American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference Author(S): Noel H

American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference Author(s): Noel H. Pugach Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Jun., 1977), pp. 67-86 Published by: Organization of American Historians Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1888274 . Accessed: 10/03/2012 00:14

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http://www.jstor.org AmericanFriendsh4 for China and the ShantungQuestion at the WashingtonConference NOEL H. PUGACH

IOLLOWING the Paris Peace conference,the Shantungdispute be- tweenJapan and China disturbedworld leaders who soughtto stabilize internationalrelations in theFar East and to developgreater cooperation amongthe industrialpowers. Secretary of StateCharles Evans Hughes triedinitially to isolate the Shantungissue fromthe othercomplex diplomaticquestions and to settlethe matterprior to the Washington conference.This provedto be impossible.Hughes was onlytechnically correctin maintainingthat the "Shantungsettlement lay outsidethe Conference"and he lateradmitted that "the successof the Conference hung upon this settlement."'Hughes had also favoreddirect Sino- Japanesenegotiations with a minimumof UnitedStates involvement. It was, therefore,ironic that the statedepartment, and especiallyHughes, subsequentlyassumed a major role in resolvingthe disagreement. Severalscholars have notedthis,2 but theyhave not seen that,contrary to Hughes' expectations,American friendship for China exerted signifi- cantinfluence on theactual terms of the settlement. During the past two decades,historical scholarship has tendedto assailthe popular image of the United States as thespecial benefactor of Chinaand ardentdefender of the Open Door. As partof their critical ex- aminationof the mythsassociated with American involvement in the Far East, scholarshave pointedout thatthe UnitedStates generally ig- nored the China market,actually cooperated with the otherimperial powersin despoilingChina, and acquiescedin numerousassaults on Chinesesovereignty and self-determination.Their analysisprovides a Noel H. Pugachis assistantprofessor of historyin the Universityof New Mexico. Researchfor thisarticle was partiallysupported by a travelgrant from the ResearchAllocations Committee of theUniversity of New Mexico. ' Quoted in BettyGlad, CharlesEvans Hughes and the Illusionsof Innocence:A Studyin AmericanDiplomacy (Urbana, 1966), 293. 2 Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the WashingtonConference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville,1970), 157-65; RussellH. Fifield,"Secretary Hughes and the ShantungQuestion," PacificHistorical Review, XXIII (Nov. 1954), 373-85; Glad,Charles Evans Hughes, 292-94.

67 68 The Journalof American History usefulcorrective to the traditionalistinterpretation of Sino-American relations.3 And yet,it would be a mistaketo dismissAmerican friendship for China as futilerhetoric, sheer hypocrisy,naive idealism,or romantic Sinophilism.For United States policy makersamity was rooted in Americanself-interest as well as idealism.The pro-Chineseelement in the Departmentof State consideredAmerican friendship a valuable diplomaticasset thathad to be cultivated.Paul S. Reinsch.Edward T. Williams,and othersargued that continued Chinese confidence would enable the UnitedStates to asserteconomic and politicalprimacy in Asia, encouragethe developmentof democracyand modernizationin China,and containJapanese and Europeanaggression.4 This viewwas sharedby policymakers who weremore restrained in theirenthusiasm for China or who refusedto choose sides in Asia. For example,minister Jacob Gould Schurman,upon presentinghis creden- tialsto thepresident of China in September1921, stressedthe history of good willand justicethat had governedSino-American relations. Schur- man believedthat he truthfullydescribed American policy and feltthat the Chinesehad to be remindedof it, becausePeking was reluctantto give fullrecognition and supportto the FederalWireless Company contract.5John V. A. MacMurray,who pridedhimself on his tough- mindedoutlook and warnedof the dangersof appearingto be anti- Japanese,agreed that the United States and Chinahad parallelinterests. "Our policiesdo runalong with China's good, and theyhave been op- posed by Japan:and in thatsense we are committedto a pro-Chinese policy," he noted;"But we are not pro-or anti-anybodyor anything, J Warren1. Cohen,America's Response to China: An InterpretativeHistory of Sino-American Relations(New York, 1971); John K. Fairbank," 'American China Policy' to 1898: A Misconception,"Pacific Historical Review, XXXIX (Nov. 1970), 409-20; Tang Tsou, America's Failurein China,1941-1950 (Chicago, 1963); Paul A. Varg, The Makingof a Myth:The United Statesand China, 1897-1912 (East Lansing, 1968); WilliamAppleman Williams, "China and Japan:A Challengeand a Choice of the NineteenTwenties," PacificHistorical Review, XXVI (Aug. 1957), 259-79; MarilynBlatt Young, The Rhetoricof Empire:American China Policy 1895-1901(Cambridge, 1969). 4 Paul S. Reinsch,An AmericanDiplomat in China (GardenCity, N. Y., 1922); EdwardT. Williamsto RobertLansing, April 13, 1918, BreckinridgeLong Papers (ManuscriptDivision, Libraryof Congress). ' JacobG. Schurmanto CharlesEvans Hughes,Sept. 13, 1921, JacobGould SchurmanPapers (CornellUniversity Library, Ithaca, N.Y.). In 1918, theChinese government had signeda contract withthe FederalWireless Company of San Franciscoto constructradio stations in severalcities. Oppositionfrom other foreign powers and protestsby the Marconi Companythat the Federal WirelessCompany had infringedon its patentrights delayed the implementationof theagreement. The state departmentvigorously supported the FederalWireless Company contract in orderto protectAmerican economic interests and the securityof Americancommunications in the Pacific and Far East. AmericanFriendship 69 save as our own principlesand policiesare securedor injured."6The Chineseencouraged, in turn,the notion of Sino-Americanfriendship in orderto obtaindisinterested or nonpoliticalassistance and to thwartthe "barbarians"threatening China's existence.' The settlementof the Shantungquestion at the Washingtoncon- ferencedemonstrates that, within the constraintsof America'soverall objectives,American friendship for China did shape officialUnited Statespolicy. Hughes limitedthe extentof Americanintervention on behalfof China and categoricallyruled out theuse ofmilitary force. Nor did the secretary'spro-Chinese advisers entertain the thoughtof resort- ing to militarypressure.8 Still, that peculiar concern with doing justice to Chinawhile serving American interests produced a farmore favorable settlementfor China then had earlierseemed possible.Against the backdropof widespread public sympathy for the Chinese, China's friends in thestate department played an importantrole in determiningthe out- comeof the Shantung issue. The UnitedStates had reluctantlyacquiesced in the Japaneseseizure ofShantung in 1914 and