SIERRA LEONE: THE ELECTION OPPORTUNITY
Africa Report N°129 – 12 July 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... i I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II. ELECTORAL FEARS AND HOPES...... 2
A. NEW DYNAMICS AND OLD PARTY POLITICS ...... 2 B. NEW FAULT LINES IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCES...... 4 C. THE NEC’S GOOD PERFORMANCE – SO FAR...... 6 III. LIMITED IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNANCE...... 8
A. WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION...... 8 1. The unreliable bureaucracy ...... 9 2. Diamond industry transparency...... 9 3. Security risks ...... 10 B. ENTRENCHED DOMINATION BY THE CHIEFTAINCY ...... 11 C. SUSTAINABILITY OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ...... 12 1. Army loyalty...... 12 2. Police capacity...... 13 D. POLITICISATION OF THE JUDICIARY ...... 13 E. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MEDIA...... 15 F. UN SUPPORT FOR PEACEBUILDING ...... 15 IV. CONCLUSION...... 16 APPENDICES
A. MAP OF SIERRA LEONE ...... 18 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 19 C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA ...... 20 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES...... 22
Africa Report N°129 12 July 2007
SIERRA LEONE: THE ELECTION OPPORTUNITY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Sierra Leone holds presidential and legislative elections economic mismanagement is needed to rescue Sierra in August 2007. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who Leone’s reputation as a poor place for investment, but won a landslide victory in 2002 at the end of the civil each of the major presidential candidates is burdened by war, split the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) by history. Vice President Berewa is fully implicated in the anointing a successor, Vice President Solomon Berewa. current system. Margai was part of the administration When Charles Margai formed the People’s Movement for until 2005. Ernest Koroma of the APC has not held office Democratic Change (PMDC), the break-up rejuvenated himself but his party’s long-serving president, Siaka politics but also heightened tension in SLPP strongholds. Stevens, was an autocrat who introduced a one-party state. The All People’s Congress (APC), which gained in 2004 local elections, may be able to exploit this division. If the elections go smoothly and the new administration Return to a constituency-based voting system for starts with a strong reform program, Sierra Leone can parliament has reinforced the leverage of traditional chiefs profit from remaining international goodwill, exemplified in national politics and produced potentially vicious by the commitment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission competition. Sierra Leone is still a fragile state in which as well as of the UK and other partners, to achieve its peace will not be consolidated until two things happen. potential. If not, a return to conflict would again be a real The elections must be violence-free and fair for results possibility. In any event, the population’s tolerance of bad to be respected. Then the new authorities must deal with governance and lack of economic development is unlikely sources of discontent such as corruption, chiefs’ abuse to last much longer. of power and youth unemployment, lest they threaten stability. RECOMMENDATIONS The completely new National Electoral Commission To All Political Parties: (NEC) has started well and broadly inspires confidence. It has completed voter registration and has one month 1. Respect the voluntary Code of Conduct and, in after nominations close to produce and distribute ballot particular, instruct all officials and supporters papers. The choice of 11 August, the height of the rainy that violence, or calls to violence, will be swiftly season, as polling day will not make the task any easier. investigated and punished in accordance with law. National and international observers have a critical responsibility but it is also essential that allegations of 2. Deploy witnesses to voting stations all over the fraud or malpractice be adjudicated promptly and fairly. country to strengthen transparency of the polls. 3. Commit to a comprehensive post-election reform An escalating spate of house burnings, which started in program to tackle the popular discontent generated Pujehun District in January, indicated tension between by corruption, chiefs’ abuse of their powers and the SLPP and the breakaway PMDC. No one has claimed politicisation of the security forces and judiciary. responsibility or been convicted, a lack of clarity which is reminiscent of the war years and undermines confidence To the National Electoral Commission (NEC): in the re-establishment of rule of law. Although the police seem to have calmed the situation, more accountability 4. Develop a proactive communication strategy on is essential if recourse to violence is to become less shortcomings in administration of the elections and attractive. challenge the government to maintain a free, secure and fair environment throughout the electoral All parties are vying for the youth vote. Reconstruction period. efforts have done little to address the marginalisation of young people, and the next government must find a new 5. Establish decentralised coordination with the approach to boosting economic growth and increasing national police designed to produce quick reaction income-generating opportunities. A robust attack on to security incidents. Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page ii
6. Support civil society in conducting a dialogue to sensitise chiefs on the need for them to act impartially throughout the electoral process.
To the Government of Sierra Leone:
7. Take all necessary steps, including approaches to Paramount Chiefs and security officials, to ensure even-handed policing and a level field for all parties and candidates during the campaign. 8. Ensure that government funds are not misused to support the ruling party’s campaign and that state- run media cover the election impartially.
To Donors:
9. Maintain oversight and offer technical and logistical support during the election period with the overriding aim of minimising risk of conflict. 10. Immediately engage with the new administration to make clear that a break with past failure to tackle corruption is a prerequisite for long-term support. 11. Supplement the funds given through the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund so as to ensure sustained support for projects to create youth employment, good governance, justice and a capable public service.
To the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission:
12. Strengthen local outreach strategies to emphasise the independent and apolitical nature of its funding under the Peacebuilding Fund. Dakar/Brussels, 12 July 2007
Africa Report N°129 12 July 2007
SIERRA LEONE: THE ELECTION OPPORTUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION been isolated acts of violence since the beginning of the year, and tension is increasing, especially between the ruling party and the breakaway People’s Movement Since the civil war officially ended in 2002, Sierra Leone for Democratic Change (PMDC). With a return to a has made significant progress in consolidating peace and constituency-based system, the outcome is difficult to rebuilding basic government institutions.1 The state now predict. A proposed referendum on constitutional reform, has reasonable monopoly over the use of force. There is including such sensitive issues as a second legislative a functioning government, with an elected president and chamber and citizenship, has been shelved, and the new legislature, as well as a justice system which works, even National Electoral Commission (NEC) has corrected if slow and flawed. The army and police, with substantial fundamental irregularities identified in the previous support from the UK and others, have been rebuilt. Since elections. But police capability to contain violence will the UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) withdrew in be under a spotlight, and the elections will be a good test December 2005, no security incident has required outside of how far Sierra Leone has actually come. intervention. Youth unemployment and disillusionment 3 remain serious threats and core state institutions are still Most of the problems that existed before the war remain. untested, but Sierra Leone is no longer a failed state.2 Although efforts have been made by the international community and civil society to control and make There have been two successful, nationwide elections transparent the exploitation of diamonds – one of the key since the war. The first, in March 2002, which President resources that helped fuel the conflict – significant official Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People’s Party corruption and meddling still impede development of 4 (SLPP) won in a landslide, was followed in 2004 by local a rational and transparent industry. This is extremely government elections – a pillar of the decentralisation dangerous, as impoverished diamond diggers were among process – in which the opposition All People’s Congress the most enthusiastic recruits for the Revolutionary United 5 (APC) made significant gains, including winning the Front (RUF) during the war. capital, Freetown.
August 2007 presents the next electoral challenge. Presidential elections, without the incumbent, and 3 The 2004 Truth and Reconciliation Commission report (op. parliamentary elections will take place on the same day cit.) lucidly analysed these problems, including bad governance; and without the presence of UN peacekeepers. There have endemic corruption and poverty; disenchanted youth; a repressive political system that closed legitimate avenues of expression; legacies of the divide-and-rule policy of the former colonial administration, including seriously uneven development that 1 For more on the war, see extensive Crisis Group analysis of left much of the interior a backwater; persistence of capital Sierra Leone since 2001, including Africa Reports N°28, Sierra punishment; a sclerotic elite; autocratic chiefs; a largely elderly Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy, 11 April ruling class that looked down on youth; and a patrimonial 2001; N°49, After Elections: Politics as Usual?, 15 July 2002; political system, which excluded the majority of citizens. and N°87, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, 4 Historically, diamonds provided important clandestine means 8 December 2004. See also “Witness to Truth”, Sierra Leone for the enrichment of politicians and a handful of business cronies Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004; Lansana Gberie, A amid poverty and the collapse of the formal economy. Through Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of shadowy networks – William Reno called it the “shadow state” Sierra Leone (Indiana University Press, 2006); and P. Richards, – politicians controlled the lucrative underground trade, resisted Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra pressure for reform and state capacity building, and were Leone (Oxford, 1996). able to maintain political authority despite the withering of state 2 Failed or dysfunctional states can be described as those that infrastructure. William Reno, Corruption and State Politics “cannot guarantee law and order throughout their territory, in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, 1995). and…cannot fulfil certain critical international obligations”. 5 In 2006, diamonds, mostly mined by artisans earning less than Stephen Ellis, “How to Rebuild Africa”, Foreign Affairs, a dollar a day, produced 70 per cent of the country’s exports September–October 2005; see also Crisis Group Report, and employed about 10 per cent of the total work force. But Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, op. cit. the diamonds, mostly alluvial, are easy to mine, requiring little Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 2
Free and fair elections would strengthen government II. ELECTORAL FEARS AND HOPES legitimacy, make more change possible and so help prevent a return to conflict, but high expectations must be managed to avoid post-electoral instability. If the results The emergence of a new party has rejuvenated the are contested or the new administration does not address political scene, providing hope for change. However, the the underlying causes of the conflict, troubles will quickly dominance of regional party politics and informal yet resurface. This report examines the tensions on the eve strong links between traditional chiefs and the ruling party of voting and evaluates the contribution a successful mean the pace of change may still frustrate those who have election needs to make towards consolidating the state’s recent experience of resorting to violence. Rivalry between fragile stability. the SLPP and PMDC, especially in the Southern and Eastern Provinces where tension is rising and both sides are mobilising youths, is a potential flashpoint.
A. NEW DYNAMICS AND OLD PARTY POLITICS
Before independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was physically and politically divided between the Colony (Freetown and the peninsula area, dominated by Westernised Creoles)6 and the rest of the country (the Protectorate or Provinces, dominated by indigenous inhabitants). Since independence the separation has diminished, replaced by a split between Northern Province (Temne- dominated) and the Southern and Eastern Provinces (Mende-dominated). The two ethnic groups each are about 30 per cent of the population and have remained the main power brokers. The Mende generally support the SLPP, the Temne the APC.
The third major party, the PMDC, is in effect a breakaway faction of the SLPP formed by Charles Margai, a member of the establishment, after he lost the party leadership contest in 2005 to Solomon Berewa, Kabbah’s anointed successor.7 It could change the dynamics of the SLPP- APC rivalry, which dates back to the first decade of independence.
