Title SINO-WESTERN RAPPROCHEMENT and THE

SINO-WESTERN RAPPROCHEMENT AND THE RESPONSE OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKERS Title 1928-1938-MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY-

Author(s) 三宅,正樹

The Bulletin of the Institute of Social Sciences Citation Meiji University, 12(2): 1-28

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10291/18047

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Issue Date 1989

Text version publisher

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

DOI https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/

Meiji University Th eB 酬 n of the Lstitute Lstitute of Social Sciences Meiji Meiji University ， Vol. 12 ，No. 2， 1989.

SINO- WESTERN RAPPROCHEMENT AND THE RESPONSE OF

1I' HE JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION 圃 MAKERS

1928 ・1938: MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

Masaki Miyake PrO ・fessor o{ lnternational Biお tory School o{ Political Science and Economics M eiji University CONTENTS

1. 1. Introductory Remarks

II. II. The Manchurian In cident as a 'Coup d'E 旬 t' ofthe Japanese Japanese Ar my ...... 2

I. II I. The In ternational Ci rcumstances Surrounding the Manchurian Manchurian In cident ...... 7

N. The Am o Statement .，...... 11

V. V. The Currency Refonn in China by Frederick W i1l iam Leith-Ross Leith-Ross and the Reaction of the Japanese Arm y ... 13

VI. VI. The Brussels Conference ...... 5 1

VII. VII. Britain ， the United States and J apan in 1938 ..... 16

VIII. VIII. From Pax Britannica to Pax Am ericana ...... 19

N. Conclusion .... .・・・・・・21

Notes Notes ...... ・・・・・・22 1. 1. Introductory Remarks

Any discussion of Sino ・Western re1ations needs to be preceded by a defi 凶- tion tion of the term “Western". One should particula r1 y note that for the period from 1928 to 1938 it is not appropriate to c1 assify Germany as “ Western" when reference is made to Japan's foreign policy decision-makers. In geograph- ical ical terms ，“ Western" usually refers to Western Europe ，wh i1 e Germany is considered sidered part of Central Europe. A typical example of this distinction can be found found in Henry Cord Meyer's work.( l) This distinction between Western and Central Central Europe has a great deal of validity with regard to the Japanese and Chinese Chinese po 泊ts of view because in Sino ・Western relations ，Britain occupied a pivotal pivotal position wh i1 e France played a lesser part. However ， the United States also also played an important role as a Western power ， not because of its geograph- icallocation icallocation but because it constan t1 y supported or at least influenced British policies policies in East As ia. The “ Unequal Treaties" with China had placed Britain in a vulnerable position ，particula r1 y when Chinese nationa 1i sts demanded the dissolution dissolution of these treaties. Eventually this situation proved to be a handicap for for Britain in her efforts to resist effectively the military thrust of Japan into China. (2) The United States ，on the other hand ， was less burdened by vested interest ，and in a better position to oppose Japanese expansion. Germany had been been ex c1 uded from the East As ian theatre as a great power since its defeat in in the First World War and since Hi tler's seizure of power in January 1933 had begun to reshape its policy toward East As ia by supporting Japan's m i1 itary thrust thrust into China and by openly recognizing the existence of Japan's puppet state state Manchukuo in February 1938. (3) At the Washington Conference (November 1921 - February 1922) ，convened vened by US President Warren G. Harding ， the Washington Treaty System was established established to secure a new po 1i tical order in East Asia. It consisted of the Naval Naval Disarmament Treaty ， the Nine Power Treaty ， and the Four Power Treaty. Treaty. The Nine Power Treaty was a strong reaffirmation of the Am erican policy policy in China pre 吋ous1y known as the ‘Open Door Policy¥ As A. Whitney Griswold and George Kennan have pointed out ， the circumstances stances under which the Open Door Policy was made public are rather obscure. However ， once this policy was pronounced by Secretary of State John Hay in his his Open Door Circular (J uly 1900) ，it was reaffirmed again and ag

-1 ー checking checking Japan's expansion onto the Chinese continent. Within Within the short period from 1917 to 1922 ， Japan lost both Britain and Tsarist Tsarist Russia as allies: by signing the Four Power Treaty with the United States ，Britain ， and France ， Japan dissolved the An glo ・Japanese A1 liance of 1902 ， which had been a mainstay of Japanese diplomacy ， and the October Revolution 加 1917 terminated the quasi-military a11i ance between Russia and J apan formed in July 1916 and known as the Fourth Russo-J apanese Entente. Entente. (5)

Foreign Foreign Mi nister Kij uro Shidehara tried to adjust Japan's policy to its rela 固 tively tively isolated position by scrupulously adhering to the Washington Treaty System. System. Wh en the national unification movement of Chiang Kai-shek's Nation- alist alist Party threatened Japan's interests in China ， the dissatisfaction with and ttacks attacks against “Shidehara Peace Diplomacy" became more and more pronounced in Japan ，particula r1 y from among the Japanese colonists in Man- churia. churia. The Kwantung Ar my of Japan guarding the ra i1 way network of the South South Manchurian Railway Company ut i!iz ed this mood to establish control over over Manchuria by military action in September 1931. The “ Manchurian In cident" dent" strengthened the influence of the military on Japanese politics to such a degree degree that Michio Fujimura ，Professor of Japanese History at Sophia Univer- sity sity in Tokyo ，recently felt justified in presenting a hypothesis of the “two occupations" 加 the recent history of Japan. According to Fujimura ， the first occupation occupation of Japan was one by her own army from 1931 to 1945 and the second second that by the United States military forces under General Mac Ar thur from from 1945 to 1952. (6)

2. 2. The Manchurian lncident as a 'Coup d'Etat' o[ the Japanese Army After After the Washington Conference ， four movements were active on the Chi- nese nese Continent. They existed simu It aneously and caused a number of conflicts: (1) (1) The National Unification movement of the Chinese government in Nan- k泊g. (2) (2) British efforts to secure Britain's priv i1 eged position and interests in China ， a legacy from her colonial past. (3) (3) Am erican efforts to secure observance of the Open Door Policy by other powers. powers. (4) (4) Japanese efforts to establish military predominance over Manchuria and Northern Northern China. The Nine Power Treaty was not strong enough to dissolve many of the conflicts flicts arising from the collision of these four contradictory movements. It failed failed to recognize the significance of Soviet Russia as an emerging new wo r1 d power. power. Nor did it treat China as an equal partner ，despite its curb on expansion

- 2 ー into into China by the Western powers and Japan ， whi1e not obliging China to fo1- 10w any prescribed course of action. (7) Japan's Japan's foreign policy decision-making process has to be seen within this context. context. It is a process far too complicated to be grasped by any one compact theoretica1 theoretica1 approach. 1 shall therefore try to ou t1i ne the perceptions of the decision-makers decision-makers individually and present a survey of the major prob1ems they had to dea1 with during this period. Special attention must be paid to the moves of the Japanese m iIi tary ， as factors influencing and often deciding Japan's Japan's decision-making process ， because ever since the turmo i1 surrounding Japan's Japan's signing of the London Nava1 Di sarmament Treaty in 1930 ， i. e. just short1y short1y before the outbreak of the Manchurian lncident on 18 September 1931 ，military intervention in politics was crucia1 to domestic and externa1

policy policy decision 欄 making in Japan.(8) As Japan's De1egate at the Washington Conference ， Shidehara had tried to work out the Nava1 Di sarmament Treaty ，together with the Am erican P1enipo- tentiary ，Cha r1 es Evans Hughes. Ever since his appointment to the Foreign Minister ， Baron Shidehara had done his best to guide Japa n. ese dip10macy in accordance accordance with the Washington Treaty System. As mentioned above ，when the the nationa1 unification movement of Chiang Kai -s hek's Nationalist Party appeared peared to threaten Japan's interests in China ，dissatisfaction with and attacks against against the ‘Shidehara Peace Dip10macy' grew more and more vio1ent in Japan. The Privy Counc i1 forced the resignation of the First Wakatsuki Cabinet of the Minsei ・to Party of 26 April1927 ，when it refused the extraordinary imperia1 ordinance ordinance which Pr ime Minister Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki had issued in order to to save the Taiwan Bank from bankruptcy. The rea1 target of the Pr ivy Coun- ci1 ，however ，was Shidehara ， the Foreign Minister ，who was a1so forced to resign. resign. ln this way ， the Pr ivy Counc i1 reflected public dissatisfaction with Shidehara's Shidehara's China policy. ln response to this public mood ， Prime Minister Giichi Giichi Tanaka ，president of the Seiyii-kai Party and Genera1 in active service ，

tried tried to steer ， at 1east in form ，a more militant course toward China. By send 欄 ing ing Japanese troops to Tsinan of the Shantung peninsu1a ， he brought about a military military conflict with Chiang Kai-shek's army resu 1t ing in the Tsinan lncident of of 3 May 1928.(9) ln ln spite of the unsuccessfu1 and unnecessary expedit

