81

SWEDEN’S SECURITY THE LONG WAY TOWARDS TOTAL DEFENCE

Justyna Gotkowska NUMBER 81 WARSAW JANUARY 2021

SWEDEN’S SECURITY THE LONG WAY TOWARDS TOTAL DEFENCE

Justyna Gotkowska © Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies

CONTENT EDITOR Mateusz Gniazdowski

EDITOR Katarzyna Kazimierska

CO-OPERATION Szymon Sztyk, Tomasz Strzelczyk

TRANSLATION Radosław Alf

CO-OPERATION Timothy Harrell

GRAPHIC DESIGN PARA-BUCH

DTP IMAGINI

PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER SERGEI BRIK / Shutterstock.com

Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, [email protected] www.osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-65827-67-8 Contents

MAIN POINTS | 5

INTRODUCTION | 8

I. A SMALL COUNTRY IN AN INCREASINGLY INSECURE REGION | 10

II. A DENSE NETWORK OF MILITARY COOPERATION | 14

III. LIMITED NATIONAL DEFENCE CAPABILITIES | 20

IV. (RE)CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL DEFENCE | 24 • • MAIN POINTS MAIN

2021–2025 outlines the the Swedishfurther transformation of Armed redefinition a thorough for wasa reason Ukraine intervention in 2014 For the minority second­ minority For the been not has policy defence and Sweden’s security Nevertheless, Sweden’s Forcesof and policy.defence the competitiveness of the domestic economy,domestic the in economic growing competitivenessof the the Green Party, rising insecurity in the Nordic ­ coope­ military of up stepping the and ForcesSwedish Armed the to changes in reflected was which a priority, made was defence torial the US and Europe have contributed to this rising insecurity. Russia’s the Nordic­ mantling of the arms control regime and rising tensions between tensions rising and regime control arms the of mantling ing has so far been maintained at about 1% of GDP. It is only in the in only It is 1% of GDP. about at maintained been far so has ing public. the by much so not but politicians, concerned a few and nity for strategy The security Finland. and NATO,the US, with ration law, the unravelling of the European security architecture, the dis the architecture, security European the of law,unravelling the problems concerning housing policy.spend Consequently,housing defence concerning problems Since 2008, the Swedish security and defence establishment has be has establishment defence and security Swedish the 2008, Since segregation in Sweden, globalisation that has a negative impact on impact a negative has that globalisation Sweden, in segregation and military the strengthen to need the and Russia from stemming coming five years that a significant increase can be expected. be can increase a significant yearsthat five coming equalities and social polarisation, gang­ social and migrants of integration with problems change, climate many challenges.one of In the government’s view, these also include commu expert the by primarily discussed been have defence civil begun already had process policy,Swedishthis security although of and country the of security the about concerned increasingly come a priority for the government up to now.challengesgovernment to and the up for The threats a priority Russian­ 2008 the after ‑Baltic region. Russia’s international repeated violations of ‑Georgian war. Between 2015 and 2020, terri 2020, and 2015 Betweenwar. ‑Georgian ‑term cabinet of the Social Democrats and Democrats Social the of cabinet ‑term ‑related activities, and finally ‑Baltic region remains ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

5 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 6 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 • • •

Already in 2016–2020, the priority to enhance national defence guided visages a further strengthening of its military capabilities. itsmilitary Thistime visages a furtherstrengtheningof There is no doubt that Sweden will be involved in military crises military in involved be will Sweden that doubt no is There In its security strategy for 2021–2025, the Swedish government en governmentSwedish the 2021–2025, for strategy security In its policy,mili­ In security an everon relynetwork to tighter began of it Penin Scandinavian the of regions northern the defend to Finland and Norway with cooperating a war; during it seizing from Russia Finland and Norway. Sweden’s The priorities of security and defence in at: aimed be wouldRussia by attack a military scenarios, In such to reinstate the total defence concept. defence total the reinstate to began also Sweden Finland. and NATO,States with United tion the coopera strengthened significantly it In addition, cooperation. tary Swedish as well as Forces Armed Swedish the of development the the Baltic states that wouldtive also imply defence some operation of mainly neighbours – its to assistance military Swedish thwarting reach around 1.5% of GDP in 2025. It should not be forgotten, how forgotten, be not It should in 2025. 1.5% of GDP around reach to set is which spending, defence increase to plans in reflected is it Sweden’sand using NATO preventingterritory; from region; the in kind of cooperation from Sweden. from cooperation of kind policy currently include:defending itsown andpreventing territory proving wartime mobilisation, though without providing enough providing without though mobilisation, wartime proving funding. The government also reintroduced defence planning, partial sula; ensuring the security of supplies to Sweden; and securing the securing and Sweden; to supplies of security the ensuring sula; strengthening the operational readiness of its military and on im on and military its of readiness operational the strengthening gradually on focused then policy.Stockholm defence and security conscription and returned to large­ to returned and conscription a collec within region Sea Baltic the NATOto forces of deployment operations military Russian for manoeuvre for room the creasing equipment, have deficiencies that make it impossible to effectively to impossible it make that deficiencies have equipment, dish Armed Forces, despite their relatively modern arms and military Swe­ the underfunding, and reforms of decades two after ever,that and conflicts in the Nordic­ the in conflicts and ‑Baltic region between NATObetween and region ‑Baltic ‑scale national defence exercises. defence national ‑scale ­Russia. ‑ ­ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ • •

The new strategy reflects the changes that have taken place in Swe­ in place takenhave that changes the reflects strategy The new without an official status. It is also deepening its informal military military informal its deepening also It is status. an official without Forces will depend on cooperation with civilian entities.civilian with cooperation on Forcesdepend will to adapt to a different way of functioning, and the SwedishArmed the and functioning, of way a different to adapt to need economySweden’s time,and this society During attacks. tary military support in times of peace, crisis and war. It will therefore It will war. and crisis peace, of times in support military and civilian military aid. In the years ahead,theSwedishreceiver” of reduced significantly to related is This attack. a conventional resist ing coordinating institutions, imposing additional responsibilities additional imposing institutions, coordinating ing designat problems, defining areas, various in strategies mulating point for total defence at planning is least a threea scenario­ of Norway,land, NATO.and the US However,port. Sweden ­ a quasi becoming is personnel insufficient and capabilities command and logistics Sweden is also in the process of recreating its civil defence. It is for It is defence. civil its recreating of process the in also Swedenis government wants todevelop a realcapacityfor giving andreceiving seek to coordinate or develop joint operational planning with Fin with planning operational joint develop or coordinate to seek 2019 report. its in sion Commis Defence parliamentary the by highlighted was as strength, crisis in Europe, including Sweden,involvesEurope,including also in which crisis mili­ limited The starting sectors. public and private the between cooperation of possibility the exploring and entities, local and regional central, on cooperation with partners. NATO membership is still not considered regarding those and policy defence and security about thinking dish line ih iln. oevr i dfns tef s “ie and “giver a as itself defines it Moreover, Finland. with alliance sup political and public sufficient have not does it option – a viable ‑ally of NATO ‑allyof the US and ‑month ‑month ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