In 2002, Kabbah won enough votes in the Northern Province to challenge the once easy assumption that it would automatically vote APC. The APC ruled Sierra Leone from 1968 until its overthrow by young military officers in 1992. During its repressive rule, opposition
6 The 2004 census put the Creole population at only slightly more than 1 per cent. It is less than 6 per cent in Freetown and the peninsula area, its traditional home. 7 Its origins and the fact that PMDC gains likely mean SLPP losses partly explain why the APC has been enthusiastic about the new party. When Margai returned from a trip abroad to a rousing welcome, the APC paper We Yone led with the headline: capital and manpower. As a result, they attract large numbers “SLPP Gone!” It claimed that “over 70% of the hundreds of of people, and diamond areas are generally poorer and less people who turned up to welcome [Margai] were originally SLPP developed. The key district, Kono, is far poorer than largely members and supporters….[T]he PMDC support base is in the agricultural Pujehun. See “Sierra Leone: Adding Value through Southern and Eastern Regions which used to be the exclusive Trade for Poverty Reduction, a Diagnostic Study”, World reserve of the SLPP. Now…SLPP has no strong support base”. Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF), October 2006. “SLPP Gone!”, We Yone, 18 December 2006.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 3
parties were crushed, the economy collapsed, and the introduced a one-party state in 1978. He then retired to country imploded into civil war in 1991. private legal practice in Bo. When multiparty politics were reintroduced in 1996, he vied for the SLPP leadership but The parties do not show many policy differences but the lost to Kabbah. He joined the unsuccessful National Unity major presidential candidates – two Mende, one Temne, Party (NUP), was later appointed to the cabinet by Kabbah 8 all Christian – offer contrasts. Berewa, a Mende and lost the SLPP leadership contest in 2005 to Berewa. and devout Catholic, is by far the best known, also Not alone in claiming that contest was rigged, he left the internationally. He was a distinguished lawyer before party to form the PMDC. More outspoken than Koroma, becoming attorney general and justice minister in 1996 he sometimes sounds facile and glib. He has openly said and vice-president in 2002. That year, Kabbah named he has no faith in the electoral institutions, including the him his successor, thus making himself a lame duck. NEC, and has spoken, without offering evidence, of plans Since then, Berewa has been virtual head of state and to rig the elections.11 constantly campaigning. Among donors, he has a reputation for thoroughness and more decisiveness than One positive result of the emergence of the PMDC is the dilatory Kabbah but he bears major responsibility for that it has forced the SLPP and APC to appeal to a wider lack of progress in restoring delivery of services and constituency of younger people. Though Margai is in his in rebuilding core state institutions. He has been the key late 60s, the initial PMDC base was young, educated interlocutor for donors and has virtually controlled post- people from the Southern and Eastern Provinces who felt war reconstruction. Opponents consider him ruthless and largely disenfranchised by an SLPP leadership dominated manipulative. He has pledged policy continuity, though by the old elite with strong links to traditional rulers. it is expected he would name new ministers. Margai also claims support among ex-combatants, both RUF and Civil Defence Forces (CDF), since the PMDC Ernest Koroma, a Temne and leader of the APC, is the calls for the sort of “just society” they are demanding.12 least politically experienced, so would start with a cleaner slate. He was an insurance executive before becoming To prevent massive defections from the SLPP, Berewa has party leader and presidential candidate in 2002, when he started to modernise its structures and encourage active ran a good campaign but lost decisively to Kabbah.9 Since participation of young people at the highest levels. The then, his leadership has been much contested in the party, secretary-general is in his late 30s, and some candidates and until March 2007 he faced a legal challenge from in key constituencies in the south and east are similarly aspirants to his position.10 He has been accused of young professionals. The SLPP has also introduced a much abandoning the party after the 1992 coup, which overthrew more inclusive selection process for its parliamentary the APC administration of Joseph Saidu Momoh. However, candidates. In Bo District, seven of the nine candidates it he is generally regarded as a decent and honest leader, has proposed have not previously held office. Through the above the highly partisan and divisive nature of Sierra efforts of the secretary-general, the SLPP recently created Leone’s politics. the “Reform Group Sierra Leone”, an organisation of young professionals who support party reform. Although Charles Margai, a Mende, is a fixture of the political less conspicuously, the APC is also courting the youth scene, having first stood for parliament under the SLPP vote. in 1973 (he was disqualified then by the autocratic APC president, Siaka Stevens). He is the son of Sierra Leone’s Running mates will be an important factor in the second prime minister (Albert) and nephew of the first presidential election. If Berewa, 69, wins the presidency, (Milton), both SLPP. After his failed bid for parliament, as most observers anticipate, he is expected to serve only he continued as an SLPP official until Siaka Stevens one term, with the likelihood that his vice-president would succeed him. Berewa is from the Southern Province, so needed a Temne from the north as a complement. He
8 chose Kabbah’s preference, Foreign Minister Momodu President Kabbah is a Muslim. Koroma, who is eighteen years younger, has a reputation 9 Koroma won 22.3 per cent of the votes in the 2002 presidential elections. for competence and has strong support within the party, 10 The legal challenge was launched by five former party but is not necessarily regarded as true northerner since heavyweights: Edward Turay (former secretary-general), Abdul he was born in the south, went to school in Bo and speaks Karim Koroma (foreign minister under Siaka Stevens), Jengo Mende as well Temne. Stevens (a son of ex-President Stevens), A. F. Serry (a well known barrister) and Moses Sesay (another party grandee). See “History of the Conflict in the APC”, We Yone, 18 December 11 He made these comments at a meeting of the All Political 2006. The case boiled over into physical confrontation between Parties Association on 5 January 2006. Crisis Group was supporters of the plaintiffs and of Koroma, colourfully reported present. by an SLPP paper under the headline “APC Unleashes Terror 12 Crisis Group interview, Charles Margai, Freetown, 6 June Again”, Unity Now, 18 December 2006. 2007.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 4
The PMDC’s Margai has chosen as running mate Dr can deliver blocs of votes, will have more leverage that Ibrahim Tejan Jalloh, a Fula and a northerner. Margai said they can use to further disfigure the decentralisation he wanted an experienced elder who would be prepared process. In the electoral process itself, campaigning is to challenge his decisions and could contribute to north- expected to be more personal and visceral, increasing the south reconciliation.13 The selection has caused a public chances of violence. split within the Jalloh family – traditionally an SLPP bulwark.14 The APC’s Koroma chose little known Samuel Gender balance may have been an unintended victim of Sam-Sumana, a Kono, which indicates that he does not the change in systems, with parties less willing to select expect to compete seriously against the SLPP and PMDC women to contest constituencies than they might have in the Mende-dominated areas of the south and east. been to put them on electoral lists. The SLPP has endorsed only seventeen for parliament, far below its stated goal of The concurrent parliamentary elections revert to a 36 per cent; the APC has said it wants to have 37 women constituency-based system from the Proportional candidates in winnable constituencies but official figures Representation National List (PRNL) and District Block have not yet been announced.17 Representation System (DBRS) used in 2002. Proportional representation had been introduced as a temporary measure after the conflict because population displacement had B. NEW FAULT LINES IN THE SOUTHERN made a constituency system impractical. Return to the old AND EASTERN PROVINCES system has entailed drawing new constituency boundaries based on population density using the provisional results of The Southern and Eastern Provinces are dominated by the the 2004 census; 112 constituencies, in addition to twelve Mende, whose lead the smaller ethnic groups generally mandatory seats reserved for Paramount Chiefs, were follow. Traditionally the Mende support the SLPP but delimited.15 this is uncertain in 2007 given what many perceive as its role in the arrest and indictment of Hinga Norman, A constituency-based, majority system is meant to enhance ex-head of the Kamajor militia, the core group of the parliamentarians’ accountability. Reactions to the exercise, CDF that fought the RUF.18 Norman was arrested by however, showed how the establishment continues to the Special Court for Sierra Leone on charges of crimes perceive the chieftaincies as key instruments for political against humanity, war crimes and other violations of mobilisation. The SLPP and APC were concerned about international humanitarian law and died in custody in creation of constituencies that cut across long-established March 2007. Norman, from Bo District, was a government chiefdom boundaries, and the PMDC said it would revisit minister when arrested. the boundaries once in office to rationalise the relationship between chiefdoms and constituencies.16 Supporters consider him a hero who helped return the country to civilian rule and blame in particular Berewa, Return to the first-past-the-post British system in fact who was justice minister and attorney general when the reinforces the weight of chieftaincies in the political Special Court was set up. Some believe he saw Norman system. Of the 112 seats to be contested (by some 1,500 as a rival for the party leadership and that he and Kabbah candidates), 40 are in the Northern Province, 27 in the were happy to see him arrested. In prison, Norman became Eastern Province, 25 in the Southern Province and twenty a rallying point for those opposed to the government and in the Western Area (dominated by Freetown). In the the Special Court, as well as for disillusioned Southern PRNL and DBRS systems, party loyalty was the main and Eastern Provinces youth who feel they have not consideration for securing a good position on the electoral benefited from peace.19 list, and candidates of parties with strong traditional support in key districts could be reasonably assured of A government report notes that many of these people “tend re-election. This time party loyalty will not be as important, to blame [Norman’s incarceration] on the ruling SLPP” and individual candidates will have to establish their but since hardly any of them may be “inclined to vote personal credibility and use their own resources to win for the APC [given their voting history], they may find votes. This means, however, that Paramount Chiefs, who
17 Information provided to Crisis Group by the U.S.-based 13 Ibid. National Democratic Institute (NDI) during a meeting at the 14 Sayoh Kamara, “Fulas Hotly Oppose PMDC….The Tejan offices of the UK Department for International Development Jalloh Family Denounce PMDC’s Running mate in Sierra (DFID) in Freetown, 7 June 2007. Leone”, Awareness Times, 19 April 2007. 18 For a description of the Kamajors, see Crisis Group Africa 15 See “Report On Electoral Constituency Boundaries Process”, Report N°67, Sierra Leone: the State of Security and NEC, August 2006. Governance, 2 September 2003, pp. 13-14. 16 Crisis Group interview, Charles Margai, Freetown, 6 June 19 “Hinga’s death hits home”, Africa Confidential, vol. 48, 2007. no. 5, 2 March 2007.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 5
