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TITLE PAGE

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BOKO HARAM AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN NIGERIA; 2009-2011

BY

OKWU STEPHEN EMEKA PG/M.SC./10/52530

A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (POLITICAL ECONOMY) TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

SUPERVISOR: DR. KEN IFESINACHI

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA

DECEMBER, 2011.

APPROVAL 2

Project Report by Mr. Okwu Stephen Emeka with registration number PG/MSC/10/52530 is written under the supervision and approval of the academic authorities of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, School of Post Graduate Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

------DR. KEN IFESINACHI PROF. OBASI IGWE SUPERVISOR HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

------EXTERNAL EXAMINER PROF. EZEANI EMMANUEL DEAN, FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the student, Mr. Okwu Stephen Emeka with registration number PG/MSC/10/52530, of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the 3

Social Sciences, School of Post Graduate Studies, University of Nigeria Nsukka, has satisfactorily completed the requirement for the award of Master of Science in Political Science (Political Economy).

______Dr. Ken Ifesinachi Supervisor

DEDICATION

This Project is dedicated to God Almighty, the fountain of Peace and Freedom in the universe.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is my esteemed honour to thank you all who contributed in one way or the other to the success of this project. To God, I remain grateful for sustaining our lives; the life of my supervisor, lecturers, my course mates and myself. I appreciate most profoundly my supervisor, Dr. Ken Ifesinachi for his painstaking guidance, assistance and supervision throughout the period of this research. It has been very wonderful working with him. I am also grateful to the academic staff of the Department of Political Science, especially Prof. Obasi Igwe, Head, Department of Political Science., Prof. Ezeani Emmanuel, Prof. Jonah Onuoha, Dr. Aloysius Michael Okolie, Late Prof. Ikejiani-Clark, may her gentle soul rest in perfect peace. Amen, for refining me in a furnace, Mr. Ezeibe Christian for his academic advice and intellectual support. I would not fail to mention the immense contribution of my course mates like Onyishi Augustine, Nwankwo Clement, Nwaeke Clement, Ogbodo Ifeanyichukwu, Nwanyim Emmalee.N., among others who through their robust academic debates raised the bar of my knowledge. I also appreciate my best friend Mr. Agu Marcel U (junior) who advised me to advance on this study. I equally thank him and his family for their assistance both financially, morally and spiritually. I appreciate the support, corporation and love shown by my Precious and ever caring wife who also typed this work. In a special way I also appreciate my lovely child Princess Okwu Amarachi Miracle. I would not also fail to acknowledge the warmth, financial, moral, and other encouragements I got from my family and friends especially Master Okwu Peter Nnamdi, Igbeaku Benjamine. C., Ph.D among others. I hold you all dearly and I value inestimably your productive contributions.

Okwu Stephen Emeka. PG/MS.C/10/52530 Department of Political Science University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the impact of the Political Economy of Boko Haram and political instability in Nigeria between; 2009-2011. The study drives its theoretical foundation from the frustration- aggression model. This helped us to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the activities of the Islamic sect (Boko Haram) and the amount of danger it poses to the state as a result of frustration they met in their view of how the state is ought to be. Guided by this theoretical framework, we posited the following hypotheses: The first enquires whether activities of Boko Haram sect account for the political instability in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011. The second sought to discover if Government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram have ensured internal peace and security in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011. Data was collected for the study through the use of qualitative method by development of the logical data framework. The data collected was analyzed using qualitative descriptive technique, while the logical data clarified the empirical indicators. The study discovers that during the period of study, the insurgence of Boko Haram sect and its terrorist act has been on increase. The study equally notes that the sects’ activities have contributed to insecurity as a result of the instability in the Northern part of the country. It also notes that the government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram could not yield a positive result. This is true in the case of frequent bombings, attacks, killings among other vices despite government’s intervention in the crisis. Instead of being in control of the situation, the Boko Haram crisis has spread to other places including the Federal Capital, Abuja. The study equally discovers that poverty and leadership are also the remote causes of the crises. Also, the extra-judicial killing of the sect’s leader and other members of the sect on July, 2009 escalated the insurgence. Based on these findings, the study recommends that the Federal government of Nigeria should create more jobs for the teaming population of citizens who are often used by the political and religious elites for the satisfaction of their own selfish gains. Government should also bring the culprits to book as it will serve as deterrence to others. Also, government should rise up to the challenges of protection of lives and properties which it is entrusted to safeguard. The Federal Government must find a way to withdraw small arms in circulation and also check the influx of arms into the country. One other indisputable fact is the urgent need to overhaul our security system. Finally, the study finds out that the act of violence accompanied by more bombings, mass killings and destructions will be higher in 2012 and above. 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background of Study ======1 1.2 Statement of Problem ======3 1.3 Objective of Study ======5 1.4 Significance of Study ======5 1.5 Literature Review ======6 1.6 Theoretical Framework ======19 1.7 Hypotheses ======22 1.8 Method of Data Collection ======22

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA 2.1. Origin of Boko Haram ======27 2.2. Ideologies of Boko Haram ======41 2.3. Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria= = = 55

CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OF PAST RELIGIOUS CRISES AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 3.1. The Maitatsine Religious Riots.-1980 = = = = 63 3.2 The Sharia Crisis and Hisbah = = = = = 65 3.3 Kaduna Religious Crises.1987, 1992. 2000. = = = = 72 3.4 Ilorin Religious Crisis.-1986 = = = = = 74 3.5 Bauchi Religious Riots.-1991, 1992 = = = = = 75 3.6 Kano Religious Crises.-1982, 1991 = = = = = 75 3.7 Jos Religious Crisis-2001, 2008 = = = = = 76 3.8 Organization of Islamic Conference = = = = = 77 3.9 Political and Economic Causes of Religious Crises = = = 79 3.10 Governments role to Religious Crisis in Nigeria = = = 87

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 4.1 The Political and Economic Implications of Boko Haram Sect = 92 4.2 Boko Haram and Joint Task Force (JTF) = = = = 100 7

4.3 Boko Haram and Amnesty Offer = = = = = 101 4.4 Governments Role to the Prospects of Internal Peace and Security in Nigeria ======104

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Summary ======117 5.2 Conclusion ======119 5.3 Recommendations ======122

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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LIST OF TABLE/ FIGURES Table Table 2.1 Some selected cases of Boko Haram attack and casualties in different parts of the federation between 2009 -2011 = = = = 45

Figures Figure 2.1 Some members of Boko Haram sit after their arrest in Kano = 32 Figure 2.2 Nigerian police display confiscated militant items brought to a police station after a gun battle between Boko Haram and security forces in the early morning, at the northeastern city of Bauchi July 26, 2009 = 33 Figure 2.3 Some of the sect’s members killed by military in 2009 = = 33 Figure 2.4 Members of the local Islamic group Boko Haram lie on the ground at a police station after their arrest in the Northeastern city of Bauchi, July 25, 2009 ======33 Figure 2.5 Yusuf Mohammed when he was arrested = = = = = 34 Figure 2.6 Dead body of the Boko Haram Leader late Yusuf Mohammed = 35 Figure 2.7 Scene of the Bomb blast at Police Headquarters in Abuja = = 38 Figure 2.8 President Goodluck Jonathan at Police Headquarters in Abuja the Background of the bomb blast = = = = = 39 Figure 2.9 The team at the police Headquarters in Abuja = = = 39 Figure 2.10 People killed by the Boko Haram Sect = = = = 40 Figure 2.11 Map of states Boko Haram operates more frequently = = 41 Figure 3.1 People killed by Boko Haram Sect = = = = = 94 Figure 3.2 Nigerian forces killed 32 after station attack by Boko Haram = 94 Figure 3.4 Car and buildings damaged by the Boko Haram Sect = = 96

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY

This study seeks to explore the dangers posed by the activities of the Boko Haram sect on the Political Economy of Nigeria and its consequencial political instability between 2009 and 2011. It also aims at finding out the challenges and mechanisms of containing Boko Haram in order to ensure national stability, security of lives and properties, religious tolerance and so on among Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Conflicts and crises are found at every stage of life. Individuals, groups, associations, clubs, societies, local, national and even world community continue to experience conflicts and crises in one way or the other. Conflicts and crises are features of life and they have been since the beginning of creation. So, conflicts and crises are permanent features of life which we have come to live and cope with and resolve from time to time. Their existence cannot be terminated in life unless we want to terminate life itself. However, a poorly handled conflict or crisis could become violent or destructive which could hinder national peace, unity, stability and security of any nation. Thus, effective strategies that can help to nib conflict in the bud and to prevent it from escalating if it erupts, as well as to sustain peace to avert future occurrence of crises and their attendant large scale effects should be developed and sustained by any nation that seeks peace, growth and development. The objective of this study also aims at reviewing the antecedent, causes and management of religious crises in Nigeria with a view to propose a better strategies for containing the activities of Boko Haram in particular and general management of crises in Nigeria since the strategies being employed to date have not been proactive, problem-solving and solution-oriented. Experience the world over shows that where opposing beliefs about ultimate values enter the political arena, they exacerbate struggles by preventing compromise Alford, (1967: 321); unfortunately knowledge of this has not prevented a repeat occurrence, so much so that in Nigeria today no issue evokes more heated and frustrating debate than the question of politics and religion. As the leader article in the Magazine, West Africa of 30 March, 1987 points out; religion is fast becoming an emotive issue in Nigerian society and, ultimately its politics (West Africa Magazine, 30 March 1987: 599). And a correspondent for the same magazine underscores the problem when about four months later he observed that many 10

Nigerian are sincerely concerned that religion is being made to become the key issue in the stormy national question, pushing other elements of ethnicity and sectionalism to the background (West Africa Magazine, 30 March 1987: 559). This concern is heightened by the fact that violence, both overt and covert, has been the crudest and most pervasive of the mechanisms of religious fervor in Nigeria. Therefore, this work aims at exploring the causes, implications and solutions to the menace of Boko Haram sect from the point of view of political and ethno- religious differences in Nigeria. Political instabilities in Nigeria are being caused by both religious, ethnic and socio- political differences to mention but a few. Since independence, Nigeria has never escaped a season that was free of crises both at community level and beyond. The crises, each time the occurred used to bring calamities of monumental effects that often shook the country to its foundations. From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedeviled by ethno- religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of Boko Haram sect, the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fermenting, or only freely condemned it. The internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This work documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links with the promotion of Islam and the challenges it poses to the secularity of the Nigerian state. The outbreak of the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria in July 2009 marked yet another phase in the recurring pattern that violent uprisings, riots and disturbances have become in Nigeria. Given the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society, the religions sensitivity of Nigerians, and the prolonged military rule that ended with the advent of civil rule in 1999, (but during which a significant section of the society was highly militarized),. The situation could perhaps not have been difference. But what is alarming is the forceful attempt by Islamic fundamentalists to impose a religious ideology. 11

A discussion on the activities of Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria seems too ripe at this time than ever, as Nigeria is deeply immersed in ding-dong turmoil and political uncertainty despite the democratic coloration of the moment. The group behind the latest violence in northern Nigeria is known by several different names, including al-Sunnah Wal Jamma, or Followers of Muhammad's Teachings in Arabic, and Boko Haram, which means "Western education is forbidden" in the local Hausa dialect. Hence one of the real challenges facing the Nigeria State, especially from 2009 to date has been the insecurity of lives and property of most citizens. Nigerians have never felt so insecure in the past as now. The question which most people are asking is: who then is safe? Since its inception, the past and present administrations have been confronted with a lot of imbroglio. All these no doubt threaten peace and progress in the country as well as constitute serious setbacks to national development. This is placed against the backdrop of the fact that any religious crisis that is not well managed is always a potential threat to peace and stability anywhere in the world. In fact, while depicting a similar picture across the continent, Richard Joseph (2003: 8) submits that: This is a critical moment in the history of African peoples. If I had to suggest one word to characterize their current status, it would be insecurity’. This insecurity affects virtually everyone. The poor and disadvantaged, of course, suffer most. However, filaments of insecurity connect those at the bottom to those at the top of the political and social hierarchy, and vice-versa. They extend across ethnic, religious and regional boundaries (Richard 2003: 8). Therefore, the Nigerian state cannot be said to be at peace when individual citizens are raising public and official outbursts over plans to terminate their lives. Sometimes such out bursts are serious that people are forced (out of desperation) to look elsewhere beyond the state for protection and security. More importantly, there is the fear among Nigerians that while such killings persist, other innocent citizens and people who have rather given the better part of their lives in nurturing the state’s democracy may fall victim to such spates of violence. This has led to a contagious fear of insecurity griping the majority of people.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM The religious sect, Boko Haram, appears to have laid a siege to the Northern part of Nigeria, especially, the North East geo-political zone of the region. Outside mindless killings of innocent Nigerians, the sect’s member’s also carryout wanton destruction of property in a bid to make people in the zone embrace their views on Islamic religious code that is against Western education. 12

The group, which parades religious extremists’ pushing for the enthronement of Sharia and abandonment of western education in the region, has always sent jilters down the spines of old and young in the North Eastern states of Borno, Banchi, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe and Taraba. Wherever the group operates, it often leaves behind sad stories and scary scenes of destruction, maiming and death. Nigeria is a multi-religious country with prominent adherents of Christians in the south and Muslims in the north; a country where religious tolerance is a mirage. In 2009, Nigeria witnessed wanton destructions, arson, attacks and killings of more than 1000 citizens (Abimboye and Adzegeh, 2009; 12-18; The Guardian Editorial, 2009; 14). In Borno, Bauchi, Kano and Yobe States by the Boko Haram Islamic sect in pretense of fighting against western education, culture and any western-styled development of the country. Before the Boko Haram crisis, the Jos crisis in 2009 also claimed over 1,000 lives. The statistics of casualty recorded by the Jamaat Nasr Islam (JNI) as reported by Dr. Tijani Halilu in the Nation (2009:3) are made up of 638 males, 19 females, 39 school children, and 26 infants. In the North East, in the 1980s, Nigeria witnessed the Maitatsine sectarian and extremist violence disturbance from Kano to Gongola states, then the Taliban, and followed by the Boko Haram extremist disturbance. Also, under ethno-religious and communal crises between May 29, 1999 and February 2009, over 14,000 Nigerians lives were reportedly lost (Vanguard, 2009: 17). The actions of members of the Boko Haram sect who were caught and paraded; the trigger-happy Niger Delta militant youth fighting to defend the Kaiama Declaration, which was made December 11, 1998 by the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC); the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC); and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) all speak volume of the moral decay and involvement of the youth in the litany of violent acts in Nigeria. Scholars like Chukwulozie (1986), Kukah (1993), Okogie (1992), Okike (2000), among several others have made elaborate discussions on religious crisis in Nigeria but none was able to link it to Boko Haram. Also Ezeibe (2009:125) remarked that violence is more rampant under democracy than the military. He argued that between 1999 and 2004 Nigeria experienced 33 religious conflicts. This is relevant because the major religious groups in Nigeria are formed along ethnic lines. The spread of small arms and light weapons in Africa has further worsened religious violence in Nigeria. Again, the inability of the states in Africa to cater for her people has emboldened the various ethnic groups to arrange their own security. In the context of numerous ethnic security networks, conflict of interest endemically leads to both inter and intra-ethnic and religious violence. Even though some scholars like 13

Kukah (1993), Okogie (1992), Okike (2000), among several others have made elaborate discussions on religious crisis in Nigeria. They have also contributed on the issue of religious crises and so on but could not discuss on issue of Boko Haram sect, and its activities in Nigerian state. Also several scholars have said much about the activities of Boko Haram but a lot needs to be said about it. It is this lacuna that was found missing in existing literatures that motivated this study. It is this gap in the existing literature that this study is structured to fill using the following questions. • Did the activities of the Boko Haram Sect accounts for the political instability in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011? • Has government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram ensured internal peace and security in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY This study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective sets to look at the Boko Haram sect activities and political instability in Nigeria; a study of 2009-2011. Hence, this broad objective will serve as the focal point of this study. The specific objectives of this study are; • To investigate whether the activities of Boko Haram sect accounts for the political instability in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011 • To find out if government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram has ensured internal peace and security in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The deterioration in the security of Nigeria which was clearly manifested in the recent bombings, killings, destructions of lives and properties in the country should be a source of worry to everyone. Despite the worsening nature of this problem, scholars have not shown much interest in discovering the socio-political roots of this ugly incidence. To the best of our knowledge, this study is timely because there is no much scholarly study on the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

This study therefore has both theoretical and practical significance. The theoretical importance of this study cannot be overemphasized as it will serve as a secondary source of data to researchers who would carry out study on this topic. Also, given that the recent 14

“incidence of Boko Haram’s violence in northern Nigeria have alarmed the international community to the point where Nigeria is now perceived as a potential breeding ground for transnational terrorism and violent religious extremism” (Schwartz, 2010:1). The fear is that the upsurge of Boko Haram could turn Nigeria into a failed state. Failed or failing states are seen as the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism (Reed, 2007:23). Thus, the ideas and insights generated in this study would add to the body of knowledge on religious crises in general and would spur further debate and research on the subject of Boko Haram sect’s activities in Nigeria.

At the practical level, this study would help the Nigerian government in formulating and implementing measures that would contribute to containing the outbreak of Boko Haram activities or other religious crises. In particular, it hopes to proffer recommendations that the Nigerian state can adopt to effectively contain the Boko Haram threats without excessive recourse to repressive violence. Also, security agents and policy makers would find this study relevant as it will help them in the formulation of policies.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW This section reviews relevant and accessible literature related to the key research questions of this study, with a view to clarifying the gaps in literature that this study seeks to fill. This research questions are: • Did the activities of Boko Haram sect accounts for the political instability in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011? • Has government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram ensured internal peace and security in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011?

In conducting our literature review, we are interested in works that focused on the manifestation of religious and political crises in Nigeria as that will help us understand Boko Haram sect and its activities in Nigeria. Religious crisis in Nigeria began after the Independence of 1 st October, 1960. During the colonial period, the religious bombs in Nigeria were not detonated probably because the British managed and directed the affairs of the country. Between the middle and late 1970s the issue of Sharia became the first obvious ambition of the Northern political elites to give national elevation to Islam over and above Christianity. Therefore there can be no mention of religious crisis without the Shaira crisis since it epitomizes in its true form the connection between religion and politics in Nigeria. 15

The political elites whose political fame, for one reason or the other, had waned hid under the cloaks of religion to warm themselves back to the heart of the ignorant masses. For example, the debate over the introduction of Shaira into the legal code of Nigeria nearly rocked the very foundation of the nation Kukah (1997:112). The Shaira crisis, an outfall of the Constitution Drafting Committee set by General Murtala Mohammed took a crisis turn with the coming to power of General Olusegun Obasanjo. General Obasanjo, a Southern Christian, threw the debate back to the Constitution Drafting Committee which was open to various sections of the country. Of all the items on the draft constitution the debate on Sharia was the most divisive in nature and like some scholars observed, “It marked the beginning of the introduction of religion into Nigerian Politics” Bala Usman, (1987:15). The Shaira war was abated with the coming to power in the second republic of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, a grandson of Usman Dan Fodio, in 1979. The Moslems showed a sign of relief because “Allah’s will” for Nigeria has been done. The joy of the Moslems over the victory of Alhaji Shehu Shagari knew no bounds for it confirmed the electoral/ anticipated victory songs of Alhaji Dankwairo (recorded vividly in Kukah, 1993. 153), which he puts thus. Since the time of Almadu Bello, there has never been another leader with power, except Alhaji Shehu Shagari the trusted one. He is the grandson of the servant of God; He is a servant of God (Bawan Allah). My happiness is that, out flag which has been lying on the ground of Mecca, the reign of Alhaji Shehu Shagari has raised it up. In the face of Islam today in the whole world, Nigeria is first. (Kukah, 1993. 153) Of particular concern here is the alleged linkage between the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria and international terror networks like the Al Qaeda. These concerns underscore the importance of engaging with this debate. Nigerian Muslim organization and their Christian counterparts have links to the Middle East and the West. While the Christians are seen to tilt towards the Euro-American pole, the Muslims look up to the Arab World for religious alliance. The Iranian revolution of 1989, anti-Western imperialism, has gained acceptance amongst the Muslim community in Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria today, Christian evangelism and even academic research sponsored by the international community other than from Islamic countries are perceived to be a part of the agenda of Western imperialism (Umar, 2001; Ohadike, 1992). Religion is probably one of the oldest of our social institutions. (Tylor, 1958.62), theorizes that religion everywhere shares fundamentals that promote social cohesion and 16 solidarity by uniting people with the values and norms of their society. This could be the natural function of religion in the first instance i.e. unity and cohesion. However, following the ambitions and materialistic tendencies of man, these functions are not always realizable. Hence Karl Marx on the other hand conceptualizes religion as “an opium of the people”, a tranquilizer that dulls the senses and hulls them into passive acceptance of the injustices of a capitalist economy (Mc Gee, 1980:339). To him religion serves to maintain the interest of the dominant class in society, contributing significantly to the exploitation of the lower class. Marx’s ideas to a large extent, confirm the role religion, which the political elites often manipulate for their personal aggrandizement, unfortunately serves in Nigeria. The religious community of Nigeria like in many other societies is distinguished by reference to their central object of worship. Hence we have in Nigeria various types of religions namely. Traditional religion which is indigenous and centered around the worship of ancestors and objects as gods, Christianity of which the central object of worship is God and Islam whose worship centre on Allah and to a little extent, atheism that is, worship of no god. The issue of religious related crises in Nigeria can hardly be fully discussed in a study of this nature. There had been a lot of religious crisis such as religious crisis in Kaduna state - 1987, 1993, 2000, (Okogie, 1992: 15, Newswatch, 1 June, 1992), Religious Crisis in Ilorin in 1986, the Bauchi Religious Riot – 1991, 1992, Kano Religious Riot -1980, 1982, 1991, Jos Religious Crisis – 2001 to mention but a few. (Kayode, 2000: 49, Udoidem 1997, Onwubiko, 1973). And others were of the view that Moslems tend to restore to violence whenever a Christian take over power. Violence in Borno, Yobe and Bauchi States in 2009 and 2010 pitted police and army against a rejectionist group commonly referred to as Boko Haram, raising again the issue of radical rejectionist groups. The immediate predecessor of Boko Haram was the socalled “Nigerian Taliban”, which emerged in Yobe and Borno states in 2003. Between 2003 and 2004, it fought security forces on three occasions. On 31 December 2003, roughly 200 clashed with police in Geidam and Kanamma, Yobe state. Some say the police provoked this; (Crisis Group interview, prominent Islamic preacher in Kaduna and former director of an international Islamic organisation, June 2009), others maintain the group’s sophisticated organization implied plans for violence. Whichever was the case; the group raided two police stations, killed a policeman and seized some AK-47 rifles. They subsequently attacked three police stations in the state capital, Damaturu, and confronted other police units near the Borno state capital, Maiduguri. After four days of fighting in January 2004, security forces routed them, killing at least eighteen and arresting dozens. 17

The second clash followed an incident in June 2004, when four members of the group, arrested during the January fight, attempted to escape jail in Damaturu and was shot dead by police. (Crisis Group interview, Senior Official, Nigeria Prisons Service, Abuja, 15 October 2009). Retaliating and apparently also trying to seize more guns, the group attacked police stations in Bama and Gworza (eastern Borno State, close to the Cameroon border) in September, killing six people and abducting four. Security forces again subdued them, killing 24 and arresting many more. Others fled into nearby Cameroon and Niger. (Crisis Group interview, former police commissioner, July 2009). On 8 October 2004, the group launched a third attack. Ambushing a police patrol in Kala-Balge, near Lake Chad, it killed three officers instantly and captured twelve, whom they later killed (Crisis Group interview, senior police officer, Abuja, July 2010). Heavy deployments of police and army dispersed them: some again fled into Cameroon, police said, but most retreated to Maiduguri, according to locals, (Crisis Group interviews, local sources, Maiduguri, Borno State, September 2009). In 2006-2009, the group re-emerged, primarily in Borno state, under the banner “Boko Haram”. Its leadership, particularly Mohammed Yusuf, showed it was a direct continuation of the Taliban, (Crisis Group interviews, several sources, Borno and Yobe states, July-September 2009). On 25 July 2009, police arrested several leaders on suspicion they were preparing for violence. The Bauchi state governor, Isa Yuguda, said he ordered the arrests after intelligence indicated the group was planning to over-run Bauchi city. They had already clashed with police in Borno state. Protesting the arrests, and probably also trying to free their detained leaders, several hundred members attacked the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi, on 26 July 2009, but they were repelled and at least 50 of them killed. For the next four days, the group battled police, reinforced by the army, in Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe states. The worst violence was in Maiduguri, where the sect was based. On 30 July, army units stormed its headquarters, captured Yusuf, who had fled to his father-in-law’s house, and handed him over to the police. He was shot dead in custody hours later, (Crisis Group interviews, Kano and Abuja, October 2010). Exact casualty figures were never published, but the Red Cross reported over 780 bodies buried in mass graves. (Daily Nation, 31 July 2009). CAN show 29 churches burnt and at least three pastors killed, and police listed 28 of its officers among those killed. Unsurprisingly, the events of July 2009 did not put an end to the sect’s activities. Taking refuge in neighbouring Niger and Chad, or simply lying low in Maiduguri, (Crisis Group interviews, security experts, Abuja, 2010), it used martyrdom videos of the events to radicalise its membership, and in the first months of 2010, there were 18 clashes with security forces. The group has now begun to issue increasingly radical messages to the press, stating an intention to wage war on secular authorities and seek revenge on those it considers have betrayed it. On 8 September 2010, it executed a spectacular prison break in Bauchi, a highly violent, military-type operation that freed 150 of its members and several hundred other prisoners. One prison guard, one policeman and two civilians were reported killed. This has been followed by a series of assassinations of clerics and policemen who spoke out against the sect, principally in Maiduguri. In the same vain, some scholars have made a lot of contributions to the activities of Boko Haram sect, an offshoot of Sharia. Boko Haram is one of the numerous Islamic sects in Nigeria. Boko Haram (figuratively, “Western or non Islamic education is a sin”) is a controversial Nigerian militant Islamist group that seeks the imposition of Sharia law in the northern states of Nigeria. The sect became known internationally following sectarian violence in Nigeria in 2009. The leader of the Boko Haram Movement, Yusuf, was a secondary school drop-out who went to Chad and Niger Republic to study the Qur’an. While in the two countries, he developed radical views that were abhorrent to Westernization or Modernization. Like the late Maitatsine, Yusuf got back to Nigeria and settled in Maiduguri and established a sectarian group in 2001 known as the Yusufiyya , named after him. The sect was able to attract more than 280,000 members across Northern Nigeria as well as in Chad and Niger Republic. Yusuf began his radical and Provocative preaching against other Islamic scholars such as Jafar Adam, Abba Aji and Yahaya Jingir and against established political institutions. The ideology and philosophy of the movement can best be understood by explicating the two words- “Boko” and “Haram”. In Hausa language, the word “boko” is an equivocal term which means either “western” or foreign; while the word “haram” is an Arabic derivative meaning “forbidden”. Piecing the two words together ‘boko haram’ means to forbid everything western and western education. The intent is to replace modern state formation with the traditional Islamic state, because western values run contrary to Islamic values. Umma Mahammadiya (Muslim faithful) and Dar-ul-Islam (Islamic community) cannot be compromised in the face of Western influence. Evil in the society is as a result of the embrace of Western civilization, and in order to curb such evil an Islamic society must be entrenched by destroying modern state institutions. The philosophy goes hand in hand with the entrenchment of the sharia law in the society. This accounts for the reason why police formations and government establishments and properties became the target of destruction by the sect. According to the minority leader in the House of Representatives, Mohammed Ali 19

Ndume in Abimboye and Adzegeh (2009:14) “Boko Haram” was an assemblage of youths who were school drop-outs and university graduates who were not gainfully employed and who believed that their state of hopelessness was caused by the government that imposed western education and failed to manage the resources of the country to the benefit of all. Ndume maintained that the insurrection could have been nipped in the bud if the security had started early to monitor the assemblage of youth, some of who are school dropouts and unemployed university graduates that were vulnerable and willing horses to ride through indoctrination. A 14 year-old- female student of JSS III Aisha Abbas, confessed that she was enjoined by her uncle to join the Boko Haram sect. if the confessional statement were any guide, Ekpu (2009:5) reinforced that many of the religious eruptions in the north or other forms of political and ethnic violence can be traced to the lack of the liberating influence of higher education because these youthful anarchists are usually hanging on their half-baked understanding of the value of their belief system to kill, maim, and destroy humans and anything on their way after being indoctrinated. The onslaught by the police to stop the insurgency had remained Pyrrhic as the attacks were continuous with the killing of about 13 Policemen and some traditional rulers in the north in October 2010 (The Nation, 2010:8). The Boko Haram, like many other violent attacks in Nigeria, reveals the neglect of early warning system in Nigeria’s security operation. Ideologically, any member who fought and died for the cause of an Islamic/Sharia state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment would automatically gain “Aljanna” (paradise or heaven). Tell Magazine aptly captured the ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram sect thus: The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where ‘orthodox Islam’ is practiced. Orthodox Islam according to him (Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the sect) frowns at Western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government including security agencies like police, military and other uniformed personnel should be crushed (Tell, August 10, 2009 : 34). Newswatch magazine learnt that as far back as 2004, parents and security agencies became worried about the activities of the sect and the involvement of youths. It states that this is because students especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states like the University of Maiduguri, Ramat Polytechnic Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic Damaturu and others who constitute their members withdrew from school, tore their certificates and joined the group for Qur’anic lessons and preaching (Tell, August 10, 2009 : 34). However, despite several complaints by parents and security agencies, government did not deem it necessary to take steps to curtail the activities of the sect. In fact, Governor Ali Modu 20

Sherrif of Borno State, where the Boko Haram crisis wrecked a lot of havoc on people and government institutions, acknowledged that he was approached by a former Commissioner in his cabinet, who had resigned to join the sect, to also resign as governor and join the sect. According to him, it would be the only way he could merit heaven, politics being corrupted (Interview presented on the African Independent Television, Wednesday, September 2, 2009, The 8 pm News). There is no gainsaying that even among Muslim elite in Northern Nigeria; preference is usually given to the Islamic slate than to Western education. This accounts for the “almajeri syndrome” (pupils and students learning the Koran) to the extent that pupils who attended schools for Western education were treated with contempt and derision. A Hausa popular song that pervaded Northern Nigeria, and often sung by the almajirai, goes like this: Yan makaranta boko, Ba karatu, ba Sallah. Sai yawan zagin mallam. The song translates as: Pupils of western schools, You do not learn or read the Qur’an Save continuous abuse of your teacher. It is worth noting that a good number of almajirai (Hausa plural of almajeri) according to Paden: They come from very wealth homes but are subjected to the mendicant way of life, i.e. surviving by begging. Parents, the society and the government do not find it disturbing that the almajirai roam in the streets. It often makes them vulnerable to social vices including being a ready-made army that can be recruited to perpetrate violence. In 1964, the late Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, boasted of establishing over 2 million Koran schools scattered in all parts of Northern Nigeria (Paden, 1986:9). This notwithstanding, colonial authorities also conspired with the Northern elite at the inception of colonial administration through the indirect rule. They shielded the Muslim North from being exposed to Western education and culture (Coleman, 1986; Dudley, 1968; Ohadike, 1992). As succinctly put by Sanusi: One consequence of the alliance between the British and the emirates was that the integrity of the political and social structures in the north could only be achieved by sealing the region off from Western influences, including from Southern Nigeria. In this attempt to insulate the north from modernity, Western education was severely curtailed in order to prevent in the north what Lord Lugard termed the “utter disrespect” for British and natives ideals alike that was beginning to emerge in the South”(Sanusi, 2007.181) 21

For this reason, only few Western schools were built by British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria, and the consequential impact became one of the major reason for which Nigeria could not gain independence in 1957. Nigerian Muslim organizations and their Christian counterparts have links to the Middle East and the West. While the Christians are seen to tilt towards the Euro-American pole, the Muslims look up to the Arab world for religious alliance. The Iranian revolution of 1989, anti-Western imperialism, has gained acceptance amongst the Muslim community in Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria today, Christian evangelism and even academic research sponsored by the International Community other than from Islamic countries are perceived to be a part of the agenda of Western imperialism (Umar, 2001; Ohadike, 1992). Muhammad Yusuf taught his followers not to be afraid, but to fight in the belief that even if they died, `heaven’ was assured. He warned them of the consequence of allowing him to die before any one of them, claiming that he had the key to the gate of `heaven’, and that once he got to `heaven’, the door would be locked against anyone coming after him. Members of the sect defied all state laws, including the compulsory wearing of crash helmets by motorcycle operators; and majority of members of the sect were said to use motorcycles either for commercial purpose or for private use. The sect’s organized defiance of state authority was a source of constant clash between its members and law enforcement agencies in the state, particularly; the State’s Special Anti Crime Squad, named Operation Flush. The sect’s initial attacks were hence targeted at state institutions and officials, including police stations and personnel, government officials, educational institutions, etc. Leaders of other Islamic sects had at different times expressed concern over the unbecoming and lawless activities of the Boko Haram sect and on several occasions reported the sect’s activities to the police. Oloyede observes that: The beginning of the latest violence last July 26, 2009 to the killing of the misguided group and others recently, the form culture of violence appeared to have been let loose like a loaded cannon. While those who participated in the crises appeared hell-bent to embark on mindless bloodletting and suicide mission, those who should keep peace and restore order, according to media reports, in overzealous hyperactivity and trigger-happiness, engaged in summary executions and extra-judicial killings (Oloyede, 2009:40). Newswatch’s account has it that violence began 4 kilometers from the headquarters of the sect in Maiduguri after an explosion killed one person and wounded several others. Armed members of the sect were said to have stormed and attacked and burnt police stations, churches, mosques, prisons and government establishments. Simultaneous attacks also occurred in Bauchi, Kano and Yobe states. Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, was the 22 worst hit leaving hundreds of people dead and several houses, churches and government properties burnt and destroyed. Churches that were targets of the violence in Maiduguri included the Celestial Church, the Eklesiyan Yan’Uwan Nigeria, the Deeper Life Bible Church and several other Evangelical Churches. These were burnt and more than 30 vehicles were also burnt by the sect in the premises of the churches, (Newswatch, August 10, 2009:34). Newswatch gathers that the residence of the Commandant, Police Training College Maiduguri, was also razed to the ground by the sect. Also burnt and destroyed were five primary schools and the headquarters of the Universal Basic Education. In the neighboring Yobe state, the town of Potiskum also suffered its share of the sectarian violence as churches, the headquarters of the Federal Road Safety Commission, a Police Command and the National Population Commission Office as well as several vehicles were attacked and burnt by the sect (Newswatch, August 10, 2009:33-35 & 43). This Day also recorded thus: 500 members of the sect were killed by government security forces in Borno. In Bauchi state, 41 persons including a soldier and a police officer lost their lives while in Yobe state 43 persons lost their lives with greater casualty on the sect. By the time the violence was contained, between 1,000 and 1, 400 people have lost their lives with inestimable damages to properties. The sect was said to have used propelled grenades, locally produced bombs and AK 47 riffles in carrying out the attacks. A certain Abdulrasheed Abdullahi confessed to the police that he and another member of the group were sent to Afghanistan to train in the art of bomb and explosive making devices (This Day, Thursday, September 3, 2009:1).

