Iran Hostage Crisis:

A Personal Account within the Political Drama

By Bekah Reiter

Oral History Project

St. Andrews' Episcopal School

A.P. U.S. History

Instructor Mi\ Haight

February 2003

OH REI 2003

Reiter, Bekali TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTRACT page 2

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE page 3

BIOGRAPHY page 4

HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION

V. S. ~ Iranian Relations Leading up to the Iran Hostage Crisis page 5

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT page 15

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS page 50

APPENDIX page 56

WORKS CONSULTED page 60 ST. ANDREW'S EPISCOPAL SCHOOL

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interviews will be piotected by copyright and deposited in Saint Andrew's Libraiy and Archives for the use of future students, educators and scholars. 1 also understand that the tapes and transcripts may be used in public presentations including, but not limited to, audio or video documentaries, slide-tape presentations, exhibits, articles or the world wide web at the projects web site www.doingoralhistory.org. This gift does not preclude any use that I myself want to make of the information in these transcripts or recordings. The interviewee acknowledges that he/she will receive no renumeration or compensation for either his/her participation in the interview or for the rights assigned hereunder.

CHECK ONE:

Tapes and transcripts may be used without restriction

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INTERVIEWER:

c.>J:g7^ lignature of Interviewee Signature Paul M, Needharn Rebekah C» Reiter Typed Name Typed Name 28;?5 Berryland Dr, 5906 Aberdeen Road Address Address Oavton, VA 2212[|. Bethesda, TTO 20817

c^^d-^ c>cy^ \ZJ-3^'\ /O^ Date Date

8804 Postoak Road • Potomac, Maryland 20854 • (301) 983-5200 • Fax: (301) 983-1710 • hUp://w\vw.saes.org Reiter 3

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this Oral History Project is to establish a better understanding of the unportance and mipact of oral liistory when studymg the past. Tliis interview conducted with Paul Needharn gives his viewpomt of emotions and thoughts fi'om when he was held captive in Iran. This account of oral Iiistoiy also provides a comprehension of the interactions between Iran and tiie United States previous to the Iran Hostage Crisis.

From the perspective of Paul Needharn, who was iield hostage for 444 days, Iiis personal account reveals the dii'ect influence that history and events affect people and the value of

gaining insight and knowledge from his account of the Iran Hostage Crisis. Reiter 4

BIOGRAPHY

Paul Needliam was born in 1950 in Tampa, Florida. He grew up in a Methodist home with both of his parents and spent time growing up going to church. His father was a militaiy man, therefore Paul Needham spend many years growuig up in Boy Scouts.

For his education he attended many universities and has a doctorate degree, a masters degree in mathematics, and a bachelors degree. Currently he is a professor for the

National Defense University at the Industrial College of Ar-med Forces, livmg m Oakton

Vir-ginia with his wife and two kids.

In 1969, Mr. Needham orighially avoided the draft for the Vietnam War, by enlisting in the Aii* Force. This was the beginning of his career in the military. After being enlisted in the Air Force he went to finish his degree fi'om the courtesy of the Air

Force, by going to night school, in 1969 tlnough 1973. The Aii* Force choose him to go to a graduate school at the Air Force Institute of Teclmology where he studied international logistics, wliich deals with foreign military sales. The Air Force assigned him to a job in DaUon Ohio that deals with contracts with foreign governments for the sale of aii'craft, suppoi-t equipment and spai-e parts. In the summer of 1979 he was asked to go to Iran to negotiate the spare pails contract. October 14, 1979 Paul Needham went to Iran and November 4, 1979 the American embassy was overrun by Iranians and he was help hostage for 444 days until January 20, 1981. Reiter 5

HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION US,- Iranian Relations Leading up to the Iran Hostage Crisis

The hostage crisis in 1979-1981 marked the collapse of U.S.-Iran relations.

America become known as the "Great Satan" m Iran, resulted with 52 Americans held hostage by the anti-American rhetoric of KJiomeini m Iran for 444 days. Iran and the

U.S. have never resolved their hostility, which built immensely until the Iranian militants seized the American Embassy in Teheran November 4, 1979 and originally took 66

Americans hostage. Previously, the U.S. and the Shah of Iran were in close contact until the radical fundamentalists followers of KJiomehii overtlu'ew the Shah. Throughout the crisis, President Jmimy Carter tackled this issue delicately attempting to bring the hostages iionie safely. He did not come to a final resolution until late January of 1981, durmg the fmal days of his presidency. The Hostage Crisis in Iran greatly affected the election of 1980 and marked the fmal collapse of U.S.-Iranian relations.

The U.S. involvement and relations with Iran consistently supported the 1909-

1979 monarchy of the Shah. Iran was ruled under the dictatorships by the Pahlavi kings,

Reza Shah, 1926-1941, and Mohammad Reza Shah, 1941-1979, until the 1979 revolution

(Iran 237). In 1953, the U.S. became particularly involved with the Anglo Iranian Oil

Company when Britain controlled all of the Iranian assets to oil for this company. Tliis created a power struggle between the U.S. and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, until the CIA became uivolved in negations. This resulted the U.S. gaining 40% of Iran's oil industry, and in return, the Shah receiving U.S. suppoi-t to prevent nationalism (The

Hostage 1). After this the U.S. grew relations with the dictatorship of the Shah. The

United States began providing military advisors in order to train the SAVAK, the Shah's Reiter 6 secret police (Bourne 452). Thioughout this period the Iranian people changed then- views on the existing monarchy and the role of foreign powers m theii* govermnent as the

Shah became increasingly harsh. The citizens of Iran no longer wanted to receive economic and military aid fi'om America, since America was supporting the Shah's forcefiil dictatorship fiom 8 American presidents (The Hostage 1). This growmg resentment was the beghming of the "demonizing" of the United States and the hatred that the Iranian people had built up mto the 1970's.

In the early 1960's the Shah's social and economic reforms reftised to grant political freedom to the Iranian citizens. America's support of the Shah's regime because of theii- close relations with Iran's oil supply, created more hostility among the Iranian citizens. In 1963, the Shah suppressed opposition to religious nationalists such as

Ayatollah Ruhoilah KJiomeini. The Shah's secret police, the SAVAK, made several arrests and exiles to strong nationalists. Khomeini was exiled from Iran in 1963 and became the "bitter" foe of America and it's support of the Shah (The Hostage 1). His son was killed by the SAVAK when he participated in a revolt against the Shah in 1977, which reinforced Khomeini's hostility towai'ds the Shah. Betweeir 1963 and 1979, the

Shah spent billions of dollars of the oil money from the U.S. on military weapons. Since the military had lost popular support, the ai'ms did not help the current culture nor support for the Shah. Therefore the Shah's regime collapsed in 1979 thi'ough the revolution of

1977-1979 because he was unable to sustain and expand fieedoms of the Iranian citizens and people (The Hostage 2). Many Iranians had a sense of "personal joy" m the overtlii'ow of the mvincible Shah and gained "new self-confidence" tluough expressions Reiter 7 of hatred for the Shah and the U.S. (Iran 237). The Shah fled Iran after his overtlirow,

Januai-y 16, 1979 and never returned (The Hostage 2).

In the winter of 1979, oil prices soared in the U.S. at the fall of Iran's Shah.

KJiomeini returned to Telu'an in February of 1979 to take over politics in Iran. JJie popular discontent and hostile feelings of the Iranian people emerged into anti-

Americanism and anti-we sterilization because of American support to the Shah (Bourne

454). Many fundamentalist followers were influenced by Khomemi's anti-American rhetoric. Jolin Skow, writer for "Jime Magazine,"reported the Ayatullah, "aMuslim mystic and fiindamentalist who despised the West and held the U.S. in special hatred for it's long support of the Shall, had flown into a pious rage" (Skow 20). The anger was focused and manifested towards President Caller because he embodied all that was

"American." The political problems over the past years were placed on him because of the presidential U.S. support of the Shah's coniipt aristocracy (Iran 237). The U.S. permitted the Shah to come to America, fi-om a hideaway in Mexico, for medical treatment of cancer and gallstones in a New York center October 23, 1979 (Skow 20).

As hostage William J. Daugherty states, "Now the same President who had spoken frequently in support of human rights was letting the Shah into the United States for putatively humanitai'ian reasons. Again a sense of betrayal flooded the Iranian people"

(Daugherty 6). Intense rage towards the Shah riled Iranian students who raided the U.S. embassy and took Americans hostage, two weeks after the Shah came into the United

States.

