Permanent Organisation of the Olympic Games in Greece

Permanent Organisation of the Olympic Games in Greece:

Infrastructure and Technology Management Issues

George-Marios Papadimitropoulos

nology h

rsity

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U lft

Challenge the future

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT DELFT – FACULTEIT TECHNIEK, BESTUUR EN MANAGEMENT (TBM)

MASTER THESIS PROJECT

PERMANENT ORGANISATION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN GREECE; INFRA- STRUCTURE & TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES

GEORGE-MARIOS PAPADIMITROPOULOS

DELFT 2017

PERMANENT ORGANISATION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN GREECE; INFRASTRUCTURE & TECHNOLOGY MAN- AGEMENT ISSUES

GEORGE-MARIOS PAPADIMITROPOULOS

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY (MoT)

AT DELFT UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, TO BE DEFENDED PUBLICLY ON 26/10/2017

THESIS COMMITTEE: Prof. dr. G.P. (BERT) van WEE (CHAIR) Dr. Mr. N. (NIEK) MOUTER (1 ST SUPERVISOR) Dr. ir. Z. (ZENLIN) ROOSENBOOM KWEE (2 ND SUPERVISOR)

Preface

A journey of two years is coming to an end. My decision to study at a recognised university like TU Delft was taken long ago during my first year of my studies for my bachelor programme in Greece. Such a decision was not only taken for building my CV or because of the deadlock in which my country currently is. I desired to acquire life experience away from my family and friends and to broaden my horizons, to confront life challenges with wisdom. Daily moments played a dominant role in this attempt. I experienced many difficult moments during this journey. Although the best way to become tougher in life is to undergo every challenge, since “good things come after pain”. From this experience, I realised three things – for the third I would like to make a special citation: don’t ever give up a battle even though you fight under unequal conditions; you will once be awarded. Also, we should not forget the power of human relations, since a real friendship is born when both people are sharing the same hardships, and are realising one another. My life in the Netherlands during the last two years, made me to believe that my country where I was born, grown up and educated will make it someday, despite the syndromes of misery, medi- ocrity and of wretchedness – as known as “the aki syndrome” named by my bachelor professor Mr. Yannis Pollalis. That’ s why when living away from your familiar environment to other cul- tures you get stimuli that are needed to be channelled to the country where you were born, in order for it to progress. And this is not easy if we consider the current situation Greece encounters. Unfortunately, disappointment is apparent from all young people, who immigrate permanently to other countries. The main argument behind this is summarised that Greece “kills” its own children and that “Greece is done; there is no hope for the future”. So, this is how the subject of this Master Thesis was born; to become a primitive incentive to promote Greece internationally, given the globalised reality and to set the foundations for incen- tivising innovation on modern technologies and on delivered infrastructures, with the parallel re- vival of the Olympic Spirit and of its values. All these require investments within the real economy, that determine Greece’s presence in the global scene of developed nations. I would like to thank all who were willing to support me in this attempt and especially my family and my Thesis committee. I would also like to give my special thanks to Niek Mouter for his contribution in helping me to understand and to apply Cost-Benefit Analysis theory to an idea that would exhibit primarily the Olympic Spirit to the country where it was born and to redefine it, under the face of relentless competition, commercialisation and of economic interests that have corrupted it.

Delft, 26th of October 2017

George-Marios Papadimitropoulos

This Thesis is fully dedicated to my family and especially to my father who has just recovered from a recent health problem, and to my deceased brother George who left us behind too early and unexpectedly.

Thesis Summary

Research problem: The Olympic Games is an ultimate event that unites all nations together, so as to attend and to compete at multiple sports events, delivering hence a unique experience. In parallel with this experience, the Games are interwoven with multiple legacies that should be maintained and exploited favourably, in order to state that the Games left a positive trace to the hosting country or city. Special notice should be made about technological legacies, being the developed infrastructures and introduced technologies; before the start of the Games these have to be implemented and tested, otherwise the country runs the risk of undergoing negative global exposure. Moreover, the quality of delivered infrastructures and technologies and the level of economic competitiveness are highly related; after the end of the Games, these can be either exploited in favour of the hosting country or city or may end up being cash cows, something that Greece experienced from its own Games in 2004. Not only this, but also concerns have arisen upon the economic feasibility of hosting the Games to multiple countries. Gradually future candidate cities propose alternative public investments that can have more long-term effects, than hosting the Olympic Games. Usually the socioeconomic effects of the Games can be either positive or negative, but hosting cities have to undergo large costs that are usually undertaken by the public or private domain. Sometimes economically weak countries have to debt finance the Games, resulting in further macroeconomic burden in terms of increased and unmanageable indebtedness. Hence, these mentioned challenges can potentially be addressed by proposing a permanent home for hosting the Olympic Games. This can be Greece, as it is the country where these were born, and especially in Athens, where all Olympic facilities are already present. But how feasible this policy is from a social cost-benefit perspective and how important would be for Greece from a technology management perspective, led to the formulation of the following research question: What would be the socio-economic impacts, if the Olympic Games were organised permanently in Greece? How important is the role of managing infrastructure and technology projects so as to facilitate a permanent organisation of the Olympic Games in Greece? The purpose of this Thesis is to deviate from the current literature, which adopts a revenue-expenditure approach in evaluating the outcomes of such major sports events, that under the current situation are hosted to different countries. Also, from this analysis can be estimated the social costs from the improper exploitation of infrastructures. In order to contain these costs, an identification of the challenges that lead to poor infrastructure management are defined. From these, proposals to the Greek government can be extracted to ensure a successful infrastructure management. Methodology: To assess the effects of the permanent organisation of the Olympic Games in Greece, both a national and an international Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) are carried out, since they are capable for providing managerial implications to the institutions responsible for the organisation of the Games. While assessing the impacts of major events, the majority of current

9 studies adopt an economic impact analysis. In this thesis this was not carried out, since it does not provide indications of the actual societal benefits and costs, as well as to communicate the government whether to support the organisation of the Games or not. This also provides an indication whether this policy is beneficial or not for the Greek society. Analysing the importance in managing infrastructures and technologies, so as to facilitate a permanent host of the Games in Greece, this was made possible through the conduct of face to face and online semi-structured interviews (n=34). People asked were then divided into clusters being bodies in Greek administrative levels (politicians and engineers) and academics. Citizens were also asked in order to acquire public non-expert opinion. From these clusters, it becomes possible to construct perspectives each with its own arguments according to their area of expertise in prioritizing the challenges and the current weaknesses crucial to support the proposed policy. In addition to these, literature and ex-post-Olympic case study analyses were performed for assessing, comparing and contrasting the outcomes of the previous Games from 1992 till 2012. The combination of these mentioned methods provides useful lessons to Greece, in order to avoid repeating the reality after the 2004 Games and to guarantee a smooth running of the Games with a sustainable high level of spectacle and international awareness. Results: The below tables present that the proposed policy is beneficial to the Greek society within a time horizon of 5 Olympiads, since the Net Present Value (NPV) is positive and the Benefit Cost ratio (B/C) is more than one for all scenarios. However, it is damaging for the participating countries, for the bad and expected (reference) scenarios, since NPV is negative and B/C is less than one. The solution for Greece does not change for the reference and good scenarios, if they are considered the equivalent annual net benefits (EANB) of the current situation of hosing the Games to different countries. These account for $ 0.98 billion. These results are drawn since it is assumed that all the countries participating at the Games are willing to contribute financially. The induced effects stemmed from spectacle (ticketing and TV rights) and from the Olympic Halo effect (sponsorship and sale of licensed merchandise) are shared among Greece and the rest of the countries. On the other hand, some additional effects of the Olympic Hallo effect, being the effects induced from touristic activity, future use value of venues and from national pride are debited to Greece.

Greek level CBA (in current billion USD) Bad scenario Expected scenario Good scenario NPV EANB B/C NPV EANB B/C NPV EANB B/C $ 8,020 $ 0,74 51,38 $ 14,486 $ 1,33 120,53 $ 20,942 $ 1,92 230,20

Table A.1: CBA summary of Greece (amounts in current billion USD).

International level CBA (in current billion USD) Bad scenario Expected scenario Good scenario NPV B/C NPV B/C NPV B/C $ -0,081 0,49 $ -0,027 0,78 $ 0,015 1,17

Table A.2: International CBA summary (amounts in current billion USD).

However, in calculating the indirect benefits of Greece, their valuation was made based on studies related to previous Olympic Games in other countries. Therefore, the figures extracted are subjected to errors, so future research is needed to make more representative estimations. In parallel with this, this is an ex-ante CBA deploying forecasting models based on previous Games data. Also, every CBA is not enough in ending up with a final decision, let alone while examining the probability of giving the Games a permanent home, since there are hidden agendas and ideological barriers in negotiating among countries the height of financial contribution for hosting the Games. From a technology management perspective, based on the sampling output derived from the above-mentioned interviews, the Greek government should address the following challenges in the following order of importance (from 1 to 9), so as for the infrastructures to be implemented on time, with the lowest cost and with the highest value for citizens, tourists and Olympic members. The importance order from 1 to 9 is derived from the corresponding scores for each challenge ranging from 1 to 5 (least important to most important), as depicted in the below table.

Order Challenge/Factor Overall average score 1 Financing of projects 4,49 2 Bureaucracy 3,78 3 Legal framework 3,75 4 Spatial planning 3,68 5 Environmental protection 3,45 6 Expropriation of properties 2,58 7 Construction technology 2,51 8 Availability of construction materials 2,26 9 Geology and seismicity 2,20

Table A.3: Summary of challenges in order of importance.

Table of Contents

Thesis Summary...... 9 List of Figures ...... 16 List of Tables ...... 17 List of Abbreviations ...... 21 1. Introduction1 ...... 24 1.1. Problem description ...... 24 1.2. Preliminary breaking down of Christine Lagarde’s argument ...... 26 1.3. Research objective – Research question ...... 29 1.4. Thesis outline ...... 30 2. Literature Review1 ...... 32 2.1. The Olympic Games as mega events ...... 32 2.1.1. The bidding process ...... 33 2.2. Impacts of the Olympic Games...... 35 2.2.1. Socio-economic impacts ...... 35 2.1.2. Environmental impacts ...... 41 2.1.3. Socio-cultural impacts ...... 42 2.1.4. Political impacts ...... 42 2.2. Attempts to make the Olympic Games more cost-efficient ...... 43 3. Research Methodology1 ...... 47 3.1 Identifying social costs and benefits of the permanent Olympic Games ...... 47 3.1.1 A review of CBA ...... 48 3.1.2 Differences between CBA and Economic Impact Study (EIS)...... 49 3.2 Investigating the required challenges to be addressed for achieving a successful management of technology of a permanent Olympiad...... 50 3.3 Summarising research design ...... 51 4. Site selection for hosting the Olympic Games in Greece ...... 52 4.1. Advantages and disadvantages of Athens ...... 53 4.1.1. Advantages ...... 53 4.1.2. Disadvantages ...... 54

1 These parts draw also from the Theses Proposal submitted in the course “Preparation for Master Thesis” (MOT 2003) 13

4.2. Advantages and disadvantages of expanding the Games to other locations ...... 55 4.2.1. Advantages ...... 55 4.2.2. Disadvantages ...... 55 4.3. Additional supporting infrastructure needed in Athens ...... 56 4.4. Additional supporting infrastructure needed in other cities ...... 58 5. Cost-Benefit Analysis of the permanent host of the Games in Greece ...... 60 5.1. Distinction between costs and benefits ...... 60 5.2. CBA of the current bidding process...... 63 5.3. CBA of the expected situation ...... 67 5.3.1. Forecasting errors ...... 68 5.3.2. Forecasting Methods ...... 70 5.3.3. Additional parameters needed ...... 73 5.3.4. Valuation of OCOG costs...... 74 5.3.5. Valuation of Non-OCOG costs ...... 75 5.3.6. Valuation of OCOG benefits ...... 76 5.3.7. Valuation of Non-OCOG benefits ...... 79 5.3.8. Valuation of opportunity costs ...... 82 5.4. Discussion of findings...... 83 6. Infrastructure and Technology Management of the Olympiads from 1992 until 2012 ...... 88 6.1. Barcelona 1992 ...... 89 6.1.1. Infrastructure management and development ...... 89 6.1.2. Technology Management ...... 93 6.2. Atlanta 1996 ...... 101 6.2.1. Venue construction management ...... 101 6.2.2. Technology management...... 106 6.3. Sydney 2000...... 117 6.3.1. Olympic Infrastructure Management and Development ...... 117 6.3.2. Technology Management ...... 123 6.4. Athens 2004 ...... 128 6.4.1. Olympic Infrastructure Management ...... 128 6.4.2. Technology management...... 138 6.5. Beijing 2008 ...... 145 6.5.1. Infrastructure management and development ...... 145 6.5.2. Technology Management ...... 148

6.6. London 2012 ...... 150 6.6.1. Venue Construction Management and Development ...... 150 6.6.2. Technology management...... 155 6.7. Lessons Greece can learn ...... 157 7. Conclusions – Recommendations ...... 162 Annex ...... 165 A. Interviewing ...... 165 a) Interview protocol ...... 165 b) Sampling ...... 167 B. Non-OCOG Benefits estimation of Olympiads from 1996 to 2016 ...... 171 a) Barcelona 1992 ...... 171 b) Atlanta 1996 ...... 171 c) Sydney 2000 ...... 172 d) Athens 2004...... 172 e) Beijing 2008 ...... 173 f) London 2012 ...... 173 g) Rio 2016 ...... 174 C. OCOG costs estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece ...... 175 a) Forecasting of OCOG costs ...... 175 b) OCOG costs valuation ...... 176 D. Non-OCOG costs estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece ...... 177 E. OCOG Benefits estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece ...... 178 a) Forecasting of OCOG Benefits ...... 178 b) Valuation of OCOG Benefits ...... 179 F. Non-OCOG benefits estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece ...... 181 a) Forecasting of Non-OCOG benefits ...... 181 b) Valuation of Non-OCOG benefits ...... 185 G. National CBA of the permanent Olympic Games in Greece ...... 189 References ...... 190

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: EU unemployment rates (Eurostat, 2016)...... 26 Figure 1.2: Total financial costs of the Olympic Games from 1992 to 2016 (Baade & Matheson, 2016)...... 27 Figure 1.3: Financial Cost Overrun of the Olympic Games (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier). .... 28 Figure 2.1: Bidding costs per country for the 2016 Olympics (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015)...... 33 Figure 2.2: The Olympic Games Process (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015)...... 34 Figure 2.3: Trends of cost overruns of Winter Olympics (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012)...... 46 Figure 2.4: Trends of cost overruns of Summer Olympics (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012)...... 46 Figure 4.1: Proposed expansions of Attica Highway (shown in red and green) (Lialios, 2009). . 57 Figure 4.2: The development plan of the airport Eleftherios Venizelos...... 58 Figure 5.1: Relationship between Sports-related costs and Social benefits...... 62 Figure 5.2: Relationship between Social Benefits and OCOC & Non-OCOG benefits...... 62 Figure 5.3: Definition of consumer surplus and expenditure, through a demand curve (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer, 2011)...... 77 Figure 6.1: Technology management at territorial level (COOB '92)...... 97 Figure 6.2: Phases of infrastructure development for the Atlanta Games (ACOG 1996)...... 102 Figure 6.3: Responsibilities distribution in ACOG Technology Department in 1995...... 108 Figure 6.4: Distribution of staff and roles based on provided services...... 109 Figure 6.5: ACOG Technology Department divisions...... 109 Figure 6.6: Info '96 main menu options (ACOG 1996)...... 111 Figure 6.7: The Olympic Complex of Faliron under construction (ATHOC 2004)...... 129 Figure 6.8: The Olympic Complex of Hellinikon semi-completed (ATHOC 2004)...... 130 Figure 6.9: Venue Technology Management areas of supervision (ATHOC 2004)...... 140 Figure 6.10: Telecommunications functional area organisation (ATHOC 2004)...... 141 Figure 6.11: Vision, aims and strategies of LOCOG Venue & Infrastructure Department (Aukett, 2012)...... 151

List of Tables

Summary Tables

Table A.1: CBA summary of Greece (amounts in current billion USD)...... 10 Table A.2: International CBA summary (amounts in current billion USD)...... 10 Table A.3: Summary of challenges in order of importance...... 11

Main Text Tables Table 1.1: Percentage of government debt to GDP (Eurostat, 2016)...... 25 Table 2.1: Total costs of the Olympic Games in Athens (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015)...... 39 Table 2.2: Total revenues of the Olympic Games in Athens (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015)...... 39 Table 2.3: Comparison of Olympic Games cost overruns (in real terms) before and after the introduction of OGKMP (2016)...... 45 Table 3.1: Methods of answering research questions...... 51 Table 4.1: Olympic Venues in Athens (ATHOC 2004)...... 53 Table 5.1: Distinction between costs and benefits...... 63 Table 5.2: OCOG costs valuation (amounts in current million USD, sources above)...... 64 Table 5.3: Percentage of bidding costs relative to total OCOG cost...... 65 Table 5.4: OCOG benefits valuation (amounts in current million USD)...... 65 Table 5.5: CBA of the Olympic Games from 1992 till 2016 (amounts in current million USD). 67 Table 5.6: Valuation of total OCOG benefits (amounts in current billion USD)...... 78 Table 5.7: Sensitivity analysis of Net OCOG benefits when sentiments of routine start from the 4th Olympiad...... 78 Table 5.8: Sensitivity analysis of Net OCOG benefits when sentiments of routine start from the 3rd Olympiad...... 78 Table 5.9: Forecasting of the number of countries participating at the Games (Statista, 2017). .. 84 Table 5.10: CBA summary of Greece (amounts in current billion USD)...... 84 Table 5.11: Comparison between the current and permanent Olympics (in billion USD)...... 85 Table 5.12: International evaluation of the proposed policy (amounts in current billion USD). . 85 Table 5.13: Greece sports related benefits summary with 23% Greek participation at sports related costs (in current billion $)...... 86

Table 5.14: International evaluation with 23% Greek participation at sports related costs (amounts in current billion USD)...... 86 Table 5.15: Greece sports related benefits summary with 50% Greek participation at sports related costs (in billion USD)...... 86 Table 5.16: International evaluation with 50% Greece participation at OCOG and Non-OCOG costs (in billion USD)...... 87 Table 5.17: CBA summary of Greece...... 87 Table 5.18: CBA summary of international level...... 87 Table 6.1: Allocation of Olympic Games investments (values in million USD) (Brunet, 1995). 90 Table 6.2: Allocation of construction costs for the Olympic Games (Brunet, 1995)...... 91 Table 6.3: Economic impact of the Olympic Games in Barcelona (Brunet, 1995)...... 92 Table 6.4: Companies involved in the provision of technology services (COOB '92)...... 94 Table 6.5: Organisational arrangements in technology development (COOB '92)...... 97 Table 6.6: Definition of Systems (COOB '92)...... 98 Table 6.7: Staff engaged in technology services provision (COOB '92)...... 100 Table 6.8: Training of technology staff (COOB '92)...... 101 Table 6.9: Atlanta's Olympic Venues (ACOG 1996)...... 106 Table 6.10: List of venues and their source of funding (SOCOG 2000)...... 123 Table 6.11: Number of personnel engaged in technology services provision (ATHOC 2004). . 139 Table 6.12: Sampling output per cluster...... 157 Table 6.13: Sampling output...... 160

Annex B Tables Table B.1: Spain national pride calculation for the '92 Games...... 171 Table B.2: Barcelona '92 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). 171 Table B.3: Georgia US pride calculation for the '96 Games...... 171 Table B.4: Atlanta '96 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). .... 172 Table B.5: New South Wales pride valuation for the 2000 Games...... 172 Table B.6: Sydney 2000 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). . 172 Table B.7: Greece national pride calculation for the 2004 Games...... 172 Table B.8: Athens 2004 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). . 173 Table B.9: China national pride calculation for the 2008 Games...... 173

Table B.10: Beijing 2008 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). 173 Table B.11: England national pride calculation for the 2012 Games...... 173 Table B.12: London 2012 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (in current million USD)...... 174 Table B.13: Brazil national pride calculation for the 2016 Games...... 174 Table B.14: Rio 2016 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD)...... 174

Annex C Tables Table C.1: Forecasted technology costs (amounts in current billion USD)...... 175 Table C.2: Forecasted Operating, Ceremony, Administrative, Paralympics, Workforce, Marketing, Lodging and catering costs (amounts in current billion USD)...... 175 Table C.3: Valuation of Security costs (amounts in current billion USD)...... 176 Table C.4: Valuation of Technology costs (amounts in current billion USD)...... 176 Table C.5: Valuation of Operating, Ceremony, Administrative, Paralympics, Workforce, Marketing, Lodging and catering costs (amounts in current billion USD)...... 176

Annex D Tables Table D.1: Renovation cost calculation of Olympic facilities (in current billion USD)...... 177 Table D.2: Valuation of Non-OCOG direct costs (amounts in current billion USD)...... 177

Annex E Tables Table E.1: Forecasted TV rights benefits (amounts in current billion USD)...... 178 Table E.2: Forecasted benefits from sponsorship (amounts in current billion USD)...... 178 Table E.3: Forecasted revenues from licensing (amounts in current billion USD)...... 179 Table E.4: Ticketing during the 2004 Games (ATHOC 2004)...... 179 Table E.5: Valuation of ticketing...... 179 Table E.6: Valuation of benefits from TV rights (amounts in current billion USD)...... 180 Table E.7: Valuation of sponsorship benefits (amounts in current billion USD)...... 180 Table E.8: Valuation of licensing benefits (amounts in current billion USD)...... 180

Annex F Tables Table F.1: Estimated Greek population (Eurostat, 2017)...... 181 Table F.2: Forecasted tourism benefits (amounts in current billion USD)...... 182 Table F.3: Annual use value of venues for the needs of 2004 Olympic Games (Kintis, Papanikos, & Patsouratis, 2003)...... 183

Table F.4: Annual use value of venues...... 184 Table F.5: Pride valuation (amounts in current billion USD)...... 185 Table F.6: Valuation of tourism benefits (amounts in current billion USD)...... 186 Table F.7: Use value of venues valuation (amounts in current billion USD)...... 187 Table F.8: Revenues from the exploitation of venues (amounts in current billion USD)...... 188

Annex G Tables Table G.1: CBA of the expected situation (Greek level, amounts in current billion USD)...... 189

List of Abbreviations

3D Three dimensional ACOG Atlanta 1996 Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games AEM Applications Enabling Methodology AOB Atlanta Olympic Broadcasting ATHOC Athens 2004 Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games AU Australia BIT Barcelona Computing and Telecommunications Study BOCOG Beijing 2008 Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games BRA Brazil CAD Computer Aided Design CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis CCTV Closed Circuit Television CIOT Technology Information and Operations Centre for the 1992 Olympic Games COOB Barcelona 1992 Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games CVM Contingent Valuation Method DF Discount Factor EANB Equivalent Annual Benefits EFTEC Economics for the Environment Consultancy EIS Economic Impact Study ENG England ERP Enterprise Resource Planning ESP Spain GDP Gross Domestic Product GEO Georgia US GIS Geographical Information System GR Greece HKTDC Hong Kong Trade Development Council HTO Hellenic Telecommunications organisation ICCOP Interministerial Committee for Coordination of Olympic Preparation for the 2004 Olympic Games ICT Information Communication Technologies IMF International Monetary Fund IOC International Olympic Committee IT Information Technology ITS Incident Tracking Systems IVR Interactive voice response

LAN Local Area Network LOCOG London 2012 Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games MAE Mean average error MASE Mean average scaled error METARS Medical Encounter Tracking and Reporting System for the 1996 Olympic Games MoU Memorandum of Understanding NOC National Olympic Committee NPV Net Present Value NSW New South Wales OCA Olympic Coordination Authority for the 2000 Olympics OCOG Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games ODA Olympic Delivery Authority for the 2012 Olympics OGKMP Olympic Games Knowledge Management Platform ORTA Olympic Roads and Transport Authority for the 2000 Olympic Games PBX Private Branch Exchange (Telephony) PCG Project Control Group for the 2000 Olympic Games PMG Project Monitoring Group for the 2004 Olympic Games PMT Project Management Team for the 2004 Olympic Games PNI Standard Installations Plan for the 1992 Olympic Games PNO Standard Operations Plan for the 1992 Olympic Games PPC The Greek Public Power Corporation PRC People’s Republic of China RFID Radio-frequency identification RMSE Root Mean Squared Error ROCOG Rio 2016 Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games ROI Return on investment SCADA System Control and Data Accumulation for the 2004 Olympic Games SEBRAE Brazil small business association SMAPE Symmetric Mean Absolute Percentage Error SMEs Small-Medium sized Enterprises SOCOG Sydney 2000 Organisational Committee of the Olympic Games TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio TIC Technology Implementation Centre TOC Technology Operations Centre TOP The Olympic Partners TPC Technology Partner Council for the 2000 Olympic Games UK United Kingdom UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply US United States USD United States Dollar VEP Venue equipment planning WAN Wide Area Network WLAN Wireless Local Area Network WNPA World News Press Agency WTP Willingness to Pay

1. Introduction

1.1. Problem description “Let the Olympic Games come home to Athens, permanently. I think it is a great out of the box idea” (IMF Communications Department, 2016). In June 2016, the Aspen Institute in Colorado U.S organised the Aspen Ideas Festival. This conference, has as an objective the idea expression and discussion with people well-known in business, arts, politics, sciences, humanities, and philanthropy. The ideas expressed can potentially raise provocative questions, useful for undertaking future action in a broad context (Aspen Institute, 2016). In this conference one of the people invited invitees was the president of the IMF, Christine Lagarde. During the event, in one point the Vice President and Event Manager of the Aspen Institute Kitty Boone (2016) made the following statement-question to the president of IMF (IMF Communications Department, 2016): “Okay here is my idea but I don’t know how to turn it into a question. Maybe you can say does this make sense, is it possible. The Greek economy is a disaster. The debt now is a huge question. Rio for the Olympic Games is a disaster. The International Olympic Com- mittee, the way they make decisions is really complicated. Could we please permanently install the Olympic Games in their home in Athens and give economy and tourism and strength and have one place that’s environmentally safe. You don’t have to build stadiums that have dust weeds right after the day and help Greece and help the world find a place in Europe that is a legitimate home for the Olympic Games. That’s my question2”. At this point, Christine Lagarde answered: “I think it is a great out of the box idea. Thank you, Kitty, thank you4”. Following that, Lagarde continued that this initiative will create a demand stimulus, given the current dramatic economic situation Greece has been already. Additionally, she affirmed that the prerequisite in order for this to be realised is a more responsible government with full control of what is happening, enhancing transparency and preventing any wrong and “funny business” practices. She also stated the historical character of sports events that all began from Greece (IMF Communications Department, 2016). To the reality, during the last six years Greece has been undergoing a constant economic recession as well as a persistent debt crisis based on Eurostat data (2016) and according to studies implemented by academics such as de Grauwe (2010), Lane (2012), Nelson, Belkin & Mix (2010). Unfortunately, every attempt of financial convergence results in a deadlock according to Stiglitz (2016) and Storm (2015); demand continues to shrink, unemployment keeps rising (Eurostat, 2016), pensions and wages are being constantly squeezed (Flassbeck & Lapavitsas, 2013),

2 For the full transcript of the Aspen Ideas Festival please visit: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/07/06/18/14/TR062616-Transcript-of-Aspen-Ideas-Festival-Conversa- tion-with-Christine-Lagarde 24

(Matsaganis, 2011), (Storm & Naastepad, 2015), investments are being diverted to other economies with more favourable tax conditions, leading hence to a drop in the domestic business activity (Eurostat, 2016); domestic trade is facing growing deficits (Storm & Naastepad, 2015), and in addition to these comes the social and political crisis (Stiglitz, 2016). The later can be proved from an increasing wave of more and more indignant citizens expressing their aversion to politicians and their policy agenda on the whole, and from the frequent elections that have occurred during the whole 6-year period of the recession. Attempts have been made so far in dealing with the crisis from part of the Troika (European Union, European Central Bank and IMF) in collaboration with the Greek government, as well as many academics have made their own arguments on this subject like Lapavitsas and Flassbeck (2013), de Grauwe and Moessen (2009), (2010), Stiglitz (2016), Storm & Naastepad (2012), (2015) and Blyth (2013), but the crisis still persists (see also Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1).

Percentage of government debt to GDP by Eurozone country Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Austria 68,80% 80,10% 82,80% 82,60% 82,00% 81,30% 84,40% 85,50% Belgium 92,50% 99,50% 99,70% 102,30% 104,10% 105,40% 106,50% 105,80% Cyprus 44,70% 53,40% 55,80% 66,20% 79,30% 102,20% 107,10% 107,50% Estonia 4,50% 7,00% 6,60% 6,10% 9,70% 10,20% 10,70% 10,10% Finland 32,70% 41,70% 47,10% 48,50% 53,90% 56,50% 60,20% 63,60% France 68,00% 78,90% 81,60% 85,20% 89,50% 92,30% 95,30% 96,20% Germany 65,10% 72,60% 81,00% 78,70% 79,90% 77,50% 74,90% 71,20% Greece 109,40% 126,70% 146,20% 172,10% 159,60% 177,40% 179,70% 177,40% Ireland 42,40% 61,70% 86,30% 109,60% 119,50% 119,50% 105,20% 78,60% Italy 102,40% 112,50% 115,40% 116,50% 123,30% 129,00% 131,90% 132,30% Latvia 18,70% 36,60% 47,40% 42,80% 41,30% 39,00% 40,70% 36,30% Lithuania 14,60% 28,00% 36,20% 37,20% 39,80% 38,70% 40,50% 42,70% Luxembourg 15,10% 16,00% 19,90% 18,80% 21,80% 23,50% 22,70% 22,10% Malta 62,70% 67,80% 67,60% 70,00% 67,60% 68,40% 67,00% 64,00% Netherlands 54,80% 56,90% 59,30% 61,60% 66,40% 67,70% 67,90% 65,10% Portugal 71,70% 83,60% 96,20% 111,40% 126,20% 129,00% 130,60% 129,00% Slovakia 21,80% 34,60% 38,40% 46,60% 53,90% 71,00% 80,90% 83,10% Slovenia 28,50% 36,30% 41,20% 43,70% 52,20% 54,70% 53,60% 52,50% Spain 39,40% 52,70% 60,10% 69,50% 85,70% 95,40% 100,40% 99,80% Table 1.1: Percentage of government debt to GDP (Eurostat, 2016). Beyond the issue of socioeconomic crisis, an important thing that strongly emphasizes this country’s identity is the Olympic Spirit; Greece is the birthplace of the Olympic Games, an event with global magnitude and the pinnacle of sports events. The organisation of such major sports events promotes a country’s image worldwide according to Lee et al. (2005) no matter the large costs of setting up the supporting infrastructure (i.e. stadiums, sport centres, motorsport circuits, etc.) and of hosting the events (i.e. license fees paid to international sports organisations). Taking into account the ongoing recession that Greece has been undergoing, and the fact that Greece is the birthplace of the Olympic Spirit, here comes the main subject for this Master Thesis project; the idea

25 proposed and described at the Aspen Ideas Festival, and honoured by Christine Lagarde for permanently hosting the Olympic Games in Greece every 4 years.

30 23… 20 14.2 11.4 11.9 9.5 10.5 8.8 9.6 8.3 9 7.6 7.1 7.4 7.3 7.9 7.6 10 5.8 6.5 6.2 5.6 6 5.7 6.8 3.7 4.1 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.8

2.8 Percentage Percentage %

Italy

Malta

Latvia

France

Cyprus

Poland

Ireland

Austria

Greece

Croatia

Iceland

Finland

Estonia

Norway

Sweden

Belgium

Bulgaria

Slovakia

Slovenia

Hungary

Portugal

Romania

Denmark

Germany

Lithuania

MeanEU28

Netherlands

Luxembourg Czech Republic Czech

Figure 1.1: EU unemployment rates (Eurostat, 2016). 1.2. Preliminary breaking down of Christine Lagarde’s argument After the organisation of the recent Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, under the shadow of the difficult financial situation Brazil encounters, this argument can raise discussion on the economic efficiency of organising the Olympic Games to a particular country. With the current situation, it is true that organising such an event implies huge costs for a country, that cannot easily be recouped even if the sources of revenues are known and especially when the costs outweigh benefits. Also, an important issue arises regarding the utility of the infrastructures after the organisation of the Olympic Games, because there is a risk that these will be left unused, meaning that sunk costs are turned into losses. These infrastructure projects are called “white elephants” or “cash cows” as mentioned by McBribe (2016). For instance, the Olympic Stadium of Sydney which hosted the Olympic Games of 2000 has an annual cost for the city of about $30 million per year (Byrnes, 2012). The corresponding stadium of Beijing cost about $10 million annually for maintenance and for construction $460 million, but it is left unexploited (Byrnes, 2012). Based also on facts from the Greek press, the case of Athens in 2004 is considered to be the culprit of the current economic crisis, since there were spent millions of Euros for their organisation. In reality, this is only part of the problem since the Greek economic crisis is more complicated. Empirically supporting the argument in the previous paragraph, indeed in Athens most of the infrastructures constructed for the needs of the Olympics (i.e. sports centres and buildings used for media broadcasting) were left abandoned and never exploited by the Greek State in a productive way (i.e. promote them for rent, and receive the corresponding proceeds). This means that these infrastructures could have been used productively in favour of the Greek society and economy. Hence, there can be identified a management problem from the part of the Greek government in maintaining and using these infrastructures for socially efficient purposes.

A preliminary observation hypothesizes that this current system of assigning the organisation of the Olympic Games to different countries is not so economically feasible, according to data retrieved from a study carried out by Said Business School of Oxford University (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier, 2016). Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 depict that the costs of hosting the Games can be as high as those of Beijing (over 45 million) and can exceed from those defined in the Bid File as much as in Barcelona by 341%. The same study affirms that even for the advanced economies, these expenses can squeeze significantly an economy’s profitability and can create societal losses. But nothing is stated about the height of the actual societal costs. Hence, one case under investigation is how socially beneficial would it be, if the Olympic Games were organised to a permanent home and under what theoretical assumption. To investigate further on the problem of infrastructure management, first of all it is needed to define what are infrastructures. According to OECD (2002), infrastructures are “the system of public works in a country, state or region, including roads, utility lines and public buildings”. World Economic Forum argues that infrastructures play an essential role in every country, since they have a direct relationship with economic development, defining thus its level of competitiveness (Schwab & Sala-i-Martín, 2016). World Bank cites that if a country aspires to play a central role in the global economy, infrastructures have to be reliable and responsive to market needs, offering hence high-quality services to citizens (Fay & Toman, 2010). Infrastructures under no circumstances should compromise environmental protection and country planning (European Commission, 2017).

Total financial costs of the summer Olympic Games (in 2015 bn $) Rio 2016 $18,000.00

London 2012 $11,401.00

Beijing 2008 $45,000.00

Athens 2004 $13,800.00

Sydney 2000 $6,926.00

Atlanta 1996 $3,576.00

Barcelona 1992 $16,409.00

$- $10,000.00 $20,000.00 $30,000.00 $40,000.00 $50,000.00 Figure 1.2: Total financial costs of the Olympic Games from 1992 to 2016 (Baade & Matheson, 2016).

Total financial Cost Overrun (in %)

Rio 2016 51%

London 2012 76%

Beijing 2008 3%

Athens 2004 54.50%

Sydney 2000 90%

Atlanta 1996 149%

Barcelona 1992 341.50%

0.00% 100.00% 200.00% 300.00% 400.00% Figure 1.3: Financial Cost Overrun of the Olympic Games (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier). However, Greece encounters a problem in managing infrastructure development. Despite the last 30-year attempt of Greece to achieve a satisfactory quality level of infrastructure projects, with culmination the organisation of the Olympic Games in 2004, still is lagging behind other developed or even developing countries, according to data from World Economic Forum (Schwab & Sala-i- Martín, 2016). This can be explained by multiple reasons, such as the current economic crisis that has created a volatile and uncertain business environment making technical companies reluctant to invest, due to high taxation and interest rates (Schwab & Sala-i-Martín, 2016). Also, bureaucracy plays a determinant role in the progress of infrastructure projects, since according to Greek press tabloids it is one of the main causes of delays in completion and of increasing costs of construction. Moreover, it is true that Greece has particular geological properties i.e. lots of mountainous areas and seismicity that demand the use of expensive construction practices and technologies making thus the projects too expensive and timeless to be completed. Indicatively can be cited the case of the highway that links Corinth with Kalamata, and especially the part between Tripolis and Kala- mata, which took about 27 years of construction, due to the mountainous area of central Pelopon- nese and land instabilities in some places (Ntounias, Belokas, Marinos, & Kavvadas, 2006). Finally, in Greece country planning is quite complex; cities especially Athens and Thessaloniki were developed without an organised urban plan (Serraos, Gianniris, & Zifou, 2005). This made such cities big enough that brought about negative environmental effects and low life quality for their citizens. Hence, supposing that a future infrastructure project is going to be implemented (e.g. a highway bypass) may encounter difficulties even from the design phase, since it will cause disturbances in residential areas and therefore negative reactions from residents. According to magazine Condé Nast Traveller (2016), Greece is unique for its fascinating places, its hospitable people, its sunny weather, its long history, and its Democracy. As a country, according to Hellenic Statistical Authority (2016) it is one of the best performers in tourism and in order

28 to strengthen its position, high quality and even more reliable infrastructures can give a boost to this sector of economic activity -according to Jovanovic and Ilic (2016), since not only the touristic period can be extended throughout the whole year, but also more confident predictions can be made on the number of tourists who are going to visit Greece. Hence, an opportunity for Greece to develop even further and to redefine its attempt to infrastructure management development could be the permanent organisation of the Olympic Games.

1.3. Research objective – Research question This thesis aims to provide knowledge in assessing societal costs and benefits when organising the Olympic Games to a permanent country. Furthermore, it could be a proposal for further investigation by the Greek government and by the National Olympic Committee (NOC), as long as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) takes into account the organisation of the Games to a permanent home. So far, the analysis of financial costs and benefits of the Olympic Games is made by hosting them in different cities or countries; hence, there is no knowledge concerning the estimation of social costs and benefits whether the Games are organised permanently to a particular country. It is interesting to study the case of Greece for filling this literature gap, as proposed by Christine Lagarde. As well as this, the organisation of the Olympic Games is inextricably connected to the development and management of infrastructures and of Games-related technologies; their development requires not only financial resources, including a potential social burden through taxation (Kesenne, 2005), but also when they become operational, these bring about social benefits that accrue from their use. However, it is unknown how much is the actual societal cost in monetary terms from the abandonment of the Olympic infrastructures in Athens. Hence an additional requirement to fill this literature gap is to define the challenges that if not addressed adequately can lead to poor management of technology from the part of the Greek government. This addresses how the permanent organisation of the Games in Greece can redefine the management of infrastructures and of technology development. To make things clear, first a national Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) will be realised for the first time in the literature, as it will provide conclusions about how beneficial for Greece is this idea. In other words, it will explore how socially beneficial the policy of organising permanently the Olym- pic Games in Greece would be for the Greek society. However, because the Olympic Games is an international issue and when it is decided to be hosted permanently in Greece, this will trigger reactions from the other countries, as these will no longer experience social benefits from their organisation. Hence, it is also needed to deduct the national CBA analysis to the international level as well, so as to conclude whether this policy leads to a win-lose or to a win-win outcome. Second, the domain of technology management translated into the management of facilities, infrastructures and of installed technological equipment within the venues will be spent on both proposing infrastructure projects and on highlighting possible challenges in implementing them. This can also be considered as a part of the CBA analysis of the permanent Olympic Games, since

29 emphasis will be given on the social context of infrastructures. In such a way, the social costs that result from their abandonment and the benefits that will come from their use can be defined. In addition, this study will analyse current management practices by focusing on the institutional arrangements made between government, industry and OCOGs for the construction, renovation of infrastructures and installation of technological equipment. Thereinafter, recommendations will be provided on how construction, renovation, maintenance of infrastructures and management of technology equipment should be coordinated, in order for these to be successful and ensure a smooth running of the Games. Hence, the main research question that should be investigated is: What would be the socio-economic impacts, if the Olympic Games were organized permanently in Greece? How important is the role of managing infrastructure and technology projects, so as to facilitate a permanent organisation of the Olympic Games in Greece? In addition to this main question, sub questions can be formulated that will help to answer the research question:

 What are the social costs and benefits of organising permanently the Olympic Games in Greece? o Under the current biding situation, how much does a country spend in order to host the Olympic Games and what are the resulting benefits?  Should the Olympic Games have a regional or national character? What are the advantages and disadvantages?  What infrastructure projects are needed to facilitate a permanent organisation of the Olym- pics in Greece?  What are the challenges in the management of infrastructure and technology projects of the Olympic Games organised between 1992 and 2012 and what lessons can Greece learn from these Olympic Games, as well as from its own Games organised in 2004?

1.4. Thesis outline The structure of this Thesis project is divided into two parts. The first part is a literature review, while the second part is consumed on the investigation of the previously mentioned research question. More specifically:

 In chapter 2 an analytic literature review is performed around the impacts that the previous Olympic Games have brought about. In parallel, a review is made about the current attempts made so far in restricting the costs of the Olympic Games.  Chapter 3 summarises the research methods employed in this Thesis.  Chapter 4 addresses the location issue for hosting the Games. An analysis around the possibility of hosting the Games to one particular city or nationally is made, by presenting both the advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, the required infrastructures for development are proposed.

 In chapter 5, an assessment of the permanent organisation of the Olympics in Greece by means of a national CBA is made. In addition to this, a comparison of the current way of hosting the Olympic Games to different countries is needed, so as to conclude if the status quo is more advantageous. Furthermore, a deduction of the national CBA to the international level is also made, in order to assess whether the permanent host of the Olympics in Greece leads either to a win-lose or to a win-win outcome.  Chapter 6 performs a case-study analysis on underlying the importance of the management of infrastructures and of provided technologies needed for the Olympic Games. This analysis covers a period of six Olympiads from 1992 till 2012. From this chapter, results can be deducted, which can be inputs for Greece when dealing with technology planning and management, especially on the part of infrastructure development and maintenance.  Finally, chapter 7 wraps up the findings of previous chapters to answer the main research question, the limitations encountered, as well as possible future research is mentioned.

2. Literature Review

Following the problem and subject definition part and after having made a quick preview about what is going to be addressed in this thesis, this part will present the academic contribution made so far on this subject. The literature review provides the basis of getting into the topic by introducing concepts that have to be discussed and analysed. Such subjects that have to be addressed concern the impacts of the Olympic Games. Searching for adequate literature is an ongoing and time-consuming process, since this will provide a standpoint from where the research will start. First of all, data was searched on the Greek press and on websites such as BBC, Reuters, CNN, and others since they help in getting a sense in the topic and they provide the foundations in searching for academic literature. This next step was done by searching on Google Scholar, as well as on Science Direct, Springer, Scopus, Elsevier and Taylor and Francis for published papers and books. In order for this step to be implemented, very essential was the identification of the keywords which are listed below:

 Sports  Economics  Infrastructures  Management  Olympic Games  Impact Analysis  Cost-Benefit Analysis By skimming journal articles, more related sources can be found that are important in assessing any differences proposed.

2.1. The Olympic Games as mega events Before unlocking the potential of the Olympic Games to a country’s image, it is useful to define what a major event or mega event is. According to Malfas et al. (2004), Brunet (1995), Hill (1992) and Stevens & Bevan (1999) such events irrespective of their duration (usually small) have consequences on the economy of the host city or country. These events also presuppose the development of adequate infrastructure and the reformation of urban environment. Main sources of revenues come from ticket sales, media exposure and tourism. Mega events are also used as tools for political expression, since these seem attractive for upgrading the image of political parties. Being on the same dimension, Baade et al. (2010) add a key characteristic of major events being the large costs of hosting them. In addition, mega events put in the foreground doping and corruption issues, capable of making organisational committees, teams, coaches and athletes being committed to “run for the gold”, because success breeds glory, but can lead to tremendous failure. Based on that definition, the Olympic Games can qualify as a mega event. Here it is useful to make a distinction between the summer Olympics from the winter ones; both are organized every four

32 years if we look at them separately, and after two years summer Olympics succeed winter ones and then again, the summer ones. Usually summer Olympics as an event are considered to have more glamour and importance, since more sport events are organized -including athletics- and more people around the world -due to better weather conditions- attend to them. Winter Olympics on the other hand, are mainly organized during winter and hence the variety of sports is quite limited, mainly focused on winter sports. But both share the spirit of Olympism and they can have significant impacts in the countries where they are organized. In this Thesis for time limitation reasons there will be given a focus on the viability of organising every 4 years the summer Olym- pics in Greece, as well as to focus on the challenges that have to be transcended in terms of technology-infrastructure management for hosting them successfully. For simplicity reasons, the summer Olympics will be referred as merely the Olympics, Olympic Games, Olympiads or Games.

2.1.1. The bidding process The preparation for a country to host the Olympic Games starts about 10 years before. For that reason, an Organisation Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG) is being established first and then a candidature file has to be submitted to the IOC. This file includes an ex-ante economic impact study, as well as details about the infrastructure projects required for hosting the Games. Every country tries to bid with the highest possible and most ambitious offer, so as to increase the probabilities of being selected by the IOC as the city for hosting the Olympic Games. On average, each participating OCOG spends more than 20 million dollars during the bidding process, a significant amount compared to the total costs for organising the Olympic Games. For example, Rio for bidding for its own Games in 2009 has spent more than 40 million dollars and other candidate cities such as Tokyo, Doha and Chicago this cost has reached nearly 50 million dollars (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015). This can be also shown in the below figure.

Bidding costs (in million USD) $60.00 $48.00 $48.00 $49.00 $50.00 $41.00 $42.00 $40.00 $28.00 $30.00 $22.00 $20.00

$10.00

$- Prague Baku Madrid Rio Tokyo Doha Chicago

Figure 2.1: Bidding costs per country for the 2016 Olympics (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015).