-3- Plenipotentiary ，Count Uchida ，a former foreign minister ， to sound out British British diplomats on the possib i1抗 y of An glo ・Japanese cooperation in China.( l1) In In June 1929 ， Tanaka resigned because he believed that he no 10nger had the Emperor Hirohito's confidence after he had tried to conceal Colone1 Daisaku Komoto's role in the assassination of General Chang Tso ・1i n on 4 June 1928. When the Hamaguchi Cabinet succeeded the Tanaka Cabinet ， Shidehara was re-appointed re-appointed to the Foreign Mi nistry. As before ，Shidehara as Foreign Minister of of the Hamaguchi Cabinet and of the Second Watatsuki Cabinet was not suc- cessfu1 cessfu1 in his attempts to convince peop1e that by adhering to the Washington Treaty Treaty System Japan could effectively dea1 with growing Chinese nationalism and guarantee nationa1 safety for a non-aligned Japan. Aki ra Iriye speaks of the negative negative reaction of the Japanese masses against tl). e dip10matic elites represented sented by Shidehara. (l 2) This This 1ack of persuasion became obvious in Shidehara's par 1i amentary speech on the 1ρndon Naval Di sarmament Treaty ， which he gave on 25 Apr i1 1930.(13) The same weakness can a1so be seen among the supporters of the pro- An g10- Am erican course in Japan who were politicians and bureaucrats at the Imperial Court Court with Pr ince Kin-mochi Saionji and Count Nobuaki Makino as their chief representatives.(14) representatives.(14) Both Saionji and Makino had attended the Paris Peace Con- ference ference as Japan's delegates in 1919 and realized that J apan had to adjust its policy policy to the democratic tendencies that preva i1 ed after the First World War. Shidehara Shidehara had thereby come to be their favourite diplomat and was effective1y chosen chosen by these elites surrounding the Imperial Court to adjust Japan's diplomacy lomacy to the new trend introduced by US President Woodrow W i1 son's in- sistence sistence on the New Diplomacy.(lS) Dissatisfaction Dissatisfaction and uneasiness were especially strong among the Japanese colonists onists in Manchuria ， because they felt that the growth of Chinese nationalism was was threatening their position. Fully aware of the situation ， the leaders of the the Kwantung Ar my stationed in Mukden secured the colonists' moral support and and planned and executed the m i1i tary operation against Genera1 Chang Hsueh- liang's liang's army stationed in Manchuria. Fujimura insists that the notorious Oc- tober tober In cident of 1931 cannot be interpreted as an abortive and ill-prepared coup coup d'etat ， but has to be reinterpreted as a careful

-4- dignity. dignity. If any statement which might cast suspicion on the action ofthe army were were to be uttered from within the government ， the army should wam the government government showing a firm resolution. (2) 百le K wantung Arm y sho u1 d protest stron g1 y to the branch offices of the Foreign Foreign Ministry in Manchuria and of the South ManchuI 匂n Railway Company about about their reports which might cast suspicion on the army's actions. And the army should prohibit any such treacherous conduct.

(3) (3) The army should threaten the government by organizing a large-scale de 幽 monstration monstration ra l1 ying the right-wing groups. (4) (4) If the government should reject the request of the army despite al1 these measures ， the War Mi nister should resign requesting the demission of the whole Cabinet. Cabinet. If the Cabinet intended to survive by nominating a retired general as War Minister ， the army should prevent this nomination. (l7) This document ends ends with the proposal of saigo -s aku (日nal measure):

If If the government were to hush up this Incident or to utilize it as a means to suppress suppress the army and thereby dishonour it ， we should carry thr

Fujimura Fujimura assumes that the so-c al1 ed “ October Incident" was p訂 t of this plan. According According to him ， the coup d'etat plan was intentionally leaked by the army to the the civ i1i an politicians to terrify them. In the middle of November 1931 ， Foreign Foreign Mi nister Shidehara ，who had remained highly critical of the army's m i1i tary action in Manchuria ， ceased to resist the m i1i tary;(19) “ Shidehara Peace Di plomacy" collapsed totally before he was forced to resign in December 1931. It It was due to this success ， says Fujimura ， that the October In cident was not thorou gh1 y carried out. (20) It It sho u1 d be noted in this context ， that the Japanese Ann y had learned from the the assassination of General Chang Tso ・1in by Co lonel Daisaku Komoto of the Kwantung Arm y(2 1) that without the support of the home government ， m i1i tary action alone was doomed to fa i1 ure. Komoto murdered General Chang ， but but he was not able to give rise to the military action of the Kwantung Ar my as as whole.(22) At the time of the Manchurian Incident ， Japan was a standing member of the the League of Nations Counc i1 to which China also belonged. After Japan's invasion ， China appealed to the Le ague quo 世ng the Lea gue Covenant ，Art icle 11. 11. However ， the wo r1 d's interest was then not focussed on Manchuria ， but on the the Wo r1 d Economic Crisis ，especi al1 y on the suspension of the gold standard by Britain. The Le ague's frrst response to the Manchurian In cident was therefore fore merely lukewarm. 百le League Counc i1 of 30 September 1931 passed a resolution resolution concerning the Manchurian problem consisting of nine items. The

-5- tone tone was optimistic and there was no fixed date with regard to the withdrawal of the Japanese Ar my.(23) On the other hand ， the League Counc i1 was eager to consult consult with the United States ， although the United States was not a member of the League. In the initial phase of the Incident ， United States Secretary of State ，Henry L. Stimson ，relied on Shidehara's skill for a management of the crisis. crisis. However ， this reliance on Shidehara was shattered when the Kwantung Ar my bombed Chinchou where General Chang Hsueh-liang's most 恒lportant m i1i tary base was located.(24) On 7 January 1932 ， Stimson de c1 ared in a note disptached to China and Japan Japan that the United States did not approve any Japanese military action in Manchuria. Manchuria. As Griswold has pointed out ，(25) the Stimson Doctrine meant the reaffinnation reaffinnation on a large scale ofthe traditional United States Asian policy ， that

is ，of the Open Door Policy. In China this policy consisted of ， as might be ex 圃 pected ，an “open door" in China ， equality of opportunity in the trade in China ，and the safeguarding of its territorial and administrative integrity. The Times Times criticised the Stimson Doctrine by saying that the administrative integrity tegrity of China ，which Stimson had assumed ，was non-existent. As w il1 be dis ・ cussed cussed later ，this attitude reflected the British point of view in those days.(26) Because Because of the collapse of the Wakatsuki Cabinet in December 1931 ，Shide- hara hara had to resign ， but he was to return to public office as Prime Minister of Japan Japan in October 1945. Un ti1 that date ，he was not able to influence Japanese diplomacy diplomacy and his resignation caused a diminution of the influence of the civ i1i an diplomats. The phase of dual diplomacy emerged.(27) This is not to say that that the civ i1i ans were able to compete with the m i1i tary on an equal footing. It It is rather that the civilians ， ranging from the top echelons to the consuls in Manchuria Manchuria and China ，became followers of the military by experiencing strong m i1i tary influence 担 the realm of diplomacy. In this sence ， the Manchurian Incident Incident was a watershed in civ i1 relations -military in the modern history of Japan.(28) Japan.(28) Neither Neither the Japanese Prime Minister Wakatsuki nor the Foreign Minister' Shidehara Shidehara were able to control the arbitrary action of the Japanese Ar my in Manchuria. Manchuria. There were several factors which hindered the civ i1 politicians in their their efforts to control the military. First of all ， the constitutional system of Japan ，w

-6- Japan's Japan's alienation from a Western -o riented League of Nations and its surround-

加g rules of international behavior ， her dis i11 usionment with the notional Wash 幽 ington ington Conference system of cooperation 加 the Far East ，and the unstable and ineffectual ineffectual nature of her own civilian policy-making institutions ， overshadowed as as they were by the actions and wishes of the Arm y. ，， (29)

The extent to which Sino ・Westem cooperation could be achieved within the framework framework of the League of Nations was expressed in the famous Lytton Report Report conceming the Manchurian Incident. Japan's reaction to this report was its its withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933. When we examine this this report ，we find that ，a1t hough it defmed the Japanese military action in Manchuria Manchuria as an aggression and not as an act of self-defence ，it did not propose any sanction by the League of Na 世ons against Japan. Th e biographer of

Generalissimo Generalissimo Chiang Kai 圃 shek was right in criticizing the fact that this report cautiously cautiously evaded the application of the sanction according to Arti c1 e XVI of the the Covenant of the LeaguePO) However ，it is an undeniable fact that Japan decided to discard in her policy the the course of cooperation with Britain and the United States. Foreign Minister Shidehara Shidehara was more eager to follow this course in his days as Minister of the Ca binets of Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki (1 929-31) 也an as Mi nister of the Kato

Cabinet Cabinet and the First Wakatsuki Cabinet (1 924-27).(31) The change of ci 吋1・ military military relations within Japan caused a reorientation of its diplomacy which ，

in in turn ， led to a tightening of Sino ・West 町'll rapprochement.τhe mood of temporary temporary rapprochement between Nationalist China and Japan shortly after the the Nanking In cident of 24 March 1927 ，(32) just a lit t1 e before Shideha 問、 demission demission as Minister of the First Wakatsuki Cabinet ，and sim i1 ar situations between between China and Japan disappeared totally after the outbreak of the Man- churian churian Incident.

3. 3. Th e International ci ・rcumstances Surrounding the Manchurian Incident

When the Kwantung Arm y of Japan be 伊 n its military action 泊 Manchuria ， the the most influential powers of the wo r1 d，Britain ， the United States ， and France ， were all suffering from the impact of the Wo r1 d Economic Crisis which had originated in the New York stock market in October 1929. The economic crisis crisis of the United States directly influenced Germany and then spread gradu a1 1y to Britain and France. The reason why the crisis of the United States entan g1 ed other countries consisted in the fact that the economies of these four countries countries were linked by the reparation problem ofGermany. The Dawes P1 an concerning concerning the payment of reparations by Germany a1 10wed abundant loaning from 世間 United States ， both short and long term ， to be introduced to Ger- many. This loaning ， in tum ， enabled Germany to pay reparations to Britain

