Settled for a Generation? Policy, Strategy, and Means of the Post-Referendum SNP Coree Brown Swan, University of [email protected]

EARLY DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION Presented at the PSA Annual Conference, Sheffield, 30 March – 1 April, 2015.

Abstract Following the unsuccessful independence referendum and yet with more than a year left in their parliamentary term, what happens now for the SNP? Building on work which studies the behaviour of substate nationalist parties as they move from opposition to power and balance competing demands in multilevel systems, this paper will present an analysis of the SNP’s policy, strategy and means in the run-up to the General Election. With polling indicating high probabilities of a hung parliament and strong returns for the nationalist party, how might the party position itself to pursue its goals within and outwith the union. Comparing post- devolutionary manifestos at Westminster and Holyrood, this paper examines the party’s policies, priorities and tactics in an increasingly complex multilevel system.

Settled for a Generation? Policy, Strategy, and Means of the Post- Referendum SNP Introduction The tendency toward decentralisation in Western Europe has seen the introduction of new levels of government, causing a subsequent shift in party strategies, voting behaviour, and competition within party systems. While the literature has largely focused on the organisational and programmatic adaption of statewide parties to new multilevel systems, substate nationalist parties have been faced with a similar strategic dilemma. Although their attentions have shifted to this regional level of government, where they typically garner better electoral results, the centre remains important, and is perhaps increasingly so in recent years. The Flemish nationalist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie is now the largest party in Belgium and after the 2014 federal elections, entered into government at the centre, Catalan nationalists have supported governments at the centre, and based on current polling, the post-referendum SNP seems to be on track to influence the process of government formation at the statewide level. How do substate nationalist parties, oriented toward the periphery but needful of the centre to bring about further constitutional change, balance competing demands across levels? What are the strategies and policies pursued in an increasingly complex multilevel space? This paper will explore this phenomenon in the case of the , examining the strategy of the party on multiple levels, particularly in light of the potential success of the SNP in the upcoming 2015 UK General election. Elections in multilevel contexts To understand the dynamics impacting substate nationalist parties, we must first unravel the theory of multilevel elections. The introduction of regional or substate levels of government causes shifts in the behaviour of voters and political parties, both statewide and smaller parties which do not compete in all areas. (Thorlakson, 2007) For statewide parties, the introduction of

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an intermediary level of government challenges traditional tactics. They must simultaneously behave as statewide parties seeking office and as local parties seeking power. For non-statewide or substate nationalist parties, this introduction provides new opportunity structures but also poses challenges in resource allocation and messaging. The behaviour of voters may also shift, with lower levels of turnout documented at non-statewide elections, and disruption in traditional voting patterns.

