UNDP COMPENDIUM.Cdr

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CÔTE D'IVOIRE 71 3.5.1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges 71 INTRODUCTION 1 3.5.2. Specic Challenges facing Women and Girls 72 1.1. Background 1 3.5.3. Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 73 1.2. Objectives of the Research 2 3.5.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 79 1.3. Methodology 2 3.5.5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 81 1.4. Structure of the Report 3 References 83 REGIONAL REPORT 4 2.1. Brief Description of the Sahel Region 4 2.2. Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges 5 2.3. Specic Challenges facing Women and Girls 13 2.4. Regional Dimension of the Responses to the Peace and Security Challenges 15 2.5. Limits and Pitfalls of the Responses to peace and security challenges 20 2.6. Conclusions and Recommendations 25 References 29

COUNTRY REPORT 32 3.1. Brief Background 32

MALI 33 3.2.1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges 33 3.2.2 Specic Challenges facing Women and Girls 35 3.2.3. Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 36 3.2.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 40 3.2.5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 43 References 45

NIGER 46 3.3.1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges 46 3.3.2. Specic Challenges facing Women and Girls 48 3.3.3. Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 50 3.3.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 53 3.3.5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 55 References 57

BURKINA FASO 59 3.4.1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges 59 3.4.2. Specic Challenges facing Women and Girls 61 3.4.3. Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 62 3.4.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 66 3.4.5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 67 References 69 PAGE 04 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 05

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COUNTRY REPORT 32 3.1. Brief Background 32

BURKINA FASO 59 3.4.1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges 59 3.4.2. Specic Challenges facing Women and Girls 61 3.4.3. Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 62 3.4.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to Peace and Security Challenges 66 3.4.5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 67 References 69 PAGE 06 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 07

Acronyms

PNLEVT Prevention and Control of Violent Extremism and Terrorism ACEACN Association for More Cohesion between North Central livestock and Farmers PPU Presidential Emergency Programme ACLED Armed Conict Location and Event Data Project SDF Defence and Security Forces ADDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Authority SDGs Sustainable Development Goals AFD Agence Française de Développement UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine' AfDB African Development Bank UN United Nations AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali UNDP United Nations Development Programme AU African Union UNFPA United Nations Population Fund CAFO Coordination of Women's Associations UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees CCDO Coordinating Centre for Operational Decisions UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund CDVR Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund CECI Centre for International Study and Cooperation UNISS United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel CILSS Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel UNOCI United Nations created the United Nations in Côte d'Ivoire CMA Coordination of Azawad Movements UNOWAS United Nations Ofce for West Africa and the Sahel CONARIV National Commission for Reconciliation and Compensation of PNCS UNSC United Nations Security Council National Programme for Social Cohesion UNSP United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel CREDD Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development USAID United States Agency for International Development CSOs Civil Society Organisations VDP Volunteer for Defense of Homeland DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration WAEMU West African Monetary Union DoD Department of Defence WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebulding (WANEP) ECOMICI ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire WFP World Food Programme ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States WPS Women, Peace and Security EU European Union EUCAP European Union Capacity Building Mission EUTM European Union Training Mission in Mali FAN Nigerien Armed Forces FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FC-G5S G5 Sahel Joint Force FSI Fragile State Index GATIA Tuareg Self-Defence Group Imghad and Allies GBV Gender Based Violence IOM International Organization for Migration ISGS Islamic State Group in the Greater Sahara JNIM Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin LGA Liptako-Gourma Authority MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali MISAHEL African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel MSA Movement for the Salvation of Azawad OCHA United Nations Ofce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA UN Ofce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid OIC Organisation of Islamic Cooperation PISRC Integrated Security Plan for Central Regions PNLEVT Prevention and Control of Violent Extremism and Terrorism PAGE 06 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 07

Acronyms

PNLEVT Prevention and Control of Violent Extremism and Terrorism ACEACN Association for More Cohesion between North Central livestock and Farmers PPU Presidential Emergency Programme ACLED Armed Conict Location and Event Data Project SDF Defence and Security Forces ADDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Authority SDGs Sustainable Development Goals AFD Agence Française de Développement UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine' AfDB African Development Bank UN United Nations AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali UNDP United Nations Development Programme AU African Union UNFPA United Nations Population Fund CAFO Coordination of Women's Associations UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees CCDO Coordinating Centre for Operational Decisions UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund CDVR Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund CECI Centre for International Study and Cooperation UNISS United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel CILSS Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel UNOCI United Nations created the United Nations in Côte d'Ivoire CMA Coordination of Azawad Movements UNOWAS United Nations Ofce for West Africa and the Sahel CONARIV National Commission for Reconciliation and Compensation of PNCS UNSC United Nations Security Council National Programme for Social Cohesion UNSP United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel CREDD Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development USAID United States Agency for International Development CSOs Civil Society Organisations VDP Volunteer for Defense of Homeland DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration WAEMU West African Monetary Union DoD Department of Defence WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebulding (WANEP) ECOMICI ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire WFP World Food Programme ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States WPS Women, Peace and Security EU European Union EUCAP European Union Capacity Building Mission EUTM European Union Training Mission in Mali FAN Nigerien Armed Forces FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FC-G5S G5 Sahel Joint Force FSI Fragile State Index GATIA Tuareg Self-Defence Group Imghad and Allies GBV Gender Based Violence IOM International Organization for Migration ISGS Islamic State Group in the Greater Sahara JNIM Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin LGA Liptako-Gourma Authority MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali MISAHEL African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel MSA Movement for the Salvation of Azawad OCHA United Nations Ofce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA UN Ofce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid OIC Organisation of Islamic Cooperation PISRC Integrated Security Plan for Central Regions PNLEVT Prevention and Control of Violent Extremism and Terrorism PAGE 08 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 09

Introduction

1.1. Background In response to the security challenges in the Sahel, Acknowledgements there have been various interventions by multilateral The Sahel region has long been one of Africa's most agencies, regional organisations and bilateral fragile regions, with many complex and multi-layered partners including the United Nations (UN), security challenges, exacerbated by the 2012 Malian European Union (EU), African Union (AU), the The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) gratefully acknowledges the crisis. In recent years, the Sahel has been in the Economic Community of West African States strategic support of ECOWAS and the nancial support of the United Nations global spotlight due to structural and contextual (ECOWAS), France and the United States. Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa, in the production of this challenges such as poor governance, corruption, Additionally, there have been diverse responses by comprehensive report titled “The limits and Pitfalls of Multilateral, Regional and National terrorism, violent extremism, political crisis, election Governments and Civil Society Organisations Responses to the Peace and Security Challenges in the Sahel Region and Côte d'Ivoire”. violence, intercommunal violence, transnational (CSOs) as part of the broader efforts to address the organised crime, climate change, and food threats. A classic example is the ongoing G5 Sahel 1 Our sincere appreciation also goes to the National Consultants, Dr Aly Tounkara, insecurity . These challenges are the product of both initiative initiated by Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger Professor Ousmane Zina, Dr Dicko Abdourahame, Dr Poussi Sawadogo, who greatly local and global dynamics. The combined effects of and Mauritania to address the multiple security and contributed to the analysis in this report. the challenges are derailing the progress and developmental challenges in the Sahel region. investments made in democratic consolidation and 4However, despite the diverse responses to the Additionally, WANEP appreciates the support, inputs and insights from the regional staff the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable threats in the Sahel, the security situation continues of WANEP as well as the participants of the Research Findings Validation and Lessons Development Goals (SDGs). More ominously, the to exacerbate with the recent political crisis in Mali Learnt Workshop held on February 12-13, 2021 in Accra, Ghana. We would also like to consequences on the lives and wellbeing of women being a case in point. But even before the August thank our Network Coordinators in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger for and girls have also been particularly grievous. 2020 crisis in Mali, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, who facilitating the process of conducting this study. According to Plan International, adolescent girls in is the head of UNOWAS, had in July 2019 notied the the Sahel are enduring the catastrophic United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of the We also wish to acknowledge with gratitude the respondents who supported with the consequences of conict, food insecurity and mass region's volatile security situation, and how data collection process despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, WANEP would like to displacement manifesting in the form of extreme escalating violence and insecurity have sparked an thank all stakeholders who assisted with information in preparing this report. violence, loss of education, health, food and unprecedented humanitarian crisis across the 2 livelihoods . A similar report by the United Nations region. 5Indeed, UNOWAS recorded more than 4,000 Ofce for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) deaths in 2019 alone as compared to 770 in 2016 due showed how the humanitarian crisis in the region has to the resurgence of attacks and violence in left a total of 5.1 million Burkinabe, Nigeriens and especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. 6Worryingly, 3 Malians especially women in need . the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and its debilitating impact on the economy of countries has

¹WANEP. (2020). WANEP Monthly Bulletins. January-April, p.2; UNOWAS. (2019). op. cit. ²Plan International. (2020). Sahel crisis: Girls pushed to the brink by violence and trauma https://plan-international.org/news/2020-06-18-sahel-crisis-girls-pushed- brink-violence-and-trauma, accessed on 8 October 2020. ³UNOWAS. (2019). West Africa and the Sahel, between security challenges and the need to consolidate peace. https://unowas.unmissions.org/west-africa-and-sahel- between-security-challenges-and-need-consolidate-peace. Accessed on 8 October 2020. ⁴UN Security Council Report. (2020). Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force. June 2020 Monthly Forecast. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly- forecast/2020-06/group-of-ﬁve-for-the-sahel-joint-force-2.php, assessed on 9 October 2020. ⁵UNOWAS. (2019). op. cit. ⁶UN News. (2020). 'Unprecedented terrorist violence' in West Africa, Sahel region. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981, accessed 20 November 2020 PAGE 08 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 09

Introduction

¹WANEP. (2020). WANEP Monthly Bulletins. January-April, p.2; UNOWAS. (2019). op. cit. ²Plan International. (2020). Sahel crisis: Girls pushed to the brink by violence and trauma https://plan-international.org/news/2020-06-18-sahel-crisis-girls-pushed- brink-violence-and-trauma, accessed on 8 October 2020. ³UNOWAS. (2019). West Africa and the Sahel, between security challenges and the need to consolidate peace. https://unowas.unmissions.org/west-africa-and-sahel- between-security-challenges-and-need-consolidate-peace. Accessed on 8 October 2020. ⁴UN Security Council Report. (2020). Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force. June 2020 Monthly Forecast. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly- forecast/2020-06/group-of-ﬁve-for-the-sahel-joint-force-2.php, assessed on 9 October 2020. ⁵UNOWAS. (2019). op. cit. ⁶UN News. (2020). 'Unprecedented terrorist violence' in West Africa, Sahel region. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981, accessed 20 November 2020 PAGE 10 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 11

further added another layer to the pre-existing strategies to the peace and security international organisations contacted for the study national interventions based on the four selected challenges in the Sahel. challenges in the Sahel region; and were unable to grant interviews to the researchers countries - Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Cote vi) Provide evidence-based policy due to their involvement in the electoral processes d'Ivoire. The enduring and protracted nature of the security recommendations to address the existing and COVID-19 related matters. Nevertheless, the challenges in the Sahel invokes critical questions gaps in the existing responses to inform researchers were able to collate signicant primary For each of the sections, the themes or indicators for appropriate and effective interventions in about the efcacy of existing responses and the value data for the analysis of the research objectives. the analysis and discussions were grouped as support of the SDGs in the Sahel. of the huge nancial and human investments made follows: by states, regional and international stakeholders in the region. Undoubtedly, to be able to address this 1.4. Structure of the Report 1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and 1.3. Methodology dilemma and recommend a lasting panacea to the Security Challenges The report is structured into two sections after the 2. Specic Challenges facing Women and security challenges in the Sahel, an evaluation of the The research adopted a qualitative approach and a Girls limits or pitfalls of current interventions is essential. It introductory section. The rst section focuses on the case study design by focusing on three countries in 3. Responses to Peace and Security is for this reason that the West Africa Network for regional dimension of the multilateral, regional and the Sahel region of West Africa namely, Mali, Niger, Challenges Peacebulding (WANEP) partnered with ECOWAS and national responses to the peace and security and Burkina Faso. An additional target country was 4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to Peace challenges in the Sahel, while the second section the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as part of Côte d'Ivoire due to its proximity to the selected and Security Challenges provide a case study discussion of the specic the project “Building an Inclusive Post COVID-19 countries and its strategic political and economic 5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations Recovery, Crisis Transitions and Governance importance to the region. Primary data for the Reforms in the Sahel and Côte D'Ivoire” to undertake research was generated through series of in-depth this comprehensive research. interviews and consultations with the relevant stakeholders in the selected countries (see Appendix 1 for list of respondents), while the secondary 1.2. Objectives of the Research sources involved the review of extant literature on the The main objective of the research was to assess the subject matter. Due to the COVID 19 restrictions, the gaps in the multilateral, regional and national interviews were conducted using multiple responses to the peace and security challenges in the techniques such as face to face interviews, Sahel especially as they affect women and young girls interviews via telephone, zoom and emails. A team of and proffer evidence-based policy recommendations ve researchers (one from WANEP regional ofce to address the threats. and one each from the four selected countries) conducted the research between November and The specic objectives of the research were as December 2020. Content analysis and thematic follows: analysis were employed to identify broad themes I) Examine the complex and multi-layered and patterns within the multilateral, regional and peace and security challenges in the Sahel national responses to the peace and security region; challenges in the Sahel as well as the key gaps or ii) Analyse the specic challenges facing deciencies. Additionally, quotes, maps, diagrams women and girls in the Sahel region; and other forms of infographic materials are used to iii) Interrogate the multilateral and regional explain some of the issues. responses to the peace and security challenges in the Sahel region; However, the study faced some limitations. Due to iv) Interrogate the national responses (both the timelines for the conduct of the research, COVID- Government and CSOs) to the peace and 19 restrictions and elections in Burkina Faso and security challenges in the Sahel region; v) Identify and discuss the gaps/pitfalls in the Côte d'Ivoire at the period of the research, not all multilateral, regional and national response stakeholders contacted were able to participate in the study. Thus, some of the state actors and PAGE 10 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 11

further added another layer to the pre-existing strategies to the peace and security international organisations contacted for the study national interventions based on the four selected challenges in the Sahel. challenges in the Sahel region; and were unable to grant interviews to the researchers countries - Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Cote vi) Provide evidence-based policy due to their involvement in the electoral processes d'Ivoire. The enduring and protracted nature of the security recommendations to address the existing and COVID-19 related matters. Nevertheless, the challenges in the Sahel invokes critical questions gaps in the existing responses to inform researchers were able to collate signicant primary For each of the sections, the themes or indicators for appropriate and effective interventions in about the efcacy of existing responses and the value data for the analysis of the research objectives. the analysis and discussions were grouped as support of the SDGs in the Sahel. of the huge nancial and human investments made follows: by states, regional and international stakeholders in the region. Undoubtedly, to be able to address this 1.4. Structure of the Report 1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and 1.3. Methodology dilemma and recommend a lasting panacea to the Security Challenges The report is structured into two sections after the 2. Specic Challenges facing Women and security challenges in the Sahel, an evaluation of the The research adopted a qualitative approach and a Girls limits or pitfalls of current interventions is essential. It introductory section. The rst section focuses on the case study design by focusing on three countries in 3. Responses to Peace and Security is for this reason that the West Africa Network for regional dimension of the multilateral, regional and the Sahel region of West Africa namely, Mali, Niger, Challenges Peacebulding (WANEP) partnered with ECOWAS and national responses to the peace and security and Burkina Faso. An additional target country was 4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to Peace challenges in the Sahel, while the second section the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as part of Côte d'Ivoire due to its proximity to the selected and Security Challenges provide a case study discussion of the specic the project “Building an Inclusive Post COVID-19 countries and its strategic political and economic 5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations Recovery, Crisis Transitions and Governance importance to the region. Primary data for the Reforms in the Sahel and Côte D'Ivoire” to undertake research was generated through series of in-depth this comprehensive research. interviews and consultations with the relevant stakeholders in the selected countries (see Appendix 1 for list of respondents), while the secondary 1.2. Objectives of the Research sources involved the review of extant literature on the The main objective of the research was to assess the subject matter. Due to the COVID 19 restrictions, the gaps in the multilateral, regional and national interviews were conducted using multiple responses to the peace and security challenges in the techniques such as face to face interviews, Sahel especially as they affect women and young girls interviews via telephone, zoom and emails. A team of and proffer evidence-based policy recommendations ve researchers (one from WANEP regional ofce to address the threats. and one each from the four selected countries) conducted the research between November and The specic objectives of the research were as December 2020. Content analysis and thematic follows: analysis were employed to identify broad themes I) Examine the complex and multi-layered and patterns within the multilateral, regional and peace and security challenges in the Sahel national responses to the peace and security region; challenges in the Sahel as well as the key gaps or ii) Analyse the specic challenges facing deciencies. Additionally, quotes, maps, diagrams women and girls in the Sahel region; and other forms of infographic materials are used to iii) Interrogate the multilateral and regional explain some of the issues. responses to the peace and security challenges in the Sahel region; However, the study faced some limitations. Due to iv) Interrogate the national responses (both the timelines for the conduct of the research, COVID- Government and CSOs) to the peace and 19 restrictions and elections in Burkina Faso and security challenges in the Sahel region; v) Identify and discuss the gaps/pitfalls in the Côte d'Ivoire at the period of the research, not all multilateral, regional and national response stakeholders contacted were able to participate in the study. Thus, some of the state actors and PAGE 12 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 13

2.2. Multi-layered Peace and Security Hummel, Rios, and Abb, the human security Challenges paradigm provides a holistic and empathetic approach to understanding the security situation in Regional Report This section provides a thematic analysis of the the Sahel. 13Its application will also enhance people- regional security threats in the Sahel. It takes a multi- centred and integrated responses by stakeholders dimensional analytical framework by examining the that address the multidimensional causes and major security challenges that have negative impacts consequences of the complex challenges to fully on the stability of states in the region using the human realize the transformative promise of the Sustainable 2.1. Brief Description of the Sahel Region security lens. The human security approach is a Development Goals (SDGs). comprehensive methodology that allows for a broad Geographic denitions of the Sahel region vary among scholars and practitioners. But generally, perspective on the complex and multi-dimensional Ÿ Political Insecurity the Sahel is a 5,000-kilometre belt of land below the Sahara Desert and stretches from Africa's challenges that people and Governments face to Atlantic coast to the Red Sea as shown on the Map 2.1.7The region marks the physical and cultural help realize a world free from fear, want and indignity. The political realities in the Sahel partly account for transition between the Sahara Desert to the north and tropical savannas to the south with a the chronic nature of the threats in the region. From population of over 300 million. There are seven types of human insecurities which the eld study, it was quite clear that the genesis of are:12 the crisis in the Sahel emanates from years of poor Figure 2.1. Map of the Sahel region governance, weak state institutions, endemic Ÿ Economic insecurity (persistent poverty, corruption, lack of state presence in signicant parts unemployment, lack of access to credit and other of countries' territories, political repression, lack of The Sahel is also culturally and historically, a economic opportunities). rule of law, injustice, unlawful killings and alarming Ÿ shoreline between the Middle East and sub- Food insecurity (hunger, famine, sudden rise in human rights violations by members of the defence Saharan Africa, making it a site of interaction food prices) and security forces, armed groups and self-defence Ÿ Health insecurity (epidemics, malnutrition, poor between Arabic, Islamic and nomadic cultures militias, who sometimes operate with rampant sanitation, lack of access to basic health care) from the north, and indigenous and traditional impunity. 8 Ÿ Environmental insecurity (land degradation, cultures from the south. The core Sahel countries resource depletion, natural disasters) 14 includes four countries bordering Lake Chad – For example, the absence of state authorities in Ÿ Personal insecurity (physical violence in all its Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria as well as Burkina some regions has not only limited service delivery but forms, human trafcking, child labour) Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and also left communities with limited protection, leading Ÿ Community insecurity (inter-ethnic, religious and Senegal. As a largely semi-arid belt of barren, to the proliferation of armed groups and militias such other identity-based tensions, crime, terrorism) sandy and rock-strewn land, the Sahel has as the Koglweogo militia group in Burkina Faso. 15Due Ÿ Political insecurity (Political repression, human abundant human (demographic and cultural to the aforementioned structural and governance rights violations, lack of rule of law and justice) assets) and natural resources, offering enormous decits, countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and potential for rapid growth. Source: https://theconversation.com The analysis focuses on these different types of Niger have consistently ranked at the bottom of human insecurities in the Sahel. Practically, adopting international indexes on governance and political For example, the Sahel is one of the richest regions potential for renewable energy such as solar and the human security approach provides a synergistic stability such as the Fragile State Index (FSI), in the world with abundant oil, natural gas, gold, 10 wind than other regions of the world . However, there framework to understanding the broad range of Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank's phosphates, diamonds, copper, iron ore, bauxite, are deep-rooted challenges that affect the prosperity challenges the Sahel faces. As argued by Jebb, governance indicators.¹⁶ biological diversity and precious woods, among and peace of the region. As described by the UNDP, it 9 many other assets . It is also endowed with more is a “land of opportunities as it is of challenges”11

¹²United Nations. (2016). Human Security Handbook. New York: Human Security Unit. ¹³Jebb C.C.R., Hummel C.L.J., Rios L.C.L., Abb L.C.M.A. (2008). Human and Environmental Security in the Sahel. In: Liotta P.H., Mouat D.A., Kepner W.G., Lancaster J.M. (eds), Environmental Change and Human Security: Recognizing and Acting on Hazard Impacts. Springer, Dordrecht: NATO. ⁷UNDP. (2019). Sahel: A region of Opportunities. https://feature.undp.org/sahel/index.html, accessed 10 January 2021. ¹⁴Interviews with key stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 24 November 2020. ⁸Suleiman, M. (2017). Sahel Region, Africa. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569, Accessed 20 December 2020. ¹⁵Chauzal, G. (2020). From the Malian crisis to the Sahel breakdown: An overview of SIPRI's work in the G5 Sahel region. ⁹United Nations. (2019). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/malian-crisis-sahel-breakdown-overview-sipris-work-g5-sahel-region. Working Groups. ¹⁶For more information see Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2018, Washington, April 2018, http:// fundforpeace.org/global/?p=569.; UNDP website: Human ¹⁰Ibid, pp.6-7 Development Index (HDI), http://hdr.undp.org/en/ node/149.; World Bank website: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.world- ¹¹ UNDP (2019). op.cit. bank.org/governance/wgi/#reports. PAGE 12 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 13

¹²United Nations. (2016). Human Security Handbook. New York: Human Security Unit. ¹³Jebb C.C.R., Hummel C.L.J., Rios L.C.L., Abb L.C.M.A. (2008). Human and Environmental Security in the Sahel. In: Liotta P.H., Mouat D.A., Kepner W.G., Lancaster J.M. (eds), Environmental Change and Human Security: Recognizing and Acting on Hazard Impacts. Springer, Dordrecht: NATO. ⁷UNDP. (2019). Sahel: A region of Opportunities. https://feature.undp.org/sahel/index.html, accessed 10 January 2021. ¹⁴Interviews with key stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 24 November 2020. ⁸Suleiman, M. (2017). Sahel Region, Africa. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569, Accessed 20 December 2020. ¹⁵Chauzal, G. (2020). From the Malian crisis to the Sahel breakdown: An overview of SIPRI's work in the G5 Sahel region. ⁹United Nations. (2019). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/malian-crisis-sahel-breakdown-overview-sipris-work-g5-sahel-region. Working Groups. ¹⁶For more information see Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2018, Washington, April 2018, http:// fundforpeace.org/global/?p=569.; UNDP website: Human ¹⁰Ibid, pp.6-7 Development Index (HDI), http://hdr.undp.org/en/ node/149.; World Bank website: Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.world- ¹¹ UNDP (2019). op.cit. bank.org/governance/wgi/#reports. PAGE 14 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 15

Figure 2.2. Mali Soldiers are celebrated as they parade in Bamako. extremist/terrorist/Jihadist groups, armed self- The rising violence has increased the number of d e f e n c e g r o u p s , a s w e l l a s civilian victims dramatically. Civilians are being counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations by targeted, intimidated, abducted, harassed and killed, state security forces and international partners. with increasing regularity by conict actors who Armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic accuse them of supporting their opponents. State such as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State Group in the Greater Sahara There have been killings and attacks against state (ISGS) and Ansarul Islam are gradually expanding ofcials, churches and Imams who are deemed less their presence and capabilities. Indeed, due to the radical by terrorist groups to cause community porous borders and the absence of the state in large tensions and also to project the image of a weak stretch of lands in the Sahel, some of these groups government that is unable to provide security for its have established lucrative criminal ventures such as citizens. In 2019, data from the Armed Conict the imposition of taxes on the rural population, Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) showed Source: AFP News trafcking of drugs, weapons and people to raise that casualties from attacks targeting especially funds to sustain their activities. 21Pre-existing ethnic civilians in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger increased tensions and inter-communal violence over land vefold since 2016, with over 4,000 deaths.Majority of disputes, chieftaincy successions, and customary the civilians killed came from the Fulani, Bellah, 17Similarly, for the 2019 Corruption Perception Index beyond the North and Central regions of the country rites have become mixed up with terrorism and Tuaregs, and Dogon ethic groups. While the bulk of by Transparency International, Mali ranked 130 out of due to the political insecurity in neighboring insurgency, further aggravating the community and the civilian related attacks are orchestrated by the 198 countries, Niger ranked 120, Chad ranked 162 countries. In a similar vein, the leadership vacuum in terrorist and jihadist groups, the community-based 18 personal insecurities in the region. and Mauritania ranked 137 out of 198 countries. Burkina Faso after the fall of President Compaoré and militias such as the Volunteer for Defence of the dissolvement of the Presidential Guards It has also led to conict spirals within the region, with Homeland (VDP) militiamen, local Dozo and Dogon The cumulative effects of the governance and political contributed to the escalation of insecurity within the the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and ethnic militias and government forces have equally challenges in the Sahel have caused widespread administrative provinces of Soum and Oudalan as Niger being at the centre of violence.22 been perpetrators.These actors routinely commit public discontent, lack of condence and mistrust of 20 well as the Boucle du Mouhoun and Nord regions. atrocities across the region with impunity. The attacks state's authority, weakened state legitimacy, and The current President, Christian Roch Kabore, has against civilians especially by government forces has worsened the security situation across the region.19 In been widely criticized for his poor handling of the in most instances alienated the local population from Mali, which is the epicentre of the Sahel crisis, efforts political and security situation in the country which is Figure 2.3. Extremist/Armed Attacks in Key Countries in W/Africa government and undermined the short-term gains of to advance peace and stability has been undermined threatening border areas with Benin and Côte counterterrorism operations. The human rights by the recurrent political crisis. The 2012 political d'Ivoire. violations have also enabled armed groups to instability caused by the Tuareg rebellion, the military sometimes pose as as 'community protectors' to coup d'état and the subsequent power vacuum further consolidate their control of communities. created in the North of the country is partially blamed Ÿ Community and Personal Insecurities for the destabilisation of the entire Sahel region. There The Sahel region has been a frontline in the war are growing fears that the fragile political situation Ÿ Environmental and Food Insecurities caused by the recent military coup d'état as depicted against terrorism and insurgency over the past in gure 2.2 that overthrew President Ibrahim decade. In recent years, as represented on gure Climate change and its impact has dominated 2.3., the region has witnessed an increasing Boubacar Keita could potentially lead to opportunistic Source: WANEP NEWS; ACLED online News site n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e o n expansion and consolidation of violent extremism proliferation of non-state armed groups, violent environmental insecurity in the Sahel. The Sahel has

¹⁷Fragile State Index (FSI), Country Dashboard. https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/, accessed 20 November 2020. ²¹Interview with CSOs in Bamako, Mali, 22 November 2020. ¹⁸Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/mrt, accessed 20 November 2020. ²²International Crisis Group. (2020). The Sahel: Promoting Political alongside Military Action. ¹⁹Interview with CSOs in Bamako, Mali, 23 November 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/sahel-promoting-political-alongside-military-action, accessed 30 November 2020. ²⁰DECAF. (2020) Burkina Faso Country Background Note. https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-Profiles/Burkina-Faso-Note-d-information- ²³ WFP. (2019). Five things to know about spiralling insecurity in the Sahel., https://insight.wfp.org/five-things, 1 December 2020. RSS,accessed 25 November 2020. ²⁴ Dewast, L. (2020). How West Africa is under threat from Islamist militants. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51061229, accessed 24 November 2020. ²⁵ The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2020). State atrocities in the sahel: the impetus for counterinsurgency results is fueling government attacks ofcivilians. https://acleddata.com/2020/05/20/, 1 December 2020. PAGE 14 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 15

¹⁷Fragile State Index (FSI), Country Dashboard. https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/, accessed 20 November 2020. ²¹Interview with CSOs in Bamako, Mali, 22 November 2020. ¹⁸Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/mrt, accessed 20 November 2020. ²²International Crisis Group. (2020). The Sahel: Promoting Political alongside Military Action. ¹⁹Interview with CSOs in Bamako, Mali, 23 November 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/sahel-promoting-political-alongside-military-action, accessed 30 November 2020. ²⁰DECAF. (2020) Burkina Faso Country Background Note. https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-Profiles/Burkina-Faso-Note-d-information- ²³ WFP. (2019). Five things to know about spiralling insecurity in the Sahel., https://insight.wfp.org/five-things, 1 December 2020. RSS,accessed 25 November 2020. ²⁴ Dewast, L. (2020). How West Africa is under threat from Islamist militants. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51061229, accessed 24 November 2020. ²⁵ The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2020). State atrocities in the sahel: the impetus for counterinsurgency results is fueling government attacks ofcivilians. https://acleddata.com/2020/05/20/, 1 December 2020. PAGE 16 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 17 Figure 2.5 – Map of Food insecurity in the G5 Sahel countries

been considered as one of the world's most Figure 2.4. Impacts of climate Change vulnerable regions to climate change due to extreme temperatures, uctuating rainfall, and droughts, resulting in land degradation, changes in grazing patterns, and reduction of water supply for both humans and animals.

26Specically, rainy seasons are becoming shorter, more intense, and less predictable as precipitation increases 7% for every degree Celsius in temperature rise. 27Droughts and oods due to more intense rainfall are growing longer and more frequent, triggering new conicts, disrupting livelihoods of the most vulnerable and leading to forced migration. The UN estimates that roughly 80% of the Sahel's farmland is degraded and temperatures are rising 1.5 times faster than the global average. 28Figure 2.4. Source: https://mrgeogwagg.wordpress.com shows the impacts of climate change in the region, covering the hazard, vulnerability and people's people in rural areas, young people, and many Source: UN OCHA, Humanitarian data exchange, July 2020. capacity to cope. It is clear that the vulnerability of women.” 30The situation in Niger is not different from climate change threatens food security, water the other Sahelian countries where land available for security and health issues. The outcome or coping Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the number of food- problems include the high rate of malnutrition, poor pastoralists and farmers is shrinking and leading to mechanism has usually been forced migration, insecure people in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has sanitation conditions, poor water and lack of access competition between farmers and herders over scare competition over natural resources, and increased risen from 1 million to 4.8 million and this is expected to healthcare due to weak health systems.33 resources. Hundreds of civilians are killed every year risk of domestic conict. to increase in 2021 as the virus continues to spread.32 Malnutrition in particular has been a major threat to in inter-communal violence between herders and Already, the UN Ofce for the Coordination of children's health and development. According to the Commenting on the situation, Niger's former farmers in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) estimates that 12 million United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 15 per President Mahamadou Issoufou during his remarks Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. people in the region, of whom 5 million in Burkina cent of children in Niger were acutely malnourished at the UN General Assembly summit on climate Faso, Mali and Niger alone are facing a serious lack as of 2018 (unchanged since 2006). In Chad, change in the Sahel in September 2019, emphasised Closely linked to the environmental insecurity is food of food. Figure 2.5. shows the food insecurity UNICEF pointed out that almost 1.8 million children the perceptible effects of climate change on insecurity which has become a key humanitarian classications in the region under three categories of under 5 years were suffering from global acute agricultural land, pastures and water availability as issue especially for subsistence farmers who lack risk – minimal, under pressure and crisis. malnutrition, including 500,000 who are severely well as how it is jeopardising food security with alternative source of livelihoods. The Food and malnourished.34 The drivers of malnutrition in the negative impact on security and migration. Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that 29.2 29 million people in Sahel region are food insecure, region can be attributed to insufcient high-quality President Issoufou further indicated that Niger loses Ÿ Health Insecurity and diverse foods due to shocks, climate change, “100,000 hectares of arable land every year…the including 9.4 million suffering from severe food challenging agroecological conditions, population degradation of our land is unheard of and affects insecurity who are likely to experience extreme food Health issues are a major concern in the Sahel. Prior 31 growth, and underdeveloped food systems as well as decits. to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, diseases insufcient purchasing power to access food due to such as malaria, meningitis, poliomyelitis and HIV- 35 poverty. ²⁶Penney, J. (2019). West Africa's Sahel region is especially vulnerable to climate change but also weak governance. https://qz.com/africa/1719442/west-africa , 1 AIDS were prevalent in the region. Other health December 2020. ²⁷ibid ²⁸FAO. (2020). The magnitude of the Problem. http://www.fao.org/3/X5318E/x5318e02.htm, Accessed 2 December 2020.; World Economic Forum. (2019). The Sahel is engulfed by violence. Climate change, food insecurity and extremists are largely to ³²Lamarche, A. (2020). Mounting Hunger in the Sahel: The Unintended Impact of COVID-19 Prevention. Refugee International Issue brief. blame. https://www.weforum.org/agenda, accessed 1 December 2020. ³³FES. (2020). Covid-19: In the Sahel region, a health crisis may hide other ones. https://www.fes.de/referat-accessed 20 December 2020. ²⁹United Nations. (2019). Consultative meeting of the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region. http://webtv.un.org/watch/consultative-meeting, accessed 2 ³⁴UNICEF. (2020). Chad Appeal Humanitarian Action for Children. https://www.unicef.org/appeals/chad, Accessed 15 December 2020. December 2020. ³⁵United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Strengthening Partnerships, Results, and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING). (2018). ³⁰ ibid Drivers of Malnutrition in Niger: Analysis of Secondary Data Sources. https://www.springnutrition.org/sites/default/ﬁles/, Accessed 15 December 2020 ³¹FAO. (2020). Sahel Crisis. http://www.fao.org/emergencies/crisis/sahel/intro/en/, accessed on 7 December 2020. PAGE 16 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 17 Figure 2.5 – Map of Food insecurity in the G5 Sahel countries been considered as one of the world's most Figure 2.4. Impacts of climate Change vulnerable regions to climate change due to extreme temperatures, uctuating rainfall, and droughts, resulting in land degradation, changes in grazing patterns, and reduction of water supply for both humans and animals.