an alternative in the PMDC as a means of expressing of one of their leaders on CKC grounds, the students asked their disgruntlement”. The situation “has now rendered them to leave, they refused and violence ensued. Buildings the South-East more prone to confrontation” during the were damaged, one bike was burned and seven elections.20 SLPP leaders, who are campaigning frequently disappeared. The police prevented escalation by using in the areas, dismiss the PMDC threat as exaggerated.21 teargas, firing shots and taking some students into safe custody. The situation remained tense and hostility erupted Margai, the PMDC leader and longtime Bo resident, was again. The BRA claims to be apolitical but some members lead defence counsel before the Special Court for one of have PMDC political profiles.26 Norman’s fellow CDF defendants. Though his political support in the area was never significant, he gained from The police are playing down the significance of a spate of the report (though contested) that Norman, shortly before fires which started in January 2007, escalated in March his death, said he would support the PMDC. After his and April and have destroyed around 100 homes, mostly death, Margai called for two minutes of silence at a PMDC in Southern Province, Pujehun District. Motivations are meeting for “one of our strongest members”.22 Whether unclear but most agree they were more than the usual his new support will hold is uncertain. Margai is seen by accidents connected to the agricultural cycle of burning some as opportunistic, and many Mende are aware that and family feuds. The chief UN representative in-country taking votes from the SLPP could allow the APC, their attributes them to partisan politics at the local level and main nemesis and a stronger force than Margai’s PMDC, says the upheaval of changing political allegiances and to return to power.23 the intensified demand for scarce resources are leading to increased tension and a settling of scores.27 The incidence of political interference and intimidation during voter registration in March was higher in SLPP Pujehun, a key district, has a history of family rivalries and strongholds that are now seriously contested by the feuds which have fed into political rivalries and provoked PMDC. This reflects strong anxiety in the ruling party that intense violence. In the 1980s, during the one-party era, its hold may be slipping and underlies the fears of many, the brutal murder there of a supporter of a candidate including in the security agencies, that those areas are out of favour with the APC hierarchy led to widespread potential flashpoints during the elections.24 This is the violence and destruction as family members and others more worrying because they are also the strongholds of sought revenge.28 This tendency also was partly behind the Kamajors, who, though disarmed, are probably easy the sustained violence in the area during the war. Though to re-mobilise. both sides deny responsibility, it is believed the recent cycle of fires began when Brima Victor Kebbie, the Bo may well become problematic during the elections. Paramount Chief of Malen Chiefdom and the district’s The first serious post-war confrontation happened there SLPP parliamentarian, took exception to his brother’s in November 2005, when PMDC supporters allegedly joining the PMDC. The PMDC is thought to have used blocked Berewa’s motorcade as he made his way to an former CDF/RUF fighters to retaliate. No one has died; event at the secondary school he and Margai had attended. several people have been arrested but their statements have Margai and some of his supporters were arrested and not clarified responsibility. Police interventions and UN charged with assault, and the case is pending. surveillance have calmed the situation but that no one is prepared to identify perpetrators means the stand-off is More recently, a tense confrontation between students from far from resolved. Christ the King College (CKC) and motorbike riders in Bo had to be contained by the police and local citizens. The Margai told Crisis Group he felt the SLPP was “hell-bent latter, a close-knit local fraternity a large majority of which on rigging the elections” and while he “hoped to avoid are ex-combatants, run a motorbike taxi service around violence, any attempt by the governing party to interfere 25 town. In late May 2007, a CKC student died after a taxi will not be acceptable or tolerated”. With reference to accident. The Bike Riders Association (BRA) paid its his claim of wide support from former RUF and CDF respects to the family and community, but a few days later, when several hundred of its members attended the burial
26 Some civil society groups are working with bike riders and their associations in Bo and elsewhere with a view to avoiding 20 Confidential report by the Office of National Security (ONS), conflict. This involves encouraging respect for rules of the road, Freetown, November 2006, made available to Crisis Group. offering support for their internal elections and trying to reduce 21 Crisis Group interview, SLPP Secretary-General Jacob Jusu prejudice against them. Crisis Group interviews, Bo and Saffa, Freetown, December 2006. Freetown, June 2007. 22 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Bo, 9 June 2007. 27 Crisis Group interview, Victor Angelo, Executive 23 Crisis Group interviews, Bo, March 2007. Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Freetown, 7 June 24 Confidential report by the ONS, op. cit. 2007. 25 Crisis Group interview, ex-combatant, Bo, June 2007. 28 The affair was known as the Ndorgborwusui crisis.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 6
combatants, he said he “prayed the SLPP did not provoke particular in Kenema districts and Goderich, a village close violence, because they have no capacity to sustain it”, to the capital, including “beating of registrars, belittling of while his own party “has what it takes to protect its electoral officers and flogging of other elections officers”. interests” in legal self-defence.29 The group, however, praised the NEC for maintaining “neutrality and independence”, even under “great pressure A PMDC official in Bo went further, calling the such as the registrars’ strike in two constituencies in development of an SLPP “task force” – a youth group – Freetown or the incidence of gross political interference around Kenema, in neighbouring Eastern Province, a clear in Kenema”.34 The process was completed by 31 May, sign of “guerrilla warfare” against the opposition and with an exhibition and enquiry phase, during which more saying “we cannot tolerate victimisation day by day”. than 900,000 voter names were checked and some 17,500 This task force, he claimed, had intimidated people during corrections made.35 voter registration.30 Even if, as a diplomat said, it is “not doing too much that is illegal”,31 such developments and NEC’s neutrality and independence, not to mention claims have potential to destabilise the rule of law in the competence, are refreshing. The current body was set up Southern and Eastern Provinces and show the importance after an IFES report on the 2004 local government of continued police and UN vigilance.32 elections detailed irregularities, including blatant ballot rigging by all parties, so extensive that IFES, donors and Parties have shown a marked tendency in the past to recruit the government agreed to withhold publication and UK unemployed youths as thugs to intimidate opponents. Department for International Development (DFID) The APC has a particular history of such violence but kept back part of its budget support for the government.36 indications like those cited above suggest others may be A subsequent investigation by Justice Johan Krieger, appealing directly to ex-militia fighters who are easy to who helped conduct South Africa’s 1994 elections, mobilise. This trend needs to be stopped. Party leaders recommended completely dismantling and rebuilding the should make a public commitment to behave responsibly old NEC with new staff and leadership, to make it in the interest of peace and stability. capable of “attaining and maintaining the capacity to conduct the country’s electoral undertakings fairly, C. THE NEC’S GOOD PERFORMANCE – SO competently, affordably, without outside assistance”. The FAR first step would be for it to “metamorphose from an appendage of the government service into a state-funded but independent electoral management body employing The National Election Commission inherited a difficult its own core of electoral experts”.37 legacy but has been tackling potentially divisive reforms well. Continuation of this performance is vital to securing The new chairman, Christiana Thorpe, a minister under free and fair elections and ensuring the results are the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) junta in accepted. To maintain momentum, challenges to the the 1990s, was sworn in in May 2005. Prior to her brief process must be dealt with swiftly, transparently and fairly. ministerial responsibility, she was a Catholic sister and civil society activist and has a reputation for honesty. Four NEC passed its first major test with voter registration commissioners were appointed to represent the country’s across the country, ending on 18 March. According to the four regions. NEC then moved to well-equipped new report it released shortly afterwards, 2,621,313 were Freetown offices38 and hired a highly educated, competent registered, 91 per cent of the estimated voting population of 2,873,000.33 The National Election Watch, a Freetown- based NGO, fielded 187 observers nationwide to monitor the process. Its first report criticised intimidation by 34 “Report on the Voter Registration Process”, National Election “government officers, party members and citizens” in Watch, March 2007. 35 Information provided to Crisis Group by NDI during a meeting at DFID offices in Freetown, 7 June 2007. 36 IFES is a U.S.-based non-profit organisation, formally known 29 Crisis Group interview, Charles Margai, Freetown, 6 June as the International Foundation for Election Systems but now 2007. using only the acronym. Crisis Group has seen the IFES report, 30 Crisis Group interview, PMDC official, Bo, 9 June 2007. which still has not been published. Crisis Group interview, 31 Crisis Group interview, UK High Commission official, senior DFID official in Sierra Leone, Freetown, December 2006. Freetown, 7 June 2007. The IFES report and the subsequent investigation by Justice 32 Victor Angelo, Executive Representative of the UN Secretary- John Krieger did not hold the government responsible. The General, cites the overcrowded Freetown area, where loyalties malpractices were initially detected and reported by the earlier are much divided, as another part of the country at risk. Crisis incarnation of the NEC and appeared to involve both ruling party Group interview, Freetown, 7 June 2007. and opposition candidates. 33 The 91 per cent figure may be a slight overestimate, given 37 Johan Krieger, “Second Assessment Report”, May 2005. doubts about the accuracy of the census number used, 4,976,871. 38 The former offices were decrepit and neglected.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 7
staff of 135, including those based in regional offices. It and has also trained local NGOs to help with registration has demonstrated independence by supporting members and voter education.45 Hope–Sierra Leone has launched of the Limba ethnic group who filed a petition in the a “Clean Election Campaign”, which organises dialogues Supreme Court challenging the election of a pro- around the country that bring together Paramount Chiefs, government candidate.39 local councillors, ward committee members and other stakeholders to discuss how to work towards free, fair The tasks ahead, however, are onerous. The NEC has a and peaceful elections.46 shortfall of about $2 million of the $20 million it requires to conduct the polls. In May it recommended postponement Provisions have been made for courts to hear petitions from 28 July to 11 August to allow more time for under the Electoral Law over six months, starting with the campaigning after parliament dissolved on 25 June40 but nominations process in July. Judges and magistrates will there are serious concerns about organising the elections be paid extra for this work. Parliamentary election cases at the height of the rainy season, which could prevent will be dealt with under high court rules, presidential people reaching polling stations and make the transport election cases under Supreme Court rules. of ballot boxes difficult. The UN mission (UNIOSIL) worries about the reaction of those unable to vote.41 A To retain goodwill, the NEC must satisfy expectations single week, to 9 July, was allocated for processing that all complaints will be handled transparently and fairly candidate nominations, including one day for challenges and it will respond rapidly to any deterioration in security. on grounds such as mistaken identity or a criminal record, If it does this, it will then remain for the newly elected before the formal campaign begins.42 government and parliament to address seriously the governance challenges analysed below. A little debated but crucial step in the process is recruitment of polling agents. IFES and others attributed most malpractices during the 2004 local government elections to polling agents. The job is temporary and not well-paid. Experienced political operatives have a way of getting their partisans hired and then using them to tamper with the balloting. NEC has said it will not recruit school teachers, since this might affect their substantive jobs, but it has not indicated what other sources will be sufficient to fill hundreds of positions that require literacy and understanding of electoral rules. In an effort to avoid local affiliations, those hired will be posted outside their home areas.43 PMDC remains sceptical about their independence, so it intends to have party officials at each polling station to report irregularities.44
