics” (Kinnvall & Mit- by re-establishing a previous identity or zen, 2017). So how does this theory help formulating a new one” (Kinnvall, 2004). us to understand this relationship? Furthermore, the concept of self-identity, When thinking about security in in- for both Erikson and Giddens, referred to ternational relations, the concept of sur- the biographical continuity and the abili- vival plays a central role. All major realist ty to maintain continuous narrative about scholars accentuate the importance of the the self (Kinnvall, 2004). Only actors who physical survival of a state. John Mear- have a sense of biographical continuity sheimer’s offensive realism even highlights and completeness recognized via rela- the need for states to gain power at the tions with others feel ontologically secure. expense of others if they want to survive However, when ontological security be- in the international system (Mearsheimer, comes endangered due to a rupture in es- 2001). Thus, the realist security dilem- tablished relations and routines, then this ma is rather concerned with “security of situation may result in anxiety, paralysis or survival” while ontological security refers violence (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2017). to “security of being” (Giddens, 1991). Despite the fact that there is no di- Meaning, actors are not only interested in rect link between insecurity and violence, the physical security of a state but more having a stable self-identity is important importantly, in continuation of their “self ” for two reasons. Firstly, it enables states representing their own subjectivity that to maintain long-term social relations allows and stipulates actions and choices through which the ontological security is
68 "Narratives are the causing insecu- rity, which then foundation of self- leads to anxiety. Subsequently, identity’s sustainability. states then use their biographical They are used to legitimise narrative and es- tablished routines and give meaning to state in order to reduce anxiety and pro- duce the feeling actions." of biographical continuity (Mit- established. Secondly, the destabilisation zen, 2006). As of previously established routines and re- Dmitri Chernobrov (2016) specified in lations may result in violence or conflict. his research, in order to rehabilitate, the For these reasons, the aspect of anxiety is ontological security events ought to be essential as it proposes that even relations interpreted in a manner in which the that may be perceived as durable are al- self-identity of a state is reinforced. Ac- ways feeble to some extent (Kinnvall & cordingly, unanticipated internation- Mitzen, 2017). al events need to be (re)imagined into something predictable and familiar, so the Ontological (in)security and critical biographical continuity of a state is main- situations tained. Chernobrov identified this to be A crisis is a substantial component important especially in relation to identity in ontological security presenting a chal- and boundary security as this process may lenge to state’s identity. Defining crisis, I motivate the political leaders to misinter- will not understand crisis as an “objective pret critical events (Chernobrov, 2016). fact”. Instead, I will be using Jutta Wel- Nevertheless, during the times of cri- des’s conception of understanding crisis sis as the situation is developing and new as a social construct formed by the state information arrives, we observe how nar- officials for the purposes of production ratives and our comprehension of what and reproduction of states’ identity. There- drives the critical situation alter. Recalling upon, constructed crises forged in respect the definition of critical situation, these to specific identities will be manifested critical events are unpredictable; states as a different crisis, if at all as a crisis, by cannot prepare for them. Therefore, when different actors in spite of the crisis’s ap- an actor faces an unpredictable situation, parent similarity for states with various it must clarify what a situation may mean, identities (Weldes, 1999). Corresponding how did the situation emerge, and what self-identity threats happen when an un- to do in the future in order to prevent this predictable event influencing a vast num- situation from happening again. Howev- ber of individuals takes place and is rec- er, if it is impossible to eliminate the re- ognised as a threat to the state’s or group’s occurrence of that situation, then such a identity (Steele, 2008). situation would no longer be considered Crisis disrupts established routines as critical because nation-states do not see
69 "I consider Europeanisation it as falling within the competence of their agency. Thisto be a contested concept shows how securi- ty interests change with two meanings. First, within the course of events (Steele, represented by the EU 2008). Role of integration containing Narratives in Ontological benefits such as four Security- seeking freedoms…. Second, Narratives are the foundation of which considers the self-identity’s sus- tainability. They are Europeanisation to used to legitimise and give meaning to state actions. be a threat to state’s Via narratives, states are capable sovereignty and identity." of connecting their behaviour with the ourselves as well as the outside world. It comprehension of the self (Steele, 2008). makes us question the reasons behind our Biographical narrative “constructs a reali- insecurity and existential anxieties as well ty as perceived by an actor…” so that “… as examine emotional responses to those State agents relate their identity to their feelings (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2017). In actions and place the self in the context this way, ontological security comprehen- of a(n)(international) community” (Steele, sion of identity and security distinguishes 2008). Therefore, in consideration of sta- itself from constructivist or post-struc- ble public self-identity, biographical nar- tural understanding. Individuals are not ratives are employed in political discours- connected only via structure, but it is their es (Marlow, 2002). Political leaders create reason, understanding of ideas, a way of narratives that give meaning to events and communications and arrangements, heu- connect them, so they correspond with ristics and last but not least, emotional in- one another in a certain way: “narratives ter-subjectivity. Emotional inter-subjec- bind temporal events together such that tivity enables individuals to continuously meaning can be ascribed to a pattern. The and frequently unconsciously obtain and organization of time itself endows mean- deliver emotional messages. (Craib, 1989; ing to events’’ (Bach, 1999 in Steele, 2008). Craib, 1994; Vogler, 2000 in Kinnvall & Our attention to ontological insecuri- Mitzen, 2017). For that reason, the stress ty highlights the input to the narratives or is given to the discursive construction of stories we internally communicate about subject positions adopted by a certain so-
70 cial agent with the assistance of “choice greater liberalisation of markets. Thus, the and fantasy identification/emotional ‘in- adoption of monetarist macroeconomic vestments’” (Barker, 1999; Hall, 1992; policies and later structural adjustments Kinnvall, 2012; Zarakol, 2010 in Kinnvall programs in 1980s and 1990s, promoted & Mitzen, 2017). privatisation and increased global com- petitiveness (Hurrell & Woods, 1999). Globalisation as an Insecurity The goal of these changes was to establish Globalisation is a phenomenon most- strong civil societies and stability. Howev- ly described in terms of elimination of er, instead of creating a strong civil society, trade barriers, communication and cultur- they have provoked social tension over job al exchange that are being felt by ordinary security among middle and lower-middle citizens all over the world (Robertson, class people (Calhoun, 1994; Hoogvelt, 1992). As a result, globalisation com- 2001; Hurrell, 1999; Kolodner, 1995 in presses geography, turning the world into Kinnvall, 2004). Consequently, this sit- a more unified and singular place (Waters, uation of anxiety and uncertainty gave 2001). Hence, Giddens defined globalisa- space to leaders who challenge the state tion as “the intensification of worldwide with nationalist and anti-globalist claims social relations which links distant local- (Kinnvall, 2004). ities in such a way that local happenings Moreover, globalisation and spread are shaped by events occurring many of democratic values strongly influenced miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, social dislocation in many parts of the 1991). Due to this increased intercon- world. New democratic norms of equali- nectivity and interdependence, we have ty and egalitarianism disapproved of the less control over our own surroundings. former hierarchical structures in many And as events happening elsewhere in societies and impaired old patterns of be- the world become localised, globalisation haviour as conventional power relations became for many a source of security and (Kolodner, 1995 in Kinnvall, 2004). Ac- certainty as much as a source of insecu- cordingly, Kinnvall (2004) recognises two rity for the others (Kinnvall, 2004). Thus, aftereffects of these processes: (1) Global- globalisation divides people on those who isation altered the way things were done, benefit from globalisation and those who which created the feeling of uncertainty; have been left behind. as well as (2) it altered the structures and Globalisation’s impact on politics, bounds identifying communities, which economics as well as human affairs has has a disintegrative effect. enormous social and economic con- sequences (Manners, 2000 in Kinvall, Europeanisation as an Insecurity 2004). Rather undesirable consequences Having connected globalisation with are feelings of alienation, loss of resis- insecurity, I want to make further clarifi- tance to capitalist development, media cation in regard to globalisation. For the overabundance, unemployment, forced purposes of my thesis, I will not speak only immigration, and other transformational of globalisation, but also Europeanisation forces. Here, Kinnvall (2004) highlights because Europeanisation and globalisa- the role of the neoliberal ideology in the tion are tightly interwoven. They stand on globalisation process. The departure from the values of neo-liberalism, representa- Keynesian economics in 1970s aimed for tive democracy and open market econo-