Traditionally, regional elections have been understood, along with European Parliamentary elections, as second-order, with voters behaving in distinct ways in response to this perceived second-orderness. (Reif & Schmitt, 1980: 325). In elections perceived by voters as less important in the hierarchy of contests, we would expect to see a lower level of overall turnout, higher levels of support for new or smaller parties, and lower returns for parties in office at the centre. For Reif and Schmitt, second-order elections provide the voter an opportunity to reward or punish parties in government. Voters may behave in this manner because ‘less is at stake’ in these contests. (1980: 325). Although the concept of second-order elections has been widely referenced in the literature, it faces increasing challenges particularly in regions with high level of authority. Jeffery and Hough ask ‘Just how ‘second-order’ are regional elections?’ (Jeffery & Hough, 2003: 201). Schakel and Jeffery (2013) critique the notion of regional or substate elections as second-order in cases in which regional elections ‘do not have the potential to signal a future alternation of government at the national level’, in authoritative or powerful regions and in those contests in which non- statewide parties compete. Increasingly, governments are formed as a result of these elections, and those governments have an array of powers over issues of education, healthcare, welfare, and economic development, challenging the conception that there is ‘less at stake’ in these concepts (Henderson & McEwen, 2010: 406; Swenden & Maddens 2009: 4-5). Voters may respond to this, behaving differently at different levels, even when the parties competing are the same. (Jeffery and Hough, 2003: 199). Voting trends are likely to reflect this, with Schakel and Jeffery noting that regionalised voting behaviour is likely to be demonstrated in regions with extensive self-rule, or when voters feel that their votes are impactful. (Schakel & Jeffery, 2013: 327). Lower levels of turnout have been documented at the regional level, although the gap varies between regions (Perez-Nievas & Bonet, 2008: 60). Regionalist parties tend to do well in elections at the regional level, with particular success linked to the timing of the elections. (Jeffery & Hough, 2003: 201; Perez-Nievas & Bonet, 2008: 60) ‘Voters may express different kinds of judgements in different elections about the same political parties’ (Jeffery & Hough, 2006: 2). Parties may be judged on their ability to form governments and advance policies at the centre but at the regional level, voters may evaluate them on different criteria- the perception that a party will stand up for a territory or represent regional identities. The literature on party politics, substate nationalism, and multilevel governance has captured several important aspects of party change and voting behaviour. However, this literature has largely focused on the statewide parties as the unit of analysis, asking how these parties cope with new demands posed by decentralisation and competition at multiple levels. These studies have focused on party organisation, with work by Van Houten (2009) and Moon and Bratberg (2010) on organisational shifts in response to decentralisation. Hopkin (2003) examines the impact of centre-periphery tensions on both the organisation and behaviour of statewide parties, noting a degree of denationalisation in response. The analysis of issue salience has been a useful lens through which to identify shifts in party strategies, with work from Pogorelis, Maddens, Swenden and Fabre (2005) comparing regional and statewide party manifestos in the UK, Leon (2014) examining shifts in the manifestos of Spanish socialist parties, and Libbrecht, Maddens and

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Swenden comparing statewide parties in Spain and the United Kingdom.. The behaviour of voters in multilevel systems has also received attention. Pallares and Keating (2003) examine multilevel elections and party competition, while Henderson and McEwen (2010) look at turnout in regional elections compared to elections at the centre. Schakel (2013) examines voting patterns to identify explanations for differences in vote share over time in light of theories of congruence, second- order elections, territorial cleavages and differences in regional authority. While the literature on multilevel elections is extensive, it does in some ways fail to capture how non-statewide or substate nationalist parties respond to competition at varying levels. Substate nationalist parties in multilevel systems For substate nationalist parties, the introduction of an intermediary level of government provides a ‘very peculiar structure of opportunities’ (Deschouwer, 2003: 214). Deschouwer asks ‘where exactly is the party?’ or put simply, where do parties focus their efforts? The reorientation of systems of electoral competition toward the regional level may change the dynamic of competition between statewide parties and those which compete in a limited number of territories. (Jeffery, 2010: 145). With the introduction of intermediate levels of government, the ‘point of reference’ or core level for parties may change. (Deschouwer, 2003: 217). Parties will act as both the agent and the principle, governing at the regional level and speaking for the region at the centre. (Deschouwer, 2003: 221). While the party may continue to compete at both levels, we should be able to identify one level as the core.

Protest at the centre, power in the periphery? Despite the appeal of the intermediary level of government, non-statewide parties do continue to mobilise at the centre as a means of incentivising further change and positioning the party as a defender of regional interests. De Winter argues that substate nationalist parties will focus their efforts on the centre, as this is where constitutional change or the further transfer of powers will originate from. He writes: As the main policy objective of ethnoregionalist parties is the reorganisation of the national power structure towards an increase in the degree of self-government and for this reorganisation only legislative bodies at the national level are competent, ethnoregionalist parties tend to focus on increasing their political weight at the level of the national parliament, rather than at the sub-state levels of political representation De Winter, 1998: 211-12

This was challenged by Jeffery and Hough, who note that ‘regional parties now choose to direct their energies towards the newly empowered regional level of government’ (Jeffery & Hough, 2003: 207). Further constitutional reforms may be introduced at the central level, which retains its ownership of constitutional issues and state reform, but they may be incentivised by the electoral success of substate nationalist parties in the periphery. These moves have been driven not ‘by ethnoregionalist party presence in national parliaments, but rather the vigour of pro-autonomy sentiment in the region itself’ (Jeffery, 2010: 154). As the competences accorded to the regional election increase, the appeal of competition at the centre, where the party might be marginalised or excluded from influence, may diminish.