KJiomeini's regmie and hostility mai'ked the fmal completion of fi-iendlyU.S.-Ira n relations with the Shah. John Skow, writer for "Time Magazine" stated in his ailicle Reiter 8

"The Long Ordeal of the Hostages," that KJiomeini "told student followers that the U.S. embassy was 'a nest of spies' and 'a center of intrigue'" (Skow 20). On November 2" and 3'^ 1979, many Iranian students were being bussed into the city and the Americans in the embassy knew that "something big" was going to happen (Wells 33). The next day,

November 4"', tluee thousand Iranian students invaded the U.S. embassy in Teluan and took 66 Americans hostage. It was "the most fateftil day of Carter's presidency" (Bourne

452). Iran invaded the embassy for many reasons; the stramed tensions between the two countries, the anti-American hostility, the culture clash, and the fact that the U.S. opened its doors to the much despised Shah. Khomeini demanded that the Shah be returned to

Iran as a criminal, to stand trial before the revolutionary court. The radical students burned the U.S. flag as a sign of resentment to Americans and paraded the hostages blindfolded (Bourne 456). During this crisis, "the Carter administration's strategy towards Iran revolved around two ftjndamental objectives: protection of America's vital petroleum mterests and finding the quickest possible route to the hostages' safe release"

(Brinkley 12).

Carter's Administration quickly responded and retaliated to American citizens being taken captive. On November 12, 1979, Carter terminated all oil purchases from

Iran, which was 4% of the U.S. supplies (Bourne 455). J'wo days later he fi'oze twelve million dollars of Iranian assets in American bonds (Wells 179). He also stopped the delivery of $300 million in spare parts for the military (Skow 20). Khomeini endorsed a threat saying that he would kill all of the hostages if the U.S. attacked or attempted a rescue, giving Carter no choice but to negotiate (Wells 99). Caller's concern for the safety of the American hostages refrained him from military action that might result in Reiter 9 unnecessary bloodshed. On November 19"', Khomeini released thiiJeen hostages, five women and eight black men, which left only 53 hostages. KJiomeini reasoned theii- release because he believed that the blacks suffer in the U.S. and that Islam does not make war on women (Skow 21). Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, assured to the released hostages, "We will not rest or relent in our efforts until every one of your colleagues stands safely on American soil. We will continue to pursue every avenue available to us until all of our people are home. We will continue to stand fu-m. We will continue to stand as a nation united" (Goshko 1). During the Crisis, hostage I^chard

Queen, who suffered fi'om multiple sclerosis was released to the U.S. because of his health issues, which left 52 white male American hostages who remamed in Iran for 444 days.

The hostages' safety was a priority to President Carter along with peaceftil negotiations. Khomeini knew of the president's motives and said the U.S. President

"knows that he is beating an empty drum. Carter does not have the guts to engage in a military operation" (Skow 21). Khomeini knew of the America system and he the use of propaganda, he says, "because of propaganda, people are afi'aid of the superpowers, and they think that the superpowers can not be touched" (Gosliko 1). Reversmg the fear, he used the hostages as propaganda. In the safe return of the hostages, KJiomeini ordered the U.S. to return the Shah back to Iran as a criminal under the new government, along with the admission of guilt, recognition of Iran's right to seize the Shah and his assets, and a pledge of non-interference form the United States government (Skow 21). Carter hoped that the United Nations would find "a peaceful solution, because a peacefiil

solution is preferable to the other remedies available for the United States and the world. Reiter 10

At the same time we pursue such a solution with grim determmation, the goverrunent of

Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation it has created itself and the grave consequences which will result if harm comes to any of the hostages" (Goshko 1). The

U.S. continued the attempt to negotiate however plans became contradicting because the

Iranian government was reluctant to settle on an agreement. Carter stated in reference to the return of the hostages, "We will continue to defend the security, honor, and fi'eedom of Americans everywhere. We will not yield to blackmail" (Goshko 1). President Jimmy

Carter became determined to bring tiie hostages home.

Once the U.S. gamed a sufficient amount of information about the hostages and their location, Carter set up a military plan m order to free the hostages since Iran was not complying with his negotiations. This plan was called Operation Desert One. It was a secret mission in order to release the hostages safely. JJiere were 90 members of the rescue team (Carter 579). The plan was aborted April 25, 1980. Two of the eight RH-53 helicopters were attempting to land in the desert, their vision was clouded with sand, and both helicopters were destroyed ui the collision. The mission was canceled because only

6 helicopters landed and there were many difficulties tlu'oughout the process (Carter

580). Today there is a Servicemen Memorial Monument for the 8 Americans that died in an attempt to save the 52 hostages (Morris 277). After Carter's presidency he was asked what he would have done differently in handling the Iran Crisis and he stated "I would have sent another helicopter" (Brinkley 12). Hiis failed mission was heartbreaking to the

Carter administration and this was the only military operation that Carter attempted in this crisis. Reiter 11

During this crisis the hostages were held captive, yet theii' location and position changed thi'oughout the time of thefr imprisonment. JJiey were held at the Chancery, the

Bijon Apartments, Evui Prison, and the Musliroom Inn, where they were kept in different vaults and the guards carried knives and guns that were swung at the hostages and slapped them around (Wells 80). There were constant mterro gat ions and many mock executions as the hostages waited in captivity (Wells 191). Six American diplomats, who were in the American embassy in J'ehran the day Iranians seized the embassy, managed to escape to the Canadian embassy (Wells 219). The Canadian policy was to hide the

Americans under Ambassador J'aylor (Wells 219). Yet, only these few escaped fi'om the imprisonment that the other 52 endured. During the summer of 1980 the hostages were moved to Komiteh Prison. One hostage described, "the prison was a massive concrete structure built in a series of concentric rings, with cii'cular two story cell blocks located one inside the other" (Wells 357). Hostages were also held in solitary confinement for weeks at a time (Wells 274). Tlii'oughout the entiie captivity the hostages were moved through many different prisons, but usually held in the American embassy under Iranian rule.

The election of 1980 was greatly affected by the Iran Hostage Crisis. The hostage crisis helped Carter to retain nommation for the democratic vote, or else Edward

Kemiedy would of defeated Carter (Morris 277). Carter's favor went up with the crisis situation from 32% to 62% (Morris 278). However Carter could not obtain the requii*ed electoral votes because of economic problems, such as inflation, high oil prices, and the

7% rise of unemployment. Despite the fact that the hostage crisis helped hun become nominated instead of Edward Kennedy, the 52 hostages were still held captive in Iran Reiter 12

(Brinkley 2). Therefore Ronald Regan, the Republican nominee, won the election of

1980.

Mohammad Reza Shah died m June 1980 fi-omlymphom a with an obstruction of the bile duct on American soil (Bourne 454). Immediately following the death of the

Shah hi July 1980, Khomeini requested that the U.S. not interfere with Iranian affairs and that they release the Shah's and Iranian assets. Ayatollah Ruhoilah Khomemi listed the conditions under which the hostages would be released. These conditions were set m

September of 1980 when Iran recognized that they would not take on two enemies at once when the Iran- Iraq was started (Bruikley 11). Iran requested that the U.S. return all of the Shah's wealth, cancel the American claims, unfi'eeze the Iranian assets in

American banks, and promise not to interfere in Iran's affairs (Jordan 176). After Carter lost in the Election of 1980, he became even more determined to persuade the terrorists to release the 52 captives. After much debating and conversation, at 4:55 AM January 19,

1981, Carter finally made an agreement with Iran in his last day in presidential office

(Brinkley 34). Carter complied with Khomeini's requests and agreed to end trade embargo against Iran and for the U.S. to not mterfere with Iran's internal affaiis

(Brinkley 40). Yet, for some reason KJiomeini delayed the final release of the hostages to

West Germany until the 20"' of January, consecutive to Regan's uiauguration (Bourne

469). President Regan asked Jhnmy Carter to greet the hostages in West Germany. All of the liostages had great respect for Carter and his efforts to set them fi-ee and bringing them home alive (Brinkley 41). There was no ransom for thek release, only tlii'ee billion doliais returned fi'om the assets fi'ozen in the U.S (Bruikley 41). Former President Carter at this time said, "the mistreatment and abuse of the hostages was more comprehensive Reiter 13 and severe than we had anticipated" (Brinkley 41). The 52 hostages were fmally set free fi'om the captivity of Iran after being held there for 444 days.

After Regan's victoi7 m the election, there were speculations of scandalous negotiations between Iran and Regan's campaign operatives. The Republican Party was accused of negotiating with Iran to delay the hostages' release, until Regan was in office.

This scheme was supposedly a way to have Khomemi hold off on the release of the hostages until after Carter's presidency was over. This scandal is called the "October

Surprise" by Gary Sick, who was a member of the National Security Council Staff in

Middle Eastern Affah's from 1976-1981 (Sick 4). It was alleged to have had the mtent to after the election and defeat Carter and elect Regan by blocking the release of the hostages. Regan focused on the failed Operation Desert One, stating that Carter was preparing to exchange arms for the hostages (October 1). As a critic of Sick's October

Surprise Douglas Brinkley says, "The congressional report did state that Casey was

'fishing in troubled water' and that he conducted informal, clandestine, and potentially dangerous efforts on behalf of the Regan campaign to gather intelligence on the volatile and unpredictable course of the hostage negotiations" (Brinkley 44). Historians still debate on the October Surprise and ai'e not positive to whether or not the scandal is true under Gary Sick's idea.

