The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung

AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page i Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

THE POLITICAL AND MORAL IMPERATIVES OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE OF 1955 THE REACTIONS OF THE US, UK AND JAPAN AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page ii Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page iii Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

THE POLITICAL AND MORAL IMPERATIVES OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE OF 1955 THE REACTIONS OF THE US, UK AND JAPAN

by KWEKU AMPIAH The University of Leeds AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page iv Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

THE POLITICAL AND MORAL IMPERATIVES OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE OF 1955 THE REACTIONS OF THE US, UK AND JAPAN by Kweku Ampiah

First published in 2007 by GLOBAL ORIENTAL LTD PO Box 219 Folkestone Kent CT20 2WP UK

www.globaloriental.co.uk

ISBN 978-1-905246-40-3

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library

Set in Stone Serif 9/10.5pt by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester Printed and bound in England by Cromwell Press Ltd, Trowbridge, Wilts AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page v Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

Contents

Preface ix Acknowledgements xi List of Abbreviations xii

Introduction 1 Unbridling a Third World 1 The Road to Bandung 7

1 Neutralism as a Political Force in Asia in the Mid-1950s 15 The Resurgence of Neutralism and the Politics of Non-Alignment 22 The Exploits of the Neutralists 27 The Bandung Conference and its Antecedents 29 Negotiating about Prospective Participants 31 The Phantom of Bandung 35 Divisions within a United Front 39 Neutralism and Japan’s Reticent Foreign Policy 45 The Socialists and Japanese Foreign policy 47 Conclusion 51

2 US Attitudes Towards the Conference: From Revulsion, to ‘Benevolent Indifference’, and Reluctant Acceptance 63 Pre-Conference Angst 64 Initial Reactions to the Impending Conference 65 The Quest for a Reliable Person to Represent Western Interests 69 The U-turn 74 The State Department’s Damage Limitation Strategies 82 The Conference and its Surprises: Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Initiatives 84 The Japanese Participation in the Conference: An American Dilemma 88 Japan and the US: Conferring about the Conference 90 Pre-Conference Consultations between the US Embassy (Tokyo) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 94 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page vi Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

vi Contents

The Japanese Leadership Question and Reactions to US Interventions 97 America’s Response to the Japanese Performance at the Conference 101 The American Assessment of the Outcome of the Conference 102 Conclusion 107

3 Britain and Bandung: Whitehall’s Prognosis 118 The Implications of the Bandung Conference for Whitehall 120 The Problem of the Attendance of the African Countries 127 The Gold Coast, Nkrumah and the Bandung Conference 129 The Other African Countries at the Conference 137 British Reactions to Japan’s Involvement in the Conference 138 British Concerns about the Formosa Affair within the Context of Bandung 141 British Views about the Implications of Bandung for the UN 146 An Assessment of Parkes’s Report about the Conference 149 Anxieties about the Economic Initiatives of the Afro-Asian Countries 153 Conclusion 157

4Japan’s Journey back to Asia and the New Foreign Policy of Independence 166 Japan After the Second World War 166 The Dilemma of Japanese Foreign Policy in the Early Post-war Era 169 Japan’s Policy Options towards the Conference 171 Issues and Concerns about the Conference 172 Preparations for the Conference 174 The Policymaking Process within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 178 The Composition of the Japanese Delegation 181 Diet Discussions of the Membership of the Japanese Delegation 184 The Takasaki-Zhou Meeting at Bandung 186 Post-Conference Parliamentary Debates: An In-house Assessment of Japan’s Performance at the Conference 188 Takasaki’s Reports 190 Conclusion 195

5 Conclusion Bandung’s Legacy: The Struggle Against Marginalization 203 The Political Imperatives of the Conference 205 The New Discourse of Peace and Security 207 The Economic Imperatives of the Conference 209 Japan’s Role in Post-war Asia 212 The Non-aligned Movement 214 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page vii Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Contents vii

Appendix 1: Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference 222 Appendix 2: Proposal for Economic Cooperation 229 Appendix 3: Address of Mr Tatsunosuke Takasaki, Principal Japanese Delegate, Before the Asian-African Conference 230 Appendix 4: President Sukarno’s Opening Speech 233

Bibliography 241 Index 245 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page viii Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gar AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page ix Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Preface

his book is about the Bandung Conference of 1955 – otherwise known Tas the Asian African Conference of 1955 – and in that sense it proposes to deal with what seems, on the face of it, to be an obscure event in the mid- 1950s, when post-war international politics was contending with much more serious occurrences, such as the beginning of the Cold War between the superpowers, the US and the USSR. Yet, as this study reveals, there are no small questions in international diplomacy, or indeed in history. The conference was indeed about registering the grievances of the independent countries of Asia and Africa about the nature of international politics and their role in it. The other major concern of these countries was how to effect decolonization in the regions that colonialism still existed, as in Africa. In the grand scheme of things, the organisers of the conference, in particular the neutralists amongst them, aimed to use the conference as a public forum to initiate changes to the existing international geo-political arrangements. In the ﬁrst instance, they wanted a meaningful role in the orchestration of world affairs, not least because they were no longer prepared to submit to marginalization in the affairs of a world to which they also belonged. Nor were they prepared to accept the role of satellite entities that the superpowers, the US and the USSR, had conveniently assigned to them, a by-product of the Yalta agreements. They had fought hard to gain their independence from colonialism and their expectations from that vantage point were really high. Thus, as Jawaharlal Nerhu, the charismatic prime minister of India and one of the inspirations behind the conference, optimistically proclaimed in his opening address to the conference:

Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has again become important in world affairs . . . We live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes her rightful place with the other continents.

Consequently, in a speech to the Political Committee at the conference, he insisted that ‘It is an intolerable thought to me that the great AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page x Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

x Preface

countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves’ by serving as satellite states to the warring powers. Seemingly obscure events in international diplomacy, as in history, have a tendency to assume prominence in the larger scheme of things. The Asian-African Conference did exactly that. By drumming up the issue of decolonization, it threatened and managed to undermine the conﬁdence and the complacency of the colonial powers. The conference, therefore, succeeded in turning the British Empire, for example, into a poisoned chalice – the colonies were a nuisance to US geo-political ambitions. US policymakers wished to treat the conference as a nonentity and therefore as something to be ignored. In reality what the conference represented haunted the State Department. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, was deeply concerned that Bandung was an embodiment of the hardening of an anti-Western mentality in Asia; and he utterly distrusted neutralism for this. Thus, for geo-strategic reasons Bandung could not be ignored. In the end, the State Department was forced to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards the conference, as the study shows. In the event, as O.C. Morland, the British High Commissioner in Indonesia remarked: ‘The Americans got out from Washington a team of cipherers and secre- taries, who were stationed in Bandung and who reported direct.’1 The attention that the event unexpectedly received worldwide turned it into what I refer to as the ‘Global Bandung Project’, and it empowered the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa to constantly question the status quo as the spirit of Bandung evolved into the Non-Aligned Movement. Finally, I wish to note that I enjoyed undertaking this rather exhila- rating research exercise; exploring and retelling the narrative of the Bandung Conference was a real privilege. I regret, however, that I was not able to cover every aspect of the story; it is of course too long and too complicated a narrative for one person to handle. After all, there were twenty-nine countries represented at the conference and, as one can imagine, an uncountable number of gate-crashers. Thus, like Rossi in The Historian, I concede that this trail of scholarship is merely something one person makes a little progress on, then another, each contributing a bit in his/her own lifetime. I hasten to add that I have written this book from the perspective of a political scientist.

Edinburgh June 2007

1 O.C. Morland to F. S. Tomlinson (South East Asia Department, Foreign Ofﬁce) 3 May 1955, Public Record Ofﬁce, FO 371/116984 [D2231/348]. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page xi Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Acknowledgements

n researching for and writing this book I have become indebted to Imany individuals and some institutions. Professor J. A. A. Stockwin deserves a special mention for his support and encouragement; and I thank him for his generosity in reading and commenting on the manu- script. I am also grateful to Professor Iokibe Makoto for showing interest in my research and inviting me to join the Anglo-Japanese Joint-project on Post-war Japanese Diplomacy. Paul Nobury and David Blakeley at Global Oriental have worked patiently with me to bring this book to publication, and I am grateful for their cooperation. I should also thank David Haight of the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas and Michael Hussey of the National Archives & Records Administration, Maryland for their patience and professional responses to my queries. Finally, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee and the Nufﬁeld Foundation for independently funding this project. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page xii Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

List of Abbreviations

AA Afro-Asian ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CAF Central African Federation CO Colonial Office CRO Commonwealth Relations Office ECAFE The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East FE Far Eastern FO Foreign Office IRD Information and Research Department JSP Japan Socialist Party KMT Koumintang NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OCB Operations Coordinating Board PSA Political and Specialized Agency PRC People’s Republic of China SC Security Council SDP Social Democratic Party SEAD Southeast Asia Department SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation SUNFED Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development UNGA United Nations General Assembly

A note on the text

In this book the following stylistic conventions have been followed. All Japanese names are given in the Japanese order with family name ﬁrst except for those of Japanese authors of English-language articles and books. Macrons are used in the normal way to designate long vowels in Japanese words. The only exceptions to this rule are well-known place names such as Tokyo, where macrons have been omitted. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 1 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

Introduction

UNBRIDLING A THIRD WORLD he Bandung Conference – ofﬁcially referred to as the Asia-Africa TConference of 1955 – was an event waiting to happen, if only because historical epochs seem to impose themselves on political communities, and they in turn fervently embrace them. But its occurrence was also precisely because all political communities desire moments in their history for celebration if only in emulation of the other turning points in history that have been canonized. Such events are also designed to ensure and crystallize community identity. Inevitably, the liberation of the Asian countries from colonial rule had to, somehow, be recorded in one big event where all those who had been freed from Western political domination would meet up for a big riotous convention. This would involve a meeting of similar minds, moments of discord between minds of divergent opinions (even about shared histo- ries) and some advice for those yet to be liberated, as in the case of the countries in Africa still under colonial rule. Ultimately, however, a meeting such as took place in Bandung, (Indonesia’s fourth largest city) in April 1955, would have an impact that would go a long way in pro- nouncing certain events and moments in history – episodes in international relations – as irresponsible and certainly reprehensible, because they were inherently wrong. In this new interpretation of things, those who perpetrated such acts would also be seen as aggressive, self- conceited and imperialistic, and they would be roundly censured for disturbing the peace. By the same token, such an event would also set down certain guidelines and grand ambitions which would be evoked as the principles by which nation-states should, or should not, behave. In that sense, the Bandung Conference was an epiphany, one that brought hope to all those who craved independence and freedom from foreign domination. In so doing, it questioned the concept and practice of European colonialism and queried the right of one nation to dominate another. In essence, Bandung championed and helped enforce the inevitable developments that were already taking place between the entities that became AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 2 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

2 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

known as the ‘Third World’ and the West in what was subsequently referred to as North-South relations. Because it was a forum that was almost universal in stature and also carried the universal message of justice; and because it was initiated and orchestrated by the victims themselves, the Bandung Conference is endowed with metaphorical power. The event was composed of a distinctive political group that was eager to effect changes to post-war international politics. It was a community on the margins of world affairs – one that sought to ensure that the old international political structures as instituted through the political impositions of the Europeans on the peoples of Asia and Africa would end, and would not recur. The conference was therefore a statement – a political declaration, if you will – designed to vindicate the independence of the new States of Asia and embrace and drum up solidarity for those yet to win their freedom. It was also a proclamation of the arrival, even if late, of these States in the affairs of world politics. Indeed, earlier in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, had jubilantly declared at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi that: ‘Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has again become important in world affairs.’ He also reminded his audience that: ‘We live in a tremendous age of transition’, and predicted that, ‘. . . already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes [its] rightful place with the other countries’. Bandung was the afﬁrmation of the next stage, and hence a manifestation of the ‘Wind of Change’ that was unleashed on the international community by the Second World War and its outcomes. Ultimately, the event exempliﬁed the highest point of the indignation among the Asian countries against the injustices of the international political system as designed at Yalta, and the dangers that were posed by the bi-polar structure that emanated from it. Inevitably, it was clear to the leaders of these newly independent states that it was to the hegemonic powers, the US and the USSR in particular, that the conference would have to address its vision of the ideal world. As Nehru argued:

The mistakes of my country and perhaps the mistakes of other countries here do not make a difference; but the mistakes the Great Powers make do make a difference to the world and may well bring about a terrible catastrophe.1

In that respect, the crusade against colonialism and the campaigns against the Cold War were two sides of the same coin, at least as far as the neutralists among the pack were concerned. Thus, the conference was not organized for the purposes of evoking goodwill to all nations, nor, as it turned out, was it for calming the nerves of the Great Powers. On the contrary, it was meant to issue a strong political statement to the powerful nations (in particular the Western countries), and to warn against the dangers of a global war. In that sort of climate, Nehru was eager to dispel the notion that because he was a neutralist he was necessarily a paciﬁst. Hence, when speaking to the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 3 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

Introduction 3

Political Committee2 of the meeting in one of his ﬁred-up moments, he stated:

I never challenged the right of my country to defend itself . . . We will defend ourselves with whatever arms and strength we have, and if we have no arms, we will defend ourselves without arms. I am dead certain that no country can conquer India. Even the two great power blocs together cannot conquer India.

