global asia In Focus global asia Vol. 10, No. 3, FALL 2015 98 106 112 Yun-han Chu, Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu, Hsin-hsin Pan Mark Weatherall Min-hua Huang & Wen-chin Wu & Jack Wu & Jie Lu Why authoritarian or Why are levels of Perceptions in non-democratic trust in political East Asia of ’s governments enjoy institutions in Asia’s rise and how this In Focus more popularity than democracies on will influence democratic states. the decline? US thinking. Asian Baromet er

SurveyEast Asia Wrestles With Questions of Trust and Democracy

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1 Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew Nathan and Doh Chull 3 Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Regime Legitimacy in East Asia: Shin, “Introduction,” in Yun-han Chu et. al. eds., How East Asians Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). View Democracy (Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 1-34. 4 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New 2 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) Why Non-Democratic States Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965). Fare Better than Democracies By Yun-han Chu, Hsin-hsin Pan

& Wen-chin Wu ing sources of regime legitimacy in 13 East Asian shared among East Asian citizens. The diver- countries, including , China, Hong gence in regime support to a substantial degree Kong, , , , , manifests itself in the way people understand the , the , , , meaning of democracy. East Asians tend to con- and . Our data suggest that ceptualize democracy in terms of output-related many authoritarian countries enjoy a higher level policy performance rather than input-related

Barometer Survey In Focus: For proponents of orthodox East Asia poses an intriguing puzzle to the lit- of regime legitimacy than their democratic coun- norms and procedures. theories of Western liberal erature of comparative democratization, because terparts in East Asia. Put another way, a high level the region has evidently defied the global trend of regime legitimacy enjoyed by many East Asian Regime Legitimacy in East Asia democracy, the results of of concurrent movement toward democracy authoritarian and hybrid regimes prevents them Legitimacy by definition concerns how power the third wave of the Asian over the last three decades.1 Since the start of from experiencing democratic transitions. may be used in ways that citizens consciously Asian Barometer Surveys pose a third-wave democratization in 1974, more than Furthermore, we investigate sources of regime accept. The survival and effective functioning of serious challenge. 80 countries have gravitated into the orbit of legitimacy in East Asian countries. Based on modern political regimes depends on the public’s democratization, triggering a series of politi- the political system theory elaborated by David will to familiarize and support them. As Bruce It turns out that authoritarian cal reforms, including allowing media freedom Easton (1965),2 classic Western democratic the- Gilley forcefully points out, regimes without or non-democratic governments and holding competitive national elections. In ory emphasizes the input side of a political sys- legitimacy devote more resources to maintain- East Asia, however, the wave of democratization tem — including universal suffrage, competi- ing their rule and less to effective governance. in East Asia enjoy more has swept through only a few countries. While tive elections and popular accountability — as When citizens’ regime support declines, regimes support from their people South Korea and Taiwan fully democratized in the defining features of democracy and sources are vulnerable to overthrow or collapse.3 Empiri- than the region’s democratic the 1990s, Thailand has swung back and forth of regime legitimacy. With the ABS3 data, how- cally, one can measure the level of regime legiti- governments. Yun-han Chu, between democracy and military rule; the Philip- ever, we demonstrate that non-democratic macy by examining to what extent the existing pines, Indonesia and Mongolia are still struggling regimes denying democratic rights to their citi- system of government enjoys popular support. Hsin-hsin Pan and Wen-chin Wu with democratic consolidation; and other Asian zens may still enjoy higher levels of political sup- Western normative political theory typically dissect the survey’s findings to countries remain resistant to democratic grav- port if they deliver economic wellbeing and good expects democratic regimes to be more legiti- explain why. ity as late as this second decade of the 21st cen- governance. In other words, empirical data from mate than authoritarian ones, because democ- tury. More surprisingly, some of the most long- East Asian countries suggest that regime legiti- racy is built on the consent of the ruled and uni- lived authoritarian regimes, such as mainland macy turns out to be created, maintained, and versal suffrage that ensure the participation of China, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, have destroyed less at the input but more at the output citizens in the policy-making process. A fair and sustained themselves and thrived in the past dec- side of the political system. participatory democracy with citizens’ collective ades against all odds, and they are expected to In the rest of this essay, we will first flesh out input, the argument goes, produces better out- sustain their rule for many years to come. As a how the literature of liberal democracy and put to improve the wellbeing of the general pub- result, authoritarian resilience in so many East regime legitimacy fails to apply to political devel- lic. In contrast, authoritarian regimes are ques- Asian countries raises a puzzling question: why opment in East Asia. While theories of liberal tioned for their lack of legitimacy because they can they successfully resist the momentum of democracies emphasize the input side of the suppress political competition and deny citizens democratization in an age of globalization and political systems as the fundamental cornerstone the right to a final say over the selection of gov- digital revolution? of regime legitimacy, East Asians tend to place ernment leaders. In this essay, we use the third-wave Asian emphasis on the output side when evaluating The difference in the level of legitimacy can Barometer Surveys (ABS3) to track down micro- the legitimacy of their political regimes. Further- be further explained by David Easton’s theory of level evidence and explain why we still find more, we also see that a higher level of regime political systems. Members of a political system, entrenched authoritarian rule in so many Asian support found in the non-democratic regimes according to Easton (1965), express their sup- countries. We answer this puzzle by investigat- is buttressed by a cognitive foundation widely port for the system in a way that corresponds to

