Beyond the bodycount

HE BISHO dead have now been OR ALL its disturbing cynicism ROGER SOUTHALL, Tburied, and to all intents and pur­ Fand instrumentality, this perspec­ PROFESSOR OF poses, South Africa has returned to its tive packs a considerable punch. Yet POLITICAL STUDIES troubled normality. Indeed the "South what needs to be stressed is that the AT RHODES UNIVERSITY, African peace process" is now so awash government and the ANC are not now with violence (more people die from due to resume talks out of the depths of LOOKS AT THE political violence in an 'ordinary' week their mutual horror, but because Bisho PROSPECTS FOR PEACE than were killed at Bisho) that it has represented a major and fundamental AND PROGRESS AFTER become almost a necessity to bury intro­ defeat for the former. Indeed, the THE BISHO MASSACRE spection with the bodies of the dead. massacre indicated how quickly matters Phoenix-like, hope must perpetually are beginning to slip out of President De off the killings as yet another species of arise out of the latest tragedy, for other­ Klerk's control. black on black violence (as so much of wise the burden of pessimism becomes A first point is quite simply that the the conflict between Inkatha and the too much. What may appear to outsiders government lost in the hail of Gqozo's ANC in Natal has been internationally as a callous indifference on the part of bullets the very considerable ground portrayed), responsibility for the deaths both black and white South Africans to which De Klerk had gained inter­ was pinned firmly on the government; the victims of this latest disaster is, in nationally when he won his handsome for having established the divisive home­ fact, a necessity. To ponder too deeply referendum victory for the continuation land system in the first place, for not upon the horror of Bisho could be to of reform. Then it seemed to many having previously disposed of the local give way to despair, and beyond that to a observers that apartheid, at long last, tyranny of Gqozo, and for not having resignation of the collapse of the country really was dead, killed off once and for exercised proper restraint over the CDF into anarchy and civil war. all by the convincing defeat of the white via the bevy of seconded South African right, which subsequently registered military and intelligence officers who Hence it is that within a few short gaping divisions. But having pro­ command it. Meanwhile, the ANC, al­ weeks of the massacre, attention is turn­ though not smelling to the coterie of ing to Bisho's silver lining. In short, this nounced it dead, the international press reporters and opinion-makers of roses, interpretation argues that, for all its was forced to resurrect apartheid in the recovered much of the sympathy it had brutality, Bisho was just what was needed killing grounds of the Ciskei. previously lost internationally. to get negotiations going again. What the government tried to do, and in this regard its efforts were echoed by a Transitions to democracy from large body of the established South SECOND adverse consequence of authoritarian rule are everywhere charac­ African press, was to shuffle responsibi­ A the Bisho massacre for the govern­ terised by uncertainty, as divided lity for the killings off onto the shoulders ment has been that it has narrowed its societies seek to claw their way through of the ANC, and especially Ronnie options. Since negotiations were broken political timetables which are far more Kasrils, not only for staging the march in off at CODESA II, the government has compressed than history ever allowed to the first place, but also for breaking the been busy at work promoting an anti- the emergent nations of Western Europe terms of the agreement concerning the ANC coalition in support of a federal and North America. Indeed, diversions exact limits and constraints to which this constitution. and distractions along the road to demo­ particular instance of mass action should It was significant that in drawing up cracy are completely normal, and Bisho adhere. But much to its chagrin, what its original constitutional proposals, needs to be located firmly in perspective; the government found was that although and throughout CODESA I and it was only a concentration of killings international opinion proved quite CODESA II, the National Party avoided amidst a wave of violence which has critical of the ANC, it was as overwhelm­ commitment to 'federalism' in favour of engulfed the country since 1990 as, in ingly condemnatory of the De Klerk a preference for 'regionalism', a term essence, the various political forces government as if it had been white which was sufficiently flexible to enable compete for space and loyalty amongst a fingers, and not black, which had been it to seek a compromise — even a black population which is about to on the CDF's triggers. The unimpressive consensus — with the ANC (which become enfranchised. It follows that this Gqozo was seen as the satrap he is, and remained wedded to the notion of a violence is unlikely to cease until the the South African authorities were unitary constitution). As a consequence, political race is over, and a new govern­ roundly censured for not having reined the prospect was glimpsed of a surpris­ ment, whose standing is legitimated by a him in. ingly trouble-free transition to an interim government and even a dual NP-ANC democratic election, is installed in Having declared at CODESA for the administration, founded upon a shared Pretoria. re-incorporation of the TBVC states, commitment to a shared South African how could the government ever contem­ What is good about the Bisho mas­ nationalism. This new South Africa plate that the inexperienced troops of the sacre, therefore, is that one way or would be formally unitary, yet NP reluc­ CDF should face a massive ANC throng another it has massively increased pres­ tance to concede power to a highly sures upon the major political actors, with live ammunition? Where was any centralised ANC-dominated government notably the ANC and NP, to- resume minimal concession to modern tech­ would be catered for by the granting of negotiations where they were previously niques of crowd control? And hence it left off at CODESA. was that, rather than being able to pass

