The Syrian Population in Turkey: Future Prospects

Tuğba Adalı1 and A. Sinan Türkyılmaz2

Abstract Turkey currently hosts 2.8 million registered Syrians under temporary protection; a number that has been growing since the outbreak of the internal conflict in 2011. Less than 10 percent of the asylum seekers reside in temporary protection centers in Turkey; the majority is spread around the country, living in cities and district centers. This study aims to provide a quantitative insight to the Syrian temporary protection holders in Turkey, and wishes to demonstrate what the demographic picture can be in the upcoming 10 years for the sake of planning. While data on the registered number of Syrians under temporary protection is available, further information on this population is scarce. Using the cohort-component method of projection, this paper projects the Syrian population in Turkey to the near future using four scenarios based on different migration assumptions. Findings suggest the Syrian population to be a young population with a large proportion of working age population; pointing out the need for job opportunities. The relatively high birth rate and high share of children under 15 underline the need for education services. According to the assumed scenarios, the Syrian population will reach a minimum of 1.9 million and a maximum of 3.6 million in 10 years. The study recognizes limitations in terms of data availability, as well as the high level of uncertainty related to the future of the conflict in Syria and the settlement desires of the Syrian population in Turkey.

Keywords: Syrians, Turkey, Temporary Protection, Population Projections

1. Introduction Turkey has reached the end of its demographic transition with a fertility around replacement level and increased life expectancy at birth. With stabilized fertility and mortality rates, the third component of population change –migration– is on the forefront. Turkey has been described as an emigration county since the 1960s; and then also a country of transit migration; and is currently also an immigration country. In addition to legal migration, irregular migration is also an agenda for Turkey with arriving refugees and asylum seekers. Among these, refugees from Syria hold great importance, 1) because of the magnitude of arrivals, 2) because of the need for planning in Turkey, considering the uncertainty of the conflict’s end in Syria. The uprising that began in Syria in 2011, following the Arab spring, rapidly transformed to a civil war, causing the displacement of millions of Syrians. According to the UNHCR, the total number of registered Syrian refugees is 4,798,574 (as of 07.11.2016; UNHCR, 2016a), 2,753,696 of which are in Turkey (UNHCR, 2016b). The number of internally displaced persons is estimated as 6.1 million (UNOCHA, 2016). Thus about half of the pre-war (2010) Syrian population of 20.7 million has been displaced due to internal conflict (İçduygu, 2015), and 13.5 million Syrians are currently in need of humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA, 2017). As the northern neighbor of Syria, Turkey has been among the countries most affected by the crises. The first group of arrivals to Turkey took place on April 29th, 2011, with 252 Syrians (Kap, 2014). After further arrivals and some returns (Yakın Doğu Haber, 2012); the number of registered Syrians was 8,000 by the end of the year (Table 1). The following year marked the acceleration of arrivals. With conflict

1 Dr., Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies, [email protected] 2 Prof. Dr., Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies deteriorating after a failed ceasefire in May, about 20,000 thousand Syrians crossed the Turkish border every months in 2012 (İçduygu, 2015). Arrivals more than doubled in 2013 compared to 2012; and monthly arrivals reached an average of 81,000 for the 2014-2015 period. The estimates for 2016 mark a decline in arrivals, however, the number of Syrians refugees who have entered Turkey has reached 2.8 million as of November 2016; out of a total of 4.8 Syrian refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2016a). The Directorate General of Migration Management (GIGM) reports the number of Syrians in Turkey to be 2,758,409 (as of 26.10.2016; GIGM, 2016). Temporary camps to cover basic needs such as shelter and health services have been built since 2011 for Syrian refugees; in line with the state’s expectation that the internal conflict in Syria would resolve soon and arrivers would return home (İçduygu, 2015). While these temporary protection centers (camps) were sufficient for Syrians under temporary protection until 2013, as of late 2014; most started residing in city and district centers (İçduygu, 2015). Currently, only 252,494 Syrians reside in temporary camps (AFAD: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, 2016), corresponding to a mere 9% of the Syrian refugee population in Turkey. Table 1. Syrian refugees in Turkey, 2011-2016

