WINTER 2004

IN THIS ISSUE: Labrador History II LearnedLearned AboutAbout Flying From That! How To Increase Your Paperwork!Paperwork! TABLE OF CONTENTS

1...... How Long Should It Take? 2...... How Close Is Too Close?

4...... You’re On Vancouver Island, Dude! Directorate of Flight Safety 5...... Labrador History Director of Flight Safety Col A.D. Hunter 6...... Keep The Air Picture Editor Capt T.C. Newman 8 ...... I Learned About Flying From That! Art Direction DGPA–Creative Services 9 ...... Engine Fire? Translation 10 ...... Home Safely! Coordinator Official Languages 11...... Finger Problems? Printer Tri-Co 12 ...... How To Increase Your Paperwork! Ottawa, Ontario 13 ...... Weather Signs The Canadian Forces Flight Safety Magazine 14 ...... Maintainer’s Corner Flight Comment is produced 4 times a Qualified/Authorized — What’s the Difference? year by the Directorate of Flight Safety. The contents do not necessarily reflect 16 ...... “How’s The Ride?” official policy and unless otherwise stated should not be construed as 17...... HEY…They Modified the Airplane!! regulations, orders or directives. Contributions, comments and criticism 18 ...... Untouchable! are welcome; the promotion of flight safety is best served by disseminating 20...... “Just A Quick Trip Around The Block!” ideas and on–the–job experience. Send submissions to: 21...... Assumptions ATT: Editor, Flight Comment 22...... Flying Doesn’t Start In The Cockpit Directorate of Flight Safety NDHQ/Chief of the Air Staff 23...... In A Hurry? 4210 Labelle Street Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0K2 24 ...... Approved Over-The Counter (OTC) Medications Telephone: (613) 995–7495 FAX: (613) 992–5187 25 ...... 178 Seconds E–mail: [email protected] 26...... From the Investigator Subscription orders should be directed to: 30 ...... Good Show Publishing Centre, CCG, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0S9 31...... For Professionalism Telephone: (613) 956–4800 Annual subscription rate: 36...... Letter from the Editor for Canada, $19.95, single issue $5.50; for other countries, $19.95 US., 36...... From the Flight Surgeon single issue $5.50 US. Prices do not include GST. Payment should be made to Receiver General for Canada. This Publication or its contents may not be reproduced without the editor’s approval. “To contact DFS personnel on an URGENT Flight Safety issue, an investigator is available 24 hours a day by dialing 1-888 WARN DFS (927-6337). The DFS web page at www.airforce.dnd.ca/dfs offers other points of contact in the DFS organization or write to [email protected].” ISSN 0015–3702 A–JS–000–006/JP–000 HowHow LongLong Should It Take?

n March, we were planning vision goggles and it was ten minutes worse. The FE proceeded to turn Ia Transport and Rescue into the flight when the AC realized the heat up, and then reached for a Standardization and Evaluation that the left wiper was not function- flashlight, pulled his NVG’s up, Team (TRSET) check-ride for one ing. We decided to continue and and had a look at the rear right of our CH-146 Griffon pilots. Our shortly after, we encountered some window. crew of four met in the squadron snow showers. The temperature It hit us all at the same time — the briefing room for our aircraft com- gauge on the aircraft indicated fogging was actually icing! When I mander’s (AC’s) briefing. The plan -1 degrees. The flying pilot, who looked at my window, I saw that one was to conduct a navigation flight was doing the TRSET check-ride, third of the surface was covered with along the Saguenay River and then was getting fog in the windshield ice. An immediate right turn was ini- to make our way back. On our and requested the heat to be turned tiated and we returned to the base. return leg, we intended to conduct on. The flight engineer (FE) and the As we were getting back to the base, a search and rescue (SAR) sequence SAR technician also noticed that the we discussed the events that led to consisting of two hoists and a rear windows were fogging as well. our inability to identify the problem stokes-litter hoist, followed by two At this point, we started to encounter right away. It was obvious that being confined-area hoists. The tempera- marginal weather conditions. The on NVG’s was the main factor. Other ture was three degrees on the ground, ceiling was lowering as well, but we causes were that the FE and the AC and the meteorology report was were still able to see the ground were too busy trouble-shooting the calling for rain throughout the and the mountain features, so we wiper and the weather. Despite the evening with strong (20-30 knot) decided to continue with the mis- reasons, my thoughts are that I can- winds. sion. Attempts were made to rectify not believe that it took us fifteen the wiper problem but to no avail. We departed from Bagotville airport minutes to identify the problem. Again the pilot asked for more heat, without incident and started our as the windshield fogging was getting Master Corporal Michaud training. The crew was on night

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 1 fter being an instructor and a Late one afternoon, just prior to the the aim was to start a gentle, high Asolo display pilot in the Alfa jet official presentation of our perfor- turn to the right in order to realign, for five years, I decided I wanted to mance, the unexpected occurred. but it never came that far. After do something different. I thought coming out of the barrel roll, I tried We departed in close formation and that the idea of creating a duo team to start my next figure but my followed this by a 270° turn with #2 to perform aerobatics would be new control inputs had no effect. abreast me; I was the lead aircraft. and challenging for our Belgian Air Our intent was to roll out heading The next thing I saw was something Force and I knew that thousands of towards the crowd and start a loop. I will never forget — the other spectators would enjoy the acts. After coming out of the loop, we did aircraft was literally glued to mine. Finding another pilot to help develop a cloverleaf move to the right and I could see my teammate sitting in this idea and to fly with me was not #2 went into close formation astern. his cockpit, only five feet away and a big problem, and soon we started We were once again lined up with 45° to my right. The canopy was still to develop a display program. The the runway centreline and we did a nicely closed. My first thought was main idea was to fly as much as pos- barrel roll to the right. After this, “what the heck is he doing here?” sible in close formation. We decided that splitting up would be limited because it was both difficult and time-consuming. Finally, after being approved by many people in the chain of com- mand, we could start our airborne training. Initially, we did this by fly- ing the whole sequence together in one aircraft. Next, we followed each other and finally, we progressed to close formation. As we practiced, we would slowly descend in altitude.

TOOTOO

2 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 This was directly replaced by the Now…what happened? While com- caused the pressure to drop and thought that this was a very unusual ing out of the cloverleaf, my wing- then suction occurred. The closer and hopeless situation. I tried to get man got out of position backwards. the wings get to each other, the rid of the other aircraft by shaking He tried to reassume his position stronger the phenomena will be. all the controls, reducing the power, by increasing the power in order to No warning is given and the effect and selecting the air brakes but it catch up. At that moment, I had increases. didn’t change a thing. Very quickly, already started my gentle, high I am happy that we tried close for- I decided to bail out and, after a turn, which decreased my speed. mation flying and I am happier that glance around to see where we were Unfortunately, #2 came into a posi- we can still talk about it. Close for- and a radio call, I pulled the handle tion where there was a “mutual mation flying is great and a lot of of my Martin-Baker Mk-10. The aerodynamic interference.” This fun, but there is only one close. ejection was uneventful and later, happens when two wing profiles are Closer than that, you cannot go! much later, I saw a second chute situated above each other and the deploying which meant that my speed of the air stream in between Captain Deschrijver teammate made it also. the wings increases. This increase

HowHow CloseClose isis CLOSECLOSE?? Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 3 You’re On Vancouver Island, Dude!Dude! engines, we received a tasking from the Rescue Center to instead proceed south, towards a heli-logging S-61 Sikorsky helicopter that had just crashed in Howe Sound. We arrived on scene in just under an hour and proceeded to survey the site. There was no communication with any- body on the ground, so we lowered two SAR Technicians to the site to investigate while we flew circles nearby. The SAR-techs quickly radioed back that the pilots had already been evacuated to a parking lot at the bottom of the mountain. Once again, we positioned the heli- copter over the crash site to hoist up the SAR-techs. Rescue Center called again and asked us to medevac the pilots from the parking lot to a helipad in Vancouver that was near the hospital. Shortly after picking up the patients, en route to Vancouver, the Aircraft Commander (AC) very calmly stated “I think we have a problem here…” The number one engine was slowly rolling back to idle and was unre- sponsive to any control inputs. We s I stood in the parking lot, star- The day had begun as normal as quickly decided to head straight for Aing at the night sky and waiting any other day with the crew of the Vancouver International Airport for some form of transportation, Rescue Labrador planning to fly where emergency services and I couldn’t help but laugh to myself. around the northern part of the several runways were available. “You’re on Vancouver Island, dude!” island for an area familiarization Everything seemed to work like was the response that brought me flight and some Search and Rescue clockwork. The SAR-techs were back to reality this night. (SAR) training. Shortly after starting informed of the situation and

4 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 prepared the patients in the back. After the immediate responses, LABRADOR HISTORY the AC flew the airplane while the engineer troubleshot the engine n Tuesday, 21st October The magazine cover photo problem. I was informing the Rescue O2003, all the helicopter and this one both show how Center of the problem, declaring crews of 424 Squadron, ground they all took off to the hover an emergency with Vancouver Air and aircrew, assembled to fly and, one by one, departed to Traffic Control and helping navigate all of their Labradors (six) at join into one common circuit through the congested airspace. the same time. They couldn’t around the airfield. Upon Upon landing, the patients were have done that without instru- completion of the mission, transferred to ambulance and taken mental support from Transport all aircraft were serviceable.” and Rescue Standardization to hospital without further incident. “It was a perfect opportunity and Evaluation Team (TRSET.) However, that was not to be the end to acknowledge to ourselves As Lieutenant Colonel of our day. that, although we are continu- Lalumiere, Commanding ing to operate the Labrador After an entire day of repair, we Officer of 424 Transport fleet under all the constraint and Rescue Squadron, said, donned our Night Vision Goggles and pressures of its upcoming “After having “probed” all the (NVG’s) and started for home. retirement, the common available historical corporate It was a quiet and pleasant flight Squadron focus on the job to knowledge at large, we are back across the strait towards Comox be performed is not decreas- quite confident in stating that until, once again, the AC said ing. Quite the opposite, it is this has been the first opportu- “I think we have a problem here…” being maintained at its high- nity ever where six Labrador This time, the rear transmission est level, with exceptional helicopters found themselves pride. All the resources of the pressure gauge was indicating zero! in one location, in flyable Squadron and the 8 Wing We very quickly pointed ourselves status. It has, as you also know, units pulled together to exe- towards shore and started down. been the last opportunity this cute the task, and all should Once again, each crewmember could ever be accomplished, now be commended for its did their specific job while scanning as three of these helicopters great success. These pictures will now be put in permanent the shoreline for any place to land. are in recognition of all the storage. All six Labradors We managed to find a small parking members that have ever started together and taxied to lot near the shore, landed and shut- worked on the CH113 and the runway, accompanied by down without any incident. I got 113/A Labrador helicopter one Cormorant who supported out of the helicopter to ask the or flown it over the years.” the Wing photographers. occupants of a parked car exactly where we were. The driver very enthusiastically replied “Vancouver Island, dude!” The emergency drills and crew co- ordination that we practice time and again really do work. Both emergen- cies could have ended up very differ- ently had someone paused, hesitated, or been unsure of what their role in the situation was. By knowing the basic drill by heart, it leaves your brain time to figure out anything in the situation that isn’t standard. Two critical emergencies in the same day: unusual. Being alive to learn that you’re on Vancouver Island: priceless! Captain Irvine