thetemporary transfer of German rights in the provinceto Japanin 1915. Reinsch,the ardentlypro-Chinese minister to Peking duringmost of the Wilson administration,and the other friendsof China grudginglyaccepted the realityof wartimeexigencies. But they looked to the postwarconference to restoreShantung to China.9They were to be sadlydisappointed. Japanesedelegates came to Versailleswith not only secret Allied pledgesof supportfor Japan's claims but also a treatywith the corrupt militaristregime in Peking,signed in September1918, forthe purpose of developingthe ShantungRailway as a jointSino-Japanese enterprise. Nevertheless,the friendsof China counted on sympatheticworld opinionand WoodrowWilson's moralleadership to rescuethe Chinese governmentand to wrestShantung from Japan. Leavingnothing to chance,Reinsch and the Far Easternadvisers at the Paris conference repeatedlywarned the Presidentof the need to returnthe Shantung Railwayand economiccontrol in theprovince to China. "To disappoint 6 John V. A. MacMurray,note [Aug. 1921], John V. A. MacMurrayPapers (Princeton UniversityLibrary, Princeton, N.J.). ' Forexample, see Young,Rhetoric of Empire, 12, 81, 231. 8 Charles E. Hughes, "Memorandumfor Mr. MacMurray," Jan. 26, 1922, 793.94/1265, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State,RG 59 (NationalArchives); Merlo J. Pusey,Charles EvansHughes (2 vols.,New York,1951), II, 505-06. 9 Reinsch,An AmericanDiplomat in China,123-49. For thegeneral background, see RussellH. Fifield,Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacyof the ShantungQuestion (Hamden, Conn., 1965). 70 The Journalof AmericanHistory herwill meanirreparable injury to our good namein the FAR EAST," Williamsadvised the Americanpeace delegation.General Tasker Bliss, speakingalso forRobert Lansing and HenryWhite, told Wilson: "If we supportJapan's claims, we abandon the democracyof China to the domination of the Prussianized, militarismof Japan.... We shall be sowing dragon's teeth.... Peace is desirable, but there are things dearerthan peace-justice and freedom."10In spite of these appeals, Wilsonresponded to otherfactors: the pressureof the Allies, the fear that Japan would withdrawfrom the conference,and his own ra- tionalizationthat the League of Nationswould rightthe matterin the end. The Treatyof Versaillesawarded Japan all formerGerman rights and preferencesin Shantung,including the railway,in returnfor a promiseto restorethe leaseholdof Kiaochow to China undercertain conditions.l Seriousconsequences followed. The stunnedChinese delegation refusedto signthe peace treaty,and Chineseresentment and nationalism exploded in the May FourthMovement. Wilson's abandonmentof Chinaand his disavowalof the Americanminister's assurances brought Reinsch'sresignation in June 1919. "Ashamed to look a Chinesein the face," Williamshastily left Paris. Withoutconcealing their anger, Reinsch,Lansing, and StanleyK. Hornbeck-a technicaladviser-insistedthat Wilson ask Japanfor guarantees that it wouldrestore Shan- tungto China. The President,chagrined when the Japanese demurred, was dealta farheavier blow when the public and Congress severely denounced theShantung decision, which became an importantfactor in theSenate's rejectionof the Versaillessettlement."2 The San FranciscoChronicle, a Republicannewspaper and a frequentadvocate of close economicrela- tionswith Japan, editorialized: "The Presidentdoes not seem to us to

0 Paul S. Reinschto Lansing,Dec. 12, 1918, 893.77/1696, GeneralRecords of the Department of State;E. T. Williamsto Lansing,Jan. 28, 1919, E. T. Williamsmemo, April 9, 1919, E. T. Williamsto WoodrowWilson, April 24, 1919, TaskerBliss to Wilson,April 30, 1919, Edward T. WilliamsPapers (University of California, Berkeley); E. T. Williamsto BreckinridgeLong, May 5, 1919, LongPapers. E. T. Williamsto Long,May 5, 1919, Long Papers;Thomas Millardto Reinsch,June 23, 1919, Paul S. Reinsch Papers (Wisconsin State HistoricalSociety, Madison); MacMurray, memorandumon Shantung,July 21, 1919, MacMurrayPapers. 2 Reinschto Wilson,June 7, 1919, 123.R271/101, General Recordsof the Departmentof State;Reinsch to Lansing,July 24, 1919, Reinschto Wilson,Sept. 5, 1919 (probablyneither was sent),Reinsch Papers; E. T. Williamsto Long,May 5, 1919, LongPapers; Stanley K. Hornbeckto Wilsonand Lansing,May 27, 1919, StanleyK. HornbeckPapers (Hoover Institutionon War, Revolution,and Peace, StanfordUniversity, Stanford); Hornbeck to Wilson, June 5, 1919, ibid.; Hornbeck,"Outstanding Questions Relating to Far EasternAffairs," July 24, 1919, Frank Polk Papers (Yale UniversityLibrary, New Haven); Wilson to Lansing,June 20, 1919, ibid.; Lansingto Baron NobuakiMakino, June 28, 1919, ibid.; EdwardHouse Diary,Aug. 7, 1919, EdwardHouse Papers(Yale UniversityLibrary). AmericanFriendship 71 statethe real issue. It is a moralissue. It is not assumedthat in the futureany more than in the past we shall go swashbucklingabout rightingall wrongsin the world.The objectionmade is thatwe should not becomea formalguaranteeing party to whatthe Presidentintimates andunofficial persons assert is an abominablevillainy." 13 WithShantung already in itspossession, Japanese officials pressed the Chinese governmentto enter into bilateralnegotiations. They were eager to validatethe Versaillesaward and arrangefor the returnof Kiaochow to China. The totteringPeking regime refused these over- tures;it talkedinstead of takingthe matterto the League of Nations. Meanwhile,China's friendsin theUnited States were ineffective because ofthe extended debate and eventualrejection by theSenate of the peace treaty.14 Americanleaders, however, recognized that a quick and just resolu- tion of the Shantungissue was a necessaryprelude to comprehensive settlementof Far Easternproblems. Schurman, who was notconsidered a Sinophile,stated bluntly during his visitto Japanin 1920 that"the wayto restoreShantung was to restoreit and thesooner this was done, thebetter would be theeffect on publicsentiment in theUnited States." He didnot spell out theterms of the restoration, but in thecourse of the Senate's considerationof his nominationas ministerto Pekingin the springof 1921 he again remindedSenator James Wadsworth of his in- sistenceupon the immediate transfer of Shantung to China.'5 The summoningof the Conferenceon the Limitationof Armaments in July1921 and the inclusionof Far Easternquestions on the agenda highlightedthe Shantungissue. It emergedas "probablythe mostim- portantFar Easternquestion that called for solution in 1921." To pre- ventChina from raising the questionat theWashington conference, the Japaneseambassador, Kijuro Shidehara,asked Hughes to urge the Chineseto enterinto bilateral talks. Hughes, attempting to getJapan to attendthe conference without prior agreement on theagenda, expressed interestin the proposalwithout committing himself. But he explicitly statedthat before extending its good officesthe UnitedStates must be