After the selection of the host city, it has seven years to get prepared by developing the supporting infrastructure, especially sports venues, transportation networks and the Olympic Village. Usually the government intervenes in financing these projects, so it is expected to raise taxation or even diverting financial priorities of other projects or policies, leading thus to a social burden (Kesenne, 2005). A network of organisations, authorities and stakeholders coordinate their forces, in order to strive for a single objective; that of hosting successful Olympic Games. How successful the Games are, is a matter of multiple criteria; one of these is the creation of a “long-term, positive and sustainable legacy” (International Olympic Committee, 2017). The bidding process for hosting the Olympic Games has changed and it has been designed according to the 2020 Olympic Agenda presented in Monaco in 2012 (Bach, 2014). Main objective of this new process is the encouragement of discourse between IOC and the candidate city by accurately defining its needs, assuring that the Games are going to create “long-term sustainable legacy” (International Olympic Committee, 2017). The bidding process comprises of two main steps as it is predicted by the Olympic Charter Rule 33 and its By-Law (International Olympic Committee, 2015). This can also be summarised in the below figure. 1. The Invitation Phase, which is a new phase and direct consequence of the Olympic Agenda 2020. 2. The Bidding Process, which comprises of three stages i. Stage 1: Strategic analysis phase ii. Stage 2: Governance, Legal and Venue Finance iii. Stage 3: Games Delivery, Experience & Venue Legacy

Invitation Bidding Olympic After Games Preparations phase process Games Legacy

Figure 2.2: The Olympic Games Process (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015). The invitation phase is characterized by mutual discourse between the IOC and the candidate cities willing to host the Games. For this purpose, these cities via their NOCs can participate in a meeting in Lausanne at the headquarters of the IOC to discuss their ideas. The IOC provides them with feedback and with help based on the objective of ensuring that the Olympic Games are in line with the objective of positive long-term sustainability and development. As long as the proposal is fi- nalized and adequate, the NOC sets officially the candidature of becoming a candidate city for hosting the Olympics. After the end of the invitation phase with the official candidature of the city, the bidding process is an ongoing process which can last even up to two years, before the ceremony of city selection. It is composed of three stages; starting from the strategic analysis phase, the candidate host cities

34 define their “Games vision” and “legacy plans” after having gained national support. These have to get focused on future and lasting development of their city or country and on sustainability. The second stage of the bidding process has to make clear if the country or cities can afford the cost of the Olympic Games. The Evaluation Commission of the IOC is responsible for the evaluation of the institutional aspects that the country has, so as to define the difficulties and the opportunities of hosting the Olympic Games. For that reason, the candidate city via the NOC has to send a candidature file to the Evaluation Committee of the IOC. The purpose of the final stage is to outline how the Games will be carried out by making sure that they are going to create a positive legacy. The candidate cities have also to send a final version of their candidature file to the Evaluation Committee, which subsequently will publish and distribute it to every member of the IOC, indicating clearly all the restrictions and opportunities of each candidate city. In this final stage, the candidate city has the opportunity to present their Olympic project in front of the members of the IOC which will evaluate the technical details of every candidature. Finally, the voting process is carried out, and the winner of the bidding process is called to sign the “Host City Contract” with the IOC. However, a review of this bidding process identifies a weakness, and especially on the part of the Bid File that describes how the candidate city is going to ensure that it will deliver a lasting legacy. In reality, it is unknown if every city is really continuously maintaining its infrastructure legacies served for the needs of the Games. Good examples are Athens, Beijing and Rio, where Olympic infrastructure legacies left unexploited. Despite the fact that the Games have an international character, it could be possibly a duty for the NOCs or even for the IOC to supervise somehow if the hosting city conforms with the legacy guidelines provided at the Bid File. Usually, the management of these infrastructures is left to the national governments of each country, arising hence a question of how capable are they and with what challenges are faced when exploiting these infrastructures in favour of their society.

2.2. Impacts of the Olympic Games This section provides an overview of the impacts of organizing Olympic Games. Both Malfas et al. in (2004) and Miguélez & Carrasquer (1995) identify four categories of impacts when a country organizes the Olympic Games; these are among others socio-economic, socio-cultural, physical and political. In the following lines, a brief description of them is given:

2.2.1. Socio-economic impacts These impacts constitute a basis for assessing the suitability of mega events for a national economy and for upgrading its social profile. These impacts can be analysed in terms of revenues from ticket sales, television rights and sponsorship, employment, and country reputation translated into tourism, social aspects and liveability. It is worth noticing that revenues from ticket sales, television rights and sponsorships, do not contribute adequately to the economic development, since such revenues are used to recoup only the costs of hosting such mega events. Also, Ricketts (2012)

35 argues that infrastructure projects for the needs of the Games enhance the construction activity of the country hosting them. But on the other hand, if the financing of infrastructure projects is fully publicly financed, this will crowd out other privately financed projects, something that would not happen in the situation of not hosting the Olympic Games. The following lines describe in detail the socio-economic impacts, being job generation, reputation impacts for a country, tourism impacts, housing and land prices effects, and social effects. Job generation: It is true that the Olympic Games create jobs that are related either to the organization of the event (construction domain, sports domain), or to tourism and retail. For example, Stevens and Bevans (1999) argue that the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona created jobs that drove the unemployment rate down from 18.4% to 9.6%. From 1991 till 1997 in Atlanta nearly 600,000 jobs were created. However, Malfas et al. (2004) affirm that attention should be paid in terms of quality and duration of these jobs; indicatively, many jobs created pertain to the category of services provision being part-time and with low salaries. According also to Pyo et al. (1988), the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona created temporary rather than permanent jobs. Reputation impacts on the country: When a mega event is going to happen, according to Hall and Hodges (1998) media plays an important role in cultivating public awareness for the host city or country. Such cities desire respect and recognition, to be unforgettable to visitors and local people. Impacts on tourism: In this case research is ambiguous; despite the fact that due to country promotion through the media and to job generation revenues from tourism flourish, however, according to Beaty (1999) and Horin (1999) tourism adopts a narrow-lens approach regarding its longev- ity. Indicatively the 1988 Seoul Olympics did not have long-term positive impacts on tourism, and in 2004 in Athens tourism fell a bit due to the existed concerns regarding the incomplete infrastructure works that were shadowing touristic monuments. This argument strengthens the position that infrastructure management and development was problematic in Greece during the pre-Olym- pic Games period of 1997-2004, in which months before the kick-off of the Games many infrastructure projects were incomplete. Impacts on housing and land prices: Impacts can be identified in terms of price and rent increases in properties where infrastructure projects are going to be implemented. That is because housing relocation occurs, something indispensable in the attempt to find land for the construction of infrastructures as stated by Hall and Hodges (1998). Negative social impacts can be identified when examining for instance the 1996 Atlanta case, according to Beaty (1999), when a large number of houses were lost, and the 2000 Sydney case according to Horin (1999), when home rent prices increased causing problems to regions where unemployed people lived and then used for the purpose of the Games. Social effects: The hosting of the Games favours social problems in terms of injustices; that means governments tend to impose taxes on citizens after creating too much public debt for such an event. As well as this, in Atlanta after winning the bid an attempt to arrest any home-less people started,

36 something that cost about a significant number of dollars a day for each tax-payer according to Beaty (1999). Moreover, the knowledge is scattered to provide an answer whether Olympics can lead to economic development. The following cases provide an overview, that such events have the ability for debt accumulation, or on the other hand to drive economic development. These cases implicitly recommend that candidate countries bidding for hosting the Olympic Games should be aware of the potential downturns in their economy. The case of Barcelona 1992: This case is mainly invoked by advocates of the organisation of the Olympic Games through governmental expenditure. During that period, Barcelona set the strategic foundations for its future development with the institutions, people, businesses and the local government of Catalonia being in alliance with each other. In reality, the Olympic Games proved beneficial, since the city has been developing for a long time after the end of the Olympics. The infrastructures built and used for that purpose, were managed in a way that promoted the economic development as well as the benefits to the local society. Judging by the case of Barcelona, it is not safe to conclude that the Olympics provide an effective way to drive economic development, because such an event may dislodge other activities that promote profitability even more. The case of Atlanta 1996: Hotchkiss, Moore and Zobay (2003) have reported that the 1996 Olym- pics in Atlanta brought about positive outcomes in terms of employment. Indicatively, during that period 293,000 job posts were created leading to a rise in employment growth rate by 0,2% annually, according to their analysis. The same authors argue that during the month in which the Olym- pic Games were hosted 29,000 jobs were created. These Olympic Games had a positive financial result of 5.1 billion dollars, compared to the costs that reached about $ 3.58 billion, from which $ 765 million and $ 959 million were allocated to the development of sports and general infrastructure respectively (Baade & Matheson, 2016). After the Olympic Games, further $ 1.8 billion of investments were allocated to the development of hotels (more than 6,000 were added, leading thus to an upswing in touristic capacity by 9,3%), business premises, accommodation and entertainment venues. During the preparation for the Games, investments in telecommunications were made by upgrading Atlanta’s current telecommunication system with optic fibres (International Olympic Committee, 2013). But based on Feddersen and Maennig (2009), these scholars have proved that the 1996 Atlanta Olympics were not proved beneficial for the economy, as there were not noticed any remarkable wage effects.

The case of Sydney 2000: According to Jean-Loup Chappelet (2000), Sydney’s Organisation Committee of the Olympic Games (SOCOG) budget ended up to a budget valuing at A$ 2.5 billion in 2000. The revenues resulted from ticket sales and from sponsoring; specifically, about A$ 700 million accrued from the 24 Team Millennium Sponsors (including also the 11 sponsors of the IOC’s TOP program), from 60 official providers and from 19 supporters of the SOCOG. Also, A$ 70 million of royalties came from the sale of merchandise having the badge of SOCOG by officially licensed merchants. In addition to these A$ 770 million that came from commercialisation,

37 a total amount of A$ 1039 million were received from television rights. This cost about A$ 40 for every Australian citizen a number much higher than the commercial revenue of the Atlanta Games, if the Australian population is also considered. Regarding ticket sales, total sales of 7 million was reached and during the period of the Games about 50 thousand tickets were sold every day. In monetary terms, ticket sales reached a total amount of about A$ 566 million. However, during the last months before the start of the Games the SOCOG has received A$ 140 million by the government of New South Wales (NSW), in order for its budget to balance. This also led SOCOG to support its operational decisions on financial criteria only, so as to avoid probable losses. This came to the point to even sacrifice investments in transportation and IT systems. But fortunately, the value of the Australian dollar declined, something that did not happen frequently when a country is about to host the Olympic Games. This change in the Australian dollar led the SOCOG to increase further its revenues by about A$ 50 million. Regarding the costs side, the total costs of these Olympics according to Preuss (2004) were $ 6.93 billion, from which $ 1.76 billion were spent for the development of sports infrastructure, $ 1.82 billion for the construction of general infrastructure including transportation, buildings and ICT, and security costs amounted to $ 250 million. This implied a cost for each Australian taxpayer, reducing thus the mean consumption for about $ 2.1 billion, according to Giesecke and Madden (2011). Nowadays, the operational costs for the Olympic stadium constructed for the needs of the Olympics reached about $ 30 million. Security costs for the Games reached about $250 million. The case of Athens 2004: According to the Hellenic Foundation for Economic & Industrial Re- search (2015), Athens made significant investments in upgrading its infrastructures, as well as building facilities that would be capable of hosting other major sports events in the future. This can be considered as a product of pressure outside from Greece, since the country had to be ready for hosting the Games. More specifically, the Games cost the Hellenic Republic € 6.6 billion, and they generated about € 2.9 billion that returned to the Greece’s reserves. They were mainly publicly financed but there can be observed a participation from the OCOG Athens 2004 (ATHOC) as well as from private investors. Also, according to Matheson (2013) security costs reached about $ 1.6 billion. Analytical data about the financial costs and benefits of the Games are depicted in the below tables. Despite the dominant arguments among academics and the press that these Olympic Games are the main cause of the current recession that Greece encounters today, however, there cannot be drawn a sound conclusion that these were the culprit of the current crisis. According to simulations carried out by the Hellenic Foundation for Economic & Industrial Research these are not significantly associated with the rising indebtedness, as it is stated also by Mourmouris (2014). Moreo- ver, these Olympic Games led to a positive impact on tourism until 2008, and the factors that contributed to this can be better described in the section of socio-cultural impacts. Finally, had not the Olympic Games been organized in 2004, these would have led to a decline in GDP by 2.5% and to a lower amount of job posts by 44,000.

Category Description Costs (in € millions)

Expenditures from Public Investment Program € 6.000,00 Public Expenses Ordinary expenditures € 571,00 Operating expenses of OCOG Athens 2004 € 1.968,00 Expenses on behalf of the Greek State € 304,00 Workers' Housing Association expenses for the development of Private Expenses the Olympic Village € 280,00 Upgrade of Karaiskakis Stadium by Olympiacos Piraeus Football Club € 60,00 Construction of Media Villages € 40,00 Table 2.1: Total costs of the Olympic Games in Athens (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015).

Category Description Benefits (in € millions)

Revenues from the surplus of the OCOG Athens 2004 € 7,00 Direct and indirect revenues from investments € 2.400,00 Public Revenues Revenue from current spending € 500,00 Revenues from tourism and increased fame Not identified Operating income of the OCOG Athens 2004 € 2.098,00 Funding of activities on behalf of the Greek State € 180,00 Private Revenues Revenues from the use of Karaiskakis Stadium Not identified Revenues from the sale and rent of residences Table 2.2: Total revenues of the Olympic Games in Athens (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015). The case of Beijing 2008: The hosting of the Olympic Games in Beijing has boosted the economy annually by 2.5% since 2002, being the year of announcement of the Olympic Games in China. Advertising expenditures rose significantly thanks to the recruitment of Olympic sponsors, partners and other companies reaching $18.4 billion especially on television. Sports industry also grew rapidly, compared to Western developed economies. Based on data from the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) western economies consume on average $300-$500 per year on sports, while in China only $12. The host of the Olympic Games in China increased the sports consumption by more than 20%. The case of London 2012: According to data from IOC (2013) and revised in (2016), these indi- cate positive impacts in terms of job generation and tourism. To begin with the first branch of socioeconomic impacts, the London Olympics led to a decrease in the level of unemployment by 1.2%. Nearly 50,000 people found jobs especially in the construction domain, 10% of whom had no working experience before. These people were employed on the Olympic Park and Olympic Village. These Olympic Games brought about a good business environment for the UK construction companies to deliver their services for the needs of the Sochi 2014 and Rio 2016 Olympics, and additionally the World Cup of 2022 in Qatar.

For the second category of impacts, the Olympic Games of 2012 were expected to create an increasing wave of tourists. A rise in the number of tourists implies a growth in the UK GDP due to the increased spending of tourists. It was predicted that the extra 4 million tourists in 2015 will lead to a growth of 1.4 GBP billion in its GDP. In reality, in August 2012 being the month of the Olympic Games tourist spending rose by 9%, compared to 2008. The case of Rio 2016: Costs of these Olympic Games were expected to transcend $11 million, while the country’s economic performance was quite dismal. This can be proved from its recession percentage that reached 3.8% in 2015, making the local government unable to settle the needs for public security, health and social welfare. The organisation of the Olympic Games led the local government to borrow from the national government $900 million to recoup the security costs, given the increased levels of crime. Indeed, 85,000 people have worked as security personnel more than the number of those worked at the London Olympics. However, according to a research carried out by the Social Policy Centre at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, this has concluded based on public view that the Rio economy started to grow when the Olympic Games were announced. Take for example the fact that for every $1 spent for the development of sports facilities, $5 were directed to create legacy projects serving the Rio society in the long-run. With regard to revenues, the accurate number is still unknown but according to different news agent sources the revenues from the media coverage of the Games accounted for about $4.1 million (King, 2016), (Chapman, 2016), (Settimi, 2015). Other sources of revenues comprised of sponsor deals that accounted for 20% of the total income of the Olympic Games; indicatively, revenues of about $900 million are predicted from international sponsors and $1.3 million from national ones. Notable international sponsors of these games were Samsung, Coca-Cola, McDonalds, Panasonic and Nissan. Revenues from marketing rights are predicted to reach approximately $300 million. Concerning their distribution, 10% of them are accumulated by the IOC to recoup any operational- administrative costs and the rest 90% are used for the organization of the Olympic Games. Rio de Janeiro also has invested in tourism about $1.5 billion and the return of this investment was translated into revenues. This can be proved from the rise of the number of foreign visitors being 6.6 million in 2016 from 6.3 million in 2015. Hence, the increased number of visitors is reflected to a growth in revenues from tourism being from $1.26 billion in 2014 to 2.10$; however, this can be explained from the recent football World Cup; hence, the conditions were existing for Rio to expect a stream of tourists coming to visit Brazil.

Regarding employment, the rise of the construction sector for the implementation of the required infrastructures, led to the creation of additional 16.000 job posts. Indeed, job generation contributed to local economic growth, and this is proven from the wage rise of the bottom poor people by 29.3%, compared to the top 5% of rich people whose wages rose by 19.9% (International Olympic Committee, 2016). The Rio Olympics also contributed to the growth of Small Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), and this can be attributed to the cooperation of the OCOG Rio 2016 (ROCOG) with the Brazil’s small

40 business association (SEBRAE). This partnership provided assistance to the SMEs, in order for them to generate revenues from contracts signed with the ROCOG, as well as to “participate in tenders of other Rio 2016 suppliers”. This initiative, led SMEs to accumulate revenues accounting for $94 million. Overall, Malfas et al. (2004) conclude that socio-economic impacts of hosting the Olympic Games depend on the economic situation of the candidate country; if there is macroeconomic upswing - investments that bring an increase in consumption- this squeezes its overall economic benefits. In different case, if event expenditures are made in economically weak countries without adequate infrastructures and high levels of unemployment, then it is economically beneficial. Research conducted so far adopts a financial-lens oriented approach in identifying the profitability of the Games, due to the underlined inability of monetising intangible social impacts. On the other hand, Malfas et al., as well as the previously mentioned cases do not clearly demarcate social costs and benefits; instead, they are condensed as socioeconomic impacts. For example, the positive reputation impacts can be considered as a social benefit leading to pride, instead of a financial benefit, and house relocation can be considered as a social cost, since people are being moved away from their properties.

2.1.2. Environmental impacts The organisation of the Olympic Games unlocks possibilities of implementing infrastructure projects, that lead to the reformation of areas being in the past abandoned. Such reformation includes apart from the construction of sporting facilities, that of transportation networks, leisure facilities and shopping centres. Furthermore, current infrastructures can be upgraded, with the aim to meet the requirements of hosting the Games for a limited period of time. Hence, a large-scale country planning upgrade takes place, as Kitchen argues (1996). Giving yield to the construction of infrastructures related to the organisation of the Games, this may lead to procrastination of other public projects. This is because funds are concentrated into the main metropolitan area, and hence there is quite sparse circulation of them to other areas, according to Rutheiser (1996). But this problem is not only a matter of decisions that are taken in the political level as Malfas et al. state (2004), but also in managerial level of businesses in terms of coordination of their activities, while implementing such infrastructure projects. Appropriate management structures among public and private entities specialised in infrastructure development can lead to minimised costs of implementation, better assessment of weak points, as well as minimised lead times restricting the probability of having incomplete projects before the Games start. The IOC in its legacy reports issued in (2013) and in (2016) provided an overview of the environmental impacts that the Olympic Games from 1996 till 2016 brought about. From these cases, it can also be argued that the Games can set the foundations for the emergence of new international environmental standards, as well as there can be observed an attempt for organising “green”

Games that combine the development of large infrastructure projects with respect to environmental protection. However, in the existing literature there is no clear monetisation of environmental impacts for the development and management of Olympic infrastructures; let alone the environmental costs occurred in Athens from the abandonment of the venues, as well as when constructing the Rowing Centre at Schinias (Triantafyllopoulos, 2012). Such environmental impacts consider the identifi- 3 cation of indicators such as for example kilograms of CO2 emitted, m of water wasted, tons of disposed waste, μm of PM10 and others. Their monetization provides simplification in assessing sustainability, provided that quantified benchmarks are provided. This becomes possible through the application of Natural Cost Accounting; a method that identifies the environmental impacts on physical terms with subsequent monetization.

2.1.3. Socio-cultural impacts This impact category is related to any changes in the everyday life of residents, and in addition to the values and intellectual expression. Major sport events increase the willingness of residents to make use of sport and cultural areas, leading to a higher level of “self-fulfilment, local pride” and a real sense of community, according to Ritche (1984) and Essex & Chakley (1998). Major sport events give also the opportunity for people being on the margin of society to be integrated. More- over, in the current literature should be mentioned the attempts made by (Walton, Longo, & Dawson, 2008), and by (Mourato, et al., 2005) in monetizing national pride that resulted from the London Games of 2012. Kintis, Papanikos and Patsouraris (2003) made another study for monetising benefits, resulting from the organisation of recreational and other cultural activities in the venues, created for the needs of the Athens Games in 2004. Hence Malfas et al. (2004), conclude that the Olympic Games can shift a city to develop an economic activity, under the assumption that previously the economy of a particular city or country was in a downturn. On the other hand, there should not be omitted the negative consequences being the excessive application of security measures, on the attempt to deliver the city or country a “good image”, that sacrifice potential “civil liberties”. On the contrary, they do not take into account a potential critical attitude from a country’s population regarding the organisation of the Games. Such examples are the general disappointment and frustration of Brazilians -let alone of Greeks nowadays-, given the dismal macroeconomic performance of their national economy. Therefore, it is needed to assess whether the Olympics actually lead to a positive expression via national pride.

2.1.4. Political impacts These can be linked to the socio-economic impacts and especially to the part of financing the projects for hosting the Games. According to Baade & Matheson (2010), (2016), a large part of the construction cost of the infrastructures cannot be stood fully by the part of the Organisational Committees. In this case government intervenes by covering an important part of these expenses. Problems also arise in case the construction or renovation of the Olympic infrastructures end up in

42 rising governmental indebtedness, so this can be translated into the imposition of taxation that can be unfair in cases in which the government has promised that through the Olympic Games the economy will lead to an upturn and that the hosting city/country will become a “world-class” centre (Malfas, Theodoraki, & Houlihan, 2004).

2.2. Attempts to make the Olympic Games more cost-efficient During the new era of the Olympic Games started in 1896, usually countries used to publicly finance the Olympic Games. However, this rationale of finance ended up being unsustainable and the last time in which the Games were financed in such a way were the Montreal Games of 1976. The 1984 Olympics of Los Angeles meant the beginning of the commercialization era of the Games, in which the main characteristic is the attraction of “sponsorship”. So, there can be observed a turn to private financing of Games with the participation of large multinational companies. But again, with the exemption of 1984 Olympics of Los Angeles and of 1992 in Barcelona this model of financing was not proved profitable for many of the subsequent hosts (McBribe, 2016). After the Los Angeles Olympic Games that proved quite beneficial crediting the U.S economy with over $200 million (Zijfren, Ueberroth, Usher, & Perelman, 1985), cities that asked for candidature for hosting the Olympic Games increased from two for the 1988 Olympics to twelve for the Olympics of 2004 (Zimbalist, 2015). This made the IOC to accept bids from cities that submitted the highest priced and most ambitious plans. In a research posted by Baade and Matheson (2016) it concludes that more and more developing countries are most likely to have their bids accepted for hosting the Olympic Games, since there is a need for these countries to improve and demon- strate their image worldwide. Although such countries have to spend immense amounts of capital to develop the supporting infrastructure. Indicatively, for the Beijing Games the cost reached approximately over $50 billion and for the Rio Olympics of last summer the cost is expected to be around $20 billion. Such concerns emerged to the foreground and some cities have withdrawn their candidature for the Olympics of 2022 and 2024, due to the huge costs that they are about to undergo. For instance, Stockholm and Oslo withdrew for the bidding process for the Winter Games of 2022 (Abend, 2014), as well as Boston for the 2024 Summer Games (BBC, 2015), having as main argument the cost overrun risk as well as the risk of increasing indebtedness in the economy. Since costs for hosting the Olympic Games have increased significantly over the last years, ideas to render them more affordable were proposed. Economists have cited that the candidature process of IOC should be reconsidered, since it only promotes cities or countries that submit the most ambitious agenda. Ricketts affirms (2012) that these bids are often inflated due to construction ventures interests and also it is argued by (McBribe, 2016) that the IOC does not share its increasing profits from the Games. Matheson (2015) argues that totalitarian countries that simply ignore the bidding process of the Olympic Games are in an advantageous position and this can be proved for the existence of only

43 two bids for hosting the Winter Olympic Games of 2022; Kazakhstan and China but finally the bid went to China. Scandals of corruption were also present at the IOC with bribes and illegal payments in the attempt of city selection for hosting the Olympic Games. Faced with these problems, the president of the IOC Thomas Bach has made recommendations by presenting the Olympic Agenda of 2020 in (2014). Among these recommendations it is proposed the decrease of candidature costs, enabling thus more flexibility for countries to use the existing sports facilities for hosting the Games. Such an approach lets candidate countries to develop sustainable strategies, including external auditing and transparency. Others such as Baumann and Matheson (2013) propose that the developing countries when they desire to host the Olympics should divide the costs, mitigating thus the economic burden when one of these countries had organized the Games by its own. Zimbalist (2015) shares the argument of the president of IMF Christine Lagarde that the Olympic Games should be organized permanently in Greece by taking advantage of the current existing infrastructure. But how beneficial this would be for Greece from a Cost-Benefit Analysis perspective, and what lessons can be learned from other Olympic Games and from its own Games of 2004 in terms of technology management? The problems of delivering a mega project in the right time, quality and costs can be attributed to the following factors, according to (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier, 2016):

 The type of project decided has not been delivered before by others, rendering it risky.  Placing it somewhere, where no other project has been placed in the past in order to learn from any errors and omissions made.  Implementing it in a non-transparent way favouring thus corruption, ballooning its final costs. Since the Olympic Games can qualify as a mega event as stated before, these are the most common problems that the Olympic Games encounter, making them the costliest mega event. The introduction of the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program (OGKMP) seems to mitigate the problem of cost effectiveness, but still it is argued that there is room for further improvement.

Indicatively, Flyvbjerg, Stewart and Budzier in their studies of (2012) and of (2016) have concluded that from the time of introducing the OGKMP, this has led to an improvement in cost- efficiency of the Games. This system was firstly introduced in late 1990s for the preparation of the Sydney Olympics in 2000 and it is being used until nowadays. Before its introduction, costs of hosting the Olympics were transcending by 230% on average the initial ones being agreed at the bidding process; after its introduction, this percentage was limited to 75%. This conclusion was drawn with adequate confidence by studying some cases of both Winter and Summer Olympics from late 1960s till today. To elaborate briefly on the OGKMP, this enabled countries which desired to host the Olympic Games in the future to learn from previous ones, so as to host them more efficiently. This program comprises of a knowledge platform which the hosting countries can approach, and of a program

44 in which people are charged to be trainees and observers to help other countries which will host Olympic Games in the future, by looking at previous Olympic Games. Concerning the cost performance indicator translated into cost overruns for hosting the Games, an improvement of it means that the OGKMP works well. The below table depicts the findings proposed by Flyvbjerg, Stewart and Budzier in (2016), prov- ing that the OGKMP has done its job quite effectively. They also argue that the result is quite sensitive even to minor changes in the numbers that may conclude the opposite.

Before OGKMP After OGKMP Games % Cost overrun Games % Cost overrun Grenoble 1968 191 Sydney 2000 90 Salt Lake City Montreal 1976 758 2002 26,5 Lake Placid 1980 322,5 Athens 2004 54,5 Sarajevo 1984 145,5 Torino 2006 81 Calgary 1988 62 Beijing 2008 3 Albertville 1992 136 Vancouver 2010 15 Barcelona 1992 341,5 London 2012 76 Lillehammer 1994 277 Sochi 2014 289 Atlanta 1996 149 Rio 2016 51 Nagano 1998 56 Average 243,85 Average 76,2 Table 2.3: Comparison of Olympic Games cost overruns (in real terms) before and after the introduction of OGKMP (2016). Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 describe the downward course of cost overruns of the Olympic Games, in which can be identified outliers before the implementation after the implementation of the OGKMP, being the cases of Calgary in 1988, Nagano in 1998 and of Sochi in 2014 respectively. The authors cannot explain further to which specific factors these outliers occur, but they give a recommendation to the IOC, arguing that the OGKMP has to be even reinforced.

In contrast, there are still many unknowns about the institutional arrangements between national governments and the ministries related to the organisation of the Games in a hosting country. That is, the decisions taken are unknown, as well as the incentives and the agendas of the responsible stakeholders for the organisation of the Games. Therefore, the effectiveness of the OGKMP in supressing the increasing costs of the Games is under question. Overall, this literature review provided an identification and analysis of the impact categories, and in addition the scattered knowledge regarding the economic viability of the Games. Also, it illus- trates some preliminary attempts on how future Olympic Games will be more cost-efficient especially in a period where cost minimisation is a primary concern for a national economy to improve its competitiveness. The gaps in the literature identified in each section, provides useful input for redacting the rest of this Thesis project.

Course of Cost Overruns of Winter Olympics 450%

400% Lake Placid 1980 350% Lillehammer 1994 Sochi 2014

300% Grenoble 1968 250%

200% Albertville 1992 Torino 2006 150% Sarajevo 1984 Salt Lake City 100% 2002

50% Calgary 1988 Nagano 1998 Vancouver 2010 0% Figure 2.3: Trends of cost overruns of Winter Olympics (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012).

Course of Cost Overruns of Summer Olympics 900%

800% Montreal 1976

700%

600%

500%

400% Barcelona 1992

300%

200% Atlanta 1996 Sydney 2000 London 2012 100% Athens 2004 Rio 2016 Beijing 2008 0%

Figure 2.4: Trends of cost overruns of Summer Olympics (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012).

3. Research Methodology

The purpose of this Thesis is to provide an answer to the main research question, as well as to the accompanying sub questions. Multiple methods will be used in answering them; those will be analysed in the following lines.

3.1 Identifying social costs and benefits of the permanent Olympic Games To make a social cost and benefit assessment of the permanent organisation of the Olympics in Greece, a both national and international Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is performed by attributing monetary values to potential impacts identified in the second round of the qualitative part. In general, CBA as analysed by Boardman et al. (2011) is a policy tool that measures in monetary terms the value of consequences in society. It examines by how much benefits outweigh costs, and how much would society benefit. CBA plays a key role in decision making and its purpose is the efficient allocation of resources to society, when there are market failures. CBA moreover, makes lines of reasoning objective, when public discourse occurs in deciding for the application of initi- atives like the Olympic Games case. There are 9 steps that will be followed when implementing CBA. These are described in brief thereinafter: 1. Identification of the alternative policies. In this stage, a discussion will be made upon the current situation of hosting the Olympic Games in different countries (=status quo), and that of permanently hosting the Olympic Games in Greece. 2. Standing of benefits and costs; identification of the levels in which benefits and costs will count – international, national, regional or local. In this case a both national and international standing will be made. 3. Identification of the impact categories, distinction between benefits and costs, and selection of a measurement method. 4. Impact prediction over the life of the project. 5. Impact monetization. 6. Discount of benefits and costs into present values. 7. Calculation of the projects’ Net Present Value (NPV). 8. Perform a sensitivity analysis by analysing how uncertainties affect CBA results. 9. Propose a recommendation by taking into account monetary results. When conducting CBA, it should be realised that CBA compares the NPV of benefits of a hypo- thetical project with the current situation. Hence, for that reason it is needed to conduct a CBA on the current situation (status quo) of bidding for the Olympic Games, and compare it with the case of permanently hosting them in Greece every 4 years. For that reason, the status quo can be analysed by providing ex-post-Olympic Games case studies and academic papers on sports management. For the evaluation of the impacts of the needed infrastructures, these can be catalogued by

47 searching for literature or by extracting data from the semi-structured interviews that will be carried out. From these sources, economic data for the organisation of the Olympics -including costs for infrastructure development- can be extracted and analysed. Mechanisms such as the contingent valuation method (CVM) for evaluating impacts that cannot be monetised easily or the benefit- transfer method will not be applied due to time constraints of implementing this thesis project. Instead, CBA will be carried out by analysing data from ex-post CBA analyses of Olympic Games as well as from sport economics literature and make estimations by applying forecasting methods. On the other hand, the argument proposed by Kitty Boone to Christine Lagarde to strengthen this idea, concerns the financial contribution of the participating countries to the Games. This lies to the fact that under the current hosting situation, each country is subjected to undergo significant costs for hosting the Games. Hence, for carrying out the CBA a simplified assumption is made which is the following:

There is equal financial contribution from the countries participating in the Olympic Games. This assumption was chosen, as an attempt to contain the already increased costs that each hosting country undergoes for organising the Games. It also facilitates the CBA, since this analysis would be more sophisticated, if an attempt was made to define the desirable amount of contribution for each participating country. There are multiple hidden agendas, incentives and nested interests for each country worldwide, that cannot be defined easily in this Thesis project.

3.1.1 A review of CBA However, CBA has some limitations that should be considered in the phase of execution. First, all impacts cannot be monetized in monetary terms, because some they are not tradable in markets. The solution to this would be to implement a CVM, but it is considered far too optimistic for the purpose of this thesis. Second, there can be identified social critics regarding utilitarian assumptions of CBA; i.e. making compromises between utility gains for some and utility losses for others. Third, CBA results for projects resulting in positive externalities according to Mouter & Chorus (2015) may not align with citizen’s preferences; so, a need for setting an appropriate discount rate will be a challenging issue. Fourth, CBA does not take into account technical efficiency of projects; hence an adjusted cost-effectiveness measure can be used as a proxy to calculate allocative efficiency. Finally, Mouter (2015) argues that CBA results can be rejected by politicians, especially if the results are not in line with the interests and objectives of politicians, or can be “exploited” as a means of political ammunition in the name of democracy. The issue of setting an appropriate discount rate is important, since (Mouter) argues that “the discount rate is unique to each person; much like the moral legitimacy of the death penalty or abor- tion rights, it is the kind of thing reasonable people may reasonably disagree about”. The selection of an appropriate discount rate is both empirical and ethical activity, since it should be decided to what extent the discount rate should be grounded on the actual behaviour of citizens. But in this

48 case academics have made their own propositions on the process of setting a discount rate, like Nordhaus (2006), Gollier (2011) and van Liedekerke (2004). They think that setting a discount rate should be fully based on actual behaviour, otherwise issues regarding unfair tax allocation will occur. Also, setting a discount rate requires some ethical considerations, such as the definition of a fair distribution model between societal members, without the need to connect it with actual behaviour. If a discount rate predicts outcomes that will be rejected ethically, then it is wrong. There are also cases where the definition of a discount rate is partly normative, as a product of weakness of the imagination. In actual politics, sufficient care should be taken when dealing with several ministries. Mouter (2015) affirms that there are ministries that apply a guardian perspective when applying CBA, so they use a high discount rate to keep CBA scores low; while spending ministries adopt a low discount rate to maintain high CBA scores and thus provide sound arguments for projects approval. Thus, because of time and thesis size constraints, the discount rate that will be used in the analysis is extracted from World Bank database. Overall, limitations of CBA can be summarized as follows, according to Mouter, Annema and van Wee (2015):

 Incompleteness of CBA in interpreting all impacts; there is a possibility of “overlooking” some positive externalities of projects, either by misevaluating them or by not realising them. This can be due to lack of “reliability” in evaluating them in monetary terms.  Uncertainty in defining the results of externalities of projects; CBAs that are carried out before the kick-off of projects (ex-ante CBA) are full of “assumptions about the uncertain future”. Empirically, there are monetary and time restrictions in defining fully the value of all impacts, so it is certain that “rules of thumb” will be used including uncertainty.  Impacts that are hard to be monetized do not add rigor to CBA analysis.

3.1.2 Differences between CBA and Economic Impact Study (EIS) The purpose of the EIS is to analyse the effects of a particular project in the Greek economy and can be interpreted by analysing indicators such as employment level, national income and value added. Hence, it analyses whether a project or a policy has an economic effect in Greece, adopting a revenue-expenditure approach (Kesenne, 2005). This approach characterises the majority of studies, those also reported in the Literature Review. On the other hand, a CBA is focused on assessing the social welfare effects of a policy or project and can be applied in a broader scope (national, regional or local level) including also users and non-users. CBA can also evaluate impacts (e.g. environmental), whilst an EIS fails to do so (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer, 2011), (Kesenne, 2005). For these reasons, a CBA analysis can be more complete in this first academic attempt for assessing social welfare effects of a permanent host of the Olympic Games in Greece.

Compared to CBA, an EIS cannot provide proposals to the Greek government to finance major sport events -and therefore of the Olympic Games-, but a CBA does. The economic studies having been carried out so far in assessing the economic impacts of hosting a major sport event, have as a purpose to serve politicians’ interests in their attempt to decide their organization. These studies also are invoked by sports lobbies, highlighting the positive aspects of these events such as the increased benefits of a national economy. However, these studies according to Kesenne (2005) lack force to explain accurately the actual societal benefits and costs, as well as to provide a claim to the government whether to support or not the organisation of a major sports event.

3.2 Investigating the required challenges to be addressed for achieving a successful management of technology of a permanent Olympiad. The results of CBA can provide managerial implications especially to the Greek government, especially when assessing the social welfare effects of the Olympic infrastructures. If these effects are not taken into account adequately because of inadequate management, then the results of CBA can be problematic. A preliminary example proposed by Kesenne (2005) arguing that the results of CBA for hosting major sports events is negative, having as winners the organisation committees and as losers the citizens who have to pay higher taxes. Hence, this assertion can be a serious point for the governments to rethink their actions whether to subsidise major sports events, among others the Olympic Games. They have to think about for instance the source of funding for their hosting. The investigation of the challenges encountered in technology management and development required the conduct of face to face and online semi-structured interviews. Forty (40) people were asked, with a non-response rate of 15%, leading to a final sample of n=34. More interviews were unfeasible to be conducted, due to time constraints and due to the unavailability of people, since the interviewing period was during summer, being a holiday season. People asked were then divided into clusters, being politicians (n=4), engineers (n=10) and academics (n=10). From these clusters, expert-insider opinion was provided. Citizens (n=10) were also asked in order to acquire public non-expert opinion, since their background was not identified. From these clusters, it became possible to construct perspectives each with its own arguments according to their area of expertise in prioritizing the challenges and the current weaknesses crucial to support the proposed policy. The questions asked are summarised in the Interview and were developed in a way that minimised any potential bias while answering them. The questions addressed, started with a general question asking whether people are in favour or not of hosting permanently the Olympics in Greece. Afterwards, the questions concerned the management part of the Games, rotating into three axes:

• Site selection • Defining the needed infrastructures for development or upgrade, in order to meet the expectations of the initiative. • Defining the challenges needed to prioritize when developing and maintaining technology projects.

Complementary to these interviews, a case study review is performed on the institutional arrangements required for the development of the infrastructures needed for the Olympic Games hosted so far from 1992 till today. This case study review was carried out by taking the following steps: 1. Find ex-post-Olympic Games studies through the Internet, such as those of (COOB '92), (ACOG 1996), (SOCOG 2000), (ATHOC 2004), (Hwang, 2009) and (Aukett, 2012). 2. Identify possible challenges in infrastructure and technology management. For example, suppose that infrastructure development in previous Olympics brought about negative social consequences (i.e. low use value after the end of the Olympics, construction imperfec- tions, and bureaucracy problems). 3. Identify the reason(s) why problems exist. In explanation, an identification of the problematic institutional arrangements should be made. 4. Identify how these problems affect the overall outcome of the Olympic Games. 5. Propose possible solutions and review them using existing literature, as well as data from the interviews. For example, a proposal of the appropriate institutional arrangements that could be applied in the Greek society in order to stimulate effective infrastructure development has to be made (e.g. modernization of bureaucratic processes).

3.3 Summarising research design

Sub-question Method Carry out CBA. Monetary data from previous Games will What are the costs and benefits of organising perma- be estimated through forecasting methods, based on nently the Olympic Games in Greece? data from previous Olympic Games. Under the current biding situation, how much does a  Searching for ex-post-Olympic Games analyses and country spend in order to host the Olympic Games and academic papers on sports management. what are the resulting benefits?  Carry out CBA.

 Semi-structured interviews with politicians, citizens, Should the Olympic Games have a regional or national academics and with engineers to identify any possi- character? What are the advantages and disad- bilities for further infrastructure development in vantages? both Athens and the rest of Greece.  Literature analysis for analysing the current situation of the existing infrastructures in Athens.

What infrastructure projects are needed to facilitate a Semi-structured interviews with politicians, engineers, permanent organisation of the Olympics in Greece? academics and citizens.  Ex-post-Olympic Games analyses on the manage- What are the challenges in the management of infra- ment practices applied in institutional level for the structure and of technology projects of the Olympic organisation of the infrastructures and technologies Games organised between 1992 and 2012 and what needed for the Olympic Games from 1992 till 2012. lessons can Greece learn from these Olympic Games,  Semi-structured interviews with academics, citizens, as well as from its Games organised in 2004? engineers and politicians.

Table 3.1: Methods of answering research questions.

4. Site selection for hosting the Olympic Games in Greece

Under the current situation, a hosting city is chosen through the bidding process. This process was described in section 2.1.1. But what if the Olympic Games were going to be hosted permanently in Greece, which city or cities would be ideal for hosting them? The recent experience of Athens Olympiad of 2004 shows that most sports were hosted in Athens, with the exception of the Shot Put organised in Ancient Olympia and of the football, which hosted in other towns and cities of Greece. Opening and closing ceremonies were hosted in Athens, where the Olympic Stadium is. Athens was chosen because of the fact that it is the capital of Greece, as well as the centre of the Greek economic activity. Athens also had adequate current infrastructure in terms of sports facilities. The most decisive reason was the fact that the Bid File submitted in 1997 was quite ambitious -in a positive sense- in terms of developing new infrastructure projects, creating an attractive place for hosting the Games. In reality, choosing the ideal city for hosting the Olympics in Greece would be quite an easy task, if the recent experience of Athens is taken into account. Another alternative solution, could be a bidding process arranged in a national level with the same logic as it is in the current bidding process. For the needs of this thesis, to provide an answer of what is the ideal site for hosting the Olympics rounds of face to face and online interview surveys were conducted and the results enabled an analysis of hosting the Games either only in Athens, or expanding them nationally. A first idea expressed during the interviews, and especially to the question of assessing the idea of hosting the Games permanently to Greece, was to keep going with the current situation of organising the Games to different countries. This allows more people to enjoy all the sports when they are hosted in a country, which makes sure that there are always big crowds at all events. This can be justified from the fact that Greece is in a current difficult financial situation, so this would be impossible to host such an event on a permanent basis, underlying also the practical impossibility of the participating countries to contribute financially. Also, the current situation is beneficial for sponsors to promote their products and services to the hosting countries. On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Olympic Games are hosted permanently to a single country, this may be beneficial to the economy, leading to a win-lose outcome between the other countries, as this is not the best outcome and source of interest rivalry between the organising nation and the other countries. The other argument was in favour of organising permanently the Games in Greece for historical purposes, and as an opportunity to boost further tourism with whatever this implies in terms of employment, and hence global awareness of the country/host city. To further break down this argument, and after having taken into account the assumption made in section 3.1.1, two location possibilities will be examined; the organisation of the Games in Athens and that of expanding the Games to the rest of Greece; each idea with its own advantages and disadvantages.

4.1. Advantages and disadvantages of Athens

4.1.1. Advantages First of all, the main advantage of organising the Games in Athens is that the city has existing venues and facilities developed for the needs of its own Games in 2004. These can be renovated to meet the demands of a permanent host of the Games. These can be listed in the below table:

Olympic Centre Venues Olympic Stadium Olympic Velodrome Athens Olympic Sports Complex Olympic Tennis Centre Olympic Aquatic Centre Olympic Indoor Hall Hellinikon Indoor Arena Olympic Baseball Centre Olympic Canoe/Kayak Slalom Centre Hellinkon Olympic Sports Complex Olympic Hockey Centre Olympic Softball Centre Agios Kosmas Olympic Sailing Centre Olympic Beach Volley Centre Faliron Olympic Complex Faliron Sports Pavilion Peace and Friendship Stadium Markopoulo Olympic Equestrian Centre Markopoulo Olympic Complex Markopoulo Olympic Shooting Centre Boxing Olympic Hall (Peristeri) Western Attica Olympic Complex Olympic Weightlifting Hall (Nikea) Wrestling Olympic Hall (Ano Liosia) Badminton Olympic Hall Goudi Olympic Complex Olympic Modern Pentathlon Centre Galatsi Olympic Hall Georgios Karaiskakis Stadium Other facilities Panathinaikon Stadium Vouliagmeni Olympic Centre

Table 4.1: Olympic Venues in Athens (ATHOC 2004). However, renovation and reformation of these facilities may require a high initial cost maybe equal to that when these had to be constructed from scratch. Such costs will occur in the first Olympiad, and afterwards provided that a clear legacy management is delivered, only maintenance costs would charge the participating countries. This is analysed in detail in chapter 5. The increased initial renovation costs occur because legacy management was inadequate, despite the maintenance costs that had to be paid and agreed during the development of venues (Kintis, Papanikos, & Patsouratis, 2003). As stated before, someone who would visit nowadays the venue areas, all of these are in a state of despair.