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 5 Keep The AIR PICTURE hile on my Basic Flying fly-through from initial because of my aircraft as I was almost directly WTraining Course in Moose the congestion below. I had the two below, and slightly ahead of him. Jaw, I was involved in an incident Snowbird Tutors on low approach in The premise of VFR flying is “see and which opened my eyes to what can sight, and knew from experience be seen.” This is hard to do when you happen if you don’t maintain a good that they would be well ahead of me can’t see the conflicting traffic in the air picture while flying. I was on a as I accelerated after my touch-and- first place. The tower could see us daytime solo trip in the Tutor, prac- go and climbed up to circuit alti- both and judged that we would be ticing circuits on the outer pattern, tude. I could not see the third Tutor, able to see each other, and avoid each using runway 28L. As usual on a though, and the tower informed me other. I was expecting to see the fly- good weather day, traffic was busy that it was at my six-o’clock high. through traffic pass above and ahead and both patterns were congested. As I accelerated and climbed after of me, as he was already at circuit Coming in on a straight-in approach, my touch and go, I checked visually speed. My course mate, in the fly- I requested and was cleared for a for the aircraft several times, but through Tutor, was expecting me to touch-and-go. Pertinent traffic for could not see it due to the bulkhead be behind him as I reached circuit me to keep an eye out for was a pair blocking my vision behind my seat. altitude, because of the time required of Snowbirds doing a low approach The aircraft on fly through at circuit for me to accelerate and climb. between the runways, and a third altitude was informed of my position, Tutor above and behind me doing a but the pilot within could not see

6 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 I approached circuit altitude and regain some separation and fly out climbed 200 feet higher than the levelled off, curiously surprised that of my jet-wash. He was somewhat standard circuit altitude, the occur- I hadn’t seen the fly through traffic shaken up, but managed to finish rence would never have happened through any portion of my climb his circuit and land without further with the close-quarter results that out. At the required distance upwind, incident. we experienced. The thought never I turned left crosswind, and contin- even crossed my mind while the I never realized how close we had ued my circuit. As far as I was con- situation was unfolding. been to colliding until we debriefed cerned, there had been no conflict, after our flights! This one really In my operational flying these days, and I continued my circuit-training made me stop and think. Avoidance I keep this incident in the back of trip without further incident. of this situation would have been my mind, and try to maintain a All had not been so calm for my simple for someone with a better air good air picture of the surrounding course mate, though. He finally picture. The fact was that neither of traffic to avoid conflicts like this. picked me up visually as I levelled us could see each other until it was It is an important lesson for me to off at circuit altitude, his altitude, too late for avoidance. In light of the remember, even in the relatively slow less than 100 feet directly in front of situation we were faced with, a cou- moving Labrador helicopter world him. At the same moment he say ple of things could have been done. that I am in today. me, he flew into my jet-wash, and If I had levelled off 200 feet low Capt. Stelfox instinctively went IDLE-BOARDS to and/or if my course-mate had

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 7 II LearnedLearned AboutAbout FlyingFlying FROMFROM THAT!THAT! he briefed mission was a student that if the weather hadn’t improved, weather was in fact down to mini- Ttwo-plane formation-training we could knock off the trip and RTB mums. Fortunately, we were able to mission. Due to the typical bad win- with more than sufficient alternate land off the approach albeit with a ter flying weather we’d been experi- fuel. I didn’t realize that my wing- fuel level below that required to get encing at “the Jaw,” we had decided man held a restricted ticket. to a suitable alternate. to try and get the trip done on a We departed on the SID uneventfully So…what did I learn? Firstly, some- Sunday afternoon. Arriving at the and broke out of cloud at approxi- times the decision to get in the trip base, the weather didn’t look so mately 1000’ AGL. The local flying clouds over our common sense. great but according to the met area was wide open. After complet- Secondly, it is the responsibility of observer we were dealing with a ing the first half of the briefed sortie every formation lead to realize the scattered layer at 400 feet and we had reached our JOKER fuel. Just qualifications of his wingman (i.e. a another at 10,000 feet. The forecast, prior to passing the lead over to my restricted ticket) and it is the wing- which came all the way from wingman, I contacted tower for an man’s responsibility to ensure that Trenton on the weekends, was update of the weather. They told me his lead receives this information. In calling for the same conditions. that it was “scattering out” over the this case, we never should have taken Looking out the window it seeded base and appeared to be “clearing up.” off with the 300’ ceiling. Remember, worse, but if the met office says… Satisfied that the weather was not the formation is only as qualified as My gut instinct said, “Why bother going to be a problem anymore, it’s lowest common denominator. going?” but with the perceived pres- we continued. Thirdly, if the weather does look sure to get the “X” we decided to questionable, especially in those low, Just prior to BINGO fuel we started press. After starting up and calling scattered conditions, even if you heading for home. The planned for taxi, tower told us that the ceiling think that an alternate is not required, recovery was via the PAR approach was now 300 feet broken. I called my hold one anyway. Finally, for those to runway 11. Upon initial contact wingman and re-formulated the people on the ground, passing old with the terminal controller, the plan. Since the only valid alternate weather information in rapidly dete- weather, based on information that was Saskatoon, which required that riorating weather conditions is a was 23 minutes old, was passed as we hold about 1000 lbs of gas on the risky practice and could make the 300’ broken with 10 miles visibility. overshoot, I decided that we could difference between the aircrews Imagine our surprise when we continue with the trip as briefed successful diversion to a suitable thought that all we would encounter until our scheduled “JOKER” fuel of alternate or getting caught out of on the way home was a low scattered 1400 lbs where there was a planned gas and ideas. layer. It got worse from there; the lead change. At this point, I figured

8 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 Engine FIREFIRE? on. Why? For starters, our maintain- Secondly, while operating? ashore, ers searched regularly for the cause our crew is constantly changing with of the problem and always indicated every mission we fly; therefore I he sudden glare of an “engine that the engine was operating fine. didn’t know the rest of the crew’s Tfire” warning light in your face Secondly, the first fire warning light comfort level with situations like will send a chill up your spine, espe- that we experienced had come on this. My first reaction was to check cially if you have never seen one when the outside air temperature for secondary indications, of which before. This is what happened to our increased significantly, as we sailed there were none. Next, I called for Sea King crew as we were conduct- into warmer temperatures. Finally, the hoist operator to continue rais- ing a hoisting evolution over our the fire warning light only came ing the hoistee and then cease the Canadian Warship during a NATO on while we were in the hover and evolution once the hoistee was up. deployment. Our immediate actions would extinguish as soon as we got The next sequence would be to land were to cease the hoist evolution as airflow through the engine compart- at the airport, which is thirty sec- soon as possible, clear the flight deck ment. As a crew, we agreed that we onds away and figure out the prob- of all personnel, and land the air- would be comfortable continuing lem on the ground, which is what craft. That all seemed like a pretty on with the mission so long as there eventually happened. were no secondary indications of easy decision to make at the time After the flight, looking back at what fire. As well, we were still confident and was handled well by everyone had just happened as well as over that there was nothing wrong with involved. When we landed however, the past six months, I realized that the aircraft itself but merely the sens- that same fire warning light extin- I had become too comfortable with ing system, and we would have it guished, leaving us somewhat con- this particular incident. While the fixed as soon as parts were available. fused as to whether or not we had actions were correct, the speed at a real problem, so the aircraft was Several months after this deployment, which I had made the decision to shut down. Our technicians con- I was conducting another wet hoist- land was a lot slower than what I ducted a check of the engine and ing evolution less than half a mile was used to. My first thought was engine compartment but found from our home airfield when that to fly out of it and see if the light nothing to indicate a problem. same engine fire warning light came stayed on. From this incident, I had Over the next several weeks, this on. No problem, I had seen it before, to remind myself that every emer- same fire warning light came on right? Wrong! This time, while it was gency is different, even if I had seen a number of times for each crew. the same light, it was a different air- it before many times. The difference now was that we had craft. I did not know this aircraft become comfortable seeing it come as well as I had the previous one.