13 San FranciscoChronicle, Sept. 20, 1919. 14 Departmentof State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates 1920 (3 vols.,Washington, 1935), I, 814; BainbridgeColby to CharlesTenney, April 8, 1920, 793.94/1082a, GeneralRecords of theDepartment of State; Tenney to Colby,April 14, 1920, 793.94/1083,ibid.; Roland Morris to Colby,April 23, 1920, 793.94/1084, ibid.; Tenneyto Colby,June 1, 1920, 793.94/1088 and 793.94/1091,ibid. 15 Reporton a luncheongiven by the Council on ForeignRelations, July 14, 1920, FredRogers to MacMurray,Aug. 10, 1920, MacMurrayPapers; Schurman to Sen. JamesWadsworth, May 16, 21, 1921, ArthurJ. Brownto WarrenG. Harding,April 14, 1921, SchurmanPapers. 72 The Journalof American History givenfull information and mustbe assuredthat Japan would offer a fair and liberalsettlement. Sensing the driftof affairsfrom his conversations withstate department officials, Alfred Sze, the Chineseminister to the UnitedStates, suggested that Hughes mediate the conflict. 16 Hugheswas not anxiousto mediate.He informedSze and Schurman thatthe United States was primarilyinterested in disposingof the issue, thatit wishedto avoid a repetitionof the impasseat Paris,and thatit could not act as an advocatefor either China or Japan.In fact,Hughes was neitherparticularly sympathetic to China nor hopefulof a settlementfavorable to China.The secretaryof state believed that the Chinese had prejudicedtheir case by signingthe 1915 and 1918 agreements concerningShantung. He was also increasinglyannoyed with Chinese politicaland financialdisorganization, all ofwhich threatened American loans and futureeconomic influence. When, at the last minute,Peking defaultedon a loan fromthe Continentaland CommercialTrust and SavingsBank, Hughes angrilydirected Schurman to warnthe Chinese thatunless they took immediate steps to remedythe situation,America wouldclose its moneymarkets to China foran indefiniteperiod. This would"create a convictionof such a lackof authority and responsibility ... as cannot but affectmost adversely the position of China at the forthcomingconference." Hughes, moreover,was sensitiveto the degreeof pressurethat could be appliedto the Japanese.In conversa- tionswith his advisers,Hughes stressedthe need fora genuinecom- promiseand expressedhis own viewthat Japan should be givena share in therailway. But therewas anotherside. Hughes realizedthat resolving the Shan- tungmatter as wellas otherissues would determine his successin bring- ing stabilityto the Far East, effectinga generalaccommodation with Japan,and testingJapan's willingnessto accept Americanformulated groundrules for competition in China. Moreover,his desireto restore orderand unityto China, to set the consortiumin operation,and to secureChinese compliance with the wishes of the Federal Wireless Com- panynecessitated the retentionof Americangood will and influencein China. Hughes also understoodthat the Senate's approval of the Washingtonconference would depend on a successfulresolution of the

1 Departmentof State, ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates 1921 (2 vols., Washington, 1936), 1, 613-17; MacMurray,"Memorandum on a Conversationwith AlfredSze," Aug. 13, 1921, 500.A4/128, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State; HenryBeerits, "Far Eastern Questions: The WashingtonConference," Charles E. Hughes Papers (ManuscriptDivision, Libraryof Congress); E. T. WilliamsDiary, Aug. 11, 1921, WilliamsPapers; Buckley, The United Statesand the WashingtonConference, 159-60. AmericanFriendship 73 Shantungquestion. American public opiniondemanded a settlement thatat leastappeared to be favorableto China.17 These realitiesconfronted Hughes whenthe Japaneserevealed their termsfor settlementon September8, 1921.18 Althoughthey made some concessionsin otherareas, the Japanesestill insistedupon joint ownershipand operationof the Shantungrailroad and minesas well as continuedJapanese policing of the railway. Seizingon Hughes' requestfor a detailedanalysis of the Japanese proposals,state department experts now joined hands to oppose Hughes' positionand to revealJapanese duplicity. MacMurray, head Qfthe Far EasternDivision, was primarilyconcerned with the defense of American rightsand interestsand therestoration of the balance of power. The two majortechnical advisers in the Americandelegation to theWashington conference,however, also had deep emotionalattachments to the Chinesecause. Williams,on leave fromhis professorshipat theUniver- sityof California,and Hornbeck,a politicalscientist and sometimead- viserto the statedepartment, nursed bitter memories of the American betrayalat Paris. They remainedsuspicious of Japaneseintentions and methods,and theymaintained that a totalrestoration of Shantungto Chinawas required,both as a matterof justice and forthe protection of America'slong-range interests in China.19 Williams' memorandumof September10, and Hornbeck'sof Sep- tember15, to whichMacMurray attached comments, carefully dissected theJapanese proposals. Reminding Hughes of Wilson's error-ignoring the significanceof Japaneseeconomic rights-Hornbeck stated: "The kernel,the meat, the piee de resistance,the pearl of the whole matter is the railway.... Give Japan the Shantung Railway and you give her the instrument for recovering all that she gives up.... Better yield everythingthan yield the railway." All three advisersinsisted that

17 Beerits,"Far EasternQuestions," HughesPapers; E. T. WilliamsDiary, Aug. 1, 13, 1921, WilliamsPapers; Departmentof State, ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates 1921, 1, 621; Buckley, The United States and the WashingtonConference, 159-61; Glad, Charles Evans Hughes, 292-94; Fifield,"Secretary Hughes and the ShantungQuestion," 373-75; William ApplemanWilliams, "China and Japan," 263-64. 18 Memorandumof a conversationbetween Hughes and Kijuro Shidehara,Sept. 8, 1921, 793.94/1316, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State; Beerits,"Far EasternQuestions," HughesPapers. 19 MacMurrayMemorandum on Shantung,July 21, 1919, MacMurrayPapers; E. T. Williams Diary,Aug. 1, Sept. 10, 13, 1921, WilliamsPapers; MacMurray to Hughes,Sept. 10, 15, 1921, 793.94/1291 and 793.94/1284, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State;E. T. Williamsto Hughes,Sept. 10, 1921, 793.94/1291, ibid.; "Memorandum:On Japan'sProposals Concerning Shantung-Negotiationsand Substance" (preparedby Hornbeck),Sept. 15, 1921, 793.94/1284, ibid.; Akira Iriye,After Imperialism: The Searchfor a New Orderin the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge,1965), 14. 