Being on the same spectrum, the selection of Athens as the place of organising permanently the Olympic Games, enables the existence of a future use value of facilities. This because Athens has increased population, so residents coming from Athens and from its around area would be bene- fited from their future use, as possible recreational activities would be organized between two Olympiads. Another advantage of organizing the Games in Athens, this provides transportation facilities (in terms of elapsed distance and time) for both spectators and athletes. That is, this could make it easier for people to visit multiple events and for the athletes to meet each other as well during this period, creating more of a bond within the teams of athletes. Being on the same spectrum, to accommodate and to serve transportation needs of all spectators, athletes and other relevant personnel, this may require the development of additional installations and of transportation networks. The latter are better defined in section 4.3. Facilitating transportation can be also applied for locating construction materials for the renovation of venues, reducing thus upgrade costs. There is no need to locate such materials in various locations. Finally, giving the opportunity for Athens to organise permanently the Olympic Games, this con- tributes to the economic development of Attica region through the creation of business in the construction and touristic domain, and to its cultural promotion. Athens is a city with historical interest which dates back 2,500 years ago, as well as an agglomerated economic centre for the whole country. Hence, this cultivates further the global awareness of the city, which indirectly promotes further the economic development of the region.

4.1.2. Disadvantages Concerning the disadvantages of hosting the Games in Athens, to begin with this encourages further agglomeration in a negative sense; that is, all the economic activity and population is concentrated within a small region at the expense of promoting the development to other Greek towns and cities. This effect may also lead to urban planning problems, since Athens will be urged to accommodate a wave of increased population coming from all over the country. What is more, organising the same event over and over again in the same region, this would bring about a sentiment of routine, translated into decreased spectatorship during the events. This can be explained from the fact that spectators who come and visit Greece for attending Games events, need to visit other places, so a restricted image of Greece is delivered once spectators stay in the same place. Finally, a permanent organisation of the Games in Athens would lead to negative externalities, such as environmental burden and excessive energy consumption within a particular region. This stems from the increased number of spectators and of Games-related personnel. Thus, other investments have to be made in terms of waste management, something that is quite challenging, due to poor country planning of the region of Attica, and of energy management. The latter allows for the re-operation and expansion of existing power plants located in Attica.

4.2. Advantages and disadvantages of expanding the Games to other locations The experience from the Olympiad of 2004, shows that these Olympic Games enabled the organisation of Football in selected Greek cities and towns and of Shot Put in Olympia. Such venues implemented were the Pan Peloponnesian Stadium in Patras, the Pan Cretan Stadium in Heraklion, the Pan Thessaly Stadium in Volos and the Kaftantzoglio Stadium in Thessalonica. The Ancient Stadium in Olympia was used directly for hosting the Shot Put.

4.2.1. Advantages Expansion of the Olympic Games to other regions in Greece offers initially the possibility of regional development and deglomeration. Thus, decentralization would help in reducing the load of one city, in terms of negative externalities defined above. Other secondary results from regional development can be translated to a decrease in unemployment, something that nowadays is an important problem in Greece, with percentages reaching above 50%, according to Hellenic Statis- tical Authority (2016). In addition to this, if the Olympic Games have a national character, they will allow spectators and Games-related staff to get to know more of Greece, instead of staying in one particular region. Every part of Greece has its own history and tradition; a spillover effect that can occur concerns the demonstration of local products worldwide leading to their export, as well as recognition effects of the country would be much more apparent. That is because branding becomes stronger; it is different to market the Games as “the Athens Olympics” instead of “the Greek Olympics”. For example, it would be possible to organise water based sports on islands, because in such a way they would have the opportunity to exhibit their own history and tradition. Moreover, the development of venue country planning is easier, since smaller Greek towns have more space in order to construct a new facility. However, this becomes very expensive and prac- tically impossible, since most of the venues are already located in Athens; hence it is difficult to relocate a sport event to another place. A possible halfway solution could be the creation of a venue to arrange of an Olympic event mainly of cultural importance in Olympia (not only the Olympic Flame Torch Ceremony), because this place constitutes the source of the Olympic Spirit.

4.2.2. Disadvantages The first main concern that stems from the attribution of a national character to the Games, is transportation of spectators and of Games-related staff; this brings about more transportation costs as well as fatigue -an impact that cannot be monetised easily- to athletes, spectators, coaches and other Olympic related staff. From one side, this could be beneficial for the public and private sector’s economic gains, coming from toll collection (road transportation), air-ticket fees for domestic flights and from shipping tickets. But on the other hand, there would be a risk of small attendance to events organised in other areas, if it is taken into account the small population of

55 towns and the transportation cost concerns of spectators. A solution for tackling transportation problems, would be the development of cutting edge transportation infrastructure capable of serving increased transportation needs, something that it is the case for Greece as it is a conventional commitment from the already agreed Memorandum of Understanding between its creditors. The increased construction cost of venues is a function of the costs of conducting feasibility studies, expropriation payments to land/property owners, as well as transportation costs for delivering construction materials. Given also the smaller population of the regional cities/towns of Greece, as well as defining the sporting interests of these populations, maybe such large investments in developing venues may not be so feasible to be implemented and prone to failure. These require if careful analysis beforehand. For example, developing a weightlifting centre to a Greek town (e.g. Sparta), while Spartans are interested in wrestling, this investment is a failure.

Another concern could be the minor change of the quality level of infrastructures, in front of huge investments possibly made. Despite being an initial step for change in infrastructure management, in order for this change to become true, this demands an initial agreement between all institutions. This agreement should encourage the development of internal mechanisms in defining commitments regarding maintenance of infrastructures. This change process could be also realised even with the absence of the Olympic Games. Recall also, that the quality level of delivered infrastructures and services is a function of the provided overall impression of the country to every tourist, let alone to every stakeholder involved for the organisation of the Olympic Games.

4.3. Additional supporting infrastructure needed in Athens For Athens, probably future transportation projects will be needed in order to handle increased traffic loads during Games-time, that is to facilitate the transportation of athletes, journalists, coaches and members of the Olympic Family towards venue locations. These projects are also supposed to bring about mitigation of the congestion problem, from which Attica is suffering nowadays, as well as further environmental improvement within the city area of Athens. The transportation projects that were proposed, include among others the expansion of Attica Highway towards southern Athens and its connection with the coastal avenue connecting Piraeus and Sounio. This project was proposed after the Olympic Games in 2007 by the at the time Minister of Environment, Country Planning and Public Works G. Souflias. However, micropolitics between the at the time central-right winged Government and the Opposition (central-left winged), as well as technical, geological and financial challenges led to delays and to different proposals for this transportation project. The Juncker financial Plan (2016) brought to the foreground this proposal, but its terms are not so favourable for the Government in terms of time, since by the time the proposal is submitted and accepted by the EU, the government has up to 3 years to seek for financing, in order for the project to start. Another transportation project was the upgrade of Skaramangas interchange and the connection of Schisto Avenue with the western bypass of Mount Egaleo. In 1997, its construction started, but

56 after multiple rounds of legal disputes, changing specifications of the project, and of insufficient environmental studies carried out by the at the time central-left winged Government, led the project to be turned down. In 2011, after Troika’s demand the project joined the Financial Package of the EU, and a new proposal was made by a private engineer, but in 2013 the regional governor of Attica I. Sgouros argued that “there is no reason to deal with a dead project” and automatically it was deducted from the Package. Finally, today the project will be implemented by the regional government of Athens with own funding and it will cost about more than 50 million €, according to (Lialios, 2017). The below figure shows the proposed expansions for the road network of Attica. In green is shown the future expansions of the motorway, and in red is shown the already made proposals.

Figure 4.1: Proposed expansions of Attica Highway (shown in red and green) (Lialios, 2009). Concerning the expansion of the underground railway, a development plan of 8 metro lines was proposed in 2008 by the former Minister of Environment, Country Planning and Public Works G. Souflias (Karayiannis, 2013). However, the project proposed was far too optimistic to be implemented within the period of 25-30 years, and quite expensive to be implemented due to technical and geological challenges; hence the project was not adopted by the current regulatory plan of Athens. It was reformulated, so as to include a fourth line that would connect some of Athens’ regions that would have been connected, had the proposal of G. Souflias been accepted. The project has already been auctioned and it is estimated for the works to begin in 2018 (Lialios, 2016). About the international airport Eleftherios Venizelos, further expansion of it has already been proposed, but it is unknown when this is going to be implemented. In a daily visit that was personally

57 arranged there, a meeting with people working there and especially with people from the marketing and logistics department was organised. They argued that touristic traffic every year is increasing, hence sometime in the future further expansion of the airport is needed, in order to host more aircrafts and hence passenger traffic. To get more detailed information about the expansion plan of the airport, a meeting with an engineer working there was made. He presented a development plan that predicts the increase of the main passenger terminal area, as well as the expansion of the freight terminal. This plan is depicted in the below figure. In red is shown the expansion of the passenger terminal area. It was also proposed the addition of a third runway, but this proposal is settled for the future in order to avoid a potential financial restrain for implementing the current proposal.

Figure 4.2: The development plan of the airport Eleftherios Venizelos. 4.4. Additional supporting infrastructure needed in other cities The main difficulty is based on the fact that sports and supporting infrastructure to other regions is inadequate to meet the demands of the Olympic Games. That is the basic reason of the increased costs of developing such infrastructure from scratch and these would burden not only Greece, but also the other participating countries. If it is supposed that the Olympic Games receive a national branding, in the following lines are given some essential facilities that have to be developed:

 Stadia, including every type of supporting facilities (e.g. toilets, environmentally friendly lightning, changing rooms, protection equipment from extreme weather conditions, audio- visual systems for results reporting).  Thermal insulation equipment and climate control systems.  Leisure areas nearby competition venues.  Hotel installations for accommodating spectators, athletes, coaches and members of the Olympic Family.  Dining areas (e.g. restaurants, cafeterias and others). 58

 Upgrade of telecommunication networks supporting optic fibre networks until the venues.  Security systems (e.g. installation of metal detectors, fire extinguishing systems, CCTVs and other related security equipment) and hiring of related personnel for guarding venues. Personnel should be trained adequately to prevent potential terrorist attacks.  Venue maintenance units equipped with maintenance equipment and staffed by technically skilled people to coordinate maintenance works.  Leading class highway networks, regional airports and high-speed railways. Special notice should be made for the region of Ancient Olympia, where a venue should be built away from the archaeological site. The later should be only used for the Olympic Flame Torch Ceremony (there is an apparent need of the sun in order for the Flame to turn on) and for touristic purposes. Whether this venue can be open just like a stadium or a closed hall, this decision is based on both engineering and cost criteria, something that is outside the scope of this thesis to be analysed further. This venue could be ideal for hosting both the Opening and Closing Ceremonies of the Games and could be possibly implemented independently of the fact that the Games are organised in Athens or they do have a national character. Finally, it is a vital need to connect the region of Olympia with other nodes of cultural interest, just like Nafplion being the first capital city of the modern Greek country since 1829, with Nemea and Ancient Mantineia being places of historical interest with the latter being known for the Mantinean Games organised in Antiquity, and with the Temple of Apollo Epicurus in Messenia. For such an initiative to become true, an upgrade of the transportation network of Peloponnese is needed, plus with the creation of an international airport, and with the construction of high-speed railway networks starting from Athens. The only technical challenge for these projects to be implemented, are the geological properties of Pelopon- nese, being a rough mountainous area.

5. Cost-Benefit Analysis of the permanent host of the Games in Greece

Organising the Olympic Games requires significant investments from the hosting country and city, so careful budget planning is needed. Policymakers need to determine both costs and benefits to define whether it is worth such an investment. In reality, the revenues generated by the Games have to be shared among sponsors, IOC, NOCs and other stakeholders and therefore benefits are not large for the hosting country. The net profits from the Games can accrue only through the productive exploitation of legacies, and hence meticulous forward planning is needed. Olympic Games is not a single project, but an integrated one which comprises of multiple projects each with its own costs and benefits. The main aim of hosting the Olympics is to "forsake a positive legacy" as stated by the IOC (2015), translated into the provision of high value services to citizens. In order to assess the accuracy of this statement it is needed to demarcate the scope of the Olympics and to identify any other projects that could be valuable even without their organisation. When dealing with an integrated project, it is impossible to assess with CBA every single project and decide which one is the most appropriate by taking into account the highest NPV. This because each project with one another has dependencies; that is, there can be transportation networks and sports centres without hosting the Games but Olympics cannot be hosted in the absence of the aforementioned projects. The purpose of this part, is to carry out a national CBA for hosting the Games permanently in Greece and not to assess the feasibility of the infrastructures, since the later constitute part of hosting the Olympics. For the fact that all existing infrastructure is present in Athens (recall Table 4.1), and also because Greece is unable to bear the costs of expanding the Games nationally, the Games will be hosted in Athens. In addition, this policy has to be assessed in international level, given the underlined assumption of equal financial participation of the participating countries at the Games. Hence an international CBA is also made. Hosting the Games means that a country attracts athletes to compete, journalists to cover the Games and tourists to admire and experience a unique spectacle within a fortnight. Before that, it is needed to demarcate clearly what are the social costs and benefits, as well as to compare this proposed policy with the current situation of how much are the costs and benefits of hosting the Games.

5.1. Distinction between costs and benefits Regarding the distinction of costs and benefits, according to Ricketts (2012) they can be distinguished in two categories; the “explicit” and “implicit”. For instance, the explicit costs comprise of the costs for infrastructure and facilities development, and the explicit benefits are linked to the revenues coming from the sale of tickets, television rights, sponsorship, licensing and consumption from tourism. For the second category of costs, these are related to the benefits that could arise from the most efficient use of funds. Take for example the implementation of other infrastructure projects (e.g. a highway or a high-speed railway), the investments in education or the distribution of funds to social welfare, rather than organizing the Olympic Games. The implicit benefits cannot

60 be monetized easily and they are related to the positive image created to the country that hosts the Games. Such benefits can be a good predictor for boosting international awareness and pride of the country hosting the games, leading thus according to Rose and Spiegel (2009) to improved tourism, business and trade activity. Such benefits should be taken into account when deciding for hosting the Olympic Games. A major concern that the implicit costs of the Olympic Games raise, is debt accumulation. Take a look at the Greek case with many infrastructure legacies being unexploited at the expense of the Greek State (Rhoads, 2010), the case of Montreal Olympics of 1976 in which it took the city of Montreal 30 years to pay-back its Olympic debts and the Sochi Winter Olympic Games of 2014 which put a financial burden to Russian taxpayers of about $1 billion annually, according to Müller (2015).

In addition to this, Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) distinguish even clearer the costs of the Olympic Games into 3 categories, being the following:

 OCOG costs that are directly related to the purpose of hosting the Olympic Games. These costs are undertaken by the relevant OCOG, including “technological, operational, transportation, bidding, administration, security, workforce, marketing, medical services, ceremony organization, lodging/catering and Paralympic organisation” costs.  Non-OCOG construction costs for implementing the infrastructure needed for the Olympic Games. These include media broadcasting premises, the venues and the Olympic Village. Such costs charge usually the hosting country or city(ies) and the private investors, instead of the OCOG. These two categories when added, give the sports-related costs that are directly related to the Olympic Games.

 Costs allocated for the construction of transportation infrastructure (roads, railways, ports and airports), for the construction of touristic facilities (e.g. hotels) and also these include business investment for the preparation of the Games. Such projects can be also implemented even the Olympic Games are not organised. On the contrary, finding such data is quite scarce, so difficult to be found and if found these are not so accurate to include them in the research. Analysing this literature, it is possible to define both social costs and benefits for carrying out CBA. For the “explicit costs” defined by Ricketts (2012), it is unknown whether the OCOG costs of Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) are included. Instead, the distinction used by the latter is clearer, since both OCOG and Non-OCOG costs can have a social cost for both the Greek and the Inter- national societies through taxation, if the implicit affirmation of Müller (2015) is taken into account. On the other hand, since OCOG and Non-OCOG costs concern investments needed for hosting successfully an Olympiad, the return to these investments take the form of the “implicit benefits” of Rickets (2012). In this Thesis, these are called social benefits coming from spectacle

(ticketing and TV rights) and from the Olympic Hallo effect (sponsorship, licensing, tourism, pride and use value of venues). These occur because athletes, media personnel, as well as other tourists are present during the 15-day period of the Games, generating thus revenues. Moreover, further distinction of the social benefits is possible; especially, benefits from spectacle and some benefits resulting from the Hallo effect (sponsorship and sales of licensed merchandise), are direct benefits brought about from the Games, debited to the OCOG. In addition to the assumption made on page 48, it is also assumed that the OCOG responsible for the permanent organisation of the Olympics in Greece is a non-profit organisation with a global character. These benefits can be shared among national economies, including Greece. The rationale behind this, is the fact that all the countries are financially participating. Such benefits can be defined as OCOG benefits. The Non-OCOG benefits pertain to the category of Hallo effect (tourism impacts, venue use value and national pride) and are mainly experienced by Greece. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 depict3 the relationship between OCOG and Non-OCOG costs, based on the aforementioned literature, as well as the relationship of social benefits between OCOG and Non-OCOG ones.

OCOG Costs Spectacle

Sports-related costs Social benefits

Non-OCOG Costs Hallo Effect

Figure 5.1: Relationship between Sports-related costs and Social benefits.

OCOG Benefits Debited to Greece and (tickets, TV rights) Internationally

Spectacle OCOG Benefits Debited to Social Benefits (sponsorship, Greece and licensing) Internationally Hallo Effect

Non-OCOG Debited to Greece benefits

Figure 5.2: Relationship between Social Benefits and OCOC & Non-OCOG benefits.

3 A line describes the categorisation of sports-related benefits and of social benefits. 62

The below table4 summarizes the categories of OCOG, Non-OCOG costs, as these mainly have standing for the organisation of the Olympic Games.

OCOG Costs OCOG Benefits - Operating expenses . Transportation services expenses . Broadcasting expenses . Medical services expenses . Venues operating expenses - Ticket sales - Bidding costs - TV rights - Ceremony expenses - Sponsorship (both national and international) - Administrative expenses - Licensing - Technology investments . Benefits from philately, coins and lottery - Paralympic Games expenses . Merchandising - Workforce - Security investments - Marketing expenses - Lodging and catering expenses5 Non-OCOG Costs Non-OCOG Benefits - Construction of the Olympic Village - Revenues from touristic activity - Construction of the media premises - National pride - Venue construction/upgrade - Use value of Olympic facilities

Table 5.1: Distinction between costs and benefits. 5.2. CBA of the current bidding process As stated in Literature Review and in section 3.1.2, most of the ex-post-Olympic Games analyses presented in the official reports and in academic literature like Brunet (1995), Zonzilos et al. (2015) and Hwang (2009) are mainly EISs that adopt a revenue-expenditure approach. In addition to the assertions of section 3.1.2, an EIS does not capture the basic elements of a CBA, being the consumer surplus and the opportunity cost. It becomes more challenging when conducting CBA ex-ante analyses of the Olympic Games. Usu- ally these cannot provide good predictors regarding costs and benefits, and according to Keim (2015) such studies are quite biased, so as to show that it is worth organising the Games to a particular city. That is, they emphasise the economic success of the Games, as well as the image gained, without mentioning any negative effects. Countries participating in the bidding process usually try to show-off their position in the global scene in their attempt to vindicate their power for winning the bid.

4 Since multiple authors and ex-post analyses from previous Olympic Games give non-standardised categories for OCOG costs, in CBA only their total value will be mentioned for simplification. 5 Some authors like McHugh (2006) argue that these can be omitted since housing, catering and transportation services are being offered to athletes for a short period of time. But according to (Blok, et al., 2011), these are included assuming that these are related to the level of service being offered to the Olympic personnel during the Games. 63

Recall also from section 2.1.1 that each country spends a significant amount of money for placing a bid for the Games which in case of failing to succeed in the bidding process, it becomes a sunk cost. Here questions arise on the true criteria of selecting the city to host the Olympic Games apart from the financial ones that cannot be answered in an unbiased way. The next tables (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3) exhibit the OCOG costs and benefits (in current final amounts) that currently countries exhibit from the organisation of the Games. These include Games organised from 1992 till 2016. Such costs concern a period of 7 years including all four phases of the Olympic Games; bidding, preparation, in-Games and post-Games period. More specifically, OCOG costs occur in different periods according to their classification; bidding costs during the bidding process 7 years before the start of the Games; technology and security costs during the preparation phase, and the rest of the costs as well as OCOG benefits during the Games period. Classification of costs and benefits was made based on Table 5.1. OCOG costs and benefits were extracted from ex-post-Games studies and from relevant academic literature as in (COOB '92), (Brunet, 1995), (ACOG 1996), (SOCOG 2000), (ATHOC 2004), (Hashmi, Fida, & Alhayk, 2008), (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012), (Oxford Economics; Lloyds Banking Group, 2012), (LOCOG Ltd., 2013), (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015), (Baade & Matheson, 2016), (IOC, 2016) & (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier, 2016).

OCOG costs Barcelona Atlanta Sydney Athens Beijing London Rio Bidding costs $ 0,024 $ 0,008 $ 0,024 $ 0,050 $ 0,051 $ 0,027 $ 0,042 Technology $ 0,351 $ 0,341 $ 0,323 $ 0,488 $ 0,709 $ 0,474 $ 0,545 Covered by Covered by the public the public Security $ 0,066 $ 0,051 $ 0,050 sector $ 0,057 sector $ 0,026 Operating, Ceremony, Administrative, Paralympic Games, $ 1,848 $ 2,282 $ 1,886 $ 1,852 $ 3,944 $ 4,399 $ 2,584 Workforce, Marketing and Lodging expenses Total OCOG direct costs $ 2,289 $ 2,682 $ 2,283 $ 2,390 $ 4,760 $ 4,900 $ 3,197 Table 5.2: OCOG costs valuation (amounts in current million USD, sources above). An interesting finding from this table concerns the remarkably small amount of the bidding costs compared to the overall OCOG costs. Data retrieved in (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015), by (Anonymous, GamesBids.com, 2017) and in (Associated Press, 1999) for the Olympics of Atlanta, Athens, London and Rio, as summarised in the below table, bidding costs constitute on average 1.06% of the total OCOG costs. By invoking the average bidding cost percentage relative to total OCOG costs (1.06 %) were defined the bidding costs for Barcelona, Syd- ney and Beijing.

City Atlanta Athens London Rio Average

Total OCOG costs (in bn current USD) $ 2,682 $ 2,390 $ 4,900 $ 3,197 $ 3,292 Bidding costs $ 0,008 $ 0,050 $ 0,027 $ 0,042 $ 0,032 % of bidding costs relative to total OCOG costs 0,30% 2,09% 0,55% 1,31% 1,06% Table 5.3: Percentage of bidding costs relative to total OCOG cost. For the OCOG costs, and especially for the category of security costs, these concern investments made in reinforcing police measures as well as for the installation of security systems that ensure the avoidance of a terrorist or of other attack type. In most cases, these investments are made under the responsibility of the relevant OCOG; only in the Games of Athens and of London these costs were made under public responsibility, and this cost Greek public sector about 456 million Euros (in 2004 €). It could be possible in this case to classify these costs as non-OCOG costs since they have direct relevance for the organisation of the Games.

OCOG benefits Barcelona Atlanta Sydney Athens Beijing London Rio Benefits from ticket sales $ 0,134 $ 0,663 $ 0,643 $ 0,279 $ 0,188 $ 1,060 $ 0,410 Benefits from TV rights $ 0,768 $ 0,886 $ 1,373 $ 0,833 $ 1,770 $ 2,620 $ 4,180 Benefits from sponsorship $ 0,824 $ 0,434 $ 0,789 $ 0,773 $ 1,240 $ 1,170 $ 0,635 Benefits from licensing $ 0,022 $ 0,073 $ 0,114 $ 0,173 $ 0,166 $ 0,121 $ 0,051 Gross OCOG Benefits $ 1,747 $ 2,056 $ 2,920 $ 2,057 $ 3,364 $ 4,971 $ 5,276 Minus 10% for IOC rights $ 0,175 $ 0,206 $ 0,292 $ 0,206 $ 0,336 $ 0,497 $ 0,528 Net OCOG Benefits $ 1,573 $ 1,850 $ 2,628 $ 1,852 $ 3,028 $ 4,474 $ 4,748 Table 5.4: OCOG benefits valuation (amounts in current million USD). It can be also observed that OCOG benefits are constantly increasing and more specifically, those that accrue from the television rights are increasing rapidly. These revenues comprise by definition the main and sustainable source of revenues of the Olympic Movement and they constitute a great amount of the final benefits. This can be attributed to the fact that the Olympic Games are being broadcasted to an increasing number of countries, so more and more spectators have access to television and hence more minutes are spent watching the Games (IOC, 2016).

Concerning Non-OCOG benefits, these occur before, during and after the Games. For their calculation, the following considerations were taken into account: For the valuation of tourism impacts, standing in national level was used. From the Literature Review, it is true that the Olympic Games create international awareness of the country or State where these are hosted. For the case of Atlanta and Sydney, tourism impacts are defined at the level of State since Atlanta is the capital of the State of Georgia and Sydney of New South Wales. Such data were retrieved from Humphrey’ – Plummer (1995) and from Kintis et al. (2003).

For estimating the use value of venues and national pride, accurate monetary data was impossible to be found. However, a basis for estimating them can be provided from the cases of Athens and London. Such data were provided by Kintis et al. (2003) and by Walton, Longo and Dawson (2008) respectively. More specifically, use value of venues in Athens was about $ 900 million per year (in current USD), starting from the Games-year, and national pride in the UK for the London Olympics accounted for about $ 25.73 (in current USD) per year per UK resident. To calculate national pride for the rest of the Olympiads as well as the use value of venues, the following considerations were also considered:

 It is assumed that the WTP of pride for every country is based on that of the UK, but it is reversely analogous to the population (i.e. a country with higher population has less WTP of pride value). However, this condition is not satisfactory, as this depends on the general perceptions of the local populations towards the idea of hosting the Olympic Games. Hence, for populations like Georgia in US and New South Wales in Australia it will be roughly assumed that the WTP of pride will increase by 60% for both cases based on that of the UK, since reversely proportional estimates to population give rather ambitious results, that residents could impossibly attribute.

 For China, the WTP of pride will be assumed to be equal to $ 0.5, since China’s population is the largest in the world.  For Greece and Spain, national pride will be calculated by using the WTP value of pride for the UK, being $ 25.73 per year.  It is also assumed that the use value of venues constitutes 10% of Non-OCOG benefits, including tourism and pride. For London, since these Games adopted a strategy of creating temporary venues, assume that the use value of venues is restricted by 75% of its total Non- OCOG benefits.  For discounting will be used the annual nominal discount rate of each country (for its calculation refer to equation (17)); estimates of inflation and real interest rate were retrieved from World Bank database.  Special note should be made for Brazil; since there were negative national pride impacts in Rio among the protestors expressing that the country undergoes dismal economic performance and high indebtedness rate, the WTP of residents it is assumed to be negative; consider for example $ -3 per resident. The tables depicted in Annex B (Table B.1 - Table B.14) provide a calculation of the national pride per country, as well as use value of venues and tourism benefits. Knowing these, the Non-OCOG benefits per Olympiad can be easily extracted.

In a more concentrated table (Table 5.5) can be presented the results of a CBA of the current situation. From this table, there can be observed in general that the Olympic Games were beneficial, except from the cases of Sydney and especially of Rio. These Games were proved not to be beneficial, reporting net losses of $ 975 and $ 8,938 million respectively. The conversion of these amounts into USD 2017 was made by taking into account the following considerations. The Games of 1992 in Barcelona were organised in a period in which the official currency of Spain was the Peseta. Data retrieved from Brunet (1995) affirms that the exchange rate of USD to Peseta was $ 1 = 119.41 in 1992. For the Games of Sydney in 2000, first the 2000 AUD was converted to its 2017 value6 and then the today’s exchange rate was applied (1 Α$ = $ 0.79). For the 2004 Games in Athens the same methodology was applied as in Sydney with the today’s exchange rate of Euro to USD being 1 € = $ 1.17, as well as for the London Olympics (1 £ = $ 1.30). The formula for converting amounts in year 푥 nominal currency into amounts expressed in year 푦 has as follows:

퐼푛푓푙푎푡푖표푛 푖푛 푦 푦푒푎푟 ∗ 푥 푦푒푎푟 푎푚표푢푛푡 푦 푦푒푎푟 푎푚표푢푛푡 = (1) 퐼푛푓푙푎푡푖표푛 푖푛 푥 푦푒푎푟

Element Barcelona Atlanta Sydney Athens Beijing London Rio 1. Total OCOG direct $ 2,289 $ 2,682 $ 2,283 $ 2,390 $ 4,760 $ 4,900 $ 3,197 costs 2. Net OCOG benefits $ 1,573 $ 1,850 $ 2,628 $ 1,852 $ 3,028 $ 4,474 $ 4,748 3. Non-OCOG direct $ 7,711 $ 1,588 $ 2,907 $ 4,656 $ 2,270 $ 10,940 $ 9,903 costs 4. Non-OCOG benefits $ 24,947 $ 3,933 $ 1,587 $ 11,140 $ 28,071 $ 17,651 $ -0,587 5. Total Sports-Related $ 10,000 $ 4,270 $ 5,190 $ 7,046 $ 7,030 $ 15,840 $ 13,100 Costs (1+3) 6. Total Sports-Related $ 26,520 $ 5,783 $ 4,215 $ 12,991 $ 31,099 $ 22,125 $ 4,162 benefits (2+4) 7. Total Sports-Related $ 16,520 $ 1,513 $ -0,975 $ 5,945 $ 24,069 $ 6,285 $ -8,938 benefits (6-5) Table 5.5: CBA of the Olympic Games from 1992 till 2016 (amounts in current million USD).

5.3. CBA of the expected situation To deal with the optimism bias occurred in ex-ante CBA analyses resulting finally in excessive cost overruns for the organisation of the Olympic Games and finally in economic burden for the countries hosting the Games despite the glamour that these generate, the previous data will be used as a basis for conducting CBA analysis for the proposed policy.

6 For the conversion, the webpage http://www.in2013dollars.com was consulted. 67

While performing an ex-ante CBA, the estimation of costs and benefits of future events is faced with uncertainty, and therefore the use of forecasting methods is indispensable. Such estimations are very useful in assessing the feasibility of potential investment projects. When selecting the most appropriate forecasting method, this depends on a number of criteria, being the expected form of forecasting, forecasting period, precision, simplicity of application and data availability. The expected form of forecasting usually takes the form of estimating single or multiple characteristics of the probability distribution of a variable. Such form can be the mean value of a variable or the standard deviation or the forecasting range. The forecasting period is the time unit in which forecasting is done. Here, it applies to the number of Olympiads hosted so far. This case includes the study of 7 summer Olympiads in estimating the costs and benefits of future Olympiads, as well as to make a prediction for 5 future Olympiads if these were organized permanently in Greece. Forecasting precision is sought depending on the forecasting type used. Precision of a forecasting method increases as long as it is based on an adequate amount of quantitative data and if the time horizon of analysis is small. Simplicity of application depends on how simple a forecasting method is. The simpler a forecasting method is, the easier it is to be applied. The quality and type of available data determines the selection of an appropriate forecasting method. For the case of assessing the costs and benefits the Olympic Games, this requires sufficient and accurate longitudinal quantitative data and to identify potential tendencies.

5.3.1. Forecasting errors Longitudinal data is historical data composed by successive observations during a period of time. Such observations can occur either annually, or monthly, or weekly. Such data have the following qualitative characteristics (Nikolaou, 2007):

 Stationary, when values fluctuate around a mean value.  Trend, when there is a long or short-term fluctuation of their values.  Seasonality, when data is affected by seasonal factors.  Cyclical, when values fluctuate but not in steady periods.  Outliers, when data present unusual values from the expected ones.  Irregularities, when fluctuations occur randomly. Forecasting methods are purely based on statistical concepts. Before moving on the analysis of these methods, a brief citation of basic statistical indicators is made

∑푛 푥 Mean or Average: 푥̅ = 푖=1 푖 푛

Median: If total number of data (푛) is odd, it is the middle observation; while (푛) is mean, it is the average of middle observations. Mode: The most frequent observation in the data.

∑푛 (푥 −푥)2 Variance: 휎2 = 푖=1 푖 푛−1

∑푛 (푥 −푥)2 Standard deviation: 휎 = √ 푖=1 푖 푛−1

∑푛 (푥 −푥)(푦 −푦) Covariance: 퐶푂푉 = 푖=1 푖 푖 푥푦 푛−1

푛 ∑푖=1(푥푖−푥)(푦푖−푦) Correlation: 푟푥푦 = −1 ≤ 푟푥푦 ≤ 1 푛 2 푛 2 √∑푖=1(푥푖−푥) √∑푖=1(푦푖−푦)

However, the quality of forecasting methods depends on how much close the estimates are with the actual data. If estimates are too far from the actual values, then the forecasting method is not sufficient in making estimations; when estimates are too close to each other, then the required forecasting method is reliable, given that it predicts the estimates of a variable with adequate precision and confidence. In the following lines are presented some indicators that define the quality of a forecasting method.

Error: 휀 = 퐴푐푡푢푎푙 푣푎푙푢푒 − 퐹표푟푒푐푎푠푡푖푛푔 푣푎푙푢푒

∑푛 휀 Mean error: 휀 = 푖=1 푖 푛

∑푛 |휀 | Mean absolute error: |휀| = 푖=1 푖 푛

∑푛 휀2 Mean squared error: MSE = 휀2 = 푖=1 푖 푛

Root Mean Squared error: RMSE = √푀푆퐸

푇 ∑푖=1|휀푖| Mean absolute scaled error without seasonal data: MASE = 푇 ∑푇 |푌 −푌 | 푇−1 푖=2 푖 푖−1

푇 ∑푖=1|휀푖| Mean absolute scaled error with seasonal data: MASE = 푇 푚 = 푠푒푎푠표푛푎푙 푝푒푟푖표푑 ∑푇 |푌 −푌 | 푇−푚 푖=푚+1 푖 푖−푚

푛 100% ∑푡=1|퐹푡−퐷푡| Symmetric mean absolute percentage error: SMAPE = ∗ 퐷푡 = 푎푐푡푢푎푙 푣푎푙푢푒 푛 (|퐷푡|+|퐹푡|) 2

5.3.2. Forecasting Methods There can be distinguished three general categories of forecasting methods, being time-series or projective methods, causal methods and qualitative methods. Each one is analysed briefly in the following lines.

 Time-series or projective methods. These methods require the use of historical data for the estimation of future states of the world. Such methods have as purpose the identification of the way by which historical data was defined, so as to help us in identifying the way by which future data can be estimated. If the time horizon is small, such methods are quite reliable. These methods include among others moving average, simple exponential smoothing, trend-adjusted exponential smoothing, seasonality-adjusted exponential smoothing and seasonality and trend-adjusted exponential smoothing.  Causal methods. These methods assume that there is a cause (independent variable) that leads to an effect (dependent variable) and the purpose is to estimate the value of the dependent variable, as long as predictions are possible to be made concerning the independent variable.  Qualitative methods. These are based on subjective estimations of individuals combined with qualitative data. To carry out CBA an application of time-series methods will be applied, since Olympic Games data are longitudinal. The forecasting methods that will be applied in estimating costs and benefits are those of simple exponential smoothing, trend-adjusted exponential smoothing and trend-adjusted exponential smoothing with seasonality. The simple exponential smoothing model: Exponential smoothing models of forecasting assume that the impact of past data is reduced, while most recent data have greater impact. These models are quite elementary in their application and they can be readjusted by the time new data is made available. Any random fluctuations of time-series data can be handled easily. The simplest model of exponential smoothing is the simple exponential smoothing method. This model can be applied only if data do not show upward or downward trends and seasonality. To predict a future value of a variable, the actual value of the current period should be given. It has to be noted that this model does not presume the existence of a causal relationship between variables.

The simple exponential smoothing method “smoothens” the unsystematic fluctuations of variables. To understand how this model works, a brief reference to the forecasting method of moving average is needed. It is an elementary projective method for forecasting. The forecasting value of a variable 푋푡 is equal to the average actual values 퐷푡−1,…, 퐷푡−푁 for the N previous periods.

푡−푁 퐷 + 퐷 + ⋯ + 퐷 1 푋 = 푡−1 푡−2 푡−푁 = ∑ 퐷 푡 푁 푁 푖 (2) 푖=푡−1

First, is selected the number of periods for which the moving average can be calculated. The larger the N, the larger the smoothing effect in random fluctuations of the variable’s value caused by outliers. To make a forecast for the next period, it is needed to take into account the most recent value of a variable subtracting it from the previous one. Then, equation (2) becomes:

퐷푡 − 퐷푡−푁 푋 = 푋 + (3) 푡+1 푡 푁

This equation is used when the previous expected value of 푋푡 is given, as well as the actual value of the variable for periods 푡 and 푡 − 푁.

Returning to the application of the simple exponential smoothing model, by invoking formula (3), it is assumed that only the most recent value of the variable 퐷푡 and the expected value 퐹푡 of period 푡 are known. Formula (3) can be reformulated in such a way to ignore the value of the variable in period 푡 − 푁 and to substitute it with an approximate value. This value could be equal to 퐹푡 from the previous period. Formula (3) can be rewritten as follows: 퐷 − 퐹 1 1 퐹 = 퐹 + 푡 푡 = 퐷 + (1 − ) 퐹 푡+1 푡 푁 푁 푡 푁 푡 (4)

To define the forecasting value of 푋 for the period 푡 + 1, the most recent actual value 퐷푡 is taken 1 into account having weight equal to and the most recent forecasting value 퐹 with weight equal 푁 푡 1 1 to 1 − . Substituting with 푎 it is implied: 푁 푁

푭풕+ퟏ = 풂푫풕 + (ퟏ − 풂)푭풕 (5) where 푎 is the smoothing factor ranging from 0 to 1. Usually, small values of 푎 give better smoothing than large values. On the other hand, large values of 푎 means that the model reacts faster to actual changes of the value of the variable. If fluctuations of variables are unsystematic-random, usually a small value of 푎 is selected. When it is desired to minimise differences between actual and expected values, a higher value of alpha is selected. The trend-adjusted exponential smoothing method: If actual input data for forecasting show a constant upward or a downward trend, then the previous model fails to explain such fluctuations.

This because the difference between 퐷푡+1 and 퐷푡 includes a trend that characterises longitudinal data. To explain this forecasting method, the following terms are defined:

퐹푡: cost or benefit estimate at time 푡 푇푡: trend estimate at time 푡 From these estimates, the forecasted value of costs and benefits for the following periods can be defined (푃푡+1). For this case, in addition to the smoothing factor alpha that smoothens the random

71 fluctuations of input data, the smoothing factor beta (훽) is needed to smoothen the fluctuations of the trends for every forecasting period. This factor is also known as trend adjustment factor.

To make a forecasting with this method, first 퐹푡+1 is calculated by transforming equation (5), to include the trend estimate.

퐹푡+1 = 푎퐷푡 + (1 − 푎)(퐹푡 + 푇푡) (6) Next, the forecasting of the trend is calculated through the below formula:

푇푡+1 = 훽(퐹푡+1 − 퐹푡) + (1 − 훽)푇푡 (7) where β ranges from 0 to 1. Equation (7) is an estimate of how much the change would be between

퐹푡 and 퐹푡+1 Combining equations (6) and (7) the value of 푃푡+1 can be estimated.

푃푡+1 = 퐹푡+1 + 푇푡+1 (8) and for making forecasts for m-periods, equation (8) becomes

푃푡+푚 = 퐹푡+1 + 푚푇푡+1 (9)

In order for the trend-adjusted exponential smoothing to function, the initial values of 퐷1 and 푇1 should be given. This method, provides estimations of the values that are closer to the actual values. Hence, the selection of two smoothing factors affects significantly the error level as it is decreased. If the previous method had been applied then the forecasted values would have been lower than those of the method analysed so far, and hence error levels would have been higher.

The trend-adjusted exponential smoothing method with seasonality: This method was developed by Winters, and it is used in case the longitudinal data present both seasonality and trend. The existence of such a method presumes the existence of a third smoothing factor called gamma (훾), as well as of a seasonality factor 퐼. The later can be calculated by dividing the actual value of a variable with the seasonal average value of that variable. If the value of 퐼푡 is more than 1, it means that there is a seasonal upsurge, while if it is less than 1 it means a weak upsurge. This model presents fluctuations not only on the level of actual demand, but also on the trends and on the seasonality factor. To track down such changes, this model can be explained by means of four equations: First, equation (6) is transformed so as to include the seasonality and trend factor.

퐷푡 퐹푡 = 푎 + (1 − 푎)(퐹푡−1 + 푇푡−1) (10) 퐼푡−퐿 where L is the seasonal range (i.e. number of Olympiads). Second, seasonality factor is estimated by equation (11):

퐷푡 (11) 퐼푡 = 훾 + (1 − 훾)훪푡−퐿 퐹푡 Third, trend factor is calculated by transforming equation (7):

푇푡 = 훽(퐹푡 + 퐹푡−1) + (1 − 훽)푇푡−1 (12) Therefore, future costs and benefits for m periods are forecasted through formula (13):

푃푡+푚 = (퐹푡 + 푇푡푚)퐼푡−퐿+푚 (13)

5.3.3. Additional parameters needed The forecasting methods, help to control uncertainty in estimating future states of the world. How- ever, when applying CBA if they are fully based on raw data they would imply unrealistic results. This because additional factors have to be taken into account; the discount rate and the time horizon of the project. The discount rate is a key component of a CBA analysis, since it is required to discount future cashflows into today’s terms, so as to assess the feasibility of a proposed project by calculating its Net Present Value (NPV). A positive NPV means that the project is feasible to be implemented, while a negative NPV means the opposite. A zero NPV means that the project is marginal and decision making is quite hard. Calculation of an NPV is made through the below formulas:

푁푃푉 = 푃푉 푏푒푛푒푓푖푡푠 − 푃푉 푐표푠푡푠 (14)

∑ 퐹푉 푏푒푛푒푓푖푡푠 ∑ 퐹푉 푐표푠푡푠 푃푉 푏푒푛푒푓푖푡푠 = (15) 푃푉 푐표푠푡푠 = (16) (1 + 푖)푛 (1 + 푖)푛 where 푖 is the nominal discount rate and n the number of periods in which discounting is made. To adjust the nominal discount rate for inflation, this gives the real discount rate that can be calculated from the below formula: 푖 − 푚 푟 = 1 + 푚 푟 < 푖 (17) where 푚 is the expected rate of inflation. Formulas (15) and (16) can be re-written by substituting 푖 with 푟 if 푚 is known. In the analysis, from data extracted from World Bank (World Bank, 2017) the current (2016) real discount rate of Greece is about 7.54%. Since data found from previous Olympics concern nominal amounts including inflation, discounting by using nominal interest rate will be used. Data from World Bank show that the inflation rate of Greece for 2016 is -0.826%. Hence the nominal discount rate amounts to 6.65%. The time horizon of the project concerns the period in which the feasibility of a project is being studied. Typically, most ex-post analyses of the Olympic Games concern a period of about 10 years starting from the bidding process until some years after the organisation of the Olympic

Games. For the analysis, it is assumed a period of 20 years that includes 5 Olympiads occurring every 4 years. As base year is considered to be this current year 2017. Using the forecasting tool of Microsoft Excel, according to the provided input data from previous Games, the program determines which of the aforementioned methods analysed in section 5.3.2 will be used. For the OCOG costs the following findings are provided with a confidence level of 95%, as well as the forecasting statistics concerning error terms (refer to section 5.3.1) and exponential smoothing factors. While looking at the forecasting tables in Annex C and E (Table C.1, Table C.2, Table E.1, Table E.2 and Table E.3), the first column called Olympiad numbered from 1 to 7 concerns the Games organised from 1992 till today. The second column includes retrieved cost or benefit data from the Olympiads under study. The third column, depicts the forecasted values of the costs or benefits, whilst the fourth column Confidence Interval provides the possibility to include two possible scenarios in the CBA; the bad scenario and the good one. A bad scenario means that forecasted costs will be increased by 2.5% (i.e. for each forecasted cost, it is added the confidence interval to calculate its upper level), while forecasted benefits will be decreased by the same percentage (i.e. for each forecasted benefit, it is subtracted the confidence interval to calculate its lower level). The opposite logic is applied for the explanation of the good scenario. On the other hand, the reference scenario for each cost or benefit is depicted in the third column. In such a way, uncertainty is controlled in this CBA.

5.3.4. Valuation of OCOG costs To make a valuation of the OCOG costs this needs the take into account the following: when do these occur? As stated in section 5.2, OCOG costs occur during the bidding process, during the preparation phase and during the in-Games period. About the bidding costs, although these constitute a small part of the OCOG costs, under a permanent host of the Olympics in Greece these no longer occur. This because there is no need for countries to submit a Bid File, something that implies costs for its preparation. About technology and security costs, these concern investments on technologies used for the needs of the Games such as ICT, energy and venue technology management, as well as investments for preventing potential terrorist and other types of attacks during the Games. Such costs also occur during preparation phase, being the 4-year period before hosting the Games. For the CBA analysis, it is assumed that these costs occur one year before hosting the Games. The rest of the costs, such as all the categories of operating expenses, lodging, catering, marketing, administrative, workforce, Paralympic Games organisation and ceremony expenses, are assumed to occur during the in-Games period. Since these costs occur periodically in a one-off manner, discounting is needed. For the technology, operating, ceremony, administrative, workforce, marketing, lodging, catering and Paralympic expenses, the trend-adjusted exponential smoothing was applied, since in Table C.1 and in Table C.2 in Annex C, a value of beta is provided. In addition to this, data from recent Olympiads show a tendency for an upward trend. This means that there is a constant attempt from

74 the OCOG to invest in spectacle, translated into new technologies making them accessible to spectators, so as to ensure leading class provided services, and a smooth and reliable running of the Games. All these have as an objective to deliver a “unique experience” to all Olympic visitors. On the other hand, while forecasting the Games security costs, some missing points can be observed for both Athens and London Olympics. These were covered by the public sector, so they do not have standing as OCOG costs. Someone could argue that the real phenomenon of terrorism and violence in Greece is one of the longest in Europe started from 1974 until today (Bossis, 2003). Let alone, someone could argue that further security investments are needed, at the moment that there is worldwide awareness of the phenomenon of terrorism and of its effects either during the Games or in general during the everyday life of citizens. An example of global terrorism today is the ISIS that periodically spreads the fear around the world and especially in Europe. To estimate exactly what would be the security costs, this is quite difficult. Theoretically speaking, this spending is highly related with the terrorism index that each country has, but it does not nec- essarily mean that a higher security spending means a terrorism-free country. On the other hand, Greece is one of the countries in the world with a medium to high terrorism index of about 4,218 being on the 43rd position worldwide, according to data from Institute for Economics and Peace (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). To tackle with this inconsistency of the forecasted data, it will be assumed that periodically 2 years before the start of the Games security costs will be a fixed cost occurring at a level as it was in 2004 -about 457 million € ($ 656 million in today’s USD)-, by taking into account the success that Athens has achieved by its own Games as analysed in its ex-post-Olympic Games study (ATHOC 2004).

