USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 355, 16 July 2004

Articles & Other Documents:

How Niger Uranium Story Defied Wide Skepticism Iran: Nuclear Negotiations States Getting Antidotes to Chemical Weapons Congress Nears OK of Weapons Vaccine Bill Merit Seen In Claims That Sought Uranium Ex-Official Named To Weapons Panel Flaws Cited In Powell's U.N. Speech On Iraq British Report Links Al Qaeda, Baghdad Corrections N. Korea Admits Nuclear Aims, Diplomat Says, But No Deal Near More N. Korean Bombs Likely, U.S. Official Says

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953- 7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

New York Times July 14, 2004 SENATE REPORT How Niger Uranium Story Defied Wide Skepticism By James Risen WASHINGTON, July 13 - Soon after the Central Intelligence Agency heard in 2001 that Iraq was seeking to buy uranium from Niger to build nuclear bombs, the first doubts about the account were raised. But the story was included in President Bush's State of the Union address last year despite sustained skepticism by the State Department, disclaimers by another intelligence agency, assertions that key documents were faked and a dearth of evidence that eventually led C.I.A. officials to grow wary. The Senate Intelligence Committee, in a report released Friday, has provided the most comprehensive review of what went wrong in the Niger case, which became a major political issue last year after documents that described the uranium deal were discredited as forgeries. The Senate report disclosed deep concerns among intelligence agencies about the credibility of the information. It concluded that the C.I.A. had failed to aggressively investigate the Niger matter, described the agency's assessments as "inconsistent, and at times contradictory" and noted that the agency had allowed the uranium claims into intelligence reports to policy makers - and the president's speech shortly before the war - without proper vetting. The C.I.A. first began looking into reports that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger in October 2001, much earlier than previously disclosed. A foreign intelligence service, which is unidentified in the Senate report but which is believed to be Britain's, had said Niger was planning to ship several tons of uranium ore - called yellowcake - to Iraq. The foreign service told the C.I.A. that the Iraqi sales agreement dated to 1999, and had been approved by Niger's president, Tandja Mamadou. At the time, analysts at the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy considered the reports of Iraq's purchases of uranium from Niger to be "possible"; only a State Department intelligence analyst thought the report was "highly suspect," the Senate found. The State Department analyst did not believe that Niger would risk selling uranium to Iraq, in violation of international rules, and also knew that a French consortium controlled Niger's uranium industry, making it nearly impossible for Niger to make large shipments on its own. In February 2002, the C.I.A. received more detailed information from the foreign intelligence service, including what was described as the verbatim text of the sales accord, but the State Department analyst still doubted its veracity. Until then, Iraq's possible relationship with Niger was an issue being debated by a handful of intelligence professionals. That changed on Feb. 12, 2002, when the Defense Intelligence Agency issued a follow-up report that said in its title that Niger "signed an agreement to sell 500 tons of uranium a year to Baghdad,'' and that caught the eye of Vice President Dick Cheney. After he read the Defense Intelligence Agency's report, Mr. Cheney asked his C.I.A. briefer what the agency thought about the issue. The director of the C.I.A.'s center for weapons intelligence, nonproliferation and arms control responded by writing in a report that "information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated." Another unit of the C.I.A., the counterproliferation division of the Directorate of Operations, tried to collect more evidence. Instead of assigning a trained intelligence officer to the Niger case, though, the C.I.A. sent a former American ambassador, Joseph Wilson, to talk to former Niger officials. His wife, Valerie Plame, was an officer in the counterproliferation division, and she had suggested that he be sent to Niger, according to the Senate report. That finding contradicts previous statements by Mr. Wilson, who publicly criticized the Bush administration last year for using the Niger evidence to help justify the war in Iraq. After his wife's identity as a C.I.A. officer was leaked to the news media, Mr. Wilson said she had not played a role in his assignment, and argued that her C.I.A. employment had been disclosed to punish him. The F.B.I. is investigating the source of the leak about Ms. Plame, which was classified information. Mr. Wilson went to Niger in February 2002 and met with the former prime minister, former minister of mines and other business contacts. In his C.I.A. debriefing, Mr. Wilson reported that the former prime minister said he knew of no contracts with any so-called rogue nations while he was prime minister, from 1997 through 1999. But he did say that in June 1999, a businessman insisted that he meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss expanded commercial relations with Baghdad, according