74 The Journalof American History Chinaobtain unqualified control of the railway, in bothits operation and policing,and thatit becomepart of China's unifiedrailroad system. If Japanhad to be compensated,they advised financing a loan throughthe Consortiumor theAssociation of Chinese Bankers. Hornbeck also asked MacMurrayto counselHughes to be patientwith the Chineseon the FederalWireless Company contract. Japan and Britain,he pointedout, werepressing China for concessions before the conference, and personal and partyconflicts were responsible for the Chinese unreasonableness. It was in theinterest of the United States to strengthenrather than weaken China beforethe conference.The Far Easternadvisers conceded that China mightindeed obtain better terms before the conferenceopened, but theydeclared "that it would be a mistakefor this Government to place itselfin the positionof recommendingthat China negotiatewith Japanon the basis of these proposals,at least untilwe have received satisfactoryassurances of the purport of several of the terms. ' 20 Through their memorandaand conferenceswith Hughes, these friendsof China convinced the secretary that Japan had to be pressedfor a moregenerous settlement. When the Japaneseambassador called on Hughes on the afternoonof September15, 1921, the secretaryex- pressedhis disapprovalof joint ownershipof the railwayand declared that,in view of Chineseopposition and the tenorof Americanpublic opinion,the UnitedStates could not assumethe moralresponsibility of urgingit on China's delegates.Hughes' positionelicited an admission fromShidehara that Japan's proposals were not final.Taking advantage of this opening,Hughes asked fora plan "by whichChina would be able to obtaincomplete control and ownershipof the railway by making reasonablecompensation."2 The Far Easternadvisers, however, had proofthat the proposalswere presentedto China as "Japan's utmost concession."Thus, theywarned Hughes thatit was necessaryto place on the publicrecord Shidehara's statements that his governmentwas notinflexible.22 In its reply of October 5, the Chinese governmentrejected the Japaneseproposals outright and declaredthat Japan's concessions were

20 E. T. WilliamsDiary, Sept. 13, 15, Nov. 22, 1921, WilliamsPapers; MacMurray to Hughes, Sept. 10, 15, 1921, 793.94/1291 and 793.94/1284, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State; E. T. Williamsto Hughes, Sept. 10, 1921, 793.94/1284, ibid.; "Memorandum:On Japan's ProposalsConcerning Shantung-Negotiations and Substance," Sept. 15, 1921, 793.94/1284, ibid.;Hornbeck to MacMurray,Sept. 10, 1921, HornbeckPapers. 21 Beerits,"Far EasternQuestions," Hughes Papers; E. T. WilliamsDiary, Sept. 15, 1921, WilliamsPapers; Department of State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates 1921, I, 619-20. 22MacMurrayto Hughes, Sept. 17, 1921, attachedto 793.94/1285, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State: MacMurrayto Hughes,Oct. 3, 1921, 793.94/1288, ibid.; MacMurrayto Hughes.Oct. 7. 1921, 793.94/1297,ibid. AmericanFriendship 75 inadequate.The Chinesegovernment hesitated to give groundsfor the suspicionthat, by entering into negotiations with Japan, it was recogniz- ing the validityof the wartimeagreements or was sellingout China's birthright.With a certainnafvete, the Chinese also tendedto relyon the conferenceand the beliefin Americansupport to solve all of theirpro- blems,and especiallythe Shantung question. The conditionof the Chinesegovernment itself added furthercom- plications.Weakened by financialbankruptcy, civil war, and struggles among warlords,the government-headedby PremierChin Yun- p'eng-was on the vergeof falling.This preventedForeign Minister W. W. Yen fromattending the conferenceand aggravatedthe conflict withinthe Chinese delegation. The internalsplit, largely between V. K. WellingtonKoo and Sze, was causedby personalfactors and ambitions, partyallegiances, and differingattitudes toward the conference. The Koo faction,which had considerablestrength in Peking,wanted to enlarge the Hughes agenda and refusedto negotiatethe Shantungdispute because it amounted"to an admissionthat the Japanesehave some rightto be there." The second group, led by Sze and styledthe "realists" by Lansing,wanted to concentrateon mattersthat offered the bestchance of successand wishedto avoid alienatingworld public opinion.The primaryconsideration, they argued, was to get Japanout ofShantung, and thatmeant diplomatic negotiations.23 ThroughoutOctober 1921, Hughes stuckto his policyof isolating the Shantungissue and avoidingdirect American involvement in the Sino-Japanesedispute. He would assistonly in bringingthe two sides together.To the distressof the Chinese,he stillinsisted on immediate directSino-Japanese negotiations, though he allowedthat theymight continueat Washington,"collaterally but not partof the Conference." Williamsand MacMurrayalso agreedthat it would be dangerousfor China to raise the Shantungquestion at the conference.The state departmenttherefore instructed Schurman to tell the Chinesethat they shouldnot bringthe issue beforethe conferencenor counton the con-

23 Schurmanto Hughes,Sept. 26, 1921, 793.94/1195, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State; Departmentof State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1921, I, 622-24; MacMurray,"The ShantungConversations," March 20, 1936, HornbeckPapers; E. T. Williams Diary,Oct. 12, 24, 29, 30, 1921, WilliamsPapers; Robert Lansing Diary, Oct. 26, 1921, Robert LansingPapers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress);New York Times, Sept. 13, 1921; Minuteby Sir WilliamTyrrell, Sept. 30, 1921, on BeilbyAlston to LordGeorge N. Curzon,Sept. 27, 1921, F3604/132/10in FO 371/6620 (Public RecordOffice, London); Minute by Victor Wellesleyon memo communicatedby Chinese minister,Oct. 10, 1921, F3734/132/10,ibid.; Minutes by Tyrrelland Wellesley,Sept. 16, 1921, F3399/132/10,in FO 371/6619, Public RecordOffice. 76 The Journalof American History ference to settle every problem. "God helps those who help themselves,"Schurman reminded Foreign Minister Yen.24 Meanwhile, the state departmentwas concernedthat the anti- Japaneserhetoric and advice of officialand unofficialAmerican and Britishadvisers, who had attachedthemselves to theChinese delegation, would preventreconciliation. Individuals such as B. Lenox Simpson, ThomasMillard, John C. Ferguson,and Reinschdenounced Japanese aggression,gave out misleadinginformation on Americanpolicy, and ad- vocatedan uncompromisingstand on directnegotiations with Japan. The state departmentand the BritishForeign Office nonetheless at- temptedto restraintheir activities. MacMurray, for example, persuaded Reinsch,who was thenserving as counselorto theChinese government, to modifya telegramto Pekingofficials. The originalmessage declared that negotiationson Shantungwould weakenChina's positionin the eyesof American public opinion.25 Hughes' effortsfound support in London.British Far Easternexperts believedthat it was necessaryto obtaina reversalof the Shantung award and a comprehensivesettlement of the Sino-Japanesedispute. For many monthsthey had hopedthat the UnitedStates would take the initiative whilethe Foreign Office remained discreetly in thebackground. Because ofthe Anglo-Japanese alliance and Britain'srole at theParis conference, Britishdiplomats conceded that they could not intervenein the dispute. "We shouldonly reap the odium of bothsides," AssistantSecretary of StateVictor Wellesley observed. The ForeignOffice was irritatedby the uncompromisingattitude of Chineseofficials on directnegotiations and was encouragedby the tone of the Japanese proposals. And yet,it agreed thatJapan would have to makefurther concessions and could no longer counton Britishsupport for claims to Shantung."For our part,we feel we have unwittinglybeen a partyto a greatinjustice to China," Miles Lampsondeclared in a memorandumon Shantung.In orderto maintain China's integrity,British Far Eastern expertsconcluded that Japan would have to give up controlof the ShantungRailway in favorof a generalscheme of unification.For a change,therefore, the ForeignOf- ficewatched Hughes' handlingof issueswith approval. And by theend