Many historians brmg into question whether or not it is possible for Iran and the

U.S. to come full cii'cle and are these two countries ready for rapprochement. Since the

Iran Hostage Crisis, the American embassy has been closed in Iran and the relations still fluctuate with "diplomatic disdain" (Iran 234). The U.S. -Iran diplomatic relations ended with the hostage crisis and because of the tensions that brought about the hostage crisis Reiter 14

such as the countries different ideologies and political cultures. Historians such as Mai'k

K. Katz, wrote m his scholarly essay. The United States and Iran: Ready for

Rapprochement? that, "the most likely catalyst for an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations is the emergence of a conmion tlii'eat to both" (Katz 7). The Hostage Crisis had put a damper in U.S.- Iranian relations, which will requiie time to restore the trust and reformation of theii" former contact.

American- Iranian relations have been stramed because of the clash of the

different countries politically, economically, and socially. Specifically in the I970's with

the overthrow of the Shah's dictatorship, resentment of the U.S. support of his regime, and the Iran Hostage Crisis, the two countries grew stronger against each other. The Iran

Hostage Crisis is vital to the understandment of the U.S. mvolvement with Iran. There

must be a complying effort to resolve the nations' differences in order for relations to return, it is uncertain that U.S.- Iran relations will ever be amiable or even tolerant because of the conflict that the Hostage Crisis created between America and Iran. Reiter 15

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

Interviewer: Bekah Reiter Interviewee: Pant Needham Location: The Reiter Residence Date: December 29, 2002

Bekah Reiter: Today is the 29"' of December 2002, my name is Bekah Reiter and I am interviewmg Paul Needham at my house. First of all, how has the experience of bemg held hostage affected your life to the present day?

Paul Needham: Being in captivity gave me time to reflect on the real values and meanings that strengthened me in my relationship with God.

BR: Tell me about your upbringing. How you were brought up and how it has been relative to you being held hostage?

PN: My father was a career military man. 1 spent time m boy scouts dohig those various tiimgs. I also spent time going to church. At that time we went to a Methodist church.

Comhig out of college I avoided the draft by enlisting m the air force m 1969, March of

1969, if you go back and look at the times of the Vietnam War. Boy scouts helped me to develop a sense of self-reliance and being able to do things, which helped me translate into my early time in the military. In 1969-1973 I really did want to get a college degree so I went to night school.

BR: At the time how and why were you sent to Iran? Reiter 16

PN: After bemg enlisted in the Ah Force, I went to finish my degree from the courtesy of the Air Force. They took me to be selected to go to a graduate school at the Aii' Force

Institute of Technology. There I did a major in International logistics, which translates mto foreign inilitary sales. When I went into graduate school, the Aii" Force assigned me to a job in Dalton Ohio, that deals with contracts with foreign government for the sale of afrcraft, support equipment, and spare parts, llie way that 1 got into Iran was, since that was my specialty, in the summer of 1979 I had been asked to go to Iran and be a fi'ee lancer as far as negotiating with other countries. In September I was in Portugal working in selling them F5 's. In October my organization gets ready to go to Iran in order to replace a person fi*omou r organization that there. And so 1 was supposed to go originally for only 60 days because I was not assigned to a specific country. So I went to negotiate that. In October, on October 14"', 1979 I left to go to Iran, to negotiate the spare parts contract. As you take a look back at 1978-1979, very terrible times there in Iran, of course the biggest demonstrations begiimmg in September 1978. December 1978 led to the decision to remove most of the contractors that we had there, at that time we had about 40 thousand contractor personnel and families. January 1979 was when the Shah abdicated his thiown. Aboliiassan Bani-Sadr is elected president of Iran. And then m

February of 1979 Kliomeini comes back into the country of Iran. The embassy was overrun on the 14"' of Februai-y and all of the people leave. Then months later, about

May, the Iranians and the United States ti-y to make some type of relationship form theii* government to our government. Then they decide to re-open the American embassy.

Bruce Langdon becomes in chai'ge of the affafrs and there are a number of different Reiter 17 people who aie assigned over there for foreign military sales and defense department. Of course the embassy itself opens up to counselor section, the economic section, those different sections of the embassy to help hearken companies m their country to stmt finalizing some contracts that had been in the process before that.

BR: Did you know the tensions between the Iran-U.S. relations when you left, the tensions with the oil companies?

PN: Well, oil was a factor in it, but if you take a look at... again 1978-1979 are real important years... you have the Satirical Ai*ms Limitation treaty to consult to, that's being negotiated. President Caiter signs this with the British Empii'c. Now the reason that we could do that was for national technical means. We had radar sights up north of

Tea Greets near the Hill Breeze Mountams looking out over the Caspian Sea to the

Russian missile fields. So those radar sights were critical to be able to monitor what the

Soviets were domg, so Iran has a very important position in the world geographically, wliich was satii-ic for the U.S. Oil bemg a part of that and Iran bordering the Strait of

Hormuz, and of course tradition in the significant amount of oil, but really it's the position in the world with respect to Russia and Strait of Hormuz, more than just oil.

Going back m history a little bit, you look back into 1973 the Yom-Kippur war when the

Shah assisted the United States m supplymg oil over to Israel, which many people are not aware of, cause they haven't done theii- homework. [Laughbig]

BR: So you went there [Iran] in October... Reiter 18

PN: ...October 14'\...

BR; .. .and less and a month later the embassy was overrun...

PN: ...November 4"*...

BR: .. .Yes, November 4"'.Now, how did the attack occur and how did the Iranians actually take over? 1 noticed that when I was reading 444 Days some of the hostages quoted m there said that they knew that something "big" was going to happen because many Iranian students were bemg bussed a tew days before the embassy was overrun.

PN: Well again Teheran is a very metropolitan city, at the time about six million and today about twelve or thiiteen million people, somewhere in that range. There is a lot of unemployment followmg the Shah's downfall. The revolution in Iran of course there was a significant amount of unemployment. There is also the University of Telii-an, the university there m the center of the city, where a number of the professors there had actually been exciting the students behind the revolution. And the Shah was the villain.

So when the Shah abdicated the tliiown, he left the country for Egypt, if I am correct...

BR: Yes that is. Reiter 19

PN: ...Since the United States was trying to improve relations with Iran, the Shah appeals to President Cater to be allowed to come to the United States for medical treatment because he was dying of cancer. President Caiter and the cabinet said yes. It was the 22 or the 23 of October 1979. Regarding the Shah, the military advisors sent messages back and forth saymg that this was not going to help our relationship with the current govermnent. President Carter says that we aie not gomg to withstand that and we are still going to let hhn [the Shah] come. The Shah comes to the U.S. as soon as the people in Iran fmd out about his they start having demonstrations outside the embassy.

On the 14"'of October...

BR: What type of demonstrations?

PN: Well they were marching around and yelling, "Death to the Shah," "Death to U.S.,"

"Allah Ackbar," meaning God is great, and just cliaiitmg. fhere were some students fr-om the Teheran University who did not want to go to class so they came out and demonstrated mstead, they would get extra credit by doing that. They were also able to bring m a lot of people from the upper and lower parts of Tehran where there was a lot of unemployment, 'f herefore there were many demonstration industries marching up and down m front of the embassy any chance that they got. They did it on the 25"\ on the

26*' and the 27th [of October 1979] and each time the demonstrations got larger and larger. It was about a thousand people towards the end of the month and even more, but definitely all were good size demonstrations. I had finished the negotiating contract that 1 had to do. I got a five million dollar gold deposit for the spare parts that my company Reiter 20 was gomg to provide. I talked to my boss about coming home early that weekend, but he suggested that I stay, and so I did. That Friday the 2'^'' of November the demonstrations that day at least caused me to thuik that something was going to happen, what was going to happen I did not know. But then on the Sunday morning November 4'"', the demonstrations started about the same time as normal, about eight o'clock in the monung. 1 was m my office up on the thii'd fioor in the Chancellor's building of the embassy. The demonstrators, or students, came over the walls and the national police stood aside and they started taking people hostage, Americans hostage, in some of the outer buildmgs. They had weapons, the students had weapons. They were able to get inside the main Chancellor's building, tiiis is now about nine fifty or ten o'clock yet they didn't start unfolding there until about two o'clock when most of the Americans had afready surrendered. Then I was hiding a security volt until about tlu'ee or four o'clock in the afternoon, then we finally surrender in fhere.

BR; What type of weapons did they have?