7 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 8 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 Alliance? ioosy n h SeihAmd ocs n icesd hi person their increased and Forces Armed Swedish the in vigorously the of a member become to Sweden for possible be it Or would viable? INTRODUCTION Kremlin, has faced a major challenge in the last decade: how to pur to how decade: last the in challenge a major faced has Kremlin, havebeen states member The allied Russia. and NATO,the US both and Nordic­ NATO’s northernandeasternflanks, Sweden’s andairspacewill territory of junction the at location its to due conflict, an armed of event In the Given the circumstances outline above, the minority government of of government minority the above, outline circumstances the Given the domestic political circumstances. political domestic the the Social Democrats and the Green Party should have invested more investedhave should Party Green the and Democrats Social the nel in the past few years. The recent decision to significantly increase significantly to decision The recent years.few past the in nel given satisfactory answer,nonetheless is an optimal it not admittedly is defence limited the complement to others and neighbours Nordic its be neutrality War Cold its to returning of NATO,option not the would but West, the of part is that a country For capabilities? military ited hoping to see Sweden join NATO, while Russia has sought to convince to sought NATO,has Russiajoin Swedenwhile see to hoping Stockholm has found its own answer to the security dilemmas – this is this dilemmas – security the to answerown its found has Stockholm the of policy aggressive increasingly the with confronted Stockholm, Sweden’s government andsocietythatitwould bebettertoabandoninte gration with the trans­ the with gration become important for NATO’s and Russia’s military operations in the in operations NATO’sRussia’s military for and important become society and economy to function in times of crisis and war. While this Whilewar. and crisis of times in function to economy and society ­ a non of policy defence and security the sue capabilities of the Swedishthe its Forces,Armed of capabilities of ability the restoring and NATO.to weaving accession is Swedennor neutrality neither currently states, Baltic and Nordic the of countries the from interest keen drawn defence spending by 2025 was only possible because of pressure from from pressure of because possible only was by 2025 spending defence an ever tighter network of military cooperationwiththe an everAlliance, military the US, tighternetwork of ‑Baltic region. Since 2008, therefore, Swedish security policy has Swedishpolicy therefore,2008, security Since region. ‑Baltic ‑Atlanticstructures. security ‑aligned country with lim with country ‑aligned ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

the Baltic Sea region. Sea Baltic the conservative­ the ­ a well introduce Sweden’s biggest challenge for 2021–2025 is to move to a more advanced a more moveto to is Sweden’s2021–2025 for challenge biggest stage of military cooperation in the Nordic­ the in cooperation military of stage parliament. in strategy security new the of adoption ­secure ence in endeavouring to do this may prove useful for other countries of of countries other for proveuseful may this do endeavouringto in ence experi The Swedish concept. defence total the of part as cooperation a viable basis for wartime cooperation. The challenge will also be to be also will The challenge cooperation. wartime for basis a viable ‑functioning system of civil defence and civil­ and defence civil of system ‑functioning ‑liberal opposition, whose support was necessary to necessary was support whose opposition, ‑liberal ‑Baltic region and to create to and region ‑Baltic ‑military ‑military ‑

9 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 10 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 with military planning within the total defence concept, and an arms an arms and concept, defence total the within planning military with I. A SMALL COUNTRY IN AN INCREASINGLY AN IN COUNTRY I. A SMALL It drastically reduced its defence budget, downsized its armed forces, armed its downsized budget, defence its reduced It drastically this strategic pause, traditional military threats ceased to exist for Swe for exist to ceased threats military traditional pause, strategic this regional the of Swedishperception the changed Union, European the to NATO,Sweden’sand and accession the EU into countries European tral Cen of integration War,the Cold the of end the After WarsawPact. the tary intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea to provide to Crimea of annexation the and Ukraine in intervention tary rial integrity and sovereignty. In spite of this, it took the Russian mili Russian the took it this, of sovereignty. and In spite integrity rial conservative­ the in 2009, adopted 2010–2014, for strategy rity prompted have region Sea Baltic the and Arctic the in activity military Russian increased the and Forces Armed Russian the of modernisation Nordic­ the in conflicts and crises military dividend”. “peace the of advantage taking while paradigm security new Sweto due required was This needs. domestic met largely that industry focused on challenges, such as international terrorism, and consequently Since 2008, however, Stockholm has become increasingly aware that aware increasingly become has however,Stockholm 2008, Since and threats security of perception its in way a long come has Sweden government’s priorities included not only participating in international in participating only government’snot included priorities security environment. Sincethelate 1990sStockholmhas adapted tothe option to take sides in a time of war. of a time in sides take to option the retaining while peacetime in alliances military of out staying or non­ of favour in neutrality abandoned also Stockholm den. During abroad. operations management crisis in activeparticipation on NATOand blocs: hostile two between position its and den’sneutrality the Cold War,challenges in the last three decades. Until the end of it was crisis management operations, but also ensuring the country’s territo country’s the ensuring also but operations, management crisis a strong impetus for fundamental changes in Sweden’s security policy policy Sweden’ssecurity in changes fundamental for impetus a strong secu In the threats. military traditional of terms in thinking to a return indirectly.or Swedendirectly­ affect The Russian and withextensivea country armedforces, a civil defence system integrated INSECURE REGION INSECURE ‑Baltic region may emerge may region ‑Baltic ‑Georgian war,the ‑Georgian ‑alignment, ‑alignment, ‑liberal ‑ ­ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ with Russia, in the form of creating informal buffer zones with sepa with zones buffer informal creating of form the in Russia, with Republic (10.7 million) and Belgium (11.5 million). Its GDP of 474 billion 474 billion of Its GDP (11.5 million). Belgium and (10.7 million) Republic US‑European tensionsduringDonaldTrump’s presidencyandtheunrav territory,10.3 million, Czech the than smaller Sweden of a population has to assistance military providing from refrain to Sweden press or tions preventNATOto seek from also wouldMoscow (e.g. Gotland); territory wary is Sweden hand, one On the deteriorate. to continues region the in situation the in 2020, adopted 2021–2025, for strategy security the intelligence­ likely Sweden’s(most watersin territorial tions n eet er. usa n Cia hlegn te nentoa law, international the challenging China and Russia years. recent in defencerial priority. Aggressiveprovocativeand Russian against actions its neighbours – mainly Norway and Finland. Norwayand mainly neighbours – its to aim wouldRussia Sweden itself. against attack an armed out rule not governmentdoes Swedish the arise, they Should neighbourhood. its in no it hand, other On the region. Sea Baltic the for regimes security rate using Swedish territory (e.g. Gotland) in conducting its military opera military its conducting in (e.g. Gotland) territory Swedish using conflicts military involvedin be will it that doubts any harbours longer functioning regimes and international organisations. It sees itself in the in itself organisations.It sees international and regimes functioning Sweden is concerned about erosion of the international order, based on order,based international the of erosion about concerned Swedenis increased have defence and security its about concerns Stockholm’s from ranged They turnaround. this to contributed Swedenin 2013–2014 by the Social Democratic­ Social the by in i Fre xrie, isae iltos ad newtr opera underwater and violations, airspace exercises, Force Air sian Rus during infrastructure military Swedish against attacks simulated security architecture as a small country, a small as architecture security ­ a non and dependent on a stable regional and global environment. Despite its vast its Despite environment. global and regional a stable on dependent Swedish using by region Sea Baltic the in activities military its expand deals European or US possible by curtailed sovereignty its having of to According this. to contributed all have regime control arms the of dismantling a gradual with architecture security European the of elling and armed forces. The security strategy for 2016–2020, adopted in 2015 in 2015 adopted 2016–2020, for strategy The security forces. armed and activities). ‑Green government, established a clear territo a clear government,established ‑Green ‑aligned one, which is is whichone, ‑aligned ‑gathering ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ 11 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 12 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 2 1 ­Löfven’s chal and threats the of assessment pessimistic increasingly the Despite armyLithuanian the than 2,000onlynumber are in largerGuard, Home the excluding conscripts and soldiers professional 15,000 with Forces, the coalition to remain in power for another term. Those also included also Those term. another for power in remain to coalition the in 2019, parties enabled whichopposition with reached deal the in tioned and GDP.tion ments has until nowSwedishwelluntil in been has reflected expenditure, ments military men challenges of list the of bottom the at It was since 2014. power in coalition minority the for problems many of one remained has region in which sectors, many in reach global with companies to home is it small their equipment, modern use largely they Although peacetime. in lenges, security and defence policy has not been a priority for a priority been not has policy defence and security lenges, and War), Cold the of a legacy extent (to some industry defence large gation, globalisation impairing the competitiveness of the Swedishthe econ competitivenessthe impairing of globalisation gation, size limits their ability to defend the country. At the same time, Swe time, same At the country. the defend to ability their limits size omy, rising economic inequalities and polarisation of the society,gang the of polarisation and inequalities omy,economic rising segre social and migrants of integration with problems change, climate popula of terms in countries similar to compared potential its creases welldiplomacy,­ an active has den Belgium’s. levelthe of on was in 2019 euros and defence policy among the priorities of current and previous governprevious and current of priorities the among policy defence and policy.housing in problems finally activity,and