26Specically, rainy seasons are becoming shorter, more intense, and less predictable as precipitation increases 7% for every degree Celsius in temperature rise. 27Droughts and oods due to more intense rainfall are growing longer and more frequent, triggering new conicts, disrupting livelihoods of the most vulnerable and leading to forced migration. The UN estimates that roughly 80% of the Sahel's farmland is degraded and temperatures are rising 1.5 times faster than the global average. 28Figure 2.4. Source: https://mrgeogwagg.wordpress.com shows the impacts of climate change in the region, covering the hazard, vulnerability and people's people in rural areas, young people, and many Source: UN OCHA, Humanitarian data exchange, July 2020. capacity to cope. It is clear that the vulnerability of women.” 30The situation in Niger is not different from climate change threatens food security, water the other Sahelian countries where land available for security and health issues. The outcome or coping Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the number of food- problems include the high rate of malnutrition, poor pastoralists and farmers is shrinking and leading to mechanism has usually been forced migration, insecure people in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has sanitation conditions, poor water and lack of access competition between farmers and herders over scare competition over natural resources, and increased risen from 1 million to 4.8 million and this is expected to healthcare due to weak health systems.33 resources. Hundreds of civilians are killed every year risk of domestic conict. to increase in 2021 as the virus continues to spread.32 Malnutrition in particular has been a major threat to in inter-communal violence between herders and Already, the UN Ofce for the Coordination of children's health and development. According to the Commenting on the situation, Niger's former farmers in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) estimates that 12 million United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 15 per President Mahamadou Issoufou during his remarks Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. people in the region, of whom 5 million in Burkina cent of children in Niger were acutely malnourished at the UN General Assembly summit on climate Faso, Mali and Niger alone are facing a serious lack as of 2018 (unchanged since 2006). In Chad, change in the Sahel in September 2019, emphasised Closely linked to the environmental insecurity is food of food. Figure 2.5. shows the food insecurity UNICEF pointed out that almost 1.8 million children the perceptible effects of climate change on insecurity which has become a key humanitarian classications in the region under three categories of under 5 years were suffering from global acute agricultural land, pastures and water availability as issue especially for subsistence farmers who lack risk – minimal, under pressure and crisis. malnutrition, including 500,000 who are severely well as how it is jeopardising food security with alternative source of livelihoods. The Food and malnourished.34 The drivers of malnutrition in the negative impact on security and migration. Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that 29.2 29 million people in Sahel region are food insecure, region can be attributed to insufcient high-quality President Issoufou further indicated that Niger loses Ÿ Health Insecurity and diverse foods due to shocks, climate change, “100,000 hectares of arable land every year…the including 9.4 million suffering from severe food challenging agroecological conditions, population degradation of our land is unheard of and affects insecurity who are likely to experience extreme food Health issues are a major concern in the Sahel. Prior 31 growth, and underdeveloped food systems as well as decits. to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, diseases insufcient purchasing power to access food due to such as malaria, meningitis, poliomyelitis and HIV- 35 poverty. ²⁶Penney, J. (2019). West Africa's Sahel region is especially vulnerable to climate change but also weak governance. https://qz.com/africa/1719442/west-africa , 1 AIDS were prevalent in the region. Other health December 2020. ²⁷ibid ²⁸FAO. (2020). The magnitude of the Problem. http://www.fao.org/3/X5318E/x5318e02.htm, Accessed 2 December 2020.; World Economic Forum. (2019). The Sahel is engulfed by violence. Climate change, food insecurity and extremists are largely to ³²Lamarche, A. (2020). Mounting Hunger in the Sahel: The Unintended Impact of COVID-19 Prevention. Refugee International Issue brief. blame. https://www.weforum.org/agenda, accessed 1 December 2020. ³³FES. (2020). Covid-19: In the Sahel region, a health crisis may hide other ones. https://www.fes.de/referat-accessed 20 December 2020. ²⁹United Nations. (2019). Consultative meeting of the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region. http://webtv.un.org/watch/consultative-meeting, accessed 2 ³⁴UNICEF. (2020). Chad Appeal Humanitarian Action for Children. https://www.unicef.org/appeals/chad, Accessed 15 December 2020. December 2020. ³⁵United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Strengthening Partnerships, Results, and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING). (2018). ³⁰ ibid Drivers of Malnutrition in Niger: Analysis of Secondary Data Sources. https://www.springnutrition.org/sites/default/ﬁles/, Accessed 15 December 2020 ³¹FAO. (2020). Sahel Crisis. http://www.fao.org/emergencies/crisis/sahel/intro/en/, accessed on 7 December 2020. PAGE 18 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 19

The region is now facing the additional challenge of 2020.37 Bøås and Rupesinghe posit that “signicant Ÿ Economic Insecurity remains high with the country ranking 182 out of 189 COVID-19 which is putting pressure on the already disruptions to education due to COVID-19, have also countries in the UNDP Human Development index. fragile health situation and worsening humanitarian left children and youth in destitute and frustrating Generally, the economic outlook of the region is not 40The case of Niger is not good either as the country emergency. As of 20 February 2020, the West African situations, sharpening the sentiments of encouraging due to the lack of economic growth and ranked 161 out of the 189 countries. Niger's economy Health Organisation (WAHO) had recorded 369244 marginalisation.” 38There is also no doubt that Sahel d e v e l o p m e n t . C r e a t i n g v i a b l e e c o n o m i c has progressively become unformalised and conrmed cases of COVID-19 in West Africa, out of countries will suffer directly and indirectly from the opportunities, creating jobs for the youth and meeting criminalised, especially in peripheral areas due to the which 321154 have recovered and 4676 have died. economic recession caused by the pandemic in the the basic needs of the population has been a very increasing cross border trafcking activities along the 36Some of the COVID-19 details of countries in the coming years. Most of the countries may be affected daunting task for countries in the Sahel. According to northeast region close to the Libyan Border. region are captured in gure 2.6. It is quite clear from by fewer resources from the international community the World bank, “the COVID-19 crisis, coupled with Longstanding economic fragility has made the Sahel gure 2.6. that the rate of COVID-19 infection for development purposes and remittances from the impact of conicts and violence, the effects of susceptible to persistent crisis and cultivated a fertile continues to increase. Although the implementation diaspora populations in Europe and elsewhere may climate change, and the many vulnerabilities in the ground for instability. Promoting economic growth of measures by governments in central Sahel is also drop. region, is expected to push almost 1.3 million more and development is critical to putting the Sahel on a 39 slowing the spread of the virus, the situation is made people into extreme poverty.” Women are expected path to stability. Investment in entrepreneurship, with worse by decades of underinvestment in the region's to be the worst affected due to their limited a focus on youth and women to foster job creation is health sector as well as the enduring security crisis participation in the economies of countries. particularly crucial to make the livelihoods of the poor which has displaced 1.2 million people as of May more resilient to natural and man-made crises. Already, the fallout from international lockdown measures, border closures and the global economic Figure 2.6. Conﬁrmed Cases of COVID-19 in West Africa crisis are proving challenging for most Sahelian 2.3. Specic Challenges facing Women and countries. In Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso, the Girls economic fallout has wreaked havoc on fragile food supply chains and cross-border trading networks. Women and girls are ordinarily affected by the diverse Governments have relaxed lockdown measures due security challenges in the Sahel discussed in the to growing poverty, hunger, and anger among the preceding section. However, there are peculiar population. Poverty in Burkina Faso for example challenges that threaten their lives and futures.

Figure 2.7. Displaced Women in Southern Niger

Source: WAHO. Source: CARE International (https://www.careinternational.org.uk/stories)

³⁶For more information see https://data.wahooas.org/outbreaks/#/, accessed 20 February 2021. ³⁹World Bank. (2020). The World Bank Boosts Support to the Sahel for a Resilient Recovery from the Security and Economic Crisis. ³⁷Brown, W. (2020). No Time for Complacency: The Covid-19 Pandemic in West Africa's Sahel Region. https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-time-, accessed 20 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-releases, accessed on 3 January 2021. December 2020. ⁴⁰UNDP. (2020). The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene. Human Development Report 2020. ³⁸Bøås, M and Rupesinghe, N. (2020). COVID-19 in the Sahel – implications for an already deteriorating security situation. ACCORD COVID-19 In-depth Analysis. Interviews with stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 23 November 2020. PAGE 18 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 19

Figure 2.7. Displaced Women in Southern Niger

Source: WAHO. Source: CARE International (https://www.careinternational.org.uk/stories)

³⁶For more information see https://data.wahooas.org/outbreaks/#/, accessed 20 February 2021. ³⁹World Bank. (2020). The World Bank Boosts Support to the Sahel for a Resilient Recovery from the Security and Economic Crisis. ³⁷Brown, W. (2020). No Time for Complacency: The Covid-19 Pandemic in West Africa's Sahel Region. https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-time-, accessed 20 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-releases, accessed on 3 January 2021. December 2020. ⁴⁰UNDP. (2020). The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene. Human Development Report 2020. ³⁸Bøås, M and Rupesinghe, N. (2020). COVID-19 in the Sahel – implications for an already deteriorating security situation. ACCORD COVID-19 In-depth Analysis. Interviews with stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 23 November 2020. PAGE 20 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 21

From the eld ndings, the main challenges identied become exposed to violence perpetrated by their lower value on girls' education. A report by UNOWAS and Mali for instance, majority of the women are economic exclusion, poverty, limited access to older partners. According to the World Bank, Niger indicated that school closures during the lockdown population work in agriculture. Their livelihood is education and healthcare, gender-based violence, has the world's highest prevalence of child marriage period have wiped out efforts to keep girls in school.46 dependent on agricultural products and natural limited participation in political and public life, harmful (75%), followed by Chad as the world's third highest The lack of education, forced marriages, and other resources. Climate variability, environmental cultural practices, negative impacts of climate (68%), and Mali as the fth highest (55%).43 These harmful traditional practices are preventing girls from degradation and natural disasters have made such change, displacements, COVID-19 related problems statistics show the alarming rate of child marriage in fully engaging in society. livelihoods difcult to sustain.48 The degradation of and exclusion from the peace tables despite being the Sahel. In the long run, it is not only their education land and natural resources has disproportionately the worst affected by most conicts.41 In particular, that suffers but their health, development and Climate hazards are also having a negative impact on made women economically and nutritionally Women formed majority of most displaced opportunities for economic empowerment. For most the livelihood of women. Repeated shocks, including vulnerable, leading to forced migration, social unrest populations as a result of conict in the Sahel. Figure women, the lack of formal education caused by droughts and oods, have led to disruption of and instability. Indeed, the effects of climate change 2.7. shows a section of displaced women with their poverty, harmful cultural norms and practices, poor livelihoods of women who account for about 80% of and insecurity remained the key drivers of growing 47 children in Southern Niger near the border with infrastructure, and conicts limits their full the Sahel's workforce in agriculture. In Burkina Faso humanitarian needs in the Sahel. Nigeria engagement in society. Thus, without education, women nd it difcult to take active part in local Figure 2.8. Regional Security Responses in the Sahel The challenges mentioned above are interwoven and governance and economic empowerment cut across the Sahel countries. They are also opportunities. enduring challenges that have deed years of responses by governments, international Beyond being a health crisis, COVID-19 has also organisations, development partners and civil society exacerbated pre-existing gender inequalities and led organisations. For example, despite efforts to to profound economic, social and security improve women's economic potentials, contextual challenges for girls and women.44 Findings from the and domestic factors continue to limit the outcomes eld research showed the increased risk of gender- of interventions. Contextual factors such as laws, based violence, with some reported cases of regulations and policies that regulate formal domestic violence against women, exacerbated by institutions and gender related socio-cultural norms the fall in income due to connement, curfew and job in the informal sector continue to limit women's power loss.45 Lockdowns and other COVID-19 prevention of self-determination in the economic and political measures have also pushed millions of people into scene. extreme poverty including women. Terrorism, violent extremism, conict and displacements aggravated For girls in particular, forced marriages, child by the effects of the pandemic are also driving pregnancy and child labour exacerbated by poverty escalating levels of sexual violence, exploitation and are major issues of concern in the region. In most human right abuses towards girls and women. communities, girls who get pregnant face strong Additionally, COVID-19 is having a negative impact stigma and discrimination. The stigma associated on girls' health and well-being. From the eld with teenage pregnancies is further compounded by interviews, it was noted that many girls risk dropping unequal gender norms that often lead to school out of school either because of teenage pregnancy, 42 dropout. Equally, girls who marry as young as 12 early marriages, COVID-19-related illness/death or and 13 years also sometimes drop out of school and helping out at home particularly for parents who put

Figure 2.8. Regional Security Responses in the Sahel ⁴¹Interviews with stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 23 November 2020. ⁴² World Bank. (2020). Girls' Education. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/girlseducation, ⁴³ World Bank. (2020). Getting Religious and Traditional Leaders on Board in the Sahel to End Harmful Practices Against Girls. ⁴⁶UNOWAS. (2020). Women, A Centerpiece In The Fight Against Covid-19 And Its Effects.Https://Unowas.Unmissions.Org/Women, accessed on 24 December https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/, 2020. ⁴⁴UNOWAS. (2020). Women, A Centerpiece In The Fight Against Covid-19 And Its Effects.Https://Unowas.Unmissions.Org/Women-Centerpiece-Fight-Against- ⁴⁷Alliance Sahel. (2020). Meeting The Challenge Of Women's Empowerment In The Sahel. https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/news/women-empowerment- Covid-19-And-Its-Effects sahel/, accessed on 24 December 2020. ⁴⁵Interviews with regional stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 24 November 2020. ⁴⁸McOmber, C. (2020). Women and Climate Change in the Sahel. West African Papers, No. 27, OECD Publishing, Paris. PAGE 20 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 21

Figure 2.8. Regional Security Responses in the Sahel ⁴¹Interviews with stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 23 November 2020. ⁴² World Bank. (2020). Girls' Education. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/girlseducation, ⁴³ World Bank. (2020). Getting Religious and Traditional Leaders on Board in the Sahel to End Harmful Practices Against Girls. ⁴⁶UNOWAS. (2020). Women, A Centerpiece In The Fight Against Covid-19 And Its Effects.Https://Unowas.Unmissions.Org/Women, accessed on 24 December https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/, 2020. ⁴⁴UNOWAS. (2020). Women, A Centerpiece In The Fight Against Covid-19 And Its Effects.Https://Unowas.Unmissions.Org/Women-Centerpiece-Fight-Against- ⁴⁷Alliance Sahel. (2020). Meeting The Challenge Of Women's Empowerment In The Sahel. https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/news/women-empowerment- Covid-19-And-Its-Effects sahel/, accessed on 24 December 2020. ⁴⁵Interviews with regional stakeholders in Bamako, Mali, 24 November 2020. ⁴⁸McOmber, C. (2020). Women and Climate Change in the Sahel. West African Papers, No. 27, OECD Publishing, Paris. PAGE 22 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 23

2.4. Responses to the Peace and Security Sahel countries, and other bodies including the to investigate alleged violations, establishment of the EU training mission in Mali (EUTM) helping to Challenges European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Economic specialised investigative units in Chad and strengthen the capacities of law enforcement Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Mauritania, creation of a specialised anti-terrorism agencies (Police, Gendarmerie, National Guard) to As shown on gure 2.8, the cross border and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the G5 investigations brigade in Burkina Faso, and combat terrorism and organised crime through the transnational nature of the threats in the Sahel has Sahel as well as nancial institutions such as the deployment of counter-terrorism investigators provision of advice and training assistance.60 elicited some regional responses by multilateral and African Development Bank, Islamic Development embedded alongside military operations in Niger.56 regional organisations, development partners and Bank, and World Bank.51 states in the region. This section succinctly analyses Ÿ African Union some of these responses focusing on the UN, EU, The progress report of UNISS implementation from Ÿ European Union AU, ECOWAS, G5 Sahel Force and France Operation 2018-2019 shows some positive outcomes. For Following the transfer of authority from the African-led Barkhane. Other responses by CSOs and external example, the Youth for National Peace and Apart from the UN, the EU also provides support to International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to actors are captured in the country case studies. Reconciliation programme in Mali under UNISS is Sahel countries in areas of development, good United Nations Multidimensional Integrated helping to inspire the commitment of over 2,500 governance and internal conict resolution; politics Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the AU youth and women as agents of peace to strengthen and diplomacy; security and the rule of law; the ght deployed the African Union Mission for Mali and the Ÿ 57 United Nations social harmony, communal dialogue, coexistence, against extremist violence and radicalisation . It Sahel (MISAHEL) to support Mali and countries in the 61 and the development of youth potential across 25 provides nancial and technical support to Sahel in their stabilisation and development efforts. At the centre of the multilateral responses is the municipalities in the Mopti and Segou regions.52 governments through the European Strategy for Since 2014, MISAHEL has been operating around implementation of the 2013 United Nations Integrated Furthermore, support to the Liptako-Gourma security and development in the Sahel which was four main pillars. The rst pillar which is on policy Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), targeting 10 countries Authority (LGA), which is located at the conuence of adopted in 2011 and subsequently reviewed in 2015 support focuses on electoral support and assisting - Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, the border provinces of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso as part of the Sahel Regional action plan (2015- Sahel countries in reforming their institutions and Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and is helping to build its administrative and human 2020). The EU has already provided about ¤147 governance structures within the framework of the Senegal.49 UNISS aims to address the root causes of capacity to respond to numerous governance and million to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force to African Charter on Democracy, Elections and the Sahel crisis with a special focus on Women and development challenges in the area.53 The UNDP improve regional security and ght terrorist and Governance. The second pillar focuses on human Youth. In accordance with UN Security Council Country Ofces in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, have criminal groups. The EU, together with its Member rights and humanitarian action. Under this pillar, Resolution 2391 (2017) to foster coherence and also supported the governments of the three States, is also the biggest provider of development MISAHEL is working with states and development coordination for greater efciency and results countries, to promote community security and social cooperation to the region with ¤8 billion over the partners to promote and protect human rights, build delivery, UNISS was given a renewed impetus 58 cohesion in the Liptako-Gourma region with funding period 2014 to 2020. the capacity of human rights institutions, law through the operationalisation of United Nations from the Peacebuilding Funds (PBF).54 This support enforcement agencies and civil society organisations Support Plan for the Sahel (UNSP). The UNSP covers Despite the revamping of its strategy in 2015, the has resulted in the provision of equipment to 300 and undertaking humanitarian action in the region. the period 2018-2030, with a focus on six priority implementation has been difcult and insecurity in young people to enable them improve on their The third pillar addressed security issues in the Sahel areas: cross border cooperation, climate action, the region has impeded tangible achievements in capacities in diverse occupational elds and by assisting in coordinating the AU's efforts to nd crisis prevention, women and youth empowerment, preventing radicalisation and fostering inclusive jumpstarted income generating activities. In the area appropriate solutions to the security challenges economic revitalisation and renewable energy.50 The development. 59 Although the strategy ended in 2020, of security, UN assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint facing the region, including armed conicts, overarching goal is to scale up efforts to accelerate it is likely to be revised to take into account West Force to combat terrorism and transnational terrorism, drug trafcking and other forms of shared prosperity and lasting peace in the region to Africa's new geopolitical interests and effects of organised crimes has led to the adoption of a code of transnational organised crime. It also contributes to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable COVID-19 pandemic. Under its Common Security conduct and procedures manual on the improving coordination between the security and Development and the African Union Agenda 2063. and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU also has three imprisonment and custody of detainees to promote intelligence services as part of the Nouakchott UNOWAS plays a key role in the implementation 55 missions namely, EU Capacity Building Mission in human rights. It has also led to internal mechanisms Process, to ensure the mutualisation of regional process in close partnership with other UN entities, Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), EUCAP Sahel Mali and efforts in the ght against these threats. The last pillar

⁴⁹United Nations. (2019). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar Working Groups. ⁵⁶ Ibid, p.24 ⁵⁰ United Nations. (2018). UN Support Plan for The Sahel: Working Together for A Prosperous and Peaceful Sahel. New York: UN ⁵⁷ European Union. (2016). Factsheet- EU relations with Sahel countries - Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger. Brussels: EU ⁵¹UNOWAS. (2020). Supporting the Implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.https://unowas.unmissions.org/supporting- ⁵⁸ European Union. (2019). The European Union with The G5 Sahel Countries. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/factsheet_eu_g5_sahel_july- implementation-united-nations-integrated-strategy-sahel; United Nations. (2019). 2019.pdf, accessed 25 December 2020. ⁵²United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar Working Groups. ⁵⁹ Interview with EU officials in Bamako, November 2020. ⁵³Ibid, p.18. ⁶⁰ European Union. (2020). Understanding the EU Strategy for the Sahel. Briefing EU Policies - Insight ⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 19. ⁶¹ African Union. (2014). African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) Press release. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquy-de-presse- ⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 23 accessed 10 December 2020. PAGE 24 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 25 on development focuses on innovative ways to regional body has played a leading role in the make the FC-G5S effective, there have been limited. Critics also blame France as the cause of the reduce poverty, food insecurity and desertication, as reconciliation, mediation and negotiation of political repeated calls by G5 countries and France since problems in the Sahel and note that its strategy is well as coordinating and facilitating the impasses in the region. 2017 for the UN Security Council to authorise it with a rather reinforcing its legitimacy in the region. 70As the implementation of the development aspects in the AU Chapter VII mandate and a logistical support security situation in Mali and the wider Sahel region Strategy for the Sahel region.62 package with UN assessed contributions through deteriorates, with waves of anti-French protests, the Ÿ 67 G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) MINUSMA. However, countries like the US have legitimacy of France in the region has been been wary of authorising MINUSMA to support the questioned. Ÿ The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) is an ECOWAS FC-G5S. As noted by the International Crisis Group, intergovernmental cooperation framework for the success or failure of the Force depends on To reshape a faltering security strategy to rebuild Based on the Decision of the 43rd Ordinary Session coordinating regional response to the development whether it can position itself in the crowded eld of trust, France and its European partners launched a of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of and security challenges in the Sahel. It was armed forces already in the Sahel and gain people's new counter-terrorism task force, called Takuba on 15 ECOWAS in July 2013, ECOWAS is also established by the Heads of States of the G5 Sahel 71 trust as well as political support and tangible nancial July 2020 composed of European special forces . implementing a Sahel strategy (2016-2020) countries (Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Burkina 68 support from its donors. Takuba is part of Operation Barkhane, under the developed in collaboration with the West African Faso) in February 2017 and headquartered in French command. Although the Takuba Task Force is 65 Monetary Union (WAEMU), UEMOA, Commission Nouakchott, Mauritania. It lls an important gap yet to achieve it full operational capacity, it is and the Permanent Interstates Committee for among national forces by engaging more directly in Ÿ France Operation Barkhane envisaged to make a change amid a faltering security Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). The strategy counter-terrorism operations in hard-to-access strategy in the Sahel to improve effectiveness in focuses on major projects such as interconnection of areas and border zones that are outside the mandate This operation succeeded Operation Serval which combatting ISGS and other armed groups to bolster 66 infrastructure, resilience & food security, education of the MINUSMA. Since its deployment, the Force was deployed in January 2013 to push back the France's reputation in the region. and peace and security support measures valued at has mainly focused on combating the threat of terrorist groups in Northern Mali, and to support the cost of $4.75 billion.63 Unlike the strategies of the terrorism, cross-border organised crimes and Malian and AFISMA troops to restore peace and UN, EU and AU, the main objectives of the ECOWAS human trafcking in the G5 Sahel zone. It carried out security. The aim of Operation Barkhane is to provide strategy is to consolidate the regional responses to its rst operation in November 2017 with the armies of broader support to the countries in the Sahel to 2.5. Limits and Pitfalls of the Responses to the long-term development and security challenges Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Since then, the G5 combat the jihadist threat in the Sahel.69 Since its Peace and Security challenges of the Sahel-Saharan zone and promote strong Sahel Joint Force has conducted joint operations deployment in 2014, Barkhane has undertaken political dialogue with both North and Central Africa. against JNIM and other violent extremist groups in counterterrorist activities in the border areas between Despite the various interventions to address the Consequently, under the aegis of ECOWAS, the region. Improving border security stands out as Mali and Niger, the Liptako, and between Mali and peace and security challenges in the Sahel, the countries of the Sahel-Saharan countries (Algeria, the greatest potential asset of the FC-G5S. However, Burkina Faso, the Gourma which are strategic problems persist and continue to evolve. In order to Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Chad) are its operations became limited following an attack by crossing point of groups such as ISGS, JNIM and design new tailor-made solutions to the challenges, it collaborating with member states of Mali and Niger JNIM on 29 June 2018 at one of its headquarters in Ansarul Islam. Several militants have been killed and is important to interrogate the limits or pitfalls in the with support of development partners to collectively Sévaré, Mopti, Mali. Although the Force increased injured in these operations. But Barkhane has also existing interventions to deepen understanding on tackle insecurity and instability. However, the the tempo of military operations in late 2019, the encountered casualties due to the guerrilla tactics why the responses have failed to achieve their implementation of the ECOWAS Sahel Strategy has security situation, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) attacks by intended purposes. From the eld study, the been challenged by duplication of activities due to the and Niger, has continued to worsen amid a growing jihadist groups. Aside the military operations, following issues were identied as some of the gaps multiplicity of Sahel Strategy initiatives and humanitarian crisis, political instability and the Barkhane is also working to address the root causes limiting the efcacy of the existing responses: inadequate funding.64 in the words of an ECOWAS COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the G5 Sahel Joint of the development and security challenges to gain First, some of the stakeholders interviewed raised ofcial interviewed “ECOWAS is overshowed by the Force still lacks full operational capacity and has the trust of the local population. However, despite the powerful actors in the region, making its presence struggled to nd its place in the region with many increased French presence, military gains remain and impact less felt by the people”. Nevertheless, the reported cases of human rights abuses. In order to

⁶⁷UN Security Council. (2020). Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force. November 2020 Monthly Forecast. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly- forecast/2020-11p, accessed 12 December 2020. ⁶²ISS. (2019). AU summit 31: What is the African Union's role in the Sahel? ⁶⁸International Crisis Group. (2017). Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/258-force-du- https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-summit-31, accessed 13 December 2020. g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-securitaire, accessed 14 December 2020. ⁶³ECOWAS. (2015). ECOWAS Oﬃcials meet Over Sahel Strategy. https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas, accessed 10 December 2020 ⁶⁹See “France's action in the Sahel”. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-, accessed 15 December 2020. ⁶⁴ECOWAS. (2019). ECOWAS to develop new Sahel strategy. https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-to-develop-new-sahel-strategy/, accessed 11 December 2020. ⁷⁰ See “West Africa: Shifting strategies in the Sahel”. https://www.theafricareport.com/17843/west-africa-shifting-strategies-in-the-sahel/, accessed 23 December ⁶⁵See “G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance” https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign- , accessed 20 December 2020. 2020 ⁶⁶Gorman, Z. (2019). Pursuing elusive stability in the Sahel. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/pursuing-elusive-stability-sahel, ⁷¹Schmauder, A., Gorman, Z., and Berger, F. (2020). Takuba: A New Coalition For The Sahel?. https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/takuba-new-coalition- accessed 21 December 2020. sahel, accessed 24 December 2020. PAGE 24 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 25 on development focuses on innovative ways to regional body has played a leading role in the make the FC-G5S effective, there have been limited. Critics also blame France as the cause of the reduce poverty, food insecurity and desertication, as reconciliation, mediation and negotiation of political repeated calls by G5 countries and France since problems in the Sahel and note that its strategy is well as coordinating and facilitating the impasses in the region. 2017 for the UN Security Council to authorise it with a rather reinforcing its legitimacy in the region. 70As the implementation of the development aspects in the AU Chapter VII mandate and a logistical support security situation in Mali and the wider Sahel region Strategy for the Sahel region.62 package with UN assessed contributions through deteriorates, with waves of anti-French protests, the Ÿ 67 G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) MINUSMA. However, countries like the US have legitimacy of France in the region has been been wary of authorising MINUSMA to support the questioned. Ÿ The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) is an ECOWAS FC-G5S. As noted by the International Crisis Group, intergovernmental cooperation framework for the success or failure of the Force depends on To reshape a faltering security strategy to rebuild Based on the Decision of the 43rd Ordinary Session coordinating regional response to the development whether it can position itself in the crowded eld of trust, France and its European partners launched a of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of and security challenges in the Sahel. It was armed forces already in the Sahel and gain people's new counter-terrorism task force, called Takuba on 15 ECOWAS in July 2013, ECOWAS is also established by the Heads of States of the G5 Sahel 71 trust as well as political support and tangible nancial July 2020 composed of European special forces . implementing a Sahel strategy (2016-2020) countries (Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Burkina 68 support from its donors. Takuba is part of Operation Barkhane, under the developed in collaboration with the West African Faso) in February 2017 and headquartered in French command. Although the Takuba Task Force is 65 Monetary Union (WAEMU), UEMOA, Commission Nouakchott, Mauritania. It lls an important gap yet to achieve it full operational capacity, it is and the Permanent Interstates Committee for among national forces by engaging more directly in Ÿ France Operation Barkhane envisaged to make a change amid a faltering security Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). The strategy counter-terrorism operations in hard-to-access strategy in the Sahel to improve effectiveness in focuses on major projects such as interconnection of areas and border zones that are outside the mandate This operation succeeded Operation Serval which combatting ISGS and other armed groups to bolster 66 infrastructure, resilience & food security, education of the MINUSMA. Since its deployment, the Force was deployed in January 2013 to push back the France's reputation in the region. and peace and security support measures valued at has mainly focused on combating the threat of terrorist groups in Northern Mali, and to support the cost of $4.75 billion.63 Unlike the strategies of the terrorism, cross-border organised crimes and Malian and AFISMA troops to restore peace and UN, EU and AU, the main objectives of the ECOWAS human trafcking in the G5 Sahel zone. It carried out security. The aim of Operation Barkhane is to provide strategy is to consolidate the regional responses to its rst operation in November 2017 with the armies of broader support to the countries in the Sahel to 2.5. Limits and Pitfalls of the Responses to the long-term development and security challenges Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Since then, the G5 combat the jihadist threat in the Sahel.69 Since its Peace and Security challenges of the Sahel-Saharan zone and promote strong Sahel Joint Force has conducted joint operations deployment in 2014, Barkhane has undertaken political dialogue with both North and Central Africa. against JNIM and other violent extremist groups in counterterrorist activities in the border areas between Despite the various interventions to address the Consequently, under the aegis of ECOWAS, the region. Improving border security stands out as Mali and Niger, the Liptako, and between Mali and peace and security challenges in the Sahel, the countries of the Sahel-Saharan countries (Algeria, the greatest potential asset of the FC-G5S. However, Burkina Faso, the Gourma which are strategic problems persist and continue to evolve. In order to Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Chad) are its operations became limited following an attack by crossing point of groups such as ISGS, JNIM and design new tailor-made solutions to the challenges, it collaborating with member states of Mali and Niger JNIM on 29 June 2018 at one of its headquarters in Ansarul Islam. Several militants have been killed and is important to interrogate the limits or pitfalls in the with support of development partners to collectively Sévaré, Mopti, Mali. Although the Force increased injured in these operations. But Barkhane has also existing interventions to deepen understanding on tackle insecurity and instability. However, the the tempo of military operations in late 2019, the encountered casualties due to the guerrilla tactics why the responses have failed to achieve their implementation of the ECOWAS Sahel Strategy has security situation, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) attacks by intended purposes. From the eld study, the been challenged by duplication of activities due to the and Niger, has continued to worsen amid a growing jihadist groups. Aside the military operations, following issues were identied as some of the gaps multiplicity of Sahel Strategy initiatives and humanitarian crisis, political instability and the Barkhane is also working to address the root causes limiting the efcacy of the existing responses: inadequate funding.64 in the words of an ECOWAS COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the G5 Sahel Joint of the development and security challenges to gain First, some of the stakeholders interviewed raised ofcial interviewed “ECOWAS is overshowed by the Force still lacks full operational capacity and has the trust of the local population. However, despite the powerful actors in the region, making its presence struggled to nd its place in the region with many increased French presence, military gains remain and impact less felt by the people”. Nevertheless, the reported cases of human rights abuses. In order to

concerns about the top-down (state centric) instances have not penetrated local communities and security agencies, forcing the people to fend for respondent from a CSO interviewed for example peacebuilding approaches that has characterised are perceived as an imposition. It is rather the themselves in the mix of jihadist invasion and socio- stated that “the nature of funding sometimes most of the interventions in the Sahel. According to complex and interdependent relationships between economic challenges. The vacuum created by prevents them from tackling the real problems them, despite the discourses on the importance of the state and local authorities (both traditional and states are often lled by jihadist/terrorist groups who because it compels them to focus on specic local ownership, most of the internationally religious), women and youth groups, characterised exploit local grievances to further their goals and gain priorities of donors with tight timelines which leaves supported peacebuilding programmes continue to by a mix of conict and cooperation that explains the local support. The consequence is that the state is little time for coordination with other CSOs”. ignore the local context, the informal actors and resilience of states.74 In most communities, traditional unable to pursue peacebuilding initiatives for the initiatives that could contribute toward sustainable and religious authorities who existed before long-term to build sustainable peace. Furthermore, Nevertheless, while stakeholder coordination is still a peace. Commenting on this limitation, a respondent colonialism have continued to play key roles in the some respondents noted that protracted inter general problem in the Sahel, the study also found noted that provision of welfare services including peace, security communal conicts, political conicts and terrorism out that the existence of many coordination and justice due to the weakness or fragility of states. It have also contributed to the inability of states to frameworks by different entities is further The existing interventions are not taking due is therefore important that the interventions by sustain short-term peace gains for lasting peace. complicating the situation. For example, there is the consideration of the specic cultural and local context especially the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS and other This is reminiscent of the maxim that “development International Coalition for the Sahel, a group that of the problems. Most of the Sahel strategies are development and bilateral partners focus on new cannot take place in the mix of insecurity or conict.” aims to facilitate coordination and interaction developed in the ofces of international actors, state ways of generating mutual accommodation of the between the various dimensions of international 78 institutions and civil society organisations without the state and indigenous traditional/religious systems Third, the weak or limited functional coordination action to support the G5 Sahel countries. The explicit inputs of the local population especially the (Imams and Priests) to generate new forms of hybrid among the different stakeholders in the Sahel was Contact Group of International Partners for the Sahel; Imams, traditional leaders, women and youth groups. governance that better serve the needs of the people. cited as a major deciency that militate against the the Ministerial Coordination Platform; and the Therefore, the people who are beneciaries of the effectiveness of responses. Due to the large Steering Committee of the UNISS are frameworks programmes do not own the strategies to support Second, the inability to sustain the short-term gains or geographical area, no single entity has the capacity used by UNOWAS to enhance coherence and their implementation. The Jihadist groups exploit this key achievements for greater impact is also seen as a to address the problems in the Sahel alone. This coordination among UN entities and other partners in to provide the needed support to gain the condence major pitfall of the existing interventions. Thus, makes coordination necessary and relevant. the Sahel.79 There is also the Sahel Alliance and trust of the communities.⁷² although some achievements have been made over However, as noted by some respondents, many of composed of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the the past years, the security condition continues to the actors continue to operate in silos without United Kingdom, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Another respondent also had this to say: deteriorate every year. This situation has contributed effective coordination despite the transnational and Denmark, EU, UNDP, the African Development Bank to the failure of states to sustain or consolidate the cross border nature of the threats. For example, (AfDB) and the World Bank. The Alliance aims at the dominant focus on the formal institutions of state in gains of local and international peacebuilding internal rivalries, regional frictions, limited resources coordinating and delivering aid quicker and more most of the responses hides the important interventions. In most cases, it is either states lack the and leadership adjustments have affected the ability efciently in the region. These coordination contributions of the traditional and religious funding to continue peacebuilding projects of the G5 countries to effectively coordinate among frameworks are not properly harmonised or authorities. It also overlooks the development implemented by local and international partners that themselves and international stakeholders like integrated. According to most respondents, the priorities of governments, people's culture, history, has ended or they lack strong institutions and MINUSMA and the French Operation Barkhane. many coordination frameworks create a complex socio-economic context as well as their conception of presence in peripheral areas to consolidate the short- 76Moreover, competing visions and interests of web of coordination architectures that operate peace, security, and justice which are necessary to term gains. Thus, efforts to stabilise the region has international partners has also hindered effective without a common vision and strategic direction. build resilient social institutions for lasting peace.⁷³ often relied on weak, corrupt and absent state coordination and stabilisation efforts from taking a There is therefore the need for an inclusive and well- institutions, whose derelictions incite a marketplace decisive direction.77 The coordination challenges is integrated coordination framework that species The abovementioned views are based on the fact that of alternative actors attempting to provide the missing not only limited to the international and state actors roles and responsibilities of the different actors in all the Sahel countries, the authority to exercise links for populations, further delegitimising central but also CSOs operating within the region. A lot of based on their comparative advantages, resources legitimate force and the provision of peace, security governments.75 Most Sahel countries lack effective respondents lamented on the limited cooperation and geographical coverage of activities. and justice does not rest exclusively with the presence in large parts of their territories. In some and coordination between CSOs due to competitions institutions of central government, which in most areas, there are no functioning state institutions and and funding goals, leading to duplication of efforts. A