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 9 Home SSAFELYAFELY!! he mission was super simple — mid-afternoon by now, with a solid night ops, and with considerable night Tall we had to do was to get home three or four hours of flight until we hours between us. Night flying? No from the squadron reunion. We were got home. problem! Except… we didn’t bring any part of a multi-ship, same day, same night vision goggles (NVGs) with us for We found the sick Griffon with only way gaggle of Griffon helicopters, the trip. Wasn’t it supposed to be a day, a little searching around, rearranging working our way across eastern VFR transit? There is only one word to the supplied grid reference to one Ontario, Quebec, and northern describe northern Maine after sundown that worked for their actual location. Maine. Our crew was the last to — BLACK! We wouldn’t be seeing a However, our extra tour of the coun- depart, roughly an hour behind the whole lot of the countryside enroute, tryside cost us enough gas that we pack. It was going to be a cinch; we particularly the 2000-4000’ hills scat- could only make enough passes to were expecting good visual flight tered along our intended route. As long determine that the crew had already rules (VFR) weather and light winds as we stuck to our well-planned and vacated the plane for better populated all the way. programmed track, they shouldn’t be surroundings. We had to depart quickly a problem. A couple of instructors Perhaps it was foreboding that we in order to reach Sherbrooke with our should never stray from track, right?? had to return to our start point with VFR reserves. The clock was steadily Well, it’s a sound theory, anyway. a rotor brake caution light, because ticking away toward dinnertime by the pucks weren’t pressing the micro- this point. And so, off we went, into the wild, switches firmly enough to close the black, and subliminally rocky yonder. While the flight engineer (FE) gassed circuit. With a few well-placed curses Pretty uneventful, save the odd com- up and turned the plane around, the of the same micro-switches and a ment on how bleeding dark it was. pilots conducted a quick phone search skillfully applied calibration, we were All we heard was a couple of pings of the more familiar accommodations soon on our way once more. on the radar altimeter (radalt) as we in Sherbrooke, finally locating the crew cleared the hills by 1000’ or so. We kept The going was easy through Ottawa and passing the info from Operations. a close eye on our radalt to make sure and we landed at St Hubert for gas. Feeling sufficiently satisfied with our- we actually gained height as the hill We made a quick weather check for selves, we then turned to getting our dropped away. No big deal, we should our northern route through Quebec own butts home for the night. This is be home within a couple hours of our City and Riviere du Loup, and we where it all started to break down original plan. were off again. We were not quite to for us… Quebec when we got a radio call ask- It was no big deal until we finally found Meteorologists were reporting a thin ing us to try and tee up with one of the hill that pinged our radalt and layer at 3000’,which was overhead us our scattered flock that had landed didn’t drop away again immediately like now, and ending along the Maine/New outside of Sherbrooke with a slightly the others. We both watched as this one Brunswick border. There was a lot of more serious, but still bothersome, came up to 800’,600’,500’(!). I don’t icing being reported, so it was pretty malfunction. Our home base opera- recall exactly what was said, but I am clear that instrument flight (IFR) was tions cell had some information they sure it was suitably expletive as I took out. That left VFR flight as our only wanted to pass to the crew of the sick control of the aircraft and started a option. Notice here that we didn’t even bird, but air traffic control (ATC) was- climbing turn to my side, using a very consider calling Operations ourselves n’t able to get hold of them. A quick small and dimly lit town-site as a target to say “see ya tomorrow.” Sick kids, check of the amount of gas we carried out my window. I told the crew that I anxious wives, and a full flying gave us an acceptable reserve to get had had enough, and that I was climb- schedule tomorrow were the items into Sherbrooke after our visit, so, as a ing to an IFR altitude to continue. As I that crossed our minds. crew, we agreed and headed off to find spit this out, disgusted with myself for our comrades. We were easing into The whole crew was comprised of letting us go on this long, I was chilled instructors, all intimately familiar with

10 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 to see the radalt wobble at 200’ before finally starting to increase again as I put our tail to the hill. FINGER PROBLEMS?

True to the meteorologist’s word, we he night was dark with no did indeed encounter that cloud layer Thorizon or lights visible at 3000’.As I was already hard on the from the mountains seven dials from our turn away from the thousand feet below. It was black hole, the transition was seamless. the late 1990s and I was a Much to everyone’s surprise, we broke Griffon instructor pilot at out into a bright, full moon lit starscape 403 Squadron. I was flying the last leg of an instrument a mere 500’ higher. On the horizon cross-country training trip that was our extremely well lit and easy was a scheduled instructional to see destination. trip for my previously experi- an engine chip light. They Needless to say, the rest of the trip was enced student. Suddenly, the handled the emergency pretty quiet. I have no doubt that every- number two engine chip light quickly and promptly flipped one was thinking along the same lines illuminated. Nuisance chip the fuel valve switch for the lights were common, but still — why did we even consider doing wrong engine, flaming it out needed to be treated as immediately. From fifteen what we just did? “Get-home-itis” though the component was feet, the pilot carried out a at its worst! Judgement, expectancy, about to fail. Since it was rou- low-level turning autorotation JUDGEMENT! We did indeed make it tine, I closed the throttle on and saved the aircraft. When I home from there without further heart engine two and instructed read the report, I realized that failure, and carried out an intensive my student to complete the maybe this could have been debrief amongst the crew. checklist procedure. I listened prevented if I had properly as he went through the steps reported my own incident. I took away innumerable lessons from and then froze as the flight Following the standards offi- our little adventure and it changed the engineer (FE) screamed cer’s incident, Griffon proce- way I do business in a few ways. Now, “WRONG SWITCH, WRONG dures were amended such I will not accept a surprise task until I SWITCH!” I glanced down to that one crewmember identi- completely understand the effect it will see the student’s fingers on fied critical switches but, have on my crew and our ability to the fuel valve switch for the before moving it, has it con- complete our current mission. Given wrong engine. Our FE had just firmed as the proper switch the same circumstances today, I would prevented us from doing an by another crewmember. unaided night autorotation have NO hesitation telling Operations This is not just another great that we would be staying in Sherbrooke into the mountains, likely saving our lives. “There I was…” story for the as well. They had added to our intended bar; it is also a chance to flight time, after all. I would much When I wrote up the initial reflect on the importance of rather explain a night’s hotel bill to report, I was tempted to good reporting. Maybe noth- the boss than a controlled flight into include some description of ing would have been done if terrain because we pressured ourselves the switch proximity hazard. I had reported my incident, into pressing on. I now carry NVGs as However, considering that as people likely would not part of my fly away kit, and insist that “nothing happened,” I was have grasped its seriousness. hesitant to write a report on the rest of the crew have them as well. Maybe, though, it would have a finger problem. I filed the provided a catalyst that could I think of how invaluable even a single standard report and returned have prevented the really close set would have been around those hills to my duties. call of the standards officer. in Maine. And I have forced myself to We will never know — regard non-critical arrival times as Approximately one week later, the 1 Wing standards officer because it was never entirely flexible. I won’t be caught was flying tactically with a properly submitted. again endangering the crew and the load of people when he had Major Eaton aircraft trying to make a timing that isn’t critical. My wife and kids under- stand completely. Even if it means Dad won’t be home for another day. At least he’ll be home safely. Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 11 How To Increase Your PAPERWORK!

everal years ago I was flying with of exercise, find someone that has The trip itself went off without a Sa crew on the HMCS Provider. and you will understand what it is hitch…at least until just after we We were a worked-up crew that had like simply by the expression on had put the fuel hose back down on flown together for the better part of their face.) the ship. At that point, all we heard three months. On this particular in the back door was an engine start Anyway here we were, five of us trip, we were extremely busy and, to wind down. This was instantly crammed into a small office for the I’m sure, sleep was on everyone’s recognized as being a BAD THING! weather brief. We were on our way minds. (For those of you who have Over the intercom we heard “full to Florida, fully dressed with immer- never had the enjoyment of this type power both!” At this point we were sion suits and we were all over- half over the ship and half over the heated. All we wanted was basically water with an engine dying on us. to get into the Sea King for a crew The pilot and co-pilot were up front, training trip and get two or three taking care of the emergency, and hours of peace away from the ship. the three of us were in the back We covered the basics, and agreed to door, on the monkey tails, watching do some radar work and then some the water get uncomfortably close as dipping and maybe a photo run. We planned to finish with some hoisting and a hot in-flight refueling (HIFR), which is basically like flying up to a moving gas station and filling your tanks while you are flying.

12 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 we dove for speed. The co-pilot handled the emergency flawlessly, right out of the red pages. Just as WEATHER SIGNS everything came under control we heard the engine spring back to Look for cloud and unsettled Look for continued life and the pilot congratulate weather when: bright weather when: the co-pilot on a well-handled • The barometer is falling. • You can look directly at the “SIMULATED” emergency. • The temperature at night sun whenever it sets like a is higher than usual. ball of fire. For a few brief minutes, all of us in • Clouds move in different • The barometer is steady the back of the helicopter had been directions at different or slowly rising. wondering if we were going swim- levels. • Cloudiness decreases after ming. A simulated emergency had • High, thin clouds (cirrus) 3 or 4 p.m. not been briefed and, if it had have increase. A large ring may • Morning fog breaks within been, I’m sure that none of us would appear around the sun or two hours after sunrise. have agreed to it. The lesson here is moon and remain there • A light breeze blows from until overcast clouds the west or northwest. to always be sure to brief the entire thicken and obscure it. mission, including any practice • A red sunset occurs. • Clouds darken on a emergency procedures. A lot of summer afternoon. Look for higher temperatures paperwork is generated by a flight when: Look for steady precipitation • The barometer is falling. In safety incident or, worse yet, acci- when there have been signs summer, a falling barometer dent. If you don’t brief the entire of unsettled weather, and: may indicate cloudy weather, mission, then the paperwork • The wind is south or south- which will be cooler than clear could increase. east, with pressure falling. weather. If the pressure falls slowly, Sergeant Moffitt • The wind swings away from rain or snow will occur the north or west into the within a day; if it falls southwest or south. rapidly, it will rain soon, with increasing wind speeds. • The morning sky is clear, except when the barometer is high or • The wind is southeast to rising in wintertime, or if the northeast, with pressure wind is strong from the north falling — it will rain or or west. snow soon. • Thunderclouds develop Look for lower temperatures against a south or when: southeast wind. • The wind swings from the southwest into the west, Look for showers when: or from the west into the • Thunderclouds develop northwest or north. in a westerly wind. • Skies are clearing. Clearing skies • Cumulus clouds develop in the morning will likely mean rapidly in the spring or sum- warmer weather by afternoon, mer during early afternoon. particularly in summer. Look for clearing • Snow flurries occur with weather when: a west or north wind. • The barometer is rising. • The barometer is low and • The wind shifts into the falling rapidly, wind east or west or northwest. northeast and backing slowly • Temperature falls fairly into north (the fall in tempera- rapidly, especially during ture will be gradual). the afternoon. Reprinted with kind permission of System Safety, Civil Aviation, Transport Canada.