Table C.3 to Table C.5 in Annex C depict the valuation of the OCOG costs (security, technology, OpEx, Administrative, Ceremony, Paralympic Games, Workforce, Marketing and Lodging Ex- penses.

5.3.5. Valuation of Non-OCOG costs For the valuation of Non-OCOG costs, it is known that all relevant Olympic infrastructure is present from the Games of 2004. Hence, there is no need to focus on longitudinal data from previous Olympic Games, since the majority of Olympic Works started from scratch. It is assumed for simplicity that the number of countries, athletes and sports events will not change. After the 2004 Games, according to Kintis et al. (2003), it costs Greece for maintaining the Olympic facilities $ 263 million per year on average and their total annual depreciation amounts for $ 133 million per year. Any other operating costs that accrue to the organisation of diverse cultural and sports events are priced at $ 166 million (all amounts in 2017 USD). Hence it is possible to calculate the accumulated value needed for the restoration of facilities being now in bad condition, due to poor legacy management. It is also needed to take into account their remaining value if depreciation had been applied for a time horizon of 30 years. If it is considered as base year 2017, then 13 years have already passed from 2005, being the year after the organisation of the Olympic Games. The

75 total accumulated value amounts to $ 5.69 billion, amount greater than that required for their development for the Games (it cost the Greek public sector about $ 4 billion for the Olympic Works, according to (Zonzilos, Demian, Papadakis, Paratsiokas, & Danchev, 2015). This cost will occur immediately from the first year, and then depreciation, maintenance and operating costs will occur on an annual basis. It is also assumed that venues will be fully functional for any other cultural events, apart from sports ones. The figures presented above can be summarised in Table D.1 and in Table D.2 in Annex D. Since no new infrastructures are going to be developed from scratch, no environmental impacts can be identified. It is also assumed for simplicity, that the Greek government is going to adopt a sustainability agenda, based on the recent Games organised from 2008 till 2012 (further details are depicted in sections 6.5.1 and 6.6.1) for renovating its existing Olympic infrastructure, which means that environmental impacts are negligible.

5.3.6. Valuation of OCOG benefits Valuation of OCOG benefits is mainly based on longitudinal data from previous Games, so the application of trend-adjusted exponential smoothing was made, since data depicted in Table E.1 to Table E.3 in Annex E show an upward trend. This is applied to the revenues from TV rights, licensing and sponsoring, but not on ticket sales. The message behind these trends are summarised firstly to the fact that more and more people have access to the media in watching the Games. Moreover, sponsors are more willing to promote their technology services to the hosting country, and also people seem to give more focus on symbolism by purchasing licensed goods, to remember the Games. Concerning the particularities of ticket sales, these depend on the size of venues where all events take place; hence different countries have different sizes of venues. Second, benefits from ticket sales can be defined by means of a demand function, in which the WTP of spectators should be known, as well as the slope of the curve. Even assuming a unitary elastic linear demand curve, and even knowing the total number of tickets sold and the average price (market clearing price) during the 2004 Games (a total of 5,300,000 tickets with an average price of $ 52.67), again it is impossible to define the WTP, so as to calculate the consumer surplus, being the triangular shaded area exhibited in the below figure. This is possible by applying CVM, something that is outside the scope of this thesis.

If it is assumed that the number of sports does not change and no further capacity expansion of existing sports facilities is needed, then ticketing valuation becomes easier; they are already known the total number of tickets sold, average price and attendance rate (it was 72% during the 2004 Games according to (ATHOC 2004)) so as to take three possible scenarios; half attendance; 75% attendance and full attendance. Assume also for simplicity that ticket revenues occur during the in-Games period, as well as the rest of the OCOG benefits. All these facts from the 2004 Games are shown in Table E.4. By invoking the previously mentioned assumptions, as well as the data presented in Table E.4, valuation of ticketing becomes possible presented in Table E.5

Figure 5.3: Definition of consumer surplus and expenditure, through a demand curve (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer, 2011). For the estimation of TV rights as depicted in Table E.6, it is assumed that these occur once every 4 years and especially during the Games period. But behind the idea of a permanent organisation of the Olympic Games in Greece, it is needed to take into account sentiments of routine, translated into a potential fall in TV audience spectacle after 3 Olympiads; so that is the reason of explaining the existence of a negative scenario in the revenues from TV rights. It could be possible that for two Olympiads it is expected an upsurge in TV revenues, but in the rest of Olympiads may be observed a fall in them. In a proportional logic are analysed the revenues from sponsorship and licensing in Table E.7 and in Table E.8 respectively. It is assumed that these also occur once every 4 years during the in- Games period. Under a permanent organisation of the Games in Greece, it is likely probable that the sponsors due to their international outlook, may not be willing to invest their technologies every time to Greece. Hence, it is possible that after for example three Olympiads such revenues may not increase significantly. Concerning the bad scenario of licensing revenues, it is possible to state that there will be no revenues from the sale of licensed products. This could be even probable after some Olympiads, given the general sentiment of routine. Having made a valuation of all direct OCOG benefits, it is now possible to calculate the expected net OCOG benefits (Table 5.6), as well as the amount that accrues to the IOC. For their estimation, it is needed to consider that the IOC charges every OCOG with 10% of their gross benefits, as stated in its charter of (2015). It will be assumed that this also holds under a permanent organisation of the Games in Greece. Gross benefits are implied if OCOG benefits are subtracted from the OCOG costs. This charge by the IOC in CBA brings a surplus loss for the OCOG. This because IOC has to cover mainly its operating and administrative expenses of “governing the Olympic Movement”.

IOC rights Gross benefits Net OCOG benefits (10% of Gross benefits) Olympiad Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario 1 $ 3,170 $ 4,650 $ 6,138 $ 0,317 $ 0,465 $ 0,614 $ 2,853 $ 4,185 $ 5,524 2 $ 2,526 $ 3,928 $ 5,350 $ 0,253 $ 0,393 $ 0,535 $ 2,274 $ 3,536 $ 4,815 3 $ 2,052 $ 3,295 $ 4,559 $ 0,205 $ 0,329 $ 0,456 $ 1,846 $ 2,965 $ 4,103 4 $ 1,680 $ 2,747 $ 3,834 $ 0,168 $ 0,275 $ 0,383 $ 1,512 $ 2,472 $ 3,450 5 $ 1,379 $ 2,277 $ 3,193 $ 0,138 $ 0,228 $ 0,319 $ 1,242 $ 2,050 $ 2,874 Total Net Benefits $ 9,726 $ 15,207 $ 20,766 Table 5.6: Valuation of total OCOG benefits (amounts in current billion USD). Total OCOG benefits can range from $ 9.726 to $ 20,766 billion. The most optimistic figure tends to be biased, since it predicts that everything in Greece is going to evolve ideally, under the proposed policy. In reality, if it is considered that during the first Olympiad the good scenario comes true, as it would cultivate a general sense of euphoria of giving the Olympics to Greece again; then in the 2nd and 3rd Olympiad the expected scenario may be realised, as slowly sentiments of routine emerge; and in 4th and 5th Olympiad the bad scenario may come true; then it is possible to say that the total net benefits can arise to $ 14,779 billion. All OCOG costs have been taken into account in the calculation. But if sentiments of routine become dominant from the 3rd Olympiad, then benefits are restricted to $ 13.66 billion (during 1st and 2nd Olympiad again it is considered that the good and expected scenarios are realised respectively). These can be easily depicted in the below tables.

Olympiad Realised Scenario Net OCOG benefits 1 Good $ 5,524 2 Expected $ 3,536 3 Expected $ 2,965 4 Bad $ 1,512 5 Bad $ 1,242 Total Net Benefits $ 14,779

Table 5.7: Sensitivity analysis of Net OCOG benefits when sentiments of routine start from the 4th Olympiad.

Olympiad Realised Scenario Net OCOG benefits 1 Good $ 5,524 2 Expected $ 3,536 3 Bad $ 1,846 4 Bad $ 1,512 5 Bad $ 1,242 Total Net Benefits $ 13,66

Table 5.8: Sensitivity analysis of Net OCOG benefits when sentiments of routine start from the 3rd Olympiad. If it is considered the current international image of Greece in terms of economic, social and political stability, then it is more likely to be more conservative in estimations, and to assume that

78 the net OCOG benefits will be no more than $ 9.726 billion. However, in section 5.4 it will be mentioned that these benefits are not debited exclusively to Greece, provided the assumption made in section 3.1 and the additional consideration for creating a win-win outcome between the participating countries and Greece.

5.3.7. Valuation of Non-OCOG benefits This category of benefits accrues mainly from the consumption occurred by touristic activity, from national pride that a nation exhibits during the organisation of the Games and from use value of venues. Especially, there is tendency to overlook pride when carrying out both ex-ante and ex-post CBA analyses of the Olympic Games; therefore, only tangible and easy to monetize effects are included (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997). As Helen Lenskyj (2004), Professor of Sociology of University of Toronto states that the Olympic Games generate too much enthusiasm among citizens all over the hosting country, since there is the sentiment of being at the foreground of the worldwide actu- ality. This sentiment tends to “trump” every logical argument, leading to optimism biases. On the other hand, when such an event occurs periodically at the same place, then national pride tends to diminish in the long run as such an event becomes a routine.

5.3.7.1. National Pride estimation Valuation of national pride is made by applying CVM. Because such a process can be considered too ambitious for the objectives of this thesis, this can be estimated (roughly) from a CVM study carried out in 2006 for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics. Average WTP was estimated at $ 6.55 per habitant in current dollars ($ 5.77 in 2006 USD). According to this study carried out by McHugh (2006), national pride is highly correlated with the population of the country hosting the Olympics. This externality of the Games is also expressed during the whole period of Games preparation and during the Games-period, according to the same source. However, this provided valuation cannot be considered a good predictor, since Winter Olympics as an event does not have the popularity of the Summer Games, and in addition to this, McHugh provided such a WTP price by invoking proportional events similar of the scope of Winter Olympics, such as hockey champion- ships. The author affirms that “the $ 5.77 figure would be biased downwards from the true existence value of the Olympic Games”. Another CVM study, was conducted by Longo, Walton and Dawson in 2008 for the 2012 London Olympics (Walton, Longo, & Dawson, 2008). In brief, these authors built on a study that was carried out in 2005 by the Economics for the Environment Consultancy (EFTEC) (2005). EFTEC performed a CVM to evaluate national pride at the UK level for the London Olympics, by making a survey across the populations of London, Manchester and Glasgow. The EFTEC study has provided the following median Willingness to Pay (WTP) amounts for these regions; £ 11, £ 6 and £ 4 respectively. In addition, Walton, Longo and Dawson performed another CVM to estimate the WTP of residents living in Bath and in South West England and they found a median value of £ 42.2, after having conducted several rounds of interviews asking Bath’s and South West England’s residents. The questions asked addressed whether these residents were willing to pay a specific

79 amount of pounds to attend an event. Combining their results with those provided by the EFTEC study, the average WTP for the UK level was implicitly extracted. Therefore, the regional WTP for the London Olympics can be a good predictor in estimating the national WTP, but this also depends on the mentality of the population of the hosting country. For Greece, it is true that sentiments of desperation, disappointment and suspicion are dominant nowadays, so it would be possible for the entire population to affirm that this idea is “too good to be true”. Indeed, population seems to be biased by attributing the causes of the current recession to the Olympic Games of 2004, but on the other hand a small ray of pride may arise from the fact that Greece is the birthplace of the Olympic Games, as well as the starting point for the modern Games, so there are also some positive thoughts about this idea. So, it is not feasible to attribute such a high WTP value as it was for the London Olympics being on average $ 25.73 per habitant (current USD), given the dominant mentality of Greek people, nor too low than $ 6.55 for the Winter Games of Vancouver. An average value of $ 16.14 is selected for this case. To take into account the fact that the event after 10 years will bring about sentiments of routine, it is assumed that WTP value will be reduced by 10% per year. In addition to these, a problem that Greece is facing currently is the reduction of its population, since deaths exceed births, and there is a tendency for young people to leave Greece behind because of the weak macroeconomic situation, according to Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2017). An analysis of this data, through the method of trend-adjusted exponential smoothing gives the following results in a 20-year future period in Table F.1 in Annex F. Data about the net Greek population are provided by the Hellenic Statistical Authority as it was measured in 2011. The bad scenario is that population decrease would be much quicker, and the good scenario predicts that there would be stagnation to the population with a small tendency to decline. These projections are provided, by keeping in mind the current situation. Note also that national pride can be calculated by taking into account the net Greek population, excluding foreigners who live in the country. These benefits are assumed to occur every year, and these have a standing at national level. With all these considerations in mind, Table F.5 exhibits the benefits accruing from national pride.

5.3.7.2. Benefits from touristic activity Concerning revenues from touristic consumption, these can occur even without the organisation of the Olympic Games, but on the other hand they can cultivate international awareness for the country which hosts them, so it is possible to expect an upsurge in touristic activity, resulting in benefits as it is shown from previous Olympics. Barcelona Olympics for example, on average from 1985 till 1992 led Spain to experience annual touristic benefits of $ 2.63 billion and to a total impact on GDP of $ 18.4 billion. The highest level of touristic benefits was exhibited by China, which experienced an annual increase of its tourism revenue of $ 3.12 billion per year, resulting in total touristic revenues from 2001 to 2008 of more than $ 20 billion. Regarding Greece, it is a touristic country, but a higher number of tourism arrivals does not nec- essarily mean that benefits from tourism will be higher. This because tourism depends on the level

80 of spending of tourists and on the number of days they stay; that is for example we have 1000 tourist arrivals in year 푥 and their average spending is about $ 15 per day. Assume also that these tourists stay on average for 10 days, we have total revenues of $ 150,000. If we double now the number of tourist arrivals in year 푥 + 1 but these on average spend $ 7 per day, by keeping stable the number of days total revenues from tourism amount for $ 140,000. If now 3000 tourists stay for five days and they spend $ 8 per day in year 푥 + 2, the total revenues account for $ 120,000. Hence, we have a total surplus loss from touristic activity of $ 10,000 in year 푥 + 1 and of $ 20,000 between year 푥 + 1 and 푥 + 2; average loss from tourism is $ 15,000 per year. The previous simple examples show how tourism annual benefits are calculated for the upcoming 20-year period of 5 Olympiads; differences of tourism revenues between year 푥 + 1 and 푥 give the annual surplus or loss of touristic consumption (tourism benefits). Then, the method of trend- adjusted exponential smoothing is applied.

More specifically, data from tourism shown on Table F.2 and on Table F.6, tourism annual benefits are defined by World Bank as expenditures by international inbound visitors, including payments to national carriers for international transport. Such receipts include any other prepayments made for goods or services received in the destination country. They do not include receipts from local tourists. Such definition concerns the secondary effects of tourism from the Olympic Games, occurring from the demand of Olympic tourists (journalists, NOCs, sponsors, athletes, the Olympic Family and other visitors) for restaurants, hotels, etc that these are considered to be secondary effects. That is because the Olympic Games as a project is related to the provision of quality transportation, housing and security services, as well as sports spectacle. These can be called as primary effects. Hence, in order to avoid double counting of benefits, primary benefits of the Olympic Games are defined by the help of secondary effects. Forecasting benefits from touristic activity (Table F.2) with the method of trend-adjusted exponential smoothing gives results in bad scenario that explains the fact that there would probably be a reduction of touristic consumption, being not directly related to the number of tourists by themselves. Probable causes may be an upward price change that may affect the number of days tourists that visit Greece, or the fact that a radical increase to the number of tourists, may lead a majority of them out of the accommodation facilities that currently Greece possesses; hence, this can be a consumption loss.

5.3.7.3. Use value of venues estimation Finally, benefits that accrue from the use value of venues, it is assumed that these venues will be fully operational for recreational activities during the years that succeed the Olympic Games. Such benefits are defined by means of a CVM, and they have direct relationship with the net population of both Greece and of municipalities where the venues are situated. An analysis made by Kintis et al. (2003), determined the WTP value of citizens in municipalities at $ 117.59 (for more information about the use value of venues for the Olympic Games of 2004, refer to Table F.3). This WTP is analogous to a municipal tax that they have to pay in order to have the facility in their

81 municipality regardless of how frequently they use it. Estimation of venue use values is the same as for national pride. It is also assumed public exploitation of venues, since multiple countries have a stake in their investment, so that the benefits in which they participate equally during the preparation phase between the Olympics, cover the operating, maintenance and depreciation costs. In addition, it is assumed a perfect relationship between Greece’s and Attica’s municipalities population, since Attica’s population constitutes more that 40% of total Greece’s population. To calculate the total use value of venues, it is needed to take into account the benefits that these generate to people living in the municipality of Attica and to the Greek population. These benefits also include revenues from the operation of venues that constitute part of the total benefits. Esti- mation of these benefits in both municipal and national level is made based on raw data that Kintis et al. provided, and on the most recent trends of the net Greek population. So, percentage changes of the Greek population will have an equivalent percentage change to the benefits generated from the use of venues in local, municipal and national level (invoke data from Table F.1). Local and national use values were determined by Kintis et al. by taking into account the population as it was provided by the Hellenic Statistical Authority in 2001. Table F.4 and Table F.7 give the actual annual use value by taking into account the afore mentioned parameters, after having included the annual population percentage changes. The explanation behind the existence of three different scenarios, is the same as in National Pride estimation. The existence of the venues’ use value makes clear that recreational activities are carried out in the venues between Olympiads. This presupposes sufficient legacy management (as it will be em- phasised in section 6), in order to take advantage of the revenues coming from recreational events. These revenues are depicted in Table F.8. These are assumed to occur within two consecutive Olympiads. It has to be mentioned that during the Games period, recreational events do not take place, since testing of the Games’ technology equipment has to be carried out; therefore, the only source of revenues from the use of venues will come from ticket sales. Moreover, since it is assumed public exploitation of venues, the revenues from recreational activities will phase out any operational and maintenance costs, as well as depreciation. This additional condition was also considered by Kintis et al. (2003) when talking about the exploitation of venues after the Olympic Games. Such costs have been already defined in Table D.1, in order to estimate construction-renovation costs of facilities.

5.3.8. Valuation of opportunity costs Under the current situation of hosting the Olympic Games, it is generally argued that there are better opportunities in investing public funds in other projects such as in education, healthcare, in transportation or in urban planning. Due to the ongoing increasing costs of hosting the Olympic Games, there is enough scepticism from the part of future candidate cities, such as Boston for the 2024 Games (Anonymous, 2014). Hence a manifestation movement called “No Boston Olympics” was created. Another example were the cities of Rome, Hamburg and Budapest, which withdrew

82 from the bidding process for hosting the Games of 2024. Rome reported financial difficulties in hosting the Games (BBC News, 2016), while Hamburg in 2015 arranged a referendum in which citizens voted against the organisation of the Games (Huggler, 2015). Budapest also organised a referendum in which citizens collected signatures for not hosting the Olympics, because the main argument was the lack of any significant post-Olympics effects (Dunai, 2017). Hence none of these cities were willing to spend more than $ 2 billion as OCOG costs for the organisational aspects of the Games, excluded any other Non-OCOG costs, since the main argument was the opportunity cost of alternative useful investments. Imagine now the permanent organisation of the Games in Greece; since the Olympic Games is an integrated project, by the time these acquire a permanent character to their birthplace, Greece will be obliged to invest more and more to them, so as to keep delivering a unique experience and to become again a source of expression of the Olympic Spirit. Hence, multiple investments are going to be done in the aforementioned domains that otherwise would be impossible. It is also an opportunity for the national political scene to deduct this issue as a national one, for the purpose of reviving the spirit of Olym- pism free from any commercialization and competition concepts being dominant in today’s sports. Therefore, no opportunity costs can be identified under the proposed policy.

5.4. Discussion of findings After having made a valuation of OCOG and Non-OCOG costs and benefits, it is needed to answer who is going to undergo these costs and benefits. The answer lies to the assumption made on page 48. Hence, the OCOG and Non-OCOG costs are distributed equally to the participating countries. This probably would need the creation of an OCOG division within the IOC, instead of national OCOGs that used to be under the stake of the hosting country which took all these costs. While distributing OCOG and Non-OCOG costs among all participating countries, it is needed to add the following parameter when talking about the three scenarios. The bad scenario means that the increased costs will be distributed among fewer countries, while the good scenario means that the reduced costs will be distributed to fewer countries. For the expected scenario, the estimated forecasted costs will be distributed to the expected number of countries going to participate at the Games. A forecasting for the number of countries is made in the below table. At the moment that all countries are participating at the OCOG and Non-OCOG costs for the Games, in order for them to have a positive return from this investment it is logically inferred that they will also participate at the revenues. When using the three scenarios for the distribution of benefits described above, here someone would argue that when making estimations in good scenario, mathematically the fewer the participating countries the larger the benefits for each country, and for the bad one is applied the opposite. However, it will not make sense to take as a good scenario the participation of fewer countries in the Games, at the moment that more countries have participated in the distribution of costs. The same is applied when talking about the bad scenario. This because in the Olympic Games it is not possible to have entry and exit of countries in the

83 distribution of costs and benefits, hence the same logic of cost distribution will be applied as for the distribution of benefits.

Forecasted No. of Confidence Interval Olympiad No of countries Statistic Value countries (No of countries) 1 169 Alpha 0,900 2 197 Beta 0,001 3 199 Gamma 0,000 4 201 MASE 0,877 5 204 SMAPE 0,027 6 204 MAE 5,262 7 205 RMSE 9,252 8 210 18 9 214 24 10 219 29 11 224 34 12 228 37 Table 5.9: Forecasting of the number of countries participating at the Games (Statista, 2017). The final CBA of the proposed policy after having distributed OCOG costs/benefits and Non- OCOG costs is given in the following table. More analytically the results are presented in Annex G, Table G.1.

Greek level CBA (in current billion USD) Bad scenario Expected scenario Good scenario NPV B/C NPV B/C NPV B/C $ 8,020 51,38 $ 14,486 120,53 $ 20,942 230,20

Table 5.10: CBA summary of Greece (amounts in current billion USD). It is evident that for the Greek level, in both three scenarios the NPV is positive with a time horizon of 20 years. In order to compare these NPVs, with the NPV of benefits from the Games organised from 1992 till 2016, the EANB method is applied. This, because the valuation of costs and benefits in these Olympiads considered a time horizon of 7 years, starting from the preparation phase, until the Games year, as well as discount rates are different per country. Formula (18) is used for calculating EANB: 푁푃푉 퐸퐴푁퐵 = 1 − (1 + 푖)−푡 (18) 푖 where 푡 is the time horizon of the project. The average nominal discount rate for every hosting country is calculated based on time series data from Table B.1, Table B.3, Table B.5, Table B.7, Table B.9, Table B.11 and Table B.13. Hence, the below table shows the comparison between the equivalent annual benefits for every hosted Olympiad, and the permanent hosting of the Olympics in Greece.

EANB of EANB EANB EANB EANB EANB EANB EANB of Scenarios permanent of 1992 of 1996 of 2000 of 2004 of 2008 of 2012 2016 Olympics Games Games Games Games Games Games Games Bad scenario $ 0,74 Expected scenario $ 1,33 $ 3,91 $ 0,29 $ -0,19 $ 1,27 $ 4,28 $ 0,99 $ -3,67 Good scenario $ 1,92 Average EANB $ 0.98 Table 5.11: Comparison between the current and permanent Olympics (in billion USD). Results from this table, imply that a permanent host of the Olympic Games in Greece is a preferable option, compared to the Games organised in different countries. This refer to our expected reference scenario, as well as to the good one. If the bad scenario occurs, then it is more feasible to remain at the status quo, that is to organise the Olympics in different countries. However, these results refer solely to the Greek level. For the international level, the permanent organisation of the Games arises the following issue; do the other countries which are willing to contribute in hosting the Games permanently in Greece are winners or losers from the whole story? The answer is given in the following tables (Table 5.12 - Table 5.16) which summarise the benefits and costs that accrue to the participating countries. Also, the benefit-cost ratio is mentioned. Coun- tries willing to participate in financing the Games to Greece, participate not only at the OCOG and Non-OCOG costs, but also at the OCOG benefits and at the benefits generated from the exploitation of venues. Benefits that result from pride and touristic activity are debited to Greece.

Total Sports related costs per Total Net OCOG revenue per Total Net benefits per country country country Olympiad Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario 1 $ 0,065 $ 0,053 $ 0,043 $ 0,023 $ 0,028 $ 0,031 $ -0,041 $ -0,025 $ -0,011 2 $ 0,032 $ 0,024 $ 0,017 $ 0,019 $ 0,022 $ 0,025 $ -0,014 $ -0,001 $ 0,008 3 $ 0,026 $ 0,019 $ 0,013 $ 0,015 $ 0,018 $ 0,020 $ -0,011 $ -0,001 $ 0,007 4 $ 0,021 $ 0,015 $ 0,010 $ 0,012 $ 0,014 $ 0,016 $ -0,009 $ - $ 0,006 5 $ 0,016 $ 0,012 $ 0,008 $ 0,010 $ 0,012 $ 0,013 $ -0,007 $ - $ 0,005 Total NPV $ -0,081 $ -0,027 $ 0,015 Benefit-cost ratio 0,49 0,78 1,17 Table 5.12: International evaluation of the proposed policy (amounts in current billion USD). It can be observed that finally the permanent organisation of the Games in Greece has a win-lose outcome, even for the expected scenario, since countries will be obliged to suffer from losses that account for $ 27 million within 5 Olympiads, with a benefit-cost ratio of 0.78. And this is also true for countries that really desire to host an Olympiad. Under the proposed policy, the rest of the world will no longer be able to host any Games. In a good scenario, the policy has a win-win outcome, since the countries (and Greece also) have a net benefit within 20 years of $ 15 million from the Olympic Games themselves, and not from their indirect effects.

To challenge the assumption made in page 48, a sensitivity analysis determines the percentage level Greece should contribute to sports related costs, so as to create a zero outcome in the expected scenario. This percentage was calculated to 22.76 %, which again implies that Greece could be a winner from the proposed policy. In all scenarios, social benefits are restricted within a time horizon of 20 years; these are set now to $ 1.143, $ 8.565 and $ 15.978 billion respectively. However, in this case for Greece it is preferable to host the Olympic Games permanently, if the good scenario is realised. This because the equivalent annual benefits for the expected and bad scenarios, are well below the average ones ($ 0,98 billion), resulting from the Games hosted so far.

Sports related benefits summary (22.76 % Greek financing of OCOG/Non-OCOG costs) Scenarios Bad Scenario Expected Scenario Good scenario Total NPV $ 1,143 $ 8,565 $ 15,978 EANB $ 0,11 $ 0,79 $ 1,47

Table 5.13: Greece sports related benefits summary with 23% Greek participation at sports related costs (in current billion $).

Total Sports related costs per Total Net OCOG revenue per Total Net benefits per country country country Olympiad Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario 1 $ 0,050 $ 0,041 $ 0,033 $ 0,023 $ 0,028 $ 0,031 $ -0,027 $ -0,013 $ -0,002 2 $ 0,025 $ 0,018 $ 0,013 $ 0,019 $ 0,022 $ 0,025 $ -0,006 $ 0,004 $ 0,012 3 $ 0,020 $ 0,014 $ 0,010 $ 0,015 $ 0,018 $ 0,020 $ -0,005 $ 0,004 $ 0,010 4 $ 0,016 $ 0,011 $ 0,008 $ 0,012 $ 0,014 $ 0,016 $ -0,004 $ 0,003 $ 0,008 5 $ 0,013 $ 0,009 $ 0,006 $ 0,010 $ 0,012 $ 0,013 $ -0,003 $ 0,003 $ 0,007 Total NPV $ -0,045 $ - $ 0,036 Benefit-cost ratio 0,63 1 1,51 Table 5.14: International evaluation with 23% Greek participation at sports related costs (amounts in current billion USD). If Greece participates in sports related costs by 50%, then the international outcome becomes a win-win one for both the expected and optimistic scenario. This can be proved from the improved scores of benefit-cost ratios for all scenarios. However, social benefits for Greece are restricted even more throughout a timespan of 20 years, but the bad scenario proves that the permanent organisation of the Games in Greece is not worth, since NPV becomes negative. When looking at the EANB values, these in any scenarios are well below the EANB of the previous Games ($ 0,98 billion). Hence, under this condition, not only the status quo should be maintained, but also a permanent organisation of the Games in Greece leads again to a win-lose outcome, having as winners the participating countries, and Greece as a loser.

Sports related benefits summary (50 % Greek financing of OCOG/Non-OCOG costs) Scenarios Bad Scenario Expected Scenario Good scenario Total NPV $ -7,084 $ 1,480 $ 10,038 EANB $ -0,65 $ 0,14 $ 0,92

Table 5.15: Greece sports related benefits summary with 50% Greek participation at sports related costs (in billion USD).

Total Sports related costs per Total Net OCOG benefits per Total Net benefits per country country country Olympiad Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario 1 $ 0,032 $ 0,026 $ 0,021 $ 0,023 $ 0,028 $ 0,031 $ -0,009 $ 0,001 $ 0,010 2 $ 0,016 $ 0,012 $ 0,009 $ 0,019 $ 0,022 $ 0,025 $ 0,002 $ 0,010 $ 0,017 3 $ 0,013 $ 0,009 $ 0,007 $ 0,015 $ 0,018 $ 0,020 $ 0,002 $ 0,009 $ 0,014 4 $ 0,010 $ 0,007 $ 0,005 $ 0,012 $ 0,014 $ 0,016 $ 0,002 $ 0,007 $ 0,011 5 $ 0,008 $ 0,006 $ 0,004 $ 0,010 $ 0,012 $ 0,013 $ 0,001 $ 0,006 $ 0,009 Total NPV $ -0,002 $ 0,033 $ 0,061 Benefit-cost ratio 0,98 1,54 2,32 Table 5.16: International evaluation with 50% Greece participation at OCOG and Non-OCOG costs (in billion USD). Summarising, the permanent host of the Olympics in Greece is a win-lose policy having as winner Greece and losers the other participating countries. Hence, it is not such a feasible policy to be discussed within the IOC, due to the vested interests inside the organisation. However, under specific circumstances and arrangements, such a policy can have a win-win outcome. This depends mainly on how willing is Greece to bear the sports related costs. The following tables (Table 5.17 and Table 5.18) summarise the results already presented, for both Greece and internationally.

Greece sports related benefits (in current billion USD) Bad scenario Expected scenario Good scenario Financing strategies NPV EANB NPV EANB NPV EANB Equal contribution to sports $ 8,020 $ 0,74 $ 14,486 $ 1,33 $ 20,942 $ 1,92 related costs 23% contribution of Greece to $ 1,143 $ 0,11 $ 8,565 $ 0,79 $ 15,978 $ 1,47 sports related costs 50% contribution of Greece to $ -7,084 $ -0,65 $ 1,480 $ 0,14 $ 10,038 $ 0,92 sports related costs Table 5.17: CBA summary of Greece.

Net Benefits per country (in current billion USD) Bad scenario Expected scenario Good scenario Financing strategies NPV B/C NPV B/C NPV B/C Equal contribution to sports $ -0,081 0,49 $ -0,027 0,78 $ 0,015 1,17 related costs 23% contribution of Greece to $ -0,045 0,63 $ - 1 $ 0,036 1,51 sports related costs 50% contribution of Greece to $ -0,002 0,98 $ 0,033 1,54 $ 0,061 2,32 sports related costs Table 5.18: CBA summary of international level.

6. Infrastructure and Technology Management of the Olympiads from 1992 until 2012

The success factor of infrastructure projects developed for the needs of the Olympic Games lies to their post-Olympic use expanding therefore the legacy of the Games. In order to achieve this so, two key points have to be taken into account by country planners and by people responsible in legislating for urban planning, according to Synadinos (2005).

 High quality and balanced transportation and communication networks being in harmony with aesthetics and the environment.  Premises constructed for the needs of the Olympic Games have to be developed in a flexible way, so that during the post-Olympic Games period these building will "serve as a central social centre for the surrounding area". Throughout the years, cities that host the Olympic Games tend to invest huge amounts of funds for the development of large infrastructure projects, in order to affirm firmly to the IOC during the bidding process that they are capable for hosting them. According to Chalkley and Essex (1999) the environmental impacts from the infrastructure development for hosting the Games can be divided in four phases.

 The first phase includes the Olympic Games that took place from 1896 till 1904. These Games were of small scale without any needs for the development of new large-scale infrastructures.  The second phase includes the Games taken place from 1908 till 1932. In this case, despite their small-scale character, they had better organisation and some infrastructures were built.  In the third phase (Games organised from 1936 till 1956), the Games were even better organised, since errors from the past have been learned and they were characterized as being large scaled and the infrastructures developed had some effects on urban planning of the host cities.  The fourth phase (Games organised from 1960 till today), shares common elements with the previous one, but here the infrastructure development and management becomes a main concern, since their impact is significant to the urban structure of cities. The scale of infrastructure development can be explained to the rising number of athletes, coaches, members of the National Olympic Committees of every participating country, journalists and photographers responsible for the media coverage of the Games. This increasing number of people has to be accommodated. But the main dilemma that arises here is: permanent or temporary facilities should be developed? The only thing required from city planners and legislative bodies is to gain some lessons from previous Olympic Games by carrying out comparative analyses and to think carefully the previously mentioned two points as the key criteria to successful infrastructure management and development with the greatest legacy value to citizens and future visitors.

Regarding technology, it is another key success factor of the Olympic Games, since it is involved at every moment; from the preparation phase until competition. From spectators’ dimension, it is perceived as a moving image shown on television, there are hundreds of meters of optic fibres and cables, satellites, ICT systems and graphics system, guaranteeing thus a perfect result. To achieve it so, arduous efforts of professionals are needed by designing and testing such artefacts. Two key factors to success should be also taken into account:

 The exploitation of high quality, recent and known technologies, ensuring smoothness and reliable operation of the Games.  The staffing of the OCOG with highly-skilled people having technical knowledge, being fully ready to tackle any technical challenges during the Olympic Games (reporting results, guaranteeing data integrity and security of IT systems, guaranteeing uninterrupted broadcasting coverage, etc).

6.1. Barcelona 1992

6.1.1. Infrastructure management and development Barcelona began its attempt to promote its image through the organisation of mega events in 1888. At that time, Barcelona used to be the host city for the Universal Exposition. Its substantial effort of setting its objectives for urban management and transformation began in 1901 when the at the time "Industrial and Nationalist party" submitted a series of policies for application at the Town council (Monclús, 2000). These policies aimed to realise the motto "Barcelona; the Paris of South" translated into the creation of a city with well-organised regions and spectacular monuments. Two years later, the Town council has announced a competition in which architects proposed their own blueprints for the urban reformation of the city, and the winner was the architect Leon Jaussely from France. His blueprint included the creation of zones in order to provide cohesion and order of the agglomeration. In addition to this, this blueprint was in line with the at the time dominant standard in Europe named as "Beautiful City". Furthermore, Jaussely's urban design draft comprised of rules of thumb that enabled the reformation of the historical centre through the development of other monuments (Monclús, 2000). The public awareness of the city started to be cultivated to foreign visitors in 1908 through the establishment of the "Society for the attraction of foreigners". During that period, monuments such as the church of la Sagrada Familia, la Plaza de Cataluna, el Paseo de Gracia, the buildings at the Gothic neighbourhood and the addition of a monument on the Montjuic hill were implemented. The mixture between historical monuments and modern ones managed to bridge and reveal the glorious history of the city with its future (Brunet, 1995). For the Olympic Games of 1992, Barcelona's city council did not find it difficult to made a new reformation of the city to meet the needs of the Games, since experience from the past was existent. The Games were the cornerstone for setting the foundations to convert Barcelona into a flexible

89 city. Some remarkable construction works that were implemented for the Olympic Games period include among others (Brunet, 1995):

 Widening of the sea front towards the city.  Maintenance of the monumental buildings in Gothic neighbourhood and on Montjuic hill.  The construction of ring roads around Barcelona.  The construction of the Montjuic Telecommunications Tower.  The construction of the International Trade Centre at the port.  The redevelopment of the Olympic Stadium in Montjuic hill.  The construction of the Palau San Jordi gymnasium. These projects, however, were developed and completed before the start of the Olympic Games. It is true that Barcelona has set the strategic foundations to maximize the value of these projects especially after the period of the Olympic Games. The strategic orientation that Barcelona applied towards the development of the infrastructure projects, is translated to the definition of the important projects in order of importance for the Olympic Games. This, enabled the city to predefine the maximum amount of funds to be allocated for the case of the Olympic Games, and the rest for projects with long time-horizon offering value to citizens. The importance order of the projects related to the Olympic Games was as follows (Anonymous, 2005):

 Transportation networks  Accommodation, offices and commercial buildings  Touristic facilities  Sports facilities  Environmental infrastructures The below table gives the allocation of spending of these Games, compared to previous ones. From this table, it can be clearly argued that Barcelona compared to other Olympic Games tried to min- imize the direct expenditures related to the organisation of the Games and gave too much on indirect investment which included the previously mentioned infrastructure projects.

Tokyo 1964 Montreal 1976 Los Angeles 1984 Seoul 1988 Barcelona 1992

1. Operational $ 169,51 $ 411,86 $ 450,39 $ 478,20 $ 1.361,16 expenditures 2. Direct $ 282,61 $ 2.413,01 $ 72,04 $ 989,65 $ 1.099,70 investments 3. Total direct $ 452,12 $ 2.824,87 $ 522,43 $ 1.467,85 $ 2.460,86 Expenditures (1+2) 4. Indirect $ 6.373,37 $ 350,01 $ - $ 1.687,42 $ 6.915,27 expenditures 5. Total Olympic $ 6.825,49 $ 3.174,88 $ 522,43 $ 3.155,27 $ 9.376,13 Investments (3+4) Table 6.1: Allocation of Olympic Games investments (values in million USD) (Brunet, 1995).

Another strategic orientation from Barcelona concerns the involvement of the private sector to the development of the Olympic facilities. It participated to an extent of 37.2% and such projects covered the following sectors:

 Accommodation  Touristic facilities  Highway construction  Entrepreneurship centres The below table depicts the total costs of infrastructures for the needs of the Olympic Games, as well as the percentages of cost allocation among them.

Project Cost (in million $) Allocation % Road construction $ 2.318,00 36,0% Poble Nou Olympic Area $ 1.433,00 22,2% development Developments in other $ 795,00 12,4% Olympic areas Montjuic hill $ 392,00 6,1% Vall d' Hebron area $ 198,00 3,1% Diagonal Area $ 205,00 3,2% Other infrastructure pro- $ 1.228,00 19,0% jects in Barcelona Western urban route $ 54,00 0,8% Eastern urban route $ 110,00 1,7% Old port renovation $ 46,00 0,7% Service Galleries $ 68,00 1,1% Other facilities $ 143,00 2,2% Upgrade of hotel facilities $ 807,00 12,5% Projects in Olympic sub- $ 471,00 7,3% sites Other sports-related infra- $ 201,00 3,1% structure projects Total $ 6.446,00 100,0% Table 6.2: Allocation of construction costs for the Olympic Games (Brunet, 1995). The following lines, give some examples of projects that had an important post-Olympic Games value, based on a case study developed on (Barcelona: Urban Transformation and 92’ Olympic Games, 2005). The Olympic Village and the coastal area of Barcelona: The Olympic Village was situated at the coastal area of Barcelona and was developed by the Barcelona Holding Olympic S.A a company also responsible for the construction of the Olympic Ring. The area formerly was destined for industrial use, having two railway lines that serviced that serviced the city mainly for shipping needs. The Olympic Games opened a new opportunity for reformation of the area which included

91 the renovation of the currently existed railway line, the construction of a coastal road, the development of the port and of the Olympic Village, as well as the upgrade of the sewerage system. Presently this area is used mainly by local people and by tourists for leisure activities. Here it is needed to emphasise the importance of the coastal area not only for the needs of the Olympic Games, but also for its post-Olympic Games use in favour of the Catalonian economy. The bypass route of Barcelona: An important part of funds was also allocated for the development and upgrade of the transportation network of Barcelona facilitating thus the traffic during the Olympic Games period and afterwards. Such projects included the construction of the main bypass and of its lateral roads that go around Barcelona. The Olympic Ring: The Olympic Park was situated at Montjuic hill, which was reformed to suit the needs of the Olympic Games. Indicatively, on Montjuic hill was situated the Olympic Stadium, the Picornell Swimming Pool which was renovated after its first construction in 1969 and two more buildings were added: the Sant Jordi Sports Hall and the National Institute of Physical Education of Catalonia. The fact that Barcelona used the Olympic Games as a new strategic attempt to economic and urban development for the future and not just for the period of the Games was reflected into its positive economic impacts that can be summarised in the below table. Even though the positive economic impact is the most decisive criterion in judging the success of the Games, Barcelona also succeeded in promoting its image internationally. According to a survey carried out in 1992 by (Brunet), people expressed their delight regarding Barcelona because of its exceptional services, its infrastructure, its labour market and its overall competitiveness compared to other cities.

Value (in million $) Direct economic impact $ 7.859,00 Total investment $ 6.449,00 Public investment $ 4.339,00 Private investment $ 2.110,00 Consumption $ 1.410,00 COOB expenditures $ 1.099,00 Visitors consumption $ 311,00 Induced economic impact $ 13.098,00 Total economic impact $ 20.957,00 Table 6.3: Economic impact of the Olympic Games in Barcelona (Brunet, 1995). Barcelona also succeeded in architecture; the city was awarded the gold medal in 1999 by the Royal Institute of British Architects. Until then, the holders of the medal were only professionals who managed to show inquisitiveness and dedication to promote unique architectural ideas (Anonymous, 2005).

The case of Barcelona is an important lesson, since the management for the development of infrastructures is not an opportunistic case, because of the Olympic Games themselves, but it involves strategic orientation and careful planning that should lead to the general reformation of the image of each candidate city. The Olympic Games by themselves do not usually imply an immediate positive outcome in the local or national economy. The key was to focus on improving the image of the city with the aim of creating infrastructures for a long-time horizon offering value added services to citizens. For example, transportation projects that were used during the period of the Olympic Games, serve today a solution to minimise congestion in the city centre, and the facilities situated at Montjuic hill are used by local people. Moreover, Barcelona keeps upgrading and maintaining its existent infrastructure projects or even creates new ones, in the face of urban regeneration, so as to further promote its image worldwide. For example, in 2004 was submitted a new blueprint for further reformation of the coastal area. That is the reason why Barcelona is a flexible city, since it tries to adapt to the needs of the present day, under the pressure of global competition.

6.1.2. Technology Management The hosting of the Olympic Games in Barcelona not only did contribute significantly in urban planning and in infrastructure development and management, but also gave enough focus on technology management. The beginning was made through the redaction of the Barcelona Computing and Telecommunica- tions Study (BIT '92), that described all relevant technologies and systems being vital for the organisation of the Games. More specifically, this report was submitted for approval to the IOC in 1986, after Barcelona succeeded in winning the bid for hosting the Olympics. In 1987, it underwent a revision in which were clarified the aims and strategies to be followed in technology management. That is, it was decided which technology projects were essential based on the functional requirements, so as to allocate appropriately human and financial resources to execute them. This was also an attempt to make clear to the candidate technology companies the proposed technology program for application by the COOB, in order for them to offer their services. The revision of the BIT '92 was made by taking into account how the technology projects would be organised and grouped; hence this would make easier the job of contractors for their development, testing and finalisation. However, the analysis of requirements, and general management of technology works was under the stake of COOB. Hence, based on the objectives and strategies which were depicted in the BIT '92, technology projects were assigned to the following companies: IBM for the provision of computers, EDS for the provision of results management software, Sema Group T&G for the delivery of operational management software, Eritel for the delivery of ICT services to the members of the Olympic Fam- ily, Càlcul y Gestió for the provision of ERP systems, Xerox for printing systems, Telefónica for telecommunication services, Telettra for Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) systems, Ericsson

93 for PBX systems, Phillips for Audio-Visual systems, Alcatel for broadcasting equipment and Ap- ple for office automation. All these companies participated in technology provision as sponsors, leading them to a higher level of commitment. This led to the provision of high quality technology services particularly remarkable for that period and compared to previous Games.

Company Provided Technology services IBM Computers EDS Results management software Eritel ICT services Sema Group T&G Operational management software Càlcul y Gestió ERP systems Xerox Printing Telefónica Telecommunications Telettra TETRA systems Ericsson PBX Phillips/Panasonic/Sony A/V systems Alcatel Broadcasting Apple Office automation Kodak Accreditation Ricoh Fax machines Seiko Timing systems

Table 6.4: Companies involved in the provision of technology services (COOB '92).

6.1.2.1. The way of development of the technology plan The technology plan for the Olympics was developed thanks to the provided administrative assistance from the COOB, by invoking previous experience from the Olympic Games of Seoul. De- velopment teams were created to set the requirements for the technology projects and two years before the onset of the Games, some preliminary technological prototypes were developed to make sure that these conform with the defined requirements. Apart from supervising their progress, COOB also applied the Standard Operations Plan (PNO), by means of which COOB set the organisational structure of the Games. It comprised of technology operations and of a Standard Installations Plan (PNI) that was related to the placement and adjustment of all technologies related to the Games. The existence of these two entities of PNO and PNI, enabled the reliable organisation of the Games and the sharing of information between them, during the preparation and operation phases. Testing of the technologies was scheduled to be carried out during 1991. During that period, two computer systems the IBM ES/9000 were put on testing service. In the first semester of the same

94 year, sound and telecommunications systems were tested. In addition, contracts were signed for the installation of security systems and for the provision of cable TV services. Before the kick-off of the Games, this period was sacrificed by finalising supporting software, and installing all the computational, telecommunications and electronic appliances. Also, technological overhaul was made for the equipment being already installed at the venues, before the later became at the stake of COOB. During the Games year, COOB created a more decentralised division, where each element was independent. The Technology Information and Operations Centre (CIOT) was responsible for the coordination of telephone systems, cable TVs and mobile telecommunications. In managing technology, more than 5,500 people were engaged.