PN: They had G3 Belgium-made, Iranian-made G3; it*s a 7.62-minimeter automatic weapon, and machine pistols, the niaclO pistol. They also had Palestinians in with them.

BR: Did you yourself have any idea as to how many hostages were being taken at the time that this was going on, as you were hiding m the security volt? Reiter 21

PN: I had only been there tor 19 days, but we knew how many, well the people who I

had gone info the volt with, knew how many people were there and they knew where they had been working so we knew by process of deduction. We figured that there were about

67 total that were being taken at that point. We figured this out fi*om the 10 of us that

were in the volt.

BR: What was your actual job in the American embassy? You mentioned a little bit

earlier about selling parts and you mentioned that you were actually finished with your job at this point.

PN: My job was... the United States has what we now call an office of Defense

Cooperation in most countries with the embassy and a staff of military officers who help

a foreign govermnent decide what type of military equipment that they might like to have. If it is military equipment we go ahead and buy it. The U.S. has passes certain

laws controlling the sales of anmiunitions, if you would; aii" planes, trains, jeeps, trucks,

and all the types of items that could be used for military purpose, even a snow blower

[laughing]. In order for any country to buy these items on this list, what is referred to as

Anmiunitions list, that country has to go thi'ough my company and the department runs it

and proves it but the contractual relationsliip with the company and the U.S. has to be passed tlu'ough the United States government and the department of defense. I worked

for the department of defense and that is what I was doing over in Iran. Again, because

of the Shah, the United States had sold them [Iran] the navy set 14. We had sold the afr

force C130s, air force F4s, air force F5s, and equipment, all kinds of ground equipment, Reiter 22 radars and so forth was all sold to the Shah. Along with these pieces of equipment you need spare parts. We afready had to uicite them so now they needed some spare parts and that was exactly what my job was there. Of all the contracts that had to exist prior to that had been terminated and a new set of agreements.

BR: Afrer they captured you, where did they actually take you and hold you captive?

PN: The mam chancellery is on Ticajumsky and Eisenliower Boulevard. In the embassy compound there was about 40 acres. After being taken from the thii'd fioor of the

Chancellor's room back in this safety voft, where we did the secret administrations. They took us eventually out the back door, blmdfolded us and lead us over to the ambassador's house, where all of the Americans had been taken because it was a convenient place. At about 5:30 or 6:00 on that Sunday night, that is when the 10 of us, one at a tune were eventually lead over to. So this group of demonstrators, "students," because the demonstrators were still outside the walls this gave them a definite sense of control and fi-ee reign of the city and fi-eereig n of the compound. They decided to use the ambassador's house for this purpose.

BR: Did you know at tiie time where the other hostages were?

PN: I saw most of the other hostages, but the ten of us were kept separate. We were hand cuffed, and blindfolded, and tied fi-om the wrists, and we had surrendered at one tune in the security volt. They thought that I was a spy. Reiter 23

BR: Once you were taken hostage were you always held with those ten that you surrendered with?

PN: No, the conditions varied. Do you want me to walk through the different stages?

BR: Yes, go right ahead.

PN: On that night of the 4"' of November, the ten of us were separated into two groups of five each. Finally on the 5"' of November we were, the ten of us were taken and had our hands tied to ciiaiis, and our feet, we were blindfolded. And put in a circle around facing the wall. The reason I knew tliis was because I could count the feet, it was not a very good blindfold. We were kept there all day and at night they would untie us fi-om the chafr and tie our hands behind our back or tie our hand to our legs, so that we could sleep. They did that for the fnst few days. But Monday night, the 5"' of November, there were 10 to 14 people who were taken to a safe house. So had there been a rescue attempt they still would have had those hostages. There are rules about going ahead and taking certain precautions, Iran was sure that there was gomg to be a rescue attempt. Because

President Carter had stated previously that he would not negotiate with teiTorists when there are hostages uivolved. So I kept on thuikmg that there was going to be a rescue attempt and that the Iranian government would assist in this rescue attempt. At that point

I did not know that the students were pait of the Iranian govermnent. It dawned on me later on. So from the 5'^ of November through about the 18"' of November we moved Reiter 24 around a couple of tunes to the different houses there, as they took us from of those locations to the others I watched some of the defense department people who wanted to fast with the Iranians and lend moral support to them. I had difficulties with that because of the military code of conduct when one is taken hostage.

BR: What does that state?

PN: If hi command, I will not surrender as long as all of my men have gone tln-ough. It is something to try to live by if you become a captain. I watched these people give aid to comfort to the enemy, my words. The 18"' of November I was handcuffed with about 10 other people. I knew that it was about 10 other people because there were about 10 other voices.

BR: Could you communicate with the other hostages?

PN: No, the Iranians would not let us talk to one another, because fliey were very paranoid, but as each individual talked to the Iranians or answered questions or said "oh, that hurt!" You heai'd about 10 different voices. When you are taken hostage, suddenly every faculty that you have you use to try and gleam some information. I would listen for a cough or listen for a different voice. I would listen for movement to try and see which direction that I was walking. Agam close your eyes and try walking around, what do you sense? I was trymg to listen to all the different sounds. Reiter 25

BR: I see what you are saying.

PN: I guess that it is not unlike how a blind person feels. The senses become much more enlianced. When I was blindfolded, that was what I would try and do. Some of us were taken around the 18"' of November and put into vans and the vans had driven off the embassy compound to a safe house in the northern pait of Teiiian. The reason I know that it was the northern part of Tehan, is again, trying to set some dii*ection, and use all of these different elements to try train if you are riding in a car. So we got into the car and we go up to t!ie back gate. Now I know that it was the back gate because of the way the car turned when it left where we were. I used every motion that I had to detect wliich way or diiection we were going. They eventually ended up in noithern part of Telu-an. I knew that because my ears are sensitive to pressure change, so even at 50 ft, my ears would start popping. And the way that Teluan is geographically, it is on the foothills of the Oolieh Mountauis. I ended up there for about ten days, then Thanksgiving 1979 came around and I was in a room at this pomt with two cai'dinals and the state department cardinal at that point and I said "yes sir." We are still not allowed to talk but they announced that the Iranian guard...we ai'e not communicatmg but we are talking back and forth havmg a dialogue, but they are makmg announcements like tliis so I could said

"yes sii'" at that tune. Thanksgiving came and we didn't eat breakfast, because the civilian ate our breakfast. We didn't eat lunch the civilian ate our lunch. Suppertime came and the army Colonel that I work for...

BR: Were your blindfolds off at this time? Reiter 26

PN: Yes they were off, but we were still tied to the chairs and handcuffed. The Colonel

did not eat out of spitefiil hate so I didn't eat either. I was going to follow the army

Colonel that I worked for instead of the air force Colonel who couldn't stand a diet.

[Laughmg] He continued his diet for about 2 to 3 more days. But the main point of that

stoi-y is the lack of solidarhy between the civilian who was hi our room and the tlii'ee

military advisors. In the code of conduct, the senior officer is the person that you should

follow. It wasn't doing any good, I mean the Iranians had a good laugh at us for domg this, but sometimes you need to feel good about yourself even in captivity. On the 3^" of

December the Iranians took us back to the embassy. Wlien they took off our blindfolds,

the Colonel spoke fiuently and the Iranians told him that we were going to have a steak

dmner tonight. I thought that was our last meal. I did not sleep that night; I just waited

for the execution in the morning.

BR: Wlio told you that it was going to be your last meal?

PN: The Air Force Colonel. He said, "our last mean," speakmg of the steak. Certain

word you have to be carefiil about saymg, I found out from experience. With the image of our last meal, since I didn't speak Farce. I couldn't understand, and I thought maybe

he understood so I figured that I was going to be shot in the mornmg. The next morning

we weren't shot obviously. But then a period of inteiTogation began for me. I was

separated from the four people and put into solitai-y confinement. My fnst mterrogation

began. There method was that at about 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning they would come Reiter 27

and wake me up and take me to a room. Where I would be facuig tlii-ee individuals, the

interrogator, the enforcer, and my fi'iend the interpreter, he wanted to help me get tlrrough

all of this. It seemed that it was fi-om a movie. Anyone who has ever read anything on psychological operation, warfare interrogations, it was classic. So I was trying not to

laugh because I was on the wi'ong side of it, but it was classical. I used that to my

advantage because it was easier to deflect some questions. Agam the code of conduct,

only allowed to state, social security number, date of bhth. But we were really not at war, but I still had to be careful and watch myself so that I wouldn't start crossing that

line and that is really what the rule means to me. It means that one cannot give out classified information, or do any harm to anybody else.

BR: What type of information?

PN: Just...they never used any physical torture and such, mental, yes, but it was always in the form of cruninals and spontaneity. When the first interrogation began they had about six different periods about 3 hours each. Then during this they moved us again.

BR: How long were you in solitary confinement?