2 Schurmanto Hughes,Sept. 26, 1921, 793.94/1195, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State,Department of State,Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates 1921, I, 620-21; CharlesW. Eliotto Curzon,Oct. 18, 1921, and minuteby Miles Lampson,Oct. 21, 1921, F3829/132/10,in FO 371/6620. PublicRecord Office. " ThomasLamont to Hughes,Nov. 9, 1921, 893.51/3537, GeneralRecords of the Department of State: MacMurray. memorandumof a conversationwith Reinsch, Sept. 20, 1921, 793.94/1289. ibid.,E. T. WilliamsDiary, Oct. 29. 30, 1921, WilliamsPapers; Alston to Curzon, Oct. 30. 1921. F4005/1635/10.in FO 371/6660, PublicRecord Office. AmericanFriendship 77 of October,the ForeignOffice thought that British-American cooperation mightresult in a satisfactorysolution through concurrent Sino- Japanesenegotiations at Washington.26 Afterthe Washington conference assembled, the pressureon Chinese officialsincreased and theyaccepted a face-savingformula worked out by theUnited States and GreatBritain. Direct talks on Shantungwould be carriedon by the Chinese and Japanesedelegations outside the conference,but the resultswould be reportedto the conferencein orderto provideofficial recognition and moralforce. To reassurethe Chinese, the talkswere termed"conversations," rather than negotiations, and theydid not assumethe legalityof Japan'sstatus in Shantung.British and Americanofficials would be present,but to satisfythe Japanese that thetalks were confined to thetwo parties concerned, there was to be no collectiveinterposition by the observers.Outside the formalconversa- tions,however, American and Britishofficials made use of numerous opportunitiesto suggestalternative solutions and to breakdeadlocks.27 Nevertheless,the friendsof China remainedapprehensive. Williams triedto impresson Sir JohnJordan, one of the BritishFar Easternad- visersand lateran observerat the Shantungtalks, that "there could be no just settlementthat left Japan in possessionof the railway."28From Peking,Schurman urged Hughes to be patientwith the Chineseand declaimedon the importanceof Americanfriendship for China: "Our fundamentalpolicy of Open Door in Chinashould be maintainedand appliedto newconditions. Just in itselfit is equallyadvantageous to China and America.That policycombined with our unselfishdefense of in- dependenceand territorialintegrity of China has won forAmerica the good will of the Chinesepeople whichis an invaluableasset. We are universallyregarded by the Chinesepeople as theirspecial friend. Com- 26 Minutesby Wellesley, May 18, 1921, F1548/132/10,in FO 371/6619,Public Record Office; Minutesby Charles W. Campbell,Sept. 14, 1922 and Wellesley,Sept. 16, 1921, F3399/132/10, ibid.; Minutes by Wellesley,Sept. 30, 1921, F3604/132/10,in FO 371/6620, Public Record Office;Lampson memo, "Shantung," Oct. 10, 1921, F4199/132/10,ibid.; Minutes by Wellesley, Oct. 14, 1921, and Tyrrell,Oct. 15, 1921, F3768/132/10,ibid.; Minuteby Tyrrell,Oct. 1921, F3620/132/10,ibid.; WellesleyMemo, "General Surveyof PoliticalSituation in Pacificand Far East with Reference to the ForthcomingWashington Conference," Oct. 20, 1921, F3823/2635/10,in FO 371/6660,Public Record Office. 27 Beerits, "Far Eastern Questions,'' Hughes Papers; MacMurray, "Memorandum of a Conversationwith Sze," Aug. 13, 1921, 500.A4/128, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State; MacMurray,"The ShantungConversations," Hornbeck Papers; Departmentof State, ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates 1922 (2 vols., Washington,1938), I, 935-37; ArthurJ. Balfourto Curzon, Nov. 25, 1921, F4350/132/10,in FO 371/6620, Public Record Office; Minutes on Balfour to Curzon, Nov. 30, 1921, F4436/132/10 and Alston to Curzon, F4437/132/10, by Basil C. Newton, Wellesley,and Tyrrell,Dec. 1, 1921, ibid.; Fifield, "SecretaryHughes and theShantung Question," 375-77. 28 E. T. WilliamsDiary, Nov. 22, 1921, WilliamsPapers. 78 The Journalof American History munityof republicaninstitutions draws them closer to us. Ifwe can aid in strengtheningChinese Republicthrough Conference or otherwise America'sposition in Chinawill be renderedstill more favorable."29 The Subcommitteeon the Pacificand Far EasternQuestions now maintainedthat Japan's title to Shantungwas invalidand that the Japanesecould claim reimbursementonly for the expenses of the militaryexpedition and improvements.An enduringpeace in theOrient mustbe builton a "foundationof justiceto China," the subcommittee declared;and, if the conferencewas to respectthe sovereignty,in- dependence,and integrityof China,as providedin the Root resolutions (whichwere incorporated into the Nine PowerTreaty), "it is imperative that China's wrongs in the matter of these leases should be redressed.'' 30 But is was Hornbeckwho adoptedthe most outspokenstand in December1921. In a somewhatconfused letter, which may or maynot have been sent on to Hughes, Hornbeckmade Shantungthe test of justiceand fairdealing in internationalrelations. "Far betterno Shan- tung 'decision' thana 'decision' whichagain attemptsto fastenupon theChinese an odiousimpairment of one of thoserights which are vital to nationalexistence anywhere, an impairmentwhich will continueto contributeto the disintegrationof the Chinesestate," he wrote.Horn- beck also insistedthat in directtalks, China was no matchfor Japan: "Under the circumstanceswhich prevail,the Chinese are to the Japaneseat the diplomaticboard as a youthfullightweight boxer would be to a maturedand experiencedheavyweight in theprize ring.'31 The Shantungnegotiations began on December1 and madeprogress as longas thethorny questions were postponed.32 But pressuredby their advisersand by the Chinesestudents who frequentedthe delegation's headquarters,the Chinese raised the railwayissue soonerthan expected. Without withdrawingJapan's original plan for a joint venture, Shideharaoffered to sell the Japaneseshare if the Chinesewould agree to a long-termloan fromJapanese bankers on termsof control similar to otherforeign railway loans-that is theappointment of Japanese experts Departmentof State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates 1921, I, 321. Reportof the Subcommitteeon the Pacificand Far EasternQuestions. [Dec. 1921? Hughes Papers. t Hornbeck,''The ShantungProblem is Distinctand EasilyDistinguishable," Dec. 8, 1921, Hornheckto MacMurray,Dec. 8, 1921, Hornbeckto Hughes,Dec. 9, 1921, HornbeckPapers. " The Sino-Japanesenegotiations may be followedin Conversationsbetween the Chineseand JapaneseRepresentatives in regardto the ShantungQuestion: Minutes Prepared by the Japanese Delegation(Washington. 