International observers will complement NEC’s work. DFID and the European Union (EU) will station theirs across the country, and the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), which has offices in Freetown, will work with the local National Elections Watch (NEW) to put mostly Sierra Leonean observers at every polling station. NDI already has its own long-term observers in place
39 The Supreme Court ruled against the petition on the grounds that the election of a Paramount Chief is not a public election, and the NEC had no role to play in it. 40 NEC set one month – 10 July to 9 August – for formal campaigning. 41 Crisis Group interview, Victor Angelo, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, Freetown, 7 June 2007. 42 Information provided to Crisis Group by NDI during a meeting at DFID offices in Freetown, 7 June 2007. 45 Crisis Group interview, Nicholas Demeter, NDI country 43 Ibid. director, Freetown, January 2007. 44 Crisis Group interview, Charles Margai, Freetown, 6 June 46 Crisis Group interview, John Koroma, Centre for Human 2007. Rights and Peace Education, Bo, 8 June 2007.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 8
III. LIMITED IMPROVEMENTS IN Fund50 – has put poor young people to work cleaning the 51 GOVERNANCE garbage-strewn capital. Nevertheless, indicators reveal that post-war reforms have not had the intended economic impact. Sierra Leone Sierra Leone is still fragile and somewhat volatile. Violent is ranked 176 of 177 countries on the UN Human protests involving youth and students, sometimes leading Development Index (HDI);52 youth unemployment, one to major property damage and confrontations between of the drivers of the eleven-year war, is at an all-time rival political supporters, show that domestic instability high of nearly 80 per cent, and over 70 per cent of the remains a real threat. A section of the country’s population lives below the poverty line, including 26 per impoverished population is willing to take the law into its cent in extreme poverty.53 Prospects for improvement own hands, as evidenced in occasional riots and vandalism through private investment are poor. The World Bank in Freetown, including an incident a few years ago that led ranks Sierra Leone 168 of 175 countries for ease of to the near-destruction of the national stadium. Impunity doing business. While recent national economic growth for the house burnings described above is another sign of has been good, it has been most evident in subsistence weakness. Law enforcement remains a challenge and can food production and in the mineral and tourism sectors, only be assured by competent security professionals, in which are not sufficient to substantially alleviate particular the police and army. Substantial efforts have widespread urban and rural poverty. been put into making these institutions much more accountable and manageable but the jury is still out on Particularly international observers often express frustration their impact; corruption threatens to undermine progress that after years of sustained support the country should in these and other areas. be in such an abject state.54 That progress on good governance, poverty reduction, economic growth and job A. WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION creation has been far less than hoped for is naturally blamed on the government. There is a growing sense that it is lukewarm towards much-needed reforms. The With assistance from donors, in particular the UK, the EU perception that the state is corrupt has grown since the and the World Bank, Sierra Leone has made some end of the war, with Sierra Leone slipping from 126 to progress in post-war reconstruction, resettlement and 142 on Transparency International’s ranking in 2006.55 reintegration. Primary school enrolment is higher than in pre-war years,47 and there has been substantial devolution of authority to district councils. Across the country since 2003, 406km of roads have been resurfaced or improved, 50 The UN Peacebuilding Fund was launched in 2006 for post- and 153 primary and secondary schools and 76 hospitals conflict peace building; priority is to be given to countries on the 48 Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, including Sierra Leone. or health centres built or rehabilitated. Freetown had 51 street lights installed in December 2006 after decades of See “Aid and Votes”, Africa Confidential, vol. 48, no. 8, darkness. The new National Revenue Authority has made 13 April 2007. 52 “Human Development Report”, UN Development Programme the government more effective at revenue generation and (UNDP), 2006. collection. The economy has registered an impressive 53 Crisis Group interview, senior DFID official, Freetown, growth of nearly 7 per cent annually in the past two years, December 2006. and violent crime is low.49 Donors forgave the $1.6 billion 54 At the Consultative Group meeting in Freetown in late 2006, external debt in 2006, and a new youth employment the head of DFID/Sierra Leone, Richard Hogg, said: “While we scheme – partly supported by the UN Peacebuilding acknowledge the constraints and the distance to be travelled…the time for excuses is passed. What we need is a sustained focus on implementation….I welcome the focus of the vice-president…on growth and infrastructure, particularly energy, but we need to 47 During his administration, President Kabbah has said, the move beyond rhetoric to real commitment to change and number of children attending school increased from 400,000 reform”. Crisis Group interview, senior DFID official, to 1.2 million, farewell speech to parliament, 21 June 2007, at Freetown, December 2006. www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/article.php3?id_article=1368. 55 The index primarily provides an annual snapshot of the 48 Crisis Group interview, senior DFID official, Freetown, views of businesspeople and country analysts. Transparency December 2006. International points out, however, that year-to-year variations in 49 An EU-funded study of law enforcement in 2005 found very a country’s score can result not only from a changing perception low levels of violent crime in the country, and noted that of performance but also from changing samples and “contrary to what might be expected, the war itself and its methodology. Methodology is discussed in more detail at aftermath does not appear to have caused a sudden growth in www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/dnld/framework_en.pdf. the crime rate”. Bruce Baker and Amadu Sidi Bah, “Policing The score should be used as a tracking indicator, rather than Agencies in Sierra Leone: An Evaluation”, Campaign for Good as the basis for making definitive statements about the level of Governance, occasional papers series, no. 2, 2005, p. 5. corruption in any given year.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 9
1. The unreliable bureaucracy in 2006 and replaced by Henry Joko-Smart, a law professor and close friend of President Kabbah.61 Joko-Smart was Development assistance, though modest compared to (perhaps unfairly) penalised by a corruption inquiry under 56 some other post-conflict countries, has been substantial. the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) in 1992 Bilaterally, the most important donor is the UK, mainly and tends, like the president, to view allegations against through DFID. London committed to providing a total of senior officials, however well-grounded, as malicious. at least £120 million over three years, making Sierra Leone Whereas Collier brought charges against ministers, an one of the highest recipients per capita of its development Appeals Court judge and several senior civil servants, aid in Africa. While it is generally agreed there has been Joko-Smart has focused almost exclusively on junior and substantial improvement in the security sector and the mid-level officials, thus sending the wrong message about diamond industry, progress on reducing poverty and endemic corruption. improving governance more generally, in particular tackling corruption, has been disappointing.57 Direct A 2006 review of the ACC by two consultants for DFID, budget support immediately after Kabbah’s arrival, when its chief supporter, found a “deterioration in the institutional “there was neither systematic assessment of financial capacity to lead the fight against corruption” and almost systems nor a plan to improve them”, was exceptional and zero impact on public perception and reduction of contravened DFID’s own subsequent guidance.58 Too corruption affecting basic service delivery and the private often the government, attracted by extra funds, has signed sector. It noted a “significant under-spend” of over $1 up to projects it was clearly unprepared to implement million, suggesting that “work relevant to the achievement adequately, or which were not immediate priorities. of the operational plan in investigations, prevention and Inadequate commitment to projects, resulting in misuse of community relations is not being carried out”. It the money, has been at the root of much of the corruption recommended ending support for the ACC, but DFID that has characterised post-war institution building. plans instead to mainstream anti-corruption and accountability measures in its projects with a view to Corruption in the civil service is evident, even without removing obstacles to private investment.62 The findings, 59 reliable sector statistics. A recent survey of the provincial however, are a serious indictment of a government which branches of the health and agriculture ministries, for badly needs to attract foreign money to fuel private sector example, found 162 ghost (or dead) workers on the growth and create sustainable jobs. The next president payroll; an assessment of the senior civil service in 2005 must take the fight against corruption more seriously discovered that salaries were being paid to 236 persons and set a strong example. when there were only 125 at those grades.60 Often incomprehensible administrative discretion and bogus 2. Diamond industry transparency procedures create opportunities for graft; bribes are common for even basic government services. The diamond industry is a key sector that has been a very strong focus for reform because of both its strategic The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), always importance – it played the leading funding role in the war problematic, is now virtually moribund. The previous head, – and its economic significance, including as the employer Val Collier, a respected former civil servant, was dismissed of over 100,000 mostly young people. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the biggest contributor to GDP (20 per cent), as well as providing over 70 per cent of foreign exchange 56 In 2003, donor disbursement (multilateral and bilateral) was $257,617,819; in 2004, it was $244,027,607 and in 2005 $304,163,149, with DFID and EU the top two, followed by the U.S. The 2006 figure is about the same as that for 2005. 61 The government accused Collier and his deputy, Andy Felton 57 Crisis Group interview, senior DFID official, Freetown, (a British national and DFID consultant), of causing the death December 2006. of Gloria Newman-Smart, the former head of customs and 58 Quoted in Brian Thomson, “Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? immigration, whom the Commission accused of corruption; of Conflict and Governance Reform”, Chatham House report, discourtesy to the president and parliament (which Collier June 2007, p. 19. allegedly described as full of rogues); of “travelling in and out of 59 Examples of inconsistent statistics include: the Public Sector the country without the permission of the government”; of paying Reform Task Force reported in 2005 that the public sector as a journalists to “write negative articles against the government”; whole comprised 60,600 personnel, including 15,500 in the civil and of giving a French public relations firm $50,000 “to write service, 24,750 teachers, 8,450 police, and 11,900 military; in against the Sierra Leone Government”. The allegations were 2004 the Establishment Secretary’s Office gave a figure for the contained in a memo sent to the British High Commissioner in civil service of 17,500. “Design of a Comprehensive Pay and late 2005. Crisis Group has seen the memo. Grading Reform Strategy for the Government of Sierra Leone”, 62 Joel Cutting and Gladwell Otieno, “Annual Review 2006 of CoEn Consulting, Public Service Reform Unit, May 2004; see DFID Support to Anti-Corruption Commission Phase 2 in Sierra also “Drivers of Change/Sierra Leone, 2006”, DFID. Leone”, 25 January 2007. Crisis Group Interview, DFID staff, 60 Ibid. Freetown, 6 June 2007.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 10