to the Senate report. The meeting took place, but the prime minister said he never pursued the idea because of sanctions on Iraq. Analysts at the C.I.A. did not believe that Mr. Wilson had provided significant information, so the agency did not brief Mr. Cheney about it, despite his clear interest in the issue, the Senate found. The C.I.A. issued another report in March 2002, based on information from the same foreign service, saying there was a sales agreement calling for Niger to provide 500 tons of uranium to Baghdad a year. The foreign service did not identify its source to the agency, and the agency told Senate investigators that it still did not know where the information came from. Analysts at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research were still skeptical, but reports of Niger uranium continued to course through the intelligence system. On May 10, 2002, the C.I.A. issued a report for policy makers repeating that a "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger." In September 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency published a report saying that "Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore" even as it warned that it "cannot confirm" whether Iraq had the uranium. In October 2002, a National Intelligence Estimate, an interagency review for policy makers, included the foreign service's Niger reports. But as that information was being published, C.I.A. officials were growing uncomfortable with the evidence. A British white paper on Iraq issued in September 2002, made the allegations public, but C.I.A. officials warned Congress and the White House that they believed the British had exaggerated the case. In a conversation with the deputy national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, persuaded the White House to remove a reference to the uranium purchases from a speech Mr. Bush was planning to give in Cincinnati on Oct. 7, 2002. Just as the C.I.A. was turning cautious, new documents surfaced in Rome that seemed to confirm an Iraq-Niger deal. Once the documents arrived in Washington, the State Department's analyst was dubious. In an e-mail message to other analysts, he wrote, "You'll note that it bears a funky Emb. Of Niger stamp (to make it look official, I guess.)" A month later, however, the Navy issued an intelligence report saying a large quantity of uranium from Niger was being stored in warehouses in the West African nation of Benin, and was destined for Iraq. The report included the name and phone number of a West African businessman coordinating the deal, someone supposedly willing to provide further information. The Senate found that the C.I.A. never contacted the businessman. "No one even thought to do that," an agency official told the Senate committee. A month later, an American defense attaché finally went to the Benin warehouses and found only bales of cotton. In January 2003, the State Department's analyst sent an e-mail message to other analysts saying that he believed that the documents obtained in Italy were fake. The "uranium purchase agreement probably is a hoax," he wrote. But by that time, the White House was already working on Mr. Bush's State of the Union address, and wanted to include some mention of Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium, the Senate report said. On Jan. 27, the White House gave Mr. Tenet a draft copy of the address to review. He passed it on to his executive assistant to give to other C.I.A. officials. He never read the speech, he told the Senate, and did not realize it included the uranium reference. It was left to midlevel C.I.A. and White House officials to deal with the speech. A C.I.A. proliferation expert talked with his White House counterpart about the uranium reference, but he did not question its credibility, the Senate found. The next day, in his State of the Union speech, Mr. Bush said, "The British government has learned that recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." His address suddenly gave the uranium issue high visibility, but it could not withstand global scrutiny. In February 2003, Washington sent copies of the Iraq-Niger documents to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors nuclear proliferation. The next month, the agency determined that the documents were forgeries. On March 11, the C.I.A. issued its own assessment, in which it said it could not dispute the atom agency's conclusion. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/14/politics/14nige.html?pagewanted=all

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

New York Times July 14, 2004 Iran: Nuclear Negotiations Iran said it would resume negotiations this month with Britain, and France over its disputed nuclear program. The announcement gave no details on the location or likely content of the talks. The European countries brokered an agreement with Iran last year under which Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and to allow unannounced inspections of its nuclear facilities. But Iran was angered last month by a tough resolution sponsored by the three countries that rebuked it for poor cooperation with the United Nations nuclear monitoring agency, and said it would resume the manufacture and assembly of uranium enrichment centrifuges which can be used to make bomb-grade material. --Reuters http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/14/international/14brie.html?pagewanted=all