Strong words, indeed. Having legitimized the role of neutralism in international affairs, Bandung as an event mushroomed into the Non-Aligned Movement. As described in Chapter 1 and the Conclusion (Chapter 5), the Non-Aligned Movement evolved from the agitation of the neutralists, and subsequently became a force against the gap between the rich North and the poor South in terms of economic achievement. This was all very dra- matically played out at the United Nations forums; consequently, at the UN, the ‘Third World’ raised fundamental questions about economic and political injustices, while belittling the concept of peace as propagated by the West. The activities of the movement further underlined the sense that there was indeed more than one Cold War. There was the conflict between the superpowers, on the one hand, and the struggle of the Afro- Asian countries to free themselves from economic exploitation and political domination by the West, as well as for racial equality within the framework of the new International Order, on the other. This accentu- ated what Ali Mazrui3 referred to as the philosophical clash between the ideal of peace as the moral foundation of the UN in the view of the older members, and the ideal of human dignity and justice, deemed as the basis of the UN by the newer members. Essentially, the newer members of the world body demanded, and continue to demand, a re-evaluation of the priorities of the UN without necessarily intending to undermine its essence. After all, the organizers of the conference seemed determined to work within the framework of the world body, and they had the Final Communiqué of the meeting as a testament to that. At any rate, the Third World was determined to re-invent politics in a way that would ultimately upset the status quo. In sum, therefore, reading back into the development narrative of the Afro-Asian (AA) solidarity, it would be difficult to deny the role of the conference in defining the role of the AA group as a force in UN bloc politics. In that scheme of things, the conference has become part and parcel of the post-colonial discourse – even central to it. As a result, there have been recent attempts to reinvigorate the common destiny of the people of Asia and Africa which was captured and drummed up by the event in Bandung. The Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD), for example, has evoked the shared destiny of the two continents, and has sought to encourage direct dialogue and exchanges between African and Asian leaders to find areas where the development AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 4 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

4 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

of African economies could benefit from the Asian experience. It was in relation to this that the Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa Cooperation was adopted at the First Asia-Africa Forum (AAF 1) in Indonesia in 1994. Even more recently, in October 2004, the World Bank organized a conference on Africa-Asia Trade and Investment Relations under the auspices of the TICAD to help promote better economic relations between the two regions. That the Bandung Conference is an iconic moment in post- colonial history is further illustrated by such events as the conference that was held at Stanford University in May 2005, and the one organized by the Indonesian Government, in Indonesia, in April 2005, to com- memorate the fiftieth anniversary of Bandung. Although the event has been extensively written about, it is often either in passing in scholarly discussions about the roles of the Third World or the Non-Aligned Movement in post-colonial politics, or in jour- nalistic pieces. Thus, we come across the conference in H.W. Brands’s The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960, where, in fact, the author discusses Bandung in great depth within the context of the interplay between ideology and geopolitics. In the same fashion, Evelyn Colbert’s Southeast Asia in International Politics 1941–1956, discusses the relevance of the conference in international affairs, as do G.H. Jansen’s Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment,and Peter Lyon’s Neutralism.Publications about India’s foreign policy and biographical treatises about Jawaharlal Nehru, as for example Michael Brecher’s Nehru: A Political Biography, would also normally carry an extensive exposé about the conference. Jamie Mackie’s 2005 publication, Bandung 1955: Non- Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity, with its beautiful illustrations, is also a fine and helpful reminder of what took place in Indonesia. The first scholarly work that was entirely devoted to the conference is George McTurnan Kahin’s The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, published by Cornell University Press in 1956. Although useful in mapping out the structure and content of the meeting, Kahin’s book was more reportage than an analytical piece of work. Nicholas Tarling’s learned article, ‘ “Ah-Ah”: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955’, is equally unique in concentrating on the conference and discussing the viewpoints of Whitehall officials and British diplomats about the event and its relevance to British foreign and colonial policies. So is Jason Parker’s recent publication,4 which concerns itself with the Eisenhower administration’s responses to the conference; and Roland Burke’s article, which passionately argues for the recognition of the conference’s embracement and affirmation of the ideals of Human Rights. A few other recent publications have also, correctly, highlighted the racial resonance of the conference and its effects on international race relations. For example, Thomas Borstelmann’s illuminating book The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena, 2001, Cary Frasers’ ‘An American Delimma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955’; and Matthew Jones’ ‘A “Segregated” Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 5 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

Introduction 5

and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1945-1955’, present a richly nuanced assessment of how the conference confronted US foreign and domestic policy on the issue of race. According to Jones, ‘the idea of a transnational racial solidarity challenging a white- dominated power structure that operated at both international and domestic levels was powerfully communicated by Bandung to many African-American leaders’.5 Fraser contends that: ‘The Afro-Asian conference launched an era of growing antiracist assertiveness by the people of colour’ particularly against ‘the ideologies of white supremacy that girded segregation in the United States, apartheid in South Africa, and European colonial rule in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean’.6 In general, these publications explore what Richard Wright7 referred to as the shared sense of ‘Colour Consciousness’ that defined the relations of the conference participants – and the relevant others – more potently than ideology could. Despite the recent spread of academic commentary on the topic – the variety of angles from which these studies explore the subject, not to mention the breadth and sophistication of analyses that they bring to the ‘conversation’ – the need for a more extensive study that is primarily devoted to the conference and looks at it from a comparative perspective is long overdue, not least because 2005 was the fiftieth anniversary of this most momentous event in post-colonial history. Such a publication is made more essential because the relevant archives are abounding with documents about the event and these are now accessible to researchers and the general public. My personal interest in the topic was initially triggered in 1991 by my first research into the Japanese participation in the conference, on the basis of which I published a short, rather preliminary article in 1995.8 It was through that research that, to my complete surprise, I came to realize that Japanese scholars have largely ignored the topic, Japan’s participation in the event and its extensive involvement in the post-colonial economic development of South East Asia notwithstanding. The situation, however, seems to be changing since the publication (in 2001) of Bandon kaigi to nihon no ajia fukki: Amerika to ajia no hazama de (‘The Bandung Conference and Japan’s Return to Asia: Negotiating the narrow path between America and Asia’), by a young academic, Miyagi Taizo.9 To some extent, the publication of this volume in Japanese amounts to the exhumation of a prematurely buried chapter in Japanese diplomatic history – one that evokes a substantial degree of sentiment and nostalgia for those old enough to remember news coverage of the event as it unfolded in 1955. Effectively, the publication has re-ignited the debate about Japan’s relations with its neighbours, and confirmed that the political nuances of Japan’s relations with Asia – especially South East Asia – since the end of the war have yet to be exhausted. Thus, I had initially intended to confine this research to an account of Japan’s participation in the Bandung Conference. Upon reflection, however, I decided that a comparative assessment of the responses of the US, UK and Japan to the conference might do the event more justice. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 6 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

6 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

After all, the accounts of both the American and British responses to the event are also far from being exhausted. The study consists of four main chapters and a concluding chapter. The first of these lays the theoretical groundwork for the articulation of the ideals of the countries that met in Bandung, but also elucidates for us the problems with which they were faced. The subsequent three chapters comprise case studies that examine the US reaction and responses to the Bandung Conference (Chapter 2); Britain’s response to the conference (Chapter 3); and finally Japan’s reactions and participation in the talks (Chapter 4). The decision to examine American and British reactions to the event is simply based on the fact that the two countries were clearly the main targets of the conference, despite the protestations of the organizers. As Arnold Wolfers correctly points out, the Afro-Asian cause had within its central ethos an inherent anti-Western bias,10 and this seems to have made it difficult for the group to recognize any forms of oppressive and exploitative systems other than Western colonialism and imperialism. Certainly, the capitalist undertones of the colonial empires made the two leading capitalist countries – America and Britain – morally reprehensible. One might say that this judgement was based on history and experience, as Wright11 argued. As he put it, the only thing the countries that met in Bandung had in common was ‘what their past relationship to the Western world had made them feel’. Thus, he felt that the meeting ‘was in itself a kind of judgement on the Western world’. Japan is also used as a case study because it was the most important ally of the West to attend the conference. Moreover, it was unique in being the only former colonial power at the event, not to mention the fact that it stood out as a former enemy of many of the Asian countries during the war. In that sense, it was the ‘cat at the mice’s convention’ – with a bell around its neck, if you will. Consequently, Japan had to tread carefully, in a manner that made it look more like a mouse at a cats’ convention. At the same time, Japan’s determination to be reintegrated into the Asian community of nations makes it a useful case study for our purposes. In essence, Japan’s attendance was unlike that of any of the other countries at the gathering. In view of Japan’s socio-political circumstances in the aftermath of the war and its effects on domestic politics, not to mention the extent of America’s influence on the country, the dynamics of Japanese party politics in the early 1950s are discussed in both Chapters 1 and 4, the last of which is devoted to Japan. This is not only to illustrate how diverse political opinions were, even among the country’s ruling elite, but also to underline the fact that Japan’s foreign policy was not based on a single orthodoxy. The three case studies examined here are essentially based on archival research conducted in the US, UK and Japan, respectively. In the main, the information collated here is gleaned from the National Archives (Maryland), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Abilene, Kansas), the National Archives (Kew, England) and Gaiko shiryokan [the Diplomatic Record Office] (Tokyo). Japanese parliamentary gazettes relating to the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 7 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

Introduction 7

conference were also examined particularly for our Japan case study. Foraging these official documents constitutes an attempt to evaluate, by comparing and contrasting, the plurality of attitudes and responses of Washington, London and Tokyo to the ‘raging tide’ of the Third World in the 1950s. This is of particular significance because there was an attempt to coordinate the responses and attitudes of the three countries to the conference and its potential consequences into a unified front against, as the US perceived it, the neutralist threat. As we shall find out, however, despite the similarities in their ideological positions, and their shared concerns about a coalescing ‘third force’, the respective interests of the three countries enforced different interpretations in their assessments of the event. After all, the ‘seismic waves’ generated by the impending conference affected them differently. This led to divergent responses on a number of issues in terms of how Britain and Japan dealt with the expectations of the US. What then was the raison d’être of the US anxieties, and what were its major concerns about the conference? Most importantly, how did it try to address them? To what extent did Whitehall share America’s nagging preoccupations, and how did Britain respond? Moreover, what expectations did the US have of Japan in its attempts to counter the threat posed by the supposed union of the neutralists and Communist China, and to what extent did Japan cooperate in the exercise? These are some of the questions that this book attempts to address.