This leaves the impression that the sect had been receiving financial and military support from foreign countries and other terrorist groups. Though the Boko Haram violence did not occur with the same magnitude in some Northern states, the movement enjoyed a wider spread within a short period of time. In Kano city, 300 of its adherents and sympathizers were prevented from carrying out arson on a police station. The police was said to have discovered large quantity of arms and ammunition in a swift raid of the residence and mosque of a certain Al- Amin Aljasawi, the leader of the Yusuffiya sect in Kano. In Katsina state, members of the sect attacked a police station in the Danja local government but were timely dislodged by the police who arrested some of the arsonists. In Kaduna state, 23 persons who had links with the sect were arrested. In Sokoto, 5 persons were arrested when they were planning to launch attacks. Bauchi state’s forces demolished several buildings belonging to the members of the sect and discovered a well poisoned by the sect. 23

During the Maiduguri riots, the sect was said to have held government security forces to ransom for about 3 days, while their leader, 39 years-old Mohammed Yusuf tried to escape into the neighbouring Chad. He was later arrested by the Nigerian Army in a chicken coop in his father-in-law’s house and handed over to the police who later announced his death to the public. According to Governor Isa Yuguda of Bauchi state, Mohammed Yusuf beclouded his people by living a life of deception. Imagine, their leader is about 32 years old, he rides exotic cars including expensive jeeps, has his children in choice private schools receiving sound and quality education, has private lawyers and doctors who treat and attend to him, yet he has the powers to indoctrinate people (Newswatch, August 10, 2009: 14). This revelation by the Governor suggests there is more in the Boko Haram crisis, it indeed became manifest that religion could actually be used as a tool for mobilization and protest. In the case of Boko Haram, “Operation Sawdust”, carried out in 2005 by the military and the police and which covered Borno, Bauchi and Yobe, led to the arrest of some Islamic fundamentalists whose activities posed a threat to the security of the Nigerian state. Among those arrested were Yusuf Mohammed the leader of the Boko Haram sect, a certain Bello Maiduga and one Ashafa. These arrests provided the first facts about the links between the fundamentalists and the Al-Queda terrorist group. “The three arrested revealed they had been trained in the act of terrorism in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq. Items recovered during the operation included maps and diagrams of government establishments and of some specific buildings in Abuja” (Tell, August 17, 2009: 69). They were kept in prison custody until ex-President Obasanjo left office in 2007. When Musa Yar’Adua accessed to the Presidency, some Muslim scholars and elites lobbied for the release of arrested fundamentalists by persuading him they were simply Islamic evangelists. President Yar’Adua therefore ordered the release of Yusuf and some other fundamentalists. Prior to the Boko Haram crisis, the State Security Service (SSS) submitted 14 reports to the government of Borno state, the Presidency and the Police Headquarters under Mr. Mike Okiro. Except for Governor Ali Modu Sherrif, both the Inspector General of Police and President Yar’Adua failed to take action against Yusuf and his activities. When Governor Sherrif received security reports revealing that the sect was making bombs, he ordered the security agencies to take action. The security agencies invaded the premise of the sect and dislodged them. It was during this raid that one of the bombs exploded, killing a member of the sect. It also triggered the violence that ravaged the six Northern states (Tell, August17, 2009:69). In Nigeria, where power is centralized, there is 24 absolutely no way for the Inspector General of Police to take action unless he is ordered by the President to do so. If the President had refused to carry out any action, it could be assumed that it was because he had a soft spot for his fellow Muslim brothers who belong to the same Muslim Umma. However, it cost the Nigerian state a lot in terms of human lives and destroyed property resulting from the sectarian violence. During the Boko Haram crisis, Aljazeera made an impressive analysis about the situation in Nigeria; a country that is the 5th largest producer of oil in the world but where the vast bulk of the population live below the poverty line of 1$ a day. Northern Nigeria is the worst hit by poverty according to Charles Soludo, the former Central Bank Governor. His statistics show that the North-Central recorded 67%; the North-West recorded 71.1% and the North-East recorded 72.2% of people living below the poverty line. Accordingly, the “teaming population of unemployed youth, especially in the urban centers, takes full advantage of the opportunities provided by these sectarian crises to wreck havoc on the economic institutions of the state” (Soludo, 2007) I think that the point Aljazeera wanted to make was to dissociate Islam from violence, even though it could not explain the sectarian violence in Iraq between the Sunni and the Shiites. But there is a strong point in stressing that Nigerians have been denied good governance for long. The youths that are mostly engaged in acts of violence or serve as an army of this sectarian violence are the first victims of this bad governance and acute corruption. Those educated youths who tore their university degree certificates to demonstrate their loyalty to the sect, could have done that out of frustration. One can imagine the frustration for a young man or woman who had graduated from the university and could not secure job years after graduation. For such a person, Western education will ever remain valueless. As a matter of fact, such youths live in a country where education is treated with much disdain and where the educated are insignificant, but where uneducated political bandits are assigned status privilege. One of the reasons given by the Commission of Inquiry for the Maitatsine riots was the economic situation of the country that left millions of people, especially the youths, without jobs or any means to live a decent life. The late Bala Usman consistently maintains that: Violence in the garb of religion has always been a manipulation of the elite and the political class. He went further to question the link between violence and Islamic fundamentalism: “What are they actually fanatical about? What beliefs, values and practices in contemporary Nigeria are they specifically fanatically opposed to or in support of? What exactly in the Islamic faith and practice in the contemporary world do they regard as so fundamental as to determine all their actions so totally and exclusive?” (Usman, 1987:73). 25

Bala Usman refused to accept the fact that it was fanaticism that drove the Maitatsine sect into violent demonstrations but rather economic hardship triggered by bad governance. Mallam Hussaini Salisu, an Islamic cleric, says: the level of frustration and poverty among youths in the country is a fertile ground for activities of such groups…their conduct is totally un-Islamic but the whole problem boils down to the failure of government at all levels to make the welfare of the citizenry a priority. The Islamic cleric went further to say, a nation that allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb because frustrated people seek relief in religion (Tell, August 10, 2009:38). There is some sense in the position of the Islamic cleric because those engaged in the “Boko Haram” violence were between 18 and 40 years old and virtually all of them did not have a job. An editorial from the Nigerian Tribune newspaper captured it all: In some other more serious climes, the recent mayhem in the North should be an opportunity for the state as represented by Federal, State and Local governments in Nigeria to put some commitment in their statutory responsibility of protecting life and property. Such will of course include creating an enabling environment for individuals to have access to good life and be able to actualize themselves. This is the first step towards security of life and property. To neglect to do this is to give rein to violence, anarchy, even anomie in whatever guise or disguise. The insensitivity of the government and the resentment of the citizenry are the recipe for an avoidable and eventual conflagration (Nigerian Tribune, Monday, August 10, 2009:17). During her visit to Nigeria in August, 2009, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, aptly captured the problem associated with the rise of conflict in Nigeria when she said: The most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the federal, state and local levels….Lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state” (Clinton, “Nigeria: Lack of Good Governance”, The Nation, Friday, August 14, 2009:1). It would seem that there is a deliberate attempt by the Nigerian political elite to continue to pauperize the citizenry for political gains. Most of the problems associated with the violence in Nigeria can be linked to the fact that many a Nigerian has to first contend with issues of poverty. Thus, they are ever willing to give up or even betray their civic responsibility for some meager money thrown to them by politicians (Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007:25). In this sense, there is a very strong correlation between poverty and conflict. Good governance, which ultimate goal is to reduce poverty, will go a long way in addressing the issue of conflict in any society. Fisher et al (2000: 151) claims that the aim (of good governance) is no less than to upgrade the capacities of political, economic, social and community structures so that the basic needs and rights of the population are met. Part of this process is to enable these institutions to be managed and structured in such a way that conflict can be dealt with 26 effectively within them and in the communities in which they operate. Political authority and systems are therefore geared towards providing human basic needs through the institutionalization and practice of good governance. But the current operation of the group defers greatly from what it started out with in 2002 when it was established by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State capital, as Al-Sunnah wal Jamma, meaning followers of Prophet Muhammad's teachings. According to Professor Abdulmumin Sa'ad, a Muslim scholar who teaches Sociology at the University of Maiduguri, at the outset, the aim of the group was to separate itself from the rot in the society. Members of the group, many of who were from wealthy families, believed that the Nigerian society was excessively corrupt with unpardonable immoral practices at every facet of life and for them not to be contaminated by the corruption in the country, they had to quarantine themselves and live apart from the rest of the society. Sa’ad, who claimed he taught some of the members of the sect, said, The idea was that there is a lot of sin in the larger society and their parents had amassed a lot of ill-gotten wealth. They believed there was widespread immorality, and so they thought the best thing for them was to remove themselves from the larger society and camp elsewhere, where they could concentrate on their religion, meditate, reach out and begin to form a fellowship.” Their focus was to be acceptable to Allah such that they would remain candidates of Aljanah, the paradise. The group believed that it would be difficult for the rest of the society to wrongly influence it if it would strictly abide by Sharia, the Islamic law, so the members swore to live by the dictates of the Islamic jurisprudence. (Saad 2007:20).

So, Ustaz Yusuf embarked on an aggressive conversion programme. He was going about sharing his belief about the endemic corruption in the society and the need for genuine Muslims to shun corrupt lifestyle so that they would not incur the wrath of Allah. His targets were young people and he tried his utmost to win converts to his group. The message soon began to make sense to a number of young people and the group swelled daily and grew to a point that in 2004, it decided to move to Kanamma in Yobe State, where it set up a base known as ‘Afghanistan’. There, the group shielded itself from the corruptive influence of the larger society. It had ample time for spiritual exercises without any interference from the larger society, with all the members believing that their actions were pleasing and acceptable to Allah. Yususf, in an interview with the BBC in 2009, claimed that his group’s vehement opposition to Western education was premised on the fact that the education could lead Muslims to disbelieve the oneness of God. He said, “There are prominent Islamic preachers 27 who have seen and understood that the present Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam.” Like rain, we believe it is a creation of God, rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain as Western education would want us to believe. Like saying the world is a sphere; it runs contrary to the teaching of Allah. If anything runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism Having reviewed the works of these scholars, we found that most of them acknowledge the fact that religious conflict endangers political stability. However, they were not able to see the causes of these religious conflicts from the frustration and aggression of some group of people who then hid under the umbrella of religion to showcase their dissatisfaction with the government. Those who do not belong to the ruling class tend to pick up arms to endanger the stability and security of the nation.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In the analysis of this study, frustration- aggression model is adopted as the theoretical framework. Frustration-Aggression model could be traced to “Dollard” a sociologist in his work, frustration and Aggression written in 1951. However, Ted Gurr in his work, “Why Men Rebel” written in 1975 helped in developing and popularizing the theory. In his book; Why Men Rebel, Gurr holds that there is a strong positive correlation for people to fight against what they perceive as an impending their achievement of a goal. In such a situation whereby something or somebody has consistently blocking ones goal, he tends to take violent measures in eliminating such obstacles to achieve his goal. This therefore meant that aggression becomes inevitable whenever frustration occurs, or simply put, frustration leads to aggression. This model as an explanatory framework for studying violence is based on the popular behaviourist persuasion and the theory assumes that aggressive behaviour such as bombing, maiming and destruction of lives and properties are almost consequent upon a discontent by the perpetuator (Okanya, 2001:7). The agitations of the Boko Haram sect cannot be separated from both socio-political and economic attachment. This is noted more especially now that power is shifted to southern part of the country. Since most of the northern leaders are not benefiting from this administration as before, they felt deprived of some advantages and see violence as a means to getting the power back to the North. Gurr (1970) and Beikowitz (1962) argued that the primary source of human capacity for violent action like destruction of lives appears to be frustration-Aggression. This is the 28 anger which is induced by frustration. Political instability is an act of violent aggression that resulted from frustration met by some people. Laborite (1978:736-745) distinguishes the following kind of aggressive behaviour:

• Predatory aggression – is aimed at an object of prey and result from the need to satisfy a basic need, hunger.

• Defensive aggression results from the presence of painful or noxious stimuli and occurs when escape is impossible.

• Competitive aggression occur when two organism seek to satisfy their desire for the same object. Both inter male and territorial defence are form of competitive aggression. The end result of competitive aggression is hierarchy formation. Dominate members of a group achieve satisfaction of their needs basic or acquire, at the expense of other members.

• Anxiety or irritability aggression results from the frustration of desires. The frustration is relieved only through the satisfaction of those desires which may come as a result of aggression.

Laborite (1978: 746) goes on to argue that most aggressive behaviour is learned. All types of aggression, except predatory aggression, are learned behaviours. Aggression behaviours result in the satisfaction action of those desires which may occur as a result of aggression. Human beings tend to resort to violence only under extremely frustrating ego- damaging, and anxiety producing conditions. And understanding of violence as a mode of human behaviour is also required if we are to understand instability. Mayer (1976: 89-188) points out that the normal tendency towards violent aggression is increased by frustration of desire. More so, feeling of deprivation or relative deprivation can lead to collective violence.

The frustration-aggression theory assumes that individuals and groups have goals of sort, that much of their behaviour is purposive in the sense of goal- seeking and that if this behaviour is not prevented in some way, the group or the individual is likely to behave quite peaceably. Since this condition is unlikely to be regular or at best, always fulfilled in the human condition of scarcity, the theory predicts that the result is likely to be aggressive behaviour. Dowse and Hughes (1972) have argued, the frustrated individual or group is likely to attack the believe source- which is not necessarily the real source of frustration, and if the attack fails to remove the frustration, the aggression is likely to recur. 29

Remarkably, a person thwarted in the attempt to reach a goal is made very angry and likely to strike at the imputed source of frustration. To this end, Dowse and Hughes observed, in every social life, men come to value many things: wealth, status, power, security, equality, freedom, amongst others. When they cannot achieve these core values, or when achieving one values means losing another, dissatisfaction, anger, and often aggression occur. Mayer (1976) asserts that the normal tendency towards violent aggression is increased by frustration of desires. According to him, when a goal presumably attractive to two or more individuals is made available in such a way that it can be obtained by only one of them, the end result is frustration for the loser. These frustrated actors in the political system can become potential terrorists. Davies (1976) observed that frustration may lead to the building up of ionized particles in the brain which, when released, lead to violent behaviour, either individually or collectively.

Davids (1973) further maintains that aggressive action requires four main steps, namely, activation of demands; frustration of demand, mental processes of deciding how to overcome the frustration, and action. It is important to note here that Boko Haram aims at satisfaction of desires, which they believe has been denied. The denial of those desires leads to frustration which the terrorist feels may be overcome by violence. Most of them hope to alter power hierarchy in which they perceive a ruling elite satisfying its own desires at the expense of other members of society.

From this theoretical stand point, it is very clear that the killings, maiming, bombings, lootings and so on in Nigeria, like other types of violent aggression, serves certain purposes for its perpetrators and often aims to make the condition of its proponents better. From this perspective, destructive activities of Boko Haram can be seen as a strategy for actualizing the core values or goals of the perpetrators. This theory will go a long way to explaining the reasons behind terrorists’ bombings in Nigeria. It will also help us to predict the behaviours of these terrorists and proffer solution as to halt further occurrences.

Thus, in the northern Nigeria where the activities of Boko Haram sect is practiced, and given the extremist or fundamentalist view of Boko Haram sect towards religion and governance, violent becomes inevitable. And so, the people who lost out in the control of government therefore hid and disguised themselves and stage back in the name of religion thereby trying to gain power again. Also, people who after graduating from schools and could not find job and out of frustration tore their certificates and join these extremists in fighting 30 western education. Hence to them, is useless since it cannot fetch one with any meaningful job.

Among the groups that make up the Boko Haram sect are almajiari whom most of them are school dropouts, university graduates who have no job etc while most of their financiers can be traced to be influential politicians who are out of government. For most of them, the present joblessness in the nation that caused frustration in their lives and danger their prosperity now leads them to aggression. This aggression resulted in the use of explosives, fire arms etc. to make the country ungovernable.

1.7 Hypothesis

This study will be guided by the following hypothesis:

• The activities of Boko Haram sect accounts for the political instability in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011.

• Government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram have not ensured internal peace and security in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011.

1.8 Method of Data Collection and Analysis

We adopt observation method of data collection because modern social science is rooted in observation. Observation is the method by which political scientists study the behavior of occupants of roles. Observation is a purposefully planned and executed act of watching or looking at the occurrence of events, activities and behaviours which constitute the subject or focus of research study (Obasi, 1999:169).Nachmias and Nachmias (1981:153) noted that all social research begins and ends with observation. The usefulness of observation method in social sciences is further highlighted by Webbs (1932:138) and Babbie (1983:178) who explained that deliberate and sustained personal observation is an indispensable part of the study of any social institution from which the investigator classifies his ideas, revises his personal classifications and tests his tentative hypotheses. An observation has directness as its major virtue because it makes it possible to study behavior in their order of occurrence. Observation relies on firsthand data and, therefore, minimizes the theoretical and personal bias or artificiality. Riley (1963) aver that even though disposition to act politically and socially may be best accessed by questionnaire; observational methods are required to assess the ‘acting out” of these dispositions. More so, the relationship between a person and his or her environment is often best maintained in observational studies. Opportunities for analyzing the contextual 31 background of behavior are improved by the researcher’s ability to observe the environment in operation with the observed. Obasi (1999:169) identified two forms of observation methods; the participant and the onlooker or spectator – which aid a variety of research purposes and states that in the on looker type, the researcher is restricted to watching the activities because ‘the onlooker sees most of the game’ and .. is in a better position to judge than those who are taking part’. Weich (1968) holds that observation helps the research to evaluate verbal, nonverbal, extra- linguistic and linguistic phenomena in order to compare them with actual behaviours. For our purpose of descriptive study of the activities of Boko Haram sect and political insecurity in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011, observation method is germane to aid our source of secondary data. Secondary sources of data refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another person, usually data from the available data, archives, either in the form of document or survey results and books collected for a purpose other than the present one (White, 1983:233; Asika, 2006:27). Usually, there data are gathered from the available data from internet sources, newspapers and books, official documents like the reports from amnesty International, journal articles, seminar, and magazines. Given the nature of this study especially the type of data required to interrogate our hypothesis, we employed secondary sources of data. Secondary sources of data refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another person, usually data from the available data, archives, either in the form of document or survey results and code books collected for a purpose other than the present one (White, 1983:233; Asika, 2006:27). Usually these data are gathered from the available date from internet sources, newspapers and books, official documents like the reports of Amnesty International, journal articles seminar, and magazines.

RESEARCH DESIGN We adopt the ex-post facts analysis in our research design. Cohen and Manion (1980) explain that the phrase “ex-post facto” means ‘after the fact’ or ‘respectively’ which refers to those studies that investigate the possible cause and – effect relationships by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for plausible causal factors, conditions and/ or situations. An ex-post facto research is defined by Kerlinger (1977) as a descriptive research in which an independent variable has already occurred and in which, therefore, an investigator starts with the observation of a dependent variable then studies the independent variable in retrospect or after the fact to discover its relationship to and effect on, the dependent variable. 32

Here, the ex-post facto or single –case design assumes the language of experimental design though it is based on observation for plausible evaluation of existing cases.

In the single case design.

R B1 B2 B3 X A1 A2 A3

Where, O = Observation

R = Random assignments of experimental treatments to elemental groups

X = Independent experimental variable which is experimentally manipulated.

Y = Independent experimental variable

B = Before observation

A = After observation

This has a series of ‘Before’ observation and one case (subject) and a series of ‘After’ observations. It is an extension of quasi experimental design. Unlike experimental designs that rule out the effects of influences other than exposure to an independent variable or a stimulus, quasi experimental designs do not require randomization and often depends on stimulus response and property –disposition relations (Rosenberg, 1968) to explain the possibility that influences other than the treatment can be ruled out by additional empirical evidence and/ or data analysis techniques. (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981: 108) stimulus response relationship is characterized by the independent variable that is external, specific and well- defined, with a dependent variable being a particular response to it. Example is the relationship between reward and satisfaction or between advertisement and consumption patterns. The second type is between property (usually some background characteristics) and dispositions, such as attitudes, values, and orientations, e.g., the relations between race and prejudice. 33

A randomized judgmental selection of ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the activities of Boko Haram sect in Nigeria before 2009 and after the government perception of the dangers of the sect before 2009 and after. The analytical routines involved in testing frustration aggression framework hypothetical inductions are based on concomitant variation of independent variables (X) and dependent variable (Y). This demonstrates that (X) is the factor that determines (Y). In testing the hypothesis which states that “the activities of Boko Haram sect accounts for the political instability on Nigeria between 2009 and September 2011”, then, “activities of Boko Haram” is seen as (X) and political instability is seen as (Y). The empirical indicators of (X) are: • Bombing churches, markets, schools etc. • Maiming • Killings of innocent citizens • Destruction of lives and properties. The empirical indicators of (Y) are: • No freedom of worship. • No freedom of movement • Disturbance during voting • Attacking of government security agents.

Method of Data Analysis

Logical Data framework

S/ Hypotheses Variables Main Indicators Data Method of Method of N Source Collection Analysis o 1 The Activities X • Bombing of Secondary Observation of Theoretical of Boko Boko Haram churches, sources method of framework of Haram Sects Sect Activities markets ang secondary Frustration- accounts for government sources of Aggression Political establishments. recorded model, Instability in • Maiming documents Ex post facto Nigeria • Killing of such as books, design, table, between 2009 innocent web-sites, figures, and 2011 journals Research citizens • design and Destruction of logical data lives and framework. properties.

Y • No freedom of Political worship 34

Instability • No freedom of movement • attacking of electoral offices • Attacking of government security agents and the civil society

2. Government’s X • Deployment of Secondary Observation of Theoretical strategies to Government’s Joint Task Force Source method of framework of contain the strategies (JTF) secondary Frustration- activities of • Amnesty offer sources of Aggression Boko Haram • Declaring state recorded model, has not of emergency in documents Ex post facto ensured such as books, design, table, Borno, Niger, internal peace Yobe and web-sites, figures, and security in journals Research Plateau Nigeria design and • Closure of some between 2009 logical data and 2011 boarders framework.

Y • Freedom of Internal peace religion, free and security movements • Protection of lives and properties. • Absence of molestations destruction of lives and properties.

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CHAPTER TWO HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BOKO HARAM SECT IN NIGERIA 2.1 Origin of Boko Haram Sect Opinions may vary on the genesis, manifestation and management of the Boko Haram imbroglio, but Nigerians know that ethno-religious conflict is not a new phenomenon in the country. Since the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in the 1980s, Nigerians North of the Niger have witnessed several other crises, with each incident presenting its own peculiarity and sophistication, even as each has idiosyncratic set of challenges. Those conversant with the issue can attest to the fact that the Boko Haram imbroglio is a metamorphosis of earlier unresolved religious fallouts. Quite contrary to views being peddled to the effect that it was a recent development and a creation of a particular person or persons, Boko Haram remains a phenomenon whose manifestation is the fulfilment of earlier threats posed by the activities of fundamentalists. At around the same time as the emergence of the Izala movement, a smaller, far more radical group emerged. A young preacher from northern Cameroon, commonly known as Marwa, started gathering significant followers in Kano, much to the consternation of the city’s established religious elite. He presented himself as an epochal liberator and took an aggressive stance against Western influence, refusing to accept the legitimacy of secular authorities. As the ranks of his followers swelled during the 1970s with unemployed urban youth, relations with the police deteriorated, and the group became increasingly ready to use violence. In December 1980 a confrontation with police at an open-air rally sparked massive rioting, causing destructive chaos in Kano for several weeks, leaving many hundred dead and spreading to other states. Despite Marwa’s death in the initial riots, pockets of violence continued for several years, (Falola, 1998:77-93). Marwa’s movement, the Maitatsine, was for some time seen as a one-off, variously interpreted as a revolution of the underclass or a reoccurrence of Mahdist- type millenarian Islam. However, in the early 2000s, a similar group emerged in north-eastern Nigeria. Generally referred to as the “Nigerian Taliban”, it also rejected all secular authority. Over time, its position hardened, until it entered into a seemingly inevitable clash with the police in Borno state, in 2004, resulting in dozens of deaths. The group then re-emerged, this time commonly known as Boko Haram (“Western Education is Forbidden”). Centered on the radical young preacher Mohammed Yusuf, it gradually built support among unemployed youth in Maiduguri, the state capital. In a strikingly similar way to the Maitatsine, its relations with the police deteriorated, and it took an increasingly violent and radical stance 36 against all secular authorities. The seemingly inevitable (and for the group prepared) clash took place in July 2009, leaving hundreds dead in Maiduguri. Despite Yusuf’s death at the hands of the security forces, the group has since re-formed. In September 2010, it conducted a spectacular prison break in Bauchi, freeing over 700 prisoners, including 150 of its members. It is currently behind a series of targeted killings in Maiduguri, Abuja and some other cities in the Northern Zone of the country. As with the Maitatsine, interpretations of the motivations and worldview of the Boko Haram movement differ. Some, including members of the sect, point to disgust with the corruption of secular authorities. Others see its violent rejectionist ideology as coming from a religiously informed world view, (Crisis Group interviews, October 2010). While the comparison with the Maitatsine is persuasive in many respects, the Boko Haram has emerged at a different historical point, and it is clear that it draws considerable inspiration from al-Qaeda, with which it has concrete links. (Crisis Group interviews, September and October 2010). Several individuals have, since 2006, been charged by the Nigerian state with having links to international terrorist organisations and having received training from the North African and Sahelian branch of al-Qaeda, though to date no convictions appear to have resulted from these cases. As with many jihadi movements, Boko Haram needs to be understood in both its Nigerian and international aspects. Links with al- Qaeda may provide the means to sustain the group for far longer than the Maitatsine. The highly violent reaction of the security forces in 2009, the group’s ability to find refuge in both urban centers in Nigeria and bordering countries and indications of evolving tactics all point to a serious and persistent problem. The attempted bombing of a passenger jet in the U.S. in December 2009 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young man from a rich family in Kaduna, again focused attention on this extreme radical fringe. However, it would be mistaken to draw too direct parallels between this case and the more long-standing problem of radical rejectionists in the north. Although some see the anti-Western discourse common in northern Nigeria as a contributory factor in his radicalization, Abdulmutallab was radicalized principally in Yemen and appears to fit the profile of young men who drift into violent extremism during long periods away from their area of origin. No links are known between Abdulmatallab and Boko Haram. Until recently, the group was never known as “Boko Haram (Western education is a sin),” but it is known to be against Western education and forbids one working in any government establishment. The name Boko Haram, may have been given to it by members of the public, because of the group’s opposition to Western education. The group, which 37 initially drew membership from the South-West of the North, started off as “The Taliban.” It was first invited to Yobe State during the build-up to the 2003 elections, in the wake of Sharia implementation in some states in the North. However, because the election in the state did not assume the dimension their host thought it would take, the group was said to have been abandoned to its fate, before the state government ordered them to vacate its vicinity. The group first struck in Yobe State in December 2003, precisely on December 22, a day after according to the then governor, Senator Bukar Abba Ibrahim, they had promised to leave the state. The group equally struck again on December 31, 2003, in Yobe State, while on their way to Borno State on the New Year’s Day, when they engaged in a gun duel with military personnel drafted to the borders between Borno and Yobe states, a situation that left two of the members dead. Findings indicate that the group’s initial abode was Burkarti, in Bursari Council of Yobe State before leaving for Kanamma, a border town between Nigeria and Niger. Kanamma is the headquarters of Yunusari Council, also in Yobe State. It is also not far from Gaidam Local Government, where the leader of the group, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf hails from. Their first strike in Borno State was recorded on Tuesday, September 21, 2004, when they invaded Bama and Gwoza in Borno State, where the Area Commander-in-Charge of Bama, Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Ismail Sirajo, was brutally murdered. This forced former Borno Governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, to call for assistance from the Federal Government. And after about four days of gun battle between them and a combined team of army and mobile policemen, the group was subdued, with about 40 of the members killed.

A year later, the late Yusuf, leader of the group resurfaced in Maiduguri in Bayan Quarters, where members of the group from all over the country, especially the North converged. In one of the encounters with Ustaz Yusuf in 2005, shortly after one of his arrests, he confessed to this reporter that he had since severed his relationship with the Taliban group because of their “extremist” tendencies. He was, however, quick to admit that his group would not relent until an independent and a just state devoid of anything haram (unGodly) was established, (http://allafrica.com/stories/201105250466.html). Since that 2005 till their attacks in 2009 in Kano, Bauchi, Yobe and Borno, he was always a guest of the security operatives in Abuja. And as at the last count, before his brutal murder, allegedly by the police, his release was facilitated by a frontline Peoples Democratic Party, (PDP) chieftain and a former presidential aspirant from one of North Central states in Nigeria. Details of how the late Yusuf’s father began the ideology in the 60’s Scary details 38 have emerged on how the Boko Haram ideology was actually started by the late Yusuf’s father, in Gashua, Bade Local Government Area of Yobe State, which was then under the old Borno State. Unknown to many, the late Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, can authoritatively reveal actually inherited the idea of condemning Western education from the father, who started it all in the 60’s, while he was still living in Gashua.