⁷²Interview with a civil society actor, Bamako, 23 November 2020. ⁷⁶ ibid ⁷³Interview with a civil society actor, Bamako, 25 November 2020 ⁷⁷Helly, D., Theroux-Benoni, L.A., Galeazzi, G., Maiga, I., Ouedraogo, F. (2015). Sahel Strategies: Why Coordination is Imperative. ISS Policy Brief 76

⁷⁸For more information see https://www.coalition-sahel.org/en/, accessed 20 December 2020. ⁷⁵Gorman, Z. (2019). Pursuing elusive stability in the Sahel. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical, accessed 28 December 2020. ⁷⁹UNOWAS. (2020). Supporting the Implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. https://unowas.unmissions.org/supporting, accessed 20 December 2020 PAGE 26 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 27 concerns about the top-down (state centric) instances have not penetrated local communities and security agencies, forcing the people to fend for respondent from a CSO interviewed for example peacebuilding approaches that has characterised are perceived as an imposition. It is rather the themselves in the mix of jihadist invasion and socio- stated that “the nature of funding sometimes most of the interventions in the Sahel. According to complex and interdependent relationships between economic challenges. The vacuum created by prevents them from tackling the real problems them, despite the discourses on the importance of the state and local authorities (both traditional and states are often lled by jihadist/terrorist groups who because it compels them to focus on specic local ownership, most of the internationally religious), women and youth groups, characterised exploit local grievances to further their goals and gain priorities of donors with tight timelines which leaves supported peacebuilding programmes continue to by a mix of conict and cooperation that explains the local support. The consequence is that the state is little time for coordination with other CSOs”. ignore the local context, the informal actors and resilience of states.74 In most communities, traditional unable to pursue peacebuilding initiatives for the initiatives that could contribute toward sustainable and religious authorities who existed before long-term to build sustainable peace. Furthermore, Nevertheless, while stakeholder coordination is still a peace. Commenting on this limitation, a respondent colonialism have continued to play key roles in the some respondents noted that protracted inter general problem in the Sahel, the study also found noted that provision of welfare services including peace, security communal conicts, political conicts and terrorism out that the existence of many coordination and justice due to the weakness or fragility of states. It have also contributed to the inability of states to frameworks by different entities is further The existing interventions are not taking due is therefore important that the interventions by sustain short-term peace gains for lasting peace. complicating the situation. For example, there is the consideration of the specic cultural and local context especially the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS and other This is reminiscent of the maxim that “development International Coalition for the Sahel, a group that of the problems. Most of the Sahel strategies are development and bilateral partners focus on new cannot take place in the mix of insecurity or conict.” aims to facilitate coordination and interaction developed in the ofces of international actors, state ways of generating mutual accommodation of the between the various dimensions of international 78 institutions and civil society organisations without the state and indigenous traditional/religious systems Third, the weak or limited functional coordination action to support the G5 Sahel countries. The explicit inputs of the local population especially the (Imams and Priests) to generate new forms of hybrid among the different stakeholders in the Sahel was Contact Group of International Partners for the Sahel; Imams, traditional leaders, women and youth groups. governance that better serve the needs of the people. cited as a major deciency that militate against the the Ministerial Coordination Platform; and the Therefore, the people who are beneciaries of the effectiveness of responses. Due to the large Steering Committee of the UNISS are frameworks programmes do not own the strategies to support Second, the inability to sustain the short-term gains or geographical area, no single entity has the capacity used by UNOWAS to enhance coherence and their implementation. The Jihadist groups exploit this key achievements for greater impact is also seen as a to address the problems in the Sahel alone. This coordination among UN entities and other partners in to provide the needed support to gain the condence major pitfall of the existing interventions. Thus, makes coordination necessary and relevant. the Sahel.79 There is also the Sahel Alliance and trust of the communities.⁷² although some achievements have been made over However, as noted by some respondents, many of composed of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the the past years, the security condition continues to the actors continue to operate in silos without United Kingdom, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Another respondent also had this to say: deteriorate every year. This situation has contributed effective coordination despite the transnational and Denmark, EU, UNDP, the African Development Bank to the failure of states to sustain or consolidate the cross border nature of the threats. For example, (AfDB) and the World Bank. The Alliance aims at the dominant focus on the formal institutions of state in gains of local and international peacebuilding internal rivalries, regional frictions, limited resources coordinating and delivering aid quicker and more most of the responses hides the important interventions. In most cases, it is either states lack the and leadership adjustments have affected the ability efciently in the region. These coordination contributions of the traditional and religious funding to continue peacebuilding projects of the G5 countries to effectively coordinate among frameworks are not properly harmonised or authorities. It also overlooks the development implemented by local and international partners that themselves and international stakeholders like integrated. According to most respondents, the priorities of governments, people's culture, history, has ended or they lack strong institutions and MINUSMA and the French Operation Barkhane. many coordination frameworks create a complex socio-economic context as well as their conception of presence in peripheral areas to consolidate the short- 76Moreover, competing visions and interests of web of coordination architectures that operate peace, security, and justice which are necessary to term gains. Thus, efforts to stabilise the region has international partners has also hindered effective without a common vision and strategic direction. build resilient social institutions for lasting peace.⁷³ often relied on weak, corrupt and absent state coordination and stabilisation efforts from taking a There is therefore the need for an inclusive and well- institutions, whose derelictions incite a marketplace decisive direction.77 The coordination challenges is integrated coordination framework that species The abovementioned views are based on the fact that of alternative actors attempting to provide the missing not only limited to the international and state actors roles and responsibilities of the different actors in all the Sahel countries, the authority to exercise links for populations, further delegitimising central but also CSOs operating within the region. A lot of based on their comparative advantages, resources legitimate force and the provision of peace, security governments.75 Most Sahel countries lack effective respondents lamented on the limited cooperation and geographical coverage of activities. and justice does not rest exclusively with the presence in large parts of their territories. In some and coordination between CSOs due to competitions institutions of central government, which in most areas, there are no functioning state institutions and and funding goals, leading to duplication of efforts. A

Figure 2.9. Importance of Investment in Women and Girls Fourth, the existing responses have been challenged their programmes, this is often done once and not a by duplication of activities due to the multiplicity of longitudinal study or process to understand the different Sahel strategies and initiatives.80 This outcomes of interventions. This often leads to the limitation is closely related to the challenges of weak design and implementation of programmes that do functional coordination. A mapping that was done in not meet the needs and expectations of the people 2017 by the UN identied around 19 strategies and especially women and girls affected by conicts. strategic frameworks in the Sahel.81 Many of these strategies are also similar in terms of the priority areas of intervention. For example, a study conducted by Sixth, the eld study revealed that while countries in the Institute for Security Studies in 2015 highlighted the Sahel have shown commitment to the Women, the similarities among the various initiatives in the Peace and Security (WPS) agenda through the Sahel articulated around key priority objectives to adoption of policies and programmes, the delivery of promote peace, stability, governance, security, and such commitments has been inadequate. There is resilience, focusing on the G5 Sahel region and still a wide gap between the array of policies and the neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin and implementation of WPS commitments to strengthen West Africa.82 However, due to weak coordination and the role and leadership of women in peace and synergies as well institutional competition and political processes. The ndings also showed that different funding goals, there continues to be despite the progress made over the past decades, duplication of efforts among stakeholders. As noted targets continue to be missed and the prospect of in the previous paragraph, a well integrated achieving the WPS agenda remains elusive. Women coordination mechanism for all actors and a and girls continue to face violence including sexual knowledge management platform is not only and gender-based violence and their representation necessary to improve synergy among stakeholders at all levels of decision-making in peace processes, but also relevant for planning joint programmes to such as conict prevention, peacebuilding and post- deal with the root causes of the problems conict reconstruction remains limited. There are still systematically and comprehensively. cultural barriers that prevent women and girls from achieving their full potential. Moreover, there are also Fifth, there is lack of effective feedback mechanisms fears that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will on peacebuilding activities undertaken from further erode the gains made over the years in the beneciaries to understand whether the interventions WPS Agenda and affect the achievement of the SDG are yielding positive results or not to inform Goal 5 by 2030. It is important to prioritise the subsequent policies and programmes. Thus, as implementation of the WPS agenda to enable women noted by a respondent, there are no follow-ups on contribute to the peace, security and development of projects implemented. As a result, there is often lack countries. As shown in gure 2.9. investment in of information on what is working and not working on women and girls improve health, benets families, ground in terms of activities caried out by both strengthen economies, increases productivity, create national and external actors. Admittedly, while some sustainable nations and reduces hunger. Source: https://www.pinterest.com/pin institutions undertake monitoring and evaluation of Seventh, the study identied the lack of effective leadership is critical to the successful outcomes of leadership and crisis management skills among the crisis response strategies. However, most of the political leaders in the Sahel as part of the pitfalls of political leaders especially in central Sahel lack ⁸⁰ ECOWAS. (2019). ECOWAS to develop new Sahel strategy existing responses. According to some respondents, strong leadership and crisis management skills to https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-to-develop-new-sahel-strategy/, accessed 11 December 2020. ⁸¹United Nations. (2019). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar in an environment like the Sahel where the threats deal with the complex challenges. One of the Working Groups. continue to evolve almost every time, effective respondents for instance stated that: ⁸²Helly, D., Theroux-Benoni, L. A., Galeazzi, G., Maiga, I., Ouedraogo, F. (2015). Sahel Strategies: Why Coordination is Imperative. ISS Policy Brief 76. PAGE 28 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 29

Figure 2.9. Importance of Investment in Women and Girls Fourth, the existing responses have been challenged their programmes, this is often done once and not a by duplication of activities due to the multiplicity of longitudinal study or process to understand the different Sahel strategies and initiatives.80 This outcomes of interventions. This often leads to the limitation is closely related to the challenges of weak design and implementation of programmes that do functional coordination. A mapping that was done in not meet the needs and expectations of the people 2017 by the UN identied around 19 strategies and especially women and girls affected by conicts. strategic frameworks in the Sahel.81 Many of these strategies are also similar in terms of the priority areas of intervention. For example, a study conducted by Sixth, the eld study revealed that while countries in the Institute for Security Studies in 2015 highlighted the Sahel have shown commitment to the Women, the similarities among the various initiatives in the Peace and Security (WPS) agenda through the Sahel articulated around key priority objectives to adoption of policies and programmes, the delivery of promote peace, stability, governance, security, and such commitments has been inadequate. There is resilience, focusing on the G5 Sahel region and still a wide gap between the array of policies and the neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin and implementation of WPS commitments to strengthen West Africa.82 However, due to weak coordination and the role and leadership of women in peace and synergies as well institutional competition and political processes. The ndings also showed that different funding goals, there continues to be despite the progress made over the past decades, duplication of efforts among stakeholders. As noted targets continue to be missed and the prospect of in the previous paragraph, a well integrated achieving the WPS agenda remains elusive. Women coordination mechanism for all actors and a and girls continue to face violence including sexual knowledge management platform is not only and gender-based violence and their representation necessary to improve synergy among stakeholders at all levels of decision-making in peace processes, but also relevant for planning joint programmes to such as conict prevention, peacebuilding and post- deal with the root causes of the problems conict reconstruction remains limited. There are still systematically and comprehensively. cultural barriers that prevent women and girls from achieving their full potential. Moreover, there are also Fifth, there is lack of effective feedback mechanisms fears that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will on peacebuilding activities undertaken from further erode the gains made over the years in the beneciaries to understand whether the interventions WPS Agenda and affect the achievement of the SDG are yielding positive results or not to inform Goal 5 by 2030. It is important to prioritise the subsequent policies and programmes. Thus, as implementation of the WPS agenda to enable women noted by a respondent, there are no follow-ups on contribute to the peace, security and development of projects implemented. As a result, there is often lack countries. As shown in gure 2.9. investment in of information on what is working and not working on women and girls improve health, benets families, ground in terms of activities caried out by both strengthen economies, increases productivity, create national and external actors. Admittedly, while some sustainable nations and reduces hunger. Source: https://www.pinterest.com/pin institutions undertake monitoring and evaluation of Seventh, the study identied the lack of effective leadership is critical to the successful outcomes of leadership and crisis management skills among the crisis response strategies. However, most of the political leaders in the Sahel as part of the pitfalls of political leaders especially in central Sahel lack ⁸⁰ ECOWAS. (2019). ECOWAS to develop new Sahel strategy existing responses. According to some respondents, strong leadership and crisis management skills to https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-to-develop-new-sahel-strategy/, accessed 11 December 2020. ⁸¹United Nations. (2019). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar in an environment like the Sahel where the threats deal with the complex challenges. One of the Working Groups. continue to evolve almost every time, effective respondents for instance stated that: ⁸²Helly, D., Theroux-Benoni, L. A., Galeazzi, G., Maiga, I., Ouedraogo, F. (2015). Sahel Strategies: Why Coordination is Imperative. ISS Policy Brief 76. PAGE 30 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 31

Leadership and crisis management are very key in unfathomable to think that a leader could effectively welfare services, guaranteeing people's safety jeopardise the legitimacy and effectiveness of proactively responding to crisis. However, leaders tackle the threats without a high level of preparation and security and making the state present in all operations both at the political and military levels are not being and understanding. regions. trained. They have the impression that taking decision Ÿ Governments should consider creating an in normal times is the same as in crisis period but there Ÿ Strengthen the social contract between the state inclusive national integrated coordination are differences. Political leaders, military leaders and 2.6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations and the people (i.e., between the ruled and their mechanism to ensure that all the external and public servants often think that the strategies that rulers) by addressing the political, institutional and internal actors operate with a common vision and worked 40 years ago are still relevant in our current Despite its enormous potential and abundant socio-economic governance challenges and objectives to avoid the duplication of efforts. context but that is false. The fact is that we are not in resources, the Sahel still faces multiple security corruption to build the trust and condence of the Ÿ Governments should develop effective feedback normal times and therefore, the crisis response challenges that hinder its progress. Some of these population government mechanisms to assess the gaps and outcome of approaches should be extraordinary. This requires challenges identied from the eld study include Ÿ Governments should involve the people and interventions to inform future strategies and strong leadership with excellent crisis management to among others, issues related to poor governance, 83 community leaders in the conceptualisation, enhance transparency and accountability proactively respond to crisis. weak state institutions, corruption, lack of state presence in signicant territories, terrorism, violent design, and development of peacebuilding and Ÿ Governments should effectively implement the From the above statement, it is quite clear that while extremism, political repression, human rights development programmes to foster local commitments under the Women, Peace and leadership in normal situation involves routine violations, injustice, election related violence, ownership to aid the implementation process. Security agenda through policy and institutional decisions made in an environment where the intercommunal violence, transnational organised Ÿ Countries should budget for peace or reforms in all sectors, address the peculiar consequences of actions may be well understood, crimes, climate change, poverty, food insecurity and peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, challenges of women and monitor the changes crisis situations often involve complex decisions COVID-19 related problems. Furthermore, the study and resilient resource mobilisation strategy to made. made with limited time and information, with wide identied some peculiar challenges that affect the support the implementation of initiatives ranging implications, under the pressures of progress of women and girls in the Sahel such as increased scrutiny. Being unprepared as a leaders economic exclusion, poverty, limited access to Ÿ Strengthen the social cohesion between G5 Sahel Forces & Defence and Security Forces and failure to take the right decisions could ultimately education and healthcare, gender-based violence, communities especially in areas of inter-ethnic make the situation even worse. Unfortunately, that is limited political participation, harmful cultural conicts and terrorism to promote peaceful co- · the situation in the Sahel according to the practices, negative impacts of climate change and Ÿ existence. Integrate the local population into the provision of respondents. Weak leadership and over reliance on COVID-19 pandemic. There have been different security by educating them about their roles, military approaches to deal with the intricate security, interventions by governments, international Ÿ Provide access to justice to victims of human addressing their concerns, requesting for their political, socio-economic, ecological, development organisations, development partners and Civil rights violations or abuses by ensuring public support and protecting them against attacks by and humanitarian challenges in the Sahel is seen as Society Organisations to respond to these threats, accountability of perpetrators to ght impunity and armed groups when they share valuable security part of the problem which has received little attention. with varying degrees of successes and pitfalls that violence. Continued human rights abuses risk information. To a d d r e s s t h e s i t u a t i o n , a r e s p o n d e n t continue to limit the efcacy of interventions. The undermining the government's credibility with · Ÿ recommended that political and military leaders following recommendations are therefore made citizens, may serve as a recruiting tool for Signicantly improve security sector governance should not just open conferences and workshops based on the gaps identied in the existing responses terrorists, and undermine efforts for regional and anti-corruption measures in counterterrorism and leave but should be trained to understand the for the consideration of national and international stability. and other security operations by reinforcing dynamics of the crisis in the Sahel and be equipped partners: parliamentary oversight, transparency and with crisis prevention and management skills to think Ÿ Promote economic empowerment programmes accountability. outside the box in responding to threats. Thus, the or income generating activities to sustain the Ÿ most effective way to succeed in a crisis where the Governments livelihood of the people especially women and the Promote the implementation of effective stakes are high, and the pressure is on like the Sahel, youth monitoring and independent investigation Ÿ Enhance the utility and relevance of the state to the is for leaders at all levels to be prepared for one. The mechanisms that track, verify and establish people by improving governance, access to basic complex environment in the Sahel make it almost Ÿ Counter-terrorism measures should be carefully responsibility for allegations of human rights designed to ensure that they are human rights violations or abuses in order to hold perpetrators compliant and do not undermine the global accountable. ⁸³Interview with a Training Facilitator, Bamako, Mali, 24 November 2020. human rights and rule of law framework to PAGE 30 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 31

Leadership and crisis management are very key in unfathomable to think that a leader could effectively welfare services, guaranteeing people's safety jeopardise the legitimacy and effectiveness of proactively responding to crisis. However, leaders tackle the threats without a high level of preparation and security and making the state present in all operations both at the political and military levels are not being and understanding. regions. trained. They have the impression that taking decision Ÿ Governments should consider creating an in normal times is the same as in crisis period but there Ÿ Strengthen the social contract between the state inclusive national integrated coordination are differences. Political leaders, military leaders and 2.6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations and the people (i.e., between the ruled and their mechanism to ensure that all the external and public servants often think that the strategies that rulers) by addressing the political, institutional and internal actors operate with a common vision and worked 40 years ago are still relevant in our current Despite its enormous potential and abundant socio-economic governance challenges and objectives to avoid the duplication of efforts. context but that is false. The fact is that we are not in resources, the Sahel still faces multiple security corruption to build the trust and condence of the Ÿ Governments should develop effective feedback normal times and therefore, the crisis response challenges that hinder its progress. Some of these population government mechanisms to assess the gaps and outcome of approaches should be extraordinary. This requires challenges identied from the eld study include Ÿ Governments should involve the people and interventions to inform future strategies and strong leadership with excellent crisis management to among others, issues related to poor governance, 83 community leaders in the conceptualisation, enhance transparency and accountability proactively respond to crisis. weak state institutions, corruption, lack of state presence in signicant territories, terrorism, violent design, and development of peacebuilding and Ÿ Governments should effectively implement the From the above statement, it is quite clear that while extremism, political repression, human rights development programmes to foster local commitments under the Women, Peace and leadership in normal situation involves routine violations, injustice, election related violence, ownership to aid the implementation process. Security agenda through policy and institutional decisions made in an environment where the intercommunal violence, transnational organised Ÿ Countries should budget for peace or reforms in all sectors, address the peculiar consequences of actions may be well understood, crimes, climate change, poverty, food insecurity and peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, challenges of women and monitor the changes crisis situations often involve complex decisions COVID-19 related problems. Furthermore, the study and resilient resource mobilisation strategy to made. made with limited time and information, with wide identied some peculiar challenges that affect the support the implementation of initiatives ranging implications, under the pressures of progress of women and girls in the Sahel such as increased scrutiny. Being unprepared as a leaders economic exclusion, poverty, limited access to Ÿ Strengthen the social cohesion between G5 Sahel Forces & Defence and Security Forces and failure to take the right decisions could ultimately education and healthcare, gender-based violence, communities especially in areas of inter-ethnic make the situation even worse. Unfortunately, that is limited political participation, harmful cultural conicts and terrorism to promote peaceful co- · the situation in the Sahel according to the practices, negative impacts of climate change and Ÿ existence. Integrate the local population into the provision of respondents. Weak leadership and over reliance on COVID-19 pandemic. There have been different security by educating them about their roles, military approaches to deal with the intricate security, interventions by governments, international Ÿ Provide access to justice to victims of human addressing their concerns, requesting for their political, socio-economic, ecological, development organisations, development partners and Civil rights violations or abuses by ensuring public support and protecting them against attacks by and humanitarian challenges in the Sahel is seen as Society Organisations to respond to these threats, accountability of perpetrators to ght impunity and armed groups when they share valuable security part of the problem which has received little attention. with varying degrees of successes and pitfalls that violence. Continued human rights abuses risk information. To a d d r e s s t h e s i t u a t i o n , a r e s p o n d e n t continue to limit the efcacy of interventions. The undermining the government's credibility with · Ÿ recommended that political and military leaders following recommendations are therefore made citizens, may serve as a recruiting tool for Signicantly improve security sector governance should not just open conferences and workshops based on the gaps identied in the existing responses terrorists, and undermine efforts for regional and anti-corruption measures in counterterrorism and leave but should be trained to understand the for the consideration of national and international stability. and other security operations by reinforcing dynamics of the crisis in the Sahel and be equipped partners: parliamentary oversight, transparency and with crisis prevention and management skills to think Ÿ Promote economic empowerment programmes accountability. outside the box in responding to threats. Thus, the or income generating activities to sustain the Ÿ most effective way to succeed in a crisis where the Governments livelihood of the people especially women and the Promote the implementation of effective stakes are high, and the pressure is on like the Sahel, youth monitoring and independent investigation Ÿ Enhance the utility and relevance of the state to the is for leaders at all levels to be prepared for one. The mechanisms that track, verify and establish people by improving governance, access to basic complex environment in the Sahel make it almost Ÿ Counter-terrorism measures should be carefully responsibility for allegations of human rights designed to ensure that they are human rights violations or abuses in order to hold perpetrators compliant and do not undermine the global accountable. ⁸³Interview with a Training Facilitator, Bamako, Mali, 24 November 2020. human rights and rule of law framework to PAGE 32 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 33

Ÿ Prioritise the needs and rights of the most Ÿ Address the human rights violations and abuses vulnerable people especially women and girls in Ÿ Increase advocacy on the implementation of Ÿ Advocate for the adoption and implementation of by security personnel through periodic capacity respective post-COVID-19 recovery interventions Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments hybrid governance systems in the Sahel that development trainings and orientation for them to by countries in the Sahel region. p r o m o t e s t h e a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f Ÿ adhere to the rule of law and human rights Emphasise on human rights and rule of law in your indigenous/traditional authorities and structures principles. engagements with the G5 Sahel Force and the Ÿ Provide capacity building and sensitisation in the governance process to address the National Defence and Security Forces. programmes to strengthen the role and limitations of the state Ÿ Enhance effective media communication on leadership of women in the security sector and Ÿ human rights allegations, investigations, and Increasing funding for research into the long-term peace processes. Ÿ Research into the long-term effects of COVID-19 punishment meted out to perpetrators to gain effects of COVID-19 pandemic on women and pandemic on women and girls and its public trust and condence. girls and the implications for the attainment of Ÿ Design and implement capacity building and implications for the attainment of SDG Goal 5 in SDG Goal 5 in West Africa to support policy orientation programmes on Leadership, West Africa to support Government recovery Ÿ Develop a robust communication strategy design on recovery efforts. Peacebuilding and Crisis Management for the efforts. targeting both the traditional and new media political and security actors at the highest level of Ÿ outlets to publicize the results of interventions to Support research on resilience, peace generating decision-making to adequately prepare them to Ÿ Leverage the use of digital technologies in the gain public support. factors and social cohesion in both the Sahel respond effectively to the evolving conict light of COVID-19 to strengthen data collection communities and relatively peaceful context in situation in the Sahel. and reporting on violence against women to West Africa amid COVID-19 and Conicts to inuence government responses. capture useful lessons and good practices for Regional and International Actors programming

Ÿ Support the collective curtailment of the widening Ÿ Increase funding support to CSOs with a regional ravages of terrorism and violent extremism to and community reach to implement programmes ensure that terrorists and their sympathisers do that support the implementation of the WPS not nd safe heavens in any Sahel countries and agenda as well as strengthen the social contract their neighbours. between the local population and governments in the governance process. Ÿ Align your response strategies to national development policies and action plans to ensure Ÿ The UN as the lead multilateral institution should context and culturally specic interventions to consider developing a knowledge management address the exact needs of the population. platform to improve synergy among international partners. Ÿ Promote a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in the Sahel by investing more in the indigenous actors and initiatives to promote peace, security Civil Society Organisations and justice. This will help adapt interventions to the realities on ground. Ÿ Increase education and awareness creation at the community level on the need to empower women Ÿ Encourage and ensure the involvement of CSOs in all sectors of society - political, social, and local authorities such as Imams, Priests, economic, religious and the private sector to Mayors and Traditional Leaders in the promote the WPS agenda for sustainable conceptualisation, design, development and development. implementation of programmes to address the specic needs of the people. Ÿ Strengthen existing regional platform on the WPS agenda to enhance coordination of actions among CSOs, sharing of best practices and lessons learned. PAGE 32 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 33

Ÿ Support the collective curtailment of the widening Ÿ Increase funding support to CSOs with a regional ravages of terrorism and violent extremism to and community reach to implement programmes ensure that terrorists and their sympathisers do that support the implementation of the WPS not nd safe heavens in any Sahel countries and agenda as well as strengthen the social contract their neighbours. between the local population and governments in the governance process. Ÿ Align your response strategies to national development policies and action plans to ensure Ÿ The UN as the lead multilateral institution should context and culturally specic interventions to consider developing a knowledge management address the exact needs of the population. platform to improve synergy among international partners. Ÿ Promote a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in the Sahel by investing more in the indigenous actors and initiatives to promote peace, security Civil Society Organisations and justice. This will help adapt interventions to the realities on ground. Ÿ Increase education and awareness creation at the community level on the need to empower women Ÿ Encourage and ensure the involvement of CSOs in all sectors of society - political, social, and local authorities such as Imams, Priests, economic, religious and the private sector to Mayors and Traditional Leaders in the promote the WPS agenda for sustainable conceptualisation, design, development and development. implementation of programmes to address the specic needs of the people. Ÿ Strengthen existing regional platform on the WPS agenda to enhance coordination of actions among CSOs, sharing of best practices and lessons learned. PAGE 34 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 35

Ÿ FES. (2020). Covid-19: In the Sahel region, a health crisis may hide other ones. https://www.fes.de/referat-accessed 20 December 2020.

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Ÿ ECOWAS. (2019). ECOWAS to develop new Sahel strategy. https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-to- Ÿ Schmauder, A., Gorman, Z., and Berger, F. (2020). Takuba: A New Coalition For The Sahel?. develop-new-sahel-strategy/, accessed 11 December 2020. https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/takuba-new-coalition-sahel, accessed 24 December 2020. Ÿ European Union. (2016). Factsheet- EU relations with Sahel countries - Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger. Brussels: EU Ÿ Suleiman, M. (2017). Sahel Region, Africa. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/sahel- region-africa-72569, Accessed 20 December 2020. Ÿ European Union. (2019). The European Union with The G5 Sahel Countries. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/les/resources/factsheet_eu_g5_sahel_july-2019.pdf, Ÿ The Armed Conict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2020). State atrocities in the sahel: accessed 25 December 2020. the impetus for counterinsurgency results is fuelling government attacks of civilians. https://acleddata.com/2020/05/20/, 1 December 2020. Ÿ European Union. (2020). Understanding the EU Strategy for the Sahel. Brieng EU Policies - Ÿ Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index. Insight https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/mrt, accessed 20 November 2020.

Ÿ FAO. (2020). Sahel Crisis. http://www.fao.org/emergencies/crisis/sahel/intro/en/, accessed on 7 Ÿ UN News. (2020). 'Unprecedented terrorist violence' in West Africa, Sahel region. December 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981, accessed 20 November 2020 PAGE 34 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 35

Ÿ FES. (2020). Covid-19: In the Sahel region, a health crisis may hide other ones. https://www.fes.de/referat-accessed 20 December 2020.

Ÿ FAO. (2020). Sahel Crisis. http://www.fao.org/emergencies/crisis/sahel/intro/en/, accessed on 7 Ÿ UN News. (2020). 'Unprecedented terrorist violence' in West Africa, Sahel region. December 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981, accessed 20 November 2020 PAGE 36 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 37

Ÿ UN Security Council. (2020). Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force. November 2020 Monthly Forecast. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-11p, accessed 12 December 2020.

Ÿ UNDP. (2019). Sahel: A region of Opportunities. https://feature.undp.org/sahel/index.html, accessed Country Reports 10 January 2021.

Ÿ UNDP. (2020). The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene. Human Development 3.1. Brief Introduction Report 2020. To understand the limits and pitfalls of the existing Ÿ Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Ÿ UNICEF. (2020). Chad Appeal Humanitarian Action for Children. interventions from the country level perspectives, four Challenges https://www.unicef.org/appeals/chad, Accessed 15 December 2020. countries were selected as case studies. These Ÿ Specic Challenges facing Women and Girls Ÿ Responses to the Peace and Security Challenges Ÿ countries are Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Côte United Nations. (2016). Human Security Handbook. New York: Human Security Unit. Ÿ d'Ivoire. This section provides the ndings of the Gaps/Pitfalls of Responses to Peace and Security Challenges Ÿ United Nations. (2018). UN Support Plan for The Sahel: Working Together for A Prosperous and research in each of the four countries based on the Ÿ Conclusions and Policy Recommendations Peaceful Sahel. New York: UN following themes:

Ÿ United Nations. (2019). Consultative meeting of the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region. Figure 3.1. Map of the Sahel and Surrounding Area http://webtv.un.org/watch/consultative-meeting, accessed 2 December 2020.

Ÿ United Nations. (2019). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar Working Groups.

Ÿ UNOWAS. (2019). West Africa and the Sahel, between security challenges and the need to consolidate peace. https://unowas.unmissions.org/west-africa-and-sahel-between-security- challenges-and-need-consolidate-peace. Accessed on 8 October 2020.

Ÿ UNOWAS. (2020). Supporting the Implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.https://unowas.unmissions.org/supporting-implementation-united-nations-integrated-strategy- sahel

Ÿ UNOWAS. (2020). Women, A Centrepiece In The Fight Against Covid-19 And Its Effects.https://Unowas.Unmissions.Org/Women-Centerpiece, accessed on 3 January 2021.

Ÿ WANEP. (2020). WANEP Monthly Bulletins. January-April, p.2.

Ÿ World Bank. (2020). Getting Religious and Traditional Leaders on Board in the Sahel to End Harmful Practices Against Girls. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/, accessed on 3 January 2021.

Ÿ World Bank. (2020). Girls' Education. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/girlseducation, accessed on 3 January 2021.

Ÿ World Bank. (2020). The World Bank Boosts Support to the Sahel for a Resilient Recovery from the Security and Economic Crisis. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-releases, accessed on 3 January 2021.

Ÿ World Economic Forum. (2019). The Sahel is engulfed by violence. Climate change, food insecurity and extremists are largely to blame. https://www.weforum.org/agenda, accessed 1 December 2020. PAGE 36 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 37

Ÿ UN Security Council. (2020). Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force. November 2020 Monthly Forecast. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-11p, accessed 12 December 2020.

Ÿ UNDP. (2019). Sahel: A region of Opportunities. https://feature.undp.org/sahel/index.html, accessed Country Reports 10 January 2021.

Ÿ United Nations. (2019). United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Progress Report 2018-2019. New York: Implementation Support Unit and Pillar Working Groups.

Ÿ UNOWAS. (2020). Women, A Centrepiece In The Fight Against Covid-19 And Its Effects.https://Unowas.Unmissions.Org/Women-Centerpiece, accessed on 3 January 2021.

Ÿ WANEP. (2020). WANEP Monthly Bulletins. January-April, p.2.

Ÿ World Bank. (2020). Getting Religious and Traditional Leaders on Board in the Sahel to End Harmful Practices Against Girls. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/, accessed on 3 January 2021.

Ÿ World Bank. (2020). Girls' Education. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/girlseducation, accessed on 3 January 2021.