THE ROAD TO BANDUNG Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter 1, there had been a number of Asian conferences before the gathering at Bandung, all designed to bring together the people of the region as one cohesive unit against the stag- nation wrought upon them by alien, speciﬁcally European, domination. For example, there was the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 which was held in New Delhi, followed by the conference on Indonesia in New Delhi in 1949 – a gathering designed to bring the world’s attention to the problems of Dutch police actions in the country. At the latter meeting, Nehru made a recommendation for machinery for effective communication between member states, which received tremendous support. From then on there was a growing tendency towards an Arab-Asian regional cooperation – with the appearance of a bloc – in the United Nations. The road from there to a larger, more comprehensive conference, to underline the growing cohesiveness of the Asian and Arab countries, was less complicated. Initially there was the Baguio Conference of May 1950. Then, in late 1953, the new Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, declared his wish for a joint action by the newly independent countries of South East Asia to preserve world peace, increase their inﬂuence in world Affairs, and provide mutual aid in development. By then, Nehru’s brand of neutralism had been circulated and popularized to such an extent that by 1950 some Asian states were identifying themselves as Neutralists in relation to the Cold War. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 8 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

8 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

The Colombo Conference of 28 April to 2 May 1954 involved only the leaders of five countries: Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Fundamentally, this prepared the grounds for the Bandung Conference of 1955, although it was not until December 1954 at Bogor in Indonesia, when the five powers met again, that it was confirmed that such an Asia- Africa Conference should be convened. Incidentally, the meeting in Colombo exposed the rifts within the group: India and Pakistan disagreed over Kashmir and US economic assistance; India and Indonesia were ideologically divorced from Ceylon and Pakistan, and Burma hovered between the two entities. All the same, despite the evident faulty partnering, it was obvious to all the parties involved that there were good and profound reasons for cooperative action. At the very least, it was agreed, a conference was required to examine the socio-economic problems facing the newly independent states, and to address the desperate aspirations for self-rule of the countries still under foreign domination. But, as noted above, Bandung embraced another responsibility by injecting into its agenda an ideological position that questioned the antagonism between the two superpowers: the US and the Soviet Union. The position was neutralism, which is defined here as the avoidance of formal political or security commitments to either of the major power blocs. It was an ideology championed by the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, which gathered momentum as a weapon against the Cold War. In that sense, it was aggressively political in its ambitions to ensure world peace: the neutralists also saw themselves as capable of mediating between the Cold War powers. Thus, apart from being a forum for political, economic and cultural unity between the Asian, Arab and African countries, the Bandung Conference was also aimed at developing an understanding of the new dimensions of conflict in international politics. The neutralists, in particular, were geared towards insisting on an alternative approach to conflict resolution, which inevitably raised a rather important question: how does the international community effectively police the actions of the major powers in international politics? Expressed in another way, how do the small powers control the behaviour of the superpowers who appear to have very little regard for the rules of international relations that they themselves have put together? As was evident with the rather unsettling developments of Cold War politics, the superpowers were seemingly determined to pursue peace through the medium of violence. As neutralism attracted the support of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it also became trapped in partisan politics and therefore succeeded in dividing the gathering at Bandung into two camps: the neutralists on the one hand, and the pro-West group on the other. Thus, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, the neutralist ideals of Nehru and his supporters were viewed rather menacingly by John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State of the Eisenhower administration, and by the State Department as a whole. In addition to these issues, the first chapter attempts to explore the essence and ramifications of neutralism, and does so by bringing into AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 9 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's

Introduction 9

perspective its evolution, as well as the tensions it brought to bear on the fragile unity of the Asian countries. The last section of the chapter inves- tigates the neutralist influences on Japanese foreign policy. The neutralist ideals, as is argued here, also informed Japan’s participation in the conference. Chapter 2 consists of three main parts, with the first half providing an account of America’s various reactions to the conference from the latter part of 1954 to 1955. It examines, with the view to illuminating, the manner in which the State Department (including its outposts abroad, such as the embassies) perceived and addressed the challenges thrown up by the conceptofneutralism and its actualization through the Bandung Conference. Specifically, it is an account of America’s attempts to control the events in Asia at the time, and in particular its efforts to undermine the talks. Consequently, a confluence of events and attitudes surrounding the selection of a leader for the pro-West faction within the Bandung group of states, and the State Department’s concerns about finding a strong and dynamic person to lead the faction emerges clearly from the study. Thus, as Fraser notes,12 although the United States was not invited to the conference it thoroughly participated in the event; its ‘. . . participation was guaranteed by its partnership with the invited delegations and the use of the Djakarta embassy as a clearing house to coordinate the activities of the anti-communist coalition’. The study also explores the proceedings at Bandung and brings into perspective issues about American relations with the PRC during this period. The spectre of Zhou Enlai’s participation in, and contributions to, the conference and America’s reactions to these are examined. The US’s main concern about the event, it seems, was that China and its ‘army’ of friends at the conference might press for the announcement of the equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine for Asia to keep the West outside the region. There was also the concern that these anti-Western countries would embarrass those cooperating with the West, either through SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) or by means of bilateral military assistance agreements. Thus, the chapter provides us with an insight into how deeply worried the State Department and its head, Dulles, were about the gathering and its expected outcomes. It further demonstrates how uncertain the State Department became of its friends in the region,13 not to mention its own position against the back- drop of the Asian states’ ambition to confirm, ensure, and expand their independence against all forms of foreign interventions. Related to all of these was the issue of the PRC’s claims on Taiwan and its threat to use force to repossess the country. In the event, the US adopted the attitude that the newly-independent states of Asia who were still infantile in the grand arena of world politics needed some protection, otherwise they would be led astray by the forces of communism and hence away from the US. As we shall notice in our analysis, the fear of the communist threat was grave enough for the State AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 10 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

10 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

Department to initially assume the attitude that the US would ostensibly ignore the conference. Its immediate reaction, in that respect, was to discourage the pro-Western states of Asia who had been invited to Bandung from accepting the invitation. That position was subsequently altered. Thus, the chapter maps out the events and the gradual processes of decision-making that went into the formation of the US attitude to the conference. In the end, the State Department’s attitude was transformed from what was referred to as ‘benevolent indifference’14 to one of active encouragement of its friendly countries in the region to attend. The U-turn came with the instruction that the delegation of its friendly states should be strong enough to counteract the perceived communist influence. The stipulation, among others, was that an astute and strong leader, a good navigator that is, should lead the delegation of its friends. A robust delegation with a forceful and well-informed leader, it was thought, would effectively challenge the wisdom, competence and agility of Zhou Enlai and Nehru in international politics. In reality, the business of identifying such a person to lead the pro-West group of states was rather arduous and tortuous at best. The second part of the chapter is a discussion of the overall attitude of the US to the issue of Japan’s participation in the conference. It examines the major concerns of the US about Japan’s position within the new political climate fronted by the newly independent states of Asia. In particular, it explores US anxieties over the potential Japanese ‘drift’ into the neutralist camp, and shows that the State Department was dissatis- fied with Japan’s performance at the event. In other words, despite Japan’s attempts to please the US, it failed to impress officials at the State Department with its performance at the talks. This is partly attributable to the Japanese Government’s determination to emphasize the economic aspects of the conference while de-emphasizing its political objectives and their ramifications. The third section evaluates the outcome of the conference from the perspective of the State Department and concludes that, after all, the event had not been detrimental to US interests. As noted above, the chapter dwells extensively on US archival documents to explore the cross-current of official US opinion, attitudes and emotions, as well as those of friendly countries such as Pakistan and the Philippines, regarding how best to deal with the perceived communist attempt to take control of the proceedings of the conference. The documents include correspondence between the State Department and its overseas diplomatic missions; US Government reports about the conference; as well as exchanges between the State Department and the relevant departments of the British Foreign Office, and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The comments in the archival documents are broad-ranging and, in certain cases, speculative. Nevertheless, they formed the basis of the US attitude and policy towards the evolving concept of neutralism, and of course the conference. They also provide us with useful insights into AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 11 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Introduction 11

what individual policy-makers and the collective machine of the State Department thought and felt about both friends and foes involved in the talks. The comments and advice of the US diplomats to the State Department are informative. Some of these are both instructive and constructive in terms of their contribution to the American decision-making process. They are also useful for our purposes because they expose some of the conflicts between diplomatic missions abroad and the ‘Head Office’. For example, while the initial reaction of the State Department was to ‘ignore’ the conference, a number of the US missions insisted on the need for US interests to be represented and defended at Bandung. Moreover, while the State Department dismissed the conference as misguided because it was oriented towards neutralism as well as being tainted by communism, many of the missions warned against throwing the baby out with the bath-water. They advised that the US should ‘establish common ground with the neutralist nations’ as a way of wrestling the initiative from the communists.15 The British, like the Americans, were very concerned about the impending conference. However, they were motivated by reasons different from those of their ideological bedfellows on the other side of the Atlantic. Britain’s main concern, as articulated by Whitehall, was the threat of the ideas behind the conference to their interests in the remaining colonies, especially in Africa. Thus, although Whitehall was concerned about the developments between the PRC and Taiwan and America’s role in that seemingly unmanageable conundrum, it was the ramifications of the talks to British political and economic interests in Asia and its colonies in Africa that occupied the minds at Whitehall. Consequently, neither the neutralist nor communist threat loomed as large for Britain as it did for America. It was instead the danger inherent in such conferences to provide the Asian and African countries with the opportunity ‘to form an Afro-Asian bloc which, if forced to adopt an attitude in the world struggle, may perhaps prefer the communist cause’, that worried the Foreign Office (FO). If the gravitation towards the left should happen it would ‘not [be] because [they like] communism but because [they] dislike the West’, it was further noted.16 Thus, although the interests of these countries were not identical and ‘sharply conflict(ed) in some instances’, Whitehall took cognisance of the fact that they were united by their ‘anti-colonial sentiment and the common realization that ...they are all alike different from the Europeans and Americans’. Whitehall was also concerned that although ‘the peoples represented have lately emerged from the stage of Western domination . . . the embers of resentment still glow and can readily be fanned’, not least by ‘[the] fear of a re-imposition of that alien domination, even if only in an indirect, economic, form’. Consequently, it was noted that: ‘the idea of the struggle for national freedom has in many Asian countries become a mental habit, a staple of politics’.17 There was, therefore, good reason for Whitehall to prevent the African countries still under British rule from attending the talks: to stop them from AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 12 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

12 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

being ‘poisoned’ with that ‘mental habit’. As shown in Chapter 3, the CO in particular saw as an affront the invitations extended to the Central African Federation (CAF) and the Gold Coast, for whose external relations Britain still retained responsibility. When it became obvious that the Gold Coast had accepted the invitation, the CO wailed, as it were, but the FO, as is shown, remained philosophical about it. The last of our case studies provides an insight into how Japan navi- gated its way around the demands of the conference. Specifically, it sup- plies us with the tools for evaluating Japan’s own understanding of the conference, not to mention what it aimed to gain from it. As a corollary, it sheds light on the nature of the US-Japan Alliance as well as on Japan’s relations with its neighbours. As with the other case studies, the chapter draws on archival documents to peruse the cross-currents of official Japanese attitudes and ambitions generated by the conference, as well as the position that Japan adopted towards it. Also analysed are the Official Gazettes of the Diet to reveal the nature and intensity of the parliamentary debates about Bandung, both before and after the conference. The archival documents, which include correspondence between the Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, and relevant Japanese officials, reveal Japan’s attempts to strike a balance between its interests in Asia, on the one hand, and its responsibilities towards the West, and to the US in particular, on the other. Most importantly, the chapter informs us that under the Hatoyama Ichiro administration, Japan was determined to establish an independent foreign policy that would be free from encroachment by the State Department. It is argued that Japan intended to use its attendance of the conference to underline its sovereignty since the end of the Occupation in 1952. The other crucial factor that emerges from the documents is Japan’s determination to re-establish relations with its neighbouring countries, especially the South East Asian states and the PRC, a position not unrelated to its ambitions to achieve an independent foreign policy. Despite these aspirations, however, Tokyo cooperated extensively with the US in its preparations to attend the talks. The Official Gazettes examined for this research are the ‘Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee’, the ‘Proceedings of the House of Councillors’ and the ‘Proceedings of the House of Representatives’. The parliamentary debates about the conference reveal inter-party concerns about, for example, the composition and quality of the Japanese delegation, the government’s anxieties about certain aspects of the conference, the position of the political parties on the Taiwan problem, and the government’s overall attitude to the conference. From the debates, we see that the opposition parties, and in particular the socialists, not only questioned but in fact ridiculed the government’s economic-centred approach to the talks, while highlighting its political implications. The socialists also urged the government to disengage the country from American domination, in their ambition to steer Japan into the neutralist fold.18 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 13 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Introduction 13

