A Guide to the Constitutional Structures and Electoral Systems of East, South

Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121–151 www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of east, south and southeast Asia Allen Hicken a,∗, Yuko Kasuya b a Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Suite #213, 611 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-3028, USA b Graduate School of International Relations & Paciﬁc Studies, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA

Abstract

In 1997 an economic crisis swept through much of Asia. In addition to the various proximal causes of the crises, e.g. overvalued exchange rates, lax banking regulations, etc., political structures have received much attention. Some claim that problems in countries’ political structures set the stage for the crisis. Others argue that governments’ responses to the crisis were helped or hindered by existing political institutions. However, research on the consequences of Asian political institutions is hampered by a lack of basic information on the different constitutional and electoral frameworks around the region. This article is an attempt to help ﬁll this void by providing a description of the constitutional structures and electoral systems of 17 Asian-Paciﬁc countries since 1945.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Electoral systems; Constitutions; Plurality; Proportional representation; Mixed systems; Asia

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide a succinct summary of the political institutions of Asia. Asia is home to an amazing variety of regimes and institutions including monarchies, socialist systems and long-established democracies. In addition, many of the countries in the region are new democracies, having undertaken

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-734-615-9105; fax: +1-734-764-3522. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Hicken); [email protected] (Y. Kasuya).

0261-3794/02/$ - see front matter  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(01)00053-1 122 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 a transition to democracy within the last two decades as elected legislatures have replaced authoritarian leaders or powerful bureaucracies. This has spurred an interest in the strengths and weaknesses of particular democratic institutional arrangements among those who study the region. The recent Asian economic crisis has also con- tributed to this growing interest in institutions. Policymakers, political reformers and international actors (such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank) are beginning to recognize that the constitutional structure and electoral system a country adopts can have important implications for democratic stability, economic growth and social welfare. Unfortunately, research on the political institutions of Asia has thus far lagged behind the need for such information. Indeed, Asian democracies or semi-democracies (with the exception of Japan) have rarely been included in large comparative studies of institutions. We seek to fill this void. This paper is modeled on several studies of comparative institutions in Western or Latin American democracies (e.g. Jones, 1995; Lijphart, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997).1 The lack of concise comparative descriptions of the electoral systems and constitutional structures of Asia does not imply that country-focused scholars are unaware or uninterested in the subject. Quite the contrary, there are numerous case studies which explore the political institutions of particular countries in great detail, and we made grateful use of such work during the research for this paper. What has been lacking, however, are works that put the institutions of a given country in a broader comparative context. In the pages that follow we place these country-specific data in that comparative context while using terminology common to other studies of constitutional structures and electoral systems. We hope that this information will be of use to institutional scholars, policymakers and political reformers. This paper is simply a description of the various constitutional and electoral systems across the region. We do not discuss the origins of the political institutions in a given country, nor do we attempt to assess the quality or effectiveness of these institutions. We also do not review the pros and cons of particular institutional arrangements. Finally, we do not include information on different party systems across the region.2 Data for a total of 17 countries in East, South and Southeast Asia are presented in the paper.3 Following the convention used by Jones (1995), Powell (1982) and others, only systems that were independent and had elected governments for a minimum of five years are included. We have intentionally made an effort to include regimes that are typically excluded from comparative institutional studies because they are not considered fully democratic. We include in our study any regime that has held regular elections for at least five years, in which opposition parties were

1 We are especially indebted to Mark Jones’ 1995 article on the institutions of Latin America which motivated us to do something similar for Asia. 2 A project is being designed to collect party system information and we hope to include it in future work. 3 We also chose to include Papua New Guinea due to its close proximity to the region, even though it is generally not considered part of Asia. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 123 allowed to participate. Unlike most comparative studies of democratic institutions, we do not require that those elections be completely open and competitive. While most of the regimes included in the following tables meet the openness and competitiveness criteria we also include systems such as Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea which have held regular elections, but which, during certain periods, have fallen short in terms of the competitiveness or openness of those elections. As a rule of thumb we excluded regimes that held elections for only a minority of the legislative seats.4 We have attempted to catalogue every regime in Asia that met our criteria between the years 1945 and 2000. In some countries there were signiﬁcant changes to the electoral laws and/or political institutions during the period. Where there are changes in the variables listed in a given table over time, such changes are noted by dividing the country into multiple time periods, e.g. Cambodia I (1953–1970), (1993–1998) and Cambodia II (1998–) (Table 1). In order to keep the tables from becoming overly complex, multiple country periods do not carry over from table to table. For example, Table 1 contains Cambodia I and Cambodia II, reﬂecting a change in the number of legislative chambers over time. Table 3, by contrast, has only one listing for Cambodia since the variables relating to the head of state did not change.

2. Constitutional structure

Table 1 contains three different ways to classify constitutional structures across Asia. The first and most obvious is the distinction between a presidential and parliamentary form of government. Presidential systems are those in which an executive (a) is elected by a popular vote, (b) holds office for a fixed term (i.e. is not dependent on parliamentary confidence), (c) selects and directs the cabinet, and (d) has some legislative authority.5 In parliamentary systems the executive is (a) selected by the legislature,6 and (b) dependent on the legislature’s confidence (Jones, 1995, p. 6).7 Of the 17 countries listed in Table 1, 15 have had a parliamentary system at one time or another. The majority of these are former British colonies (Bangladesh, Burma, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Sri Lanka) or

4 Based on these criteria the following countries were included: Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. Vietnam is included in Table 1. Cambodia is included although the 1997 coup d’etat took place only 4 years after elections. China, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, Bhutan and Brunei were excluded altogether because they did not meet these criteria. China, Vietnam, Laos and North Korea are communist systems. Brunei is a sultanate while Bhutan is a monarchy. Hong Kong and Macau, as former colonial territories now part of China, were also excluded. Because of the lack of data the elected regimes of 1950s and 1960s South Vietnam and Cambodia had to be excluded from all but Table 1. 5 On the importance of the latter two criteria see Carey and Shugart (1995). 6 In many parliamentary systems it is the head of state that formally selects the Prime Minister, but does so on the advice of the legislature. 7 For a more detailed look at the differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes, see Shugart and Carey (1992) and Lijphart (1992, 1994). 124 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151

Table 1 Regime types in Asia

System Time period Form of government Legislative brancha Federal/Unitary

Bangladesh I 1986–1991 Presidential Unicameral Unitary Bangladesh II 1991– Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Burma 1948–1962b Parliamentary Bicameral Federal Cambodia I 1953–1970, Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary 1993–1998 Cambodia II 1998– Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary India 1950– Parliamentary Bicameral Federal Indonesia I 1950–1959c Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Indonesia II 1971–d Hybride Unicameralf Unitary Japan 1947– Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary Malaysia 1957– Parliamentary Bicameralg Federal Nepal 1990– Parliamentary Bicameralh Unitary Pakistan 1985–1999i Parliamentaryj Bicameral Federal Papua New 1975– Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Guinea Philippines I 1946–1972 Presidential Bicameral Unitary Philippines II 1978–1986k Hybridl Unicameral Unitary Philippines III 1987– Presidential Bicameral Unitary Singapore I 1965–1991 Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Singapore II 1991– Hybridm Unicameral Unitary South Korea I 1948–1952 Hybridn Unicameral Unitary South Korea II 1952–1960 Presidentialo Unicameralp Unitary South Korea III 1960–1961 Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary South Korea IV 1962–q Presidentialr Unicamerals Unitary South Vietnam I 1956–1963t Presidential Unicameral Unitary South Vietnam 1967–1975 Hybridu Bicameral Unitary II Sri Lanka I 1948–1972 Parliamentary Bicameralv Unitary Sri Lanka II 1972–1977w Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Sri Lanka III 1978–x Hybridy Unicameral Unitary Taiwan I 1991–1997z Presidentialaa Unicameralbb Unitary Taiwan II 1997– Hybridcc Unicameralbb Unitary Thailand I 1978–1997dd Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary Thailand II 1997– Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary

a In the “Legislative Branch” column an italicized Bicameral signiﬁes that the second or upper chamber is appointed rather than elected. b The Prime Minister handed the government over to an army-controlled caretaker government for eighteen months between 1958 and 1960. c Indonesia fought a war of independence from 1945 through 1949, formally receiving its independence on December 27, 1949. The 1950 constitution was actually Indonesia’s third constitution. An independence constitution was drafted in 1945 (and later readopted by Sukarno in 1959) and a short-lived federal constitution came into being in 1949. d In 1959 Sukarno abrogated the 1950 constitution and reinstalled the 1945 constitution in its place. This in effect brought the parliamentary era to an end, although the title ‘Prime Minister’ was used to describe the executive position up until 1966. From 1959 until 1971 the legislature (DPR) and electoral college (MPR) were appointed bodies. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 125

Table 1 Continued

e An electoral college (MPR) made up of elected and appointed members chooses the Indonesian president. The president has broad legislative powers and can appoint and remove the cabinet on his own. The MPR has the power to remove the president at any time. f Indonesia has two assemblies, one of which, the MPR, is not part of the normal legislative process and meets only once every five years to select the President and set broad policy outlines. It is made up of both elected and appointed members but the majority was appointed until 1999. g Majority of the upper house is appointed, with only a few elected members. h Majority of the upper house is elected while a minority is appointed. i (9) Martial law was lifted and new (amended) constitution promulgated in 1985, but elections were not held under the new constitution until 1988. The elections in early 1985 were held under martial law with a ban on political parties. j Pakistan has a more powerful President than many parliamentary regimes (s/he can dissolve the legislature and appoint and dismiss the cabinet.) However, because the President is not directly elected Pakistan is classified here as parliamentary. k The Philippines was under martial law from 1972 to 1981. The 1973 constitution called for a unicameral legislature. However, an elected legislature was not put in place until 1978. From February 1986 to May 1987 an interim ‘Freedom Constitution’ was in place. l President-Parliamentary. The 1973 martial law constitution technically established a hybrid system with the President as head of State and Prime Minister as head of Government. However, for much of the period Ferdinand Marcos filled both positions. m President-Parliamentary. In 1991 a constitutional amendment was passed creating a President with some legislative and dissolution powers along side a Prime Minister and cabinet subject to parliamentary confidence. The President can appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister. n The President sat for fixed term, functioned as both the head of state and government but was elected by a 2/3rds vote of the National Assembly. o From 1952 to 1954 the President chose a Prime Minister who then chose and removed the cabinet. The cabinet was collectively subject to parliamentary censure. p A 1952 constitutional amendment created an upper chamber. However, due to the war, elections for the upper chamber were not held until 1960. q Spans the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Republics (1962–1972, 1972–1980, 1980–1987, 1987–). r During the 3rd and 6th Republics (1962–1972, 1987–) a directly elected President appointed the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister appointed and removed the rest of the cabinet. The cabinet was not subject to parliamentary confidence. s Between 1972 and 1987 South Korea had an electoral college (the NCU) whose job was to elect the president. However, unlike the electoral colleges in Taiwan and Indonesia, under the Korean constitution the NCU was not considered a second legislative chamber. t In 1955 a referendum was held which did away with the monarchy and installed Ngo Dinh Diem as President. A republican constitution was subsequently adopted in 1956. u President-Parliamentary. The President with legislative power selects the Prime Minister and cabinet but they in turn are subject to parliamentary confidence. v One-half of the Senate was appointed and one-half elected. w After a violent uprising in 1971 a new constitution was passed in 1972 which changed the name of the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka. x The first presidential elections under the 1978 constitution were not held until 1982. y President-Parliamentary. The President is directly elected, can appoint the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, and is not dependent on the confidence of Parliament to remain in office. However, the Prime Minster and Cabinet must maintain the support of parliament to remain in office. 126 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151

Table 1 Continued

z The lifting of martial law and the decision to allow opposition parties to contest elections in 1987 was the beginning of a semi-democratic period. However, it was not until the constitutional changes of 1991 that the entire legislature was open for competitive election (the first election was held in 1992). Prior to 1991 supplementary elections were held for both legislative chambers, but only a minority of the seats were open to contestation. aa The President appoints the head of the cabinet, the President of the Executive Yuan (the Premier), and the Premier appoints the rest of the cabinet. The appointment of the Premier must be confirmed by the Legislative Yuan. The President can remove cabinet members. The cabinet is not subject to legislative confidence. bb Taiwan has a legislative assembly (the Legislative Yuan) as well as a National Assembly. The latter has no legislative power and until 1996 met only once every four years to select the President and Vice-President. Since 1996 the President and Vice-President have been directly elected and the National Assembly’s role has been confined to voting on constitutional amendments and holding the power of presidential impeachment. In 2000 the National Assembly was changed to a non-standing body elected entirely via list PR. cc President-Parliamentary. Under a 1997 constitutional amendment the Premier (President of the Execu- tive Yuan) is subject to a no confidence vote by the Legislative Yuan and the President has the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan once such a vote has been cast. dd From 1991 to 1992 members of a coup group that had overthrown the previous government ruled Thailand. When democracy was restored in 1992 the pre-coup rules and institutions were largely readopted. were strongly influenced by the British system (Thailand). In addition to these countries, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Nepal and South Korea have also adopted parliamentary systems at some point in their democratic history.8 Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia I, Pakistan, Singapore I, South Korea III and Sri Lanka II each have Presidents as their head of state, but are not classified Presidential systems since these Presidents are not popularly elected or do not have cabinet and/or legislative authority. Five of the countries have had a presidential regime which meets the four criteria listed above: Bangladesh (I), the Philippines (I, III), South Korea (I, III), Taiwan (I) and South Vietnam (I). Seven countries have used hybrid systems that do not fit well into either category. Singapore’s (II) directly elected President has some legislative authority and can appoint and remove the Prime Minister. However, the Prime Minister and cabinet are also subject to parliamentary confidence. Until 1952 the South Korean President sat for fixed term and functioned as both the head of state and government but was not popularly elected.9 In Taiwan II the President selects the head of the cabinet (the Executive Yuan) and the head of the Executive Yuan (known as the Premier) selects the rest of the members of the Executive Yuan. However, the Premier is subject to a vote of no confidence by the Legislative Yuan and the President has the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan if a no confidence resolution is passed. Indonesia II