Year Number of registered Number of Syrian refugees1 arrivals2 2011 8,000 8,000 2012 170,912 162,912 2013 560,129 389,217 2014 1,622,839 1,062,710 2015 2,503,549 880,710 20163 2,753,696 250,147 1 UNHCR, 17.01.2017. 2 Estimated by the difference between two consecutive years. 3 Figure for 07.11.2016. Not all Syrians who have arrived to Turkey have stayed. Some have been resettled by the UN to third countries, but the scale of resettlement is small relative to the total number of Syrian refugees. For instance, 5,457 Syrian resettlement submissions were made from Turkey in 2014, and 284 Syrians have departed from Turkey within the same year for resettlement (UNHCR, 2016c). The corresponding figures for 2015 are 8,091 and 1,141 respectively (UNHCR, 2016c). Regardless of the hosting country and the country of resettlement, the total places made available for Syrian refugees to March 2016 were 179,147 (UNHCR, 2016d), a small proportion despite being a large number. Many Syrian refugees in Turkey have taken the path of irregular migration to Europe, which at times was lethal. In 2015, 851,319 people arrived to Greece from Turkey by the sea, 56% of whom were of Syrian origin (UNHCR, 2015a). The nature of this migration makes it difficult to know whether they are dropped from Turkey’s registration system, or for how long they have been kept in the system after having left. The number of migrants crossing to Greece has declined significantly after March 2016 after an agreement explained in the next section. In 2016, between January and November, 171,785 migrants entered Greece from Turkey (UNHCR, 2016e), a number much less than those taking the sea route in the year before. Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and approved the 1967 Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees with a geographical restriction (UNHCR, 2017). Accordingly, the current international migration policy in Turkey grants refugee status for people of European origin only by allowing people fleeing as a consequence of “events occurring in Europe” (Human Rights Watch, 2017), and a temporary asylum status is provided for non-European persons. Moreover, the Settlement Law of 2006 suggests that only people of “Turkish descent and culture” can be admitted as migrants (Tokuzlu, 2007; İçduygu, 2015). The procedure in Turkey for temporary asylum seekers aims to ensure their resettlement to third countries; the UNHCR receives asylum applications, examines them and proceeds with resettlement. Despite the legal framework that is against accepting refugees, a special status was granted for Syrians in October 2011 (UN, 2014), called the temporary protection status. This was both due to the large number of Syrians fleeing the civil war, and due to an assumption that they would be ‘guests’ who will eventually return home (İçduygu, 2015). The temporary protection status is based on three principles: 1) Acceptance to the country with open borders, 2) No sending back to country of origin, 3) The provision of emergent and fundamental needs of incomers (GIGM, 2015). Under these principles, Syrians can reside, receive education and health services in Turkey and they have no restrictions of travel within the borders of the country; thus the temporary protection status complies with international law and humanitarian obligations (Kap, 2014). The phrase “Syrian refugees” is used to mean “Syrian temporary protection holders” in this paper. The temporary protection status provided to Syrian refugees in Turkey requires Syrians to be registered with the Turkish State (GIGM), and not the UNHCR. Further, those under temporary protection cannot apply for an international protection status in Turkey, with limited exceptions (AIDA, 2016). They are not candidates of resettlement by the UNHCR either, unless they are at a very vulnerable state (UNHCR, 2015b). An agreement of readmission was reached between the EU and Turkey in March 2016 to end the irregular migration of Syrians from Turkey to EU. The highlights of the agreement were as follows: 1) All irregular migrants entering Greek islands as of 20.03.2016 from Turkey are to be returned to Turkey, 2) For every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands-another Syrian to be resettled by the EU, 3) Turkey to take measures to prevent irregular migration, 4) Turkey to receive monetary aid for the refugee problem, and 4) Acceleration of the Schengen visa liberalization process for citizens of Turkey. The agreement has reduced the migration to Greece through the sea, has been criticized. The visa liberalization has not taken place, a small share of the monetary aid has been received, and not much success was attained in returning Syrians from Greece to Turkey (İçduygu, 2016). Whether Syrians arriving at Greece are eligible for being sent back to Turkey was also questioned, based on an argument on whether or not Turkey can be regarded as fulfilling the EU criteria of being a “safe third country” (Collett, 2016). As of September 2016, 1,614 Syrian refugees were resettled from Turkey to Europe and 578 irregular migrants were sent from Greece to Turkey, in full respect of EU and international law, according to the European Commission (2016). Ever since the first arrival from Syria, the state of the Syrian population in Turkey has been a leading topic in social, political and academic circles. In addition to many articles and reports, field studies have also been conducted. AFAD has carried out a field study in 2013 to obtain a profile of Syrians living in Turkey, aiming to understand the socio-economic and cultural structure, future prospects and needs of this population (AFAD, 2013). ORSAM (Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi: Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies) and TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı : Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) carried out another fieldwork in 2014 in provinces bordering Syria, interviewing affected people, i.e. locals, Syrians and local authorities (ORSAM, 2015). Another study was conducted by the Hacettepe University Migration Research Center in 2014; including in-depth interviews and an opinion poll (Erdoğan, 2015). Moreover, institutions as HDD (Hayata Destek İnsani Yardım Derneği: Support to Life International Humanitarian Aid), SGDD (Sığınmacılar ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışma Derneği: the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants), TESEV, Amnesty International, MAZLUMDER (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği: The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Opressed, TTB (Türk Tabipler Birliği: Turkish Medical Association), also conduct interviews with Syrians, to help them determine their current state and needs (Kutlu, 2015). This study aims to make a quantitative assessment of the Syrian population in Turkey for near future. Using four scenarios based on different assumptions regarding whether or not Syrians would stay, we project the Syrian population in Turkey until 2026. The obtained figures are assessed along with Turkey’s population projections, so that the effect on the total population can be observed. 2. Data and Methods The cohort-component method of population projections was used to get an estimate of the Syrian population in the upcoming 10 years. This projection method provides an age and sex distribution as well as the total population. The DemProj module of the Spectrum software package was used for this purpose1. The cohort-component method exposes all age groups to mortality every year and shrinks them; while women of reproductive ages are exposed to childbearing every year and bear children. The method requires an initial population by age and sex, as well as data/assumptions on the level and age pattern of fertility and morality. Assumptions regarding migration are optional, and also require data on the level and age pattern when added. The age and sex distribution of the Syrian population in Turkey was obtained from the Directorate General of Migration Management through an official data request in February, 2016; when this data was not presented on the GIGM website. This data was provided for single ages, ending at 65. This age distribution was preferred in the analysis to the five year-age group November distribution found in the website, since the latter was more irregular in terms of the distribution of age groups. The assumptions regarding the initial population of the projections are as follows: 1. The total number of Syrians in Turkey is taken as 2,758,409, the estimate provided by GIGM. We do recognize the possibility that unregistered Syrian refugees exist, and the possibility that some who have left may still appear in the figures; we stick with the official figure, provided no estimates are there for either of the situations. 2. The age distribution of the Syrian population in Turkey, as explained above, is taken from GIGM in February after an official data request. Since this age distribution closed at age 65; the five year age distribution of population aged 65 and above were borrowed from the five year age distribution present on GIGM’s website as of November 7, 2016. 3. Data on the fertility of Syrians in Turkey is limited to some figures on the number of births. For instance, 35,000 Syrian babies are said to be born in Turkey since the first arrivals up to January 2015 by ORSAM, (2015). Another source claims that 60 thousand babies were born by Syrian women in Turkey in 3.5 years (Erdoğan, 2014). The press reported 177 thousand births until September 2016 (Sözcü, 2016). The direct calculation of fertility rates is not possible due to the rapid changes in the magnitude and composition of the denominator, thus we referred to the level of fertility suggested by the UN (2015) for Syria in the 2015-2020 period. A study from Lebanon mentions that the fertility of Syrian refugees in Lebanon may be lower compared to what it was in Syria (BRIC, 2013). This has been our basis in assuming the UN 2015-2020 figure as the current fertility level of Syrians in Turkey; a value lower than the Syrian average at the beginning of the conflict in 2011. During the 10 year period for which the projections were made, the change in fertility was assumed to follow that expected by the UN for Syria. The value for 2025 was taken as the TFR estimate by UN for 2015-2020. 4. There is no published data on the age structure of fertility for Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey; we assumed the 2010-2015 age structure of UN (2015) and kept it constant throughout the period. 5. For the level of life expectancy, UN’s (2015) pre-war estimates (2005-2010) were used. The reason for using data from this period is the sharp decline in male life expectancy in the 2010- 2015 period. We do not expect as dramatic a decline in male life expectancy provided they have survived the war and made it into a safe country. We assumed an improvement in life expectancy in the 10 year projection period; one that is parallel to what the UN expects for post-war Syria (assuming it ends soon). Thus the 10 year increase from 2010-2015 to 2025-2030 was used.