Ÿ World Economic Forum. (2019). The Sahel is engulfed by violence. Climate change, food insecurity and extremists are largely to blame. https://www.weforum.org/agenda, accessed 1 December 2020. PAGE 38 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 39

The country is currently affected by three subversive It should be recalled that military responses have Mali phenomena that are intertwined: violent extremism, been made in the wake of terrorist and armed groups local conicts and transnational organised crime.85 attacks in some circumstances. However, beyond the The latter is dened in the history of the G5 Sahel complexity and porosity of the security environment, 3.2.1 Overview of the Multi-layered space where “illicit activities of trafckers and armed some interventions of the Defence and Security Force Peace and Security Challenges groups operate through networks located in different interventions have exacerbated tensions and countries within and outside the region. Arms conicts between communities and spread feelings The security environment in Mali, like the other countries of Liptako-Gourma, the epicentre of the Sahel crisis, trafcking, migrant trafcking, ivory trafcking and among some communities that they are being has deteriorated considerably, from 2012 to present day. The situation was initially induced by the irredentist money laundering are among the main activities harmed by the central government. Tuareg movement that wanted the establishment of a "federal state that would unite Azawad: Timbuktu, carried out by regional criminal networks.86 The words 84 Kidal, Gao, and a southern state made up of other regions of Mali. of some respondents are perfect illustrations of these For example, in the Mopti region of central Mali, where challenges. conicts between communities permeate the daily Figure 3.2.1. Map of Mali lives of the populations, the Malian army has often "The security challenges are enormous and lie at all been accused by Human Right Watch of helping levels: [...] the circulation of arms in the country, the certain militias including the “dozo" (traditional unprecedented rise in increasing crime and terrorism, brotherhood of hunters) or "Dan na ambassagou" inter-communal clashes, [...] physical restriction, 88and being behind several massacres of civilians in targeted killings and abductions of persons and central Mali.89 However, these accusations, are property, armed robbery with violence, robberies and sometimes difcult to verify. The G5 Sahel Force has the use of IED explosive devices on highways [...]87 also been criticised for its supposed or real collusion with one community, in this case the Bambara The presence of the three phenomenon is causing community at the expense of others. This has led to enormous problems, in many ways. On one hand, we increased local tensions as well as arbitrary arrests are witnessing all kinds of human rights violations. and extrajudicial executions. In the Mopti region, This includes looting of the livelihoods of human rights organisations and some community- communities that materialises through the based associations have documented numerous destruction of agricultural elds, pastoral routes, abuses of civilians, mostly people suspected of water points, community habitat, as well as the theft collaborating with violent extremist groups. The dozo of animals; lethal attacks, summary and extra-judicial (traditional hunters) initially targeted individuals executions committed by armed groups and belonging to the Peulh community suspected of sometimes certain elements of Defence and Security providing material and/or nancial assistance to Forces, unjust arrest and imprisonment. On the other violent radical groups in the commission of crimes. hand, the challenges weakened the presence and authority of the State as well as the fundamental On the Nigerian-Malian border, the Malian and pillars of the local economy focused mainly on inter- Nigerien armies and their partners Operation and intra-community relationships. B a r k h a n e a r e r e g u l a r l y a c c u s e d b y

⁸⁵ISS. (2018). Report on people's perceptions of Operation Pagnal (Unpublished report) ⁸⁶G5 Sahel. (2020). Lexicon of radicalization and violent extremism in the G5 Sahel. Source: United Nations - Department of Field Support. ⁸⁷Interview with AS, coordinator of the APIF (Support for Women's Projects and Initiatives) of Gao., November 2020. ⁸⁸Ambassagou is a self-defense group that claims to be from the Dogon community. It was born around the last quarter of 2016 after the assassination of Theodore Somboro who was the leader of the hunter community of the 'dogon country'. Active in the circles of Douentza, Bandiagara, Bankass and Koro, the group is positioning itself as a legitimate defender of the Dogon country against attacks/attacks, including by extremist groups. It is suspected of being the source of more attacks on The People's Communities Central Mali, the most emblematic of which are those of Koulogon (January 1, 2019) and Ogossagou ⁸⁴Gaoukoye, A. (2018). Conspiracy in Mali and the Sahel. Paris: Harmattan editions. (March 23, 2019) which, in all, killed more than 180 people. ⁸⁹Africanews. (2019). Mali: Dan Nan Ambassagou, the militia suspected of being behind the Ogossagou massacre, https://fr.africanews.com/2019/03/25/mali- dan-nan-ambassagou-la-milice-soupconnee-d-etre-derriere-le-massacre-d// , assessed on 21 December 2020. PAGE 38 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 39

⁸⁵ISS. (2018). Report on people's perceptions of Operation Pagnal (Unpublished report) ⁸⁶G5 Sahel. (2020). Lexicon of radicalization and violent extremism in the G5 Sahel. Source: United Nations - Department of Field Support. ⁸⁷Interview with AS, coordinator of the APIF (Support for Women's Projects and Initiatives) of Gao., November 2020. ⁸⁸Ambassagou is a self-defense group that claims to be from the Dogon community. It was born around the last quarter of 2016 after the assassination of Theodore Somboro who was the leader of the hunter community of the 'dogon country'. Active in the circles of Douentza, Bandiagara, Bankass and Koro, the group is positioning itself as a legitimate defender of the Dogon country against attacks/attacks, including by extremist groups. It is suspected of being the source of more attacks on The People's Communities Central Mali, the most emblematic of which are those of Koulogon (January 1, 2019) and Ogossagou ⁸⁴Gaoukoye, A. (2018). Conspiracy in Mali and the Sahel. Paris: Harmattan editions. (March 23, 2019) which, in all, killed more than 180 people. ⁸⁹Africanews. (2019). Mali: Dan Nan Ambassagou, the militia suspected of being behind the Ogossagou massacre, https://fr.africanews.com/2019/03/25/mali- dan-nan-ambassagou-la-milice-soupconnee-d-etre-derriere-le-massacre-d// , assessed on 21 December 2020. PAGE 40 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 41

climate continues to weaken the efforts of the representatives/members of the Peulh community in and kidnapping of women. Others include women's organisation in Mali. 3.2.3 Responses to the Peace and Security particular of acting on behalf of two armed groups discrimination in inheritance and succession, Challenges in Mali defending the interests of the Daoussahaq and discrimination in access to administrative or political In the justice sector, the presence of women is low. Imghad. They are the Movement for the Salvation of positions of responsibility, difcult to access to land, When all judges and chief clerks are taken into Ÿ International responses Azawad (MSA) and the Tuareg Self-Defence Group prohibitions on the conduct of economic activities, account, they represent 10.77% and 16.18% Imghad and Allies (GATIA) which are also harmful widowhood rites, connement in the name of respectively, of the entire Judiciary. However, the There have been several international responses to stakeholders in the agreement for peace and religious factors just to mention a few. representation is relatively high in low-level positions the peace and security challenges in Mali with the reconciliation resulting from the Algiers process in such as the secretariat where women are 90.73% of main intervention being the United Nations 2015. However, the French Barkhane force and the Commenting on these challenges, a respondent the total. 92The actors interviewed, including women's Multidimensional Integrated Mission for Stabilisation 96 Malian army categorically deny these allegations stated that: organisations, and development partners, stressed in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA has made signicant against them. Undoubtedly, these allegations and Despite the fact that women are increasingly that women and young people are not well involved in contributions to the implementation of peace and getting into school, social and cultural accusations on both sides are real challenges that security initiatives in Mali despite the fact that they are development programmes, as well as the burdens are preventing many of them from must be addressed in order to achieve lasting peace the largest and most affected by insecurity issues. implementation of Disarmament, Demobilisation and being politically and economically self- Reintegration process the (DDR). Some of the and stability in the Sahel. The multitude of 90 sufcient. unconventional armed groups operating in the For example, a respondent in the security sector activities are represented on Table 3.1. In 2020, MINUSMA contributed to the creation of northern and central regions of Mali and the volatility Indeed, 89% of the opinions expressed during the pointed out that: Young people and women are forgotten at all reconciliation committees in at least four of the security situation make the analysis of conict eld interviews conrmed these challenges against levels. Even at the Level of the National municipalities in the Douentza and Bandiagara in the dynamics more complex and even blurred. women. The CECI-Mali reports also showed that 20% Defence, Security and Civil Protection Mopti region. The mission also supported several of women are in a marriage before the age of 15 and Commission, which is a key area in security meetings devoted to inter- and intra-intra community concluded that at least every Malian woman is a 3.2.2. Specic challenges facing Women and governance, there is not enough emphasis dialogues in March 2020 in the villages of Touguéré- victim of one of the identied forms of violence. 93 Girls in Mali on their concerns. {...} They are also less Koumbé, Woko and Nema-Badenyakafo (Mopti involved. region) which resulted in the signing of peace A respondent noted that As previously mentioned, insecurity is affecting girls Insecurity in northern and central Mali affects all social agreements between the communities. To contribute In my opinion, Malian women still face and women in Mali. As a category in terms of status strata. However, women and children remain the most to the peace and stability of the country, the mission several challenges, for example the (a subordinate status) that is entrusted to it by society, affected by insecurity. For example, the situation in persistence of socio-cultural, religious has also supported the Malian security forces to it remains the most affected by insecurity. Yet they are Mali described in the Secretary-General's Report burdens, the managerial decit of women's perform their functions effectively. In May 2020, less involved in conict management and resolution (2020:15) revealed that among the 239,484 organisations, the issue of governance and MINUSMA assisted the Central State of Mali displaced persons in March 2020, 54% were women. legitimacy at the level of women's mechanisms, according to Lorentzen, Touré and 94 logistically, technically and nancially as part of the 91 Gaye. However, an interview with an ofcial of The same report looks at the serious violations of leadership. process to deploy reconstituted units of the national MINUSMA attributes the less inclusion of women in human rights in Mali and in particular the Central armed forces to the northern regions. 97Additionally, it It should be noted that social and cultural burdens the peace process and democratic governance to Region (Mopti and Ségou regions) where women and has strengthened the operational capabilities of the remain, largely unfavorable to the development of their low level of education. 95The difcult mesh children are the rst victims. Internal Security Forces to control small and heavy females. However, women's organisations ghting between some cultural and religious practices weapons, deploy throughout the country, implement The Centre for International Study and Cooperation for equal opportunities and rights between the sexes sometimes explains the position of women and girls community projects and the Community Violence (CECI-Mali) conducted a study on barriers to gender face organisational barriers and lack of democratic in the Malian context. However, from independence Reduction Programs. equality; challenges and solutions in 2020 and governance within them. For example, since 2017, to the present day, slow changes are taking place identied some of the various forms of discrimination the Coordination of Women's Associations and towards a much more prominent consideration of against women as name-calling, sexual and gender- NGOs (CAFO) has been facing leadership crisis girls and women in the development of the country. based violence, forced or early marriages, rape, between the outgoing and the new leadership over female circumcision, exclusion, sexual harassment, the legitimacy of the presidency. This deleterious ⁹²Gaanderse, M., Valasek, K. (Eds), (2011.), The Security and Gender Sector in West Africa: A Study of Police, Defence, Justice and Prison Services in ECOWAS Countries, Geneva: DCAF ⁹³Interview with a security personnel, Bamako. November 2020. ⁹⁴Lorentzen J; Touré N. A; Gaye B. (2019). Women's participation in the peace and reconciliation processes in Mali, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo ⁹⁰Interview with a member known Capacity Building Project of Women's OrganiSations in Mali (RECOFEM), Bamako, November 2020. (PRIO). ⁹¹Contact, Gender Advisor at the Centre Study and Study International Cooperation (CECI-Mali) . ⁹⁵Interview with a MINUSMA manager. Bamako, November 2020. ⁹⁶MINUSMA is present In Central and Northern Mali regions involved in a variety of gender-based areas in all shares that she Leads. ⁹⁷Interview with the team Civil Aﬀairs Division - MINUSMA, November 2020 PAGE 40 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 41

climate continues to weaken the efforts of the representatives/members of the Peulh community in and kidnapping of women. Others include women's organisation in Mali. 3.2.3 Responses to the Peace and Security particular of acting on behalf of two armed groups discrimination in inheritance and succession, Challenges in Mali defending the interests of the Daoussahaq and discrimination in access to administrative or political In the justice sector, the presence of women is low. Imghad. They are the Movement for the Salvation of positions of responsibility, difcult to access to land, When all judges and chief clerks are taken into Ÿ International responses Azawad (MSA) and the Tuareg Self-Defence Group prohibitions on the conduct of economic activities, account, they represent 10.77% and 16.18% Imghad and Allies (GATIA) which are also harmful widowhood rites, connement in the name of respectively, of the entire Judiciary. However, the There have been several international responses to stakeholders in the agreement for peace and religious factors just to mention a few. representation is relatively high in low-level positions the peace and security challenges in Mali with the reconciliation resulting from the Algiers process in such as the secretariat where women are 90.73% of main intervention being the United Nations 2015. However, the French Barkhane force and the Commenting on these challenges, a respondent the total. 92The actors interviewed, including women's Multidimensional Integrated Mission for Stabilisation 96 Malian army categorically deny these allegations stated that: organisations, and development partners, stressed in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA has made signicant against them. Undoubtedly, these allegations and Despite the fact that women are increasingly that women and young people are not well involved in contributions to the implementation of peace and getting into school, social and cultural accusations on both sides are real challenges that security initiatives in Mali despite the fact that they are development programmes, as well as the burdens are preventing many of them from must be addressed in order to achieve lasting peace the largest and most affected by insecurity issues. implementation of Disarmament, Demobilisation and being politically and economically self- Reintegration process the (DDR). Some of the and stability in the Sahel. The multitude of 90 sufcient. unconventional armed groups operating in the For example, a respondent in the security sector activities are represented on Table 3.1. In 2020, MINUSMA contributed to the creation of northern and central regions of Mali and the volatility Indeed, 89% of the opinions expressed during the pointed out that: Young people and women are forgotten at all reconciliation committees in at least four of the security situation make the analysis of conict eld interviews conrmed these challenges against levels. Even at the Level of the National municipalities in the Douentza and Bandiagara in the dynamics more complex and even blurred. women. The CECI-Mali reports also showed that 20% Defence, Security and Civil Protection Mopti region. The mission also supported several of women are in a marriage before the age of 15 and Commission, which is a key area in security meetings devoted to inter- and intra-intra community concluded that at least every Malian woman is a 3.2.2. Specic challenges facing Women and governance, there is not enough emphasis dialogues in March 2020 in the villages of Touguéré- victim of one of the identied forms of violence. 93 Girls in Mali on their concerns. {...} They are also less Koumbé, Woko and Nema-Badenyakafo (Mopti involved. region) which resulted in the signing of peace A respondent noted that As previously mentioned, insecurity is affecting girls Insecurity in northern and central Mali affects all social agreements between the communities. To contribute In my opinion, Malian women still face and women in Mali. As a category in terms of status strata. However, women and children remain the most to the peace and stability of the country, the mission several challenges, for example the (a subordinate status) that is entrusted to it by society, affected by insecurity. For example, the situation in persistence of socio-cultural, religious has also supported the Malian security forces to it remains the most affected by insecurity. Yet they are Mali described in the Secretary-General's Report burdens, the managerial decit of women's perform their functions effectively. In May 2020, less involved in conict management and resolution (2020:15) revealed that among the 239,484 organisations, the issue of governance and MINUSMA assisted the Central State of Mali displaced persons in March 2020, 54% were women. legitimacy at the level of women's mechanisms, according to Lorentzen, Touré and 94 logistically, technically and nancially as part of the 91 Gaye. However, an interview with an ofcial of The same report looks at the serious violations of leadership. process to deploy reconstituted units of the national MINUSMA attributes the less inclusion of women in human rights in Mali and in particular the Central armed forces to the northern regions. 97Additionally, it It should be noted that social and cultural burdens the peace process and democratic governance to Region (Mopti and Ségou regions) where women and has strengthened the operational capabilities of the remain, largely unfavorable to the development of their low level of education. 95The difcult mesh children are the rst victims. Internal Security Forces to control small and heavy females. However, women's organisations ghting between some cultural and religious practices weapons, deploy throughout the country, implement The Centre for International Study and Cooperation for equal opportunities and rights between the sexes sometimes explains the position of women and girls community projects and the Community Violence (CECI-Mali) conducted a study on barriers to gender face organisational barriers and lack of democratic in the Malian context. However, from independence Reduction Programs. equality; challenges and solutions in 2020 and governance within them. For example, since 2017, to the present day, slow changes are taking place identied some of the various forms of discrimination the Coordination of Women's Associations and towards a much more prominent consideration of against women as name-calling, sexual and gender- NGOs (CAFO) has been facing leadership crisis girls and women in the development of the country. based violence, forced or early marriages, rape, between the outgoing and the new leadership over female circumcision, exclusion, sexual harassment, the legitimacy of the presidency. This deleterious ⁹²Gaanderse, M., Valasek, K. (Eds), (2011.), The Security and Gender Sector in West Africa: A Study of Police, Defence, Justice and Prison Services in ECOWAS Countries, Geneva: DCAF ⁹³Interview with a security personnel, Bamako. November 2020. ⁹⁴Lorentzen J; Touré N. A; Gaye B. (2019). Women's participation in the peace and reconciliation processes in Mali, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo ⁹⁰Interview with a member known Capacity Building Project of Women's OrganiSations in Mali (RECOFEM), Bamako, November 2020. (PRIO). ⁹¹Contact, Gender Advisor at the Centre Study and Study International Cooperation (CECI-Mali) . ⁹⁵Interview with a MINUSMA manager. Bamako, November 2020. ⁹⁶MINUSMA is present In Central and Northern Mali regions involved in a variety of gender-based areas in all shares that she Leads. ⁹⁷Interview with the team Civil Aﬀairs Division - MINUSMA, November 2020 PAGE 42 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 43

Table 3.2.1. Some Projects carried out by MINUSMA⁹⁸ counterterrorism, it was reported that the African (DDR) initiatives, the increase in security patrols and QIP Project (MOP20_003): Rehabilitaon support and Equipment for Mop Regional Union intends to deploy 3,000 troops to support the the adoption of mobility restriction measures. As part Reconciliaon Support Teams (PRRA) - Amount: 15,931,346 FCFA, G5 Sahel Joint Force and ECOWAS also adopted an of the implementation of the PISRC for example, the Project QIP (MOP20_023): Strengthening Social Cohesion, Prevenon and Conflict action plan to make nancial resources available to Government has established security posts in certain Management through Dialogue and seng up Local Reconciliaon Commiees in the Mop ght terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa, localities plagued by terrorist attacks and community and Segou Regions, Amount: 23,369,780 FCFA. particularly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. tensions in the Mopti region, including Kouakourou, Following the political crisis in Mali in August 2020, Dialloubé, Ourbé-Doudé, Korombana, Ténenkou, Project Trust Funds (TF -2018-34) "Building peace and building the resilience of vulnerable which ended the departure of President Ibrahim Keita Youwarou, Douentza, Mondoro and Kouloko. The populaons affected by conflict in the municipalies of the Koro Circle”, Amount: in a military coup on 18 August 2020102ECOWAS with report by the Civil Society's Citizens' Coalition for 184,873,500 FCFA the support of the AU and UN played key mediation Peace, Accelerated Unity and National Reconciliation Project trust funds (TF -2018-32) "My neighbour my brother" Promote the peaceful roles leading to the establishment of a transitional in Mali (CCSC-PURN) on the DDR process showed transformaon of conflicts in the circle of Bankass" Amount: 337,535 USD. government in Mali. that among the 1,840 ex-combatants targeted in the Algiers agreement in 2015, only 1,325 ex-combatants Source: MINUSMA had completed the process as of December 2020. · National Responses Apart from MINUSMA, UNDP and its partners have agriculture and in the private sector as well as The 1,840 ex-combatants have been reintegrated into the Security and Defence Forces of Mali. However, also supported the Ministry of Social Cohesion, of working towards the increased participation and The focus of state response is to address insecurity there are a lot of arms still in circulation in the conict Peace and National Reconciliation in the process of leadership of women in decision-making deals at the and extend the presence of the state throughout the affected areas despite formulation of a national policy building and consolidating peace by improving inter- local, regional and national levels to ensure long-term country to ensure the safety and security of citizens to combat the proliferation of small arms and light and intra-community relations in the Tenenkou and peace and security. UN Women is also building as well as the delivery of basic social services. weapons. Macina Circles with the involvement of 2,600 young resilience in the context of climate change. Most of Several initiatives have been implemented by the people, women, community and religious leaders. the activities of UN Women is funded by the Government to deal with the multitude of challenges While the Malian state and its partners seem to place They are also supporting the Youth Employment for governments of Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Japan confronting the country. 101 particular emphasis on military responses to address Peace programme in the Northern and Central and Germany. the security challenges, communities are outraged by Regions through the Ministry of Employment and In an attempt to stem this insecurity, there have been the rate of banditry and the human right violations of Vocational Training. Indeed, UNDP has a programme considerable increase in the defence and security Ÿ Regional Responses security personnel. The analysis of community called Young and Peace Mali-Burkina (Transrugial budget (22% of the national budget), the signing of perceptions also revealed that the threat associated Mali-Burkina) that supports young people from two the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in The regional responses to the peace and security with violent extremist groups appears to be a countries in the prevention and management of Algiers (2015), the adoption of National Policy for the according to the respondent's centers around the secondary concern in the hierarchy of challenges conicts through the Ministry of Youth and Sports and Prevention and Control of Violent Extremism and 99 mobilisation of foreign defence forces and peace confronting the people. This is because of the primary implemented by the NGO AZHAR Terrorism (PNLEVT)103, the Strategic Framework for projects to respond to the numerous peace and targets of the armed groups, who are mostly security Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development With respect to Women, UN Women provides development challenges. There is the G5 Sahel force personnel, state ofcials and foreigners. (CREDD), the implementation of the Integrated 104 which is operating within the region with the strategic Furthermore, the research ndings revealed that the support to government, civil society and works Security Plan for Central Regions (PISRC) among support of the AU and ECOWAS. The Force has PISRC which seeks to establish an inclusive closely with the local private sector to put in place the others, with the support of technical and nancial carried out several counterterrorism operations since framework for inter-sectoral consultation and policies, laws, services and resources that women partners. The practical measures taken to implement 100 its creation albeit with some logistical and nancial coordination for the implementation of the actions of need to achieve equality. It is supporting gender these strategies and policies cover a diversity of limitations. The AU and ECOWAS have also been in government and its partners in the prevention and equality and the empowerment of women across the actions, ranging from military operations to Mali since the outbreak of the multidimensional crisis ght against violent extremism and terrorism has not country as part of the implementation of the UNSCR disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 1325. It is promoting the economic empowerment of in 2012 supporting mediation and reconciliation been effective. Just like PISRC, the security sector the poorest and most vulnerable women and girls in efforts and the political processes. In terms of

¹⁰²Interview with ECOWAS-Mali, November 2020. ⁹⁸Ibid. ¹⁰³See the PNLEVT document, p.9. ¹⁰⁰Interview with UNDP-Mopti. November 2020 ¹⁰⁴The double attack on 30 September 2019 on the elements Malian Armed Forces Mondoro (Mopti region) and a military camp under the command of the G5 For more information see UN Women. (2021). Mali Sahel Force to Boulkessi (in central Mali, Mopti region), clearly indicates that violent radical groups intend to delegitimize the central state and, in turn, beneﬁt Les Femmes au Mali. https://africa.unwomen.org/fr/where-we-are/west-and-central-africa/mali, accessed 12 January 2021. from the support and support of communities to their causes. ¹⁰¹Ibid PAGE 42 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 43

¹⁰²Interview with ECOWAS-Mali, November 2020. ⁹⁸Ibid. ¹⁰³See the PNLEVT document, p.9. ¹⁰⁰Interview with UNDP-Mopti. November 2020 ¹⁰⁴The double attack on 30 September 2019 on the elements Malian Armed Forces Mondoro (Mopti region) and a military camp under the command of the G5 For more information see UN Women. (2021). Mali Sahel Force to Boulkessi (in central Mali, Mopti region), clearly indicates that violent radical groups intend to delegitimize the central state and, in turn, beneﬁt Les Femmes au Mali. https://africa.unwomen.org/fr/where-we-are/west-and-central-africa/mali, accessed 12 January 2021. from the support and support of communities to their causes. ¹⁰¹Ibid PAGE 44 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 45

reform process has also not been very effective in Ÿ National Gender Policy (2009-2018) to women's groups, etc.). Some NGOs specialise in (Menaka) Tenenkou (Mopti) to ensure the terms of implementation. The basic reason for the domesticate national, regional and international emergency operations of all kinds: epidemics, effectiveness of projects or programmes. ineffectiveness of the policies is that there is lack of commitments to build a democratic society and famines, oods, refugees, etc. It should be recalled adequate knowledge of the provisions in these the rule of law in which equality between women that CSOs in Mali also participated in all stages of the Ÿ There is the issue of relevance and effectiveness polices at all levels including state authorities, and men is a fundamental value. peace agreement process, from the preliminary of programmes. Support is very often decided defence and security forces, elected ofcials, civilian agreements in Ouagadougou (June 2013) to the from urban centres, without necessarily involving population and civil society organisations. A head of a Ÿ The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Action Algiers agreement in 2015 between Mali and the the people at the periphery. women organisation interviewed for instance noted Plan: Mali launched its rst National Action Plan armed movements. that: (2011-2013) in 2012 to operationalize the Ÿ We have never been called upon to talk about Resolution. On 31 October 2020, the third Despite the tremendous efforts of CSOs to promote Regional responses security, let alone the SSR. In Bamako here, National Action Plan of Resolution 1325 for the peace and stability, they do not have a framework of The limits at the sub-regional level are: it's insecurity everywhere, the state can't period 2019-2023 was launched. However, the coordination among themselves, leading to the risk of Ÿ The lack of coordination of initiatives by the secure us. We women are forgotten by the implementation of the previous Action Plans has a trafc jam or duplication of actions. 105 various stakeholders with the Malian State. Mali is actors of security and defence. been poor. not in a position today to list the number of This demonstrates the gap between security actors 3.2.4. Limits and Pitfalls of existing responses initiatives that are being implemented to promote and community expectations. Indeed, the civil society to the peace and security challenges in peace in the country because there is lack of white paper for peace and security in Mali notes that Ÿ CSO Response Mali formal coordination framework. Of course, the "the gap between the security and development various state structures (ministries, departments, priorities of local communities and the responses of At the CSO level, several programmes and initiatives Analysis of the data collected shows that there are prefectures, etc.) are involved depending on the national and international policies” is growing. 106The for peace, social cohesion, development and some limitations/inadequacies in existing responses nature of the initiative, but between public responses do not also sufciently address the root stabilisation have been implemented at the central to the challenges of peace and security. These are structures, there is no effective and efcient causes of insecurity such as poverty, unemployment and northern regions. Some of these CSOs include grouped under the international, regional and coordination. and disparities in the distribution of wealth as well as WANEP, IMPRAP (Malian Institute for Research national responses. 107 Ÿ sufciently integrate, the notion of human security. Action), ARGA (l'Alliance Malienne pour Refonder la The lack of human and nancial resources to Gouvernance en Afrique), Humanitarian Dialogue implement initiatives. ECOWAS, for example, had Ÿ In terms of responses to the issues of women, the Centre (HD), and Think Peace-Mali. The CSO Think International responses promised from the beginning of the crisis to send Government of Mali has shown commitment to Peace-Mali for example, conducts a number of its force to eradicate the terrorist phenomenon. In terms of international responses, the inadequacies gender equality and youth development and their initiatives and programmes within the framework of But for organisational and budgetary reasons, it are broadly related to the following factors: participation in peace processes. peace and reconciliation in the Mopti, Ségou, ended up relying on the United Nations. Ÿ The non-alignment of most development plans Timbuktu, Taoudéni, Gao, Kidal and Menaka and projects with the realities on the ground This is manifested through the adoption of the regions.108 following documents: Ÿ National Responses Ÿ The non-involvement of communities, especially Generally, CSOs are mainly involved in awareness Ÿ those in the rural area in initiatives affecting them. At the national level, the inadequacies of existing Law 052 of 18 December 2015, establishing creation, sensitisation programmes, and assistance For example, MINUSMA is carrying out projects in responses to the peace and security challenges were measures to promote Women access to to victims of crisis. The development projects are central Mali that are not necessarily those highlighted by the respondents. The multitude of nominative and elective Functions. However, often one-off projects on a small scale. These expressed by rural communities in terms of needs. actors on the ground without a functional women are still underrepresented in State projects are in the areas of the ght against famine, institutions. coordination mechanism was also identied. In order support for food, health, agriculture, drinking water Ÿ The difculty of reaching certain areas of insecurity to address this, some respondents suggested the and sanitation, livestock, credit to small businesses in order to assess the impact of initiatives in the creation of a comprehensive integrated framework of (agricultural, commercial, artisanal, assistance to process of reconciliation and social cohesion. The initiatives to ensure coherence and targeted UNDP and the European Union for example responses. A respondent had this to say - support local NGOs operating on the ground. ¹⁰⁵Head of a women's organisation, November 2020. ¹⁰⁶Book developed by SIPRI and CONASCIPAL as part of the project: towards lasting peace in Mali However, for reasons of insecurity, partners [...] it is better to integrate efforts ... in the area of ¹⁰⁷ RSS Expert, Bamako, November 2020. cannot travel to certain localities (Anderboukane ¹⁰⁸Interview with the Director of the NGO Think Peace-Mali. November 2020 security cooperation, humanitarian action, economic PAGE 44 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 45 reform process has also not been very effective in Ÿ National Gender Policy (2009-2018) to women's groups, etc.). Some NGOs specialise in (Menaka) Tenenkou (Mopti) to ensure the terms of implementation. The basic reason for the domesticate national, regional and international emergency operations of all kinds: epidemics, effectiveness of projects or programmes. ineffectiveness of the policies is that there is lack of commitments to build a democratic society and famines, oods, refugees, etc. It should be recalled adequate knowledge of the provisions in these the rule of law in which equality between women that CSOs in Mali also participated in all stages of the Ÿ There is the issue of relevance and effectiveness polices at all levels including state authorities, and men is a fundamental value. peace agreement process, from the preliminary of programmes. Support is very often decided defence and security forces, elected ofcials, civilian agreements in Ouagadougou (June 2013) to the from urban centres, without necessarily involving population and civil society organisations. A head of a Ÿ The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Action Algiers agreement in 2015 between Mali and the the people at the periphery. women organisation interviewed for instance noted Plan: Mali launched its rst National Action Plan armed movements. that: (2011-2013) in 2012 to operationalize the Ÿ We have never been called upon to talk about Resolution. On 31 October 2020, the third Despite the tremendous efforts of CSOs to promote Regional responses security, let alone the SSR. In Bamako here, National Action Plan of Resolution 1325 for the peace and stability, they do not have a framework of The limits at the sub-regional level are: it's insecurity everywhere, the state can't period 2019-2023 was launched. However, the coordination among themselves, leading to the risk of Ÿ The lack of coordination of initiatives by the secure us. We women are forgotten by the implementation of the previous Action Plans has a trafc jam or duplication of actions. 105 various stakeholders with the Malian State. Mali is actors of security and defence. been poor. not in a position today to list the number of This demonstrates the gap between security actors 3.2.4. Limits and Pitfalls of existing responses initiatives that are being implemented to promote and community expectations. Indeed, the civil society to the peace and security challenges in peace in the country because there is lack of white paper for peace and security in Mali notes that Ÿ CSO Response Mali formal coordination framework. Of course, the "the gap between the security and development various state structures (ministries, departments, priorities of local communities and the responses of At the CSO level, several programmes and initiatives Analysis of the data collected shows that there are prefectures, etc.) are involved depending on the national and international policies” is growing. 106The for peace, social cohesion, development and some limitations/inadequacies in existing responses nature of the initiative, but between public responses do not also sufciently address the root stabilisation have been implemented at the central to the challenges of peace and security. These are structures, there is no effective and efcient causes of insecurity such as poverty, unemployment and northern regions. Some of these CSOs include grouped under the international, regional and coordination. and disparities in the distribution of wealth as well as WANEP, IMPRAP (Malian Institute for Research national responses. 107 Ÿ sufciently integrate, the notion of human security. Action), ARGA (l'Alliance Malienne pour Refonder la The lack of human and nancial resources to Gouvernance en Afrique), Humanitarian Dialogue implement initiatives. ECOWAS, for example, had Ÿ In terms of responses to the issues of women, the Centre (HD), and Think Peace-Mali. The CSO Think International responses promised from the beginning of the crisis to send Government of Mali has shown commitment to Peace-Mali for example, conducts a number of its force to eradicate the terrorist phenomenon. In terms of international responses, the inadequacies gender equality and youth development and their initiatives and programmes within the framework of But for organisational and budgetary reasons, it are broadly related to the following factors: participation in peace processes. peace and reconciliation in the Mopti, Ségou, ended up relying on the United Nations. Ÿ The non-alignment of most development plans Timbuktu, Taoudéni, Gao, Kidal and Menaka and projects with the realities on the ground This is manifested through the adoption of the regions.108 following documents: Ÿ National Responses Ÿ The non-involvement of communities, especially Generally, CSOs are mainly involved in awareness Ÿ those in the rural area in initiatives affecting them. At the national level, the inadequacies of existing Law 052 of 18 December 2015, establishing creation, sensitisation programmes, and assistance For example, MINUSMA is carrying out projects in responses to the peace and security challenges were measures to promote Women access to to victims of crisis. The development projects are central Mali that are not necessarily those highlighted by the respondents. The multitude of nominative and elective Functions. However, often one-off projects on a small scale. These expressed by rural communities in terms of needs. actors on the ground without a functional women are still underrepresented in State projects are in the areas of the ght against famine, institutions. coordination mechanism was also identied. In order support for food, health, agriculture, drinking water Ÿ The difculty of reaching certain areas of insecurity to address this, some respondents suggested the and sanitation, livestock, credit to small businesses in order to assess the impact of initiatives in the creation of a comprehensive integrated framework of (agricultural, commercial, artisanal, assistance to process of reconciliation and social cohesion. The initiatives to ensure coherence and targeted UNDP and the European Union for example responses. A respondent had this to say - support local NGOs operating on the ground. ¹⁰⁵Head of a women's organisation, November 2020. ¹⁰⁶Book developed by SIPRI and CONASCIPAL as part of the project: towards lasting peace in Mali However, for reasons of insecurity, partners [...] it is better to integrate efforts ... in the area of ¹⁰⁷ RSS Expert, Bamako, November 2020. cannot travel to certain localities (Anderboukane ¹⁰⁸Interview with the Director of the NGO Think Peace-Mali. November 2020 security cooperation, humanitarian action, economic PAGE 46 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 47 development and peacekeeping, and above all the Ÿ CSO Responses was also mentioned that CSOs do not often provide advantage of being very close to communities, full return of state authority to all parts of Malian regular feedback of their interventions to the public to especially those in the rural areas. territory.109 CSOs are very ambitious but very often lack the build community support and government trust in technical, nancial and human resources necessary their activities. Ÿ Implement the various recommendations made at There is also the difculty in the implementation of the to achieve the objectives set. They also largely the National Agreement Conference (2017) and Algiers Peace Agreement. The dialogue between the depend to a large extent on external support to take the National Inclusive Dialogue (2019) signatory parties of the Agreement is not progressing. action. Without donor support, CSOs are hamstrung 3.5.1. Conclusion and Recommendations Ÿ Implement Law 052 of December 18, 2015, The parties continue to pursue acts that undermine in terms of the number of activities they are able to instituting measures to promote Gender Access peace and reconciliation efforts. For example, the undertake within a given period. A respondent noted The research shows that the responses to the peace to Nominative and Elective Functions. Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) issued the following: and security challenges are far from being Ÿ two unilateral decisions on 30 January 2019, covering appropriate for the Malian context. According to most Government should budget for peace or both administrative measures in the Kidal area and I nd that many CSOs struggle to have a local anchor. respondents, for the responses to be effective and peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, the launch of a military security operation. As a In most cases, actions are contained in the areas that enable the maintenance of peace and development, and resilient resource mobilization strategy to reminder, this region is still under the administration of house the headquarters. However, the causes that are it must address the following key areas: securing the support the implementation of initiatives the CMA, the State of Mali has no effective control of sometimes defended require local anchoring. north and central regions; restoring the authority of the region. On the Malian government's side, the Similarly, many of them are not nancially self- the state through the empowerment of the state itself; International and Regional Partners launch of the military operation in March 2020 called sufcient, they depend on foreign aid. And that could the effective involvement of women and young raise the question of autonomy and independence of people in the process of reconciliation and Dambé (which literally means dignity) without Ÿ Effectively communicate the actions of regional actions to be carried out.110 democratic governance; and management of involving the other signatory movements, constitutes partners, including ECOWAS to change public political and electoral issues through institutional a violation of the agreement. opinion to gain support of the population. Thus, most CSOs depend on donor support and that reforms. The main question at this stage is how to ECOWAS has been in Mali since the crisis erupted The weak technical and operational capabilities of the also has implications for ownership of project create a bridge between the existing set of peace and in 2012. However, many people see it as usurping Security and Defence Forces in the face of the conceptualisation, design and implementation. security governance arrangements to achieve the powers of Malian authorities. The various multiple challenges is another issue highlighted. The There is also sometimes limited coordination and maximum impacts. In light of the ndings, the main criticisms made against ECOWAS after its Mali Defence and Security Forces are experiencing competition among civil society actors. This problem policy recommendations are: mediations before, during and after the fall of tactical and operational difculties in dealing with the emanates from the competition for project funds from President Keita are a perfect illustration of this security threat, resulting in the expansion of insecurity similar sources and the weak leadership of some state of history. from North to South through the Centre. CSOs. The respondents also identied the short-term Government of the Republic of Mali funding packages and project cycles as a major gap Ÿ Ÿ International partners such as French Barkhane Lastly, the respondents mentioned the lack of strong in existing interventions because it does not allow for Ensure better coordination between partners Force should genuinely cooperate and leadership and crisis management skills among lasting impact of their interventions to inuence (technical and nancial) and national actors to collaborate with National Forces of Mali in the ght political and security actors in the country as a major changes in the status quo. boost the effectiveness of actions carried out against violent radical groups to legitimise their gap in the existing interventions to address the through the creation of an observatory for the operations instead of taking military actions alone multitude of problems in the country. Due to weak Furthermore, although the challenges in Mali are coordination of peace and reconciliation which creates feelings of neocolonialism leadership and lack of crisis management skills, cross border and transnational, there is very limited initiatives. respondents noted that most of the countries leaders joint cross border initiatives by CSOs to address the Ÿ Ÿ Strengthen the capacity of CSOs, especially different dimensions of the problem from a regional Ensure better coordination between the local and just take kneejerk political decisions to deal with women and young people, through long term perspective. With the exception of organisations like national actors to promote collective participation ongoing crisis situations which has cost human life nancial and technical support to play their full WANEP that implement cross border initiatives due to and accountability at all levels across the various and properties worth millions of dollars. and meaningful role in peace-building and social its national ofces in all the Sahel countries, most of governorates, prefectures and sub-prefectures. cohesion initiatives. While CSOs benet from the the CSO initiatives are nationally focused. Lastly, it State representatives can rely on the Regional Reconciliation Support Teams, attached to the technical and nancial contributions of partners, National Reconciliation Support Mission of the they raise the issue of duration of the support