Despite this decreased utility, parties do continue to compete at the centre in addition to the regional level as a means of allowing for voters to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo and positioning themselves as defender of the region. Lutz notes that ‘it can be useful for a party to participate in an election when their utility of being present in the political arena is higher than the costs of taking part in an election’ (Lutz, 1997). The decision to participate and degree of investment is shaped by opportunity structures afforded to the party, particularly structural

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factors which may help or hinder their electoral prospects, reputational factors and the availability of public funding for the campaign. (Lago & Montero, 2008: 29). At the centre, parties may exert their blackmail potential, placing pressure on the centre to advance the interests of their territory, or in some cases, the party may serve as a potential supporting party or coalition partner. (Stefuric, 2013: 109).

Regional elections have become increasingly detached from elections at the centre, particularly in those territories with strong degrees of self-rule. (Schakel & Jeffery, 2013: 327). Substate nationalist parties demarcate their territory through the contestation of elections. (Miodownik & Cartrite, 2006: 67). As a result, the support of substate nationalist parties at this level can be understood as more than a protest against parties at the centre, as second-order election theory attests, but as the expression of distinctive national identities and policy preferences. (Schakel & Jeffery, 2013: 327). Substate nationalist parties are likely to prioritise the regional level, using participation in government, either alone or in coalition as a means of furthering their territorial goals. Participation in government at the centre is likely to be met with less enthusiasm, with parties ‘fearing that the compromises it would need to make would dilute its regionalist appeal and incur electoral punishment’ (Stefuric, 2013: 100) Methods of analysis In an attempt to capture dynamics at multiple levels, this research compares manifestos published in advance of the UK General Election and those published for the Scottish Parliamentary elections. These manifestos are subject first to a quantitative analysis to identify the ways in which the content of the manifesto may reflect the context in which the party is competing. I then examine the discourse included within the analysis, comparing the party’s articulation of its role at the centre and at the Scottish level. The corpus for this work includes manifestos from devolution onwards, with Scottish Parliamentary manifestos in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011 and manifestos from Westminster contests from 2001, 2005, and 2010. The manifesto for the forthcoming UK General Election has not yet been published. In the interim, I will draw on public speeches which set out the position of the post-referendum SNP in the contest. As these materials become available, I will update my analysis.

The use of manifestos in political research is commonplace. Manifestos provide ‘authoritative statements of party preferences and represent the whole party’ (Alonso et al, 2012: 1). They are comprised of ‘various intentions, emphases, promises, pledges and goals that will be activated once the party enters government’ (Dandoy, 2013: 362) The use of manifestos, in comparison with interviews, analysis of parliamentary statements, and other documents, allows the researcher to unpack a moment in time and identify instances of change over time and in this case, with the comparison of manifestos at multiple levels, changes between contexts. (Pogerelis et al, 2005). Alonso et al (2012: 1) note the advantages of the use of manifestos in multilevel settings as allowing the identification of ‘claims concerning the distribution of competences and the relationship between the different levels of government’. The manifestos were read, digested, and subjected to content analysis with the use of a codebook. As my units of analysis, I used natural sentences rather than sentence fragments or quasi- sentences in order to facilitate coding and improve accuracy as a solo coder. (Daubler et al, 2012) While the Comparative Manifesto Project and the Regional Manifesto Project offers an extensive and valuable framework for coding manifestos, I adopted a simplified framework for coding. Party manifestos provide ‘both abstract ideologies’ and ‘narrower, concrete policy proposals’ (Vassallo & Wilcox, 2006). Of interest to this research were those specific policy proposals. These were identified and then coded according to whether they represented a devolved or reserved

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policy area1. I also coded those sentences which referred to independence as a party policy, reflecting both on the process and policies of an SNP government in an independence scenario.