1 The user manual for Spectrum/DemProj module can be referred for the cohort component method of population projection (Stover and Kirmeyer, 2005). 6. The West family of the Coale and Dement model life tables was preferred to demonstrate the age structure of mortality, as done by UN (2006) earlier in the absence of data. The scenarios prepared for migration cover only a few of many possible circumstances that could take place. One scenario assumes that 1) all arrived Syrians will remain in Turkey; another assumes that 2) some of them will be resettled to third countries; another assumes that 3) more Syrians will seek asylum in Turkey and one assumes 4) both more Syrians will arrive and some will leave Turkey. The details of the four scenarios are as below: Scenario 1: The total population along with the mortality and fertility assumptions are used as explained above. Net migration is assumed to be 0. Scenario 2: The second scenario assumes an outflow of 800 thousand Syrians to third countries in the 5 years ahead, and zero migration is assumed for the remaining years of projection. The idea driving this scenario is the expectation that third countries will accept Syrian Refugees. For instance, Germany, the largest host of Syrians in Europe, “may accept 500 thousand refugees annually for a few years” (BBC, 2015). Keeping in mind that half the Syrians who have fled their country made it to Turkey, and assuming third countries would accept refugees for several years; we expected the departure of 800 thousand people from Turkey1. Scenario 3: The third scenario assumes that Syrians will remain in Turkey; and the inflow will continue; provided the conflict in Syria has not come to an end. Yet Table 1, previously has shown a declining trend in arrivals. Keeping this decline in mind, we have assumed a maximum of 400 thousand more Syrians arriving to Turkey; a number we spread to the first five years of the projection period. Scenario 4: While the second and third scenarios represent extremes assuming single directions for migration, the last scenario assumes that both immigration to and emigration from Turkey happen simultaneously. Numerically, we assumed a net migration of 400 thousand people to leave within five years.