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5 E.g. Bruce Gilley, “The determinants of state legitimacy: Results for 72 not only by local scholars or research institutions but also by credible Political Change in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 7 Yun-han Chu, “Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate countries,” International Political Science Review, 27, 1 (2006): 47-71. international collaborative survey projects, such as Asian Barometer 2005) and Teng Zhenglai and Sujian Guo, eds., Reviving Legitimacy: over the Chinese Model,” The China Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 6 Most work in English on the subject has used surveys organized and the World Values Survey. See Tang Wenfang, Public Opinion and Lessons For and From China (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011). (Spring 2013): 1-42.

FIGURE 1 Regime Support in East Asia FIGURE 2 Government Responsiveness and Regime Support in East Asia Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Wave 3 (2014-2016). Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Wave 3 (2014-2016).

100 Regime % Thailand support Thailand Singapore Cambodia Vietnam 88.9 Malaysia Indonesia 80 how their demands (inputs) are met by the pol- Singapore icies (outputs). Since democracies have institu- Philippines Mongolia tionalized political participation and electoral 86.1 China competition, citizens may give more support 60 Taiwan to the regime. In other words, the emphasis on Cambodia the input side of the political system, in the eyes 84.7 Barometer Survey In Focus: of some theorists of democracy such as Rob- 40 ert Dahl (1971),4 has made liberal democracy a Vietnam Japan more desirable and legitimate form of political 83.5 South Korea regime than any other alternatives. Many empir- 20 ical studies also demonstrate that democratic 10 % 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Asian Malaysia Regime Responsiveness regimes usually have better policy outputs than their authoritarian counterparts, such as more 80.7 protection of property rights, more provision of ing democratic rights to their citizens might still side of the political system. Instead, outputs of the public goods, and a lower rate of child mortality. Indonesia enjoy a higher level of political support if they political system can garner support among citi- However, East Asia poses a serious challenge to 78.5 deliver economic wellbeing and good govern- zens and legitimize the system. these liberal democratic theories. As illustrated ance.5 On the other hand, mechanisms of popular Drawn from the ABS3 data, Figure 2 further in Figure 1, East Asian citizens under non-demo- Philippines accountability and democratic representation do illustrates our argument. In it, we plot the percent- cratic regimes usually register higher regime sup- 76.2 not immunize democracies from poor economic ages of agreement with the statement “How well port and loyalty than their counterparts in demo- performance and bad governance. do you think the government responds to what cratic regimes. Specifically, when presented with China For instance, China has been regarded as a people want?” against the percentages of their the statement, “A system like ours, even if it runs regime with limited legitimacy in the eyes of fol- support for the regime in each surveyed country. 69.1 into problems, deserves the people’s support,” lowers of Western liberal democracy, since it lacks The relationship between perceptions of govern- more than 80 percent of respondents in Thailand, direct and competitive elections. However, the ment responsiveness and regime support, as sug- Mongolia Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia empirical data from survey after survey have cor- gested in Figure 2, is positive with a correlation agreed with this statement. Meanwhile, citizens 61.4 roborated our findings, showing that the Chinese coefficient of 0.53, indicating that a higher per- in democratic countries such as Mongolia, Tai- one-party regime actually enjoys substantial pop- ception of government responsiveness is associ- wan, Japan and South Korea express substantially Taiwan ular support.6 A plausible explanation suggests ated with higher regime support. Furthermore, lower support for their regimes. If democratic pro- 51.1 that the Chinese political system under one-party Figure 2 demonstrates that citizens in non-dem- cedures, such as free elections and multi-party rule has succeeded in delivering a “for the people” ocratic regimes, China and Vietnam in particular, competition, are key components of regime legiti- Hong Kong government. Although the current Chinese politi- perceive more responsiveness from their govern- macy, these findings are indeed implausible. 45.2 cal system fails to meet the criteria “of the people” ments and express higher regime support than and “by the people,” this system can still enjoy those in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, the three Input vs. Output in Political SystemS Japan sustainable public support as long as it maintains highest-rated liberal democracies in the region. The high regime support and loyalty in non-dem- its “for the people” track record.7 In addition to government responsiveness, the 34.1 ocratic East Asian countries not only account The validity of this explanation and its implica- ABS3 also investigates citizens’ evaluation of the for authoritarian resilience in the region, but tions for authoritarian resilience is not confined improvement in their families’ economic situa- Korea also shed light on the inadequacy of existing lib- to the Chinese political system, but can be further tion. Similar to Figure 2, we draw Figure 3 (over- eral theories that overemphasize the input side 27.3 extended to other East Asian countries. In short, leaf) to illustrate the relationship between East of the political system. Alternatively, Bruce Gil- we have to entertain the possibility that regime Asians’ regime support and their evaluation of ley argues that non-democratic regimes deny- 0 % 20 40 60 80 100 legitimacy does not solely depend on the input the economic situation of their countries com-