Sample Coded Sentences Reserved SNP MPs will oppose any involvement in a possible US National Missile Defence Programme believing it to be unwise and damaging to international relations between east and west. (SNP, 2001) Devolved We will reduce Scottish business rates to below the UK rate within the first term of our government. (SNP, 2003) On to independence An SNP government will not be part of a nuclear-based commitment such as NATO. (SNP, 2001)

Sentences were coded in nVivo which allowed for the review, revision and verification of coding. Introductory texts, captions to images, sidebars and anecdotal texts were excluded from the analysis. Sentences which did not contain any specific policy proposal or in the case of the 2011 Holyrood manifesto, reflected on past actions in government, were also excluded. After reviewing the results, I realised that my coding schema failed to capture the ways in which reserved areas were articulated. Did the party state which policies they would support at Westminster or were these policies made in favour of the transfer of reserved powers from Westminster to Holyrood? In an effort to capture this distinction, I conducted a second round of coding which distinguished between policies that a) should be transferred to Holyrood; b) would be advanced or challenged at Westminster by SNP MPs; and c) those areas which the had no competences, but had a stated policy. In total, 2352 policy sentences were coded across 7 manifestos.

Total coded sentences

Election year Coded sentences 1999 Scot Parl 326 2001 Westminster 219 2003 Scot Parl 442 2005 Westminster 173 2007 Scot Parl 596 2010 Westminster 107 2011 Scot Parl 489

Of interest in this research was the salience of reserved policy areas vis-à-vis devolved policy areas in an attempt to identify the party’s core. Much of the work conducted around manifestos leverages the standardised format, consistency, and widespread availability to develop measures of salience of a given issue area. Salience theory assumes that parties emphasise issue areas in which they have strong, distinctive positions rather than those positions which are generally

1 Competences are accorded to Westminster and Holyrood as part of the Scotland Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 2012. Reserved matters include benefits and social security, immigration, defence, foreign policy (including representation within the European union), employment, broadcasting, trade and industry, nuclear energy, oil, coal, gas and electricity, consumer rights, data protection and the Constitution. Devolved matters include agriculture, forestry and fisheries, education and training, the environment, health and social services, housing, law and order, local government, sports and the arts, tourism and economic development and certain aspects of transport.

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accepted in political discourse (valence issues) or ‘owned by rivals’. (Budge, 1994). Parties ‘compete not by taking different positions on a common set of issues, but rather by stressing different sets of issues’ (Ray, 2001: 151). We can understand this by looking at the issue areas a party chooses to include, operating under the theory that ‘greater salience means greater importance’ (Wlezien, 2005). In this instance, what was of interest was the ways in which the SNP approached those issue areas which were held, or reserved to the centre, and those devolved to the . This allowed me to develop a quantitative measure of issues in party manifestos.

I then examined the discourse in each manifesto. Discourse is valuable as it captures the way in which actors ‘interpret the world in which they find themselves in order to orient themselves strategically towards it’ (Hay, 2002: 209). By examining the language used and comparing it across levels and across time, I hoped to capture the ways in which the party viewed its participation at multiple levels. Parties are expected to behave differently at each level, in response to different opportunity structures, patterns of party competition, and the perceived preferences of the voters. The SNP, unlikely to be considered as a party of government at the centre, might adopt a more broadly assertive tone here, where it does not have to worry about being an acceptable party of coalition [whilst focusing on the day to day politics at the Scottish Parliamentary level. Scottish elections in a multilevel context Second-order elections are typically characterised by lower voter turnout, a tendency of voters to use their vote to weigh in on the actions of governments at the centre, and a perception that there is ‘less at stake’. (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) Evaluating this on the basis of voter participation, we might conclude that Scottish Parliamentary elections are second-order. The level of voter participation remains lower in Scottish Parliamentary contests, with around 50% of those registered turning out. The first Scottish Parliamentary election was an exception, with 59.1% participation. In contrast, General Elections since devolution see about 60% turnout among the Scottish electorate. Although lower levels of turnout might indicate second-orderness, there appears to be an increasingly distinction drawn by both the electorate and the parties between elections to Holyrood and elections at Westminster. As voters become more familiar with the roles and competences of the Scottish Government and the positions of the parties who compete to lead it, the elections become more focused on Scottish issues, placing organisational and political demands on statewide parties. (Scully, 2013).