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Los Angeles Times July 14, 2004 IN BRIEF / WASHINGTON, D.C. States Getting Antidotes to Chemical Weapons From Times Wire Reports States will begin getting stocks of antidotes to chemical weapons under a long-awaited federal program to boost response to a potential terrorist attack, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said. New York and Boston, sites of this summer's political conventions, are among the first areas that will get the "chem- packs." The gurney-sized packs come with an assortment of antidotes to the many chemicals available to a terrorist; atropine to fight nerve agents, for instance, or amyl nitrite for cyanide. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-briefs14.2jul14,1,6031845.story?coll=la-headlines-nation

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Los Angeles Times July 14, 2004 Congress Nears OK of Weapons Vaccine Bill By JIM ABRAMS, Associated Press Writer WASHINGTON — Lawmakers who experienced the dangers of anthrax firsthand are sending President Bush legislation to give private companies $5.6 billion in incentives to develop antidotes to biological and chemical weapons. Over the next 10 years, the Project Bioshield Act would give the pharmaceutical industry the financial guarantees it says it needs to research and produce vaccines and antidotes for bioterror agents that otherwise would have little marketable value. With a House vote Wednesday, Congress was completing work on the legislation Bush requested in a State of the Union speech 18 months ago. Agreement between the House and Senate was delayed by a dispute over how to guarantee a steady stream of funding to drug makers without taking away Congress' authority to make annual decisions on spending levels. Protection against the weapons is of personal interest to many lawmakers who have seen their offices closed and their lives disrupted twice by biological threats since the Sept. 11 attacks. It took three months and $23 million to clean up Senate office buildings after deadly anthrax bacteria was discovered in October 2001 in the mailroom of then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D. Hundreds of people who work in those buildings were given antibiotics such as Cipro. Three Senate office buildings were also closed for up to a week this February after the biological toxin ricin was found in the office of Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn. The legislation guarantees that any company that develops countermeasures to treat diseases and conditions caused by bioterrorism would have a buyer in the federal government. Also included would be antidotes for chemical, radiological and nuclear agents. Among the first candidates for purchase are next-generation anthrax vaccines. The government eventually hopes to stockpile enough doses to inoculate 25 million people. California-based VaxGen Inc. and Britain's Avecia have the leading candidates. Safety testing is under way, but the hope is that the newer type of vaccine could cut in half the number of shots now required for anthrax inoculation, with few side effects. The bill also would accelerate the approval process for vaccines and, in an emergency, let the government distribute certain treatments before the Food and Drug Administration approves them. In cases where the private sector does not respond to the federal incentives, the bill allows the government to operate emergency programs to research and produce vaccines. The House passed a bioshield bill in July last year, but Senate appropriators balked at language that would have made spending automatic, saying that would undermine their authority to oversee and determine annual spending and create an entitlement for the drug industry. In the compromise unanimously approved by the Senate in May and endorsed by the House Wednesday, Congress agreed to spend $5.6 billion over the next decade while retaining control over how the money is appropriated. Among the agents to be included in Project Bioshield are smallpox, anthrax, botulism toxin, plague and Ebola. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/ats-ap_top13jul14,1,1360540.story?coll=sns-ap-topnews