-7- and France. In this way ，Britain and France were ab1e to repay their war debts to to the United States. The outbreak of economic panic in the United States ， however ，short -c ircuited this circulation. On 6 Ju1y 1931 ， President Hoover was forced to de c1 are the “Hoover Moratorium" on the payment of both reparation ration and war debts. Unt i1 the outbreak of the Manchurian In cident ， the White House Staff under President President Hoover had not been especially antagonistic towards Japan. Indeed ， the the Secretary of the In terior ，Ra y L. W i1 bur ， the Secretary of War ， Patrick Hur1ey ， the Secretary of the Navy ， Char1es F. Adams ，and the Secretary of State ，Henry L. Stimson ，were all without exception rather friendlily disposed to 抗. W i1 bur ， for examp1e ，had once condemned the 1924 Immigration Act ， which prohibited the immigration from Japan to the United States ， as “offens- ive ive to Japan and As ia".(33) “ Stimson came to the State Department accepting what was a1ready the predominant assumption there ， that a modus vivendi with Japan Japan was both possible and 1ike1y. Thereafter ， he was impressed by Shidehara's approach approach to internationa1 re1ations ，and by the concessions made by the Japa- nese nese at the London Nava1 Conference".(34) W i11 iam R. Cast1e ，who had been Am bassador to Japan ，was appointed as Stimson's Undersecretary by the death of his predecessor Joseph Cotton in March 193 1. Cast1e's stay in Japan had reinforced reinforced the beHef that Japan's “predominance in eastern Asia was not only inevitab1e inevitab1e but ， as a stab i1i sing factor ， in the interest of the United States".(3S) With regard to the perception of Am erican diplomats concerning the Man- churian churian prob1em ，Christopher Thorne has written: Growing Growing tension over Manchuria had not gone unnoticed in Wasrungton during during the summer of 193 1. Most Am erican observers on the spot ，however ， unlike unlike several of 也.eir British colleagues ， had doubted whether an explosion was was imminent: early in September ，Nelson Johnson (U.S. Minister to China) was was describing a Chinese officia l' s story of Japanese plans to occupy the area within within the next three months as “highly improbable" and “fantastic" ，while warning warning signs in Tokyo did not disturb Cameron Forbes's concentration on his his new Embassy building and polo ponies. (3 6).'

Forbes Forbes was the U.S. Am bassador to Japan during these fatefu1 days. We may con c1 ude from this situation ， that the outbreak of the Manchurian In cident struck the United States a1most as an unexpected thunderbo1t from the the b1ue. What was the British situation at that time? The Prime Minister ，)ames Ra msay MacDona1d ，was forced to resign on 23 August August 1931) because his saving p1an which cut the fund of unemp10yment insurance insurance and that of unemp10yment allowance by 10 per cent met with the opposition opposition of Cabinet members representing the interests of the trade unions. MacDonald organized a coaHtion cabinet without the support of his own party. This This Third MacDona1d Cabinet ， the “ National" government ， experienced the

-8- In vergordon “ mutiny". On 21 September ， the Cabinet was forced to abandon the gold standard ，an incident which attracted the attention of the wo r1 d's journalists journalists far more than the Manchurian Incident. On 7 October ， the British Parliament Parliament was disso1ved and for the next three weeks the country was “im- mersed" in a fierce e1ection campaign.(37) R. R. Bassett reports on the indifference of the British po 1i ticians to Manchuria as as follows: Two very brief statements on Manchuria had been made in reply to questions before before the dissolution. On November 11t h Sir John Simon made a longer statement ment in the same way; but so preoccupied was the country with its own domestic tic problems that in the Debate on the Address (November 10th-16th) only one member appears to have mentioned the subject to Manchuria.(38)

France ， another signatory of the Washington Nava1 Desarmament Treaty ， the Four Power Treaty which disp1aced the An g1o-Japanese Al liance and the Nine Power Trea ty ，was not on1y the pivota1 power of the Versa il1 es Trea ty System ， but but a1so shared an important ro1e in the Washington Treaty System. Neverth e- 1ess ，and notwithstanding the fact that France was not so grave1y affected by the the Wor1d Economic Crisis as other powers ， France showed litt1e interest in the situation situation in Manchuria. Thorne says of the French attitude: It It was European political and security issues which preoccupied France in the the autumn of 1931: unres01ved naval differences with It aly; the growing German German clamour for an end to the Versailles restrictions ， and the approaching dilemma dilemma over disarmament. Forthcoming skirmishes in Manchuria might seem of of lit t1 e importance by the side of even a single event nearer home ，like the launching launching of the pocket-battleship Deutschland in May. (39) Judging Judging from the interna1 conditi0ns of the three great powers constituting the the main signatories of the Washington Treaties ，1931 ，and particu1ar1y Sep- tember ，was suited better than any other time for the Japanese Army to 1aunch am i1i tary adventure in Manchuria. The news of Britain's abandonment of the gold gold standard comp1etely overshadowed any news fぬm Manchuria. From a short-term short-term perspective ， Japan's invasion of Manchuria was favoured by fortui- tous tous international circumstances resulting from the economic crisis. From a 10nger 10nger perspective ， the invasion was the beginning of Japan's international isola- tion tion and its m i1i tary defeat in the Pacific War with the United States ， because its its action challenged direct1y the principle of international politics which had functioned functioned since the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The Versa il1 es Treaty System and the Washington Treaty System were supp1ementary to each other. The League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were covering up and were functioning functioning as reinforcement of the Versa i11 es Treaty System. The Washington Treaty Treaty System consisted of the above-said three treaties. The most important

- 9 ー principle principle of this treaty was ， as has often been pointed out in this article ， the Open Door Policy. Japan's m i1i tary action was an open cha lI enge to all these trea trea ties and principles and 江 was only natural that the US Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson declared the following:

・… the American Govemment deems it to be its duty to notify both the 1m. peri a1 Japanese Government and the Govemment of the Chinese Republic that 抗 cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those Govern- ments ， or agents thereof ， which may imp 油 the treaty rights of the United States States or its citizens in China ，in c1 uding those which relate to the sovereignty ， the the independence ， or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Re- public public of China ， or to the international policy relative to China ， commonly known as the open door policy; and 血at it does not intend to recognize any situation ，treaty ， or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary trary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27th ， 1928 ，to. ~hich Treaty both China and Japan ，as well as the United States ，are parties. parties. (40)

It It was a somewhat strange fact that the Japanese Ar my showed no fe 紅 to ・ ward the intervention of the Western powers of the Nine Power Treaty against its its military activity in Manchuria. It was only the movements of the Soviet Union ， that the Japanese Arm y was hig h1 y sensitive to. On 1 March 1932 ， Colonel Colonel Doihara ofthe Kwantung Arm y told a Japanese local reporter from the Kyushu Nippo ， that it was a matter of great conc 町 n “to the p 回 ce in As ia and wo r1 d peace" which of the two things was to be completed ea r1 ier: the establishment lishment of the new state “Manchukuo" or the Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union.(4 1) Lieutenant Lieutenant General Kuniaki Koiso ， chief of the Mili tary Af fairs Bureau (Gunmu-kyoku) of the War Mi nistry at the point of time of the outbreak of the the Manchurian Incident and later Prime Min ister during the Pacific War ， opposed the Kwantung Arm y's plot shortly before the outbreak of the In cident ， because he heard of the possib i1i ty of military collision with the Soviet Union in Manchuria.(42} It It should be stressed that Sino-Western rapprochement began at a time when Japan Japan was launching her m i1i tary invasion of Manchuria. An y traces of rapprochement between the Chinese Nationalist government and Japan ，still a viable viable hope in the days of Shidehara Di plomacy and even in those of General Tanaka's Tanaka's premiership ， vanished completely. Chiang Kai-shek was forced nolens volens volens to rely upon the assistance of the Western powers to resist Japan. At the end of my consideration of the international circumstances surrounding ing the Manchurian In cident ，I would like to mention Generalissimo Chiang's views views on Japan's policy towards China ， the United States ，and other powers. He made the fo lI owing remarks shortly after the end of the Manchurian Inciden t. Giving Giving a speech at am i1i tary training school in March 1934 ， the Genera 1i ssimo pointed pointed out that although Japan had a strong m i1i tary presence in China ，its final 旬rget was not China ， but the Soviet Union for the Japanese Arm y，and Britain Britain and the United States for the Japanese Navy. He prophesied that Japan

would provoke a drawn 圃 out war doomed to fa i1 ure. He viewed this coming war as as a good opportunity for the 1i beration of China from Japanese m i1 itary interference. ference. Unt i1 this as yet unknown date ，it was only a question of resisting that was vital for China.(43)

4. 4. The Amo Statement

As an outstanding example of Japan's reaction to Sino ・Westem “cooperation" tion" from the period after the Manchurian lncident un ti1 the outbreak of the Sino ・Japanese War 加 1937 ，1 should like to mention two issues: one is the pub- 1i cation of the Amo statement in 1934 ，and the other is the Japanese Arm y's reaction reaction to the currency reform in China introduced by Frederick W i11 iam Leith-Ross. Leith-Ross. After After the Manchurian lncident 1931-33 ， cooperation between Nationa 1i st China China and the Western powers increased. In May 1933 ， the United States offered offered a loan of fifty m i11i on dollars to the Nationa 1i st govemment 担 China. 百le League of Nations also showed concern over China and in June 1934 the former former Under-Secretary of the League ， Jean Monnet ，arrived in China to estab- 1i gh an economic organization (Development Finance Corporation) for the purpose purpose of promoting foreign investments in the Chinese economy. (44)

In formation about Monnet's plans for Sino ・Western economic cooperation reached reached the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo as ea r1 y as March.1934 and caused irritation. The Am o statement ，which appeared in an ill-prepared form ，was an expression of this irascible mood. (45) Eiji Eiji Am o， Section Chief of the In formation Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry ，de c1 ared in a press conference on 17 Apr i1 1934: We oppose .... any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influ. ence ence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we a1 so oppose any action taken taken by China ca1 cu1 ated 旬 play (o ff) one Power ag 血 st another. An y joint operations operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technic a1 or financial financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance …J apan therefore fore must 0 切ect to such undertakings as a matter of principle …肘) The “Am o statement" became notorious as Japan's de c1 aration of an Asian Monroe Doctorine and caused strong antipathy in Washington and 1ρndon.