The priorities of the Social Democratic Social the of The priorities Poland’s GDP in the analysed year was €532 billion. €532 billion. was year analysed the in GDP Poland’s och Miljöpartiet de gröna de Miljöpartiet och ket prices’ ket kraterna ropa.eu/eurostat one side and two factions of the conservative the of factions two and side one sakpolitisk överenskommelse mellan Socialdemokraterna, Centerpartiet, LiberalernaCenterpartiet,Socialdemokraterna,sakpolitisk överenskommelse mellan areas and made it possible for the minority coalition to remain in power. power. in remain to coalition minority the for possible it mentioned made above and the areas in cooperation for Janu allowed in election, struck general the agreement, after January ary 2019 so‑called This other. the on Liberals) the the on and Party Green the and Democrats Social ruling the between agreement an oenet o a. rwn iscrt i te Nordic­ the in insecurity Growing far. so government .se , Eurostat. Population data, see see data, Population Eurostat. , . . , Socialdemokraterna ‑established soft power, a relatively a relatively power, soft ‑established ‑Green minority cabinet are contained in in contained are cabinet minority ­‑Green ‘Population projections’ ‘Population ‑liberal opposition (the Centre Party Party (the Centre opposition ­‑liberal , 11 January 2019, 11 January 2019, , 1 In turn, the Swedishthe Armed In turn, ‘Gross domestic product at mar at product domestic ‘Gross 2 The place of security of The place www. , Eurostat, Eurostat, , socialdemo Utkast till till Utkast ‑Baltic Stefan Stefan ec.eu ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ 2021–2025 will the defence budget see a significant increase. The deci increase. a significant see budget defence the will 2021–2025 hc hs eand t rud % f D i rcn yas Nt until Not years. recent in GDP of 1% around at remained has which ne­ rsue rm h conservative­ the from pressure sion to boost defence spending was, however, only possible thanks to thanks possible however,onlywas, spending defence boost to sion cessary for the Swedish parliament to adopt a new security strategy.security a new adopt to Swedishparliament the for cessary lbrl poiin Is upr was support Its opposition. ‑liberal ‑ 13 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 14 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 Alliance was not responsible for the security of countries which were which countries of security the for responsible not was Alliance 3 The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) with Norway,with (NORDEFCO) Cooperation Defence The Nordic and Finland conservative ­ The then The Russian was unprepared to defend itself against a conventional armed attack. armed a conventional against itself defend to unprepared was II. A DENSE NETWORK OF MILITARY COOPERATIONMILITARY OF NETWORK II. A DENSE NATO’s Secretary General undermined this narrative, stating that the that stating narrative, this undermined NATO’sGeneral Secretary efficient more to lead to supposed was since 2009, place in Denmark, to them expected it that and Iceland), and (i.e. Norway country Nordic non­ 2008, In a relatively and capabilities military limited NATOpossesses which and the over environment security the in changes adverse the of In light tion to Sweden’s dilemmas. After the 2008 financial crisis, there was there crisis, financial the 2008 Sweden’sAfter dilemmas. to tion to belong not does that a country of policy defence and security the not its members. its not In 2012, operations. and NATOexercises in participation its increased a strength followedwaswith up The declaration stance. this reciprocate strategy security its in solidarity of declaration so‑called the included budget. defence modest past decade, Stockholm has faced a major challenge: how to conduct to how challenge: a major faced has Stockholm decade, past passive in the event of a disaster or armed aggression against an EU or an EU against aggression armed or a disaster of event the in passive for 2010–2014. Sweden unilaterally declared that it would not remain not would it that declared unilaterally Sweden 2010–2014. for sus on joining NATO, membership in the alliance was not a viable solu a viable not was alliance NATO,the joining in on membership sus ny n at See, xetn “oiaiy fo te line also Alliance, the from “solidarity” expecting Sweden, part. in only interoperability, greater achievedand been spending has whichdefence NATO.and neighbours Nordic its with cooperation military of ening consen social and political of a lack to Due help. outside on dependent other Nordic countries and NATO. On the one hand, the government the hand, one NATO.On the and countries Nordic other also no desire to increase defence spending. The government therefore The government spending. defence increase to desire no also