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 13 MAINTAINER’S

QUALIFIED/AUTHORIZED — WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? Judging from some of the incidents we see in the Flight Safety Information System (FSIS), it would appear that there is some confusion about the difference between the words “qualification” and “authorization”. Put simply, you cannot be authorized without being qualified although you can be qualified but not authorized. So, in order to dispel any confu- sion that may exist, this article will explain what it means to be qualified and/or authorized.

o become qualified, the Formal documentation refers accept the authorization. Tprocess is straightforward. to the Technical Authorization Voice your concerns to your The person has to receive formal Record Set (TARS), which will supervisors, remembering that basic trade training as well as be discussed later. It is important you are accountable for the specialty training courses and/or to note that a technician can work you sign for. pertinent experience on an receive an authorization to sign Supervisors also have responsibili- aircraft, engine, component or for a task carried out on a sys- ties in the authorization process. system. The technician will be tem, sub-system or component, They should: qualified when deemed techni- or can be granted an authoriza- cally competent to perform the tion for a skill-set.3 A skill-set • know exactly what each mem- maintenance tasks associated is not specific to any weapon ber of the crew is qualified for with the training.1 So, when you system and can be used for a and authorized to do. WOs or go on an engine course, for wide array of maintenance activ- Sgts may not be able to know what each person can do on a example, once you have passed ities on any weapon system.4 large crew; however, MCpls all theory and practical tests you Examples of skill-sets are NDT should be thoroughly aware would receive the qualification techniques, metal work, high of what the corporals and reliability soldering, painting, etc. for that particular engine. You privates they supervise are complete the formal training, As an authorized technician, authorized to do; either a course or on-job train- you should: ing (OJT), and then you are • review the technicians’ TARS qualified. You can do the job • know exactly what you are regularly. This is especially as long as you are supervised authorized to do and sign for. important if the supervisor is while you do it. Understand that Know which weapons sys- new to the crew or has been you cannot sign for the job – a tems, sub-systems or compo- away for a while (course, TD, qualification does not give you nents you are authorized to sick leave, etc.); and the authority to do so. However, work on and the task you are • review the technicians’ TARS a qualification is the first step authorized to carry out. In before going on TD. TD’s quite in becoming an authorized other words, know what sys- often include technicians from tem and task the authoriza- technician. other crews or even from tion code refers to; and another squadron or unit. An authorized technician • ensure that your abilities Since the supervisor may not “is qualified on an aircraft, reflect the authorizations you be familiar with these techni- engine, equipment or system, have been given. If you feel cians, it is vital to review their and is authorized through for- that you cannot carry out any TARS to know exactly what mal documentation, to sign spe- of the tasks for which you each is authorized to do. It is cific aircraft maintenance records have been recommended for the only way to avoid unpleas- for specific maintenance tasks.”2 authorization, then do not ant surprises while on TD. 14 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 CORNER

The TARS is an important docu- system that personnel involved in So, now you know the difference. ment, and you should be aware the incident are “safe” from Qualified means you completed of the airworthiness implications punitive action. Personnel are still formal training; authorized means it carries. When technicians sign responsible and accountable for that you can sign for the tasks you to certify and date the autho- their actions, especially in cases have been qualified to do. You rization record, they acknowl- of serious damage and injury. A also know about the responsibili- edge that they understand their separate investigation, indepen- ties and accountability an autho- responsibilities and accept dent of the Flight Safety system, rization brings. Hopefully, this accountability for their perfor- would have to be carried out to article will re-emphasize the mance related to the authoriza- assign blame and take punitive significance of your signature tion granted.5 This should not be action as required. on an aircraft record. taken lightly. Your signature on Sgt Anne Gale a CF 349, for example, certifies DFS 2-5-2-2 that you have completed and documented the task in accor- dance with approved orders I guess I forgot a few and procedures, and that the things since my last serviceability status of the sys- posting here!! That tem, sub-system or component doesn’t look good… has been recorded accurately. Not ensuring these requirements have been met when signing an aircraft record is a serous offence under the National Defence Act.6 (For an article on airworthiness fundamentals, please refer to the Maintainer’s Corner in Flight Comment, no 4, 2002 or to DFS website EARLIER at the following address: Of course http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/ The tires I can. I learned dfs/pdf/Flight_Comment/Fall_2002/ fall2002.pdf) need air. that on my last Can you do it? posting here. The Flight Safety system is non- punitive in principle, and the goal is to ensure people learn, through a reporting system, from others’ mistakes. However, it is erroneous to think that The next question should have been: because an incident has been entered in the Flight Safety ARE YOU AUTHORIZED TO DO THE JOB?

1 C-05-005-P01/AM-001, Glossary 4 C-05-005-P03/AM-001, page 5-1, paragraph 3 2 C-05-005-P01/AM-001, Glossary 5 C-05-005-P03/AM-001, page 7-12, paragraph 22 3 C-05-005-P03/AM-001, page 1-15, paragraph 23 6 C-05-005-P02/AM-001, page 5-2, paragraph 5

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 15 ““HOW’SHOW’S THETHE RIDE?RIDE?”” am a German co-pilot on the NATO E-3A AWACS based in Geilenkirchen, Germany. The following Istory happened to me. I was on a flight from Geilenkirchen to Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma, together with a Belgian aircraft commander (AC), a Turkish navigator, and an Italian flight engineer. The AC was flying and I had control of the radios when, after six hours of flight, we entered US airspace. We were transferred from Gander Air Traffic Control (ATC) to Boston Centre ATC. I checked in with Boston Centre (BC).

There is no similar phraseology in Europe for that question and Me: “BC, this is NATO 10, at “What does he want,” I asked. it made me realize that when flight level 330; good afternoon.” The Belgian replied, “I have no flying to another country or idea, ask again!” Then the BC replied, “Good afternoon continent, I must be prepared Turkish navigator shouted from NATO 10; you’re in radar for different procedures or the back, “he said ‘hard right’ contact.” After a little while, phraseology. Now, I won’t hesi- so break right, he might have the following conversation tate to ask for clarification until opposite traffic!” But, in my was going on: I understand clearly what ATC opinion, that was not the wants from me. BC: “NATO 10, Boston Centre.” intention of BC so I asked again. Captain Schauer Me: “Go ahead for NATO 10” Me: “Say again. Speak slowly German Air Force for NATO 10.” BC: “How’s the ride, NATO 10?” BC: “Oh sorry; NATO 10, I stared at my AC with big eyes do you report any turbulence and asked, “did you get that?” at flight level 330?” “Negative,” he replied. Finally I understood what Me: “BC, say again for NATO 10.” Boston ATC wanted and I BC: “How’s the ride, NATO 10?” answered: “Negative for NATO 10, we have no turbulence and Again I looked at my AC, are in visual meteorological annoyed, begging for help. (VMC) flight conditions.”

16 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 ... HeyHeyThey Modified ... the Airplane!!

fter a long winter break, every- On the fourth flight since coming During winter maintenance, in Aone was looking forward to out of maintenance, the standards order to upgrade radio wiring, the beginning of the Spring Glider pilot noticed that the left hand rud- the liner had been removed. Familiarization Training season. der cable, which normally ran along Unfortunately, it was improperly Open book and closed book exams the inside of the rear cockpit liner installed. The rudder cable should had been written, marked, and from the rear left rudder peddle to a have been in front of the liner. debriefed. The weather was VFR. guide bushing passing through the Even though this was a relatively An annual proficiency check for rear seat bulkhead, was behind the minor incident and “probably noth- the staff was the only item on the plastic cockpit liner. The aircraft was ing would have happened anyway,” schedule for the afternoon. There landed without further incident and I think this shows how easily we can was nothing left to do but fly. was grounded. become complacent with the little What could go wrong? The two pilots who had conducted details. Who knows which little detail The glider had just been ferried the preflight inspections “thought may have a very profound effect on to the airport without incident. that the rudder cable had been mod- the rest of the afternoon? Certainly the cross-country pilot ified so that only one cable was visi- Captain Bodnar had done a thorough daily inspec- ble.” Even though the cable was tion (DI). A glider instructor had sawing into the plastic liner, there already flown the aircraft from the was no obvious increase in friction. rear cockpit twice. Everything seemed in order.

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 17 Untouchable!Untouchable! he summer was about to begin. was taking TThis was to be a year of big place and, as I was events! I had successfully completed concluding my brief, the my pilot training, earned my wings tow plane taxied up in front of and was well on my way to starting the glider, signalling that he was an aviation career. However, due to available for another launch. Two unforeseen events, my subsequent minutes later, I finished my brief confronted by his supervisor to operational training was delayed for only to witness the tow plane drop rectify this poor example of flying an extended period of time. Wanting the tow-line, power up, and fly off. behaviour. To my surprise, I found to make the most of the summer I inquired with the launch control myself in the boss’s office having to and motivated to avoid supervising officer if an engine problem was explain why I felt the need to file a a desk, I decided to volunteer with responsible for this display, and he flight safety report. He told me that one of the Cadet Regional Gliding informed me that this particular tow such an effort would only create School (RGS). I had spent a few pilot refused to wait for glider pilots more work for his small staff and years prior working with the cadet and would often depart if he felt his the individual in question wouldn’t program while waiting for pilot time was being wasted. change his ways anyways. At this courses, and one of the schools was The next day, the same situation point, I felt powerless to do anything short of instructors with experience. presented itself; only this time the more but make an attempt to keep With my past experience, I was tow plane taxied several meters in my students and myself out of this gainfully employed as a standards front of the glider and ran his engine individual’s way. Shortly thereafter, officer and, therefore, tasked with at high power. Needless to say, prop I was assigned to one flight and this teaching instructor candidates on wash and loose gravel flew violently person to another. We went the rest the Qualified Glider Instructor in our direction. Furious with this of the summer without seeing each (QGI) course. Within a few days of poor display of professionalism, other and, to my knowledge, the arriving at the school, I met an older I approached the individual with summer went without further inci- gentleman who conducted mainte- the hopes of educating him on the dents, though with the supervisory nance on the tow planes and also danger of his actions. I had hardly attitude I’d seen, I couldn’t help but helped pilot them throughout the begun my explanation, when he wonder if more incidents did occur. summer. It would be an understate- walked away and refused to hear Shortly after the summer concluded, ment to say that my first impression what I had to say. I spoke to several I was back at my unit and often of him was nothing more than poor. supervisors, only to be told that this spoke of the events of that summer. He was a grumpy individual and was just the way he operated and I was informed that my favourite never seemed to have anything posi- I should make every effort to avoid character was a distinguished mem- tive to contribute. Determined to encouraging him. ber with vast experience and lots of make the most of my summer, I Within a couple of days, the same credibility. People within the unit simply tried to go about my business event occurred and, this time, my who had served with him in the past and avoid him when necessary. student took a rock in the eye and mentioned that they didn’t agree Shortly after ground school finished was unable to fly the mission as a with his behaviour, but were in no for the instructor candidates, we result. I spoke to the field supervisor, way surprised. Not only was I began the flying phase. Briefing time informed him of the repeat occur- shocked, but I also couldn’t compre- on the flight line is very limited and rence, and expressed my interest in hend how such a well-respected often, we find ourselves briefing as filing a flight safety report. I had individual could conduct himself we strap into the glider. During one hoped that with the filing of a in such an irresponsible manner. particular flight, this very process report, this individual might be