Concerning the phases of technology project development, despite the discrete nature of each project, there can be identified a general structure that included the total of all projects.  1st stage: Planning In this stage, an identification of the technological needs was made, as well as the scope of works were defined and the introduction of a timetable that tracked down the progress of works was also made.  2nd stage: Development This stage is the most essential one, since all tasks assigned to each project, as well as all human and financial resources are attached to each other for the design, implementation and scheduling of testing. In addition, during this phase according to the nature of each project all required human, material and technological resources were allocated accordingly.  3rd stage: Installation This stage concerned the placement of all technologies at the corresponding venues timely as scheduled. For example, the timely installation of a quality power supply system was crucial so as to assess the level of completion of all technological equipment. However, concerning the installation of equipment that required physical cabling this had some particularities. Such were the integration with other tasks related with the preparation of competition venues and of Olympic Villages, and the low number of experienced companies that were able to change the direction of cabling in case problems arose.  4th stage: Preparation for operation In that stage, the engaged personnel with the use of all technology systems was technically trained.  5th stage: Operation It included not only the actual functioning of the systems, but also the processes of starting up and maintenance, in order for them to function properly. It is true that most of the technologies were

95 in general required to be fully functional during the Games-period, some of them had to be ready long before. This because such technologies were supportive during the preparation phase and such technologies were the following:

 Office automation; it was ready until 1988.  Admin IT systems; operational from 1988.  Publications Centre; ready from 1989.  Design assistance and space management centres; functional from 1989.  Digital documentation library; operational from 1990.  The internal telephone network; active from 1988.  Radio networks; available from 1990.  The electronic security system; active from 1989.  The Games calculation centre and its technical services; available from 1990.  Other projects related to the accommodation of the Olympic Family (booking services) that were available from 1991.

6.1.2.2. The evolution of technology projects – Levels of arrangement

On the basis of the previous stages, the course of technology projects towards their next stage was defined through the following processes:

 The application of a particular methodology for their supervision.  Prioritising activities.  Agreements with subcontractors, when an already signed contract is quite complex.  The explicit application of budget control, during the whole duration of the Games. Concerning the arrangement of technology projects, these were arranged by means of three levels (from the lowest to the highest); the project, the system and the territorial unit. Each level concerned a specific phase of development, which determined the staff involved with its corresponding tasks and the type of managerial structure needed for supervision and coordination. The project was the lowest level of arrangement, which required multiple staff mainly for control. These were acting as intermediaries between sponsors and users, so as to define the requirements, to check the overall progress implemented, to evaluate the system as long as it is fully developed and to allocate human resources to guarantee a smooth workflow. Organisational structure was a specialist one, since project managers were assigned based on the nature of the project. Hence the divisions involved were either the Data Processing or Telecommunications and Electronics divisions of COOB. A territorial unit is the medium level of arrangement, which concerns the installation of technological equipment. The staff needed was specialised in the installation and adjustment of systems. Organisational structure at this level was also a specialist one (same to the project level), because

96 there was a technology manager at territorial level who assigned the mentioned works for telecommunications, sound, results management, computing and electronic security systems to the relevant specialised personnel per domain.

Technology Management

Telecommunica Results Electronic Sound Computing tions management Security

Figure 6.1: Technology management at territorial level (COOB '92). A system is the unification of multiple projects related to one particular category and it is the final level of arrangement. For example, the provision of photocopiers, fax machines, TETRA systems, mobile phones and TV monitors constitute the basic technologies that do not need special installations to operate. This grouping of projects to systems is depicted in Table 6.5. Organisational structure was general, since mainly volunteers with no specialist knowledge were required for the pre-operation and operation stages of technology development. To get used to the use of technologies, training was required during the pre-operation phase. Compared to these stages, during the planning phase only few people were needed, but the scope of their activities was quite high. These included among others the identification of the required systems for the needs of the Games, the planning of the budget and the undertaking of works to sponsors.

Structural Organisational Stage Personnel Activities element structure

Few people . Definition of the required systems for the Games Planning System with high span General . Make budget planning of tasks . Contracting with sponsors

Required for . Development Development Project Specialized . Construction control . Evaluation

Specialized for . Installation Installation Territorial unit Specialized installation . Adjustment Pre-operation System Training Volunteers General Operation System Operation

Table 6.5: Organisational arrangements in technology development (COOB '92).

Project System Printers Fax machines TV monitors Standard equipment with no Internal radiotelecommunication systems special installation needed TETRA systems Mobile phones Electronic Security Systems Conference rooms Cable TV CCTV for sports Standard equipment with special Telephones installation needed Office automation Sound Videoconference services Accreditations Results Information System Commentator information system Olympic Family information system Business management information system Hardware and software Track instruments Scoreboards Results distribution system Internal telephony Data network Data processing centre Complex services Publications centre Public networks Private wireless network

Table 6.6: Definition of Systems (COOB '92).

6.1.2.3. Technology development strategies Strategies implemented for technology development took into consideration the nature of venues or facilities under interest. Such strategies applied were “fixed date”, “short duration”, “large scale”, “immediate response” and “the impossibility of rehearsal”.

Fixed date: This strategy predicted that the projects had to be implemented no later than a particular date; otherwise, issues of last moment that could not be handled easily would have arisen, if inadequate planning had occurred. To minimise this risk the following points were taken into account: “conservative planning”,” participation of important events” and “priority of functions”. The concept of conservative planning predicted that the technology systems should have been developed until one year before the onset of the Games. Participation in important events predicted that any unfulfilled commitments should have been settled until the date of finalisation of the projects. Setting priorities of functions, allowed for the classification of the functions of technological

98 products from the most important ones to the complementary ones. For example, the first version of such products should meet the primary needs, while subsequent versions should be evolutions to the first one. Short duration: This strategy allowed for the absence of any time-consuming corrections to the systems after they have been functional. To meet this expectation, “operative evaluations” were carried out and “simulations” as well. Operative evaluation allowed for checking and verifying through simulations the reliable functioning of the introduced technological systems, and additionally the correction of any potential faults. Simulations allowed for putting into operation all software and hardware of the computer systems. Large scale: It means here not the quantity of technologies being installed for the needs of the Games, but the organisational complexity of hosting the events in different venues within a fortnight. This required “standardisation” and “industrialisation” of processes, so that the venues would contain replicas of equipment only with minor modifications. Large scale strategy is composed of two sub-strategies being “standardisation” and “industrialisation”. The first refers to the homogeneity of technologies when operation is made on a large scale, making thus easier and more flexible the process of training the personnel responsible for their operation. The second refers to the activities of technology installation, and especially those regarding the preparation for the operation of computers. This sub-strategy reduces the amount of time needed for the installation stage.

Immediate response: This strategy is related to the level of reliability and stability that the technologies provide. Usually current existed technologies are used, since new ones being at the development phase are continuously updated, so in such a big event it is preferable to leave aside any possible advantages that a newer technology would offer, instead of sacrificing reliability and stability. Moreover, this strategy enabled flexibility in case unwanted situations occur when applying known procedures. This is also known as the provision of emergency procedures, ensuring that the Games at all costs will not be paralysed. The impossibility of rehearsal: This strategy arose from the facts that volunteers had very little time to get used to the use the systems and that members of the Olympic Family had nearly no time to plan their training because of the flexible arrival dates and the multiple members engaged. So, the technologies mainly used by the members of the Olympic Family, such as the Results Distribution System, the Commentator Information System and the Olympic Family Information System the already trained volunteers were available to resolve any issues. Sometimes by means of this strategy, it was also possible the development of the required technologies without the participation of end-users. In this way, issues arose about the awareness of

99 project requirements. Therefore, to cope with such issues, flexible applications were designed and operative evaluations were realised.

6.1.2.4. The Technology, Information and Operations Centre organisation The Central Information and Operations Centre (CIOT) was a decentralised unit, that aimed to provide solutions to problems having arisen during the installation phase of the technology equipment. It began its operations in 1992, three months before the start of the Games. It provided a real-time control of all ICT networks and of results management systems during the operational phase. The staff engaged in CIOT, in case they identified probable issues during the operation of systems they did not decide unilaterally for one single system without taking into account the functioning of other systems. It also consisted of a “crisis table” in which participated people from the previously mentioned sponsoring companies.

6.1.2.5. Human resources Not only did the successful functioning of the ICT equipment play a determinant role during these Games, but also the personnel contributed to this success. When talking about the managerial level (e.g. technology manager, assistant manager, ICT manager, results management manager and others), these posts were occupied by people having expertise in coordination of analogous projects. Mainly these people had background on computer science; those who did not possess such knowledge were providing paper distribution services in first stage, while they were being provided training services.

Training of the staff without technical knowledge was provided from 1989 to 1992. The whole process can be summarized in Table 6.8.

Function Preparation phase Operation phase

Management 50 50 Project Managers 50 Technicians 500 1070 Administration 65 Territorial management 300 Operators 2600 Third-party technology services 1500 Total 665 5520 Table 6.7: Staff engaged in technology services provision (COOB '92).

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Year Training stages 1989 October Results management system notification December Definition of human resources requirements 1990 January-March Choice of results directors June Training kick-off October Course for results directors 1991 January Training plan completion February Testing phase May Choice of personnel for results distribution October Start of courses for results technicians November Course for technology directors December Definition of computer systems functions 1992 January Volunteer choice for the operation of IT systems February Choice of support volunteers for the operation of IT systems April Training of volunteers May Kick-off of CIOT operations

Table 6.8: Training of technology staff (COOB '92).

6.1.2.6. Operation of technology systems Finally, operation of all technology systems was characterised by three management procedures; decentralisation, user support and maintenance. All these management procedures were carried out by volunteers being directed by technical staff and the central operation was responsibility of the Olympic Calculation Centre. The later comprised of central computers connected to the Games related computer networks. Its main purpose was to supervise the main computer systems, as well as the data, telephone and video networks.

6.2. Atlanta 1996

6.2.1. Venue construction management For these Olympic Games, preparation and planning started in 1991. The ACOG, established a dedicated department responsible for the development of the Olympic Works. Main mission of this department was the development of infrastructures in such a way that would deliver an unforgettable experience to people who would attend to the Games (from spectators to athletes and members of the Olympic Family) and to maximise their legacy value. Infrastructures developed for the needs of the Games included both new and renovated that needed to comply with the requirements sets by the ACOG and International Federations. Such guidelines

101 included among others the maintenance of urban planning, the after-Games utility, cost-effectiveness and environmental protection. The Construction department was responsible for coordinating Works of about $ 500 million including permanent and temporary infrastructures. The most remarkable project was the Olympic Stadium that cost $ 207 million and hosted both the Opening and Closing ceremonies and the athletics.

6.2.1.1. Organisation The implementation of infrastructure projects was divided into five phases; programming and planning, site acquisition, design, construction and retrofitting. In the first phase, a specification of the projects' properties was made. In addition to this, simultaneous processes of buying land where the Venues would be developed and signing of contracts was made. The third phase started as long as the previous phases were completed successfully. After the Games, venues were converted again and transferred to their corresponding owners.

Programming and Planning

Site acquisition

Design

Construction

Retrofitting

Figure 6.2: Phases of infrastructure development for the Atlanta Games (ACOG 1996). The development of the Olympic Works required to consider three major aspects during each phase: make a design draft of the facility, understand the needs of the event, as well as the needs of the community. The design draft of the facility comprised of parameters such as the requirements of multiple users before, during and after the Games, and the circulation of participants through different ways dis- tinguishing them into four groups, being the members of the Olympic Family, athletes, journalists and spectators. Understanding the needs of the event, is a function of how many spectators are going to attend a particular event. This would define the provision level of food services, media needs, security services and transportation to the Venues. A deep understanding of these parameters is a rock- bottom to the successful development of the Venues.

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Understanding the needs of the community is another factor that defined the success of infrastructure development. ACOG was closely in touch with local people whose needs were affected during and after the construction of the Olympic infrastructures, by assessing how much they will be positively or negatively affected in both short and long-term. ACOG ’96 was also responsible in keeping local people fully aware of the schedules when the works will be carried out, so as to be fully ready for any inconveniences (mainly noise and dust).

 Programming and planning ACOG has made use of graphical methodologies for planning and programming in order to specify quantitatively and qualitatively the properties of the Olympic projects. For this, outsourcing took place by hiring Sizemore Floyd Ingram company to provide the services of planning and programming. Graphical programming analyses challenges that have to be tackled during the development of the Olympic projects, and then are divided into smaller components of information that can be easily understood and adjusted to comply with the already modified requirements. This process delivered information on a frequent basis to ACOG and notably to the Construction Department. The information made available to the ACOG for decision-making about Venue development was already reviewed. However, the complexity and scope of the Olympic Games as an event, enabled the addition of a supplementary layer of project planning characterised by three steps: data gathering, macro event modelling, and detailed venue programming. Data gathering is a phase held through the arrangement of a meeting with ACOG executives in which data about the Olympic facilities is collected, so as to determine their vision for the Games, as well as their use after the Games period. After the vision is determined, the programming team performs an analysis of the use of past Olympic Venues, so as to determine clearly the venues’ requirements. This is made possible by retrieving data from previous ex-post Games reports and from already conducted interviews with experts. Macro event modelling is performed by carrying out interview rounds with executive members of ACOG, which define the preliminary system concepts that are applied during the Games period. Such system concepts cover domains such as operating and closing ceremonies, construction, catering services, security, sponsorship, spectacle and transportation. The model developed repre- sented a matrix which depicted how each domain is involved in each venue. Sizemore Floyd In- gram during this phase performed assessments from previous summer Olympic Games started from 1984 to 1992, so as to define more specifically the functional requirements of each venue. Thus, compared to the previous phase of data gathering, definition of functional requirements definition was more tangible. Detailed venue programming started after having gotten a total understanding of how the Games and the afore-mentioned systems would function as a whole. During this phase were determined space requirements, level of provided services, architectural-engineering systems and budgeting.

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After the macro level modelling phase, Sizemore Floyd Ingram has created five teams responsible for the planning of venues. In the beginning, questionnaires were created and distributed to the ACOG members, to the International Federations and to the owners of land where the venues are going to be developed, so as to extract any primitive requirements for the venues. These were helpful for specifying space needs, and the circulation of various members throughout different trajectories. After that, a meeting was organised to simulate the operation of a system within a particular venue. Afterwards, land, utilities and data related to each sports event acquisition was performed, after having conducted a feasibility study upon the appropriateness of the candidate land for selection. In most cases, all proposed locations were proved to be suitable with only minor formatting needed. Also, new sites for venue development were selected among other proposed ones as being more suitable. Sizemore Floyd Ingram's construction costing team has performed simulations through the development of a model, that tested budgets of programming, design and construction processes. Based on these simulations, as well as after having carried out a primitive market research on the prices of big construction projects, the Bid File assumptions were reviewed. For each venue, a cost scenario matrix was developed which underlined the possible provided service levels of ACOG, extending from permanent to temporary (also combinations were included). This enabled ACOG to start construction while having as an alternative the strategy to change the budgeting of the venue according to the Games’ needs. The final budgeting venue plan included not only the “hard costs” being the construction and site preparation ones, but also the soft costs being the design expenses, administrative fees and the installation of non-technology and technology equipment. All amounts included inflation, contin- gencies and personnel support programs. Afterwards, a decision-making round initiated, so as for the ACOG to review and make proposals upon the available options. The end of a decision-making round was signalled when a detailed venue development plan was provided to venue architects. Together with the plan were provided guidelines for architectural choice, design and development. Until the end of a venue program, each venue budget was considered to be provisional. When all venue programs are finished, a report of each venue was provided for acceptance to the ACOG describing their role and scope and probable alternative budgeting. After the venue programming phase, Sizemore Floyd Ingram started programming of the supporting facilities, being the International Broadcasting and Press Centre. Just like the main venues, requirements for space, budget, provided services and transportation were provided and tested.

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 Site acquisition In order for the Olympic Works to be implemented and before taking the decision for land acquisition, an attempt to exploit the already current facilities was made; however, due to increasing spatial needs, the need for land acquisition was apparent. Sites that were under State’s property, were acquired by means of a lease agreement, that predicted land use for a particular period of time, plus the payment of compensation to the State or to other owners. The owners of currently existing sites were compensated by means of a rental payment and recompensed by any provided supporting services. In order to maintain the rental and re-compensation rates as competitive as possible, the acquisition of other sites was also possible. Unexploited areas were obtained with a more composite agreement. In such situation, ACOG decided the construction of permanent venues with post-Games value as a compensation. Owners of such areas were usually public bodies, such as governments, authorities or universities. In accord- ance with the Olympic needs, alternative sites were not available; thus, there were not competition while acquiring unexploited locations. For the acquisition of areas that would be used for the training of athletes, the construction department of ACOG decided to develop such centres near the Olympic village. Land acquired was previously under the property of high schools or of colleges. Compensation to the owners was provided in the form of rental payment or of facility upgrade. But on the contrary, most venues were also exploited for training purposes.  Design The design process included the hiring of architects and engineers and it lasted 2 years from 1992 to 1994. ACOG ‘96 has opted for architects and engineers based on the properties of each venue and according to their skills, ensuring hence the best possible construction quality. The minimum skills required were determined by ACOG, as well as from International Federations.  Construction The main purpose of these Games was to construct high quality Olympic facilities. The selection of construction managers and of contractors was made by a similar process as in the design process. When the future use value of the facilities would be zero, usually temporary ones were implemented. Such examples were the Georgia Dome, Georgia World Congress Centre and Omni Col- iseum. The rest of the infrastructures distinguished into existing and new ones are depicted in the below table.

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New Venues Existing Venues Olympic Stadium Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium Stone Mountain Park Tennis Centre, Alexander Memorial Coliseum Archery Centre, and Cycling Velodrome Georgia Tech Aquatic Centre Georgia World Congress Centre Georgia International Horse Park Georgia Dome Clark Atlanta University and Morris Brown Georgia State University Gymnasium Stadia Morehouse College Gymnasium University of Georgia Coliseum Wolf Creek Shooting Complex The Omni Coliseum Lake Lanier Road courses Wassaw Sound

Table 6.9: Atlanta's Olympic Venues (ACOG 1996).  Retrofitting After the end of the Olympic Games, the process of venue retrofitting stood for returning the venues to the original venue holder. This required the transformation of the venues to their previous state before the Games. Only the Olympic Stadium had to be reformatted, so as to comply with the needs of baseball.

6.2.2. Technology management Management of technology was responsibility of the Technology Department of ACOG, and its main objective was the provision of high quality services at the venues and at global level through the Internet (being at its very first development stages) and through broadcasting. In parallel with this, the Technology Department provided administrative support to ACOG during preparation, in-Games and post-Games period. Technology was for the ACOG the cornerstone for hosting successfully the Olympic Games. It enabled ACOG to make available more than 800,000 available rooms for accommodation and more than of 10 million tickets; to manage more than 5,000 vehicles provided for the needs of the Games, to deliver timing and scoring services at all venues and to provide more than 3,000 television hours, resulting in a class leading figure of 19,6 billion audience. Technology operations coverage was quite large, as this can be proved from the large amount of technology equipment needed. Indicatively, there can be identified 7,000 computes (notebooks and desktops), 3 mainframe systems, more than 1,000 laser printers, more than 250 LANs, 7,700 pagers, 700 photocopiers, 12,500 mobile radio devices, 10,000 monitor TVs and 20,000 phones. During the initial planning phase, ACOG gave enough focus on user-friendliness of computer systems. This characteristic helped the engaged personnel their training, in order to get used to them. It enabled the delivery of integrated systems which provided a high degree of flexibility.

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Already available software complied with the ACOG's needs, hence it was not necessary to develop new applications from scratch. During the preparation phase, software development was based on Applications Enabling Methodology (AEM) which can be considered as a stage-gate process with multiple phases. Moving to the next stage of application development, required a review of what was done previously. Backing up of data was essential for any application, since it provided responsiveness and agility when errors occurred, without affecting negatively spectacle and worldwide broadcasting. All technology services for the needs of the Olympic Games were supplied by the following companies being sponsors of the Games from the IOC’s TOP Program.

 AT&T; provision of fixed telecommunication systems.  Kodak; development of the badging accreditation system.  BellSouth; supply of data and paging services.  IBM; IT systems support.  Motorola; provision of mobile telecommunication systems.  Panasonic; supply of audio-visual systems.  Scientific Atlanta; delivery of cable TV services.  Sensormatic; provision of venue security systems.  Swatch; supply of scoring and timing services.  Xerox; delivery of printing services. All these companies who had the provided equipment under their property were engaged in design, development, function and asset recovery. The above-mentioned provided services were available by Rate Card for lease during the Games period to broadcasting media, International Federations, NOCs and to merchants.

6.2.2.1. Organisational arrangements The personnel engaged with technology management had to coordinate all technological requirements for the events themselves, as well as those at the administrative level of ACOG. As the organisational committee increased in size, more personnel in the technology department was needed to ensure the smooth and efficient operation of ACOG.

ACOG's technology department was established in 1990 and began its operations by focusing mainly on daily non-complex issues. In 1991, organisational structure was extended since the department acquired two divisions; the IT services and the technical services, each one with its own director. The first division was responsible for the development of computer based applications, such as results management, accreditation, computer network design and the Info '96 platform. The technical services division was responsible for non-computerised technologies, such as cable TV, telephony, radio and security systems.

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In 1991, the technology department hired members coming from the sponsor companies Motorola, AT&T, BellSouth and IBM, in an attempt to define clearly the functional requirements and technology applications during the Games-period. A trip to Barcelona during the Olympics of 1992 helped significantly on how technology management would be organised for the 1996 Games. For the implementation and development of ERP systems, computer networking, document distribution services, telecommunications, timing and scoring, radio systems and of the platform Info '96, project managers were indispensable for the coordination of such works. In 1994 and 1995 the technology department acquired more personnel, such as administrative employees, programmers, contractors, consultants, civil engineers and venue technology managers. In 1995, the new organisational arrangements of the technology department have altered its structure so as to be adjusted to the in-Games period. The managing director of the department was in charge of supervising works carried out in IT and in technical services divisions. Each division in addition to the director that they had, a program director who provided consulting and budget planning and supervision services was added to perform a supportive role.

Technology Department

Managing Director

IT services Technical services

Director & Program Director Director & Program Director

Figure 6.3: Responsibilities distribution in ACOG Technology Department in 1995. In 1996, volunteers offered their services in both technical and IT services, according to their area of expertise. Volunteers working in the provision of technical services supervised the function of non-computerised machines (e.g. printers) and those working in the provision of IT services coordinated the computer systems operation. Here can be also added specialised personnel engaged in the provision of Rate Card services; this staff was responsible for guaranteeing that the provided technology was placed and worked properly. Indicatively, during the in-Games period over 5,000 people was employed as technical staff. During the testing phase of the installed technologies in 1995, the Technology Implementation Centre (TIC) and the Technology Operations Centre (TOC) initiated their operations. These were considered to be the central nodes that supervised the function of all installed technologies and they provided immediate technical support in case an issue arose. The TIC especially supervised the application of technologies at venue level, while the TOC provided technical support in managing difficult situations that could not be tackled at venue level. TIC included personnel coming from ACOG technology department, while TOC included employees from sponsor companies. 108

IT services Technical services Rate Card services

•Volunteers •Volunteers •Specialised staff •Computer systems •Non-computer systems •Ensuring reliable function operation operation of installed tecnhologies

Figure 6.4: Distribution of staff and roles based on provided services. Finally, energy management and distribution required the installation and management of electrical systems, having been under the responsibility of Georgia Power Company, which was hired by the technology department. It comprised of the installation of both permanent and temporary systems, that satisfied more than adequately the energy needs of the in-Games period.

Technology department

Technical Energy IT services services distribution

Figure 6.5: ACOG Technology Department divisions. 6.2.2.2. IT services management The IT services division was in charge of the development and design of computer applications and of ACOG administrative and Games networks. These works were assigned mainly to IBM. The scope of IT services was quite extensive as it covered the following components:

 Competition Results System  Info '96  Olympic Games promotion  Operations Management systems  CAD systems  Network Delivery Systems  Systems integration Competition Results System: It was a system that was developed by Swatch, IBM, Xerox and Scientific Atlanta. The components by which the competition results system was built were mainly technologies like client-server, object-oriented programming and relational databases. As long as results were finalised and became official, they were delivered to the media and to sports managers through a client-server application implemented by IBM and they were ready for printing.

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The functions of this system were the following:

 Timing, scoring and results creation at venue level.  Printing of results and sharing them to the media, sports management and to the Olympic Family.  Creation of real time data for the events (e.g. starting lists for athletes, points or time needed for qualification to the next round or for medal acquisition, rankings, and overall results).  Real-time data for journalist use for some sports (e.g. basketball, football, tennis and other related sports)  Results lists and statistics uploaded to Info '96 terminals, and to World News Press Agency (WNPA).

On the other hand, there can be distinguished two issues that occurred during the first days of the Games. The first concerned an issue that occurred to the WNPA, in which the results were not distributed consistently and as a result, all information was not displayed correctly. It was triggered by errors in coding and it was not recognised during the testing phase, since it was impossible for the ACOG to simulate an in-Games period environment. A temporary solution was provided to correct such errors, but the system in general did not took advantage of its full potential. Another problem concerned the transmission speed of the information that affected the system for the production of printed reports. The results were distributed immediately at the venue level and at the International Broadcasting Centre; however, other locations such as the Olympic Village and the Main Press Centre experienced delays. This issue was due to errors occurred in the distribution parameters that concerned reports type and quantity. Despite the immediate applied corrections, some isolated issues were identified. In general, both the development process of the competition results system and the redaction of a report that underlined the success and failure factors of this system having being distributed to the IOC and to future OCOGs, was a useful lesson for building such systems for future Games, since only minor improvements were needed to tackle the afore-mentioned issues occurred during these Games. Info ’96: It was a system developed by IBM, composed of a touch-screen information system that included Olympic-Games related information and an e-mail sending facility. It was an important tool for the media, athletes, Olympic Family and for other official staff engaged in the Games. In Atlanta were placed nearly 1,800 terminals and especially at the venues, at the International Broad- casting Centre, at the Media Press Centre, at the Olympic Village, at the Olympic Family accom- modations and at the accreditation centres. User-friendliness characteristics of this system were the main menu, in which the user had to choose between French and English as the display language of the terminal, the e-mail built-in tool (only accessible by accredited personnel), help tool in explaining the information of the contents, as well as printing capabilities.

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Although, issues regarding the transmission speed of results information occurred, just like in the case of WNPA. These issues were related to those mentioned above of the Competition Results System. Another issue was the slower than expected responsiveness of navigation, but overall speaking the Info ’96 was a very useful tool. Olympic Games promotion: ACOG used mainly the Internet promotion strategy for creating awareness of the Games despite being at its very first steps of development. Together with IBM in 1995 created the first Olympic Games-related Website at the address http://www.atlanta.olympic.org. The website comprised of information analogous to Info '96 platform and in addition to this included also images, videos, electronic purchase of tickets and products, live timing of events and travel information to Georgia. More than 200 million people accessed the website during the Olympic Games.

Sports competitions information; starting lists, News from competitions, ACOG, Athletes', Coaches' and previous Olympic Winners, Weather forecast both national IOC and International Olympians' biographies statistics, results, participant and international Federations lists per sport and sports information

Information about records Schedule information about achieved by athletes per sport sports events, press Transportation services Medal information per country (i.e. World, Olympic, conferences, Olympic Village information Continental and National) events and ceremonies

Information about IOC, NOCs, Information about competition Cultural Olympiad event International Federations and Olympic Village Information venues and cities information previous Games

ACOG related information E-mail tool

Figure 6.6: Info '96 main menu options (ACOG 1996). Also, ACOG in collaboration with IBM created public awareness of the Games, by developing public kiosks that comprised of touch screens including images, video, audio and text. IBM was responsible for the management of these screens, that is their maintenance and update with the most recent information. Operations Management Systems: These are computer-based systems that are composed of the following sub-systems that served the corresponding functional domains:

 Accommodation; used for the allocation of rooms based on arrival and departure dates of visitors.

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 Olympic Village room allocation; it operated at the airport and it consisted of a Microsoft Access database that assigned rooms to athletes, media personnel and coaches. This database included additionally graphical representation of rooms, as well as description of room supplies, floor, sector, room and NOC.  Accreditation; it was directly bought from COOB and it was upgraded by SEMA Group to meet the ACOG expectations. This presupposed the existence of a database, in which were registered people having a direct stake for the Games ranging from volunteers to members of NOCs and the Olympic Family. For the Atlanta Games, the registries outnumbered about 228,563 entries, so accreditation badges were provided to these persons. Accreditation interface was developed in cooperation with Kodak, IBM and Sensormatic.  Arrivals and departures; like the accreditation system, this was again purchased from COOB and upgraded by SEMA Group. This presupposes the registration of an Olympic Family member, in order for the system to trace the expected arrival times to the venues based on location and departure data. Dependencies on this system can be identified with the transportation, accreditation and Uniform Distribution systems.  Games staffing; its main role was to support volunteer services in terms of requesting tasks to do and to guarantee correct accreditation. Any changes occurred in volunteer's profile were tracked down.  Staff scheduling system; it was a PC software that deployed the use of the FoxPro database. This supported ACOG functional areas in planning, recording and communicating the works in venue level for volunteers and contractors. All the functional domain personnel filled in the database the number of hours and amount of work to be done. Employees were assigned for specific time slots and days, while the functional personnel were in charge for providing the information.  Incident tracking; it provided the ability to ACOG to report incidents and to search for their explanation in reports or electronically.  Materials Management and Planning; a system that helped in placing orders, receiving, inventorying and asset tracing for Logistics, Procurement and Contract Administration and Technology. Upgrades to the system gave the ability to find items such as pagers, computers, radios and mobile phones by using a serial number that was provided in bulk to a venue.  Technology Materials Management and Planning; it was a database that reported all the requirements for technology materials at the venue level. It provided a description of where and the amount of technological equipment that would be placed, by taking into account budget concerns. The date of delivery of the equipment was assigned by an Olympic facilities engineer. This database outnumbered nearly 200,000 records of technological equipment that had to be allocated in more than 150 places.  Medical services: Serving the functional area of medical services required the development of a Medical Encounter Tracking and Reporting System (METARS) that would satisfy the information needs of IOC, NOCs, ACOG medical services department and local state and

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federal health supervision centres. It was an IT system with host and peripheral computers connected to each other used to collect and report primary health assistance at venue level, secondary healthcare at Olympic polyclinics and hospitals, hospitalisation and emergency situations and tracing of patients.  Ticketing; it was a database including the number of total ticket sales. Useful information about ticket pricing and demand rate could be extracted. This database was developed by IBM, ProTix and Integrated Systems Solutions Corporation.  Uniform Distribution system; a system that managed the distribution of special clothing to more than 60,000 Olympic Games personnel with a processing ability of 300 people per hour. The system consisted of two components being the check-in and check-out; the first operated with the logic of scanning the staff’s accreditation card to notify him/her that clothing has not been delivered yet; and the second was used to update the existing clothing database.  Security systems; these systems were composed of the following components responsible for the security of venue locations and therefore of the Olympic Games: CCTV systems, Access Control Systems and RFID Access Control Systems. All these systems were controlled through integrated IT systems connected to the mentioned systems and they running special software packages provided by Sensormatic. CAD systems: The majority of departments within ACOG was based on information provided by Computer Aided Design (CAD) systems, but other more specialised departments in graphical representation and design used CAD tools for their own needs.

Such systems were provided by IBM and Xerox as these were working together with Auto Desk Inc., being the company that provided the AutoCAD software for delivering the ACOG's needs. As long as CAD systems became available within ACOG, the organisational committee created both centralised and decentralised CAD operations. Overall CAD operations provided support to ACOG staff on learning the use of AutoCAD. After training took place, users were awarded with licenses to start working with CAD.

CAD software enabled designers and architects in collaboration with Venue Management Depart- ment to develop 3D master plans including blueprints of the areas where the venues were going to be constructed. Not only these, but also CAD contributed to the design on how technology equipment was going to be installed; for that reason, the technology department hired a contractor responsible for the service of technology installation. Finally, CAD enabled the design of seat placement and flag placement within the Olympic Stadium. Network Delivery Systems: Computer equipment during the Games was connected either through LANs or WANs. The networking architecture was a function of the size of the venue and of the number of applications supported within them.

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All venues possessed one LAN connection which was connected to remote LAN bridges which ended up primarily or secondarily (back-up LAN) to the data centre. Connection speeds ranged from 128 kbps to 1,544 Mbps. Communication controllers 3745s were installed at the data centres and at the venues. Communi- cation controllers of the venues were connected to a concentration substation (there was a maximum number of 4) with the logic of minimising the number of needed ports to the substation (public frame relay networks) with speeds ranging from 64 kbps to 1,544 Mbps. All the 3745s connected to all four substations created a private network with transmission rates that reached nearly 50 Mbps. The Info '96 platform consisted also of a central platform connected at the data centre that distributed data at the rest of the platforms placed at the venues. At the ACOG premises, office applications used were the MS Office and the EMC2 for e-mail services. Systems integration: Systems integration operation aimed at reporting the planning progress and delivery performance of the Games Operation Management Services, Results Management Sys- tems, Security Systems and Info '96 platform. The evaluation standards were based on AEM applied by IBM and adjusted for the grouping of systems based on ACOG's requirements. Systems integration had as a purpose to create a quality integrated platform for the needs of the Games. Before the Games-period (one year before specifically) a testing of the systems was carried out. While integrating these systems, a quality function was attached, so as to guarantee that the final product is manageable and fully operational.

Systems integration was also in charge of developing and keeping the enterprise data model for the main Games applications. Such data model included information about the venues, athletes and events distributed to all Games management applications. Finally, it played an important role in change management of Technology during Games preparation and in-Games period.

6.2.2.3. Technical services management Technical services management concerned non-computerised technologies covering a wide variety of the following areas: telecommunications, pagers, radios, document editing and cable TV networks.

Telecommunications: The increasing telephone needs of ACOG at office level were usually satisfied through the introduction of PBX and ESSX systems. When ACOG offices were inaugurated in 1991, a PBX system was used. In 1994 AT&T added an extra PBX system so as to satisfy its sponsorship needs. With the growing demand for phone calling, an IVR system was introduced to ACOG. This system offered the ability to users with button-tone telephones to press a specific number for information about volunteering, cooperating with ACOG and ticket services. Ability to communicate with a

114 live operator was also possible. The operator was responsible for transferring calls and for providing and recording information. During the Games time, main telecommunication services were provided by AT&T and BellSouth; the latter was used in case of a power outage. Phone calls to the ACOG outnumbered 7,000 per day on average. For wireless telecommunication services, wireless PBX systems were provided at the venue level that had limited coverage. To tackle with this limitation, mobile phones were also used. BellSouth developed a digital mobile network and Motorola provided dual-band mobile phones. The mobile network distinguished ACOG personnel and Rate Card users from users using the analogue network. Long distance calling was made possible through multiple ways. ACOG staff used authorisation codes for long distance calls. For the members of the Olympic Family, a software defined network (SDN) being a low fee network was used. For data services needs of ACOG, AT&T upgraded the network to remote venues and provided ISDN services. AT&T moreover, provided call cards to athletes and media personnel. These were available at the AT&T calling centres. AT&T provided also the Public Phone 1000 Plus, which was installed at the Media Press Centre and at the International Broadcasting Centre. This telephone system required exclusively the use of AT&T cards, so AT&T credit was provided to media personnel. However, call cards could not be used for long distance calls; only the AT&T call card was the first option and the alternative was the use of a laptop computer. Another restriction of the Public Phone 1000 Plus was the system collapse, because of the fact that the media personnel utilised call packages from their laptop computers. BellSouth also installed public telephones in an attempt to extend its telecommunication services at venue level for staff, volunteers and spectators. For handicapped people with acoustic problems, special telecommunication equipment was also available at any venue. Pagers: Pagers were provided by MobileComm a subsidiary of BellSouth. A total of 1,100 alpha- numeric pagers were delivered during the preparation phase. These were able to establish a paging connection to ACOG's email system for sending and receiving text messages. For the in-Games period, Motorola provided 7,700 pagers for national, regional and international use. These pagers were using the current network developed by MobileComm, as also did so the Info '96 e-mail service, and they served all functional domains of ACOG.

Radios: Radio communications were essential and redundant (with a positive sense), since provided reliability even when fixed networking is problematic. To ensure reliability, the installation of UPS systems was indispensable to tackle with potential power outages. Radio telecommunications were based on the concept of the talk group. This concept did not require from the users to fully understand the properties of radio technology; only it needed to define who wants to talk with each other and to share radio signals.

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Before deciding upon the development and installation of radio telecommunications, a detailed needs definition provided answers whether groups of people needed to communicate with wired solutions or with wireless ones. Afterwards, a balance of the number of users participating in a talk group was implemented; few enough users need a few number of frequencies to communicate with each other; while lots of users, make the radio network unstable and hence unreliable. The proposed strategy for the development of radio telecommunications was to offer adjacent radio spectrum that allowed adjustment and wide compatibility as needs become different. The equipment needed was decided to be resold after the hosting of the Games. There can be identified the following radio systems developed and managed for the needs of these Games. Simplex Radio Systems were used when radio-to-radio communication was sufficient. Such systems provided good and reliable coverage even outside the Olympic Ring. Moreover, these systems were used mainly in important events, such as Opening, Closing ceremonies and important sports events, for example finals. Trunked Radio Systems were more complex than the simplex ones, as they enabled frequencies to be reused and more training of people to understand their function was needed. Although these systems brought about a number of advantages being the increased efficiency in transmission of radio channels, larger coverage and ability of frequency reconfiguration. Other radio systems included the use of digital radio networks that enabled the communication between small talk groups being mostly of private character, as well as they could be used as mobile phone networks. Another radio system used combined both simplex and trunked systems to satisfy more complex needs. Document editing: This mainly concerned printing and facsimile services that were mainly provided by Xerox. The load of documents that had to be managed during the preparation period of the Games and during the Games time was tremendous; indicatively about 2,000 copies, including millions of images were printed during the preparation phase of the Games. During the Games period, more than 40 million results were printed and distributed for the 26 sports.

To assess whether the ACOG would take advantage of its inhouse printing service, instead of outsourcing it to third parties, a cost analysis was done. The results showed that the adoption of its inhouse printing service could save up to $ 2 million with a time horizon of four years. ACOG then decided to introduce for the first time a print server that connected Xerox printers and copiers. Cable TV networks: Cable TV services were provided by Scientific Atlanta, BellSouth and Pana- sonic. The cable TV network consisted of two components; venue video flow provided by Atlanta Olympic Broadcasting (AOB) and emitted to an ACOG Cable TV system, and a return video flow that emitted all AOB's feeds from all venues to selected ones. Cable TV services were accessible to the media, Olympic Family, volunteers and to athletes. The return video flow network was capable of hosting up to 48 channels that were transmitted from the International Broadcasting Centre to selected places such as the Media Press Centre, the Olympic Family Hotel, the Olympic

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Village and to sponsor places. The cable TV network also transmitted channel that broadcast the weather forecast and news. The Olympic Village had access to 12 international channels and to entertainment ones as well.

6.2.2.4. Overall impression of technology management These Olympic Games required large amounts of technological equipment to support both the Olympic facilities and broadcasting services. It is worth noticing that the audience for these Olym- pics reached about 19.6 billion. The development, installation and operation of technological equipment required collaboration between the ACOG technology department, sponsors and technical staff. High quality equipment was crucial to the success of these Games. Here it should be noticed the emergence of the Internet that guaranteed real-time information provision.

Judging the overall technology management of these Olympic Games, the success was due to the fact that technical support was continuous during the whole period of 7 years and to the specialised and experienced personnel involved even at previous Olympic Games.

6.3. Sydney 2000

6.3.1. Olympic Infrastructure Management and Development The development of the required infrastructure for the Sydney Olympics gave yield in two main pillars; the building of leading class sports facilities within a small area, while taking into account environmental protection of the around area. These two pillars in order to be satisfied, it was the job of the government of the state of New South Wales. It had under its property the locations where the venues were developed and in addition it was a commitment stated in the Bid File to implement all the relevant infrastructure. For infrastructure management and development, the government of New South Wales established the Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA). This was the responsible body that undertook the construction of sports facilities as well as the restoration of the wasteland located in Homebush Bay. However, during the reformation of this area the following challenges had to be addressed:

 Long term impacts of the Olympic Games in country planning strategy  Legacy management after the Olympic Games.  Conforming with the Environmental Guidelines redacted in the Bid File.  Taking into account accessibility of handicapped people  Conforming with the concept of sustainability.  Protecting sites with historical and cultural importance. The most rigorous and time-consuming attempt of the Olympic Agencies (SOCOG, OCA and Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA)] for infrastructure development was land acquisition, as well as the development and installation of supporting infrastructures (technological

117 equipment) within and near the venues. The later, play a determinant role in defining the success of these Games. Many decisions that concerned infrastructure development expressed mainly the constraints of Homebush Bay location, that had to be transcended in order to transform it to a leading-class site. The history behind this region was that it used to be an urban industrial wasteland that had to be cleaned up first. Then, transportation network had to be developed, as well as telecommunications and power network. Such works were of leading importance, to support the operation of the venues during the Games period. The possibility of reformatting the Homebush Bay area and characterising it as a probable Olympic area was identified from 1973 by the at the time New South Wales Government. From them slowly started the transformation of this location into a commercial, leisure and suburban area. Before the Olympic Bidding process and especially during the years of reformatting the area of Homebush Bay, the New South Wales Government founded the Homebush Bay Development Corporation to supervise the works carried out there. Other private developers entered also at the scene and the whole area became known as the Australia Centre. After Sydney having won the Bid, started the development of the sports facilities; the beginning was made in 1994 with the State Sports Centre and with an urban redevelopment project being the Bicentennial Park, a park that was extended along the shores of Homebush Bay. Moreover, the Sydney International Athletic Centre and the Sydney International Aquatic Centre were constructed. All these projects were financed publicly from the government of New South Wales.

6.3.1.1. Creating the masterplan of works In 1995 however, there were expressed concerns about the progress of the Olympic projects, so the pace of planning and implementation had to accelerate. The newly elected government of Bob Carr in 1995 together with the OCA had as first priority the acceleration of the Olympic Works. This became possible through the design of a clearer masterplan of the Homebush Bay. Until that period, its absence had a negative impact on the pace of works.

For the production of this masterplan, renowned architects, designers, economists and traffic management experts joined their forces. This masterplan comprised of four subprojects that described also the relationships between the different areas.

 The zone where the venues were situated, being a commercial and recreational area.  The Newington area, where the Olympic Village was built and afterwards converted to a housing area.  The Millennium Park, being a location of environmental and leisure interest.  Coastal reformation that enabled transportation from and to Homebush Bay. This masterplan constituted the basis of reformatting Homebush Bay area by defining the location of venues, supporting facilities and transportation networks. It provided also guidelines on how

118 construction would be implemented. It also phased out any ambitious designs proposed in the Bid File for the reformation of that area. The area was supposed to be developed in such a way that the Homebush Bay would be open to Parramatta river; the masterplan predicted that all the venues would not have contact with the river. A challenge the OCA encountered for the development of Homebush Bay was the relocation of businesses running there that were backed by the former slaughterhouse. The New South Wales government undertook directly with these businesses a negotiation round that aimed to satisfy their interests, as well as to assure land for the works to be done. For the improvement of the masterplan, useful input was provided by the Design Review Panel which was redacted by the New South Wales Government Architect office that was composed of experienced personnel being architect designers and heritage managers. This review had as purpose to guarantee the quality and aesthetics of Venues and of the Olympic Ring. Concerning the transportation plan that supported the masterplan included among others railway, bus, ferry, pedestrian and cycling networks. More priority was given to public transportation that serviced the venue locations, something that constituted commitment of the Government.

6.3.1.2. Olympic Ring Planning The Olympic Ring was the area surrounded by the Olympic venues. Its main characteristic was the easy circulation of spectators through its pedestrian ways, the variety of leisure options, as well as its aesthetics and its accessibility.

Behind this modification, a significant role played the previous Olympic Games of 1996. Lessons from these Games contributed to the revision of the masterplan that concerned mainly the part of the Olympic Ring. This predicted the creation of green areas, the development of networks linking the Millennium Park and the central area of the Ring, the development of a big place that would concentrate a large number of spectators and the creation of water places such as small lakes and fountains.

The aim of creating a more environmentally friendly Olympic Ring giving focus on spectator flow, led to a trade-off between venue concentration and spectator movement. This brought the decision to relocate the Cycling Centre to the western part of Sydney, as well as the creation of the Olympic Plaza and of the Overflow Park. Green works included among others the planting of more than 16,000 trees, being among others pine trees and fig trees. Works of improving the flow of spectators included among others the Olympic Boulevard that connected all the venues with nodes of transport, being bus stops, train stations and boat quays. Regarding leisure activities, constructed facilities included the Indigenous Arts and Culture Centre that exhibited works of Australian In- digenous people and the Samsung Athlete tent where the Olympians had the opportunity to join with their families.