PN: Total, maybe about 9 months, excuse me I'm sorry about 6 months total of solitary

confinement. Reiter 28

BR: I believe that in the book 444 Days it was you who stated that you liked solitary confinement over the other places that you were held.

PN: It was not that bad. Where I think I said that I liked it was in the begimiing it was not very good because 1 was not given a roommate. But later I was given a roommate, who I was with for about 4 or 5 months. There was a thi-ee weeks break fi'om hun and that was solitary confinement. He and I were together all the time, every week for 5 months, where he went I went where I went he went.

BR: I take it that you guys got to know each other really well.

PN: Yes, if I wanted to go down to the batlii-oom, they would take me and he would come too. So finally after that period when we got caught communicatmg, I was put into sohtai'y confmement and given a break. But he was next door so I could tap tliiough the walls and use the tap code, but I did not liave to see somebody.

BR: How did you communicate with Iranians when you needed to go to the batlu-oom or somethmg?

PN: They spoke some English. The Shah, m his education system had required that everybody take English. Tlii'ee of the captors had been to the United States before to go to college. Reiter 29

BR: How did the Iranians mterrogate you? What types of questions would they ask you to play the mental games?

PN: Basically they asked about, why the U.S. had le the Shah in? What was the U.S> plamimg on doing? Wliy had the U.S befi-iended the Shah? Who had the combinations to certam safes? Who had... why I was there? Who was I negotiating with the Afr

Force, the army or the navy? They were trying to get information so that they could have a purge.

BR: How did you replay to theii- questions?

PN: I was vague. I don't know the person who has the list. I'm only here on temporary duty. The person with the hst left on this date, you can see if you check your files. He took it back to the person who was supposed to replace me because I didn't need the list smee I was only in Iran for temporary duty. He's out of the country and the new person isn't coming here now. I would try using that type of answer.

BR; Do you think that they believed you?

PN: No, because they kept on asking but it was easy for me because it was true. A number of prisoners of war that I have talked to...one of the important things that you do m the military, part of the traming is some type of issue in bemg a prisoner of war, very Reiter 30 elementary. Within the afr force the afrcrews get a much better taste of that in our survival school that we have.

BR: So did you feel prepared for bemg held hostage?

PN: I had not gone to that school. But I had read good books and had good conversations with people and committed myself to learn some of that as a professional officer. Therefore 1 understood basically when you should try and what type of mformation to steer them away from. So I did not feel well prepared, no, but it was learning on the job.

BR: WeU, I guess that you can ever be prepared for that type of situation.

PN: No, but you have to learn very quickly on the job.

BR: I understand that there were mock executions, and more than one.

PN: Well there were two that I was definitely part of So the mterrogations continued until about Christmas time. The Iranians decided to use that for a lot of propaganda. At times like these I would look to the Colonels for leadership. When Chi-istmas came we were still in the same place where we called the Muslu'oom Imi. Interrogations now have stopped. And I started getting some mail. Conditions...the food was not too good, but not terrible, but I lost a lot of weight and was now down to about 140 pounds. On the 4"' Reiter 31 of February we had gotten some mail. We had set up a dead letter drop back in the batlii-oom, leavmg notes underneath the toilet paper and toilet seat. We set up the tap code. Do you know the tap code?

BR: A little but I'm not familiar with it.

PN: Well a one would be an A, a one-five would be a E, a five-one would be an S and a five-five would be a Y, a two one would be an F, so just making a matrix to do the alphabet. So you could conmiunicate by going two-one, F. Or you could start tapping but since Morse code is very hard to do tlnough a wall, because it is hard to disthiguish a dash fi-om a dot. (Tap tap, on the coffee cup as a demonstration) So I stared using the tap code to communicate. Agam I did not know the tap code going in but I picked it up very quickly.

BR: How useful was the tap code?

PN: It was very usefiil. That way we could communicate though the walls and gam new information.

BR: What type of information did you gain from using if?

PN: If would depend upon what individuals were receiving mail. All of the mail was censored, so we started sharing what we each knew signally. The mail that I got fi'om my Reiter 32 mother was always censored and if was from back in November, so if was not much new news, some of the people were given mail fi-omlat e December. On February 4'^ the

Iranians mai-ched m and at 045 m the mornuig and they had us march uifo another room, m the Muslii'ooni room, which we called if, it was a warehouse, the basement of a warehouse. We marched in there and they lined us up agamsf the wall for a firing sequence. They were chantmg ai'ound the room, and taking the safety lock off their weapons but they checked it around us mstead of shooting.

BR: Could you tell that they were mock executions?

PN: I know now that they were mock executions because they didn't shoot, but at the time I thought that they were going to shoot us. It is just hai'd to describe sometimes but there was a real presence there to calm me. So that takes care of February, not much else happened, March comes along. If you have any knowledge of the negotiations that were going on outside of Iran at the time, the new president of Iran said okay you can let the

United Nations mspectors to come in, we want to tell everyone just how bad the Shah was. Finally on about the 6"' of March we were supposed to be turned over to the govermnent and the UN mspectors would be there to see us. I didn't have much regard for UN inspectors then, nor today... UN inspectors... anyway, enough of my political amiouncements. Wliat is important here is that fhere were negotiations going on and then

Mai-ch comes along and the negotiations have failed. Then there is the second mock execution. Then by about the middle of March I finally am put in with my roommate.

Then we were put back frito the mafri chancellery. My roommate was the conmioner in Reiter 33 charge of the Maruie Corps. The two of us start putting together all of the couglis and hacks fri order to get a number of hostages.

BR: How long did that take you?

PN: A couple of days with everythmg that he knew and that I knew. We would just listen to the people coughing and look at the food portions.

BR: Were you then able to talk to him?

PN: Yes we could talk, we were just locked in a room and the only tfrne we needed to get out was to go to the batlii-oom. That was the fii'st tune that I was able to talk to another person since November. So from November to the end of March we were not allowed to talk to each other, and that is when we used the tap code.

BR: Were you aware of the days that were passuig and the fhne?

PN: Oh yeah, I mai'ked them down with chalk,

BR: What were the conditions of the room?

PN: The room that we finally went into in Mai-ch it was just an office room that had been stripped of all of the ftirnifure. The Iranians put m a couple of pads in there so we Reiter 34 could sleep on them. There was a light bulb m the ceiling. In the main chancellery what we have done, what the Americans had done earlier was to make if mto a bulletproof boxes outside the windows to protect us fi-om the Iranians. So there was a quarter inch steel plate filled with six niches of sand and another quarter mch steel plate to make a window box for planting, but that was on the outside of the windows so now we couldn't get out. You can't shoot in, but it's hard to get out now.

BR: Were there any attempts made to escape?

PN: Several people did, I say several there were maybe 2 or 3 people who made an attempt to escape, and they were obviously not successfiil. My roommate and I kept on planning our escape. We kept on going and planning on how we were gomg to escape, i knew how to hotwfre veliicles and those types of skills, that are usefial in big cites,

[laughmg] for hotwfring cars. So we planed out where we would go, what radio frequency we needed to be able to communicate on. He had a very strong background in maruie infantry and I had a background in air* force communications and electronics. We were putting together our scheme. However in order to take the first step we probably would have to kill one of the Iranians going out.

BR: How elaborate was your scheme?

PN: We knew which way that we wanted to go and we knew where we might be able to get a car and the dfrection we would like to go and how we would travel. We would Reiter 35 travel at night and sleep durmg the day someplace. We did not write anything down but we had it pretty well planned out. But we would have to get past that first step. And we didn't know what would happen... well, if we got caught we knew what would happen to us, but what would iiappen to the rest of the hostages we did not know. We didn't know exactly what to do here. We questioned what we were gomg to do.

BR: Were you willing to risk your life in order to escape?

PN: Oh yeah, that was not even a question about risking our lives, it was the other people that we would be leaving behind and since I'm not the senior officer m this place, so on and so forth with the code of conduct.

PN: We both recognized the risk involved. You know, being in the military, of course you have to recognize the risk there. If we had known what might of happened to the other people... we never had to opportunity ffr-st of all, and we were reluctant to go kill an

Iranian on the way out, that kept us fi-om doing it. We never had the opportunity where either one of us could get out where we were kept. The other people were not kept in the same conditions as we were... everybody was... I shouldn't say it that way... there were different groups of hostages and where they were kept and the way they were help hostage. I was in a group that they guarded very closely, because they were sure that we were spies. I got put in the wrong group of people. I was not a spy but I was m the group where the rest of the people were spies. Reiter 36

BR: So all of the people that you were with, were spies.

PN: Well, 9 out of 10,1 can assure you of that.

BR: Except for you of course. [Laughing]

PN: By saying spy, I mean by being the CIA station chief, the CIA station chief is sort of an overt spy position. The defense machete is an overt spying position, known ui all countries. The covert, I did not know who was covert but the overt people I did know.