J. Gotkowska, ‑Ukrainian war uprooted the calculations of Sweden, the Sweden, of calculations the uprooted war ­‑Ukrainian aind wdn fcd ih h Russian­ the with faced Sweden, ‑aligned

‘Swedish security in crisis’ 3 ‑liberal government understood that Swedenwas that governmentunderstood ‑liberal , OSW, 13 February 2013, www.osw.waw.pl. 2013, 13 February OSW, , Goga war, ‑Georgian ‑ ‑ ‑ 5 4 with the Alliance, ratified two years later, making it possible for NATOfor possible it making later,years two ratified Alliance, the with coopera deepening that recognised part, its NATO.for with The latter, Response Force practiced a collective defence operation on its northern its on operation defence a collective practiced ForceResponse European ensures that organisation main the NATO,considers it which multi­ and trilateral bilateral, intensifying of strategy This ­Finland. On the other hand, the Swedish Ministry of Defence began to invest in invest to began Defence of Ministry Swedish the hand, other On the the country, and integrating their military support. military their country, integrating the and NATOstates, member of forces the hosting tested military Swedish the defence). of minister Democratic Social the region. entire the of security the and states Baltic the of defence the tion withSweden, despiteitsnon­ in Stockholm, composed of the Social Democrats and the Green Party Green the and Democrats Social the of composed in Stockholm, in recent years in Norway – the Trident Juncture, in which the NATOthe which in Juncture, Trident the Norway – in years recent in member states in the Baltic Sea including region, the Baltic states. In 2018, lateral military cooperation was called the “Hultqvist doctrine” (after doctrine” “Hultqvist the called was cooperation military lateral flank. NATO countries, in turn, have stepped up their participation in participation their up stepped have turn, NATOin countries,flank. Swedish the with waters and territory,airspace Swedish use to forces Swedish national exercises, including the largest defence manoeuvres defence largest the including exercises, national Swedish with relationship its tightening been therefore has Sweden 2014, Since oenets osn. tchl hs lo hne is tiue and attitude its changed also has Stockholm consent. government’s since the 1990s in 2017 (codename ‘Aurora’). There, for the first time, first the ‘Aurora’).for (codename There, in 2017 the 1990s since NATO’sdrills in military part largest took soldiers Swedish 2,200 some security. and the US with primarily relations, military bilateral strengthening securing their movement from western Sweden to the east and south of of south and east the Swedenwesternto movement from their securing expanded its involvement in military exercises involvingNATOits exercises and military involvementin its expanded after the 2014 elections, began to intensively strengthen cooperation strengthen intensively to began 2014 elections, the after

B. Kunz, Kunz, B. J. Gotkowska, P. Szymański, J. Gotkowska, www.ifri.org. land’s relations with NATO with relations land’s h bcdo o Rsin revisionism Russian of backdrop the 5 In 2014, Stockholm signed a Host Nation Support Agreement Support Nation a Host signed Stockholm In 2014, Sweden’s NATO Workaround. Swedish security and defense policy against against policy defense and security Swedish Workaround. NATO Sweden’s , OSW, Warsaw 2017, www.osw.waw.pl. 2017, Warsaw OSW, ,

Between co-operation and membership.Fin co-operationandSwedenandBetween ‑membership, was toensure necessary , ou stratégique Focus 4 n. 4 IR, ai 2015, Paris IFRI, 64, no. , ‑ - 15 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 16 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 7 After 2014, it also became a priority for the Swedish Ministry of Defence Swedishthe forof Ministry a priority became also it 2014, After of perception negative the of regardless 2016–2020, for Forces Armed with cooperation military intensify to began Swedentime, same At the 6 The desire to tighten bilateral cooperation was confirmed by an agree by confirmed was cooperation bilateral tighten to The desire NORDEFCO, prioritised strengthening relations within NATOwithin relations NORDEFCO, strengthening after 2014. prioritised Nordic­ the in exercises national and Nordic to aimed that signed was Intent of Statement a US‑Swedish In 2016, o nac dfne olbrto wt Finland. with collaboration defence enhance to Democratic­ Social the by administration Trump the Swedish the of priorities the of one became which States, United the improving their security have become the binding force behind their behind force binding the become have security their improving cooperation. Finnish‑US Swedish‑USand both in synergies increase thePatriot medium­ ment concludedin 2018for thepurchaseof and training through interoperability and capabilities military increase platforms for expanding cooperation and interoperability with the US. the US. with interoperability and cooperation expanding for platforms oig er. hy ged o sals a Swedish­ a establish to agreed They years. lowing Sweden and Finland therefore signed an signed therefore Finland Swedenand group (which became operational in 2017), increase the number of joint of number the increase in 2017), operational became (which group but above all their non ­ their all above but enhanced cooperation, as Denmark and Norway,involvedin formerlyand Denmark as cooperation, enhanced a trilateral signed Finland year,and Sweden The same system. defence cises, with the largest numbers to date in Aurora 17 (1,300 troops). NATO’s, exer military Swedish in participate to began Forces US Armed the of branches armaments.All the on providecooperation also exercises,and among the Nordic countries. Not only their close geographical location, geographical close their only Not countries. Nordic the among ­ far most the in engaged currently are to cooperation military deepening on States United the with agreement cooperation

. Szymański, P. P. Szymański, J. Gotkowska, OSW Commentary OSW no. 205, 31 March 2016, www.osw.waw.pl. 2016, 31 March no. 205, eeo coe mltr co military closer develop as early as 2014, with more agreements coming in the fol the in coming agreements more with as 2014, as early

‘The northern tandem. The Swedish tandem. ‘The northern , no. 298, 20 March 2019, www.osw.waw.pl. 2019, 20 March no. 298, , ‑aligned status and the need to find a recipe for a recipe find to need the and status ‑aligned - prto wt te ntd States’ United the with operation