earnings and 15 per cent of tax revenue. The war wiped 3. Security risks out this economic contribution but since its end, the sector has started to resume its historic role. In 1999, Many poor countries emerging from war tend to relapse Sierra Leone officially exported about $1 million worth into armed conflict because the fundamental conditions of diamonds; in 2005, this rose to $142 million. It dropped that sustained violence and made it attractive, such as the in 2006 to $125 million, probably due to increased opportunity to plunder a feeble and corrupt state, remain smuggling or depletion of reserves. Most observers, unchanged. The risk is particularly great if, as in Sierra however, say this is a fraction of what the country Leone’s case, those who fought the war believe they are produces. In 2005 the Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA), an not benefiting much from the peace. At the end of Sierra NGO coalition, estimated the annual value of diamond Leone’s war in 2002, 71,043 combatants went through production at $400 million.63 a UN-supervised disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. A report on the aftermath A DFID review of the industry in 2005 found that of that process in July 2004 gave some insight into the although there has “undoubtedly been progress made problems of unemployment and disillusionment still towards…ensuring that the potential benefits from prevalent in the country, particularly among the former diamond deposits are fully realised by the government fighters. It concluded that “overall, the data support and people of Sierra Leone”, the capacity of the mineral the view that the fighters in the conflict were largely resources ministry (which oversees the industry) “has only underprivileged individuals who had been failed by the marginally improved and remains weak at national and Sierra Leonean state” and explained that: particularly local level”. It added that the ministry “has a Across factions, both political and material narrow focus, lacks management, monitoring and training motivations mattered for the recruitment of fighters. capacity, and there is no clear strategy for confronting RUF combatants claimed that they fought to express the strong vested interests of politicians and chiefs”. The dissatisfaction, to root out corruption and to bring government has deliberately not put high taxes on the down the existing regime. CDF fighters argued alluvial sector of the diamond trade as it knows that, given that they aimed to defend their communities the ease of smuggling, it would undermine legal from the violence brought by the war. Political commerce. During 2004, revenue from export tax and motivations notwithstanding, there were strong licences was only $5.2 million, of which one quarter went material incentives as well. RUF combatants were to the Diamond Areas Community Development Fund and promised jobs, money, and women; during the another quarter to cover the Gold and Diamond Office’s war, they received women, drugs and sometimes costs.64 more valuable goods. The CDF helped to meet An area of concern, and one prone to corruption, has been the basic needs of the members and provided 66 tax concessions for individual mining companies. Koidu increased security for their families. Holdings Ltd. (the biggest diamond mining venture in the Only 42 per cent who had completed DDR training had country) has on occasion, according to Partnership Africa found jobs, 72 per cent of these in the first three months. Canada, been granted duty free facilities for equipment With respect to employment opportunities and corruption, and other mining-related goods it imports, and waivers for the report noted, “more than 50 per cent of [those the residential permits of its dozens of foreign employees. surveyed] think things are about the same or worse [as] Such incentives are aimed, understandably, at attracting before the war”. Though most ex-combatants “think foreign investment despite the country’s weak the government has made progress in rebuilding the infrastructure, but they are problematic. An International educational infrastructure, education remains far and away Monetary Fund (IMF) review criticised the approach as the most important priority (48 per cent), employment ad hoc, apparently without documentary framework and appears as the second most prominent concern (23 per costing the government considerable revenue. A review cent), followed by corruption (11 per cent)…. Importantly, of the mining industry by the Governance Reform combatants across factions broadly accept this set of Secretariat estimated that revenue losses from several priorities, whether they have returned to their home concessions granted to Sierra Leone Rutile’s titanium communities or entered new ones in the post-war period”.67 mines will amount to $98 million from 2004 to 2016.65 Another recent evaluation found that “for those [former
child soldiers] who took part in the formal disarmament,
63 This is a probably an exaggeration but even the government admits there is still widespread smuggling, and the actual export figure should be in the region of $200 million. Crisis Group 66 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “What the interviews, Freetown, December 2006. Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June- 64 Thomson, “ Reform or Relapse?”, op. cit. August 2003”, interim report produced in partnership with Pride, 65 Cited in “Annual Diamond Review 2005”, Partnership Africa Sierra Leone, July 2004. Canada, at www.pacweb.org. 67 Ibid.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 11
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, Chiefs has implications well beyond local government. It vocational training and employment opportunities were is central in sustaining elite patronage politics, increases inadequate…. [Moreover,] significant numbers, perhaps SLPP leverage and helps subvert efforts to build more as many as half, did not take part in the DDR process formal state structures.73 and subsequently received no support”.68 Sierra Leone’s government, like that of other African countries, has to negotiate its authority with social B. ENTRENCHED DOMINATION BY THE institutions. As in colonial days, there are two sets of laws: CHIEFTAINCY one based on the British judicial system and anchored in a constitution, statutes and judicial precedents, the other The much-heralded decentralisation process, which both resting on unwritten traditional customs, known as donors and the government embraced, has encountered customary law and enforced by chiefs with hereditary many problems resulting from the state’s inherent powers.74 The modern component, on which most reform weaknesses and the bad, old ways of doing things, notably efforts have focused, is the smaller; 66 per cent of the persistence of chiefdom governance; chaotic revenue population lives in rural areas, and over 70 per cent – collection systems; informal provincial land and property including many in cities such as Freetown – submit to the markets; and poor record-keeping.69 jurisdiction of traditional authorities.75 Most importantly, the right to hereditary use of land in villages and chiefdoms Of these, the position of Paramount Chiefs is the greatest depends in most cases on the whims of chiefs. These rights threat to decentralisation. Paramount Chiefs have often and privileges are unwritten, and chiefs, as customary actively interfered with the operation of the new local authorities, remain their primary guarantors, with very few councils and distorted their powers. Elected local checks and balances. councillors complain of humiliation at the hands of chiefs, who remain powerful partly because they are actively The injustices and petty tyrannies inherent in traditional supported by parliamentarians and other central authority, especially as they relate to young people’s access government officials who look to them to deliver votes.70 to land and to women for marriage, contributed to the Donors bear some responsibility for this. When peace alienation which drove some to join the rebellion.76 The came, DFID spent millions of dollars on an ill-conceived challenge has been to streamline customary law and make project to restore Paramount Chiefs – most of whom it fairer and its execution more transparent. Chiefs are had been displaced by the war – as a way of stabilising additionally given restrictive powers by statutory law. The the interior.71 The money, in most cases corruptly used 1965 Public Order Act stipulates that any person intending by local officials, reinforced the power of unaccountable to “convene or hold a public meeting at any place in the individuals over people who probably no longer needed provinces shall first notify in writing the Paramount Chief them. of the Chiefdom in which such place is situated”. The chief in question shall then “by order in writing addressed to such In fact, 44 per cent of Paramount Chiefs today were elected person giving notice, disallow the convening or holding of after 2002. Though most of the new chiefs are educated, the public meeting in any place in the Provinces or impose well travelled and apparently progressive, the institution such conditions as he may consider necessary on any such remains built around a system that ties the chiefs to central meeting where the interests of defence, public order, government officials in a mutually reinforcing alliance public safety or public morality reasonably so require”.77 that, in the words of one analyst, leaves “large groups of excluded citizens and some groups that [in effect] have no hope for advancement within such a closed feudal 72 Affairs, vol. 106, no. 422, January 2007, p. 101. approach to governance”. The position of Paramount 73 Ibid, pp. 96-111. 74 One presidential hopeful, Charles Margai, suggested in 2005 that he would subject Paramount Chiefs to periodic 68 “Child Soldiers Coalition welcomes verdicts against child elections but he quickly backed down when they objected. recruiters in Sierra Leone”, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 75 Crisis Group interviews, Freetown, December 2006; see also Soldiers, press release, Dakar, 20 June 2007. “The Sierra Leone Poverty Profile” (the country’s poverty 69 Crisis Group interviews, Freetown, December 2006. For a reduction strategy paper, PRSP), IMF, February 2005, Chapter review of fast-track decentralisation limitations, see also Richard 3, pp. 20-28. Fanthorpe, “On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and 76 Paul Richards has done valuable work on this, though democratic decentralisation in post-war Sierra Leone”, African sometimes his analysis seems overdrawn. See “Controversy over Affairs, vol. 105, no. 418, January 2006, pp. 27-49. Recent West African Wars: An Agrarian Question?”, occasional 70 Crisis Group interviews, Bo, December 2006. paper, Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 71 See Crisis Group Report, Liberia and Sierra Leone, op. cit., January 2004. pp. 23-24. 77 “The Public Order Act, 1965: Being an Act to Consolidate 72 Paul Jackson, “Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The and Amend the Law Relating to Public Order”, 31 December politics of local government reform in Sierra Leone”, African 1965, Part IV, 24(1) and (2).
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 12
Decentralisation has done little to curb their power, so ended, it has faced the major challenges of re-establishing chiefs remain a serious barrier to a strong and accountable state authority by improving governance and creating “a state. Many are pro-SLPP, some aggressively so. viable structure of coercion” – that is, firmly establishing Secretary-General Jacob Jusu Saffa says his party is the the state’s monopoly over armed violence by rebuilding natural home for chiefs because it is distinctly friendly and strengthening the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed to traditional authority.78 Some abuse the 1965 law to Forces (RSLAF) and the Sierra Leone Police (SLP).83 suppress rival parties. A threat assessment by the Office Because threats have traditionally been internal, emanating of National Security (ONS) in December 2006 noted chiefly from those security forces, the test has been to instances in which Paramount Chiefs tried to prevent the create especially a military that is accountable and loyal to activities of parties other than the SLPP; in one case a the civilian leadership. Since the collapse of the first chief led the police and others to deface the APC party military government in 1968, this concern has led to at least symbol in Kambia District. The report noted that the six attempts at institutional reform of the RSLAF, the latest “blatant show of support” by chiefs for a party could the current UK-funded security sector reform.84 “threaten to limit the rights and freedom of supporters of other parties”, which “may nurture disgruntlement 1. Army loyalty among the locals and possibly confrontations during the electioneering process”. During the war, the RSLAF nearly self-destructed, with many of its personnel joining the rebels to fight against the The Code of Conduct for Political Parties, signed by eight government, which was backed by West African forces registered parties on 20 October 2006,79 urges all to “ensure and the Kamajor militia. After he was reinstated to power that they do not coerce or intimidate Paramount Chiefs or in 1998, President Kabbah initially announced that the their sub-chiefs, or any other authority to deny any political army was to be disbanded but later changed his mind. party the right of access to any chiefdom for political Instead, it was to be reformed by new recruitment and functions”.80 The Political Parties Registration Commission intensive training. The UK took the lead, providing (PPRC) now has code monitors for all twelve districts, substantial funding from its Africa