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The most particular part of the Olympic Ring was the Southern Threshold. This used to be a place in which waste was buried underground, that was transformed to meet the environmental and spectatorship demands of the Olympic Ring. In its entrance was situated a bus stop, as well as restaurants and other entertainment facilities. Other works that were carried out in the Homebush Bay included:

 The bridge of Sarah Durack Avenue; it was used for the connection of the Aquatic and Tennis Centre  Kevin Coombs Avenue underpass; this was used to connect the Olympic Park with the northern part of transportation nodes.  Overflow Park; it was designed to be the checking-in area for tickets.

6.3.1.3. Regulatory arrangements Before OCA carried out the Olympic projects, this body had to take into account multiple criteria that concerned the future value of these projects after the Olympic Games period, their conformity with environmental standards and with the concept of sustainable development, the fact of making them accessible to handicapped people and securing cultural patrimony. In order for these factors to be fully satisfied, OCA was subjected to regulation. Hence the OCA Act predicted that OCA was a body that issued permits for the reformation of both public and private land for the development of the Olympic Works.

Since OCA's projects gave too much significance to the state of New South Wales, the government elaborated the State Environmental Planning Policy in which all the projects approved by OCA were under the stake of the Ministry of Urban Planning. Thus, whatever objections against the implementation of the Olympic projects were not possible to be raised by third-parties. Given the short period of time in which the Olympic projects had to be implemented, such regulation assisted significantly to the minimisation of construction time.

6.3.1.4. Preparation for construction Before the kick-off of the Olympic Works, the whole area of Homebush Bay had to be fully cleaned up and restored, since the aim was its transformation into a leading-class place. Indica- tively, test results that carried out in the beginning of 1990s in the region identified that waste concentration reached 9 million m3, spread over an area of about 160 hectares out of 760 hectares of the total region. The strategies applied for cleaning up and restoration of this area not only did confront land pollution, but also new area for exploitation was created. One of the strategies implemented concerned the construction of landfills at the same site, in which all retrieved waste were buried safely underground.

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OCA implemented the cleaning up and restoration strategy in three segments: firstly, the purpose was to retrieve all the waste material to render the land ideal for setting up construction equipment. This step was supervised by the New South Wales Environmental Protection Authority. Secondly, the aim was to concentrate all the waste into a specific area that was away from residential areas and away from the area where the works were going to be implemented. Thirdly, the area where all waste was collected had to be inspected regularly, to guarantee that waste material would not outflow to the nearby environment. Supervision of this project was made possible through the application of three programs; program 1 encompassed the creation of a database that tracked down the environmental changes occurred at Homebush and enabled environmental managers to decide upon future environmental interferences. Program 2 provided tools that permitted the management of reformed lands, and finally program 3 aimed to cultivate environmental awareness to SOCOG level to deduct environmental protection strategy beyond Homebush Bay location. To control sea pollution and to eliminate the risk of polluting river Parramatta, scientists involved in this project implemented the method of letting microorganisms in the water area that were fed with pollutants. For controlling land pollution, reeds and grasses were used as a physical filter versus land contamination. The whole environmental protection and rehabilitation program cost about A $ 137 million (in 2000 AUD). In addition to the environmental rehabilitation strategy, another challenge was the existence of “over the air” high voltage lines in the area of Homebush Bay. Thanks to a sponsorship agreement, together with the contribution of the New South Wales government, a project of A $ 40 million (in 2000 AUD) was assigned to substitute the existing “over the air” high voltage lines to underground ones.

6.3.1.5. Venue construction Fifteen Olympic Venues, together with the Olympic and media villages were constructed for the needs of these Games, that had to be implemented within the preparation phase of 7 years. The permanent facilities were completed by 1999, almost one year before the onset of the Games. Indeed, there was enough time for SOCOG to host their testing events. The OCA apart from being responsible for the development of the Olympic Works, it was also responsible for realising agreements for the use of the currently existing venues for SOCOG. Agreements were realised for street cycling, for the opening of triathlons were used the Opera House, the Botanic Gardens, the Government House, the Exhibition Centre, the Darling Harbour, Bondi Beach and Rushcuters Bay Reserves. Apart from the development of permanent infrastructure projects, also temporary facilities were developed. Among these there can be identified the Sydney International Aquatic Centre, which had both permanent and temporary seating. The capacity by combining permanent and temporary seating scheme reached round 17,500. Other temporary works included the installation of barriers

121 for the triathlon events and of the "long blue line" used in marathon. For the permanent infrastructure projects, these were developed in a way that could satisfy the operational requirements of the Games. For example, the venues had enough space to accommodate media, spectator and catering services. Site selection for venue construction was based not only on the design layout of the masterplan, but also from interest expressions by the New South Wales government to find other alternative locations outside the Olympic Park. After having selected the appropriate location for infrastructure development and after having performed the preparation works mentioned previously, the OCA was in charge of maintaining a continuous communication between the government, Syd- ney's residents and other stakeholders, in order to assure that venue development requirements are set in place. Judging the extent of venue completion was made by a Project Control Group (PCG) that was founded by OCA. Its main aim was the provision of strategic management advice to the members responsible for the delivery of venues. The managing director of the PCG was an OCA Executive Director. Regarding post-Games venue management, a commitment from New South Wales Government was to ensure that all these Olympic projects would have future sustainable use value. This was translated into the inclusion of temporary solutions within the permanent venues (e.g. seating), so as to meet the expectation of the in-Games period spectacle demand and to minimise maintenance costs after the Games. An important success factor during the development of Olympic projects lied to the fact that there was an excellent working environment in the construction sites. A determinant role for the creation of such a positive working environment played the Labour Union of New South Wales. Otherwise, had not contributed this union, considerable delays in infrastructure delivery would have occurred. This can be proved from the absence of any strikes during the Games preparation period and this can be explained from the fact that the Olympic pride was fully expressed even at workers level. Behind this success in the job environment, the OCA implemented a strategy that can be explained in four components:

 The inclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that made explicit the relationships between New South Wales government, Labour Union and workers containing also the "no strike dispute setting procedures"  Assigning the responsibility for Health and Safety and Industrial Relations to the contractors.  A well-defined Olympic Works program with clear guidelines on Health and Safety and Industrial Relations, guaranteeing the normal kick-off of projects.  The endorsement of awards by the New South Wales Industrial Commission of Project Contracts that were negotiated and discussed between contractor and the Labour Council.  Enforcement of direct relationship between OCA executive level with architects, engineers, workers and contractors, to guarantee that the level of commitment and motivation

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is high enough, and that possible issues occurred in between relationships and interests were solved on-time. Finally, moving to the economic impacts of Olympic Works development, these cost about A $ 3.3 billion from which 64 % came from governmental contribution and the rest from the private sector. During preparation phase, in the construction domain 40,000 workers were employed and over 11 million hours of work were recorded. These workers were also employed in multiple domains such as suppliers, foremen, construction equipment users and others. The following table provides a list of the venues constructed and served these Games, as well as their source of finance.

Project Funding Olympic Stadium Sydney SuperDome Combination of private and public funding Olympic Village New South Wales Tennis Centre Cycling Centre Sydney International Equestrian Centre Sydney International Shooting Centre State Hockey Centre Public funding Sydney International Archery Park Mountain Bike Course Penrith Whitewater Stadium Bondi Beach Volley Centre No Data Sydney International Aquatic Centre Blacktown Olympic Centre Mainly public funding, with minor contribution from SOCOG Water Polo Centre 60% public funding and 40% from SOCOG

Table 6.10: List of venues and their source of funding (SOCOG 2000). 6.3.1.6. Naming strategy of venues All the venues and facilities developed were given names that expressed Australia's sports patrimony. Behind this naming strategy, OCA formed a Names Advisory Committee that included members from SOCOG, Royal Agricultural Society, Australian Olympic Committee and Auburn Council. These members were characterised by their expertise in providing site names. Examples of names given were the Olympic Village named as Newington that recalls in mind the Naval history of Australia, and the naming of roads in Homebush Bay with the names of former Australian Olympians and Paralympians. Such of them were Herb Elliott, Shane Gould, Dawn Fraser, Marjorie Jackson- Nelson, Kevin Coombes, Shirley Strickland, Edwin Flack and Murray Rose.

6.3.2. Technology Management The Technology Department of SOCOG was responsible for the management, development and installation for the technological equipment and services needed for these Games. Areas served

123 were ICT, Audio-visual and general support. During the Games time outnumbered 8,500 staff, and 4,500 served their services as volunteers. The programs with which the technology department had to manage were:

 Telecommunications  IT services  Venue Technology Group  Competition Results Systems  Games Management Systems  Operations and integration  Business and Contract Management.

6.3.2.1. Organisational arrangements The design of the technology program for these Olympic Games started in 1993. Until 1996 this program contributed to the organisation of SOCOG's headquarters and in preliminary planning of the Games. Resources such as knowledge and money were allocated to design the technological requirements of SOCOG, and to find ways to recruit sponsors for the procurement of goods and services. The first core applications that SOCOG used to design its technology program were word and spreadsheet software, "legal and marketing databases", "royalty systems" that track down product sales, finance and email software. The first Internet webpage of SOCOG was developed in 1993.

The previous Olympic Games of Atlanta gave the opportunity to SOCOC staff to gather experience from the management of technology systems at both venue and non-venue level. After the Olym- piad of Atlanta and especially in 1997, the technology department of SOCOG was established. In 1997 negotiations started with IBM so as to be one of the technology suppliers for these Games. Especially these negotiations concerned the supply of IT hardware and software useful for hosting the Games. In the meantime, SOCOG decided to change the role of IBM by rendering it supplier of Operations Management Systems and assigning also the tasks of incorporating other technologies such as results recording, reprographics and audio-visual systems. To better coordinate tasks between Olympic Games bodies and to tackle important strategic issues created the need of plan management for both SOCOG and New South Wales government. Hence two technologies executives were assigned by OCA to provide assistance in technology planning. Moreover, during the same year a supervising entity responsible for the diffusion of Games technology was formed within the SOCOG. This was the Technology Partner Council (TPC) in which involved Olympic Technology sponsors, SOCOG senior management, the IOC Technology Di- rector and other participants coming from media covering sports. TPC held every three months meetings in which discussed with the sponsors the management framework and their duties in technology provision.

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With the growing requirements for SOCOG personnel, SOCOG changed the location of its headquarters and in combination of technological advances in software technology of that period, SO- COG then was able to keep closer control over its network through the use of a more stable Oper- ating System platform (Windows NT system). Current technologies were again used for organising this Olympiad, but here it is worth mentioning the strategy of "technology freeze". This means that SOCOG set a deadline for any available technology having been until 31/12/1998. Technologies emerged after 1/1/1999 were considered to be as untested, so this strategy hedged the risk of using uncertain technologies.

6.3.2.2. Telecommunications management Telecommunications were the simplest component of most of the technologies used in these Olym- pic Games. Application scope is large and starts from the networking infrastructure being the optic fibres and it ends up in consumable applications being telephones, PBX systems, mobile phones, pagers and others. Telecommunications program management can be analysed by means of three components. Firstly, and most basic one is the provision of networking infrastructure that can be used for telephony, results management systems, operation management systems and for customer equipment. This was delivered by the national telecommunication company. The second level is deducted to the delivery of connections to venue and non-venue locations, and to the internal management connections within the locations. The third level, concerns the provision and the installation of appliances. Overall management and provision of telecommunication services was a project under the responsibility of Samsung, Panasonic and Telestra in cooperation with the SOCOG Technology department. Managing mobile telecommunications, SOCOG technology department was first engaged in col- lecting information to define frequency needs. After doing research it has sent the findings to the Australian Telecommunications Authority. Then the Authority has issued permits for mobile radio transmission networking. However, security concerns arose in governmental level and to other relevant bodies and it was agreed not to accumulate the whole list of frequencies emitted even within the SOCOG.

6.3.2.3. IT services management

This program concerns the management of all computer systems, providing thus the ability to SOCOG to plan effectively the Games, and of the website for these Olympic Games. Main objectives of computer management included among others:

 The provision of a safe and effective network architecture for both SOCOG and users being away from SOCOG's premises.  Reporting technology equipment roll-out and changes to SOCOG.

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 Defining Pre-Games technical needs.  Providing solutions to extemporary and contemporary needs. The key objectives of the website management are summarised as follows:

 Render it to a contemporary website that would not only create revenues, but also to "redefine" sport spirit.  Advertise IBM  Reflect all users' needs of what do they expect to see there  Cultivate global awareness of the event. The primitive website developed in 1993 and until 1997 was a static one that was based in the architecture of Web 1.0, since it provided only written text. After SOCOG's technology department cooperation with IBM and with the web designer production company Gadfly Media, investments were made in creating a more interactive website containing hyperlinks and media (Web 2.0). In 1999 upgrade works of the website were finished, as the website took its final form. It included among others:

 Online purchasing capabilities (including ticket sales).  Support for French language.  Information about the Games (schedule of events, weather conditions, venue information, etc).  Information about Sydney.  Online games and polls.  Cultural Olympiad information. In order for this content to be available by taking into account cost concerns, SOCOG made special arrangements with online providers of media. This provided the ability to both IBM and Gadfly Media to fully focus on their primary activities or web design. During the Games year, the website management ceased to be under the stake of the technical department of SOCOG and it was fully assigned to IBM, so the latter took full control of its update and operation.

6.3.2.4. Venue Group technology management This program was in charge of managing all technology systems installed in both non-competition and competition venues. It directed the technical design of venues having as inputs user requirements. During 1997, once collaboration with IBM was successful staffing and training started. Other agreements were also made with universities and with the Australian Computer Society to hire other specialised personnel.

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Definition and reviewing of requirements was made in 1998 through a meeting between Venue Technology Managers. However, some venues were incomplete, so requirements definition was made possible by invoking design drafts of the venues and especially of the technology equipment rooms. Since audio-visual requirements were not clearly identified, contracting with Panasonic in 1999 made this possible. But on the other hand, interferences by OCA and International Federations led to a change in requirements. Then SOCOG decided to go with Panasonic for the venue level provision of technological equipment, while OCA undertook the installation of video boards outside the venues, that is around the Olympic Ring. As long as venue construction was completed, the role of Venue Technology Managers became of primary importance, since these had a close contact of taking into action the technology plan; this also entailed the interconnection of dependencies, in order to successfully support the installation of the proposed technologies.

6.3.2.5. Business and contract management Business and contract management program was in charge of tracking down technology expenses and the current and future value of technology equipment, as well as the current position of each sponsor. This program had also the ability to prepare any report required for submission to SOCOG executive staff and to the IOC, and it maintained close relationships with Sydney Broadcasting Organisation, OCA, ORTA, AOC, IOC and SOCOG technology partners.

6.3.2.6. Games management systems For this program, SOCOG hired Sema Group which was experienced from the development of such systems from the Olympics of 1992 in Barcelona. In general, Games Management Systems were responsible for handling the needs, development and testing of systems that covered Games related areas such as accreditation, medical services, logistics, doping and personnel placement.

6.3.2.7. Operations and integration management Its purpose was to organise the diffusion of technology at all SOCOG departments and programs while ensuring that the staff was going to adopt it effectively and in a coherent way. Its other aim was to establish the TOC being responsible for the handling of glitches and for guaranteeing the smooth operation of all crucial for the Games installed technologies.

6.3.2.8. Competition results management systems Competition results management systems program was in charge of providing reliable scoring and results systems employed at both the testing events and during the Olympic Games period. Data from these systems were then circulated to other platforms such as Info 2000 (a platform similar to Info '96), Commentator Information Systems, Television Graphics, Data Display System and World News Press Agency. For such data transmission, use of networking was essential.

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IBM, Sema Group and other providers undertook the provision, installation and function of these systems. The director of the program directed the delivery and installation of the systems, as well as the relationships between sponsors and the rest of SOCOG technology programs. Results management systems consisted of an Event Programming System and of an Olympic En- tries and Qualification database system. Key provided service of the competition results management systems was the Olympic Results Information Service. This service was commissioned by IOC and during 1997-1998 IBM reviewed its current systems used in previous Olympiads, and assigned further development of these systems to MSL and Sema Group. This upgrade process did not allow for the redevelopment of systems from scratch but based on current coding scheme used in previous Games. For validating the requirements of these systems, IBM hosted user workshops with relevant stakeholders behind the development and use of the systems. Other workshops were arranged for determining the requirements of Info 2000 and of the Olympic Entries and Qualification Databases.

6.3.2.9. Management of technology testing events During 1998 until 2000 testing events were performed in order to assess the level of readiness not only of the technical equipment, but also of the personnel handling this equipment. SOCOG played a role of either an observer, or of supervisor when simulation of a real event was carried out. The result of the testing events was precious in terms of gaining experience in managing procedures and staffing and in terms of understanding sports and logistics needs of venues.

The first testing event was carried out in 1998 in order to assess the readiness of the technology systems. Despite being too early, support was provided by the SOCOG Technology department in the functional areas of reprographics, telecommunications and of results systems. In 1999, in an attempt to test event operations, the Technology Test Event Planning Cell was established. Budgeting was undertaken and supervised by the Director of Technology of Testing Events. This testing event was an opportunity for the Technology Partners to come together and cooperate in planning Games technical operations. However, a limitation concerned the absence of Cable TV and audio-visual systems requirements; hence during testing events no services by the Technology partners were provided.

6.4. Athens 2004

6.4.1. Olympic Infrastructure Management

6.4.1.1. Venue Location and construction After Athens has won the bid for hosting the Olympic Games in 2004, a majority of sports infrastructures was available. Some examples were the Olympic Stadium and the Peace and Friendship Stadium which were constructed years ago before placing the bid in 1997. However, some sports infrastructures needed to be renovated and in some cases, they needed to be constructed from

128 scratch. Such examples were the pitches to host Hockey, Baseball, Softball and the Canoe Kayak Centre. The master plan for infrastructure development and management that was submitted in the bidding process of 1997 hosted in Lausanne Switzerland was moving into the following directions:

 The implementation of the Olympic road that would connect the Faliron Olympic complex and the Olympic Centre of Athens.  The centralisation of the venues in specific areas rather than spreading them as being stand- alone.  The full exploitation of the existing sports infrastructure. The completion of the sports venues was challenging, since the delays that occurred were due to the existence of diverse decision-making rounds between the government, the OCOG Athens 2004 (ATHOC) and the IOC concerning the location of the venues. Indicatively, such a problem that had to be tackled was the complex legislation framework regarding country planning. Conse- quently, there can be cited the change that was implemented in the location of the Equestrian centre from Tatoi to Markopoulo, because in the former area there was decided to host the Athens Race- course. This competition venue was decided beforehand to be built in the area of Faliron where it used to be in the past, but there were concerns to free up this area which was drastically reformatted for the needs of the Games. Indeed, major urban development and improvement of this coastal zone of Athens was programmed during the period from 1997 until 2004. Furthermore, Judo and Wrestling were decided to be hosted in Faliro. But after having reached an agreement between the government, the ATHOC and the IOC, other sports such as the Judo and Wrestling were decided to be hosted in Northern-West At- Figure 6.7: The Olympic Complex of Faliron under construction (ATHOC 2004). tica. Even the Government had its own proposal to locate the venues from Faliro to a town in western Attica named Aspropyrgos, but it was rejected by the IOC. The development of the Equestrian centre and of the Racecourse in Markopoulo delayed, due to constant existing concerns to keep it at the current area of Faliron. But finally, it was decided to

129 construct at Faliro one indoor venue to host two events, instead of exploiting the current racecourse area7. This indoor venue developed there finally hosted the Taekwondo and the Handball. Other challenges that had to be tackled concerned the minimisation of transportation needs for athletes, spectators and members of the Olympic Family, as well as the development costs of the venues, since these increased costs resulted in a cost overrun. As a result, a fair number of venues hosting Hockey, Baseball, Softball, Canoe-Kayak, Basketball and Fencing, were decided to be developed in the area of Hellinikon, and specifically in the area where it used to be the old international airport of Athens. Some of the former airline company Olympic Airways hangars were used to host some of the above-mentioned events. This decision can be explained from the fact that the new international airport Eleftherios Venizelos was inaugurated in 2001 in the region of Spata.

Figure 6.8: The Olympic Complex of Hellinikon semi-completed (ATHOC 2004). For the organisation of road events such as the classic Marathon, the Cycling Road race, the cycling time attack and the Triathlon, the OCOG Athens 2004 has made a proposal in which these events should follow routes which advertise the culture, history and natural beauty of Athens. More specifically the proposals that were made acceptable by both the Government and the IOC have as follows:

 The classical Marathon would have an endpoint the Panathinaikon Stadium, a monument implemented by Evangelos Zappas and George Averof for the needs of the 1896 Games. It is situated at the hill of Arditos a place with natural interest in the city centre of Athens. Today it is used as a start point for the journey of the Olympic Flame around the world when it is the year for conducting the Olympic Games. The Cycling Road Race would be hosted in the streets of the historic centre of Athens linking the Acropolis, Lycabettus Hill and other Archaeological sites of the city.

7 Today in this area is situated the National Cultural Centre of Stavros Niarchos. 130

 The Triathlon would be hosted at Vouliagmeni, a fascinating coastal area.  The Cycling Time Trial would follow the route with destination to Sounion, where the Temple of Poseidon is situated.  The hosting of the Shot Put in Ancient Olympia, a decision that was made in December 2003.

6.4.1.2. Accommodation infrastructure Concerning the accommodation of athletes, members of the Olympic Family, journalists and photographers, the Olympic Village was decided to be implemented at the foot of mount Parnitha. However, in 1998 the government observed some barriers being environmental ones, the existence of high voltage lines in a very short distance and the existence of installations of the Air Force. Consequently, the village went a bit to the south and the total area rose from 830,000 m2 as proposed in the bidding process, to 1,240,000 m2. Being on the same spectrum, a market research that was carried out in 1998 by the Accommodation section of the ATHOC proved that more infrastructure was needed in order to accommodate more people. Facing this probable accommodation deficit, the ATHOC together with the Government and the Olympic Family made investments in creating more residences. More specifically, these additional residences included among others the Media Village, the Hotels for technical officials, floating residences being in cruise ships, and private residences for accommodating foreign visitors. Concerning the Media Village, this idea was presented in 1999 by the ATHOC and through cooperation with the government has proposed the construction of it. At the same time, an investigation concerning the probability for the private domain to intervene financially for its construction was made. Indeed, in 2000 a competition for submitting offers started but it failed, since technically the proposed project did not comply with the quantitative and qualitative criteria set be the IOC. After that, at the beginning of 2001, the ATHOC in association with the Ministry of Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works made a research in evaluating the case of using current properties whose owner is the State or benevolent institutions. This could be possible if there had been a willingness for both the Government and the ATHOC to coordinate their forces and make investments. But the main focus was on the future economic viability if for example the accommodation infrastructure satisfies adequately the demand from the Olympics market.

6.4.1.3. Media coverage premises The coverage of the Olympic Games was decided to be carried out in a large building located at Kifissias Avenue nearby the Olympic Complex of Athens where the Olympic Stadium is also situated. This building was property of the Greek exhibition body HELEXPO and was decided further extension of it. The Main Press Centre was decided to keep it at the current premises located at the Olympic Stadium.

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However, delays in the development of the Media Broadcasting Centre occurred, since after the implementation of a requirements analysis by the ATHOC, it was found and decided with the consent of the Government that the currently existed infrastructures were insufficient, so relocation was needed. A proposal for relocating the Broadcasting Centre within the region of the Olympic Stadium was made. But finally, the HELEXPO building was used and decided to be expanded as initially decided to host the Main Press Centre. The Broadcasting Centre was installed next to the HELEXPO building to an unused parking area at the interchange of Kifissias with Spyrou Loui Avenue.

6.4.1.4. Transportation infrastructure The main transportation problem Athens encountered before the period of the Games was congestion. According to 2006 data it can be proved that people living in Athens used to buy cars at a rate of 350 cars per 1000 residents, and only the 30% of Athens' population use the public transport (Frantzeskakis & Frantzeskakis, 2006). Congestion is also attributed to a lack of organised parking areas, resulting in illegally parked vehicles on a daily basis, making matters worse regarding traffic congestion. The transportation projects that were included in the transportation chapter of the 2004 candidacy file started even before the bidding process for the Olympic Games during the early ‘90s (Palaiokrassas, 2013). These included among others the new international airport of Eleftherios Venizelos, the underground railway and the Attica Highway with its connecting routes being the Hymettus bypass and the Western bypass of Mt. Egaleo.

Thanks to these projects, the problem of congestion was appeased for the following reasons (Frantzeskakis & Frantzeskakis, 2006):

 All transportation projects were scheduled to be finished on time.  Current traffic management control and police enforcement were improved.  The adoption of new technologies in traffic management, such as the installation of dy- namic signs, the upgrade of current traffic lights through the installation of sound assistance for vision-handicapped people and the installation of new signs and of cameras monitoring traffic in real-time.  The adoption of the Olympic Ring, facilitating the movement of the members of the Olym- pic Family, of Athletes, journalists and of political staff.  The current experience in applying the measure of banning the traffic for private cars, according to the last digit of the license plate of the vehicle.  The modernisation of the currently existing means of public transport and the introduction of express bus lines. The proposed improvements in transportation infrastructure were organised through the creation of the Transport Division within the ATHOC. This division developed an Olympic Transportation strategic plan with the help received from the ministries of Environment, Country Planning and

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Public Works, of Transport and Communications and of Public Order. However, these infrastructures were executed by the Ministry of Environment Physical Planning and Public Works. In order for the transportation sector of the candidature agenda to be fully prepared, simulations were carried out in order to make estimations on how traffic conditions would be during the period of the Games. Main purpose of the simulations was the evaluation of alternative plans regarding traffic and to recognise possible areas of interest that would require measures for further improvement. These provided a representation of how traffic loads would be redistributed after having made available the transportation infrastructure during peak and off-peak hours. Also, these simulations were used to compare and contrast the traffic conditions in Athens before and after the creation of the transportation infrastructure. All simulations included the application of traffic measures mentioned above.

Furthermore, simulations regarding the transportation of all Olympic Games related people were carried out which provided an estimation of demand concerning origin and destination areas. The estimations that were made concerned the following categories of people:

 The public  People of the IOC and of the ATHOC  Sponsors  Volunteers and people working at the venues  Journalists and photographers. For carrying out these simulations the following criteria were taken into account:

 The time when the events were organised.  The capacity of the venues and the distribution of seats to the members of the Olympic Family.  The sites where the accommodation was located.  The expected time of arrival and departure according to the schedule of the event.  The phase at which a sport event was i.e. whether it was a quarter-final, semi-final or final, that judges the attendance to the event.  Number of private cars on the streets, during the transportation process of the Olympic Staff.  Allocation of local residents and visitors according to location.  Public transport arrival frequency and predicted waiting times for shifting between them. Another point that has to be cited here is that the transportation management included the provision of information to the public (both locals and visitors) by providing them with maps of the underground railway network and by frequent media broadcasting concerning the utilisation of public transport and the banning of parking and traffic at critical areas.

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However, despite the positive legacy regarding transportation, further expansion and maintenance of it is very little. Some proposals for future development of the transportation network of Athens are frozen, because Greece nowadays is facing a crisis and hence financialisaton is too risky. In addition to this, from the interviews that were carried out by asking people from multiple sectors (academics, engineers, journalists, politicians and citizens) argue that this problem also exists due to the volatile legal framework regarding country planning, and due to poor coordination of the public sector, that results into delays and poorly prepared proposals regarding the technical specifications of the projects. Even issues of micropolitics occur between the government and the responsible companies, that is translated into lack of willingness between these parties to settle any differences of their interests and perceptions, leading thus to delays in implementation.

6.4.1.5. Coordination of works The ATHOC being responsible for the overall preparation and organisation of the Games, among others it was engaged to the construction of the majority of Venues, according to its founding charter. This came into action through a decision made from the Interministerial Committee in July 1998, which contemplated the undertaking of the following projects by the ATHOC: the en- semble of the venues situated in Faliro which included the Baseball, Softball, Beach Volley and the multipurpose complex, the Equestrian Centre, the Archery Centre, the Sailing Centre, the Ca- noe-Kayak Centre, and the Olympic Village. The rest of the sports infrastructure being the Boxing Centre, the Weightlifting Centre, the Equestrian Centre (after 2000), the upgrade and renovation of the existing sports infrastructure, as well as the development of the International Broadcasting Centre and Media Press Centre was coordinated and implemented by the General Secretariat of Sports, an entity under the management of Ministry of Culture. The infrastructure projects initially undertaken by the ATHOC were the most challenging ones specifically during their first steps of development. In particular, a "Project Construction Team" was established that focused mainly on the implementation of projects. The most important challenges that had to be addressed concerned the following areas: first, the issue of spatial planning raised concerns regarding land security for infrastructure and venue development, payment of expropriations, and environmental protection. For the later, relevant feasibility studies needed to be carried out, so as for the construction plans to be approved. In parallel with this, the existence of an adequate legal framework was also important to enable the development of the venues and infrastructure. Second, funding was another major challenge, since during the bidding process it was unclear how the projects would be financed; in other words, the question was focusing on searching for private or public funding.  Funding Searching for private funding was a process that required the help of a financial consultant, as well as a "call for tender". In the end, from this process it was found out that there were possibilities for private funding for the projects of Canoe-Kayak Centre, Sailing Centre, Equestrian Centre and for the multipurpose complex of Faliro. The probability for assigning projects through private-

134 public domain partnerships was not discussed, since it was not legally permitted, and ATHOC's Top Management was not experienced in such arrangements. Furthermore, it would have led to large delays while implementing projects, something that actually happened with the case of the Hellenic Horseracing Organisation S.A. This concerned the acquisition of the Equistrian Centre through venture contract whose terms predicted the grant of the betting income to the actual de- veloper of the Centre.  Country planning A major challenge for the development of venues and infrastructures was the selection of an appropriate land, through concession if it was under the stake of the public sector, or through payment of expropriations to land owners. Adequate experience on legal, technical and administrative issues was needed and for that reason the ATHOC requested assistance from a legal advisor, being in charge of preparing a proposal mentioning the possible regulation that would facilitate the implementation of the Olympic infrastructure. As a result, the Article 18 of Law 2730/1999 was formulated with the unanimous opinion of the Government and became law of the State, with regards to "Planning, Implementation, Develop- ment and Construction of Olympic Works and Related Acts". In addition to this, an entity at the former Ministry of Environment Physical Planning and Public Works was established to serve the issuing of the construction permits. This law, facilitated land expropriation and hence the implementation of projects. Indicatively, the processes of land pricing and bestowal of use used to be very long (usually it took 5-6 years on average); under this law, they are carried out rapidly in about one semester. An exception was the development of the Olympic Village, because most of the land used belonged to the Greek public domain or to citizens who had acquired it illegally. For assessing geotechnical and topographical properties as well the environmental impacts of the projects going to be implemented, feasibility studies were carried out. Such studies included also an assessment of funding alternatives and their main purpose was to ensure that the projects complied with environmental protection standards and for the development of their initial plans. An example of a feasibility study was carried out when the idea of reformation of the Faliro coastal zone was at the foreground.

6.4.1.6. Problems in coordination – Management remedies However, delays in the implementation of projects from the part of ATHOC led the IOC to give the Organising committee a warning sign. This triggered change in the top management of ATHOC, and to discussions whether a subsidiary technical company would take responsibility for the coordination of Olympic Works. This idea was finally dropped and in 2000 the Government by applying the Law 2819/2000 Paragraph 2a Article 4 transferred the responsibility for the construction of all the Olympic projects to the Greek public sector, and the ATHOC was restricted only to the supervision of projects in terms of time for their completion.

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As a result, this legal intervention made clearer the distinction of roles and functions vis-à-vis Olympic Works between the Government and the ATHOC, without compromising the spirit of cooperation between these entities. For instance, the ATHOC has delivered all the required documentation to the Governmental agencies regarding the progress made so far of the projects already started, as well as feasibility studies conducted so far. In addition to these, documentation specifying the requirements of projects has been delivered. Such requirements were defined and continuously refined in collaboration with the IOC and with the functional and sports division of ATHOC. Until the year of the Olympic Games, the public sector has worked vigorously in order to deliver the Olympic projects on time, in fear of running the risk of international humiliation. Indicatively, this can be proved from the time of project completion. This time is composed of “maturing period”, being the procedural period from the start of the project until the installation of workers, equipment, issuance of permits, purchase of land and payment of expropriations, and the implementation period being the period when workers started working until the termination and delivery. For example, this “maturing period” used to last up to 5 years and in the case of the Olympic Works this took about one and a half year for the majority of projects.

6.4.1.7. Supervision of projects – Methods Supervision of project development was made possible through the establishment of three bodies; the Interministerial Committee for Coordination of Olympic Preparation (ICCOP), the Project Management Team (PMT) and the Project Monitoring Group (PMG). The first two entities provided guidance frequently mainly on top managerial levels, but there was weakness in dealing with issues that needed quick and practical action; such concerned “land expropriation”, legal and technical issues, “social and local demands”. To cope with these challenges, the third supervision body was set up, being a flexible group that included representatives from ATHOC, Ministry of Environment Physical Planning and Public Works and Ministry of Culture. The PMG has played a very important role for finalizing the Olympic Works on time, since arduous bureaucratic procedures were avoided as it was the entity in which all problems concerning the construction of Venues and infrastructure were discussed and resolved. Problems that were not solved for a long period of time were transferred to ICCOP, instead to the Governmental level. Supervision of projects in terms of time and preparation of progress reports led ATHOC to use IT tools to process data provided by the bodies responsible for the development of projects and to plan and schedule all activities organised by ATHOC. For managing pending and incomplete issues, databases were developed. Key tools used included Monthly and Analytical Progress Re- ports, Gap Analysis, Issue Monitoring System for PMG and Venue Integrated Timelines. Monthly Progress Reports: These were made public to ATHOC Top Management and to IOC and comprised of the following elements:

 Executive Summary

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 Last month’s works  Pending issues  Impact specification of pending issues to overall progress  “Progress Tables” for every Olympic project in terms of elapsed time.  GANTT Charts  S-curves describing the actual percentage of project completion compared to the reference one. Analytical progress reports: These reports are considered as an extension of the Monthly Pro- gress Reports, which include all the critical and pending issues that are going to be discussed during the meetings of the ICCOP. They include a list of Olympic projects indicating their current development phase and key events that mark their progress i.e. contract signing, creation of design drafts, tender rounds, kick-off of works, completion and expected trial operation. They also include a list of last month’s works, something included in the Monthly Progress Reports, and there are indications that clarify whether a project is (not) started or in progress. Any arisen critical issues unable to be tackled are also highlighted, in order to be handled by the ICCOP. Issue Monitoring System for PMG: It was a database created by ATHOC and comprised of any pending issue that was transferred to the PMG for resolving it. For each issue properties were provided including its description, importance, decision taken, people who participated in discussions, action taken and deadline. ATHOC handled any issue to be transferred to the PMG through the Venue Teams and the Meetings of the Games Operations Management Executive Board.

Gap Analysis: It was a time-consuming process and its main purpose was to recognise any im- perfection on the Venues, so as to take immediate action to make them conform with any operational requirements defined by the IOC. Usually, this interference took the form of Venue design adjustment. Moreover, Gap Analysis was used to complete any pending works after having decided the repar- tition of responsibilities between the public sector and the ATHOC. This process gave a significant focus on the installation of any electrotechnical equipment at the Venues. When disagreement arose or the contribution of a higher-level decision was needed to let public sector to proceed with supplementary works, PMG played an important role. It provided with cost- effective solutions or it developed proposals for submission to the ICCOP for further discussion and decision-making. Venue Integrated Timelines: These were developed by an internal team within the ATHOC by collaborating with Venue Teams during the last months before the kick-off of the Games. These were related to the last stages of Venue construction, in which Venues had to be fully equipped. A critical aspect in the completion of Venues was the adjustment, review and certification of the technological equipment of the Venues. Such equipment included among others scoring boards, telecommunications, electricity installations and IT systems.

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This process required the involvement of highly technically skilled personnel. Thus, a committee was founded in 2003 which consisted of the following members: The Heads of the Technology and Site Management Central Teams, the President of Athens Olympic Broadcasting (AOB), members of the Technology Sponsors for the Information, Results, Telecommunications and Back-up Energy systems and the IOC Technology Director.

6.4.2. Technology management Management of technology during these Olympic Games was a responsibility of the ATHOC. More specifically, the technology cluster of the ATHOC began its operation in early 1999. Key responsibilities of this cluster included the supervision and coordination of ICT, Energy and Venue Technology departments.

During the 15-day period of the Games, technology management was coordinated by the so-called Technology Operations Centre encapsulating all the operations of the individual departments of the ATHOC’s technology cluster. At Venues, a Venue technology manager was in charge of managing all technology services in the particular venue and especially ICT, energy and technology sponsors. All technology services for the needs of the Olympic Games were supplied by the following international sponsors of the Games from the IOC’s TOP Program.

 Atos Origin; provision of IT services.  Kodak; provision of imaging hardware and services.  Panasonic; provision of Audio – Video hardware and services.  Samsung; supply of wireless telecommunications services.  Swatch; supply of timing and scoring systems and services.  Xerox; provision of photocopying and fax services.  General Electric; supply of back-up power services, ensuring energy sufficiency in case of power outages. Also, technology services were provided by the following national sponsors.

 Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (HTO); provision of fixed and mobile telecommunication services, as well as cable TV services.  Public Power Corporation (PPC); realisation of investments in energy infrastructure.  Altec, InfoQuest and Intracom; provision of integrated ICT services.

6.4.2.1. Personnel engaged in provision of technology services During the Olympic Games, a total of 6,859 people were employed in the provision of technology services. From this personnel, 704 came from ATHOC, 2,355 volunteered, 3,231 were people working at the sponsors and 569 were working at the contractors. The following table depicts how

138 the total number of personnel was allocated in the different sectors or technology services provision. During the 15-day period of the Olympic Games, the workforce engaged in the provision of technology services comprised of 252 people from Atos Origin, 200 from Panasonic, 93 from Sam- sung, 310 from Swatch, 26 from Xerox and 2,350 from HTO.

No. of personnel engaged Sector Technology ATHOC Volunteers Contractors' Sponsors' Telecommunications 50 180 2610 350 IT services 488 2175 621 219 Energy 44 N/A Venue Technology 122 N/A Total No. of personnel 6859 Table 6.11: Number of personnel engaged in technology services provision (ATHOC 2004). 6.4.2.2. Testing Technology The purpose of this stage was to test all the Olympic Games support systems and to define any shortfalls concerning planning, allocation of workforce and organizational structure. This presupposed the timely installation of the technological equipment in the venues. This stage also allowed for the specification of cabling infrastructure needed to ensure that the Games would be carried out smoothly.

All the engaged technology sectors carried out simulations by making use of operational scenarios, in order to test the venues’ technologies when real cases emerge, as well as the operations of the Technology Operation Centre.

6.4.2.3. Venue technology management Within the context of Venues, management of Technology was coordinated by a Venue Technol- ogy Manager. Duties included the delivery of all Technology services at the venues, and their planning, monitoring and implementation. Moreover, the Venue Technology Manager had full span of control and encouraged cooperation with the telecommunications, IT, Energy and Tech- nology Sponsor departments.

More specifically, the Venue Technology department had to define the operational requirements of each venue and the way of communication between them; i.e. the communication and control channels. In addition to this, the department was also responsible for establishing the operational regulations of all technology departments, under the guidance of the Venue Operations Division. For the installation of technological equipment within the Venues, collaboration between Venue Technology Managers and Technology Sponsors was needed to make sure that everything is in place and on time completed and complied with the Venue Operational Design Drafts.

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From the context of Venue Operational Planning, there can be identified a tight collaboration between Functional Area personnel, so as to specify the required needs of the technological equipment to appropriately deliver the functions of the Venues. This was effectuated through the application of a central procedure named Technology Equipment Allocation Requirements. Functional Areas included among others competition management for scoring, timing and reporting of results, site management for the execution of the technology infrastructure and Rate Card services. During the whole preparation period for the Olympic Games, Venue Technology Managers had to provide with information (once a month) to the Central Manager of the Venue Operations division, with the purpose of ensuring tight supervision based on a detailed plan of works per venue.

Venue Technology Manager

Telecommunica Scoring/Timing Audio-Visual IT services Enery provision Admin network tion services services services provision (Atos) (PPC) services (HTO) provision (HTO) (Swatch) (Panasonic)

Figure 6.9: Venue Technology Management areas of supervision (ATHOC 2004). 6.4.2.4. Management of Central Technology Operations All technology operations were centrally coordinated by the TOC. Its duty was to deter any unwanted situations and to take immediate action. Such problems could affect hardware and software that supports the results, the Olympic Information System INFO 2004 and the Commentator Infor- mation System. In addition, TOC was responsible for correcting any bugs occurred in telecommunications, electricity and in unlimited power supply systems (UPS). This was made possible by the Telecommunications Control Centre and System Control and Data Accumulation. The TOC guaranteed the quality of the Olympic Games with respect to Competition, Schedule, Broadcasting and Results.

6.4.2.5. Management of Telecommunications People working in ATHOC undertook positions with management responsibility and mainly positions of project management. The workforce that provided services to sponsors and contractors carried out the technical works. The engagement of Sponsors in the management of telecommunications was distributed as follows:

 HTO was the major national sponsor provided services such as fixed and mobile telephony, Cable TV, Internet and special services such as TETRA technologies.  Samsung provided wireless telecommunication services (provision of mobile phones).  Panasonic provided Audio-Visual equipment.

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In such a major sports event, reliable and known telecommunication technologies were used, after having reached an agreement with the Sponsors two years before the onset of the Games. During the testing phase, all telecommunication technologies were tested to define and assess the expected level of service. Telecommunications also played an important role during the specification of needs for the equipment of Venues. The following figure depicts the organisation of the Telecommunications functional area.

Planning team

Fixed Electronics Systems Telecommunications Radio Systems Team Team Team

Figure 6.10: Telecommunications functional area organisation (ATHOC 2004). Fixed Telecommunications team: This team was in charge of managing fixed internet, voice and data services. Radio Systems Team: It was responsible for the management and provision of wireless telecommunication services, such as mobile telephony, TETRA services and radio frequency management. Electronics Systems Team: This team was responsible for the management of audio-visual services and of cabling. To the overall assessment of telecommunications management is credited the punctual completion of all telecommunication infrastructure works, as well as the accurate definition of the number of users for both fixed and mobile telecommunications. Also, another success factor was the reliability of the services, and the timely intervention of personnel in critical cases (diversion and backup). It is also worth noticing that the Telecommunication Functional Area has managed to "rationalise" needs after having taken into account cost, avoiding hence the development of redundant networks.

6.4.2.6. IT management Strategic arrangements in managing IT services were implemented in a similar way as in Tele- communications management. People working at the ATHOC undertook managerial and coordination roles, as they were engaged in project management, while Sponsors of the TOP program were realising the provision of these services.

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 Atos Origin implemented applications for the Games Management Systems, for the Infor- mation Diffusion Systems and for the Results Distribution. Moreover, this sponsor provided security services for IT systems to ensure data integrity.  Swatch provided time, scoring and recording of results services. These were provided as inputs to the databases created for the Games.  Xerox and Kodak provided imaging and printing services, with the only difference being that Kodak was specialised in the printing of the Accreditation Certificates, while Xerox in the printing of results.  Altec, Intracom, InfoQuest and PC Systems provided desktops, servers, mainframes and storage systems. Also, these sponsors provided repair services for the previously mentioned equipment.

During the testing phase of IT systems, the following tests were carried out, in order to guarantee reliability and smoothness of the systems during the period of the Olympic Games. The results of these tests were positive, and additionally the personnel involved in IT management was tested for its readiness and reaction during critical situations.

 Interface tests: These tests aimed to verify that the software was developed and it provides the functions as it is supposed to.  End-to-End Tests: The purpose of these tests was to ensure the correct flow of data to the whole IT network.  Homologation Tests: Their objective was to check whether the software conforms with the regulations of each Sport and Discipline. Overall speaking the provided IT services during these Olympic Games include among others:

 Games Management Systems: They constitute an integrated set of software systems used for the preparation phase of the Games and during Games time. These systems were developed by Atos and provided support for the following areas: accreditation, Games staffing, sports entries and qualifications, transportation, health services and protocol services.  Information Diffusion Systems: In such systems, there can be distinguished four main components; a database including all relevant information about the Olympic Games which is accessible to the general public; the Olympic Information System Info 2004, which included Games-related information that was mainly used by the media; the Commentator Information System and the Real Time Feed Systems. All these systems were developed by Atos.  Timing, Scoring and Results Systems: This system was comprised by the following components: timing and scoring, on venue results, scoreboards and TV graphics. Responsible sponsors for the development of these systems were Swatch in collaboration with Atos and with the IT department of the ATHOC.

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 Reprographic Services: These included printing, copying and faxing services that were provided to the ATHOC, as well as to the Olympic Family. These services were provided by Xerox.  Printing and distribution of results: Includes the management and distribution of results to Press Operations, Rights Holding Broadcasters, Technical Delegates of the International Federations, Athletes and to organisers. Sponsors engaged in this service were Xerox (provision of printing equipment) and Atos (provision of software).  Administrative Services Support: Provided services included internet access, e-mail and intranet services, central network storage systems, specialised technologies such as Geo- graphical Information System (GIS), Computer Aided Design (CAD), ERP systems, Docu- ment Management Systems, Venue Equipment Planning (VEP) and Incident Tracking Sys- tems (ITS), administrative support by ATHOC either in headquarters or in venues and real- time access to IT services to authorized users.  Admin Services: Such services had an internal character within the IT functional area.  Network Security.  Technology Logistics: It was a special service of the IT functional area that was focused on warehousing, transportation and timely delivery of technological equipment to the pre- arranged locations. To the overall assessment of the IT management, it is recognised the use of cutting-edge technology and easy to use systems, the provision of education to users and the significant assistance from the TOC that dealt with extreme situations, to make sure that nothing will affect reliability and smoothness of the Games.