‘Pro - American non American ‑reaching military cooperation military ‑reaching Action Plan for deepened defence deepened for Plan Action - alignment. Sweden and Finland Finland and Sweden alignment. ‑Baltic region also became also region ‑Baltic - Finnish defence cooperation’ defence Finnish 7 h to countries two The Fnih aa task naval ‑Finnish ‑Green government.‑Green , S Commentary OSW ‑range air 6 ‑ ‑ ‑ , , ‑led European Intervention Initiative (EI2) and to send its special forces special its send to and (EI2) Initiative Intervention European ‑led (coordination of the Anaconda and Aurora exercises), Germany (par Germany exercises), Aurora and Anaconda the of (coordination In recent years Sweden has also been expanding its military coopera military its expanding been also has Sweden years In recent ticipation in the Framework Nation Concept) and Canada, which is the is which Canada, and Concept) NationFramework the in ticipation (less the Among in 2020. Sahel the in Takuba operation French the to It has neighbours. Nordic its and NATO, beyond the US, network tion Riksdag. the Hel from assistance military accepting to regard with and territory ing military assistance to Finland in the event of violations of Finnish of violations of event the in Finland to assistance military ing they cooperation, defence on agreement bilateral 2018 In their ments. the of and bases naval and air share to ability their of use full make et at t srnte jit prtoa pann wt Finland. with planning operational joint strengthen to wants ment govern The partners. priority and neighbours with cooperation ing Arctic. the in states Baltic the recognises also Swedencountries, partner important) major deploy rapidly to ability its and region Sea Baltic the to mitment lation granting the government greater rights with regard to provid to regard with rights greater government the granting lation framework nation of the NATO battlegroup in Latvia and has interests has and Latvia in NATO the battlegroup of nation framework Nordicthe in ­ forces arrange NORDEFCO’s through territories their to access facilitated Sweden’s security strategy for 2021–2025 goes a step further in devis in further a step goes 2021–2025 for strategy Sweden’ssecurity ik i aaoos iutos ocrig wdn Ti as includes also This Sweden. concerning situations analogous in sinki developing European security policy and it decided to join the French the join to decided it and policy security Europeandeveloping com its appreciating Kingdom, United the with cooperation developed ­ legis passed SwedishParliament the In September 2020, commitments. alliance formal without albeit war, and crisis peace, during operations brigade, a combined of concept the develop and forces land of exercises and increase the interoperability of their air forces. The two countries The two forces. air their of interoperability the increase and and has participated in military exercises on their territories, Poland territories, their on exercises military in participated has and in France’sengagement recognised also has Stockholm (JEF). Force ary attack, an armed joint and planning operational towardsdevelopcoordinated it to agreed although in this case it requires prior approval from from approval prior requires it case this in ­although ‑Baltic theatre.In 2017,‑Baltic Jointthe Expedition joined it ­ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑

17 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 18 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 ‑membership in the Alliance, this may encounter political and formal and political encounter may this Alliance, the in ‑membership (and in the future – although the strategy does not mention it – perhaps it – mention not does strategy the although future – the in (and 8 With regard to Norway, Sweden considers it important to coordinate to important it considers Norway,Sweden to regard With The priority areas are the protection of transport routes and security and routes transport of protection the are areas The priority Moreover, it will strive to coordinate operational planning with Norway,with planning Moreover, itoperational coordinate striveto will with Poland and the Baltic states). Baltic the and Poland with Denmark, the UK, the US and NATO – not only for times of peace, but peace, of times for only not NATO – and the US the UK, Denmark, Despite Sweden’s increasingly close relationship with NATO,with Sweden’s relationship Stockholm Despite close increasingly tic Sea region will pass through the ports of Trondheim and Narvik and Narvik and Trondheim of ports the through pass will region Sea tic Bal the to Swedenand to the UK or the US from support and transports and forces air the between cooperation existing the to in addition that – the Riksdag in December 2020, that the possibility of NATO of membership possibility the that December 2020, in Riksdag the times in cooperation expand to wants also Stockholm region. Oslo the ain ih owy s lo motn fr nte rao – military – reason another for important also is Norway with ration Fin in operate to ready be to are units Swedish selected ground navies – problems. To a certain extent, these problems may be resolved through resolved be may problems these extent, To a certain problems. also is planning Defence possible. as much as US the with planning appropriate. it consider countries both if war, or crisis of times in land for worstfor ­ by four conservative­ four by should not be expected to join the Alliance in the coming years.coming the in the Alliance A motion join to expected be not should sula. A Norwegian closer cooperation of Sweden and Finland with NATONorway with member Finland and Sweden of cooperation closer Sweden’sto NATO,non­ due with although coordinated be to expected operational align to seek also governmentwill The Swedishsupplies. of Denmark. with planning operational coordinate and war and crisis of September 2020. in signed already was area this in cooperation Scandinavianthe Penin ­ of regions northern the in planning operational also crisis and war.and crisis also Sweden developplanning wantsto military concrete

h Mnsr o Dfne f h Rpbi o Fnad te iity f eec of Defence of Ministry the Finland, of Republic the of Defence of Ministry The ment of Intent on Enhanced Operational Cooperation’ Operational Enhanced on Intent of ment tember 2020,www.regeringen.se. Sweden, of Kingdom the of Defence of Ministry the Norway, of Kingdom the ‑case scenarios. In the case of Finland, Stockholm has declared has Stockholm Finland, of case In the scenarios. ‑case ­‑Swedish ‑liberal opposition parties, which was approved in in approvedwas which parties, opposition ‑liberal ‑Finnish agreement on enhanced opera­ enhanced on agreement ­‑Finnish , Regeringskansliet, 8 Coope­ 23 Sep tional ‘State ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ (the so‑called (the so‑called 9 Without a change in the position of the Social Democrats and an increase an increase and Democrats Social the of position the in a change Without 10 There is also not enough public support in Sweden for joining NATO.joining for Sweden in support public enough not also is There Despite intensifying cooperation with NATO in recent years, the ruling the years, NATOrecent with in cooperation intensifying Despite Opinion polls confirm the division that has existed since 2014: 32% of 32% of since 2014: existed has that division the confirm polls Opinion the Alliance. The adopted motion is not binding for the government. the for binding not is motion The adopted Alliance. the in public support, Sweden’s membership in NATO will not be possible. be NATOnot Sweden’ssupport,in will public membership in Social Democrats (and the Green Party) have ruled out membership in membership out ruled haveParty) Green the (and Democrats Social strategy will not have any immediate consequences in the short term. short the in consequences immediate anyhave not will strategy citi­

zens are against it, 29% are in favour and 39% have no opinion. no 39% have and favour in 29% are it, against are zens It was adopted with the support of the Sweden Democrats, a far Democrats, Sweden the of support the with adopted It was J. Martinsson, U. Andersson (eds.), (eds.), U. Andersson J. Martinsson, www.som.gu.se. www. Sweden should not exclude this option from its security strategy, just as Finland. Finland. as just strategy, security its from option this exclude not should Sweden is generally opposed to accession to NATO, but at the same time believes that that believes time same the at but NATO, to accession to opposed generally is försvarsutskottets betänkande 2020/21:UFöU4 betänkande försvarsutskottets Säkerhetspolitisk inriktning – Totalförsvaret 2021–2025. Sammansatta utrikes- och och utrikes- Sammansatta 2021–2025. Totalförsvaret – inriktning Säkerhetspolitisk riksdagen Natooption .se . ) should not be excluded from Sweden’s excludedfrom be not should ) security Svenska Trender 1986–2019 , Sveriges Riksdag, Sveriges , ­ SOM 15 December 2020, 15 December ‑right party which which party ­‑right ‑Institutet, 2020, 10 9

19 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 20 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 ‑Georgian war mainly involved providing reserve units with more arms more with units involvedreserve providingmainly war ‑Georgian aot S5 ilo) Cneunl, h amd ocs tuge with struggled forces armed the Consequently, billion). US$5 (about 12 11 The changes in Sweden’s security policy over the past decade have been been have decade past the overSweden’s policy in security The changes would be able to defend itself for one week in the event of a limited mili a limited eventthe weekof in one for itself defend to able wouldbe SEK 40–42 between oscillated it envisagedeither.Until 2013, was III. LIMITEDNATIONAL DEFENCE CAPABILITIES 50,000 soldiers in the late 1990s to about 15,000 in 2009. 15,000 about to late 1990s the in soldiers 50,000 coun the defend to unprepared wereForces SwedishArmed the In 2008, NATOand operations.EU management crisis It took the Russian­ the It took Sweden that stated publicly staff defence the of chief then the In 2012, to carry out national defence tasks on a par with participation in crisis in participation with a par on tasks defence national out carry to over from reduced – significantly was component try.The operational tary attack,andeventary thiswould attheearliest, only bepossiblefrom 2019 implementation of the reform. the of implementation the following operational fully were forces armed the of branches all if mili­ and arms of shortages and personnel insufficient revised. Decisions were made to professionalise the and military abandon intro to forces armed the obliged again it (and operations management wdn rsial rdcd h sz o is iiay n is defence its and military its of size the reduced drastically Sweden security strategy for 2010–2014 stated that the military was supposed was military the that stated 2010–2014 for strategy security conscription. The changes introduced as a direct result of the Russian­ the of result a direct as introduced The changes conscription. ­ signifi not were plans reform earlier the planning), defence duce UN, on focus to order in planning defence abandoned and expenditure of the Swedish military. The security strategy for 2016–2020 changed 2016–2020 for strategy The security military.Swedish the of and military equipment. No significant increase in the defence budget defence the in increase No significant equipment. military and 1990s, late In the forces. armed its of a transformation by accompanied

J. Gotkowska, About 22,000 soldiers of the Home Guard, corresponding to Poland’s Territorial Territorial Poland’s to corresponding Guard, Home the of soldiers 22,000 About OSW, Warsaw 2013, p. 22, www.osw.waw.pl. p. 22, 2013, Warsaw OSW, Defence Forces, should be added to this number. this to added be should Forces, Defence

Sitting on the fence. Swedish defence policy and the Baltic Sea region Sea Baltic the and policy defence Swedish fence. the on Sitting ‑Ukrainian war to bring about major transformation major about bring to war ‑Ukrainian 12 tary equipment. tary 11 While the While ­billion cantly ‑ ‑ ‑ , An audit of the military transformation implemented since 2015 was the military part An audit of (men and women) a year. The defence of the strategically located Got located strategically the of The defence a year. women) and (men 14 13 1% of GDP, which hampered development and modernisation. In view In view modernisation. and development hampered which 1% of GDP, wartime land forces consist of reserve units. The Swedishunits.Forcereserve Air was of consist forces land wartime the introduced changes was the 2017 Aurora exercise.2017 Aurora the was changes introduced the part for exercises tion mobilisa rapid on placed was simultaneously.Emphasis brigades two was region the in exercises military of number the while island, the 4,000 call‑ups about conscription – partial to a return been has there as well as exercises, mobilisation and planning through achieved be to defence increase gradually to began The government goal. primary the became country the of defence the development – its for priorities the increased. The Swedish Army was to be able to command and control and command to able be to was Army The Swedish increased. key,was whichas recognised was forces armed the of units mobilised in 2019 by the Defence Commission. Defence the by in 2019 a dis implement to expected also war. and It was crisis peace, of time in persed basing concept, including the use of sections of national highways sections of persed basing concept, including the use of on group a combat of establishment the with strengthened, was land for take­ for bilities became a priority for the Swedish Navy. The first major test of of test major Navy.Swedish the The first for a priority became bilities pnig ih h lret ug i 21, u i sil oee around hovered still it but 2019, in surge largest the with spending shortcomings that prevented the military from repelling a conventional repelling from military preventedthe that shortcomings of the report on the future of securitypolicyandthearmedforces issued thereportonfuture of of units.Since 2018, and branches individual the of drills readiness combat all of readiness operational wartime the increasing limitations, these of also directed to adjust its structure and increase its operational readiness also directedtoadjustitsstructureandincreaseoperationalreadiness

14 May 2019,www.regeringen.se. The Defence Commission is a forum for consultation between the government government the between consultation for forum a is Commission Defence The . Gotkowska, J. Värnkraft – Inriktningen af säkerhets politiken och utformningen av de militära för militära de av utformningen och politiken säkerhets af Inriktningen Värnkraft – www.osw.waw.pl. prepared as part of the process of developing the security strategy for 2021–2025. 2021–2025. for strategy security the developing of process the of part as prepared svaret 2021–2025 svaret and representatives of the political parties in the parliament. The report was was report The parliament. the in parties political the of representatives and ‑offs and landings. Strengthening anti­ Strengthening landings. and ‑offs

Arr: wdns epne o Zapad?’ to response Sweden’s ‘Aurora: , Regeringskansliet, Försvarsdepartementet, Försvarsberedningen,Försvarsdepartementet,Regeringskansliet, ‑time and reserve soldiers since half of Sweden’s of half since soldiers reserve and ­‑time 14 It openly pointed out numerous out pointed It openly ‑submarine warfare capa warfare ‑submarine OW 2 Spebr 2017, September 20 OSW, , 13 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ -

21 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 22 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 ‑level artillery battalions, upgrade heavy equipment including tanks and tanks including heavy‑levelequipment battalions, upgrade artillery vettes after 2025. An additional amphibiousbattalionistobeestablished Between 2021 and 2025, the Swedish Army is expected to consist of two of consist to expected is SwedishArmy the 2025, and 2021 Between Guard will be strengthened by obtaining new matériel – vehicles, sen vehicles, matériel – new obtaining by strengthened be will Guard the goals of the 2020 strategy will only be achievable around 2030.around achievable be only will 2020 strategy the of goals the 2021–2025, for strategy security the Therefore, Sweden. of defence the the existing JAS 39C/D and further implementation of the dispersed bas dispersed the of implementation further and JAS 39C/D existing the is also set to gradually rise, from around 4,000 to 8,000 a year by 2025. a year 8,000 to 4,000 around from rise, gradually to set also is conscripts of 60,000 90,000about The number to troops. from increase ForcesSwedishshould Armed the of strength The wartime concept. ing reform the continue to set is Force The Air region. Gothenburg the in ­ an older upgrading additionally and vessels new two ing medium­ Patriot the service into vehicles, systems andalsopurchaseadditionalartillery infantry andput division two and battalion a command headquarters, a divisional ing be will units new The Gotland. on battalion mechanised a reinforce underway,one and a third of formation the with brigades, mechanised processes of acquiring arms and military equipment and newand equipment military and arms acquiring personnel, of processes by modernising five Visby five modernising by order (by five to four from submarines of number the increasing by infcn lmttos o odcig eua mltr oeain for operations military regular conducting to limitations significant sors and night combat equipment. The Navy will boost its capabilities its boost will The Navy equipment. combat night and sors established in the central and northern parts of the country. It is envis country.It is the of parts northern and central the in established also and region, Stockholm the in brigade motorised a reduced create cited military,were the of size insufficient the alongside capabilities, of 60 JAS 39E aircraft to be organised in six squadrons, together with together squadrons, six in organised be to aircraft 60 JAS 39E of and modernisation initiated in 2015, with the introduction into service service into introduction the with in 2015, initiated modernisation and form by command level division the restore will Army the that aged lengthy the to Due wartime. in operate to forces mobilised the of ability an enhanced from 2015 – one the as goal same the sets in 2020, adopted still are there and 2015 strategy, the by out set goals the of all achieved not have forces armed the report, the to According reasons. primary as control and command and logistics reduced Significantly attack. armed ‑class corvettes, and acquiring two new cor new two acquiring and corvettes, ­‑class ‑range air defence system. The Home The Home system. defence air ‑range ‑type one) and one) ‑type ‑ ‑ ‑ ­ ‑ ‑ ‑ A newdefencethe in announced increase development significant the is 15 * 2018 constant prices. constant 2018 * 2021–2023 and by SEK 6 billion a year in 2024–2025. If implemented, Swe2021–2023 andby SEK 6 billiona year in2024–2025.If implemented, Table. It will be the most significant increase since the late 1990s. the since increase significant most the be It will budget for the period 2021–2025. It is set to rise by SEK 5 billion a yearin byrise SEK 5 billion to set It is 2021–2025. period the forbudget Institute,www.sipri.org. den will increase its military expenditure to around 1.5% of GDP in 2025. in 2025. 1.5% of GDP around to expenditure military its increase will den Source: (bn)* (bn) % GDP USD SEK

eeign pooiin 002:0 Ttlösae 2021–2025 Totalförsvaret 2020/21:30, proposition Regeringens Försvarsdepartementet, Sweden’s military spending from 2008 to 2019 Sweden’s2008 from spending military

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database Expenditure Military SIPRI 2008 39.7 1.2 4.9 2009 38.7 1.2 4.8 42.4 2010 1.2 5.2 14 October 2020,www.regeringen.se. 41.0 2011 4.9 1.1 42.3 2012 5.0 1.1 42.5 2013 5.1 1.1 , Stockholm International Peace Research Research Peace International Stockholm , 44.9 2014 5.4 1.1 45.4 2015 5.4 1.1 46.4 2016 5.5 1.1 , Regeringskansliet, Regeringskansliet, 47.3 2017 1.0 5.5 15 49.8 2018 1.0 5.7 55.9 2019 6.3 1.1 ‑ 23 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 24 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 Agency (MSB). Civil­ Agency(MSB). to started only not Sweden Russia, by Crimea of annexation the After vague wording. At the time, the strategy highlighted three areas: coor areas: three highlighted strategy the time, At the wording. vague The Swedish government decided as early as 2015 that it was necessary necessary was it that as 2015 early as governmentdecided The Swedish it War,after Cold but the Swedenduring in operative was Totaldefence The Swedish government tasked the Defence Commission with address with Commission Defence the governmenttasked The Swedish IV. (RE)CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL DEFENCE IV. (RE)CONSTRUCTIONCIVIL OF these three areas was then assigned to the Swedish Civil Contingencies CivilSwedish the to assigned then was areas three these defence military with integrated was that defence a civil to to return planning. defence civil and military integrating concept, defence total model, defence civil the reactivate to started also it defence, territorial the 2017 Aurora national defence drills. defence national 2017 Aurora the ing the issue of civil defence more comprehensively. In 2017, a separate comprehensively.a separate more In 2017, defence civil of issue the ing its of needs the to forces armed the and policy security its recalibrate prehensive planning, changes in the law, proper goallaw,­ proper the in changes planning, prehensive must economy the and society civil both that realisation the under lnig Te euiy taey o 21–00 etrd n extensive an featured 2016–2020 for strategy security The planning. cooperation sectors, state and private the between levels,collaboration function in times of crisis or war. Sweden is thus coming back to the to back coming thus is Swedenwar. or crisis of times in function ocs pyhlgcl eec, nesod s omnctn t the to communicating as understood defence, psychological forces; Swedish public and countering disinformation and propaganda in times in Swedishpropaganda and disinformation countering and public between the civilian sector and the armed forces, additional personnel additional forces, armed the and sector civilian the between of peace, crisis, or war. A central role in coordinating activities within activities coordinating in role war.A central or crisis, peace, of armed the for support civilian defence; civil in planning and dination rather its however,was striking, was What defence. civil on chapter time,com requires that task up. ground the a difficult It is from concept defence civil the Swedenrethinking Therefore, reformed.is component military the and dismantled, essentiallywas component civil the ended, a structured approach to this issue. this to approach a structured resources. developing Swedenand financial iscurrently intheprocessof local and regional central, the at entities on responsibilities additional ‑military cooperation started to be exercised during exercised be to started cooperation ‑military ‑setting, imposing ‑setting, ‑ ‑ ‑ 16 The government isgradually identifyingthemainactorsincivil defence. was another step in developing a comprehensive total defence concept. defence total a comprehensive developing in step another was It has appointed a commission to come up with a structure for the re the for a structure with up come to a commission appointed It has entitled 2021–2025, for strategy security the influenced It heavily Defence ht seil gny o mntrn ad vlain f oa defence total of evaluation and monitoring for agency special a that security,energy,and and foodenforcement law population, civilian the impact on the functioning of the state, society and economy.and society state, the of functioning the on impact a negative has and country the against actions military involveshostile of a scenario is preparations and planning for point The starting ment. The report cooperation. international and development, and research published, was subject the on report medicines and medical materials, as well as food. It has also announced also It has food. as well as materials, medical and medicines submit should commission the March 2021, Bylevel. local and regional untary defence organisations, economy and total defence, protection of of protection defence, total and economy organisations, defence untary be established in 2022 to develop and coordinate activities in the field field the in activities coordinate and develop to in 2022 established be sponsibility, management and coordination of civil defence at central, at defence civil of coordination and sponsibility,management coope­ of a system create also will The government defence. psychological of develop its in steps next the out set does it take, should model defence civilSwedish the form what to as answer a clear provide not does egy healthcare, preparedness, financial supply,transport, water drinking volsecurity,personnel, cyber and communications electronic defence, psychological defence, total of management and organisation defence: and theprivate sector, including theproduction,storage andtransportof appropriate management inthisarea.In turn,a government agency will introduce to decision a governmental for basis the be will that a report ­ a three least at strat security new the though policy.Even defence and security to as