8 Most of these states were monarchies at one time. Empirically it is the case then whenever monarchies have democratized, they have chosen parliamentary government (Lijphart 1999, p. 142). 9 The President was selected by a 2/3rds vote of the National Assembly. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 127 has a President that is chosen by an electoral college (the People’s Consultative Assembly or MPR) made up, in part, of the members of the legislative assembly.10 The President can appoint and remove the cabinet independent of the legislature and has very broad legislative powers. The President is not subject to the confidence of the legislature (House of Representatives or DPR) but the electoral college (MPR) can remove the President prior to the end of his term. In Sri Lanka III and Vietnam II a fixed term President with legislative power selected a Prime Minister, but the Prime Minster could be removed by a no confidence vote of the legislature. Finally, the 1973 martial law constitution in the Philippines (II) established a Hybrid system with a directly elected President with legislative powers as head of state and a Prime Minister as head of government. The Prime Minister was nominated by the President and approved by the legislature and the Prime Minister and cabinet were responsible to the legislature.11 The footnotes to Table 1 include a finer classification of these hybrid regimes using Shugart and Carey’s (1992) President-Parliamentary and Premier-Presidential categories.12 Table 1 also contains two other ways of classifying regimes: by their legislative structure and by structure of central–local government relations. Legislatures can be unicameral or bicameral. In bicameral legislatures the upper house can either be elected or appointed. The number of countries with unicameral versus bicameral legislatures is about equal in the region. Column 4 in Table 1 presents the information on structure of the legislative branch. Six countries have changed key features of their legislative branch over time. Cambodia, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam and Sri Lanka have switched between a unicameral and bicameral legislature. Thailand recently replaced an appointed second chamber with an elected version. Countries in the region also differ to the extent the national government formally shares power with sub-national governments. In federal systems there is a formal division of power between the central/national government and sub-national governments (Lijphart, 1999, p. 186). Typically, this includes a formal division of legislative authority. Such a formal division does not exist in unitary states. Column 5 in Table 1 lists any state that formally declares itself federal in its constitution. Only four states have had federal regimes—Burma, India, Malaysia and Pakistan. It is worth noting that the terms ‘federal’ and ‘unitary’ mask a good deal of complexity within each category. There are formally unitary states, such as Japan and the Philippines, which have granted substantial powers to sub-national governments, and there are

10 The MPR’s role goes beyond that of an electoral college. This is discussed in more detail below. 11 In practice this hybrid system functioned more like a presidential system. For much of the period Ferdinand Marcos was both the President and Prime Minister. He was for all intents and purposes an “all-powerful and dominant president”. (Brillantes, 1988, p. 123). 12 Premier-Presidential regimes meet the following criteria: (a) the president is elected by popular vote, (b) the president possesses considerable powers, and (c) there also exists a premier and cabinet subject to legislative conﬁdence, who perform executive functions. President-Parliamentary systems have the following characteristics: (a) the popular election of the president, (b) the president appoints and dismisses cabinet members, (c) cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary conﬁdence and (d) the president as the power to dissolve parliament and/or legislative powers. (Shugart and Carey, 1992, pp. 23–24). 128 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 formally federal states where the powers of sub-national governments are extremely limited, e.g. Malaysia.

3. Election of the president and presidential vetoes

In the region’s presidential and hybrid systems voters can either elect the president directly, or choose representatives who then elect the president. Among the presidential and hybrid systems listed in Table 2, eight provide for the direct election of the president via the plurality formula: Bangladesh, Philippines I, II, III, Singapore, South Korea II, V and Taiwan II. Sri Lanka also directly elects its president but uses preference voting rather than strict plurality.13 The remaining systems in Table 2 indirectly elect their presidents. From 1948 to 1952 (South Korea I) the South Korean President was chosen by a 2/3rds majority of the National Assembly. In Indonesia I voters elected most of the members of the Indonesian parliament (DPR). The 500-member DPR joined with 500 additional presidential appointees to form the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). The MPR met every 5 years to select the president by majority vote. Under the current Indonesian system the 500-member DPR joins with 65 appointees and 135 other elected representatives to form the MPR. In Pakistan the president is elected by a majority of an electoral college composed of members of both legislative chambers and the provincial assemblies. South Korea III used a 5000-member electoral college called the National Conference for Uniﬁcation (NCU) to elect the President using the majority rule. The NCU was disbanded under a 1980 constitutional amendment but was replaced with a nearly identical electoral college (South Korea IV). Voters in pre-1996 Taiwan elected an electoral body (National Assembly), which then elected the president on a majority basis. See Table 8 for more details on systems that rely on electoral bodies. There is also quite a variation among the Asian presidential regimes in terms of presidential terms and term limits (Table 2, columns 4, 5). The length of presidential terms ranges from 4 year in the case of Philippines I and Taiwan II to 7 year in South Korea IV. A presidential term limit does not exist in Bangladesh, Indonesia I, Philippines II, Singapore and South Korea II and III while there is a ban on re- election in South Korea IV, and V and Philippines III. Sri Lanka, Taiwan, South Korea I, Indonesia II and Philippines I place a two-term limit on their presidents. Finally, differences in the veto power of presidents are marked. The South Korea III and Indonesian presidents are the most powerful in terms of veto power—their vetoes can not be overridden. Taiwan’s president, by contrast, has no veto power

13 Each Sri Lankan voter ranks up to three candidates for president in order of preference. If no candidate gets an absolute majority of ﬁrst preferences all but the top two candidates are declared defeated. The votes of the defeated candidates’ supporters are then transferred to whichever of the remaining candidates they have marked as a second preference. If still no candidate has an absolute majority, third preferences are distributed to the remaining two candidates and the candidate with the most votes is then declared the winner. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 129

Table 2 Presidents in presidential and hybrid systems

System Time period Method of election Presidential Term limit Veto/override term (yr) requirement

Bangladesh 1986–1991 Plurality 5 None Package/majoritya Indonesia I 1959–1998b Majority of electoral 5 None Package/none body (MPR) Indonesia II 1998– Majority of electoral 5 Two term Package/none body (MPR) limit Philippines I 1935–1972 Plurality 4 Two term Partial & limit package/2/3rds both houses Philippines II 1981–1986c Plurality 6 None Partial & package/2/3rds Philippines III 1987– Plurality 6 No re- Partial & election package/2/3rds both houses Singapore 1991– Plurality 6 None Package (limited)/2/3rdsd South Korea I 1948–1952 2/3rd vote of National 4 Two term Package/2/3rds Assemblye limit South Korea II 1952–1960, Plurality 4 Noneg Package/2/3rds 1962–1972f South Korea 1972–1980 Majority of electoral 6 None Package/none III body (NCU)h South Korea 1980–1987 Majority of electoral 7 No re- Package/2/3rds IV body election South Korea V 1987– Plurality 5 No re- Package/2/3rds election Sri Lanka 1978– Preference voting- 6i Two term Nonej majority limit Taiwan I 1991–1996 Majority of electoral 6 Two term Nonek body (National limit Assembly) Taiwan II 1996– Plurality 4 Two term Nonel limit

a Non-money bills only. b From 1959 until 1971 the MPR was completely appointed by the president. c No presidential elections were held during the martial law period (1972–1981). d Provisions for overriding a presidential appointment veto were added in a 1996 constitutional amendment. In addition to the power to veto certain appointments to government agencies, statutory boards and government corporations, the president must also approve the budgets of some government entities. The president can also veto any changes to the Central Provident Fund and bills affecting foreign borrowing. e If no candidate could obtain 2/3rds of the votes after two rounds of voting a majority run-off election would be held between the top two vote-getters. f Spans the 1st and 3rd Republics (1950–1960 and 1962–1972). g In 1954 and again in 1969 the constitutions were amended, lifting restrictions on re-elections, thus allowing the sitting presidents (Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee) to run for re-election. h The National Conference for Uniﬁcation, headed by the president. i A 1982 amendment allows the president to call for elections any time after serving 4 yr. 130 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151

Table 2 Continued

j Presidential approval is required before the results of a referendum become law. k The president by himself does not have a veto over legislation. However, the Executive Yuan may veto legislation with the approval of the president. Such a veto can be overridden with a 2/3rds vote in the Legislative Yuan. l The Executive Yuan may veto legislation with the approval of the president. Such a veto can be overridden with a majority vote in the Legislative Yuan. The change from a 2/3rds to majority vote occurred in 1997. independent of the Executive Yuan. The Sri Lankan President also lacks veto power over legislation, although the president’s approval is required before the results of a referendum become law. In South Korea (I, II, IV, V) and the Philippines presidents have package vetoes that take a supermajority to overturn. The Bangladeshi and Pakistani presidents can veto non-money bills but the veto can be overturned by a simple majority.14 The Philippine president also has a partial or ‘line item’ veto over budget-related bills. In Singapore the position of President is a relatively new invention—created in 1991 via a constitutional amendment. However, unlike the heads of state just mentioned, the Singaporean President cannot veto most legislation. He can however veto certain government appointments as well as bills that affect the Central Provident Fund (CPF).15 The President must also approve the budgets of certain government agencies and can veto bills relating to foreign borrowing. His veto can be overridden by a 2/3rds vote of the legislature.16 The presidential veto powers and override requirements are listed in Table 2, column 6.