71 my (Ladi, 2006). Moreover, this step will be understood as a political unification be effective as in my thesis I will focus on project (Olsen, 2002). For instance, after the foreign policy of Slovakia in relation the fall of Soviet Union, EU membership to the EU. The logic goes that alike the supplied certain identity-political needs economic crisis in 2009; the recent migra- in Central and Eastern Europe (Kuus, tion crisis reinitiated a forceful political 2004; Kuus, 2005; Kuus, 2007; Dittmer, debate on notions of “EU solidarity” and 2005 in Moisio, 2012). This goal stimu- “EU values” putting political and cultur- lated the creation of the Visegrad Group al differences into the spotlight (Moisio, in Central Europe shortly after the fall of 2012). Hence, the process of Europeani- Communism in 1991. Or as Rupnik not- sation will refer to the social and political ed about the V4: “forged with democratic processes of European integration. ideals, aspirations and leadership… It also It is essential to note that Europe- represented a strong opposition to nation- an integration is understood differently alism… in the region. And thirdly, there across different geographical contexts in was a European dimension—the com- which “Europe” figures as a “differential- mon goal was to join Europe, to create a ly articulated concept, vision and project new Central Europe while simultaneously within self-defining national narratives” integrating it with the broader European (Moisio, 2012). Meaning that European project” (Rupnik, 2016). Moreover, in the integration is perceived, legitimised, ar- context of the current Central European ticulated as well as conducted in different discourse, I consider Europeanisation to ways. Therefore, Europe and European in- be a contested concept with two mean- tegration should be understood as a “trav- ings. First, represented by the EU inte- elling idea” which needs to be adapted to gration containing benefits such as four the historical and social context of na- freedoms – free movement of goods, cap- tional circumstances (Fleischmann, 2013). ital, services, and labour – and constitute National political cultures comprise of a basis for the Single European Market. specific concepts, framings of ideas as well Second, which considers the Europeani- as speeches. They shape our imagination sation to be a threat to state’s sovereignty and expression of European integration and identity (Kazharski & Makarychev, and Europe that in turn influence our 2018). experience and expectations (Antonsich, What is more, the processes of Eu- 2008; Manners, 2010; P., et al., 2005 in ropeanisation had an impact on political Moisio, 2012). From this perspective, con- movements, parties, and how they legiti- structing a certain image of European in- mise or reject their European integration. tegration and globalisation plays an essen- For example, nowadays, we may observe tial causal role in shaping policy discours- a rise in the radical populist parties that es (Smith & Hay, 2008 in Moisio, 2012). often define themselves as Eurosceptic. As result of this, the EU and Europe are As a rule, these parties always attain more constantly challenged and open to refor- attention in the times of crisis. Interest- mulation in several national contexts. In ingly, these parties are many times capable return, the diversity of these concepts is of existing only because of the “Europe- beneficial to divergent political interests, anised” political processes against which whether national or international (Moisio, they situate themselves (Triandafyllidou 2012). In this sense Europeanisation can & Wodak R and Krzyźanowski, 2009 in
72 Moisio, 2012). This kind of behaviour was tological insecurity as a result of dramatic prominent during the economic crisis in change and uncertain future. Nationalism 2009 as well as during the migration cri- and religion work well together because of sis. They usually put together the Europe- their particularly persuasive narratives and an integration with the “migration threat” beliefs conveying simple messages that and present it as a “national issue” (Trian- give us a solid ground when constituting dafyllidou & Wodak R and Krzyźanows- a “true” world with a “meaning”. They can ki, 2009 in Moisio, 2012). An excellent easily provide us with the image of securi- example of this kind of mobilisation was ty, stability and meaningfulness (Kinnvall, Nigel Farage’s political party UK Inde- 2004). pendence Party (UKIP) that mobilised As Kinnvall argues, the comeback of people to vote for Brexit. religious nationalism is a reaction to anxi- Overall, national traditions greatly in- ety and discontinuity caused by globalisa- tion that is making "Homesteading calls for us feel “homeless”. On the contrary to that, religious 'simple definitions of who nationalism is per- ceived as “home”, we are' in order to maintain something we are already familiar a sense of continuity in with (Kinnvall, 2004). In this our social and economic sense, the category of “home” possess- es the qualities of environment." security and cer- tainty creating a fluence our approach to European institu- foundation for identity construction (Du- tions, narratives and practices. Therefore, puis & Thorns, 1998 in Kinnvall, 2004). an understanding of the interplay among For that reason, “homesteading” is a strat- the national, the European and the global egy of ontological security seeking that is is highly essential to the understanding of “making and shaping a political space for my research (Moisio, 2012). oneself in order to surpass the life of con- tradictions and anxieties of homelessness” Homesteading (Kinnvall, 2004). Homesteading calls for As a result of the predisposition of “simple definitions of who we are” in order individuals and groups to insecurities and to maintain a sense of continuity in our anxieties in times of crisis, attachment social and economic environment (Kin- to any “collective identity” to reduce the nvall, 2004). However, when our sense anxiety and insecurity became essential of security vanishes in response to social in maintaining identity. One of the most and economic changes, new identity – effective reactions is the combination of new home has to be established for the religion and nationalism that act as “iden- purposes of maintenance of ontological tity signifier” arising in the times of on- security (Kinnvall, 2004). Consequently,
73 "The picture of immigrants Challenges of and refugees as a potential Theory The challeng- danger became accepted es of this theory come from its di- versity. The schol- in everyday life and public arship of ontolog- ical security varies institutions, such as among greatly and has no coherent research police, politicians and agenda. It focus- es on the different bureaucrats." level of analysis (individual, society, group, state). Fur- this process of identity affirmation -al thermore, it focus- ways happens in relation to the “other”. es on diverse political outcomes (coopera- This means that the “self ” is not a static tion, conflict, violence; stability or change) object but heavily depends on the greater and different methods (quantitative, qual- process of identity construction and that itative and discursive). While this at first the self/other nexus is reactive to new could seem very problematic, scholars relations (Ogilvie & Ashmore, 1991 in found these disparities to be highly pro- Kinnvall, 2004). Nonetheless, this process ductive, even leading to cross-fertilisation, of reaffirmation of identity is being mis- collaborations and better understanding used by political leaders that use the pow- of our own approaches. Hence, the schol- er of emotions in order to advance their ars do not perceive the lack of coherent political goals. This close connection of research agenda of ontological security Europeanisation with insecurity was also negatively. On the contrary, the pluralistic apparent in 2015 in Europe when the mi- agenda of this theory enables us to explore gration crisis emerged. Migrants, asylum possibilities of this concept’s application seekers, and refugees were and still are se- in world politics, thus avoiding early con- curitized by populists in many European clusions (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2017). Even countries including Slovakia, as threats to though, I have focused on the discursive our economic and social systems as well foreign policy analysis of Slovakia, the pa- as to our culture, for political goals. Kin- per is not only focused on the structural nvall (2004), also demonstrated this in an understanding of identity and insecurity. example when after 9/11 national govern- I also combine the societal comprehen- ments increased security and closed bor- sion of changes, their way of communi- ders for immigrants in response to their cation and interpretation. In general, my citizen’s fears. Subsequently, this policy research relates to the bigger debate about and anti-immigration rhetoric became globalisation/Europeanisation and the the norm and were used for mass mobili- understanding of (in)security in the world sation of voters (Kinnvall, 2004). politics.