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Los Angeles Times July 15, 2004 THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ Merit Seen In Claims That Iraq Sought Uranium British and U.S. panels say there was evidence that the Hussein regime tried to deal with Niger. By Doyle McManus, Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON — In reports released during the last week, U.S. and British panels sharply criticized their two governments for making ill-founded claims about Iraq's efforts to build weapons of mass destruction — claims that were the central rationale for the U.S.-led invasion of the country in March 2003. But on at least one hotly debated issue — Iraq's purported interest in buying uranium from the West African nation of Niger — the two governments may have been on stronger footing than generally believed, both investigations found. In a report issued Wednesday, the British commission of inquiry, headed by Lord Robin Butler, a retired civil service chief, found that Saddam Hussein's government had no usable stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons, contrary to assertions by President Bush and British Prime Minister . But on the issue of Hussein's interest in nuclear weapons, the commission said, "The British government had intelligence from several different sources" indicating that Iraqi officials sought to buy uranium from Niger in 1999. "The intelligence was credible," the report says. Last week, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence excoriated U.S. intelligence agencies for assessments of Iraq's weapons programs that "either overstated or were not supported by" the evidence. But on the question of whether Iraq had sought uranium from Africa for nuclear weapons, the committee found that the CIA's statement, in a 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, "was reasonable" at the time. The committee added, however, that the evidence behind the assertion turned out to be weak, and charged that the CIA failed to make that clear to policymakers. The issue has been a point of unusual contention for two reasons: Bush mentioned Iraq's alleged uranium-buying effort in his State of the Union speech in January 2003, as he was urging the nation to war, only to acknowledge later that the assertion was not backed by conclusive evidence. And the controversy led to a criminal investigation after an administration official leaked the name of an undercover CIA officer to a newspaper columnist in an apparent attempt to discredit the operative's husband, a prominent critic of the administration. In the State of the Union address, Bush said that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." But as the White House later acknowledged, CIA analysts did not believe that the British report was well-founded, and although the administration never stated that the allegation was false, it did admit that the evidence behind the statement did not support the inclusion in a major presidential address. The Senate report quoted a written CIA warning to the White House three months before the speech: "The Africa story is overblown…. We differed with the British." As a result, the controversy over uranium from Niger turned into a political embarrassment for Bush — and spawned a second imbroglio, over the role played by Joseph C. Wilson IV, a former ambassador. In February 2002, the CIA sent Wilson to Niger to investigate reports that Iraqi officials had sought to buy uranium. Wilson reported that "there was nothing to support allegations either that Iraq had tried to obtain or succeeded in purchasing uranium from Niger." More than a year later, in July 2003, Wilson went public, telling the story of his secret mission and denouncing the administration for "twisting" intelligence. Eight days later, in his syndicated column, Robert Novak wrote that Wilson had been sent to Niger on the recommendation of his wife, a covert CIA officer named Valerie Plame. Novak said his information had come from "two senior administration officials." Plame's unmasking created an uproar in Congress and prompted the Justice Department to open a criminal investigation of the White House staff to determine who had disclosed her identity and whether laws were broken. The investigation is continuing. The Senate committee report questioned Wilson's account on several issues. Wilson has maintained that his wife did not suggest him for the mission to Niger, but the committee found that she did, noting that another CIA official said Plame had "offered up his name." "That's just false," Wilson said in a telephone interview Wednesday. He said he was preparing a written rebuttal to the Senate report. A senior intelligence official said the CIA supports Wilson's version: "Her bosses say she did not initiate the idea of her husband going…. They asked her if he'd be willing to go, and she said yes," the official said. The Senate report also accused Wilson of exaggerating his knowledge of forged documents that purported to be evidence of an Iraqi purchase of uranium. Wilson acknowledged that he might have "misspoken" on that issue. The committee found that intelligence analysts recalled Wilson's report on his mission to Niger as ambiguous and unimpressive, not as the conclusive refutation he has sometimes described. In a strange mirror-image reaction, the State Department's intelligence bureau, which was skeptical of the uranium story, believed that Wilson's report supported its view — but the CIA, which at the time believed the uranium story, also thought that Wilson's report supported its position, the report found. The CIA's summary of Wilson's 2002 mission said he reported that an Iraqi delegation had attempted to start trade discussions with a former prime minister of Niger and that the former prime minister believed the Iraqis were after uranium. "That's legitimate," Wilson said Wednesday. "But the administration's assertion was that Iraq had attempted to buy uranium, and what I reported didn't support that." Times staff writer Greg Miller contributed to this report. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-uranium15jul15,1,4698277.story?coll=la-home- headlines