4. Parliamentary systems and heads of state

As is the case in many parliamentary democracies, parliamentary systems in East, South and Southeast Asia separate out the duties of the head of government (the Prime Minister) from the duties of the head of state (a President or Monarch). Usually the duties of these heads of state are only ceremonial in nature, however this is not always the case. Table 3 presents information on the different heads of state in Asian parliamentary systems and their various powers. Seven of the parliamentary systems have had monarchs as their head of state. In all cases but Malaysia these monarchs sit for life. The position of Malaysian monarch and head of state is passed between nine Malay Sultans, each of whom serves a term of 5 years. The remaining parliamentary regimes have presidents as heads of state, none of which are directly elected.

14 In the case of bicameral Pakistan, a majority of both houses is required. 15 The CPF was introduced in 1955 to give ﬁnancial security to retired or disabled workers. Employees and employers must contribute a percentage of an employee’s salary to the CPF. 16 The President may also veto any bill that would curtail his discretionary powers. This veto can only be overturned by a 2/3rds vote in a national referendum. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 131

Table 3 Heads of state in parliamentary systems

System Time period Head of Method of election Term (yr) Veto/override state requirement

Bangladesh 1991– President Majority of Parliament 5 Non-money/majority Burma 1948–1962 President 2/3rds of Parliamenta 5 None Cambodia 1953–1970; Monarch Non-elected Life None 1993– India 1950– President Electoral collegeb 5 Non-money/majority Indonesia 1950–1959 President NAc NAc None Japan 1947– Monarch Non-elected Life None Malaysia 1957– Monarch Elected by Sultansd 5 Non-money/majority both housese Nepal 1990– Monarch Non-elected Life Non-money/majority Pakistan 1985–1999 President Electoral Collegef 5 Non-money/majority both houses Papua New 1976– Monarchg Non-elected Life None Guinea Singapore 1965–1991 President Majority of Parliament 4 None South Korea 1960–1961 President 2/3rds of Parliamenth 5 Nonei Sri Lanka I 1948–1972 Monarchg Non-elected Life None Sri Lanka II 1972–1977 President Appointed by Prime 4 None Minister Thailand 1978– Monarch Non-elected Life any bill/2/3rds both houses

a The President was elected by a 2/3rds vote of joint session of lower and upper legislative chambers. Candidates were rotated between the various ethnic groups. b The Electoral college consists of the members of both national legislative chambers together with the elected members of state assemblies. c The method of electing the President and his term were to be determined in a Presidential election law but no such law was ever passed. As a result, no presidential elections were held during this period. President Sukarno, President of the short lived Republic of the United States of Indonesia, stayed on as President under the 1950 constitution. NA=not available. d The Monarch is selected from among nine Malay Sultans. e Prior to constitutional amendments in 1983 and 1984, it was unclear what exactly the Monarch’s veto powers were. The 1983 and 1984 amendments set forth the above rules. f Members of both national legislative chambers together with the members of state assemblies. g The British Monarch. h If, after the ﬁrst round of votes no candidate received a 2/3rds majority, a second round would be held. If a second round failed to produce a 2/3rds winner, the plurality candidate would be declared the winner. i The president could veto a state of siege declaration passed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

In Sri Lanka II the Prime Minister appointed the President. The remaining presidents are elected by an electoral college which combines the national legislature with representatives from local assemblies (India) or by the national legislature only (Bangladesh, Burma, Singapore, South Korea). As mentioned, these heads of state enjoy primarily ceremonial powers. However, 132 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 several heads of states in Asia do possess some additional powers.17 The most common additional power granted to the head of state is the power to refuse to sign bills passed by the legislature—or veto power. Where granted, veto power is typically limited to non-monetary bills and vetoes can be over-ridden by a majority vote of one or both legislative chambers. This is the case in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Nepal. The Thai King enjoys somewhat greater power than most ceremonial heads of state. He can withhold his consent on any bill and send the bill back to Parliament for redeliberation. An override of the King’s veto requires a 2/3rds vote of both houses.18

5. Selection of the legislature

Tables 4–7 contain the basic information for the legislatures in our set of cases. Table 4 contains data for lower or single legislative chambers elected using the plurality formula. Table 5 has the same information for those lower/single legislative chambers elected on a proportional or semi-proportional basis. Table 6 lists systems that use two-tier or mixed-member systems to elect the lower/single chamber. Table 7 includes data on the make-up and election method of the second or upper chamber in bicameral systems. Basic information common to many or all of these tables include: (1) the electoral formula used to allocate the legislative seats; (2) assembly size; (3) number of electoral districts; (4) district magnitude; (5) the presence or absence of thresholds; (6) the term length of legislators, (7) their term limits and (8) whether the legislature includes appointed/reserved seats. Assembly size, the number of districts and district magnitude often vary over time as the population changes. Where this is the case we included the data from the last election held under a given set of rules.

5.1. Electoral formulas for the legislature

There are two general types of electoral formulas used to allocate legislative seats, namely, plurality formula and proportional representation (PR). Several countries employ a combination of these formulas in mixed-member systems. Such systems will be discussed in some detail below. Under the plurality formula the candidate(s) with the highest number of votes in a given district is elected. The plurality formula is usually used in single-seat districts, however, several countries use the plurality formula in multi-seat districts, for example, Thailand’s lower chamber (prior to 1997) (see Table 4), the Philippine Senate (see Table 7) and the provincial seats in Indones- ia’s electoral college (see Table 8). In these three systems voters have as many votes as there are seats to be ﬁlled and the highest polling candidates ﬁll the available seats. Singapore’s system (after 1987) combines a handful of single-seat districts with