We take up the various threads in the individual chapters and attempt to weave a wider tapestry of the ‘Bandung Experience’ in Chapter 5. Consequently, we evaluate the American and British anxieties about the gathering, and also explore the responses of the two countries to the event in this chapter. The Japanese participation in the conference is also assessed in terms of the current problems that the talks posed for Japan’s policymakers, including the pressures that US expectations brought to bear. The post-Bandung engagements between Japan and its neighbours are, to some extent, also brought into perspective to show how, through its economic relations with the South East Asian countries, Japan fulfilled its dream of reconnecting with East Asia, at least economically, and quietly leading the region on a number of important geo-political issues. Most importantly, this chapter looks at the evolution of the Spirit of Bandung into the Non-Aligned Movement, and specifically engages with the issue of Third World economic development. The long-term impact of the conference on current (twenty-first century) events is also discussed, if in passing, particularly in relation to US national security policy since ‘9/11’ and its consequences globally, not to mention the regional and international attitudes observable in Japan to these.

NOTES 1 G.M. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1956, pp. 64–72. 2 Ibid. 3 Ali Mazrui, ‘The United Nations and Some African Political Attitudes’, International Organisation, Vol. xviii, 1964. 4 Jason Parker, in ‘Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era’, Diplomatic History, vol. 30, no. 5, November 2006. 5 Matthew Jones, ‘A “Segregated” Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1945-1955’, vol. 29, no. 5, November, 2005. p. 865. 6 Cary Fraser, ‘An American Delimma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955’ in Brenda Gayle Plummer, Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 118. 7 Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 1956. 8 Kweku Ampiah, ‘Japan at the Bandung Conference: The Cat Goes to the Mice’s Convention’, Japan Forum, vol. 7, no. 1, 1995. 9 Miyagi (in pp. 13–14) mentions the publications by Okakura Koshiro (Bandun kaigi to gojunen dai no ajia, 1986), and Watanabe Akio (Ajia-taiheiyo no kokusai kankei to nihon, 1992) as dealing with the conference. Okakura’s edited volume is, apparently, more about the Non-Aligned Movement, with a concentration on the foreign policies of the leading organizers of the talks, such as India, Indonesia and Burma. Miyagi states that the publication hardly deals with the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 14 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

14 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

issue of Japan’s participation in the conference while Watanabe gives an account of the relevance of the conference within the context of Japanese post- war diplomatic history, because it served as the platform for Japan’s ﬁrst constructive meeting with the Asian countries. In that sense, Japan’s involvement in the event was the kick-start for the debate on Japan’s diplomatic relations with the Asian countries. While the latter publication deals with Japan’s involvement in the conference, the author apparently argues that Japan’s participation was viewed with much trepidation by the Western countries who were concerned about Japanese neutralism. As will be demonstrated in both Chapters 1 and 2, the US was certainly apprehensive about the neutralist tendencies in Japan in 1955. 10 Arnold Wolfers, ‘Allies, Neutrals and Neutralists in Current US Defense Policy’, in Lawrence W. Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Non-Alignment: The New States in World Affairs, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p. 160. 11 Richard Wright, The Color Curtain. 12 Cary Fraser, ‘An American Delimma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955’, p. 129. 13 Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 69. 14 Department of State, ‘Verbatim Comments [of Secretary of State] from His April 12 Press Conference’, Circular 598, 12 April 1955. Central Decimal Files, 1955- 1959, National Archives Record Group 59; Committee on Foreign Relations, Bandung Conference: Statement of Adam C. Powell Jr. (Member of Congress from New York) to the United States Senate 10 May 1955; ‘Policy Criticized: Powell, Dulles Differ on Bandung’, Washington Post, 6 May 1955. 15 From Hong Kong to Secretary of State, 5 February 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955-1959, National Archives Record Group 59. 16 Asian Conferences, 1947–1955, 2 December 1955, (Public Record Ofﬁce) FO 371/116987 [D2232/3]. 17 Ibid. 18 J.A.A. Stockwin, The Neutralist Policy of the Japan Socialist Party, a thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University, 1964; J.A.A. Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism, London: Melbourne University Press, 1968. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 15 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

1 Neutralism as a Political Force in Asia in the Mid-1950s

lthough discourses are highly stratified in the field of international Adiplomacy and the point of view of the dominant presents itself as a universal point of view, one has to conceive the possibility that dominant discourses may be strategically manipulated by different actors with different ends in mind.1 Accordingly, in the 1950s the newly-independent neutralist states of Asia attempted to redirect the course and operations of post-war international politics away from the stipulations of the Yalta agreements of 1945. Neutralism – as a political discourse – was the essential medium according to which these countries attempted, at the very least, to diversify the operations of international politics. According to a State Department document dated 1 July 1955, the ‘. . .Ingredients of what [are] commonly referred to as Asian neutralism [are] ill-defined and [have] fluctuated through time and in the context of changing conditions.’ While neutralism in the early post-war era lacked precision, it existed as a reflection of the Cold War. Significantly, it was a reaction to the bipolar system whose relevance in international politics, essentially, depended on the Cold War. As the lengthy document, based on a study that was ordered by the Planning Coordination Group, amply points out, in theory ‘the essential ingredient of the neutralist position [was the] avoidance of formal political or security commitments to either of the major power blocs’.2 Specifically, it describes neutralism as ‘a national policy of maintaining more or less equal relations with the communist and the free nations and avoiding close cooperation with either bloc.’3 Peter Lyon’s working definition of neutralism as ‘dissociation from the Cold War’4 runs along similar lines. He argues that this definition is sufficiently broad enough to take account of such popular expressions as ‘non-alignment’, ‘active and peaceful co-existence’, ‘active policy for peace’, ‘independent policy’, ‘positive neutrality’ and ‘positive neutralism’. Thus, while Francis Low-Beer’s5 theoretical postulations question the viability of neutralism as a principle for foreign policy formulation, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 16 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

16 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

Lyon6 , on the other hand, identifies what he refers to as the ‘five main threads in the tangled skein of neutralist argument’. He argues that ‘these five affirmations suggest what are the central concerns of virtually all neutralists’. The five affirmations are as follows:

(1) Cold War conditions can be mitigated and perhaps removed altogether; (2) Neutralism is morally justiﬁable; (3) Neutralists must pursue an ‘independent’ foreign policy; (4) All forms of colonialism must be eradicated; (5) Foreign aid must be given without strings.

Lyon suggests that point (3) may perhaps be seen as the most primary concern of all the neutralists. Generally, however, the above afﬁrmations are interrelated and reinforce each other, as in the case of (3) and (5). Point number (1) addresses the anxieties of the neutralists as potential victims of the Cold War; while point number (2) is merely the assertion of the belief that it is only by remaining neutral to a problem that one can approach it without bias and ‘confront’ it objectively. Embedded in this position is the optimism of the leading neutralists that they ‘can help to prevent war’.7 The belief among the newly-independent states that a neutral body can help avert war between the superpowers was signiﬁcant in that it gave much credence to their adopted principle; and it also served as a source of empowerment for them. As is later demonstrated in our analyses, some of these new states sincerely believed in the idea of a power that was separate from the Cold War protagonists. Thus, as the Prime Minister of Ceylon S.W.R.D. Bandaraniake expressed it in 1956,8 his country, as the other Asian nations, was determined:

...to build a new society for ourselves. . .which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today. This is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this Power-bloc or that Power-bloc.

He explained this as the philosophy of neutralism and insisted: ‘It is not something dishonest. It is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of both worlds.’ Instead, he described this position, and correctly so, as one that has been ‘inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case’. Bandaranaike, also believed that the ‘. . .position. . .will be of great help in the world situation today’, for it provides ‘a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions’. In other words the neutralist doctrine, emboldened by the ethos of non-alignment (with either of the powers), was also about conﬂict resolution. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 17 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Neutralism as a Political Force in Asia in the Mid-1950s 17

Jawaharlal Nehru apparently first used the term ‘non-alignment’, which is what neutralism was effectively about, in May 1950;9 and it was resurrected in 1960 to reinforce the neutralist aspirations of the growing number of newly-independent states. The concept also refers to a political bloc, an association of states, with a reasonably well-defined political agenda. This association initially involved the newly-independent states of Asia, Africa and the Middle East although Yugoslavia and Cuba,10 despite their close relations with the Soviet Union, became active, if not leading, members of the group as it expanded its area to embrace non-traditional members. Why these two obvious communist countries with strong ties with one of the superpowers were accepted into the fold of the non-aligned club was in part because they were evidently desperate to ensure their independence against encroachment from their respectful powerful neighbours; and, anyway, their manifestly radical positions against imperialism made them automatic candidates for a movement that was willing to expand its membership. Following the neutralist tradition, the non-aligned states saw it as strategically imperative to consolidate their independence against the wilful interference of the powerful states in their national affairs. As was evident enough, based on the agreements reached at Yalta (in February 1945) which ensured the division of Europe into two halves, liberal democratic and communist states, the superpowers made decisions about geo-political issues that affected the newly-independent states without consulting them. Non-alignment therefore refers to the initiatives of the members of an actual political entity, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), to defend the interests of what became known as the ‘Third World’11 – a body of economically and politically peripheral states in the southern hemisphere whose limitations are perceived to be doubtlessly made worse by the extraordinary skills of the West, and who, inspired by the politics of defiance, have often tried to come up in the world on their own terms but also often failing miserably in these efforts, because they operated within an enormity that invariably swallowed the weak. Evoking the same sense of ‘Third Worldist’ predicament, Vicky Randall12 has also noted the perennial problem of ‘ “economic dependency and backwardness” even while it strongly shaped its imperatives’; and she speaks of the syndrome of Third World political instability, authoritarianism, clientelism and corruption that, one might add, was very often externally lead and orchestrated,13 as John Prados and Michael R. Adamson inform us in their separate works on the Eisenhower administration. Seemingly aware of the fact that they have nothing to lose by their actions, many of these Third World countries have often confronted the Western countries, and the US in particular, in varying acts of astounding, if sometimes reckless, bravery.14 Yugoslavia did the same with respect to the Soviet Union. We shall discuss the activities of the NAM more extensively in Chapter 5 but it would be worth clarifying a few points about the Third World here, since it is indeed a concept that seems to be very much out of breath, according to some observers. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 18 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

18 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

In a very useful appraisal of the ‘life and times’ of the concept, Mark T. Berger15 informs us that ‘The 1970s were the golden years of Third Worldism. . .By the 1980s, however, Third Worldism as both a revolu- tionary and a reformist project had entered into a period of precipitous decline’. Thus, as he suggests, ‘the age of the Third World has passed irrevocably into history’.16 Incidentally, however, history has a very cunning way of ‘sticking around’ and reinventing itself. It is, therefore, tempting to suggest that as long as the life themes that brought about the concept, and the body politics that sustain these, persist then it would be difficult for the aspirations trumpeted by the concept, as well as the concept itself, to fade away into oblivion. As other commentators have rightly noted, like any broad church the Third World keeps rework- ing itself to deal with the issues that matter to the disenfranchised communities of the world. What is, however, not in question is the fact that the Third World as a concept has strong links with the Bandung Conference, as well as being an intrinsic part of the NAM. There is also no doubt that neutralism fomented the principles of the NAM, and in that sense served as an orthodoxy and a principled justification for the sceptical attitude with which the non-aligned states approached the bi- polar system. As with the concept of the Third World the essence of neutralism also varied with the changing character of international politics17 and its fundamental determinants. The difficulty in the application of the concept of neutralism may also lie in the fact that the particular geo-political circumstances of one committed neutralist may produce a different set of responses from those of another committed neutralist faced with the same set of problems. According to Arnold Wolfers,18 ‘ In view of these divergences, and the flu- idity of the attitudes involved, neutralism must be understood not as a conformity with a fixed pattern of behaviour but rather as a current tendency towards a pattern peculiar to the states involved and one that may be weakened or reversed in time.’ Finally, although neutralism and neutrality display the same generic ethos, they represent two distinctive ideas. The distinction may lie primarily in the fact that ‘neutrality has a strictly legal as well as a general diplomatic or political connotation.’ 19 Thus, neutralism was a distinctive reinterpretation of an already existing ideal, neutrality. ‘By neutrality is meant non-involvement in war, while by neutralism is meant no involvement in the Cold War.’20 Also, traditional ‘neutrality’ is perceived as highly localized in the sense that it is self-contained and self-seeking. From this standpoint, neutrality was viewed as a negative ideal.21 Neutralism, on the other hand, seeks to actively turn the wheels of global politics in a collective and concerted fashion and in a more positive direction. Consequently, instead of excluding itself from the vicissitudes of international politics, the post- war neutralist engages directly with them and, in the process, contends with what might immediately seem like ‘somebody else’s problem’. It is fair to note, however, that traditional neutrality also experienced several stages of metamorphosis until it finally assumed its so-called negative AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 19 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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role in international politics during the inter-war period. This was a position apparently adopted in response to the League of Nations’ stipulation that all member states were obliged to assist in waging lawful war against unlawful aggression. At the same time, traditional neutralists were convinced that, instead of being self-seeking, their adopted position was capable of affecting world politics in the way in which it could influence more countries to turn against war. In any case, the premise of neutralism was the Cold War coupled with its strategic considerations, which were markedly different from the motivations for neutrality.22 Neutralism as a concept came into popular political usage following the reaction of a certain political constituency in France to the Cold War. Between 1947 and 1949, when the term was being floated around it was ‘. . .primarily associated with expressions of war-weariness, of pessimism, or nihilism, of distrust and dislike of alliances and indeed of all foreign policy, of passivity or je-m’en-fichisme (I could not care-lessism)’. What is also worthy of note is that, ‘In Europe generally professions of neutralism, however articulate, were the concern of impotent cliques not of governments’,23 and they served mostly as a point of reference for those opposed to the formation of NATO. It was not until India and Yugoslavia became the vanguards of the ideals of neutralism that the term became acceptable and popular among those who believed that an alternative approach to the belligerency of the Cold War climate was necessary.24 There were, however, certain powerful forces in opposition to the concept. To the US in particular, neutralism as a concept was a heresy championed by a group of exotics. The orthodoxy, along with the political culture of the newly-independent states as exemplified by the Bandung Conference of 1955, was therefore declared an ‘immoral and short-sighted conception’25 by the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in June 1956. Yet the supporters of the concept believed that it was embedded and emboldened with certain moral qualities and prerequisites which encouraged the ‘small powers’ to try and ‘civilize’ the big powers by weaning them away from war, by foreclosing the Cold War. The Cold War26 represented a state of war between acknowledged rivals, the US and the Soviet Union, which engendered a state of contin- uous preparation for war. It was, therefore, compatible with all forms of organized violence, short of direct encounters between the armed forces of the protagonists. In other words, it is a period when Great Power relationships ‘had neither sunk to war nor risen to peaceful cooperation’.27 All the same, proxy wars were being fought in different regions of the world, the Korean War (1950–53) being a typical example. That these wars were devoid of direct combat between the armed forces of the two superpowers is instructive: they were indicative of how the ‘Superpowers’ fought their wars without actually engaging each other in direct combat. In that sense, Robert Rothstein’s point that in a period of Cold War ‘Small Powers find themselves the objects of competition but not the victims of war’28 is highly contentious. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 20 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

20 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

The protagonists of neutralism were, at the very least, cynical about the Cold War, although neutralism itself was not about keeping out of Cold War conflicts. On the contrary, the leading neutralists, India, Yugoslavia and Egypt, for example, aspired to dampen the threats posed by the Cold War from Washington and Moscow29. They argued, heckled, teased, manipulated and even antagonized the superpowers. In essence, they attempted to use the neutralist doctrine to dictate and direct the cause of post-war international politics away from the belligerent posturing of America and Russia, and towards their own configuration of what the world situation should look like. After all Nehru had proudly stated that India would not play second fiddle in international politics.30 Nevertheless, the behaviour of the newly-independent states was, by and large, determined by the sort of relationship they had with the powers. Between 1947 and 1950, for example, Indian neutralism seemed to have been pro-Western in orientation. This was partly a by-product of Nehru’s positive orientation towards Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations in which India was determined to play an active role, a ‘patently un-neutral’ position given India’s public protestations against alignment.31 From 1951 to 1956, however, India seemingly moved from a Western-oriented neutralism and adopted a middle-of-the road position vis-à-vis the Cold War powers. This was apparently necessitated by events in the international political arena, as for example, the Korean War (which demanded a mediator between the Western countries and the Communist states). The fact that by that time India’s relations with both the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) had improved also made it necessary for it to maintain a proper neutral position. As already alluded to above, neutralism also commonly implies the theoretical possibility of bringing the opposing sides together, if only by serving as a bridge over the gulf dividing them. India, for example, had adopted non-alignment partly because of Nehru’s ambition to serve as peace-maker, although Washington came to view his ‘. . . peace- mongering. . . as mischievous’.32 Moreover, Washington suspected India of exploiting the conflict between the Cold War powers, which was perhaps not too far from the truth. As Raj Krishna points out, ‘The military significance of the policy of non-alignment is simply that it avoids a complete military alliance with any one power in order to permit limited military agreements with all powers.’33 Certainly, of great importance to the direction of Indian neutralism during this period was the development of Soviet aid programmes to India, which had the ‘political advantage of removing a wholesale dependence on the Western powers for vital foreign aid. . .’.34 All the same, India’s real sympathies lay with the West. After all, it was dependent on Britain and other Western countries for its economic survival, but there was also the Indian obsession with the British cultural way of doing things. In view of that, plus its strong affinity to the Commonwealth on the one hand, and association with the Soviet Union on the other, the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 21 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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declared Nehru’s neutralism as nothing more than ‘philosophical posturing’ that lacked ‘diplomatic substance’.35 Effectively, Washington viewed India and the rest of the neutralist states as nothing more than small countries attempting to manoeuvre themselves into a position of importance in international politics by feasting on Cold War animosities between the superpowers. Undoubtedly, no one would deny that neutralism was the antithesis of real politik; on the contrary, it was part and parcel of power politics. Because of their history and the less than satisfactory system of international relations they were thrust into after independence, the newly- liberated states of Asia saw it as a matter of paramount importance to consolidate their independence in the best way possible. This meant a total commitment to the development of the domestic economy, as well as ensuring domestic political stability. In both senses it implied protecting their newly-won independence from what were perceived as ‘neo-colonialist’ and imperialist advances. There were, of course, certain countries among the newly-independent states, like the Philippines who chose to be ‘the great exception to the general rule that the new states of the post-war world do not enter Cold War alliances’.36 Pakistan was another newly-independent country that seemingly compromised its independence as a result of its alignment to America’s prerogatives for security in Asia.37 Such US security initiatives in Asia, including its alliance with Japan, were bound to increase Soviet anxieties about its own security and invariably its interests in the region. For Nehru at least, these local satellite countries had thrown a spanner into the works with regard to his ‘aim to keep the superpower contest out of Asia – to prevent the extension of the Yalta framework to India’s environ’. 38 Meanwhile, India was determined to press on with de-colonization. Indeed, ‘because of their anti- imperialist ideology, the more radical leaders in neutralist countries consider[ed] it their mission, even after their countries ha[d] attained independence, to continue the ﬁght against all remnants of European colonialism, as well as against all forms of what they conceive[d] to be American imperialism’.39 In view of that, Nehru and his supporters perceived the American protectorate over the Ryukyu Islands as tantamount to colonialism. Essentially, he ‘. . . did not conceal his preference for an Asia controlled by Asians’. In being consistent to this ideal, he wanted the Soviet Union out of the PRC just as he wanted the US out of Japan, the Philippines and Pakistan.40 Incidentally, as C.V. Crabb argued,41 the US tended to confuse the neutralist’s determination to escape Western domination and control with an intention to embrace communism. Keeping the superpower struggle outside of Asia was certainly an objective of non-alignment. But ‘peace was its own reward’, as H.W. Brands put it, although Nehru also perceptively knew that peace was the prerequisite for India’s economic development, just as it was for the coherence of Asia. Effectively, there was the collective regional aware- ness42 that embroiling the neighbourhood in war, or to force it to prepare AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 22 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

22 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

for war, would slow down the region’s economic development, if not halt it altogether.

THE RESURGENCE OF NEUTRALISM AND THE POLITICS OF NON-ALIGNMENT The Korean War of 1951–53 had inadvertently given a voice to the neutralists who opposed the war and attempted to find a more peaceful way to deal with the problem in the peninsular. Moreover, by 1953, the Arab- Asian bloc, with a neutralist outlook on international affairs, had started to exert some influence at the United Nations General Assembly. This was roughly when the US’s dominance of the Assembly had started to show signs of weakness. Meanwhile, as America’s military aid to its allies and satellite states expanded, those who were espousing neutralism became even more anxious of Washington’s intentions and actions within the context of the Cold War. The US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, for example, made many of Japan’s neighbours even more suspicious of the US’s designs in East Asia, given Japan’s history as an aggressive colonizer. Inevitably, they saw the alliance as intensifying the Cold War in the region and, understandably, it also rekindled fears of potential Japanese expansion in the event that Japan regained its past glory and ambitions. After all, lest we forget, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902–23 immensely contributed to Japan’s pre-war expansionist policy in East Asia.43 Consequently, the US bases in Japan merely aggravated the anxieties of some of the latter’s neighbours and those of neutralist persuasion in Japan, including the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which favoured a neutralist foreign policy for the country.44 We shall say more about the JSP and Japanese foreign policy during the early post-war period in due course. Suffice to say that Nehru made it clear to the Truman administration that India would not sign the peace treaty with Japan. He felt justified in his actions because of ‘the continued American presence in Japan, the American trusteeship over the Ryukyu and Bonin islands, and the failure to return Taiwan to China and the Kuriles and South Sakhalin to the Soviet Union’. Remarking on Nehru’s reaction, Loy Henderson, the American Ambassador to India at the time, thought this was part of the prime minister’s attempts to popularize his neutralist beliefs ‘and to gain the nationalistic and anti-white elements in Japan’.45 This may well have been a correct assessment of Nehru’s attitude to the US, but the prime minister’s objectives went far beyond that. Henderson was aware that Nehru held the same attitude towards Soviet presence in Asia.46 Nehru was also genuinely concerned that the US-Japan Alliance would merely intensify the Cold War in East Asia. The position Washington adopted in response to Nehru was perhaps the best action they could take at the time, which was to ‘. . .live with a non-aligned India’. However, ‘it did not have to stand by while Nehru spread the neutralist gospel’. What the US – the Truman and AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 23 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Eisenhower administrations – feared most about neutralism was its potential contagiousness and, most importantly, its possible representation of a ‘net loss to the American alliance system’. Washington’s response was to try and contain it and undermine Nehru’s ambitions to direct the affairs of Asia in relation to the two superpowers.47 In yet another form of its damage limitation exercise, and so as to bolster its security interests in East Asia, the US had initiated and implemented the Philippine-American Pact of August 1951. It was also in this vein that the US signed the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand, an ‘. . .exclusively Western joint action in Asia. . .’ that suggested an attempt on the part of the US to ‘exercise some form of Whiteman’s monopoly over [the] defense [of] Southeast Asia’.48 Later, in September 1954, the conclusion of the Southeast Asian Collective Defence Treaty linked the security interests of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand with Britain, France and Pakistan into a comprehensive agreement – the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the Manila Pact. Moreover, the newly-independent states of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (and rather surprisingly North Vietnam) were pronounced as states under the protection of the SEATO treaty members, ‘though they did not become full members themselves’.49 In a separate operation, the US concluded a bilateral defence agreement with Formosa (Taiwan) in December 1954, supposedly in response to the PRC’s attacks on the two islands of Quemoy and Matsu. This merely intensiﬁed the tension in the region while the Security Council debated the crisis but to no avail. As could be expected, the above defence agreements, and the resounding problems they generated, only strengthened the resolve of the countries – such as India, Indonesia and Burma – who were committed to a neutralist foreign policy. Moreover, it made them perceive SEATO as deeply intimidating and offensive to their ambitions for peace in the region. Consequently, as the US attempted to strengthen its defences in East and South East Asia, there emerged in the region an eruption of ‘neutralist’ determination to consolidate a more robust position against the Cold War. The Bandung Conference of April 1955 was a demonstration of that resolve, although, as we shall later see, the Bandung platform was more than just an exposition of the neutralist position vis-à-vis the Cold War. Nevertheless, it epitomized the sense of anxiety permeating the emerging Third World in relation to the mutually-exclusive ideologies of the superpowers and their ambitions to conquer the world. In essence, Bandung symbolized a rejection of the naked ambitions of the superpowers and their imposition of the agreements at Yalta on the rest of the international community. Despite the rigid adherence of the Cold War camps to their respective ideological beliefs, supported by their individual alliance initiatives, it was also apparent to many of the newly-independent states who did not care to join the Cold War that diplomacy still mattered, even in Cold War politics. The neutralists, in particular, held to that ideal. With the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 24 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

24 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

explosion of Africa into independent states the efficacy of neutralist diplomacy through the medium of the Non-Aligned Movement seemed highly plausible. Consequently, as Geoffrey Barraclough noted, ‘The spread of neutralist doctrine in an ever-widening circle from Bandung outwards is perhaps the clearest evidence of a new constellation in international affairs.’50 The indications were clearly that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) would provide the platform for this initiative. However, the neutralists, too, brought their own baggage of problems onto the scene whereby ‘having avoided in their own view, the prevailing East-West stereotypes’ they then superimposed their own stereotyp- ical views on the international situation. Peter Lyon suggests that they adopted ‘. . . some other attractive but deceptively simple views of the inter-state system – the big versus the small, the old versus the new, the colonialist versus the anti-colonialist, the rich versus the poor, are the four favourites’.51 He further argues that: ‘such dichotomies, which cut across and divide Cold War solidarities, can suggest to many neutralists a spectrum of common sympathies and antipathies, and these become powerful influences shaping their world outlook’.52 Indeed, the contrasts of the ‘rich and poor, the ‘have and have-nots’, the ‘developed and the underdeveloped’ nations became central to the ‘post-colonial debate’ and the demands of the Afro-Asian states for equality. These ideas were later to be theorized and given a more robust analysis by the ‘dependency’ theorists who argued that total political and economic independence was the only way for these countries to ‘regain’ true economic and political maturity.53 The other crucial world outlook shared by the majority of the non-aligned group of states was ‘justice’, which they saw as perhaps more beneficial than ‘peace’. The idea of peace, from their point of view, was a luxury that only the rich industrialized (Western) states could afford to indulge in. The victory of the Allies in the war and the victors’ subsequent emphasis on peace was therefore perceived as an excuse to maintain the status quo. The widespread perception among the newly-independent states, and the countries still under colonial domination, was simply that the West was hardly interested in justice or equality in international politics. As part of their agenda, therefore, the newly-independent states were determined to emphasize that peace and justice should be at least of equal importance in the overall scheme of things, since, all things considered, after all, the two were inseparable. In other words, the neutralists and their supporters felt that the rules of the international system had to be redefined and redesigned to reflect the aspirations of the Afro-Asian states. Ultimately, however, it was the protection of the independence and sovereignty of the newly-liberated countries and the expansion of decolonization that mattered most to the neutralists. Nevertheless, they also hoped that by pursuing a neutralist foreign policy, peace, at least in relation to the Cold War, could be attained for the benefit of all states. On the other hand, as already noted, to the leadership in Washington, and in particular to Eisenhower and Dulles, neutralism was morally AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 25 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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reprehensible; in fact ethically flawed. They subscribed to the notion that morality ‘demanded commitment, and to the degree diplomacy reflected morality there was no middle ground between West and East, between democracy and dictatorship’54 or better still between good and evil. However, H.W. Brands argues that given the fact that both the President and the Secretary of State were astute politicians, they were realistic about the requirements and operations of international politics. In other words, they were pragmatic statesmen who appreciated the limitations of morally-inspired policy positions, and understood that nation-states would do what they saw fit to safeguard their national interests. Embedded in that position was the understanding that: ‘morality alone did not carry diplomacy very far and that the arena of military strategy and great power politics was essentially amoral’. Consequently, Eisenhower was prepared to give the neutralists a chance, for he saw no reason why a relaxation of tensions brought about by neutralism would be any less valuable to international politics.55 Thus, Brands further argues that despite their ideological protestations against the perceived spectre of neutralism, the policies of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations ‘demonstrated a shrewd weighing of the effects on the international balance of power of the particular activities of specific non- aligned countries’. All the same, they allowed their public pronouncements to be infected with the history of the conflict between capitalism and communism and all of the relevant ideological abstractions,56 for the benefit of the ‘political market in the United States’. In other words, they had to perform for the domestic hawks. C.V. Crabb and Robert McMahon, on the other hand,57 assess the Eisenhower administration’s responses to the neutralist tendencies of the Third World as a misjudge- ment and a failure of policy. Meanwhile, the Bandung Conference of 1955 succeeded in institutionalizing the neutralist doctrine by bringing Asia, the Middle East and Africa together as a coherent political entity. At the same time, as early as 1954, the neutralist platform was split from top to bottom. India, Indonesia and Burma displayed sentiments that were clearly anti- Western; Pakistan and Ceylon were pro-American and opposed to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. The champions of the developing countries were thus confronted with the very problem they hoped to avoid, taking sides in the complex ideological conflict between the West and the East. That conflict was to further permeate the ranks of the Non-Aligned Movement although most of the members of the Afro-Asian group maintained a rather sceptical attitude towards the West as a whole, and the UK and the US in particular. Their suspicion of the UK was based on their historical experiences as appendages of the British Empire, and indeed of Britain’s sprawling colonial interests. In that sense, British resistance against de-colonization in Africa did not help. It confirmed, from their point of view, the intransigence of the British establishment, and especially the Colonial Office, against the liberation movements of Africa. But the Afro-Asian states AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 26 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

26 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

were also opposed to American policies because they saw the US as having replaced the UK as the hegemonic power, ambitious and determined to conquer and control the world. Moreover, there was widespread suspicion among the Asians that the US was ‘not really interested in the attainment of full sovereignty in world affairs by the new South and South East Asian countries’.58 The newly-independent states were also aware of the workings of the special relationship between America and Britain. All that combined to exacerbate the tensions between these states and the West. As Nehru put it, ‘. . .the crisis of the time in Asia is colonialism versus anti-colonialism, let us be quite clear about it’. Thus, as we shall later observe, all the Afro-Asian states, irrespective of their ideological position and differences, agreed that it is important to end all forms of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’. The emphasis, very clearly, was more on Western imperialism.59 Reﬂecting on the situation, Arnold Wolfers makes the poignant observation that ‘it has been the tragic fate of the West that all the new states and would-be nations that are presently capable of affecting the course of world events recognize out of experience none but Western colonialism and imperialism’. He further notes that: ‘As a result. . .neutralist ideology [had] a kind of built-in anti-Western bias, particularly marked where anti-colonial zeal goes hand in hand with strong socialist aversion against the capitalist system of free enterprise.’60 In that sense, the drummed-up impartiality of the neutralists was questionable, not least because it seemingly confronted and challenged only the status quo that was championed by the West. Not surprisingly, the anti-Western bias and all of its other manifestations bothered the US, the State Department in particular. As a corollary, the latter came to view Britain and the other European colonial powers as a nuisance to American strategic interests in Asia and Africa because of their colonial holdings. Dulles apparently became rather frustrated about the inﬂexibility of the British and the French regarding the issue of independence for the colonial peoples. In his focused and calculating mind, he came to realize that setting the colonies free ‘would enable [America] to take the initiative away from the Soviets and the Communists in this matter’.61 By 1955, both Dulles and Eisenhower were fully conversant with the fact that the issue of colonialism was neither an illusion, nor a perfunctory matter; it would not go away on its own; it had to be resolved. The issue of de-colonization was important to the newly-independent states in another respect, namely the concept of collective initiative and ability. In that sense, they believed that their newly-attained sovereignty would only be made perfect and enhanced if all the other colonial countries became independent. This revolved around the concept of gaining strength in numbers, and was demonstrated through the actions of the then few Afro-Asian states at the UNGA by sticking together over the apartheid issue in South Africa, for example. However, they also felt rather strongly that this power gained through their acquired freedom could AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 27 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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only be ensured through the pursuance of an independent foreign policy, which all the neutralists saw as paramount to national independence. Meanwhile, the newly-independent states were determined to use the offices of the UN to implement changes to the international system. They were optimistic about the efficacy of the international body and saw it ‘as perhaps the most important symbol of recognition and enfran- chisement in the international society’.62 Because most of these countries shared many common problems, including poverty as well as political and economic marginalization, they tended to operate as a bloc at the General Assembly for strategic reasons. Thus, irrespective of some important conflicting positions among them, some ideological, others cultural, on a number of very crucial issues as for example de-colonization and racial discrimination they tended to cooperate. As Conor Cruise O’Brien63 points out in his analysis of bloc politics at the United Nations General Assembly, although the Afro-Asian countries may be divided along ideological lines on certain issues, such as on matters relating to religion as in the Middle East, on an anti-colonial (not contending with a Cold War) issue, or on a straight race issue (for example apartheid), they tended to bury their differences. It was therefore no surprise at all that while Pakistan was opposed to Egypt’s neutralist tendencies, it supported the Arab cause against Israel. It did so as a Moslem country, and in spite of its alliance with the US. Within the context of early post-war international politics, therefore, it was inevitable that Africa and Asia would represent the evolving spirit of freedom and independence. It was in this vein that neutralism was perceived and applied as a useful political strategy to ensure that no big power would gain major influence in the two regions to the extent of threatening their independence.64 It bears emphasizing, however, that despite the African representation at the conference, and indeed despite the official title of the gathering – ‘The Asian-African Conference of 1955’ – the six Africa countries at the event, apart from Egypt, played a rather limited role in the proceedings, despite the symbolic importance of the region to the cause. This caused some consternation among some of the African delegates65 who felt left out of most of the discussions for ‘. . .there was little opportunity [for them66]. . . to present their case’. Significantly, however, the real tension at Bandung was between the ‘aligned’ and the ‘non-aligned’ groups. We shall examine this in greater detail in due course.