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Post July 15, 2004 Pg. 7 Ex-Official Named To Weapons Panel President Bush appointed longtime Pentagon official Walter B. Slocombe to an independent commission investigating U.S. intelligence operations, particularly the flawed prewar information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Bush formed the commission -- called the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction -- in February after criticism surfaced about whether such weapons existed in Iraq. Allegations about such weapons were an important factor in the run-up to the war that drove Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from power. Slocombe will replace Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel to Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. Cutler has stepped down for personal reasons. Slocombe served in the Pentagon as undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50153-2004Jul14.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Los Angeles Times July 15, 2004 Pg. 1 THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ Flaws Cited In Powell's U.N. Speech On Iraq State Department analysts saw errors in early drafts, prompting revisions, report says. By Greg Miller, Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON — Days before Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was to present the case for war with Iraq to the United Nations, State Department analysts found dozens of factual problems in drafts of his speech, according to new documents contained in the Senate report on intelligence failures released last week. Two memos included with the Senate report listed objections that State Department experts lodged as they reviewed successive drafts of the Powell speech. Although many of the claims considered inflated or unsupported were removed through painstaking debate by Powell and intelligence officials, the speech he ultimately presented contained material that was in dispute among State Department experts. Powell's Feb. 5, 2003, speech to the U.N. Security Council was crafted by the CIA at the behest of the White House. Intended to be the Bush administration's most compelling case by one of its most credible spokesmen that a confrontation with Saddam Hussein was necessary, the speech has become a central moment in the lead-up to war. The speech also has become a point of reference in the failure of U.S. intelligence. Although Powell has said he struggled to ensure that all of his arguments were sound and backed by intelligence from several sources, it nonetheless became a key example of how the administration advanced false claims to justify war. Powell has expressed disappointment that, after working to remove dubious claims, the intelligence backing the remaining points of his U.N. speech has turned out to be flawed. "It turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong, and in some cases deliberately misleading, and for that I am disappointed and I regret it," Powell said in May. A State Department spokesman said late Wednesday, however, that the United States made the right decision "to go into Iraq, and the world today is safer because we did." Offering the first detailed look at claims that were stripped from the case for war advanced by Powell, a Jan. 31, 2003, memo cataloged 38 claims to which State Department analysts objected. In response, 28 were either removed from the draft or altered, according to the Senate report, which was released Friday and included scathing criticism of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence services. The analysts, describing many of the claims as "weak" and assigning grades to arguments on a 5-star scale, warned Powell against making an array of allegations they deemed implausible. They also warned against including Iraqi communications intercepts they deemed ambiguous and against speculating that terrorists might "come through Baghdad and pick-up biological weapons" as if they were stocked on store shelves. The documents underscore the extent to which administration and intelligence officials were culling a vast collection of thinly sourced claims as they sought to assemble the case for war. But the origin and full scope of some errors remain unclear because Senate investigators were denied access to a number of relevant documents, according to aides involved in the probe. The CIA rejected requests for initial versions of what became the Powell presentation on the grounds that they were internal working documents and not finished products. And the Republican-controlled committee did not seek access to a 40-plus-page document that was prepared by Vice President Dick Cheney's office and submitted to State Department speechwriters detailing the case the administration wanted Powell to make. According to the Senate report, the idea for the speech originated in December 2002, when the National Security Council instructed the CIA to prepare a public response to Iraq's widely criticized 12,000-page declaration claiming that it had no banned weapons. It