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FIGURE 3 Economic Evaluation and Regime Support in East Asia FIGURE 4 Popular Assessment of Democracy level by country Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Wave 3 (2014-2016). Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Wave 3 (2014-2016).

100 10 Regime % Country mean on 10-point scale support from 0 (“completely undemocratic”) Thailand Singapore Vietnam to 10 (“completely democratic”) Malaysia 8 80 Cambodia Indonesia Philippines 6 China 60 Taiwan Mongolia 4

Hong Kong

Barometer Survey In Focus: 40 2

Japan

South Korea 0 20 0 % 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Japan Korea China

Asian Taiwan Economic Evaluation Mongolia Thailand Malaysia Vietnam Philippines Hong Kong Indonesia Cambodia Singapore

pared with what it was a few years ago. Figure Asians do have very different 0 represents “completely undemocratic” and 10 The real story is more complicated than this. 3 shows that the better respondents think the “completely democratic.” Citizens living under Besides, we have to explain why people in Tai- economic conditions in their countries are, the understandings of democracy non-democratic regimes such as China, Vietnam, wan and South Korea do not rate their own politi- higher regime support they tend to express. Both from people in the Western Singapore and Malaysia rate their countries rel- cal system more favorably on the 10-point dem- Figure 2 and Figure 3 suggest that non-democra- atively higher than citizens living under demo- ocratic scale. The key to this puzzle is how East cies in East Asia still enjoy a higher level of polit- world. Even for citizens in cratic regimes. For instance, citizens in Mongo- Asians actually understand democracy. While ical support if their citizens perceive that their East Asian liberal democracies, lia on average rate their political system below democracy has become the only game in town in governments are able to deliver economic well- including Japan, South Korea the passing grade of 6.0. A majority of people in many Asian societies, it remains a contested con- being and good governance. It is not a coinci- Taiwan, South Korea and Japan still think their cept, having numerous connotations in popular dence that citizens in Taiwan, South Korea and and Taiwan, the procedural respective political system is far from being com- political discourse. To tap into people’s conception Japan both give a very downbeat assessment of and liberty components are pletely democratic (not much above the passing of democracy, ABS3 employed a four-question bat- their country’s performance and register a rather grade of 6.0). While these results might look per- tery. According to our prior research using open- low level of regime support. This implies that the easily subordinate to good plexing to some observers, our respondents are ended questions, East Asians’ understanding of mechanism of popular accountability and demo- governance and social at least cognitively consistent. For example, Viet- democracy typically contained four different com- cratic representation does not protect East Asian namese citizens think that their system is very ponents — namely, norms and procedures, free- democracies from reaping a disparaging level of equity components. democratic and also deserves their support. dom and liberty, social equity and good govern- support for the system of government. Why do people in Vietnam, China, Singapore, ance. The four-question battery was designed as Malaysia and Cambodia think this way? The most repetitive measures. For each of the four questions, how east asians define Democracy objectively non-democratic regimes paradoxi- plausible explanation that immediately comes our respondents were asked to choose one state- The observed divergence of regime support cally tend to think their political systems are quite to our mind is that the non-democratic regimes ment out of four choices corresponding to free- among East Asian political systems challenges the democratic, while a majority of the people living seemingly enjoy a higher level of regime legiti- dom and liberty, social equity, norms and proce- prevailing theory on sources of regime legitimacy. in objectively democratic systems tends to think macy and are rated as a more favorable political dures, and good governance, respectively. These Does this mean that the citizens living under non- their current system is not democratic enough. system because the citizens living in those coun- statements were summarized by their correspond- democratic regimes do not embrace democracy as Figure 4 shows the results of the subjective tries are denied access to free media, are influ- ences to different meanings of democracy. an ideal form of government and they don’t mind democratic rating based on the measurement enced by official propaganda, are not exposed to The empirical result can be summarized into a living under a non-democratic regime? Our sur- asking respondents to place the country’s cur- open criticism from an opposition, and are afraid percentage measure for the appearance of each vey results suggest otherwise. People living under rent political system on a 10-point scale where to express their real feeling and views. major concept. As Figure 5 shows, Asians are more

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FIGURE 5 east asia’s definition of Democracy Source: Asian Barometer Survey, Wave 3 (2014-2016). Note: Percentages based on respondents’ first choice from four major concepts.