Subsequently, Modibdo in This Day Saturday, 3 September 2011 observed that Boko Haram metamorphosed into a guerilla organization that has become a serious menace to the Nigerian state, whose security system is notoriously corrupt and incompetent; preys on innocent individuals (like journalists) and is not people-friendly. Boko Haram exposed the incompetence of our security system and the clay-footedness of the Nigerian state itself. The natural hunch is to launch even more vicious acts of repression against the organization. (Modibo, This Day, Saturday 3 September, 2011:12)

The group's official name is Jama'atu ahlis Sunna lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". But residents of Maiduguri, where it was formed in 2002, dubbed it Boko Haram. Loosely translated from the local Hausa language, this means Western education is forbidden. Residents gave it the name because of its strong opposition to Western education, which it sees as corrupting Muslims. The term "Boko Haram" comes from the Hausa word boko meaning "Animist, western or otherwise non-Islamic education" and the Arabic word haram figuratively meaning "sin" (literally, "forbidden"). Since the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate to the British in 1903, the area's Muslims have tended to resist Western education. Some analysts view the group's emergence as an extension of the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s and subsequent ethnic and religious tensions in the 1990s. Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf formed Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri. He established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school. Many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighboring countries enrolled their children in the school, which also served as a recruiting center for jihadis to fight the Nigerian state. In 2004 it moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, where it set up a base called "Afghanistan", used to attack nearby police outposts, killing police officers. Yusuf is hostile to democracy and the secular education system, vowing that "this war that is yet to start would continue for long" if the political and educational system was not changed. The group's official name is Jama'atu ahlis 39

Sunna lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad"(http://allafrica.com/stories/ 201105250466.html). Since the Sokoto caliphate, which ruled parts of what is now northern Nigeria, Niger and southern Cameroon, fell under British control in 1903, there has been resistance among the area's Muslims to Western education. Many Muslim families still refuse to send their children to government-run "Western schools", a problem compounded by the ruling elite which does not see education as a priority. Against this background, the charismatic Muslim cleric, Mohammed Yusuf, formed Boko Haram in Maiduguri in 2002. He set up a religious complex, which included a mosque and an Islamic school. Boko Haram despises Western education and wants Islamic law imposed. Many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria, as well as neighbouring countries, enrolled their children at the school. But Boko Haram was not only interested in education. Its political goal was to create an Islamic state, and the school became a recruiting ground for jihadis to fight the state. Though the Boko Haram attacks had been on, even before the run-up to the last general elections, where President Goodluck Jonathan emerged winner, it intensified after, becoming more incessant and deadlier than ever. To many, this did not come as a surprise, only the magnitude. They interpret the new twist as the actualization of the threat of some politicians who contested against Jonathan. They had threatened that they would make the country ungovernable should he stand for and win the election. One of them had specifically instructed his followers to lynch anybody who might stand in the way of his own success. The main grouse against the president was that he refused to respect the People’s Democratic Party’s zoning arrangement. So, the perpetrators of the current insecurity in the land, had long ago, planned and arranged how to thoroughly harass President Goodluck Jonathan and scare him off his plans, if he eventually mounts the saddle. But beyond that the activities of the sect have done serious damage to economic activities in the country. For instance foreign investors can easily be scared away by the series of bombing we are experiencing in the country. Though we have a myriad of other security challenges like armed robbery, mugging, cultism, kidnapping and political assassination, the Boko Haram crisis stands out because of the seeming facelessness of the perpetrators and the mystery surrounding their real agenda. “I doubt if we understand what Boko Haram is all about”, says the former governor of Kaduna State, Alhaji Balarabe Musa. Speaking in the Guardian newspaper of Thursday, July 7, 2011 the Chairman of the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) opined that Nigerians should first be 40 convinced about the identity of those called Boko Haram. While many believe that it is a religious sect which frowns against Western Education since Boko Haram translates to mean, “Western Education is a sin”, Musa interjects that, it is not. Rather, he asserts that, “it is a reaction to negative state of the nation. We are not talking about Western Education. Western Education is just education… and even Moslems recognize it.” According to him, Moslems are not opposed to Western Education or any form of education. “What they are opposed to is exploitative Western Civilization and Culture”. Whatever Boko Haram may be, one fact sticks out, there are basically two distinct groups involved: Those who naively hold the belief that they are engaged in a Jihad (Holy War); and those exploiting the ignorance of the supposed Jihadists. The latter is highly suspected to be largely made up of self-centered politicians who lost out in the last general elections.

Some of the Attacks of the Boko Harm in Nigeria

‹ In July 2009 the Nigerian police started investigating the group, follow the reports that the group was arming itself. Several leaders were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people.

Fig. 2.1: Some members of Boko Haram sit after their arrest in Kano July 27, 2009/Afolabi Sotunde

Source: "Over 100 dead in Nigerian clashes" .RTÉ.2009-07-27.http://www. rte.ie/news/ 2009/0727/nigeria.html. Retrieved 2009-07-27. 41

Fig. 2.2: Nigerian police display confiscated militant’s items brought to a police station after a gun battle between Boko Haram and security forces in the early morning, at the northeastern city of Bauchi July 26, 2009/Ardo Hazzad

Fig. 2.3: Some of the sects’ member killed by military in 2009

A police officer looks at the bodies of Islamic fundamentalists who were shot during cross fire outside police headquarters in Maiduguri, Nigeria, on July 28, 2009

Source:"Over 100 dead in Nigerian clashes". RTÉ. 2009-07-27. http://www.rte.ie/news /2009/ 0727/nigeria.html. Retrieved 2009-07-27.

Fig. 2.4: Members of the local Islamic group Boko Haram lie on the ground at a police station after their arrest in the Northeastern city of Bauchi, July 25, 2009/Ardo Hazzad

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‹ Prior to the clashes, many Muslim leaders and at least one military official had warned the authorities about Boko Haram. Those warnings were reportedly ignored (The Guardian, August 2, 2009:8) http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram# ‹ In the state of Yobe, fighters reportedly "used fuel-laden motorcycles" and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko- Haram#cite-note-18#-note-18 ‹ On 30 July, allegations were made that Yusuf himself was killed by Nigerian Security Forces after being taken into custody. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite- note-19#-note-19

Just as the world was happy that the situation had become calm and the leader of the group had been arrested came the unfortunate news that the captured leader had somehow been killed in a gun battle. Later that day, it was announced that the military had in fact handed him to the police, and that he had allegedly been killed while in police custody. Fig. 2.5: Yusuf when he was arrested

Sources: http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-19#-note-19

This Photo: Mohammed Yusuf's bullet-ridden body shown to journalists in a video hours on July 30, 2009 after Nigerian police announced they had captured him alive. Police said Yusuf was shot while trying to escape.

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Fig.2.6: Photo above: late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf Police said Yusuf was shot while trying to escape. Sources: http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note- 19#-note-19. Sources: http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-19#-note-19

This death is particularly unfortunate as it not only transferred national and international attention away from the victims of appalling crimes committed by Boko Haram to the extra judiciary execution of its leader, but also because the real funders and perpetrators that facilitated the growth and activities of the group may now never be known. His death means that an effective and thorough investigation into where, how and from whom Mohammed Yusuf’s group received its funding, of how it managed to secure arms, and of the true nature and extent of his network may not now be possible. Mohammed Yusuf was a library of information concerning jihad activities and issues of security in Nigeria, and especially in the northern states. Under questioning he might have revealed important information concerning extremist activity in Nigeria.

As many human right organizations began to focus on the killing of Mohammed Yusuf. The group mostly affected by the Boko Haram violence was the Christian community of Maiduguri, who suffer majority of civilian casualties, including the brutal killings of church leaders and church members in their homes, in the church premises, and as hostages in the Boko Haram compound; the burning of churches using bombs manufactured by Boko Haram, and the destruction and looting of Christian business premises and residential buildings. A total of three (3) pastors were killed in 2009: Rev. Sabo Yakubu of the COCIN Church Kirkasama, Rev George Orji of Good News Church (executed on the Boko Haram compound for refusing to renounce his faith) and pastor Sylvester Akpan of National Evangelical Mission, Wulari.

Some of the churches destroyed by Boko Haram sect during the July 2009 attack. 1. COCIN Church, Jajere 2. COCIN Church, Gamboru 3. COCIN Church, Old Maiduguri 4. COCIN Church, Railway 5. St. Michael Catholic Church, Railway 6. EYN Church Jajere 7. Elija Apostolic Church, Wulari 44

8. Deeper Life Bible Church, Wulari 9. The Lords Chosen Charismatic Church 10. Deeper Life Bible Church, Railway 11. Assemblies of God Church 12. Redeemed Christian Church, Railway 13. Baptist Church, Railway 14. COCIN Church, Gambaru 15. Catholic Church, Gambaru 16. Anglican Church, Gambaru 17. EYN Centre, Wulari 18. National Evangelical Mission, Wulari 19. Celestial Church of Christ, Wulari

The 27 th July attack witnessed the destruction of the largest Cathedral in Borno State, the Wulari EYN Centre, where between five hundred to four thousand people would regularly attend a single service. The attack on the Church was carried out by around 50 Boko Haram members, who carried sophisticated weapons and locally made bomb on Sunday 20 th July at about 11.00 pm. Many Christians were kidnapped and taken to the Boko Haram Camp, where they were forced to denounce Christ and convert to Islam. Those who refused, especially the men, were immediately killed. Some had their fingers chopped off. Those who agreed to convert were given a fruit to eat (Dabino) and water to drink which symbolized total acceptance, and were taught some form of prayer. Baba Ibrahim survived this experience; his fingers were chopped off simply because he refused to convert. Some of the women taken hostage who also refused to convert were obliged to wash the bloody clothes of Boko Haram men that were killed in the battle with government forces and brought back to the camp. This was what happened to Mary a 13year old girl who was kidnapped when she was sent by her parents to take care of her sick pastor. The pastor and his brother were killed in front of her and Mary was taking to the camp. Where she spent four days before she miraculously escaped. It is said to note that not all the Churches, Pastors or even Christians were adequately mentioned in the media, both international and local. The Boko Haram attack was the worst so far on the Christian in Maiduguri unlike the February 28 th , 2006 crisis occasioned by the publication of cartoons in Denmark which also claim a lot of innocent Christian lives and led to the destruction of fifth-six Churches, the current violence has been described by the 45 traumatized survivors as being akin to a war. Many are now leaving, unable to get over and process the ordeal while in the area. ‹ In January 2010, the group struck again in the Nigerian state of Borno, killing four people in Dala Alemderi Ward in Maiduguri metropolis. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-20#-note-20 ‹ On September 7, 2010, Boko Haram freed over 700 inmates from a prison in Bauchi State. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-AllAfrica-8-sept-21 ‹ In December 2010, Boko Haram was blamed for a market bombing, following which 92 of its members were arrested by police. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko- Haram#cite-note-22 ‹ On Friday January 28, 2011, the Borno State candidate of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) for the April 2011 gubernatorial elections was assassinated, along with his brother, four police officers and a 12-year old boy. Boko Haram has been blamed for these killings; other commentators have noted that the assassination of the ANPP governorship candidate Mr. Modu Fannami Gubio was politically motivated. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-23#cite-note 23 ‹ On Tuesday February 8, 2011, Boko Haram gave conditions for peace. The radicals demanded that the Borno State Governor, Senator Ali Modu Sheriff, should step down from office with immediate effect and also allow members to reclaim their mosque in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko- Haram#cite-note-25#-note-25 ‹ On 9th May 2011 Boko Haram rejected an offer for amnesty made by the governor- elect of Borno state, Kashim Shettima http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko- Haram#cite-note-26#-note-26 ‹ On March 29, 2011 police “thwarted a plot to bomb an [ANPP] election rally” in Maiduguri, Borno State (map). The threat was blamed on Boko Haram. ‹ On April 1, 2011 (the day before the original date of Nigeria’s legislative elections), suspected Boko Haram members attacked a police station in Bauchi. ‹ On April 9, 2011 a polling center in Maiduguri was bombed. ‹ On April 15, 2011 the Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission was bombed, and several people were shot in a separate incident on the same day. Authorities suspected Boko Haram. ‹ On April 20, Boko Haram killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police officers in Maiduguri. 46

‹ On April 22, Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-27#-note-27 ‹ Boko Haram was blamed for a series of bombings in northern Nigeria on May 29, 2011 that left 15 dead. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-28#-note- 28 ‹ On June 8, 2011, a pair of explosive attacks in northeast Nigeria killed 11 people, a spokesman for Borno state police said Wednesday. The attacks took place Tuesday at a police station and outside a church, said Abdullahi Lawal, the police spokesman. In the first incident, "unknown gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram attacked Gwange police station," Lawal said. "They threw local explosives into the police station premises.” Boko Haram is a militant Islamist group that has challenged Nigeria's government. http://articles.cnn.com/keyword/boko-haram ‹ On June 17, 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a bombing attack on the police force headquarters in Abuja that occurred the previous day. Officials believed that the attack was the first suicide bombing in Nigeria's history and that it specifically targeted Police Inspector-General Hafiz Ringim. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko- Haram#cite-note-29#-note-29

Fig.2.7: Scene of the Bomb Blast at Police Force Headquarters in Abuja

Source: http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-29#-note-29

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Fig.2.8: President Goodluck Jonathan at Police Force Headquarters in Abuja the background of the bomb blast

Source: http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-29#-note-29

Fig. 2.9: showing the rescue team at the police HQ in Abuja

Source: http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-29#-note-29. At least six people were killed when the police HQ in Abuja was bombed in June

‹ On June 25, 2011, the sect carried out a bombing attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri, according to officials and witnesses. Militants on motorcycles threw explosives into the drinking spot, killing about 25 people. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-30#-note-30

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Fig. 2.10: People killed by the Boko Haram.

Source: http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-30#-note-30 Saturday June 25, 2011. Killed in Maiduguri by Boko Haram Sect.

‹ On June 27, 2011, another bombing in Maiduguri attributed to the group killed at least two girls and wounded three customs officials. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko- Haram#cite-note-31#-note-31 ‹ On July 03, 2011, a bombing in a beer garden in Maiduguri attributed to the group killed at least twenty people. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note- 32#-note-32 ‹ On July 10, 2011, a bombing at a church the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-33-note-33 ‹ On July 11, 2011, the University of Maiduguri closed its Institution down citing security concerns. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-34#-note-34 ‹ The prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana was shot dead by Boko Haram on August 12, 2011. He died after sustaining gunshot wounds while walking home from conducting prayers at the main mosque in Ngala. http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko- Haram#cite-note-35#-note-35 ‹ On August 26, the UN headquarters in Abuja was blown up by a suicide car bomber, leaving at least 18 dead and dozens more injured and Boko Haram spokesman later claimed responsibility http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram#cite-note-36#-note- 36 ‹ On 25 th December, 2011, over 43 people died and 75 other people injured in a bomb blast that occurred on Christmas Eve at St. Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madallah, Niger State. Boko Haram was responsible for the bomb attack.

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Fig. 2.11: Map of states Boko Haram operates more frequently

Photo: Wikimedia

2.2 Ideologies of Boko Haram Sect The Taliban and Boko Haram are among several radical, anti -establishment groups that have emerged among Muslims in the region in recent years. The interpretations of their motivations and world views differ widely. Many believe that they are part of a generalized discontent with the Nigerian state and a product of a moribund economy. Others claim that they emerged from doctrinal religious disputes. In either case, they have been characterized by radical rejectionism, including refusal to enter into dialogue or compromise with secular authorities. The movements have attracted Muslim youth, including university students and some young people who apparently were revolted by corruption in their wealthy families. (Crisis Group interviews, several sources, Borno a nd Yobe States, July and September 2009). These middle class youths then developed a following among more marginalized youths. The initial Taliban numbered only a few hundred, but Boko Haram drew a much larger membership that was probably boosted by worse ning unemployment. Most were Nigerian, but small numbers came from neighb ouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, (Crisis Group interview, Senior Police Officer, Maiduguri, Borno State , 12 October 2009). Members wore long beards, red or black headscarves and refu sed to use certain modern (purportedly Western) goods, such as wristwatches and safety helmets. The original Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was born in Girgir, Jakusko local government area, Yobe state, on 29 January 1970. He had basic Western educatio n but undertook a Quranic education in Chad and Niger. He was a member of the Borno State Sharia Implementation 50

Committee under Governor Mallah Kachallah (1999-2003) and active in debates on Islamic issues on local radio and television stations. He later joined the Taliban movement for a short period. A colleague recalled that even while on the committee, Yusuf was “against the system of government, and he used to regularly preach against it”, (Crisis Group interview, religious leader, Maiduguri, Borno state, 21 August 2009). The view that the group was merely opposed to Western education tends to oversimplify its complex and somewhat vague ideology. It is clear that it rejects secularism, seen as incompatible with Islam, and Western influence in general, considered the source of secularist ideology. Western education comes in for particular criticism, which echoes long- standing mistrust in northern Nigeria of colonial and Christian influence carried through schooling. Yusuf constantly railed against what he saw as the corrupting influences of a “Godless” system of education introduced during colonial rule. (Crisis Group interviews, members of Boko Haram, Bauchi, May 2010). However, this apparent rejection of Western education and associated technology sits uneasily with the organization’s ready use of the internet to disseminate its ideas. As a recent study has shown, when challenged to define exactly what elements of Western education are objectionable or incompatible with Islam, Yusuf was unable to provide a clear answer. (Abdalla, 2010:45). Followers whom Crisis Group was able to interview said they were angry at northern state governors’ insincerity in applying Sharia and allowing massive corruption and illegal affluence to continue amid grinding poverty, (Crisis Group Interviews, members of Boko Haram, Bauchi, 5 June, 2010). Believing that Sharia can never be implemented properly under a secular state, they insisted on establishing an Islamic regime. A Maiduguri resident said, “they were opposed to a lot of Western culture and what they saw as its anti-Islamic and corrupting influences … opposed to the federal and state governments which they saw as propagating these Western influences as a cover-up for their own corruption … opposed to security forces which they saw as protecting the corrupt governments and oppressing fundamentalist Muslims … opposed to Christians whom they regarded as infidels aligned to the West, and who had to be converted to Islam, forcefully”, ( Crisis Group Interviews, members of Boko Haram, Bauchi, 5 June, 2010). Many youths in Maiduguri saw Boko Haram as a social movement protesting the “corruption” of the secular state and campaigning militantly for an Islamic state. Seeking the strength to defy the authority of that “corrupt” state, they were attracted by “the bravado which many [Boko Haram] members usually displayed against security agents, especially the police … and so wanted to join them, in order to enjoy whatever immunity that made them seemingly untouchable”, (Crisis Group Interview, Independent analyst of religious groups in 51 the North East, Maiduguri, August 2009). That members of the group offered ethnic motivations, centered on the corruption of the secular elite, appears confirmed by many interlocutors. This resonates with much religiously inspired rejection of state authority across the country, including in the Christian Churches, (Pierce, 2006:902). However, the debates that Yusuf entered into with other Islamic scholars, and the group’s preaching – available on cassettes across the region – concerned almost exclusively detailed points of religious doctrine and what actions can and cannot be permitted within Islam. While this did include debates on the relations between democracy and Islam, it would be incorrect to think that Yusuf was a social reformer or was overly concerned with corruption. His concern with a pure interpretation of Islamic texts, combined with the group’s rejection of public authority, clearly places Boko Haram within the fold of international al-Qaeda type movements. Since the death of Yusuf, who his successors have tried hard to turn into a martyr figure, there are signs of a growing rapprochement with al-Qaeda ideology and an increasingly violent and radical tone. For example, speeches and pamphlets seen by Crisis Group in October 2010 carry clear jihadi iconography, with deliberate attempts to echo the stage props of jihadi groups in Afghanistan (reading a speech while sitting in front of a white cloth with two AK47s propped behind, for example). Concrete personal links are said to already exist between the group and the al- Qaeda affiliate in the West African Sahel, known as al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (Crisis Group interviews, security specialists, Abuja and Europe, September and October 2010). Public reactions to the Boko Haram movement, its violent actions and the equally violent reactions of security forces are ambivalent and hard to gauge. On one hand, many northern Muslims share the movement’s desire for stricter implementation of Sharia, or even for an Islamic state, and its hostility to federal authorities. This undoubtedly explains why some politicians in the area got close to the group in its early years, sensing that it might develop popular support. Equally, the fact that the group has a very strong presence in Maiduguri and at times in 2009 openly ran parts of the town indicates that the local population either offered some support, was intimidated or – most likely – both. But many now reject its violent tactics, and some now see Yusuf as merely having exploited the dire economic conditions and popular religious sentiments to build a personality cult, (Crisis Group interviews, lecturer in Peace and Conflict Management and Resolution, National Open University of Nigeria, Maiduguri, August 2009). Many Maiduguri residents considered his followers cultists and lawless, often in breach of public regulations, (Crisis Group interviews, several local people, Maiduguri, May-June 2010). Indeed, many learned scholars, including the late Sheikh Adam Ja’afar, 52

Sheikh Abba Aji and Yahaya Jingir, rejected Boko Haram’s militant ideology as a perversion of Islam’s peaceful teachings but were unable to dissuade it from violence, (Crisis Group interviews, several religious leaders, Maiduguri, May-June 2010). Reacting to the July 2009 violence, JNI “firmly and categorically (dissociated) Islam and Muslims from this … devilish … motley outfit [that] constituted themselves into a terror group”. (Statement by Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA)”, signed by the Sultan of Sokoto and leader of Nigerian Muslims, Alhaji Mohammed Sa’ad Abubakar, 6 August, 2009). By 2009, the group had established connections with would be sponsors and ideological defenders. It had by then amassed sufficient wealth, and had made inroads into the political hierarchy at both state and the federal levels. While the clash with security operatives in 2009 remains the immediate cause of the crisis which has today evolved into a national calamity, the remote cause is the unchecked activities of some clerics who use Islam as a shield to perpetrate to foment terrorism. Borno former State governor, Kashim Shettima, is worried with the growing sophistication of the Jamaatul Alsunnah Lida Awati Wal Jihad, otherwise called Boko Haram. As the casualty figures continue to grow by the day, the state government became even more disturbed, almost to a point of despair. There is no doubt that, even beyond the challenges of governance, the menace of Boko Haram remains the single biggest challenge to the government and security operatives in the state. They seem to have placed Maiduguri, the state capital, under a virtual siege, and have also become even more daring in their operations. In the face of new security measures, they have also changed tactics, from the guerilla style where they deploy snipers after their targeted victims; they now invade communities, throwing explosives, and even confront security operatives in gun battles. There have been several arrests and the Joint Security Task Force (JTF) seems to have got a clue on their operations, they said. But they also seem to have devised new methods of beating the military officers. For now, it has become a ding dong affair, with both the security operatives and the group claiming victory in this new war which has made citizens virtual hostages. The public and, indeed, the police suspect that there may be political undertones to the issue. This suspicion is informed by the drastic shift from their initial aim of fighting the injustice of the western-style government against Muslims to a seeming vendetta on politicians, government officials, clerics and even innocent civilians. The group seems to have the former state governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, as its primary target for now, going by their pronouncements. Even as Sheriff’s successor, Kashim Shettima, 53

spends sleepless nights working out how to rout the group permanently, his political opponents seem to be enjoying the unfolding drama, with some of them calling for a state of emergency in the state. Far beyond the death of their leader, Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, and that of their other compatriots slain or arrested in 2009, the Boko Haram members have gradually turned into a terrorist group with a pathological hatred for fellow humans, irrespective of tribe, religion or creed. Even those who stirred their minds against the government, by providing them covers inside and outside the courts where they are being prosecuted, are no longer safe. They may have enjoyed a lot of sympathy from people with an axe to grind with Governor Sheriff and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) government in Borno State, but having transformed from a seeming ideological sect into a group of murderers and political gangsters, only a few seem to regard Boko Haram as victims of an oppressive government, but rather as dissidents with an insatiable thirst for blood. The members of the sect have vowed to make this country ungovernable unless their demands are meant. The table below aids in illustrating the violent killings and destructions by the sect members.

Table 2.1: Some cases of Boko Haram violence in different parts of the Federation between 2009 and 2011.

S/N Month/year Location Incident Casualties 1 26 July, 2009 Bauchi Dutsen Tanshi Police Station was 40 of its members were attacked by Boko Haram killed and over 200 arrested. 2 26-27 July 2009 Borno State Police Headquarters; Police 5 police officers on Mobile College Barracks; Maximum training were killed. A Security Prison; National Directorate of Sergent and one prison Employment; Makera Police Station officer were also killed. and several churches More than 30 vehicles, churches and Mosques were burnt while prison inmates were freed. 3 27 July, 2009 Yobe Police Area Command, Federal Road Three police officers Safety Commission Office, Calvary and a fire service staff Baptist Church, and National were killed, while 7 54

Population Commission were affected other police officers sustained injury. Suspects in the police custody were freed 4 27 July, 2009 Kano Wudil police Station was attacked The Divisional Police Officer and a Mobile police officer were injured. 3 members of the sect were killed. 5 July ,2009 Bauchi Several leaders were arrested 700 people die 6 July 30 th 2009. Yobe Fighters reportedly used fuel leaden No death was recorded motorcycles and bows with poison arrows to attack a police station 7 July 30, 2009 Maiduguri Mohammed Yusuf died in police Their leader died custody 8 January 2010 Borno Group struck again in Dala Alemderi 4 people were killed ward in Maiduguri metropolis by Boko Haram 9 September 7, Bauchi Boko Haram freed over 700 inmates Nobody died 2010 State from a prison. 10 December 2010 Bauchi Boko Haram were blamed for a market 92 of its members were bombing arrested. 11 Friday January Bauchi A gubernatorial candidate along with 2 people were killed by 28 2011 his brother and four police officers Boko Haram were killed 12 January 28, Maiduguri Clashed in another incident with people 6 people were killed 2011 by Boko Haram 13 March 29,2011 Maiduguri Police thwarted a plot to bomb an Nobody died (ANPP) election rally 14 April 1, 2011 Bauchi Boko Haram members attacked a police station 15 April 9, 2011 Maiduguri A polling center was bombed 16 April 15, 2011 Maiduguri Maiduguri office of the Independent Several people were National Electoral Commission (INEC) shot in a separate 55

was bombed incidents on the same day 17 April 20, 2011 Maiduguri Boko Haram killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police officers. 18 April 22, 2011 Yola Freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak. 19 Feb 8 th , 2011 Borno Boko Haram gave conditions for peace. Nobody died 1. Borno state Governor, senator Ali Modu Sheriff to step down from office with immediate effect. 2. To allow members reclaim their mosque in Maiduguri among others. 20 9th May, 2011 Borno Boko Haram rejected an offer for Nobody died amnesty made by governor elect of Borno state Kashim Shettima. 21 May 29 th 2011 Boko Haram blamed for series of 15 people died bombings in Northern Nigeria 22 June 12 th 2011 Maiduguri Boko Haram attacked and killed 4 4 killed persons at a beer parlour in the Bulunkutu suburb of the city. 23 17 th June 2011 Abuja The group claimed responsibility for a 2 dead, many injured bombing attack on the Police Force 38 cars burnt, 40 others Headquarters in Abuja. And it marked damaged. the first suicide bombing in Nigeria. 24 June 19 th 2011 Katsina Boko Haram attack a commercial bank 6 killed no fewer than in Kankara town in Kastina State, seven sustained bullets killing 5 police man including a wound attack a police Divisional Crime Officer (DCO) and station opposite the one passer- by death bank 25 20 th June 2011 Maiduguri Boko Haram sect stormed a drinking 30 people died joint in the Maiduguri metropolis killing no fewer than 30 people.

26 25 June Maiduguri The sect carried out a bombing attack 25 people died 56

on a beer garden in Maiduguri, according to officials and witnesses. Militants on motorcycles threw explosives into the drinking spot, killing about 25 people. 27 27 th June 2011 Maiduguri Boko Haram bombs Customs house 3 killed, 9 injured. barely two hours after the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) formally commenced its operation in the State 28 July 03, 2011 Maiduguri A bombing in a beer garden in 20 people killed Maiduguri attributed to the group killed at least twenty people. 29 July 10, 2011 Niger Bombing at a church; All Christian State Fellowship Church in Suleja,. 30 July 11, 2011 Maiduguri The University of Maiduguri closed its Nobody died Institution down citing security concerns. 31 August 12, Maiduguri The prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Liman Bana was shot 2011. Ngala Bana was shot dead by Boko Haram. dead He died after sustaining gunshot wounds while walking home from conducting prayers at the main Mosque 32 August 26, 2011 Abuja The UN headquarters in Abuja was 18 dead and dozens blown up by a suicide car bomber, and more injured Boko Haram spokesman later claimed responsibility 33 December 25, Madala, Boko Haram bombed the St. Theresa’s Over 43 people died 2011 Niger Catholic Church, Madallah in Niger and more than 75 State, near Abuja. people were injured. Sources: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1913796,00.html#ixzz1QK2tLdS5 Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Inmates." allAfrica.com. 8 September 2010. Retrieved on 31 May 2011. 57

Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Inmates." allAfrica.com. 8 September 2010. Retrieved on 31 May 2011. http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE75G0BF20110617?sp=true. Retrieved 2011- 06-17, etc.

If their fight had been against the neglect of citizens by government at all levels, or against the plunder of our commonwealth by a few, or the unjust political system, or generally against bad governance, many Nigerians would have taken up arms with them. Again if their struggles had been to correct the imbalances in our society and give the masses a say in the affairs of government, or to correct perceived misinterpretations of Islam, many others would have joined them. But without any of these as their overriding philosophy, it is difficult for them to get more disciples beyond the scattered followership, which they are striving hard to keep together. Whatever they are fighting for, no matter their grudges against groups or individuals, it is apparent that the battle by the self- styled Islamic sect has transformed into an uncontrollable monster threatening to consume even its own masters. No one can tell which group is their specific target, but everyone is leaving in fear, not knowing where next they will strike. If recent threats by the group are anything to go by - to the effect that they will eliminate Modu Sheriff, and other perceived adversaries - then the real battle may have just started, as the federal government seem to have devised its own strategy of routing the group with military might. As citizens count their losses, and the government kept on its toes, there are palpable fears that there may be more casualties. The news of the arrest of some of them may sound cheering, but the mere mention of Boko Haram is still enough to cause panic, and put security operatives on their toes. Nigeria's militant Islamist group Boko Haram - which says it bombed the UN headquarters in the capital, Abuja - is fighting to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state. Its followers are said to be influenced by the Koranic phrase which says: "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors". Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it "haram", or forbidden, for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. This includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education. Boko Haram regards the Nigerian state as being run by non-believers, even when the country had a Muslim president. 58

In the past, and even till date, there are certain Islamic scholars, who obviously out of ignorance, believe strongly that any Muslim who attends the conventional schools, other than Islamic schools would certainly not enter Paradise. It was, therefore, common to find the Almajiris who roam most streets in the northern part of the country telling anyone who cares to listen that “Mallam ya ce du wan da eje makaranta boko, wuta ze shiga (my Islamic teacher says anyone who goes to seek Western education would enter hell fire.)” Daily Sun’s investigation Friday, 17 June 2011 reveals that the late Yusuf’s father was one of the numerous Islamic scholars popularising the ideology that views Western education as anti- Islam. Unfortunately for him, the emir of his area at that time, who is now late, Umar Suleiman, whose son, Alhaji Abubakar Umar Suleiman, is the present emir of Bade, with headquarters in Gashua, was well educated, both in Islamic and Western education, and such could not stomach the Boko Haram ideology within his domain, (Daily Sun’s investigation Friday, June 17, 2011:5).