74 Methodological Approach Papers, reports from government minis- This research adopts qualitative for- tries, departments, and agencies because eign policy discourse analysis as the main they exhibit well-prepared representations analytical tool, which helps us to under- of narratives offered by the elites. Addi- stand discourse practices in Slovakia’s tionally, I examine academic literature and foreign policy in between 2015 and 2017. magazines such as Visegrad Insight, and My object of analysis is discourse practic- The Economist, that usually articulate the es – speeches, actions as well as material official neoliberal visions. objects – that help us to understand how Semi-official discourse is important cultural meanings are produced and un- for my research because the intertextual- derstood. To my research, it was not im- ity or the base for the understanding of portant to collect all data available, but concepts in the discourse is settled in as enough data to reveal positive patterns the low data. Here, I focus on actors who and answers. I have finished gathering are not directly involved in the power new data when the collected information structures yet are connected with it. Those had not generated any new knowledge or are non-governmental organisations or substantial information altering research think tanks (Weldes, 2006). Moreover, conclusions. Gathering data, I used Jutta for my secondary sources, I also relied on Weldes’ (2006) method of intertextuality the interpretations of discourse by other distinguishing between official (high-da- researchers. Finally, I analyse newspapers ta) and semi-official discourse (low-data). that are fundamental for the reproduction Intertextuality emphasizes that text and and contestation of official discourses. My concepts are never understood in isolation. sources are predominantly from EurAc- This method enables us to demonstrate tive, Politico and Reuters. and explain notice-worthy resemblances Looking mostly at Slovakia’s relations in the fashion of how world politics are with the EU, I have identified several key narrated officially in contrast to how the events that had an impact on shaping the media tells stories. Thus, connected via course of Slovak foreign policy. Collect- multifaced interactions, high and low data ing data, I have been following timeline create intertextual knowledge or so-called starting with the migration crisis in 2015, “image banks” that we have and influence which acted as a catalyst that incentivised the way we produce meanings in a certain the discursive disagreement between the way, rather than other (Fiske 1987 cited in EU institutions and Western European Weldes, 2006). member states on one hand and Eastern The official discourse consists of dis- European states on the other (Kazharski, cursive practices conducted by individuals 2017). Accordingly, over the Slovak Pres- who directly and officially participate in idency of the Council of the EU, Slovakia the exercise of power. Since foreign policy had to balance its interests on a diplomat- is the main domain of the prime minister, ic level as former close cooperation with the president and the minister of foreign other V4 became contested. Then, in the and international relations as well as dip- aftermath of Brexit, when Juncker’s White lomats, I consider their speech-acts to be paper and the results of French elections the primary source of my data (Weldes, saw the possibility of a multi-speed Eu- 2006). Moreover, I analyse policy docu- rope put on the agenda, Slovakia took ments and other policy statements, White more pragmatic orientation towards the
75 EU causing an internal split within the – people and the elite (Radnóti, 2017). V4. This shift confirmed the opportunistic The response to refugees varied greatly. foreign policy, which is not driven by the The initial acts of openness towards war normative agenda. In the end, I highlight refugees in Austria and Germany is now actions undertaken which demonstrate generally dominated by anxiety, fear of the Bratislava’s orientation on the core of foreigners and Islamic culture (Krastev, the EU, such as Posted workers directive 2017). Many people who call for national or an agreement on Permanent Structured sovereignty fear that by letting the refu- Cooperation – PESCO. gees in, their national welfare system will suffer and that the refugees will devastate Empirical Analysis our culture together with our liberal so- cieties. These people are anxious and at Fear of the other the sources of their moral panic are Is- In this chapter, I focus on the migra- lamisation, terrorism and generic fear of tion crisis in 2015 and insecurity it caused the unknown (Krastev, 2017). However, across Europe. By looking at securitisa- even this anxiety connected to refugees tion as a discursive action, I explain how and multiculturalism is partially in con- the fear of migrants was constructed in flict with our liberal values such as respect Slovakia. This emphasizes the role of pop- for democracy, civil and human rights and ulist domestic policy in shaping foreign internationalism, which we say we want to policy. Consequently, I focus on the East- protect. On one hand, liberalism advocates West divide and the foreign policy of the for mutual respect and multiculturalism, Visegrad Group as a whole, which shaped but on the other, it is crucial to note that the image of Central Europe highlighting migrants often share attitudes contrary to how Slovakia used the Visegrad Group as these. Nonetheless, the moral problems a tool to fight some aspects of Europeani- of whether to help refugees or general- sation in relation to migration policies. isations that all of them are Islamic ter- Migration crisis as the source of Anxiety rorists are incompatible with liberal soci- The refugee crisis caused a whirlwind ety’s excuses concerning the protection of of emotions, arguments, votes and po- identity or national culture. Because such litical identities across Europe (Krastev, visions about society and its future image 2017). As Ivan Krastev named it: “The are not morally acceptable and compatible refugee crisis turned out to be Europe’s with the political liberal values guarantee- 9/11” (Krastev, 2017). Meaning that the ing freedom of an individual and equality. migration crisis was a test of survival for In such cases when a state accepts people the EU because, while the crisis bolstered from various backgrounds, it is to strongly national sentiments, it also weakened the stand by its values and liberal principles likelihood of constitutional patriotism in and to demand them (Cíbik, 2017). the EU. In this time people called for the Yet the discussion, which tinged protection of their own political commu- many European states, including Slovakia, nities in referendums, opting for exclusion went totally in the opposite direction. Be- rather than inclusion (Krastev, 2017). In fore the refugee crisis in 2015, migration this regard, the migration crisis caused was not an issue in Slovakia. Therefore, a “moral combat” in politics, emptying it was highly interesting to observe how moral distinctions between us and them the migration topic quickly standardised
76 in Slovakia when it was not the destina- Slovakia, but it was also the agenda-set- tion country nor the transit country. The ting by politicians, media and political discourse about refugees interpreting mi- analysts in the pre-election period. Even- gration as a security threat was normalised tually, this topic completely dominated by the opposition parties as well as by the every aspect of the elections campaign. highest government officials apart from During this period, migrants were dis- the President Andrej Kiska. As a result, criminated against based on their religion, their perception of migration as a threat culture and ethnicity by many state offi- dominated not only the political life, but cials who delivered emotional messages it also entered the legal framework of to people that Islam and Islamic culture the country. In December 2016, the Na- are a danger to our society (Androvičová, tional Parliament passed a constitutional 2016). At the celebration of the 71st an- anti-terrorist act which enabled the "It was not only the police to hold a person suspect- ed of committing unexpected migration terrorist offenses in custody for 96 crisis which stimulated the hours instead of former 48 hours debate about the migration (Ministerstvo vnútra SR, 2016). in Slovakia, but it was The enemy-build- ing strategy against refugees was an also the agenda-setting essential part of creating anxiety by politicians, media and and moral panic. The picture of im- political analysts in the migrants and refu- gees as a potential pre-election period." danger became ac- cepted in everyday life and public institutions such as police, niversary of the Slovak National Uprising politicians and bureaucrats (Androvičová, in August 2015, Robert Fico had a more 2016). Here, I find it essential to mind than thirty-minute-long speech about the the sequence of events which had an im- negative aspects and impacts of “influx of pact on the discourse about migrants and migrants” on national culture and values subsequent shaping of the foreign policy (TASR, 2016). He noted that people must agenda. The refugee crisis started less than not underestimate or ignore this problem. a year before the parliamentary election in Overall, the prime minister Robert Fico March 2016. Hence, it was not only the whose socially democratic party SMER- unexpected migration crisis which stim- SD had the majority in the parliament be- ulated the debate about the migration in fore the elections was probably the most
77 active when commenting on migration. into “us” and “them” which is also known Others who very actively contributed to as “othering” (Neumann, 1999). In this the discourse were Richard Sulík, leader political discourse, “us” represented the of the liberal opposition party (SaS) and national, cultural, religious and ethnic at- a member of the European Parliament, tributes connected to Slovaks, which were then Andrej Danko, leader of the Slovak not compatible with the Muslim religion Nationalist Party (SNS) and leader of the and their cultural heritage. While “the extreme far-right party Marián Kotleba others” – migrants – were labelled as a - People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) danger to Slovak citizens because of their and others. Also, during that time Slovak other unfamiliar culture and rather violent celebrity businessman with controversial religion (Androvičová, 2016). Thus, refu- background and now populist politician, gees and immigrants were excluded based bought a political party which he renamed on their culture, religion and ethnicity in to Boris Kollár-We are Family and ran on order to surpass the anxiety caused by the the migration issue too. This implies that migration crisis. Analysing the securiti- the anti-immigration discourse dominat- sation of migration, the most important ed the political discourse across the whole assertion was that Slovaks would not give political spectrum and there was no real up any of their comfort or safety. Politi- opposition among political parties which cians advocating against migration want- would confront the ideas of the ruling ed to keep the status quo and acted as if party. However, in my analysis, I focus the migrants were just a problem they predominantly on the government’s po- have to cope with. People were presented sition as they were shaping the official with simple messages carrying definitions state’s foreign policy. of who they are and what Slovakia as our Having shown the migration dis- “home” is like - Christian, traditional and course caused anxiety in Europe as well as nationalistic in order to overcome the anx- Slovakia, consequently, I present how the iety and contradictions. While refugees securitization of migrants played an im- were portrayed as, “economic migrants” portant role on the domestic level in on- who only want the “social benefits” and tological-security seeking. In this analysis, did not need help at all because most of I have stressed the usage of “homestead- them were just “young men” looking for a ing” strategy by the populist politicians "Thus, refugees and in the context of the parliamentary elections to invoke immigrants were excluded the collective iden- tity that eventually based on their culture, lead to the enforce- ment of the anxiety religion and ethnicity triggered by the migration crisis. in order to surpass the The securiti- sation of refugees polarised societies anxiety caused by the migration crisis."