6.4.2.7. Energy Management Energy functional area was in charge of providing the requirements for electricity during the period of Olympic Games, while ensuring adequacy of energy. Also, in collaboration with the Ministry of Development and with PPC it was responsible for the implementation and finalisation of the required energy infrastructure. More specifically, the duties of the Energy functional area included the coordination and reliable functioning of all electrical systems within the Venues and the Olympic Village, and the obligation to provide with back-up power in extreme situations of power outages.

For strategic planning in energy management, the following criteria had to be taken into account while determining energy requirements:

 The number of households participating in the current power supply network.  Programmed works in electrical infrastructure within the Venues.  How temporary electrical infrastructures would be used.  How Rights Holding Broadcasters would be serviced.  How much lightning would be provided for Broadcasting needs.

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The body responsible for engraving the strategy of defining the energy needs was the Technology Division of ATHOC. The electricity transmission network used for the needs of the Games was separate from that which satisfied the needs of households. Emphasis was given to the improvement of power supply to the Venues, ensuring energy adequacy even under critical cases. All electrotechnical projects were implemented in association with PPC. Other energy management works included the installation of temporary sub-stations that covered supplementary energy needs at the venues, especially for broadcasting services. Another project was the installation of low voltage substations outside the Olympic Venues with UPS systems as it was predicted from the Energy Policy and from the Operational Planning for Venues. The establishment of a System Control and Data Accumulation System to inspect Medium Voltage networks at specific Venues, such as the Olympic Stadium, the Olympic Complex of Hellinikon, the Faliro Olympic Complex and the International Broadcast Centre was a product of research from the Energy Department of ATHOC. Finally, lightning works were defined based on the needs per Venue and Competition. Also needs of Broadcasters, International Federations and Photographers could not be deviated, since these specified whether temporary or permanent lightning infrastructure should be installed. Coordination of lightning works followed contest procedures based on Greek and European legislation, in which contractors undertook the installation of temporary lightning and UPS systems. For the implementation of lightning works, applied lightning technologies were not unknown and most importantly collaboration between different actors with technical knowledge was indispensable, so as to warrant that such projects meet the specifications of each Sport event. Judging the management of energy during these Olympic Games, it was effective and energy consumption did not reach excessive amounts (over 90% of the total capacity) that could pose power grid instability issues. This can be attributed to the following facts:

 A new electricity distribution centre was developed, and current grids were maintained appropriately, ensuring reliability.  Venues were electrified independently from the rest of the power grid.  The contribution of the SCADA system was significant in monitoring Medium Voltage loads.  The energy adequacy of temporary substations that covered temporary needs (i.e. broadcasting).  The creation of a loop-type internal Medium Voltage grid which was supplied by means of two lines.

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6.5. Beijing 2008

6.5.1. Infrastructure management and development Venue development for Beijing Olympics went to the "green" direction, without compromising the use of high-technologies and their supposed future value, so as to deliver the "People's Games". All venues were constructed by using environmentally friendly materials that gave to the venues energy-saving characteristics. As with previous Olympic Games the construction of the Olympic Venues started after having carried out feasibility studies and having been approved in institutional level. Also, as it is predicted by the IOC, already existing infrastructure had to be upgraded in order to meet the needs of the Games. For these Olympic Games, a total number of 37 venues were constructed and upgraded for the needs of the Olympic Games. 12 of them were built from scratch, 11 were upgraded and the rest were built as temporary. Also within permanent venues, were installed temporary facilities (e.g. seating). The majority of them were finalised by 2008 after having performed the required testing events; these that required only upgrades were ready even by 2006. Preparation for venue construction and supporting facilities began after Beijing won the Bid for hosting the Games in 2001. During that period, the Beijing Olympic Venue Plan and the Outlines for Constructing the Beijing 2008 Olympic Venues and Facilities were redacted. In addition, the Beijing OCOG (BOCOG) Construction & Environment Department developed the Guidelines for Olympic Construction Design, which defined the standards and requirements for venue construction. All these reports were submitted then to the Chinese government for approval. Moreover, the organisational arrangements made included the establishment of the Beijing Olympic Venue Con- struction and Coordination Commission, the Beijing Municipality 2008 Engineering Construction Headquarters, the latter being responsible for the supervision of venue construction. In general, these bodies were responsible for determining and reviewing the venues' final design drafts. In late 2002, the afore mentioned submitted reports were accepted by the government and thus construction works started in early 2003.

6.5.1.1. Applying Olympic Concepts in venue construction To deliver "high-tech", "green" and mainly "People's Olympics", the Commission on Science and Technology for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, the “2008 Engineering Headquarters, the Bei- jing Municipal Government, research institutes, venue engineers and BOCOG had to join their forces in order for these values to be fully expressed. This presupposed the creation of leading class venues and facilities that would also bring about a unique experience to all Olympic stakeholders concerned. How the “green” concept was expressed? For venue development, 358 environmental pro- grammes were commissioned by the Chinese government; from these 69 concerned the domain of

145 clean energy use, 168 concerned energy saving, and 121 at water management. From the total number of constructed and upgraded venues, 26 venues made use of clean energy, resulted in a reduction of 200,000 tons of CO2 per year. Indicatively, the indoor areas of Olympic Tennis Centre and of Peking University Gymnasium were heated by means of geothermal energy. At the Olympic Stadium, the Olympic Basketball Arena and the Olympic Green Central Area solar panels were installed for energy production. At the Shooting Range Hall, Laoshan Velodrome, Olympic Vil- lage and Media Villages was installed a system of water heating by means of solar energy. Other green energy technologies installed at the venues concerned the use of heat-pump systems that enabled the cooling and heating of indoor areas, the installation of energy saving lightning systems, the introduction of rainwater collection systems, and of natural cooling systems installed at the Olympic Tennis Centre that was capable of reducing the seats temperature by 5o C making thus a bearable environment for spectators. How now the “high-tech” concept was expressed? During the construction of venues, new construction technology developed either domestically or internationally was used. For the construction of the Olympic Stadium for example were used approximately 150,000 tons of steel. Other high-tech construction materials used were the Ethylene Tetrafluoroethylene adopted in the Na- tional Aquatics Centre provided adequate resistance to environmental pressure (hailstorms and any type of storms), by giving spectators a good spectacle. The installation of Low-Emittance at the Basketball Arena helped significantly in saving energy as it trapped heat from the outside environment during summer and cold during winter. Finally, the installation of smart lightning control contributed to saving energy, as well as facility in error identification and maintenance.

What about delivering “People’s Olympics”; to what extent this was achieved? The majority of venues were planned to be designed in a such a way to deliver a unique experience translated into the provision of quality services to athletes, coaches, members of the Olympic Family and spectators. Handicapped people were not excluded, as special facilities were installed, such as wheelchair lift systems within the venues. To deliver a nice environment for athletes in the venues, the installed climate control systems were adjusted accordingly. For example, in the National Aquatics Centre, when athletes were walking barefoot so as to perform their program, the floor was heated by means of ground heating system, so as to provide convenient conditions. In the badminton and table tennis centres, ventilation was adjusted, so that the air could not exceed 0.2 meters per second, affecting negatively the athletes' attempts. For spectators, as stated before ventilation systems were installed under the seats so as to provide comfort. Seating design was implemented by taking into account safety as well as good flow of spectators by eliminating the risk of congestions while entering and exiting the venues. Being on the same spectrum, seating provided a good view of athletes when they were performing.

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6.5.1.2. Organisational arrangements in venue management Venue management was organised by focusing on key responsibilities assigned to participating members, flow of information, standardisation of processes and on performing testing events for venue operation. During the Games period, three venue teams were in charge of managing operations. These were the Competition Venue Team, Non-Competition Venue Team and the Training Venue Team. The first team, was composed of a venue manager, deputy managers responsible for the areas of logistics and Games security, general secretariat for managing operations, full-time employees for coordinating competitions, media tasks and construction of venues, people working in public administration levels and BOCOG members.

In the second team, all members are under the responsibility of Venue Management Department. These members developed the operations plans describing responsibility areas for the management of non-competition venues. Such areas covered security, logistics and other related Games services. The third team, concerned the management of training venues, where the athletes were prepared for taking part in competitions. These included also a venue manager, and of managers carrying out operational tasks. Such tasks were proportional to those carried out at both competition and mainly in non-competition venues. Regarding venue staffing, all venue managers irrespective of venue type came from the local government of Beijing, from administrative levels of China public domain especially from the domain of Sports, and from other BOCOG departments. Venue functional area managers came mainly from BOCOG. Management of the existing venues, was assigned to current venue owners, or to university staff in case venues were university buildings. Such staff was more familiar with the operations of these venues. For designing the operations plan, the secretariat and the competition manager were working on a full-time basis. For the organisation of venues' operations as long as these were nearly completed, this was under the responsibility of functional area managers. In general, management of venue teams was related to the stage at which was the construction of a venue. That is, there can be observed changes in management responsibilities during the Games preparation phase. During the construction of venues, managing venue teams was under responsibility of the BOCOG and during testing events and in-Games time, management was transferred to the venue teams. During venue testing phase, this was carried out by hiring for a short period of time people working at public administrative levels.

6.5.1.3. Managing Venue Operations BOCOC Venue Management Department was charged with the following responsibilities for both competition and non-competition venues:

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 Defining responsibilities of venue functional areas.  Creation of venue teams, staffing and training of personnel.  Overseeing venue operations to assure a satisfactory quality level.  Overseeing venue operations to other cities during Games time.  Scheduling test events.  Guiding personnel in simulation training.  Providing information to the IOC.  Engaged in technology management tasks, such as the installation of audio-visual and telecommunications equipment and of the venue information management system.  Arranging seating for accredited personnel. The key to success in venue management operations was the organisation of testing rehearsals known as "Good Luck Beijing Test Events". These took place a semester before the start of the Games, and it consisted of simulation exercises where the personnel were tested under real Games time conditions. Even anti-terrorism exercises were carried out in order to identify and deter possible attacks. Before the start of the testing phase, the BOCOG Venue Management Department redacted the Guidelines for Venue Team Simulation Exercises and Dress Rehearsals that provided guidelines to venue teams on organising the testing phase.

6.5.2. Technology Management Technology management during Beijing Games was pretty much identical to previous Olympic Games. Services that managed the BOCOG technology department concerned the areas of ICT, results management, radio frequencies, audio-visual and document management. For the development, testing and final installation of the required technologies, similar institutional arrangements were made between BOCOG and the sponsors. During Games time, central management was assigned to the TOC with similar responsibilities as in previous Games; management and supervision of technological equipment at venue level and fixing of potential arisen problems during their operation.

6.5.2.1. Strategies and procedures during testing and operation BOCOG technology department applied directly knowledge from previous Games to ensure that all technology systems were performing properly their functions. For example, let us take the example of the system that manages results; In order to create a fault tolerant and upgradable system, two back-up systems were developed and tested to hedge the risk of potential malfunctions in officialising competition results. As needs were increasing during the Games-time, flexibility enabled such systems -and the rest of them used in the Games- to be adapted quickly, without the need to undertake time consuming process of expanding systems during the last moment (i.e. in- Games time). The Good Luck Beijing Test Events played also a determinant role in assessing technology readiness for the Games. Main objective of these events was to identify malfunctions and applying

148 directly fixes to the systems; hence reliability was assured. More specifically, these were performed by hiring a software company that tested the systems under real conditions; any glitches identified were corrected immediately and the systems were retested, until glitches were absent. Error correction was therefore an iterative process. Other simulation tests were also carried out during these events, that provided training to the technical staff at venue level in identifying technical needs and to cultivate responsiveness in extreme situations occurring in Games time. Such concerned hardware/software failure, power outages, sports equipment changes and network invasions and interruptions. The most interesting fact from these testing events was the vast size of these testing events, not only in terms of the number of simulations carried out, but also of the number of people participated in this event. Approximately more than 500 simulation tests were realised in 39 venues, including those being outside Beijing, as well as 2,500 people attended the events. Regarding operations, the TOC was in service 24 hours per day for a fortnight being ready to intervene in every glitch occurred. During the whole period of the Olympic Games, technical support managed effectively 10,023 reports that addressed system failures and other requests. Most of system failures were solved at venue level; however, these failures did not affect vital operations such as broadcasting coverage and competition conduct. In technology management, 8,800 people were engaged during the 15-day period of the Games; 570 came from BOCOG Technology Department as well as personnel working at TOC. About 5,600 were people working at sponsors and the rest were mainly volunteers. The successful management of technologies and especially of technology failure management were acknowledged by both the IOC Technology department and by the Media Broadcasters.

6.5.2.2. Technologies emerged for the first time These lines present some new technological facilities emerged for the first time in these Olympic Games. First of all, the Media Broadcasters holding broadcasting rights had access through their home country to the real-time information system providing commentary.

Second, vast usage of WLAN networks were used. The platform Info 2008 (a system similar to Info ’96) provided access to users through WLAN to edit and update information. This presupposed the use of WLAN cards.

Thirdly, large Media Broadcasters such as Reuters, Associated Press, Agence France Presse, Getty Images, and Xinhua News Agency had access to optic fibre networks that enabled them to upload rapidly news feeds with the inclusion of media files (e.g. pictures). Fourthly, it can be observed the usage of digital cable TV services that phased out the obsolete analog cable TV services provided during the previous Olympic Games. This can be considered another application of the value of delivering “high-tech” Olympic Games. In addition, the digi-

149 talisation of TV networks enabled the transmission of high definition audio and video signals during the events. The Games Video On Demand service was also provided to athletes and coaches, so as to be fully prepared for the upcoming events, and in a such a way they were fully aware of their opponents.

6.6. London 2012

6.6.1. Venue Construction Management and Development The London Olympics of 2012 were hosted by giving yield to the development of temporary venues, so as not to fall into the trap of abandoned infrastructures. This logic moved in the spectrum of sustainability and it was very important beforehand to verify that sustainability was implemented in the design, development, operation, decommissioning and reinstatement of the venues and infrastructures. The temporary logic that was applied can be proved from some figures regarding the number of commodities used to develop venues; 250,000 modular chairs were installed with capability of assembling and disassembling them, 165,000 m2 of tents, 140 km of fences, 240 km of crowd barriers and 100,000 m2 of temporary sports surfaces. The Venues and Infrastructure section of London OCOG (LOCOG) was in charge of designing, developing, operating, decommissioning and reinstating of all relevant infrastructures and venues that served operations such as logistics, catering, waste collection and management, and satisfied the needs of athletes and spectators. This department faced the only constraint being the management of 500 million pounds to the development and installation of temporary structures.

6.6.1.1. Strategic development To focus on sustainability, the Venues and Infrastructure department developed an internal strategy that aimed to be in line with the London 2012 sustainability policy framework as well as with the experiences learned from previous Olympic Games. This strategy was based on the following central aspects:

 To accomplish the London 2012 sustainability guidelines, and to identify potential future challenges.  To verify that the strategy is in line with regulations and planning rules  To channel social benefits and environmental protection at venues  To achieve cost effectiveness in a sustainable way.  To provide a positive legacy  To keep in high priority branding and inter-actor relations. The sustainability strategy requires the fulfilment of three delivery criteria which focus on strategic decision making, the creation of partnerships and the availability of local solutions to realise sustainability philosophy.

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More specifically, strategic decision making is the cornerstone for judging the success in applying sustainability. The creation of partnerships was very essential in clarifying the sustainability concept. Indeed, LOCOG had a close relationship with the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) which provided information that made clear that only venues with post-Olympic use value would be developed with a permanent character. Other partnerships concerned collaborations with the Olym- pic Sponsors, as well as with suppliers that provided temporary installation supplies, with institutional authorities such as the Environmental Agency, and with current owners of venues or lands where new venues were going to be developed. Availability of local solutions, helped the Venue and Infrastructure Manager to provide support to venue teams in elaborating solutions that were in line with the sustainability concept (e.g. sustainable design of venues and management of used resources for venue development).

Taking these considerations into account, the vision, aims and strategies of the LOCOG Venue & Infrastructure Department were defined, and they are depicted in the following figure:

NO WASTE - Waste minimisation while encouraging NO HARM recycling and reuse of materials. - Safety first in the working environment. - Efficient water management. - Use of environmentally friendly materials.

Vision: Redefining Sustainability Standards of major sports events

NO NEGATIVE TRACE YES TO POSITIVE TRACE - No negative environmental externalities - Provide future opportunities to domestic caused during construction and dissassembling business and liveability benefits. of venues.

Figure 6.11: Vision, aims and strategies of LOCOG Venue & Infrastructure Department (Aukett, 2012). 6.6.1.2. Prioritising and measuring aims When the objectives were of high level and too broad, these could be deducted into more specific targets able to be measured. However, this consideration is valid when permanent venues were to be constructed, since for temporary venues, it was impossible to calculate how sustainable these installations were, due to their temporal character. There can be distinguished six main targets that could be measured in terms of how much these were accomplished.

1. Decrease of LOCOG's CO2 emissions by 85%; 86 % was achieved.

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2. Decrease carbon footprint of venues by 25%; 47% was achieved. 3. Gradual banning of unconventional air-conditioning systems to an extent of 70%; 82% was achieved. 4. Minimise emissions from running temporary power generators by 80%; 80% was achieved. 5. Achieve a target of 20% of purchased materials being recycled; this was not possible to be measured. 6. Recycle and reuse more than 90% of materials proceeding from the construction and deconstruction of temporary venues; 99% was achieved.

6.6.1.3. Delivering the strategy – Success factors In order for LOCOG Venue and Infrastructure Department to apply the expressed vision and hence to deliver its strategy, the focus was given into four delivery pillars: sustainable design, sustainable delivery, sustainable urban planning and sustainable venue construction and operations.  Sustainable Design Sustainable design means that both environmental and social impacts are taken into account in the design of both permanent and temporary venues. Indicatively, for the construction of permanent installations materials with a lifespan of around 60 years were used. Guidelines about the design of temporary venues were not existent, but LOCOG elaborated the Temporary Materials Guide- lines and the Temporary Venues and Overlay Sustainable Design Requirements. These were shared with the design teams and in order to further stimulate innovation training and workshops were arranged. Guidance provided at the workshops were rotating around the following issues:

 Carbon footprint reduction at venue level.  Construction by using modular concepts; this enabled the aftermarket use of unused materials.  Use of materials that minimise environmental impacts.  Design for energy efficiency (e.g. reduce the needs for climate control, take advantage of natural lightning)  Design for modular installations that can be removed after the Games, or for fixing when- ever an issue occurs (e.g. ground piping instead of underground).

Of course, there can be identified challenges while addressing the sustainable design objective. For instance, several sustainability programs (e.g. the provision of renewable materials) required a long-term payback and many designs required frequent changes, resulting hence to a change in focus from design to provision while making sure that all supplies were designed by suppliers by taking into account sustainability.

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For the design of temporary materials that would equip the temporary venues, a working group was created that would recognise any possible sustainability opportunities and to prepare a provision agreement with suppliers of temporary materials. This agreement could describe all the sustainability criteria of these materials (e.g. how steel for fencing should be manufactured, if scrap material was used and if there are any other alternative materials for fencing manufacturing). Therefore, this approach in general made sure that the sustainability concept was clearly defined in the materials provision contracts signed with providers.  Sustainable delivery The implementation of Olympic infrastructures required from LOCOG to hire providers of construction materials. After having elaborated on the requested requirements that would be delivered by the potential providers, then starts the recruitment process of providers. It is composed of the following steps: Expression of Interest, Pre-Invitation to Tender, Invitation to Tender, Contract award, Contract development and Contract Management. In Expression of Interest, the LOCOG's sustainability values were expressed. In Pre-Invitation to Tender, a meeting between LOCOG parties took place in which the sustainability requirements were reviewed and to make sure that they were clearly understood. In Invitation to Tender phase, the candidate suppliers were called to react on the sustainability requirements proposed by the LOCOG, concerning the provided construction materials. In Contract awarding, a supplier who distinguished among other candidates in expressing principles of sustainability, after having noted them down in the Sustainability Procurement Check Sheet, this was selected by the LOCOG as the provider of construction materials. In Contract development, all suppliers were required to serve the sustainability requirements of LOCOG. Finally, Contract management concerned prioritising suppliers to projects in terms of environmental risk and areas of service. When infrastructure projects were large and environmentally risky, a sustainability manager was used in order to supervise suppliers when delivering projects. Main challenges addressed in delivering sustainability, were the large number of participating candidate suppliers during tender within a short period of time, potential differences between technical and sustainability needs and differences to the extent of understanding between suppliers and LO- COG.  Sustainable urban planning

In order for the temporary infrastructure to be placed and be operational for the period of the Games, LOCOG should have acquired urban planning authorisation. Before submitting an application at public level for granting authorisation, a review of the environmental impacts of the predicted urban planning had to be reviewed and mentioned, in order for the outcome to be successful. The grade of environmental interference was a function of the environmental impact grade caused, the type of development, and the natural importance of the area going to be reformatted.

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In an attempt for LOCOG to be in line with its sustainability strategy, it had to review the environmental impacts of placing the temporary infrastructure by applying the following process:

 Preliminary identification of environmental impacts.  Carry out a study that reviews the environmental impacts by tracking down opinions at Local Planning Authorities through survey research.  Referring to institutional governmental level for advice. When authorisation was granted, terms or exemption conditions were additionally needed. LO- COG implemented an application that controlled each venue whether these terms and conditions were sufficient. So, preparing the required documents was a first essential step in acquiring per- mission to LOCOG to express its sustainability strategy in urban planning.

A main challenge addressed during the application of this strategy was the probable delay that may occur during the processing of the submitted applications. There were multiple infrastructure projects all competing for priority in issuing urban planning authorisations; hence more personnel and technology means were needed in order to assess these applications.  Sustainable venue construction and operations It is recalled that LOCOG was the main body in charge of managing the construction, operation and deconstruction of the venues. Its principal aim was to satisfy its vision towards sustainability, something that was also required from the institutional level in order for it to grant all the relevant urban planning permits.

Concerning operation of venues, a main requirement was that all operational processes would not only comply with the environmental protection, but also these would assure a secure working environment to the personnel involved. For this to be realised, the responsible body was the LOCOG venue management team. Management of risks in operational level was idem to that during the construction process; this concerned the following areas of interest:

 Environmental impacts management; this presupposed the use of an Environmental Man- agement Plan in which all environmental risks were reported and it provided incentives for action. So, this guaranteed that the objectives of the defined strategy are met.  Resource and waste control; this was another commitment for delivering the sustainability strategy. Even suppliers of construction materials were supposed (as defined in the terms and conditions agreed with LOCOG) to find ways of reusing and recycling their waste materials. All other waste that came from the operation of venues was collected, recycled and reused from waste management companies.  Supervision of contractors; to make sure that their provided services comply with the sustainability vision expressed in the contractual agreement provided by LOCOG.  Stakeholder engagement; it is very essential to keep high levels of engagement between stakeholders that they have an institutional role in environmental protection

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 Compliance control; when carried out regularly it ensures that all environmental and social impacts are unceasingly addressed.  Incident management; all these were addressed at venue level and concerned technological failures, needs change in terms of equipment or personnel, accidents, probable environmental damage and others.  Operations reporting; LOCOG required daily reports on the amount of water and energy consumed as well as on the amount of waste disposed, so as to evaluate whether the objectives mentioned previously are satisfied to a sufficient extent. In order for the sustainability strategy to be addressed successfully in its all four pillars, a main success factor was the maintenance of a high level of commitment of LOCOG leadership in moti- vating engineers, architects, suppliers and other personnel to keep improving on sustainability performance and fulfil the defined targets.

6.6.2. Technology management A great amount of technology systems was needed so as to deliver a unique experience to all those involved during these Olympic Games. These systems delivered areas similar to previous Olympic Games. The difference between previous Games lies to the need of providing access to real-time information at spectators' level instead of official personnel level that used to be; this became possible with the vast use and management of social networks. The main commitment in delivering such an experience demanded the provision of real-time information for every Olympic Sport. This was quite risky, despite the introduction of contemporary software by Atos; hence rigorous testing was undoubtedly required. Integrated test labs were developed to simulate within a small scale the true dimension of the Games. More than 200,000 working hours were spent in testing between 2010 and 2011. Testing events played also their role just like during previous Games, as their purpose was to provide improvements in technical equipment, as well as to ensure organisational readiness of the involved personnel (from venue managers to volunteers). The principal challenge encountered in managing technology was the rise of the smartphone market. As these mobile phones can be considered as portable computers, users demanded interaction with real-time Games-related information, so as to be timely informed about the events and hap- penings. As a result, relevant applications were created for the smartphone platforms.

Given the rise of the smartphone market, LOCOG technology department was also aware of expanding the coverage of UMTS networks around the Olympic Park. This set the foundations for LOCOG to develop adequate mobile networking infrastructure. Hence this led LOCOG to cooperate with UK’s mobile operators creating an alliance called as the Joint Olympic Operators Group. This partnership was very beneficial for the mobile operators, since mobile telecommunications infrastructure developed during the Games had a post-Games value (positive legacy). UMTS network was developed by BT being one of the key players collaborating with LOCOG.

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Such developments brought about unique a spectatorship experience, as not only quality telecommunications needs were achieved within venues, but also increased social-networking activity. Not only spectators were the only affected group by these technological developments, but also Games related personnel. Indicatively the following facts are provided:

 NOCs now were able to experience the use of an online accreditation system.  Broadcasters were able to access more commentator Info systems than in previous Games and more virtual graphics systems in a variety of sports.  The media Info system was now accessible via a website for the registered members.  Torch relay assignment was made completely online thanks to the use of cloud technology.  The Olympic Data Feed could be utilised by media personnel and agencies and by Inter- national Federations. As with infrastructure development, LOCOG technology department had a central role in coordinating the collaboration with TOP and domestic sponsors and suppliers for the development and delivery of the technology services. Concerning the in-Games time operations, one challenge identified was related with the changing needs on video equipment that was related to the analysis of controversial phases during some sports; hence this was solved with the introduction of a venue technical operations team. Another issue was the case of cyber security; LOCOG had the support of UK government bodies in order to create a special internet security architecture to the LOCOG’s and the Games’ IT management systems. Hence protection and unauthorised access to Games data was blocked. Finally, radio frequencies management was another area of interest for LOCOG; the committee cooperated with Ofcom to elaborate on the way how frequencies would be distributed. Hence this collaboration ended up to the introduction of a converged radio network for the first time in Olym- pic Games history. Management of technology required from the LOCOG technology department to ensure that it expresses the sustainability concept as it was the case of the LOCOG Venue and Infrastructure department. This concept on managing technology gave yield on zero CO2 emissions and waste. Indicatively, LOCOG negotiated with Xerox (responsible TOP sponsor for the provision of printing equipment) to buy back any pieces of paper left unused after the end of the Games. Therefore, 30 million unused pages were returned, resulting in a decrease of 70% of paper usage than the amount used in Athens Olympiad. This also results in a decreased need of cutting down trees for paper production. In a proportional logic moved the provision of excess equipment (110,000 items) and of cabling (5,500 km); these were brought back to the original suppliers for future sale to other businesses. Also, equipment used at the venues with future use value to the original venue holders were maintained. For example, the equipment used at the TOC which was housed at the East London College

156 was kept in favour for college’s functions and therefore for servicing students’ educational needs. Such a technology management strategy accredits a positive legacy during the post-Games period.

6.7. Lessons Greece can learn In order for Greece not to fall again into the trap of “cash cows” Olympic infrastructure projects, the following challenges were identified and should be taken into account, in case the Olympic Games receive a permanent character: financing of projects, bureaucracy, spatial planning, legal framework, environmental protection, expropriation of properties, geology and seismicity, availability of construction technology and availability of construction materials. The sample inter- viewed and presented in section 3.2, was asked to state its opinion on these challenges and to classify them in terms of importance in a scale of 1 to 5. Number 1 means that the challenge is of very low importance, while 5 means extremely high. Sampling data derived from the interviews are presented in detail in Annex A (tables (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)). From this data, the below table is extracted, which depicts the classification of the above explained challenges per sample cluster.

Average scores per sample cluster Overall average Challenge/Factor Academics Citizens Engineers Politicians score (n=10) (n=10) (n=10) (n=4) Financing of projects 4,30 4,75 4,90 4,00 4,49 Bureaucracy 4,29 3,70 3,40 3,75 3,78 Expropriation of properties 3,56 2,83 2,70 1,25 2,58 Legal framework 3,99 3,98 3,30 3,75 3,75 Environmental protection 3,75 3,56 3,50 3,00 3,45 Availability of construction materials 2,41 2,54 1,90 2,19 2,26 Spatial planning 3,51 3,78 3,80 3,65 3,68 Construction technology 2,64 2,98 2,10 2,34 2,51 Geology and seismicity 1,90 2,52 2,90 1,50 2,20 Table 6.12: Sampling output per cluster. To begin with the issue of financing, this is the most important thing before a project is going to be undertaken; without the existence of funding, an idea cannot be realised at all. The general opinion among all clusters, is moving to the fact that funding is a very important issue, given Greece’s difficult financial position. Also, there is uncertainty in terms of return on investment (ROI), that would help to both assess the feasibility of the projects, as well as to pay pack possible debts, if debt finance is selected. Concerns about potential social burden through taxation were also expressed in general. However, only one academic specialised in financial management stated an interesting argument concerning the Games’ source of funding. Indicatively, it was argued that financing of the Olympic Games is not a challenging issue, as long as only private investors would undertake their financing, given the failure of the public sector in managing funding, resulting thus in cost overruns. Hence a score of 1 was given.

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Moving to bureaucracy, this constitutes an indispensable part of managing the development of technology projects during the Games. It was considered the second most important challenge for politicians and academics. This because the main argument invoked was the delays occurred when infrastructure or other technology projects are going to be developed. They invoked the case of the 2004 Olympiad, in which infrastructure projects were progressing slowly, due to the slow bureaucratic process. For citizens and engineers, it is the 4th most important criterion, as scores of 3.70 and 3.40 were attributed respectively. They argued that bureaucracy ensures that quality is achieved during the processes of issuing permits, of signing partnerships with other companies, of issuing land expropriations and others. The only prerequisite is the application of legislation. These clusters also agreed with the fact that bureaucracy has to be modernised, so as to tackle with the occurred delays. Here, politicians stated that today there is a commitment of the government to its creditors through the MoU to modernise all bureaucratic processes by introducing modern technologies, that are expected to be a remedy to delays occurred while servicing the development of major projects. Legal framework is another important issue, but here all clusters gave a different classification on average. It is the fourth most important criterion for academics, the second for citizens, the fifth for engineers and the third for politicians. However, on average they think that it is an issue of medium to high importance. It is volatile during the last years and in most cases, it is too complex to be applied. In terms of managing macroeconomic development it becomes investment averse, impeding a potential upward to the economy. An idea expressed by a citizen working as a bank employee, as well as by two academics specialised in financial management and in economic theory, concerned the strengthening of the legal framework from a funding management perspective. This would predict the establishment of a third-party independent organisation, unbiased from the interests of the current government, to supervise, report and sanction any misuse of construction funds. Lenient application of the legal framework results in corruption, bribing and in general to a lack of punishment when rules are bent. However, from all clusters it was argued that the problem is not the lack of legislation, but the inability and difficulty of its application. Finally, engineers argued that for infrastructure development, extensive guidelines exist in the development of infrastructures, as provided by IOC and by International Federations. In addition, they stated that adequate experience from the Games in 2004 can be also acknowledged. Therefore, another good lesson for Greece in its attempt to reinforce its legal framework, lies in the will from the government to apply it “by the book”, without making distinctions.

Regarding spatial planning, this is a challenge of medium-high priority in overall, because of the large set of required infrastructures. Engineers and citizens consider it as a high priority issue, since they gave on average a value of 3.8 and 3.78 respectively. There is adequate experience from the Olympiad of 2004, but theoretically speaking there should be enough area and careful planning beforehand, and to control any possible disturbances to local populations. For example, it would be ideal to locate leisure areas around venues, so as to facilitate the flow of spectators from one venue to another. Regarding transportation, it would be ideal to construct bike roads as well as to

158 expand public transportation network, by applying at the same time restrictive measures regarding vehicle circulation. However, this is an important problem, since according to politicians, urban planning became a real issue from the late 1960s. Construction of buildings became uncontrollable and in combination with the inconsistent legal framework, construction permits were issued -or even not issued in some cases- without any constraint, and therefore challenges occurred, when an infrastructure project was going to be implemented. The case of Barcelona in urban planning could be a very good lesson for Greece to learn; thus, it is indispensable to put a lot of thought to create a tidy area around the venues and around the hosting city or cities. Environmental protection is another issue of medium to high importance in overall. If the Games of London and Beijing are considered, these were organised by applying sustainability strategy, having as a main objective the reduction of waste disposed and of energy consumed. As mainly expressed by the respondents (academics, citizens and engineers), today there are already available environmental standards by which all newly developed infrastructures and technologies should comply with. However, politicians from the central-winged parties consider it as a challenge of low to medium priority. They argue that, the Article 24 of Constitution predicts the conduct of feasibility studies before the development of a potential project analysing probable environmental impacts. On the contrary, a parliament deputy from the left party considers it a top issue, despite the already existing legislation. In any case, it is indispensable for the Olympic Games to have a green image, at the moment that concerns about climate change and of illogical exploitation of natural resources are dominant. This also presupposes that all venues and supporting infrastructure, as well as provided technologies should exist in harmony with the natural environment.

Expropriation of properties is an issue of medium to low importance in overall. However, academics consider it an important issue of medium-high priority, as this could be a potential source for residents to appeal against the development of infrastructures. Despite the experience of the 2004 Games and the existence of a legal framework that allows the public sector or private companies to refund owners of land, a trade-off has to be made between respecting the right of the owner to maintain his/her land or property and of using part of land to implement a project. This trade-off has the potential to bring about delays in the progress of infrastructure development. On the other hand, if it is assumed that in Athens the Games are going to be hosted permanently, this challenge becomes of low priority, since all relevant infrastructure is existent. That’s why respondents (citizens, engineers and politicians) attributed low-medium scores in evaluating this criterion.

Geology and seismicity is a challenge of low importance, as this concerns the geological characteristics of soil and the risk of an earthquake event. On the other hand, engineers consider it a challenge of medium priority. They primarily evaluate safety, so as for the venues to be built robust and to withstand forces in case of an earthquake event. On the other hand, the other clusters and especially politicians stated that there is adequate legal framework, which predicts the proofing of all infrastructures against earthquakes of a high magnitude. It is legally required by engineers and architects to carefully design the venues and the materials used for their construction.

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Finally, availability of construction technology and of materials are issues of low importance on average. Some individual cases of academics, citizens and of engineers with knowledge on entrepreneurship argue that these can be potentially of critical importance. They are taking primarily into account potential funding problems and secondarily if the Games are supposed to have a national character, materials and technologies have to be transferred to other places, resulting in increased construction costs. On the contrary, the majority of the respondents expressed the argument that each infrastructure project going to be developed, uses the latest construction materials and technologies. In addition to this, the facilities needed for the Games are already existent; only medium scale interventions are needed for their renovation. So, these are the reasons why these parameters are of low importance. The following table summarises the average classification of the above explained challenges based on these conducted interviews. From this table it becomes clear, that primary priority should be given on financing, bureaucracy modernisation, creating a more stable, coherent and applicable legal framework, structured urban planning and be aware of environmental protection. Indeed, these are the main pillars in managing successfully the development of Olympic and other infrastructures.

Table 6.13: Sampling output. In order for the afore mentioned challenges to be fully addressed successfully, in organisational level the following recommendations -as proposed in (ACOG 1996)- could provide a useful lesson for Greece, as long as the Games take a national character:

 Establish venue management teams during planning phase, to ensure that expensive designs and construction processes are avoided.  Clear definition of needs. Under the proposed policy venues with permanent character are needed, which is the case as long as Athens organises the Games, equipped also with temporary facilities such as seating to accommodate potential increases in spectacle demand.  Keep public bodies being involved in the process of construction, as long as bureaucracy is successfully addressed.

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 Set and follow deadlines that predict that the venues would be fully prepared up to one year before the Games. This is only applied during the first preparation period following the assignment of the Games to Greece, no matter if they have a national or a local (Athens) character.  Provide with alternative solutions of locating venues, if the Games acquire national character. This is again applicable during the first preparation period.  Always cater for maintenance of venues between Olympiads, since lack of it would result in increased costs of renovation, and would change radically the results of CBA. For managing technologies, the following lessons can be also provided based on those of (ACOG 1996):

 When cooperating with sponsors for managing development, delivery and operation of technologies, the organising committee must make sure that the personnel is adequately experienced and that delivery of technologies are made timely in the right quantity; otherwise sanctions should be considered.  Careful staffing according to technological requirements and provision of administrative support is crucial to ensure smooth Games-time operations, as well as careful budgeting restricting thus cost overruns.  Set deadlines for introducing new technologies, as Sydney did, as well as for testing the function of technological equipment. The latter has to be at least one year before the start of the Games and agreement is presupposed between sponsors, contractors and organising committee.  Generalised use of CAD systems to simulate technological needs and to select flexible systems that could operate successfully with both existing and new equipment.  Always cater for energy surplus, to ensure a smooth operation of the Games.

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7. Conclusions – Recommendations

In this thesis, the case of the permanent organisation of the summer Olympic Games in Greece every 4 years, was analysed. It was a first attempt to deviate from the current existing literature that adopts a revenue-expenditure approach in evaluating the outcomes of such major sports events, that under the current situation are hosted to different countries. This analysis was achieved in two parts; first an assessment of the social benefits and costs by carrying out a CBA was provided in identifying whether this is beneficial or not for both Greek and international level. In this analysis, a simplified assumption was made that all participating countries to the Games are willing to contribute financially for the organisation of the Games. The results depicted in section 5.4, show that this is beneficial for the Greek society, but not in international level. Therefore, it is concluded that a permanent organisation of the Olympics in Greece creates an outcome that has as winner Greece, and losers the participating countries. The analysis was rotated around the use of three scenarios, so as to control uncertainty. The aforementioned result was based on a reference expected and a bad scenario, in which sentiments of routine may be realised after a particular period of time -for instance after 10 years on average. In a good scenario, a permanent home for the Olympics can lead to a win-win outcome between Greece and the participating countries; this presupposes that the event would lead to permanent positive externalities in terms of induced tourism, national pride, willingness of sponsors to invest, eagerness of tourists to buy licensed products and promptness of spectators to fully attend to the Games either physically (ticketing), or virtually (TV rights). Such externalities presuppose decreased sports related costs, that could be possible through the participation of more countries to them. While comparing the permanent Olympics with the current situation of hosting the Games to different countries, based on the expected and good scenarios it is also feasible for Greece to host them permanently, as the equivalent annual net benefits exceed the average value of $ 0.98 billion of the current situation. In a bad scenario, it is better to host the Games as currently it is. In addition, a sensitivity analysis was performed in order to challenge the underlined assumption that predicts an equal distribution of costs among the participating countries. In explanation, a definition of the participation of Greece to sports related costs of the Games was provided, in order for the reference expected scenario to have a zero outcome for the international level. However, from this sensitivity analysis it was also concluded that there is a possibility in which a permanent home for the Olympics is not worth for both Greek and international level.

Second, from this CBA the social costs from the abandonment of the existing Olympic infrastructure of Athens were identified (Non-OCOG costs), as well as the benefits from their future use. In order for the Greek government not to fall again to the trap of “cash cow” projects, an identification of the crucial challenges that lead to a successful management of infrastructures was provided. The challenges that have to be tackled were financing -to arrange whether public or private companies would undertake the financing of the Games-, bureaucracy -to modernise it with technology so as to give an end to delays and to ensure quality and clarity in processes-, urban planning, legal

162 framework, environmental protection, land expropriation, geology and seismicity, and availability of construction materials and technology. Also, some cases of previous Olympic Games were invoked, especially those of Barcelona, Beijing and London, which were successful in the domain of technology management. From these cases, recommendations were extracted, that could be used as guidelines for redefining and refining the institutional arrangements between the Greek government, the future OCOG (and its own departments), and the IOC. Such recommendations concern the definition of requirements for the development of Olympic facilities, that should comply with sustainability trends. Concerning the provided technologies, these should be recent and tested ensuring reliability during Games time. For these recommendations to be realised, cooperation between the aforementioned bodies is needed, free from organised interests and ideological barriers.

While conducting this thesis research, certain assumptions were made which are not free from limitations. First of all, the financial contribution from the participating countries has to be aggre- gated by a particular percentage of return, which is unknown. It is also unknown how willing are the countries to contribute at the Games. There are too many hidden agendas, ideological barriers and technical difficulties, that may prevent them in financial participation. For example, Northern European countries may express their discontent vis-à-vis a financial contribution for a permanent Olympics in Greece, at the moment that they have contributed repeatedly for the current Greek crisis. Other countries, such as the dismally macroeconomic performing ones, may not afford to contribute, despite their probable willingness, since such a decision may burden their economy. Also, the participating countries might ask “why not organise a permanent Olympics in my country?”; hence this might trigger further competition among them in the attempt of trying to promote the Olympic Spirit and its resulting benefits. Being in the same spectrum, it is also unknown whether all the participating countries are willing to join their forces, so as to create an international OCOG responsible for the permanent organisation of the Games in Greece and in each other country. Every country when it takes their organisation, it is an opportunity for it to show off its culture, cultivating thus global awareness. Let alone the sponsors themselves, it is usually their extraversion that makes them international for promoting their technologies and services worldwide and not to a single country. About the CBA conducted, the Olympic Games is an integrated project; hence, other investments in areas such as urban planning, construction, education and healthcare would be possible; however, it is too difficult to extend the analysis to levels that are indirectly related to the Olympic Games. Moreover, the valuation of all indirect non-OCOG benefits was made by retrieving data from other CVMs related to other countries; hence, these figures may not be so representative for the Greek case and may be subject to errors. Being on the same line, estimation of environmental impacts from the renovation of infrastructures was not provided, but were assumed to be zero, due to the existent sustainability trends in construction industry. The rationale behind this assumption was that all disposed waste and emissions

163 from the construction activity do not exceed the predefined environmentally sustainability indicators. However, the extent to which this sustainability approach would be delivered and with what strategies is unknown. Finally, this CBA is not enough in fully judging the appropriateness of the policy of hosting the Games permanently in Greece. It is also difficult to transcend only with this tool any ideological barriers existent in international discourse, about how sustainable and feasible is to organise the Games to a permanent place. Bearing in mind these aforementioned limitations, future research areas can be provided. First of all, an analysis of the willingness of the nations for financing the Games, as long as these are going to be organised to a permanent country. Such research should analyse the interests, goals and incentives of each participating country, of NOCs and of IOC. Secondly, a more complete CBA by conducting a full CVM in determining more accurately values extracted from pride and from venue use value, as made by (Walton, Longo, & Dawson, 2008), and by (Kintis, Papanikos, & Patsouratis, 2003) respectively. In that way, the already conducted CBA would be more representative for the Greek reality through the valuation of these indirect impacts. In parallel, another research area would be the valuation of the environmental impacts of upgrading the existing infrastructure in Athens, under a permanent organisation of the Games. Moreover, future research is needed in assessing with a regional CBA the case of hosting these permanent Olympic Games in the region of Olympia. Finally, another future research area would concern the study of the relationship between non- OCOG costs for the development of the Olympic infrastructures and the management of infrastructures. In explanation, an analysis of how such findings are affecting decisions of policy mak- ers for the development of Olympic Works, would provide valuable knowledge in the field of technology management.

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Annex

A. Interviewing a) Interview protocol I would like to thank you very much in advance for your participation in this interview, useful for the needs of my Master Thesis that I am currently carrying out. Everyone is fully aware of the Olympic Games not only for the sports events being realized, but also for their historical importance and for cultural spirit that they inspire. Hosting the Games to a particular country is a process that demands for the hosting country to accomplish a series of challenges with the main purpose of delivering to athletes and spectators an unforgettable experience.

However, concerns have already risen about the feasibility of the current situation of hosting the Olympic Games to different countries from both economic and technological perspective. Hence, my Thesis deals with infrastructure and technology management issues, whether the Olympic Games are held permanently in Greece. One purpose of this project concerns the evaluation of the policy for permanently organizing the Olympic Games in Greece from a social cost-benefit perspective, with the assumption that all countries participating in the Games (including also Greece) are willing to invest. The second purpose is the revelation of the technology management problem, translated into the implementation and renovation of infrastructures and its deduction into an opportunity of solving it. The questions that will be addressed concern the second part of the research and will moved into three pillars:

• Selection of site • Defining the needed infrastructures for development or upgrade in order to meet the expectations of the initiative. • Defining the challenges needed to prioritize when developing and maintaining technology projects.

The results of the research will contribute to the evaluation of whether the permanent host of the Olympic Games in Greece will be an opportunity to redefine several of the bad practices applied in the past regarding the development and exploitation of the infrastructures and facilities for the Greek society. The interview is kept anonymous. 1st question: Last summer in an event organized in the U.S was presented an idea-issue regarding the Olympic Games and specifically to find a permanent place to host them. What is your opinion (both positive and negative) for the idea of permanently organizing the Olympic Games in Greece? Is this country adequately ready to host them? Why yes/not? 2nd question: What socio-economic outcomes do you think that a permanent host of the Olympics in Greece will bring about?

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3rd question: Consider that the Olympic Games are going to have either a local character being organized in specific regions like in Athens, or a national character with sports events being hosted in different cities. i) What are the advantages and disadvantages for the Games to be organized at a specific region? ii) Could you please mention the same if the Games had a national character? iii) Suppose that if the Games acquired a national character, would this be an opportunity for Greece to redefine its strategic direction towards infrastructure management? Why yes/not? 4th question: What kind of infrastructures are needed for the previously mentioned locations in order to facilitate a permanent host of the Olympic Games in Greece?

5th question: Suppose the following challenges that have to be tackled in order for the infrastructure and technology projects to be implemented in the right time, with the lowest cost and with the highest value for the citizens, tourists and Olympic members:

• Financing of projects • Bureaucracy • Expropriation of properties • Legal framework • Environmental protection • Availability of construction materials • Spatial planning • Available construction technology • Geology and seismicity How important do you think these challenges are? Please rank these challenges according to their importance from a scale of 1 to 5 (least important to most important), and please give a short argument (just a few words) for explaining your choice. If you have other ideas for challenges, please feel free to specify them. I would like to thank you very much for your time. Your opinion was particularly useful in my attempt to track down my answers that I need for the implementation of my Thesis project.