From available records, the late Suleiman who became emir at a very young age of 26 memorized the Holy Qur’an when he was just six years old. He was said to have invited the late Yusuf’s father to his palace, to ascertain from him if it was true that he was preaching against Western education. Once investigations confirmed the earlier reports received on Yusuf’s father, the emir did not hesitate to banish him from the town. And that was how he relocated to Ngazaragamo emirate, which is based in Gaidam. Ngazaragamo to Kano Before now, the Ngazaragamo emirate, which covers up to Damaturu, the now state capital of Yobe extends to as far as Chad and Niger, the neighbouring countries. But today, in Yobe, the emirate has been split into two, making Damaturu a separate emirate from that of Ngazaragamo. Ismail Omipidan in Daily Sun (Friday, 1 June 2011:10) further gathered authoritatively that contrary to Yusuf’s claim that he was born in Gashua, he was actually born in Gaidam, while the father was still in exile. While in Ngazaragamo, Yusuf’s father was said to have continued his preaching unhindered until the Maitaisine crisis broke out in Kano. Although, he was not known to be a Maitaisine, he felt he owed it a duty to rise in “defence of Islam.” He left his base, and moved to Kano. Unfortunately for him, however, by the time he was arriving Kano, most of the entry points were said to have been condoned off by security men, and that was how he lost his life in a crossfire. Yusuf raised by the father’s friend Daily Sun can authoritatively reveal that the late Yusuf never knew his father in the real sense of it, as he was raised by the father’s friend, Mohammed Fugu Alhaji, who later became his in-law. He grew up with the in-law, who may 59 have told him (Yusuf) about the activities of his late father, because as it later turned out, Yusuf grew up harbouring serious hatred for Western education, and any Muslim who sought the knowledge. This, perhaps, may have explained why till his death, he never saw the four walls of a conventional school, even at the primary level. And it was the father-in-law that relocated him and other family members to Maiduguri, where the gospel of Boko Haram ideology spread like wildfire. In fact, in the early stage of the group, he was able to attract membership from the families of the high and mighty in Borno and Yobe states. In fact, at a point, one of the sons of a former SSG in one of the States in the North-East region was a member of his group. The group, however, opposes not only Western education but western culture and modern science as well. The most worrying dimension to the Boko Haram ideology is their rejection of the modern, secular and republican state, as they appear to favour a theocratic Sharia state. It is this threat rather than their rejection of the educational system that has placed them on the path of confrontation with the state and its institutions. The Nigerian state cannot negotiate its secular and republican status. Yusuf, throughout his adult life, was hostile to democracy and the secular education system, and before his death had vowed that his war would continue to rage until the present political and educational system was changed. The group most time likes to live a reclusive life, refusing to mix with local people and some of its members are said to come from neighbouring Chad Republic and speak only Arabic to distinguish them. They oppose not only Western education, but Western culture and modern science as well. Yusuf had in a 2009 BBC interview taken a position against the popular belief that the world is a sphere, claiming that it was contrary to Islam and should be rejected by all, he also stood against Darwinism and the theory that rain comes from water evaporated by the sun. The group though had fought against government and its agencies on many occasions but came into the nation’s consciousness when it took arms against the police in July 2009 in some states of the North and held the states hostage for days. Many policemen were laid to waste until the Nigeria Army was called on to arrest the situation. In this battle, the leaders of the group were captured and alleged to have been summarily executed by the police. The base of the sect was also demolished by government security agencies and the few that were lucky enough escaped or were captured and have been facing prosecution since then. They were silenced for a while but a year later they returned with vengeance. Though they have changed tactics, with the guerrilla warfare they have waged on Borno State and 60 some states in the North, the group has continually crept into town like ghosts on a mission to destroy, killing on a daily basis mostly security men. The new leader of the group, Imam Abu Muhammad Abubakar bin Muhammad, better known as Shekau, was during the 2009 clamp down on the group said to have been killed. Though the group has not stopped killing security men it has extended its hit list to include Christians, critical Islamic clerics and traditional leaders, Igbo traders and politicians. They have at various times given conditions for a truce, including the institutionalization of Sharia legal system, the prosecution of those they alleged to be involved in the death of their leaders during the 2009 attack, the resignation of the present government in Borno State, release of their detained members and unconditional amnesty. Boko Haram’s grouse, from all indications, arose from the way and manner Yusuf was killed. He had been captured alive by the army and was handed over to the police. Moments later, the police showed his bullet ridden body to journalists, claiming he had tried to escape from custody. Nobody believed them. http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-in-defence-of-what-/93385/.

This sect led by the (late) Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, Mallam Sanni Umaru and Abu Darba has, as its sole aim, entrenching Shariah law as the official and only religion not only in the North but also in Nigeria as a whole. With its operational headquarters in Kanamma, Bornu state of Nigeria, the term “Boko Haram” comes from the Hausa and Arabic words meaning, “Western or non-Islamic education” and “sin” respectively. So, to believers of the faith, “anything western or non-Islamic education is a sin.” It therefore, goes to say that members of the sect are totally averse to anything that has to do with western civilization and this literally means that “Western or non-Islamic education is a sin.” Investigation carried out by Crime Alert revealed that though the fanatical religious movement started in 2002 in Maiduguri, its anti- people, anti-government activities became intense in 2004 when the group reportedly attacked a police formation and killed several senior police officers for reasons only known to members.

Afterwards, it became much more hostile to non-members, secular education and of course, the nation’s nascent democracy. In fact, the leader of the sect, in his avowed determination to drive home the group’s ideology was once quoted as saying, “This war that is about to start would continue for a long time” if the political and educational system in the country was not changed. The group considers all those not following its strict ideology as infidels, whether they are Christian or Muslim. It demands the adoption of Islamic law, Sharia, in all of Nigeria. 61

There are widely held notion that today’s Boko Haram is more a political tool than the rag-tag group founded and led by the late Mohammed Yusuf. For instance, South South People’s Assembly, SSPA (Vanguard, Sept. 1, 2011:5) in people and politics described those allegedly behind today’s Boko Haram as “power hungry merchants and economic parasites” that have been orchestrating violence in Northern Nigeria. They warned that the group would lose more if they pushed the country to the brink of war, adding: “Let all those sponsoring these acts of terrorism know that while it is easy to tell the beginning of a war, no one can tell its end”. They also added they do not believe that the Boko Haram of today is the same as the original one led by Yusuf.

Examining the Boko Haram phenomenon at close quarters, tying up some loose ends in our recent political history, you might be led to this same conclusion. When Yusuf came up with his group in 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua was still fit enough to order a military campaign that squelched it with the leader captured alive and extra-judicially executed. Between July 2009 and the beginning of the 2010/2011 political season, all was calm from Boko Haram. In the build-up to the April general elections of this year, there was an intense series of power struggles between some political leaders from the North and President Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan was running for president on the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, platform, but some members of the party from the North reminded him that Yar’ Adua occupied only about 29 months out of the “rightful” eight years of the “turn of the North” in the party’s rotational presidency/zoning mechanism. When the President ignored this argument, first a Northern gang-up against his candidacy was contrived, but it failed to stop him at the PDP primaries. Majority of the North’s voters lined up behind General Muhammadu Buhari’s Congress for Progressive Change, CPC, for the presidential election which Jonathan won.

At the National Stakeholders Conference of the Northern Leaders Political Forum, NPLF, on December 16, 2010 attended by the who-is-who of the Forum, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar and consensus candidate of the Malam Adamu Ciroma group threatened as follows: “Let me, again, send another message to the leadership of our country, especially our political leadership: Those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable”. It was after the conclusion of the PDP primaries in Abuja on Thursday, January 13, 2011 that the Boko Haram gradually resumed its gruesome comeback. It attacked police, military and security personnel and facilities in Maiduguri and environs. This 62 intensified after Jonathan won the presidential election in April 2011 and in June the hit on police headquarters in Abuja prompted the ongoing military response. Unlike in the past when military expeditions quickly brought such menace to heel, the activities of the new Boko Haram have actually graduated to suicide attacks.

Today’s “Boko Haram” is faceless and has no known leaders. It is more like what the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) became after its leader, Henry Okah, was arrested. But even at that, we still heard of such other “generals” as Tompolo, Boyloaf, Ateke Tom, Farrah Dagogo and others, all masquerading behind “MEND”, with “Cynthia White” or “Jomo Gbomo” signing their press releases. Structurally, the new “Boko Haram” does not have a semblance of other groups around the world linked to Al Qaeda. The Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, was founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Algeria after it pulled away from its original identity with Hassan Hattab’s Salafist Group for Call and Combat, SGPC. Its theatres of operation include Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Senegal. And of course, the original Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was well known even before he was captured. By general tradition, Islamic militants never conceal the identity of their leaders. Even when Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan on May 2 this year, his successor and former number two, Ayman Zawahiri, was unveiled to the world. These militant groups cannot tactically afford to hide the identity of their leaders because the suicide fighters need their “inspiration”; and the disclosure of identity is a statement in courage and defiance. Also, the new “Boko Haram” has no known leader or leaders, not even one with an assumed name. Their mode of operation is more like a copycat of MEND’s methods. The thinking pattern seems to be to copy closely the MEND’s method through which it was able to wrestle the presidency for Jonathan, their kinsman. There are those who allege that should this group succeed in, somehow or the other, driving Jonathan out of power and a Northerner finds himself in Aso Villa the attacks might cease almost immediately, just as MEND’s has since done.

The possible political nature of the new “Boko Haram” campaigns appears also justified by the containment posture the Presidency seems to have adopted. Spokespersons of security agencies long ago disclosed that they knew those behind the bombings, though conclusive evidence was still being gathered for a watertight case. Perhaps, the Presidency is hoping that since this method was adopted to escort the “Sharia” phenomenon to expire itself, it will also work in this case. Perhaps, it is being reasoned that a frontal engagement with 63 those behind the attacks could backfire politically. Whatever the issue is, it needs to be noted that the nation may be brought to the brink of ethnic and religious disaster if the perpetrators of the bombings take their sick venture beyond certain bounds. If this happens, then nobody can predict what will follow, as indeed, those who start wars hardly know how they will end.

2.3 Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria

From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedeviled by religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This paper documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links with the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to the secularity of the Nigerian state.

The outbreak of the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria marked yet another phase in the recurring pattern that violent uprisings, riots and disturbances have become in Nigeria. Given the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society, the religious sensitivity of Nigerians, and the prolonged military rule that ended with the advent of civil rule in 1999, (but during which a significant section of the society was highly militarized), the situation could perhaps not have been different. But what is alarming is the forceful attempt by Islamic fundamentalists to impose a religious ideology on a constitutionally recognized secular society. Obviously a manifestation of the growing religious sensitivity and ineffective deterrence measures in the past, the effects of the riots on the country are legion. Aside from the continued loss of lives and property, the growing fear and animosities among Nigerians, particularly about the threatened secularity of the Nigerian state, and the likelihood of recurrence given the growing 64 religious revivalism around the world are enough justification for a careful consideration and documentation of the phenomenon that the Boko Haram uprising represents. The Boko Haram uprising was not the first forceful attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society, but like the first major attempt and subsequent small- scale attempts, it widened the scope of the efforts at Islamic revivalism. More significantly, despite the brutal suppression of previous attempts, the gallantry of the Boko Haram soldiers, the spread and swiftness of its military organization and the belief of its leadership – and perhaps its membership – that it could successfully engage a modern state in a military duel all show an extraordinary commitment to the cause. Yet, the Boko Haram uprising attracted attention not only because the legitimacy of a state was challenged in the course of promoting Islamic revivalism, but also because its outbreak was an indictment of the state, whose seeming ineptitude was becoming apparent with regular outbreaks of violence of many kinds despite the state’s continuous promises to check them. Boko Haram riots were intensified from 25 July to 30 July 2009 and spread across the four states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno, the latter of which saw the most extensive rioting perhaps because it was the leader of the movement’s base. The immediate cause of the riot was the sacking of the sect’s hideout at the Dutsen Tanshi area of Bauchi on 26 July 2009 by a joint security team, during which nine of its members were arrested and materials for making bombs and other weapons confiscated. This led to reprisal attacks two hours later by the sect members on police formations in Bauchi and eventually in the other three states (Bakare, Adedeji and Shobiye 2009: 5; Owuamanam, Falola and Shobiye 2009: 2-3; McConnell 2009; Hines 2009). The riot was eventually quelled after the capture and killing – supposedly in police custody – of its leader, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, and a fierce battle with his followers, some of whom were arrested (Adedeji 2009; McConnell 2009). It is estimated that over 700 people, mostly sect members, were killed, and public buildings like police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches were destroyed (Nwankwo and Falola 2009: 2; Oyegbile and Lawal 2009: 67-71). With the death of its leader and known sponsor Alhaji Buji Foi and the scattering of its members, and in the absence of any official report so far, it is difficult to obtain precise information on the sect. From what is available, however, it would appear that the group has been around for some time, as long as ten or fifteen years, and had operated under different names in the past. Such names included Ahlusunna wal’ Jamma Hijra; the Nigerian Taliban; and the Yusufiyya (Fasure 2009: 2; Omipidan 2009b: 48; Sunday Tribune 2009:5). Indeed, its leader Yusuf claimed to be part of the Shiites under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky 65 originally, and when the Kano-based Jama’atul Tajdidi Islam (JTI) of Abubakar Mujahid broke away from the Shiites in the 1990s, Yusuf also became a member of the JTI and was even the Emir (leader) of JTI for Borno State (Suleiman 2009: 19-23). The Shiites, also known as the Islamic Society of Nigeria, emerged in Nigeria in the late 1970s under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky. Its objective is the establishment of an Islamic state governed by the Sharia through preaching and subtle influence on society. It also sympathizes with the state of Palestine and abhors Israel and the United States of America. The Shiites did not hide their disdain for the state police and the judiciary, both of which it considers instruments of Satan (Olugboji 1995:6). Although this sect is elitist and appears less dangerous than either the Maitatsine or the Boko Haram movements, its goal is revolutionary/reformist and its members could resort to carrying arms or engaging in armed conflict if the sect’s present strategies of preaching and exerting subtle influence on society do not work. Its predisposition to violence, even when not professed, and as seen in its clashes with other Islamic groups, is pertinent. For instance, the Shiites engaged their breakaway group, the Yan Tauri – and other Muslims it considered liberal – in violent confrontation in 1996 and 1997, among other instances. Also, the Shiites’ regular clashing with policemen during their processions and anti-West protests is an indicator of what the group is capable of (Albert 1999a: 286-288; Akhaine and Abuah 2009: 1-2). Yusuf’s revolutionary transformation, borne out of his long-term dream of reforming society, could explain the radicalization of the group under his leadership, the group having assumed a hard-line position after its erstwhile leader, Abubakar Lawal, left to study at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia (Oyegbile and Lawal 2009: 68). A different claim was that Yusuf left the Taliban because of its extremist tendencies but vowed that his group would not relent until an “independent and a just State devoid of anything haram (ungodly or sinful) had been established” (Omipidan 2009a: 43-44). It would appear that Yusuf prepared himself for the leadership role that he later played in the Boko Haram sect with his membership in other fundamentalist groups. It is also not impossible that the Boko Haram sect was just one facet of the multifaceted and well-linked fundamentalist movement, the true extent of which has yet to be fully determined. The reason that Yusuf decided to sever his ties with the Taliban – if in fact, he actually did – could have been informed not by his opposition to their extremist tendencies but rather by his desire to realize his long-term dream of reform, which, perhaps, was being slowed down by others who were not as passionate as he was. It seems that the group might not have explicitly given the name “Boko Haram” to itself; rather the name could come from the external view of its basic beliefs: “Boko Haram” 66 is derived from a combination of the Hausa word boko meaning “boko” and the Arabic word haram which is something forbidden, ungodly or sinful. Literally, it means “boko is sinful”, but its deeper meaning is that Western education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden. Characteristically, the sect not only opposed but out rightly rejected Western education, Western culture and modern science. Alternatively, it embraced and advocated the propagation of and strict adherence to Islam by all and sundry regardless of anyone’s persona wishes. In line with this objective, the sect sought to impose Sharia across all Nigerian states (Bumah and Adelakun 2009: 40; National Life 2009). Ironically, Yusuf, the sect leader, enjoyed the best that Western technology offered in the form of exotic cars, the latest communication equipment and the best medical services. In addition, his desire to fully prepare for his jihad encouraged his sending people abroad for medical training, a development that alienated some of his members (Madunagu, Shobiye and Chiedozie 2009: 2). The sect’s membership cut across the broad spectrum of society, but a preponderant number of members came from its poorest groups. Thus, beyond former university lecturers, students, bankers, a former commissioner and other officers of Borno State, membership extended to drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people. Although the common denominator among all members was their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law, the oratory prowess of Yusuf arguably contributed to their mobilization and participation (Michael and Bwala 2009: 3; Omipidan 2009a: 43-44; Olu 2009: 9). The wide gap in time notwithstanding, the socio-economic conditions that sustained the Maitatsine uprisings in 1980 are relevant to the Boko Haram situation. In some cases, the situations had got worse: There was mass poverty; inequality in educational, political and employment opportunities; ignorance due to limited educational opportunities; growing unemployment; and governmental corruption, including the misuse of resources, by which the people were repulsed (Usman 1987: 21; Enwerem 1999: 125; Ale 2009: 8). These problems swelled the army of vulnerable people whose disillusionment and impoverishment made them easy prey in the hands of a demagogue like Yusuf. In particular, with the notorious corruption among the political elite, the country’s vast wealth has failed to improve the lives of citizens. This, coupled with stolen election mandates, has led to a growing disenchantment with the Western system of governance, particularly among jobless young men (McConnell 2009). The London Times saw the uprising as a symptom of the social breakdown that has made Nigeria so prone to violence (Anonymous 2009). Interestingly, fanatical uprisings have mostly originated in the North, arguably the poorest part of the 67 country (Ibelema 2009: 18; Makinde 2009: 6). Indeed, out of the 178 clashes that have taken place in Northern Nigeria between 1980 and 2004, 104 were related to religion, (Sani 2007). They are links with jihadist movements outside Nigeria, the modus operandi of the sect, is fashioned after the Taliban in Afghanistan, this has generated some curiosities. Given its large followers and the claim that it had sent members to Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mauritania and Algeria for training, it could be that the Boko Haram modeled after the Taliban simply to acknowledge its source of inspiration. It could also be that it was meant to attract sympathy and support from the Taliban or related groups. Viewed from another perspective, it could also be that the links actually exist but have not been conclusively proven. The loud speculation in the Nigerian and foreign press about the activities of such groups as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, Tablighi clerics from Pakistan, and Wahabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia in Northern Nigeria, as well as the reported training of some fundamentalists in Al-Qaeda camps in some foreign countries, offer proof of Boko Haram’s links with fundamentalist groups around the world, however tenuous, (Alli 2009: 1, 8; Oyegbile and Lawal 2009: 69; Soboyede 2009: 14). But there was financial support for the sect also from within Nigeria. Although many of them are not yet known, the support of Alhaji Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State, is commonly acknowledged. There were also other speculated sponsors, from prominent religious leaders to businessmen from the North. Motivations for such support could include belief in the sect’s cause; desire to promote religion, or sowing the seeds for future reciprocity of goodwill. The givers could also be disciples, admirers, partners or associates of Yusuf. They could also be underestimating the potential ramifications of the sect’s agenda (although that is doubtful), but through their support, they became part of the Islamist agenda to launch a revolution that would entrench Islamic doctrines and practices in Nigeria like the jihadist organizations outside the country. The role that partisan politics and political patronage play in the sustenance of the sect is obvious. It would appear that the introduction of Sharia in some Northern states beginning in 1999 encouraged closeness between Yusuf and some of the ruling and/or aspiring politicians as their decision aligned with his plan to promote strict adherence to Islamic law. But he was perhaps disappointed by the type of Sharia that was introduced across some Northern states that fell short of his standards. He may have believed either that the office- holders were not serious Muslims or that their Western education was hindering or limiting their commitment. In addition, his fraternization with the political class possibly informed his willingness to use his group to assist the political elite to secure political power that would, in 68 turn, be used to protect and possibly advance his career (Omipidan, 2009a:44). The disappointment he felt following his abandonment by the political elite could have hastened his desire to effect a change through violence. Another dimension could be the failure to attach the Sharia-based law to social welfare schemes – with the dividends of Sharia seemingly not forthcoming, radicals thus had the opportunity to step in and demand a fully beneficial Islamic State (McConnell, 2009). When the fact that the Maitatsine riots broke out during the tenure of a civilian president in 1980 is considered, the link to Yusuf’s rise to political patronage could be understood. The thesis that politicians who patronize religious leaders, either for support or protective charms, use them as a tool and later discard them or unleash them on innocent people best describes Yusuf’s situation (Adam al Ilory, 2009: 23). Most of those who backed violent and revolutionary sects were politicians who needed the sect members’ violent disposition to achieve their political and, by extension, economic ends (Muogbo, 2009). Therefore given its abhorrence of the evil that Western civilization and its products represent, and given its strong commitment to the promotion of conservative Islam, whose agenda constitutes a threat to the corporate existence of the secular Nigerian state, a clash was inevitable. As a group that desired to facilitate change by any means possible, Boko Haram’s acknowledgement of and actual use of violence became a foregone conclusion. Beyond being an organization with elaborate plans, the intensity, spread and gallantry of the sect members serve as evidence of their remarkable commitment to their cause. Buji Foi selling his properties and donating the proceeds to the sect was the height of his commitment to the cause (Oyegbile and Lawal, 2009: 71). But it also shows the hollowness and the futility of implementing a religious agenda and engaging a modern state in combat or warfare, particularly when the means are limited and the level of support is low. In June 2009, some Boko Haram members who were travelling for a funeral had a clash with some policemen over the wearing of crash helmets. During the clash, some of them were killed, and Mohammed Yusuf responded by openly swearing revenge and vowing that nothing would dissuade him in his goals (McConnell, 2009). Whereas the strength of the organization and the level of internal and external support could have informed this open challenge to a legally constituted government, the support was just not there or simply fizzled out when the chips were down. The denouncement of Yusuf
by mainstream Islam is pertinent. Mainstream Islam’s ambivalence, according to Hickey, (1984:254), was caused by the vague or ambivalent attitude of some vocal elements within Islam who, though they would not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly 69 condemned it. The ambivalence was not due to mainstream Islam’s lack of belief in the fundamentalists’ position or ultimate aims, but rather due to differing opinions on the method of carrying out those aims. Although the adoption of Sharia by twelve Northern states (beginning in 1999) appeared to pacify some conservative elements within Islam – contrary to Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution, which clearly defines the secularity of the Nigerian state) – its limited application was still condemned by the Boko Haram sect, which criticized the governors for their insincerity and for politicizing Sharia. This explains why the full implementation of Sharia not only in the North but in the whole of the country was the advertised cause of the jihad. Viewed from a broader perspective, the adoption of Sharia appeared to be an effort to pacify a section of Muslims who had consistently agitated against the secular nature of the country and who perhaps were seen either as a threat to the tenure of the political office- holders or as a support base that could not be neglected on the basis of political calculation. The undue emphasis on religion as a basis for differentiation and mobilization accounts for this, but the measure appeared not strong enough to appease these vocal but loose elements. The conservatives insist on a unitary view of society that recognizes no difference between state and religion, and they advocate making Nigeria an Islamic state administered according to the principles of Sharia law. For them, all Muslims belong to the umma (community), and the idea of a secular state is atheistic or syncretistic. Apart from challenging the Muslim affirmation of religious principles – especially the Sharia – the imposition of secularity, according to them, amounts to a cultural affront to a significant portion of the population and reduces them to the status of second-class citizens. Although this view is claimed to be a Quranic injunction, it does not enjoy popular acceptance among liberal Muslims who maintain that such a view does not imply the need for the Islamisation of Nigeria nor does it endorse non-acceptance of the constitutional provision of the secularity of the state (Imo, 1995: 58-59; Ibrahim, 1998: 39-66; Ilesanmi, 2001: 529-554) One major factor in the recurrence of religious uprisings in Nigeria is the inability (or, perhaps, reluctance) of the government to deal decisively with past occurrences and the dramatis personae, including their backers. Implicitly, it would appear that once a culprit or a sect member avoids being killed during the suppression of their insurrection, it is all but sure that he will take part in the next one, all other things being equal. This non-deterrence has arguably encouraged a culture of impunity and promoted a circle of violence, hence the recurrent nature of religion-related crises in Nigeria. The Kala Kato riot of December 2009 is a pertinent example: Mallam Sale Badamasi, Kala Kato’s leader, had criticized the unjust 70 killing of Boko Haram members for preaching against what they considered to be the reality of religious permissiveness and laxity, particularly among those considered to be leaders (Abubakar and Mohammed 2010; Michael 2010: 13). Indeed, what could not be conclusively proved is if the Kala Kato riot was a continuation of the Boko Haram riot, a resurgence of the Maitatsine movement of the 1980s, or perhaps another face of the hydra-headed monster that Islamic extremism is gradually assuming in Nigeria. The growing problem of Islamic fundamentalism appears to be more deep-rooted than the approaches adopted by the Nigerian government to address it. Given the danger it poses to the country and global security, and given the more serious response by nations around the world to terrorism related events, comprehensive and drastic measures that aim to address the root causes should be fashioned. Wishing the problem away, pretending it is not there, or that it is not as serious as it is, is akin to sitting on a time bomb. The recurrent nature of intra and inter religious crises with ethnic angles is a timely warning.

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CHAPTER THREE THE IMPACT OF PAST RELIGIOUS CRISES AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA It would seem an exaggeration to say that the country has become a battle field where religious riots are constantly staged; but a cursory look at instances of religious crises would prove this fact. Earlier studies have recorded some of these crises up to 2005. This work contains a summary of some of them and others which occurred hereafter. What is essential to note is that most of the religious crises paved way for merciless killings of human beings, just like the jahiliyyah period. The crisis, given serious attention by the Federal Government, has become a recurring decimal, and, up till now, it could not be said that it has been totally suppressed. The Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi, obviously the first attempts at imposing a religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria, marked the beginning of ferocious conflict and crises in Nigeria (Isichei 1987: 194-208; Ibrahim 1997: 511-512). Following the Maitatsine crises, or interspersing them, were several other crises. These include the Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of March 1986, the University of Ibadan crisis of May 1986, the nationwide crisis over Nigeria’s membership in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in January/February 1986, the Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/ Funtua religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 1988, the acrimonious, nationwide debate on Sharia (Islamic law) at the Constituent Assembly in October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the Bauchi/Katsina riots of March/April 1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano civil disturbance of December 1991 and the Jos crisis of April 1994 (Imo 1995: 21-23; Ibrahim 1997: 512-516; Enwerem 1999: 124). Similarly, between 1999 and 2008, 28 other conflicts were reported, the most prominent being the Shagamu conflict of July 1999 and the recurrent Jos crises of 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2008 (Omipidan 2009: 5-6; Akaeze 2009).

3.1. The Maitatsine Religious Riot -1980 The Maitatsine religious riot was master-minded by one Mohammed Marwa Maitatsine, a Cameroonian origin who had his infamous kingdom in the heart of Kano. He came to the notice of Nigerian authorities first in 1962 when he was arrested, imprisoned for three months and subsequently deported. He later staged a come back trip of settlement to Kano and by 1973, he had built a fanatical band of more than 10,000 followers. 72

Towards the end of 1980 Maitatsine struck; following a two-week ultimatum given by Abukakar Rimi, former civilian governor of Kano State that he should quit the area illegally occupied by his group. The city of Kano was put under siege for two weeks by this Maitatsine group numbering thousands. Armed with all sorts of weapons including guns they killed, maimed and wounded thousands of people. Writing on the Kano riot of 1980, Ilori noted: The existence of Southern Moslems and Northern Christian is appreciated. Maitatsine attack on Kano was grave and savage. About 4, 177 people were killed in the carnage and the State Government paid more than N3 million as compensation to various victims of the disturbance (Ilori; 1987:25). Since the Kano riots of 1980, the Maitatsine disturbance has become almost a yearly ritual. Even though Maitatsine died during the 1980 riots, in 1982 his disciples surfaced again. That time in Bulumkutu an outskirts of Maiduguri, Borno State and also in Kaduna. About 400 lives were lost and property worth more than N3 million were destroyed. In February 1984, the fanatics now growing in number inflicted horror on Jimeta in former Gongola now Adamawa State where 763 casualties were recorded and about 5,913 people were displaced. A year later (1985), in spite of the assertion of then Gongola State Police Commissioner, Nuhu Aliyu, that his command had advanced intelligence report on the group the same group struck at Gombe, Bauchi State. On April 26, 1985, more than a hundred people died after about ten hours of fighting in Gombe. Virtually all these crises, many of which took a violent form, have been explained or justified by one reason or the other. Where the crisis was not borne out of the need to curb the excesses of some groups, prevent them from being a security threat, or contain their spread – as was the case with the Maitatsine riots (Albert, 1999a: 285-286; Ladan, 1999: 101) – it arose out of the conversion driven by one religious group and the resistance by another religious group of its perceived stronghold. This was the case with the Kano riot of 1991 during which Muslims complained of preferential treatment in the approval of conduct of a religious crusade by Christians and the use of Kano Race Course earlier not approved for Muslims to hold a similar programme (Albert, 1999a: 291-292; Williams, 1997: 33-49). In some other cases, it was the seemingly unresolved indigene-settler problem that was at its root. The Zangon-Kataf riots and the recurrent Jos crises fall into this category (Nwosu, 1996: 141-152; Williams, 1999; Ibrahim, 1998: 39-66; Uchendu, 2004: 132-144; Human Rights Watch, 2005: 7-10). Although almost all the crises have been subsumed under religion and explained by even some authors as religious factors, it is apparent that other extraneous and underlying factors like economic disequilibrium/inequality, envy, poverty among youths 73

(who easily became willing tools in the hand of patrons), and the unhealthy contest for political offices have all played parts (Ibrahim 1997: 521-524; Human Rights Watch 2005: 48; Sulaiman 2008: 20-26). The assertion of Ibrahim, corroborated by Ladan, that all ethno- religious crises have behind them a perceived domination by supposedly external or illegitimate groups, is quite accurate in this case (Ibrahim 1998: 51; Ladan 1999: 105). Specifically, the Maitatsine uprisings – to which those of Boko Haram compared in terms of philosophy and objectives, organizational planning and armed resistance, and modus operandi – have generally been explained by a combination of factors like economic dislocation, deprivation, and income inequalities, as well as poverty aided by local disasters like drought and a rinderpest (cattle plague) pandemic, all with links to Islam. Other contributing factors were the rejection of the secular nature of the Nigerian society and the impact of the success of the 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini revolution in Iran (Hickey 1984: 251- 256; Lubeck 1985: 369-390; Hiskett 1987: 209-223; Usman 1987: 11-25; Isichei 1987: 194- 208; Clarke 1987: 93- 115; Kastfelt 1989: 83-90; Ibrahim 1997: 509-534; Albert 1997: 285- 325; Falola 1998: 137-162; Albert 1999a: 274-309; 1999b: 19-36; Stock 2004: 415- 417). Significantly, many of the explanations offered for the outbreak of the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s are relevant to the Boko Haram uprising. The Maitatsine riot in Kano metropolis in 1980 was like a burning fire during harmattan in the northern part of the country. The intra-religious riot was said to have claimed 4,177 lives. As if that was not enough, subsequent Maitatsine riots in Bullum-Kutu in Borno State of 26th - 29th October 1982 were pathetic. Imam (2004:32) recorded the enormous casualty of the Maitatsine uprising of Bullum-Kutt that it claimed more than four hundred lives and properties worth over 3 million naira were destroyed or looted. According to him, the Jimeta Maitatsine crisis of 26th February -5th March 1984 claimed one thousand and four lives, while five thousand, nine hundred, and thirteen families were displaced; and the Gombe Maitatsine disturbance of 26th – 28th April 1985 claimed over one hundred lives.