Conflict Prevention based in the regional capitals, but no powers to sanction Pool.85 The projects are now backed by less than 100 UK misconduct. In the current election period, the chief of Bo troops, led by a brigadier general, under the International Town, after reluctantly granting the APC permission to Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT). hold a town hall meeting, disappeared with the key. The police had to break the lock so that the meeting could take RSLAF strength reached 10,300 in 2006, a figure that place.81 There are also isolated examples of citizen appears unsustainable. Even with strong UK support, pay defiance; the Paramount Chief of Mambolo, Northern is low (about $50 monthly for the rank and file). The Province, apparently sought refuge in Freetown after his army still lacks logistical, communication, accommodation community rejected his urging to support the SLPP.82 and transport capabilities and is certainly not yet the highly mobile, capable force envisaged in the security sector review commissioned by the UK.86 Operation Pebu, the C. SUSTAINABILITY OF SECURITY SECTOR important UK-funded project to build barracks, is on REFORM schedule to be completed by 2009, however. Lack of accommodation for many RSLAF personnel potentially Although in political geography – a small, fairly evenly jeopardises discipline and military coherence. distributed population of some five million, a solid resource base and manageable communications – Sierra With its history of abuse and violence, the army is still Leone appears far from terminally fragile, it has been one feared by a large section of the populace, and a key of West Africa’s most unstable countries, suffering coups problem is that the new force is not so new; many and counter-coups, violent upheavals and, recently, total members have been involved in coups and counter-coups state collapse. Since the brutal civil war of 1991-2002 and collaborated with the insurgents during the war, 87 which raises concerns about their dependability. There is
78 Crisis Group interview, Freetown, December 2006. 79 They are: the SLPP, APC, PMDC, Peace and Liberation 83 Christopher Clapham, “Sierra Leone: The Political Economy Party (PLP), Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), United of Internal Conflict”, Clingendael working paper, July 2003. National People’s Party (UNPP), National Democratic Alliance 84 Ibid. (NDA) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP). 85 Aid to Sierra Leone is one of the most significant investments 80 “Political Parties Code of Conduct”, We Yone, 11 December made under this instrument. 2006. 86 “Supporting Security, Justice, and Development: Lessons for 81 Crisis Group interview, Sallieu Kamara, Network Movement a New Era”, Vera Institute of Justice, June 2005, pp. 17-19. for Justice and Development, Bo, 8 June 2007. 87 Kellie Conteh, retired brigadier and National Security 82 Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Bo, 8 June 2007. Coordinator, insisted in December 2006 Crisis Group interviews
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 13
also some evidence that a minority is very hostile to problem of the police and of Sierra Leone more generally, Berewa, because he is believed to have masterminded namely institutional neglect of the poor. While the capital’s while attorney general and justice minister the 1998 economically powerful, such as businesspeople, newspaper trial and execution of more than a dozen officers who editors and lawyers, said the police responded quickly participated in the bloody coup the previous year. The when contacted, impoverished market traders and youths army is still largely dominated by people from the said they were always slow or never responded.92 Northern Province, so more naturally APC supporters. Despite substantial effort to make it more professional The SLP handled the Bo crisis in November 2005 93 and subject to civilian control, this is still not certain. The inappropriately. Its lack of training in crowd control armed forces, in other words, remain a potential source of was evident. The incident, which probably could have instability and probably the most important factor in the been contained easily, caused such trouble in the country’s country’s fragility. second largest city that British-led IMATT forces had to be dispatched to reassure the populace. They flew Margai The UK military, with RSLAF personnel, conducted out to Freetown, where the SLP arrested him. Several spectacular amphibious exercises in Sierra Leone in officers were later redeployed from Bo to less volatile October 2006, involving some 3,000 soldiers and intended areas.94 to provide reassurance that help could come quickly from over the horizon in the event of trouble. Such exercises The SLP reached its target of 9,500 personnel in 2006, should continue for at least the next five to ten years; one and recruitment in 2007 aims to add a further 250 officers. should be conducted a few weeks before the elections. UK The UN Mission’s police section is working with the 95 troops are highly respected, and feared, by the RSLAF, and force to review the training curriculum. Some 3,000 may be the main reason for the army’s present quiescence. personnel have recently received new training focused In the 2002 elections, the security forces voted separately, on crowd control and related activities relevant to the and the results showed limited support for Kabbah and elections. The SLP today is a much more disciplined, the ruling SLPP. In some areas an estimated 80 per cent better equipped force than it was a few years ago. New of the army voted for ex-Armed Forces Revolutionary uniforms, vehicles and better pay and training are clearly Council (AFRC) leader Johnny Paul Koroma’s party, in evidence but few think it is yet competent to handle while the police appeared to support it.88 such critical issues as election violence or widespread demonstrations on its own. Some fear its new-found 2. Police capacity efficiency and professional outlook will be hard to sustain once the British withdraw. The strategy for the elections The UK alone has spent some $40 million retraining and is to free the police from their border tasks and deploy restructuring the SLP, which had been reduced from 9,317 them in potentially volatile areas like Bo, Kenema and (pre-war) to 6,000 at the end of the war.89 Public perception Kono. The army will not participate in the electoral of crime, however, shows little regard for the result. Only process but will take over posts temporarily vacated by 3 per cent of those questioned in a 2004 SLP survey in the police. the four major towns, Freetown, Bo, Makeni and Kenema, replied they felt “very safe” in their communities; 25 per D. POLITICISATION OF THE JUDICIARY cent did not feel safe at all. A further 26 per cent said they “just trust in the Lord’s protection”; 81 per cent claimed 90 In addition to concerns about the limited scope and huge the traffic police extorted money from drivers. expense of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and its In fact, these perceptions do not fully accord with the indictment of CDF members, there are persistent doubts reality of crime incidence. An EU-funded study of policing about lack of accountability and absence of rule of law agencies in 2005 found low levels of violent crime for a more broadly. The 2004 Truth and Reconciliation country just emerging from war.91 One finding in the police perception survey, however, goes to the heart of the
92 To be fair to the SLP, 46 per cent of those surveyed said there had been “a great improvement” in police attitude and that the ONS and the RSLAF have calculated that soldiers competence; only 15 per cent said that there had been “no with this past and who may be prone to subversive activities improvement”. are probably less than 1 per cent and were being monitored. 93 See Section II.B above. 88 Crisis Group Africa Report N°49, Sierra Leone After Elections: 94 Crisis Group interviews, Freetown, December 2006. Another Politics as Usual?, 12 July 2002. pending case involves Ernest Koroma, the APC leader, whose 89 About 900 officers were killed during the war; many fled the bodyguard was arrested for possession of unlicensed weapons. country or left what had become an extremely dangerous job. Many observers think both cases are politically motivated. 90 See “Policing Agencies in Sierra Leone”, op. cit., p. 8. 95 “Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 91 Ibid, p. 5. Integrated Office in Sierra Leone”, 28 November 2006, p. 4.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 14
Commission (TRC) report identified the collapse of an ordnance depot in Freetown (sources suggest they had independent judiciary and the abuse of power and denial been specially taken there by the police).99 of basic human rights that resulted from this collapse as part of the “deplorable conditions” that led to and fuelled Part of the reason for the delay in bringing the men to trial the long conflict.96 The perception of the judiciary as is the fact that the judiciary does not have sufficient judges, unjust and subservient to the executive is still very strong. and the government has had to hire retired judges on The prominent cases below indicate how corrosive the contract. One of these, Samuel Ademusu, is presiding, and problem is. Access to justice is at the heart of democratic Golley’s lawyers have objected, arguing that because he governance and accountability; fair and timely judgements lacks tenure, he will do what the government wants. This are essential for the rule of law. has visibly aggravated the judge. The case has also been put back several times on the grounds that there is no In 2005, thugs reportedly acting on the orders of an SLPP petrol for the prison van to bring the accused to court. parliamentarian and including two of her children, attacked Golley has lost more than half his body weight in the a young journalist, Harry Yansanneh, acting editor of For Pademba Road prison, and a doctor stated he has had Di People. He died from kidney failure in hospital shortly “recurrent episodes of malarial fever and typhoid” and after, apparently as a result of his severe beating. An exhibits acute kidney problems.100 inquest headed by Senior Magistrate Adrian Fischer recommended that the parliamentarian, Fatmata Komeh, While the concerns raised in these high-profile, politically and her children be tried for manslaughter. Komeh was sensitive cases are obvious, the interplay between arrested and briefly detained but freed on order of the customary law and the formal sector brings its own 101 attorney general and justice minister,97 Fred Carew, who problems for vulnerable groups such as women. threw out the charges on grounds that in making the President Kabbah’s reference to justice sector reform in recommendation Fischer had not followed “the rules laid his farewell speech to parliament was complacent, listing down in law”. Komeh, whom the SLPP has not nominated measures in train, but the only concrete improvements are to stand in the August 2007 election, and her children some new laws and new justices of the peace to address 102 (now in the UK) are free. The Sierra Leone Journalist the shortage of judges. Respect for law remains low, Association (SLAJ) as well as family and friends of while impunity continues to characterise much of society. Yansanneh remain seriously aggrieved by what they This is a disincentive to economic investment and perceive as state injustice.98 undermines respect for human rights – both of which are needed to prevent a return to conflict. Omrie Michael Golley, a UK-based lawyer and former self-proclaimed spokesman for the RUF insurgents, was arrested on 12 January 2006. On 23 January, he and two others, Mohamed Bah and David Kai Tongi, both junior 99 ex-RUF combatants, were charged with plotting to Crisis Group interviews, lawyers and legal experts following overthrow the government and assassinate Vice President the case, Freetown, January 2006. 100 Crisis Group has seen the medical record. Berewa. They have been denied bail and their trial 101 For an overview of women’s experience of the informal postponed nearly two dozen times. Key evidence the state legal sector, see “Sierra Leone: Woman face human rights prosecutor has produced includes $100 (said to be from abuses in the informal legal sector”, Amnesty International, $1,000) and two mobile phones Golley is alleged to have 17 May 2006. given the others to facilitate the plot. Also made public is 102 “Many of the ills of our society were blamed on the lack of a picture of the accused, which the defence and other justice particularly for the weak and poor. It is also well known observers state was taken over a week after their arrests, that there could be no sustainable human development where and which appears to show them inspecting the main army there is no justice and where the basic human rights of the citizens are trampled. Reform of the Justice Sector is therefore indispensable for the promotion of the rule of law, the protection of Human Rights, delivery of justice, good governance and economic and social progress. The efforts of my Government to 96 “Witness to Truth”, op. cit. reform the Justice Sector have been supported by a number of 97 Several Crisis Group reports, as well as human rights activists Donor interventions notably UNDP, UNAMSIL, DFID and in the country, have called for separating the offices of attorney the Commonwealth. UNAMSIL and [UNCIVPOL] have general and justice minister. The combination politicises the been involved in Human Rights training and a Bill for the position of chief government prosecutor and is one reason why establishment of a Human Rights Commission has been enacted anti-corruption cases, in particular those dealing with senior and the Commission set up. UNICEF is undertaking the officials, have gone nowhere. The separation of the two offices, strengthening of the Juvenile Justice System in Sierra Leone. also recommended in the TRC report “Witness to Truth”, op. Furthermore, my government has appointed Justices of the Peace cit., is believed to have been one of the constitutional review in order to address severe manpower shortages and to ensure the proposals in the shelved referendum. functioning of the courts in the districts and the chiefdoms to 98 Crisis Group interviews, Freetown, December 2006. address minor cases”. Kabbah, farewell speech, op. cit.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 15
E. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE independent media should also make an effort to be open MEDIA to all and fair in its coverage of political activities. The 1965 Public Order Act has criminal provisions, The vibrancy and diversity of Sierra Leone’s media are not including a three-year prison term, for “defamatory and matched by its credibility. In fact, the media is seriously seditious libel”, which have been interpreted so as to limit limited in both scope and quality. The dozens of critical or embarrassing comment regardless of accuracy. newspapers are often more vocal than reasoned. There is It states that during a trial for seditious libel, “the truth a broad public perception that most are unprofessional and of the matters charged may be inquired into, but shall unreliable.103 All are small, generally owned and edited not amount to defence”. Such provisions led to the by the proprietors themselves, and Freetown-based. Few imprisonment in 2004 for nearly two years of a leading circulate outside the capital. There are persistent reports journalist, Paul Kamara, of For Di People, an opposition of politicians and businesspeople planting stories for self- newspaper. He wrote articles in October 2003 reproducing promotion or to attack opponents and competitors. While a 1967 commission of inquiry report into allegations of the quality of reporting and analysis can be judged fraud relating to the now-defunct Sierra Leone Produce negatively, however, the press is taken seriously by the Marketing Board (SLPMB), which was partly overseen ruling elite, as indicated by persistent attacks on editors by President Kabbah, who was then permanent secretary and reporters by the government and powerful individuals. in the finance ministry. The paper was suspended for six Given limited literacy and widespread poverty, radio has months, and the owner of its printing press was also become the most accessible and dynamic media form. arrested. The law in effect restricts inquiry into activities, There are 31 stations, almost all private, and more than a past and present, of those in authority or aspiring to high 105 dozen new ones are to be launched soon. They are deemed office. more credible than the press. Politically outspoken and The Code of Conduct for Political Parties states “there broadcasting in several national languages, radio reaches shall be equal access to the state media”.106 However, far and wide; with the proliferation of mobile phones, without the power to impose sanctions, the PPRC is not call-in programs have become a strong measure of free in a position to police this provision. The SLAJ has a five- expression and political education.104 person monitoring team to oversee fairness, objectivity UNIOSIL has initiated timely discussions with journalists and equal access, but only for the written press. It will about election reporting. Despite radio’s greater reach, the initially report on a weekly basis to UNIOSIL, which is print media has considerable influence on public debate. committed to ensuring that at least its own radio station Responsible, professional print coverage, therefore, is will be open to all parties during the campaign. critical for successful, violence-free polls. Nevertheless, a donor-supported project to “improve the capacity of F. UN SUPPORT FOR PEACEBUILDING civil society and the media to provide information on and monitor the 2007 national elections and 2008 local The decision of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) government elections”, with a budget of more than $4 to make Sierra Leone one of its first two priority countries million, does not include engagement with newspapers was a welcome promise of sustained international attention and radio. Instead, PIVOT (Promoting Information and to and support for post-conflict reconstruction and Voice for Transparency on Elections) proposes to work consolidation of democracy. The $35 million allocated by with the international media, including the BBC World the Secretary-General under the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Service Trust and Hirondelle Foundation. If its aims are for reconstruction represents some 10 per cent of the to be realised, it is imperative that its managers engage country’s annual official development assistance and a with Sierra Leone journalists, perhaps through the SLAJ. tangible signal of commitment.107 The government’s Likewise, those journalists, again possibly under SLAJ auspices, should commit to reporting the elections fairly and responsibly. 105 In 2006, the SLAJ began a campaign, including a legal Equally, the government must respect the media’s role, challenge, to have the law rescinded, Crisis Group interviews, including by ensuring that all parties and their leaders leading journalists Isaac Massaquoi and David Tam-Baryoh, have equal access to state-owned radio and TV. The Freetown, December 2006. 106 Code of Conduct for Political Parties, para 11. 107 The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is one component of the enhanced UN peacebuilding architecture that also includes the 103 See “Media Sector Mapping in Sierra Leone”, a report by Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It provides a quick infusion of Search for Common Ground/Talking Drum Studio Sierra resources to countries just emerging from conflict or suffering a Leone, 31 October 2005. funding gap in the post-conflict phase of their peace process. 104 Ibid. It helps countries under consideration by the PBC but is also
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 16
plan for spending it identifies four critical areas: youth IV. CONCLUSION empowerment and employment; democracy and good governance; justice and security; and capacity building of public administration. Approximately $6.6 million has Shortly after the 2002 elections, a veteran observer of already been distributed to projects to enhance police Sierra Leone’s politics wrote: crowd control capabilities, create jobs for young people through microfinance and skills training, and build the The landslide victory by the Sierra Leone People’s capacity of the Human Rights Commission. Party (SLPP) in the 2002 elections was due not to any ideological or policy differences with Nonetheless, there is controversy over the timing of the opposition parties, but to the perception among disbursement of these funds. The Secretary-General a plurality of voters that the party delivered on its announced the allocation in March 2007, only a few promise to end the war and therefore deserved months ahead of the presidential and parliamentary re-election….The SLPP, however, can ill-afford elections, thus opening the UN to the charge that it was to bask in electoral triumph or ignore the festering helping the ruling party fund patronage projects in problems of rampant official corruption and mass order to secure votes. The allegation has appeared more poverty that led to armed conflict in the 1990s. plausible to some in Sierra Leone because the ruling party Tackling the problem of corruption and mass presidential candidate, Vice President Berewa, co-chairs deprivation may hold the key to democratic the national steering committee that decides how to consolidation, but it is doubtful whether the SLPP, spend the PBF money. The UN should clarify that the as presently constituted, is capable of leading the funds would have gone to Sierra Leone under any fight against these scourges. The SLPP may be government and are unconnected to the elections. reaching out to become a national party but it still remains an unreconstructed patronage outfit Another concern is that the money was released before that is unresponsive to popular currents and mass adoption of the Strategic Peacebuilding Framework aspirations.109 (Compact), negotiations on which have appropriately been postponed until after the elections in order to secure It is unfair to say that Sierra Leone today is identical to the sustainable local ownership. Disbursement at this time, pre-war shadow state the RUF rebelled against. However however, has diminished the UN’s leverage to secure fragile, national institutions have been rebuilt or built from important commitments from the government in those scratch: serious effort has been put into constructing an negotiations. It has also led to a focus in Freetown on who army and police force that submits to democratic, civilian gets the money rather than consensus building over the 108 control; the new National Revenue Authority (NRA) details of the Compact. The $35 million is intended as has ensured transparent tax collection; and strict only a short-term infusion and catalyst. Much more donor implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification help is required to address adequately youth employment, Scheme has made official diamond exports transparent. good governance, justice and a capable public service. President Kabbah is a weak leader but not a Siaka The projects receiving PBF funding, particularly the Stevens. Except for occasional misuse of the Public one aimed at strengthening youth employment, may Order Act, there is a reasonable level of freedom of backfire if they raise expectations that cannot be met the press and other forms of expression, including widely because funding has dried up. Both bilateral donors and listened to satirical songs, such as Emmerson’s “Tu Fut the international financial institutions will need to supply Arata” about the approaching elections and corruption. the more substantial, longer-term funding required to keep the projects functioning. But corruption in the public services, fuelled no doubt in part by extremely low civil service pay and emoluments, remains the elephant in the room. Rooting it out requires more than higher salaries or occasional exposure and prosecution of an official. It demands a thorough review of the system perpetuating the practice.
The security and justice sectors need several more years of external oversight and support to become self-sustaining. available to other countries as designated by the Secretary- They remain untested, an especially pertinent point in view General. Its resources, which come from voluntary contributions, are meant to act as a catalyst for other, longer-term financial aid. 108 “Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission”, 109 Jimmy Kandeh, “Sierra Leone’s post-conflict elections of Action Aid, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development 2002”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 41, June 2003, (CAFOD) and Care International, June 2007. pp. 182-216.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 17
of instability in neighbouring Guinea, which in early 2007 experienced serious unrest and whose crisis could threaten peace in Sierra Leone and Liberia.110
The 2007 elections are a crucial test of whether Sierra Leone has definitively turned away from conflict, in terms of both security and democratic governance. Renewed political vibrancy has opened up competition but also heightened rivalry. Getting the elections right requires commitment by those in office and those fighting for office. A success would significantly boost chances for recovery and sustainable democracy. A fiasco could undo the gains of an expensive peace process and set the country on the path of destabilisation again.
Perhaps for the first time since the war’s end, the population has a real chance to make a free choice for change. There is no immediate danger of return to conflict if a certain candidate does not win but there is real risk of this if whoever wins does not take seriously the challenge to tackle the still extant conditions for conflict. Those who gain power must commit to substantial governance reforms, and civil society and the electorate more generally, with further international help, must ensure that commitment is kept. Dakar/Brussels, 12 July 2007
110 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°121, Guinea: Change or Chaos, 14 February 2007.