3. Results According to the results of the projections, provided Syrians do not leave Turkey until 2025 and no newcomers arrive, the total number of Syrians under temporary protection will increase by over 500 thousand and reach 3.3 million (Figure 1). 313 thousand of this population will be under age 5, and 100 thousand will be over 65. The base of the population pyramid is expected to shrink until 2025, with the assumed decline in fertility over the years (Figure 2). Based on the second scenario which assumes emigration from Turkey, the number of Syrians in the country will reduce to 2.4 million (Figure 1). Since the age structure of migrants is assumed the same throughout all scenarios, the shape of the pyramid in 2025 for Scenario 2 will look like that of Scenario 1 in terms of shape (Figure 2), but the population will be smaller in size. The third scenario assumed further immigration to Turkey. According to this, the total number of Syrians will increase by 35% compared to today’s figures and reach 3.7. million (Figure 1). The number of children under 5 will be 381 thousand, and about one third of the population will be under 15. The number of people of working ages (15-64) is expected to be about 2.5 million.

1 The number of refugees other European countries are expected to take are relatively small. A total of 120 thousand is mentioned for the European region in total (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34193568), the UK for instance is expected to host 20 thousand Syrian refugees (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34171148). The final scenario including immigration to and emigration from Turkey provides results that are similar to Scenario 1, where net migration was assumed as zero. The 2025 population of this final scenario will be 60 thousand larger than that of Scenario 1 (2.8 million, Figure 1). The results of the projection, together with the projections for Turkey made by TURKSTAT imply that the effect of the Syrian population is stronger on younger age groups (Figure 3). For example, the 0-4 age group increase by 233 thousand people under the out migration scenario (S2) and 381 thousand people under the in migration scenario (S3), when Syrians are included. With this scenario, about 4 percent of Turkey’s population will be Syrian asylum seekers (not shown in tables). For all scenarios, the sizes of age groups subject to specific needs such as education (6-13 for primary; 14-17 for secondary school), delivery care (women in reproductive ages, 15-49), work (population aged 15-64) and elderly care (65+) are provided in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4. Figure 1. Syrian population in Turkey in 2025