18 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 Many times throughout the course guys, who only have procedures to fall event capable of stimulating such of a career, we encounter individuals back on when the going gets tough. change is a grave air accident that so highly regarded and respected often claims lives. No Air Force in The argument against such a mindset that we are inhibited from remind- the world can afford such a price, is raised when such icons continu- ing them of flying orders and regula- can it? Don’t such events represent ously violate regulations and, at tions. Although from time to time a failure in leadership? When our times, make decisions that endanger these icons may contravene the occa- leaders choose not to enforce the their peers. When this “untouchable” sional rule, we often conclude that it regulations and policies of our mentality has set in, and is well must be OK because of their vast organization, how can they expect known, across the organization, the experience. We let this experience us to follow them? ability to change it becomes exponen- give them “carte blanche” and grant tially difficult. Sometimes, the only them more latitude than the new

DFS Responds: I was very concerned when I read this article. I was even more surprised when I learned the identity of the individual implicated because, as the article indicates, he is an exceptional pilot with an outstanding reputation. However, factors such as reputation and seniority carry absolutely no weight from a flight safety perspective. We are all human and even high-ranking, experienced personnel blessed with exceptional skills are capable of making mistakes. The disturbing part of this article is that one of these individuals apparently started working under their own set of rules and, in doing so, fostered a poor flight safety culture. In this instance, supervisors have a responsibility to intervene as soon as they become aware of the circumstances. As the actions reported in this article also had flight safety implications, flight safety professionals also have a responsibility to become involved. In this situation, the Unit Flight Safety Officer (UFSO) may be placed in an awkward position. However, if you believe that safety is at risk, then you or the UFSO or both can raise the issue up the flight safety chain to the Wing FSO, the 1 CAD FSO or to me. In this case, I have spoken with people in a position to address the particular situation and have reason to believe it has been rectified. Colonel Hunter

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 19 Quick“Just a Trip Around The Block!”

’ve been a flight engineer (FE) After a very challenging take-off, we During the informal debrief, the AC Ifor a number of years and, to me, were barely airborne when a sudden asked me if I recalled doing any of it always seemed as if it was easy to feeling of uneasiness was upon me. the pre-landing checks. To my amaze- “fly” an aircraft. Was I about to I was unable to focus beyond the ment, my answer was “NO!” He learn a lesson or two?! Nearing the ‘hands and feet coordination’ that it explained that he had seen that I was end of a session in the flight simula- took to stay airborne. As I regained over-tasked and unable to handle any tor, the aircraft commander (AC) partial situational awareness, a voice more inputs, so he just carried them asked me whether or not I would be from the back said, “Would you like out. I was in total agreement as I interested in a flying lesson. Being for me to do a post take-off check?” recalled having difficulty just to stay fairly coordinated (and even more My only thought was “whatever!” on the glide path. I learned a valuable confident), I accepted the challenge. Then came the downwind leg…and lesson that day. Now I realize that It didn’t take me long to realize that more checks. I completed the circuit we all have a job to do and that it wasn’t as easy as it looked! and an uneventful landing. teamwork is paramount. Sergeant Bonner

20 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 ASSUMPTIONS ur unit had just stood up in released and, before the crew chief three of us that day not made OBaden, West Germany. We were could start the winching process, the assumptions. In that lies the lesson the first squadron overseas to have aircraft started rolling back on its learned form this story — never the, then, new CF-18 aircraft and own. The scream for “brakes” came assume. On that day, all of us made our chests swelled with pride over immediately from the crew chief and assumptions. For me, I assumed I this accomplishment. It was with I reacted, quickly jamming my feet knew how to work the brakes. The this squadron, and shortly after onto the rudder pedals. Nothing crew chief assumed the same and standing up, that I was to learn one happened; we were still rolling all of us surmised that we knew of the most valuable lessons of my backwards! Thanks to the always the area and conditions around us. career. My story begins during a prepared and quick-thinking crew If nothing else, please be reminded routine winching operation whereby chief, using speed I have never seen that the word assume is often said to you pull an aircraft into a Hardened before, he threw a chock under the make an “ASS” out of “U” and “ME.” Aircraft Shelter (HAS). Normally, nose wheel. The aircraft came to a On one embarrassing day, that this was not a difficult job, even jarring halt. Not hearing any grind- epitomized the three of us. knowing that a HAS was originally ing or crunching noises, relief fell WO Tony Pettipas built for a CF-104 aircraft, some- over us. Boy, that was close! The what smaller than a Hornet. wing was mere inches from hitting the HAS. We had saved the aircraft, The process was carried out with or so we thought, until we looked three people; one to steer the nose down by the left-hand main tire and wheel, one to ride the brakes, and saw hydraulic fluid pour- one who operated the winch con- ing all over the trols, ensuring clearance as well ground. As a result as accepting responsibility as tow of the plane rolling crew chief. On the particular day in backward and the question I was to be the brakeman, cable not being something I had never done on the taken up, the tow- Hornet aircraft. I let my inexperi- ing bridle ended ence be known and asked the simple up wrapping question “Do I just step on the around the wheel rudder pedals to apply the brakes?” and it sheared the The answer that I received was “yes.” brake line. After hooking up the steering bar and winch cable, I climbed into We were lucky in the cockpit to carry out my the fact that no brakeman tasks. one was hurt and only minor dam- The slack was taken up on the winch; age occurred, but the chocks were removed, at which all could have been time I was told to take off the park avoided had the brake. As soon as the park brake was

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 21 FLYING DOESN’T START IN THE COCKPIT

nock, knock. “You’re late.” emergency procedures are. KDefinitely not a good way Seems a little slow, I’m gonna to wake up. Check the watch… ask what’s up. Oh…haven’t In A oops, should have been up taught you this one yet? Well, thirty minutes ago. Well, no my turn, should have taken help for it; just enough time over a little earlier…ah, there’s to shave. I’ll skip the shower the airport again, looks like “ is ist ein Kanadisher Snowball and breakfast. Hmm…morning I might make it. Might not. DAlarm!” Sound Familiar? It was briefing too from the looks of Good, there’s the crash trucks; day one of a new NATO tactical can almost hear them. things. No problems, out to evaluation (tac-eval) season. Those the airfield, find my student, BZZZT. BZZZT. I hate the alarm were the days when day two and and strap in to the airplane. clock! Another one of those What are we doing? Um, not three followed directly after. It was a weird dreams. Probably the too sure… What flight are we hard-fought war. We ran the gamut UFSO’s fault. Hmm…I’ve got a on? Lemme think, oh yeah, of air attacks, nuclear fallout, while before I go flying, I think I got it! This student’s pretty intruders overrunning the Canadian I’ll try what the UFSO suggested. good. He’s got working stuff Air Group (CAG), and the eventual I’m going to check the student’s between his ears. OK, lined records, and find out where mass launch (“flush”) of whatever up, ready to go. This flight he is. Maybe I’ll give him a serviceable CF-104’s we had left to should be done early, not good briefing, and go over live to fight another day. going to miss tee-off time. some emergency procedures. Very nice take-off. Good band Three days later, all we were think- That will make our time playing at the local bar I ing about was slipping back into the in the air more effective. understand; maybe tonight… comfortable routine of a week of Hmm…this is good; maybe Through 1,000’ uh oh…bad they’re right — flying doesn’t day shifts followed by a week of sound…lotsa quiet now! start in the cockpit. night shifts in the cozy confines of Let’s see how the student’s #1 Hangar at 1 CAG Snags. I was ready to go home, after augmenting the flying squadrons as our war- tasked assigned place of duty, when I was reminded that now that the “war” was over and the flying was done, it was time to put things in order for the next day’s peace-time missions. Since both shifts were together, it seemed like a good time to meet at the mess for an all-around debrief. There were just a couple of tow jobs left and everyone was pitching in to get it done quicker. Putting two CF-104 aircraft in one hardened air shelter (HAS) was known as double- HAS’ing and it was done quite regu- larly as we had more jets than floor space. It was also a relatively simple task if you had a qualified tow driver and the back airplane was

22 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 Hurry?positioned just right. We had one, kicked inwards three to four inches but not quite the other. It looked before travelling in the advertised close though, and the other guys direction. I’m sure you can imagine hurrying. Someone did have the had already left for the mess. the chain of events that took place presence of mind to put things in next. The door struck the pitot tube We inched the front aircraft back order, but it was too late. If we had of the front aircraft, bending it and ever so slowly. The wing walkers, taken the time to think this one pushing it into the radome, crack- tail guard, and tow crew were in through, we would have taken the ing that beyond repair. The rear fin constant communication. It looked time to reshuffle the HAS in the of the left tip tank of the front jet perfect. The airplane looked like it first place and we would have been struck the right leading edge flap of was in. The front jet’s left-hand tip able to enjoy the debrief with the the back jet, damaging both enough tank cleared the back jet’s right rest of the crew. to require replacement. Thankfully, wing leading edge by a whole inch no one was hurt. Master Warrant Officer Sabad or so. If you eyeballed it right, the pitot tube of the front aircraft was I’m sure we all see the lesson here, definitely inside. The HAS door but it never hurts to say it again. closed very slowly. “Let’s lock it up,” We had had a long shift, we were someone said, “we’re outta here!” In tired, and we were a sudden fit of professionalism, the crew chief took another look around. It didn’t seem right to him. He decided to reposition both of the jets with the correct clearances, just to be sure. When the door horn sounded, we didn’t hear the crunch but we all saw both airplanes jump back against their chocks. The HAS doors, by some quirk of engineering, apparently