Scully notes that ‘Holyrood and Westminster are not simply two alternative arenas in which the same politics are played out. The rules, the players, and above all the relative strength of those players are all quite different’ (Scully, 2010: 107). The parties competing at multiple levels have had to evolve to compete in these new spaces. The , who campaigned against devolution in 1997, faced the largest challenge in reorienting themselves toward the Scottish Parliament. (Smith, 2011). This came to the fore with the 2011 leadership contest in which candidates presented two radically different visions of the future of the party within a Scottish context. (Convery, 2012). The Labour Party, although in office at both levels until 2007, also struggled with the organisational demands posed by devolution. (Laffin & Shaw, 2007). The decentralised internal structure of the Liberal Democrats has perhaps been best equipped to cope with the changing political opportunity structure but they have struggled to draw a distinction between their actions in government at the centre and their stance in Scotland. The election of the SNP in 2007, elected on its perceived ability to govern rather than an attempt to send a message to government at the centre, seems to underline the increasing importance of elections at this level.

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The SNP in a Multilevel System The introduction of devolution and the Scottish Parliament in 1999 caused a sea change in the dynamics of party competition, creating an opportunity for the SNP, which since its peak in the 1970s, had struggled to advance its territorial goals. In the 1997 General Election campaign, the party criticised both the proposals and the intentions of its mainstream rivals. 'New Labour's scheme for a Scottish assembly is fatally flawed, and will deliver no real power. The Tories are stuck in the bunker of 'no change' whilst virtually the whole of Scotland is now scunnered by their anti- Scottish actions' (SNP, 1997). Ultimately, the party embraced the Parliament, with ’s opening speech acknowledging this dual role. ‘It is no secret that, to members of the Scottish National party, this Parliament is not quite the fulfilment of our dream, but it is a Parliament we can build a dream on’ (Ewing, 1999). After devolution, the SNP continues to contest seats at Westminster but it seems that the party views its role differently here, which may indicate that the party’s ‘core’ has shifted. At the centre, behaves as a party of pressure, exercising to some degree, its blackmail potential. At Holyrood, the party has positioned itself as a prospective party of government, emphasising its policies under the existing settlement, arguing for the further transfer of powers prior to independence, and building a case for its ultimate goal. In some ways, Westminster elections can be viewed as second-order for the nationalist party, with little opportunity to participate in the government formation process, less support from voters, and perhaps, less at stake. This may be, in part, attributed to the first-past-the-post electoral system which makes gaining seats more difficult for small parties. We can see this by comparing the issue salience of reserved versus devolved policy areas between elections at different levels as well as the discourse across levels.

Devolved and Reserved Policies

Election year Devolved policies Reserved policies 1999 Scot Parl 94% (273) 6% (18) 2001 Westminster 74% (129) 26% (46) 2003 Scot Parl 85% (326) 15% (58) 2005 Westminster 74% (103) 26% (36) 2007 Scot Parl 91% (533) 9% (56) 2010 Westminster 40% (39) 60% (60) 2011 Scot Parl 82% (435) 18% (50)

Westminster manifestos tend to be shorter and although we see a greater degree of coverage of those reserved policies in UK general elections, they do, with the exception of 2010, focus largely on devolved issues.