78 job. This nationalistic rhetoric was contin- states seriously. He expressed that: “The uously coupled with the religious aspect problem of migrants has escalated because (Androvičová, 2016). Islam was perceived the big countries solve it at the expense as a violent religion and any Muslim could of the small ones” (Androvičová, 2016). be a potential terrorist. Connecting No- Henceforth, constructing the EU as an vember terrorist attacks in Paris and the external other exposed how the Central 2017 New Year’s attack in Cologne to- European states felt about the migration gether with migration and Islam, Robert crisis. It is best described by Ivan Korčok’s Fico many times repeated that “Muslims personal online blog in which he explains: are impossible to integrate” (Baribazzi, “Exaggerating a little, it shows experi- 2016). Therefore, later Fico together ence from the Union: if one state in the with Robert Kaliňák, Minister of Interi- Union - or a group of member states like or, claimed that Slovakia is willing to ac- the V4 - expresses its opinion or even cept only Christian migrants. Defending disagreement, it is perceived as breaking their statement, they explained that this of the unity of the Union, while if the step would not be discriminatory against opinion expresses another other state or religion because only Christian migrants a group, it is seen as a demonstration of can be “integrated transparently” (Smith- an attitude or leadership” (Korčok, 2017). Spark, 2015). Speaking of transparency, Accordingly, this discourse uncovers an- Fico also publicly stated, “We are mon- other element of inclusion and exclusion. itoring every single Muslim” (Buchanan, On the domestic level, Europeanism was 2015). This statement has attained broad- constructed as an external other – “Bad er attention to Fico’s anti-migration poli- Brussels”– undermining national state cy and the V4 in the world. It highlighted sovereignty and misusing the principle of the securitised aspect of migration and put subsidiarity. Whereas on different occa- him in a position of a police officer or an sions, when talking about the Schengen agent protecting Slovakia from migrants. area and guarding of external borders in Proceeding to the analysis of secu- Brussels, the EU was considered as an in- ritisation and its impact on the foreign group (Androvičová, 2016). Such double policy, I emphasize how Fico’s approach standards show us how on one level Slo- to the EU depended on the audience. vakia tried to reason its negative attitude When in Brussels, he mostly tried to stay towards the EU on the basis of their com- in line with the EU official whereas at the prehension of the self, while on the other domestic level he was using the anti-EU hand, abroad Slovakia tried to sustain its rhetoric to advance his position. In his self-identity as a pro-EU country. statements, he often referred to Slovakia Nonetheless, the situation concerning as a “small” nation (Androvičová, 2016). the refugee crisis escalated to the conflict This category had two meanings. First, with the EC over the contentious EU one was used in terms of resources say- quota plan reallocating 120 thousand mi- ing that Slovakia has enough problems of grants. The quota plan was based on the its own and is not able to integrate refu- idea that refugees coming to the frontier gees. The second meaning referred to the states, such as Italy or Greece would be strength of Slovakia’s voice in the EU. reallocated to other European states. The Fico often blamed the bigger states in the proposal was controversial due to a poten- EU for not taking the opinions of smaller tial measure, which would fee a country
79 for €250,000 per migrant if it refuses to Owing to the conflict over the quo- take in the asylum-seekers allocated by ta system, the focus shifted to Slovakia’s the quota system. However, the quota foreign policy actions. Slovak Minister of system met with strong opposition from Foreign and International Affairs, Miro- Visegrad and some other eastern states slav Lajčák , in an interview for German opening the East-West divide. “As long media Deutsche Welle, explained why the as I am prime minister, mandatory quo- accusations against Slovakia discriminat- tas will not be implemented on Slovak ing against migrants based on religion are territory,” (Nielsen & Eszter, 2015) Fico not true. In the interview, he expressed said, arguing that he wants to prevent “the that the government's party, SMER’s, emergence of a compact Muslim commu- anti-migration strategy was only aimed nity in Slovakia” (Gabrižova, 2016). The at the domestic audience to maximise founding member states and EU repre- the voter potential during parliamenta- sentatives heavily criticized this stance. ry elections and how Europeanisation is For instance, Frans Timmermans com- perceived in Slovakia. Therefore, the tran- mented: “There is no à la carte solidarity script of his interview is worth quoting in the European Union. You cannot pick here at some length: and choose when to show solidarity or The fact that we turned to the court is not not” (Winneker, 2015). Preceding the ac- an unprecedented thing, it is a normal tual official voting on the quota system in instrument of European politics. Let’s the European Council, long negotiations have the court decide. And I see abso- were held which tried to reach a unani- lutely no contradiction and absolutely no mous decision. However, the countries problem in that. never managed to find a common ground. Everyone who has ever asked for asylum For that reason, the voting took place on in Slovakia was granted asylum if that the ministerial level based on simple ma- person met the conditions. There was jority voting instead of the Council, which never any discrimination based on reli- requires unanimous approval. In the end, gion. (…) You should see these statements the EU interior ministers approved the in the context of the electoral campaign. quota plan by a large majority opposing People felt I would say, under pressure the central and eastern European states from the EU institutions that were (Baribazzi & De La Baume, 2015). Later, pushing them into something which was Slovakia together with Hungary took the new to them. They were not used to it, so reallocation scheme to the Court of Jus- they reacted with fear. And you have to tice (The Slovak Spectator, 2017). These understand the fact that there are coun- actions too echoed abroad and greatly tries which have been open to other cul- contributed to the image of illiberal Cen- tures for centuries, and there are coun- tral Europe as the Visegrad Group, which tries for whom this is a new experience. was blamed for not being solidary and And this cannot be ordered overnight. It tagged as “The Big Bad Visegrad” (The has to be a process. You have to explain Economist, 2016). However, such an im- it to people. They have to get used to it age of Slovakia in the world was contrary (…). And we have an excellent model in to how it wanted to present itself, which Slovakia where we are hosting migrants endangered Bratislava’s biographical con- who applied for a settlement in Austria, tinuity. but they stay in Slovakia, we take care
80 of them...1200...this is the reality, and Further, he alleged that it was his obliga- this is what helps our people to get used tion to protect Slovakia from negative ex- to them. periences, which had already been seen in Our people have not been exposed to other European states. He was referring Muslims and they are frightened. It’s a to such events as in Cologne, Germany new phenomenon for them (…). Hun- during the New Year’s celebration, when dreds of Muslims mean nothing in Bel- around 80 women reported sexual assaults gium or London, but it does mean some- and muggings by men of “Arab or North thing in Slovakia (…) People are afraid African appearance” (BBC News, 2016). of what they don’t know (Lajčák, 2016). Putting himself into the role of protector The interview gives us the grasp of of Slovak nation and traditional values, he what was the goal of SMER-SD’s an- again confirmed the anti-immigration line ti-immigration pre-election campaign, in of Slovak foreign policy, acting contrary to the EU. This "These actions too echoed line of continued campaign mode abroad and greatly suggests that, if not for Brexit, which opened the contributed to the image of question of Eu- rope’s future, Fico’s illiberal Central Europe." nationalistic and anti-immigrant strategy would which the main slogan was “We protect continue. Nevertheless, this empirical Slovakia” (Cunningham, 2016). It shows analysis of the securitisation of migration the understanding of Slovakia as very was essential because it highlighted how conservative, closed or even xenopho- the state officials and other political par- bic society. SMER-SD, as well as other ties constructed the critical situation. The political parties, took take advantage of migration crisis was interpreted as a criti- this during their campaign. Nonetheless, cal situation, which challenged Slovakia’s it was expected that after the elections identity. And as the relationship between strong anti-immigration discourse would Slovakia and the EU was hampered by disappear. However, Fico kept his rhetoric the anti-immigrant line of Slovak foreign for a bit longer. “It may look strange but policy, the system of trust between them sorry... Islam has no place in Slovakia,” lowered. These developments caused the (The Slovak Spectator, 2016) Fico opined feeling of anxiety, especially after Brexit against the quota on the 25th of May, ar- when the discussions about the future of guing that multiculturalism would threat- the EU set off. As a result, Slovakia’s bi- en Slovakia's Cyrilo-Methodian tradi- ographical continuity was damaged due to tions. “I talked about it several times with the rupture in routine that endangered the the Maltese prime minister and he said Slovak ontological security. the problem was not in migrants coming To conclude, during the parliamenta- in, but rather in them changing the face of ry elections in Slovakia 2016, the migra- the country” (The Slovak Spectator, 2016). tion agenda was heavily politicised and
81 used in the campaign by the mainstream (The Economist, 2016). Nationalism, il- political parties, which adopted the rhet- liberalism and conservativism tinged the oric of far-right parties. The anti-globalist dominant political discourse. As Rup- tendency can be seen through the na- nik (2016) noted referring to Kundera’s tionalistic narrative, that dominated the (1989) “Tragedy of Central Europe”: whole political spectrum. Populist politi- “what was once referred to as the ‘kid- cians have “othered” migrants by claiming napped West’ now seems to imitate its that their cultural values and lifestyle are incompatible "Slovakia’s biographical with our Christian heritage and Eu- continuity was damaged ropean values. As migrants became due to the rupture in defined as a threat, many people felt as routine that endangered if their well-being was endangered – they were trapped the Slovak ontological in a moral panic. So, it was relatively security." easy for the populist political parties to make use of this critical situation and used former captor”. Over the year 2016, the the strategy of “homesteading” to convince Visegrad Group worked together in Brus- people that they knew best how to protect sels as a united block on issues concerning a nation from a potential danger. It cre- migration (Nič, 2016). Their behaviour ated the feeling of uncertainty and anx- and actions were perceived negatively iety challenging ontological security. The and were blamed for not being solidary securitisation of migrants on the domes- enough. Some expected that the Viseg- tic level consequently shaped Slovakia’s rad countries could create an opposition foreign policy and negatively challenged block within the EU that arguably had a Slovakia’s identity abroad. By presenting negative impact on Slovakia’s foreign pol- the migration crisis as a national securi- icy actions concerning migration policies. ty issue, Europeanisation with regards to However, from Slovakia’s position, such EU migration policy was constructed as a assumptions were false and misunderstood negative phenomenon threatening Slova- their cooperation. The role of the alliance kia’s national sovereignty. is to “act as an amplifier, an ad hoc coali- tion, reinforcing regional positions where Visegrad Group as Pragmatic they exist” (Nič, 2016). Diplomat R. Káčer Instrument and Political Burden and State Secretary I. Korčok confirmed As the discourse around the migra- this perception in interviews many times. tion crisis gave “an unsettling new direc- Especially, R. Káčer noted that “I am very tion to an old alliance”, many started to much interested in regional cooperation question the Central European identity within the Visegrad Four, but Slovakia’s