100 %

80 A Season of Democratic Recession? Our empirical evidence also shows that it is 60 During the 1990s, East Asia’s third-wave democ- entirely possible and conceivable that an objec- racies maintained satisfactory policy perfor- tively democratic regime may be viewed by its cit-

40 mance and fared better than non-democracies, izens as being not fully democratic and not fully just as the classic theories of liberal democ- legitimate if it fails to fulfill “good government” racy would suggest. The situation has dramati- or “social equity” criteria. It is also entirely pos- 20 st Barometer Survey In Focus: cally turned around at the turn of the 21 cen- sible for an objectively non-democratic regime to tury. Non-democracies in East Asia have become be perceived as being democratic and legitimate 0 a vibrant force in driving regional development, if it fulfills “good government” or “social equity”

China Korea Taiwan Japan Vietnam while democracies are showing signs of lan- criteria. This prevailing popular conception Mongolia Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Cambodia Hong Kong Singapore guishing. An alternative system embedded in the shapes Asian people’s expectation about what Asian Good Governance Social Equity Norms and Procedure Freedom and Liberty prevailing East Asian conception of democracy, democracy ought to deliver. It also shapes Asian which places more emphasis on the output side of people’s diffuse support for the overall political the political system, has been clearly on the rise. regime and lifts popular support for the region’s The historical experiences likely to think of democracy in terms of output- The historical experiences constitute a pull for non-democratic regimes. related characteristics such as good governance a non-democracy that delivers and a push from Another important take-away is that Asian peo- constitute a pull for a non- and social equity rather than input-related ones a democracy that stagnates. East Asian democ- ple simply expect more out of democracy. They democracy that delivers and such as norms and procedures or freedom and lib- racies now seem to be trapped in a loss of vision expect democracy to deliver social equity and erty. For instance, in Singapore, the most popu- and adaptability in an age of ever-changing glo- effective governance, not just popular accounta- a push from a democracy lar connotation of democracy is good governance balization. Japan surrendered its position as the bility, rule of law and political freedom. They also that stagnates. East Asian (36.1 percent), followed by social equity (29.6 per- second-largest economy in the world to China in expect democratically elected governments to be democracies now seem cent), norms and procedures (18.5 percent), and 2010. It has not yet found a way out of its third responsive to people’s needs. freedom and liberty (15.7 percent). This cogni- decade of loss in the global economy. Taiwan has In a nutshell, democracy has to deliver more to be trapped in a loss of tive pattern, however, is not unique to Singapore. been struggling with its political and economic to win over the hearts and minds of Asian peo- vision and adaptability in In fact, this is the prevailing pattern across all relationship with China, and it still lacks a clear ple. We cannot afford to be complacent about the East Asian societies, regardless of their different grand strategy to consolidate its foothold in the challenges that East Asian third-wave democ- an age of ever-changing trajectories of regime evolution or levels of socio- global economy. In East Asia, democracies are racies are facing. Asian political leaders have to globalization. economic modernization. not only failing to advance, they have also fallen find ways to close the big gap between the prom- Indeed, Asians do have very different under- behind developmental authoritarian regimes. ises and the realities of democracy in the eyes of standings of democracy from people in the West- Compared with democracies in the region, the their citizens. ern world. Even for citizens in East Asian liberal levels of regime support and perceived regime democracies, including Japan, South Korea and responsiveness are found to be higher in non- Taiwan, the procedural and liberty components democratic countries. This anomaly is buttressed are easily subordinate to good governance and by a cognitive foundation widely shared among Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research social equity components. Citizens in Japan and East Asian citizens. The divergence in regime sup- Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at South Korea put even more emphasis on good port substantially manifests Asian people’s under- Academia Sinica. Hsin-hsin Pan is a governance than people in other countries do. In standing of the meaning of democracy. A substan- postdoctoral fellow at the Center for East other words, East Asians tend to value the out- tive understanding of democracy anchored in Asia Democratic Studies of National Taiwan put of political systems more than the underlying social equity and good governance turns out to University. Wen-chin Wu is Assistant normative principles that are prioritized by theo- be more popular across East Asia than one based Research Fellow at the Institute of Political rists of Western democracy. on norms and procedures or liberty. Science at Academia Sinica.

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