A party of pressure at Westminster At the centre, the SNP was excluded, by virtue of the UK’s tradition of majority governments, the party’s limited number of seats and its anti-system stance, from participation in government. Without the constraints of rendering itself coalitionable, the party could claim an uncorrupted Scottish perspective. Support for the SNP was associated, in the party’s discourse, with the expression of a voice of dissent with the everyday politics of Westminster. Voting for the SNP at the centre has, in some ways, been framed as a protest vote. ‘We can express our dissatisfaction with the stale and sterile politics of the parties - New Labour and Old Tory alike’ (SNP, 1997). The success of the SNP was linked with the success of Scotland, ‘A Strong SNP means a strong

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Scotland’ and the process of devolution was articulated as incentivised by the SNP. ‘It was SNP pressure that led to the setting up of the Scottish Parliament’ (SNP, 2005)

Election Results at Westminster

Election year Percentage Seats Position 2001 Westminster 20.1 5 2nd 2005 Westminster 17.7 6 3rd 2010 Westminster 19.9 6 3rd

Even in the event of the failure by the main parties to achieve a majority in 2010, the SNP pledged to remain outside of coalition. In 2010, the party, in partnership with Plaid Cymru, explained its 4 Wales, 4 Scotland stance. They pledged to 'seek to secure key concessions for Scotland on a vote by vote, issue by issue basis' a position that might be revisited in the forthcoming election (SNP, 2010). A hung parliament was viewed as an opportunity for Scotland rather than a hindrance.

The prospect of a balanced parliament has now become increasingly likely. The thought causes panic in the Labour and Tory ranks but it is a development that is welcome here in Scotland and one which we embrace enthusiastically for it is with a balanced parliament that Scotland’s greatest opportunity exist. SNP, 2010 The election of SNP MPs was, in 2001 and 2005, linked with the ability to further referendum legislation, with competences for constitutional matters reserved at the centre. In this case, ‘The election of SNP MPs to the Westminster Parliament is a vote for Scotland and a vote for Independence’ (SNP, 2001). This did shift, with the addition of a referendum option and attempts, particularly in documents published for Scottish Parliamentary elections, to draw a distinction between a vote for the SNP and a vote for independence. The 2010 General Election manifesto was a much shorter document and independence was only discussed in detail in the later pages. In this case, the election of an SNP government was interpreted as a mandate for a referendum, rather than an option that must be pursued through Westminster. At the centre, the party stresses the ability to ‘stand up for Scotland’ and challenges the capacity of its statewide rivals to do so. The statewide parties are often described as ‘London parties’ or ‘Westminster parties’ to denote their participation in the political establishment and their inability to adequately account for and represent Scottish interests. The party positioned itself as 'Scotland's Party' which could be trusted to put Scotland first. This was in contrast to the ‘London parties’ or ‘parties of the same metropolitan political machine – a machine that leaves ordinary men and women of our country on the outside’ (SNP, 2010). The 2010 manifesto urged voters to ‘Elect a local champion’ which further emphasised the focus of SNP MPs on local and Scottish issues rather than issues pursued at the UK wide level. (SNP, 2010).

Reserved Policies: Proposed Plans

Election year Proposed transfer Policies at No competences but Westminster policy 2001 13 28 15 2005 2 20 14 2010 7 53 -

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Despite this emphasis on local issues, the SNP at Westminster does advance specific policy proposals, whether at the centre in cooperation with other parties or through the further transfer of powers to the Scottish level. At the centre, the party pledged to join with likeminded parties in a coalition against Trident, push for more ambitious action on climate change and encourage incentives for the development of renewable energy. It also stated its commitment to protect Scottish regiments and ensure that Scotland continued to receive its share of defence funding. (SNP, 2001). The party also registered its opposition to the UK’s participation in military action in Iraq and to the introduction of ID cards. (SNP, 2005). In 2010, the focus of the manifesto shifted to action at Westminster in response to growing concerns about the austerity policies put forth by the main parties. In this manifesto, 60% of the content was linked to reserved policies, a departure from past trends, and the party emphasised their resistance to budget cuts. ‘At this election’, the party explained, ‘more votes means more Nats, and more Nats means less cuts. Local services and recovery can and must be protected’ (SNP, 2010) A party of performance at Holyrood At the regional level, the SNP has positioned itself as a prospective party of government, focused both on near-term policies which fall within the competences of the Scottish Government, and, to a lesser degree, to the pursuit of independence. In its first manifesto for the devolved parliament, the SNP makes commitments for its first four years in office. The first commitments are in the short-term, focusing on activities within the remit of the Scottish Parliament and its existing powers, including a Penny for Scotland, Public Service Trusts as an alternative to privatisation, and land reform. (SNP, 2001). Participation in government is framed as a means of getting the best deal for Scotland in the near-term but also as a means of demonstrating the limits and weaknesses of the existing constitutional settlement, a theme repeated from year to year. In the 2003 manifesto, the party pledged to ‘make as much of a difference as we can with the current powers of the Scottish Parliament, and to show why we need the powers of independence' (SNP, 2003). The party viewed participation in government as means of building the confidence of the nation, arguing that ‘We will demonstrate what an independent Scotland could be by showing what our government can do’ (SNP, 2003). Manifestos were lengthy and policy heavy, with several hundred sentences coded as policy proposals in each manifesto. These focused on the specific policies the party would enact once in office, from improving outcomes within the NHS, to sweeping land reforms, to small things, like free fruit in schools. Competing at the Scottish Parliamentary Level