wasn't until late January 2003 that intelligence officials learned their work would form the basis for a speech Powell would give to the United Nations. Powell and several of his aides then spent several days at CIA headquarters working on drafts of the speech, in what participants have described as sessions marked by heated arguments over what to include. When Powell appeared before the U.N., he made a series of sweeping assertions that have crumbled under postwar scrutiny — including claims that Iraq had chemical weapons stockpiles, was pursuing nuclear weapons and that "there can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more." But the documents in the Senate report show that earlier drafts of the speech contained dozens of additional, disputed claims; they provide the most detailed glimpse to date into the last-minute scramble to strike those claims from the text. Several of the dubious statements in the early drafts had to do with alleged Iraqi efforts to thwart weapons inspections that had been restarted by the U.N. One allegation was that Iraq was trying to keep incriminating weapons files from falling into the hands of inspectors by having operatives carry the sensitive documents around in cars. The State Department reviewers called the claim "highly questionable" and warned that it would invite scorn from critics and U.N. inspection officials. Another claim was that Iraq was having members of its intelligence services pose as weapons scientists to dupe U.N. inspectors. But the State Department noted that such a ruse was "not credible" because of the level of sophistication it would require. "Interviews typically involve such topics as nuclear physics, microbiology, rocket science and the like," the State Department reviewers wrote, indicating that even a well-rehearsed intelligence operative would be hard-pressed to pull off such a charade. In their critique, State Department analysts repeatedly warned that Powell was being put in the position of drawing the most sinister conclusions from satellite images, communications intercepts and human intelligence reports that had alternative, less-incriminating explanations. In one section that remained in the speech, Powell showed aerial images of a supposed decontamination vehicle circling a suspected chemical weapons site. "We caution," State Department analysts wrote, "that Iraq has given … what may be a plausible account for this activity — that this was an exercise involving the movement of conventional explosives." The presence of a water truck "is common in such an event," they concluded. The experts labeled as "weak" a claim that a photograph of an Iraqi with "marks on his arm" was evidence that Baghdad was conducting biological experiments on humans. The language was struck from the speech, although Powell told the Security Council that Iraq had been conducting such experiments since the 1980s. State Department analysts also made it clear that they disagreed with CIA and other analysts on the allegation that aluminum tubes imported by Iraq were for use in a nuclear weapons program. "We will work with our [intelligence community] colleagues to fix some of the more egregious errors in the tubes discussion," the memo said. In the speech, Powell acknowledged disagreement among analysts on the tubes, but included the claim. The Senate report concluded last week that the tubes were for conventional rockets. In a section on nuclear weapons, the analysts argued against using a communications intercept they described as "taken out of context" and "highly misleading." There is no more information on what was in the intercept, but Powell in his speech referred to intercepted communications that he said showed that "Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors." Aside from the two memos, the Senate report refers to other language that was deleted from drafts of Powell's speech, although it is not clear who urged the items to be struck. In one case, Powell was to say that the aluminum tubes were so unsuitable for use in conventional rockets that if he were to roll one on a table, "the mere pressure of my hand would deform it." Department of Energy engineers said that statement was incorrect. For all their skepticism, State Department analysts did not challenge some of the fundamental allegations in the Powell speech that have since been proved unfounded. Chief among them is the claim that Iraq had mobile biological weapons laboratories, an accusation based largely on information from an Iraqi defector code-named "Curveball." What the State Department didn't know at the time was that a CIA representative who had met with Curveball found him to have a drinking problem and to be highly unreliable. The CIA representative's red flags were not relayed to Powell until recently, a State Department official said, when then-CIA Director George J. Tenet contacted Powell to tell him that problems with Curveball would be detailed in the Senate report. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/la-na-powell15jul15,1,4127976.story?coll=la-home-headlines