3.2 The Sharia and Hisbah Crises A prominent scholar has observed: “Until the present day, politicians of the north, the religious scholars and modern Muslim intellectuals claim the legacy of Usman Dan Fodio for themselves in order to legitimise their political strategies and programs” Loimeier,(1997:3-4). In that context, debates over Sharia (which Dan Fodio first introduced), and its relationship to customary, colonial or national law, have been a permanent feature of politics in the region for 200 years. As we earlier noted, British colonial authorities left in place many elements of 74

Sharia but gradually reduced its scope as they introduced common law codes. On the eve of independence they further limited its scope, and it was formally excluded from the legal system of independent Nigeria when the Islamic court of appeal was abolished in 1967. However, aspects of Sharia continued to be used, as part of “area” or customary law (practiced at village level). Yusuf, (2007:10). In 1978, the issue again came to the fore, in the context of drafting a new civilian constitution. Heated debates focused on using the word “secular” to describe the state and on the proposed creation of a federal-level Sharia court of appeal. Eventually the matter was settled through compromise. The court was not created, and the new constitution prohibited the adoption of any single religion by the state, but the word “secular” was dropped. Falola, (1998:77-79). The return to civilian rule in 1999 was seen by some in the far north as a challenge to their authority, by others as an opportunity for religious and cultural renewal. The loss of power to a Christian southerner was considered a reversal of political fortunes. The new beginning called for moral and religious revival. It was in the quest for political legitimacy, as much as for religious purity, that the Zamfara state governor, Ahmed Yerima, started the campaign to restore (or more accurately enlarge) Sharia in 1999. That initiative, however, instantly found wide resonance with many Muslims. Last, (1991:19). For the clerics, it was an opportunity to restore a religious and moral heritage (and position of social power) suppressed after colonial conquest (Wakili, 2007:14). Common people saw Sharia as an instrument for achieving a just, safe, compassionate and less corrupt society. Dukku, (2009). For the political elite having lost its hold on the federal government, Sharia was potentially an instrument for regional self-assertion and putting pressure on President Obasanjo. The Sardauna of Sokoto was initially skeptical but did not want to be seen as obstructive. Thus the Zamfara government’s lead had a bandwagon effect on other states, whose governors followed with varying degrees of enthusiasm Ibrahim, (2004). The federal government declared Sharia incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, but the far northern governors argued that the same constitution vested in states concurrent powers to establish their own court systems. Obasanjo, avoiding a confrontation with the pro-Sharia states in order not to inflame religious passions, merely called for moderation in Sharia’s application. International debate on Sharia in northern Nigeria has been distorted by such headline grabbing events as the sentencing to death by stoning of Amina Lawal for adultery in 2002, though Lawal’s conviction was ultimately overturned on the basis of arguments made within 75

Islamic law. Such extreme punitive measures are very rare, and most serious crimes continue to be dealt with by normal secular law courts. However, Sharia does signify a more prominent role for religion in public affairs in general and greater policing of “public morals”. The views of the north’s non-Muslims vary. Initially the issue strained the already fragile relations between Christians and Muslims, culminating in riots in Kaduna and Kano in 2000. In many areas, minority Christian populations still consider Sharia restrictive of their rights (in terms, for example, of public music and alcohol consumption), and fears remain that Christians may be subjected to it against their will. However, over the years, attitudes have calmed, as state governments have been restrained in applying the harsher punishments. The exact effect of Sharia on non-Muslims varies across the region, as it has not been widely applied in some states. Where it has, Christians tend to be free to drink alcohol if they do so in private, and to use secular courts if they wish. In many cases, authorities have made efforts to underline the common benefits that may derive from Sharia (especially as many people, including Christians, have little faith in the state’s justice system) and to build bridges with Christian communities. Ostien (2007:3) The hisbah groups operate with the consent and support of state governments, although the exact natures of that support, as well as mechanisms for accountability, vary from one state to another, Adamu (2008). In some, the government pays a small salary and provides uniforms, vehicles and offices at both the state capital and local levels. In others they are less organized and unpaid. Kano has the most developed organisation, due to the push of Governor Shekarau. It has 9,000 members (most paid a small stipend), an active censorship board and committees to look at public morality issues. In some states, new members undergo a training program with a brief outline of their duties and the limits of their powers. Introduction of the hisbah has raised controversies. In February 2006, the federal government accused the Kano state government of seeking foreign funding to turn it into a parallel police force. Kano hisbah officials rejected that accusation and maintain that “there is a distinction between hisbah and the police. Hisbah preaches, while the police do not. Hisbah apprehends offenders, hands them over to the police, but does not prosecute, because it is not empowered to do so, Last, (1991:19). However, as the Nigeria Police Force is the only police force permitted under the federal constitution, there have been tensions and occasional clashes between it and hisbah groups. In the early years of operation, there were reports of hisbah violence, as operatives sometimes assaulted women they judged to be inappropriately dressed, destroyed alcohol merchants’ shops and dealt severe punishment on anyone alleged 76 to have insulted Islam. However, there were no reports of extrajudicial killings. With time, both the enthusiasm and the human rights abuses of the early years have declined. Controversies have centered on more prosaic issues, such as whether men and women can mix in public transport. The Kano hisbah tried to stop this (following a state law banning women from riding motorbike taxis), but failed to consider that people are forced to share transport due to cost. The state government has since introduced rickshaw motorbikes, so that male drivers can transport female passengers, but, in reality, the Sharia restrictions have been quietly dropped, (Last,2000). Hisbah operatives are now most likely to describe their work in terms of social mediation. They encourage (or impose) out-of-court settlement of land, marriage and inheritance disputes and facilitate reconciliation of family issues. In this way, they have reduced the need for local people to resort to the police and the courts to settle disputes. They encourage forgiveness and reconciliation, based on Islamic principles, assist the Nigeria Police Force, even serving as traffic wardens, help regulate markets and aid in the Hajj. In some cases, they have the authority to make arrests, but they generally relinquish suspects to the police (who may then bring the suspect before a Sharia court). Hisbah officials consider the flexibility of this approach, and Sharia’s openness to forgiveness and financial restitution to victims to be advantages. While some locals and observers may object to such moral policing, it has undoubtedly achieved some success at this level. However, there are several critical voices of Sharia and the hisbah from within the Islamic community. The initial expectations that Sharia would curb corruption in government, enhance socio-economic welfare, reduce grassrootslevel crime and ensure more efficient dispensation of justice have not been realised. Crime statistics in Nigeria are very unreliable, but there is little evidence that Sharia has reduced overall criminality in the twelve Sharia states. Equally, Sharia has done little to stem corruption in government, (Last, 2000). There are muted but continuing protests that Sharia’s punitive provisions are applied only to the poor. Some take the position that Sharia was implemented without the necessary moral education being in place. The Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria expressed early concern that the criminal aspects of Sharia were being carried out, while the injunctions to create a more just society were being ignored. (Yusuf, 2007:251). However, despite the shortcomings, many see these very discussions as part of what Sharia has brought and consider that it has stimulated much debate over the rule of law and equality. (O’Brien, 2007). The uneven extension of Sharia and the hisbah and the fluctuations in their popularity need to be seen as part of widespread popular dissatisfaction with the Nigerian state and with general moral decline, as well as of the search for solutions within religious canon. In this sense, Sharia can 77 be understood as an extension of other less prominent forms of civilian protest – for example, the Islamic anti-corruption organisation the Muslim League for Accountability (Crisis Group interview, head of the Muslim League for Accountability, Kaduna, August, 2009.). The introduction of Sharia and the activities of the hisbah have raised the question of women’s rights in the region. (Umar, 2007) At one level, it is clear that Sharia does not treat men and women equally and that the intrusion of the hisbah into family matters gives religion a very prominent role in settling disputes that may sit uncomfortably with notions of legal and other forms of equality. Many involved in elaborating Sharia strongly object to women playing a prominent role in public life, and the region has few elected female politicians, (Adamu, 2008). Many in the south and abroad, and some in the region, object to this attitude. However, most Crisis Group interlocutors, including women working in human rights areas, offered a more nuanced view. For them, women’s rights can be pursued and developed within the Islamic canon, by challenging narrow interpretations and drawing on the diversity of Islamic traditions. A number of NGOs have been set up to forward this agenda. Although this attitude is largely limited to those with resources and education, it points to emerging possibilities for seeking gender equity within a Sharia context. (Umar, 2007). Sharia is the sacred law of Islam governing all aspects of Islamic life. It is a law that regulates the total life of a Moslem. The Moslems have insisted that this law which is only applicable to Moslems be incorporated into the nation’s Constitution. In addition they have insisted that a Sharia Court of Appeal be set up at the Federal level. The Christians are understandably opposed to this since there is no state religion in Nigeria. Each time the issue of a review of the nation’s constitution is raised, Moslems have been seen fighting for the inclusion of Sharia, which is essentially an Islamic law, into the Constitution. In fact, during the Buhari regime, the junta was alleged to have concluded arrangements for the incorporation of the Sharia into the Constitution. But before this could materialize the Babangida coup which ousted Buhari’s regime took place on August 27, 1985 stopped it. In 1988, the same Sharia question nearly capsized the boat of the Constituent Assembly headed by Justice Anthony Aniagolu (Rtd). The Assembly Members were at each other’s throat over Sharia when the then Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) was constrained to declare the issue a ‘no-go’ area. As all events, the matter is far from being settled as some Moslems have swore that there shall be no peace in this country until the Sharia becomes part of the constitution (Abu, 1988:15). Between the middle and late 1970s the issue of Sharia became the first obvious ambition of the Northern political elites to give national elevation to Islam over and above 78

Christianity. Therefore there can be no mention of religious crisis without the Sharia crisis since it epitomizes in its true form the connection between religion and politics in Nigeria. The political elites whose political fame, for one reason or the other, had waned hid under the cloaks of religion to warm themselves back to the heart of the ignorant masses. For example, the debate over the introduction of Sharia into the legal code of Nigeria nearly rocked the very foundation of the nation. The Sharia crisis, an outfall of the Constitution Drafting Committee set up by General Murtala Mohammed took a crisis turn with the coming to power of General Olusegun Obasanjo. General Obasanjo, a Southern Christian, threw the debate back to the Constitution Drafting Committee which was open to various sections of the country. (Uju, 2004:147). Of all the items on the draft constitution, the debate on Sharia was the most divisive in nature and like some scholars observed, “It marked the beginning of the introduction of religion into Nigerian politics” (Bala Usman, 1987:15). In order to leave no stone unturned, in ensuring that Islam was officially recognized nationally, the Moslems in the North organized series of seminars to sensitize other Moslems and also tighten the knots for a grand master plan to win. A few examples of the arguments in the seminars would help to confirm the preparation for the Sharia tussle. In March 1977 at the seminar on Sharia in Zaria, Maaji Baba Shani argued that “…when we were helpless because of foreign domination we tolerated the supremacy of un-Islamic laws. But we are now the masters of our destiny” (New Nigerian 15 September, 1977). In a similar seminar in Mina, the New Nigeria of 27 March, 1977 quoting Shaik Lemu, the host of the conference states that “… the solution to Sharia issue was simply to give Islam a pride of place and make Islam supreme”. The argument put up at another conference at Bayero University, Kano was that, “the laws of the country were a legacy of colonialism and biased in favour of Christianity … that the present legal system was tyrannical and inimical to the welfare of Moslems” New Nigerian, May 8, 1977). The arguments at these seminars were clear pictures of the debate at Constituent Assembly (CA). The non Moslem members of the CA were particularly concerned about how the Sharia laws would affect their non- Moslem communities, the Moslems themselves made serious efforts to win the Sharia war thereby strengthening their political fortunes. The arguments at the CA were so explosive that some Moslem die-hards at the CA staged a withdrawal and actually walked out of the CA. The controversy at the CA and the likelihood that the outcome of the debate was not going to favour the Moslem prompted the demonstration by the Moslem Students Society (MSS) and the subsequent ultimatum issued by this body to the CA, urging it to, “stop opposition to Sharia or take full responsibility for 79 putting the entire nation in chaos” (ABU Students Press Release, 1978). Subsequently, there were series of pro-Sharia demonstrations in Zaria and Kaduna with some placards that read: “No Sharia, no peace, No Sharia, no constitution, No Sharia, no Moslems, No Sharia, no Nigeria” (West Africa, April 24, 1978:779). The drama that accompanied these reactions i.e. the walkout and the demonstrations convinced even some Northern Moslems like Alhaji Nudu Bamali (quoted in Kukah 1993:127) that “… the walkout was hypothetical, it was not done in favour or against Sharia, and it was for people to enhance their political future”. In an interview granted to Kukah (1993:127). Onongo states that, “it was part of arm twisting meant to affect a constitutional crisis and to frighten the southern delegates into submission”. One continues to wonder why Sharia issue was not prominent at the time of Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, General Gowon (though a Christian but a Northerner) and even General Murtala Mohammed. The baton of leadership shifted away from the North, hence the political uneasiness displayed by some ambitious political elites. The obvious selfish tendency displayed by some CA delegates in their blind argument led the former governor of Kaduna State. Alhaji Balarabe Musa, to confirm that the Northern ruling class meant to ride on the horse back of Sharia in order to ascend the political throne in the Second Republic. He said, In the face of the new political programme, the ruling class in Northern Nigeria knew that they threatened by the new democracy. They had no foothold or any solid base for political competition as a block with the rest of the country. In view of this political bankruptcy, it became clear that Islam would offer the only alternative for the protection of their class interest … it was clear that to seek to defend it would enhance their position. So, they held to the issue of Sharia in the Assembly as their only weapon for mobilizing in the North (Balarabe Musa- Interview with Kukah, 1993:127).

In the same vein late Mahmud Turkur (Head Department of History, ABU Zaria) confirming that in one way or the other, behind the clouds of religious acrimony there is politics, opines that, “certain groups with political ambitions from the North and South decided to use the Sharia debate as a means of mobilizing support, the advantage being that either way, these individuals would still use the support they had earned in presenting themselves as defenders of Sharia or defenders of their people from the cloak of Islamic domination. The idea then was for either side to build up a pool of supporters that should be relied on for electoral advantage of their collective class interest. (Kukah, 1993:121). 80

The Sharia war was abated with the coming to power in the second Republic of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, a grand son of Usman Dan Fodio, in 1979. The Moslems showed a sigh of relief because “Allah’s will” for Nigeria has been done. The joy of Moslems over the victory of Alhaji Shehu Shagari knew no bounds for it confirmed the electoral/anticipated victory songs of Alhaji Dankwairo (recorded vividly in Kukah, 1993:153), which he put thus. Since the time of Almadu Bello, there has never been another leader with power, except Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the trusted one. He is the grandson of the servant of God; he is a servant of God (bawan Allah). My happiness is that, our flag which has been lying on the ground of Mecca, the reign of Shehu Shagari has raised it up. In the face of Islam today in the whole world, Nigeria is the first (Kukah, 1993:153).

It could be true from the above verse that in Mecca, the flags of countries with Moslem heads of states in the North that introduced Sharia in the past willingly abolished it because of its numerous lapses in the face of the level of civilization at the moment the demand for introduction of Sharia in the Northern States has suddenly increased, thereby casting some doubts in the minds of people as to the real intention of those who advocate for it. Hence, in the third republic, there is no discussion at national level on the introduction of Sharia in Nigeria, but some states like Zamfara, Sokoto, Kastina, Yobe, Kano; Borno etc. have introduced Sharia without minding the implications for those non-Moslem members of the state. It does not need any Divine revelation to convince the world that behind this religious heat mounted again at that time when a Southerner and a Christian is in power, is a political ambition by those (Moslem) who feel that the land has been desecrated. In 2001, the former military Head of State, Major General Mohammed Buhari (rtd) was under severe attack over his call on Northerners not to vote for Christian Presidential candidates in 2003 election. (The Leader, 24 June 2001:7). For the citizens of a secular state like Nigeria to be under siege in the 21 st century, when the world is going nuclear, indicates that all is not well with our political elites.

3.3 CRISES IN KADUNA STATE- 1987, 1992, 2000 Series of religious crises have occurred in various parts of Kaduna State and they have generally been devastating in terms of the cost and damage. The religious crisis of 1987 in Kaduna State was significant for it opened the flood gates of violent religious uprising in the State. The state is one of those multi-religious states of the North. The Southern part of Kaduna State is predominantly Christians while the North is made up of mainly Moslems. The traditional political base of Kaduna State lies in the North. But the South had produced a 81 lot of enlightened people who are not comfortable with the imposition of the authority and the interference of the Emir of Zaria in their affairs. On the other hand, the Moslem North of Kaduna State enjoys their hegemony over the south. Some of the sons from the South had become powerful in national government as military governors even in Moslem States, Armed Forces Ruling Council members, Air Marshals, Managing Directors etc (Kukah 1993:186). Therefore the political disharmony coupled with religious differences existing between the North and South meant that the State is basically a potential source of religious upheaval. It is not surprising therefore that minor religious misunderstandings often led to disproportionate physical violence between the two groups Kafanchan Religious Crisis (Kaduna) - 1987 The Kafanchan violent religious crisis of 1987 was the first obvious violent religious clash in the State. The Kafanchan riot of March 1987, in addition to some mosques and churches that were burnt, left about twenty-five people killed and several others hospitalized (Lateju & Adebayo, 2006). It resulted as religious activities organized by Federated Christian Students (FCS) at the College of Education, Kafanchan but ended up in a fiasco. The most provocative events were the mounting of a banner at the school gate which read, “Welcome to Jesus Campus” coupled with the “abominable preaching” (as conceived by the Moslems) by Rev.Abubakar Bako, culminating in a Moslem being converted into Christianity. In the crisis that ensued, some Christian Churches were set ablaze and many lives and property lost. Colonel Abubarkar Umar, the then Kaduna State Governor had addressed the people of the State while the then President, General Ibrahim Babangida, also addressed the nation promising to put a stop to such acts by punishing the offenders. The job of the Committee set up to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the riots, the damages and those responsible was made difficult to some extent by some Moslem members who claimed that Islam forbade a woman leading a man even in a committee (West Africa, 20 April, 1987). The Zango-Kataf Riot (Kaduna)-1992 The Zango-Kataf Riot of 1992 was another crisis that confirms the presence of religious crisis in Nigeria. The history of Zango- Kataf crisis is partly communal and partly religious but later metamorphosed into a full blown religious crisis. The Zangos are Moslems while the Katafs are mainly Christians. The Zangos often lord it over the Katafs by insisting that the Katafs be included into their traditional political domain Zaria as the overall leader. In other to achieve this, the Emir of Zaria imposes a traditional ruler (often a Moslem) over the Katafs who naturally resists it. For this reason, any minor difference between the two 82 groups is often over-amplified by interested individuals thereby giving rise to more serious problems. The immediate cause of the 1992 crisis was the relocation of a local market which previously offered more advantage to the Zangos at the instance of the Chairman of the Local Government, Ayola, and a Kataf Christian by origin. This, the Zango Moslems rejected and what seemed an uncontrollable misunderstanding erupted into a full-blown religious crisis claiming many lives and properties. Many Kataf senior citizens were incarcerated including retired Major General Zamani Lekwot (Okogie, 1992:15, Newswatch, 1 June, 1992). Religious crisis of Kaduna-February 21, 2000 In Kaduna, the war that engulfed the entire ancient city in February 21, 2000, was a response against attempts to introduce the Sharia legal code into the State by the government. The serious casualty recorded in the Kaduna State’s reaction to adoption of Shariah would forever remain in the memory of Nigerians. The decision of the Kaduna State House of Assembly to press ahead with the Sharia in the face of the controversy and unsettled conflicts it was generating in other places plunged the State into another round of unending war (Nmodu, 2000:14). In the process, the mayhem became an ethnic crisis as many Igbo people were killed. A rejoinder to this was the killing of many northern Muslims residing in Igbo towns as retaliation. The Moslems had demonstrated earlier demanding the full introduction of Sharia in the State but their demonstration did not attract any crisis. On the day the Christians demonstrated against the introduction of Sharia, the Moslems came out violently on them. The crisis claimed many lives and property (The Punch, 28 March 2000:5). The frequency of religious crises in Kaduna show that there is also a perpetual political power tussle between those who believe in traditional leadership of the Moslems and those who do not believe in it (the Christians) According to Awowede (2000:15), Christians in their thousands field out peacefully early in the morning at the central market area via the Lugard Hall House of Assembly to the Government House to express their dissatisfaction and grievances over the House of Assembly’s decision. They met resistance from some of the Muslims around Leventis Roundabout on Ahmadu Bello Way. The fight that ensued brought back mayhem to Kaduna, reminiscent of the era of Zango- Kataf Crisis of 1992. 3.4 Religious Crisis in Ilorin-1986 Ilorin is the capital of Kwara State, a State which is made up of two ethnic groups-the Yoruba and the Hausa/Fulani as one would call them. Therefore, it is not homogenous in terms of religion and of course culture. As usual, the Christians often resist the interference 83 from the traditional Moslem rulers in their own affairs. The mistrust between Christians and Moslems engineered by the selfish political elites is so much that any little problem would spark off a big religious upheaval, (Uju, 2004:150). It was therefore not a surprise to those who are abreast with the historical setting of the State that Ilorin was a veritable ground for religious crisis any time. By the Palm Sunday of 1986, the Christians who were on the normal procession, marking the triumphant entry of Jesus into Jerusalem were attacked by the Moslems on the ground that the Christians had trespassed into the Moslem area “a holy ground” so to say. What appeared to be a no issue turned to be a big national issue by the way people were maimed and some thoroughly beaten and property destroyed.

3.5 The Bauchi Religious Riot- 1991, 1992 The religious blood bath did not spare Bauchi State. The Christian tribes in Bauchi, the Tayiawa, are not spared from the aggressive tendencies of the Moslem Fulani who would want to lord over them politically. Though in the majority, the Tayiawa “… were denied responsible positions in the Council by the Emir of Bauchi whose responsibility it was to appoint district heads” (Udoidom, in F.U. Okafor, 1997:178). The Tayiawas are by origin the real indigenes of Tafawa Balewa town and the discrimination against them in local political appointment was not acceptable to them. Every little provocation angered each of the groups. The 1991 unavoidable religious crisis was simply as a result of “suya” (roasted beef meat) bought from a Christian by a Moslem boy. A number of deaths were recorded as a result of the ensuing crisis between the Moslems and the Christians over worthless piece of meat. The near religious war that arose in Bauchi 1992 was over the use of an abattoir in Tafawa Balewa town. Though the abattoir was demarcated separating the Moslem butchers from the Christian butchers, the Moslems rejected the slaughtering of pigs (a forbidden animal by Moslem law) at all in any part of the abattoir. The crisis from the disagreement led to a very bloody violence that cut across many areas of the town.

3.6 Kano Religious Riot -1980, 1982, 1991 The first religious violent crisis was carried out in 1980 by a group of fanatical Moslems known as the Maitatsine group led by Mohammed Marwa Maitatsine. According to Okike (2000:63), “…they were the puritan fanatics who aimed at correcting the misapplication of some Islamic practices among Moslems, beginning from Kano”. They 84 therefore slaughtered both Moslems (non fanatic) and Christians numbering about 4,177 people including churches and private property (Newswatch, 30 May,: 25). The Maitatsine religious crisis has been treated above. However, other Kano riots were directed specifically towards the Christians who form a larger population in the Kano metropolis. The 1982 Kano riot was as a result of the laying of foundation stone for the building of a new Church in Kano by Archbishop Runcie during his visit to Nigeria. The Moslems claimed that the new Church was sited near their Mosque. The crisis that ensued led to the destruction and burning of about eight Churches in the State. (Committee Report, 1983:13). The 1991 Kano riot was directed towards the Christians particularly those inhabiting Gari and the Fegge area of Kano town. The Christians in these areas were mainly non- indigenes of Kano. The Moslems were naturally envious of this group whom they felt were making a lot of progress. The Christians, after series of requests were permitted by government to invite a German Christian preacher. In 1991, the invitation of Reinhard Bonnke, a German Christian preacher to Kano, was met with bitter opposition by the Muslims, who felt cheated for previously denying Ahmed Deedat, a Muslim preacher from South Africa, to come to the country for the same purpose. The crises took place between 11 and 14, October 1991 and left behind a casualty of over 500 lives and million-worth property destroyed (Uju, 2004:151). This the Moslems saw as an undue favour to the Christians. It is notable that Moslems do not need to ask for any permission to invite any preacher even in a Christians dominated State. The account given above is not exhaustive of Kano religious riots

3.7 Jos Religious Crises- 2001, 2008 The most recent and most surprising religious crisis took place in a one time serene Jos town. On September 10, 2001, another serious religious crisis enveloped the entire city of Jos consequent upon the reaction of a woman who drove through a street barricaded by a group of Muslim worshippers during a Friday service. The woman bent on having her way because she felt the people had no right to block a public road. The consequence of the crisis was succinctly described by Lateju and Adebayo (2006:9) in the following words; Jos which was hitherto a serene town had become a mass grave of decaying corpses nose-wrenching odours and paratrooping vultures as arrows, machetes, swords and guns of varying sophistication were employed (freely used) indiscriminately. Human bodies were strewn on virtually every street in Jos. People who were not blown up by bullets were simply hacked down and 85

their throats slit in the manner of slaughtering of an animal. Many others were sprayed with petrol and set ablaze. The stench of burnt bodies was suffocating. Buildings and vehicles were not spared. A particular car dealer in Jos metropolis lost all the vehicles on display in his fleet to the mayhem (Lateju and Adebayo 2006:9).

Jos, a predominantly Christians town was thrown into chaos on another occasion by the Moslems who after their Friday prayers faced the Christians living in the town both indigenes and non-indigenes. It was purely a case of political crisis under the guise of religion. The trouble began with the appointment of a Moslem, Alhaji Mohamed Muktar as the Coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPED) for Jos North Local government area. (The Daily Champion, 11 September, 2001). The indigenes of the area vowed to resist the appointment as well as others that did not conform to their ethnic interest. The Moslems then prepared for war and even imported according to some reporters, fanatical Moslems from other States. According to The Daily Champion of 11 September 2001, the mutilated bodies littered the streets; private properties of highly significant value were destroyed. Another Jos crisis of 2008 was fatal as it recorded more than 700 casualties. The cause of the fracas is given by Umejesi (2010:236) when he writes: The Jos religious crisis of 2008 was both ethnically and politically motivated, as it was as a result of Local Government elections in Jos North, which Hausa/Fulani Muslim settlers claim to be their own as against the claim of ownership by indigenous people of the area who are mostly Christians. The Head Quarters of Jos North was, shortly, before the election of November 27, 2008 relocated from its location of C Division of the Nigeria Police to the premises of the Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB). The relocation did not go down well with the Jasawa (Hausa/Fulani in Jos) who saw the relocation as an attempt to short change them politically and they were prepared not to allow that.

3.8 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Having discussed briefly some of the religious crisis in Nigeria that has a lot of political connotation, it will be right to go through the issue of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Nigeria’s controversial membership of the OIC is yet another source of religious conflict that has threatened the peace, unity and stability of Nigeria. The history of Nigeria’s presence in the OIC dates back to September 1969, when Arab countries met in Rabat, Morocco, to put finishing touches to the proposed Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Nigeria Moslems showed their enthusiasm to be part of the historic gathering. With 86 the support and encouragement of the then sultan of Sokoto, Sadiq Abubakar III, a delegation which was led by Abubakar Mahmood Gumi, a prominent Islamic priest, was sent to register Nigeria’s presence. With the atmosphere of the Nigerian civil war around him, Gowon felt uneasy and quickly sent an urgent message to king Hassan of Morocco, namely, that the delegation did not represent Nigeria. This message turned to Nigerian delegation into an obvious status. In 1984, during the Buhari regime the issue resurfaced “Tunde Idiagbon, second in command during the Buhari regime was said to have made incessant trips to Saudi Arabia in that connection. However the regime was soon ousted by Babangida. In December, 1985, the OIC sent an invitation to Nigeria to attend the OIC ministerial conference slated for January 6-10, 1986 in Fez, Morocco. Without any consultation, the Babangida government surreptitiously sent an official delegation to represent Nigeria. At that meeting, Nigeria was formally admitted as a member (Olojede; 1986:12-13). The matter was thought so confidential by the Babangida government that Commodore Ebita Ukiwe, then second in command to Babangida learnt of it through the media like any other Nigerian. He said he did not know anything about the issue and that it was never discussed before the AFRC. Nigerian non-Moslems did not find this fuuny. It was alleged that Nigeria by 1986 was the youngest of the members of OIC (Impact International 1990:12). Nigeria it was said, was secretly attending the OIC as an observer Nation for so long but decided to be secretly registered (Okeke, 2000:60). Nigeria is already benefiting from membership of OIC. It confirmed “… that recently the IDB (Islamic Development Bank) gave 10 million dollars loan to six States in the country because of her membership of OIC. The States are Niger, Zamfara, Jigawa, etc (The Guardian, 19 May, 2000:69). It is also worthy of note that the Arabic language (the language of Islam) is inscribed on our currencies (Okike, 2000:11). Moreover, political instability just like religious crisis equally affects the political economy of any nation. Although Nigeria is rich in both human and natural resources capital, the pervasive instability and the management of its economics have made it one of the poorest nations in the 21 st century. Although there are cases where democracy has impacted on the economic sphere in Africa such as Botswana and Mauritius (Adejumobi, 2002:157), and the level of transparency and accountability of the substantive government, more than seventy (70) per cent of African countries rank among the poorest in the world. While Adejumobi (2002:157) in his summation posits that non-democratic polities have found it quite difficult to reduce the incidence of poverty, and hence recorded negative GNP, 87 implying that democratic polities are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty, Nigeria lack the space for innovative changes that give rise to the consolidation of democracy. What the above chronicles, showed was the fact that crisis, instability and poverty necessitate powerlessness, voicelessness, and further limits the space of negotiation. As poor people come to the roundtable of policy debate cowed and weak. In a polity where such indices exist, the poor and marginalized struggle to irk out a living, while issues of democratic choice, contributing to the debate on strategic national issues are left to the same class of people (TMG, 2003). A fall out from the above, furthermore, is the link between poverty and political instability. What we can deduce from the poverty and its link with instability is simply that the poor are subject to manipulation by the elite class as long as there is no realization of the power behind the vote. Clearly therefore, the poor have no political power, neither do they have economic power. In cases as stated above, coupled with the existent dominant power game, exercised in circumstances that breed violence, the poor and the marginalized are excluded from the frontline of politics-exclusionary politics. Powerlessness in this regard equals disenfranchisement. The creative distance of the state from the lived experiences of the people further increases such exclusion. Nigeria, for instance, represents one of the illiberal democracies existing in the 21 st century. While civil society activist would emphasize that the present democracy was fought and won through sacrifice of June 12, with the hope that democracy would engineer social justice and reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and iron out the root cause of political instability and religious violence, the Nigerian democratic experiment has been captured by the forces against stable polities.