¹⁰⁹Interview with the Director of the NGO Think Peace-Mali. November 2020. Ministry of Reconciliation. ERPs have the provided. Actions for peace are long-term. ¹¹⁰Interview with an A-member Alliance to Refound Governance in Africa (ARGA-Mali), Bamako, November 2020. PAGE 46 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 47 development and peacekeeping, and above all the Ÿ CSO Responses was also mentioned that CSOs do not often provide advantage of being very close to communities, full return of state authority to all parts of Malian regular feedback of their interventions to the public to especially those in the rural areas. territory.109 CSOs are very ambitious but very often lack the build community support and government trust in technical, nancial and human resources necessary their activities. Ÿ Implement the various recommendations made at There is also the difculty in the implementation of the to achieve the objectives set. They also largely the National Agreement Conference (2017) and Algiers Peace Agreement. The dialogue between the depend to a large extent on external support to take the National Inclusive Dialogue (2019) signatory parties of the Agreement is not progressing. action. Without donor support, CSOs are hamstrung 3.5.1. Conclusion and Recommendations Ÿ Implement Law 052 of December 18, 2015, The parties continue to pursue acts that undermine in terms of the number of activities they are able to instituting measures to promote Gender Access peace and reconciliation efforts. For example, the undertake within a given period. A respondent noted The research shows that the responses to the peace to Nominative and Elective Functions. Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) issued the following: and security challenges are far from being Ÿ two unilateral decisions on 30 January 2019, covering appropriate for the Malian context. According to most Government should budget for peace or both administrative measures in the Kidal area and I nd that many CSOs struggle to have a local anchor. respondents, for the responses to be effective and peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, the launch of a military security operation. As a In most cases, actions are contained in the areas that enable the maintenance of peace and development, and resilient resource mobilization strategy to reminder, this region is still under the administration of house the headquarters. However, the causes that are it must address the following key areas: securing the support the implementation of initiatives the CMA, the State of Mali has no effective control of sometimes defended require local anchoring. north and central regions; restoring the authority of the region. On the Malian government's side, the Similarly, many of them are not nancially self- the state through the empowerment of the state itself; International and Regional Partners launch of the military operation in March 2020 called sufcient, they depend on foreign aid. And that could the effective involvement of women and young raise the question of autonomy and independence of people in the process of reconciliation and Dambé (which literally means dignity) without Ÿ Effectively communicate the actions of regional actions to be carried out.110 democratic governance; and management of involving the other signatory movements, constitutes partners, including ECOWAS to change public political and electoral issues through institutional a violation of the agreement. opinion to gain support of the population. Thus, most CSOs depend on donor support and that reforms. The main question at this stage is how to ECOWAS has been in Mali since the crisis erupted The weak technical and operational capabilities of the also has implications for ownership of project create a bridge between the existing set of peace and in 2012. However, many people see it as usurping Security and Defence Forces in the face of the conceptualisation, design and implementation. security governance arrangements to achieve the powers of Malian authorities. The various multiple challenges is another issue highlighted. The There is also sometimes limited coordination and maximum impacts. In light of the ndings, the main criticisms made against ECOWAS after its Mali Defence and Security Forces are experiencing competition among civil society actors. This problem policy recommendations are: mediations before, during and after the fall of tactical and operational difculties in dealing with the emanates from the competition for project funds from President Keita are a perfect illustration of this security threat, resulting in the expansion of insecurity similar sources and the weak leadership of some state of history. from North to South through the Centre. CSOs. The respondents also identied the short-term Government of the Republic of Mali funding packages and project cycles as a major gap Ÿ Ÿ International partners such as French Barkhane Lastly, the respondents mentioned the lack of strong in existing interventions because it does not allow for Ensure better coordination between partners Force should genuinely cooperate and leadership and crisis management skills among lasting impact of their interventions to inuence (technical and nancial) and national actors to collaborate with National Forces of Mali in the ght political and security actors in the country as a major changes in the status quo. boost the effectiveness of actions carried out against violent radical groups to legitimise their gap in the existing interventions to address the through the creation of an observatory for the operations instead of taking military actions alone multitude of problems in the country. Due to weak Furthermore, although the challenges in Mali are coordination of peace and reconciliation which creates feelings of neocolonialism leadership and lack of crisis management skills, cross border and transnational, there is very limited initiatives. respondents noted that most of the countries leaders joint cross border initiatives by CSOs to address the Ÿ Ÿ Strengthen the capacity of CSOs, especially different dimensions of the problem from a regional Ensure better coordination between the local and just take kneejerk political decisions to deal with women and young people, through long term perspective. With the exception of organisations like national actors to promote collective participation ongoing crisis situations which has cost human life nancial and technical support to play their full WANEP that implement cross border initiatives due to and accountability at all levels across the various and properties worth millions of dollars. and meaningful role in peace-building and social its national ofces in all the Sahel countries, most of governorates, prefectures and sub-prefectures. cohesion initiatives. While CSOs benet from the the CSO initiatives are nationally focused. Lastly, it State representatives can rely on the Regional Reconciliation Support Teams, attached to the technical and nancial contributions of partners, National Reconciliation Support Mission of the they raise the issue of duration of the support

However, the various supports given by partners Ÿ CSOs should consider collaborating with their are short-term counterparts in neighboring countries to implement joint projects to address the References Ÿ Review the existing funding mechanisms to allow transnational and cross border dimensions of the local authorities to access direct funding to ensure threats. Ÿ Africanews. (2019). Mali: Dan Nan Ambassagou, the militia suspected of being behind the Ogossagou citizen participation in the efforts of governance massacre. https://fr.africanews.com/2019/03/25/mali-dan-nan-ambassagou-la-milice-soupconnee-d- and economic development at the local level. Ÿ Strengthen existing national platform on the WPS etre-derriere-le-massacre-d// , accessed on 21 December 2020. agenda to enhance coordination of actions among CSOs in the implementation of Ÿ Antil, A. (2019). Sahel: the underpinment of a disaster. Foreign Policy, 84(3), 89-98. Civil Society Organisations programmes Ÿ Assanvo, W., Dakono, B.,Theroux-Benoni, L. A. (2019). Violent extremism, organised crime and local Ÿ CSOs should strengthen existing coordination Ÿ Increase advocacy on the implementation of conicts in liptako-Gourma. West Africa Report, Institute for Security Studies. and cooperation mechanisms to ensure Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments coherence and targeted responses to by countries in the Sahel region. Ÿ Bencherif, A. and Campana, A (2017). Alliances of convenience: assessing the dynamics of the Malian compliment government efforts. insurgency. Mediterranean Politics, Issue 22.1, 115-134. Ÿ CSOs should develop good communication Ÿ CSOs should explore alternative sources of strategies to effectively communicate the Ÿ Bencherif, A. (2019). For a (re-)reading of the Tuareg rebellions in Mali: memoirs and representations in funding especially from the private sector and outcomes of their intervention to the public, the Tuareg political assembly. Canadian Journal of African Studies, Issue 53.2, 195-214. businesses aside the traditional donors to sustain governments and development partners to gain their activities in the long term. Ÿ Benjaminsen, T.A. and B, B. (2019). Why do pastoralists in Mali join jihadist groups? A political the support and trust of stakeholders. ecological explanation. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 46(1), 1-20.

Ÿ Bourgeot. A. (2012). The Malian crisis: towards a geopolitical recomposition of the Saharan space. in Mokhe and Antil (eds.), The Maghreb and its South: towards renewed links, Paris: Ifri, pp.91-109.

Ÿ Gaoukoye, A. (2018). Conspiracy in Mali and the Sahel. Paris: Harmattan editions.

Ÿ G5 Sahel. (2018). Lexicon of radicalization and violent extremism in the G5 Sahel. Unpublished Report on people's perceptions of Operation Pagnali.

Ÿ Young Africa. (2019). Mali: Is the new military strategy announced up to the challenge? https://www.jeuneafrique.com/857164/politique/mali-la-nouvelle-strategie-militaire-annoncee-est -elle- a-la-hauteur-des-enjeux/, accessed on 21 December 2020.

Ÿ Lorentzen, J., Touré, N. A. and Gaye, B. (2019). Women's participation in the peace and reconciliation processes in Mali. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

Ÿ Marc. G. (2017). National Policy document for the Prevention and Control of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. Unpublished document.

Ÿ Morgane, L. (2019). In the face of violence, our very fragile Sahelian states can collapse very quickly.https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/06/14/face-aux-violences-nos-etats- saheliens-tres-fragiles-peuvent-s-effondrer-et-tresrapidement_5476245_3210.html, accessed on 21 December 2020.

Ÿ Tounkara, A. (2020). Mali. Sociohistorical analysis of conicts (North and Centre). The state between the search for legitimacy and slander. Paris: Harmattan. PAGE 48 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 49

Ÿ Gaoukoye, A. (2018). Conspiracy in Mali and the Sahel. Paris: Harmattan editions.

Ÿ G5 Sahel. (2018). Lexicon of radicalization and violent extremism in the G5 Sahel. Unpublished Report on people's perceptions of Operation Pagnali.

Ÿ Lorentzen, J., Touré, N. A. and Gaye, B. (2019). Women's participation in the peace and reconciliation processes in Mali. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

Ÿ Marc. G. (2017). National Policy document for the Prevention and Control of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. Unpublished document.

Ÿ Tounkara, A. (2020). Mali. Sociohistorical analysis of conicts (North and Centre). The state between the search for legitimacy and slander. Paris: Harmattan. PAGE 50 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 51

The study identied four major challenges that have a b) The challenges of the foundations of functional correlation with issues of peace and social sustainable development stability. Niger Niger is struggling to lay the foundation for its a) Structural Challenges and Poverty sustainable development because of certain 3.3.1. Overview of the multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges demographic factors that nullify almost all the efforts With a poverty rate of 48.9% and a per capita income of different governments. The population growth rate Niger is a landlocked country bounded on the Northwest by Algeria, on the Northwest by Libya, of $420, Niger unfortunately ranks last in the United is one of the most dynamic in the world. This rapid on the east by Chad, on the south by Nigeria and Benin, and on the west by Burkina Faso and Nations Programme's Human Development Index. population growth clearly explains the high demand Mali. It is divided naturally into three distinct zones - a desert zone in the north; an intermediate There are more than 3.6 million people in Niger who for basic social needs and services such as zone, where nomadic pastoralists raise cattle, in the centre; and a cultivated zone in the south, are at risk of chronic food insecurity, which affect education, infrastructure, electricity and health. This 111 where the greater part of the population are concentrated. children much more. Severe malnutrition and112 situation severely limits the economic outlook of a repetitive cycles of famine are partly linked to rainfall country hard hit by poverty and where 60% of its Figure 3.3.1. Political Map of Niger decits in recent years. The rate of poverty in Niger is population live on less than a dollar a day. much more prevalent in rural areas and affects mostly women. The employment that is supposed to enable people to generate resources is limited, c) Political challenges especially for women. The political challenges facing Niger are in two parts: According to the 2014 statistics of the National poor governance and the recurrence of institutional Statistical Institute, 60.1% of women are inactive and instability. Good governance requires the existence of among men this proportion is around 10.2%. This credible state structures capable of dening strategic precariousness of the social strata is compounded directions and implementing credible policies for the by a relatively low literacy rate. This is about 29% due consolidation and management of state resources to the high informal Islamic learning centers which the and investments. However, this can only be achieved State is struggling to control. The phenomenon of when the state itself has the appropriate human Islamic schools has the tendency to lead to resources and material resources to do so. However, enlistment in extremist organisations. Niger's Niger suffers from administrative governance proximity to Nigeria increases this threat because of challenges such as the mismanagement of public the massive recruitment of Nigerian children by funds or corruption, politicisation of state institutions, preachers often radicalized and supportive of the poor public procurement practices, poor Boko Haram sect.113 Poverty has also been the main management of state assets and political clientelism cause of recruitment of the youth into terrorist groups. that exacerbates tensions between different political Former President of Niger Issoufou Mahamadou for groups. example noted that “It is against social misery and demographic pressure that must be fought to Niger is also a country where political instability is weaken Boko Haram... Poverty is the main ally of quite recurrent. There has been the interference of the terrorism. Most of its recruits are downgraded, military in the politics of the country. From 1990 to unemployed youth.”114 present, the country has experienced military coups Source: Nationsonline in 1996, 1999 and 2010. In total, Niger recorded 7

¹¹¹ Fuglestad, F. (2020). Niger. https://www.britannica.com/place/Niger, accessed 29 December 2020. ¹¹²See UN Humanitarian Bulletin published in June 2015. ¹¹³See African Development Bank www.afdb.org, accessed 20 January 2021. ¹¹⁴This is a quote from an Interview he granted to Liberation in May 28, 2014. PAGE 50 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 51

¹¹¹ Fuglestad, F. (2020). Niger. https://www.britannica.com/place/Niger, accessed 29 December 2020. ¹¹²See UN Humanitarian Bulletin published in June 2015. ¹¹³See African Development Bank www.afdb.org, accessed 20 January 2021. ¹¹⁴This is a quote from an Interview he granted to Liberation in May 28, 2014. PAGE 52 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 53

Figure 3.3.2: Illicit arms ﬂow into the Sahel-Saharan space Women Lawyers of Niger “At the end of a divorce, if it My father unilaterally decided that I marry his is the woman's initiative, she is asked to repay the nephew Ibrahim even though I was among amount of the dowry”115. It is a phenomenon that is the top ve students in my sixth grade, he growing because women in Niger embody the image threatened my mother with divorce if she of poverty”. This discrimination persists, despite the refused this marriage and that he would curse me if I gave an opinion against his existence of legislative and institutional framework decision, that is how I abandoned my such as the National Gender Policy (PNG) that studies (...), to prevent my mother from abhors this form of violation against women. Article being on the street or to be judged by the 22 of Niger's Constitution clearly states that "the State society that encourages this type of marriage ensures the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, girls and persons with disabilities. It is clear that the causes and risk involved in child Therefore, the existence of these practices shows marriage in Niger remain complex. Niger's real commitment to upholding international and regional legal instruments relating to women and Gender-based violence (GBV): In Niger, the incidence human rights. of GBVs is frequent. Women and girls are most often the victims of GBV in the form of physical, sexual and Forced or early marriage: Article 488 of the Civil marital violence. Generally, women in the Sahelian code of Niger states 21 years as the age one is space are affected by socio-cultural prejudices that capable of all acts of civil life including marriage. A keep them in a state of dependence, ignorance and Source: UNODC man and a woman cannot marry before 18 and 15 extreme poverty. years and there is no marriage when there is no consent. Despite the existence of this law, early and A study carried out by OXAM in 2007 on women in the interruptions of the constitutional order, 5 of which 3.3.2. Specic Challenges Facing Women and forced marriages are growing in both urban and rural region of Dosso, Maradi, Zinder and Agadez revealed were by military coups and 2 by civil coups. These Girls areas due to poverty, illiteracy, religious and cultural that most violence against women is most often interruptions have affected the building of strong 116 factors. According to a Belgian cooperation ofcial carried out by household heads. The marital home democratic institutions in the country. Practices such The following are the specic challenges that affect interviewed, this bad practice persists today despite thus becomes a place that keeps the woman in as arbitrary arrests, repeated violations of the women in Niger: substantial support to the Ministry of Population, constant fear. According to a member of the Women constitution and constant harassment of opposition Divorce: this in traditional societies means a Women's and Children's Protection. According to Journalists Network,"Girls and women are exposed to parties and members of civil society are still in Niger. denitive break between husband and wife. him, some social groups with conservatives all forms of violence, the most noticeable of which are Interviews conducted during this study identify traditional and religious beliefs block all the initiatives sexual and psychological violence (...), very young married girls are often beaten and abandoned by d) The challenges of growing insecurity. divorce as a problem that affects women. From the undertaken to reverse this trend. A teenager interview with the leader of the Islamic Association of interviewed during this study recounted her story as perpetrators often in their fties [...] The average age For about three decades, the countries of the Sahel- Niger, in 2019, they registered 846 divorce cases. follows: of marriage is 15; between the age of 15 and 19, 36% 117 Saharan region, including Niger, are experiencing The women often assume the consequences of of girls are already mothers or pregnant." extremely turbulent environment due to the divorce. They are forced to leave the house they proliferation of several violent extremist groups and acquired with their spouse even when they have terrorism, cross-border crime (trafcking in rearms, custody of the children. Sometimes, if it is the woman human trafcking in drugs and other illegal products, who asked for a divorce as a result of abandonment etc.) and many inter- and intra-community conicts. or acts of violence, she will be asked to repay the

The gure 3.3.2. Shows the illicit arms ow in the dowry that her spouse paid. This discrimination was ¹¹⁵Interview with Dr. Balkissa Abarchi, head of the Association of Women Lawyers of Niger, November 2021. Sahel-Sahara space. highlighted in the words of Dr. Balkissa Abarchi, a ¹¹⁶For more information see the UNFPA 2013 report on Niger. ¹¹⁷Interview with a member of the Women Journalists Network, Niger, November 10, 2020 woman leader and head of the Association of PAGE 52 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 53

The gure 3.3.2. Shows the illicit arms ow in the dowry that her spouse paid. This discrimination was ¹¹⁵Interview with Dr. Balkissa Abarchi, head of the Association of Women Lawyers of Niger, November 2021. Sahel-Sahara space. highlighted in the words of Dr. Balkissa Abarchi, a ¹¹⁶For more information see the UNFPA 2013 report on Niger. ¹¹⁷Interview with a member of the Women Journalists Network, Niger, November 10, 2020 woman leader and head of the Association of PAGE 54 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 55

3.3.3. Responses to the Peace and Security partnership with the European Union, Niger through bilateral, regional and international agreements. Ÿ National Responses challenges the EUCAP Sahel Niger Project, which has been in Since its establishment, the platform has led to the place since 2012, has beneted from an extensive successful completion of several extradition requests Niger's response has encompassed both military programme of assistance to build the capacity of from member states in the region. So far, this platform and non-military responses. Conicts between Ÿ International responses Niger's actors involved in the ght against terrorism. has signicantly facilitated communication between farmers and pastoralists is one of the most recurrent The EU also provides nancial support to Niger as national central authorities responsible for drafting, problems particularly in rural areas. To tackle the International responses to security threats can be part of its nancial assistance of 650 million euros disseminating and ensuring the regularity of the recurrence of this form of conict, the government categorised and analysed in two essential (450 million euros paid to the three Sahel countries implementation of requests for international has put in place several structures and mechanisms dimensions. These two dimensions are: the and about 200 million euros in the Maghreb cooperation in criminal matters. for preventing and managing this crisis. The rural repressive dimension based on the use of military countries) to countries in the Sahel. code developed for this purpose has proven to be force and the preventive dimension based on The African Union also provides some support effective and the mobilisation of customary and international frameworks and conventions. There is also the counterterrorism operation of the through the African Union Mission for Mali and the administrative leaders has greatly contributed to French Barkhane Force, which has been in the region Sahel (MISAHEL) in the areas of policy development, lowering the tensions between these two The United Nations is a strategic partner of Niger in its since 2014. The Force has conducted several political processes, human rights and humanitarian communities. efforts to address the peace and security challenges operations against violent extremism and terrorist action, as well as nding solutions to security in the country. Niger has benetted from the groups in the country. The US through its Department challenges including armed conicts, terrorism, drug In combating violent extremism and terrorism, the implementation of the Integrated Strategy for the of Defence (DoD) has established a strong trafcking and other forms of transnational organised government has strengthened the operational Sahel since its adoption in 2013. The main objective partnership program with Niger. The objectives of crimes in the country.121 The AU also supports the capabilities of the defence and security forces of the strategy is to facilitate multi-sector interventions this extensive programme of support to foreign country's development efforts in nding innovative through the creation of new police stations, several in the Sahel-Saharan region.118 This strategy is called defence and security forces are to professionalise ways to reduce poverty, food insecurity and mobile security companies, the recruitment of integrated, because it envisages the promotion of the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN), combat terrorist desertication. Moreover, in the efforts to implement personnel, the purchase of military equipment good governance practices in all Sahelian countries; and criminal threats. Accordingly, the U.S. the ECOWAS counter-terrorism strategy, ECOWAS adapted to the effective ght against terrorism, the the operationalisation of a common strategic Department of Defence delivered large military has organised capacity building and awareness establishment of a scientic police laboratory among framework to combat cross-border threats and the equipment to Niger in 2012 worth $350 million to programmes in Niger involving the youth, opinion others. adoption of a humanitarian assistance programme strengthen its logistics capacity.119 Its anti-terrorism leaders and religious organisations. Several training conducive to strong community resilience. The UN programme has enabled the police, gendarmerie sessions have been organised by ECOWAS in the On the judicial front, the government of Niger is has supported Niger through nancial and technical and the Nigerien Republican Guard to receive a grant eight regions of Niger to alert, raise awareness and installing a fairly effective mechanism to combat the assistance to address some of its pressing of around $25 million.120 The US has also enhanced train actors on issues of security, the rule of law and dubious nancial ows that allow extremist challenges. aerospace capabilities, intelligence, surveillance democracy and peace. For example, from 6 to 25 organisations to prosper. A National Financial 123 and communication capabilities of the Nigerien September 2020, ECOWAS in collaboration with Information Processing Unit has been set up to At the multilateral level, Niger enjoys considerable monitor the origin of certain bank transfers. To this support, especially from the European Union, which Security Defence Forces. Zinder University organised a workshop to train Ulemas, youth leaders and civil society actors. The e n d , a r e v i e w o f t h e c o m p e t e n c e s a n d is involved in several security areas. Among the most responsibilities of legal bodies has been carried out active structures in Niger is the Counterterrorism in multi-stakeholder workshop aimed to build · Regional responses to better integrate the areas of nance. Thus, in order the Sahel (CT-Sahel) project, which is also present in participants' capacity in the culture of peace, the ght against radicalisation and violent extremism. It also to better combat terrorism, Niger has strengthened the ve G5-Sahel countries. CT-Sahel has largely At the regional level, there are some initiatives to deal aimed to strengthen the teaching skills and its legal system through legal and institutional enabled the defence and security forces to acquire with the peace and security threats. There is the knowledge of the Imams of the madrasas through reforms. several military equipment adapted to combat new Sahel Platform for Judicial Cooperation, created in new programmes (focusing on education for peace, forms of terrorist threats. Also, as part of the 2010 to strengthen judicial cooperation based on family planning, prevention of drug abuse and violent extremism).122

¹¹⁸United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel published under S/2013/354, www.un.org. accessed 30 December 2020. ¹²¹ African Union. (2014). African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) Press release. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquy-de-presse, ¹¹⁹For more information see US Defense and Security in Niger: Enhancing Our Partner's Capacity. https://ne.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/56/2018- accessed 10 December 2020. 10-25_Defense-Fact-Sheet-English.pdf, Accessed on 12 January 2021. ¹²² Interview with CSOs, November 2020. ¹²⁰Ibid, p.2 ¹²³ Cf. Aymeric Janier, in Niger, a vote against a background of security instability, www.LeMonde.fr (22.02.2016) PAGE 54 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 55

¹¹⁸United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel published under S/2013/354, www.un.org. accessed 30 December 2020. ¹²¹ African Union. (2014). African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) Press release. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquy-de-presse, ¹¹⁹For more information see US Defense and Security in Niger: Enhancing Our Partner's Capacity. https://ne.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/56/2018- accessed 10 December 2020. 10-25_Defense-Fact-Sheet-English.pdf, Accessed on 12 January 2021. ¹²² Interview with CSOs, November 2020. ¹²⁰Ibid, p.2 ¹²³ Cf. Aymeric Janier, in Niger, a vote against a background of security instability, www.LeMonde.fr (22.02.2016) PAGE 56 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 57

dilapidated equipment, reduced workforce due to nancial limitations as some of the factors limiting the Niger also contributes to the G5-Sahel Force and has monitoring role often exposes CSOs to risk but there lack of resources. Therefore, since its deployment, effectiveness of its interventions.124 bilateral agreements with Mali specically on the are no laws to protect Civil Society Organisations the Force has not lived up to expectations especially sharing of information to neutralised jihadist groups from attacks. A civil society actor interviewed in Niger where terrorism continues unabated in operating in the area. Niger also has bilateral explained “every time we lambast the security Ÿ regions along the Mali border and Diffa region. National Responses cooperation with Nigeria, Chad and Algeria to ght agencies of certain human rights violations, the extremist and terrorist groups. However, these power calls us opponents or mercenaries. we carry One of the major limitations of national responses is cooperative frameworks have been hampered by the out a difcult job that very often leads us to prison". Ÿ Regional Responses the State-centred approaches to peace with limited existence of porous borders and weak state However, it is imperative that CSOs ensure that involvement of citizens and CSOs in the presence in some part of the Sahel. The jihadists principles such as respect for human rights, good At the regional level, one of the main gaps in terms of conceptualisation, design and implementation of continue to challenge Sahel states and expand their governance and social justice are respected. responses to the threat is the low mobilisation of programmes. The respondents noted that citizens elds of inuence. resources which severely limits the effectiveness of are not involved the activities of government and In relation to poor governance, Niger has recently the decisions taken. Managing security crises sometimes they become victims of human rights experienced a situation where state ofcials have requires a signicant mobilisation of nancial abuses by the defence and security forces. This Ÿ CSO Response been cited in major cases of embezzlement of funds resources that Sahel countries do not have. The G5 situation has not helped in creating the necessary allocated to the Ministry of Defence. Several CSOs Sahel countries for instance are struggling to support for government interventions at the Civil society in Niger is a strategic link in the ght who commented on this corruption scandal were mobilize nancial and material resources to community level. Moreover, it was also indicated by against extremism and terrorism. Organisations such tagged as being part of the opposition. This is the effectively prevent or combat the threats. They suffer respondents that most states in the Sahel including as WANEP-Niger are implementing capacity building same situation when CSOs speak against the from chronic budgetary implications, politicisation of Niger do not often budget for peacebuilding aside the initiatives that focus on women and youth violations of the constitution by the government. their bodies, and excessive corruption of military budgets for counterterrorism operations. As a result, empowerment and increasing their participation in ofcials. The low mobilisation of resources is the government lacks nancial and material local governance. WANEP-Niger is also promoting compounded by the refusal of some strategic resources to implement policies to promote peace community dialogue involving women, youth and 3.3.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Existing partners to support the G5 Sahel Force. The United and stability. It has to depend on development community leaders in areas affected by conicts to Responses to the peace and security States is for instance concerned about the ow of partners for support to deal with threats such as promote peaceful coexistence. Additionally, it is challenges money to the G5 Sahel countries which are already terrorism and localised conicts. building early warning capacity for preventing violent Ÿ undermined by corruption and embezzlement of extremism in Niger. International responses public funds. This situation is further worsened by the Furthermore, the politicisation of public institutions for personal gains has been one of the major banes in More signicantly, CSOs provide a monitoring In recent years, the Sahelian space has become an exclusion of a country like Algeria, which has solid the efforts to address the peace and security function that constantly exposes them to major risks. environment where several international forces experience in the ght against Salast movements. challenges in Niger. This has weakened Niger's public It is primarily a human rights watchdog and (Germany, France, Italy, Norway, United Nations Also, among the G5 countries, there are administration and limited the institutional efforts to denounces all forms of violations. In the security eld, forces, US forces, etc.) converge. This high differentiated understanding of terrorism and this address the challenges. Additionally, the lack of Nigerien CSOs have been very successful in concentration of military forces lacks a structural and leads to contradictory positions on issues between respect for the principles of social justice and equality denouncing certain human right abuses attributed to institutional framework that coordinates the actions member states. has hampered efforts to promote reconciliation and the army in the ght against terrorist and armed of the different actors in countries like Niger. This With regard to the Sahel Judicial Cooperation peaceful coexistence within communities. Lastly, groups in the region especially in the Diffa and leads to role clashes and duplication of efforts by Platform created in 2010, it is still in its infancy. It faces there is decit in the effective application of the law Tillabéry regions. CSOs have repeatedly denounced international partners in Niger. From the responses two types of problems that limit its effectiveness. The due to certain social, cultural and political practices. the poor oversight of the repressive security system, during the interviews, it was quite clear that there is rst problem is nancial, and the second obstacle Court decisions are not always accepted by people which consistently commits human rights violations. lack of functional cooperation among development refers to the limited commitment of some States. who have reservations about due process or verdicts. On this issue, Chichangari, one of the leading civil partners in Niger. Furthermore, the large size of the Regarding the limitations of the ECOWAS responses, This decit regularly generates verbal or physical society leaders said in a public statement: "We are country coupled with the limited human and nancial respondents noted the human, logistical and violence. doing human rights monitoring work in the Lake Chad resources of international actors has hindered region, where Boko Haram is rampant and where the effective responses to the threats. For example, it would take the Barkhane forces several years to armed forces have been deployed as part of the state ¹²⁴Interview Crisis Group, Bamako, November 2014. of emergency. Niger may be at war, but we cannot achieve meaningful results in the Sahel including turn a blind eye to abuses on both sides." This Niger due to some operational and strategic barriers such as supply costs, staff support, lack of logistics, PAGE 56 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 57