82 vital interest is the EU” (Káčer, 2017). of the V4 countries supported the idea Here it is important to mention that of “flexible solidarity” on migration poli- apart from Visegrad Fund, the block is cy. In September 2016 in Bratislava, they not formally institutionalised and mainly even signed a Joint Statement before the works through diplomatic structures and non-formal Bratislava summit organized that their positions are steered by domes- within the framework of Slovak presiden- tic politics and state leaders. Despite the cy (Végh, 2017). But this proposal was not fact that Visegrad state leaders may have affirmed by the Western member states. It seemed close during the refugee crisis, was not recognized positively which also there has been a radical shift in their rela- contributed to ontological insecurity. Lat- tions following Brexit. The divisions have er, in mid-November Slovakia presented a arisen over the divergent ideas of coun- renewed, but less known concept for man- try leaders about the future of the EU aging migration flows called “effective sol- and role of the EU institutions. Dividing idarity”. It was a plan based on “tailored Central Europe, Slovakia together with solidarity contribution mechanism” which Czech government, kept a more pragmat- would provide a state with more opportu- ic attitude towards the EU while Hun- nities for how to ease the critical situation. gary formed an illiberal axis with Poland Apart from the reallocation of refugees, it (Nič, 2016). So, we see that the Visegrad enabled states to give financial contribu- Group is not a unified regional coopera- tions to the frontier states; to a fund dedi- tion working systematically together and cated to migration or raise funds either to each state minds its own national interests the European Asylum Support Office or (Marušiak, 2017). to the European Border and Coast Guard. In the aftermath of Brexit which Though, it was noted that the concept of changed the international environment the “effective solidarity” is not much dif- as the EU states started to initiate dis- ferent from the Commission’s proposed cussions about the future of Europe, Fico reform of the Dublin agreement about stated that Bratislava should be part of asylum-seekers. Nevertheless, both pro- a deeply integrated EU “core” driven by posals were not acknowledged. Arguably, Germany and France ( Jancarikova, 2017) it was mainly due to the negative percep- Hence, as the situation changed, Bratisla- tion of Visegrad countries abroad as the va altered its interests. Though, the unfa- proposals were seen only as a PR action to vourable image of Visegrad had an impact improve the image of Visegrad countries on the recognition of Bratislava foreign (Végh, 2017). By interpreting the role of policy actions. Wanting to re-establish the Visegrad group in the migration cri- the trust and previous relations with the sis, I wanted to underline that to Slovakia, EU, Slovakia introduced the concept of the V4 served only as a pragmatic politi- “flexible solidarity” which should have cal instrument for enforcing the voice of had been a replacement for the quota Slovakia abroad. Yet, as the Slovak interest system. “Flexible solidarity” was based on changed, the V4 became a political bur- the principle that the distribution mecha- den damaging Bratislava’s image and re- nism of refugees should be voluntary, and lations. Moreover, the sequence of events that it should be up to countries to decide only confirms the pragmatic and opportu- how they want to contribute in emergen- nistic line of Bratislava’s foreign policy in cy situations. The heads of governments regard to the Europeanisation.
83 Gradually, Bratislava started to back wanting to avoid anxiety, reflected on the away from regional politics more visibly. international situation by abandoning re- In spring 2017 Fico clearly proclaimed gional cooperation and warming towards that he wanted Slovakia to belong to the the EU. This shift of Slovakia towards core of Europe and that the Visegrad the EU was a response to the changing “cannot be an alternative to European environment in the EU after the Brexit. integration” (SFPA, 2017). The shift to- Thus, Bratislava wanting to secure itself wards the EU core in foreign policy made changed its interest. Yet, this turn also Slovakia a “pro-European island” within reinforced the identity of Slovakia as a the region (Reuters, 2017). However, the pro-EU country. Thanks to this, Slovakia detour from the V4 does not mean that was perceived as “pro-EU island” or the Bratislava will give up on the V4 as a pow- “bridge” in between the EU and illiberal er instrument in the future in spite of the Polish-Hungarian axis (Gabrižova, 2017). bad image of the V4, nor that Bratislava Nevertheless, on domestic grounds, the will become critical of the domestic situa- government sells pro-Europeanism in tion in Poland or Hungary (Káčer, 2017). rather social and economic terms while As Fico said, he would never dare to com- European values remain more or less on ment on the domestic situation in either the periphery (Gabrižova, 2017). of the mentioned states, he is only “glad that Slovakia has become a pro-European The Fear of Being Left Behind island in this region” (Euractiv; Reuters, In the second part of my argument, I 2017). This positive image of Slovakia explain that Slovak foreign policy orien- abroad even reinforced its previous identi- tation on the core of the EU was driven ty as a pro-EU country also gaining posi- by the fear of being left behind. In order tive reception of its politics from Brussels to grasp the full meaning of this argu- even though Bratislava did not get bet- ment, I reconstruct the broader cultural ter, just the others (V4) got worse. And context of Slovakia’s history going as far Bratislava’s identity as a pro-EU country back as 1848. This emphasizes the politi- was finally recognised by other EU states cal dimension of the argument about how and secured Slovakia ontologically. The Slovakia, perceiving itself as a small state, inability of Slovakia to re-establish the needs to articulate its identity as a part of routine would probably lead to even big- a bigger entity. Subsequently, I proceed ger anxiety or paralysis. to the 20th Century emphasizing Slova- In sum, due to the construction of the kia’s independence and events following refugee crisis as a threat to national securi- the year 1998 when Slovak foreign pol- ty and identity, the biographical continu- icy goal was to join the EU and NATO ity of Slovakia was disrupted. The general in order to catch up with the West that feeling of anxiety and insecurity over this pinpoints the economic dimension of the critical situation connected the Visegrad argument. Then, following the crucial year countries. Although each of them had a 2004 as Slovakia enters the EU and 2008 different motivation for cooperation, to- when the global economic crisis emerges, gether they opposed the Western mem- I analyse how our foreign policy deci- ber states and EU positions in regard to sions in 2016 and onwards revolve around migration. After Brexit, however, the Eu- catching up with the West. In the end, ropean “mood” changed and Bratislava despite seeming consensus on the foreign
84 policy strategy, I point at the inconsisten- the international arena that in turn influ- cy on the domestic level among the state ence the foreign policy (Szalai, 2017). He leaders. noted, that these states are geographically limited to their location and have the ten- Slovakia’s “Identity of smallness” and the idea of Pan-Slavism dency to adjoin themselves to some bigger entity that would guarantee their security. History and connected historical Slovakia’s integration to the Euro-Atlan- memory are sources of significant events tic structures was also a result of the lack and stereotypical thinking that are sub- of possibilities concluded from smallness. jective, selective, changeable and influence Though this orientation provided Slovakia foreign policy thinking. Therefore, when with operational space for the application analysing the impact of Slovak history on of national needs and broader autonomy foreign policy discourse, it is not important for foreign policy decisions. Rejecting the to know how things really were, but how East and its communist past, the foreign we remember, imagine and explain con- policy interest was aimed at balancing crete events (Gniazdowski in Maručiak et between politico-security alliance with al., 2015). Historically, Slovakia lacks the the USA and the EU integration process, experience of being a small independent which later transformed into the EU and state (Reiter, 2006). The modern state NATO membership and “made Slovakia was established only in 1993, while apart an equal partner among modern democ- from that, Slovakia has always been part racies” (SIIS 2003; SFPA 2005 in Szalai, of some other bigger state formation. This 2017). Hence, Slovakia’s self-perception contributed to Slovakia’s self-perception as a small state accentuates the necessity as a small state. Thus, identifying Slova- of a sense of wider community which they kia as a small state, Szalai (2017) argued can hinge on while the integration to the that the “identity of smallness” reflects ac- Euro-Atlantic structures demonstrates tor’s image of its size and weaknesses in the importance of these structures "Despite the fact that to Slovak foreign policy self-iden- tity: “The Slo- Visegrad state leaders may vak Republic has transformed from have seemed close during a country striv- ing to strengthen the refugee crisis, there its identity and prove itself, build- has been a radical shift in ing administrative capacities and its position in inter- their relations following national relations almost from zero – Brexit." to a country which is firmly anchored in reliable and se-
85 cure integration structures of the world” view has shown us how Slovakia’s short (SFPA 2004; SFPA 2008 in Szalai, 2017). history as a small independent state and This need for a sense of wider com- the idea of Pan-Slavism influenced Slo- munity probably stems from the Slovak vakia’s self-identity, which needs to ar- revolutionary period in 1848/1849 when ticulate its identity as a part of a bigger Slovak nationalism sparked. Attempt- entity. Subsequently, I focus on the incen- ing to emancipate from the control of tives of Slovakia to adjoin the EU while Hungarian empire or later Habsburg highlighting how Slovakia fought for its monarchy, Slovak identity was formed recognition as a democratic and Western in opposition to the West represented by country. the Monarchy and other sub-ordinated Slovak Identity Formation after 1990s nations (Marušiak, 2016). Hence, Slo- The fundamental democratic and in- vak revolutionaries and intellectual elites turned over "Nevertheless, on domestic to Russia, as it was the only indepen- grounds, the government dent Slavic nation and for Slovaks represented a way sells pro-Europeanism in to a liberalisa- tion. The conceptrather social and economic of “Slavic unity” or so-called Pan- terms while European Slavism represent- ed this worldview values remain more or less (Marušiak, 2016). Whether this con- cept was aimed at on the periphery." the ultimate rejec- tion of the West due to cultural reasons (Bombík, 1993 tellectual discussions about the nature of in Marušiak, 2016), or pragmatic reasons Slovak identity could be established only to receive Russia’s support to emancipate following the democratization and inde- Central European nations (Matula in pendence after the fall of communism in Marušiak, 2016), this worldview influ- the 1990s (Hamberger, 2002 in Szalai, enced Slovak foreign policy orientation 2017). This process was extremely hard to a great extent in how it articulates its as the nation-state building and democ- identity as a part of bigger entity for secu- ratization many times contradicted them- rity reasons. For instance, when the Slo- selves and the question of Slovak national vak republic was established, this legacy identity polarised society on many levels challenged a discussion regarding Slo- (Szomolányi, 2003). As a result, Slova- vak geopolitical orientation to the West kia’s identity is not stabilised and fixed, (Marušiak, 2016). but rather flexible and often contradicting Altogether, this short historical over- (Szalai, 2017).