3.9 Political and Economic Causes of Religious Crises Many observers have attributed conflicts in the far north to religious differences. Such differences, intolerance or even hatred are important; religion provides a simple instrument for stereotyping and demonizing opponents, and exhortations to violence acquire greater potency once framed in religious terms. Religion provides a legitimizing framework for violence that would otherwise be considered unacceptable (Falola, 1998). Given the desire of some to impose their faith on others or to fight any perceived imposition or discrimination, each group reacts to actions by the other with suspicions of hidden agendas and a sense of insecurity. For instance, while most Muslims regard Sharia as a legitimate application of their religious faith to their daily lives, many Christians read it as part of a plan to transform 88

Nigeria into an Islamic state, in which they would be reduced to second-class status, with consequences, for example, concerning access to land to build churches, (Joseph, 1992). As has been noted, doctrinal debates between Islamic groups have sometimes degenerated into violence. The conflicts and clashes between the Izala and the Sufi brotherhoods in the 1980s were directly the result of doctrinal disputes. Similarly, the Maitatsine uprising in 1980 was essentially a conflict within Islam. It is common to hear, when discussing such conflict in the region that the main cause is “ignorance” – of the peaceful precepts of different faiths, of the culture of a different community and so forth. It is widely believed, therefore, that better education, including religious and moral education, would reduce the number of people who can be manipulated to take part in violence, (Crisis Group interview, July 2009.). Others argue that religion is a cover for or a surface aspect of deeper antagonisms and that the factors causing and driving the conflicts transcend it to include a complex mix of history, political, economic, ethnic and other factors. It is a common refrain in discussing conflicts in the region that apparently religious tensions are in fact political, whether due to the restriction of political freedoms under military rule or the scheming of politicians since 1999. People feel that politicians are responsible for violence, either by using gangs of young men for political tuggery or by stirring up trouble in order to seek a payoff from federal authorities. The following is a typical view: “These elite only raise their voices when they lose out in the game of sharing power and resources among themselves. During President Obasanjo’s regime, if a northerner was sent packing from government, he quickly rushed home to hoodwink and manipulate youths to stage an armed conflict so that he could negotiate for yet another position in government”, (Crisis Group interview, political activist, Kano, July 2009.). An interlocutor argued that his state governor was creating trouble in order to shift public resources into a “security fund” so he did not have to account for their use, (Crisis Group interview, NGO leader, Kaduna, June 2009). Tensions and conflicts stirred up by politicians often take on religious or associated ethnic dimensions simply because these are society’s most visible lines of division, (Last, 2007). It is also important to consider not only the factors leading to conflict, but also those that contribute to escalation or continuation. These include irresponsible media reporting, (Crisis Group interview, Damaturu, July 2009), defensive and fearful attitudes towards other communities and the use of religious or ethnic conflict as a cover for criminality and looting. In addition, there is a reprisal cycle between communities, often in reaction to news of killings elsewhere. (Crisis Group interviews, academic, Zaria, July 2009; riot victim, Kaduna, June 2009.). Equally, the cycle of violence 89 is maintained by the failure of authorities to implement necessary measures, including providing promised compensation to victims. Some scholars have noted underlying tensions within Hausa-Fulani society, for example over control of land and taxes, (Pierce, 2006:902). These are difficult to identify, given the reluctance of that community to expose any divisions to the outside world, but it is reasonable to suppose that they may be a contributing factor in the radicalisation of some youth, who feel marginalised within Hausa-Fulani society. There are also long-running animosities between the dominant Hausa-Fulani and numerous minority groups. Grievances date back to slave raids under the Sokoto Caliphate, colonial indirect rule and continuing perceptions of marginalization among Christian minorities, exacerbated by an intensification of ethno-religious consciousness and identity in Nigeria since the late 1970s, (Mustapha, 1994). Environmental, demographic and economic factors also underlie these religious crises. The Sahelian drought of the 1970s-1980s and subsequent desertification have diminished grazing lands, ruined pastoral livelihoods and aggravated food and other insecurities, displacing many from the far north and from neighbouring countries such as Chad and Niger into a precarious existence in urban slums. These processes, accompanied by economic crisis since the 1980s, have swollen urban populations. Kano’s, estimated at 261,000 in 1964, and was 3.6 million in 2009, a fourteen- fold increase over 45 years. (Trevallion, 1966 & 2009). This predominantly poor and youthful population is prone to lawlessness and violence. Politics and religion have always been inextricably linked in the north, and recent political developments have affected religious coexistence. The expansion of the country’s political structure from three regions in 1960 to 36 states in 1996 undermined regionalism and reconfigured state-level coalitions. The smaller, predominantly Christian, ethnic groups began emerging as more significant political actors within their states. Threatened by this development, the ruling classes in the region began to explore new strategies for retaining their influence and control. In the far north, they fell back increasingly on religion “as a tool to forge a new hegemonic coalition”, and it became a major instrument for mobilising constituencies, sometimes violently (Jibrin, 1987:4). Sharia was meant to herald a corruption- free and more compassionate state, but many in the region now believe that the political establishment has become even more corrupt and uncaring than it was during the earlier era. Many youths conclude that the promises of Sharia will never be truly realised until it is implemented by religious rather than political authorities – in other words, after the installation of an Islamic state. This frequently leads them into conflict with established authorities. 90

External support to local religious organisations, seeking the allegiance of Africa’s largest Muslim and largest Christian communities, has intensified Christian-Muslim rivalries. Christian missions in the U.S. have invested considerably in evangelical work in Nigeria, including the far north. While leading U.S. evangelists have not recently been allowed to conduct revival programs there, they have offered training to local missionaries and sponsored the establishment of new churches. Saudi Arabia, Sudan, other Arab states and Iran, along with Islamic charities based in those countries, have also contributed substantial resources for propagating Islam in the region, or sometimes for empowering particular sects. The vast majority of this money is intended for normal charitable work or to cement the ties of Islamic brotherhood. However, its use is poorly monitored, and some has clearly found its way to people who preach division and intolerance. Some in the region are suspected of fostering and exaggerating differences between sects in order to keep international funds flowing. The prominent Hausa-language Islamist magazine Sakon Islam is sponsored by Muslim organisations in Iran. (Crisis Group interview, Muslim leader, Kaduna, July 2009). After the 1979 revolution, that country’s Shiite leadership sponsored many members of MSS, including El-Zakzaky, to travel there for religious training and offered the organization financial support, (Paden, 2002:4). In 1987, the Saudi government awarded the King Faisal International Prize to Gumi for his “services to Islam” (Loimeier, 1997:156). Actual links with international networks that propagate violence on the basis of religion are likely to be very few, and their importance is often exaggerated in both the southern Nigerian and international media. But international links and expressions of solidarity with groups engaged in conflicts elsewhere do fan the flames and are used by extremists to mobilise support. In the wake of the January 2010 clashes around Jos, the West African branch of al- Qaeda (AQIM), offered training and arms to Nigerian Muslims to help them fight the enemy, (AQIM Offers To Train And Arm Nigerian Muslims: SITE”, RTTnews online, 3 February 2010.Kaduna, June 2009). As discussed above, disillusionment with the implementation of Sharia is widespread. This has strengthened the lure of Islamic revolution, further encouraged by the influence of more radical Islamist doctrines from the Middle East. These had been gaining ground since the Iranian revolution but have attracted an even greater following since the U.S. government’s “war on terror”. In spite of the fact that Nigeria has been governed for most of its history by Muslims, many view it as aligned to the Western world and unable to advance Islamic interests. (Crisis Group focus group discussions, Muslim youth leaders, Kaduna, June 2000). For them, the government represents jahiliyya (ignorance) that will never allow for an Islamic state and therefore should be fought 91 in the same way the Usman dan Fodio waged the jihad against the Hausa kings. This sentiment is contributing significantly to the emergence of antiestablishment groups inclined to violence. (Crisis Group interview, Ismaila Mohammed, History Department, Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto, May 2010). Poverty as we have seen is considered as one major cause of religious crises in Nigeria. It cannot be doubted that Nigeria is naturally endowed with mineral resources and naturally blessed with fertile land that is good for both cash and food crops and it has high potentials for industrial and economic development. The discovery of crude oil is an additional advantage to the country and this serves as her major foreign exchange income. In spite of all these divine blessings, it is sad to note that the country is scored low in terms of Human Development. The 1998 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) states that in Nigeria, life expectancy is 52 years compared to 75 years in developed countries, while one-third of the people live not up to 40 years. Infant mortality is 79 out of 1000 births, compared to ten in developed countries, mortality rate of children under five years are stunted due to malnutrition; only 44 percent of adult population are literate; 49 and 70 percent, respectively, have no access to safe portable water in the urban and rural areas; 49 percent have no access to basic health facilities; and 48.5 percent live in poverty compared to 43 percent in 1985. Nwagwu (2009:224) quoting the National Bureau of Statistics (2007) noted the level of poverty in Nigeria as at the period 1980 to 2004. As at 1996, the poverty level in Nigeria was 65.6% while poverty population stood at 67.1 million. This reveals the extent of poverty incidence in the country. The Nigeria poverty assessment of 2007 notes that there have been five national poverty surveys between 1980 and 2004, while poverty, incidence has reduced from 65.6 percent in 1996 to between 51.6 and 54.7 in 2004, the number of poor people has increased significantly from about 67 million to 70 million people, using the absolute poverty index. World Bank Report (1999) also reveals that Nigeria’s Human Development Index (HDI) was only 0.416 percent, which placed the country among the 25 poorest nations in the world. The report also placed Nigeria’s life expectancy at birth at 51.7 years, while an infant mortality rate is 184 per 1,000 live births. The report stresses that no country can secure sustainable economic growth capable of reducing poverty incidence without healthy, well- nourished and well educated people. In terms of income poverty, Nigeria ranked 58 out of 88 developing countries. About 70.2 percent of the Nigerian population, according to that report, lives on an income of $1 (one US dollar) a day that is below the poverty line and the Human 92

Development Index Ranking places Nigeria in 148 position out of 173 countries of the world in its 2000 report (Amaka for Kids, 2007). Ibrahim (2008) also carried out a research on causes of ethno-religious crises in Kano State and discovered that poor economic base of the populace carried the highest percentage of 34.9%, while religious fundamentalism followed with 31.8%. The remote and immediate causes of the present security challenges in the country, to include among others: High level of poverty and illiteracy existing in the North-East; massive unemployment of youths, both skilled and unskilled; and existence of private militias that were established, funded and used by politicians and individuals and then dumped after having been trained to handle arms. Unemployment and underemployment is another factor. Unemployment is a perennial problem facing Nigeria right from the colonial era. The Federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity (2006), published the result of registered unemployed and vacancies in Nigeria between 1984 and 2004. From the report, the grand total of registered unemployed lower grade workers category from 1990 to 2001 was 257,313 jobless people; vacancies declared for the period stood at 20,160 out of which 4, 390 placements were made and 15,770 vacancies existed unfilled. This figure represented 78.224 per cent of the total vacancies declared for the period, while 21.776 per cent of the total vacancies declared for the period were filled. This reveals that 252,923 applicants were thrown back into the labour market. The government failed grossly to provide/create jobs for the people. The registered unemployed professionals and executives from 1999 to 2001 stood at 232,680 candidates and vacancies declared during the period were 287, while replacements made within the period were 188, leaving 99 vacancies unfilled. The 188 applicants recruited out of 232,492 candidates represented 0.080 per cent. 232, 680 candidates were thrown back into the labour market. The poverty alleviation programme has failed to provide jobs for jobless Nigerians (Nwagwu, 2009:227). Nigeria has a huge number of unemployed youth which the terrorist groups take advantage and recruit to perform this crime. ''An idle mind is the devil's workshop’ according to Boko haram chief their members just arrived from Somalia from training and they are scattered through the north for more attack. If these groups of people were gainfully employed would they leave their places of work to undergo such training? Despite wild claims by governments, less than 15% of qualified youths are employed either by the government or corporate organizations. Akinyode (2004:2) captures the employment condition thus: … the band of jobless graduates and psychologically assaulted 93 undergraduates, and the rising bellows of under-paid workers who have been forced to hawk their body for living … are clear indices of poverty. The Nation newspaper, quoted in Ayodele (2007:15), noted: The country’s social indicators had slipped to well below the average for developing countries, half the population lives in absolute poverty, life expectancy was only 52 years and the infant mortality rate was as high as 84 per 1,000 live birth,( Ayodele 2007:15).

To cap up the characterization of poverty in Nigeria, Attahiru Jega (2007:271) presented the matter in a picturesque form:

… 70% of Nigerians are said to be living in poverty that is earning an income of less than the equivalent of one US dollar a day. As if that is not enough, the evidence daily walks, and sleeps on our streets, manifested as an army of destitute, jobless and aimless beggars, mad persons and street urchins (Attahiru Jega, 2007:271).

Most members of the Boko Haram sect were young persons including Alamajiris (street children) who migrated from the rural areas to urban areas in search of better means of livelihood or to study under renowned Islamic teachers in Nigeria cities such as Kano, Zaria, Kaduna, Maiduguri, among others. Giving the prevalence of poverty and lack of employment opportunities in the cities, many end up taking part in religious conflict. It should also be noted that the leadership failure and corruption in Nigeria are at the root of the disenchantment that fuel violent behaviour amongst youths. The political elite have failed to judiciously utilize public resources to address some of the basic economic challenges in Nigeria, especially diseases, unemployment and poverty. Given high prevalence of youth poverty and unemployment, especially across the northern Nigeria, many Muslims are becoming increasingly skeptical about a system that has brought them little benefit and has served well the interests of the established political elite (Isaac, 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3155279.stm). The failure of the state to provide adequate economic and job opportunities for the vast majority of the population, has produced a frustrated and angry underclass of largely urban, unemployed youths. It is to this disempowered group that ambitious politicians and religious leaders look for support (Issac, 2004:15). It is easy therefore to appreciate how the Boko Haram provides the disenchanted with the platform to attack the system which they believe is largely responsible for their predicament. Hunger and Food Crises is another factor responsible for religious violence in Nigeria. Records in the Federal Office of Statistics indicate that about 65% of Nigeria’s 94 population is faced with severe food insecurity and hunger. Even before the world food crises, Nigeria had come under serious threat of food insecurity. United Nations Reports 1999 insist that even the food majority of Nigerians consumed came dismally below the required international diet standard. The pitiable way children and the youth struggle violently for food in public occasions bear eloquent testimony to the validity of this UN claim. To this therefore, most members of the Boko Haram who were hungry have no other alternative than dancing to the tune of the music of their sponsors for their lunch. Some times too, most of the members receive very small amount of money from the sponsors who then use them for their selfish interest. Hence, a hungry man they say is an angry man and he has to do anything including killing fellow human beings to survive once he is to be paid either in cash or kind. Albert (2005) considers the international dimensions of religious conflicts in Nigeria since the 1980s. In his work, he observed that some external forces used the loose security measure of the country to foment violence. He found out that Marwa, the brain behind the 1980 Maitatsine riot, was from Marwa village in Cameroun. He was said to have been deported to Cameroun in 1962 before sneaking back into the country in 1966. To substantiate this, Albert found out that about 185 of the followers of Marwa who were arrested and detained at Kano Central Prison and the Goron Dutse Prison in 1980 were non-Nigerians – 162 of them from Niger Republic, 16 from Chad Republic, 4 from Cameroun Republic, 2 from Mali Republic, and 1 from Burkina Faso.

Also, between July 2009 and the beginning of the 2010/2011 political season, all was calm from Boko Haram. In the build-up to the April general elections of this year, there was an intense series of power struggles between some political leaders from the North and President Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan was running for president on the Peoples Democratic Party, (PDP), platform, but some members of the party from the North reminded him that Yar’ Adua occupied only about 29 months out of the “rightful” eight years of the “turn of the North” in the party’s rotational presidency/zoning mechanism. When the President ignored this argument, first a Northern gang-up against his candidacy was contrived, but it failed to stop him at the PDP primaries. Majority of the North’s voters lined up behind General Muhammadu Buhari’s Congress for Progressive Change, CPC, for the presidential election which Jonathan won.

At the National Stakeholders Conference of the Northern Leaders Political Forum, NPLF, on December 16, 2010 attended by the who-is-who of the Forum, former Vice 95

President Atiku Abubakar and consensus candidate of the Malam Adamu Ciroma group threatened as follows: according to them, those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable.

It was after the conclusion of the PDP primaries in Abuja on Thursday, January 13, 2011 that the Boko Haram gradually resumed its gruesome comeback. It attacked police, military and security personnel and facilities in Maiduguri and environs. This intensified after Jonathan won the presidential election in April 2011 and in June the hit on police headquarters in Abuja prompted the ongoing military response. Unlike in the past when military expeditions quickly brought such menace to heel, the activities of the new Boko Haram have actually graduated to suicide attacks. (Vanguard, Mon 05 September, 2011).

Another reason responsible for religious crises in Nigeria is the wrong interpretation of the scripture by those who claim authority to the interpretation of the Holy Books and Holy Koran. If not so, one wonders why people act contrary to the teaching of the scriptures in matters pertaining to peaceful co-existence, unity and sanctity of life, and property. As it is a serious disease for an ignorance to claim authority to knowledge, many of the so called ‘religious leaders’ use their shallow knowledge to interpret the scripture to suit their selfish end banking on the ignorance of their followers. More over, lamenting on the wide gap between the teaching and practice of religion among its adherents, Adebayo (2003) identified some factors responsible for using religion as instrument of polarization, among which is leadership tussle, which also culminated in the proliferation of many denominations in the country.

3.10 Government’s Role to Religious Crisis in Nigeria The wanton destruction of lives and properties occasioned by incessant religious crises in the Nigerian nation call for urgent need to look into the issue of the crises and adopt strategies that can help to nib them in the bud and to prevent it from escalation if it erupts, as well as to sustain peace to avert future occurrence of crises and their attendant large scale effects. Suffice to state that though we do not have the option of staying out of conflicts as human beings, unless we stay out of relationship, family, work and community, all we need to do is to imbibe conflict management strategies and sharpen our crises management skills so that we can interact meaningfully with one another. In the words of Schmid, (2000), conflict management interference is an ongoing conflict process in such a way as to contain and, if possible, reduce the level of violence and 96 destruction, prevent the vertical escalation towards the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), prevent the horizontal expansion into other areas Crisis management according to him refers to the coordinated and timely application of political, economic military, and or security measures taken in response to a situation threatening peace, with the aim of defusing the tensed situation, preventing escalation, or achieving a peaceful settlement of a dispute. Successive Nigerian governments have managed religious crises in different but coercive and unconstructive ways. For instance, Abacha’s administration used police and military to resolve Ife- Modakeke crises in 1997, but all to no avail until peaceful intervention of United States Agency for International Development/Office of International Initiatives (USAID/OTI). Soldiers were also drafted in 1999 to quell the Arogbo Ijaw-Ugbo Ilaje crises by Obasanjo’s administration. The same administration, in its bids to settle and resolve Niger-Delta crises sent Military Joint Task Force (JTF) to the area with ideological slogan - ‘Operation Restore Hope’, in order to win legitimacy. Also, in most of the religious and tribal clashes, soldiers had been drifted to such areas in order to quench crises and restore ‘peace’, little or no attention was paid to restore permanent peace between and among the concerned groups after temporary peace was restored (Albert, 2003). All the coercive interventionist strategies employed to solve the myriad socio-political religious crises in Nigeria have yielded next to no achievements. It was only the administration of late Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua the former President of Nigeria- that looked the other way and employed alternative dispute resolution spectrum to resolve Niger- Delta crises, the crises that have become phenomenal albatross round the neck of Nigeria. He took determined and strategic steps to resolve the problem once and for all. He created Niger Delta Ministry and granted amnesty to the Niger Delta Militants. This has greatly yielded a lot of results, and peace is gradually returning into the region. To this end, government of every level should be charged to imbibe positive styles of containing religious crises in Nigeria. These will go a long way to achieving everlasting peace and stability in the country. The Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone, which was set up following the bomb attacks by the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, were in their final report, asking President Goodluck Jonathan to consider the grant of amnesty to members of the sect wishing to surrender their arms to the Federal government, (Vanguard, Friday 30 September, 2011:7). The committee submitted its report on a day the security agencies commenced manhunt for suspected Boko Haram members who may have sneaked into Abuja to carry out suicide bomb attack on a national asset to dent the nation’s 51st Independence anniversary celebrations. 97

The Federal Government panel headed by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari, recommended that the Federal Government should fundamentally, consider the option of dialogue and negotiation which should be contingent upon the renunciation of all forms of violence and surrender of arms to be followed by rehabilitation. The committee also told Vice President Namadi Sambo, who received the final report on behalf of President Jonathan that the Jaamatus Ahlus Sunnah Lid Daawatis Wal Jihad, aka Boko Haram, has nominated the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Sa’ad Abubakar III or his representative; the Emir of Bauchi and Sheik Abubakar Gero Argungu, as its representatives in any federal government team that will negotiate with its members, (Vanguard, Friday 30 September, 2011:8). Following the attack on UN House in Abuja by Boko Haram on August 26 this year which claimed 23 lives, spokesman of the group, Abu Kakah accused the Federal Government of insincerity in dialoguing with the group, saying the only condition they would accept to talk with government was unconditional release of all their members whom, he said, are in prisons all over the country. Claiming responsibility for the UN House attack as well as the failed suicide attack on Borno police command headquarters and the attack on banks in Gombi, Adamawa State which left more than 16 people dead the spokesman of the group said they had not been contacted by Borno State Government and the Federal Government or their representatives for dialogue, (Vanguard, Friday 30 September, 2011:8). The panel which had earlier submitted its preliminary report to the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Senator Pius Anyim Pius, said: Government may consider constituting another committee with wider powers and with increased membership to handle the assignment within a reasonable timeframe but not weeks as was given to this committee. The committee which said it had interacted with various stakeholders, including the governors of Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Niger and Sokoto states and the Sultan of Sokoto among other traditional rulers, also urged the Federal Government to diversify and strengthen its means of creating avenues for international intelligence sharing and inter-agency cooperation through diplomatic channels/pacts. He added that; the Federal Government should create an informal forum at the highest level, where Mr. President will discuss national security issues with governors and other major stakeholders from time to time. Again, there is an urgent need for arranging an informal forum where Mr. President will grant audience to each state governor on one-to-one basis where issues on security, could be addressed, (Vanguard, 30 September, 2011:7). The panel remarked that on the part of the security forces there are palpable operational lapses, service rivalry, underfunding, under-equipment and lack of collaboration; 98 while governments have failed to deliver justice and bring immediate relief to victims of the crises. Also cited as a major discovery by the panel is the general failure of effective and coordinated intelligence gathering and its deployment to forestall events with undesirable consequences; stressing that in this direction, there is no high level security network/forum (outside the statutory national security institutions) that will enable an informal meeting between Mr. President and the governors as well as other top level security stakeholders. Receiving the report from the committee members, Vice President Sambo who was joined by the National Security Adviser, General Andrew Azazi, the SGF, and Speaker of the House of Representatives, Alhaji Aminu Tambuwal, promised to implement the recommendations as contained in the report. The Vice President, while commending the committee for a job well done, said that some of the major issues you have stated regarding the issues of poverty, unemployment, breach of the peace and the existence of private militia are issues that this administration is looking at seriously, (Vanguard, September 30, 2011:7). Sambo explained that it was for this purpose that the government had in the 2011 budget, made available a large sum of money to tackle unemployment, stating that the issue of inadequate power supply which government was addressing squarely was central to job creation. Following substantiated intelligence reports that the Boko Haram sect had concluded arrangements to carry out a suicide bombing inside the federal capital territory by hitting at a National Asset to dent the nation’s 51st independence anniversary celebrations, topmost security organizations in the seat of power have commenced a manhunt for adherents of the group who may have sneaked into Abuja. Towards this end, The Nation, learnt that more than 40 persons suspected of having links with the group, amongst them, some foreign nationals from Niger, were at the weekend arrested by a combined team of military police and military intelligence personnel attached to the Guards Brigade at Dei-Dei, a district located on the Kubwa- Suleija-Kaduna axis of the FCT, (The Nation, September 27, 2011:7). It was gathered that the operation to round up suspects of the Boko Haram group which is termed ‘top priority’ by the security agencies, is being spearheaded by the Army Headquarters Garrison, the Military Intelligence, while all the battalions under the Guards Brigade have been put on a 24-hour alert at all the entry points into the FCT to ensure the sect members did not find their way into the FCT. The manhunt it was further gathered, has led to the Nigeria Police deploying scores of plain clothes police officers into the city and the same action is being taken by the SSS and areas mapped out for possible infiltration, like Suleija, Zuba, Dei- Dei, Mararaba, Keffi, Nyanya, Gwagwalada, Kwali, Abaji are being closely monitored. 99

Bauchi State Governor Isa Yuguda has said the Boko Haram sect has two groups: the one that distorts the teaching of Islam and another that is a band of criminals. The governor said the latter is out to destroy the country for selfish reasons. This is coming on the heels of efforts by the Federal Government to unmask those behind the sect, whose name means “Western education is sacrilege”. Yuguda spoke in Umuahia, the Abia State capital, after accompanying Governor Theodore Orji to the funeral of the former auditor of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Chief San Igwe Eke, in Alayi, Bende Local Government Area, (The Nation, September 27,2011:7). The governor said the Federal Government would bring those behind the group to justice. He said: I want to use this medium to educate our people about Boko Haram. They are categorized into two different groups. The real one is not after killing people, but focused on the distortion of the real teachings of Islam. It has a different agenda from the other group. The other, which calls itself Boko Haram, comprises criminals. Its members kill, bomb places, loot, burn police stations in the North. I want to associate their activities to, maybe, the massive unemployment in the country. But the Islamic sect that calls itself Boko Haram has distorted Islamic teachings and the preaching of Prophet Mohammad, as contained in the Holy Qur’an. I think it needs to be corrected, and the system is doing its best to do the correction. For those criminals who bomb others, we will make sure they are brought to book. Boko, in Hausa, means “learning in Western education”, but you can educate yourself using the Arabic language; Haram means “forbidden”. So, it means the sect is fighting those who learn in English language. But if they are actually fighting those who learn in English language, why are they not bombing schools? If they are fighting Western education, why are they now bombing police stations? For those criminals, we will take care of them, because they are into criminal activities. But for those who are in a sect and are trying to misinterpret the Qur’an, they can always be corrected. As long as they don’t want to be corrected, and to the extent that they are not carrying weapons and attacking people, the Constitution provides for freedom of worship. Yuguda (The Nation, September 27, 2011:6).

Yuguda called for proper equipment for the nation’s security agencies to ensure the safety of everyone. The governor noted that security is the key to human survival and accelerated development of the country and the citizens,

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CHAPTER FOUR THE IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 4.1 The Political and Economic Implications of Boko Haram Sect It is an undeniable fact that a nation that witnesses religious crises almost on an annual basis could not be said to be stable both politically and economically. The problem of Boko Haram is no longer annually but daily. This religious crises has dichotomized the country’s armed forces, is said to have been responsible for the bombings, killings that have persisted since 2009 leaving thousands of lives dead including soldiers and civilians that would have done the country proud (Ajimotokin, 2009). In essence, religious crises breed unstable governments, which is very inimical to sustainable development. Nigeria today is a country ravaged by want and laid comatose by all manner of needs, personal and communal. Most observers have noticed the steep decline in the nation’s economic fortune. For example, according to a survey carried out for the London- based Magazine Africa Today, over 45 percent of Nigerians now live below the poverty line. About 65 percent of them belong to the core poor group. Furthermore, per capita income has been on a steady decline. In 1980 it was more than $1,000 but declined to $320 in 1992. In 1994, it was $200. Nigeria of 1996 was ranked 137 on the human development index compiled annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and it is the 13 th poorest nation in the world (Akinrinade, 1996:14). Boko Haram has a contributory factor in further weakening the already poor economy of the Nation. The incessant riots that are the hallmarks of most of the activities of Boko Haram, more often than not, expose the valuable assets, human and material, of the nation to destruction. There was also higher increase in crime rate as banks, markets e.t.c were looted. The economic costs of Boko Haram violence range from lives and property destroyed to other issues such as monies expended in putting down the rioting, probe panels to unravel causes, reconstruction/ rehabilitation, compensation to victims, and loss of investment funds because of the adverse repercussions on the investment climate. Loss of Human Resources It does not need a specialist, one dares to hope, to point out that one of a nation’s most valuable assets is its human resource which can be harnessed for developmental purposes. Where this resource is decimated for any reasons, the nation is the poorer for it. For instance, the fear in the imposition of curfew brings every economic activity to a halt as it becomes difficult to move freely from place to place. The whole area of crisis, therefore, becomes desolated and remains a ghost city until normalcy is reinstated. 101

This was seen when the Joint Task Force took over Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State; Yobe, Plateau and Niger states. Since no economic development could take place in an atmosphere of fear, anarchy, and insecurity, it, therefore, implies that Boko Haram crises has become a bane to economic sustainability. Looking at it internationally, incessant violence of Boko Haram has added to the fear foreign investors are having of Nigeria. Cases of bombings by Boko Haram in the North are no more news. One wonders how foreign investors could decide to establish in the ‘war zone.’ Apart from the fact that the image of Nigeria has been dented globally as a country which breeds social miscreant and criminals, Nigerians have also become the first suspects in any scene of terrorism. They are also exposed to thorough screening before they are allowed to enter other countries. In Nigeria, it is on record that thousands have lost their lives as a result of religious violence, particularly, since the instruction of Islam and Christianity. Thus, all that one can say for sure is that the costs in terms of lives lost cannot be adequately quantified as most of the victims are not on record. Thousands of families are displaced and innocent citizens suffered untold hardship. The situation is not much different in contemporary times. Since the 1980s the incidents of religious violence have been on the increase, and the casualty figures on the upward swing; but no definite figure can be established because officialdom suppresses information in the attempt to minimize what happened so as not to cause panic among the populace. But even among the survivors, dislocation of affected persons and attendant trauma tend to cause a slowdown in productivity. The use of bombs by the Boko Haram sect has increased the number of casualties between 2009 and 2011. In 2009, More than 500 members of the sect were killed by government security forces in Borno. In Bauchi state, 41 persons including a soldier and a police officer lost their lives while in Yobe state 43 persons lost their lives with greater casualty on the sect. By the time the violence was contained, between 1,000 and 1, 400 people have lost their lives with inestimable damages to properties. The sect was said to have used propelled grenades, locally produced bombs and AK 47 riffles in carrying out the attacks. A certain Abdulrasheed Abdullahi confessed to the police that he and another member of the group were sent to Afghanistan to train in the art of bomb and explosive making devices (This Day, Thursday, September 3, 2009:1). Nowdays Boko Haram goes into churches and other places of worships to kill and bomb the worshippers. For example, some figures can help in illustrating some recorded casualties of death in Boko Haram crisis.

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Fig.3.1: people killed by Boko Haram Sect

The latest fighting has left scores of people dead [Reuters] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/nigeria-boko-haram-islamist-sect. Retrieved 2009- 08-06.