Yeah I was with them. As it came into April, my roommate was accused of a crime agamst Iran and so I got solitary confinement for a week, or maybe 2 weeks. It was pure

solitary, I could not see anybody or talk to anybody, there was nobody m the room next to me to be able to communicate with using the tap code. On the 15"^ of April the Red

Cross showed up and took a letter home. In that letter I wrote back to my father and my mother, "Is life so sweet, or peace so dear, as to be purchased at the bonds of slavery?"

Do you know the rest of it?

BR: Howdoestherestof it go?

PN: Yes, Patrick Henry's speech. "Is life so sweet, or peace so deai", as to be purchased

at the bonds of human slavery? Forbid it. Almighty God! I know not which course

others may choose, but as for me, give me liberty of give me death!" Reiter 37

BR: Oh weft I knew that last part of it.

PN: Yes, most people do. My mother knew history so she knew the first part so she could fill fri the last part. In my letter I also asked my father for a linebacker fi-eegam e for Clii-istmas. The 25"' of April comes and the conditions change agahi, by being locked up. Looking at what's changed, instead of just having a couple of aimed guards around the hallway, we were blindfolded going into the hallway, but every once in a while you could see an armed guard. Before the guard coining into the room was not armed, but now all of the guards were armed. Late that night we were blindfolded and handcuffed and lead out. I was put into a van with a couple of other people and we drove ai'ound in cii'cles, with no pattern at all. But because of my ears being sensitive to pressure I knew that we had gone up into the northern part of the city, we ended up m Ethan prison that night. I was in solitary confinement for two weeks and then I stayed there for a few days.

Now of course the 25"' of April was when the rescue attempt was terminated.

BR: Yeali.

PN: It was called Operation Eagle Claw. A friend of mine fi-omjunio r high, high school and college who was part of that rescue attempt.

BR: Really. Reiter 38

PN: Yeah, and then the co-pilot of Howard Lewis' air-craft, now Howard Lewis is the aircraft commander who died in the reuse attempt. Well until one week before going m,

Howard Lewis' co-pilot gets sick and does not go on the mission.

BR: Did you have any type of information or know that there was going to be a rescue attempt?

PN: Well 1 didn't, some of the other people might have, but 1 didn't hear anything. So I would have to say no, none of us knew about it. But in the back of our minds we kept thinkhig that there would be a rescue attempt.

BR: Did you think at any time that there had been a rescue attempt and that it had failed?

PN: Well I knew that something had happened because they moved us and dispersed us around the country. They kept on moving us further and further away, so I knew something had happened. I guess, that I myself didn't want to believe that somethmg had happened. But somefhfrig had happened drastically for them to take those actions. I was put back with the same roonmiate in an 8 by 10 ft cell. The door would slide open for food, but it was a typical solitary type of prison confinement. There was a little area off to the side where you could get some light occasionally. We were able to tap tiii-ough some of the walls and coimnunicate with some of the other Americans. Like I said before, I did not know the tap code gomg in, but I learned it really fast. The Iranians did Reiter 39 not know the tap code. I would knock and see what would come back and if they knew the tap code then I knew that it was an American.

BR: Wiiat did the Iranians do when they noticed that you were usmg the tap code to conmiunicate with others?

PN; I'hey knew, but they couldn't tell who was doing it. When you get black and blue knuckles you have to be careful. I would cover them up when the Iranians would try to look at my hands. You didn't want to tap too hard. That takes care of May when we are moved out of the city. The 22'"" of June they bring us back to the city this tune to

Colmitate prison. A different prison in the center pait of Teln-an. I would sense the way we were moving, how long I was m the van for, this all gave me a sense of the time length.

BR: You must gain some sense of time after being there for so long.

PN: You can count by heartbeats, rotations, and even when you are blindfolded, one still gets a sense of daylight and darkness. We started putthig together a sequence.

BR: Did the Iranians take anything away from you?

PN: Yes, rmgs, watches. Reiter 40

BR: This question is a little off topic, but, late in November 13 hostages were released, 5 women and 8 black men. Did you have any knowledge about that?

PN: Not at the time, but I discerned it later on. One of the black men who were released is a man named Neal Robinson; he is a regular general of the afr force. He and I had been handcuffed together for several nights, but then I didn't see him any more. 1 was curious as to why he was not with my group. I did not know about the women being let go but I knew some blacks who where. The Iranians eventually told us about that.

BR: Around what tune did you find out?

PN: I don't remember.

BR: Did you actually know that there were 52 of you all?

PN: There were 53.

BR: Oh yes, because one of you got sent home m July because of ilhiess.

PN: That was when Richard Queen was let go. That's why I say that my rooimnate and

I had pieced together back in March that there were 49 of us in the main chancellery.

One of the Americans, Jerry Plotkin, was on sight at the embassy when the embassy was overrun. He was only an American toui'ist, and American businessman, who was just Reiter 41 caught. We didn't know about luin. So when I said that there were 40 of us, he was the

50"' in that group, because we knew the tln-ee people over in foreign ministry, Bruce

Langdon, Michael Howai-d, and Ben Thompson. They were m totally different conditions.

BR: He must have not understood about anything that was gomg.

PN: No, he was one of those guys who would say, "hey look there is a riot going on, let me go see what it looks like." [Laughmg]

BR: What was the worst part for you of all the interrogations, solitary confinement, wluch prison, what was the worst for you or what did you feel was the worst?

PN; Probably the first one ui November, probably November 4"' 1980. Now looking back at the June or July tune and then look forward to November of 1980, there was a period where I had finally had it. It had been a year and I was tfred of this. I really wanted to try and break out. My roommate was not ready to break out. He restrained me mstead of the tow of us going at it. There were periods like that. But the worst, that might have been the worst. We were being used for propaganda. But that's why we kept on lookuig forwai'd to the date and then to the next date, with the realization that we were over a year now. By that time be had found out that the rescue attempt had been tried.

This time I had been put back mto solitai-y confinement. The Iraq-Iran war is going on.

So all of these different elements played towai-d that. Reiter 42

BR: Did you ever fell that Americas had given up?

PN: I did not want to think about it. The prisoners of war in Vietnam, they were there for 7 or 8 years, and I didn't want to be there 7 or 8 years, because that's a long tune.

That was always in the back of my mmd. At that time m December it seemed as if the people would desert us for the Red Cross.

BR: What type of information was given to you, if any, or known during your captivity at the different pomts and prisons of the outside world, politically, the election of 1980 hi the U.S?

PN: The Iranians gave us censored European Newsweek. They had taken out different articles dealing with the hostages. That would cfrculate around; some of it was tlii'ee weeks old. The other information was the information that we gathered and shared. But it had nothing about the hostages, notliing on Iran. In September 1980 we found out that the Shah had died. We found that out because one of the guys received a crossword puzzle enclosed in his letter, and on the back of it was TV guide. There was a picture on it of Iran, 1953. I had received a card fi'om my sister, so those pieces of uiformation.

Someone else had found out that 8 Americans died in the rescue attempt. We were given censored Eiu'opean Newsweek and also this sporthig news, baseball. Reiter 43

BR: I understand that there were six Americans who were hiding out in the Canadian

Embassy and were set fi-ee. Id you ever wish that was you?

PN: Yes I did want to be free. I like fieedom. The Iranians would tell us about what was happening, so after the election 1980, the Iranians came and told us that Jiimny

Caiter had been defeated and that President Regan had won the election and that there was gomg to be a raid of bombing. It really scared me and made me nervous for the next couple of weeks.

BR: With the switch from the Democrat to the Republican hands, did you think that with the new switch m power that your freedom was going to happen during Carter's admuiistration?

PN: Like 1 said before we set dates to look forward to our rescue, such as Cln'istmas,

Easter and everythmg. We looked for transition days, birthdays also. We thought of the switch as another unportant date, that if we were gomg to be released, then it would be then. Or else there was a new team in charge and the negotiations would have to stait over again. We figured that if we did not get out this date, then we would have to get out ourselves. [Side A of tape I end]

BR: [Beginning of side A of tape 2] Next question, what are your poHtical views, before being held hostage and afterwards? Reiter 44

PN: With respect to...

BR: With respect to Democrats. Republicans, Iran-U.S. relations and so on.

PN: Before going into that, the position of Iran is very important to the U.S. so that we could negotiate with the Soviets at the time. Iran was a very important nation hi the world for us to be able to have these relations with them. Of course several presidents and thefr administrations, Republicans and Democrats had both recognized that in previous years and had take relations with the Shah to become close to Iran. In my international logistics course I studied Iran also and hi that we discussed how it was a very backward, thfrd world country hi the 20"' century tune. The different approach of the Shah was by taking education to the English language. The campaign for Barry

Goldwater in 1964, which helped set my tone for voting Republican after yeai-s of voting with the southern Democrats, because of George McGovern rutming in 1972 agamst

Nixon. I voted in the primaries of 1976 for Ronald Regan but of course I did not vote frt the election.

