LOCAL RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS

Rishi Thakurdin 6 November 2014 RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS WHY HAVE THEM AT ALL?

BECAUSE RUNWAY INCURSION AND EXCURSION INCIDENTS ARE THE ONE AVIATION SAFETY STATISTIC THAT HAS NOT REDUCED IN OVER 20 YEARS. RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS HISTORY – BEFORE RST ESTABLISHMENT

• TENERIFE 27TH March 1977 – KLM Boeing 747-200 initiates an unapproved take-off run, during Low Visibility conditions, on the runway at Tenerife North Airport and collides with a taxiing Pan American Boeing 747-100, resulting in 583 deaths.

• TAIPEI 31st October 2000 – Singapore Airlines Boeing 747-400 turns onto the wrong runway, at night in reduced visibility, at Taipei Airport and during its take-off run the aircraft collides with construction vehicles on the runway, resulting in the death of 83 people.

• MILAN 8th October 2001 – SAS MD-87 on its take-off run collides with a Citation 2 Jet which was attempting to taxi across the runway without ATC clearance, during Low Visibility conditions, at Milan Linate Airport, resulting in 118 deaths.

• LEXINGTON 27th August 2006 – Delta Connection CRJ100 turns onto the wrong runway, at night, at Lexington Airport and during take-off overruns the short, unlit, runway, resulting in the death of 49 people.

THAT IS A TOTAL OF 833 DEATHS IN 4 AVOIDABLE INCIDENTS AND ALL DUE TO A RUNWAY INCURSION OR A RUNWAY EXCURSION RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS TENERIFE, TAIPEI, MILAN AND LEXINGTON RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS BACKGROUND – DEVELOPING RST

• ICAO released Document 9870 Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions in 2007 as a direct result of the runway incidents mentioned.

• ICAO Document 9870, Chapter 3, states that individual aerodromes should establish Runway Safety Teams as part of a Runway Incursion Prevention Programme.

• ICAO Document 9870, Chapter 3, goes on to list the minimum representative list of those who should have a direct involvement in the Runway Safety Team as well as giving guidance on objectives, terms of reference, responsibilities and effectiveness of the Runway Safety Team.

• ICAO Document 9870, Chapter 6, describes the different types of Runway Incursion and gives them a Severity Classification from Severe to Low (A to E)

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS

ACCIDENT REFER TO ICAO ANNEX 13 DEFINITIONS OF AN ACCIDENT

A A serious incident in which a collision was narrowly avoided

An incident in which separation decreases and there is a significant B potential for collision, which may result in t a time-critical corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision

C An incident characterised by ample time and/or distance to avoid a collision Incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected D area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but with no immediate safety consequences Insufficient information inconclusive or conflicting evidence precludes E severity assessment ICAO Guidelines ICAO Doc 9870 MANUAL ON THE PREVENTION OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS

RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS CURRENT – ESTABLISHING RST at ACSA

CAPE TOWN / JUL 11 / JAN 12 DURBAN / OCT 12

PORT ELIZABETH / MAR 13 GEORGE / APR 13 BLOEMFONTEIN / JUL 13 RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN ICAO

ICAO DOC 9870 CHAPTER 3.1

Establishing a Runway Incursion Prevention Programme

3.1 RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS

3.1.1 A runway incursion prevention programme should start with the establishment of runway safety teams at individual aerodromes.

3.1.2 The team should comprise representatives from aerodrome operations, air traffic service providers, airlines or aircraft operators, pilot associations and any other groups with a direct involvement in runway operations.

Local Runway Safety Teams.

• The terms of reference template is given in Doc 9870.The task is protection of aircraft

• from incursion as a result of

 Entering wrong Runway and Taxiway  People  Vehicles  Bird and Wildlife  FOD

RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION Hot Spots

ICAO DOC 9870

CHAPTER 3.4

HOTSPOTS

Many aerodromes have hazardous locations on runways and/or taxiways where incursion incidents have occurred, sometimes frequently. Any such position is commonly referred to as a "hotspot".

Definition

ICAO Doc 9870, Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions defines a “hotspot” as “A location on an aerodrome movement area with a history or potential risk of collision or runway incursion, and where heightened attention by pilots/drivers is necessary.”

RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY SIGNAGE

MANDATORY RUNWAY DESIGNATOR FOR PATTERN B HOLD WITH LOCATION CONT ….

1. Enhanced Runway Ahead, 2. Enhanced Centreline, 3. Stop Bar, 4. Enhanced Runway Designator, 5. Runway Hold Marking, 6. Guard Lights, 7. Illuminated Signage PEOPLE PROTECTION PEOPLE PROTECTION - SIGNAGE

A STERN WARNING WITH LEGAL THREAT USED TO DETER PEOPLE FROM TRESPASSING AT ANY AIRFIELD AND PREVENT RUNWAY INCURSION VEHICLE PROTECTION RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION Road Signage ANNEX 14 STANDARD

STOP SIGNAGE WITH INSTRUCTION NOTICE AT ROADWAY JUNCTION WITH TAXIWAYS AND/OR RUNWAYS RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN ICAO

SQUID TRANSPONDERS ALSO FITTED TO THOSE SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE VEHICLES WHO OPERATE CLOSE TO OR ON TAXIWAYS AND RUNWAYS RUNWAY SAFETY – INCURSION PREVENTION VEHICLE PROTECTION

INSTRUCTION SIGN BUT USE OF NO RIGHT TURN USED ON ROADWAY AT CPT FOD CONT … ANIMALS

Kimberley Airport (KIM) is located in an arid semi-desert region of . KIM had had issues with a local mammal species of nocturnal Anteater, known as an Aardvark (Earth Pig), burrowing under the airport perimeter fence

Perimeter Fence showing clear signs of Aardvark burrowing under fence to access aerodrome The risks presented by the presence of such animals, forcibly entering the airport, in search of food had never been discussed with Pilots or Airlines. CONT ….

On 16th July 2010, at 1915z, a South African Express Airways De Havilland Canada DH8- 300 operating a scheduled flight with 44 Passengers and Crew on board, from Johannesburg O.R. Tambo International Airport (JNB) to KIM, made a night landing at KIM. One second after touchdown the aircraft struck an Aardvark on the runway.

Mitigation --re installing a 14km long perimeter fence to a depth of half a meter and sideways 1 meter resulted in no further perimeter fence breaches reported. ACSA – AIRPORT

Upington Airport (UTN) is located in the Northern Cape Province of South Africa. It is situated close to both the Namibia and the Botswana borders and, subsequently, the airport is utilised by the GA industry as an international gateway airport to clear both customs and immigration enroute to, or from, Namibia or Botswana. Uniquely, UTN is the only international airport used by transiting Microlight and Light Sports aircraft.

Microlight sharing the airport with normal IFR traffic Jabiru Light Sports aircraft using UTN Between 22nd April and 28th June 2013, i.e. a two month period, UTN experienced 12 Runway Excursions, all of ICAO Severity Classification C or D. Of these 12 excursions, 10 of them were committed by Microlight and Light Sport aircraft. Example – UPINGTON AIRPORT

By not having a LRST operational, there had been no previous meetings with the Pilot Associations of these specialised aircraft to discuss problems they might encounter by operating at a licensed international airport. As a result of the excursions a LRST meeting was called where all issues were identified and solutions agreed that would ensure that runway safety was improved for microlight and light sports aircraft Pilots.

HOTSPOT Unmarked Stopway used as taxiway HOTSPOT Holding Points not enhanced A complicated 3 Runway layout and Microlight Pilots who are unfamiliar with operating within an ATC controlled airport and controlled airspace were the main transgressors. Improved Markings and Signage resulted in no further incursions. RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS Airport Experiences CONCLUSION

The need for a Runway Safety Team at every airport in Africa is a REAL one .It works and can go a long way in enhancing safety and saving lives, • The LRST meetings do not have to be separate meetings on their own. If it helps you, simply add them to your existing Airside Safety Committee meetings.

• BUT REMEMBER…… FOR THE LRST TO SUCCEED… YOU MUST…….

• Invite Pilots from ALL levels who use your airport and runways (Military, GA, Corporate, Airlines etc.). Without crucial input from Pilots your LRST will not work or perform as it should

• BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY..... FOR THE LRST TO SUCCEED… YOU MUST…..

SHOW CONTINUOUS PASSION, DESIRE, FOCUS AND SUPPORT FOR THE LRST. If all else fails ….…….

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