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 23 Picture : Cpl Levesque, DSV 3-3-2 APPROVED OVER-THE COUNTER (OTC) MEDICATIONS

ircrew may use approved • Decongestant Pseudoephedrine time must be validated and AOTC medications only when (Sudafed™): Permitted when approved by a Flight Surgeon. a Flight Surgeon is not available used for mild nasal congestion Recurrent need for nasal and only for short-term use. A in the presence of normal sprays must be evaluated by primary concern with frequent ventilation of the sinuses and the Flight Surgeon. Use or chronic use of any of these middle ears (normal valsalva). requires the aircrew member However, If you have nasal/ to be free of side effects. medications is that their use may sinus congestion, you should mask serious underlying prob- • Psyllium Mucilloid check with your Flight Surgeon lems, or even cause problems, (Metamucil™): Permitted prior to returning to flying when used to treat occasional such as overuse of aspirin caus- duties — minor congestion on constipation or as a fibre ing an ulcer. A Flight Surgeon the ground can turn into major source for dietary reasons. must be consulted if using the sinus/ear trauma during ascent Long-term use (over one following OTC medications and descent. frequently. week) must be coordinated • Kaolin and Pectin with the Flight Surgeon due • Antacids (Gastrifom™, (Kaopectate™): Permitted to possible side effects such Diovol™, etc.): Permitted when used for minor diarrhea as oesophageal/bowel when used occasionally or conditions and free of side obstructions. infrequently. effects for twenty-four hours. • Throat lozenges: Acceptable • Artificial tears (saline or other • Multiple vitamins: Permitted provided the lozenge contains lubricating solution only): when used in normal supple- no prohibited medication. Vasocon A™, or other mental doses. Prescriptions or Benzocaine (or similar anal- vasoconstrictor agents is individual vitamin preparations gesic) containing throat spray prohibited for aviation duty. are prohibited. or lozenge is acceptable. Long-term use (more than • Aspirin/acetaminophen: • Nasal sprays: Saline nasal three days) must be approved Permitted when used infre- sprays are acceptable without by the local Flight Surgeon. quently or in low dosage. restriction. Phenylephrine HCL • Cough syrup or cough may be used for a maximum Should you have any questions lozenges (Benylin™): Many of three days. Long-acting please contact your local Flight OTC cough syrups contain nasal sprays (oxymetazoline Surgeon to discuss your specific sedating antihistamine or (Dristan) are restricted to no situation. more than three days. Use of dextromethorphan and are Reprinted with kind permission of prohibited for aviation duty. neosynephrine or oxymetazo- line for longer than the above Flightfax magazine. 24 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 Seconds f you’re ever tempted to take far off course you are. But few minutes. (But you don’t Ioff in marginal weather and you’ve flown into worse weather have several minutes left…) have no instrument training, than this, so you press on. You now have 100 seconds read this article first before You find yourself unconsciously to live. You glance at you go. If you decide to go easing back just a bit on the your altimeter and anyway and lose visual contact, controls to clear those none-too- are shocked to see it start counting down from imaginary towers. With no unwinding. You’re 178 seconds. warning, you’re in the soup. already down to 1200 How long can a pilot who has You peer so hard into the milky feet. Instinctively, you pull no instrument training expect white mist that your eyes hurt. back on the controls but the to live after he flies into bad You fight the feeling in your altimeter still unwinds. The weather and loses visual stomach. You swallow, only to engine is into the red — and the contact? Researchers at the find your mouth dry. Now you airspeed, nearly so. University of Illinois found the realize you should have waited You have 45 seconds to answer to this question. Twenty for better weather. The appoint- live. Now you’re sweat- student “guinea pigs” flew into ment was important — but not ing and shaking. There simulated instrument weather, that important. Somewhere, a must be something and all went into graveyard voice is saying, “You’ve had it — wrong with the controls; spirals or roller coasters. The it’s all over!” pulling back only moves that outcome differed in only one You now have airspeed indicator further into respect; the time required until 178 seconds to the red. You can hear the wind control was lost. The interval live. Your aircraft tearing at the aircraft. ranged from 480 seconds to 20 feels in an even seconds. The average time was You have 10 seconds to keel but your com- 178 seconds — two seconds live. Suddenly, you see pass turns slowly. You short of three minutes. the ground. The trees push a little rudder and add a rush up at you. You can Here’s the fatal scenario…The little pressure on the controls see the horizon if you sky is overcast and the visibility to stop the turn but this feels turn your head far enough poor. That reported 5-mile visi- unnatural and you return the but it’s at an unusual bility looks more like two, and controls to their original posi- angle — you’re almost you can’t judge the height of tion. This feels better, but your inverted. You open the overcast. Your altimeter says compass in now turning a little your mouth to scream you’re at 1500-feet but your faster and your airspeed is but…you have map tells you there’s local ter- increasing slightly. You scan your no seconds left! rain as high as 1200-feet. There instrument panel for help, but might even be a tower nearby what you see looks somewhat Reprinted with kind permission of because you’re not sure just how unfamiliar. You’re sure this is just System Safety, Civil Aviation, a bad spot. You’ll break out in a Transport Canada.

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 25 FROM THE INVESTIGATOR Aircraft Occurrence Summary

TYPE: CH12419 Sea King LOCATION: HMCS CALGARY, Straits of Hormuz DATE: 27 August 2003

he incident aircrew were conducting a main Trotor blade-smoothing maintenance test flight from the flight deck of HMCS CALGARY, which was operating in support of Operation APOLLO. Upon aircrew heard and felt two thumps in rapid succes- completion of the first in-flight profile, the aircraft sion. While the aircrew performed an in-flight returned to the flight deck so that minor adjustments controllability check, the ship came to Emergency could be effected. The aircraft then re-launched for a Flying Stations. With no adverse handling charac- second in-flight profile. Additional adjustments teristics evident, the aircraft then landed without were subsequently required and, while manoeuvring further incident. in preparation to land, the aircraft flew down The ship suffered minor damage to bridge-top CALGARY’s starboard side from stern to bow. Once guardrails and an antenna; two of the aircraft’s abeam the bridge, the aircraft commenced a left main rotor blades were damaged. The aircraft suf- climbing turn across the bow. As the aircraft passed fered “D” category damage. in front of the bridge, the main rotor blades con- tacted the starboard top-part bridge. Simultaneously, The investigation is focusing on the pilots’ bridge personnel heard a loud bang just as the airmanship and decision-making process.

Beginning of active runway TYPE: Schweizer 2-33A Glider C-FYLP LOCATION: Mountainview, ON #3 Skid to halt DATE: 18 August 2003 #2 Skip

he solo student was conducting a training Tflight in the Central Region Air Cadet Gliding Scholarship Program when the glider landed hard #1 Stone and short of the intended landing strip. The student was uninjured. The glider sustained “C” category damage. The student completed the launch and upper air The glider bounced back into the air and landed sequences prior to joining the circuit. Once estab- again 20’ further down track before it skidded to lished on final for the glider landing strip adjacent a halt in the grassy undershoot area. A preliminary to runway 34, the student felt she was low on maintenance inspection revealed buckling of the approach. In an effort to stretch the glide, she left hand aileron and wing skin, a cracked wheel pulled back on the control column until such time rim, and a flat tire. that the airspeed bled off and the glider stalled at approximately 10’ above the ground. The aircraft The investigation is focusing on the technique then landed hard on an unseen rock in the glider and decision-making processes involved with the landing strip undershoot area. landing phase of flight.

26 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 FROM THE INVESTIGATOR Aircraft Occurrence Summary

TYPE: Cessna 172 C-GTHL LOCATION: Fredericton, NB DATE: 14 August 2003

he solo Air Cadet student-pilot Twas participating in the Atlantic Region’s Powered Flying Scholarship program through Moncton Flying College (MFC) when the aircraft landed hard at Fredericton airport, bounced several times, and finally came to rest on the runway. The cadet received minor injuries while the aircraft received “B” category damage. The student was conducting a solo cross-country flight from Moncton-Fredericton-St John-Moncton. Upon arrival at Fredericton, she set up for a straight-in normal approach to runway 27 while a Cessna 414 was circling to runway 33 from an ILS approach to runway 15. The Fredericton FSS spe- cialist was quite busy at the time managing numer- ous other aircraft within the Fredericton area. Just as both aircraft were on short final for their respective runways, the student acknowledged a request by FSS to hold short of the intersection of 27/33 to allow the Cessna 414 to conduct its land- ing. As a result, the student then had to reconfig- ure the aircraft for a short field landing. A skilled pilot can land the Cessna 172 in approximately 500’. With the student’s intended touchdown point being the 1000’- to-go marker, the remaining length of runway 27 before the 27/33 intersection was only 900’. The aircraft touched down hard and up to 30 knots faster than the normal 40 knot touch down speed of a short field landing. The Cessna 172 bounced back into the air before it Damage to the Cessna 172’s front end, although again hit very hard, this time on the nose wheel; not seemingly evident, was significant. The nose this was followed by a porpoising action that wheel tire was blown, the edges of the rim shat- oscillated between nose wheel and main wheel tered on runway contact, the oleo end-cap was contact. The student carried out an emergency pushed off after a retaining bolt failed, and the shutdown, finally coming to rest on the runway firewall and cabin floorboard panelling was warped. but past the 27/33 intersection. Anticipating a The propeller and engine were undamaged. Initial possible conflict, the Cessna 414 overshot its classification of the Cessna 172 indicates that likely approach and landed once it was safe to do so. “B” category damage was suffered. After the student egressed on her own, local maintenance personnel immediately towed The investigation is focusing on pilot decision- the aircraft off the runway. making, pilot technique, and the FSS request. ◆

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 27 FROM THE INVESTIGATOR Aircraft Occurrence Summary

TYPE: Schweizer 2-33A Glider C-GBZG LOCATION: Summerside, PEI DATE: 27 September 2003

he instructor pilot (IP) and passenger were Tconducting a familiarization flight in support of the Air Cadet Fall Glider Familiarization Program at Summerside Airport, PEI, when the glider landed hard after aborting the launch procedure. The aircrew were uninjured. The glider sustained “B” category damage. The auto-tow launch on runway 24 began normally. After the “all out” signal was given, the glider was observed to accelerate slowly by the signal cadet glider struck the runway in a level attitude approxi- who was monitoring the launch and providing sig- mately 2000’ from the threshold. After the glider nals to the tow vehicle. Believing that something came to rest, the occupants egressed and assisted was wrong with this unusually long take off run, in moving the glider off the runway. It was then the cadet gave the stop signal to the tow vehicle. that damage to the glider was noticed. Simultaneously, the glider became airborne and climbed to approximately 50 ft AGL. The signal per- Damage was initially assessed on-site as “D” son, doubting his decision, attempted to cancel his category. However after detailed examination at stop signal but by then the tow vehicle had already 14 Wing Greenwood, further damage was noted: responded to the original signal and began to the wheel axle was bent; the fuselage tubing sur- decelerate. rounding the axle frame was deformed, broken, and compressed; and the tire sidewall was com- The IP noted the poor acceleration on takeoff. pressed against the rim, causing a visible scrape Once airborne, the IP then observed the airspeed and scoring. The damage was subsequently decaying from 50 MPH to 45 MPH and released the upgraded to “B” cat. towrope. With insufficient altitude to regain the 50 MPH approach speed, the glider descended rapidly The investigation is focusing on the signal cadet’s and rounded out at approximately 3-5’ with insuffi- decision to stop the launch and the tow-vehicle’s cient airspeed to flare and arrest the descent. The serviceability/ability to accelerate.