17 In most cases these are rarely used. 18 The King’s veto power has rarely, if ever, been exercised. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 133 m k e a d g i c o o None 2 None 6 b p 24233 83145 233160 157 5 4 174 5 6 None None None Up None to 12 6 districts size seats j l n n 1111 300 5431, 330 3 to 170 6 545 109 5 170 5 109 5 None 5 None 30 None None Up to 3 1 205 205 5 None None 8 to 21 (w/1 multiple votes) 12 200 6 186 220 None 6 35 None 34 f h 19611980 1 2 (w/ SNTV) 77 233 231 233 6 4 None None 1/3 of seats None 19621994 1 1 to 5 (w/ SNTV)19721983 1987 135 119941988 250 1 5111960 1 1 2501972 419771997 1 120 4 1 1 to 3 (w/ multiple votes) 250 120 None 155 74 None 250 4 393 74 None 3 None 4 4 None 3 terms None None None None None None 1999 1 207 217 5 None 10 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – South Korea IISouth Korea III 1960 1972 IndiaMalaysia 1950 1957 Philippines IISingapore I 1977 Singapore II 1966 1988 SystemBangladeshBurma Time periodJapan 1986 District magnitude 1948 Papua New GuineaPhilippines Number I of 1976 1947 AssemblyPhilippines IIIPhilippines Term IV length 1935 1983 Term 1987 South limits Korea I Appointed/reserved Sri Lanka 1950 ISri Lanka IIThailand 1948 1972 1978 Nepal 1990 Pakistan 1985 Table 4 Lower/single chamber elected using the plurality formula 134 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 rst National fi 6 seats. – rst National Assembly, which served for only 5 years. The fi ll seats. s entire ticket. ’ fi ve 2 or 3 seat districts were allowed nationwide. fi 1/3 of the seats were appointed by the president. Appointed legislators served a 3-year term. A 1976 constitutional amendment extended the termNon-Muslim to minorities 6 elect years. 10 A members. 1978 amendment changed it back to 5 years. Elections held in 1984. The President and Parliament can appoint up to six representativesUp each. to Parliament could nominate six people to The term for the National Assembly was 6 years with the exception of the Thirty seats are reserved for women electedPresident by may Parliament. nominate up to two membersThree of additional the members Anglo-Indian may community. be appointed by a 2/3rds vote in Parliament. Twenty-one were appointed by the President from the members of the cabinet. Fourteen were elected by government-sponsored sectoral organizations. An election law was passed in 1977 and elections for an interim assembly were held in 1978 under martial law. The voters could cast as many votes Twenty were appointed byA the handful President of from single-seat the districts members exist of alongsideSome the Group sources cabinet. Representation claim Fourteen Constituencies that were with Korea elected magnitudes switched by of to government-sponsored 3 two sectoral member organizations. districts in 1958. However, most sources place the change to two member districts in 1972. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Table 4 Lower/single chamber elected using the plurality formula as there were seats.would automatically However, be voters assigned also to had that the party option of block voting--voters could simply write the name of the party on the ballot and the votes Assembly had already served for 2 years as a constituent assembly charged with drafting a new constitution. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 135 s ’ c f rst election fi 100 – i s vote share in each province. Each party ’ 455 None None Up to None 18 75 38 e b h 13 seats ll these seats. – fi (NDI, August 1999) and the system functioned like pure list PR. ’ largely emasculated ‘ 16 257 None s 27 provinces. Each party also assigns its candidates to individual districts within each ’ a 62 27 500 11 8 21 120 None 5 None None 82 27 500 None – – – exible 16 fl g ed List 4 fi list PR with nominating district Closed list PR 1 Modi formula magnitude districts size (yr) seats 1999 Closed list PR 4 1959 PR w/ – – – – 1971 d lled by the individual candidates assigned to the district where the party received its highest vote percentage. Under the Indonesia fi Parties present a list of candidates in each of Indonesia There is no threshold for winning seats in the current election, however, a party must gain 2% of the seats in the DPR or 3% of the seats in the From 1975, only three parties were allowed to participate in elections. These are Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian There was no party threshold but to win a seat a candidate had to receive at least 300,000 votes. Average district magnitude. The constitution mandated that three minority groups receive a minimum number of seats: ChineseAt 9, times Europeans an 6, internal Arabs DPR 3. rule If required these parties numbers to were have a minimum number of seats ranging from 11 to 13. The number of appointed seats in the DPR has varied over time but stayed between 15 and 25% of the total seats. Representatives of the military. a b c d e f g h i Indonesia II Indonesia I 1950 System TimeCambodia period Electoral 1993 Indonesia III District 1999 Number of Assembly Party threshold Term length Term limits Appointed province. Voters cast a single vote for a party list. Seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the party seats are Democratic Party (PDI). Table 5 Lower/single chamber elected using proportional representation (single-tier districting) using these rules, the district list portion of the electoral rules were provincial and district assemblies to be eligible to run in future elections. not attained via the elections, then the government would appoint minority representatives to 136 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 b 2% of votes 3 3 None and 3 seats seats c 200 None 4 None None a 152 c 51 192 51 146 5% of votes 4 92 1 5 None nominal 46 None 4 3% None None 4 None None d e f Plurality/PR Plurality/PR f d e assuring votes districts in tier (years) seats List Separate None List PR 7 to 33 11 ListDistrict SeparateList None Single List PR Yes 52 Plurality 1NominalListNominal Single 208 None 208 None List PR Plurality 46 1 Plurality 1 1 253 46 253 253 None 3% 253 None 4 None None Nominal Plurality 1 300 300 None NominalList SingleNominalList Yes Single Yes, Plurality 1 Plurality/PR SNTV 153 2 153 92 None 184 None b – – – – – – period separate between tiers formula magnitude of of seats length limits Reserved System Time TiersJapan Single or 1994 Seat linkage Electoral District Number Number Threshold Term Term Appointed/ South 1962 SouthKorea IV 1996 Philippines 1995 South 1980 South 1987 Korea I 1972 Korea II 1987 Korea III 1996 Majority Table 6 Mixed-member or two-tiered systems (lower/single chamber) A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 137 r l ote 20% m – lled seats fi of the list tier seats lled. The remaining fi rd district None 20% k 2 49 5% 3 None 10% j 33. – ed PR 2 to over 22 196 1/8 of votes h fi w/preferential 20voting in given ListNominal Separate None List PR 100 Plurality 1 1 100 400 5% 400 4 None None None 2nd1st Single NoneListNominal Single List PR None 29 List PR 1 Modi 8; 41 SNTV 29 None 1 to 17 29 6 176 None None g i – – – 1978 lled by appointed representatives from groups that fell behold the threshold. The rule was subsequently changes to require that un fi g The provision for a mixed-member system was included in the 1987 Constitution but a law fully implementing the measure was not passed until The party that received 50% or more of the votes automatically received 2/3rds of the list tier seats. If no party won 50% of the seats, the party with The list tier is divided into 11 blocs with district magnitudes of 7 There is a three seat cap on the number of seats a party can win in the list tier. Sectoral organizations, in addition to parties, are allowed to compete The party that won the largest number of nominal tier seats automatically received 2/3rds of the list tier seat. The remaining 1/3 The party that wins the most seats in the nominal tier receives enough seats from the list tier to ensure that it has a majority in the assembly. The a b c d e f Taiwan 1991 Sri Lanka Thailand 1997 remaining seats in the list tier are then divided proportionally among the other parties. Table 6 Continued the largest number of votes automatically received 1/2 of the list tier seats. The second-place party received 1/3 of the list tier seats as long as its v share was more thanwere double distributed that to of the the other third parties place on party. a Failing PR this, basis. the second place party received 2/3rds of the remaining seats. Any seats left ove for the party listseats seats. were During the 1998 elections only 13 parties passed the 2 percent threshold and so many party list seats were un 1995 and not usedlower in chamber. an election until 1998. In the interim both President Aquino and President Ramos appointed some sectoral representatives to the were divided among the other parties on a proportional basis. be distributed among parties above the 2 percent threshold, but below the three seat cap. 138 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 s ’ rty nishers a seat is fi rst election after the change was held in 1992. fi s candidates. The party or independent group that receives ’ s organizations, could elect several members of the Legislative Yuan. Since ’ awarded to its candidate with the highest vote total. The remaining seats are then nition of a mixed-member system. The original 1978 Constitution did not include a — fi seat ” bonus “ ll at least one of those seats with a female candidate. Parties with more than ten seats must reserve fi lling reserved seats. Under the current system there are reserved seats in both the list and nominal tiers. fi ve seats women are guaranteed at least one seat. If no female candidate is among the top fi c party list (or independent group list) and three of that list fi ve seats in the list tier must rst elections under the 1978 constitution were held in 1989, but prior to that time (1988) the constitution was amended to a two- fi fi cially sanctioned functionalist bodies, including women fi In nominal tier districts with at least Each voter chooses a speci 168 from regular districts and 8 from two special aboriginal districts. Sri Lanka is a two-tiered system but does not meet the strict de 41 national seats and 8 seats representing overseas Chinese. Prior to 1991 of Prior to a 1991 constitutional change there were supplemental elections for a minority of the seats. The g h i j k l m list then receive seats. awarded to parties/groups (including the largest party) in proportion to the votes received. The candidates with the highest vote totals from each pa two-tiered system. The the highest number of votes in the district receives one 1991 gender has been the only criterion for Table 6 Mixed-member or two-tiered systems (lower/single chamber) tiered system. 10 percent of their seats for female candidates. Parties that win at least awarded to the female candidate with the largest vote total. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 139 d money g 1/2 every 3years None NA yearsyears legislation legislation years money years money e election (years) 35 6 NA d 18 200 76 6 no successive None None delay – 3 to 25 125 6 4 None None None NA a Units years Assemblies States Direct 100 100 1 6 NoneHouse 1/2 every 3 None veto non- years Assemblies years money c a STV Lower 15 30 1 6 None 1/3 every 2 15 delay non- Plurality Direct 12 24 1 6 2 terms 1/2 every 3 None veto all STVPlurality State Direct 3 12 to 19 87 24 6 1 6 6 None None 1/2 every 3 1/2 None every 3 None veto non- veto all STV Local Gov. 5 60 7 6 None 1/3 every 2 10 delay Plurality State 2 69 13 3 None None 40 delay SNTV 1 to 4 152 47 6 None SNTV Direct 1 to 4 152 47 6 None SNTV DirectList PR 100 100 1 6 NoneSNTV 1/2 every 3 Direct None 1 veto non- List PR State 1 to 34 250 35 6 None 1/3 every 2 Up to 12 veto non- 61 Plurality Direct 2 70 62 Varied f – – – – – – – – – – – – 1971 19991972 Assemblies years money period formula magnitude size districts length Seats Powers 1982 1946 1982 1997 h b b Sri Lanka 1948 II Philippines 1987 South Korea 1960 Philippines I 1935 Pakistan 1985 Nepal 1950 Malaysia 1957 System TimeBurma Electoral Electors 1948 District Assembly Number of Term Term limits Renewal rate Appointed Legislative Thailand Japan II Japan I India 1950 Table 7 Elected second chambers 140 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 rst fi ect the ethnic and social composition of each state. (Silverstein, 1977). fl There is some dispute whether the Senate had 58 or 705 seats. of the electedThe and King 5 appointed of the the members appointed of seats the come Senate up until for 1997 renewal when every a 2 new years. constitution was passed. The methods used to elect representatives toJapan the uses upper a two-tiered chamber system. (Chamber The of top Nationalities) part varied of from the state cell to contains state. information Seats on the were second generally tier allotted and the bottom part contains information on the Beginning with the election in 2001 theSome list information PR on tier the is short-lived slated Senate to was change not from available. a closed list to an open list system. A constitutional amendment eliminated the Senate in 1971. a b c d e f g h to ethnic and social groups so as to re Table 7 Elected second chambers tier. The numbers listed under Assembly Size represents the number of seats in each tier. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 141 constitutional amendments, some legislative power amendments, some legislative power constitutional amendments National Assembly 700 5 Approval of 325 6 Approval of k k 20% e – reserved seats of Seats (years) 575 1,000103 5 Approval of 10 b c d j 100 25% i ed 4 to 82 462 fi Modi Plurality 5 135 SNTV 2 to 10 234 formula magnitude elected seats appointed/ Number length PR 4 to 62 425 List PR 20, 80 a h 1999 1996 1987 Plurality 1 to 5 5,278 none 5,278 7 None – – – – 1980 s 1999 s 1971 ’ ’ cation fi f Consultative Assembly (MPR) (MPR) ConsultativeAssembly List PRAssembly constitutional National 1991 Conference for Uni g Indonesia II People System NameIndonesia of I body Time period People Electoral District Number of Number ofSouth Korea I Total National Term Other Powers 1972-1980 Plurality 1 to 5 5,000 none 5,000 6 Selects 1/3 of Taiwan South Korea II NA Table 8 Electoral bodies for presidential systems 142 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 g ned dent. fi ve seats. fi s role has been con ’ MPR had been in place which was entirely appointed ” interim “ s organizations, could elect several members of the National Assembly. Since ’ 100 of which are appointed) and 500 additional members appointed by the president. – the 38 appointed members of the DPR. + lling reserved seats. There were reserved seats in both the list and nominal tiers. In the list tier one out of fi lled by a female candidate. In the nominal tier one seat was reserved for a woman in districts with at least fi cially sanctioned functionalist bodies, including women fi In 1990 the largely unelected National Assembly selected the president. In 1991 the constitution was amended and the National Assembly became a The MPR consists of the 500 membersElected of by the Provincial DPR Assemblies. (75 Prior to 1991 of The MPR formally came into being in 1971 under President Soeharto. Since 1959 an The MPR consists of the 500 members65 of appointed the representatives DPR of (38 functional of groups which areMixed-member appointed) system. and The 200 top additional part of members, the 65 cell of contains which information are on appointed. the list tier and the bottom part contains information on the nominal tier. While The NCU was disbanded under the 1980 constitutional amendments but was replaced with a nearly identical electoral college. 80 national seats and228 20 from seats regular representing districts overseas and Chinese. 6 from two special aboriginal districts. a b c d e f g h i j k by the president. As part of the 1971 formation of the MPR Soeharto set forth the rules regarding the make-up of the MPR. a fully elected National Assembly never had the chance to select the president, it is included here for informational purposes. to voting on constitutionalbody amendments elected and entirely holding via the list power PR. of presidential impeachment. In 2000 the National Assembly was changed to a non-standin completely elected body. Elections for the National Assembly were held in 1991, 1992 and 1996 but the elected National Assembly never selected a presi In 1996 the constitution was again amended to allow for the direct election of the president and since then, the National Assembly Table 8 Electoral bodies for presidential systems 1991 gender has been the only criterion for every four seats won by a party had to be A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 143

Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), each with three to six seats. GRCs can only be contested by teams of candidates from the same party (or allied independents) and at least one member of each team must be from the Malay, Indian or another minority community. Voters cast a single vote for a team and the team with a plurality of the votes wins all the seats in that GRC. A few countries in the region make use of multi-seat districts but give voters a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) rather than multiple votes. Under SNTV there are multiple seats in each district and each voter has one vote. Seats are awarded to candidates on a plurality basis. Uses of SNTV include the election of South Korea’s National Assembly from 1972 to 198019 and Japanese lower chamber elections until 1994 (Table 4). Table 4 lists all of those countries using the plurality formula for electing the legislature, or lower chamber in bicameral legislatures. As discussed above, countries that employ the plurality rule generally use single-seat districts as well. Assembly size among these countries ranges from a low of 74 in Singapore to 545 in India. Term lengths also vary from three years in Philippines IV to six in Philippines II, III, South Korea III and Sri Lanka II. Only legislators in the Philippines IV face a term limit (three terms). Several of the countries set aside some seats for appointees or representatives of particular societal groups. The number of appointed or reserved seats is usually a small percentage of the total seats. A few countries in the region use proportional representation (PR), where seats are allocated to parties in proportion to votes obtained. Among PR systems there are several methods of allocating legislative seats, three of which are found in the region: Closed list PR, Flexible list PR and Single Transferable Vote. Closed list PR involves each party presenting a list of candidates to the electorate with voters selecting a party rather than a candidate. Parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. Candidates are then awarded seats based on their position on the party list. Cambodia and Indonesia II use Closed list PR exclusively to elect the lower legislative chamber (Table 5).20 Several countries combine Closed list PR together with the plurality formula in two tiered systems, discussed below. Indonesia I used ﬂexible list PR to elect the legislature (Table 5). Voters cast one vote for a party list but were also allowed to vote for an individual candidate on that list. Parties were awarded seats on a PR basis and candidate vote totals were used to determine the candidate’s place on the party list.21 However, candidates in Indonesia I had to receive at least 300,000 votes in order to win a seat. Indonesia’s new system (Indonesia III in Table 5) uses a modiﬁed version of List PR. Parties present a list of candidates in each of Indonesia’s 27 provinces. Each party also assigns its candidates to individual districts within each province. While the list of candidates assigned to a given district is made public, voters still cast a single vote for a party list. Seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the