dilapidated equipment, reduced workforce due to nancial limitations as some of the factors limiting the Niger also contributes to the G5-Sahel Force and has monitoring role often exposes CSOs to risk but there lack of resources. Therefore, since its deployment, effectiveness of its interventions.124 bilateral agreements with Mali specically on the are no laws to protect Civil Society Organisations the Force has not lived up to expectations especially sharing of information to neutralised jihadist groups from attacks. A civil society actor interviewed in Niger where terrorism continues unabated in operating in the area. Niger also has bilateral explained “every time we lambast the security Ÿ regions along the Mali border and Diffa region. National Responses cooperation with Nigeria, Chad and Algeria to ght agencies of certain human rights violations, the extremist and terrorist groups. However, these power calls us opponents or mercenaries. we carry One of the major limitations of national responses is cooperative frameworks have been hampered by the out a difcult job that very often leads us to prison". Ÿ Regional Responses the State-centred approaches to peace with limited existence of porous borders and weak state However, it is imperative that CSOs ensure that involvement of citizens and CSOs in the presence in some part of the Sahel. The jihadists principles such as respect for human rights, good At the regional level, one of the main gaps in terms of conceptualisation, design and implementation of continue to challenge Sahel states and expand their governance and social justice are respected. responses to the threat is the low mobilisation of programmes. The respondents noted that citizens elds of inuence. resources which severely limits the effectiveness of are not involved the activities of government and In relation to poor governance, Niger has recently the decisions taken. Managing security crises sometimes they become victims of human rights experienced a situation where state ofcials have requires a signicant mobilisation of nancial abuses by the defence and security forces. This Ÿ CSO Response been cited in major cases of embezzlement of funds resources that Sahel countries do not have. The G5 situation has not helped in creating the necessary allocated to the Ministry of Defence. Several CSOs Sahel countries for instance are struggling to support for government interventions at the Civil society in Niger is a strategic link in the ght who commented on this corruption scandal were mobilize nancial and material resources to community level. Moreover, it was also indicated by against extremism and terrorism. Organisations such tagged as being part of the opposition. This is the effectively prevent or combat the threats. They suffer respondents that most states in the Sahel including as WANEP-Niger are implementing capacity building same situation when CSOs speak against the from chronic budgetary implications, politicisation of Niger do not often budget for peacebuilding aside the initiatives that focus on women and youth violations of the constitution by the government. their bodies, and excessive corruption of military budgets for counterterrorism operations. As a result, empowerment and increasing their participation in ofcials. The low mobilisation of resources is the government lacks nancial and material local governance. WANEP-Niger is also promoting compounded by the refusal of some strategic resources to implement policies to promote peace community dialogue involving women, youth and 3.3.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Existing partners to support the G5 Sahel Force. The United and stability. It has to depend on development community leaders in areas affected by conicts to Responses to the peace and security States is for instance concerned about the ow of partners for support to deal with threats such as promote peaceful coexistence. Additionally, it is challenges money to the G5 Sahel countries which are already terrorism and localised conicts. building early warning capacity for preventing violent Ÿ undermined by corruption and embezzlement of extremism in Niger. International responses public funds. This situation is further worsened by the Furthermore, the politicisation of public institutions for personal gains has been one of the major banes in More signicantly, CSOs provide a monitoring In recent years, the Sahelian space has become an exclusion of a country like Algeria, which has solid the efforts to address the peace and security function that constantly exposes them to major risks. environment where several international forces experience in the ght against Salast movements. challenges in Niger. This has weakened Niger's public It is primarily a human rights watchdog and (Germany, France, Italy, Norway, United Nations Also, among the G5 countries, there are administration and limited the institutional efforts to denounces all forms of violations. In the security eld, forces, US forces, etc.) converge. This high differentiated understanding of terrorism and this address the challenges. Additionally, the lack of Nigerien CSOs have been very successful in concentration of military forces lacks a structural and leads to contradictory positions on issues between respect for the principles of social justice and equality denouncing certain human right abuses attributed to institutional framework that coordinates the actions member states. has hampered efforts to promote reconciliation and the army in the ght against terrorist and armed of the different actors in countries like Niger. This With regard to the Sahel Judicial Cooperation peaceful coexistence within communities. Lastly, groups in the region especially in the Diffa and leads to role clashes and duplication of efforts by Platform created in 2010, it is still in its infancy. It faces there is decit in the effective application of the law Tillabéry regions. CSOs have repeatedly denounced international partners in Niger. From the responses two types of problems that limit its effectiveness. The due to certain social, cultural and political practices. the poor oversight of the repressive security system, during the interviews, it was quite clear that there is rst problem is nancial, and the second obstacle Court decisions are not always accepted by people which consistently commits human rights violations. lack of functional cooperation among development refers to the limited commitment of some States. who have reservations about due process or verdicts. On this issue, Chichangari, one of the leading civil partners in Niger. Furthermore, the large size of the Regarding the limitations of the ECOWAS responses, This decit regularly generates verbal or physical society leaders said in a public statement: "We are country coupled with the limited human and nancial respondents noted the human, logistical and violence. doing human rights monitoring work in the Lake Chad resources of international actors has hindered region, where Boko Haram is rampant and where the effective responses to the threats. For example, it would take the Barkhane forces several years to armed forces have been deployed as part of the state ¹²⁴Interview Crisis Group, Bamako, November 2014. of emergency. Niger may be at war, but we cannot achieve meaningful results in the Sahel including turn a blind eye to abuses on both sides." This Niger due to some operational and strategic barriers such as supply costs, staff support, lack of logistics, PAGE 58 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 59

violent extremism. Ÿ CSO responses Ÿ Involve the media (traditional, social and Ÿ Recongure the borders of the Sahel states in Ÿ Civil Society Organisations journalists' networks) in the production and order to make the borders of these states more CSOs lack nancial and material resources to carry dissemination of messages on the prevention of visible, xed and well demarcated. The porosities Ÿ CSOs should strengthen existing coordination out activities that will inure to the benet of the violent extremism. of border are linked to the lack of means and and cooperation mechanisms to ensure population. This makes them also vulnerable to equipment to monitor them as well as the lack of coherence and targeted responses to donors' whims and caprices as the funding they often Ÿ Develop initiatives to enhance the economic knowledge of the border lines that separate compliment government efforts. get is for specic purposes. Furthermore, CSOs empowerment of young people (girls and boys) s t a t e s . T h i s r e c o n  g u r a t i o n m u s t b e Ÿ frequently face attacks from politicians and other and the education of girls in rural and urban areas. a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f CSOs should consider collaborating with their state ofcials for speaking on national issues that infrastructure that can enable the occupation of counterparts in neighboring countries to Ÿ border on security, governance, corruption and Identify the causes of the different types of inter- this large area by the people and the implement joint projects to address the human rights. Additionally, the interviews revealed communal conicts specic to each region and development of economic activities in the border transnational and cross border dimensions of the that the short-term funding packages and project dene a non-violent resolution mechanism to areas threats. cycles was a major gap in existing interventions address them. Ÿ because it does not allow for lasting impact. Ÿ Expand the G5 Sahel Force to other countries CSOs should explore alternative sources of Ÿ Additionally, there is very limited joint cross border Establish an operational information control and such as Algeria to capitalise on its experiences funding especially from the private sector and initiatives by CSOs to address the different regulation system to check the Jihadists and seek technical and military assistance. businesses aside the traditional donors to sustain dimensions of the problem from a regional misinformation and populism to enlist young their activities for long term impact. perspective. people affected by unemployment and poverty. Ÿ Reorganise the mandates and deployment of Ÿ military forces in the Sahel to address their Increase advocacy on the implementation of Ÿ Discourage any form of expression of freedoms leadership conict against terrorism in the Sahel- Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments 3.3.5. Conclusion and Recommendations inspired by the poor readings of secularism. They Saharan region. generally lead to the polarisation of opinions and Ÿ Increase advocacy for the inclusion of separate Niger faces multidimensional security challenges the crystallisation of interfaith or inter-community Ÿ Organise sub-regional workshops on building peace or peacebuilding programmes budget in fueled by violent extremist and terrorist groups and hatred. the capacity of ulemas who are involved in the National Budgets for a specic amount to be the development of criminal activities related to arms, development of prevention and counter-terrorism dedicated to peacebuilding activities. Ÿ drug and human trafcking. There are also challenges Promote a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding strategies. related to political governance, inter-communal by involving local actors and initiatives to promote violence, religious fundamentalism, land and the use peace, security, development and justice Ÿ Trace the sources of terrorist nancing to reduce of natural resources. Over the years, there have been its capacity for expansion of terrorist activities and Ÿ Government should budget for peace or responses by the Government of Niger to address also deal with drug trafcking and their networks. peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, these challenges with the technical and nancial and resilient resource mobilisation strategy to Ÿ support of development and regional partners. Based Encourage research by universities on issues support the implementation of initiatives on the gaps identied from the existing responses, the that address security, peace, radicalisation and recommendations are made: violent extremism to generate new ideas and policy recommendations to complement existing Ÿ Regional and international Actors Government responses. Ÿ Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Ÿ The law enforcement agencies must change their mobilisation capabilities of Forces stationed at negative behavior and act professionally in their the borders of the G-5 Sahel countries. This dealing with CSOs. assessment would better dene the forms of Ÿ Strengthen the existing legal instruments for technical support and equipment needed to preventing and combatting radicalisation and operationalise attack units. PAGE 58 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 59

violent extremism. Ÿ CSO responses Ÿ Involve the media (traditional, social and Ÿ Recongure the borders of the Sahel states in Ÿ Civil Society Organisations journalists' networks) in the production and order to make the borders of these states more CSOs lack nancial and material resources to carry dissemination of messages on the prevention of visible, xed and well demarcated. The porosities Ÿ CSOs should strengthen existing coordination out activities that will inure to the benet of the violent extremism. of border are linked to the lack of means and and cooperation mechanisms to ensure population. This makes them also vulnerable to equipment to monitor them as well as the lack of coherence and targeted responses to donors' whims and caprices as the funding they often Ÿ Develop initiatives to enhance the economic knowledge of the border lines that separate compliment government efforts. get is for specic purposes. Furthermore, CSOs empowerment of young people (girls and boys) s t a t e s . T h i s r e c o n  g u r a t i o n m u s t b e Ÿ frequently face attacks from politicians and other and the education of girls in rural and urban areas. a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f CSOs should consider collaborating with their state ofcials for speaking on national issues that infrastructure that can enable the occupation of counterparts in neighboring countries to Ÿ border on security, governance, corruption and Identify the causes of the different types of inter- this large area by the people and the implement joint projects to address the human rights. Additionally, the interviews revealed communal conicts specic to each region and development of economic activities in the border transnational and cross border dimensions of the that the short-term funding packages and project dene a non-violent resolution mechanism to areas threats. cycles was a major gap in existing interventions address them. Ÿ because it does not allow for lasting impact. Ÿ Expand the G5 Sahel Force to other countries CSOs should explore alternative sources of Ÿ Additionally, there is very limited joint cross border Establish an operational information control and such as Algeria to capitalise on its experiences funding especially from the private sector and initiatives by CSOs to address the different regulation system to check the Jihadists and seek technical and military assistance. businesses aside the traditional donors to sustain dimensions of the problem from a regional misinformation and populism to enlist young their activities for long term impact. perspective. people affected by unemployment and poverty. Ÿ Reorganise the mandates and deployment of Ÿ military forces in the Sahel to address their Increase advocacy on the implementation of Ÿ Discourage any form of expression of freedoms leadership conict against terrorism in the Sahel- Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments 3.3.5. Conclusion and Recommendations inspired by the poor readings of secularism. They Saharan region. generally lead to the polarisation of opinions and Ÿ Increase advocacy for the inclusion of separate Niger faces multidimensional security challenges the crystallisation of interfaith or inter-community Ÿ Organise sub-regional workshops on building peace or peacebuilding programmes budget in fueled by violent extremist and terrorist groups and hatred. the capacity of ulemas who are involved in the National Budgets for a specic amount to be the development of criminal activities related to arms, development of prevention and counter-terrorism dedicated to peacebuilding activities. Ÿ drug and human trafcking. There are also challenges Promote a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding strategies. related to political governance, inter-communal by involving local actors and initiatives to promote violence, religious fundamentalism, land and the use peace, security, development and justice Ÿ Trace the sources of terrorist nancing to reduce of natural resources. Over the years, there have been its capacity for expansion of terrorist activities and Ÿ Government should budget for peace or responses by the Government of Niger to address also deal with drug trafcking and their networks. peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, these challenges with the technical and nancial and resilient resource mobilisation strategy to Ÿ support of development and regional partners. Based Encourage research by universities on issues support the implementation of initiatives on the gaps identied from the existing responses, the that address security, peace, radicalisation and recommendations are made: violent extremism to generate new ideas and policy recommendations to complement existing Ÿ Regional and international Actors Government responses. Ÿ Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Ÿ The law enforcement agencies must change their mobilisation capabilities of Forces stationed at negative behavior and act professionally in their the borders of the G-5 Sahel countries. This dealing with CSOs. assessment would better dene the forms of Ÿ Strengthen the existing legal instruments for technical support and equipment needed to preventing and combatting radicalisation and operationalise attack units. PAGE 60 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 61

References Burkina Faso

Ÿ Aymeri C, J. (2017). Niger, an election against a background of security instability. www.LeMonde.fr, 3.4.1. Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges accessed 27 December 2020. The historical evolution of Burkina Faso is marked by periods of violence which affects the peaceful coexistence of communities.125 There have been several conict issues relating to ethnicity, religion, Ÿ Bakary, S. (2018). Youth violence and the issues of violent extremism in Zinder. Geneva: International politics and development. Some of the most pressing peace and security challenges are inter- Organisation for Migration. communal conicts, agro-pastoral conicts, insecurity fuelled by banditry and terrorist attacks.126

Ÿ Bala, U. (2018). The manipulation of religion in Nigeria, 1977-1987. Gaskia Corporation LTD, Zaria et Isa Figure 3.5.1. Map of Burkina Faso Alkali

Ÿ Diffa University. (2016). Strategies for the deradicalisation and reintegration of young people incorporated into Boko Haram. Symposuim report on the International on security in the Lake Chad Basin, Niger.

Ÿ Farhad, K. (2014). Radicalisation. Paris: Edition interventions.

Ÿ Guide, M. R. (2010). The New Terrorists. Paris: Editions Otherwise.

Ÿ Idrissa, K. (2001). Niger: State and Democracy. Paris: Le Harmattan.

Ÿ Institute for Studies and Security. (2013). Report on Peace and Security in the ECOWAS Space. Report No.7.

Ÿ Morgan. (2007). Al Qaeda Recruitment Manual. Paris Seuil.

Ÿ Ney, J P., & Touchard, L. (n.d). The Black Book of Terrorism: What Do States Know? What are they hiding from us?. Paris: The Black Octopus.

Ÿ Nicholas, G. (1979). Towards a rebirth of the process of holy war south of the Sahara. Civilizations, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, pp.234-248.

Ÿ OCHA. (2015). Diffa: Evolution of the Humanitarian Situation, Humanitarian Bulletin. Available at www.unocha.org/Niger, assessed on 7 December 2020.

Ÿ Olivier, H., and Thomas, F. (2014). ISIS: Anatomy of the new Caliphate. Paris: Editions Bernard Gionanangeli. Source: Nations Online Project Ÿ UNDP. (2020). UNDP Governance Review in Niger. www.undp.org, accessed 28 December 2020.

Ÿ United Nations. (2004). State security and human security in the age of terrorism: the role of security sector reform. Geneva: UN Ofce. ¹²⁵ Pre-colonial history marked by the conquest of some communities over others, the slave trade and colonization that imposed a regime of violence on the natives, the post colonial period punctuated by political violence of the exceptional regimes and regionalist demands. ¹²⁶ Some informants point to latent political conﬂicts that result in hateful and violent speech between political actors during the November 2020 election Ÿ United Nations. Secretary-General's Report, "Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. A/70/674. campaign. See Appendix 01: The Tree of Conﬂict in Burkina Faso.

Ÿ UNODC. (2015). The Terrorist Threat and the Boko Haram Phenomenon. A training workshop report on specic aspects of the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases, Niamey. PAGE 60 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 61

References Burkina Faso

Ÿ Bala, U. (2018). The manipulation of religion in Nigeria, 1977-1987. Gaskia Corporation LTD, Zaria et Isa Figure 3.5.1. Map of Burkina Faso Alkali

Ÿ Farhad, K. (2014). Radicalisation. Paris: Edition interventions.

Ÿ Guide, M. R. (2010). The New Terrorists. Paris: Editions Otherwise.

Ÿ Idrissa, K. (2001). Niger: State and Democracy. Paris: Le Harmattan.

Ÿ Institute for Studies and Security. (2013). Report on Peace and Security in the ECOWAS Space. Report No.7.

Ÿ Morgan. (2007). Al Qaeda Recruitment Manual. Paris Seuil.

Ÿ Ney, J P., & Touchard, L. (n.d). The Black Book of Terrorism: What Do States Know? What are they hiding from us?. Paris: The Black Octopus.

Ÿ Nicholas, G. (1979). Towards a rebirth of the process of holy war south of the Sahara. Civilizations, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, pp.234-248.

Ÿ OCHA. (2015). Diffa: Evolution of the Humanitarian Situation, Humanitarian Bulletin. Available at www.unocha.org/Niger, assessed on 7 December 2020.

Ÿ UNODC. (2015). The Terrorist Threat and the Boko Haram Phenomenon. A training workshop report on specic aspects of the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases, Niamey. PAGE 62 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 63

Ÿ Inter-community conicts in Burkina Faso: Burkina are both endogenous and exogenous. In terms of 3.4.2. Specic Challenges Facing Women as family planning, gender and women's rights. All Faso's economy is 80% rural, with agriculture and the endogenous factors, experts cite poverty, and Girls this contributes to undermining the material livestock sectors as the driving sectors. The main youth unemployment, the inability of the state to conditions and women's rights in this region as well protagonists of the agro-pastoral conicts are the meet the needs of the people such as security and Several experts say that women are both victims and asprevents them from beneting from support in Fulani herders and farmers from other ethnic local development, inter-communal conicts, actors of violent extremism and terrorism in Burkina 131 terms of literacy, maternal health, income-generating groups from the different regions: Moosé - Peulhs especially agro-pastoral clashes, poor local Faso. The Arbinda massacre shows how women activities, training and safety awareness. in the north-central and central plateau, the Peulhs governance and the porosity of borders as the are often targeted by terrorist groups. Thus, on 23 and Bissa in the central east, Peulhs and Lobi in factors that facilitate the emergence of the terrorist December 2019 in Arbinda, unidentied gunmen The phenomenon of mass displacement affects the South-West. 1 2 7 Agro-pastoral conicts phenomenon129External causes include the committed the unspeakable by massacring 31 women in Burkina Faso. Displaced Women often lack undermine social cohesion and peaceful co- Libyan crisis in 2011 and the Malian crisis in 2012. women at a water point. These internally displaced adequate water, security, food, education and health. existence in the communities. From north to south Terrorism-related insecurity is cross-border and women were the subject of a possible act of Women are also exposed to gender-based violence retaliation and revenge by terrorists in the face of the and from east to west, agro-pastoral conicts affects the other G5 countries in the Sahel region, 132 (VBG) such as harassment and rape. Forced occur every dry season. The increasing mainly Mali and Niger. Since 2015, terrorist military operations of the Burkina Faso Defence and displacement exposes women to disease, starvation population and changing demographics, attacks have killed 1,665 people, including 1,229 Security Forces. This was a serious attack on the and family rifts. Women are also at risk of losing their economic activities that require more space and civilians and 436 members of the defence and social, cultural and economic lives of communities spouses and children, making them more vulnerable. poor management of shared natural resources security forces.130 As of 10 November 2020, the especially women. have contributed to the problem. Climate change, country had more than 1,049,767 internally Generally, women and children in Burkina Faso are easy access to small arms, physical violence and displaced persons, 53% of whom are women. The 3.4.3. Responses to the Peace and Security the most affected by insecurity. In the context of damage to farm and animals are also aggravating situation has deprived hundreds of thousands of Challenges terrorism-related insecurity, women and girls are factors to the conict. students of their right to education with the closure severely affected. They no longer have access to of thousands of schools. The security situation is The responses to the security challenges in Burkina social services (education, health, sanitation, food, Ÿ Armed Banditry: Since the 2000s, Burkina Faso already undermining the government's efforts to Faso come from international and regional actors, etc.) because of widespread insecurity. The Social has faced armed attacks on both roads and urban achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and national actors, including the government and Safety Nets project aimed at relieving the most centres. The regular security forces could not (SDGs) and in particular on Goals 3 and 4 for civil society organisations. Some of these vulnerable people can no longer meet its targets. respond to this insecurity to ensure the safety of health and education, respectively. Development interventions are discussed below : 128 This situation further complicates the conditions of citizens especially in rural areas. As a result, partners are having their efforts undermined by women and girls. In the Eastern Region of Burkina Ÿ people organised themselves to deal with the the inability to intervene in certain areas, delays in International responses Faso, women living in high-risk areas are most situation by setting up community structures to the implementation of certain projects, increased affected by the ban on certain income-generating The actors involved in the international responses are ensure their safety and security. Since 2010, costs and inadequate infrastructure to facilitate activities such as the sale of dolo (millet beer) and pig mainly the United Nations (especially UNDP and people have created self-defence groups, the the monitoring of projects due to the farming. Some respondents reported events such as UNHCR), the World Bank, the European Union, most well-known is the koglwéogo. In responding inaccessibility of the beneciary areas. to the threats, the koglwéogo use rearms and the purchase of all the barrels of dolo by the terrorists France and the United States. Through the knives. They have been the source of some Ÿ In addition to the major challenges mentioned who pour the drink and threaten the vendors not to do Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the UNDP in its preventive community clashes. above, respondents also cited climate change it again. They also buy the pigs, slaughter them and strategy supports national programmes for peaceful and the COVID-19 pandemic as key challenges in prohibit women from doing these activities. There is crisis management, improving trust between the Ÿ Violent extremism and terrorism: Extremist groups the country. Both threats have a negative impact also the adoption of a specic style of dress by population, administration and SDF, and promoting 133 operating in Burkina Faso, particularly in the on the human security of especially women and women, including the compulsory wearing of the veil the culture of peace and social cohesion. Similarly, administrative regions of the Sahel, North Central, children. The insecurity prevents them from without taking into account the religious the UNHCR works on prevention, humanitarian East, Central East, North and Mouhoun regions. beneting from government supports and denomination. In order to avoid being targeted by assistance and resilience building. Preventive The motives for terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso assistance from other development partners. terrorists, some NGOs prohibit themselves from activities involve raising awareness about social creating awareness and sensitisation of issues such

¹²⁷Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion (2015). Report of the study on the state of affairs of community conflicts in Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou, p.42. ¹²⁸ Sombié, I., Sawadogo, P. and Diello, A. (2019). Yirgou drama: from a terrorist attack to a major inter community crisis. Study Report/Project "Nomads facing ¹³¹Dicko, F. and Sorgho, M. (2020). 2020 must mark a turning point in the new place that women occupy in our country," Salimata Nébié said. Queen Mafa. change." Ouagadougou, p.14 https://queenmafa.net/interview-le-terrorisme-burkinabe-cest-de-la-criminalite-de-haut-vol-,accessed 10 January 2020. ¹²⁹Kaboré, M. (2020.) Burkina Faso: "The women of Arbinda must be officially recognized as martyrs of terrorism" (Salimata Nébié/Conombo). Burkina 24. ¹³²OXFAM (2020). Survivors and heroines: Women in the crisis in Burkina Faso. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxfam International. https://www.burkina24.com/2020/07/08/burkina-il-faut accessed on 20 December 2020. ¹³³ This fund is estimated at $14 million (Thiombiano ThiombianoJune 26, 2020). ¹³⁰Ibid. PAGE 64 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 65 cohesion and peaceful coexistence. As far as compact by the MCC Board of Directors has assistance is concerned, physical, psychological strengthened access to low-cost, better quality development and security in the Sahel. UEMOA has a concept, the care of GBV victims and gender and medical support are provided for the benet of electricity. Burkina Faso also benets from US military prevention tool called the Early Warning and Warning consideration in SDF missions. women victims of violence. Resilience is promoted by assistance through logistical support to SDF Mechanism (MeVap). This helps the organisation in Regarding the ght against insecurity and assistance awareness-raising activities on social cohesion and (training, equipment, military exercises). USAID its preventive and response efforts against the to communities, the State has declared a state of peaceful coexistence. provides short- and medium-term support to security threats. emergency in six regions of the country. The SDF has strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities conducted major military operations such as To prevent the impact of crises on women and girls, in the northern and Sahel regions. Ÿ the World Bank is planning to implement a large- Government responses Otapuanu (March 2019 in the eastern and central- scale programme from 2021 focusing on the "Three eastern regions) and Doofu (May 2019 in the Sahel, The national responses are provided by the state Border Zone" and the municipalities of the Sahel Ÿ Regional responses North and North Central regions). In addition, there structures. On prevention, the Prime Minister's Emergency Programme (PUS). The Bank is are permanent security actions (patrols...) across the National Early Warning and Early Response supporting the preventive actions of the restructured The regional actors include AU, ECOWAS, G5 Sahel country especially in conict prone areas. The Mechanism Coordination Centre (CN-CMAPR) Burkina Faso Territorial Communities Support Force, and UEMOA. The AU has supported efforts by SP/CONAP-Genre is involved in managing the needs produces monthly and thematic security alert reports Programme (PACT). The support takes into account the Government of Burkina Faso to increase of GBV victims in collaboration with the Legal for the government. The reports help the Government the health context of the COVID-19 pandemic at the women's leadership in peace and security (ensure Assistance Fund, UNFPA and AFJB. It also provides in the prevention and response to emerging conicts communal level and the provision of essential the consideration of women's voices in conict food and other assistance to communities especially or security challenges. The Ministry of Finance household items to internally displaced persons, the prevention and peacebuilding). During its rst to women. through the Local Economic Development Support operationalisation of the new CT Support Agency, consultative meeting of regional women's, peace Programme (PADEL) and the Sahel Emergency among others. The World Bank has also intervened and security forces in Africa in May 2019 in Programme (PUS/BF), contributes to peace and Ÿ Responses by CSOs/NGOs in building resilience through support for the Ouagadougou, the AU afrmed its commitments to development through economic empowerment Emergency Local Development and Resilience women empowerment and increased roles in projects (female entrepreneurship) for the socio- The non-state actors are contributing in diverse ways Project to improve community access (including peacebuilding ventures. ECOWAS has also shown economic integration of women in 4 regions of to address the peace and security challenges in the internally displaced persons) to critical infrastructure similar support to the plight of women and youth in Burkina Faso. The Ministry in charge of social country. Below is the list of some of the activities and and essential social services in stressed and Burkina Faso. It has also included gender issues in its cohesion has the "Amazons of Peace" Initiative which projects being carried out by CSOs: prevention areas. Regional Early Warning system to address the is composed of 58 women from different concerns of women and girls in the country. WANEP-Burkina: communities aimed at mobilising other women and In order to preserve peace and social cohesion in Ÿ Project on the Peaceful Management of Local The G5-Sahel has a more holistic policy that takes conveying messages of peace in the 13 regions Burkina Faso, the European Union supports CSOs Conicts in the North-Central Region in 2019 prevention, assistance and resilience into account. through awareness creation and education activities. through the EU Emergency Trust Fund (FFU) for (WANEP-Burkina, UNDP funding) Africa. At the same time, it contributes to building Indeed, the strategy for the Development and The government has also established the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of community resilience. On its part, France has initiated Security of the G5-Sahel countries (September 2016) Ÿ Danish demining group (DDG) and WANEP Community Conicts in Burkina Faso (March 2016) to projects on prevention of conict and resilience, takes into account the gender and human rights Women's Leadership Program: Creating a Pool of prevent and ensure the integrated management of through the AFD channel. It has supported the dimension. The February 2020 Integrated Priority Women's Expertise for Inclusive Security community conicts. The Ministry in charge of gender provision of drinking water in urban areas, sanitation Action (CAPI) provides for a women's platform and a Governance in the Sahel. in rural areas, and electricity. To deal with the security network of National Youth Coordinations to support promotion, through the Permanent Secretariat of threat, France is supporting the SDF logistically. efforts to mitigate violence; respect for human rights CONAP-Genre, organises activities to promote OXFAM (British NGO): These forces also benet from military assistance and gender inclusion. The Priority Investment plan positive gender social values in the regions of Ÿ Supporting CSOs in promoting UNSC Resolution from the Barkhane Force on the ground. (2019-2021) in May 2018 developed a project of Burkina Faso. The SP/CONAP-Genre is also involved 1325 on the 20th anniversary. OXFAM marked the women leaders of the G5 Sahel to strengthen the role in the implementation of the Social Cohesion, celebration with strong actions in support of The United States, through Burkina Faso's second of women in the consolidation of social peace, Security and Rule of Law (COSED) programme in women's and girls' commitment to peace and seven regions through training sessions on gender security issues. They support CSOs as part of the PAGE 64 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 65 cohesion and peaceful coexistence. As far as compact by the MCC Board of Directors has assistance is concerned, physical, psychological strengthened access to low-cost, better quality development and security in the Sahel. UEMOA has a concept, the care of GBV victims and gender and medical support are provided for the benet of electricity. Burkina Faso also benets from US military prevention tool called the Early Warning and Warning consideration in SDF missions. women victims of violence. Resilience is promoted by assistance through logistical support to SDF Mechanism (MeVap). This helps the organisation in Regarding the ght against insecurity and assistance awareness-raising activities on social cohesion and (training, equipment, military exercises). USAID its preventive and response efforts against the to communities, the State has declared a state of peaceful coexistence. provides short- and medium-term support to security threats. emergency in six regions of the country. The SDF has strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities conducted major military operations such as To prevent the impact of crises on women and girls, in the northern and Sahel regions. Ÿ the World Bank is planning to implement a large- Government responses Otapuanu (March 2019 in the eastern and central- scale programme from 2021 focusing on the "Three eastern regions) and Doofu (May 2019 in the Sahel, The national responses are provided by the state Border Zone" and the municipalities of the Sahel Ÿ Regional responses North and North Central regions). In addition, there structures. On prevention, the Prime Minister's Emergency Programme (PUS). The Bank is are permanent security actions (patrols...) across the National Early Warning and Early Response supporting the preventive actions of the restructured The regional actors include AU, ECOWAS, G5 Sahel country especially in conict prone areas. The Mechanism Coordination Centre (CN-CMAPR) Burkina Faso Territorial Communities Support Force, and UEMOA. The AU has supported efforts by SP/CONAP-Genre is involved in managing the needs produces monthly and thematic security alert reports Programme (PACT). The support takes into account the Government of Burkina Faso to increase of GBV victims in collaboration with the Legal for the government. The reports help the Government the health context of the COVID-19 pandemic at the women's leadership in peace and security (ensure Assistance Fund, UNFPA and AFJB. It also provides in the prevention and response to emerging conicts communal level and the provision of essential the consideration of women's voices in conict food and other assistance to communities especially or security challenges. The Ministry of Finance household items to internally displaced persons, the prevention and peacebuilding). During its rst to women. through the Local Economic Development Support operationalisation of the new CT Support Agency, consultative meeting of regional women's, peace Programme (PADEL) and the Sahel Emergency among others. The World Bank has also intervened and security forces in Africa in May 2019 in Programme (PUS/BF), contributes to peace and Ÿ Responses by CSOs/NGOs in building resilience through support for the Ouagadougou, the AU afrmed its commitments to development through economic empowerment Emergency Local Development and Resilience women empowerment and increased roles in projects (female entrepreneurship) for the socio- The non-state actors are contributing in diverse ways Project to improve community access (including peacebuilding ventures. ECOWAS has also shown economic integration of women in 4 regions of to address the peace and security challenges in the internally displaced persons) to critical infrastructure similar support to the plight of women and youth in Burkina Faso. The Ministry in charge of social country. Below is the list of some of the activities and and essential social services in stressed and Burkina Faso. It has also included gender issues in its cohesion has the "Amazons of Peace" Initiative which projects being carried out by CSOs: prevention areas. Regional Early Warning system to address the is composed of 58 women from different concerns of women and girls in the country. WANEP-Burkina: communities aimed at mobilising other women and In order to preserve peace and social cohesion in Ÿ Project on the Peaceful Management of Local The G5-Sahel has a more holistic policy that takes conveying messages of peace in the 13 regions Burkina Faso, the European Union supports CSOs Conicts in the North-Central Region in 2019 prevention, assistance and resilience into account. through awareness creation and education activities. through the EU Emergency Trust Fund (FFU) for (WANEP-Burkina, UNDP funding) Africa. At the same time, it contributes to building Indeed, the strategy for the Development and The government has also established the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of community resilience. On its part, France has initiated Security of the G5-Sahel countries (September 2016) Ÿ Danish demining group (DDG) and WANEP Community Conicts in Burkina Faso (March 2016) to projects on prevention of conict and resilience, takes into account the gender and human rights Women's Leadership Program: Creating a Pool of prevent and ensure the integrated management of through the AFD channel. It has supported the dimension. The February 2020 Integrated Priority Women's Expertise for Inclusive Security community conicts. The Ministry in charge of gender provision of drinking water in urban areas, sanitation Action (CAPI) provides for a women's platform and a Governance in the Sahel. in rural areas, and electricity. To deal with the security network of National Youth Coordinations to support promotion, through the Permanent Secretariat of threat, France is supporting the SDF logistically. efforts to mitigate violence; respect for human rights CONAP-Genre, organises activities to promote OXFAM (British NGO): These forces also benet from military assistance and gender inclusion. The Priority Investment plan positive gender social values in the regions of Ÿ Supporting CSOs in promoting UNSC Resolution from the Barkhane Force on the ground. (2019-2021) in May 2018 developed a project of Burkina Faso. The SP/CONAP-Genre is also involved 1325 on the 20th anniversary. OXFAM marked the women leaders of the G5 Sahel to strengthen the role in the implementation of the Social Cohesion, celebration with strong actions in support of The United States, through Burkina Faso's second of women in the consolidation of social peace, Security and Rule of Law (COSED) programme in women's and girls' commitment to peace and seven regions through training sessions on gender security issues. They support CSOs as part of the PAGE 66 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 67

"I matter" campaign, to say that women's rights animations, communications activities, have some limitations which is discussed in the leading to programmes that do not respond to the matter, women's engagement matters” production and performance of forum theatre subsequent section. immediate needs of the local population. Ÿ In terms of resilience building, OXFAM and AJLE sessions. There is also limited human, logistical and nancial are working to respond to the needs of women 3.4.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to resources to implement regional initiatives in the and promoting their active participation in Association of youth development (ADYP): Peace and Security Challenges country. governance and peace-building structures at the Ÿ She4Peace Project from September 15 to Ÿ International responses local, regional and national levels. The AJLE has October 30, 2020 to promote women's and girls' also carried out programmes for the benet of participation in peacebuilding While the initiatives of international partners have had Ÿ Government responses victims, particularly women and girls at risk of Association of Young Evangelical Leaders a denite impact on the lives of women and girls in the violence. (AJLE): conict prone areas, the discontinuity and short-term At the national level, there is lack of follow-up on projects implemented with the support of CECI (Canadian NGO): Ÿ Awareness, training and prayer on peace and funding package of programmes such as the Peacebuilding Fund does not provide a lasting international partners. This is the case with the UNDP- Ÿ Project to support co-consolidation of peace and social cohesion impact. An example of such a programme is the funded "Youth and Peace" project. Moreover, the social cohesion (funded by the PBF) Burkinabe Federation of UNESCO Associations, Association for More Cohesion between North establishment of institutions in charge of community Dialogue without borders: Centres and Clubs (FBACU): Central livestock and Farmers (A.C.E.A.C.N) project conicts and religious events suffers from a lack of Ÿ Awareness campaigns on social cohesion Ÿ Project to "Raise Awareness and Involvement of on the peaceful management of local conicts in the nancial support by the State. These initiatives are through high-level reections and exchanges to Young People in monitoring and preventing communities of Barsalogho, Foubé and Yirgou. The struggling to function optimally because of the lack of understand security and peace issues and violent extremism through the establishment of a project commenced in July 2019 and involved the resources. The state is also not showing sufcient propose solutions community alert mechanism" (Northern Region, organisation of rural activities bringing together leadership in the coordination of humanitarian actors. Ouahigouya, 2019) women from four villages in the Barsalogho This has impacted negatively on the effectiveness of Promediation (French NGO): municipality to promote peaceful coexistence humanitarian care. The lack of strategy for the Africa Youth Network (RAJ): Good Governance Ÿ Organized regional conferences to promote between communities. However, the end of the rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of and Security Project social cohesion and strengthen inter-community project did not allow the implementers to acquire IDPs in Burkina Faso does not allow for the Ÿ relations in the Eastern, Western, Waterfall, North Security stream: promoting dialogue between mesh for the eld fence to separate the farms and strengthening of the resilience of women and girls. and North Central regions SDF, civilians and community leaders through livestock. Similarly, the humanitarian response is The strong focus on emergency actions also regional fora more time limited and its impact is not measured. prevents the focus on sustainable resilience and CHEICK MOAZE FOUNDATION for Social This raises the problem of the quality of humanitarian reconstruction. Cohesion, Peace and Benevolence: YIM (Faso en Marche): actors' response in a context where demand is Ÿ Organised a National Conference on Social Ÿ Project to improve the level of participation of greater than supply. Cohesion and Respect for Authority (19 young people and women in elections and to Ÿ CSO responses September 2020, Ouagadougou) combat electoral and post-election violence for a peaceful and accepted election in the Sahel and Ÿ Regional responses The CSOs often lack the capacity and resources to Ÿ Organised a regional Awareness Conference for Northern regions.135 locally and nationally take ownership of projects Peaceful Elections on "Elections and Homeland" There is lack of complimentary actions or efforts by supported by international actors. Project time is also (Kaya, October 24, 2020) The non-exhaustive inventory of CSOs/NGOs the various regional actors. The peace and security limited to enable actions with sustainable impacts. responses above reveals the different peace and mechanisms of regional organisations (ECOWAS, The majority of international, regional, national and COFEPAX134 security initiatives in Burkina Faso. Most of the CSOs G5-Sahel, Liptako-Gourma Authority and UEMOA) civil society organisation responses are focused on Ÿ Project on: "Involving Burkina Faso women in are supported by donors such as France, Belgium are fragmented with relative impacts. The actors do prevention and assistance. Post-conict sustainable reconciliation and reform processes” which and the United States. But despite this diversity of not often pool their experiences and resources resilience and reconstruction are dimensions that are involves conducting activities such as foras actors and their multiple interventions, the responses together to help address the challenges in Burkina not taken into account by the various responses. Faso. Furthermore, it was also noted by respondents While prevention of conicts is important, ¹³⁴ The Women's Peace and Security Coalition (COFEPAX) is a coalition of 21 women's organisations formed in June 2017. that there is limited/or no involvement of communities consolidating peace and strengthening the socio- ¹³⁵ Follow the documentary ﬁlm - Youth and women's participation in the vote for a peaceful and accepted election. economic capacities of communities and specically https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zsqRHSH3RI. in initiatives affecting them. Thus, the regional interventions are less inclusive and participatory, women and girls is vital to help stabilise the situation in a sustainable way. PAGE 66 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 67