1922); Conversationsbetween the Chineseand JapaneseRepresentatives in regardto the ShantungQuestion: Prepared by the ChineseDelegation (Washington, 1923) (JapanChina. Shantung Conversations). AmericanFriendship 79 in charge of the traffic,accounting, and engineeringdepartments. Shideharaacted largely on his own afterAmerican and Britishofficials indicatedtheir opposition to a joint ventureand informallysuggested thatJapan sell the railroad,retaining an elementof supervisorycontrol throughthe employmentof expertsin some of the majordepartments. To demonstrateJapanese sincerity and reasonablenessand to prevent Anglo-Americanmediation, the Japanesedelegation urged Foreign MinisterYasuya Uchida to acceptthe proposedsolution. The Chinese agreedto buy the Japaneseshare, but insistedon payingwith cash or twelve-yeartreasury notes and on employinga Japanese district engineeronly until the notes were redeemed. They reached an impasse on December 20, and the talks were suspendedfor two weeks. Shideharahad overreachedhimself, and the delegationhad to consultthe ForeignOffice. American officials tried to calm Chinese fearsthat the Japanesewere temporizingto gain ad- vantagesfrom China on otherFar Easternmatters. MacMurray urged the Chinesenot to breakoff the negotiations.He declaredthat if their good officeswere requestedHughes and ArthurJ. Balfourwould recommenda "most just and reasonablesolution of the matter." Some membersof the Americandelegation strongly supported a cash settlementand Hughes was tiringof theJapanese attitude on thisand other issues. The BritishFar Easternexperts also saw furtherevidence of Japan'sdesire to retainfull control of Shantungin its refusalof a cash settlementand its demandfor the appointmentof a Japanesechief engineer,traffic manager, and chiefaccountant. For the most part, however,they preferred to "leave it to the Americansto takethe lead in objectingto anyfeatures of the settlement which are unsatisfactoryto China." Proposingto takefull advantage of the Japanesedesire to ap- pear reasonable,Hughes and the American ambassadorto Japan, CharlesWarren, pressured the Japanese to sell the railroadto Chinaon favorableterms.33 "Ibid.; JapaneseDelegation to Yasuya Uchida,Nov. 27, Dec. 5, 8, 20, 1921, Recordsof the JapaneseForeign Office, MT 317, pp. 477-79, 728-30, 883-89, 1500-02, MT 306, pp. 101-04; Beerits,"Far EasternQuestions," Hughes Papers; MacMurray, "The ShantungConversations," HornbeckPapers; E. T. WilliamsDiary, Dec. 17, 20, 21, 1921, WilliamsPapers; MacMurray, memorandumof a conversationwith Sze, Dec. 15, 1921, 793.94/1239 1/2,General Records of the Departmentof State; MacMurray to Hughes,Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1365, ibid.;Department of State, ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates 1922, I, 937-39; Wellesleyto Lampson,Dec. 12, 1921, F4601/132/10,in FO 371/6620, PublicRecord Office; Minute by Newton,approved by Wellesleyand Tyrrell,Dec. 19, 1921, F4726/132/10,ibid.; Note on a conversationbetween Lampsonand Tsuneo Matsudaira,Dec. 27, 1921, F135/69/10,in FO 371/7989, Public Record Office.The authorthanks Thomas Buckley for supplying the English translations of the Records of theJapanese Foreign Office. 80 The Journalof American History When the negotiationsresumed on January4, 1922, the Japanese Foreign Officeaccepted Shidehara's proposal to sell the Shantung Railway,but it refusedto allow paymentin cash, treasurynotes, or the ChineseBankers' Union notes.To preventthe totalbreakdown of the talks,the Japaneseand Chineseagreed to turnto othermatters, which were quicklyresolved. Two days later,when theyfaced another impasse, the Japanesereluctantly acquiesced in the suggestionthat the Americanand Britishobservers be requestedto reportto theirsuperiors on therailway problem.34 MacMurrayand Lampson,one of the Britishobservers at the Shan- tung talks, thereupondrew up three possible compromises-labeled ''A,' ''"B," and "C," -which they submittedseparately to the Chinese and Japanese for comment.No proposal was completely acceptableto bothsides, but out ofthe interchange a fourth proposition, "D," emerged.This formedthe basis of the finalsettlement. It pro- videdfor Japan to sell the railwayfor fifteen-year Chinese government treasurynotes, redeemable at China's optionafter five years; during the life of the notes, a Japanesetraffic manager and chief accountant, nominatedby Japanand appointedby China,would be employedunder thesupervision of the Chinese managing director. MacMurray also persuaded the Chinese and Japaneseto resumethe Shantungtalks on January11 to take up otheroutstanding issues while the delegations ponderedthe various proposals.35 Meanwhile,the Washingtonconference had concludedmost of its workand the delegateswere anxious to returnhome. Nevertheless, the treatiesand agreementsreached at Washingtonmight be threatenedby the failureto settlethe Shantungquestion. Hughes and MacMurray, joined by theirBritish counterparts, believed that the differencesbet- weenthe two sideshad narrowedto the pointwhere a compromisewas possible,and theywere determined not to let trivialmatters block a settlement.They were furtherreassured by informationreceived from Americanrepresentatives in Tokyo and Peking.Ambassador Warren reportedthat the Japanesecould be inducedto sell the railroad,if they were constantlypressed and if the Chinese would agree to "definite terms." Schurmancabled that Foreign Minister Yen, who was willing

* Japan/China,Shiantung Conversations; Memorandum of interviewbetween Hughes and Shidehara,Jan. 4, 1922, 793.94/1274 1/2, General Records of the Departmentof State; MacMurrayto Hughes,Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1365,ibid. '" MacMurray,"The ShantungConversations," Hornbeck Papers; MacMurrayto Hughes, Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1365 and /1366, General Recordsof the Departmentof State; E. T. WilliamsDiary, Jan. 12, 1922, WilliamsPapers; Balfour to David LloydGeorge, Jan. 20, 1922, F611/34/10.in FO 371/7974,Public Record Office. AmericanFriendship 81 to takethe responsibilityand sacrificehis position,and PresidentHsu- Shih-ch'angwanted an immediatesettlement and recognizedthat Hughes' interventionwas theonly way to bringit about.Premier Liang Shih-yiwas also inclinedto compromise,but was requiredto defend himselfagainst popular oppositionto negotiationswith Japan and againsthis politicalenemies. Installed in officeby Chang Tso-linand Tuan Ch'i-juiin mid-Decemberand facingan imminentfinancial crisis as theChinese New Year settlementday approached, Liang was afraidof beingthrown out of officeby Wu P'ei-fu,who accusedhim of planning to sellout China.36 Hughes and Balfour,head of the Britishdelegation, were now convincedthat plan D, or a modificationof it, offered a satisfactorysolution and was acceptableto Japan.Therefore, on January18, 1922, they decidedto intervenedirectly but tactfully in thenegotiations to assurea settlement.At an