-11 ー In In fact ，however ， this statement was merely an incomplete copy of a telegram dispatched by Foreign Minister Koki Hi rota to the Japanese Ambassador in in China ，Aki ra Ari yosh i. The US Am bassador in Tokyo ，Joseph C. Grew ，com- mented in his reminiscences as follows: On April 17 Mr. Amau ，(47) the spokesman of the Foreign Office ，issued his famous famous statement regarding the attitude of Japan toward the rendering ofthe assistance assistance to China by other countries ， as utterance which was generally re- garded garded in Tokyo and abroad as the most important pronouncement of Japanese Japanese policy toward Chlnil since the presentation of the Twenty-One De. mands ， the essential basis of the statement reflecting the view of the Japa- nese nese Governments before they took any action in China. At first Mr. Amau characterized characterized the announcement 郎、 nofficial" but later said that it “ could be be considered as official" ，It seems that in a press conference on April 17 Mr. Mr. Amau was questioned regarding the reported opposition of Japan to assistance assistance to China by other countries ， and that he went to his files and pro ・ duced duced a document in Japanese which appeared to be in the form of an in- struction struction addressed to the Japanese Minister in China. Of this document he made a rough translation into English which he said was unofficial although asserting asserting that the document had received the approval of the Foreign Min. ister ， and later the same evening he issued to the Japanese press a statement in in Japanese labeled “unofficial" which was translated and cabled all over the wo r1 d.(48)

A diplomat who was staff member of the East Asia Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry has recollected in an interview with a reporter from the Yomi- uri uri Shinbun that Vice- Mi nister Mamoru Shigemitsu had dictated to him the guide-l 加e of Japan's China policy and that he had made out a telegram of the dictated dictated sentences and shown this telegram to Am o. In cidentally ，a press cor ト

ference ference was held on the very day and Am o revealed the content of this tele 耐 gram to the foreign journalists.(49) According to this diplomat ，Ichiroδta ， such telegrams were normally not shown to the Informa 世on Bureau. Ota ，on his his own initiative ，had carried this telegram to the Section Chief of the In- formation Bureau and thereby caused the unexpected tumu 1t. (50) 回 rota ， frightened by the wo r1 d-wide reverberations caused by the Am o statement ，which in fact was nothing less than his own secret telegram to the Am bassador in China formulated by his Vice-Minister ， tried his utmost to placate placate Washington and Lo ndon by de cI aring that Japan would observe all the treaties treaties concerning China including the Nine Power Treaty ，and would respect the the Open Door Policy. The British Foreign Minister ， Sir John Simon ，showed himself himself satisfied by Hir ota's de cI aration when he gave a speech in the House of Commons on 30 Ap ri1 1934. 百le United States government responded in a s卸lilar way.(51) Despite Hirota's lip-service to the Nine Power Treaty and the Open Door Policy ，however ， the Japanese Ar my planned to pursue a policy in

- 12 ー China China which aimed at ignoring this commitment. According to the oral recol- lections lections of Kin-mochi Mushakoji ， at that time Am bassador to Berlin ，Hi rota confessed confessed on the occasion of Mushakoji's short stay in Japan ， that H 廿ota's job job was ， in essence ， confined solely to the handling of the army and that all his his efforts were concentrated thereupon.(52) Some of the Foreign Ministry officials officials began to sympathize with the army. Toshio Shiratori ，Ambassador to Stockholm Stockholm at the time of the Am o affair ，was the conspicuous leader of this group.(53) group.(53) But as can be seen from his secret cable to Ari yoshi in China ，which was incidentally revealed by Am o，Hir ota himself was also following the China policy policy of the m i1i tary. The same can be said of Shigemitsu ，who had drafted the the telegram to Ar iyosh i.

5. 5. The Cu"ency Relorrn in Ch ina by Frederick William Leith-Ross and the Re- action action 01 the Japanese Army

Frederick Frederick William Leith-Ross was the financial specialist who served as Bri- tain's tain's representative to the Wo r1 d Monetary and Economic Conference in Lοndon in 1933. Leith-Ross visited Japan in September 1935 and asked for Japanese Japanese financial cooperation in the currency reform 担 China. But Hi rota ， who continued to hold his post as Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of Admiral Keisuke Keisuke Okada (Okada had replaced Admiral Makoto Saito as Premier) ，refused participation participation in the project. This negative reaction on the Japanese side reflected flected the China policy of the J apanese Almy. (S 4) On his arrival in China ， Leith-Ross Leith-Ross recommended to the Nationalist government a switch from the silver silver standard to a managed paper cu 灯 ency. In the emergency degree of 3 November 1935 ， the Nationalist government forbade the use of silver cuηency and decided to link the new Chinese currency de lacto to British sterling in order order to stab i1i ze it.(55) Japan's Japan's reaction to this currency reform was almost hysterica l. The Kwan- tung tung Arm y commander General Jiro Minami ， cabled to the Chief of the General General Staff in Tokyo ， Prince Kan'in ，on 12 November 1935 ， that because this this currency reform threatened to destroy completely Japan's traditional China China policy ， Japan should cut off Northern China from the Nationalist government 加 order to prevent the currency reform.(56) The Ti entsin Arm y of Japan Japan wanted to block delivery of the si1 ver currency to the Chinese Central government government in Nanking through m i1i tary force. (57) These hysterical reactions were motivated by the Japanese Arm y's fear of a political union in China ， which might be realized by the Nationalist government if it used the stable cuηency as an effective too l. Ever since the success of Leith-Ross' currency reform ， the Tientsin Ar my as well as the Kwantung Ar my had been trying to isolate isolate Northern China and secure it as Japan's sphere ofinfluence.(58)

- 13 ー The direct domestic effect of Leith-Ross' success for China was ，according to Professor Professor Shigeaki Uno of Seikei University ，specialist of Chinese contemporary history ，也 at it 伺 used a factional change within the Kuomintang Party. Th e pro- Ang1 o- Am erican group represented by T.V. Sung (Sung Tze-wen) and We 11in gton Koo ， with their foothold in the banks ，e.g. the Central Bank of China ，increased their influence. The pro-Japanese group represented by Wang Ching-wei Ching-wei saw their influence decline ，especially because the policy of the Japa- nese nese Arm y to prevent with force the execution of the currency reform aroused aroused considerable hatred of the Chinese people towards Japan. In the course course of this uproar ，. Tang Yu-jen ，Under-Secretary of the Foreign Policy Division Division of the Nanking government ，who belonged to Wang's faction ，was as 鎚 ss 位13. ted. (59) The most irnportant effect of Leith-Ross' success was ，however ，according to Katsumi Katsumi Usui ，Professor Emeritus of Tsukuba University and specialist in Sino ・ Japanese Japanese relations ， that it made possible China's resistance for eight years during ing the Sino-Japanese War. This resistance was based on Sino-Western cooperation tion supported by the linkage between the Chinese currency and the British Pound. Pound. (60) It should be noted here that a wholly different and negative assess- ment of Leith-Ross' role has recently been offered by another historian ， Yoichi Yoichi Kibata ，As sistant Professor of Tokyo University. According to Kibata ， Leith-Ross Leith-Ross had little to do with the currency reform and the new Chinese currency currency was not 1i nked with the ste r1 ing. Th e so 四called Curr ency Stab i1i zation Lease Lease by the British government was ， contrary to common 加sistence ， never granted granted to the Nationa 1i st government.(61) Japan's Japan's reaction to the currency reform culminated in her effort to iso 1a te Northern Northern China and to estab 1i sh a puppet government in part that of the country. try. The Japanese Ar my's experiment of estab 1i shing the East Hopei An ti- Communist Autonomous Counc i1 (25 November 1935) was a concrete step in this this direction.(62) A sim i1 ar experiment undertaken by the Hopei-Chahar Political Political Counc i1 (63) failed within a short period of time and evoked the outbreak break ofthe Sino-Japanese War. The same policy of setting up a puppet government was followed on a larger scale during the Sino-Japanese War and eventually ly brought about the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking.(64) Nanking.(64) The T

-14- 由e Hopei-Chahar Twenty-Ninth Ar my ，and the Tientsin Arm y. This was the conflict conflict which opened the way to the eight-year war between China and Japan.(66) Japan.(66)

6. 6. The Brussels Conference

Shortly Shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War ， China appealed to the League of Nations quoting Art icles 10 ，11 ，and 17 of the Covenant. This time the the Chinese government argued that by resisting Japanese aggression they were defending defending Western interests in China as well. (67) This was ，担 act ua1 ity ，an attitude attitude contrary to the Chinese Nationa 1i st government's traditional policy; she she had consistently made an effort to terminate the “ unequal treaties"; but she was now holding a “pro ・Western" attitude. It is therefore no wonder that her position position appeared somewhat ambiguous both to her enemy and her allies ， but it it lasted as a characteristic feature of her policy unt i1 the end of the World War. When the Brussels Conference convened on 3 November 1937 ，fo l1 owing the recommendation of the League ， Japan did not attend ， although the Nine Powers and additionally the Soviet Union had been invited. (68) During this co 任 ference ，It aly signed the Anti -C omintern Pact (6 November) ， thereby siding with with Japan ，and opposed China's demand that the powers attending the Brus- sels sels Conference should jointly recommend a boycott of export to J apan. Th erefore no sanction against Japan resulted from the conference. (69) On 22 November 1937 ，世 le Chinese delegate ， Wellington Koo ， expressed his deep dissatisfaction dissatisfaction with the continuation of trade with Japan. (7 0) Because China was dissatisfied with the Western powers ， Chiang Kai-shek showed some interest est in Germany's peace mediations negotiated through German Am bassador Oskar Trautmann .C1l) The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shinbun (Sankei Pr ess) set up a special editorial torial office in Taipei in August 1973 to publish a series under the ti tI e Sho Kai-seki Kai-seki Hiroku (From the Private Files of Chiang Kai-shek) ，which appeared d剖ly 仕'om 15 August 1974 to the end of 1976 and was later coUected in fiι teen teen bound volumes.(72) The abridged English reports edition on the Brussels Conference Conference as follows: The The Conference was formally opened on November 3rd ，with the Belgian Fo- reign reign Mi nister ， Henri Spaak ， in the Chair. Mr. Norman Davis ， the United States States representative ， opened the general discussion on the first day of the Conference Conference with a statement which fell far short of the vigorous policy advocated cated by President Roosevelt at Chicago.(73) “ The hostilities which are now being being waged in the Far East" ， he declared ，“ are of serious concern ， not only to to Japan and China ，but to the entire world... We expect