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Times July 15, 2004 British Report Links Al Qaeda, Baghdad By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times A British government report made public yesterday provides new information showing that al Qaeda terrorists had contacts with Iraqi intelligence in developing chemical arms and that the group worked with a Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist. The special report by former top civil servant Robin Butler on British prewar intelligence found gaps in reporting on Iraq's weapons and also disclosed new details of terrorist activities of al Qaeda associate Abu Musab Zarqawi, who is leading attacks in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. On al Qaeda's efforts to obtain nuclear arms, the report stated that Osama bin Laden set up a laboratory in Afghanistan in 1999 and that a former Pakistani nuclear scientist, Bashir Mahmoud, was "associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda." For al Qaeda's chemical arms development, the report said, intelligence reports from 1999 identified al Qaeda member Abu Khabbab as "an explosives and chemicals expert who ran training courses which included information on how to make and use poisons." Those reports were confirmed after the ouster of the Taliban, when U.S. troops found videos showing chemical arms tests on animals and chemical arms training manuals. The British report also said Khabbab was developing biological agents, a claim that was confirmed by the discovery of a laboratory in Kandahar and evidence that scientists had been recruited for weapons work. A March 2003 British intelligence report stated that Zarqawi "has established sleeper cells in Baghdad, to be activated during a U.S. occupation of the city." "These cells apparently intend to attack U.S. targets using car bombs and other weapons," the report said, noting that "it is also possible that they have received [chemical-biological] materials from terrorists in the [Kurdish Autonomous Zone]." The report also said that "al Qaeda-associated terrorists continued to arrive in Baghdad in early March." The report traced the history of intelligence on al Qaeda's interest and actions in seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons from the late 1990s. A January 2000 intelligence report stated that bin Laden in the autumn of 1999 "had recruited ... chemicals specialists." "Our assessment remains that [bin Laden] has some toxic chemical and biological materials and an understanding of their utility as terrorist weapons. But we have yet to see hard intelligence that he possesses genuine nuclear material." Then after the September 11 terrorist attacks, British intelligence warned that bin Laden's suicide-attack philosophy "had changed the calculus of threat." The spy service concluded that terrorists now sought to "cause casualties on a massive scale, undeterred by the fear of alienating the public or their own supporters" that had been a constraining factor in the 1990s, the report said. "In the context of [bin Laden's] jihad, casualties and destruction could be an end in themselves as much as a means to an end," the report said, quoting a 2001 intelligence report. "He has no interest in negotiation and there is no indication that he can be deterred." British intelligence assessments of connections between al Qaeda and Saddam's government were similar to U.S. intelligence assessments, the report said, adding that there were "contacts between al Qaeda and the Iraqi Directorate General of Intelligence since 1998." "Those reports described al Qaeda seeking toxic chemicals as well as other conventional terrorist equipment," the report said. "Some accounts suggested that Iraqi chemical experts may have been in Afghanistan during 2000." The British concluded that the contacts did not lead to "practical cooperation" because of mutual distrust. "Intelligence nonetheless indicates that ... meetings have taken place between senior Iraqi representatives and senior al Qaeda operatives," the report said. "Some reports also suggest that Iraq may have trained some al Qaeda terrorists since 1998. Al Qaeda has shown interest in gaining chemical and biological expertise from Iraq, but we do not know whether any such training was provided." http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040715-121130-6893r.htm