Page Five From Page Five projected marches upon the capitals of KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana. Whether or not, in the Bisho case, the • By exercising direct or shared power ANC seriously believed it had a chance over the three economically most of toppling Gqozo remains unclear, but the more salient point is that it was important regions in the country, the NP utilising the march as a remarkable opportunity for mobilising and rallying aims to inhibit severely the financial and its support. physical capacity of an ANC-led Consequently, when the CDF let rip, they gunned down whatever minimal government to rule. j chance Gqozo ever had of promoting his ADM as a respectable minority significant (perhaps entrenched) powers In short, by exercising direct or shared tendency; and furthermore, whereas to some nine or ten regional authorities. power over the three economically most Gqozo previously was but an undis­ important regions in the country, the NP tinguished nonentity with whom the NP OWEVER, with the collapse of aims to inhibit severely the financial and might have chosen to coalesce, the H CODESA, the government signal­ physical capacity of an ANC-led govern­ killings exalted him to the ranks of an led a new assault on the ANC by now ment to rule. international criminal with whom it can openly espousing a federalism whose now scarcely choose to associate. Mean­ explicit design would be to shift the EANWHILE, the government while to dismiss him — by fiat or by balance of power away from the centre Madmits that the ANC will likely coup — would imply a capacity to have to the regions. Meanwhile, the NP sweep the Transkei, Border and Eastern prevented the' killings; but to allow him launched a pre-electoral strategy of Cape, wherein lies two-thirds of the to remain in power implies an incautious, * attempting to broaden its base of sup­ latter's national membership. Indeed, if not callous, disregard for international port by opening its doors to all races and the government may further concede the opinion. by seeking to construct a conservative ANC's proposal that this area be divided alliance capable of securing control of, if into two regions. However, for its part, it not the majority, then the most economi­ may go on to argue that such a division Y THREATENING to march on cally important regions. should be based upon an expansion of BUlundi the ANC has compounded De Klerk's problem, for whilst risking Pik Botha made the headlines with his the existing bantustans of Transkei and accusations that it is playing a dangerous upbeat proclamation that the NP could Ciskei, just as in the northern Transvaal game with the lives of its supporters, it win an absolute majority in a non-racial it would like to see the powers of the knows that the government cannot af­ election. Just as the government so grave­ present Bophuthatswana government of ford any prospect of a repeat massacre. ly miscalculated the weight of popular Lucas Mangope confirmed, extended Hence, we may surmise, De Klerk's support which swept ZANU-PF to and entrenched. rapid and major concessions of amnesty power in the 1980 Zimbabwe election The government has for some con­ for key political prisoners, just to get and SWAPO to power in Namibia in siderable time viewed Transkei as a lost negotiations back on track. For what the 1990, it is quite possible that it is serious­ electoral cause. However, its continuing government also recognises, with increas­ ly deluding itself as to its potential for support for Gqozo in the Ciskei indi­ ing urgency, is that it is rapidly running garnering black votes in South Africa cates that, at the very least, it intends to out of time if the economy is not going to itself. None the less, rather than gamble take the electoral battle into the very relapse into a yet more vicious spiral of upon the democratic option of securing heart of the enemy's territory. To this decline. majority support and thereby maintain­ end, the launch by the Brigadier of his ing control of a centralised state, the Inkatha-like African Democratic Move­ There is a good cause, therefore, for government has reverted to exploiting ment (ADM) represents an attempt to proposing that whilst Bisho has propel­ the electoral-coalition possibilities pro­ mobilise conservative sentiment based led both the ANC and the NP back into vided by the continued existence of the upon what remains of the headman negotiations, it has enabled the former bantustans. system, against the ANC and — who to reassume the moral high ground at This has recently been convincingly knows? — snatch the Ciskei-based the same time as seriously compromising portrayed as follows (Grahamstown region from under the latter's nose. the development of the latter's immediate Rural Committee Newsletter 29): At the national level, meanwhile, a strategy for retaining a significant hold (i) In KwaZulu-Natal, the NP believes Christian Democratic Alliance of the on power. But Bisho has also likely had a it can forge an alliance with Inkatha to NP, Inkatha, ADM and Mangope's longer term impact which could also share power in a regional government; Bophuthatswana Democratic Party and work against the government's interests. (ii) likewise, in the ethnically diverse other sundry elements would form a There can be no doubt that the PWV region, it reckons that an NP- tight-knit bloc in a second, regionally- massacre has sharpened the lines of Inkatha linkage would block a victory based upper house of parliament, to cleavage. Whereas CODESA operated by the ANC, which it continues to view operate as a check upon radical initia­ (not unsuccessfully until the final break­ as an overwhelmingly Xhosa organisa­ tives by the ANC majority government. down) upon a basis of 'sufficient con­ tion; The march on Bisho was of course sensus', the distrust between the major (iii) in the Western Cape, it confi­ intended by the ANC to counter this actors may now have risen to such a level dently expects to capture control by strategy by depriving the envisaged that the search for compromise — at virtue of its appropriating the vast pro­ Christian Democratic Alliance of one its portion of the Coloured vote. homeland stilts. The same goes for the