19 Korea electoral rules also restricted nominations under SNTV (i.e. no party could nominate more than one candidate in a give district.) 20 India and Japan also use List PR to elect the upper chamber (Table 7). 21 Sri Lanka also uses PR with preferential voting in a two tiered system, discussed below. 144 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 party’s vote share in each province. However, parties do not then assign those seats on the basis of candidate positions on the party list, as is the case in pure List PR. Instead, each party’s seats are filled by the individual candidates assigned to the district where the party received its highest vote percentage.22 This is the system on paper. However, under Indonesia’s first election using these rules (1999), the district list portion of the electoral rules were “largely emasculated” (NDI, August 1999). Many parties did not submit district lists before the elections and the Election Com- mission (the KPU) allowed parties to unilaterally decide who would fill the party’s seats. In other words it appeared, in practice, to function like pure List PR. It is not clear what the status of the district list rule will be in the future. No countries use Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems to elect their lower chamber. However, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka use STV systems for electing their upper chamber (see Table 7). In STV systems voters are able to rank as many candidates as they wish, both within parties and across different parties, in order of their preference. Any of the candidates who reach a certain quota23 of first-choice votes are deemed elected. The surplus votes (votes above the quota) of the just- elected candidates are then transferred to the second-choice candidates as marked on the ballots. At the same time the votes of the candidate with fewest votes are transferred in a similar manner. Once the vote transfers are complete candidates who have reached the quota are declared winners. This process continues until all the seats are filled. Table 5 contains data on those lower or single chambers elected using some form of PR. District magnitudes in these systems range from 1 in some Cambodian districts, to 82 in the largest Indonesian III district. Indonesia has the largest assembly with 500 seats compared to Cambodia’s relatively small 120-seat assembly. Term lengths are four or five years and legislators are not barred from re-election in any of the countries. Many of the assemblies also include appointed seats. Finally, requirements that parties reach a certain threshold in order to win any seats are present in Indonesia. In Indonesia II internal chamber rules at times required parties to have a minimum of 11–13 seats in order to participate in the DPR. In Indonesia III there is no threshold for winning seats in the current election. However, a party must gain 2% of the seats in the national legislature (DPR) or 3% of the seats in the provincial and district assemblies to be eligible to run in future elections. Candi- dates in Indonesia I had to receive at least 300,000 votes in order to win a seat.

5.2. Mixed-member or two-tiered systems

Several countries in the region have adopted electoral systems that use two ‘tiers’ to allocate seats. With the exception of Sri Lanka these two-tiered systems are also

22 A similar system is used in Slovenia (see Cox, 1997, p. 299). 23 See Taagepera and Shugart (1989, p. 27) for a discussion of the different ways of calculating this quota under STV. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 145 mixed-member systems (Table 6).24 The deﬁning feature of mixed-member systems is that one tier of seats is allocated nominally while the other tier is allocated on the basis of party lists. In the nominal tier members are elected solely based on votes cast for candidates by name. Usually the nominal tier relies on the plurality formula and single-seat districts. However, SNTV with multi-seat districts is used in South Korea II (Table 6) and in the nominal tier of Taiwanese legislature and presidential electoral body.25 Mixed-member systems also contain a tier of seats elected from party lists that overlay the nominal tier (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2000). In all but one case this ‘list tier’ is elected using the PR formula (Japan, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand use List PR). The exception is South Korea which has used both plurality and a mix of plurality and PR to elect its list tier (discussed below). Mixed-member systems differ in terms of how many votes voters cast. In South Korea and Taiwan voters cast a single fused vote for a candidate in a nominal tier district which also counts as a vote for that candidate’s party for purposes of the list tier. In the rest of the cases voters cast separate votes for the nominal and list tiers. Mixed-member systems also vary in terms of whether the two tiers are linked or not. This linkage can occur at either the vote or seat level. Votes are linked where there is a transfer of votes from one tier to another (ibid). Vote linkage does not occur in any of the cases in Table 6. The nominal and list tiers can also be linked in terms of seat allocation. At the one extreme, the allocation of seats in each tier can be independent (or parallel) of seat allocation in the other tier, as occurs in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea IV, Taiwan and Thailand (see Table 6).26 Alternatively, the tiers can be linked, as is the case for South Korea I, II and III, where a party’s seat total in the nominal tier in part determines its seat allocation in the list tier. South Korea’s (often complicated) form of seat linkage has varied over time. From 1962 to 1972 (South Korea I in Table 6) the party that received 50% or more of the votes automatically received 2/3rds of the list tier seats. If no party won 50% of the seats, the party with the largest number of votes automatically received 1/2 of the list tier seats. The second-place party received 1/3 of the list tier seats as long as its vote share was more than double that of the third place party. Failing this, the second place party received 2/3rds of the remaining seats. Finally, any left-over seats were distributed to the other parties on a PR basis. From 1980 to 1987 (South Korea II) the party that won the largest number of nominal tier seats automatically received 2/3rds of the list tier seat. The remaining 1/3rd of the seats were divided among the other parties on a proportional basis. In effect, the systems used for allocating list tier seats in Korea I and II made it very likely that the largest party would control a majority of the seats. However, the 1987–1996 system (South Korea III) formally