86 After Slovakia gained independence, from the rest of the democratising states the leading political parties agreed on and integration process. In the words of foreign policy orientation and priority: NATO Secretary General Solana: “The “achieving early membership of the deci- foreign policy orientation of Slovakia has sive institutions and integrating structures become hard to understand (…) concrete of the Western world” represented by the measures towards the accession process” EU and NATO (Duleba, Lukác, Wlacho- both to the EU and NATO “have dis- vsky, 1998 in Szalai, 2017). Accordingly, appeared” (Necej 2005 in Bátora, 2013). Slovakia together with other post-com- The exclusion from democratising group munist Central European states started a earned Slovakia a nickname “black hole regional cooperation by establishing the of Europe” which was first used by Mad- Visegrad Group that “tried to distance eleine Albright in 1997 (Bátora, 2013). their countries from Russia and the geo- This perception was contradictory to how political legacy of Soviet dominance” as Slovak population and government want- well as to settle the differences among the ed to see themselves, which reflected itself V4 states (Nič, 2016). However, due to the in breakthrough elections in 1998. semi-authoritarian government of Vlad- The Slovak Democratic Coalition imír Mečiar’s (1993–1997) which official- (SDK) formed a new government with ly complied with the Euro-Atlantic orien- Mikuláš Dzurinda as the new Prime tation and integration, but unofficially was Minister (1998 – 2006). Consolidating “building up [the country’s] own political democracy, he introduced extensive polit- and economic power” by keeping a large ical and economic reforms. Dzurinda pre- state control (Duleba, Lukác, and Wla- sented Slovakia as a country that respects chovsky 1998 in Szalai, 2017) caused Slo- human rights, adheres to the rule of law vakia to lag behind (Bátora, 2013). Even- and can be considered as a reliable partner though, Slovakia was still a democracy, that was supposed to lead Slovakia to the the democratic institutions were extreme- EU and NATO (Inter Press Service, 2007 ly fragile, and Slovakia became known as in Bátora, 2013). At the beginning Slova- illiberal democracy (Szomolányi, 2003). kia was labelled as a “late comer” what was This form of behaviour excluded caused by Mečiar’s policies, but this has Slovakia from being part of a group of changed. Dzurinda’s government received candidate states aspiring to join EU and a new label symbolising growth and NATO. In 1997 at the Madrid Summit, transformation – “Tatra Tiger” (Pisárová, Slovakia was eliminated from the first 2004). Already in December 1999, Slova- wave of NATO enlargement due to the kia’s efforts were rewarded by receiving an failure to fulfil the political criteria. At the invitation to start the EU negotiations on summit, the NATO membership invita- full-membership and by joining the Or- tion was sent out to all other V4 member ganisation for Economic Co-operation states, which presented a vital challenge and Development (OECD) in the year to Slovakia’s government and gener- 2000 (Mesežnikov, 2001 in Marušiak & al population (Bátora, 2013). The act of Poláčiková, 2013). Seeking recognition, omission of Slovakia from integration to Slovakia even opened up its airspace and NATO structures, put Slovakia in a po- territory for NATO’s operation in Koso- sition with a high risk of staying at the vo, which was a very delicate decision of political and economic periphery, isolated the Slovak National Council but showed
87 a great willingness to belong the West dards was perceived as one of the ben- (Bátora, 2013). Emphasizing the role of efits of EU membership and as a payoff EU conditionality in the Slovak consol- for burdensome social costs and difficult idation process and how Slovakia fought transformation to a market economy in for its recognition, I have shown how 1990s (Marušiak, 2013). Unfortunately, Dzurinda’s government demonstrated the the global economic crisis in 2008/2009 willingness to comply with the EU values together with other consequent crisis held and standards (the Europeanisation). The Slovakia up realising that catching up adoption of EU’s acquis communautaire with the West might last for generations completely transformed the socio-politi- if it continues (Marušiak, 2013). cal and economic situation and Slovakia Summing up, this section demon- became a promising candidate for 2004 strated how Slovakia, rejecting its enlargement of the EU. By 2003, interna- post-communist past fought for its rec- tional position and perception of Slovakia ognition as a Western democracy while improved to a great extent. Democracy founding its security and identity on the reached an early stage of consolidation membership in the EU and NATO. Ad- and managed to catch up with the other ditionally, in the following section, I ac- V4 and other European states. While in centuate how Bratislava approaches the 1997 Slovakia’s Freedom House democ- process of Europeanisation and how the racy rating was 3.80 alongside Russia, perception of Europeanisation from the Moldavia and Macedonia, in 2003 Slo- economic as well as political in domestic vakia was on the same level as Hungary policy influences foreign policy. receiving – 1.81 which was the third best From the periphery to the core. Or still result following Poland and Slovenia catching up? (Szomolányi, 2003). The empirical analysis of why Slo- Since the establishment of an inde- vakia lagged behind in the EU integra- pendent republic, Slovakia managed to tion process before 2004 was essential establish itself politically and become a for understanding of fear of being left valuable member of international soci- behind. At the beginning of the 1990’s ety. Slovakia, fighting for its position in it was democracy and restoration of na- the West underwent many political and tional statehood that drove us forward. socio-economic changes. They complete- Slovakia’s membership in the EU was a ly transformed its society in order to get civilisation option (Marušiak, 2017). We from the political and economic periph- wanted to catch up with the West and ery to the centre represented by the West. our membership in the EU symbolised The 2004 enlargement of the EU was not this goal. Therefore, it was that very ex- celebrated only by Slovaks, but the whole perience of being at the periphery, behind of Europe as the reunification of Europe other post-communist states and fight- (Rupnik, 2016). However today, Europe ing for our place in the West that shaped may be more divided than before. Mean- our identity (Marušiak, 2017). Moreover, ing that despite Slovakia joined the EU building on historical and cultural reasons as well as NATO, the sense of inequality for integration, the EU was perceived also towards the West still persists. Whether it as a tool for modernisation. The econom- concerns the levelling of the living stan- ic convergence with the Western stan- dards, wages or quality of food, the feel-
88 ing of being treated as colonies remains er in Central Europe than in the West- (Marušiak, 2017). The “feeling of inequal- ern European states. The data demon- ity” and the need to catch up could be cat- strated that in Central Europe around egorized into two dimensions – economic 38 percent of households had to reduce and political. The citizens in their every- the expenditure on basic food due to the day lives naturally feel the economic di- crisis while in Western societies only 11 mension more, while the political dimen- percent of households did so (EBDR 11; sion represents how seriously the voice of Prita 2011in Marušiak, 2013). So, while Slovakia is taken abroad. By looking at the the migration crisis opened the West- economic and political dimension respec- East divide, the prior economic crisis was tively in the following section, I demon- rather about the North versus South di- strate how from the Slovakia’s perspective, vision with Central Europe belonging Europe is divided to the West and the to the North despite the hard-economic East. Whereas the West represents the downturn. At that time, the Central Eu- more economically developed part and ropean states endorsed Germany against political centre of the Europe, the East, in the Southern states. This move displayed comparison to the West is lagging behind. that the geographical thinking in regard Looking at the economic aspect, to either Central, Eastern or Western Eu- EU membership indeed contributed to rope are part of mental geography raging the growth of Slovakia’s GDP. Until the about their artificial or imagined identi- financial crisis in 2009 emerged, Slova- ties (Rupnik, 2017). kia was one of the countries, which had Yet, as Bershidsky observed “the East- a favourable economic perspective to ern Europeans often feel their countries reach the EU’s GDP average (Pridham, have turned into Western Europe’s colo- 2005 in Marušiak, 2013). Hence, after nies…” (Bershidsky, 2017). They often see the economic crisis, Slovakia had to count themselves as second-grade citizens who on staying in the economic periph- ery for a longer "Attempting to emancipate time (Marušiak, 2013). Even to- from the control of the day Eurostat data shows that the Hungarian empire or later new EU mem- ber states GDP Habsburg monarchy, per capita is still below the Euro- pean average. As Slovak identity was formed reported by the European Bank in opposition to the for reconstruction and development West represented by the (EBDR), the economic crisis monarchy and other sub- struck much hard- ordinated nations."