Election year Devolved policies Reserved policies 1999 Scot Parl 94% (273) 6% (18) 2003 Scot Parl 85% (326) 15% (58) 2007 Scot Parl 91% (533) 9% (56) 2011 Scot Parl 82% (435) 18% (50)

The ability to perform as a party of government, within the existing constitutional settlement played a role in the party’s objectives from the devolutionary period onward, with an acknowledgement of the limitations of that settlement. The SNP pledged action on a wide range of issues, rather than the pursuit of independence tout court. 'Although the SNP is clear that we need the full powers of independence to deliver long term economic growth, that does not mean that we would not act within the limited powers of the devolved Parliament' (SNP, 2003). After outlining its policy proposals in advance of the first parliamentary election in 1999, the party claimed that it ‘intends to be judged by its success

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in implementing these measures if elected to government on the 6th of May’ (SNP, 1999). This theme of performance and demonstration was echoed in subsequent manifestos, with the party noting its attempt to ‘prove ourselves as a party that can make a difference to Scotland’ ‘and ‘working hard to earn the trust and support of the people of Scotland’ (SNP, 2003). This focus resonated with voters, with voters rating the party’s performance in government higher than their Labour-Liberal Democratic predecessors and higher than the UK government at the time. (Johns et al, 2013). The party returned to this theme in 2011, urging voters to ‘Re-Elect a Scottish Government working for Scotland’ (SNP, 2011) with little reference to the party’s independence objectives. ‘The SNP stands in this election on our record, our team and on our vision for Scotland's future’ (SNP, 2011). In terms of policy, the party stressed the urgency of the transfer of job creating powers and other economic levers to the Scottish Parliament through the revised Scotland Act, using its position of strength to push for more. (SNP, 2011) Through demonstrating the party’s performance as a party of government as well as the limitations of the existing constitutional settlement, the SNP sought to build the case for independence. However, multiple options were pursued simultaneously, strengthening Scotland’s voice and influence within the Union in the immediate term, and bringing an independence referendum to Scottish voters towards the end of the party’s second term. ‘As we have seen, with your support we can take forward our proposals for a referendum, and we can also, in the meantime, make the current Scotland Bill better' (SNP, 2011)

Looking forward: What next for the SNP? Our traditional understanding of voting patterns in Scotland has been summarised as ‘general election, vote British; Scottish parliament election, vote Scottish’, with voters supporting the SNP on the basis of performance politics and the party’s perceived ability to stand up for Scotland in Scottish Parliamentary elections while supporting Labour at the centre. Polling in advance of the 2015 General Election suggests that may change, with the possibility of the SNP securing a large majority of Scottish seats and playing a critical role in the process of government formation. Despite the unsuccessful independence referendum, the party appears to be in a position of strength. Although the SNP manifesto has not yet been published, we can look to speeches made in an effort to understand how the party might behave at the centre. Within these texts, we can identify an emphasis on the role Scotland, the Scottish Government, and the SNP might play within the Union. Early evidence of this is demonstrated through the party’s approach toward government, its conception of the party’s role at the centre, and specific policy proposals put forth in recent speeches and interviews. Although the party has, at this point in time, ruled out participation in government, the support of a minority Labour government is considered by the party as a distinct possibility. Speaking in a media interview about the possibilities of coalition, Angus Robertson referenced the fate of the Liberal Democrats within coalition. ‘History teaches you that minor coalition partners tend to suffer the brunt at election time’ (Robertson, 2015). As a result of this cautionary tale, he states ‘Formal coalition with seats in the UK government has never been the preference of the SNP. Our priority instead is to stand up for Scotland's interests, and advance progressive politics across the UK’ (SNP, 2015) As an alternative, the SNP is more likely to consider support from outside of government like it did in the 1970s. ‘Frankly, confidence and supply is the one outcome I am spending any time