Motståndskraft. Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försva civila det av utformningen och totalförsvaret av Inriktningen Motståndskraft. www.regeringen.se. e 2021–2025 ret ration in the security of supply preparedness between the state the between preparedness supply of security the in ration , which for the first time devotes as much space to civil defence civil to space much as devotes time first the for which , , ‑month crisis in Europe, including Sweden, which also which Sweden, including Europe, in crisis ‑month ösaseenne, Försvarsdepartementet, Försvarsberedningen, 16 listing key areas in civil and total and civil in areas key listing 0 eebr 2017, December 20 Total ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ - 25 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 26 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 Another important issue is securing the food and drinking water supply.water drinking and food the securing is issue important Another 17 The Swedishstrate government of amount the increasing considering is 10,000 more officers are set to boost the police force by 2024, partly by 2024, force police the boost to set are officers more 10,000 which has been largely decentralised until now, is to be created and created be to is now, until decentralised largely been has which important militarily in mainly reintroduced, be to are system warning preventto mechanisms wantsintroduce to assets economic takeovers of will be responsible for identifying its alternativesources. its identifying for responsible be will Hospitals will be tasked with increasing their capacities between 2021 between capacities their increasing with tasked be will Hospitals rity of supply preparedness and increasing the share of domestic food domestic of share the increasing and preparedness supply of rity military and civil a joint introduce to is aim the In healthcare, regions. com almost was protection security.As civilian national to important producers in the Swedish market. As for drinking water,municipalities drinking SwedishAs for market. the in producers war. and crisis of times for system exchange information and planning an early and War,shelters Cold the of end the after abandoned pletely have a conflict been changeslegal of case in protection border regarding retired/ recalling is consideration under step Another threats. hybrid enforcement, law and security internal of area In the services. postal former officers to strengthen the police in times of emergency. Possible of times in police the strengthen to officers former Sweden is also beg gic food storage, engaging in dialogue with the business sector on secu on sector business the with dialogue in engaging storage, food gic stocks at the regional and central level are to be built up.built be to levelare central and regional the at stocks and communications electronic supply,and energy transport, system, on o h icesd ed o rtc ciia fclte ad counter and facilities critical protect to need increased the to down payment supply,the water drinking and food healthcare, civilians, of protection enforcement,law and security internal as such defence, civil 2021–2025. for planned also is defence civil for funding Additional January 2023. by established be will efforts and 2025. A central storage system for medicines and medical supplies, medical and medicines for system storage A central and 2025. announced. Withregardtocounterintelligence, theSwedish government

The government has announced it will provide SEK 0.1 billion in 2021, 0.15 billion 0.15 billion in 2021, SEK 0.1 billion provide will it announced has The government purpose. in 2022, 0.25 billion in 2023, 0.3 billion in 2024 and 0.38 billion in 2025 for this this for 2025 in billion 0.38 and 2024 in billion 0.3 2023, in billion 0.25 2022, in inning to define the goals and tasks in specific areas of the goals areas of and tasksinning to define in specific 17 ‑ ‑ ‑ (FRA) and the Swedish Security Service ( Service Security Swedish the and (FRA) years, in cooperation with the National Defence Radio Establishment Radio Defence National the with cooperation in years, The payment system is also the subject of government analysis. Elec analysis.government of subject the also is system The payment The strategy for 2021–2025 also pays special attention to cyber security in in security cyberpays to also attention 2021–2025 forspecial The strategy Establishment (FRA), the Civil Contingency Agency (MSB), the Police the (MSB), Agency Contingency Civil the Establishment (FRA), Given theneedtoboostpersonnelindifferent publicsectorsintimes ties, including the Swedish Armed Forces, the National Defence Radio Defence National the Forces, Armed Swedish the including ties, been already haveForces Armed The Swedish system. defence total the secu ensure to or healthcare, the in population, civilian the protect to areas. these all in needed is work conceptual Further tions. in cash supplant completely almost to supposed were payments tronic rity of supplies. The responsibility of individual citizens is regarded as regarded is citizens individual of The responsibility supplies. of rity rec It also conscription. military to similar service, civil compulsory ing n h Seih oa dfne ytm tgte wt te involvement the with together system, defence total Swedish the in supplies.own their on only ing fuel supply. Greater resilience is also needed in electronic communica electronic in needed also is resilience supply.Greater fuel crisisby and expanding existing infrastructure for operatingintimesof Sweden,Guaranteeing accomplished. largelybeen has which something should beabletofunctionfor a week a seriouscrisis, rely intheevent of under now is emergency of times in state the by credit of form some security will also be strengthened in the years ahead by other entities other by ahead years the in strengthened be also will security centre within which different agencies are to coordinate their activi their coordinate to are agencies different which within centre security a cyber established government the In 2020, military. the of several for area this in capabilities defensive and offensivedeveloping they assistance, special need not do they Providing important. equally theneedtoengageognises voluntary defence organisations, for example introduc considering also Swedishgovernmentis war,the and crisis of creating contingency plans. The sameapplies toheatingsystems andthe prepared better be to needs also network The electricity consideration. and the Security Service, and the Postal and Telecom Authority (PTS). AuthorityTelecom and Postal the and Service, Security the and providing or payment, of means alternative introducing cash, to access Säpo ). Cyber and information and Cyber ). ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ 27 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 28 POINT OF VIEW 1/2021 (even though limited by the COVIDby(eventhe limited pandemic). though -19 18 In addition, emphasis is placed on the need to raise cybersecurity awarecybersecurity raise to need the on placed is emphasis In addition, tary exercise after 2017, Aurora 2020, but that was cancelled due to the to due cancelled was that but Aurora 2020, after 2017, exercise tary mili defence national largest the with synchronised additionally be to de Civil it. optimise to needed lessons the drawing and defences tary ness among the public. among ness pandemic. fence exercises ( exercises fence Sweden has been testing the functionality of the current civil and mili­ and civil current the of functionality the testing been has Sweden

Ttlösasvig 2020’ ‘Totalförsvarsövning www.msb.se. Totalförsvarsövning , Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, beredskap, och samhällsskydd för Myndigheten , 2020) were held throughout 2020 throughout held were 2020) JUSTYNAGOTKOWSKA 18 Theyweresupposed ‑ ‑ ‑