informalmeeting at Balfour'sapartment that same afternoon,the Japanese gave theirtentative approval to planD. Hughes and Balfourwere somewhat suspicious of the Japanesedemand for fur- therclarifying talks on certaindetails, but theywere heartened by the Japaneseresponse. They believed that the settlement was morefavorable to China thanthey had previouslyhoped; Japan, desiring to displayits peacefulintentions, had clearlymade a substantialconcession in accept- ing Chinesetreasury notes and in abandoningits originaldemand for a jointventure. Furthermore, Hughes and Balfourhad ascertainedthat, in viewof Japanese prestige and publicopinion, no morecould be obtained fromJapan through diplomatic pressure.37 While theirFar Easternexperts continued to doubtthe wisdomof allowingJapan to appointthe chieftraffic manager and accountant, Hughes and Balfourconcentrated all of theirinfluence on the anxious Chinese.Hughes took the lead in forcingthe realityof the situation uponAmerica's friend. Hughes informed Balfour, "that his idea was to 36 Beerits, "Far Eastern, Questions," Hughes Papers; MacMurray, "The Shantung Conversations,"Hornbeck Papers; E. T. WilliamsDiary, Jan. 10, 12, 1922, WilliamsPapers; Memorandumof InformalConversation at Balfour'sApartment, Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1300a, General Records of the Departmentof State; Memorandaof InformalConversations at the Secretaryof State's Private House, Jan. 19, 22, ibid.; Balfourto Curzon, Jan. 8, 1922, F127/69/10,in FO 371/7989,Public Record Office; Eliot to Balfour,Jan. 12, 1922, F235/69/10, ibid.;Department of State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates 1922, I, 939-41. 3 HughesMemorandum for MacMurray, Jan. 26, 1922, 793.94/1265, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State; Memorandum of an InformalConversation at Balfour'sApartment, Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1300a, ibid.; Memorandumof a conversationbetween Balfour and Hughes,Jan. 18, 1922, F480/69/10,in FO 371/7990, PublicRecord Office; Balfour to LloydGeorge, Jan. 20, 1922, F600/34/10,in FO 371/7970,ibid.; Departmentof State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1922, I, 941-43, 963; Masanao Hanihara to Uchida, Jan. 24, 1922, MT 319, pp. 24351, 2603-2607. 82 The Journalof American History put the Chinesein the positionof havingto acceptthe proposalas the utmostwhich could be extractedfrom the Japanese,or else to takethe wholeresponsibility for the breakdown of negotiations." During conver- sationsat Hughes' home, and in the course of Sze's interviewwith PresidentWarren G. Hardingon January25, theChinese were told that theirinterests and thoseof the worlddemanded acceptance of a settle- mentalong the lines agreed to byJapan. There would be no moreargu- ing over pettydetails. Largelyignoring Chinese counterarguments, Hughes warnedthat China riskedlosing American support as well as the province.Simultaneously, Schurman and BritishMinister Beilby Alston were instructedto echo a similarultimatum to officialsin Peking,if the Chinese delegates consulted their superiors.38 At thispoint, the AmericanFar Easternadvisers, who werenot con- sultedduring the finalstages of the negotiations,made one moreeffort to intercedein China's behalf.On January12, 1922, Williamshad ad- visedthe Chineseto compromiseand accepta Japaneseloan, ifit were shortterm and ifthe Japanese expert could be giventhe moreharmless role of "technicaladviser." Plan D, however,troubled him so much thathe could not sleep. Williamstried to findsolace in the factthat Japanwould surrenderthe railroadafter five years, but he concluded thatthe extendedloan periodand the appointmentof a Japanesetraffic manager would "fasten Japan permanentlyin Shantung and the Japaneseknew it." But it was Hughes' ultimatum,which he was "per- mitted"to read,that prompted him to takeissue withthe secretaryof state's policies. Williams warned MacMurray and Hughes of the dangersthat threatened the successof plan D: civilwar in China,anti- foreignboycotts followed by Japaneseintervention, Senate rejection of the treaties,the historyof Japan'sbroken promises, the immoralityof pressingChina instead of Japan, and thethreat to America'sgood name in China. His argumentsappealed to bothAmerican self-interest and a concernfor justice, but he emphasizedthe latter."It does not seem to me thatwe, as loversof justice and fairplay, can affordto urge the ownerto accept such a settlement,"Williams wrote to Hughes. He preferredno solutionat all to supportfor Japanese aggression and the

38 MacMurrayto Hughes,Jan. 18, 1922, 793.94/1366, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State;Memoranda of InformalConversations at the Secretaryof State's PrivateHouse, Jan. 19, 22, 1922, 793.93/1300a, ibid.; Balfour to Alston, Jan. 22, 1922, 793.94/1258a, ibid.; Departmentof State, Foreign Relationsof the United States 1922, I, 941-43, 945, 963; Minute by Wellesley,Jan. 19, 1922, F141/69/10,in FO 371/7989, Public Record Office; Memorandaof Conversations between Balfour and Hughesat Balfour'sApartment, Jan. 18, 1922, F480/69/10,Jan. 21, 1922, F547/60/10,in FO 371/7990,ibid. AmericanFriendship 83 consequencesthat would follow. "Let Japan bear the odium; why shouldwe shareit," he askedMacMurray.39 Separately,Hornbeck also protestedthe outlineof the settlementthat was emerging.On January12, he advisedMacMurray that the moment had arrivedfor the United States to procurea satisfactorysolution: "'All the externalevidences point to the conclusionthat the psychological situationwhich now prevailsaffords a betteropportunity than has ever previouslybeen presentedfor the success of whateverthe American Delegationmay choose to insistupon towardconclusive settlement of the question." A week laterhe took his case to Hughes. Pointingto reportsthat Japanese businessmen wanted cash paymentfor the railway and not bonds, he statedconfidently that Japan would give way if pressed;but even ifJapan refused, the responsibilitywould not reston Americanshoulders and theUnited States would save itsreputation. "I am veryreluctant to incurthe appearanceof beinginsistent," he told Hughes, "but I feelit my dutyto reaffirmthe opinionwhich I have repeatedlyexpressed that no 'settlement'of the Shantungquestion whichleaves the Japanese in any measureof controlof the railwaywill be a realsettlement.' '40 This timethe intervention of China's friendswas ineffective.Hughes rejectedthe argumentsof Williamsand Hornbeckin a caustic,even ar- rogant,statement. It was deliveredindirectly through MacMurray and assertedthat the secretaryknew what was rightin carryingout the responsibilitythat was his alone. He declaredthat the Far Easternad- viserswere not in possessionof all ofthe facts and thatthey had failedto takeinto account the entire situation. Hughes reminded them that while the UnitedStates remained sympathetic to the justiceof China's cause, it could never go to war over Shantung.Explaining his decisionto MacMurray,Hughes wrote: "I am desirousto see Chinaobtain satisfac- tionto thefull limit. As I havesaid, these are notmy terms, but it is the good partof common sense to knowin a negotiationwhen to agreeand not to lose greatresults because of sheerobstinacy on smallerpoints. I have the responsibilityof dealingwith it becauseI am convincedthat if China does not acceptthis settlement she will lose Shantung,and I am tryingto save it forher.' '41 39 E. T. WilliamsDiary, Jan. 6, 12, 19, 23, 24, 25, 1922, WilliamsPapers; E. T. Williamsto MacMurray,Jan. 19, 1922, ibid.; E. T. Williamsto Hughes, Jan. 24, 1922, 794.94/1306, GeneralRecords of the Department of State. 