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 18
APPENDIX A
MAP OF SIERRA LEONE
The boundaries and names shown and the designations Mamou used on this map do not imply official endorsement or er acceptance by the United Nations. Nig K o L le GUINEA n o t l e a SIERRA Kindia LEONEFaranah Médina Dula Falaba Tabili ba o s a g Dubréka e K n i o c Musaia r M Gberia a c Coyah S Bafodia Fotombu t a e r G Kabala Banian Konta Fandié Kamakwie Koinadugu Bendugu Forécariah li Kukuna Kamalu Fadugu Se Bagbe r Bambaya Madina e g Jct. i ies NORTHERN N arc Sc Kurubonla e Karina tl it Mateboi Alikalia Kambia L Yombiro M Pendembu Bumbuna Batkanu a Bendugu Rokupr b o l e Binkolo M Mange Gbinti e Kortimaw Is. Kayima l Mambolo Makeni i Bendou Bodou Port Loko Magburaka Tefeya Yomadu Lunsar Masingbi Koidu-Sefadu li Koundou Lungi e a Pepel S n Int'l Airport or a Matotoka Yengema R o el p k m Freetown a Njaiama Ferry Masiaka Mile 91 P Njaiama- Wellington a Yele Sewafe Tongo Gandorhun o Hastings Yonibana Tungie M Koindu WESTERN Songo Bradford EASTERN AREA Waterloo Mongeri York Rotifunk Falla Bomi Kailahun Buedu a Panguma i Taiama Moyamba a Manowa Giehun Bauya T Boajibu Njala Dambara Pendembu Yawri Bendu Banana Is. Bay Mano Lago Bo Segbwema Daru Shenge Sembehun SOUTHERN Gerihun Plantain Is. Sieromco Mokanje Kenema Tikonko Bumpe a Blama Tokpombu Gbangbatok Sew ro S Kpetewoma Koribundu o her Nitti M bro R iver a o i Turtle Is. o M h Sherbro I. Sumbuya a Matru je n M Bonthé a
a Potoru t
W i Gorahun o a Man r t ATLANTIC OCEAN S o br Pujehun Sher Zimmi Kongo LIBERIA o an Lake M Mabesi SIERRA LEONE Bendaja a Lake Mape of National capital L Bopolu Provincial capital l au City, town Sulima t P Bomi-Hills Sain Major airport Bong International boundary Lake Provincial boundary Robertsport Piso Kle Main road
Secondary road 0 20 40 60 80 km Railroad 0 10 20 30 40 50 mi
Map No. 3902 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS Department for Peacekeeping Operations January 2004 Cartographic Section
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 19
APPENDIX B
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, Uganda, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe; in Asia, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor- Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Teams of political analysts are located within or close by Kosovo and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, violent conflict. Based on information and assessments the rest of the Andean region and Haiti. from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, foundations, companies and individual donors. The a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct following governmental departments and agencies regular update on the state of play in all the most significant currently provide funding: Australian Agency for situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International widely by email and printed copy to officials in Trade, Canadian International Development Agency, foreign ministries and international organisations Canadian International Development Research Centre, and made available simultaneously on the website, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, governments and those who influence them, including French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Japanese support for its policy prescriptions. International Cooperation Agency, Principality of The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss by the former European Commissioner for External Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador of Foreign affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign International Development, U.S. Agency for International Minister Gareth Evans. Development. Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based Corporation of New York, Carso Foundation, Compton as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundación DARA organisation currently operates twelve regional offices (in Internacional, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, Amman, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. local field representation in sixteen additional locations & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart (Abuja, Baku, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu, Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Yerevan). Crisis Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Radcliffe Group currently covers nearly 60 areas of actual or potential Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Philanthropy Advisors and Viva Trust. Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, July 2007 Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 20
APPENDIX C
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2004
CENTRAL AFRICA Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, Africa Report N°124, 26 April 2007 Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report N°128, 5 July Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 2007 HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue in Africa: Lessons from Uganda, Issues Report N°3, 16 April 2004 HORN OF AFRICA End of Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch, Africa Report Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, Africa Report N°76, 25 Nº81, 5 July 2004 (also available in French) March 2004 (also available in Arabic) Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, Africa Briefing Nº18, Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report N°79, 4 May 2004 7 July 2004 (also available in French) Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, Africa Report N°80, 23 May Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem, 2004 (also available in Arabic) Africa Report N°84, 26 August 2004 Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan, Africa Report Elections in Burundi: The Peace Wager, Africa Briefing Nº20, 9 N°83, 23 August 2004 (also available in Arabic and in French) December 2004 (also available in French) Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD, Africa Briefing Back to the Brink in the Congo, Africa Briefing Nº21, 17 Nº19, 5 October 2004 December 2004 Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?, Africa Report Peace in Northern Uganda: Decisive Weeks Ahead, Africa N°88, 21 December 2004 Briefing N°22, 21 February 2005 Darfur: The Failure to Protect, Africa Report N°89, 8 March The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, Africa 2005 (also available in Arabic) Report N°91, 30 March 2005 A New Sudan Action Plan, Africa Briefing N°24, 26 April 2005 Shock Therapy for Northern Uganda’s Peace Process, Africa Briefing N°23, 11 April 2005 Do Americans Care About Darfur?, Africa Briefing N°26, 1 June 2005 The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All, Africa Briefing N°25, 12 May 2005 The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps, Africa Briefing Nº28, 6 July 2005 Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda, Africa Briefing Nº27, 23 June 2005 Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, Africa Report Nº95, 11 July 2005 Élections au Burundi: Reconfiguration radicale du paysage politique, Africa Briefing N°31, 25 August 2005 (only available The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace, in French) Africa Report N°96, 25 July 2005 A Congo Action Plan, Africa Briefing N°34, 19 October 2005 Garang’s Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan, Africa Briefing N°30, 9 August 2005 (also available in Arabic) Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis, Africa Report N°103, 9 January 2006 (also available in French) Unifying Darfur’s Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace, Africa Briefing N°32, 6 October 2005 (also available in Arabic) A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, Africa Briefing N°35, 11 January 2006 The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination, Africa Report N°99, 25 October 2005 Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report N°104, 13 February 2006 Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report N°100, 12 December 2005 Congo’s Elections: Making or Breaking the Peace, Africa Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War, Africa Report N°101, Report N°108, 27 April 2006 22 December 2005 Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, Africa Report N°102, 5 January and Uganda, Africa Report N°112, 28 June 2006 2006 Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in To Save Darfur, Africa Report N°105, 17 March 2006 the Congo, Africa Report N°114, 20 July 2006 (also available Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road in French) Ahead, Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Peace in Northern Uganda?, Africa Briefing N°41, 13 September Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership, Africa Report 2006 Nº110, 23 May 2006 (also available in French) Securing Congo’s Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Chad: Back toward War?, Africa Report N°111, 1 June 2006 Showdown, Africa Briefing N°42, 2 October 2006 (also available (only available in French) in French) Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, Africa Briefing N°39, 20 Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk, Africa Report N°120, June 2006 (also available in Arabic) 30 November 2006 (also available in French) Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo Congo: Staying Engaged after the Election, Africa Briefing N°44, and Uganda, Africa Report N°112, 28 June 2006 9 January 2007 (also available in French)
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 21
Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?, Africa Report N°116, Côte d’Ivoire: Stepping up the pressure, Africa Briefing N°40, 10 August 2006 7 September 2006 (only available in French) Getting the UN into Darfur, Africa Briefing N°43, 12 October Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, Africa Report N°118, 28 2006 September 2006 Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead, Africa Briefing N°45, 26 Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, Africa Report N°119, January 2007 25 October 2006 Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, Africa Report N°125, Guinea: Change or Chaos, Africa Report N°121, 14 February 30 April 2007 2007 (also available in French) Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis, Africa Report SOUTHERN AFRICA N°123, 28 March 2007 Zimbabwe: In Search of a New Strategy, Africa Report N°78, Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?, Africa Report N°126, 19 April 2004 30 May 2007 Blood and Soil: Land, Politics and Conflict Prevention in Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?, Zimbabwe and South Africa, Africa Report Nº85, 17 September 2004 Africa Report N°127, 27 June 2007 (only available in French) Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, Africa Report N°86, 30 November 2004 OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next?, Africa Report N°93, 7 June 2005 For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking, Africa Briefing Nº29, 14 • Asia July 2005. • Europe Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point?, • Latin America and Caribbean Africa Report N°97, 17 August 2005 • Middle East and North Africa Zimbabwe’s Continuing Self-Destruction, Africa Briefing N°38, • Thematic Issues 6 June 2006 • CrisisWatch Zimbabwe: An Opposition Strategy, Africa Report N°117, 24 please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org August 2006 Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?, Africa Report N°122, 5 March 2007 WEST AFRICA Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils, Africa Report N°75, 30 January 2004 Côte d’Ivoire: No Peace in Sight, Africa Report N°82, 12 July 2004 (also available in French) Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Africa Report N°87, 8 December 2004 Côte d'Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come, Africa Report N°90, 24 March 2005 (currently only available in French) Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?, Africa Report N°92, 31 March 2005 Stopping Guinea’s Slide, Africa Report N°94, 14 June 2005 (also available in French) Liberia’s Elections: Necessary But Not Sufficient, Africa Report, 7 September 2005 Côte d'Ivoire: Halfway Measures Will Not Suffice, Africa Briefing N°33, 12 October 2005 (currently only available in French) Liberia: Staying Focused, Africa Briefing N°36, 13 January 2006 Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System, Africa Report N°107, 6 April 2006 Guinea in Transition, Africa Briefing N°37, 11 April 2006 (also available in French) Côte d’Ivoire: Peace as an Option, Africa Report N°109, 17 May 2006 (only available in French) Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, Africa Report N°113, 19 July 2006 The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest, Africa Report N°115, 3 August 2006
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 22
APPENDIX D
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Co-Chairs Kim Campbell Christopher Patten Former Prime Minister of Canada; Secretary General, Club of Madrid Former European Commissioner for External Relations, Naresh Chandra Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador of India to the U.S. Oxford University Thomas Pickering Joaquim Alberto Chissano Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, Former President of Mozambique El Salvador and Nigeria Victor Chu Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong
President & CEO Wesley Clark Gareth Evans Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Former Foreign Minister of Australia Pat Cox Former President of European Parliament
Executive Committee Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Morton Abramowitz Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey Mark Eyskens Former Prime Minister of Belgium Cheryl Carolus Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Joschka Fischer Secretary General of the ANC Former Foreign Minister of Germany Maria Livanos Cattaui* Leslie H. Gelb Former Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Yoichi Funabashi Carla Hills Editor in Chief, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative Frank Giustra Lena Hjelm-Wallén Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Stephen Solarz Sweden Former U.S. Congressman Swanee Hunt George Soros Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt Chairman, Open Society Institute Alternatives Fund; former Ambassador U.S. to Austria Pär Stenbäck Anwar Ibrahim Former Foreign Minister of Finland Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia *Vice-Chair Asma Jahangir UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief; Adnan Abu-Odeh Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein Nancy Kassebaum Baker and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN Former U.S. Senator Kenneth Adelman James V. Kimsey Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL) Disarmament Agency Wim Kok Ersin Arioglu Former Prime Minister of Netherlands Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi Group Ricardo Lagos Shlomo Ben-Ami Former President of Chile Former Foreign Minister of Israel Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Lakhdar Brahimi Novelist and journalist, U.S. Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Algerian Ayo Obe Foreign Minister Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy, Zbigniew Brzezinski Nigeria Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President Christine Ockrent Journalist and author, France
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity Crisis Group Africa Report N°129, 12 July 2007 Page 23
Victor Pinchuk Douglas Schoen Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S. Samantha Power Thorvald Stoltenberg Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Former Foreign Minister of Norway University Ernesto Zedillo Fidel V. Ramos Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study Former President of Philippines of Globalization Ghassan Salamé Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of International Relations, Paris
PRESIDENT’S CIRCLE Crisis Group's President’s Circle is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission. Canaccord Adams Bob Cross Ford Nicholson Neil Woodyer Limited Frank E. Holmes Ian Telfer Don Xia
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser John Chapman Chester Iara Lee & George Tilleke & Gibbins (Co-Chair) Chevron Gund III Foundation Baron Guy Ullens de Elliott F. Kulick Citigroup Sheikh Khaled Juffali Schooten (Co-Chair) George Kellner VIVATrust Companhia Vale do Rio Marc Abramowitz Doce Amed Khan Stanley Weiss Anglo American PLC Richard H. Cooper Shiv Vikram Khemka Westfield Group APCO Worldwide Inc. Credit Suisse Scott J. Lawlor Yasuyo Yamazaki Ed Bachrach John Ehara George Loening Yapi Merkezi Equinox Partners McKinsey & Company Construction and Patrick E. Benzie Industry Inc. Frontier Strategy Group Najib A. Mikati Stanley M. Bergman and Shinji Yazaki Edward J. Bergman Konrad Fischer Donald PelsPT Newmont Sunny Yoon BHP Billiton Alan Griffiths Pacific Nusantara (Mr. Robert Humberson) Harry Bookey and Charlotte and Fred Pamela Bass-Bookey Hubbell Michael L. Riordan
SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time. Martti Ahtisaari Stanley Fischer George J. Mitchell William Taylor (Chairman Emeritus) Malcolm Fraser (Chairman Emeritus) Leo Tindemans Diego Arria Bronislaw Geremek Surin Pitsuwan Ed van Thijn Paddy Ashdown I.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Shirley Williams Zainab Bangura Max Jakobson George Robertson Grigory Yavlinski Christoph Bertram Todung Mulya Lubis Michel Rocard Uta Zapf Jorge Castañeda Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe Alain Destexhe Barbara McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun Marika Fahlen Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim