BULL MARKET IN FEAR GRANT’S FALL CONFERENCE / NEW YORK CITY - OCTOBER 23, 2012

For Investment Professional Use. Not for Distribution Christopher Cole, CFA Artemis Capital Management LLC Artemis Vega Fund LP

520 Broadway, Suite 350 Santa Monica, CA 90401 (310) 496-4526 phone (310) 496-4527 fax [email protected]

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 1

Zinn - Jon Kabat Jon Volatility is the market price of uncertainty market is the Volatility

We live in uncertain times… a bull market fear in market a bull times… uncertain in live We Webster - “You cannot stop the waves, but you can learn to surf” to learn can butyou waves, the stop cannot “You Merriam

from

fear

of

Definition

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 2

hellfire of hellfire inflation

and and

waterfall of deflation of deflation waterfall What is Volatility?is What

Cole

Volatility at World’s End Deflation End World’s at Volatility Christopher

by

concept

on

Our resolution may damnone the avoid fate resolution us other Our to to based

Wuiff

dangerous strait between the between strait dangerous Brendan

by

Imagine the world economy as an armada of ships passing through a narrow and and a narrow through passing ships of armada as an economy world the Imagine Illustration

Volatility in World’s End Deflation B ULL

Volatility shocks are rightfully associated with deflationary crashes

M

Volatility at World's End Deflation ARKET 120 Dow Jones Industrial Index (RHS) vs. 1-month Realized Volatility of DJIA (LHS)

50,000

IN

100 F

EAR

80 5,000

60 Realized Volatility (%) Volatility Realized 40 scale) (logarithmic DJIA 500

20

0 50

1928 1930 1936 1938 1944 1946 1952 1954 1960 1962 1968 1970 1976 1978 1984 1986 1992 1994 2000 2002 2008 2010 1932 1934 1940 1942 1948 1950 1956 1958 1964 1966 1972 1974 1980 1982 1988 1990 1996 1998 2004 2006

3

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 4 Performance in paper marks (mil) marks paper in Performance

100,000 10,000 100,000,000 1,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 100 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

23 - Nov 23 - Nov

23 - Aug 23 - Aug

23 - May 23 - May

23 - Feb 23 -

Feb

22 - Nov 22 - Nov

22 - Aug 22 - Aug

1968

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22 - May 22 - May Print

of

22 - Feb 22 - Feb

Out

21 - Nov 21 - Nov

Turroni -

21 - Aug 21 - Aug

Bresciani 21 - May (1) 21 - May

21 - Feb 21 - Feb

Adj. according to USD exchange rate exchange to USD according Adj. numbers to index wholesale according Adj. Weimar marks, paper In Constantino

20 - Nov 20 -

Nov by

20 - Aug 20 - Aug

Weimar VIX? Weimar

Germany"

20 - May 20 - May

War .

-

20 - Feb 20 - Feb Post data

(monthly volatility (monthlyvolatility data annualized)

in

Volatility in Hellfire Hellfire of Inflationin Volatility

19 - Nov 19 - Nov price

Performance of German Market Market Stock of German Performance during Weimar Republic Hyperinflaton Republic Weimar during

stock 19 - Aug 19 - Aug

Depreciation

19 - May 19 - May

available

19 - Feb 19 - Feb Currency Extreme volatility can also occur in inoccur also can volatility Extreme

from

of

18 - Nov 18 - Nov Study

variance A

;

Realized Volatility Germanof Volatility Market StockRealized duringWeimar RepublicHyperinflation 18 - Aug 18 - Aug

realized

18 - May May 18 - Inflation

of

18 - Feb 18 - Feb monthly

upon

0 “Economics

0

:

20 40 80 60 500

100 exchange fixed for adj. Performance 120 Volatility (%) 1,000 Volatility 2,000 1,500 Based

) 1 ( Source Everything you need to know about trading volatility B

volatility) are associated with lower equity returns ULL

“There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; Many people who trade volatility do not realize they that is to say there are things that, we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown M unknowns – there are things we do not know, we don't know.” ARKET

Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense

IN

F

Known Unknowns Unknown Unknowns EAR

Regimes of Volatility-of-Volatility (2007 to 2012)

Period Average SPX Return Volatility Regime Vol of VIX VIX index . US Fiscal Cliff . European Crisis (annual) Total 87.5 24.8 +1% . . (2007 to Sep 2012) China hard landing Global Recession Bull Market 81.7 13.8 +5% (2006 to July 2007) . War with Iran . Fiscal Austerity Credit Crisis Onset ? 82.7 23.0 -11% (Aug 2007 to Aug Market2008) Crash 95.7 49.6 -71% (Sep 2008 to Feb Recovery2009) to Flash 80.8 26.7 +35% Volatility Volatility of Volatility Crash (MarPost-Flash 2009 to Crash May 90.5 23.2 +10% Steepening (MayLTRO 2010Steepening to Oct 97.7 20.3 +16% . Vanilla Options . Realized Volatility . Forward Volatility . Tail Risk Hedging (Nov 2011 to Sep . VIX Index . Variance Swap . Convexity . Vol Curve Trades 2012)

Risks that you Risks that you Risks that you Risks that you know and can know but can’t don’t know but don’t know and quantity quantify could quantify can’t quantify

5

Everything you need to know about trading volatility B

ULL

M

Two very different styles of crash depending… ARKET

Known Unknowns Unknown Unknowns IN

F EAR

Regimes of Volatility-of-Volatility (2007 to 2012)

Debt-Cycle Crash Existential Flash Crash Period Average SPX Return Volatility Regime Vol of VIX VIX index (annual) (2008 Crash, Great Depression) ( 1987, 2010 Crash) Total 87.5 24.8 +1% ? (2007 to Sep 2012) Bull Market 81.7 13.8 +5% . Crash occurs over time (months) . Hyper-speed crash (days, seconds) (2006 to July 2007) Credit Crisis Onset 82.7 23.0 -11% (Aug 2007 to Aug . Slow recovery . Fast recovery Market2008) Crash 95.7 49.6 -71% (Sep 2008 to Feb Recovery2009) to Flash . Natural end of leveraging cycle . Market fragmentation 80.8 26.7 +35% Crash (MarPost-Flash 2009 to Crash May 90.5 23.2 +10% . High volatility for long period . Extreme volatility for shorter period Steepening (MayLTRO 2010Steepening to Oct 97.7 20.3 +16% (Nov 2011 to Sep . Elevated volatility-of-volatility . Extreme volatility-of-volatility 2012) . Start of a recession or depression . Omen of future recession (often)

Predictable Unpredictable (in retrospect) (even In retrospect)

6

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 7

Correlation - Structure -

Bull Market in Fear Market Bull What is the “Bull Market in Fear”? is the “Bull Market What related to our collective fear of the next deflationary crash of next fear the collective our to related

ExpensiveInsurancePortfolio Spikes Hyper Volatilityand Violent fromMonetary PolicyinVolatility Distortions Abnormally Steep Volatility Term Steep VolatilityAbnormally

New paradigm for pricing risk that emerged after the 2008 crisis as financial emerged 2008that after risk the pricing for paradigmNew

4. 3. 2. 1.

Bull Market in Fear is Definedis by inFear Market Bull

Bull Market in Fear B ULL

Structural imbalances in supply-demand dynamics of volatility markets M

ARKET

I. Emotional

. Post-traumatic Deflation Disorder IN

. Desire for safety and at any cost F EAR

II. Monetary Greater . Forced participation in risk assets drives desire for hedging Demand for . Unspoken feeling that gains in financial assets are “artificial” Volatility

III. Macro-Risks . Debtor-developed economies face structural headwinds . Unrest in Middle East

IV. Regulatory . Government regulation (Dodd-Frank, Volcker rule) has Less Supply constrained risk appetite for banks to supply volatility of Volatility . Lower demand for structured products by investors

8

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 9

M6 Expiry M3

VIX

12 - Jul

12 - Feb

11 - Dec

11 - Sep

11 - Jun

11 - Apr

11 - Jan

10 - Oct

10 - Jul

10 - May

10 - Feb

09 - Nov

09 - Sep

09 - Jun

09 - Mar

08 - Dec

2004 to Presentto 2004

08 - Oct

08 - Jul

08 - Apr

08 - Feb

07 - Nov

07 - Aug

07 - May

07 -

structure measures the anticipation volatility of future the anticipation measures structure Mar

-

06 - Dec

06 - Abnormally Steep Volatility Term Structure Term VolatilitySteep Abnormally Sep

06 -

Bull Market in Fear / VIX Futures Curve (normalized by spot VIX) spotVIX) (normalized by Futures Curve VIX / Fear in Market Bull Jun

06 - Apr

06 - Jan

05 - Oct

05 - Aug

05 - May

Volatility term Volatility

05 - Feb

04 - Nov

04 - Sep

04 - Jun

Mar 04 - "There is no terror in the bang, only in the anticipation of it." Alfred Hitchcock Alfred of it." anticipation the bang,in in the only nois terror "There

0.50x 0.70x 0.90x

1.10x 1.30x 1.50x 1.70x 1.90x Vix Futures/Spot Vix Futures/Spot Vix

Abnormally Steep Volatility Term Structure B ULL

The most extreme term-structure for S&P 500 index volatility in two decades

reflects continued anticipation of a deflationary collapse M ARKET Ratio of Expected Future Volatility as Ratio to Spot Volatility 2.4x

S&P 500 options IN

2.2x F EAR

2.0x VIX Index 1.8x

1.6x

1.4x Expected Volatility Volatility as Expected Ratio a to Volatility Spot 1.2x 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.42 0.50 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.83 0.92 1.00 1.08 1.17 1.25 1.33 1.42 1.50 Expiry (1=year) Cumulative Average (1990-Mar 2012) 2012 YTD (avg.) Bull Market of 1990s (avg.) 2000 to Feb 2009 (avg.) 2009 to 2012 Bull Market in Fear

10

Volatility is cheap and expensive at the same time B

ULL

Low VIX index does not mean cheap volatility M ARKET

35 Low Volatility? Really?

VIX Futures Curve Comparison IN

August 2012 vs. September 2008 F

30 ! EAR

25

20 Forward VIX index (%)index VIX Forward August 17, 2012 / Lowest VIX in 5 years 15 September 15, 2008 / Day after Lehman Bros. Bankruptcy

10 Spot Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 Month 7 Month 8

11

Volatility Regimes Defined by Central Banking B ULL

Volatility spikes consistently occur after the end of central bank balance sheet expansion

M

130% Fed Balance Sheet Expansion and VIX index 50 ARKET

No Fed Action LTRO (ECB), QEI Op Twist (Fed) & QEIII (Fed) 120% Aug 2011 Crash 45 QEII IN

Op. Twist+LTRO(ECB) F

QEIII EAR 110% VIX QEII 40

Risk and Vol Returns in Fed BS Regimes Flash Crash 100% 35 Crisis and Recovery (September 2008 to September 2012) Period Average Weekly Change SPX VIX 21d SV Fed BS

90% 30 Fed Balance Sheet ↑ 0.6% -1.7% 0.0% 1.5% VIX Index VIX (%) Fed Balance Sheet > +1σ ↑ 3.2% -7.4% 0.0% 8.1%

Fed Balance Sheet ↓ 0.0% 1.3% -2.0% -0.9% 80% 25 Fed Balance Sheet < -1σ ↓ 1.2% 2.7% -1.9% -4.7%

Post-Crisis Recovery Period (Mar 2009 to Sep 2012)

Fed BS % % BSChange Fed since September 2008 70% 20 Period Average Weekly Change SPX VIX 21d SV Fed BS QEI con't (March09-Jun 09) 1.4% -2.6% -2.5% 0.6%

60% 15

May May May May

Mar Mar Mar Mar

Sep Sep Sep Sep

Nov Nov Nov

Jul Jul Jul Jul

Jan Jan

Jan Post QEI (Jun09-Oct10) 0.2% -0.2% -0.8% 0.2%

- - -

- (1)

- - -

11 09 10 12

- - -

- 0.5% -1.0% 0.0% 0.5%

11 12

10 QEII (Sep10-June11)

- - -

- - - -

09 10 11 12

- - - -

10 11 09

09 10 11 12

09 10 12 11 Post-QEII (July11-Nov11) -0.2% 2.2% 2.3% -0.1%

LTRO (Dec11 to Sep 0.3% -1.5% -2.7% 0.0%

(1) period following announcement of QEII at Jackson Hole August 2010. Since 2008 global central banks have expanded their balance sheets by $9 trillion - enough fiat Sources: Federal Reserve Bank, ECB, Bloomberg money to buy every person on earth a 55'' wide-screen 3D television 12

Post-Traumatic-Deflation-Disorder (PTDD) B ULL

Tail Events are now priced as if they are standard risks

Highly unlikely events are either ignored or vastly over weighted based on our collective experiences M ARKET Lifetime odds of Dying 25% Implied Odds of % Returns for S&P 500 index

from these causes is 1 in 4.7(1) SPX Options (1year)

Black Swan? IN

20% F Heart Disease Actual from Sep 2008 to Sep 2012 EAR 1 in 6 Implied from Jan 1990 to Sep 2008 Implied from Sep 2008 to Sep 2012 15% September 2012 (average) Stroke 1 in 28 10%

Car Crash Cumulative Probability Cumulative 1 in 88

5%

0%

5%

0% 5%

-

45% 40% 30% 25% 15% 10% 50% 35% 20%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

------Implied 12m %G/L in S&P 500 Index A “black swan” is not dying because your parachute didn’t open while skydiving…. it is dying because the guy whose parachute didn’t open landed on you while you were golfing

Note: Artemis calculates the implied probability distribution using interpolated weights from variance swap pricing. This methodology may occasionally give higher weightings to tails in down markets than other 13 methods like taking the second derivative of call prices, fitting mixture of normal PDFs to recover prices, or fitting vol models (SVI,SABR). (1) "Lifetime Odds of Death for Selected Causes, United States, 2007" / National Safety Council 2011 Edition

Note :

Artemis Cumulative Probability methods 50%

40% 30% calculates 20% 10% like 0% taking

the

You are not smart for hedging what everyone else already knows! already Youelse everyone what hedging for smart notare the

implied

S&P 500 Index 12 S&P Index 500 second 1995 1995

probability derivative 1996 1996 Fear ofdeflation is notbutit MISPRICED MISPLACED is

1997 of distribution call 1998 prices, 1998

using fitting 1999

interpolated 2000 mixture -

2000 Model to Contribution % month of

2001 normal

weights

2002 High of Tail Cost Risk Insurance

PDFs

from 2002 to

variance recover 2003 prices,

(1995 to March 2012) March (1995 to swap 2004

or pricing

2004 fitting 19952012to .

This vol 2005 models methodology 2006

(SVI,SABR) 2006

may .

occasionally 2007 - Free Variance by Expected Returns Returns Varianceby Expected Free

2008 give

higher 2008

weightings

2009

to

tails

2010 in

down

markets -50.0%

than -35.0%

other -20.0% Implied 12m %G/L in in S&P 500 index -5.0%

10.0%

25.0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

-

10% - - - - 20% 30% 40% 50%

F M B EAR IN ARKET ULL 14

1 HIGHER CORRELATIONS lead to...

Extreme Volatility-of-Volatility and Hyper-Correlations B S&P 500 Sector Correlation (60 day)

ULL 0.8 2000 to 2012 1)

Fire Risk is High Today in the Forest -

Higher correlations are kindling for violent volatility fires (spike) M 0.6 ARKET 0.4 HIGHER CORRELATIONS lead to...

1 S&P 500 Sector Correlation (60 day) (0 Correlation 0.2

2000 to 2012 IN

1) 0.8

-

2000 2001 2004 2005 2009 2010 2011 2003 2003 2006 2007 2008 2012

0 2002

F EAR 0.6

0.4

Correlation (0 Correlation 0.2

2000 2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012

0 2010

205 More VIOLENT VOLATILITY SPIKES 185 Volatility of VIX index (60 day) 165 2000 to 2012 145 125 105 Volatility (%) Volatility 85

65

2000 2001 2002 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005 2006 2007 2012 45 2004

15

Hedge Fund Strategies 12m Correlation to ATM Straddle on SPX 1.00 (HFRX Absolute Return, Equity Nuetral, Hedge Index, Merger Arb, RV Arb, 0.80 Convertible Arb / Monthly) 0.60 0.40 0.20 - (0.20) (0.40) (0.60)

(0.80)

03 04 05 06 07 08 12 09 10 11

04 05 06 07 08 09 12 10 11

------

------

Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb

Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug

Extreme Volatility-of-Volatility and Hyper-Correlations B ULL

Volatility is a Shadow Currency in the Bull Market for Fear M

$USD currency index strength = Higher Volatility ARKET

Correlation of $USD Index to VIX Index 0.6 (1986 to 2012) IN

F

EAR

0.4

0.2

0

-0.2

-0.4

1987 1989 1990 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 1986 1988 1991 1993 1994 1999 2000 2001 2006 2007 2008 2009

Note: Prior to 1990 there was not VIX index. We have substituted the CBOE VXO index, the precursor to the VIX, which was available starting in 1986. 16

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 17

Itself! buy the the right buy

fundamentals known unknowns known Volatility on Safety Safety on Volatility and sell sell and the more should more you the … buy … Risky is Volatility of Impossibleof Object an Volatility

Free - How to beat a “Bull Market in Fear” a “Bullto beat Market How fear the left tail the tail left fear is a better than buy reason to is a better unknown unknowns unknown

Risk

Fear Hedge Hedge

Tail risk pricing (both left and right) has been consistently late to game the to late has and (both been pricing consistently right) left risk Tail Volatility (fear) (fear) an iseffective leading inform asset allocation to indicator Volatility When the market identifies a risk it is usually overpriced in volatility markets overpriced involatilityusually is it risk a identifies When the market When

when a “bull market in fear” meets a “bubble in safety” bet on interest rate volatility rate fear”in “bubble a safety”inon meets interest bet market a “bull when

The more we we more The

Bet on unknown unknowns… don’t hedge known unknowns B ULL

Volatility markets are surprisingly bad at predicting future risk M

When markets identify a ‘known unknown’ that risk traditionally is overblown or at ARKET

the very minimum over-hedged

Fiscal Cliff or Volatility of Volatility Cliff? IN

240 Predicted Volatility of VIX vs. Realized Vol of VIX F EAR October 2012 220 Volatility of VIX was 200% on Oct 13, 2008 Maximum was 265% on Aug 29, 2011 200

180

160 Very 140 Cheap Expensive Fear Fear

120 Volatility of VIX (%)ofVIX Volatility 100 Market Expected Volatility of VIX (local) US Fiscal Cliff 5yr Average Realized Vol-of-VIX 80 1yr Average Realized Vol-of-VIX 60 6mo Average Realized Vol-of-VIX

40 11-Oct-12 6-Nov-12 3-Dec-12 28-Dec-12 25-Jan-13 21-Feb-13 19-Mar-13 15-Apr-13 9-May-13 Forward Period

18

Bet on unknown unknowns… don’t hedge known unknowns B ULL

Sell “known unknowns” and Buy “unknown unknowns”… M

…monetize the bull market in fear by playing the term structure ARKET

1.6x Fear Arbitrage

(Volatility futures & Options, SPX Vol Term Structure) IN

F

1.5x EAR

1.4x

1.3x

1.2x Forward Volatility Term Structure Structure Term Volatility Forward 1.1x Unknown Known-Unknown Crash Unknown Crash 1.0x Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 Month 7 Month 8 Forward Volatility (October 2012) Historical Average Forward Volatility (since 2004)

19

The more people fear the LEFT TAIL the more you should buy the RIGHT… and vice versa B

ULL

Role of the trader is not so much to predict the future but to identify mispriced risk M

The options market is consistently late to the game in pricing both the right and left tails ARKET financial crash options market is marked by the transfer of risk premium from the right of the return distribution to the left tail

Cross Asset Implied Probability Distribution Comparison (2008 pre-crisis to 2012)

Variance Swap Weighting { SPY, EFA, EEM, TLT, IEF, HYG, USO, GLD } IN

F EAR Pre-Crisis 2008 2012

60% 60% 60% Right Left 50% 50% Tail 50% tail Bias bias 40% 40% 40%

30% 30% 30%

Probability Of Return Of Probability 20%

20% Of Return Probability 20% Probability Of Return Probability Gold Gold Oil GoldOil HY Bonds 10% OilHY Bonds 10% UST 10yr 10% HYUST Bonds 10yr UST 30yr USTUST 10yr 30yr Intl. Equity (Emerg) USTIntl. 30yr Equity (Emerg) Intl. Equity (Dev) Intl.Intl. Equity Equity (Emerg) (Dev)

0% Intl.US Equity Equity (Dev)

------

+0.0σ +0.5σ +1.0σ +2.0σ +2.5σ

US Equity +1.5σ

2.5σ 2.0σ 1.5σ 1.0σ 0.5σ

3.0σ US Equity

- - - - -

0% -

+0.0σ +1.5σ +2.0σ +2.5σ +1.0σ

+0.5σ 0%

------

+0.0σ +0.5σ +1.0σ +2.0σ +2.5σ +1.5σ

3.0σ 2.5σ 2.0σ 1.5σ 1.0σ 0.5σ

3.0σ 2.5σ 2.0σ 1.5σ 1.0σ 0.5σ

Expected 1yr Asset Return Distribution Expected 1yr Asset Class Return Distribution Expected 1yr Asset Return Distribution by Standard Deviation (Historical) by Standard Deviation (Historical) by Standard Deviation (Historical)

Note: Artemis calculates the implied probability distribution using interpolated weights from variance swap pricing. This methodology may give higher weightings to tails in down markets than more traditional methods 20 like taking the second derivative of call prices, fitting mixture of normal PDFs to recover prices, or fitting vol models (SVI,SABR).

The more people fear the LEFT TAIL the more you should buy the RIGHT… B ULL

Maybe it is correct to buy tail risk insurance ... but is everyone just hedging the

wrong tail? M ARKET

Mirror Reflection: Deflation vs. Hyperinflation

20% S&P 500 Probability Distributions in different Regimes of Risk IN

1-year Gain-Loss% F

EAR

15% Implied from March 2012 SPX options …but it is a valuable exercise to theorize! … Volatility markets turn Simulated from in 2013-2022 Hyperinflationary Model (1 scenario of 10k)

10% Future? Double Convexity in Inflation Boom SPX 10yr OTM Call - 10K Strike 2,500 5 yrs to expiry/ SPX @ 3,000 (16% annual gain) 2,000 5% 1,500

1,000 ProbabilityWeighting Cumulative

Value of CallOptionof Value 500 40.0% 0 30.0% 0% 15% 20.0% 20% 25% 10% 30% -50% -43% -35% -28% -20% -13% -5% +3% +10% +18% +25% +33% +40% +48% 5yr implied vol 35% 5% 40% 5yr UST Yield One Year Gain/Loss % in S&P 500 index 45% 0% 50%

Note: Artemis created a model to simulate the behavior of the S&P 500 index and volatility during an inflationary shock. The model is not intended to be a prediction of the future but is merely a rudimentary stochastic- based method to understand what modern markets may look like in rampant inflation. The simulation runs 10,000 price scenarios for the S&P 500 index over 10 years modeling daily stock price behavior using a generalized Wiener process (Wiener.. not Weimar) and a drift rate that assumes linkages between annual CPI and equity performance. We assume inflation rises sharply from current levels of 2.87% in 2012 to 26% by 21 2015 and stays elevated at that level until 2017 (20% a year overall). The average volatility shifts are based upon assumptions regarding equity return to variance parameters observed in prior inflationary episodes (1970s US & 1920s Germany). The simulation shows annualized SPX returns for the decade at +9.94% but adjusted for inflation this drops to -9.8%.

Fear over Fundamentals B ULL 50 Cyclically Adjusted PE Ratio It is hard to have a bear market in a bull-market for fear 45 (Price to Average Inflation Adjusted Earning from past 10-years)

M 40 1881 to 2012 Volatility term-structure is an effective indicator to inform equity exposure 35

ARKET 30 25 20 It pays to have exposure to when markets are hedged! 15 10

S&P 500 index portfolio exposure based on Vol Slope 5 IN

600 1996 to 2012 0

1884 1891 1901 1907 1917 1924 1934 1941 1951 1957 1967 1974 1984 1991 2001 2007 1881 1887 1894 1897 1904 1911 1914 1921 1927 1931 1937 1944 1947 1954 1961 1964 1971 1977 1981 1987 1994 1997 2004 2011

------

F

5 1 1 9 9 5 5 1 1 9 9 5 5 1 1 9 1 9 5 9 5 1 5 1 9 1 9 5 9 5 1 5 1 9 1 9 5 9 5 1 EAR 550

Period of Steep Vol Slope (1yr VarK / VIX > 1.10)

500 S&P 500 Index Tactical Allocation to S&P 500 during periods with Steep Vol Slope 450

400 575 350 Period of Steep Vol Slope (1yr VarK / VIX > 1.10) 2 Volatility Term Structure 300 S&P 500 Index

1-year Volatility / 1-month Volatility of Growth$100 475 1.5 Tactical Allocation to S&P 500 during periods with Steep Vol Slope 250 Ratio 1 0.5 200 375 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 150

275 100 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 of Growth$100

175 22

75 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 65% - 55% - 45% - 12 - May 1yr Volatility Bond (short OTM SPX Put Option Collateralized) Option Put SPX OTM (short Bond Volatility 1yr Bonds UST Dated Lond 11 - 35% - May 10 - May 09 - 25% - May 08 5% OTM Vol Skew Vol OTM 5% - - May 07 - May 15% - 06 - May 05 - May 5% - TLT 20+ US Treasury Bond ETF ETF Bond Treasury US 20+ TLT 04 - May 03 - 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% May 0.80x 0.60x 0.40x 0.20x 0.00x

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 23

Bond 30yr UST UST 30yr

the 500

of

S&P

the period

Risk to Risk to Risk 0.081x 0.034x 0.045x 0.050x

Reward Reward

for

% 2012

purchase

600bps 50 to

- the ↑ Bond

% % reward payoffs! reward 2% 2% 2% 2% to 1950

-

50% 10yr UST UST 10yr a short equity option option a short equity - and SPX ↓ SPX Historic Prob. Historic Prob. Historic close

Stress Test #4 Test Stress to - UST Rate Rate UST bonds occur

25% 25% OTM) to -

SPX ↓ SPX Loss Loss UST 2% probability 2% ↑ to320bps 600bps -33% -15% -41% -62%

Est. MTM MTM Est. MTM Est. the

13% to 2% probability2% to 13% for assumed

SPX Short Short Put SPX are Rates

2012

-

Risk to Risk to Risk 0.242x 0.176x 0.074x 0.070x tests Reward Reward (Strike @ (Strike

1960

of stress

325bps All

-25% . ↑ period % %

↓ 13% 13% 13% 13% on

SPX SPX Prob. Historic Prob. Historic Stress Test #3 #3 Test Stress depending 1yr OTM Puts(collateralized) Short 1yr OTM based

UST Rate Rate UST “Bubble “Bubble in Safety” data crash

vs. -3% Loss Loss -11% -25% -44% real

Est. MTM MTM Est. MTM Est. a

probability

during

Risk to Risk to Risk Historic 0.616x 0.588x 0.113x 0.099x

Reward Reward

.

meets a meets estimates

25% Risk / Unrealized Loss in Stress Test Scenario Test Stress in Loss / Unrealized Risk Scenario in Stress Test Loss / Unrealized Risk - scenario 200bps from

-14% ↑ % % Risk Free Assets are are Risky Assets Free Risk test

↓ 39% 39% 39% 39% differ

stress SPX SPX Prob. Historic Prob. Historic 13% chance 13% may

Stress Test #2 #2 Test Stress SPX ↓ SPX free’ UST bond have similar risk similar have bond UST free’ UST Rate Rate UST - given Long Dated UST Bond LongUST Dated shifts

-4% Loss Loss -17% -31% -0.9% actual Est. MTM MTM Est. MTM Est.

position

Efficient Frontier / Risk to Reward Comparison Comparison Reward / to Risk Frontier Efficient on

loss however

Risk to Risk Risk to Risk 1.373x 1.319x 0.214x 0.176x . Reward Reward ↑ to100bps 200bps 14% shifts,

- unrealized 68% to 33% probability33% to 68%

maturity 100bps

volatility -9% to Rates

↑ 9% to 9% % % ↓ - 68% 68% 68% 68% local Estimated

. closer

SPX SPX Historic Prob. Historic Historic Prob. Historic “Bull Market in Fear” Market “Bull Stress Test #1 #1 Test Stress 2012

differ ,

UST Rates Rates UST 14 estimated

SPX ↓ SPX may

68% to 33% probability33% to 68% on

position and “risk and position -2% -9% Loss Loss -18% -0.4% Est. MTM MTM Est. Est. MTM MTM Est. losses

based

September

of

as

pricing

Unrealized

. Return / Yield / Return year 1 year 1 data Maturity Maturity 10 years 10 years 30

Option All

. When the the When : SPX Put Put SPX UST Bond BondUST Stress Test Stress Stress Test Stress instrument Note index Yield Yield 1.87% 3.09% 2.69% 0.51% Yield to Risk / UST Bond vs. "Volatility Bond" (Collateralized Short Put on S&P 500 Bondto Bond" Risk(Collateralized UST index) vs.Yield / "Volatility SPX Put (Strike @-25%) (Strike Put SPX lows) @2009 (Strike Put SPX Bond Treasury US 10-year / Bond Treasury US /30-year Bond Treasury US Investment Collateral + Put SPX Short / Bond Volatility

Risk Free Assets are Risky B ULL

When risk-free is risky … it is time to buy volatility on safety itself M

Higher interest rate volatility can be realized in deflation and inflation ARKET

Interest Rate Volatility is Low

250 ... and a better bargain on a forward basis than equity vol IN

3.5% F

Merrill Lynch MOVE Index = VIX for UST Bonds EAR 3.0% Weighted Volatility of 2yr,5yr,10yr & 20yr UST 2.5% 200 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 1yr Volatility Bond (short OTM SPX Put Option Collateralized) 0.5% Lond Dated UST Bonds 0.0% 150 -5% -15% -25% -35% -45% -55% -65%

100

50

Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct

Dec Dec Dec Dec

Apr Apr Apr Apr

Aug Feb Aug Feb Feb Aug Feb Aug

Jun Jun Jun Jun

- - - -

- - - - -

- - - -

- - - -

- - - -

- - - -

10 11 12 09

08 09 10 11 12

09 10 11 12

10 11 09 12

09 10 08 11

09 10 11 12

Source: Bloomberg 24

Yield to Risk / UST Bond vs. "Volatility Bond" (Collateralized Short Put on S&P 500 index) Investment Stress Test #1 Stress Test #2 Stress Test #3 Stress Test #4 Volatility Bond / Short SPX Put + Collateral SPX ↓ -9% SPX ↓ -14% SPX ↓ -25% SPX ↓ -50% Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Yield Maturity Loss % Reward Loss % Reward Loss % Reward Loss % Reward SPX Put (Strike @-25%) 2.69% 1 year -2% 68% 1.373x -4% 39% 0.616x -11% 13% 0.242x -33% 2% 0.081x SPX Put (Strike @2009 lows) 0.51% 1 year -0.4% 68% 1.319x -0.9% 39% 0.588x -3% 13% 0.176x -15% 2% 0.034x US Treasury Bond UST Rates ↑ 100bps UST Rate ↑ 200bps UST Rate ↑ 325bps UST Rate ↑ 600bps Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Est. MTM Historic Prob. Risk to Yield Maturity Loss % Reward Loss % Reward Loss % Reward Loss % Reward US Treasury Bond / 10-year 1.87% 10 years -9% 68% 0.214x -17% 39% 0.113x -25% 13% 0.074x -41% 2% 0.045x US Treasury Bond /30-year 3.09% 30 years -18% 68% 0.176x -31% 39% 0.099x -44% 13% 0.070x -62% 2% 0.050x

BULL MARKET IN FEAR 25

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BULL MARKET IN FEAR 26

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BULL MARKET IN FEAR 27

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BULL MARKET IN FEAR 28

Fiat Currency

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BULL MARKET IN FEAR 29

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BULL MARKET IN FEAR 30 Quantitative Quantitative

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Kahneman General Partner andFounder Partner General

Vol and the Cross Section of Stock Returns" Guido Vol Returns" Guido Baltussen, Sjoerd Van Stock Section of the and Cross - – of -

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BULL MARKET IN FEAR 31

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LEGAL DISCLAIMER 32

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ACCURATE, BUT WETHEOF CANNOTSUCHGUARANTEEINFORMATION. ACCURATE, ACCURACY CERTAIN DATA CONTAINED HEREIN IS HEREIN IS BASED DATAON CONTAINED INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM BELIEVED SOURCESCERTAIN TO BE INVESTMENT RESULTS INVESTMENTSUBSTANTIALLYMAYVARY OVER GIVEN ANYTIME PERIOD. THAT AN INVESTOR WILL RECEIVE A RETURN OF ALL OR ANY PORTION OF HIS OR HER INVESTMENT IN THE IN INVESTMENTANY OF OR OF FUND. HIS RETURN HERALL PORTION WILL OR INVESTOR A AN RECEIVE THAT EXPECTED TO DEVELOP. BE EXPECTEDGIVEN CANTHATNO ASSURANCE THEINVESTMENT OBJECTIVE WILL BE OR ACHIEVED WITHDRAWAL, REDEMPTION AND TRANSFERABILITY OF TRANSFERABILITY REDEMPTIONAND WITHDRAWAL, SO AREINTERESTS INVESTORS RESTRICTED, MAYNOT HAVE TO CAPITAL WHENIT ACCESSIS NEEDED. THEFOR THERE IS NO SECONDARYMARKET ANDINTERESTS NONE IS AN INVESTMENT IN ANTHEFUND IS SPECULATIVE INVOLVES AAND HIGH DEGREE OF OPPORTUNITIESRISK. FOR THE MEMORANDUM. THE THE FUND’S MEMORANDUM.THE IS QUALIFIED THEIN INFORMATION HEREIN ITS BY ENTIRETY THE INFORMATION IN JURISDICTIONS WHERE PERMITTEDWHERE BY JURISDICTIONS INVESTMENTLAW. ANSHOULD ONLY BE MADEAFTER REVIEW OF CAREFUL L.P. (THE “FUND”). ANY SUCH OFFER OR SOLICITATION WILL WILL (THE“FUND”). L.P. SOLICITATION SUCH OFFER OR BE ANYONLY MEANSTOBY MADEINVESTORS QUALIFIED PLACEMENTPRIVATEA OF CONFIDENTIAL(THEMEMORANDUM “MEMORANDUM”) AND ONLY THOSEIN THIS IS IS NOTOFFERING THIS AN THEOR OF SOLICITATION AN OFFER TOINTEREST ANFUND, PURCHASEVEGAARTEMIS IN

DISCLOSURE 33 ED ED TURN TURN A FOR FOR

MAY BE MAY

RE CAT SHOULD BE SHOULD

ING R DIFFERENT DIFFERENT R E THE NET ARY EL THE THE EL ETS. ETS. THE POOL. POOL. FFECT YOUR YOUR FFECT FFE YOU TY TY ASS DUC Y Y A OMP th their own advisers before advisers before their own th wi

presented in this document includes includes this document in presented

rmance is not indicative rmance future ofindicative not is ies. Proprietary ies. Proprietary results for trading nce rfo rtion of or potentially potentially rtion their entire or of ffr me, an investment in the Partnership may the Partnership in investment me, an ll as those of close family members. Note Note family members. close of ll asthose ti po

pal of the General Partner, Christopher pal R. Partner, the General of we

legal advisors regarding the suitability this suitability of the advisors regarding legal t of potential risk factors please review the t review please factorsrisk potential of