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CODESA III or any other forum — may In the years between well become more difficult. Nor indeed, has the prospect of what we might call the government's other possible strategy, Sharpeville and Bisho aiming for an NP-ANC duumvirate, in any way been enhanced. What we may see instead is a greater many have died determination by the ANC to push for concessions in an area the government is N MONDAY, 7 September 1992, According to journalists who were on least disposed and perhaps least able to O at least 24 ANC demonstrators the scene, the shooting took place after make them: control of the security were shot dead and nearly 200 wounded some protesters stormed through an forces. Indeed, any forthcoming battle when Ciskei soldiers in Bisho opened fire open rear entrance to the stadium, while over the federal or unitary nature of the on a 40 000 strong crowd protesting another group of demonstrators re­ new constitution may well pale into against the homeland's military rule. moved a section of razor wire adjoining insignificance compared with the The permission had been granted by the stadium. It is reported that the struggle for control of the security forces Ciskei authorities for the march and a Ciskeian troops opened fire on ANC — seen as the final guarantor by the NP rally to be held in the Bisho Stadium. marchers without any warning. Brigadier of white living standards and as the key Gqozo insists that his soldiers had received orders to shoot in self-defence instrument by the ANC for breaking the trusted to hold a free and fair election. back of white minority rule. Few should To put it equally bluntly, what the doubt that the third round of the negotia­ outside world now wants to see is the RONSON DUMISANE tion process looms as much tougher election of an at least ANC-led govern­ KHULUSE, OF THE CENTRE than the second; and there is no guaran­ ment, so that the issue of apartheid FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE tee that the match will not last a full ten finally goes away. AT NATAL UNIVERSITY, rounds. RECALLS OTHER LL THIS implies bad news for the MASSACRES AND Against that, there is some specula­ NP's projected Christian Alliance. QUESTIONS THE tion that, in a desperate bid to rescue the A Quite how an election will be conducted METHODS USED BY economy, both the ANC and NP may in this country whilst violence is so rife THE SECURITY FORCES decide to go for broke in an earlier than remains a question which neither the TO CONTROL expected election in recognition of the ANC nor NP have as yet given adequate DEMONSTRATING fact that only a fully legitimated govern­ attention. However, what the idea of the CROWDS ment can conceivably hope to re­ Christian Alliance rests upon is the establish political order and attract ability of its various ethnically-defined after shots were fired and hand grenades much needed foreign investment. And in constituents to deliver their ethnic votes. were flung at them from within the ANC that case, what can be argued is that the And behind this lies the long experience crowd. The ANC says that the shooting Bisho massacre will have had the major of controlled and rigged elections in the was unprovoked and that the Ciskeian consequence of having increased the bantustans. soldiers had at no time been in danger. determination of the international com­ But what would happen if in Other ANC supporters were stopped munity to despatch an army of electoral Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu and Ciskei by Ciskeians shortly before reaching the monitors. there were to be a truly free vote? What border on their way to the march. They would happen if in the secrecy of the were thoroughly searched and the troops swore at them and said they were fooled UCH HAS been said in recent polling booth and the integrity of the by Chris Hani into believing they could times concerning the fact of South vote counting process the ethnic con­ M topple Gqozo. The troops were also Africa's increasing marginalisation. struct fell apart? The answer is self- reported to have said that in Ciskei they With the end of the Cold War, the West evident: the Christian Alliance could did not use teargas and they did not can concede black rule and, if need be, well be blown apart. have bullets to waste by firing warning allow South Africa to collapse back into In the final analysis, what the Bisho shots. its declining continent as just another massacre has done has been to reinforce Surely, soldiers are taught the circum­ chaotically run African country. But the international community's determi­ stances justifying the use of different against that, what is really not in the nation to push for a viable settlement in types of equipment, the handling of West's interests is for South Africa to South Africa. It has had enough of its various weapons, and how to assess descend into civil war. It would be far Somalias and its Yugoslavias, and if whether a crowd is aggressive and more convenient if a new South Africa nothing else, it would prefer South threatening, or merely excited. could be ruled by an indisputably, legiti­ Africa to hang together. mated government. However, what the That requires a genuinely democratic Emphasis should always be placed on massacre has done has been to suggest election. That has to be good news for the need for minimum force and its that, for all Mr De Klerk's nice face, the the country as a whole; but it is a far gradual escalation. The first step should government has scarcely changed its more ambiguous message for Mr De be to speak to the crowd. If this did not spots. To put it bluntly, a government so Klerk and the National Party. result in its dispersal, a warning should be given that, following a specified time, crass as to kill protesters in front of the • Professor Southall's article was written television cameras can scarcely be immediately after the Bisho massacre.

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