Fig. 3.2: another group killed on an attack

Source: Reuters Nigeria forces kill 32 after station attack

Loss of Material Resources Boko Haram, the militant Islamist sect responsible for the death of at least 800 individuals in northern Nigeria during a series of attacks in late July 2009. Its attack began in Bauchi State and soon spread violence across other predominantly Muslim states, forcing 4000 to flee their homes, according to officials. In addition to the deaths, businesses, homes and churches were burnt in the process (Daily Sun, Wednesday, August 5, 2009:6) Nearly every episode of religious violence has been accompanied by wanton damage to property, at times including government establishment, churches looting of shops, and arson. The cost of property destroyed or lost runs, in the aggregate, into millions of Naira. This is closely followed by the staggering costs entailed in mobilizing security forces to quell the riots, compensation for the riot victims, reconstruction, rehabilitation, commissions of 103 inquiry, etc. The Boko Haram activity is no exception and has caused more havoc than the precedents. Incessant religious violence is akin to having a society in a state of war. The war zone situation engendered by incessant religious violence of Boko Haram Sect is particularly debilitating to economic development as no meaningful development project could really thrive under such circumstances. In addition, it discourages economic growth in the sense of industrialization and modernization as it causes foreign capital flight since no businessman or individual wants to invest where the safety of their investment is not guaranteed. What is more by local business always fleeing from areas of high religious violence, like Bauchi, Borno, Niger, Yobe etc. of Northern Nigeria, a corresponding local flight (or dispersal) of capital has occurred denying the region and indeed the entire country the economic development that, is sure to kick-off from concentrated economic activities in an area. The disruptive effects of religious violence of Boko Haram also means that small and medium scale Enterprise (SMEs), which are reputed to be behind economic development in most rising post-colonial societies, would be discouraged from localizing, hence stimulating economic development. There are those that are very content to hold the north back in terms of economic development. By ensuring that the region is a hot spot for religious fighting, investment is guaranteed to stay away, depriving the region and the nation of the opportunity to improve conditions. Such concerted efforts by certain interests to take advantage of situations that will propel Nigeria on an international stage must be prevented. Particularly, as the nation has publicly pledged to 'rebrand' itself and become a top 20 economy by 2020. Further more, the financial cost of incessant religious violence means that local and national governments have to divert scarce resources that could have served social and economic developmental purposes into rebuilding burnt down and destroyed property as well as the provision of aids to victims of religious violence. Religious violence, above all, implies the abuse of religion. More so, it will cost the government millions of naira or dollars to put in place numerous amenities which were destroyed during this Boko Haram crises. The Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone, which was set up following the bomb attacks by the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, advised President Goodluck Jonathan to pay compensation to schools, churches, mosques, markets to people whose properties were damaged in the crisis. Resources, which could have been used to improve these amenities and embark on other developmental projects, would have to be used on restructuring and replacing what had been damaged during the crises. In most cases, government is to compensate victims of these crises and this gulped millions of naira, which could have been 104 used for other developmental projects. Incessant crises are also inimical to sustainable economic development of the nation. This is because, apart from the fact that many virile men of the nation are seriously affected in the Boko Haram crises which consequently led to their death, the country’s source of revenue is equally affected. Many Nigerians strongly hold, not unreasonably, that the funds so dissipated could be better invested or utilized in other beneficial pursuits- such as provision of essential amenities, at least those for which the churches have been traditionally noted for providing education, health services, potable water, etc. with better returns. Some of the material losses are many as fig. 3.3 shows a car burnt down during the crackdown on Boko Haram in Kano. Fig.3.3: Car and building damaged by the Boko Haram Sect

Photo: Aminu Abubakar/IRIN A car that was burned during the crackdown on Boko Haram KANO, 18 July 2011 (IRIN). Adverse Repercussions on the Investment Climate It is no longer news that the Euro- American would never tries of treating African countries as a “special case”. So while she continues to invest in Israel, South Africa and India, to mention only a few countries known for instability greater than obtains in Africa, she continues to threaten African countries as a matter of routine. For example, Lewis Preston, a one time President of the World Bank, warned in 1992 that sub-Saharan African countries would not attract more investment unless they demonstrated that their economies were well managed, and that they were politically stable (New Nigeria, 1995:12). About three years later Andrew Young, one time United States Representative at the United Nations in the Presidency of Jimmy Carter would warn in an article on Nigeria that “private wealth, markets, and management will not risk investing significant funds in turbulent territory” (Young, 1995:9). The negative publicity associated with Boko Haram activities in recent time plays into the hands of the country’s detractors who can now paint the country as on the boil and therefore unsafe for foreign investors and tourists alike. Also, local investors are scared of putting money into the troubled areas for fear of loss in times of religious rioting. The bottom line is that religious violence acts as an incentive to capital flight. 105

From all the foregoing, it should be quite clear that Boko Haram violence has deleterious effects on all strata of the society. It is therefore bad enough. But the worst form or manifestation of this violence is structural, that which alienates Nigerians from their own country by a mode of religious manipulation which intimately binds its adherents to the Vatican in Rome, Canterbury in England, Mecca in Saudi Arabia, ands various cities of the USA, than it binds them to the Nigerian State or compatriots. A developing country needs organized religion, but it also needs self-sustained development and liberation from all forms of imperialism. Except where organized religion in Nigeria has allied itself with functional education, its theory has failed to remedy the dependence of the poor on the rich and of Nigeria on Western and Eastern industrial economies. What is more, the authority of the Nigeria State over its citizens is already questionable enough – witness the rampant disregard for constituted authority and the recourse to violence at the slightest provocation by individuals and groups. This has been highlighted by at least one commentator on Nigerian affairs who states that by far the most alarming aspect of the current crisis is the growing recourse to violence by those who have become convinced that no useful contribution to the resolution of their problems can be expected from government institutions and centers of decision, and who feel that they have nothing left to lose. Politically, the late Nigerian sage, Chief Obafemi Awolowo pointed out in 1947 that Nigeria was not a nation but a mere geographical expression (Awolowo, 1947:47). He was drawing attention to the need to build a nation out of the disparate entitles put together by British imperial machinations. Over three decades later an observer would state categorically the following in respect of the African continent of which Nigeria forms a part. Virtually no nation- state yet exists in Africa. The continental political systems are at different stages of evolution toward becoming, or possibly failing to become viable nation- states. Almost none of the 50- old African countries possess the degree of homogeneity that would facilitate, conflict – free national integration (Legume, 1980:13). Also, the menace of Boko Haram has done the nation much harm. It has led to the current political instability and insecurity both in the states and at the national level. As I have tried to show all along, Nigeria is now, much violence. The situation is so bad that it is causing a lot of concern among well- meaning Nigerians and foreign sympathizers. Many highly- placed Nigerians have made no secret of their view that the political future of Nigeria, by which they mean her very existence as a single political entity, depends very much on the 106 way nagging religious problems, with their horrifying political implications are disposed of (Ubah, 1987:7). Religious bigotry quite often accompanied by violence has become a cankerworm that is hindering the effective political development and unification of Nigeria. Instead of religion to build, it now destroys. Instead of religion to bind, it is now tearing people apart. It has broken the fragile consensus and unleashed centrifugal forces which tend to undermine efforts at nation- building and the development of a coherent and enduring national identity. These menaces (religious crises) have become a very big embarrassment to Nigeria and her citizens. In November 2002, riots from some Moslem youths that were opposed to Miss World contest in Abuja led to its cancellation and subsequent relocation of the show to London. About 100 people lost their lives in that incident. Ironically, a lady from Turkey (a Moslem country) won the contest in London. All these religious disturbances run contrary to all “efforts” of the federal government to boost tourism. The talk of attracting foreign investors in the face of regular religious mayhem might be a total waste of energy and resources. Local investors are even tired of the instabilities in the Northern Nigeria. I know a number of Ibo business people that have relocated completely to the Owerri, Onitsha, Aba, Lagos etc due to these riots. Many have completely lost their means of livelihood. Remember, a single religious crisis will have a negative multiplier effects on other sectors of the economy. Some people might become armed robbers when their means of livelihoods are destroyed. Many innocent non-Moslems pay costly prices for these religious crises. On the other hand, as Claude Welch (Jnr) has pointed out, heightened religious sensitivities in Nigeria, with the danger of polarizing Muslims and Christians, represent a far more serious long term challenge to democratization (Welch, 1990:15). What is involved here is underscored by two different incidents. First, in the wake of the sharia debates (1978 and 1988) some elements of the political class suggested that maybe Nigeria should begin to think of the confederal option since the impasse seemed unbreakable. Second, on April 22, 1990, an army officer, Major Gideon Orkar attempted to topple the government of the day. He claimed at the time that he was doing it on behalf of the Christian northern minorities and people of the South. What noble Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka had to say on the incident is quite instructive. “I believe that the nation is about to be compelled to take stock of itself in a most painful way, to understand finally that religious aggressiveness can only engender the same response in other religions, and that the nature and the extent of such responses belong totally in the territory of the unpredictable, and irrational” (Wole, 1990:17). 107

There is reason to hold that government is very worried about the security implications of the new waves of violence especially during periods Boko Haram is terrorizing the country. The active progress towards real democracy and political transformation is being seriously delayed by religious conflicts which, as indicated above, quite often are marked by a high intensity of violence. The Boko Haram sect on many occasions has vowed to make this country ungovernable until the Sharia is implemented in Nigeria. Abuse of religion is also evident in the wanton politicization of religion and mixing up of religion with state in some cases in Nigeria. This hampers religious freedom for all religious groups and appears antithetical to Nigeria’s avowed secularity. Indeed, when religious unrest casts its shadow on the Nigerian state, Nigeria’s federal arrangement appears to be terribly bruised as Elaigwu (1993:17) tries to demonstrate in this report on the Northern Nigerian Muslim/Christian religious violence of the 1980s: The burning of Churches raised new issues of the federal association of Nigerians to the fundamentalist Muslims, by building their worship houses in predominantly Muslim areas, the Christians were being insensitive to their hosts to the Christians. It was not clear what constituted their rights if they could not have places of worship where they lived. They further argued that as Nigerian citizens, they had the right to apply for land and legitimately build their places of worship. The Christians felt incensed that in many of the areas in which the atrocities were built in adjacent plots of land. It is important to remember that most of the churches were built by people who were regarded as non-indigenes, and therefore ‘strangers’ in Kano. Often their economic activities and their operation in the modernized sectors of the society had generated negative feelings against … (Elaigwu 1993:17). It is obvious from the foregoing that in addition to the threats posed to Nigerian federalism by Boko Haram Sect; it has invariably breeds ethnic violence and ethnic chauvinism. This clearly militates against an integration of the ethnic nationalities in Nigeria into one people especially as politicians easily deploy religion as a tool for mass mobilization in which they mask the political nature of their struggle for power. But above all these, this state of affairs portend unimaginable grave implications for the future development of Nigeria as the future generations of Nigerians at very early ages are being socialized into a culture of religious violence and ethnic chauvinism. Their minds are being underdeveloped in very grievous ways. Socially, Nigerians continue to count the cost and feel the pains of Boko Haram violence. Religious fanaticism, bigotry and violence have become an obstacle to the achievement of social harmony and interaction. It is gradually destroying the country’s social 108 fabric, the basis of trust and mutual respect. It has weakened the very foundation of Nigeria’s socio- cultural existence; it has led to divisions in homes and places of work; and has caused death and destruction on fellow countrymen. The activities of Boko Haram have become a fear- inducing phenomenon among Nigerians, particularly, but not only, among southerners living, or going to do business in the northern states. This is much more so since rioters under the influence of agglomeration extend their brutal action to innocent bystanders who have neither challenged nor obstructed the teachings of any religion, nor provoked the rioters in any way. Without doubt, Boko Haram crisis has contributed in no small way to the social anomie which has characterized Nigerian national life for so long without any end in sight.

4.2 Boko Haram and Joint Task Force (JTF) In other to maintain peace, security and development, the state cannot accept any wanton violence against citizens. The breakdown of law and order in Maiduguri leading to the deployment of the military in internal operations in Borno State through the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) then becomes an option for the government to quill the violence. Following this, state of emergency was declared in Borno, Niger, Yobe and plateau states. The way in which the JTF operate can improve or exacerbate the situation. Hence, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in collaboration with the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) held a roundtable in Abuja on the issue. The participants noted that the activities of the Nigerian military deployed to Maiduguri have failed to bring the deteriorating human security situation under control but appear rather to have made matters worse. The rules of engagement of the military operation are, at best, unclear or not at all enforced by the High Command. As a result, Maiduguri has become the site of a growing military campaign characterised by credible allegations of mass extra-judicial killings, rape, and destruction of private property and intimidation of the civil populace, which deserve to be diligently investigated and documented. Two wrongs cannot make a right. While the prevailing insecurity in Maiduguri makes it difficult to withdraw the JTF, the behaviour of the military in the area must improve so that the conditions of moving towards pacification and co-operation by the community can be created. In all military operations, truth is the first victim. Public commentators and journalists have been silenced or forced out of Maiduguri by threats and action of Boko Haram, security forces, and the state government. It is important that the people living through the conflict ravaged city find their voice and recount the narratives of their lived reality. It is in this 109 context that the presidential committee offers an important opportunity. The problems posed by Boko Haram are political and cultural and cannot be resolved through a military operation alone. Our democracy can only suffer from the militarisation of internal security. While the reported excesses of the JTF have given us cause for concern, it is clear that no other alternative has been proposed. To address the concerns that have arisen, participants at the roundtable called on the military authorities to establish clear rules of engagement, ensure proper training of all personnel in these rules, establish effective command, diligently investigate all allegations of violations of the host community, and activate the relevant processes of the law to punish law enforcement or internal security personnel implicated in violations of the civilian population. 4.3 Boko Haram and Amnesty Offer To resolve the Boko Haram crisis, many concerned citizens have volunteered divergent opinions. Some are urging the Federal Government to adopt the amnesty option by inviting those who feel aggrieved to the roundtable, with the ultimate aim of pacifying such individuals. But others disagree and asked the government to pick up the stick and whip sense into the heads of the perpetrators instead. The proposal for an amnesty deal with Boko Haram by the Federal Government has elicited divergent but particularly dissenting views from Nigerians. The Federal Government held out the olive branch to the outlawed Muslim fundamentalist sect, Boko Haram, by proposing an amnesty deal with it Amaku, (The Nation, Saturday. 18 June, 2011). A precursor to this came, in May, from Borno State governor, Alhaji Kashim Shettima, shortly after being elected governor of the state where the Islamic sect is based and where a great deal of assaults against politicians, Muslim leaders, security forces, government institutions, churches and mosques have been carried out in last two years. Shettima explained that the amnesty programme, explicitly modelled on aspects of the amnesty programme offered to militants in the Niger Delta region would involve “inviting Boko Haram to a negotiation table as soon as we are in office to find out from them what their problems are and find solutions to them.” The idea of an amnesty instantly generated a debate, even as Shettima expressed optimism that a temporary peace would create the conditions for a lasting redress of grievances and the prevention of further violence (http://saharareporters.com/article/boko-haram-even-bombings-there-no-alternative- dialogue). Surprisingly, the sect called the bluff of the offer. The spokesman of the sect, Abu Dardam, in a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Hausa programme monitored in the 110 state capital, Maiduguri, stressed that their reason for not accepting the amnesty was that they don’t recognise democracy as a form of government and had no regard for the Nigerian Constitution.

The sect, in a statement written in Hausa, and entitled: Conditions for dialogue with President Goodluck Jonathan and Governor Kashim Shettima, sought for strict implementation of Sharia Islamic law in the Muslim-dominated states of the North and immediate release of all members of the sect detained in Borno and other northern states. According to the sect, for peace to return to Borno, certain individuals must be prosecuted according to Islamic law for the killing of their leader, Sheikh Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. They included the immediate past governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff, and some prominent leaders in the North. The amnesty deal proposed by the governor however received knocks from critics who were of the opinion that it was borne out of fear (of insecurity) and is only more expedient in saving his head than providing a short-time solution to the problem.

The talk of an amnesty deal with the Boko Haram, even while Nigerians are still appraising the Niger Delta amnesty deal struck two years ago, has raised more doubts than hopes about a successful truce with the dreaded religious sect. Considering the timing of the Boko Haram attacks a month after the Niger Delta amnesty deal one would be led to assume that they want the same kind of attention given to the Niger Delta region to be given to them. However, experts are of the view that the Niger Delta struggle and the Boko Haram uprising are not two of a kind. While one is purely an economic emancipation hinged on resource control that can be assuaged by financial inducement and economic empowerment, the other, Boko Haram, is ideological a struggle for the emancipation of the mind which cannot be politically, financially or materially conciliated.

Apparently, the Federal Government, getting Boko Haram to backtrack on their earlier stance and embrace an amnesty deal is a tall order, in the views of analysts and social commentators, considering the ideology that propels it. The ideology and philosophy of the movement are contained in the interpretation of the words- ‘Boko’ and ‘Haram.’ ‘Boko’ in Hausa language, meaning western, and ‘Haram’ meaning forbidden. Thus, the desire of the group is to replace modern state formation founded on western civilisation with the traditional Islamic state, because, in their view, western values conflict with Islamic values. 111

A lecturer in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Ibadan, Dr. Nathaniel Danjibo, in a chat with Saturday Tribune, questioned the rationale behind the amnesty deal. Well, a lot of people may have some hopes thinking that if you grant amnesty, perhaps we will be attending to the crisis, but if we look at it, these are two different issues; we cannot really equate the Boko Haram with the crisis in the Niger Delta. One is ideological, Boko Haram, for example, which is the fallout of religious sectarianism in Islam, the other was resource-based here, people struggled for change in their environment, improved standard of living, and so they took up arms against the state supposedly to call the attention of government to the Niger Delta plight. Of course, amnesty for Niger Delta worked, but I have serious doubts about amnesty for Boko Haram working. Boko Haram is against modern institution, government institutions, the police, the prison, bureaucracy; they see them as sources of corruption. These institutions run contrary to their Islamic principles. He maintained that;

If it is very ideological, it will be very difficult to convince them, and asking them to come and embrace an amnesty- amnesty from a state they do not recognise. This is unlike the Niger Delta crisis where there is a recognition of a state that has underdeveloped the region. So, you can see that in terms of engagement they are different, let us first all look at the issues on ground. What is Boko Haram agitating for? If we are asking them to embrace amnesty, are we now saying that Nigerians should embrace Islamic principles because we want to give amnesty to Boko Haram or declare a sharia state in the country or the North, or to say we no longer want to go with civil rule so as to appease the Islamic fundamentalists and be guided by Islamic principles? It is very difficult, as far as I am concerned, (Danjibo Vanguard, 22 August, 2011:8).

He also blamed the lingering crisis on the lack of political will.

There is no situation in which a sect can be more powerful than a state or government. What we lack is the political will to contain sectarian violence. Boko Haram is too small to hold Nigeria to ransom. But government is always so enfeebled when it comes to the issues of religion. Because the president is a Christian, he becomes so enfeebled so that people will not say that is why he did so. The truth however is that if President Jonathan takes any drastic action there will be a sharp reaction in the North, (Danjibo Vanguard, 22 August 2011:8).

Moreover, some analysts believe that if the process of evolving legislation on a crime like terrorism will be too cumbersome, an amnesty deal becomes expedient. This was the submission made by a lecturer in the Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan, Barrister Segun Onakoya, when Saturday Tribune sought his views on the issue. 112

Laws are made for men. The legislation available may not be sufficient to take care of certain situations exceptional ones like when a nation finds itself in crisis and all solutions being advanced legally. If those measures are not yielding positive results, then it will not be out of place to think of other ways out, and some of these ways may be amnesty, possibly we talk of adopting diplomatic or political solution to the problem. At the end of the day what matters is you are looking forward to the problem not continuing. There are situations where you will discover that there is a vacuum, a situation whereby you look through law book and find out that there is no law regulating a particular situation. So, in such a situation it behoves on the government, is it executive or even the legislative arm of government, to seek way out of that particular logjam that is talking about immediate solution to the problem. When this kind of thing happens, you look for immediate solution before you start talking of a long-term solution. When there is critical situation anywhere, it is good to first seek immediate solution after which we’ll start talking about long-term solution, Onakoya, (Tribune, 27 August, 2011:40)

According to Onakoya;

We are not operating under a military regime where one man will be ruling by decree. We are talking about a situation whereby a bill will have to be passed and you know the stages a bill passes in the National Assembly, and we have two houses, both will have to pass the bill before you get the presidential assent; before you go through the whole process, the crisis might even escalate. It is not every situation that a state of emergency is declared; that is why we believe that it is better to grant an amnesty instead of declaring a state of emergency. There are exceptional situations that must arise before you can grant amnesty. If there aren’t and the law can take care of it and effectively deal with the issue there is no need talking about amnesty, Onakoya, (The Nation, September, 2011:7)

Like many observers of the issue, Barrister Onakoya cautioned that an amnesty deal should not be seen as circumventing the law, noting that “such administrative position complements the position of the law.” (The Nation, September, 2011:7). He however warned that granting amnesty indiscriminately could be abusive and it could see the society drifting towards a lawless one.

4.4 Governments Role to the Prospects of Internal Peace and Security At the security level, the response of public authorities is habitually too late and far too heavy handed. Typically, the police initially keep out of communal riots, worried about their limited ability to manage crowds and about potential hostility toward them. As things deteriorate, and calls for a response grow, police and army are thrown at the problem. They frequently arrest many hundreds of rioters (or just members of the public they can round up), 113 who may spend several weeks in appalling prison conditions before being released. Very few if any are formally prosecuted. These responses generally clear the immediate trouble but at the expense of longer-term management of the issues. A heavy-handed response is particularly ill-suited to deal with the radical fringe problem. The killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, along with several others linked to his organisation, has provided those who took over the group with a valuable recruitment tool. In the words of an observer, Yusuf’s killing has now made his followers to see him as a martyr of Islam.... Many of them now look forward to dying in similar manner as their leader, and this may heighten insecurity in the society. Members of Boko Haram said they would avenge the extrajudicial killing of their leader “even if it takes one hundred years” (Crisis Group interviews, members of Boko Haram, Bauchi, June 2010).The Boko Haram violence of 2009- 2011, when the radical Islamic sect took over large parts of Maiduguri before violently confronting the police, points to major failings in the state’s security apparatus. Sources indicated clearly that state security structures had informed their superiors several times of the imminent threat. Despite the clear precedent of the “Nigerian Taliban”, very little was done. This was due to poor coordination between security agencies and also to a desire on the part of local politicians – worried by its potential local support – to co-opt the group. Over the last few months, many commentators have made the grave mistake of putting the Niger Delta crisis in the same basket with the Boko Haram question. Others have placed Boko Haram in the same cage with the Odua and Biafra agendas. They are not in any way birds of the same feather. History has shown that political, social and economic ideologies built on the foundation of religion is usually very complex and difficult to manage. This is due to the important place of God in the affairs of men and societies. It has therefore been easy for people and organizations to hide behind the banner of religion to promote their individual and collective beliefs. Even when some of these beliefs are doubtful or unpalatable, fear of the wrath of the unseen God and not necessarily threats of violence weakens the resolve to put up open resistance. This, coupled with high quality propaganda has earned many radical Islamic organizations such as Al Qaeda the sympathy of many Muslim faithful. In analyzing the Boko Haram question, one fundamental issue must be fully digested. Every religion has a unique way of responding to different issues involving God. For instance; Christians will gladly wait for God to avenge those that desecrate His name, nature, or eminence. Some Muslim sects will not. They will rather stand up to physically defend the name, nature, and eminence of Allah. This is the foundation of Islamic radicalism or 114 fundamentalism. Unfortunately, several western countries like Britain and the United States have refused to accept this bare reality. The result is a steady increase in terrorist activities all over the world. In their own folly, Washington and London have responded with the use of extreme force against militant organisations at home and abroad. Following the bomb attack of the Boko Haram sect, President Goodluck Jonathan on 31 December, 2011 took decisive action to respond to the unrelenting wave of attacks by the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, (The Nation, Sunday 1 January, 2012:4). He imposed emergency rule in 15 local government areas of Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger State as part of the strategy to check the bloody activities of Boko Haram, the Islamic sect that has held the nation to ransom for so long now. It was his response to popular clamour that the group be put in its place following deadly attacks on the UN office Abuja, the Police Headquarters, Abuja, the Eil-el-Kabirs eve mayhem in Damaturu, Potiskum and Maiduguri and the Christmas Day bombing of St. Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madallah near Abuja. President made good his vow a few hours later in an address to the nation on 31 st December night. Affected by the emergency rule are: (i) Borno State (a) Maiduguri Metropolitan LGA, (b) Geidam LGA, (c) Barkin Bama LGA, (d) Biu LGA and (e) Jere LGA (ii) Yobe State: (a) Damaturu LGA, (b) Geidam LGA, (c) Potiskum LGA, (d) Buniyadi- Gujba LGA and (e) Nashua-Bade LGA (iii) Plateau State: (a) Jos North LGA, (b) Jos South LGA, (c) Barkin-Ladi LGA, and (d) Riyom LGA (iv) Niger State: (a) Suleja LGA. All land boaders close to the 15 LGAs will be shut until further notice. President Jonathan in the address said: it has become necessary to address you on the recent events in some parts of the country that have threatened our collective security and shaken the foundations of our cooperate existence as a nation, (The Nation, 1 January 2012:4). Despite the astronomical amount of human and financial resources deployed in the last twenty years to combat religious radicalism as represented by Al Qaeda and sister organisations, very little have been achieved. This is one simple reason why I strongly endorse President Goodluck Jonathan’s decision to bring the leadership of the Boko Haram sect to a round table. This should not be seen as weakness on the part of the federal government. President Jonathan should not for any reason repeat the mistakes of the two Bush presidencies in the United States. They undermined the complexities and spiritual strength of Islamic fundamentalists. We are all sad witnesses to how wrong Washington was. With superior arguments, the Boko Haram sect will disengage. This argument will however not be done with threats, guns and tanks. In 2009, the Nigerian federal government appropriated about N400b to equip the military to extinguish militancy in the Niger Delta 115 region but failed woefully. What the military succeeded in achieving was the demolition of several coastline communities. They also won the prize of killing thousands of innocent women and children.

With all of these in mind, the federal government will need to invest enough political will and diverse resources to make the Boko Haram leadership appreciate the truth about the mechanism of globalization. They need to be told that our failing value system not western education is responsible for the sordid state we have found ourselves. A whole lot of intellectual capacity will be required to achieve this dream. I am not aware that western education encourages government officials to ignore the interests of the wider society and protect their private interests alone. Western education does not teach corruption. It does not also promote sexual promiscuity. No doubt, the concerns raised by Boko Haram are tenable. The problem is how to address them. This should be a challenge to all political, economic, cultural, and religious leaders in Nigeria. We cannot sit back and allow our values to be rubbished by the greed and strength of a few heeled persons in the society. (Kali Gwegwe [email protected] /boko haram on a revenge mission)

The manner in which the riots were contained, especially the extra judicial killings of the leader of Boko Haram and his father-in-law, shows that Nigeria is actually far from enjoying a culture of democracy. Extra-judicial killings are indeed a violation of fundamental human rights. It also highlights the absence of the rule of law. Despite 12 years of civil rule, the militarization of the Nigerian state has continued to manifest itself in different forms and at different times, defying all democratic processes and the rule of law. In November 1999, the then government of Olusegun Obasanjo reacted to the crisis in Odi, a small community in the Niger Delta, by a military clamp down after a state of emergency was declared. The military carried out the operation with crude brutality and left the reminiscence of massacre, rapes and arson. Again, in October 2000, the same approach was used against the Tiv people in Zaki-Biam, where men were massacred in reprisal attacks by the military over the killing of 19 soldiers who were perceived to have helped the Jukun fight over the Tiv. This could actually be the case because retired General T. Y. Danjuma who was the Minister of Defence at that time was a Jukun and could have used his influence to aid his people. The military was also fingered out in carrying out extra-judicial killings in containing the November 2008 Jos crisis. 116

The July 2009 Boko Haram crisis is another illustration of Nigeria’s crude response to crisis management and was justified by saying that the sectarian movement wanted to depose the government of President Yar’Adua. Security forces, especially the Nigeria Army and the Nigeria Police were said to have engaged in reckless killings of members of the sect. They are killing these people like chickens, obviously are referring to the indiscriminate manner by which members of the sect were being killed by Nigerian security forces. Although the Nigerian state has the right to respond to threats of insecurity using aggressive means (delegated authority), such exercise must be guided by democratic principles and the rule of law. Yusuf was arrested by the military in his father-in-law compound and was handed to the police hale and hearty but died of gunshots with bullets riddled all over his body. Yet, the police claimed he died in a shoot out while trying to escape from custody, but could not explain why the deceased sect leader was still in handcuffs while his body laid lifeless. Moreover, the military had released video tapes of the interrogation of the sect leader to demonstrate the fact that it handed him hale and hearty to the police. Other victims of extra- judicial killings by the police were Buji Foi, a former Commissioner of Religious Affairs who had resigned to join the sect and who became one of the sect’s financiers, and Mallam Baa Fugu Mohammed, the father-in-law of the leader of the sect who willingly surrendered himself to the police. The Police high command in Nigeria admitted that these sect leaders were ‘hastily killed’ (The Nation, Monday, August 10, 2009: 1). The Nigerian government, at all levels, has always treated issues of religion lightly no matter how serious and threatening they were. Virtually all the sectarian and religious violence that took place in Nigeria could have been dealt with earlier; security reports have always alerted governments at all levels on the dangers posed by religious extremism. Both the Maitatsine and the Boko Haram crises did not just occur out of the blue; security agents had presented reports of their threatening activities before both crises broke out. When the activities of the Maitatsine group was threatening the peace of the people of Kano, Baba Yaro who was a member of the State House of Assembly moved a motion on the floor of the House praying that Maitatsine and his group should be barred from public preaching. However, he did not receive the support of his colleagues who saw the activities of Maitatsine as a way of spreading and defending the cause of Islam (Falola, 1998: 152). In April 1980, 8 months before the crisis, the Secretary to Kano municipal local government advised the State government to take urgent steps against Marwa and his preaching before it was too late. In his words: 117

The way and manner the preaching is being conducted is not acceptable to the majority of our people as it is a total condemnation of the principles of Islam as accepted and practiced by the Moslems. The fanatic had gone to the extent of arming his lieutenants with knives and other deadly weapons. (Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry, 1981). On its own part, the Police dispatched a telegram to Lagos, then the capital of the federation, to report the true situation of the activities of Marwa and his disciples so that the federal government would take drastic action: Religious fanatics numbering about 2,000 occupied Yan Awaki Quarters in Kano city….The do not obey any law. When any member is arrested and charged to Court, they would not attend. Kano Municipal Development Board served quit notices on them but they did not obey. House of Assembly summoned the leader Muhammadu Marwa four times for discussion but did not attend. They constitute their area into a private republic not accessible to other people. (Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry, 1981: 170). Two months before the Maitatsine riots broke out in Kano, the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO), now the State Security Service (SSS) reported thus: As at now, in spite of public demand for the government to use all reasonable force to dislodge the thugs and also to bring to book their leader, Marwa who is believed to be a Camerounian and had been causing trouble in the area for long time, nothing seems to have been done to check his religious vandalism and hooliganism. The generality of the people in the state therefore feel surprised that such a person is allowed to take the law into his hands at the detriment of peace in the state. (Falola, 1998:151). Of course, both the Federal Government and the Kano state government did not heed the warning of the police and the NSO, but rather shut their mouth, eyes and ears to the damning activities of the Maitatsine group until great damage was inflicted. In the case of “Boko Haram”, “Operation Sawdust”, carried out in 2005 by the military and the police and which covered Borno, Bauchi and Yobe, led to the arrest of some Islamic fundamentalists whose activities posed a threat to the security of the Nigerian state. Among those arrested were Yusuf Mohammed the leader of the “Boko Haram” sect, a certain Bello Maiduga and one Ashafa. These arrests provided the first facts about the links between the fundamentalists and the Al-qaeda terrorist group. The three arrested revealed they had been trained in the act of terrorism in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq. Items recovered during the operation included maps and diagrams of government establishments and of some specific buildings in Abuja (Tell, August 17, 2009: 69). They were kept in prison custody until ex-President Obasanjo left office in 2007. When Musa Yar’Adua accessed to the Presidency, some Muslim scholars and elites lobbied for the release of 118 arrested fundamentalists by persuading him they were simply Islamic evangelists. President Yar’Adua therefore ordered the release of Yusuf and some other fundamentalists. Prior to the “Boko Haram” crisis, the State Security Service (SSS) submitted 14 reports to the government of Borno state, the Presidency and the Police Headquarters under Mr. Mike Okiro. Except for Governor Ali Modu Sherrif, both the Inspector General of Police and President Yar’Adua failed to take action against Yusuf and his activities. When Governor Sherrif received security reports revealing that the sect was making bombs, he ordered the security agencies to take action. The security agencies invaded the premise of the sect and dislodged them. It was during this raid that one of the bombs exploded, killing a member of the sect. It also triggered the violence that ravaged the six Northern states (Tell, August 17, 2009: 69). In Nigeria, where power is centralized, there is absolutely no way for the Inspector General of Police to take action unless he is ordered by the President to do so. If the President had refused to carry out any action, it could be assumed that it was because he had a soft spot for his fellow Muslim brothers who belong to the same Muslim Umma. However, it cost the Nigerian state a lot in terms of human lives and destroyed property resulting from the sectarian violence. To ensure internal peace and security in the country, the government on August, 2011 established a seven-member Presidential Committee on security challenges in the North East, led by Usman Galtimari. This is an important development because it is a positive signal from government that it is ready to search for a political resolution to the crisis posed by the Boko Haram movement (Jama’atu Ahlis-sunnah lidda’ati wal Jihad) (Daily Sun,August 6, 2011:6)

Not until recently, the federal government wasn’t serious about Boko Haram and their activities. In his high profile visit to the Capital of the world, Washington D.C, President Goodluck Jonathan was reported to have told the US President that his government is determined to tackle the Boko Haram issue; at the same time in Abuja, the Vice President Sambo was presiding over a national security council meeting with Boko Haram as the main agenda of the meeting, they met to find a long lasting solution to the Boko Haram mayhem that is really troubling the country ( The Nation ,Friday, 2 September 2011:7)

Indications emerged on September 2, 2011 that following the August 26 suicide bombing of the United Nations House in Abuja, which is the second of such devastating attacks inside the Federal Capital Territory, the seat of power, President Goodluck Jonathan 119 has approved the deployment of Israeli Security experts to supervise the security of Aso Rock. Saturday Vanguard gathered that the decision of the President which was deliberated at length by the National Security Council headed by the National Security Adviser, General Owoye Andrew Azazi; Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Oluseyi Petirin; Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Azubuike Ihejirika; Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Mohammed Dikko Umar; DG SSS, Mr. Ekpeyong Ita; Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Abubakar Ringim and the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Ola Sahad Ibrahim, was eventually agreed upon as terrorism attacks have shown that international cooperation was needed to tackle the threat.