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

(Editor’s Note: Article referenced below, Skepticism About Defector's Weapons Allegations Ignored, appeared in CPC Outreach Journal 354-071304.) Washington Post July 16, 2004 Pg. 2 Corrections A July 13 article about an Iraqi defector who said Iraq had mobile facilities for making biological weapons said the man was questioned by an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The employee, who at the time was detailed to the CIA, worked for the Defense Department but not for the Defense Intelligence Agency. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53685-2004Jul15.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

USA Today July 16, 2004 Pg. 9 N. Korea Admits Nuclear Aims, Diplomat Says, But No Deal Near By Barbara Slavin, USA Today WASHINGTON — North Korea has admitted for the first time that most of its nuclear activities are related to weapons production, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday. The admission, at six-nation talks in China last month, was a "positive element" cited by Kelly after the third round of talks with the repressive Asian nation. But he said North Korea still denies enriching uranium for weapons, and "it is clear we are still far from agreement." The talks, due to resume in September, are aimed at getting North Korea to give up all nuclear programs. Other participants in the talks are China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. At the last round, a U.S. delegation led by Kelly made the first detailed proposal that North Korea give up its nuclear programs in return for a pledge not to attack the country and contributions of fuel oil from North Korea's neighbors. The Bush administration, which in the past has insisted it would not give in to "nuclear blackmail," has "no plans to provide funds" to North Korea, Kelly said, except for possible expansion of a program used in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union to contain or dismantle nuclear facilities. Kelly was pressed by Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, the committee's ranking Democrat, to explain how encouraging others to give aid was not "giving in to blackmail." Kelly said there hasn't been a change in the U.S. position. "The United States may not offer tangible benefits, but our allies may see fit" to do so, Kelly said. "The world loves a reformed sinner, and there would be many who would be receptive to helping North Korea's development" if it completely gave up nuclear activities. Korea experts say pressure from South Korea and Japan, which have increased contacts with North Korea, pushed the Bush administration to make a concrete offer. They say politics is also a reason. President Bush's Democratic opponent, John Kerry, has accused Bush of wasting three years while North Korea amassed fuel for as many as six nuclear bombs. Kerry says that as president he would hold direct talks with North Korea about all its concerns. Asia scholars say North Korea is also trying to look flexible in case Bush is re-elected, but it is unlikely to make concessions before the vote. "The North Koreans are playing it smarter, but they'll drag it on as best they can," said Jack Pritchard, a former U.S. envoy to talks with North Korea. He told the committee that North Korea was unlikely to accept any economic offer that did not have significant American participation, because North Korea wants the recognition that U.S. involvement would convey. Pritchard told the committee that the Bush administration should look into non-nuclear ways to help North Korea meet its energy needs and consider building a non-nuclear power plant at a site where work has been suspended on two nuclear reactors promised under a 1994 accord. That agreement began to unravel when North Korea admitted in October 2002 to having a program to enrich uranium. The North Koreans now deny the admission. http://www.usatoday.com/usatonline/20040716/6371995s.htm

(Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Post July 16, 2004 Pg. 18 More N. Korean Bombs Likely, U.S. Official Says By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer North Korea is likely to be producing nuclear bombs even as it conducts negotiations with the United States and four other countries on ending its weapons programs, the senior U.S. official responsible for those talks told Congress yesterday. "Time is certainly a valid factor in this," said James A. Kelly, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "We don't know the details, but it's quite possible that North Korea is proceeding along, developing additional fissionable material and possibly additional nuclear weapons." Although North Korea has asserted that it has produced weapons-grade plutonium since the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear programs began 20 months ago -- and though U.S. intelligence analysts broadly believe that the number of nuclear weapons held by North Korea has increased from two to at least eight during this period -- it is highly unusual for a senior administration official to concede publicly that North Korea's stockpile may be growing. After four negotiating sessions with North Korea and its neighbors since April 2003, Kelly said, it "is clear we are still far from agreement." The first round included China and later expanded to involve South Korea, Japan and Russia. Democrats on the committee scolded the administration for waiting too long to present North Korea with a detailed proposal for ending the crisis. At the most recent six-nation talks, held in Beijing last month, the administration proposed that once North Korea declares it would end its programs, U.S. allies such as South Korea could provide immediate energy assistance. North Korea then would have three months to disclose its programs and have its claims verified by U.S. intelligence. After that, the United States would join in providing Pyongyang with written security assurances and participate in a process that might ultimately result in the normalization of relations. "The bottom line is that we now confront a much more dangerous adversary than we did in 2001," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), the ranking Democrat on the panel. He accused the administration of adopting a policy of "benign neglect" even after learning that Pyongyang had a clandestine nuclear effort, and then taking "more than two years to resolve its internal divisions and settle on an approach for dealing with North Korea." Under questioning, Kelly made it clear that improving relations with North Korea would take much more than the dismantling of its nuclear programs. In particular, he said, North Korea would need to improve its human rights record. "We're not looking to bribe North Korea to end its nuclear weapons state," Kelly said. "We see this as a very important objective, but then we have made clear that normalization of our relations would have to follow these other important issues. And human rights is co-equal in importance, perhaps even more important, than conventional forces, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, matters of that sort." In response to the administration's proposal, North Korea has demanded immediate assistance from the United States once it freezes its programs. Kelly said the administration is still studying the North Korean proposal, which he called vague. He told lawmakers that the administration does not consider the security assurances a "reward" or a benefit that could be claimed by North Korea as a U.S. concession. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53165-2004Jul15.html

(Return to Articles and Documents List)