28 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 FROM THE INVESTIGATOR Aircraft Occurrence Summary

TYPE: CC130 Near-Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) LOCATION: 20 NM SW of Kabul DATE: 29 July 2003

he incident crew consisted of an Aircraft TCommander in the left seat, the First Officer in the right seat, a Navigator, a Flight Engineer, and two Loadmasters. The incident flight took off from Kabul International Airport (OAKB) on 29 July 2003 at 0505Z (0935L) via a planned low-level tactical departure. The crew planned to transit from OAKB at 200 feet MSD in order to avoid any potential threat from MANPADs (man portable anti-aircraft devices). The crew became aware of a previously unseen finger ridge approximately 60° into the turn The crew passed turn point #1 without incident. around manoeuvre. This ridge immediately became A 75° turn to the right was commenced when the a controlling obstacle, effectively reducing the crew passed turn point #2 in order to place the valley’s width by 50%. aircraft on the proper track towards turn point #3. The AC increased the bank angle and the G load The First Officer (FO) voiced his concerns about the until the stall buffet was encountered, at which aircraft’s position after about 120° of turn. The time backpressure and bank angle were reduced. Aircraft Commander (AC) rolled the aircraft level The aircraft cleared the ridge and exited the valley. after approximately 180° of turn, by which time The aircraft’s flaps remained retracted throughout the aircraft was heading back towards Kabul. the turn around. At this point the crew planned to regain track by The crew carried out a climbing right turn over entering a valley on their left and climbing to a the lowlands West of Kabul before proceeding minimum safe altitude of at least 12000 feet ASL on course. There were no further incidents on in order to cross the ridge at the end of the valley. the return leg to Camp Mirage. The crew soon realized that that they would be unable to climb to the minimum safe altitude, or The incident is under investigation by DFS due to even to clear the ridge. The AC decided to carry accident potential and possible human factors out a right 180° turn to exit the valley. implications.

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 29 Good Show

In April 2002, Corporal Beaton similar failures in this obscure area of the cable, was an apprentice aviation Corporal Beaton initiated a local survey of unit technician carrying out his aircraft that led to the discovery of a similar failure apprentice level training at on another aircraft. As a result of this, it was decided 12 Air Maintenance Squadron to extend the survey to the tail probe haul-down (AMS). While performing a system cables, where three additional failures were before-flight (“B”) check on Sea identified. Concurrent to the survey, Corporal Beaton King CH12404, Corporal Beaton also identified a shortage of replacement assemblies discovered what appeared to be and identified a lack of direction for specific inspec- a frayed cable on the main tion of this high wear area for these cables, which probe haul-down system. Upon he then addressed through an aircraft inspection further inspection and close change proposal (AICP) and a supporting unsatisfac- CORPORAL WAYNE BEATON examination of the cable tory condition report (UCR.) Furthermore, on that assembly, it became evident same morning, while completing the “B” check on that, over time, the cable had become worn and the same aircraft, Corporal Beaton identified and fractured beyond allowable limits. Corporal Beaton rectified a fuel leak that resulted from a hairline immediately initiated corrective maintenance where, crack in a fitting for the combustor drain line. once the haul-down cable assembly was removed In both these instances, the discrepancies were very from the aircraft, it was determined that the internal difficult to see and Corporal Beaton’s dedication to cable strands were indeed failing. Further broken safety, and willingness to go above and beyond the cable strands were also discovered in an area of requirement of a normal visual inspection resulted in cable hidden by the messenger upper threaded end. the prevention of two potentially hazardous situa- The cable reel assembly was replaced and the aircraft tions. Corporal Beaton’s diligence and consistent was returned to service. efforts in ensuring the airworthiness and safety of Realizing the effect of this cables’ failure during unit resources are noteworthy, while his attention sea-borne operation and the difficulty in discovering for detail in performing his maintenance duties goes beyond that expected of his rank.

Private Holder is an appren- inspection but no apparent faults were identified. tice level 514 aviation techni- Torque wrench serviceability was also confirmed. cian, employed in the 12 Air As torque checks were commenced for the Maintenance Squadron third time, an accompanying noise prompted the (AMS) component shop. removal of several lines. An in-depth inspection He was tasked to carry out by Private Holder revealed hairline cracks that had installation of the rigid line developed along the collars of the suspect fittings. assemblies on a CH-124 Sea He immediately contacted 12 AMS Flight Safety and King main gear-box (MGB). the lines were shipped to Quality Engineering Test While carrying out critical Establishment (QETE) for investigation. QETE conse- torque checks and before quently identified that the suspect collars failed due achieving the required mini- to material deficiencies. Had the cracked collars gone PRIVATE NATHAN HOLDER mum torque, Private Holder undetected, the possibility exists that the lines could heard an unfamiliar click have leaked, resulting in the loss of MGB lubrication coming from the fitting. Private Holder made an ini- and potential catastrophic failure. tial visual inspection of the torque wrench and fitting and found no obvious discrepancies. He continued Pte Holder’s positive attitude and prompt actions in with the task but, once again, heard another unusual bringing this discrepancy to light had multi-fleet and noise. Acknowledging that this was abnormal, Private international implications, requiring local contractors Holder requested the assistance of an experienced to revise their procedures and application of certain technician. The two technicians discussed whether types of steel. His attention to detail and his diligence the click noise was coming from the line seating on in carrying out his duties were instrumental in the the component fitting or some further problem. discovery of an unserviceable batch of collars and A number of suspect fittings were removed for the elimination of a flight safety hazard. 30 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 ProfessionalismFor check, he discovered that the forward coordinator control rod on #1 engine was loose with lateral play. Further investigation led to the discovery that the locking wire on the control rod jam nut was broken and the nut was backed off half a turn. The servicing level inspection schedule requires the technician conducting the “A” check to visually inspect the area. Master Corporal Lewkoski’s physical check of the control linkage led to the MASTER CORPORAL PHILLIP LEWKOSKI finding of this critical failure. Had it not been for Master Corporal Lewkoski’s thoroughness and Master Corporal Lewkoski is an aviation technician, acute attention to detail, there was a real poten- working on long-range patrol maintenance flights. tial for loss of power lever control. The superior On 28 June 2002, while on “B” Crew for an Op professional attitude and unmatched dedication Apollo mission, he was conducting an after flight displayed by Master Corporal Lewkoski eliminated (“A”) check on Aurora # 140113. During the “A” the potential for a serious incident. ◆

CORPORAL EVEALENA RIOUX CORPORAL JOEY BAKER

On 23 May 2003, Corporal Rioux, an experienced precision radar approach (PAR) controller, was con- ducting a PAR approach on a Shorts 360 to Runway 11 at Comox. The local weather was visual flight rules (VFR) with scattered low-level cloud. When the Shorts 360 reached five nautical miles on final approach, Corporal Rioux requested and received a landing clearance from the aerodrome controller and subsequently relayed it to the aircraft. While overshoot the Shorts 360 the aircraft continued with the approach, the due to the aircraft on the recently qualified ground controller, Corporal runway. Instantly sensing the Baker, issued a clearance for a Buffalo to taxi for a gravity of the situation, VFR departure from Runway 11. When the Buffalo Corporal Rioux passed the pilot requested a take-off clearance, the aerodrome traffic and instructed the controller did a visual scan of the final approach Shorts 360 to commence an area and the surface of Runway 11 and, seeing it overshoot before the Tower was clear, issued the clearance and continued with controller had finished other duties. The Shorts 360 was hidden by cloud verbalizing his instructions. and was not visible. The aircraft discontinued the approach and rejoined the As the Buffalo commenced the take-off roll, the circuit to a safe landing ground controller did a visual scan of the aero- without further incident. drome and observed the Shorts 360 break out of a low layer of cloud approximately one-half mile Corporal’s Baker and Rioux displayed exemplary from the button of the runway. Immediately, poise and conduct under a high stress situation Corporal Baker alerted the aerodrome controller by and, in so doing, prevented a rapidly deteriorating shouting the term “Overshoot.” The aerodrome situation from developing into a potentially controller quickly instructed Corporal Rioux to dangerous state. ◆

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 31 ProfessionalismFor MASTER CORPORAL PATRICK MCCAFFERTY

Master Corporal McCafferty should not have been installed in the aircraft. is an aviation technician He immediately informed 12 AMS Flight Safety and employed in the Aircraft the Engineering and Projects Organization (EPO) of Repair Organization at 12 Air his findings. The resultant flight safety occurrence Maintenance Squadron (AMS). investigation (#107842) revealed the subject fitting On 10 April 2002, he was was an unmodified version of the elbow that is not tasked to carry out a fuel normally available through the CF Supply System. system independent check It could only be cross-referred to the installed item on Sea King #12426. While con- through technical diagrams. ducting the inspection, If this fitting discrepancy had gone unnoticed and his attention was drawn to had the aircraft been in an emergency situation the fuel dump intake fitting where fuel jettison was selected, the resultant fuel located in the #3 fuel cell. Close examination of level remaining in the aircraft would have been this assembly by Master Corporal McCafferty significantly less than that required to provide the revealed that the overall length of the fitting fifteen-minute flight time stated in the aircraft appeared to be excessively long, resulting in the operating instructions. Master Corporal McCafferty fuel dump intake being closer to the bottom of is commended for his keen eye for detail, his vigi- the fuel cell than intended. lance in conducting thorough inspections, and his Further inspection and part number verification immediate actions in correcting this discrepancy. by Master Corporal McCafferty confirmed his con- His professional attitude was instrumental in avert- cerns. The part number on the assembly was not ing a situation where an air emergency could have referenced in the aircraft system parts list and degraded and resulted in an air accident. ◆

CORPORAL CHRIS WHEATON

Corporal Chris Wheaton is an aviation technician who works in 12 Air Maintenance Squadron (AMS) aircraft maintenance. On 17 February 2002, he was walking past a cart filled with unidentified equipment that had been removed from a condemned building and was being temporarily stored inside the maintenance hangar. Amongst the old MK 8 torpedo racks, he spotted an SUS MK 411 marked with a yellow band around the bottom circumference of the store. Although Corporal Wheaton is not qualified on the Sea King armament systems and his only armament training was during initial occupation conversion, he realized this would denote a high explosive. Corporal Wheaton carefully approached the cart and positioned himself for closer inspection of the item. Upon careful examination, he noted the store had been cut away and all explosive components had been removed. Corporal Wheaton immediately brought the situation to the attention of both the senior armament technician and the armament safety officer, who took control of the inert MK 411 for remarking and raised an armament safety alert to highlight the importance of properly marked stores. Corporal Wheaton is commended for his actions in identifying, isolating, and expediting the removal of this potentially dangerous and improperly marked armament. This was an exceptional observation on the part of Corporal Wheaton and his immediate action regarding this improperly marked armament should be an example to all personnel. ◆

32 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 MASTER CORPORAL BILL ANGLIN

On 29 May 2002, Master Corporal Anglin was demonstrating a CC-138 Twin Otter pre-flight inspection to an untrained flight engineer (FE). During the autopilot portion of the check, Master Corporal Anglin removed an aircraft fuselage access panel, which is not typically part of the normal pre-flight check. He did this so the FE under training could observe the interaction of the autopilot servo and the elevator control cables. As a result of this act, it was discovered that the autopilot servo was abnormally interfering with the elevator control cable, causing it to lodge and chafe against a component of the servo. Master Corporal Anglin’s professional and thorough commitment to training discovered a hazardous anomaly in the aircraft elevator control rigging. If this danger had not been discovered, it could have resulted in a critical disruption in the aircraft elevator control. Master Corporal Anglin’s thoroughness and dedication to duty averted a potentially serious occurrence.