"I matter" campaign, to say that women's rights animations, communications activities, have some limitations which is discussed in the leading to programmes that do not respond to the matter, women's engagement matters” production and performance of forum theatre subsequent section. immediate needs of the local population. Ÿ In terms of resilience building, OXFAM and AJLE sessions. There is also limited human, logistical and nancial are working to respond to the needs of women 3.4.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Responses to resources to implement regional initiatives in the and promoting their active participation in Association of youth development (ADYP): Peace and Security Challenges country. governance and peace-building structures at the Ÿ She4Peace Project from September 15 to Ÿ International responses local, regional and national levels. The AJLE has October 30, 2020 to promote women's and girls' also carried out programmes for the benet of participation in peacebuilding While the initiatives of international partners have had Ÿ Government responses victims, particularly women and girls at risk of Association of Young Evangelical Leaders a denite impact on the lives of women and girls in the violence. (AJLE): conict prone areas, the discontinuity and short-term At the national level, there is lack of follow-up on projects implemented with the support of CECI (Canadian NGO): Ÿ Awareness, training and prayer on peace and funding package of programmes such as the Peacebuilding Fund does not provide a lasting international partners. This is the case with the UNDP- Ÿ Project to support co-consolidation of peace and social cohesion impact. An example of such a programme is the funded "Youth and Peace" project. Moreover, the social cohesion (funded by the PBF) Burkinabe Federation of UNESCO Associations, Association for More Cohesion between North establishment of institutions in charge of community Dialogue without borders: Centres and Clubs (FBACU): Central livestock and Farmers (A.C.E.A.C.N) project conicts and religious events suffers from a lack of Ÿ Awareness campaigns on social cohesion Ÿ Project to "Raise Awareness and Involvement of on the peaceful management of local conicts in the nancial support by the State. These initiatives are through high-level reections and exchanges to Young People in monitoring and preventing communities of Barsalogho, Foubé and Yirgou. The struggling to function optimally because of the lack of understand security and peace issues and violent extremism through the establishment of a project commenced in July 2019 and involved the resources. The state is also not showing sufcient propose solutions community alert mechanism" (Northern Region, organisation of rural activities bringing together leadership in the coordination of humanitarian actors. Ouahigouya, 2019) women from four villages in the Barsalogho This has impacted negatively on the effectiveness of Promediation (French NGO): municipality to promote peaceful coexistence humanitarian care. The lack of strategy for the Africa Youth Network (RAJ): Good Governance Ÿ Organized regional conferences to promote between communities. However, the end of the rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of and Security Project social cohesion and strengthen inter-community project did not allow the implementers to acquire IDPs in Burkina Faso does not allow for the Ÿ relations in the Eastern, Western, Waterfall, North Security stream: promoting dialogue between mesh for the eld fence to separate the farms and strengthening of the resilience of women and girls. and North Central regions SDF, civilians and community leaders through livestock. Similarly, the humanitarian response is The strong focus on emergency actions also regional fora more time limited and its impact is not measured. prevents the focus on sustainable resilience and CHEICK MOAZE FOUNDATION for Social This raises the problem of the quality of humanitarian reconstruction. Cohesion, Peace and Benevolence: YIM (Faso en Marche): actors' response in a context where demand is Ÿ Organised a National Conference on Social Ÿ Project to improve the level of participation of greater than supply. Cohesion and Respect for Authority (19 young people and women in elections and to Ÿ CSO responses September 2020, Ouagadougou) combat electoral and post-election violence for a peaceful and accepted election in the Sahel and Ÿ Regional responses The CSOs often lack the capacity and resources to Ÿ Organised a regional Awareness Conference for Northern regions.135 locally and nationally take ownership of projects Peaceful Elections on "Elections and Homeland" There is lack of complimentary actions or efforts by supported by international actors. Project time is also (Kaya, October 24, 2020) The non-exhaustive inventory of CSOs/NGOs the various regional actors. The peace and security limited to enable actions with sustainable impacts. responses above reveals the different peace and mechanisms of regional organisations (ECOWAS, The majority of international, regional, national and COFEPAX134 security initiatives in Burkina Faso. Most of the CSOs G5-Sahel, Liptako-Gourma Authority and UEMOA) civil society organisation responses are focused on Ÿ Project on: "Involving Burkina Faso women in are supported by donors such as France, Belgium are fragmented with relative impacts. The actors do prevention and assistance. Post-conict sustainable reconciliation and reform processes” which and the United States. But despite this diversity of not often pool their experiences and resources resilience and reconstruction are dimensions that are involves conducting activities such as foras actors and their multiple interventions, the responses together to help address the challenges in Burkina not taken into account by the various responses. Faso. Furthermore, it was also noted by respondents While prevention of conicts is important, ¹³⁴ The Women's Peace and Security Coalition (COFEPAX) is a coalition of 21 women's organisations formed in June 2017. that there is limited/or no involvement of communities consolidating peace and strengthening the socio- ¹³⁵ Follow the documentary ﬁlm - Youth and women's participation in the vote for a peaceful and accepted election. economic capacities of communities and specically https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zsqRHSH3RI. in initiatives affecting them. Thus, the regional interventions are less inclusive and participatory, women and girls is vital to help stabilise the situation in a sustainable way. PAGE 68 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 69

implementation of effective UN Security Council peace and security initiatives for greater impacts 3.4.5. Conclusion and Policy Resolution 1325 to ensure their meaningful instead of the short-term funding cycles. Recommendations participation in peace and political processes in Burkina Faso. Civil Society Organisations Promoting a peaceful society in Burkina Faso requires all actors to play their meaningful roles Ÿ Government should budget for peace or Ÿ CSOs should explore alternative sources of including women and the youth with the support of peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, funding especially from the private sector and multilateral and regional actors. A lot of interventions and resilient resource mobilisation strategy to businesses aside the traditional donors to sustain have been implemented by the Government of support the implementation of initiatives their activities in the long term. Burkina Faso, CSOs, regional and multilateral actors operating in the country. However, despite the limited Ÿ Expand activities/interventions from conict achievements, there were some limitations and Regional and International Actors prevention and the provision of humanitarian pitfalls that were identied in the existing responses. assistance to post-conict resilience building and Ÿ To address these gaps in the existing responses by Prioritise the development and humanitarian reconstruction which are lacking in current the various actors at the national, regional and component of your interventions to compliment responses. international levels, the following recommendations the security dimension instead of the Ÿ are made: preponderant focus on the latter approach. In Increase advocacy on the implementation of essence, promote the security - development - Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments humanitarian nexus in your interventions to by countries in the Sahel region. Government achieve maximum impacts Ÿ Increase advocacy for the inclusion of separate Ÿ Implement the decisions of regional organisations Ÿ Promote better synergy or coordination among peace or peacebuilding programmes budget in (G5-Sahel, ECOWAS, UEMOA...) the key actors in the provision of humanitarian aid National Budgets for a specic amount to be to the people. dedicated to peacebuilding activities. Ÿ Promote local and national ownership of the achievements of international responses to peace Ÿ Provide adequate support to families and host and security communities in need of humanitarian care to reduce frustrations and improve IDP reception Ÿ Ensure the resettlement of IDPs by creating centres. secure reception areas in other parts of the country to enable families to produce and Ÿ Offer alternative economic opportunities to empower themselves and at the same time avoid people especially the youth in areas of insecurity the risk of mass emigration to neighbouring to sustain their livelihoods and to lessen their countries. vulnerability to recruitment by violent extremist or terrorist groups Ÿ Put in place effective measures to address the political, economic, social, cultural and gender Ÿ Promote women's economic empowerment to vulnerabilities reduce their vulnerability through nancial and technical support to set up income generating Ÿ Promote peaceful coexistence and social activities. cohesion through peace education and sensitisation programmes at the community level Ÿ Provide long-term funding of gender-sensitive

Ÿ Strengthen the skills of women and girls to promote peace and security through the PAGE 68 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 69 implementation of effective UN Security Council peace and security initiatives for greater impacts 3.4.5. Conclusion and Policy Resolution 1325 to ensure their meaningful instead of the short-term funding cycles. Recommendations participation in peace and political processes in Burkina Faso. Civil Society Organisations Promoting a peaceful society in Burkina Faso requires all actors to play their meaningful roles Ÿ Government should budget for peace or Ÿ CSOs should explore alternative sources of including women and the youth with the support of peacebuilding and develop a robust, innovative, funding especially from the private sector and multilateral and regional actors. A lot of interventions and resilient resource mobilisation strategy to businesses aside the traditional donors to sustain have been implemented by the Government of support the implementation of initiatives their activities in the long term. Burkina Faso, CSOs, regional and multilateral actors operating in the country. However, despite the limited Ÿ Expand activities/interventions from conict achievements, there were some limitations and Regional and International Actors prevention and the provision of humanitarian pitfalls that were identied in the existing responses. assistance to post-conict resilience building and Ÿ To address these gaps in the existing responses by Prioritise the development and humanitarian reconstruction which are lacking in current the various actors at the national, regional and component of your interventions to compliment responses. international levels, the following recommendations the security dimension instead of the Ÿ are made: preponderant focus on the latter approach. In Increase advocacy on the implementation of essence, promote the security - development - Women, Peace and Security (WPS) commitments humanitarian nexus in your interventions to by countries in the Sahel region. Government achieve maximum impacts Ÿ Increase advocacy for the inclusion of separate Ÿ Implement the decisions of regional organisations Ÿ Promote better synergy or coordination among peace or peacebuilding programmes budget in (G5-Sahel, ECOWAS, UEMOA...) the key actors in the provision of humanitarian aid National Budgets for a specic amount to be to the people. dedicated to peacebuilding activities. Ÿ Promote local and national ownership of the achievements of international responses to peace Ÿ Provide adequate support to families and host and security communities in need of humanitarian care to reduce frustrations and improve IDP reception Ÿ Ensure the resettlement of IDPs by creating centres. secure reception areas in other parts of the country to enable families to produce and Ÿ Offer alternative economic opportunities to empower themselves and at the same time avoid people especially the youth in areas of insecurity the risk of mass emigration to neighbouring to sustain their livelihoods and to lessen their countries. vulnerability to recruitment by violent extremist or terrorist groups Ÿ Put in place effective measures to address the political, economic, social, cultural and gender Ÿ Promote women's economic empowerment to vulnerabilities reduce their vulnerability through nancial and technical support to set up income generating Ÿ Promote peaceful coexistence and social activities. cohesion through peace education and sensitisation programmes at the community level Ÿ Provide long-term funding of gender-sensitive

Ÿ Strengthen the skills of women and girls to promote peace and security through the PAGE 70 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 71

References

Ÿ French Development Agency. (2020). 22 projects in pictures and results. Ÿ Sawadogo, P. (2016). The impact of climate change on community cohesion in West https://www.afd.fr/fr/sahel-projets-images-resultats, accessed 25 December 2020 Africa and the Sahel: the case of conicts between farmers and herders in Burkina Faso. IPD- AOS contribution to COP22. Ÿ U.S. Embassy in Burkina Faso (May 7, 2020). Backgrounder: Expanded U.S. Engagement in Burkina Faso. https://bf.usembassy.gov/fr/che-dinformation-engagement-elargi-des-etats-, Ÿ Sombié, I., Sawadogo, P. and Diello, A. (2019). Yirgou drama: from a terrorist attack to a accessed 20 December 2020. major inter-community crisis. Study Report/Project "Nomads facing change." Ouagadougou.

Ÿ National Centre for the Coordination of the Early Warning and Response Mechanism. (2018). Ÿ Sombié, I., Sawadogo, P. and Diello, A. (2019). History and typology of conicts in Burkina Faso Local security initiatives and security issues in Burkina Faso. Thematic report. First ministry. (1960 to the present). Study Report/Project "Nomads facing change." Ouagadougou. Ouagadougou. Ÿ Thiombiano, A. (June 26, 2020). Burkina Faso: The peace-building fund in Burkina Faso is being Ÿ European Commission (2019). In Burkina Faso, preserving peace and social cohesion is a rehabilitated. Burkina24. https://www.burkina24.com/2020/06/26/burkina-le-fonds-de-, priority for the FFU. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/all-news-and-stories/au- accessed 28 December 2020. burkina, accessed 22 December 2020. Ÿ WANEP. (2017). Agro-pastoral conict in Burkina Faso: A localised crisis with transnational Ÿ Compaoré, I. (Director). (July 2020). Youth and women's participation in the vote for a ramications. Warn Policy Brief. peaceful and accepted election. [Film]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zsqRHSH3RI, accessed 22 December 2020.

Ÿ Dicko, F. and Sorgho, M. (March 11, 2020). "2020 must mark a turning point in the new place that women occupy in our country," Salimata Nébié said. Queen Mafa. https://queenmafa.net/interview-le-terrorisme-burkinabe-cest-de, accessed 22 December 2020.

Ÿ Kaboré, M. (08 July 2020.) Burkina Faso: "The women of Arbinda must be ofcially recognized as martyrs of terrorism" (Salimata Nébié/Conombo). Burkina 24. https://www.burkina24.com/2020/07/08/burkina-il-faut-que-les-femmes-darbinda-soient, accessed on 20 December 2020.

Ÿ Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion (2015). Report of the study on the state of affairs of community conicts in Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou: Government of Burkina Faso

Ÿ Ouédraogo, S. (2018) The re-enactment of Upper Volta on September 4, 1947: Landmarks for the Construction of the Nation, [Film]. Burkina International, Endogenous.

Ÿ OXFAM (2020). Survivors and heroines: Women in the crisis in Burkina Faso. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxfam International.

Ÿ Sanhouidi, B. J. V., Sawadogo, P. and Dabiré B. (2020). Security challenges and development cooperation in Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou, Study sponsored by dg-Coop the supervision of empt- Bamako.

Ÿ Sawadogo, P. and Sawadogo, I. (2016). Conicts between farmers and herders: a "transnational" threat to peace and security in Burkina Faso and West Africa. ECOWAS- sponsored study under PAGE 70 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 71

References

Ÿ Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion (2015). Report of the study on the state of affairs of community conicts in Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou: Government of Burkina Faso

Ÿ Ouédraogo, S. (2018) The re-enactment of Upper Volta on September 4, 1947: Landmarks for the Construction of the Nation, [Film]. Burkina International, Endogenous.

Ÿ OXFAM (2020). Survivors and heroines: Women in the crisis in Burkina Faso. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxfam International.

Ÿ Sanhouidi, B. J. V., Sawadogo, P. and Dabiré B. (2020). Security challenges and development cooperation in Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou, Study sponsored by dg-Coop the supervision of empt- Bamako.

Ÿ Sawadogo, P. and Sawadogo, I. (2016). Conicts between farmers and herders: a "transnational" threat to peace and security in Burkina Faso and West Africa. ECOWAS- sponsored study under PAGE 72 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 73

The multidimensional challenges of peace in Côte Ÿ Peace through inclusive growth d'Ivoire are mainly of three main types: security, Ÿ The ght against poverty and socio-political and economic. Ÿ the reduction of socio-economic inequalities Côte d’ivoire Socio-political: The tension and violence during Security: The challenges at this level relate to the the presidential elections of October 2020 indicate 3.5.1 Overview of the Multi-layered Peace and Security Challenges large-scale reconstruction of the Ivorian army. First that Côte d'Ivoire is still looking for peaceful downgraded during the governance of President governance and a rule of law. Moreover, the Figure 4.3.1. Map of Côte d'Ivoire Félix Houphouet-Boigny, then instrumentalised for perceived tensions in the Ivorian social setting clearly political struggles during the 1990s, it nally became demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the national a major player in the Ivorian crisis.136 The army really reconciliation process. So, the challenges at the entered the political game through the military coup sociopolitical level relates to: d'état of 1999 before remaining there permanently Ÿ Governance and the rule of law Ÿ with the armed rebellion of 2002. For ten (10) years, National reconciliation there were two opposing armed forces. On the one hand, the Defence and Security Forces (SDF) of the 3.5.2. Specic Challenges Facing Women and State of Côte d'Ivoire and on the other, the armed Girls forces of the New Forces resulting from the 2002 rebellion. After the post-election crisis of 2010 that left The specic challenges faced by women and girls are 3000 people dead, the Ivorian army was reformed. mainly three (3): socio-economic marginalisation, gender-based violence, violence in times of political However, there are still some security challenges crisis and armed conict. which include: Socio-economic and political marginalisation: Ÿ T h e r e  n e m e n t o f t h e D i s a r m a m e n t , In Côte d'Ivoire, the socio-economic downgrading of Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process women and girls is an indisputable reality. Faced with Ÿ Security sector reform the poverty of their households, they are often forced Ÿ The ght against terrorism and violent extremism to be pillars of their families. Mothers, wives, Ÿ Urban violence of young people Ÿ Social cohesion shopkeepers, farmers, they hold these roles at the risk of their health and life. In the country, one of the Economic: Poverty and socio-economic strong expressions of the marginalisation of young inequalities are a breeding ground for conict. In fact, girls is the increase in recent years of school for the World Bank, poverty is the major source of pregnancies, thus weakening their educational armed conict in Africa. 137In the Ivorian context, the background. The Executive Director of UNFPA in various political crises have weakened the country's Côte d'Ivoire stated in 2014 that: "Teenage economic capacity and accelerated the poverty rate pregnancies originate in poverty, gender inequality, during the period 1993-2000. But since 2012, Côte violence, child marriage and forced marriage, d'Ivoire has placed economic recovery at the heart of imbalances between adolescent girls and their male its peace agenda. This strategy raises three partners in imposing their will, lack of education and questions that need to be resolved in order to the failure of systems and institutions to protect their 138 consolidate peace and strengthen security: rights."

¹³⁶Kieﬀer, G.A. (2000). Ivorian Army: Refusal to Decommission. African Policy, No.78, 26-39. ¹³⁷Collier, P. et Hoeﬄer A. (1998), On economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 50, Oxford University Press, 563-573. Source : Nationonline Project ¹³⁸To see UNFPA WCARO | Pregnancy among the Adolescents School In Côte d'Ivoire: Government And l'UNFPA tackle The Scourge ; poche_20182019_fr.pdf (men-dpes.org) PAGE 72 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 73

¹³⁶Kieﬀer, G.A. (2000). Ivorian Army: Refusal to Decommission. African Policy, No.78, 26-39. ¹³⁷Collier, P. et Hoeﬄer A. (1998), On economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 50, Oxford University Press, 563-573. Source : Nationonline Project ¹³⁸To see UNFPA WCARO | Pregnancy among the Adolescents School In Côte d'Ivoire: Government And l'UNFPA tackle The Scourge ; poche_20182019_fr.pdf (men-dpes.org) PAGE 74 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 75

The phenomenon continues even as the government household poverty. While some were victims of The aim of this concentration of international actions In terms of humanitarian action, several UN agencies continues to raise awareness on the issue. In the physical and sexual violence during armed was to make a substantial contribution to the search were active during the period 2002-2010. 2018-2019 school statistics, the Ministry of National clashes,145/146 others voluntarily joined the Forces for peace in the country and to help to address the Organisations such as UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, FAO, Education and Vocational Training reports 127 cases Nouvelles rebellion and alongside Laurent Gbagbo's socio-economic, security, humanitarian and political IOM mainly covered the North-West Central areas of pregnancy at the primary level and 4,475 cases at loyalist forces (Diallo, 2018). Their long-term fragility fragilities of the population. These combined actions controlled by the Forces Nouvelles rebellion. The the secondary level.139 In addition, the rural world as a result of the military-political crisis may be an focus on mediation, peacekeeping and humanitarian humanitarian situation there was much more continues to concentrate the high rate of women's entry-level for some entrepreneurs of violence such action. worrying. The European Union, for its part, also poverty in Côte d'Ivoire. According to the National as terrorist movements in border communities. supported the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire through Statistics Institute, 75% of rural women live below the Regarding multilateral actors, the UN was at the its support for mediation, and peacekeeping through poverty line. At the political level, they also have low forefront of international interventions. It's presence ofcial development assistance and its humanitarian 3.5.3. Responses to the Peace and Security participation in political decision-making processes in Côte d'Ivoire was rst through the High Challenges action through the activities of the European and their political skills are sometimes even denied. 149 Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to manage the Humanitarian Commission (ECHO). In a political crisis, women and girls are the rst situation of Liberian refugees from Liberia's civil war 140/141 Responses to the challenges of peace and security in victims of power struggles. 147 Côte d'Ivoire are multifaceted and varied. These that began in 1989. At the beginning of the 2002- Regarding bilateral international actors, the most armed rebellion, the United Nations was active in striking example is France's involvement in the peace Gender-based violence (GBV): According to responses are mainly spread over two periods - the mediating to end the conict. From the 2003 Linas- process in Côte d'Ivoire since the beginning of the statistics from the Ministry of Family, Women and resolution of the military-political conict and the Marcoussis agreements to the 2007 Ouagadougou armed conict in 2002. At the level of mediation, Children, 36% of women in Côte d'Ivoire are victims of search for peace that runs from 2002 to 2011 and, the political agreement, the 2004 Accra agreements and French diplomacy was very active during the period physical, psychological, moral and sexual violence. consolidation of peace since the end of the post- the 2005 Pretoria Agreement, the United Nations was 2002-2011. It initiated the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Despite efforts by the government over the past election crisis of 2010-2011. At the vertical level, these heavily involved in nding solutions to the Ivorian Accords and conducted active diplomacy with the several years, gender-based violence continues in responses are provided by international, regional and problem. Several Security Council resolutions were UN Security Council in the management and the country. Political crises weakening the social national actors. From a horizontal point of view, they issued as part of the process to end the crises. resolution of the Ivorian crisis. Regarding fabric and the family are major causes. Women in cover several sectors: security, humanitarian, socio- peacekeeping, it participated in ending the armed areas of armed conict and those considered educational, health, economic and political. With regard to peacekeeping, a United Nations conict at the "buffer zone" level through the displaced have been shown to experience a greater mission to Côte d'Ivoire for the observation of the deployment of the "Unicorn" force under the auspices propensity for physical, psychological and sexual Ÿ International responses peace process was rst set up on 13 May 2013. of the United Nations. In addition, French troops violence. The challenge for the Ivorian authorities is Then, in the face of the exacerbation of armed participated in securing the 2010 election and ending 142/143 mainly to strengthen the legal framework for the The international responses involved multilateral violence and the risk of widespread violence, the the 2010-11 post-election crisis with the use of force repression of gender-based violence and to raise actors and the bilateral actors of Côte d'Ivoire such as United Nations created the United Nations in Côte (Peace enforcement). France also supported the awareness of these practices on a large scale.144 France, Germany, Norway among others. d'Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI as a peace mission in Côte peace process through ofcial development d'Ivoire was deployed to freeze the conict and keep assistance. The French Development Agency (AFD) Violence in times of political crisis and armed the peace and impose a demarcation line called a was from 2008 the catalyst for France's development conict: Because of their vulnerability, women are Ÿ The time of the resolution of the Ivorian "buffer zone" between the warring forces. It invested actions in Côte d'Ivoire. In terms of humanitarian generally victims of political crises and armed conict and the search for peace (2002- in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration action, France supported French NGOs present in conicts. However, they are also sometimes actors of 2011): (DDR) process from 2003 to 2010. Finally, the Côte d'Ivoire, including the French Red Cross. Other gun violence. Côte d'Ivoire's military-political crises During this period, there was a strong intervention by mission provided technical, nancial and security state development agencies have been much more since 1999 have severely affected women. It has multilateral and bilateral international actors in a assistance during the 2010 electoral process that active in the humanitarian eld. This is the case, for weakened their economic activities and exacerbated country cut in half and plagued by armed violence. 148 nally led to the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. example, with USAID on health issues and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). ¹³⁹Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, Pocket School Statistics, 2018-2019. To see Directorate of Strategies, Planificationet Statistics (DSPS) (men- dpes.org) ¹⁴⁰See Report World Bank consultations on the Kind: "Being a woman in Côte d'Ivoire: What empowerment strategies?", June 2013. ¹⁴¹ Ibid. ¹⁴² See Report by the Ministry of Family, Women and Social Affairs and UNFPA on: "Crisis and Gender-Based Violence in Côte d'Ivoire: Results of Studies and Key ¹⁴⁷Djane, A. and Kouakou Konan, J. (2017), Humanitarian in Côted'Ivoire: dynamics and issues of transition, in Fouquet,T. and Troit, V. (ed.), Humanitarian Challenges," 2008. Transition in Côte d'Ivoire, Karthala, "Humanitarian in the Future" Collection, 27-42. ¹⁴³ Ibid. ¹⁴⁸Chelpi-den, Hbitter, M. (2015), Thetribulations of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militiamen in Côte d'Ivoire (2003-2015), ¹⁴⁴ For more information see Report 2019, UNFPA Côte d'Ivoire. Herodotus,No. 158, 200-218. ¹⁴⁵ Interview with an NGO manager in Bouaké; Interview with the African small arms and light weapons network in Abidjan. ¹⁴⁹Djané and Kouakou, (2017), op. cit. ¹⁴⁶Interview with an official of the American NGO National Democratic Institute Côte d'Ivoire (NDI), in Abidjan, November 19, 2020. PAGE 74 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 75

The phenomenon continues even as the government household poverty. While some were victims of The aim of this concentration of international actions In terms of humanitarian action, several UN agencies continues to raise awareness on the issue. In the physical and sexual violence during armed was to make a substantial contribution to the search were active during the period 2002-2010. 2018-2019 school statistics, the Ministry of National clashes,145/146 others voluntarily joined the Forces for peace in the country and to help to address the Organisations such as UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, FAO, Education and Vocational Training reports 127 cases Nouvelles rebellion and alongside Laurent Gbagbo's socio-economic, security, humanitarian and political IOM mainly covered the North-West Central areas of pregnancy at the primary level and 4,475 cases at loyalist forces (Diallo, 2018). Their long-term fragility fragilities of the population. These combined actions controlled by the Forces Nouvelles rebellion. The the secondary level.139 In addition, the rural world as a result of the military-political crisis may be an focus on mediation, peacekeeping and humanitarian humanitarian situation there was much more continues to concentrate the high rate of women's entry-level for some entrepreneurs of violence such action. worrying. The European Union, for its part, also poverty in Côte d'Ivoire. According to the National as terrorist movements in border communities. supported the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire through Statistics Institute, 75% of rural women live below the Regarding multilateral actors, the UN was at the its support for mediation, and peacekeeping through poverty line. At the political level, they also have low forefront of international interventions. It's presence ofcial development assistance and its humanitarian 3.5.3. Responses to the Peace and Security participation in political decision-making processes in Côte d'Ivoire was rst through the High Challenges action through the activities of the European and their political skills are sometimes even denied. 149 Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to manage the Humanitarian Commission (ECHO). In a political crisis, women and girls are the rst situation of Liberian refugees from Liberia's civil war 140/141 Responses to the challenges of peace and security in victims of power struggles. 147 Côte d'Ivoire are multifaceted and varied. These that began in 1989. At the beginning of the 2002- Regarding bilateral international actors, the most armed rebellion, the United Nations was active in striking example is France's involvement in the peace Gender-based violence (GBV): According to responses are mainly spread over two periods - the mediating to end the conict. From the 2003 Linas- process in Côte d'Ivoire since the beginning of the statistics from the Ministry of Family, Women and resolution of the military-political conict and the Marcoussis agreements to the 2007 Ouagadougou armed conict in 2002. At the level of mediation, Children, 36% of women in Côte d'Ivoire are victims of search for peace that runs from 2002 to 2011 and, the political agreement, the 2004 Accra agreements and French diplomacy was very active during the period physical, psychological, moral and sexual violence. consolidation of peace since the end of the post- the 2005 Pretoria Agreement, the United Nations was 2002-2011. It initiated the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Despite efforts by the government over the past election crisis of 2010-2011. At the vertical level, these heavily involved in nding solutions to the Ivorian Accords and conducted active diplomacy with the several years, gender-based violence continues in responses are provided by international, regional and problem. Several Security Council resolutions were UN Security Council in the management and the country. Political crises weakening the social national actors. From a horizontal point of view, they issued as part of the process to end the crises. resolution of the Ivorian crisis. Regarding fabric and the family are major causes. Women in cover several sectors: security, humanitarian, socio- peacekeeping, it participated in ending the armed areas of armed conict and those considered educational, health, economic and political. With regard to peacekeeping, a United Nations conict at the "buffer zone" level through the displaced have been shown to experience a greater mission to Côte d'Ivoire for the observation of the deployment of the "Unicorn" force under the auspices propensity for physical, psychological and sexual Ÿ International responses peace process was rst set up on 13 May 2013. of the United Nations. In addition, French troops violence. The challenge for the Ivorian authorities is Then, in the face of the exacerbation of armed participated in securing the 2010 election and ending 142/143 mainly to strengthen the legal framework for the The international responses involved multilateral violence and the risk of widespread violence, the the 2010-11 post-election crisis with the use of force repression of gender-based violence and to raise actors and the bilateral actors of Côte d'Ivoire such as United Nations created the United Nations in Côte (Peace enforcement). France also supported the awareness of these practices on a large scale.144 France, Germany, Norway among others. d'Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI as a peace mission in Côte peace process through ofcial development d'Ivoire was deployed to freeze the conict and keep assistance. The French Development Agency (AFD) Violence in times of political crisis and armed the peace and impose a demarcation line called a was from 2008 the catalyst for France's development conict: Because of their vulnerability, women are Ÿ The time of the resolution of the Ivorian "buffer zone" between the warring forces. It invested actions in Côte d'Ivoire. In terms of humanitarian generally victims of political crises and armed conict and the search for peace (2002- in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration action, France supported French NGOs present in conicts. However, they are also sometimes actors of 2011): (DDR) process from 2003 to 2010. Finally, the Côte d'Ivoire, including the French Red Cross. Other gun violence. Côte d'Ivoire's military-political crises During this period, there was a strong intervention by mission provided technical, nancial and security state development agencies have been much more since 1999 have severely affected women. It has multilateral and bilateral international actors in a assistance during the 2010 electoral process that active in the humanitarian eld. This is the case, for weakened their economic activities and exacerbated country cut in half and plagued by armed violence. 148 nally led to the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. example, with USAID on health issues and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). ¹³⁹Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, Pocket School Statistics, 2018-2019. To see Directorate of Strategies, Planificationet Statistics (DSPS) (men- dpes.org) ¹⁴⁰See Report World Bank consultations on the Kind: "Being a woman in Côte d'Ivoire: What empowerment strategies?", June 2013. ¹⁴¹ Ibid. ¹⁴² See Report by the Ministry of Family, Women and Social Affairs and UNFPA on: "Crisis and Gender-Based Violence in Côte d'Ivoire: Results of Studies and Key ¹⁴⁷Djane, A. and Kouakou Konan, J. (2017), Humanitarian in Côted'Ivoire: dynamics and issues of transition, in Fouquet,T. and Troit, V. (ed.), Humanitarian Challenges," 2008. Transition in Côte d'Ivoire, Karthala, "Humanitarian in the Future" Collection, 27-42. ¹⁴³ Ibid. ¹⁴⁸Chelpi-den, Hbitter, M. (2015), Thetribulations of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militiamen in Côte d'Ivoire (2003-2015), ¹⁴⁴ For more information see Report 2019, UNFPA Côte d'Ivoire. Herodotus,No. 158, 200-218. ¹⁴⁵ Interview with an NGO manager in Bouaké; Interview with the African small arms and light weapons network in Abidjan. ¹⁴⁹Djané and Kouakou, (2017), op. cit. ¹⁴⁶Interview with an official of the American NGO National Democratic Institute Côte d'Ivoire (NDI), in Abidjan, November 19, 2020. PAGE 76 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 77

supported by the representation of the European (ECOMICI), to help end the Ivorian armed conict. and the armed forces of the new forces Ÿ The moment of peacebuilding (2011-2020) Union in Côte d'Ivoire. AfD's development constituted the various factions. For this reason, partnership is divided into three points: development This active diplomacy of ECOWAS was also evident the military was described as an "army of The end of the post-election crisis of 2010-2011 deleveraging contracts, support for the private 152 during the recent electoral crisis of 2020. Before, factions" The integration of rebels into the army restored constitutional order in the country after ten sector and partnership with French NGOs operating during and after the presidential election in October at the post-crisis period raised the question of (10) years of crisis. International actions to support in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, in the ght against 2020, ECOWAS in collaboration with the AU and the cohesion within the armed forces of Côte peacebuilding was consistent with Côte d'Ivoire's terrorism, France provides technical, material and 153 UN initiated meetings with stakeholders in the Ivorian d'Ivoire. To address this problem, a DDR post-crisis economic emergence plan. The Ivorian nancial support to Côte d'Ivoire. The country political game to reduce tensions and create the process and the reform of the security sector was state reafrmed its authority by taking control of occupies a strategic position in the ght against the conditions for a peaceful presidential election. In undertaken under the regime of Alassane priority sectors (education, health, food, etc.) and proliferation of terrorist and extremist movements in 1 5 4 addition, it dispatched a ministerial mission of O u a t t a r a . E s t a b l i s h e d i n 2 0 1 2 , t h e managed them independently. the Sahel and the rest of West Africa. preventive diplomacy with the idea of continuing the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration recommendations of the joint ECOWAS-AU-UN Authority (ADDR) led the DDR process, which With regard to multilateral international actors, the The United States, for its part, continues to provide mission. ECOWAS then embarked on an election ended in 2015. At the end, the ADDR succeeded United Nations system provided support for the DDR support through USAID-managed health programs observation mission to ensure the legitimacy and in reintegrating 52,000 ex-combatants out of a process and the security sector reform totally led by (The health sector occupies 90% of USAID's actions). credibility of the vote. Finally, in the search for total strength of 74,000. However, 18,000 could the State of Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the post- The organisation also intervenes in the area of solutions to the electoral crisis, the joint ECOWAS- not be integrated.155 The reform of the security election crisis. Despite the end of UNOCI's mandate governance, democracy and inclusive peace. AU-UN mission was reactivated to facilitate dialogue sector, on the other hand, consisted of a major in June 2017, the UN continued to play its role as a Programmes such as "Ivory Coast Transition Initiative among stakeholders. The ECOWAS actions had the restructuring of the Ivorian army to make it more peacekeeper in Côte d'Ivoire. During the recent post- 1 and 2" have focused on conict prevention and effect of preserving the socio-political climate and professional. To achieve this goal, the State election crisis of 2020, the permanent representative management mechanisms in the west of the country curbing widespread violence. The integrated created the National Security Council in 2012 to of the United Nations system was involved in nding and on the situation of ex-combatants.151 Since 2019, ECOWAS-AU-UN approach is innovative in that it lead this reform. In addition, there was the solutions to the crisis. In addition, the organisation the American NGO National Democratic Institute harmonises the views of these international establishment of elite units such as the continues to support peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire (NDI) has been leading the "Transition and Political organisations in the prevention and resolution of Coordinating Centre for Operational Decisions through the actions of its specialised agencies such Inclusion" programme in Côte d'Ivoire on the political crises. Besides ECOWAS, the AU has also (CCDO) and the Special Forces of Côte d'Ivoire. In as UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women, UNICEF, IOM, FAO consolidation of peace and democracy. been active in mediation and was involved in and WFP. The European Union, for its part, not only the ght against terrorism, Côte d'Ivoire has resolving the 2010-11 post-election crisis. At the supports development in Côte d'Ivoire but also strengthened its security apparatus. Despite its peacekeeping level, it supported the ECOWAS campaigns to raise people's awareness of peace. An Ÿ Regional responses remoteness from areas plagued by terrorist mission based on the principle of subsidiarity. example is the collaboration between the EU and the movements (Sahel-Saharan Band, Liptako- magic system musical group that has been going on The regional responses to the Ivorian crisis have Gourma, Lake Chad basin, etc.), it remains a since 2019. This initiative called the EU-Magic Tour is mostly been led by ECOWAS. It has been involved in potential target of terrorist attacks. The economic Ÿ National Responses about sharing the values of peace throughout the active diplomacy in the country than any other heart of West Africa and a country with high 150 regional organisations such as UEMOA, CEN-SAD immigration rates in the region, Côte d'Ivoire is country through music. National responses to peace and security challenges and the Mano River Union. ECOWAS was also now a strategic place in the ght against terrorism. include three components: security, economic and France, for its part, supports peacebuilding from two involved in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire from For example, it supported the deployment of socio-political. angles: Preventive diplomacy and AFD's 2002 to 2011 using its good ofces to mediate the French forces from Operation Serval against development actions. Preventive diplomacy focuses crisis. The mediation and preventive diplomacy of Ÿ At the security level:After the severe post- terrorist armed groups in the Sahel in 2013. The on the use of the good ofces of France to prevent ECOWAS led to the signing of various peace election crisis of 2010-2011, the Ivorian army presence of a French military base on Ivorian soil any outburst of violence in the country, particularly agreements. In 2003, ECOWAS launched a peace reformed itself. Several heterogeneous and is a major part of the counter-terrorism operations during the presidential election in October 2020. It is mission called ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire antagonistic forces, including the former defence in West Africa. Côte d'Ivoire's strategic position and security forces (SDF) under Laurent Gbagbo presents itself as a "possible bulwark" in the ght