nci lis and

UNITED STATES STATES TRANSACTIONS WHERE THE POOL FOR JURISDICTIONS UNITED -

EFFECTED. OR DIMINISHED PROTECTIONS TO THE POOL AND ITS PARTICIPANTS. FURTHER, TO ITS FURTHER, STATES AND C PARTICIPANTS. UNABLE POOL UNITED BE TO MAY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES THE PROTECTIONS DIMINISHED OR REGULATORY AUTHORITIES THE RULES NONOR OR MARKETS OFIN ENFORCEMENT OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING MARKETS FORMALLY LINKED TO A UNITED STATES MARKET, MAY BE SUBJECT TO REGULATIONS WHICH O WHICH REGULATIONS TO SUBJECT STATES BE MAY A MARKET, UNITED TO LINKED MARKETS FORMALLY STATES, INCLUDING UNITED THE OUTSIDE DESCRIPTION OF THE PRINCIPAL RISK FACTORS FACTORS RISK INVESTMENT. OFTHIS OFTHE PRINCIPAL DESCRIPTION THEREFORE, BEFORE YOU DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS COMMODITY POOL, YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY STUDY INCLUD THE OFFERINGMEMORANDUM, STUDY CAREFULLY SHOULD POOL,YOU THIS COMMODITY PARTICIPATE IN TO DECIDE YOU BEFORE THEREFORE, OFFERING MEMORANDUM CONTAINS A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF EACH EXPENSE TO BE CHARGED THIS POOL AND A STATEMENT STATEMENT PERCENTAGE A AND OF THE POOL THIS TO CHARGED EXPENSEBE OF EACH DESCRIPTION COMPLETE A CONTAINS MEMORANDUM OFFERING INVESTMENT . INITIAL YOUR IS, AMOUNT TO EVEN, THAT TO RECOVER THE BREAK OF NECESSARY THOSE POOLS THAT ARE SUBJECT TO THESE CHARGES TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL TRADING PROFITS TO AVOID DEPLETIONS OR EXHAUSTION OF THEIR EXHAUSTION OF THEIR CHARGES SUBSTANTIAL OR TO MAKE DEPLETIONS ARE TRADING SUBJECT THESE TO PROFITS AVOID THAT POOLS TO THOSE ABILITY TO WITHDRAW YOUR PARTICIPATION POOL. THE PARTICIPATION YOUR IN WITHDRAW TO ABILITY AWARE THAT FUTURES AND OPTIONS TRADING CAN QUICKLY LEAD TO LARGE LOSSES AS WELL AS GAINS. SUCH TRADING LOSSES CAN SHARPLY RE SHARPLY TRADING CAN TO LOSSES LOSSES GAINS.SUCH AS LARGE LEAD AS WELL QUICKLY OPTIONS THAT TRADING CAN AND FUTURES AWARE REDEMPTIONS RESTRICTIONS MA IN ADDITION, ON THE POOL. INTEREST YOUR IN VALUE OF THE CONSEQUENTLY AND THE POOL VALUE OFASSET returns. imposition of a 2% Management Fee and 20% Performance Allocation (in line with those charged against the Partnership).Past pe Partnership).Past against the charged Allocation those Performance line (in with 20% Fee and Management a 2% imposition of Cole, used the Proprietary Account as a vehicle to incubate the investment strategy of the Partnership with personal as personal funds with Partnership the of strategy investment the incubate to a vehicle as Proprietary Account the used Cole, Proprietary Accordingly, Performa Pro Forma profiled. Account the the to charged were fees or performance no management that White Fox, LLC (the “Proprietary Account”) are presented within this document that were verified by Spicer The Pri Spicer Jeffries. by verified that were document this within presented are Account”)“Proprietary LLC (the Fox, White investment. investment. be subject to additional and different risk factors. Prospective investors should also consult with their own financial, financial, tax their own with consult should also investors risk Prospective factors. different additional to and subject be substantial losing ofthe a risk bear investors and returns guarantee not does L.L.C. Artemis Management, Capital investment. deciding whether to invest in the Partnership. In addition, as the Partnership’s investment program over changes program and develops investment the Partnership’s In addition, as the Partnership. invest in to whether deciding Offering Memorandum. Prospective Limited Partners should read the entire Memorandum and the Partnership and consult Partnership Agreement the Memorandum entire and the should read Partners Prospective Limited Memorandum. Offering OR TRADE FUTURES MAY OPTIONS CONTRACTS. TRANSACTIONS FOREIGN MARKETS LO ONPOOL THIS COMMODITY ALSO THAT AWARE BE SHOULD YOU THIS BRIEF STATEMENT CANNOT DISCLOSE ALL THE RISKS AND OTHER FACTORS NECESSARY TO EVALUATE YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS COMMODI INTHIS PARTICIPATION YOUR TO EVALUATE NECESSARY FACTORS OTHER RISKS AND THE ALL DISCLOSE STATEMENT CANNOT BRIEF THIS

SUBSTANTIAL NECESS BE TO MAY CHARGES SUBJECT IT FEES. BE ADVISORY MANAGEMENT, MAY FOR POOLS BROKERAGE AND COMMODITY FURTHER,

YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER YOUR FINANCIAL CONDITION PERMITS YOU TO PARTICIPATE IN A COMMODITY POOL. IN SO INDOING, POOL. COMMODITY IN A TO PERMITS PARTICIPATE YOU CONDITION FINANCIAL YOUR WHETHER CONSIDER CAREFULLY SHOULD YOU Commodity PoolCommodity DisclosureOperator Statement All 2009 performance numbers quoted within this document are derived from financial statements that were audited by Spicer Spicer audited Je by were that financial from derived statements are this within document quoted numbers performance All 2009

An investment in the Partnership and strategies discussed in this document involve risks. For significant of full number involve a a in document this discussedand strategies Partnership in investment the An General Disclosure StatementGeneral