Also, the precision, and expertise displayed in both the bombings of the Police Force Headquarters and the UN house both in Abuja by the Boko Haram group, as claimed, are making security agencies in the country suspect that external assistance in terms of training, types of explosives and financial support (from Al-QAEDA) has been made available to the group. The new collaborative security stance of government, according to investigations, showed government’s realization that the security agencies in the country can not do it alone without assistance from foreign experts, especially those that have tackled the menace for so many years. Meanwhile, President Jonathan has declared that Nigerian security operatives are now in possession of a strong clue on members and sponsors of the emerging terror group that has recently turned the country into a theatre of bomb war, saying that he would use every available power to return fire for fire (Vanguard, September 3,2011:5). Aside Aso Rock, Saturday Vanguard gathered that wholesale surveillance and reconnaissance, was being carried out on Federal Government assets like the NNPC Towers, CBN, National Assembly, Supreme Court, Finance Ministry, Police Force Headquarters, Federal Secretariat, SFG office, foreign embassies and others with a view to coming out with a new security blueprint that will counter the element of surprise being used by the terrorists. To realise this objection, it was gathered that Israeli security experts who had made several convincing presentations on how to checkmate the Boko Haram menace, and its agencies, are convinced that they have the wherewithal to checkmate the spate of bomb blasts now ravaging the country. Already, the Federal Capital Territory is witnessing the massive installation of Close Circuit Televisions (CCTV) in and around the city as part of security measures being put in place to monitor all illegal activities going on in the city with the control room expected to be located at the Force Headquarters for central coordination. To 120 circumvent the issue of power failure, it was gathered that the CCTV Cameras are being provided back up solar power to power panels to ensure 24 hours function daily. Again, after the meeting of Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs at Abuja, the Vice President again was reported to have said the Federal government is ready for an open dialogue” with the Boko Haram sect members. On the other hand, the security agencies cannot eliminate the group; it’s always hard to end guerilla warfare of such type. Worried by the growing insecurity in the North-east geo-political zone of the country as a result of the activities of members of the Islamic fundamentalist group, Boko Haram, the Federal Government Thursday perfected a two-prong approach to restore peace in the area, (Daily Sun, Saturday, 3 September, 2011). The government’s template for peace contains what it calls “stick and carrot” approach as enunciated by President Goodluck Jonathan in New York on Wednesday. This involves an amnesty package for the group as well as strengthening security in the area to end the on-going blood-letting in the zone, (http://nationalmirroronline.net/news/13926.html). As a first step towards that, a security meeting, presided over by Vice-President Namadi Sambo to perfect the template for the amnesty was held Thursday at the Presidential Villa, Abuja. The meeting was attended by the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin; Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika; Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Mohammed Dikko Umar; and Borno State Commissioner of Police, M. D Abubakar; while the Chief of Naval Staff and Inspector General of Police were represented. This is in tandem of the commitment of Jonathan on the matter to the international community in New York. He had promised to check the activities of the group, so the security chiefs had to work ahead of time so that they would have a template on how to address the matter before the return of the President to the country, (Thisday, 3 September, 2011:7). The service chiefs, it was also gathered, decided to concentrate more on intelligence gathering before offering a chance to the group to surrender their arms and have pardon in the mode of the amnesty programme declared in the Niger Delta. Shettima further confirmed that the parley centred on the Boko Haram threats and attacks and stated the readiness of the Federal Government to contain the group. "Actually, we came to have discussions with the Vice-President and other security chiefs on security challenges we are facing in Borno State. We had fruitful discussions and we cross-coordinated our ideas on how to address those pending issues and the vice-president has pledged full Federal Government support towards 121 nipping in the bud, once and for all, the Boko Haram insurrection in the North-east," Shettima, (Thisday, 3 September, 2011:7).

The governor insisted that the Boko Haram issue was a political problem but pointed out that it was still premature to be definite on certain decisions about the menace though he expects to open a line of dialogue with the group to enable them to establish their grievances before the government will know how to approach it.

Let’s open the line of dialogue, know their grievances and see how we can address them but the line of dialogue is very much open. Boko Haram, I wish to reiterate, is a political problem and a political problem always needs a political solution. Meanwhile, we cannot talk to them from a position of weakness, we have to talk to them from a position of strength and the Federal Government has pledged all the support needed for us to restore peace and tranquillity to Borno State and for the state to restore its lost glory as the home of peace, (Shettima, Thisday, 3 September, 2011:7).

While launching the committee, the Secretary to the Government stated that they have no mandate to negotiate because you cannot negotiate with people you do not know. This position makes sense so the responsibility of the committee is to identify and listen to these people and understand what their issues are, hopefully, for future negotiations. Certain issues are, however, non-negotiable. The violence that rocked Borno State and four other states in Northern Nigeria, leading to the death of about 700 people, could have been averted if the presidency, state governors and other security agencies had acted promptly on reports by the State Security Service (SSS) that members of the Boko Haram sect were going to strike. A top security source, who disclosed this on Tuesday to Next, said, between July 14 and 17 this year, the SSS sent out 17 different reports to the Presidency, concerned state governments and relevant security agencies that the activities of the sect had reached a boiling point and that the group would soon disrupt national security if urgent steps were not taken. According to the source who pleaded anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the matter, were sent to the National Security Adviser, the Chief Security Officer to the President, the Inspector-General of Police, the Director-General of the National Security Organization, the Director of Military Intelligence and the governors of Bauchi, Yobe, Borno, Katsina and Kano States (Next, 18 September, 2011:6). Our source however lamented that the recipients ignored the reports and carried on as if nothing was amiss. When security agencies gather intelligence, they are supposed to pass it to relevant government officials and agencies. Once we do that, we have done our bit. It is then left for the police and the 122 governors to act. Because they failed to act, the impression should not be created that we did not do our job. However, the governors of Bauchi and Kano States are said to have taking the security reports seriously and being proactive in checking the militants. If the governors of Borno and Yobe had acted the way their colleagues in Bauchi and Kano did, we would not have had that magnitude of crisis. For instance, when they gathered intelligence that the sect was producing explosives in one of its hide-outs in Bauchi, Mr. Yuguda [the governor of Bauchi State] gave a go-ahead to the police to storm the place. It was after the police raided the place and arrested nine persons that the sect launched its first attack on the police station in Bauchi. Meanwhile, the State Security Service has launched an investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of Mr. Yusuf. The police claimed the sect leader died in a shoot-out with the police while trying to evade arrest. But the leader of the military He disclosed that a variant of the Boko Haram sect, which also hates western education, has been uncovered in Niger State. The source however failed to disclose the name and location of the group and whether it had been dislodged. The security challenges in the North-east geopolitical zone may proliferate and engulf the entire nation if unchecked, the chairman of the Presidential Committee on Security Challenge, Gaji Galtimari has warned. Mr Galtimari, who was speaking when the committee paid a visit to the Bauchi Government House, said his team has been going round the North- east zone talking to stakeholders, especially state governments and security personnel, on the way out. He said it was to prevent an escalation in the crisis that the committee was set up to explore ways of bringing normalcy to the North-east zone. (Daily Sun, 28March, 2011:14) Gaji explained that the committee, in its assigned responsibility, is to liaise between the federal and state governments in the zone on security issues and file any other recommendation which it feel can bring normalcy to the zone. He described security as a big challenge to the well-being of the people in the North-east, said the crisis was mostly occasioned by the violent activities of the Boko Haram group. “We have been in Borno, Yobe, and we are now here,” he said. “Our mission is to find out the immediate and remote causes of the security challenges in the North-east and offer recommendations to government as to how we can go about making our security what it was in the past.” According to Mr Galtimari, security is everyone’s problem and called on the people to support security agencies in bringing the violence under control. “Even the committee members are perhaps in 123 the same shoes as other people, because they are not security personnel who have gone through the drill to know everything,” he said (Daily Sun, March 28, 2011:14). Bauchi state governor, Isa Yuguda, appealed to the federal government to provide an enabling environment for the security operatives, whom, he said, is under-financed and lack adequate job security. “The federal government has to guarantee the future of security personnel and their children, because these are people who are supposed to give their lives for the nation’, Mr Yuguda said. “So, if you die and you imagine that after your death, your families are in trouble, would you leave the trouble and die for your country?” Yuguda, (Vanguard 5 September, 2011:7). The governor stressed the need for a good compensation package and salary structure for the military and other para-military arms to motivate them to be patriotic and ensure adequate security for the nation. (Vanguard 5Septmber 2011:7). He said though the nation’s security operatives are patriotic; the system ought to make them comfortable to be able to perform effectively, and expressed dismay that security personnel in the country are even poorly equipped. http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5738579146/boko_haram_crisis_may_engulf_n igeria.csp. President Goodluck Jonathan declared that there would be no sacred cows in the federal government’s bid to expose those behind all the bombings and acts of terrorism in the country. Accordingly, Jonathan said he had directed a review of the country’s “national security architecture to lay greater emphasis on intelligence and citizens’ participation in security surveillance” (Leadership, 5 September, 2011:5). This administration according to the President is fully determined and able to deal with all threats and agents of instability who continue to test the resolve of our nation and its democratic institutions and leadership. As President and Chief Security Officer of the nation, “I will employ every means and instrument at my disposal to secure this nation against forces of evil, which seek to divide and sabotage our country. There shall be no sacred cows in our efforts to expose, contain and defeat this network of terror and its sponsors”, (http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/boko-haram-jonathan-gets-israeli-protection) Meanwhile, there are indications that the State Security Services (SSS), and the Police are working at cross purposes over the actual arrest of suspects believed to be behind the August 26, 2011 bomb attack on the UN building in Abuja which left over 40 persons dead and over 80 wounded. The development was evident through the contradictory statements from the nation’s two leading security agencies, the SSS and the police. Three days after the tragic incident, the Inspector General of Police, Mr. Hafiz Ringim, had in a meeting with the 124 diplomatic corps at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abuja, claimed that some arrests had been made and disclosed that President Goodluck Jonathan would brief the nation on the arrests. He had said: “The security agencies have made some arrests and President Jonathan will soon make some pronouncement in that regard because I want to leave that to him to address the nation. I have directed a review of our national security architecture to lay greater emphasis on intelligence and citizens’ participation in security surveillance; we are in touch with all international agencies, involved in the global war against terror. We will work in tandem with all organizations and partners towards the timely and eventual containment and defeat of terror in our land”, Ringim. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/boko-haram- jonathan-gets-israeli-protection/ The Director of State Security Services (DSS), through its spokesperson, Ms. Marilyn Ogar, stated that on August 18, 2011, precise intelligence was obtained by this service that some Boko Haram elements were on a mission to attack unspecified targets in Abuja in an ash-coloured Toyota Camry vehicle with registration number AA539GBL. On 21st August, 2011 at about 1300 hours, a joint operation by all security services led to the arrest of two (2) notorious leaders of the Boko Haram extremist sect, namely, Babagana Ismail Kwaljima (a.k.a Abu Summaya) and Babagana Mali (a.k.a Bulama), (http://leadership.ng/nga/ articles/4680/2011/09/03/there_will_be_no_sacred_cows_%E2%80%93_jonathan.html).

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CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 SUMMARY This study examines the political economy of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The Boko Haram sect since its inception to date has impacted negatively on the political and economic development of Nigeria. Human and material resources have been lost. The political stability of the country is being threatened. Insecurity is the order of the day. The image of the country is on decline as more deaths and damages are to be recorded if nothing is done to control it. The study was motivated by the need to investigate and provide valid and plausible answers to the following research questions. • Did the activities of the Boko Haram Sect accounts for the political instability in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011? • Has government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram ensured internal peace and security in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011? In other to address the above questions, we relied on Relative Derivation-Frustration- Aggression Model, a blend of many different theories based on stimulus- response hypothesis; aggression, all aggression and conflict can be traced to some catalytic frustration. The relative deprivation (RD) construct as extensively used in social psychology, sociology, and other social sciences for more than half a century has its basic assumption that all aggression, whether interpersonal or international, has its root causes in the frustration of one or more actors’ goal achievement. That is to say, conflict can be traced to the unfulfilment of a personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand of basic human needs has always exceeded the supplied, all human conflict can be traced to an actor’s failure to obtain what he needs. In the end, it enable us to demonstrate that the underling conflict in Northern Nigeria was a feeling among some northern Moslem extremists of corruption and moral decay which the western culture brings to the country as result of no application and implementation of sharia in the country. This feeling was already reminiscent in the resistance of Usman Dan Fodio, Maitatsene (1980), and numerous crises in the country, all of which were attempts made to institute Shaira laws in the country. This law, the Moslems believe will bring to an end the corruption and other social vices which the western culture brought. Islamizing the country will according to them will ensure peace as the will of Allah will be done. 126

It therefore, enable us comprehend and specify the nature of the religious conflicts, and how a perceieved discrepancy between men’s value expectation and their value capabilities can induce anger, which if not checked, and addressed could lead to the breaking of the existing law and order. Guided by this theoretical framework, we posited the following hypotheses:

• The activities of Boko Haram sect accounts for the political instability in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011.

• Government’s strategies to contain the activities of Boko Haram have not ensured internal peace and security in Nigeria between 2009 and 2011.

These hypotheses were investigated in chapter two, three, and four respectively. The study was divided into five chapters. Chapter one dealt with the conventional research procedures such as the introduction, statement of the problem, objective of the study, significance of the study, literature review, theoretical framework, hypothesis and method of data collection, all of which justified the study. As discussed in this work, the challenges of Boko Haram sect in Nigeria are very severe to the political economy of the country. The multi-variant challenges and the requirement to improve Nigeria’s national security becomes self- evident that the leadership, security operatives and the general public especially the Nigerian youths are implicated in the scourge of Boko Haram activities resulting from religious and political priority and brigandage, general illiteracy, corruption and poverty and socio-economic underdevelopment of the people among others. There are religious conflicts in Nigeria. Nigeria has experienced colossal losses politically, economically and socially as a result of these conflicts. Politically, the country has tended to divide along religious lines. Voting is done along religious lines. Appointments are made by government on religious lines to the extent that Yakubu Yahaya, a prominent Moslem questioned the appointment of a non-Moslem military governor, John Madaki, in Katsina State. Yahaya saw him (Madaki) as coming to Katsina state to promote the goals of the Christian Association of Nigeria (Magaji; 1991:18). Economically, the loss is unprintable. So many human lives, homes, schools, hotels, shops, factories, vehicles, etc. are wantonly destroyed. In fact after the Kano of 1980 the government paid N8 million as compensation. In addition to the apparent material loss, foreign investors who could have aided our ailing economy are discouraged from investing. Even for local investors, the crisis has not been an incentive. Culturally and socially, the unity 127 of Nigeria is in terrible jeopardy. A lot of southern Christians who were living up North are now backing to their states, while those who are still remaining live daily in gruesome fear of Boko Haram crisis. This emphasizes the urgent necessity of dialogue among people of varying faiths. Religion, whether Christianity or Islam, serve as an effective instrument of social control, precisely because of such overlapping roles, Christians and Moslems alike should be encouraged to build their relationship on a more positive footing that will enable them to re- direct their enormous energies away from destructiveness towards a new sense of interdependence in dialogue. In many parts of the world, e.g. in Europe and particularly Asia, people have to live in a religiously plural society. Writing on the importance of co-existence and dialogue Chukwulozie opines; the inter-relationship of the faiths of mankind in our present world is of profound importance to the future of man. It transcends the fate of the individual religions and has to do with an emerging world civilization, Chukwulozie, (1986:57). How great and wonderful would it be to see Nigerians belonging to different creeds, everyone committed to one’s faith, living under the same roof, praying before the same light, reading from the same scriptures, and eating at the same table as if all differences of caste and creed have melted away and a Nigerian community created. With the year 2,020, this utopian expectation is only a religious equivalent of the world’s dream and expectation in science, technology, economy, health, sports, culture and peace by the year 2,020. For Nigeria to be one of the 20 th largest economies by 2020, she must first of all address her security challengies and shun violence of any kind. The religious terrorism embarked upon by the members of Boko Haram sect by destroying lives and property without any fear and without anything being done to the perpetrators of these acts shows that they have the blessings of some political elites. Therefore, Nigeria is under the threat of a religious war which will be more devastating if urgent steps are not taken.

5.2 CONCLUSION The Nigerian government has failed in terms of providing good governance to its citizens, despite the huge resources that the country has accumulated over the years. It is estimated that the youths constitute over 70% of the population and yet over 60% of this category lack jobs and better opportunities. A nexus can therefore be drawn between mass poverty as a result of bad governance on one hand and frustration and violence on the other 128 since it is observed that the breakdown of law and order in African states was basically the result of the legacy of bad governance, Clapham, (2002:200). The Maitatsine and Boko Haram sectarian violence can be viewed from this perspective. Religion is used to mobilize against modernity which is seen as the root cause of social ills. As Reverend Father Matthew Hassan Kukah rightly observed, The evil effects of bad governance, corruption, total lack of security and welfare have all become part of our daily lives. Clearly, in the eyes of the sect members, the persistence of corruption, collapse of public morality, injustice and so on could only be attributed to those who govern. In their reasoning, those who govern us do so because they have acquired their tools by gaining Western education, (Kukah, 2009:3). The Nigerian political elite must therefore demonstrate strong commitment and willingness in pursuing genuine democracy and good governance. In this respect, good governance is the remedy for conflict and disorder, including sectarian violence. As long as the Nigerian government does not show strong commitment in reversing the style of governance for the good of all, it will continue to be inundated with crisis of such kind. A lot of analysis would like to limit the reasons for sectarian violence in Nigeria to issues of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism. However, there is a lot more than ideological radicalism to be taken into account to understand the reasons for sectarian violence in Nigeria. Historically, there is the issue of unhealthy rivalry between Islamic movements whose sponsors can be linked to transnational bodies, especially in the Middle East and Asia. A lot of Muslims have been brainwashed and believe that dying in the course of defending Islam would make them earn the status of martyr. Therefore they are inclined to sacrifice their lives through violent means. There is also the “Almajeri syndrome”. A large army of unemployed vagabonds roam around the streets paying the dues of discipleship by begging and scavenging. These are ready to get involved and even perpetrate violence for a token. In one Catholic hospital in Kaduna shortly after one of the religious crises, some admitted Almajirai who had been seriously injured during the crisis were confessing in agony. One of them who had lost his limb was in deep pain and was crying with the words: “why should this happen to me? Now I have lost my life because of N200.00”. Upon further inquiry, the victim revealed that a large number of them (the Almajirai) were given some money to go perpetrate violence. Perhaps the most viable explanation for the recurrent violence, including religious and sectarian violence, is the failure of good governance in Nigeria. During the “Boko Haram” crisis, Aljazeera made an impressive analysis about the situation in Nigeria; a country that is the 5th largest producer of oil in the world but where the vast bulk of the population live 129 below the poverty line of 1$ a day. Northern Nigeria is the worst hit by poverty according to Charles Soludo, the former Central Bank Governor. His statistics show that the North-Central recorded 67%; the North-West recorded 71.1% and the North-East recorded 72.2% of people living below the poverty line. Accordingly, the teaming population of unemployed youth, especially in the urban centres, takes full advantage of the opportunities provided by these sectarian crises to wreck havoc on the economic institutions of the state. I think that the point Aljazeera wanted to make was to dissociate Islam from violence, even though it could not explain the sectarian violence in Iraq between the Sunni and the Shiites. But there is a strong point in stressing that Nigerians have been denied good governance for long. The youths that are mostly engaged in acts of violence or serve as an army of this sectarian violence are the first victims of this bad governance and acute corruption. Those educated youths who tore their university degree certificates to demonstrate their loyalty to the sect, could have done that out of frustration. One can imagine the frustration for a young man or woman who had graduated from the university and could not secure job years after graduation. For such a person, Western education will ever remain valueless. As a matter of fact, such youths live in a country where education is treated with much disdain and where the educated are insignificant, but where uneducated political bandits are assigned status privilege. One of the reasons given by the Commission of Inquiry for the Maitatsine riots was the economic situation of the country that left millions of people, especially the youths, without jobs or any means to live a decent life. The late Bala Usman had consistently maintained that violence in the garb of religion has always been a manipulation of the elite and the political class. He went further to question the link between violence and Islamic fundamentalism: In some other more serious climes, the recent mayhem in the North should be an opportunity for the state as represented by federal, state and local governments in Nigeria to put some commitment in their statutory responsibility of protecting life and property. Such will of course include creating an enabling environment for individuals to have access to good life and be able to actualize themselves. This is the first step towards security of life and property. To neglect to do this is to give rein to violence, anarchy, even anomie in whatever guise or disguise. The insensitivity of the government and the resentment of the citizenry are the recipe for an avoidable and eventual conflagration. (Nigerian Tribune, Monday, August 10, 2009:17). 130

During her visit to Nigeria in August, 2009, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, aptly captured the problem associated with the rise of conflict in Nigeria when she said: The most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the federal, state and local levels….Lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state (Clinton, The Nation, Friday, August 14, 2009:1). It would seem that there is a deliberate attempt by the Nigerian political elite to continue to pauperize the citizenry for political gains. Most of the problems associated with the electoral process in Nigeria can be linked to the fact that many a Nigerian has to first contend with issues of poverty. Thus, they are ever willing to give up or even betray their civic responsibility for some meager money thrown to them by politicians (Danjibo and Oladeji, 2007). In this sense, there is a very strong correlation between poverty and conflict. Good governance, which ultimate goal is to reduce poverty, will go a long way in addressing the issue of conflict in any society. According to Fisher et al (2000:151): The aim (of good governance) is no less than to upgrade the capacities of political, economic, social and community structures so that the basic needs and rights of the population are met. Part of this process is to enable these institutions to be managed and structured in such a way that conflict can be dealt with effectively within them and in the communities in which they operate. Political authority and systems are therefore geared towards providing human basic needs through the institutionalization and practice of good governance.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS To manage and, most importantly, prevent conflict, better strategies are required both at community and security levels. At the community level, the vast majority of religious and civil society groups need to be pushed out of their comfort zone. They need to indicate their openness to dialogue with those whose instinct is to reject contact with public authority. While direct dialogue may not be possible with the small very radical fringe, a much more inclusive dialogue is needed to reduce its recruiting pool. As well as reaching out to these more recalcitrant elements, religious and civil society groups need to be far more representative of society as a whole and develop far greater traction at the grassroots. More so, consideration needs to be given to the content of inter- and intra-community dialogues. This will naturally evolve if the main bodies become more representative. But efforts need to 131 be made to steer it toward the questions of violence and, in particular, preventative actions, building on some fragmentary successes that have been recorded in the region. The temptation to use such forums to debate issues of religious doctrine, in the mistaken belief that the other side suffers from “ignorance” of some kind, should be avoided. Such doctrinal issues are in any case endlessly debated on widely-circulated radio and audio cassettes. At the security level, a new approach is needed that focuses on better intelligence and prevention measures and avoids heavy-handed reactive responses. The police suffer from poor internal coordination and poor gathering and use of intelligence, (Centre for Law Enforcement Education Foundation, Lagos, 2008). Furthermore, particularly in collecting intelligence on potential conflicts, they receive little cooperation from citizens. Emmanuel Ojukwu, the Police Public Relations Officer, attributes this to the persistence of “a ‘we and them’ dichotomy between the force and the public”, (Crisis Group interview, 2010), partly resulting from the long history of abuse and distrust in police-citizen relations. The protection of sources is often inadequate, with the result that few members of the public feel safe cooperating with the police. (Nwanguma, 2010). Some positive steps are currently being taken in this respect, and fuller programs on intelligence-led policing are being introduced. However, far greater efforts are needed, including specific training for police officers deployed in hotspots such as Maiduguri on how to deal with young men who are drawn to violent radicalism. However, further efforts must be made if the security sector is to move from reaction to prevention. It is vital that the police make additional efforts to build alliances on the ground. That will be if mistrust can be overcome and bridges built, potentially fruitful alliances to improve intelligence gathering could be created with, for example, the hisbah groups. Further, given that many militants of hardcore rejectionist groups find refuge in neighbouring countries, regional coordination needs to be stepped up a gear. Other recommendations are: ‹ There is so much suffering in the land, the unemployment situation is alarming. Government should, therefore, make efforts to create jobs for the many unemployed youths roaming all about. If the quality of life amongst the masses is improved, it will be difficult for anybody to set them against the government. ‹ Peace is very crucial to the survival of any nation. Without peace there are no meaningful economic activities that can take place. But if we desire peace, there must be equal rights and justice. What binds one citizen must bind the other. Government should demonstrate this by action, not by sloganeering. ‹ We must take the necessary steps to rekindle patriotism and moral values. 132

‹ Corruption must be seriously and honestly tackled. According to the Secretary to the Federal Government, Honourable Anyim Pius Anyim, “inefficiency, dishonesty and all sorts of vices are by-products of corruption.” This, he says, constitute the biggest obstacle to national development. So, corruption must go. ‹ The Federal Government must find a way to withdraw small arms in circulation and also check the influx of arms into the country. One other indisputable thing is the urgent need to overhaul our security system. ‹ We need to check our current population growth. Government should enact laws that will compel parents to take care of their children. A situation where children are left to cater for themselves should be discouraged as this will control the almageris. ‹ To address the concerns that have arisen, participants at the roundtable called on the government to establish clear rules of engagement, ensure proper training of all personnel in these rules, establish effective command, diligently investigate all allegations of violations of the host community, and activate the relevant processes of the law to punish law enforcement or internal security personnel implicated in violations of the civilian population. ‹ The Government of Borno State should without further delay, make public the report and white paper on the `Administrative Committee on Boko Haram Insurgence’, which he set up and headed by former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Abuja, Alhaji Ambassador Gaji Galtimari. All affected victims, irrespective of religious, political or other affiliations or considerations must be fairly, equally and adequately compensated. The longstanding and entrenched practice of discrimination on grounds of religion and political affiliation, by the Borno State Government, and of selective compensation should end. ‹ Government should not delay further in adequately compensating and rebuilding all the churches burnt during the Boko Haram crisis at the same time that it is compensating and rehabilitating political allies and rebuilding public buildings also burnt or destroyed during the same crisis. ‹ The Federal Government should investigate the neglect, refusal and/or failure by the Borno State Government and the Borno State Police Command to promptly respond to, and act upon, the clear signs of security breach and the various early security information made available to them by various groups and individuals about the activities of members of the Boko Haram and about the sect’s planned and well advertised reprisal attack. 133

‹ Prayers should be conducted by Christians and Muslims alike to avoid the anger of God on the country. ‹ The Federal Government should ensure that all those involved in or responsible for the Boko Haram crisis are identified and brought to book. In particular, the federal government should identify all those `powers from above’ accused of being responsible for recruiting mercenaries from neighbouring states and countries; those who made sure Mohammed Yusuf was never prosecuted, but instead, returned to Maiduguri each time he was arrested and taken to Abuja for investigation and prosecution for violent and lawless activities. ‹ The Federal Government should ensure that all the security officials responsible for extrajudicial killings are identified and brought to book. Government should however, be very discrete to ensure that innocent police officers who may be wrongly accused or implicated are not unjustly punished or victimized. ‹ Government at all levels should live up to its constitutional obligations and responsibilities by fulfilling its primary goal which is the welfare and security of the people. It should provide employment and social security for the youth to shield them from being handy tools in the hands of unpatriotic, unscrupulous and self-serving politicians. ‹ Government should mount more pressure on boarders to checkmate the illegal flow of people who assist the Boko Haram in carring out terror. From the observed lapses, there is the need to reassess the composition and procedures for harmonizing peace in Nigeria.

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INTERVIEWS

Crisis Group Interview. (2009). Aminu Mohammed Dukku, Lecturer, Sociology Department, Bayero University, Kano. 23 June 2009. Several Crisis Group interlocutors stressed that they saw Sharia as a response to social immorality and associated low-level criminality.

Crisis Group Focus Group Discussions. ( 2009). Muslim Youth Leaders, Kaduna, June 2009.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2009). Prominent Islamic Preacher in Kaduna and Former Director of an International Islamic Organisation, June 2009.

Crisis Group Interviews. ( 2009). Several Sources, Borno and Yobe States, July-September 2009.

Crisis Group Interviews. ( 2009). Several Sources, Borno and Yobe States, July and September 2009. For instance, the son of the former Secretary to the Borno State government (fourth highest state official), a fourth year university student, reportedly abandoned his studies and joined the sect. Crisis Group Interview. ( 2009). Alhaji Baba Shehu, Secretary General, Dapchi Youth Development Association, Damaturu, Yobe State, July 2009.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2009). Former Police Commissioner, July 2009.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2009). Religious Leader, Maiduguri, Borno State, 21 August 2009.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2009). Alhaji Musa Muhammed, Public Relations Officer, Yobe State Islamic Centre, Damaturu, Yobe State, August 2009.

Crisis Group Interviews. ( 2009). Mallam Yusuf Yakubu Arrigasiyu, Director of Media and Publicity, MSS; and Executive Director, Muslim League for Accountability (MULAC), Kaduna, August 2009.

146

Crisis Group Interview. (2009). Independent Analyst of Religious groups in the North East, Maiduguri, August 2009.

Crisis Group Interviews. ( 2009). Local Sources, Maiduguri, Borno State, September 2009.

Crisis Group Interview. (2009). Senior Police Officer, Maiduguri, Borno State, 12 October 2009.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2009). Senior Official, Nigeria Prisons Service, Abuja, 15 October 2009.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2010). Ismaila Mohammed, History Department, Usman Dan Fodiyo University, Sokoto, May 2010.

Crisis Group Interviews. (2010). Several Local People, Maiduguri, May-June 2010.

Crisis Group Interviews. (2010). Several Religious Leaders, Maiduguri, May-June 2010.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2010). Emmanuel Ojukwu, Commissioner of Police and Force Public Relations Officer, Nigeria Police Force Headquarters, Abuja, 5 June 2010.

Crisis Group Interviews. (2010). Members of Boko Haram, Bauchi, 5 June 2010.

Crisis Group Interviews. ( 2010). Members of Boko Haram, Bauchi, June 2010.

Crisis Group Interview. ( 2010). Senior Police Officer, Abuja, July 2010.

Crisis Group Interviews. (2010). Security Specialists, Abuja and Europe, September and October 2010.

Crisis Group Interviews, Security Specialists.( 2010). Abuja and Europe, September and October 2010.

Crisis Group Interviews. ( 2010). Two Religious Affairs Specialists, Kano, October 2010.

147

INTERNET SOURCES

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Al-Jazeera: Nigeria to hold inquiry into unrest.Retrieved 2009-08-04.

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BBC News - Nigeria policemen in court trial for Boko Haram killing

BBC (26 August 2011). "Abuja attack: Car bomb hits Nigeria UN building". http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14677957. Retrieved 26 August 2011.

Brock, Joe (2011-06-17). "Nigerian Islamist sect claims bomb attack: paper". Reuters . http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE75G0BF20110617?sp=true. Retrieved 2011-06-17.

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Boko Haram and Nigeria’s Elections | Sahel Blog

Captives freed in Nigerian city, BBC, 2009-07-29

Chothia, Farouk (2011-08-26). Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?. BBC News . http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501. Retrieved 2011-09-01.

Clayton, J. (2010, February 20). Nigeria Forced to Deal with Revival of Islamist Group Boko Haram, in: The London Times , 2 April, online: http://www.timesonline.co. uk/tol/news/world/africa/ article7085022.ece>

Deadly Nigeria clashes spread, Al Jazeera , 2009-07-27

Isaacs, D. (2003). Islam in Nigeria: Simmering Tensions”, BBC News 24 September, http://newsbbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3155279.stm (accessed 5 August 2009).

Isaacs. D. (2004). Analysis: Behind Nigeria’s Violence”, BBC News 5 May http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africal/1630089.stm (accessed 5 January 2007).

Hines, N. (2009, February 20). Nigerian Islamists Routed as Army Storms Mosque, in: The London Times , 30 July, online:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/world/africa/article 6732982.ece#cid =201 5164

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More bombs follow Nigeria inauguration UPI, May 30, 2011.

Nigeria accused of ignoring sect warnings before wave of killings. London: The Guardian. 2009-08-02. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/nigeria-boko-haram- islamist-sect. Retrieved 2009-08-06.

Nigerian Islamist attacks spread. BBC. 2009-07-27. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 8169966.stm. Retrieved 2009-07-27.

Nigerian police: Gubernatorial candidate assassinated". CNN . 2011-01-28. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/28/nigeria.violence/.

Nigeria's 'Taliban' enigma. BBC News . 2009-07-28. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/ 8172270stm.Retrieved 2009-07-28.

Over 100 dead in Nigerian clashes. RTÉ. 2009-07-27. http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/ 0727/nigeria.html. Retrieved 2009-07-27.

Religious Riots Spread to Kano, Yobe, Borno. 2009-07-28

Sani, Sani Muh'd. "Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Inmates." allAfrica.com. 8 September 2010. Retrieved on 31 May 2011.

Six killed in Nigerian political massacre - Telegraph

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Two girls killed in fresh Nigeria blast, AFP 28-06-2011

University Of Maiduguri Shut Down As Boko Haram-Linked Killings Increase | Sahara Reporters

Update 1-Bombs Kill 25 At Nigerian Drinking Spot - Sources, Reuters 26-06-2011

20 killed in blast, shootings in northern Nigeria, AFP 04-07-2011

UNPUBLISHED ARTICLE

Abdalla U. A. (2010). African Neo-Kharijites and Islamic Militancy against Authority: the Boko Haram sect/Yusufiyya Kharijites of Northern Nigeria, Upublished Paper, 2010.

Kukah, M. H. (2009). Boko Haram: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects.

Mustapha, A. R. (1994). “Ethnicity and Democratisation in Nigeria: A Case Study of Zangon Kataf”, Mimeo.

150

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NEWS BROADCAST

African Independent Television (AIT) “News Hour”, at 8:30 pm, 12 September, 2009.

Lion FM News at 6.30 a.m., 6 November, 2011.