BR: How do you thuik President Carter handled the hostage crisis? Did you feel that he did a complete job or that he could of done more?

PN: Let me answer it this way, if you don't mind, carter came over to Germany's hospital to meet with us. He walked into the room, and I was a captain of the afr force, I had basically decided that I was not going to shake his hand. As president, former Reiter 45 president I would say sfr and be respectful but I did not want to shake his hand. I was angry. Then Carter spent the next hour after walking mto the room; he did not try to shake anybody's hand, talkmg to us. He explained the he could of done more, if the U.S. wanted to go to war with Iran, then yes he could of done more. He was questioning the gold reserves of Iran, which has a lot of meanmg for foreign trade and so on. He tried to negotiate with them. Then he authorized the rescue attempt, and he took full responsibility for the rescue attempt bemg aborted. He took the blame for the carrier although it was not his lauU, because I know who did call it off and it was not President

Carter.

BR: Who was it?

PN: It was Paul Edward, the operator that night. He was the person who placed the phone call for lihii. Over the years I have met a number of these people. Caiter stressed that our safety came fost and was most important to hun. I am not entfrely sure whether it should have been in terms of the U.S. policies with foreign relations before. Had we not been so valuable, maybe we would have been released earlier but probably not because we were the Iranians opportunity and like a chess match, the opposing force, just because you want sometliing doesn't mean that you are going to happen. I had a lot of respect for hun for domg that. I would not of voted for him hi 1980,1 did not vote for him hi 1976 and I would not vote for hun now, and I'm not sure about the Nobel Peace

Prize. But I was happy and proud to shake his hand by the end. Reiter 46

BR: There was a book that I wanted to ask you about. This book called October

Surprise by Gary Sick, which came up when I did my research and when I was reading it, it talked about an alleged pact between Ronald Regan and the teiTorists of Iran to keep the hostages fi-om bemg set fiee until Regan was elected. At first my research showed and stated hi articles that made h sound true. Then finally I found a counter article, which stated that it was not true. What are your feelings on October Surprise and what is your interpretation?

PN: 1 think that Gary Sick has part of it right, obviously Ronald Regan, referred to the point where the hostages have not been released, but President Carter had plenty of other problems to deal with. I do not think that President Regan, Vice President Bush, nor any of the mmiediate people there hi the Regan party had a tlung to do with keeping us captive. T am trying to remember his CIA director's name...He wanted and did some thfrigs that he probably should not have. Do I thuik that he would of done something like that? Yes. The October Surprise by Gai-y Sick, I've talked to Gary Sick before. I thuik it was Barbara that made the allegations for our release, and I know that I was m prison and when this is mentioned I was back m another prison with a group of us. Could another census of been released? Maybe. The 14 of us that I was associated with. The other thmg is, that President Caiter, after the first rescue attempt had failed he authorized general sea cord to put together another rescue attempt. The next rescue attempt was gomg to be much larger, it had over a thousand people involved, well over a thousand.

Could it of worked? Maybe. The fust one was a surprise; the second one had been expected. If the second rescue attempt had come we probably would have been fi-eed, I Reiter 47 want to believe it but then agahi I don't believe it. I look at myself any ask, ''would he of done that to keep me there? Just to become president?" No, I don't think so.

BR: That was my feeling also, but 1 wanted to get yours. Sometimes hostages sympathize with thefr captors; did you ever at any point sympathize with the cause of the

Iranians?

PN: No.

BR: Yeah...

PN: But I do know a couple of state department people who did. But I never did nor would.

BR: You talked a little earlier about you spiritual life and how it changed, would you consider it an unmense change?

PN: No, I wouldn't call h an unmense change. I had been a Clii'istian and grew up in a

Cliristian home. As a person is growmg there are all of these different events that occur in our lives, they add us eventually. And Clu'ist is the center; the center of my life when those bad moments come and you do reach out for God and you can feel him there with you. When my hands were pressed agauist the wall and my feet were tied up duruig the mock executions, I was shaking all over and h was the presence of God which clamed me Reiter 48 in a sense and I could feel hun there beside me as I repeated scripture in those hard tunes.

[Side A of tape 2 stopped and side A of tape 3 put m]

BR: Is there anything that you would of changed about this experience if you could? Do you hold any aggressions to your boss who told you to stay there, even though you were fmished with your project?

PN: He was a Colonel in the Air Force, he said exactly what he though and based on the information he had, he said what he though I should do. When I did come back and I met him again, he said "Hey, I have another project for you. I want you to go into Alvarado."

I said no, not tliis time. [Laughmg] So at least he had a sense of humor about the whole thing. Remember the profession that I was in, the afr force, the imlitary, and the six hundred people who were held prisoners of war hi Vietnam were mostly pilots from the afr force and the navy. The culture that I associated with, so bemg help hi captivity I was not the first person to be held that way.

BR; Wliat are your feelings towards your captives now?

PN: Well we cleared nunc fields on the way, across to the Iraq border, which doesn't break my heai't, because they ai'e no longer here. I know that it is not very Clii-istian of me to have bad feelmgs but it is very personal. I have a target, 35 degrees, 45 minutes north, and then 21 nfrnutes east to Iran [the placement of Telii-an on a map]. I would be glad to go ahead and zero m a few things for them. I do not care for Iran as a nation. Reiter 49

Many Iranian people, Persian people are fmding that they want to leave Iran too. The nation and thefr government, I would be glad to see it leave. Of course there ai-e a lot of

Iranians who would like to see h leave too.

BR: If you could say anything to your captors now, what would you say?

PN: [Silence].. .I'm not quhe the way that some of the people who were prisoners of war in Vietnam are or some of the other hostages are, who were able to forgive, such as Jolin

McCain and Pete Peterson, who is the ambassador there right now. It was a worse condition, but they are better people than I am. That's hard because I'm not sure if I could forgive. I have hard feelings and I'm not sure what conunent I would say because I will never go back to Iran.

BR: Thank you very much for doing this mterview. Reiter 50

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Paul Needham says fri reference to being held hostage, "When my hands were pressed against the wall and my feet were tied up durmg the mock executions, I was shaking all over and it was the presence of God wliich calmed me m a sense and I could feel Him there beside me as I repeated scripture in those hard times" (Reiter 47). As this quote illustrates the emotion and teiTor that Paul Needham experienced while being held hostage in Iran can only be seen through an oral history account. Oral histoiy plays a valuable role hi understandmg the emotions and thoughts of people who lived tlu'ough important events. The mterview with Paul Needham on bemg held hostage in Iran for

444 days is significant because it gives an mside view of captivity and the confusion, communication, fi-ustration, friterrogations, and anger that go along with being imprisoned.

History is the study of the past based on the collection of factual information and the numerous reactions tlii'ough oral liistory and interpretations of historians tlii-oughout time. The study of histoiy requfres not only acqufring knowledge of past events, people, experiences, and issues, but also developing a well-balanced understandmg of histoi-y tlirough a combination of written and oral sources. Oral history assists the present day liistorian to fiirther comprehend the effects that events and issues have on the simple every day lives of individuals. Society more often than not, views histoi-y fi-om the perspective of its historians. Historians have control over the impact that history has upon society, therefore, historian Aithur Schlesmger states, "The Ifrstorian's goals are accuracy, analysis, and objectivity m the reconstruction of the past." (Schlesuiger 51) Reiter 51

Historians must take the valuable knowledge gained from oral history in order to objectively interpret history. Oral histoiy is a combination of different opinions tlii'ough different views, morals, and convictions. From these many controversial viewpoints historians must create a welLbalanced, rational and reasonable sense of history by takhig hito account all of the remnants of oral histoi-y.

This interview was an overview of Paul Needham's captivity m Iran in winch he depicted and illustrated different events that occurred and his personal views on certain issues. The hiterview began with a discussion of Paul Needham's background. His father was a militai'y man and therefore his family moved around periodically. He was raised in a Methodist home and was brought up going to Boy Scouts. Scouting gave him a sense of self-reliance that he later used when he enlisted in the nnlitary in 1969 to avoid the draft for the Vietnam War. He went to graduate school, which eventually led liim to work for a department of the Afr Force that deals with contracts with foreign governments for the sale of afrcraft, support equipment, and spare paits. On October 14,

1979, Paul Needham went to Iran to negotiate the spare parts contract. The Iranians overran the American embassy November 4, 1979, taking Needham hostage. Paul

Needham described different stages of imprisomnent that the hostages went tlu'Ough, such as solhaiy confinement, mock executions, and periods of interrogation. Conuiiunication

is vital to any hostage in order to be in contact with other hostages, gam mformation fi-om the outside world and speak with the captors. While being held hostage, Paul Needham

eagerly awaited with anticipation a series of dates for his rescue or release. He was fmally released on January 21, 1981 at the very end of President Carter's term in office.