- 15 ー He added: “The longer the present hostilities continue ， the more difficult i11 w i11 a constructive solution become ， the more harmful w i11 be their effects upon Sino.J apanese relations and upon the world ， and the more w il1 general peace peace and stability be engendered. It is important that equitable adjustment be be found." The British representative ， Mr. Anthony Eden ，expressed his entire agree. ment with the sentiments ofhis American colleague ， and the French delegate ， M. Delbos ， spoke in the same strain. Count Aldrovandi.Marescotti of It aly acted acted as the mouth.piece of Japan. “ The only usefuI thing that we can do ，" he he said ，“ is to attempt to bring the two parties into direct contact with each other; other; after which we have nothing further to do." Thus ， in the opinion of the the ltalian delegate ， the Conference might just as well recognize that it was powe rI ess to apply the principles of the Nine.Power Treaty and of the Le ague Covenant Covenant to the situation in China. It It had become all too obvious 也at the prospect of any vigorous concerned action action by the Powers had faded away to the vanishing po 泊t. The United States ，on whose attitude everything hinged ， had manifestedly decided to take take no initiative in cooperating with other nations to check the “ epidemic of wo rI d Iawlessness." IsoIationism was st 出 rampant in the United States ， and the the po 1i cy enunciated by President Roosevelt found no popular suppor t. In. deed ， the policy was opposed by organized labor. In In such circumstances the Brussels Conference was foredoomed to failure. In In the declaration issued by the Conference on November 15th ， the Sino ・ Japanese Japanese conflict itself was ieft virtua Il y untouched.(74)

7. 7. Britain ， the United States and Japan in 1938

The year 1938 担 Sino-Western relations was so eventful ，that 抗 is beyond the the scope of this article to go into details. Therefore 1 shall limit myself to some comments on the British ， the US and the Japanese positions with regard to to the Sino-Japanese War. At the end of 1936 ，Britain's investment in China was 60 per cent of total foreign foreign investment there ，amounting to over 10 billion dollars ， while US investment was only about 2 billion dollars.(75) More than 30 per cent ofBritish investment was in 泊dustry ，which made Britain's position in China very 刊 1- nerable nerable and explains its double-faced position towards Japan. Usui says that Britain ，wh i1 e opposing its c1 aim to hegemony over China ，was ready to work out out a limited compromise with Japan.(76) Even so ， British policy towards Japan became less flexible 担 the course of 1938 ，and the British Am bassador to Tokyo ， Sir Robert Craigie ， assured US Am bassador Grew in August ， that Britain Britain would revise its conc i1i a tory po 1i cy. (7 7) China desired proof of this change in attitude ，and in talks on 4 and 5 November 1938 ， Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek asked British Am bassador Clerk-Kerr for economic assistance ， which was practic a1l y tantamount to an ultimatum.(78) Britain soon decided

- 16 ー for for a loan of 10 m i11 ion pound.(79) Commenting on the Chiang 司 Kerr talks ，Usui points points out that Britain was practica l1 y forced to grant financial support to China to make sure that China would not enter into an a1li ance with J apan ， which would have endangered Britain's position in As ia.(80) The US point of view was clea r1 y expressed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull Hull on 16 July 1937 ， ten days after the outbreak of the Sino ・Japanese War: This This country (the USA) constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace peace ..・ We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy policy and further interference in the international affairs of other nations. We advocate advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peace. ful ful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. agreements. Upholding the principle of sanctity of treaties ，we believe in modifi. cation of cation provisions of treaties ，when need therefor arises ， by orderly process carried carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. (81) The United States advocated the observance of the Nine Power Treaty and thus thus took a very legalistic attitude which differed from the somewhat more flexible flexible British policy. In a letter adressed to Japan's Foreign Minister Hachiro Ar ita of the First Konoe Cabinet ，Am bassador Grew reaffirmed this policy. (82) Japan ，on the other hand ，was unw i11 ing to adhere to the Nine Power Treaty ， and in his Cabinet declaration of 2 November 1938 ， Premier Fumimaro Konoe de c1 ared the New Order in East As ia: What J apan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent permanent stability of East Asia … This This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and and cooperation between Japan ，Manchukuo and China in political ，economic ， cultural cultural and other fields. It s objective is to secure international justice ， to per. fect fect the joint defense against Communism ， and to create a new culture and real. ize ize a close economic cohesion throughout Asia East … Japan Japan is confident that other Powers will on their part correc t1 y appreciate her her aims and policy and adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in East Asia Asia East …(83)

After After this de c1 aration Ar ita insisted in his answer to Grew on 18 November ， that that adherence to the “01d Order" ，i. e. the Nine Power Treaty ，had become bsolete. o bsolete. (84 ) The objective of this Konoe de c1 aration was to modify an earlier de c1 aration of 16 January 1938 ， in which he had announced that Japan would “ stop deal- ing ing with the Kuomintang Government and await the establishment of a new Chinese Chinese administration ，with which she would cooperate wholeheartedly in adjusting adjusting Sino-Japanese relations and bu i1 ding a New China. ，， (8S) It s fundamental message ，however ，proved to be the introduction of a “New Order in Ea st As ia" as a slogan which effectively described Japan's new policy. Japan now openly ignored the Nine Power Treaty and the US Open Door Policy.

-17- In In the initial phase of the Sino-Japanese War ， the Soviet Union was the most ardent ardent supporter ，both militar i1 y and financially ， of the Chinese Nationalist

govemmen t. After the con c1 usion of the Sino ・Soviet Non 開 Aggression Pact on 21 August August 1937 ， the Soviet Union supplied China with war credit ，m i1 itary aero- planes planes and volunteer pi1 ots.(86) Soviet support seems to have ended in 1938.(8 7) Britain and the US gradually increased their support for China ， too. As a device to counter these moves of the ‘Westem' powers in c1 uding the Soviet Union ， the top leaders of the Japanese Ar my nourished the idea of strengthening ing the An ti-Comintem Pact with Germany and It aly. Their way of thi nk: ing can can c1 early be seen in a document proposed by War Minister Seishirδ It agaki representing representing the War Ministry. Enti t1 ed “The Ar my's Hopes regarding Current Foreign Foreign Policy" ， the War Minister requested:

Diplomatic Diplomatic efforts should concentrate on the following: a) a) Strengthening of the anti-Comintern axis. b) b) Adopting pos 比ive measures to persuade the Soviet Union not to participate in in the China Incident (there is no change in the fundamental policy of discourag- ing the the ing Societ Union's aggressive intentions toward East Asia). c) c) Induci 時 Britain to abandon its policy of supporting Chang Kai-shek. d) d) Persuading the United States at the very least to retain a neutral attitude ，if possible possible to adopt a pro-Japanese attitude ， and especially to strengthen friendly economic economic relations. (88) Foreign Foreign Mi nister Kazushige Ugaki ，who replaced Hirota on 26 May 1938 ， was an influencial retired genera l. In spite of his past career as one of the top- leaders leaders of the army ，Ugaki was more cautious in treating the problem of the treaty treaty with Germany and It aly than W 訂阻nister Itagak i. At a Five Mi nisters Conference Conference on 12 August ，Ugaki presented a Foreign Ministry proposal of two separate separate agreements ， with Germany and Italy respectively. This proposal requested quested that “a mutual assistance treaty ，aimed at the Soviet Union ， should be concluded concluded between Germany and Japan" and further “existing cooperation be ・ tween Japan and It aly established by the Anti-Comintem Pact w i11 be further developed developed by the con c1 usion of a treaty ofneutrality and consu 1t ation."(89) In this this document ，Japanese- It alian political cooperation ，“ so long as it was kept within within proper 1i mits" ，was thought to “affect favorably our position vis-a ・vis Great Great Britain".(90) War Minister It agaki countered that he and the army “preferred the German plan plan linking Japan ，It aly ，and Germany by a single treaty". (91) A German draft by Joachim vun Ri bbentrop had been conveyed to Japan by Major-General Yukio Kasahar 丸 Japan's courier from Berlin ，on 5 August.(92) Herewith began the the lengthy process of the strengthening of the An ti-Comintern Pact ，which was an important chapter in the domestic and diplomatic history of Japan from 1938 up to 23 August 1939 ，when the German-Soviet Non- Ag gression Pact

-18- was signed in Moscow ，a Pact which was a thunderbolt from the blue for the Japanese Japanese decision-makers ，both civil and military. Without going into details ， it it should be mentioned that anti-British fee 1in gs became increasingly fierce during during this process. The 世de of the anti-British movement culminated during the the talks between British Am bassador αaigie and Japanese Foreign Minister Ar ita in the summer of 1939. The mass demonstrations in Japan ，which must have have been manipulated by the army ，demanded that Britain cease her support of of the Chinese Nationalist government. (93)

In In his article discussing An glo-Japanese relations during the Sino ・Japanese war ，Kazu Nagai ，historian and As sistant Professor of Ri tsumeikan University ， says says that one can perceive four altematives regarding Japan's policy toward Britain Britain during this period: (a) (a) to expel British influence from the Chinese continent (a policy supported right.wing by right.wing nation a1 ists and extremists within the army); (b) (b) to wrest concessions from Britain through blackmail by exploiting her weak position position in China (this was the policy of the top.leaders' of the army); (c) (c) to evade confrontation with Britain as much as possible and to foster British cooperation cooperation with Japan by permitting British economic activity in the Chinese territory territory occupied by Japan (this was the attitude of ‘pro ・British' politicians); (の to cooperate with Britain (and the U.S.) within the frarnework of the Washington Washington Treaty system (Shidehara Diplomacy)β4)