¹⁵⁰Interview with the National Council of human rights in Bouak11 November 2020. ¹⁵¹Djané and Kouakou, (2017),op.cit. p.31. ¹⁵²Miran-Guyon, M. (2017). Ivory Coast, the return of the elephant? Thematic introduction. Contemporary Africa, No. 263-264, 11-23. ¹⁵³Leboeuf, A. (2016), The Reform of the Security Sector in theIvorian, Ifri Studies. ¹⁵⁴ibid ¹⁵⁵Miran-Guyon, (2017). Op.cit PAGE 76 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 77 supported by the representation of the European (ECOMICI), to help end the Ivorian armed conict. and the armed forces of the new forces Ÿ The moment of peacebuilding (2011-2020) Union in Côte d'Ivoire. AfD's development constituted the various factions. For this reason, partnership is divided into three points: development This active diplomacy of ECOWAS was also evident the military was described as an "army of The end of the post-election crisis of 2010-2011 deleveraging contracts, support for the private 152 during the recent electoral crisis of 2020. Before, factions" The integration of rebels into the army restored constitutional order in the country after ten sector and partnership with French NGOs operating during and after the presidential election in October at the post-crisis period raised the question of (10) years of crisis. International actions to support in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, in the ght against 2020, ECOWAS in collaboration with the AU and the cohesion within the armed forces of Côte peacebuilding was consistent with Côte d'Ivoire's terrorism, France provides technical, material and 153 UN initiated meetings with stakeholders in the Ivorian d'Ivoire. To address this problem, a DDR post-crisis economic emergence plan. The Ivorian nancial support to Côte d'Ivoire. The country political game to reduce tensions and create the process and the reform of the security sector was state reafrmed its authority by taking control of occupies a strategic position in the ght against the conditions for a peaceful presidential election. In undertaken under the regime of Alassane priority sectors (education, health, food, etc.) and proliferation of terrorist and extremist movements in 1 5 4 addition, it dispatched a ministerial mission of O u a t t a r a . E s t a b l i s h e d i n 2 0 1 2 , t h e managed them independently. the Sahel and the rest of West Africa. preventive diplomacy with the idea of continuing the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration recommendations of the joint ECOWAS-AU-UN Authority (ADDR) led the DDR process, which With regard to multilateral international actors, the The United States, for its part, continues to provide mission. ECOWAS then embarked on an election ended in 2015. At the end, the ADDR succeeded United Nations system provided support for the DDR support through USAID-managed health programs observation mission to ensure the legitimacy and in reintegrating 52,000 ex-combatants out of a process and the security sector reform totally led by (The health sector occupies 90% of USAID's actions). credibility of the vote. Finally, in the search for total strength of 74,000. However, 18,000 could the State of Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the post- The organisation also intervenes in the area of solutions to the electoral crisis, the joint ECOWAS- not be integrated.155 The reform of the security election crisis. Despite the end of UNOCI's mandate governance, democracy and inclusive peace. AU-UN mission was reactivated to facilitate dialogue sector, on the other hand, consisted of a major in June 2017, the UN continued to play its role as a Programmes such as "Ivory Coast Transition Initiative among stakeholders. The ECOWAS actions had the restructuring of the Ivorian army to make it more peacekeeper in Côte d'Ivoire. During the recent post- 1 and 2" have focused on conict prevention and effect of preserving the socio-political climate and professional. To achieve this goal, the State election crisis of 2020, the permanent representative management mechanisms in the west of the country curbing widespread violence. The integrated created the National Security Council in 2012 to of the United Nations system was involved in nding and on the situation of ex-combatants.151 Since 2019, ECOWAS-AU-UN approach is innovative in that it lead this reform. In addition, there was the solutions to the crisis. In addition, the organisation the American NGO National Democratic Institute harmonises the views of these international establishment of elite units such as the continues to support peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire (NDI) has been leading the "Transition and Political organisations in the prevention and resolution of Coordinating Centre for Operational Decisions through the actions of its specialised agencies such Inclusion" programme in Côte d'Ivoire on the political crises. Besides ECOWAS, the AU has also (CCDO) and the Special Forces of Côte d'Ivoire. In as UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women, UNICEF, IOM, FAO consolidation of peace and democracy. been active in mediation and was involved in and WFP. The European Union, for its part, not only the ght against terrorism, Côte d'Ivoire has resolving the 2010-11 post-election crisis. At the supports development in Côte d'Ivoire but also strengthened its security apparatus. Despite its peacekeeping level, it supported the ECOWAS campaigns to raise people's awareness of peace. An Ÿ Regional responses remoteness from areas plagued by terrorist mission based on the principle of subsidiarity. example is the collaboration between the EU and the movements (Sahel-Saharan Band, Liptako- magic system musical group that has been going on The regional responses to the Ivorian crisis have Gourma, Lake Chad basin, etc.), it remains a since 2019. This initiative called the EU-Magic Tour is mostly been led by ECOWAS. It has been involved in potential target of terrorist attacks. The economic Ÿ National Responses about sharing the values of peace throughout the active diplomacy in the country than any other heart of West Africa and a country with high 150 regional organisations such as UEMOA, CEN-SAD immigration rates in the region, Côte d'Ivoire is country through music. National responses to peace and security challenges and the Mano River Union. ECOWAS was also now a strategic place in the ght against terrorism. include three components: security, economic and France, for its part, supports peacebuilding from two involved in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire from For example, it supported the deployment of socio-political. angles: Preventive diplomacy and AFD's 2002 to 2011 using its good ofces to mediate the French forces from Operation Serval against development actions. Preventive diplomacy focuses crisis. The mediation and preventive diplomacy of Ÿ At the security level:After the severe post- terrorist armed groups in the Sahel in 2013. The on the use of the good ofces of France to prevent ECOWAS led to the signing of various peace election crisis of 2010-2011, the Ivorian army presence of a French military base on Ivorian soil any outburst of violence in the country, particularly agreements. In 2003, ECOWAS launched a peace reformed itself. Several heterogeneous and is a major part of the counter-terrorism operations during the presidential election in October 2020. It is mission called ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire antagonistic forces, including the former defence in West Africa. Côte d'Ivoire's strategic position and security forces (SDF) under Laurent Gbagbo presents itself as a "possible bulwark" in the ght

against terrorism and violent extremism. This has been based on the so-called "elephant created in 2011 with much hope and great warn of the violence that marred the smooth running explains why, in the framework of an agreement triumph" scenario as announced in the National ambition to "replicate" the success of the Truth and of the election in some localities. In the post-conict between France and Côte d'Ivoire, they decided to Development Plan (2012-2015). Under this Reconciliation Commission of South Africa has context in Côte d'Ivoire, issues such as national set up an international academy to ght terrorism. approach, reviving the country's economic growth not succeeded in its mission of true reconciliation. reconciliation, reparation for victims of the crisis, The launch ceremony for the academy's was envisaged to guarantee peace and social It was weakened by its strong politicisation.159 All political dialogue, women's political participation, construction site took place in October 2018. The cohesion. It is a liberal approach to peace.157 The the institutions created as a result of the CDVR non-violence and the movement of small arms and academy's ambition is "to promote global state played the leading role in managing have had their mission undermined by the inability light weapons are brought to the attention of policy response to terrorism, from intelligence to judicial humanitarian aid itself through the Presidential of political actors to transcend their differences in makers by civil society actors. The concerted actions response to the action of specialized forces." Emergency Programme (PPU) and by order to agree on a roadmap for sincere of Ivorian civil society actors are being taken on a Although not being a member of the G5 Sahel, the streamlining its economic recovery with the reconciliation. The 2018 amnesty order, which general platform called the 162 "Ivorian Civil Society country is still a key player in the region, especially national development programme. 1 5 8 This was a far-reaching act, could not be the expected Convention". The platform members constitute a pool with the establishment of this international economic strategy, which has placed the state at catalyst for the national reconciliation process. In of experts who discuss different issues of peace and academy on its territory. In strengthening its the heart of development planning, committed other words, the project of national reconciliation security in the collective interest of the country.163/164 counter-terrorism efforts, Côte d'Ivoire joined the strong public spending on infrastructure and in Côte d'Ivoire is being held hostage by incessant Accra initiative launched in September 2017 with developed private investment incentives, enabled political struggles.160 the aim of "preventing the spread of violent Côte d'Ivoire to have a continuous growth rate of 3.5.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Existing Responses extremism and combating cross-border about 8% from 2012 to 2019. However, the to the Peace and Security Challenges organized crime in border areas." The member outbreak of the Coronavirus crisis weakened the · CSO Response Several limitations were identied in the international, states of the Accra initiative are Benin, Burkina economic by making the growth rate at 1.8%. Throughout the Ivorian crisis, civil society has regional and national responses to the peace and Faso, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. At the Economic inclusion is not yet effective, and the provided varied responses. It remains a key player in security challenges. These gaps are discussed national level, Côte d'Ivoire's National Border poverty rate seems to have stagnated over the the search for peace. More concretely, civil society is below. Commission was established in July 2017 as a past decade. experiencing two phases in its desire to support tool for development, security and integrated Ÿ peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire. During the rst International responses border management. It is also a means of Ÿ At the socio-political level: Several initiatives at phase, from 2002 to 2010, CSOs worked a lot in preventing violent extremism. However, it has the socio-political level have been undertaken to The limitations in international responses relate to humanitarian action. They supported the State, remained inactive since its inception. It was only achieve peace and facilitate social cohesion. these various points: international institutions and non-governmental from January 2020 with the establishment of an These include the Dialogue, Truth and organisations (NGOs) to address humanitarian executive secretariat that it began to carry out Reconciliation Commission (CDVR), the National Ÿ Focus on Top-Down Approaches: Activities by challenges during the period of armed conict.161 The activities in line with its objectives. In the end, C o m m i s s i o n f o r R e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d multilateral and bilateral international actors are second phase of civil society action, which started despite all these efforts, Côte d'Ivoire Ivory Coast Compensation of Victims (CONARIV), the generally based on top-down approaches. This is from 2010, focused on supporting the democratic remains on alert. The terrorist attacks in the north National Programme for Social Cohesion (PNCS), less inclusive and participatory. It does not allow process in Côte d'Ivoire and national reconciliation by of the country in Kafolo in February 2020 and the National Human Rights Council and the for a real consideration of the context of fragility or facilitating, for example, mediation and dialogue those in Grand-Bassam in March 2016 are a Ministry of Solidarity, Social Cohesion and the violence on which peace and security must be between different actors in the conict or by taking reminder that it is not entirely immune from Fight against Poverty. These institutions are to built. part in the various political dialogue processes for the subversive actions of these violent extremist contribute towards national reconciliation. But the 156 reform of the independent electoral commission or Sustainability: movements. road is still dotted with a lot of pitfalls because, Ÿ International responses are not they present a rather mixed record on national the revision of the electoral code with the aim of long-term and do not keep pace with the Ÿ At the economic level: The consolidation of reconciliation. For example, the CDVR which was achieving a consensual legal framework for elections. dynamics of peace and security in the country. peace through a robust economy in Côte d'Ivoire During the 2020 presidential elections, CSOs were These responses are generally guided by major players in electoral observation and helped to international agendas that do not take into

¹⁵⁶ To see Côte d'Ivoire: possible Rampart Against The Terrorism Sahel? | TV5MONDE - Information ; To see Presentation Academy International Fight Against The Terrorism (...) - France In Ivory Coast (ambafrance.org);To see The Initiative Accra Can Prevent The Terrorism In the States Coastal Africa West? - ISS Africa ¹⁵⁹Zina, O. (2017), « Le caillou a-t-il été retiré du soulier de la République ? », Réconciliation nationale et réformes constitutionnelles en Côte d'Ivoire, Afrique ;Interview with the Executive Secretary of the National Borders Commission of Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan, 24 November 2011; To see CNFCI | Commission National contemporaine, numéro 263-264, 25-39. Borders Côte d'Ivoire; To see Ivory Coast: Presentation (banquemondiale.org) ¹⁶⁰ Interview with the Directorate of Solidarity, Social Cohesion and the Fight against Poverty in Bouaké. ¹⁵⁷Collier, P. (2009), Post-conﬂict recovery: How Should Strategies be Distinctives? Journal of African Economies 18, AERC Suppl.1, 99-131. ¹⁶¹ Djané and Kouakou, (2017), op.cit. ¹⁵⁸ -Zina, O. (2017), L'autonomie dans la transition humanitaire ivoirienne in Fouquet, T. et Troit, V. (dir.), Transition humanitaire en Côte d'Ivoire, Karthala, ¹⁶² Interview with the African network on small arms and light weapons-Ivory Coast ( RASALAO) in Abidjan on 23 November 2020. Collection « Humanitaire en devenir »,.45-57. ¹⁶³To see site internet: Home | Civil Society Convention Ivorian (csci.group) ¹⁶⁴ Interview with the African network on small arms and light weapons-Ivory Coast ( RASALAO) in Abidjan on 23 November 2020. PAGE 78 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 79 against terrorism and violent extremism. This has been based on the so-called "elephant created in 2011 with much hope and great warn of the violence that marred the smooth running explains why, in the framework of an agreement triumph" scenario as announced in the National ambition to "replicate" the success of the Truth and of the election in some localities. In the post-conict between France and Côte d'Ivoire, they decided to Development Plan (2012-2015). Under this Reconciliation Commission of South Africa has context in Côte d'Ivoire, issues such as national set up an international academy to ght terrorism. approach, reviving the country's economic growth not succeeded in its mission of true reconciliation. reconciliation, reparation for victims of the crisis, The launch ceremony for the academy's was envisaged to guarantee peace and social It was weakened by its strong politicisation.159 All political dialogue, women's political participation, construction site took place in October 2018. The cohesion. It is a liberal approach to peace.157 The the institutions created as a result of the CDVR non-violence and the movement of small arms and academy's ambition is "to promote global state played the leading role in managing have had their mission undermined by the inability light weapons are brought to the attention of policy response to terrorism, from intelligence to judicial humanitarian aid itself through the Presidential of political actors to transcend their differences in makers by civil society actors. The concerted actions response to the action of specialized forces." Emergency Programme (PPU) and by order to agree on a roadmap for sincere of Ivorian civil society actors are being taken on a Although not being a member of the G5 Sahel, the streamlining its economic recovery with the reconciliation. The 2018 amnesty order, which general platform called the 162 "Ivorian Civil Society country is still a key player in the region, especially national development programme. 1 5 8 This was a far-reaching act, could not be the expected Convention". The platform members constitute a pool with the establishment of this international economic strategy, which has placed the state at catalyst for the national reconciliation process. In of experts who discuss different issues of peace and academy on its territory. In strengthening its the heart of development planning, committed other words, the project of national reconciliation security in the collective interest of the country.163/164 counter-terrorism efforts, Côte d'Ivoire joined the strong public spending on infrastructure and in Côte d'Ivoire is being held hostage by incessant Accra initiative launched in September 2017 with developed private investment incentives, enabled political struggles.160 the aim of "preventing the spread of violent Côte d'Ivoire to have a continuous growth rate of 3.5.4. Limits and Pitfalls of Existing Responses extremism and combating cross-border about 8% from 2012 to 2019. However, the to the Peace and Security Challenges organized crime in border areas." The member outbreak of the Coronavirus crisis weakened the · CSO Response Several limitations were identied in the international, states of the Accra initiative are Benin, Burkina economic by making the growth rate at 1.8%. Throughout the Ivorian crisis, civil society has regional and national responses to the peace and Faso, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. At the Economic inclusion is not yet effective, and the provided varied responses. It remains a key player in security challenges. These gaps are discussed national level, Côte d'Ivoire's National Border poverty rate seems to have stagnated over the the search for peace. More concretely, civil society is below. Commission was established in July 2017 as a past decade. experiencing two phases in its desire to support tool for development, security and integrated Ÿ peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire. During the rst International responses border management. It is also a means of Ÿ At the socio-political level: Several initiatives at phase, from 2002 to 2010, CSOs worked a lot in preventing violent extremism. However, it has the socio-political level have been undertaken to The limitations in international responses relate to humanitarian action. They supported the State, remained inactive since its inception. It was only achieve peace and facilitate social cohesion. these various points: international institutions and non-governmental from January 2020 with the establishment of an These include the Dialogue, Truth and organisations (NGOs) to address humanitarian executive secretariat that it began to carry out Reconciliation Commission (CDVR), the National Ÿ Focus on Top-Down Approaches: Activities by challenges during the period of armed conict.161 The activities in line with its objectives. In the end, C o m m i s s i o n f o r R e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d multilateral and bilateral international actors are second phase of civil society action, which started despite all these efforts, Côte d'Ivoire Ivory Coast Compensation of Victims (CONARIV), the generally based on top-down approaches. This is from 2010, focused on supporting the democratic remains on alert. The terrorist attacks in the north National Programme for Social Cohesion (PNCS), less inclusive and participatory. It does not allow process in Côte d'Ivoire and national reconciliation by of the country in Kafolo in February 2020 and the National Human Rights Council and the for a real consideration of the context of fragility or facilitating, for example, mediation and dialogue those in Grand-Bassam in March 2016 are a Ministry of Solidarity, Social Cohesion and the violence on which peace and security must be between different actors in the conict or by taking reminder that it is not entirely immune from Fight against Poverty. These institutions are to built. part in the various political dialogue processes for the subversive actions of these violent extremist contribute towards national reconciliation. But the 156 reform of the independent electoral commission or Sustainability: movements. road is still dotted with a lot of pitfalls because, Ÿ International responses are not they present a rather mixed record on national the revision of the electoral code with the aim of long-term and do not keep pace with the Ÿ At the economic level: The consolidation of reconciliation. For example, the CDVR which was achieving a consensual legal framework for elections. dynamics of peace and security in the country. peace through a robust economy in Côte d'Ivoire During the 2020 presidential elections, CSOs were These responses are generally guided by major players in electoral observation and helped to international agendas that do not take into

account the different phases of crisis. facilitating dialogue during the recent electoral crisis Ÿ The Leadership crisis: Regional responses also Ÿ CSO responses of October 2020. At the national level, the Ivorian State Ÿ Prevention: International responses are much suffer from a leadership crisis due to interests and has taken several initiatives on security sector reform more reactive than prevention. The prevention rivalry among states. The limitations in CSO responses relate to these and reconciliation, supported by civil society actors. component remains quite weak. Proactive various points: However, the study shows that these international, responses will allow to anticipate the relapse of regional and national responses suffer from several conict and break the cycle of violence. Ÿ National Responses Ÿ Lack of coordination and competition among gaps that deserve to be addressed. In essence, civil society actors: There is no clear The choice of internal actors: prevention is still low at the international and regional Ÿ Collaboration The limitations in national responses relate to these coordination among Ivorian civil society actors on levels and the strong involvement of civil society in between international and national actors is often different points: the responses to peace. These actors often peace actions is not yet a priority for the State of Côte diffuse. While some international actors prefer to compete in the context of capturing political, Ÿ Strong institutionalisation of actions: d'Ivoire. Based on the gaps and pitfalls of the existing formulate responses directly related to the state, Actions social, economic or humanitarian opportunities.165 responses, the following recommendations are others prefer to turn to civil society. There is for peace and security are far too state-centered provided: therefore no coordination of actions in Côte d'Ivoire. This does not facilitate popular Ÿ Lack of resources: Civil society organisations do ownership of the actions carried out. not have substantial resources (material, nancial The Leadership Crisis: Ÿ International responses and human) as part of their mission on peace and Ÿ The low involvement of civil society: The Government also reveal a leadership crisis among international In dealing security. The lack of resources also weakens the actors in their responses to peace and security with the challenges of peace and security, civil 166 prevention of CSOs. Ÿ Involve more strongly the Ivorian convention of civil issues. society are not sufciently involved, especially in society on issues of peace and security. the development of national responses. Ÿ The risk of politicisation: Some civil society actors are subject to political manipulation. This Ÿ Involve people in the development and Ÿ Regional responses Ÿ Reconciliation and the cycle of violence: Côte undermines neutrality, a major feature of civil implementation of crisis solutions and d'Ivoire has not yet succeeded in the truth and 167 society's work. reconciliation resolutions. Thus, involve local The limitations in regional responses relate to these reconciliation process of the various crises. This communities in the search for solutions to peace. different points: has affected the country's resolve to break the Ÿ Funding question: Regional responses are cycle of violence. 3.5.6. Conclusion and Recommendations Ÿ Implement a more inclusive national reconciliation regularly faced with funding constraints. This mechanism with a clear methodology and generally delays or slows the pace of peace Ÿ Struggles for state power: National responses Côte d'Ivoire's march towards peace has not been agenda. actions need to address unfolding conict are often held hostage by the struggles to easy and seems far from being certain. For more than situations conquer and preserve state power in Côte two decades, the country has been trying to break out Ÿ Put gender and women issues at the heart of d'Ivoire. Gains on peace and security are often put of the cycle of political violence in order to build Ÿ Regionalisation of armed conflicts: peace agendas in Côte d'Ivoire The to the test during election moments. National lasting peace and consolidate its democracy with the regionalisation of conicts in West Africa weakens responses should focus on consolidating the support of international and regional partners. At the Ÿ Strengthen the implementation of the human responses to a specic situation. The cross- democracy, peace and development of the international level, for example, the United Nations security approach in the transformation process of border nature of crises requires more coordinated country. has provided mediation, negotiation and the Ivorian army. and effective regional responses. However, this is peacekeeping support with the deployment of often not the case. UNOCI. At the regional level, the AU and ECOWAS Ÿ Make the national early warning system a major continue to be at Côte d'Ivoire's bedside with active, tool for crisis prevention in Côte d'Ivoire. Ÿ Prevention: Preventive measures are less concerted and preventive diplomacy. For example, emphasised in regional responses to conicts. For Ÿ the ECOWAS-AU-UN trio played a major role in Give public and private media a large place in example, ECOWAS should strengthen its early promoting peace. response system to respond proactively to

conicts ¹⁶⁵Interview with the American NGO National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Côte d'Ivoire in Abidjan on 19 November. ¹⁶⁶Interview with the African network on small arms and light weapons-Ivory Coast ( RASALAO) in Abidjan on 23 November 2020. ¹⁶⁷Interview with the American NGO National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Côte d'Ivoire in Abidjan on 19 November. PAGE 80 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 81 account the different phases of crisis. facilitating dialogue during the recent electoral crisis Ÿ The Leadership crisis: Regional responses also Ÿ CSO responses of October 2020. At the national level, the Ivorian State Ÿ Prevention: International responses are much suffer from a leadership crisis due to interests and has taken several initiatives on security sector reform more reactive than prevention. The prevention rivalry among states. The limitations in CSO responses relate to these and reconciliation, supported by civil society actors. component remains quite weak. Proactive various points: However, the study shows that these international, responses will allow to anticipate the relapse of regional and national responses suffer from several conict and break the cycle of violence. Ÿ National Responses Ÿ Lack of coordination and competition among gaps that deserve to be addressed. In essence, civil society actors: There is no clear The choice of internal actors: prevention is still low at the international and regional Ÿ Collaboration The limitations in national responses relate to these coordination among Ivorian civil society actors on levels and the strong involvement of civil society in between international and national actors is often different points: the responses to peace. These actors often peace actions is not yet a priority for the State of Côte diffuse. While some international actors prefer to compete in the context of capturing political, Ÿ Strong institutionalisation of actions: d'Ivoire. Based on the gaps and pitfalls of the existing formulate responses directly related to the state, Actions social, economic or humanitarian opportunities.165 responses, the following recommendations are others prefer to turn to civil society. There is for peace and security are far too state-centered provided: therefore no coordination of actions in Côte d'Ivoire. This does not facilitate popular Ÿ Lack of resources: Civil society organisations do ownership of the actions carried out. not have substantial resources (material, nancial The Leadership Crisis: Ÿ International responses and human) as part of their mission on peace and Ÿ The low involvement of civil society: The Government also reveal a leadership crisis among international In dealing security. The lack of resources also weakens the actors in their responses to peace and security with the challenges of peace and security, civil 166 prevention of CSOs. Ÿ Involve more strongly the Ivorian convention of civil issues. society are not sufciently involved, especially in society on issues of peace and security. the development of national responses. Ÿ The risk of politicisation: Some civil society actors are subject to political manipulation. This Ÿ Involve people in the development and Ÿ Regional responses Ÿ Reconciliation and the cycle of violence: Côte undermines neutrality, a major feature of civil implementation of crisis solutions and d'Ivoire has not yet succeeded in the truth and 167 society's work. reconciliation resolutions. Thus, involve local The limitations in regional responses relate to these reconciliation process of the various crises. This communities in the search for solutions to peace. different points: has affected the country's resolve to break the Ÿ Funding question: Regional responses are cycle of violence. 3.5.6. Conclusion and Recommendations Ÿ Implement a more inclusive national reconciliation regularly faced with funding constraints. This mechanism with a clear methodology and generally delays or slows the pace of peace Ÿ Struggles for state power: National responses Côte d'Ivoire's march towards peace has not been agenda. actions need to address unfolding conict are often held hostage by the struggles to easy and seems far from being certain. For more than situations conquer and preserve state power in Côte two decades, the country has been trying to break out Ÿ Put gender and women issues at the heart of d'Ivoire. Gains on peace and security are often put of the cycle of political violence in order to build Ÿ Regionalisation of armed conflicts: peace agendas in Côte d'Ivoire The to the test during election moments. National lasting peace and consolidate its democracy with the regionalisation of conicts in West Africa weakens responses should focus on consolidating the support of international and regional partners. At the Ÿ Strengthen the implementation of the human responses to a specic situation. The cross- democracy, peace and development of the international level, for example, the United Nations security approach in the transformation process of border nature of crises requires more coordinated country. has provided mediation, negotiation and the Ivorian army. and effective regional responses. However, this is peacekeeping support with the deployment of often not the case. UNOCI. At the regional level, the AU and ECOWAS Ÿ Make the national early warning system a major continue to be at Côte d'Ivoire's bedside with active, tool for crisis prevention in Côte d'Ivoire. Ÿ Prevention: Preventive measures are less concerted and preventive diplomacy. For example, emphasised in regional responses to conicts. For Ÿ the ECOWAS-AU-UN trio played a major role in Give public and private media a large place in example, ECOWAS should strengthen its early promoting peace. response system to respond proactively to conicts ¹⁶⁵Interview with the American NGO National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Côte d'Ivoire in Abidjan on 19 November. ¹⁶⁶Interview with the African network on small arms and light weapons-Ivory Coast ( RASALAO) in Abidjan on 23 November 2020. ¹⁶⁷Interview with the American NGO National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Côte d'Ivoire in Abidjan on 19 November. PAGE 82 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 83

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Ÿ Strengthen armed conict prevention tools that Ÿ CSOs should strengthen existing coordination References encourage regional and national early warning and cooperation mechanisms to ensure Ÿ Akindes, F. (2017), Introduction to the theme. "We don't eat bridges and tar": the winding paths of an exit systems. coherence and targeted responses to from the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, African Policy, No. 148. compliment government efforts. Ÿ Strengthen collaboration between sub-regional Ÿ Chelpi-den, Hbitter, M. (2015), The tribulations of the disarmament, demobiliSation and reintegration of organisations (CEDEA0, UEMOA, CENSAD, Ÿ CSOs should explore alternative sources of militiamen in Côte d'Ivoire (2003-2015), Herodotus,No. 158, 200-218. Mano River Union, etc.) on peace and security funding especially from the private sector and issues. businesses aside the traditional donors to Ÿ Collier, P. (2009), Post-conict recovery: How Should Strategies be Distinctives? Journal of African sustain their activities in the long term. Economies 18, AERC Suppl.1, 99-131. Ÿ Develop strong approaches to address the regional dimensions of national conicts to Ÿ Increase advocacy on the implementation of Ÿ Collier, P. et Hoefer A. (1998), On economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 50, Oxford prevent it from spreading to other countries. W o m e n , Pe a c e a n d S e c u r i t y ( W P S ) University Press, 563-573. commitments by countries in the Sahel region. Ÿ Diallo, K. (2017), Cell 39 in Côte d'Ivoire, Contemporary Africa, number 263-264, 177-194. International Actors Ÿ Increase advocacy for the inclusion of separate peace or peacebuilding programmes budget in Ÿ Djane, A. and Kouakou Konan, J. (2017), Humanitarian in Côte d'Ivoire: dynamics and issues of transition, Ÿ Strengthen armed conict prevention tools that National Budgets for a specic amount to be in Fouquet,T. and Troit, V. (ed.), Humanitarian Transition in Côte d'Ivoire, Karthala, "Humanitarian in the encourage regional and national early warning dedicated to peacebuilding activities. Future" Collection, 27-42. systems. Ÿ CSOs should at all times uphold their Ÿ Ÿ Kieffer,G-A. (2000) , Ivorian Army: Refusal to Decommission, African Policy, No.78,26-39. Develop a concerted vision (international, professionalism and impartiality to sustain their regional, national) on peace strategies. credibility to compliment government efforts in Ÿ Konadje, J-J. (2017) Ivory Coast. The Positive Peace Prize, Study Report, Friedricht Ebert Stifung. the security and development process of the Ÿ Focus on the "Bottom-up" approach to country. Ÿ Leboeuf, A. (2016), The Reform of the Security Sector in the Ivorian, Ifri Studies. peacebuilding with a strong involvement of civil society and civilian populations Ÿ Miran-Guyon, M. (2017),Ivory Coast, the return of the elephant? Thematic introduction, Contemporary Africa, No. 263-264, 11-23. Ÿ Implement long term programmes to promote peace and stability and also regularly monitor the Ÿ Miran-Guyon, M. (2017), The armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire: portrait of a fragile device. Interview with Bruno responses to the peace and security challenges to Clément-Bolle , Contemporary Africa, No. 263-264. assess their effectiveness Ÿ Perouse of Montclos, M-A. (2017), Editorial. Ivory Coast, The Return of the Elephant? Contemporary Ÿ Increase funding support for CSOs and the Ivorian Africa, no 263-264, 5-7. government to address the peace and security c h a l l e n g e s w i t h s t r o n g a c c o u n t a b i l i t y Ÿ Zina, O. (2017). Has the pebble been removed from the shoe of the Republic?", National Reconciliation mechanisms. and constitutional reforms in Côte d'Ivoire, contemporary Africa, number 263-264, 25-39.

Ÿ Zina, O. ( 2017). Bouaké, La re-belle?, Repères, Contemporary Africa, number 263-264, 263-264.

Ÿ Zina, O. (2017), Côte d'Ivoire: From the "scenario of the triumph of the elephant" to a social crisis of post- conict reconstruction?, Comparative African Studies (Rabat), No.5, 1-26. https://web.archive.org/web/20170911160523/www.egerabat.com/cresc

Ÿ Zina, O. ( 2017),Autonomy in the transition ivorian humanitarian in Fouquet, T. and Troit, V. (ed.), Humanitarian Transition in Côte d'Ivoire, Karthala, "Humanitarian in the Future" Collection,.45-57. PAGE 82 | CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL AND COTE D’IVOIRE | PAGE 83

Regional Actors Civil Society Organisations

Ÿ Zina, O. ( 2017). Bouaké, La re-belle?, Repères, Contemporary Africa, number 263-264, 263-264.