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b) Sampling

i) Academics

Challenges

Availability of Age Financing of Expropriation Legal Environmental Spatial Construction Geology and Sample Domain Bureaucracy construction group projects of properties framework protection planning technology seismicity materials academic_1 Entrepreneurship 25-30 5 3 3 4 5 4 3 4 3 academic_2 Strategy & management 35-40 4 5 3 5 3 2 2 2 1 academic_3 Construction technology 40-45 4 4 3 4 3 2 3 2 2 academic_4 Financial management 40-45 1 5 5 5 3 3 4 3 3 academic_5 Strategy & management 50-55 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 3 1 academic_6 Economics and finance 55-60 5 5 3 4 4 2 3 2 2 academic_7 Project management 50-55 4 5 4 4 4 2 4 3 2 academic_8 Construction technology 50-55 5 4 4 3 3 1 4 2 2 academic_9 Project management 50-55 5 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 1 academic_10 Entrepreneurship 50-55 5 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 2

Average 4,30 4,29 3,56 3,99 3,75 2,41 3,51 2,64 1,90

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ii) Citizens

Challenges

Availability of Geology Age Financing Expropriation Legal Environmental Spatial Construction Sample Profession Bureaucracy construction and group of projects of properties framework protection planning technology materials seismicity citizen_1 Bank employee 25-30 4 2 1 5 3 2 2 3 1 citizen_2 Private employee 25-30 5 4 2 4 3 1 2 1 1 citizen_3 Private employee 25-30 5 3 2 2 4 5 5 5 2 citizen_4 Private employee 30-35 5 4 4 3 4 2 5 3 3 citizen_5 Master student 30-35 5 3 4 4 3 4 5 4 5 citizen_6 Master student 25-30 4 5 3 4 4 2 4 2 4 citizen_7 Private employee 25-30 5 4 3 4 4 2 4 3 3 citizen_8 Private employee 25-30 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 3 2 citizen_9 Bachelor student 20-25 5 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 2 citizen_10 Master student 25-30 5 5 2 5 3 2 4 3 2

Average 4,75 3,70 2,83 3,98 3,56 2,54 3,78 2,98 2,52

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iii) Engineers

Challenges

Availability of Age Financing of Expropriation Legal Environmental Spatial Construction Geology and Sample Specialisation Bureaucracy construction group projects of properties framework protection planning technology seismicity materials engineer_1 Mechanical engineer 25-30 5 1 4 3 3 1 3 2 1 engineer_2 Innovation engineer 30-35 5 3 1 2 4 2 4 2 5 engineer_3 Electrical engineer 25-30 5 4 3 1 5 1 4 2 3 engineer_4 Mechanical engineer 25-30 5 4 1 4 5 1 4 2 5 engineer_5 Mechanical engineer 25-30 4 1 5 2 3 1 4 2 1 engineer_6 Mechanical engineer 30-35 5 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 engineer_7 Mechanical engineer 25-30 5 4 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 engineer_8 Civil engineer 25-30 5 4 5 3 5 2 4 2 5 engineer_9 Surveying engineer 35-40 5 5 1 5 2 2 3 1 1 engineer_10 Surveying engineer 35-40 5 4 1 5 2 2 3 1 1

Average 4,90 3,40 2,70 3,30 3,50 1,90 3,80 2,10 2,90

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iv) Politicians

Challenges

Availability of Geology Age Financing Expropriation Legal Environmental Spatial Construction Sample Political party Bureaucracy construction and group of projects of properties framework protection planning technology materials seismicity politician_1 Central-right 60-65 5 5 1 3 2 2 4 2 1 politician_2 Centrist 50-55 4 4 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 politician_3 Left 50-55 3 3 1 3 5 2 3 2 2 politician_4 Central-left 45-50 4 3 1 5 2 2 4 3 1

Average 4,00 3,75 1,25 3,75 3,00 2,19 3,65 2,34 1,50

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B. Non-OCOG Benefits estimation of Olympiads from 1996 to 2016 a) Barcelona 1992

Nominal ESP Population Real Interest Inflation DF per ESP Pride (in current Year WTP interest (in millions) rate (%) rate (%) year million USD) rate (%) 1986 $ 25,73 38,58 1,18% 10,88% 12,19% 89,13% $ 884,74 1987 $ 25,73 38,68 9,83% 5,94% 16,36% 76,60% $ 762,31 1988 $ 25,73 38,77 6,13% 5,94% 12,43% 68,13% $ 679,47 1989 $ 25,73 38,83 8,37% 6,90% 15,84% 58,82% $ 587,47 1990 $ 25,73 38,87 8,09% 7,33% 16,01% 50,70% $ 506,93 1991 $ 25,73 38,97 6,96% 6,94% 14,38% 44,33% $ 444,35 1992 $ 25,73 39,16 7,04% 6,71% 14,23% 38,81% $ 390,92 Total Spain pride $ 4.256,19 Table B.1: Spain national pride calculation for the '92 Games.

Barcelona '92 Non-OCOG benefits valuation ESP Total Pride $ 4.256,19 ESP Total venue use value $ 2.267,93 ESP Total tourism benefits8 $ 18.423,08 Barcelona '92 Non-OCOG benefits $ 24.947,19 Table B.2: Barcelona '92 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). b) Atlanta 1996

US Real GEO (US) Pride (in GEO US Population US Inflation US Nominal DF per Year WTP Interest current million (in millions) rate (%) interest (%) year (%) USD) 1990 $ 41,16 6,51 6,08% 3,70% 10,01% 90,90% $ 243,57 1991 $ 41,16 6,65 4,97% 3,33% 8,46% 83,81% $ 229,40 1992 $ 41,16 6,82 3,88% 2,28% 6,25% 78,88% $ 221,42 1993 $ 41,16 6,98 3,54% 2,38% 6,00% 74,41% $ 213,79 1994 $ 41,16 7,16 4,91% 2,13% 7,14% 69,45% $ 204,69 1995 $ 41,16 7,33 6,61% 2,09% 8,83% 63,82% $ 192,55 1996 $ 41,16 7,5 6,33% 1,83% 8,27% 58,94% $ 181,96 Total Georgia US pride $ 1.487,37 Table B.3: Georgia US pride calculation for the '96 Games.

8 For the valuation of these benefits, time series data for the mentioned Games preparation period was not found from World Bank. However, data about Spanish GDP was found; hence the average ratio of tourism revenue to Spanish GDP was extracted from 1995 till today. This percentage was then used for the estimation of tourism benefits for the studied period, with known the GDP. 171

Atlanta '96 Non-OCOG benefits valuation GEO (US) Total Pride $ 1.487,37 GEO (US) Total venue use value $ 357,52 GEO (US) Total tourism impacts9 $ 2.087,80 Atlanta '96 Non-OCOG benefits $ 3.932,68 Table B.4: Atlanta '96 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). c) Sydney 2000

NSW AU AU Real NSW (AU) Pride (in AU Inflation AU Nominal DF per Year WTP Population Interest current million rate (%) interest (%) year (in millions) (%) USD) 1994 $ 41,16 5,72 8,01% 1,00% 9,09% 91,67% $ 215,64 1995 $ 41,16 5,78 8,10% 2,22% 10,50% 82,96% $ 197,45 1996 $ 41,16 5,86 6,86% 2,69% 9,73% 75,60% $ 182,33 1997 $ 41,16 5,93 5,87% 1,22% 7,17% 70,55% $ 172,09 1998 $ 41,16 5,99 5,34% 1,27% 6,68% 66,13% $ 162,96 1999 $ 41,16 6,06 6,21% 0,34% 6,57% 62,05% $ 154,72 2000 $ 41,16 6,13 5,03% 2,56% 7,72% 57,61% $ 145,30 Total New South Wales pride $ 1.230,48 Table B.5: New South Wales pride valuation for the 2000 Games.

Sydney 2000 Non-OCOG benefits valuation NSW Total Pride $ 1.230,48 NSW Total venue use value $ 144,30 NSW Total tourism impacts10 $ 212,52 Sydney 2000 Non-OCOG benefits $ 1.587,30 Table B.6: Sydney 2000 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). d) Athens 2004

Nominal GR Population Real Interest Inflation DF per GR Pride (in current Year WTP interest (in millions) (%) rate (%) year million USD) (%) 1998 $ 25,73 10,72 12,80% 5,10% 18,56% 84,35% $ 232,60 1999 $ 25,73 10,76 10,98% 3,62% 15,00% 73,34% $ 203,02 2000 $ 25,73 10,81 10,56% 1,59% 12,32% 65,30% $ 181,60 2001 $ 25,73 10,86 4,94% 3,47% 8,58% 60,14% $ 168,01 2002 $ 25,73 10,9 3,93% 3,35% 7,41% 55,99% $ 156,99 2003 $ 25,73 10,93 3,22% 3,45% 6,79% 52,43% $ 147,42 2004 $ 25,73 10,96 6,30% 3,06% 9,55% 47,86% $ 134,94 Total Greece pride $ 1.224,58 Table B.7: Greece national pride calculation for the 2004 Games.

9 Calculated as in Humphreys and Plummer (1995). 10 Calculated as in Kintis et al. (2003). 172

Athens 2004 Non-OCOG benefits valuation GR Total Pride $ 1.224,58 GR Total venue use value $ 900,00 GR Total tourism impacts11 $ 9.015,00 Athens 2004 Non-OCOG benefits $ 11.139,58 Table B.8: Athens 2004 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). e) Beijing 2008

PRC Real Nominal PRC Population Inflation DF per PRC Pride (in current Year WTP Interest interest (in millions) rate (%) year million USD) (%) (%) 2002 $ 0,50 1280 4,68% 0,60% 5,31% 94,96% $ 607,73 2003 $ 0,50 1288 2,64% 2,61% 5,31% 90,17% $ 580,69 2004 $ 0,50 1296 -1,29% 6,95% 5,58% 85,40% $ 553,42 2005 $ 0,50 1304 1,61% 3,90% 5,58% 80,89% $ 527,41 2006 $ 0,50 1311 2,11% 3,93% 6,12% 76,23% $ 499,66 2007 $ 0,50 1318 -0,31% 7,81% 7,47% 70,93% $ 467,41 2008 $ 0,50 1325 -2,33% 7,83% 5,31% 67,35% $ 446,20 Total China pride $ 3.682,52 Table B.9: China national pride calculation for the 2008 Games.

Beijing 2008 Non-OCOG benefits valuation PRC Total Pride $ 3.682,52 PRC Total venue use value $ 2.551,95 PRC Total tourism impacts12 $ 21.837,00 Beijing 2008 Non-OCOG benefits $ 28.071,47 Table B.10: Beijing 2008 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD). f) London 2012

Nominal ENG Population Real Interest Inflation DF per ENG Pride (in current Year WTP interest (in millions) (%) rate (%) year million USD) (%) 2006 $ 25,73 60,85 1,64% 2,95% 4,64% 95,57% $ 1.496,27 2007 $ 25,73 61,32 2,89% 2,55% 5,51% 90,58% $ 1.429,10 2008 $ 25,73 61,81 1,80% 2,82% 4,68% 86,53% $ 1.376,18 2009 $ 25,73 62,28 -0,87% 1,53% 0,64% 85,98% $ 1.377,76 2010 $ 25,73 62,77 -1,03% 1,54% 0,50% 85,55% $ 1.381,69 2011 $ 25,73 63,26 -1,48% 2,01% 0,50% 85,12% $ 1.385,55 2012 $ 25,73 63,7 -1,02% 1,54% 0,50% 84,70% $ 1.388,25 Total England pride $ 9.834,80 Table B.11: England national pride calculation for the 2012 Games.

11 Calculated by using raw data from World Bank. 12 See note 11. 173

London 2012 Non-OCOG benefits valuation ENG Total Pride $ 9.834,80 ENG Total venue use value $ 430,52 ENG Total tourism impacts13 $ 7.386,00 London 2012 Non-OCOG benefits $ 17.651,32 Table B.12: London 2012 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (in current million USD). g) Rio 2016

Nominal BRA Population Real Interest Inflation DF per BRA Pride (in current Year WTP interest (in millions) (%) rate (%) year million USD) (%) 2010 $ -3,00 196,8 29,12% 8,42% 39,99% 71,43% $ -421,74 2011 $ -3,00 198,7 32,83% 8,32% 43,88% 49,65% $ -295,94 2012 $ -3,00 200,6 26,58% 7,94% 36,64% 36,33% $ -218,66 2013 $ -3,00 202,4 18,50% 7,50% 27,39% 28,52% $ -173,19 2014 $ -3,00 204,2 2,24% 7,85% 10,26% 25,87% $ -158,46 2015 $ -3,00 206 33,42% 7,90% 43,96% 17,97% $ -111,05 2016 $ -3,00 207,7 40,40% 8,33% 52,10% 11,81% $ -73,61 Total Brazil pride $ -1.452,65 Table B.13: Brazil national pride calculation for the 2016 Games.

Rio 2016 Non-OCOG benefits valuation BRA Total Pride $ -1.452,65 BRA Total venue use value $ -53,35 BRA Total tourism impacts14 $ 919,19 Rio 2016 Non-OCOG benefits $ -586,80 Table B.14: Rio 2016 Non-OCOG benefits calculation (amounts in current million USD).

13 See note 11. 14 See note 11. 174

C. OCOG costs estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece a) Forecasting of OCOG costs i) Technology

Technology Forecasted Technology Confidence Interval Olympiad Statistic Value costs costs (Technology costs) 1 $ 0,351 Alpha 0,002 2 $ 0,341 Beta 0,001 3 $ 0,323 Gamma 0,000 4 $ 0,488 MASE 0,624 5 $ 0,709 SMAPE 0,152 6 $ 0,474 MAE 0,075 7 $ 0,545 RMSE 0,096 8 $ 0,658 $ 0,187 9 $ 0,702 $ 0,187 10 $ 0,745 $ 0,187 11 $ 0,789 $ 0,187 12 $ 0,833 $ 0,187 Table C.1: Forecasted technology costs (amounts in current billion USD). ii) OpEx, Ceremony, Admin, Paralympics, Workforce, Mkt and Lodging costs

Forecasted OpEx, Confidence Interval OpEx, Ceremony, Ceremony, Admin, (OpEx, Ceremony, Admin, Paralympics, Olympiad Paralympics, Admin, Paralympics, Statistic Value Workforce, Mkt and Workforce, Mkt and Workforce, Mkt and Lodging costs Lodging costs Lodging costs) 1 $ 1,848 Alpha 0,002 2 $ 2,282 Beta 0,001 3 $ 1,886 Gamma 0,000 4 $ 1,852 MASE 0,756 5 $ 3,944 SMAPE 0,226 6 $ 4,399 MAE 0,659 7 $ 2,584 RMSE 0,774 8 $ 3,970 $ 1,517 9 $ 4,274 $ 1,517 10 $ 4,577 $ 1,517 11 $ 4,880 $ 1,518 12 $ 5,183 $ 1,518 Table C.2: Forecasted Operating, Ceremony, Administrative, Paralympics, Workforce, Marketing, Lodging and catering costs (amounts in current billion USD).

175 b) OCOG costs valuation i) Security costs

Olympiad Security costs Discount factor 1 $ 0,577 0,8792 2 $ 0,446 0,6795 3 $ 0,345 0,5252 4 $ 0,266 0,4059 5 $ 0,206 0,3137 Total security costs PV $ 1,839 Table C.3: Valuation of Security costs (amounts in current billion USD). ii) Technology costs

Forecasted Technology Forecasted Technology Forecasted Technology Discount Olympiad costs in PV expected costs in PV good costs in PV bad scenario factor scenario scenario 1 $ 0,697 $ 0,542 $ 0,388 0,8243 2 $ 0,566 $ 0,447 $ 0,328 0,6371 3 $ 0,459 $ 0,367 $ 0,275 0,4924 4 $ 0,372 $ 0,300 $ 0,229 0,3806 5 $ 0,300 $ 0,245 $ 0,190 0,2942 PV technology $ 2,394 $ 1,902 $ 1,409 costs Table C.4: Valuation of Technology costs (amounts in current billion USD). iii) OpEx, Ceremony, Admin, Paralympics, Workforce, Mkt and Lodging costs

Forecasted OpEx, Forecasted OpEx, Forecasted OpEx, Ceremony, Admin, Ceremony, Admin, Ceremony, Admin, Paralympics, Workforce, Paralympics, Workforce, Discount Olympiad Paralympics, Workforce, Mkt and Lodging Mkt and Lodging Factor Mkt and Lodging expenses expenses in PV bad expenses in PV expected in PV good scenario scenario scenario 1 $ 4,242 $ 3,069 $ 1,896 0,7729 2 $ 3,460 $ 2,553 $ 1,646 0,5974 3 $ 2,814 $ 2,113 $ 1,413 0,4617 4 $ 2,283 $ 1,742 $ 1,200 0,3569 5 $ 1,848 $ 1,430 $ 1,011 0,2758 PV costs $ 14,646 $ 10,906 $ 7,166 Table C.5: Valuation of Operating, Ceremony, Administrative, Paralympics, Workforce, Marketing, Lodging and catering costs (amounts in current billion USD).

176

D. Non-OCOG costs estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece

Maintenance cost of facilities per year after the Olympics (average) $ 0,263 Accumulated maintenance cost from 2005 till 2017 $ 3,419 Timespan of infrastructures (years) 30 Annual depreciation of facilities $ 0,133 Operating costs of Olympic facilities (annual) $ 0,166 Remaining value of Olympic facilities $ 2,267 Total renovation cost of Olympic facilities $ 5,686 Annual depreciation of renovated facilities $ 0,190 Table D.1: Renovation cost calculation of Olympic facilities (in current billion USD).

Year Non-OCOG direct costs Discount factor 2017 $ 5,332 0,9376 2018 $ 0,544 0,8792 2019 $ 0,510 0,8243 2020 $ 0,478 0,7729 2021 $ 0,448 0,7247 2022 $ 0,420 0,6795 2023 $ 0,394 0,6371 2024 $ 0,370 0,5974 2025 $ 0,346 0,5601 2026 $ 0,325 0,5252 2027 $ 0,305 0,4924 2028 $ 0,286 0,4617 2029 $ 0,268 0,4329 2030 $ 0,251 0,4059 2031 $ 0,235 0,3806 2032 $ 0,221 0,3569 2033 $ 0,207 0,3346 2034 $ 0,194 0,3137 2035 $ 0,182 0,2942 2036 $ 0,171 0,2758 Total PV $ 11,486 Table D.2: Valuation of Non-OCOG direct costs (amounts in current billion USD).

177

E. OCOG Benefits estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece a) Forecasting of OCOG Benefits i) TV rights

Confidence Interval Benefits from Forecasted (Benefits Olympiad (Benefits from TV Statistic Value TV rights from TV rights) rights) 1 $ 0,768 Alpha 0,900 2 $ 0,886 Beta 0,001 3 $ 1,373 Gamma 0,000 4 $ 0,833 MASE 0,629 5 $ 1,770 SMAPE 0,262 6 $ 2,620 MAE 0,471 7 $ 4,180 RMSE 0,622 8 $ 4,574 $ 1,218 9 $ 5,078 $ 1,640 10 $ 5,582 $ 1,974 11 $ 6,086 $ 2,260 12 $ 6,590 $ 2,514 Table E.1: Forecasted TV rights benefits (amounts in current billion USD). ii) Sponsorship

Confidence Interval Benefits from Forecasted (Benefits Olympiad (Benefits from spon- Statistic Value sponsorship from sponsorship) sorship) 1 $ 0,824 Alpha 0,100 2 $ 0,434 Beta 0,001 3 $ 0,789 Gamma 0,000 4 $ 0,773 MASE 0,728 5 $ 1,240 SMAPE 0,267 6 $ 1,170 MAE 0,222 7 $ 0,635 RMSE 0,276 8 $ 1,091 $ 0,540 9 $ 1,139 $ 0,543 10 $ 1,187 $ 0,546 11 $ 1,234 $ 0,548 12 $ 1,282 $ 0,551 Table E.2: Forecasted benefits from sponsorship (amounts in current billion USD).

178 iii) Licensing

Benefits from li- Forecast (Benefits Confidence Interval (Benefits Olympiad Statistic Value censing from licensing) from licensing) 1 $ 0,022 Alpha 0,998 2 $ 0,073 Beta 0,001 3 $ 0,114 Gamma 0,000 4 $ 0,173 MASE 0,640 5 $ 0,166 SMAPE 0,296 6 $ 0,121 MAE 0,029 7 $ 0,051 RMSE 0,036 8 $ 0,059 $ 0,071 9 $ 0,068 $ 0,100 10 $ 0,076 $ 0,122 11 $ 0,084 $ 0,141 12 $ 0,093 $ 0,158 Table E.3: Forecasted revenues from licensing (amounts in current billion USD). b) Valuation of OCOG Benefits i) Ticketing

Athens 2004 Ticketing No of tickets sold during Athens Olympics 5.300.000 Ticket sales (in 2017 USD) $ 279.130.000,00 Average ticket price $ 52,67 Total attendance 72% No of tickets sold under 100% attendance 7.361.111 Max ticket sales (in 2017 USD) $ 387.680.555,56 No of tickets sold under 50% attendance 3.680.556 Ticket sales under 50% (in 2017 USD) $ 193.840.277,78 No of tickets sold under 75% attendance 5.520.833 Ticket sales under 75% (in 2017 USD) $ 290.760.416,67 Table E.4: Ticketing during the 2004 Games (ATHOC 2004).

Ticket sales (in billion current USD) Olympiad Discount factor 50% attendance 75 % attendance Full attendance 1 $ 0,150 $ 0,225 $ 0,300 0,7729 2 $ 0,116 $ 0,174 $ 0,232 0,5974 3 $ 0,090 $ 0,134 $ 0,179 0,4617 4 $ 0,069 $ 0,104 $ 0,138 0,3569 5 $ 0,053 $ 0,080 $ 0,107 0,2758 Total ticket sales in PV $ 0,48 $ 0,72 $ 0,96 Table E.5: Valuation of ticketing.

179

From Table E.5, it can be inferred that under 75% attendance the surplus loss accounts for $ 239 million and under 50% this is $ 478 million. For the Games of Athens in 2004 surplus loss was $ 108.5 million. ii) TV rights

Forecasted Benefits Forecasted Benefits Forecasted Benefits Discount Olympiad from TV rights in PV from TV rights in PV from TV rights in PV factor (bad scenario) (expected scenario) (good scenario) 1 $ 2,594 $ 3,536 $ 4,477 0,7729 2 $ 2,054 $ 3,034 $ 4,013 0,5974 3 $ 1,666 $ 2,578 $ 3,489 0,4617 4 $ 1,366 $ 2,172 $ 2,979 0,3569 5 $ 1,124 $ 1,818 $ 2,511 0,2758 Total TV rights in PV $ 8,805 $ 13,137 $ 17,469 Table E.6: Valuation of benefits from TV rights (amounts in current billion USD). iii) Sponsorship

Forecasted Benefits Forecasted Benefits Forecasted Benefits Discount Olympiad from sponsorship in from sponsorship in from sponsorship in Factor PV (bad scenario) PV (expected scenario) PV (good scenario)

1 $ 0,426 $ 0,843 $ 1,261 0,7729 2 $ 0,356 $ 0,680 $ 1,005 0,5974 3 $ 0,296 $ 0,548 $ 0,800 0,4617 4 $ 0,245 $ 0,441 $ 0,636 0,3569 5 $ 0,202 $ 0,354 $ 0,506 0,2758 Total sponsorship revenues in PV $ 1,524 $ 2,866 $ 4,207 Table E.7: Valuation of sponsorship benefits (amounts in current billion USD). iv) Licensing

Forecasted Benefits Forecasted Benefits Forecasted Benefits from Discount Olympiad from licensing in PV from licensing in PV licensing in PV good scenario factor bad scenario expected scenario 1 $ - $ 0,046 $ 0,100 0,7729 2 $ - $ 0,040 $ 0,100 0,5974 3 $ - $ 0,035 $ 0,092 0,4617 4 $ - $ 0,030 $ 0,080 0,3569 5 $ - $ 0,026 $ 0,069 0,2758 Total licensing revenue in PV $ - $ 0,177 $ 0,441 Table E.8: Valuation of licensing benefits (amounts in current billion USD).

180

F. Non-OCOG benefits estimation for the permanent Olympic Games in Greece a) Forecasting of Non-OCOG benefits i) National pride (Net Greek population)

Population Population Population Gross Greek Forecasted Confidence reduction reduction Net Greek reduction Year Population net Greek Interval percentage percentage Population percentage (in millions) population (95 %) expected good bad scenario scenario scenario 2011 11,12 10.816.286 2012 11,09 10.787.105 2013 11 10.699.563 2014 10,93 10.631.475 2015 10,86 10.563.387 2016 10,78 10.485.572 2017 10,76 10.466.118 2018 10.363.767 35.963 2019 10.331.013 35.963 -0,32% -0,32% -0,31% 2020 10.235.922 45.041 -1,01% -0,92% -0,83% 2021 10.203.168 45.041 -0,32% -0,32% -0,32% 2022 10.108.078 52.611 -1,01% -0,93% -0,85% 2023 10.075.324 52.611 -0,33% -0,32% -0,32% 2024 9.980.234 59.254 -1,02% -0,94% -0,87% 2025 9.947.479 59.255 -0,33% -0,33% -0,33% 2026 9.852.389 65.255 -1,02% -0,96% -0,89% 2027 9.819.635 65.256 -0,33% -0,33% -0,33% 2028 9.724.545 70.777 -1,03% -0,97% -0,91% 2029 9.691.790 70.778 -0,34% -0,34% -0,33% 2030 9.596.700 75.924 -1,04% -0,98% -0,92% 2031 9.563.946 75.926 -0,34% -0,34% -0,34% 2032 9.468.856 80.769 -1,05% -0,99% -0,94% 2033 9.436.101 80.771 -0,35% -0,35% -0,34% 2034 9.341.011 85.363 -1,07% -1,01% -0,95% 2035 9.308.257 85.366 -0,35% -0,35% -0,35% 2036 9.213.167 89.745 -1,08% -1,02% -0,97% 2037 9.180.413 89.748 -0,36% -0,36% -0,35% Average -0,67% -0,64% -0,60% Table F.1: Estimated Greek population (Eurostat, 2017).

181 ii) Tourism

Forecasted Confidence Tourism Expected annual Pessimistic annual Optimistic annual Years tourism Interval revenue tourism impacts tourism impacts tourism impacts revenue (95%) 2008 $ 17,586 2009 $ 16,027 2010 $ 13,858 2011 $ 16,256 2012 $ 14,671 2013 $ 17,436 2014 $ 19,481 2015 $ 17,260 2016 $ 16,138 2017 $ 17,199 $ 3,658 $ 1,060 $ -2,597 $ 4,718 2018 $ 17,367 $ 4,091 $ 0,168 $ -0,265 $ 0,602 2019 $ 17,535 $ 4,484 $ 0,168 $ -0,225 $ 0,562 2020 $ 17,704 $ 4,847 $ 0,168 $ -0,194 $ 0,531 2021 $ 17,872 $ 5,186 $ 0,168 $ -0,170 $ 0,507 2022 $ 18,041 $ 5,505 $ 0,168 $ -0,151 $ 0,488 2023 $ 18,209 $ 5,808 $ 0,168 $ -0,134 $ 0,471 2024 $ 18,377 $ 6,097 $ 0,168 $ -0,121 $ 0,457 2025 $ 18,546 $ 6,374 $ 0,168 $ -0,108 $ 0,445 2026 $ 18,714 $ 6,640 $ 0,168 $ -0,098 $ 0,435 2027 $ 18,883 $ 6,897 $ 0,168 $ -0,089 $ 0,425 2028 $ 19,051 $ 7,146 $ 0,168 $ -0,080 $ 0,417 2029 $ 19,219 $ 7,387 $ 0,168 $ -0,073 $ 0,410 2030 $ 19,388 $ 7,622 $ 0,168 $ -0,066 $ 0,403 2031 $ 19,556 $ 7,850 $ 0,168 $ -0,060 $ 0,397 2032 $ 19,725 $ 8,073 $ 0,168 $ -0,054 $ 0,391 2033 $ 19,893 $ 8,291 $ 0,168 $ -0,049 $ 0,386 2034 $ 20,061 $ 8,504 $ 0,168 $ -0,045 $ 0,381 2035 $ 20,230 $ 8,713 $ 0,168 $ -0,040 $ 0,377 2036 $ 20,398 $ 8,917 $ 0,168 $ -0,036 $ 0,373 Table F.2: Forecasted tourism benefits (amounts in current billion USD).

182

iii) Use value of venues

Local use value Use value per year Use value per Use value per Use value per year Total annual Use per year (2003 (Regional level, year (Regional year (National Venue (National Level, 2003 Value (2003 data data in current 2003 data in level 2003 raw Level, 2003 raw data in current USD) in current USD) USD) current USD) data) data) Olympic complex of Hellinikon $ 1.937.003,42 $ 52.241.091,01 $ 6.284.523,50 $ 60.462.617,93 € 35.535.746,00 € 4.274.896,00 Canoe-Kayak Centre $ 1.937.003,42 $ 6.523.028,08 $ 364.571,50 $ 8.824.603,00 € 4.437.133,00 € 247.991,00 Sailing Olympic Centre $ 11.393.743,43 $ 12.223.554,46 $ 3.668.286,96 $ 27.285.584,85 € 8.314.779,00 € 2.495.264,00 Faliro Olympic Complex $ 23.230.045,68 $ 27.455.049,12 $ 7.235.883,85 $ 57.920.978,66 € 18.675.637,00 € 4.922.036,00 Olympic Rowing Centre $ 1.044.594,08 $ 37.421.979,90 $ 2.781.336,09 $ 41.247.910,07 € 25.455.402,00 € 1.891.937,00 Olympic Equestrian Centre $ 1.835.625,34 $ 61.779.814,07 $ 6.284.523,50 $ 69.899.962,91 € 42.024.233,00 € 4.274.896,00 Olympic Shooting Centre $ 1.835.625,34 $ 11.859.172,60 $ 1.496.480,68 $ 15.191.278,62 € 8.066.917,00 € 1.017.945,00 Olympic Gym of Ano Liosia $ 3.107.555,64 $ 10.398.591,75 $ 2.475.617,09 $ 15.981.764,48 € 7.073.392,00 € 1.683.979,00 Olympic Gym of Galatsi $ 6.826.202,33 $ 9.044.543,15 $ 1.493.008,31 $ 17.363.753,79 € 6.152.333,00 € 1.015.583,00 Olympic Gym of Nikea $ 10.947.656,36 $ 6.523.126,57 $ 1.354.123,57 $ 18.824.906,51 € 4.437.200,00 € 921.110,00 Peace and Friendship Stadium $ 20.663.369,15 $ 13.442.837,54 $ 559.009,84 $ 34.665.216,52 € 9.144.167,00 € 380.253,00 Olympic Gym of Peristeri $ 16.220.257,29 $ 2.480.322,88 $ 509.532,16 $ 19.210.112,33 € 1.687.180,00 € 346.597,00 Athens Olympic Sports Centre $ 8.170.226,32 $ 60.084.201,02 $ 8.513.621,04 $ 76.768.048,39 € 40.870.833,00 € 5.791.186,00 Olympic Complex of Goudi $ 11.760.797,93 $ 10.379.011,49 $ 1.529.465,31 $ 23.669.274,73 € 7.060.073,00 € 1.040.382,00 Football Pitches of Patras, Volos, Heraklion and Thessaloniki $ 87.388.373,81 $ 37.680.248,49 $ 5.097.062,20 $ 130.165.684,50 € 25.631.083,00 € 3.467.154,00 Olympic Village (Menidi) $ 8.860.702,77 $ 80.650.987,55 $ 10.301.909,17 $ 99.813.599,49 € 54.860.895,00 € 7.007.626,00 Press and Meidia Broadcasting Centre $ 8.170.226,32 $ 27.988.555,67 $ 6.680.344,92 $ 42.839.126,91 € 19.038.542,00 € 4.544.144,00 Public Press Villages $ 27.756.071,16 $ 36.485.085,33 $ 6.984.502,68 $ 71.225.659,16 € 24.818.102,00 € 4.751.040,00 Private Press Villages $ 10.131.809,81 $ 33.098.560,63 $ 5.067.548,48 $ 48.297.918,91 € 22.514.500,00 € 3.447.078,00 Totals $ 263.216.889,61 $ 537.759.761,31 $ 78.681.350,86 $ 879.658.001,78 Table F.3: Annual use value of venues for the needs of 2004 Olympic Games (Kintis, Papanikos, & Patsouratis, 2003).

183

Percentage change of Use value per Use value per Population Local use value Total annual Use Venue Municipality local use year (Regional year (National (2017) per year Value value in level) Level) 2003 Olympic complex of Hellinikon Hellinikon 16.700 $ 1.963.730,47 1,38% $ 52.961.920,99 $ 6.371.238,25 $ 61.296.889,72 Canoe-Kayak Centre Hellinikon 16.700 $ 1.963.730,47 1,38% $ 6.613.033,74 $ 369.601,91 $ 8.946.366,13 Sailing Olympic Centre Hellinikon – Glyfada 101.176 $ 11.897.300,70 4,42% $ 12.763.786,01 $ 3.830.410,37 $ 28.491.497,09 Old Faliro, Moschato, Faliro Olympic Complex 183.944 $ 21.629.935,31 -6,89% $ 25.563.916,00 $ 6.737.468,44 $ 53.931.319,74 Kallithea Olympic Rowing Centre Marathonas 12.433 $ 1.461.960,30 39,95% $ 52.373.883,95 $ 3.892.615,36 $ 57.728.459,61 Olympic Equestrian Centre Markopoulo 19.391 $ 2.280.152,88 24,22% $ 76.740.834,77 $ 7.806.426,53 $ 86.827.414,18 Olympic Shooting Centre Markopoulo 19.391 $ 2.280.152,88 24,22% $ 14.731.070,63 $ 1.858.878,64 $ 8.870.102,15 Olympic Gym of Ano Liosia Ano Liosia 32.477 $ 3.819.028,52 22,89% $ 12.779.342,70 $ 3.042.408,05 $ 19.640.779,26 Olympic Gym of Galatsi Galatsi 57.422 $ 6.752.279,08 -1,08% $ 8.946.596,74 $ 1.476.840,01 $ 17.175.715,84 Nikea – St. Ioannis Olympic Gym of Nikea 102.014 $ 11.995.834,26 9,57% $ 7.147.680,07 $ 1.483.773,46 $ 20.627.287,78 Rentis Peace and Friendship Stadium Piraeus 158.385 $ 18.624.434,39 -9,87% $ 12.116.380,64 $ 503.850,17 $ 31.244.665,20 Olympic Gym of Peristeri Peristeri 135.446 $ 15.927.049,94 -1,81% $ 2.435.487,04 $ 500.321,54 $ 18.862.858,52 Athens Olympic Sports Centre Amarousion 69.989 $ 8.230.054,82 0,73% $ 60.524.182,39 $ 8.575.964,13 $ 77.330.201,33 Olympic Complex of Goudi Cholargos, Zografou 111.821 $ 13.148.995,41 11,80% $ 11.604.108,44 $ 1.709.997,27 $ 26.463.101,11 Football Pitches of Patras, Volos, Patras, New Ionia, 722.772 $ 84.990.764,47 -2,74% $ 36.646.443,74 $ 4.957.217,92 $ 126.594.426,13 Heraklion and Thessaloniki Heraklion, Thessaloniki Olympic Village (Menidi) Acharnai 96.127 $ 11.303.596,23 27,57% $ 102.886.443,91 $ 13.142.142,86 $ 127.332.182,99 Press and Meidia Broadcasting Amarousion 69.989 $ 8.230.054,82 0,73% $ 28.193.508,76 $ 6.729.263,39 $ 43.152.826,97 Centre Zografou, Nea Makri, Public Press Villages 250.971 $ 29.511.709,29 6,33% $ 38.792.854,57 $ 7.426.289,24 $ 75.730.853,09 Acharnai, Amarousion Private Press Villages Pallini, Amarousion 91.609 $ 10.772.357,01 6,32% $ 35.191.097,99 $ 5.387.925,99 $ 51.351.381,00 Totals $ 266.783.121,24 $ 599.012.573,07 $ 85.802.633,54 $ 951.598.327,84 Table F.4: Annual use value of venues.

184

b) Valuation of Non-OCOG benefits i) National pride

Pride value in PV bad Pride value in PV Pride value in PV Year Discount factor scenario expected scenario good scenario

2017 $ 0,156 $ 0,157 $ 0,157 0,9376 2018 $ 0,146 $ 0,147 $ 0,147 0,8792 2019 $ 0,136 $ 0,136 $ 0,137 0,8243 2020 $ 0,127 $ 0,127 $ 0,128 0,7729 2021 $ 0,118 $ 0,118 $ 0,119 0,7247 2022 $ 0,110 $ 0,111 $ 0,111 0,6795 2023 $ 0,102 $ 0,103 $ 0,103 0,6371 2024 $ 0,095 $ 0,096 $ 0,097 0,5974 2025 $ 0,089 $ 0,089 $ 0,090 0,5601 2026 $ 0,083 $ 0,083 $ 0,084 0,5252 2027 $ 0,069 $ 0,070 $ 0,070 0,4924 2028 $ 0,058 $ 0,059 $ 0,059 0,4617 2029 $ 0,049 $ 0,049 $ 0,049 0,4329 2030 $ 0,041 $ 0,041 $ 0,041 0,4059 2031 $ 0,034 $ 0,034 $ 0,035 0,3806 2032 $ 0,029 $ 0,029 $ 0,029 0,3569 2033 $ 0,024 $ 0,024 $ 0,024 0,3346 2034 $ 0,020 $ 0,020 $ 0,020 0,3137 2035 $ 0,017 $ 0,017 $ 0,017 0,2942 2036 $ 0,014 $ 0,014 $ 0,014 0,2758 PV of pride $ 1,515 $ 1,524 $ 1,533 Table F.5: Pride valuation (amounts in current billion USD).

185 ii) Tourism

Tourism benefits bad Tourism benefits expected Tourism benefits impact Discount Years scenario (in PV) scenario (in PV) good scenario (in PV) Factor

2017 $ -2,435 $ 0,994 $ 4,424 0,9376 2018 $ -0,233 $ 0,148 $ 0,529 0,8792 2019 $ -0,185 $ 0,139 $ 0,463 0,8243 2020 $ -0,150 $ 0,130 $ 0,411 0,7729 2021 $ -0,123 $ 0,122 $ 0,368 0,7247 2022 $ -0,102 $ 0,114 $ 0,331 0,6795 2023 $ -0,086 $ 0,107 $ 0,300 0,6371 2024 $ -0,072 $ 0,101 $ 0,273 0,5974 2025 $ -0,061 $ 0,094 $ 0,249 0,5601 2026 $ -0,051 $ 0,088 $ 0,228 0,5252 2027 $ -0,044 $ 0,083 $ 0,210 0,4924 2028 $ -0,037 $ 0,078 $ 0,193 0,4617 2029 $ -0,032 $ 0,073 $ 0,177 0,4329 2030 $ -0,027 $ 0,068 $ 0,164 0,4059 2031 $ -0,023 $ 0,064 $ 0,151 0,3806 2032 $ -0,019 $ 0,060 $ 0,140 0,3569 2033 $ -0,016 $ 0,056 $ 0,129 0,3346 2034 $ -0,014 $ 0,053 $ 0,120 0,3137 2035 $ -0,012 $ 0,050 $ 0,111 0,2942 2036 $ -0,010 $ 0,046 $ 0,103 0,2758 Total PV $ -3,733 $ 2,670 $ 9,073 Table F.6: Valuation of tourism benefits (amounts in current billion USD).

186 iii) Venue use value

Total venue use value Total venue use value Total venue use value Discount Year bad scenario expected scenario good scenario factor 2017 $ 0,889 $ 0,889 $ 0,889 0,9376 2018 $ 0,828 $ 0,829 $ 0,830 0,8792 2019 $ 0,782 $ 0,782 $ 0,782 0,8243 2020 $ 0,728 $ 0,729 $ 0,729 0,7729 2021 $ 0,687 $ 0,687 $ 0,687 0,7247 2022 $ 0,640 $ 0,641 $ 0,641 0,6795 2023 $ 0,604 $ 0,604 $ 0,604 0,6371 2024 $ 0,563 $ 0,563 $ 0,563 0,5974 2025 $ 0,531 $ 0,531 $ 0,531 0,5601 2026 $ 0,495 $ 0,495 $ 0,495 0,5252 2027 $ 0,467 $ 0,467 $ 0,467 0,4924 2028 $ 0,435 $ 0,435 $ 0,435 0,4617 2029 $ 0,411 $ 0,411 $ 0,411 0,4329 2030 $ 0,382 $ 0,382 $ 0,383 0,4059 2031 $ 0,361 $ 0,361 $ 0,361 0,3806 2032 $ 0,336 $ 0,336 $ 0,336 0,3569 2033 $ 0,317 $ 0,317 $ 0,317 0,3346 2034 $ 0,295 $ 0,296 $ 0,296 0,3137 2035 $ 0,279 $ 0,279 $ 0,279 0,2942 2036 $ 0,261 $ 0,261 $ 0,261 0,2758 Total PV $ 10,292 $ 10,295 $ 10,299 Table F.7: Use value of venues valuation (amounts in current billion USD).

187 iv) Venue exploitation

Year Revenues Discount factor 2017 $ 0,580 0,9376 2018 $ 0,544 0,8792 2019 $ 0,510 0,8243 2020 $ - 0,7729 2021 $ 0,448 0,7247 2022 $ 0,420 0,6795 2023 $ 0,394 0,6371 2024 $ - 0,5974 2025 $ 0,346 0,5601 2026 $ 0,325 0,5252 2027 $ 0,305 0,4924 2028 $ - 0,4617 2029 $ 0,268 0,4329 2030 $ 0,251 0,4059 2031 $ 0,235 0,3806 2032 $ - 0,3569 2033 $ 0,207 0,3346 2034 $ 0,194 0,3137 2035 $ 0,182 0,2942 2036 $ - 0,2758 PV value $ 5,210 Table F.8: Revenues from the exploitation of venues (amounts in current billion USD).

188

G. National CBA of the permanent Olympic Games in Greece

Sports related costs Sports related revenue Sports related benefits Years Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good Bad Expected Good scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario scenario 2017 $ 0,028 $ 0,025 $ 0,023 $ -1,387 $ 2,043 $ 5,474 $ -1,414 $ 2,018 $ 5,450 2018 $ 0,006 $ 0,005 $ 0,005 $ 0,744 $ 1,126 $ 1,508 $ 0,738 $ 1,121 $ 1,503 2019 $ 0,006 $ 0,005 $ 0,004 $ 0,735 $ 1,059 $ 1,384 $ 0,729 $ 1,054 $ 1,380 2020 $ 0,025 $ 0,017 $ 0,010 $ 0,728 $ 1,014 $ 1,299 $ 0,703 $ 0,997 $ 1,289 2021 $ 0,002 $ 0,002 $ 0,002 $ 0,684 $ 0,930 $ 1,176 $ 0,682 $ 0,928 $ 1,174 2022 $ 0,005 $ 0,004 $ 0,004 $ 0,650 $ 0,867 $ 1,085 $ 0,645 $ 0,863 $ 1,082 2023 $ 0,005 $ 0,004 $ 0,003 $ 0,623 $ 0,816 $ 1,010 $ 0,618 $ 0,812 $ 1,007 2024 $ 0,020 $ 0,014 $ 0,008 $ 0,605 $ 0,782 $ 0,959 $ 0,585 $ 0,768 $ 0,950 2025 $ 0,002 $ 0,002 $ 0,001 $ 0,561 $ 0,716 $ 0,872 $ 0,559 $ 0,715 $ 0,870 2026 $ 0,004 $ 0,003 $ 0,003 $ 0,528 $ 0,668 $ 0,809 $ 0,524 $ 0,665 $ 0,806 2027 $ 0,004 $ 0,003 $ 0,002 $ 0,494 $ 0,621 $ 0,748 $ 0,490 $ 0,618 $ 0,746 2028 $ 0,016 $ 0,011 $ 0,007 $ 0,471 $ 0,589 $ 0,707 $ 0,454 $ 0,578 $ 0,701 2029 $ 0,001 $ 0,001 $ 0,001 $ 0,429 $ 0,534 $ 0,638 $ 0,427 $ 0,532 $ 0,637 2030 $ 0,003 $ 0,002 $ 0,002 $ 0,397 $ 0,493 $ 0,589 $ 0,395 $ 0,491 $ 0,587 2031 $ 0,003 $ 0,002 $ 0,002 $ 0,373 $ 0,461 $ 0,548 $ 0,370 $ 0,458 $ 0,546 2032 $ 0,013 $ 0,009 $ 0,006 $ 0,357 $ 0,440 $ 0,521 $ 0,344 $ 0,431 $ 0,516 2033 $ 0,001 $ 0,001 $ 0,001 $ 0,326 $ 0,399 $ 0,472 $ 0,325 $ 0,398 $ 0,471 2034 $ 0,002 $ 0,002 $ 0,002 $ 0,302 $ 0,370 $ 0,437 $ 0,300 $ 0,368 $ 0,435 2035 $ 0,003 $ 0,002 $ 0,001 $ 0,285 $ 0,346 $ 0,408 $ 0,282 $ 0,344 $ 0,406 2036 $ 0,011 $ 0,007 $ 0,004 $ 0,274 $ 0,333 $ 0,391 $ 0,264 $ 0,326 $ 0,387 Total Sports related NPV $ 8,020 $ 14,486 $ 20,942 Table G.1: CBA of the expected situation (Greek level, amounts in current billion USD).

189

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