According According to Nagai ，both (a) and (d) were unrealistic during the Sino ・Japa- nese nese War up to the day of Pea r1 Harbor. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War 泊 December 1941 ， (a) was not realizable. Since the outbreak of the Manchuri- an Incident ， (d) was not realizable. The schism between the protagonists of the Tripartite Tripartite Pact among Germany ，Italy ，and Japan (with Britain and France ， not only only the Soviet Union ， as potential enemies of the Pact) and those who hesi- tated tated to include Britain and France as supposed enemies of the Pact ，was ，according cording to Nagai ， just the schism between 由e altematives (b) and (c).(95) 官邸 antagonism antagonism was fought out 泊 the Konoe Cabinet between War Mi nister It agaki on one side ，and Fore 取 1 Mi nister Ar ita and Navy Minister Yonai on the other. This This antagonism was transferred to the next Cabinet headed by Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma up to the day of the con c1 usion of the German-Soviet Nor トAggres- sion sion Pact.(96)

8. 8. From Pax Britannica to Pax Americana

Japan's Japan's military adventure on the Chinese continent ， beginning with the Manchurian Incident ，was doomed to fail 加 the end due to the U.S. counter- attack. attack. In a short span of 世me ，however ，Japan was able to secure Manchuria and then a large part of the Chinese continent under its military control ，

-19 - although although such actions were incompatible with the principles of the Nine Power Treaty Treaty and the Open Door Policy. What factors had helped Japan to achieve

this this short-term success? Omitting all historical details ，we can 闘 y that it was mainly mainly because the years from the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident until apan's Japan's surrender ，1931-1945 ， were roughly identical with the final phase of the the period of transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Am ericana in East Asia. The Pax Britannica in East Asia ，established with Britain's victory in the Opium War (1 840-42) ，was beginning to fall short of breath at the end of the nin e- teeth teeth century ，when Britain form a1 1y secured the Kowloon Peninsula and Hong Kong Island (1 898). The circumstances surrounding the issuing of the Open Door Note by John Hay ，ghost-written ，it seems ，by Alfred E. Hippisley ，“ a British British subject and a member of 也eαrinese Imperial Maritime Cu stoms Service"(97) Service"(97) suggest 也at Britain was forced to ask the U.S. for help 加 securing her her interests in China. The threat coming from a Russia bent on occupying the whole of Manchuria ， forced Britain not only to ask for Am erican aid ， but also to to con c1 ude a military alliance with a small country in Ea st Asi a， Japan. When the First World War ended ，Britain became a debtor nation owing a huge huge amount to the United States and no longer able to uphold the “two power standard" of the navy. In the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty Britain Britain accepted parity with the United States. In In 1931 ， the British government was preoccupied with overcoming the economic crisis. When the Manchurian Incident broke out at a time between the the In vergordon “mutiny" and the decision to leave the gold standard ， the British British government could not afford to pay much attention to Manchuria. 官le Times ，which often reflected the views of the British government ，annoyed U.S. U.S. Secretary of State Stimson by. criticising his note in its editorial of 11 January January 1932 ， as follows: In In evoking its c1 auses (those of the Nine Power Treaty) the American Govern. ment ment may have been moved by the fear that the Japanese au 也orities would set set up a virtually independent administration 泊 Manchuria which would favour Japanese Japanese interests to the detriment of the commerce of other nations. It is clear clear that the Foreign Office does not share these apprehensions ， and that ， although although the Nine Power Treaty provides for consultation between the interested ested Powers ，it was not in fact consulted before the Note was communicated to to Nanking and Tokyo. (9 8) The United States was 1ik ewise fully occupied in its efforts to overcome the depression depression and in no position to announce the establishment of a Pax Am ericana ，which it potentially ，though not consciously ，was preparing not only 卸 the the Western hemisphere ， but also in East Asi a. Wh en the Bri 也 h government asked asked the U.S. administration to shoulder the financial and military aid to Greece Greece and Turkey and President Truman quickly de c1 ared the adoption of the

- 20 ー Truman Doctrine in March 1947 in rep1y to the British entreaty ， the establishment of a Pax Am ericana became a c1 ear-cut reality. With regard to East Asia ， the the establishment of Pax Am ericana can be traced further back ， that is to say ， to to the victory day of 15 August 1945. Unt i1 these dates ， confusion resu 1t ing from from the transition from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Am ericana periods can be be said to have 1asted for rather a 10ng period. It was in the 1ast phase of this transitory transitory period ， that both Germany and Japan tried somewhat belatedly to bu i1 d up colonial empires under the dictatorship of Hi t1er and a military quasi- dicta dicta torship resem bling “praetorian ru1e" ，respective1y. (99) Contemporaneous Contemporaneous with the coming of Pax Am ericana ， or in its European phase phase “Pax Russo ・Am ericana" ， both Germany and J apan were totally dem i1 i- tarized. tarized. The “bellicose" nations were thus destroyed. It is an irony of wo r1 d history history that China ，which gained enormous financial and m i1 itary aid from Britain ， and especially from the United States ，came to be 1abe l1 ed “bellicose" after after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 by U.S. standard. These stand- ards ards were nothing but a dichotomy between the “bellicose" nations and the peace-10ving" “peace-10ving" nations. (100)

9. 9. Conclusion

百lI s article has attempted to show that Japan's “be l1i cose" policy towards the the Chinese continent and the An glo-Saxon powers was to some extent a reaction tion to the Wo r1 d Economic Crisis which began in 1929. Japan was able to function function within the Washington Treaty System as long as the trade system between between the United States and Japan was well-balanced. Si1 k was Japan's most important important export to America and assured a relatively steady f1 0w of foreign currency currency into the country. As G i1 bert Ziebura pointed out in a recent study ， the the United States played a pivotal role in the world economic system both 泊 Europe and East Asia by linking those regions economica l1 y.(101) When the economic economic crisis broke out in the United States ， the export of si1 k experienced a huge huge setback. Between 1929 and 1933 the price of silk went down from 6 U.S.-Dollar U.S.-Dollar to 1. 2 per pound.(102) The “silken thread ，， (103) on which the Japanese Japanese economy depended was thus cut off ， which meant the 10ss of the economic economic basis for Japan's functioning within the Washington Treaty System. Even before the economic crisis hit Japan ，two tendencies were noticeable in in Japan's policy groups. One was oriented towards export to the United States States and represented by Foreign Minister Shidehara's “ Peace Di p10macy". The other policy group was interested rather in investing on the Chinese continent tinent and represented by the China policy of Pri me Minister Giichi Tanaka. After After Tanaka's demission 泊 1929 ， the economic crisis strengthened the power of of the second policy group with the Japanese Arm y as its strongest pro-

- 21 ー motor.(104) motor.(104) The invasion of Manchuria at a time when the three m~or powers in in the Pacific ー the United States ，Great Britain ，and France - were absorbed by domestic economic crisis ，was an attempt to cha l1 enge the Washington Treaty System ，and by defying the League of Nations principles it also affected 由 e Versailles Treaty System. That “ successful" invasion of Manchuria increased increased even more the growing influence of the m i1i tary on Japanese domestic and foreign po 1i cy. The resulting change in civil-m i1i tary relations in Japan was ， in the final analysis ，a product not only of the domestic system of Japan but also of the Wo r1 d Ec onomic Cr isis which began in the United States in in October 1929. Thus by being aware of the global conste l1 ations of that period we might be able able to have a better grasp of the po 1i tical and economic situation in East Asia.

NOTES

(1) (1) Henry Cord Meyer ， Mitteleuropa in German Tho ught and Action 1815-1945 σhe Haag ，1955). (2)Chihiro (2)Chihiro HOBoya ，“ Britain and the United 8tates in Japan's View of the International

8ystem ，1919-37 ，" in Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952 ，'・ Papers of the Anglo- Japanese Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War ed. by Ian Nish ，(Cam- bridge ，1982) ， pp. 15-7. Cf. Ian Nish ，“ Japan's Policies toward Britain ，" in Japan 's Foreign Foreign Policy ， 1868-1941: A Research Guide ， ed. by James W. Mo r1 ey (New York and and Lo ndon ，1974).

(3) (3) On the Gennan po 1i cy toward China ，cf. Bernd Martin (ed よDi e deutsche Berater ・， schaft 加 α伽 1927-1938 ，Militar- Wi rtschaft ぺAusenpolitik ，(D u鵬首'orf ， 1981);

John John P. Fox ，Germany and the Far Eastern Cri sis 1931-1938: A Stu 砂， inDiplom 仰 F and Ideology (Oxford ，1982). (4) (4) A. Wh itney Griswold ，The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven and London ，1938) ，reissued 1962 ， ch. U ，“ Writing the Open Door Notes"; George F. Kennan ， American Di plomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago ，1951). ， ch. II. Both books were translated translated into Japanese 担 1941 and 1952 ，respectively. Cf. Masaru Ikei ，“ Monko kaiho kaiho kik 必 kintδshugi" (p rinciple of Open Door and Equal Opportunity) ，inNiho 1l gaiko gaiko shi jiten (Encyclopedia of the Diplomatic History of Japan) ed. by Gaimusho shiryo shiryo kan ，Nihon 伊 ikδshi hensan kai (Committee for editing the encyclopedia of the the diplomatic history of Japan 泊 the archives of the Japanese Foreign M 凶 stry) (Tokyo ，1979) ， pp. 941-3. (5) (5) Cf. Masaki Miyake ，“ German Cultural and Political Influence on Japan ，1870-1914 ，" in in Germany in the Pacific and Far East ，1870-1914 ed. by John A. Moses and Paul M. Kennedy (8 t. Lucia ，Queensland ，1977) ，p. 174f. (6) (6) Michio Fujimura ，“ Futatsu no senryδto Showa shi ，Gumbu dokusai taisei to Amerika Amerika ni yoru senryδ" (The Two Kinds of Occupation and the History of the Showa Era ， The Regime of Mi1i tary Dictatorship and the Occupation by the United States) ， in Se 知人， Tokyo ，(August ，1981).