THE EXPLOITS OF THE NEUTRALISTS The ‘in-house’ tensions aside, it seems the neutralists naturally carefully weighed and calculated the political, military and psychological advantages that they could accrue from the stalemate generated by the Cold War. The economic beneﬁts were also immensely crucial. Consequently, the application of a ‘Neutralist foreign policy’ certainly served the interests of many of the Afro-Asian states in various ways in this regard. India AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 28 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

28 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

and Egypt especially, seemed to have used their avowed neutralist positions to a greater advantage – to squeeze as much economic aid from both sides of the Cold War; and in the process Egypt acquired substantial military assistance from both Washington and Russia, playing off one against the other, as the Eisenhower administration saw it.67 According to Lyon, ‘Simultaneous bargaining with both Cold War camps thus became one of Nasser’s favourite tactics, and perhaps his most novel and influential contribution to neutralist diplomacy.’ Apparently, Nasser was the first significant neutralist to pursue ‘a policy of active dalliance with both camps, taking the initiative himself, in attempts to elicit aid’. Josip Broz Tito, the President of Yugoslavia, also adopted the same strategy to some extent. Effectively, the insistence of these countries on pursuing an independent foreign policy was not meant to stop them from economic cooperation with viable partners, not when their aspirations were equally dictated by the ambition to develop their countries beyond their agrarian economies. The case of Japan is of particular relevance here, if from the opposite end of the analytical continuum. As demonstrated later, Japan’s relationship with the US was partly constructed on the agreement (forced on Japan by Washington) that Tokyo would concur with the United Nations’ sponsored sanctions against the PRC. Nevertheless, along with the economic and other benefits that Tokyo was gaining from the alliance with the US, it also expected to develop constructive economic relations with the PRC. As we show in Chapter 4, submitting to the dominant discourse and subscribing to the hierarchy in international politics did not prevent Japan from pursuing its own agenda. Certainly, for all the neutralists the ability to operate freely was fundamental to their national security. As such, they were keen to trade with and receive economic and military assistance from whoever and wherever possible. ‘In general, all neutralists [regarded] a wide pattern of economic relations, preferably with both of the Cold War blocs, as being the best way to avoid the snares of economic control.’68 Thus, neutralism was also about being able to get what one required from both of the Cold War powers or their allies without compromising one’s own national interests. In that respect, active dalliance became a hallmark of Japanese foreign policy too. The Japanese ambition, perhaps in the spirit of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, was to establish constructive economic links with all nations, irrespective of their ideological position. The State Department was fully aware of this, since the report on neutralism ordered by the Planning Coordination Group described Japan’s behaviour as demonstrating: ‘The beginnings of a shift towards neutralism. . . symbolized by pressures for an elaboration of economic and cultural relations with the Communist nations and by eager grasping of opportunities for demonstrable independence in national action.’ The report was also correct in noting, however, that these are attributable ‘much more to an effort to regain a leading posi- tioninAsiathantorecognitionofimpotentweakness...’(author’semphasis).69 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 29 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Either way, Japan, at least under the Hatoyama Ichiro and Ishibashi Tanzan administrations, greatly desired an independent foreign policy.

THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS The origins of the conference are traced to the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Although the latter event was a non-governmental affair it brought together representatives from twenty-eight Asian countries and observers from Australia, the Arab League, the United Kingdom, the USSR, the USA and the United Nations. Among the Asian countries attending were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Mongolia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.70 Japan was also invited but General Douglas MacArthur (the Commander of the Allied Occupation of Japan) apparently rejected the invitation. Convened by the Indian Council on World Affairs, the conference emphasized cultural relations above all else, excluding defence and security issues as too controversial;71 and Nehru set the tone of the event by emphasizing that: ‘Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has again become important in world affairs.’72 While denying that the conference was convened as an expression of ‘some kind of a pan-Asian movement directed against Europe and America’, he affirmed that Asia would now stand on its ‘own feet and cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us’. Thus, he was adamant that: ‘We do not intend to be the playthings of others’. Despite the organizer’s good intentions and attempts to steer the meeting away from aggressive rhetoric and conflict, it was afflicted with both. Not too surprisingly, the ‘anti-colonial drum was beaten, and some delegates even urged the despatch of armed assistance to national movements in revolt’,73 which Nehru, of course, declared unreasonable. The conference, however, ‘agreed that Asian governments should deny facilities to the armed forces of colonial powers seeking to dominate other Asian countries.’ There were certain domestic matters to be settled as well: for example, the South East Asian nations’ anxiety about the influx of Chinese into their countries. In January 1949, in response to the Dutch police action in Indonesia, Nehru convened a high-powered conference in New Delhi to bring pressure on the Security Council (SC) to act vigorously against the Dutch government. The assembly, which was essentially a meeting of official representatives of government, adopted a resolution condemning the actions of the Dutch Government as a flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter and a defiance of the SC. Consequently, it recommended that the SC insist on the release of the members of the Indonesian Government in Dutch jails and to ensure that the government was allowed to function freely. It also recommended a complete transfer of power in Indonesia by January 1950. As is obvious enough, unlike the 1947 conference the purpose of this meeting was very political and focused. The composition of the assembly AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 30 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

30 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

was also different in that the membership was essentially limited to Asian states which were fully self-governing, and which had diplomatic representation in New Delhi. The membership was, however, expanded to include the independent states of Africa (apart from Liberia). Some Middle East countries were also represented; so were Australia (which in 1947 was represented by observers) and New Zealand (which attended as an observer), both of which had a particular interest in Indonesia. A number of the countries that attended the last conference, including the Soviet Asian republics, were not invited; nor were the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia, all of which were previously represented by observers. The next major Asian conference was held in May 1950, in Baguio, the Philippines, and was attended by Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines had originally proposed the meeting as an anti-communist conference but it failed in this objective, on account of the neutralist policy of the Indian Government and the growing popularity of neutralism by this stage.74 Nevertheless, it took five years for the proponents of neutralism to try and convene a conference around the theme in Bandung. According to Brands, ‘Bandung as a metaphor lacks precision’ because the membership was amorphous, and it defied a convenient definition. Nevertheless, and perhaps because of that, it represented a problem of enormous proportions to the West in general, and to American policymakers in particular, precisely because it challenged Yalta, the yardstick with which the spheres of influence of the superpowers were measured. ‘Yalta. . .required a focusing of attention and a narrowing of mind’, which in turn, ‘generated a siege mentality’.75 Bandung challenged this attitude of intransigence and overconfidence on the part of the US by simply demanding ‘a willingness to question premises and set ideology aside’.76 The US’s response, as shown in the edited essays in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War, 2006, by Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, was to strap on the ideological armour, ready to treat, and indeed it treated, all sceptics as dupes or subversives. Kenneth A. Osgood (in the above volume) quotes the strategic principles guiding the newly created US Information Agency as stating:

We are in competition with Soviet Communism primarily for the opinion of the free world. We are (especially) concerned with the uncommitted, the wavering, the confused, the apathetic, or the doubtful within the free world.77

In essence, US administrators chose to preoccupy their concerns in relation to the newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa with perceived threats of communist expansion and how to subvert it while giving inadequate attention to the real issues – ‘the twin problems of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 31 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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racism and anti-colonialism’78 – that under-girded the ethos of the expanding Third World, which was incubated at Bandung. In view of these developments in international politics at the onset of the end of the war Jason Parker’s79 point is apt that:

[the] conference represented the crossroads of several key Cold-War trends: the old spectre of communism and the new one of neutralism; the vectors of anti-colonialism and Third World nationalism, and a stirring of consciousness of changes in inter- and intra-national race relations’.

The Bandung Conference directly emanated from the Bogor (Indonesia) Conference of 28 and 29 December 1954. The latter event, which was also attended by the five prime ministers of India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan, respectively, was in turn a by-product of the Colombo Conference of 28 April to 2 May of the same year. At this earlier conference, the leaders of the five countries adopted a loosely-worded agreement that pledged their five countries to neutrality in the conflict between the communist bloc and the West.80 Nevertheless, the tensions between the participants at the meeting suggested that there was no prospect at that time of the appearance of a well-knit Asian neutralist bloc.81 Yet Nehru, one of the five leading organizers of the Bandung Conference and the most influential, had intimated just before the Bogor Conference that the object of the meeting in Bandung ‘should be to create an atmosphere of cooperation and to put Asia and Africa more in the picture’.82 This was necessary because, as he put it, ‘the old balances no longer hold good’. It was also agreed that the Bandung Conference should aim to contribute to the reconstruction of the economies of the participating countries. Consequently, the ‘Colombo powers’ agreed to establish a committee for economic assistance, and were determined to lay the foundations for the technological advancement of Asia, a proposal that the Japanese found rather attractive.83