24 Sri Lanka’s two-tiered system will be discussed later. See Shugart and Wattenberg (2000) for more information about mixed-member systems. Much of this section draws on their work. 25 The Japanese upper house information is listed in the table on the election of a second chamber (Table 7). Taiwan’s presidential electoral body information is listed in Table 8. 26 Sri Lanka’s two-tiered system will be discussed later. 146 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 assured a majoritarian outcome. The party that won the most seats in the nominal tier received enough seats from the list tier to ensure that it had a majority in the assembly. The remaining seats in the list tier were then divided proportionally among the other parties. In 1996 (South Korea IV) a new system was adopted under which the two tiers are not linked. Parties receive seats from the national tier in proportion to their vote total, with no majority-assuring provisions (Morriss, 1996). The Sri Lankan electoral system is not a mixed-member system but does have two tiers. Candidates in the first tier are not elected solely based on candidate vote totals, as required to be a mixed-member system. Rather, party vote totals help determine which candidates are awarded seats. Nonetheless, it is a two-tiered system and thus shares many of the same features of mixed-member systems. For this reason it is included in Table 6. Sri Lanka uses a modified form of PR with preferential voting in its first tier. Each voter chooses a specific party list (or independent group list) and up to three of that list’s candidates. The party or independent group that received the highest number of votes in the district receives one ‘bonus’ seat—awarded to its candidate with the highest vote total. The remaining seats in the district are then awarded to parties/groups (including the largest party) in proportion to the votes received. Parties distribute the seats to the candidates from the party’s list with the highest vote totals. Seats in the second tier are allocated in a proportional manner based on national party vote shares. Table 6 below contains data for all lower/single chambers in the region that elect members via mixed-member or two-tiered systems. The cells in the table are divided into two sections. The top half of each cell contains information about the list tier while the bottom half gives information on the nominal tier. Columns 3–6 display data on the method for electing each tier. Information on district magnitude, the number of districts and the number of seats in each tier is found in columns 7–9. Countries vary widely in terms of the list tier’s percentage of total assembly seats (column 9). In Japan, 40% of the assembly seats are reserved for the list tier compared to a low of 15% in Korea (II, III). Electoral thresholds (column 10) are common in many Asian mixed-member/two-tiered systems. Several require that parties get at least 2–5% of total votes in order to receive any seats in the list tier. South Korea I and II required that parties win 3–5 nominal seats in order to receive any seats in the list tier. In Sri Lanka, parties must receive at least 1/8th of the votes in a given first tier district in order to be eligible for seats in that district. Term lengths (column 11) range from 3 to 6 years and only the Philippines imposes a term limit (column 12). Finally, Taiwan allows for some reserved seats (final column).

5.3. Elected second/upper chambers

Table 7 contains data on elected upper/second chambers in the region. It provides information for many of the same electoral dimensions found in Tables 4–6 on the lower/single chambers. Note than Japan I and II both used a two-tiered system with no seat or vote linkage between tiers. Originally the second tier was elected using SNTV but this was changed to List PR in 1982. The ﬁgures in the Assembly Size A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 147 column for Japan represent the size of each tier. The table also lists information on four important aspects of upper chamber makeup. First, column 4 gives the make- up of the electorate. In Burma, India, Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan, states, state assemblies or local government units elect the upper chamber. In Sri Lanka, the lower chamber elected the upper chamber from 1948 to 1971. In all other cases members of the upper chamber are directly elected. Second, the renewal rate is listed. In most cases, half or one-third of members are elected every two or three years. Third, the table presents data on whether there are appointed seats. Finally, the table also contains data on the legislative powers of these upper chambers. All have delay- ing power and a few can veto non-money bills by refusing their consent.27 However, only the Philippines Senate has the power to veto all bills.

6. Presidential electoral bodies in the region

Table 8 contains data on presidential electoral bodies used by three countries to elect the president—South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia. The primary purpose of these bodies is to elect a president, but unlike an electoral college, they sit for a fixed term and may have additional duties apart from electing the president. In South Korea, after martial law was declared in 1972, the direct election of the president was replaced with a 5000-member electoral body known as the National Conference for Unification (NCU). The NCU was elected on a plurality basis from multi-seat districts to a six-year term. In addition to selecting the President the NCU also selected 1/3 of the National Assembly. A 1980 constitutional amendment disbanded the NCU but replaced it with a nearly identical electoral college. This new presidential election body had a term of seven rather than six years and no longer had the power to select the members of the National Assembly. In Taiwan the presidential electoral body is called the National Assembly and serves a six-year term. Prior to a 1991 constitutional amendment the National Assembly was primarily an unelected body. Beginning in 1991 the National Assembly was elected using a mixed-member system similar to that used to elect the Legislative Yuan. The nominal tier (bottom of cell) is elected using SNTV from multi-seat districts. The list tier (top of cell) consists of two districts. The first district contains 80 seats representing a nationwide constituency and the second contains 20 seats representing overseas Chinese communities. Some seats in both tiers were set aside for female candidates. Elections for the National Assembly were held in 1991, 1992 and 1996. In 1996 the constitution was amended to allow for the direct election of the President. This change occurred before the fully elected National Assembly had a chance to select a new president. Since 1996 the National Assembly’s powers have been restricted

27 By veto power we mean that the consent of the upper chamber is required before a bill becomes a law. In other words, an upper chamber with veto power can unilaterally block legislation by withholding its consent. 148 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 to voting on constitutional amendments and the power of presidential impeachment. Although the National Assembly never actually selected a president during the period in which it was fully elected, it is included in Table 8 for informational purposes. In 2000 the National Assembly was changed to a non-standing body elected entirely using list PR. Since 1971 Indonesia’s President has been selected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Like the National Assembly in Taiwan, the MPR can amend the constitution. It may also, under exceptional circumstances, remove the president. The MPR also has the power to pass special legislation that trumps all but the constitution and to adopt guidelines setting the broad outlines of government policy.28 However, since the MPR lies outside the normal legislative process, and thus is not typical second chamber, it is included here. From 1971 to 1999 the MPR consisted of 1000 members which sat for a five- year term.29 Half of the total consisted of the 500 members from the parliament (DPR). Of the 500 DPR members 75–100 were appointed and the rest were elected from multi-seat districts using List PR. Of the other 500 members, 100 were appointed by the President to represent social and functional groups. The remaining 400 seats were divided among political parties and the armed forces (based on their share of DPR seats) and provincial representatives. Although technically the president appointed only the 100 delegates from the social and functional groups, in practice he also controlled the remaining 400 seats by virtue of the formal and infor- mal authority the executive branch had over the political parties and provincial governments (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 282).30 The rules governing the composition of the MPR were amended in 1999. The MPR now has 700 members. 500 of these once again come from the DPR, but only 38 of the DPR’s members are now appointed. The other 462 DPR members are elected from multi-seat districts using the modified form of List PR described earlier.31 Of the remaining 200 members in the MPR, 65 are chosen from representatives of functional groups. The final 135 members are elected by Provincial Assemblies. Each assembly elects five representatives but the method of electing those representatives remains unresolved. Before the last election the Election Commission issued non-binding guidelines stating that Provincial Assembly members should be allowed to vote for up to five candidates with the top five vote-getters then elected to the MPR. This is the information contained in Table 8. However, some of the provinces did not follow those procedures. Binding legislation on the matter is expected before the next election.

28 Under Indonesia’s new system it appears that the MPR may take a more active legislative role. 29 The MPR formally came into being in 1971 under President Soeharto. Since 1959 an ‘interim’ MPR had been in place which was entirely appointed by the president. As part of the 1971 formation of the MPR Soeharto set forth the rules regarding the make-up of the MPR. 30 Provincial governments were formally under the executive branch. 31 List PR with nominating districts. A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121Ð151 149

7. Conclusion

As is clear from the preceding discussion, Asia is home to a wide variety of constitutional structures and methods of election. There are both presidential and parliamentary regimes, as well as a handful of hybrid regimes in the region. In terms of electoral systems the region contains single-seat plurality districts, 82 seat PR districts, and a number of mixed-member electoral systems. In our descriptions of these institutional arrangements we have not included discussions about the quality of particular democratic institutions or of democracy more generally. Nor have we discussed the origins or consequences of different institutional conﬁgurations. We hope that the information provided in this paper will help facilitate such discussion and research in the future.

Acknowledgements

We thank the Global Foundation for Research and Scholarship for ﬁnancial support during the initial phase of this study. We also thank Nathan Batto, Gary Cox, Stephan Haggard, Eric Kuhonta, Arend Lijphart, Andrew MacIntyre, Sylvia Max- ﬁeld, Kimberly Niles, Matthew Shugart and members of the UCSD Graduate Stu- dents Discussion Group for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. The standard caveat applies.

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