40 Hornbeckto MacMurray,Jan. 16, 1922, HornbeckPapers; Hornbeck to MacMurray,Jan. 23, 1922, ibid.; Hornbeckto Hughes, Jan. 23, 1922, 793.94/1309, General Recordsof the Departmentof State. 41 Hughes,Memorandum for MacMurray, Jan. 26, 1922, 793.94/1265,General Records of the Departmentof State; E. T. WilliamsDiary, Jan. 27, 1922, WilliamsPapers. 84 The Journalof American History Somewhat chastened, Hornbeck expressed his appreciationfor Hughes' viewsand his reliefthat the UnitedStates had not presented termsto China, which was not entirelytrue. Hornbecknever com- pletelyescaped the influenceof Reinsch,his mentorand formerpro- fessorat theUniversity of Wisconsin; but the young, practical China ex- pertalso harboredambitions for a diplomaticcareer. Hornbeck replied to MacMurray:"He [Hughes]made the decision,and thatbeing done, his view becomesmine."42 There is no evidencethat Williamsre- spondedto Hughes. In his diaryentry of January26, 1922, Williams merelynoted a summaryof the secretary'smemorandum for MacMur- ray.But a dayearlier he commentedon Harding'slecture to Sze: "It is a thousandpities to see our governmenttake this step." Hurt,angry, and suspicious,Williams was anxiousto pack his bags and returnto Berkeley.43 The Chinesedelegation accepted realities and recommendedapproval. AfterLiang requested sick leave and Yen was appointedacting premier, the Chinese governmentauthorized the delegationto accede to the Shantungagreement. On January30 and 31, theChinese and Japanese delegatesnegotiated the finalterms on the railwayand on February4, 1922, theysigned the Shantung treaty.44 With the benefitof hindsight,Dexter Perkinspointed out thatthe Washingtonconference gave Japan the substanceof the Shantung settlement-plusthe meansof prolongingits controlof the province- whileChina receivedonly the shadow.45Yet mostcontemporaries con- cludedthat, given the circumstances,China did much betterthan expected.Westel W. Willoughby,one of the officialAmerican advisers to theChinese delegation, stated that, considering that Japan was in actual possessionof the province, "it is easilydemonstrable that China won an almostcomplete victory."46 While Reinschwas distressedthat the Far Eastern arrangementsgave China far less than it deserved,he also grantedthat much progress had beenmade in eliminatingthe spheres of 42 Hornbeckto MacMurray,Feb. 8, 1922, 793.94/1336, GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State. 43 E. T. WilliamsDiary, Jan. 26, 27, 28, 1922, WilliamsPapers. 44 Beerits, "Far Eastern Questions," Hughes Papers; Memorandum of an Informal Conversationat theSecretary of State's PrivateHouse, Jan.30, 1922, ibid.;Department of State, ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates 1922, I, 948-60; Fifield,"Secretary Hughes and the ShantungQuestion," 384-85. For the termsof the Shantungtreaty, see ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates 1922, I, 948-60 andChina, Shantung Conversations. 45 Dexter Perkins,Charles Evans Hughes and AmericanDemocratic Statesmanship (Boston, 1956), 110. 46 WestelW. Willoughby,Chwina at the Conference:A Report(Baltimore, 1922), 327. AmericanFriendship 85 influenceand gettingJapan out of Shantung.47And, writingin 1922, Ge-Zay Wood arguedthat the Shantungsettlement was "not a bad bargainfor China."48 Indeed, the Shantungsettlement, like most of the otherFar Easternarrangements at the Washingtonconference, gave Chinathe potentialto regaincertain aspects of its sovereignityfrom the otherpowers. Several factorswere responsiblefor China's partial victory.En- couragedby the sympathy of American public opinion and friendsin the statedepartment, and aware of the risingChinese opposition to compromise,the Chinesestood firm. Instead, Japan made mostof the con- cessionsbecause of a desireto improveits imageand its relationswith theUnited States. Senator Thomas Walsh's reportunderscored the fears of Japanesediplomats that the Senate mightreject the Washington treatiesunless the Shantung question were settled in a satisfactoryman- ner.49Hughes probablyexploited Japanese objectives and fearsmore thanhistorians have realized. Because of the convergenceof Americanself-interest and idealism, theUnited States, with the assistance of Britain, was able to exertits in- fluencefor a settlementfavorable to China.This was not at all apparent in thesummer of 1921. Hugheshad at firstbeen inclined to believethat a compromisesolution entailed a Japaneseshare in therailway, but then the friendsof China intervened.Aided by sympatheticpublic opinion and rumblingsin theSenate, they succeeded in educatingHughes to the importanceof the Shantung Railway and the necessityof returning it to China.At severalcritical points, especially in Septemberand frommid- Decemberto earlyJanuary, they succeeded in puttingJapan on the defensive. However,when the limitsof Japanese compromise were reached and theJapanese-American relationship was threatened,China was forcedto make the finalconcessions. Hughes feltthat he was actuallylooking afterChina's bestinterests. "We cannottake the responsibilityof per- mittinga stateof affairs in which,by our failingto supportthe best set- tlementobtainable, Japan would remainin Shantungfor an indefinite time," he arguedto Williamsand Hornbeck.5"Drawing the same con- 4 Reinschspeech beforethe Creve Coeur Banquet, Peoria, Illinois,Feb. 22, 1922, Reinsch Papers. 48 Ge-ZayWood, The ShantungQuestion: A Studyin Diplomacyand WorldPolitics (New York, 1922), 275. 49 Buckley,The UnitedStates and The WashingtonConference, 164. 50 Hughes,Memorandum for MacMurray, Jan. 26, 1922, 793.94/1265,General Records of the Departmentof State. 86 The Journalof American History clusion, Schurmanexplained to ForeignMinister Yen that "while Americanssympathized with China theywere, as he knew,a practical peoplewho believedin adjustingdifficulties instead of pursuing them to catastropheand theywould findit unintelligibleand unpardonableif Chinarefused an offerwhich gave hereverything she askedin fiveyears and nearlyeverything at once."" Weak friendshave oftenfound American sympathy a double-edged sword.On the one hand,the UnitedStates has wieldedit againsttheir enemies.On the other,America has used this weaponagainst friends and allieswhen it perceivedthat greater interests were at stake.Overall, in the case ofthe Shantungsettlement, China benefitedfrom American friendshipand sympathy. S1 Departmentof State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates 1922, I, 944.