89 "The 2004 enlargement of manufactures the the EU was not celebrated most luxurious cars, has a salary half or maybe two only by Slovaks, but the thirds lower than a worker in the whole of Europe as the same firm 200 km westwards, in any reunification of Europe. western country, where the work However today, Europe has lower quality, lower produc- tivity and man- may be more divided than ufactures low- er-quality prod- before." ucts” (Bershidsky, 2017). And even are being ripped off by the more devel- though this polit- oped Western European states (Bershid- ical angle in not uncommon in Slovakia sky, 2017). They blame the multinational and other Eastern countries, this strike companies for selling them cheaper and displayed how disunited the EU may be low-quality brand-name food and claim from the Eastern perspective. that the EU allocation of structural funds Another case representing the West – benefits more the Western corporations East division and reflecting on the “colo- than poorer countries in Eastern member nial” feeling of Slovakia was the matter of states (Bershidsky, 2017). For example, in the dual quality of products. It was found 2017, during one of the repeating work out that certain products and food have strikes in Slovakia’s Volkswagen plant, a different composition or are made out Bloomberg depicted Slovakia as a “poster of cheaper ingredients in Eastern Europe child for East European integration into in comparison to the Western states like the European Union” which described Austria or Germany (Reuters, 2017). Al- how the Eastern Europeans often feel though at that time there was no Euro- and think about themselves (Bershidsky, pean consumer law, which would prohibit 2017). People working for Volkswagen the changing of food recipes or product demanded higher salaries, reasoning that ingredients as long as the ingredients are they do not understand why they earn so correctly stated, this issue was immediate- little while people from a neighbouring ly picked up by Robert Fico, highlighting country (Austria) earn twice as much as his domestic populist anti-EU strategy. they do for the same job. Naturally, pop- He stated that the double quality stan- ulist leader Robert Fico supported work- dards of products and food is an interna- ers in the strike with following reaction tional scandal and that he cannot allow to the conflict: “Our western friends do Slovak citizens to be treated this way (The not understand when we ask them why Spectator, 2017). Consequently, he organ- a worker in Bratislava, in a firm that has ised a V4 Consumer summit on a minis- the highest quality, high productivity and terial level to address the issue that also
90 contributed to the anti-EU sentiment in and has the most advanced level of science other Visegrad states. Subsequently, this and culture, then Slovakia definitely still issue was addressed by the President of does not belong to the centre (Marušiak, the European Commission Jean-Claude 2017). When referring to the countries Juncker in 2017’s State of the Union at the centre or core of decision-making speech. He noted that there should be “no process in the EU, it is usually referred second-class consumers” in the European to the old member states in charge with single market saying: “Slovaks deserve as France and Germany, which are consid- much fish in their fish sticks as anyone ered the driver of European integration. else, and Czechs deserve as much cocoa Following the parliamentary elec- in their chocolate as anyone else” (Tamma, tions, which damaged Slovakia’s relations 2017). Given the problem with the man- with the EU, the Slovak government datory quota system in regard to migra- has done a lot to fix its image abroad in tion crisis when the Visegrad states were order to distinguish itself from the Pol- outvoted, the fact that this issue was taken ish-Hungarian illiberal axis. In compari- seriously by the European Commission son to them, Slovakia has much more to was politically important for Slovakia and lose by alienating Brussels than Poland for Robert Fico who earlier in July 2017 and Hungary (Reuters, 2017). Slovakia said he wanted Slovakia to be part of the is the smallest state within the V4, with EU core. To what both EU leaders, Junck- a small economy highly dependent on car er and Tusk, emphasized either that Slo- exports to Germany and other EU states, vakia “wants to be part of ”, or “will remain but most importantly, Slovakia is a mem- within” the core of Europe (Tefer, 2017). ber of the Monetary Union (Bershidsky, Notwithstanding these two cases demon- 2017). Given the bad image of Visegrad strated the economic division between the Group, Brexit and more frequent discus- East and the West and its political conse- sions about the multi-speed Europe in quences. By looking at the sentiments of Brussels and overall feeling of insecurity the people and how they perceive Euro- about the future of Europe, it was a prag- peanisation, I called attention to how Fico matic step for Slovakia to warm towards articulates the economic inequality on the the EU. Ergo, Robert Fico officially dis- domestic level. However, on the foreign tanced himself from his previous anti-EU policy level, for Slovakia, the lagging be- rhetoric, which accompanied the parlia- hind worked as a driver for further inte- mentary elections and announced that gration, especially in the wake of Brexit. Slovakia’s vital interest is to be in the core Moving on to the political dimen- of the EU. He argued for an active coop- sion of my argument, I want to remark eration with France and Germany: “The that Slovakia’s institutional integration to fundamentals of my policy are being close OECD, UN, NATO, EU as well as to the to the (EU) core, close to France, to Ger- Monetary Union since 2008, put Slovakia many” (Jancarikova, 2017). However, the out of the political periphery that it was in term core used by Robert Fico was seen as before 2004. Yet it is still not in the centre. problematic by many politicians, scholars Considering the centre as a place where or political analysts. It was unclear what strategic decisions are being taken as well it represented as one could argue that as the area that provides the most signif- Slovakia already belongs to the European icant civilisation stimuli and innovations core by being a part of Schengen and the
91 EU Monetary Union. Following the mi- 27 EU member states to unity and prin- gration crisis, rather unexpected shift to ciples of the EU and to the fight against the core means two things. Firstly, as the simplistic solutions offered by populist international environment changed, Slo- and extreme parties. Even though the vakia with its pro-European orientation Declaration tried to find an intersection distanced itself from the Polish-Hungar- of common interests on how to continue, ian illiberal axis and Visegrad group. Sec- it did not bring the wished unity (Ga- ondly, Slovakia wanting to catch up with brižová, 2017). Arguably, the adoption of the West wanted to be taken as a central the Bratislava roadmap was more import- political partner. Hence, further I focus on ant than its contents. Though, it undoubt- the actions Bratislava executed that were edly confirmed the Slovak foreign policy supposed to underline the willingness for orientation towards deeper integration cooperation. more than it represented Slovakia’s con- As mentioned, in the second half tribution to debates about the future of of the year 2016, Slovakia held Presi- the EU. dency of the Council of the EU during Almost one year after the Brexit ref- which Bratislava started to respond to the erendum, in March 2017 Jean-Claude changing moods in Europe. Bratislava Juncker, President of the European Com- abandoned the regional rhetoric, and the mission, published a White paper on the Franco – German cooperation became the Future of Europe called “Reflections and vital interest of the Slovak foreign policy scenarios for the EU27 by 2025” (Euro- (Gabrižová, 2017). Besides, Slovakia had pean Commission, 2017). The paper con- an ambitious challenge to set the presi- tained five political scenarios for the EU, dency agenda since Britain’s exit from the which were supposed to steer and frame EU changed thinking of the European the debate about the future of the block leaders. Berlin, France as well as the EU out of which one represented the possi- officials again started to talk about the bility of multi-speed Europe. Moreover, at possibility of multi-speed Europe in re- the end of March 2017 during celebrations gard to the future of the EU. However, of 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, at that time such visions were hampered a common Rome declaration was signed by the anticipated elections in France and by of the leaders of 27-member states and Germany. Accordingly, Bratislava tried to the European institutions. The declaration contribute to the discussion about the fu- expressed plans for future integration: ture of the EU. In this context, it is note- “We will act together, at different paces worthy to mention the Bratislava Decla- and intensity where necessary, while mov- ration or so-called Bratislava Roadmap ing in the same direction, as we have done (European Council, 2016). The Roadmap in the past, in line with the Treaties and was presented at non-formal Summit in keeping the door open to those who want Bratislava organised during the very first to join later” (European Council; the Eu- Slovak presidency of the Council of the ropean Parliament; the European Com- EU. It mainly addressed issues regarding mission, 2017). The First State Secretary, the perceived lack of control and people’s Ivan Korčok, accentuated the outcome fears related to migration, terrorism, and of the declaration at public discussions economic and social insecurity. The dec- assuring people about the pro-European laration expressed the commitment of the stance of Slovak government, which was
92 still hampered after the last parliamentary rhetoric about the EU core became more elections. Additionally, in May 2017 cen- concrete following the already mentioned trist and strongly pro-European Emanuel White paper on Future of Europe pub- Macron won the French elections. His lished by the EU Commission, Rome victory meant the triumph of the Euro- declaration and later presidential elections pean values and saving of the European in France. Thereupon, it was discussed by project, which could have been destroyed state officials that the EU core is sup- if Marine Le Pen had won the presidential posed to represent deeper integration in race. The victory certainly signalled to the very sensitive social and economic area as member states that the EU integration well as defence cooperation (Gabrižova, would proceed further. These talks about 2017). The reforms were supposed also the future of the EU and incentives about touch upon the Eurozone, which R. Fico the multi-speed Europe created a political sees as the cornerstone of EU integration. pressure for further integration. Slovakia, As Rastislav Káčer, Slovak Ambassador to not wanting to lag behind, reflected on Hungary quoted him in an interview: “We the change in the political environ- "Considering the centre as ment and adjusted its foreign policy by shifting towards a place...that provides the the core of the EU. Further, in most significant civilization March at the Eval- uation Conference stimuli and innovations of Foreign and European Policy and has the most advanced for 2016, Robert Fico stated that it would it would lever of science and be a pity if Slova- kia had not joined culture, Slovakia definitely the other coun- tries which want still does not belong to that to progress further in integration and centre." do not want to be hindered by oth- ers. He argued that the core of the EU have to complete the Eurozone. We have should become an unambiguous strategy, to finish it. We cannot have a common not just a formal note. Likewise, the gov- currency for a long period without having ernment rhetoric emphasizing that Slo- a banking union” (Káčer, 2017). Slovakia’s vakia is part of the most integrated core willingness for a deeper integration was of the EU within the Schengen and Eu- also expressed by the change of attitude rozone framework came to the forefront towards the problem of the Posted Work- (Gabrižova, 2017). Subsequently, Slovak ers directive, which was dividing Europe
93 again. The directive was dealing with low- ber 2017 by 23-member states and rep- paid labour and was strongly supported by resents the greatest improvement in Eu- newly elected French President E. Ma- ropean defence industry, which is aimed at cron who campaigned on the employment creating more coherent European foreign rules in the EU. Taking up his office, -Ma policy. One of the conditions for joining cron was putting pressure on the Visegrad PESCO is to participate in at least one countries, which he criticized for their consortium project. Slovakia’s contribu- stance against the migration quota. He tion will consist of leading a project called warned them that “Europe is not a super- Euro Artillery aimed at indirect fire sup- market” and that the European values and port. democratic principles must be followed Concluding, the shift of the orienta- (King, 2017). In order to not be outvoted tion of Slovak foreign policy on the core in the Council, Slovakia started to nego- of the EU was driven by the external fac- tiate on the conditions of the directive. tors such as Brexit and overall change in Restoring the Slavkov triangle and elim- the attitudes of the European leaders who inating Poland and Hungary from the opted for the multi-speed Europe. Slova- discussion, Macron met with Robert Fico kia, not wanting to lag behind, followed and his counterparts from Czech Repub- suit and changed its behaviour what is lic and Austria in Salzburg. Together they justified by Bratislava’s actions and com- agreed on the EU Posted Workers direc- promises in the EU employment rules on tive-regulating salary of workers posted the Posted Worker’s directive. abroad who should earn as much for the Inconsistency in Foreign Policy work, as workers in the country they are Aligning Slovak foreign policy to the working in. After the meeting in Salz- core of the EU, it seemed as if consen- burg, Robert Fico abandoned his rheto- sus was reached across the political scene ric that the EU wanted to take away our about the foreign policy strategy. In Octo- comparative advantage in cheap labour. ber 2017 the three highest representatives Instead, he claimed that Slovakia too ac- of Slovakia, President Andrej Kiska, Rob- cepts workers from abroad and he too did not want our "Identity anxiety was workers to be dis- advantaged abroad strongly represented by (The Spectator, 2017). the externalisation of the Additionally, Bratislava joined EU, growing nationalism the initiative and actively contribut- ed to Membership and securitization of of the Permanent Structured Co- migrants, which dominated operation (PES- CO). PESCO was the whole political signed in Novem- spectrum."
94 ert Fico and Andrej Danko who is a Chair vakia’s “Ostpolitik” approach is confusing. of the Slovak National Council signed a Such inconsistencies might also be caused common declaration. Eliminating any al- by the growing insecurity in international ternatives to the Western orientation, the relations with Brexit, Putin and unpre- declaration expressed a clear pro-Euro- dictable Donald Trump. Nevertheless, pean and pro-Atlantic orientation, which alike actions sabotage the official foreign presents a basic framework of our securi- policy of Slovakia towards the West as ty, stability and prosperity (Kiska, et al., well as complicate the communication of 2017). Though, the common statement foreign policy strategy to its citizens. stands strongly by the European values In sum, despite the efforts of the and orientation, the practical actions of government representatives to enforce a some state representatives do not reflect pro-European orientation at the official the official line of foreign policy. A month level, their actions do not align with the after the signature of the declaration, official strategy. By pointing at this incon- two opposing visions of Slovak foreign sistency in the foreign policy, I wanted to policy were presented. In Strasburg on draw attention to how this behaviour un- the grounds of the European Parliament dermines our foreign policy and weakens Andrej Kiska gave a speech in which he our standing in regard to the EU. And in confirmed the pro-European stance of these times of insecurity, it is more im- Slovakia while emphasizing the need for portant than ever to affirm foreign policy more proactive and ambitious in its for- orientation and predictable actions. eign and security policy and not limiting itself to a “money-raising benefactor once Conclusion the dust has settled” (Kiska, 2017). In ad- dition, Kiska condemned Russia for its Double Insecurity of Slovak Foreign behaviour and called for the active fight Policy against disinformation and dissemination Contextualising Slovak history and of fake news (Kiska, 2017). In contrast to society to recent political developments, I this speech, almost simultaneously Andrej have tried to look at the relations between Danko gave a speech in Moscow. To him, identity, (in)security and Europeanisation it was a historical moment as up until as a part of globalisation. My thesis was now, no Slovak politician has ever given aimed at the deconstruction of the for- a speech in State Duma. Calling for clos- eign policy discourse in between the years er cooperation between the Russian State 2015 and 2017. I have argued that during Duma and the Slovak National Coun- this time period Slovak foreign policy dis- cil, he communicated his believes about course was driven by a double insecurity: Slavic unity and heritage which binds us. the fear of the other and the fear of being “The Russian Federation still remains one left behind. In both of these fears, Europe- of the most important trade partners of anisation played an important role either Slovakia outside of the European Union” as an external or internal factor in shap- Andrej Danko said (Gális, 2017). This line ing the discourse. In regard to the fear of is in conflict with the EU foreign policy the other, the domestic foreign policy was of sanctions against the Russian Feder- the most influential. The identity anxiety ation for breaching international law in was strongly represented by the external- Ukraine. From this perspective, the Slo- isation of the EU, growing nationalism
95 "In this context, it is and securitiza- tion of migrants, essential to note that it which dominated the whole political is not enough to focus on spectrum. Populist political parties the economic aspect and and government leaders used the “homesteading” just formally comply with strategy and pro- vided people with the EU rules...One has to simple definitions of who they are. embody the core European As a result, indi- viduals became at- values as well as principles tached to any “col- lective identity” re- ducing anxiety and across all the government insecurity in times of crisis in order actions." to maintain their identity. Moreover, equal and valuable partner. This historical fighting insecurity during 2016, the Slo- background provided my research with vak government intensively cooperated the necessary information for the under- with the Visegrad Group in opposing the standing of the government position to quota system. Unfortunately, the actions get into the core of the EU was driven by of V4 during the refugee crisis contrib- the fear of being left behind. In this con- uted to the negative perception of the text, I emphasized the economic as well Visegrad group abroad. as political dimension of the argument. Nevertheless, as the international am- In economic terms, I have shown how bience was changing due to the political Eastern Europeans perceive themselves as developments in Europe, such as Brex- colonies neglected by the West. Then in it, French elections and the discussions the political dimension, I highlighted how about the multi-speed Europe, the fear in order to gain security, Bratislava had to of being left behind started to drive the once again build stable relations and rou- foreign policy discourse in Slovakia. Ex- tines with the Western partners, by more plaining how the fear of being left behind actively contributing to the discussion shaped the political discourse, I recon- about the future of the EU. Though, it structed the Slovak historical experience was not that difficult because the illiberal which emphasized the need of Slovakia to axis of Poland and Hungary immediately articulate its identity as a part of a bigger made Bratislava look like a “pro-European entity for security reasons. Consequently, island” that reinforced Slovakia’s identity I focused on the formative years after the as a pro-EU country and advanced the 1990s when Slovakia fought for its rec- position of Slovakia within the region. So, ognition among the Western states as an while throughout the migration crisis in
96 2015 the European migration policy was note that it is not enough to focus on the the main cause of Slovak identity inse- economic aspect and just formally comply curity; the EU and the Europeanisations with the EU rules (Gabrižova, 2017). One continue to be the core of security in Slo- has to embody the core European values vak foreign policy. Even though the shift as well as principles across all the govern- to the core of the EU was at the domestic ment actions. level often sold as the second entrance to the EU, in this context, it is essential to
About the Author: Kamila Potočárová is from Senec, Slovakia and a recent graduate of European studies at Comenius University in Bratislava. Kamila is currently studying towards her master’s degree in international relations at the Central European University in Budapest. She specializes in security and hopes to pursue a career within an international governmental organization.
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