4.000.000 3.733.774

3.500.000 3.276.125

3.000.000 2.818.475 2.758.411

2.500.000 2.360.826

2.000.000

1.500.000

1.000.000

500.000

0 1 no migration 2 emmigration only 3 immigration only 4 in and out 2016 Syrian population in Turkey

Figure 2. A comparison of the Syrian population in Turkey from 2015 (shaded) to 2025 (lines) (Scenario 1)

80+ 75-79 70-74 65-69 Males 60-64 Females 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4 300.000 200.000 100.000 0 100.000 200.000 300.000

Table 1. The projection of Syrian population in Turkey to 2025, Scenario 1 (0 migration)

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Fertility Input TFR 2.75 2.73 2.71 2.69 2.67 2.64 2.62 2.6 2.58 2.56 Mortality Male LE 72.19 72.3 72.4 72.6 72.8 73 73.2 73.3 73.5 73.7 Female LE 77.57 77.6 77.9 78.1 78.4 78.6 78.9 79.1 79.4 79.7 Total LE * 74.8 75 75.2 75.4 75.6 75.9 76.1 76.3 76.5 IMR * 16.4 15.9 15.5 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.5 13.1 U5MR * 19.2 18.7 18.2 17.7 17.2 16.7 16.2 15.7 15.3 Migration Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Vital Rates CBR per 1000 * 21.7 21.8 21.8 21.8 21.6 21.5 21.3 21.2 21 CDR per 1000 * 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 RNI percent * 1.91 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.9 1.89 1.88 1.86 1.84 GR percent * 1.91 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.9 1.89 1.88 1.86 1.84 Annual births and deaths Births * 61,083 62,456 63,703 64,836 65,621 66,551 67,377 68,125 68,848 Deaths * 7,271 7,383 7,524 7,675 7,833 8,006 8,192 8,393 8,611 Population Total 2,758,411 2,812,224 2,867,298 2,923,477 2,980,638 3,038,426 3,096,971 3,156,156 3,215,888 3,276,125 Male 1,465,591 1,492,500 1,520,047 1,548,146 1,576,731 1,605,621 1,634,878 1,664,442 1,694,261 1,724,312 Female 1,292,820 1,319,723 1,347,251 1,375,332 1,403,907 1,432,806 1,462,093 1,491,714 1,521,627 1,551,813 Percent 0-4 12.94 12.29 11.7 11.18 10.71 10.28 10.27 10.23 10.18 10.12 Percent 5-14 24.5 24.5 24.57 24.61 24.54 24.3 23.5 22.61 21.7 20.81 Percent 6-13 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 Percent 14-17 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 Percent 15-24 23.29 22.69 21.94 21.15 20.48 20.03 19.8 19.75 19.83 19.99 Percent 15-49 54.53 54.87 55.09 55.25 55.48 55.83 56.32 56.9 57.52 58.09 Percent 15-64 60.41 60.99 61.43 61.82 62.27 62.84 63.56 64.37 65.21 66.03 Percent 65 and over 2.15 2.23 2.3 2.39 2.48 2.58 2.68 2.79 2.91 3.04 Percent females 15-49 52.75 53.06 53.27 53.45 53.69 54.07 54.58 55.19 55.83 56.43 Sex ratio 113.36 113.09 112.83 112.57 112.31 112.06 111.82 111.58 111.35 111.12 Dependency ratio 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.51 Median age 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 24 *Not provided as input. Table 2. The projection of Syrian population in Turkey to 2025, Scenario 2 (out migration only)

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Fertility Input TFR 2.75 2.73 2.71 2.69 2.67 2.64 2.62 2.6 2.58 2.56 Mortality Male LE 72.19 72.3 72.4 72.6 72.8 73 73.2 73.3 73.5 73.7 Female LE 77.57 77.6 77.9 78.1 78.4 78.6 78.9 79.1 79.4 79.7 Total LE * 74.8 75 75.2 75.4 75.6 75.8 76 76.2 76.5 IMR * 16.4 15.9 15.5 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.5 13.1 U5MR * 19.2 18.7 18.2 17.7 17.2 16.7 16.2 15.7 15.3 Migration Male 0 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 0 0 0 0 Female 0 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 0 0 0 0 Total 0 -160,000 -160,000 -160,000 -160,000 -160,000 0 0 0 0 Vital Rates CBR per 1000 * 22.3 22.3 22.2 22.1 21.9 21 20.9 20.7 20.6 CDR per 1000 * 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 RNI percent * 1.97 1.96 1.95 1.94 1.91 1.83 1.82 1.8 1.78 GR percent * -4.07 -4.34 -4.64 -4.98 -5.38 1.83 1.82 1.8 1.78 Annual births and deaths Births * 59,144 56,630 53,956 51,147 48,044 46,889 47,496 48,056 48,610 Deaths * 7,052 6,766 6,510 6,264 6,027 6,001 6,147 6,305 6,475 Population Total 2,758,411 2,650,501 2,540,363 2,427,807 2,312,687 2,194,701 2,235,590 2,276,939 2,318,690 2,360,826 Male 1,465,591 1,411,632 1,356,550 1,300,242 1,242,633 1,183,567 1,203,920 1,224,491 1,245,248 1,266,179 Female 1,292,820 1,238,869 1,183,813 1,127,565 1,070,054 1,011,134 1,031,669 1,052,448 1,073,443 1,094,647 Percent 0-4 12.94 12.21 11.51 10.83 10.17 9.52 9.71 9.83 9.88 9.89 Percent 5-14 24.5 24.48 24.51 24.51 24.36 23.95 22.84 21.7 20.59 19.59 Percent 6-13 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 Percent 14-17 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 Percent 15-24 23.29 22.71 21.97 21.18 20.53 20.13 20.19 20.38 20.59 20.77 Percent 15-49 54.53 54.94 55.26 55.55 55.93 56.53 57.11 57.79 58.49 59.09 Percent 15-64 60.41 61.07 61.64 62.2 62.88 63.79 64.6 65.52 66.45 67.31 Percent 65 and over 2.15 2.24 2.34 2.46 2.59 2.74 2.85 2.96 3.08 3.21 Percent females 15-49 52.75 53.13 53.43 53.73 54.13 54.74 55.33 56.01 56.7 57.31 Sex ratio 113.36 113.95 114.59 115.31 116.13 117.05 116.7 116.35 116.01 115.67 Dependency ratio 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.5 0.49 Median age 20 21 21 22 23 23 24 24 24 25 *Not provided as input. Table 3. The projection of Syrian population in Turkey to 2025, Scenario 3 (in migration only)