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thinking about’ (Robertson, 2015). The theme ‘Standing up for Scotland’ is returned to but within a UK context which is novel for the party which expands upon.

The party’s early campaign materials revisit familiar themes, with a banner noting in 2015, ‘More SNP seats. More power for Scotland’ (SNP, 2015). The party asserts that ‘With strong Scottish voices at Westminster we will hold the government of the day to account on more powers. The real powers of home rule to create jobs and protect services’ (SNP, 2015). The party also stresses that it will play a constructive role at Westminster, capitalising on the enhanced cooperation that was promised in the event of a no vote. In a speech by Nicola Sturgeon in March, the First Minister built on this theme. ‘So don’t be at all surprised, if the SNP, the Scottish Government – indeed Scotland as a whole – now starts to take those Westminster politicians at their word’ (Sturgeon, 2015b). She discussed the SNP’s experience in minority government and pledged to advance a progressive agenda at the centre. Contrasts continue to be drawn between Scottish politics and Westminster politics, with the level of debate at Westminster characterised as ‘bizarrely and depressingly narrow’ in contrast to the lively referendum debate in Scotland. (Sturgeon, 2015a). However, the First Minister stressed the shared interests of Scotland and the rest of the UK, a departure from previous party discourse.

And if we get the opportunity, we intend to be a constructive voice in the months and years ahead. We won’t just serve Scotland’s interests – though we will most certainly do that. But we will seek to do more than that – we will also seek to play our part in bringing about positive, long-lasting and progressive change right across the UK. Sturgeon, 2015b This orientation toward Westminster was evident in the policies promoted in recent speeches. The First Minister noted that the Scottish Government has ‘clear and constructive views on many aspects of UK policy which affect Scotland deeply – views which we know are often shared by many people elsewhere in the UK’ (Sturgeon, 2015b). These proposals include a new approach to budgeting, bringing the UK budgetary process in line with processes in Scotland, a challenge to the current model of austerity and deficit reduction, and include institutional reforms. (Sturgeon, 2015a; 2015b). Speaking at the London School of Economics, the First Minister spoke about the need for overhaul of the central institutions of the UK, including a reform of the House of Lords, the first-past-the-post voting system which favours the two largest parties, and the ‘culture, procedures and working practices of the current Parliament’. (Sturgeon, 2015b). At Westminster, the party also pledged to pursue long-held socioeconomic goals, including opposition to the bedroom tax, Trident renewal, and austerity. (SNP, 2015) The party is now presenting it as a force for progressive policies and institutional reform at the UK level, rather than a party of independence. Prior to the referendum, the party’s position was that it would be ‘settled for a generation’ in the event of a no vote. Statements made by party leadership in the media stress that another referendum will come about at the behest of the people rather than as a result of an SNP landslide in Scottish constituencies. In an interview, Angus Robertson noted that ‘there will only be another referendum in Scotland when people want there to be another referendum’ (Robertson, 2015). This is a departure from the position of the SNP prior to devolution, in which the majority of Scottish seats held by SNP MPs was to be interpreted as a mandate to open negotiations for independence. However, the coming months will post a challenge for the party, particularly in the event of high levels of successes. Will the party interpret votes for the SNP at Westminster, or indeed in the 2016 Scottish Parliamentary elections, as a response to performance politics or the endorsement of the party’s territorial goals.

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