CORPORAL FRANÇOIS HAMEL CORPORAL SYLVAIN FRANK PRIVATE HUGO BOUCHARD

Corporal Hamel, Corporal Frank, and Private Bouchard are aviation technicians working at 433 Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) second line maintenance (snags). On 4th March 2003, they were tasked to replace all the shielded mild detonating cord (SMDC) lines in Hornet #188917. At the end of their second day changing SMDC lines, a small clang was heard while closing the aircraft canopy. Despite a long working day, Corporal Hamel, Corporal Frank, and Private Bouchard decided to investigate this anomaly. After close inspection, Private Bouchard and Corporal Hamel noticed that the lower portion of the canopy actuator support bracket was cracked and broken. Parts were also missing from this Without the professional approach and persever- bracket. They immediately initiated and carried ance of these technicians, this problem could have out a foreign object damage (FOD) check for the gone undetected because of the visually awkward missing parts. Four sheared bolts and four rivets location of the support bracket. Since the main were found behind the left and right kick panels. beam is not designed to withstand the stress that It is likely these parts migrated to this position over is normally borne by the canopy support bracket, a time. The main beam upper mounting-point bolt structural failure was inevitable. Careful attention for the rear seat was the only connection holding to detail, vigilance and quick reaction to the situa- the canopy actuator and bracket in place. The tion certainly contributed to eliminating a serious snags supervisor was informed of the situation threat to the safety of the aircraft. It is highly and a flight safety investigation (FSIS # 111425) probable that a significant flight incident was was initiated. The main beam was sent to the seat prevented because of the diligence of Corporal shop for further investigation. Hamel, Corporal Frank and Private Bouchard.

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 33 ProfessionalismFor PRIVATE CHRISTOPHER DUNBAR

On 10 December 2001, Private Initial inspection pointed to a pressure inlet fitting Dunbar, an aviation techni- on the #2 torque meter housing, but further inves- cian at 12 Air Maintenance tigation revealed that the oil inlet pressure line Squadron (AMS), was a mem- was cracked through two-thirds of the flares cir- ber of the start crew for the cumference. The line was replaced and the leak launch of Sea King aircraft check was carried out serviceable. Had this gone CH12414. The start-up undetected and the aircraft continued with the sequence was normal and, mission, the crack might well have continued to during the blade spread and propagate around the tube, resulting in complete landing gear pin removal failure of the line. The resultant massive loss of sequences, the ground crew MGB oil would have led to a rapid decrease in carried out a detailed exter- MGB oil pressure, leaving the aircrew with minimal nal check of the aircraft. Private Dunbar elected to time to find a suitable landing area and carry out give a final once-over before pulling the chock as a safe recovery. A similar incident resulted in the the aircraft prepared to taxi. It was at this time loss of twenty litres of MGB oil and, due to the that he noticed a tiny trickle of fluid coming from design of the system, no corresponding cockpit a compartment drain hole between #2 engine indications. and the main gear box (MGB) fairing. Although Private Dunbar’s keen attention to detail and his drainage from water accumulation in this area is immediate recognition of a possible hazard were not uncommon, he noted the higher viscosity and instrumental in averting what could have developed brought the matter to the attention of a more into an emergency situation. Despite his limited senior member of the start crew. The #2 engine experience on the aircraft, Private Dunbar displayed and main rotor were secured to investigate and a timely sense of judgment that was critical an oil leak was identified from the #2 torque in dealing with this unusual situation. He is meter assembly on the starboard side of the MGB. commended for his decisive actions. The aircraft was shut down to repair the problem.

MASTER CORPORAL PAUL TUFF

Master Corporal Tuff was tasked to carry out a to be published routine before flight (“B”) check on Labrador to ensure that helicopter # CH113306. During his checks, he all aviation noticed that there was excessive play in one of the technicians forward blade pitch links. Knowing that this was were aware that not normal, he decided to assess further. His detailed a wrong bear- inspection revealed that the wrong bearing had ing could be been installed in the lower end of the pitch link, installed in the where it connects to the swash plate. This situation blade pitch link. had gone undetected through several quality, The results of aircraft, and flight engineer pre-flight checks. this error could Master Corporal Tuff consulted technical orders, potentially have which confirmed that the bearing actually caused catastrophic damage to the aircraft. belonged to the slide scissors, which is also part of Master Corporal Tuff’s initiative, diligence, and the swash plate. Master Corporal Tuff went further superior technical knowledge prevented a poten- by checking all other pitch link bearings on the tially serious flight safety occurrence. His actions aircraft for proper bearing installation. His actions exemplify an outstanding attitude toward the prompted a unit flight safety maintenance alert flight safety program.

34 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 CAPTAIN BRIAN OLSVIK

On June 3, 2003, Captain Olsvik was the duty air turn left crosswind. traffic controller at 12 Wing Shearwater. He was As Captain Olsvik providing control instructions to a recently qualified did not have radio civilian Cessna pilot, who was conducting left-hand communication circuits to runway 28. At the same time, Halifax Air with the MRCs, Traffic Control (ATC) advised Captain Olsvik that he promptly and two German Air Force MRCs, which had departed calmly instructed Halifax International Airport enroute to Goose Bay, the Cessna to com- were requesting to over fly the city of Halifax at mence a right turn 1500 feet. Halifax ATC also advised Captain Olsvik to a right crosswind. that the two fighter jets would be skirting the The MRCs passed within 1000 feet laterally and Shearwater control zone to the west and assured with an estimated 300 feet vertical separation him that he would be advised if/when the aircraft from the Cessna. would enter Shearwater’s control zone. Had the Cessna continued with the standard left- As the Cessna 172 departed runway 28 for a 1200- hand circuit, the potential for a mid-air collision foot circuit, the inexperienced pilot noticed what would have been amplified. Captain Olsvik’s acute she thought were large birds at the same altitude ability to quickly assess the situation and provide in the left crosswind. Captain Olsvik, already trying excellent conflict resolution ensured the safety of to ascertain the location of the MRC jets, quickly both the civilian and MRC pilots. Captain Olsvik’s realized that they were well within the Shearwater keen situational analysis, his swift reaction to the control zone without approval and on a potential situation, and his calm demeanor averted what collision course with the Cessna, who was about to could have been a tragic air incident.

CORPORAL KEVIN ROWAN once the first aircraft passed. As the aircraft approached the threshold, the aerodrome controller On 5 March 2003, told the ground controller trainee to start foreman Corporal Rowan was on his JBI run on runway 04. Unfortunately, he monitoring a trainee failed to indicate that he wished the foreman to in the ground control hold short of the inner runway. The trainee, follow- position at the 4 ing the order of the aerodrome controller, com- Wing Cold Lake air plied. Corporal Rowan, knowing that the aircraft traffic control (ATC) was still on approach, and realizing the require- section. The weather ments of the SNIC foreman, recognized the poten- was marginal, with tial for confliction, intervened and queried the snow on the ground, aerodrome controller as to the clearance. Realizing and snow removal was in progress on the aero- that he had told the ground trainee to start the drome. At the time of the incident, the snow and foreman’s run without a “Hold short of runway ice control (SNIC) foreman was on the button of 31R” restriction, the aerodrome controller revised runway 04 waiting to do a James Brake index (JBI) his instruction and had the foreman hold short. test of the runway. The JBI test would involve Although responsible for ground traffic on the driving down the length of the runway and aerodrome, Corporal Rowan also maintained an making ten stops enroute, in order to determine a awareness of the traffic being controlled by the coefficient of friction value. This run had to be aerodrome controller. In so doing, he was able made without interruption. to recognize a confliction and take the appro- Two aircraft were on IFR approach to runway 31R, priate steps to avoid a potentially serious flight which intersects with runway 04. The aerodrome safety incident. His attention to detail and his controller intended to have the ground controller professionalism highlight the crew concept of approve foreman’s crossing of the intersection, ATC operations.

Flight Comment, no 1, 2004 35 Letter from the Editor from the n the summer 2003 Flight Iissue, in an article titled “Air Force Flight Safety Training,” there was a reference made to Group Commander “Dutch” Schultz. As editor, I Surgeon should have verified his nickname and his title, ll eligible CF members may now receive progressive bifocal which I didn’t do. After it Aglasses as part of their entitlements. Progressive lenses are was brought to my atten- still not authorized for use by pilots in flying duties, as there tion, I made an attempt are significant visual distortions in the transition zone of the to locate the source of lens. While pilots are entitled to wear these progressive glasses the nickname and I found off duty, it is not recommended, as the transition from progres- no such reference. I would sive lenses at home to bifocal lenses at work is significant as like to set the record the human visual system is not able to adapt instantly. This straight and let the read- process could take several weeks. As well, should pilots opt for ers know that the use of progressive glasses at CF expense, they would be individually both the title “Group responsible for the costs associated with Commander” and the obtaining bifocal lenses for their flying nickname “Dutch” was duties. Should you have any questions, inaccurate. I apologize please contact your Flight Surgeon. to both you, Group Captain Schultz, and to the readers. Captain T.C. Newman Editor

36 Flight Comment, no 1, 2004