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Fertility Input TFR 2.75 2.73 2.71 2.69 2.67 2.64 2.62 2.6 2.58 2.56 Mortality Male LE 72.19 72.3 72.4 72.6 72.8 73 73.2 73.3 73.5 73.7 Female LE 77.57 77.6 77.9 78.1 78.4 78.6 78.9 79.1 79.4 79.7 Total LE * 74.8 75 75.2 75.4 75.7 75.9 76.1 76.3 76.6 IMR * 16.4 15.9 15.5 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.5 13.1 U5MR * 19.2 18.7 18.2 17.7 17.2 16.7 16.2 15.7 15.3 Migration Male 0 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 0 0 0 0 Female 0 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 0 0 0 0 Total * 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 0 0 0 0 Vital Rates CBR per 1000 * 21.4 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.5 21.7 21.5 21.3 21.1 CDR per 1000 * 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 RNI percent * 1.89 1.9 1.91 1.91 1.9 1.91 1.89 1.88 1.86 GR percent * 4.65 4.54 4.43 4.32 4.21 1.91 1.89 1.88 1.86 Annual births and deaths Births * 62,053 65,369 68,577 71,681 74,410 76,381 77,318 78,160 78,967 Deaths * 7,380 7,691 8,031 8,380 8,736 9,009 9,215 9,438 9,679 Population Total 2,758,411 2,893,085 3,030,765 3,171,312 3,314,614 3,460,289 3,527,662 3,595,765 3,664,486 3,733,774 Male 1,465,591 1,532,935 1,601,795 1,672,097 1,743,780 1,816,648 1,850,357 1,884,417 1,918,768 1,953,378 Female 1,292,820 1,360,151 1,428,970 1,499,215 1,570,834 1,643,641 1,677,304 1,711,347 1,745,719 1,780,396 Percent 0-4 12.94 12.32 11.78 11.31 10.9 10.53 10.45 10.36 10.28 10.2 Percent 5-14 24.5 24.51 24.59 24.65 24.61 24.41 23.71 22.9 22.05 21.2 Percent 6-13 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 Percent 14-17 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 Percent 15-24 23.29 22.68 21.92 21.14 20.46 20 19.67 19.55 19.59 19.74 Percent 15-49 54.53 54.84 55.02 55.14 55.32 55.61 56.07 56.62 57.21 57.78 Percent 15-64 60.41 60.95 61.34 61.67 62.05 62.54 63.22 64 64.82 65.62 Percent 65 and over 2.15 2.22 2.29 2.36 2.44 2.52 2.63 2.73 2.85 2.98 Percent females 15-49 52.75 53.03 53.2 53.34 53.55 53.87 54.35 54.94 55.56 56.16 Sex ratio 113.36 112.7 112.09 111.53 111.01 110.53 110.32 110.11 109.91 109.72 Dependency ratio 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.6 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.52 Median age 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 24 *Not provided as input. Table 4. The projection of Syrian population in Turkey to 2025, Scenario 4 (in and out migration at the same time)

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Fertility Input TFR 2.75 2.73 2.71 2.69 2.67 2.64 2.62 2.6 2.58 2.56 Mortality Male LE 72.19 72.3 72.4 72.6 72.8 73 73.2 73.3 73.5 73.7 Female LE 77.57 77.6 77.9 78.1 78.4 78.6 78.9 79.1 79.4 79.7 Total LE * 74.8 75 75.2 75.4 75.6 75.8 76.1 76.3 76.5 IMR * 16.4 15.9 15.5 15.1 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.5 13.1 U5MR * 19.2 18.7 18.2 17.7 17.2 16.7 16.2 15.7 15.3 Migration Male 0 -40,000 -40,000 -40,000 -40,000 -40,000 0 0 0 0 Female 0 -40,000 -40,000 -40,000 -40,000 -40,000 0 0 0 0 Total 0 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 -80,000 0 0 0 0 Vital Rates CBR per 1000 * 22 22 22 21.9 21.7 21.3 21.1 21 20.8 CDR per 1000 * 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 RNI percent * 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.93 1.91 1.86 1.85 1.83 1.82 GR percent * -0.99 -1.02 -1.05 -1.09 -1.15 1.86 1.85 1.83 1.82 Annual births and deaths Births * 60,114 59,543 58,830 57,991 56,833 56,720 57,437 58,091 58,729 Deaths * 7,161 7,074 7,017 6,970 6,930 7,003 7,170 7,349 7,543 Population Total 2,758,411 2,731,362 2,703,830 2,675,642 2,646,663 2,616,564 2,666,280 2,716,547 2,767,289 2,818,475 Male 1,465,591 1,452,066 1,438,299 1,424,194 1,409,682 1,394,594 1,419,399 1,444,466 1,469,754 1,495,245 Female 1,292,820 1,279,296 1,265,532 1,251,448 1,236,980 1,221,970 1,246,881 1,272,081 1,297,535 1,323,230 Percent 0-4 12.94 12.25 11.61 11.02 10.48 9.96 10.03 10.06 10.06 10.02 Percent 5-14 24.5 24.49 24.54 24.57 24.46 24.15 23.22 22.23 21.23 20.3 Percent 6-13 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 Percent 14-17 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 Percent 15-24 23.29 22.7 21.95 21.17 20.5 20.07 19.96 20.01 20.15 20.31 Percent 15-49 54.53 54.91 55.17 55.39 55.68 56.12 56.65 57.28 57.92 58.51 Percent 15-64 60.41 61.03 61.53 61.99 62.53 63.24 63.99 64.85 65.73 66.57 Percent 65 and over 2.15 2.23 2.32 2.42 2.53 2.65 2.75 2.86 2.98 3.11 Percent females 15-49 52.75 53.09 53.34 53.57 53.88 54.35 54.89 55.53 56.19 56.8 Sex ratio 113.36 113.51 113.65 113.8 113.96 114.13 113.84 113.55 113.27 113 Dependency ratio 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.6 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.5 Median age 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 *Not provided as input. Figure 3. The 2025 population of Turkey, with (lines) and without (shaded) Syrian refugees in 2016 and 2025 a. Under scenario 2