Needham described how his experience in Iran affected his spiritual life. He also spoke Reiter 52 briefly about his hard feelmgs towards Iran and his captors and the way ui which Carter handled the hostage crisis.

Historians and coimnentators have long debated President Carter's handling of the

Iran hostage crisis. Carter quickly responded to the Americans bemg taken captive by terminatmg all oil purchases fi-omIran , freezing Iranian assets, and stopping the delivery of spare parts for the military hi Iran (Skow 20). According to Douglas Bruikley, who wrote hi his book The Unfinished Presidency, "The Caiter administration's strategy towards Iran revolved around two fundamental objectives: protection of America's vital petroleum mterests and fmding the quickest possible route to the hostages' safe release'*

(Brinkley 12). Carter's mam concern was the safety of the hostages, and he had hoped for a peaceful solution tlii-ough the United Nations (Gosklio I). Time magazine reporter

Ed Magnuson said that Jimmy Carter's presidency "became haunted by the hostage issue" because of the long challenge fi-omo f negotiations and disputes until the final arranged agreement whh Iranian officials (Magnuson 13). Historian Douglas Bruikley said that all of the hostages had great respect and admii'ation for Carter and his efforts to set them fiee and bring them home alive (Bruikley 41). On the contrary, Paul Needham had different thoughts on Carter's handling of the crisis. Paul Needham recalls from when Carter met the hostages ui Germany, "He walked mto the room, and I was a captain of the afr force, I had basically decided that I was not gomg to shake his hand. As president, former president I would say sfr and be respectful but I did not want to shake his hand. I was angry. Then Carter spent the next hour talking to us... Carter stressed that our safety came fust and was most important to him. Had we not been so valuable, maybe we would have been released earlier but probably not. I had a lot of respect for Reiter 53 him for doing that. I would not of voted for liim in 1980,1 did not vote tor hun hi 1976 and I would not vote for hun now, and I'm not sure about the Nobel Peace Prize. But I was happy and proud to shake his hand by the end." (Reiter 44) Unlike Brinkley's belief that Cai-ter handled the crisis hi a favorable manor, Needham had evident anger towards

Carter's dealuigs whh the hostage problem. However it is important to note that

Needham's patriotic respect for Jhnmy Caiter demonstrates that even after a tune of desperation and captivity his emotions turned into appreciation for Carter's motives durmg the Iran hostage crisis.

October Smprise, by Gary Sick, exposes speculations of scandalous negotiations between Iran and Regan's campaign operatives. Sick was a member of the National

Security Council Staff hi Middle Eastern Affafrs from 1976-1981 under Carter's administration. Later as a historian of these dealings, Sick claimed that Regan blocked the release of the hostages until he was elected president through bribes of mihtary gear and arms. Sick's book was shocking to American citizens, liistorians, and especially the hostages themselves. Opposing Sick, Wai'ren Cohen is suspicious of the facts. He says,

"Sick's meticulously documented evidence fails to convmce readers of Casey's secret deals...and two of the main characters at the crux of the scandal died in the mid 1980s"

(Cohen 2). On the other hand Cohen notes that, "Sick's accounts have found a voice with outraged Democrats" (Cohen 3). When Paul Needham was asked about this scandalous report of Sick's he recalls meethig Gai-y Sick and says hi reference to Sick's beliefs, "I thmk that Gary Sick has part of it right, obviously Ronald Regan referred to the point where the hostages have not been released, but President Caiter had plenty of other problems to deal whh. I do not thuik that President Regan, Vice President Bush, nor any Reiter 54 of the hnmediate people there in the Regan party had a thing to do with keepmg us captive... I look at myself any ask, 'Would he [Regan] have done that to keep me there?

Just to become president?' No, I don't think so" (Reiter 46). Even though, as a hostage,

Needham was imprisoned longer than expected, Paul Needham nevertheless disagrees with Sick's allegations and speculations, while other historians contmue to debate over the scandal,

Bemg held hostage is damaging and huitfril to a person, because of the mterrogations, solitary confinement, fi-ustration, and anger. Many psychologists believe m the Stockliohn syndrome, wliich was corned m 1973 regardmg hostages' behavior

(Trigiani 3). Accordmg to the Stockliohn syndrome, the abused or hostages bond to then abusers or captors as a means to endure violence and prolong the hnprisonment. It is believed that tliis characteristic is instinctive and thus becomes a survival fianction for hostages (The Stockliolm 2). According to Needham's personal experiences, he never sympathized with liis captors the Iraiuans. Needham says, "I watched some of the defense department people who wanted to fast with the Iranians and lend moral support to them. I had difficulties with that because of the militai-y code of conduct when one is taken hostage... I watched these people give aid to comfort the enemy, my words"

(Reiter 24). Psychologists say that there is a bond between a hostage and his captors.

Paul Needham responded, when asked if he ever sympathized with his captors or thefr cause, he fh'mly said, "No...But 1 do know a couple of state department people who did.

But I never did nor would" (Reiter 47). Needham clearly did not suffer the Stockholm syndrome ahhough other hostages may liave. Reiter 55

The hiterview with Paul Needham is a valuable historical source because it gives a better understanding of the human side within the political drama of the Iran hostage crisis. This interview gives a behind-the-scenes personal look at being a hostage, providmg insight into hiuiian resiliency and resourceftilness. "Bemg in captivity gave me thiie to reflect on the real values and meanings, that strengthened me in my relationship with God" (Reiter 1). Through this mterview with Paul Needham, one can see how he overcame political prejudice. Even though he was a conservative Republican, an Afr

Force captafri, and a Christian, he still kept an open mind, which is a useful lesson in any given political situation. For me personalty, this interview has deepened my awareness and understandmg of the human tragedies that prevail in any historical tune, fhe hiterview gives fresh and compassionate insight into the way that histoi-y events hifluence and changes personal lives. However, hi the end, one again sees the hostility that Paul

Needham endured m Iran. "I'm not sure if I could forgive. I have hard feelmgs and... I will never go back to Iran" (Reiter 35). Reher 56

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U.S, Military Code of Conduct

Tlie Code of Conduct tor U.S. Armed Forces was fust published by President Dwight D. Eisenliower in Executive Order 10631 in 1955. It was later amended by President Carter in 1977. It outlhies the basic responsibilities and obligations of all U.S. service members to the United States.

I am an American, fighthig m the forces, which guai'd my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in thefr defense. n

I will never surrender of my own free will. If hi command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist. m

If I am captured I will contmue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and to aid others to escape. I will accept nehher parole nor special favors fiom the enemy.

IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep fahh with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action, which might be harmflil to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawfiil orders of those appointed over me and will back them up hi every way.

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am requfred to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. 1 will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmfial to their cause.

VI

I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for fi-eedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles, which made my country fi-ee. I will trust m my God and in the United States of America. Reiter 59 Reiter 60

WORKS CONSULTED

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Brinkley, Douglas. The Unfinished Presidency. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

Cohen, Warren. Rev. of October Suiprise: America's Hostages hi Iran and the Election

of Ronald Reagan, by Gary Sick. The Flecher Forum of World Affairs Summer

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Daugherty, William J. Held Hostage in Iran: A First Tour lilce No Other. 1997. Spring.

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Farsoun, Samih K. Mashayeklii, Meliidad. Iran: Political Cuhure in the Islamic

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Gosliko, Jolin M. Oberdorfer, Don. "Carter Assails Treat: A Bid to Head off Demands

for Military Action." Washington Post 29 Nov. 1979: A1+.

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Reconstruction to the Present Day. 1864-1981. "Foreign Policy 1958-1981,

Document 12, Jhimiy Carter, Report to Congress on the Failed Hostage Rescue

Mission to Iran, April 26, 1980." New York: Vintage Books, 1982.

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Reconstruction to the Present Day. 1864-1981. "The Government and the

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1979." New York: Vintage Books, 1982.

Jordan, Hamilton. Crisis: The Last Yeai' of the Carter Presidency. New York: G.P.

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Katz, Mark N. The United States and Iran: Ready for Rapprochement? SAIS Review

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Levin, Bob. "Countdown to Freedom." Newsweek. 26 Jan. 1981: 20-29.

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fran_rescue. ht ml>

Reddie, Nikki R. Iraman Revolutions in Comparative Perspective. American Historical

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'The Mystic who Lit the Ffres of Hatred: Iran's Ayatullah Khomehii seized his nation Reiter 62

and shook Islam." Man of the Year-. Tune 7 Jan. 1980:9-21.

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Trigiani, Kathleen. Societal Stockholm Syndrome. Women's Web Ring 1999.

Wells, Tim. 444Days. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985.