- 22 ー (7) (7) Akira Iriye ， After Impel 均的m: The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921- 1931 (Cambridge ，Mass. ，1965) ， ch. 11 ，“ Co l1 apse of the Washington System ，1925- 1926." 1926." (8) (8) Cf. Samuel E. Finer ，The Man on Horseback: Th e Role of the Military in Politics ， second ，enlarged ed. ，(H armondsworth ，1976) ， pp. 80-8. (9) (9) Nobuya Bamba ， Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy ，1924-1929 ，(Kyoto ，1972) ， pp. 280f f. (10) (10) Shinkichi Eto ，“ Japan's Policies toward China ，" in Japan's Foreign Policy by Morley (ed ふp.244. (11) (11) Ian Nish ，“ Japan's Policies toward Britain ，" in めid. ， p. 215. (1 2) Iriye ， After Imperialism ， p. 284. (13) (13) Tatsuo Kobayashi ，“ Kaigun gunshuku joyaku 1921-1936" (The Naval Disarmament Treaties Treaties 1921-1936) ，泊 Taiheiyo senso e no michi: Kaisen gaikoshi (Japan's Road to to the Pacific War) ed. by Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai ， Taiheiyo senso gen'in kenkyu ・ bu (The Japan Association of International Relations ，Project Team on the Origins of the the Pacific War) (This series will be quoted hereafter as Taiheiyo) ， vo 1. 1，Manshu jihen jihen zenya (The Eve of the Manchu 巾 n Incident) ，(Tokyo ，1968) ， pp. 110-1 1.; Tatsuo Tatsuo Kobayashi ，“ The London Naval Treaty ，1930" ， inJapan Erupts: Th eLondon Naval Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident ，1928-1932 ， Selected Tr anslations from Taihe かδsenso e no michi: kaisengaiko shi ， ed. by James W. Morley (N ew York ， 1984) ， pp. 7lf. (1 4) About the politician Saionji ， cf. Yosaburo Takekoshi ，Pr ince Saionji ，trans. into English English by Nariaki Kozaki (K yoto ， 1933).

(15) (15) Cf. Hikomatsu Kamikawa (ed よJapan てAmerican Diplomat 化 Relations in the Meiji- Taisho Taisho Era ，trans. into Eng 1i sh by Michlko Kimura (Tokyo ，1958) ， pp. 395ff. (1 6) Mi chio F吋imura ，“ Kiideta to shite no Manshii jihen ，" (The Manchurian Incident as a coup d'etat) ， in Showa shi no gunbu 加 seiji (The Military and the Politics in the History History of the Showa Era) ed. by Masaki Miyake ， lkuhiko Hata ， Michio Fujimura ， Hiroshi Hiroshi Yoshu ， vo 1. 1，Gunbu shihai no kaimaku (The Beginning ofthe Military Rule) ， (Tokyo ， 1983). (1 7) lbid. ， p. 98f. This document was first published in a newsletter attached to Taiheiyo ， 1. vo 1. 4， Nitchu senso (The Sino-Japanese War) ， Part 2 (Tokyo ， 1963). Fujimura throws a tota l1 y new light on the document. (18) (18) F吋imura ，ibid. ， p. 99. (1 9) lbid. ， pp. 112f. (20) (20) lbid. ， p. 108. (21) (21) Cf. Richard Storry ，The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese 泊 tionalism (London ， 1957) ， p. 44. (22) (22) Fujimura ，“ Kudeta" ，血 Showa s

- 23- diplomacy diplomacy in Japan ， see Karl Dietrich Bracher ，“ Das Anfangsstadium der Hitlerschen Ausenpolitik ，". Vierte 抑hrshe βe fur Zeitgeschichte ，Stuttgart ， 5. J ahrgang 1957 ，1. Heft. Heft. Cf. Martin (ed ふDie deutsche Beraterschaft ， p. 297. (28) (28) Amos Perlmutter ， The Military and Politics in Modern Ti mes: On 丹'ofessionals ， Fヤ'a etorians ， and Revolutionary Soldiers (N ew Haven and London ，1977) ， pp. 74f. (29) (29) Christopher Thorne ，Allies of a Kind: Th e United States ，Britain and the 陥 ragainst Japan Japan (Oxford ，1978) ，p.29. (30) (30) Hollington K. Tong ，Ch iang Kai-shek (Taipei ，1963) ， p. 194. (31) (31) lriye ，Af ter Imperialism ， pp. 301f. Cf. Chihiro Hosoya ，“ Britain and the United States" ， and lan Nish ，“ Britain and the United States" ， in Anglo-Japanese Alienation by Nish (ed.) ， pp. 12 and 36 ，respectively. (32) (32) Iriye; Aβ er Imperialism ， p. 133. (33) (33) Christopher Thorne ，Th e Limits of Foreign Policy: Th e West ， the League and the Far Eastern Eastern Cr isis of 1931-1933 (London ，1972) ，p.83. (34) (34) lbid. ， p. 85. (35) (35) lbid. ， p. 86. (36) (36) lbid. ， pp. 152f. (37) (37) Reginald Bassett ， Democracy and Foreign Policy. A Case History: Th e Sino ・Japanese Dispute ，1931-33 (London ，1952) ， p. 11. (38) (38) lbid. ， pp. 11f. (39) (39) Thorne ，Th e Limits of Foreign Policy ， p. 79. (40) (40) Bassett ， Democracy and Fore 伊 Policy ， p. 75. (41) (41) Seizaburo Shinobu ，“ N 血on gaiko seisaku no kicho (The Keynote of the J apanese Foreign Foreign Policy) ，C 乃uo ・Ko ron (The Central Review) Tokyo σuly ， 1934). This arti c1 e is is reprinted in Seizaburo S1 曲 obu ，Zoho Nisshin senso (The Sino ・Japanese War ，1894- 95 ， enlarged ed よrevised by Michio Fujimura (Tokyo ， 1970). See Doihara's utterance ，ibid. ，p. 644. (42) (42) Hiroharu Seki ，“ Manshii jihen sen-shi 1927-1931" (The Prehistory ofthe Manchurian Incident Incident 1927-1931) ， in Taiheiyo ， vo l. 1， p. 407.; Hiroharu Seki ，“ Manchurian Inci- dent ，1931" inJapan Erupts by Mo r1 ey (ed.) ， p. 192.

(43) (43) Shigeaki Uno ，“ Chugoku no doko 1933-1939" (China's Attitude 1933 ー1939) ，担 Taiheiyo ， vo l. 3， p. 279. (44) (44) Toshihiko Shimada ，“ Kahoku kosaku to kokko chosei 1933-1937" (Japan's Activ ・ ities ities in Northern China and the Readjustment of Diplomatic Relations 1933 ー1937) ， in in Taiheiy δ， vo l. 3， p. 80.; Toshihiko Shimada ，“ Designs on North China ，1933- 1937 ぺin Th e Ch ina Quagmire: Japan 包 Expansion on the Asian Continent 1933- 1941 ，selected translations from Taiheiyo (N ew York ，1983) ， pp. 84f. (45) (45) Shimada ，“ K 油 oku kosaku" ， p. 81.; Morley (ed よThe Ch ina Qu agmire ， pp. 85f. (46) (46) Arnold J. Toynbee et al.， Survey of Internati ，

- 24 ー Vierteljahrshefte Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte ，Stuttgart ， 22. Jahrgang 1974 ，3. Heft ， pp. 294 町. (50) (50) Yomiuri Shinbun (ed.) ，Showa ， p. 204. (51) (51) Shimada ，“ Kaho 岡崎saku" ， pp. 83f.; Mo r1 ey (ed ふTh e China Qu 伊 nire ， pp. 87- 89. 89. σ2) Yomiuri Shinbun (ed.) ，Sh δwa ，vo l. 20σokyo ，1972) ， p.90. (53) (53) Ryoichi Tobe ，“ Gaimusho ‘kakushin ・ha' to gunbu" (The “Revolutionary Group" in the the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Japanese Army) ， in Showa shi no gunbu to seiji ，by Miyake et a1. (e むよ vo 1. 2 ，Tairiku shinko to senji taisei (Aggression of the C凶悶Con 曲lent 制御Domestic Military Re 酔吋. (54) (54) Hideo Kobayashi ，“ Heisei kaikaku 0 meguru Nihon to Chiigoku" (Japan ， China and Currency Currency Reform) ， in Ch ugoku no heisei kaikaku to kokusai kankei (Currency Reform 担 China 1935 and China's Relations with Japan ，Britain and America) by Yutaka Nozawa (ed.) (Tokyo ，1981) ， pp. 244f. (55) (55) Nozawa ，ibid. ， p. 6. (I ntroduction by Yutaka Nozawa and Hi deo Kobayashi); Shimada ， “Kahokukosaku" ， p. 139.; Mo r1 ey (ed.) ，Th e α ina Qt ωrgmire ， p. 137. (56) (56) Shimada ，“ Kahoku kosaku" ， pp. 149-15 1.; Mo r1 ey (ed.) ，Th e Ch ina Quagmire ， pp. 14 6f. (57) (57) Shimada ，“ Kahoku kosaku" ， p. 143.; Mo r1 ey (ed.) ，Th e China Quagmire ， p. 140. (58) (58) Kobayashi ，“ Heisei" ， pp. 254-256. (59) (59) Uno ，“ Chiigoku no doko" ， in 目的eiyo ， vo l. 3， pp. 29 6f. (60) (60) Katsumi Usui ，“ Nitchii senso no seiji teki tenkai 1937-1941" (The Political Develop. ment of the Sino ・Japanese W 紅 1937-1941) ， in Taihe かo， vo l. 4 ，p. 176.; Mo r1 ey (ed ふ Th e Ch ina Quagmire ， p. 355. (61) (61) Yoichi Ki bata ，“ Leith.Ross shisetsu dan to Ei.Chii kankei" (The Le ith.Ross Mission and Anglo.Japanese Relations) 泊 αugoku no heisei kaikaku to kokusai kankei by Nozawa (ed ふpp. 199ff. On the problem of “linking" with sterling in the currency reform reform of the Chinese government ，cf. Kin.ichiro Fujimura ，“ Kahei wa kataru. Fre- derick derick Leith.Ross kyo j司0 ・den. Kokusai kinyii no 50 nen" (Currency speaks! On the Autobiography Autobiography of Sir Frederick Le ith.Ross. Fifty years of Internation a1 F凶 nce) ， no. no. 50 ， in Kokusai Kinyu (I nternation a1 Finance) ， no. 713 ，Tokyo (1 October 1983). This This is a long series by a spec 鼠list of international finance. Fuiimura translates in this series series the autobiography of Sir Frederick W i11 iam Reith.Ross into Japanese and gives detailed detailed comments to the translated text. Fujimura's view is totally different from that of Ki bata. (62) (62) Shimada ，“Kah oku kosaku" ， p. 158.; Mo r1 ey (ed.) ，Th e Ch ina Qu 暗 mire ， pp. 153f. (63) (63) S凶 nada ，“Kah oku kosaku" ， p. 163.; Mo r1 ey (ed.) ，1加 Ch ina Quagmire ， p. 158.

- 25 ー (68) (68) Usui ，“ Nitchii senso" ， p. 124. (69) (69) Jb id. (70) (70) Jb id. (71) (71) On the German peace mediation and Japan's response to it ，cf. Gottfried.Karl Ki ndermann ，Der Feme Osten in der Weltpolitik des industriellen Zeitalters ，dtv-Welt- geschichte geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts ， Bd. 6，(Munich ，1970) ， pp. 387-9. (72) (72) Kenji Furuya (member of the editorial board of the Sankei Press and the chief of the special special editorial office 加 Taipei) ，Ch iang Kai-shek: His L( 戸 and Ti mes ， abridged English English ed. by Chun-ming Chang (New York ，1981) ，Foreword to the abridged English edition. edition. (73) (73) The “ Quarantine Speech" by President Roosevelt in Chicago on 5 October 1937. On the “epidemiological nature" of the speech ， see Yδnosuke Nagai ，“ The Roots of Cold War Doctrine. The Esoteric and the Exoteric ，"泊 Th e ori. 討'ns of the Cold 陥 rin Asia by Yonosuke Nagai and Ak ira Ir ゆ (eds.)σokyo ，1977) ， p.23. (74) (74) Furuya ，Ch iang Kai -s hek ， pp. 568f. (75) (75) Usui ，“ Nitchii senso" ， in Taiheiy δ， vo 1. 4， p. 158.; Morley (ed.) ，Th e Ch ina Q 回 'g mire ， p.339. p.339. (76) (76) Usui ，“ Nitchii senso" ， pp. 158f.; Mo r1 ey (ed.) Th e China Qu 暗 mire ， p. 339. (77) (77) Usui ，“ Nitchu senso" ， p. 159.; Morley (ed ふTh e China Quagmire ， p. 339.

(78) (78) U.S. Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson (Chungking) to the Secretary of State ，No ‘547 ， 16.11. 16.11. 1938 ， quoted in China and Japan at War by Boyle ， p. 222. (79) (79) Do cuments on British Fo 時 n Policy (hereafter cited as DBFP) ， Third Series ， vo 1. VIII ， 1939. 1939. No. 528 ，Halif: 皿 to Kerr (Shanghai) ， 3. 3. 1939.; Th e Foreign Relations ofthe United United States ，The Far E ぉt，1939 ， vo 1. III ， p. 657 ，The Charge 担 Ch 闘の ck) to the Secretary Secretary ofState ，March 10 ， 1939_ (80) (80) DBFP ，ibid. ， pp. 195f ， Kerr at Ch'angsha to 1弘lif 鉱， 7. 11. 1938 ，and pp. 216-219 ， 1. 11. 11. 1938 (Usui ，“ Nitchu senso" ，p ・ 171 ， p. 386.; Morley (ed ふTh e China Qω'g- mire ， p. 350 ，p .4 64.) (81) (81) Grew ，Tu rbulent Era ， vo l. 11 ， pp. 1047f. (82) (82) Grew to AI 加，加 Ga 加 usho (J apanese Foreign Ministry) (ed.) ， Nthon gaiko nempyo narabi narabi ni shuyo bunsho (Chronology and M 可or Documents of Japanese Foreign Re- lations) ，vo l. 2. ぐTokyo ，1966) ， pp. 393-7. (83) (83) Grew ，Tu，加 lent Era ， p. 1206. (84) (84) Arita to Grew ， in Ga 加 usho (ed.) ， Nihon gaiko ， pp. 397-9. (85) (85) Ian Ni 血，Japanese Forei 靭 Policy 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London ， 1977) ， p. 224. (8 のTomoyoshi Hi rai ， Soren no doko 1933-1939 (The Soviet Attitude 1933-1939) ， in Taiheiyo ， vo l. 4， pp. 318-25. (87) (87) Cf. Masaki Miyake ，“ Die Lage J apans beim Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkrieges ，"泊 Sommer 1939: ・Die Grosmachte und der Europaische Krieg ， ed. by Wo 3 July 1938 ， p. 268. (89) (89) Ohata ，“ Nichi ・Doku" ， pp. 68f.: Modey (ed.) ，De terrent Diplomacy ， pp. 57f. (90) (90) Ohata ，“ Nichi ・Doku" ， p. 69.: Modey (ed.) ，Dete"ent Di plomacy ， p. 58. The English translation translation reads: “ 50 long as such cooperation remains limited." The nuance of the original original Japanese expression seems to be slightly different. (91) (91) Ohata ，“ Nichi-Doku" ， p. 73.: Mo r1 ey (ed.) ，Deterrent Diplomacy ， p. 59. (92)δhata ，“ Nichi-Doku" ， p. 73.: Mo r1 ey (ed.) ，Deterrent Diplomacy ， p. 59. (93) (93) Cf. Miyake ，“ Die Lage Jap 叩 s，" pp. 203-209. (94) (94) Kazu Nagai ，“ Nichi ・Ei kankei to gunbu" (Japanese-British Relations and the Japanese Army) ，inShδ wa shi by Miyake et al (eds ふvo l. 2，Tairiku ， p. 195. (95) (95) lbid. ， pp. 195f. (96) (96) Cf. Masaki Miyake ，“ J apans Beweggrund fur den Abschlus des Dreimachtepakts Berlin- Rome'-Tokio ，" in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Untemcht ，Stuttgart 1978/1 1. Cf. further further Masaki Miyake ，Nichi-Doku-l sa 噌 oku domei no ken 砂u(A Study on the Tri- p 副 ite Al liance Berlin-Rome-Tokyo) ， Japanese with English summ 町 (Tokyo ， 1975). (97) (97) Griswold ，1h e Far Eastem poli り， ofthe United States ， p. 63. (98) (98) Ba5sett ，Democracy and Fore 伊lPolicy ， p. 91 ， note 1. (99) (99) On “Praetorianism" ， see Perlmutter ，Th e Military and Politics in Modem Ti mes ， pp. 89f f. Perlmutter 鈎 ys: “Japan was on the brink of praetorianism when the state ， society ，and the forces of ideology a11 converged in support of expansionism." ibid. ， p. 75. 75. (1 00) On the dichotomy between the “peaceloving" and “be l1i cose" countrie.s ， see Ma 鈎 ki Miyake ，Di e deutsche Nachkriegsentwicklung 1945~1975 aus japanischer Si ch ι・Ver- such such einer vergleichenden Beobachtung ， Social and Economic re 鈴 arch on Modem Japan ，Occasional Papers No. 50 ， East Asian In stitute Free University ofBerlin ，(Ber- lin ， 1984). (101) (101) Gilbert Ziebura ，Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik 1922/24-1931: Zwischen Rekon- struktion struktion und Zu 即 nmenbruch (Frankfurt amMain ，1984) ， p. 34. (1 02) W.W. Lockwood ，1 ちe Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change ，1868-1938 (p rinceton ，New Jersey ，1955) ， p. 320.; Ziebura ，Weltwirtschaft ， p.136. p.136. (103) (103) Ziebura ，Weltwirtscha {t， p. 171. (104) (104) lbid. ， pp. 142-4.

- 27- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This This paper is based on my oral presentation for Th e Sino ・European Sympo- sium sium on Republican China and the West 1912-1946 ， Foreign Policy Inter- actions actions within the Global System organized by Professor Dr. Gottfried-Ka r1 Kin dermann ， Director of the Centre for In ternational Politics ，University of Munich ， held in Tutzing and Munich in West Germany from 27 June to 2 July 1983. 1983. Professor Ki ndermann invited me to join this international conference and urged me to make an oral presentation on “Sino-Western Relations in the Perceptions Perceptions of Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Makers 1928 ー 1938". 1 am grateful grateful to him for his friendship and for kindly granting me permission to publish lish an enlarged version of that conference paper in the series of the Bulletin of of the In stitute of Social Sciences ，Meiji University. I 田n also grateful to Dr. John A. Moses ， Department of History ，University of of Queensland ，and to Mr. Justin Dyer ， Oxford. They gave me a lot of useful advice advice on this paper. Dr. Moses also gave me the opportunity to publish an article article on “German Cultural and Political In fluence on Japan ，1870-1914" in Germany in the Pacific and Far East ，1870-1914 ， edited by John A. Moses and Paul Paul M. Kennedy (St. Lucia ， Queensland: University of Queensland Press ， 1977). 1977). 1 owe a particular debt of gratitude to Dr. Moses ，who is now also the editor editor of the Australian Journal o[ Politics and History. He frequently inspired me to publish articles in English. 1 am deeply grateful for all this encourage- ment which enabled me to complete this essay.

- 28 ー