80+ 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4 4.000.000 2.000.000 0 2.000.000 4.000.000

a. Under scenario 3

80+ 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4 -4000000 -2000000 0 2000000 4000000

4. Discussion This study aimed to provide a numerical insight for the Syrian population in Turkey within the 10 years ahead. Our population projections showed that assuming zero migration of Syrians under temporary protection, the expected number of Syrians in Turkey in ten years is 3.3 million. The scenario based on Syrians only leaving Turkey and no other Syrians coming in (scenario 2), can be considered relatively unlikely. First of all, it is not for certain whether European countries would admit as many Syrian refugees; and it is hard to tell what proportion of them would be from Turkey. States on other continents (i.e. USA and Australia) are likely to admit less refugees to compared to Europe Moreover, the conflict in Syria does not seem as if it would end soon, and the refugees may not wish to return to their country even if it was over (Boz, 2016); and the irregular sea route to Greece has weakened since the EU-Turkey resettlement agreement. The value of this scenario is due to its portrayal of the large Syrian population (2.4 million), under a liberal assumption of departees where close to a million Syrians are expected to leave. The persistance of the Syrian conflict may push more people to flee Syria and cross the Turkish border. The number of people who would arrive under this assumption is highly uncertain. 800 thousand more people arriving translates into 1.4 times more refugees in 2025. The last scenario where some Syrian refugees are expected to leave, and some more refugees are expected arrive (scenario 4) is the relatively more realistic scenario among all four scenarios: there still are Syrians leaving Turkey despite not having not been granted a refugee status in a third country, and still more are crossing the border to Turkey. Under this scenario, Turkey will be hosting 2.8 million Syrians, a number close to today’s figure. One of the striking finding of ORSAM’s (2015) report is that “A significant proportion of Syrians in Turkey will either return after a long time, or will live the rest of their lives in Turkey”. Erdoğan (2014) also envisions that Syrians in Turkey tend to be more “permanent” than “temporary”. The changing status of Turkey from being a “transit country” in terms of migration to a “destination country” also increases the likelihood of refugees staying in Turkey (Kap, 2014). All these may imply that a permanent status may be required for Syrian refugees in Turkey rather than regarding them as “guests”. İçduygu (2015) emphasizes that the Syrian refugee crisis should be evaluated as a humanitarian crises independent of foreing policy; and that socio-cultural and labor integration should also be ensured. Under a scenario that the civil war in Syria would end and the refugees would return to Syria, out migration is expected to be larger than assumed in the scenarios in this paper. AFAD’s (2014) fieldwork revealed that 89 percent of Syrians living outside the camps stated a will to return home if conditions were to improve there1.

Keeping in mind that the Syrian population in Turkey is more than 3% of Turkey’s current population; this magnitude is a major population issue itself. If all Syrians in Turkey were to reside in a single province, it would be the fourth most populous province in Turkey. Thus the size of this population matters; and the projections in this paper are employed for this very reason. A well-known aspect of population projections is that they are very difficult to make; since populations are very open to change within the period of projections even under natural change. Studying a population of migrants with limited data from rather unreliable data sources, future scenarios become even more speculative than projecting ordinary populations. This study is limited to the provision of future denominators for a population that is very prone to change in the near future; which are to be of use for decision or policy makers; allowing them to plan within rational boundaries. Further studies are required to focus on specific age groups, gender groups by education, and sub-populations sensitive to labor and health.

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