NEGOTIATING ABOUT PROSPECTIVE PARTICIPANTS It was also at Bogor that the Colombo powers agreed on which countries to invite to the Bandung Conference. Sufﬁce to say, the question of who to ask was paramount to the organization of the event. Nehru insisted upon not inviting the Soviet Asian Republics, although he rejected the Ceylonese Prime Minister’s suggestion that the participants should be democratic countries.84 Nehru further argued that: ‘In the ﬁnal analysis I think that it is better not to include Israel, if that is likely to lead to the Arab countries keeping away.’85 Since ‘Pakistan stood as representative of the Arab states in unwavering opposition to Israel’ Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, must have been delighted by this outcome. Burma, on the other hand, raised an objection, because Israel, as it argued, was a ‘fellow socialist’. In any event, the Burmese objection AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 32 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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lacked passion, but then it had no chance of carrying much weight. Conversely, Nehru was adamant about not excluding China. That was ‘out of the question’ since China was eminently part of Asia and the biggest country in the region. Nevertheless, China’s invitation did not pass without some tough negotiations. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Kotelawala, raised some doubts about China’s brand of politics, as well as its ambitions in world politics.86 He was particularly concerned about what he perceived as China’s ‘export of revolution’ to the neighbouring countries through the local communist parties. With support from Ceylon, ‘Pakistan set as a condition for admitting China. . . the inclusion of Japan’, which apparently elicited no opposition87 from the other participants. Given his determination to entice Japan away from its alliance with the US, Nehru also wanted Japan’s participation in the conference. Burma was avowedly in favour of the participation of the PRC and adamant that it would not attend if China were not invited. The reason was partly strategic: the Burmese prime minister, U Nu was deeply anxious about the presence of the remaining Koumintang (KMT) troops at the border in the North of Burma and was counting on the PRC to guarantee the Northern border of his country.88 Burma also had a more immediate and specific grievance against the US regarding the surplus rice that the US had been disposing of in Asia, specifically Japan. As a result of this dumping, the Japanese were apparently not purchasing their regular amount of rice from Burma, thereby leaving the country with surplus rice. Consequently, considering that the Burmese economy was in trouble, Burma’s demand for the participation of China in the conference was seen by some as an act of schadenfreude89 to make the US uncomfortable. On a more positive level, Burma insisted on the invitation of China simply because it believed that: ‘nothing useful could be accomplished at the conference (or in international gatherings. . .) without the participation of such a powerful Asian country’.90 Nehru’s assessment of China was that it ‘was anxious to avoid war, even any possibility of conflict’ and that it ‘. . .urgently desired peace [and]. . .was passionately concerned with the problem of economic improvement’. China also ‘wished to be left in peace and to develop normal relations with other countries’, Nehru observed.91 But there were concerns that the Arab states, Thailand and the Philippines would not attend the conference if China were invited;92 after all, none of these countries had recognized China. All the same, at the final call, the Colombo powers agreed that all the countries of Asia and Africa with independent sovereign governments, and some borderline ones – such as self-governing countries without full independence – would be invited. The overall arrangement also demanded ‘the inclusion of Japan’, which ‘fitted in with Nehru’s plan, which was to invite a number of pro-Western states to coun- terbalance Communist China’ to encourage as many states as possible to attend.93 Consequently, the decision to invite Japan was arrived at without controversy.94 Indeed, the Madras newspaper, The Hindu (31 December), AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 33 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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proclaimed the attendance of Japan and the PRC at the conference as a great achievement by the summit organizers. It felt that: ‘history will be made, for it will be the first time since the war that these two important Asian nations will be meeting at the ministerial level’. In essence, the five sponsoring nations and the fourteen Afro-Asian members of the UN were immediately seen as participating in the conference. Japan, Turkey, Nepal and the three Indo-Chinese states were also to be encouraged to attend. The ‘borderline’ countries were Sudan and the Gold Coast (both of which were self-governing), and the Central African Federation (which was also self-governing, and had a Caucasian prime minister). The invitation of the Central African Federation (CAF)95 was a difficult public relations exercise designed, it seems, to show the rest of the international community that the (conference) arrangements were not influenced by race. At the same time, should the European rulers of the CAF decline the invitation then they would stand revealed as racialists. As expected, the government of the CAF declined. Hard as the conference organizers tried, it was evident right from the beginning that they could not sidestep the issue of race and colour. The fact that neither Australia nor New Zealand, both of which are geographically in Asia, was invited to the conference, or even given observer status,96 highlighted the problem. According to an Australian embassy official who covered the event, ‘it was a difficult conference to cover as we had the strange experience of being at it but not of it’.97 He was referring, in particular, to the fact that all the information he received was ‘gleaned second-hand because the meetings of the Committees and Sub- committees were closed. . .’ The European embassies and the US officials who covered the conference had to contend with a similar inconve- nience, for there was no question of inviting any countries outside of Asia or Africa. In their assessment of the matter, two independent Australian observers, Dr J.W. Burton and Professor C.P. Fitzgerald, noted that the reason given for not inviting Australia was that ‘it was not considered to be in the region covered by the conference.’ As a query, they also noted ‘Australia’s place in the Asian area was recognized for the purpose of two [previous] conferences which took place in Delhi in 1949 and in Baguio in 1950.’98 Indeed, Australia had also attended the first of the Asian summits, the Asian Relations Conference, in 1947 in Delhi, as an observer, as did the US, the UK and the USSR. New Zealand attended the New Delhi conference of 1949 but also as an observer. That was, perhaps, the reason why in his final speech at the conference Nehru somewhat apologetically noted that Australia and New Zealand were indeed ‘. . .almost in our region. . .do not belong to Europe, and much less to America’. He tried to further underline the point by noting that they ‘. . .are next to us and I should like indeed Australia and New Zealand to come nearer to Asia’.99 It was perhaps an admission of a mistake and an expression of the hope that it would not happen again. Nevertheless, the sentiments, if that was what they were, carried with them the feeling that the two nations were not ‘close AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 34 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

34 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

enough’ to the other countries in the region. There had also been concern that the participation of either Australia or New Zealand in the conference would make things difficult. The feeling was that given the unanimity rule100 these ‘two outsiders’ would hamper the decision- making process by applying the veto. All that notwithstanding, Dr J.W. Burton and Professor Fitzgerald were apparently active on the conference circuit, ‘seeking out people and ascertaining their views on various matters including Australian participation in this and future conferences of its kind’. Burton, in particular, met with leading Indonesian officials including the Foreign Minister Sunario, apparently at the latter’s request. He also ‘had contacts with the Indian delegation, including Mr Nehru himself, and . . .saw members of the Chinese delegation’ as well.101 As a result, Burton went back home unperturbed. Rather, he produced some of the seminal publications on non-alignment, and argued that the nonaligned states have ‘a status and stability wholly unlike any previous form of non-involvement in conflict’. In addition, he believed that ‘non-alignment has become an institution, and moreover one which does not necessarily rest upon the continued existence of rivalry between two powerful groupings’.102 In saying that, Burton was arguing for a comprehensive study of non- alignment rather than one based in a national context, as for example non-alignment in Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, India, etc. Other invitees to the conference were North and South Vietnam, but not North and South Korea, firstly because the Korean states still remained hostile towards each other. In addition, they had only recently been engaged in hostilities with a number of the invited countries. Effectively, the two Koreas were clearly symptomatic of the Cold War problem and were therefore perceived as a source for potential tension at the conference.103 Inner and Outer Mongolia were also excluded. At any rate, the PRC’s response to the invitation was positive. The Chinese press praised the impending summit as a major step taken by the Afro-Asian states towards peace; and Peking hoped that the gathering would be used by the composite group to ‘discuss subjects of common concern’.104 The immediate indications were that China would project a moderate attitude and cooperate at the event. For some of the leading organizers of the conference, such as Nehru, China’s participation was paramount, not least because the potential for tension in the region revolved primarily around China and its problems with the US. Having confirmed the participation of the PRC in the conference, the Colombo powers hoped to use the occasion ‘to lay a firmer foundation for China’s peaceful relations with the rest of the world’, ‘including themselves and other areas of South East Asia peripheral to China.’ The sponsors therefore envisaged it as providing a forum for achieving the following important objectives:105

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(2) Development of China’s diplomatic independence of the Soviet Union. It was India’s ambition to disentangle China from the ideological and political bondage it had formed with Russia, and by so doing, to save it from potential war; (3) Containment of Chinese and Vietminh military power and political inﬂuence at the southern border of China and the eastern bound- aries of Cambodia and Laos, and the combating of illegal and subversive communist activities in all non-communist Asia, particularly in their own.

As already alluded to, and as would be made clearer later, China, and what it represented politically, was a source of tension among the organizers and participants. However, Zhou Enlai’s congenial attitude at the time and his ﬂexibility on most issues, helped to assuage the anxieties of the anti-communist participants, as will be shown in our subsequent discussion.

THE PHANTOM OF BANDUNG The US saw the impending gathering at Bandung as offensive and dangerous, perceiving it as a confirmation of the resistance to American strategic interests in Asia. Washington was apprehensive about its allies and friends (Japan in particular) being lured away by the promises of neutralism into the communist fold. In the wider scheme of things, ‘Any appeal of non-alignment or neutrality to peoples within allied countries was a threat to the US collective-defence system.’106 In any event, by now, policymakers at the State Department had identified a certain pattern of behaviour on the part of the Asian countries. The overall perception was that these countries reacted ‘more strongly to pressure or leadership from the Western nations identified with past colonial experiences than from the communist nations with which they have had less direct contact’. 107 This ‘present[ed] one of the most formidable obstacles to the United States in [its] efforts to compete with initiatives on the part of the Soviet Union to cement friendship and cooperation with these nations’.108 Furthermore, US administrators believed that ‘forces were at work, quite aside from Soviet propaganda, that tend[ed] to enhance’109 the appeal of the Soviet Union. Consequently, ‘the sternest test of American foreign policy during this period was the management of relations with the non- aligned countries’.110 The main concern of the US about the Conference was the attendance of the PRC. The perception in Washington was that ‘Red China’ was well capable of breaking ‘. . .through the cordon sanitaire that had been drawn round her’.111 Hence, the warning, as documented just after the conference, was that: ‘We should. . .anticipate that Chinese moves in the international field will be planned with the view to stimulating the growth of neutralism in Asia and to creating a belief on the part of neutralist and other non-communist countries that “peaceful coexistence” with China is AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 36 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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not only feasible but desirable.’112 The greatest worry was that these countries ‘will. . .be prone to accept Chinese assurances at face value’.113 Thus, while American policymakers were indeed concerned about the potential ‘evil’ effects of neutralism in Europe, ultimately they felt that the ‘greatest danger’ of a well coordinated ‘Sino-Soviet neutralist offensive to the free world. . .lies in Asia’. US observers were also concerned that the concept of ‘Asia-for-the Asians’, with its implication that vestiges of foreign domination must be cast off, was central to the ethos of neutralism. In view of these and other factors that fed into America’s geo-political ambitions and anxieties, Washington’s initial reaction to the conference was that its allies and satellite states should not attend. Accordingly, in early January 1955, the Philippine foreign minister thought it ‘unthink- able’ that their country could attend – not when China was going to be there. For a while, Japan was also at a loss as to what to do: it was caught between wanting to attend on the one hand, and the US’s cool attitude towards the conference on the other. Understandably, the conservative government of Japan did not want to take any action that might offend the US. Basically, Japan ‘relie[d] heavily on the US for support, guidance and protection’114 and, therefore, had to tread carefully. But the conservative parties — the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party — might have had their own ideological uneasiness regarding the implications of the conference. There was consternation among members of the two parties that, through the neutralists, communism might gain the upper hand in Asia. Operating from such a perspective, it is hardly surprising that Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro, who was seemingly less concerned about the communist threat to Japan, did not attend the conference. We shall explore the main reasons why Hotoyama did not attend the conference later in our analysis, although it could be argued that his refusal to attend might have assuaged US anxieties about the extent of the Japanese commitment to the neutralist cause. There was no doubt, however, that Japan would be represented at the conference and not merely as an observer. The convention was too important to the Japanese government to turn down the invitation or attend as an observer for, at the very least, it was seen as providing Japan with an opportunity to ‘demonstrate [its] independence in national action’ away from US foreign policy. Moreover, it also presented Japan, as previously noted, with the chance to ‘regain a leading position in Asian’ affairs,115 which Japanese policymakers were eager to grasp with both hands. On a sociological level, which was just as important as the geo-political factors, attending the conference would also be like a home- coming for Japan. Japan, metaphorically speaking, was in political exile, since it had been somewhat disenfranchised of its membership of the Asian community as a result of its recent history. Consequently, going to the conference, and participating in it, would provide Japan with the opportunity to return from exile.116 Given Japan’s peculiar position in East Asia in the aftermath of the war, and its unique role in the conference, it would be worth our while exploring some of the factors AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 37 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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determining Japanese foreign policy in the early 1950s in this chapter as well. We shall do so in due course. The ramifications of the conference mattered to the British establishment just as much. Whitehall’s reaction to the idea of an Afro-Asian conference was, not surprisingly, one of caution. Unlike American policymakers, however, British officials did not assume the judgmental position of branding it, along with neutralism, as immoral. Moreover, the element of panic was not the most decisive aspect of the British response. After all, three of the five organizing members of the conference were loyal members of the Commonwealth nation of states, which spoke volumes in terms of where they stood in the international scheme of things. Arguably, India’s membership of the Commonwealth must have naturally made it difficult for British officials to take its neutralism too seriously, perhaps. Moreover, the British were not overly sensitive about the PRC and the fact that it would be participating in the conference; it had diplomatic relations with Peking. Thus, by making itself amenable to the conference Britain found it easier to comprehend its objectives. It is noteworthy that the Gold Coast, which was by then under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, partook in the talks. In Chapter 3 we shall examine the status of the Gold Coast and its participation in the conference in more depth. What is of equal significance to this debate is that although British interests were at stake, given what Bandung stood for – the eradication of colonialism, amongst others – the real villain to the neutralist was not the UK but the US. Through the Commonwealth, British officials at least sensed that much. That, perhaps, was the reason why British policymakers were less anxious about the conference compared to their US counterparts. Added to this was the fact that Britain, unlike the US, was not on an ideological crusade that aimed at eradicating the communists from the face of the earth. Another crucial factor in this discussion is how the US had replaced the UK as the hegemonic power in the aftermath of the Second World War. This outcome did not augur well with the British officials who had watched their country lose its ‘imperious position’ to its former colony. In view of that, there was some considerable tension within the Anglo-American relationship, contributing to a number of their conflicting positions on the unfolding events of the 1950s. Initially, Washington did what it could to undermine the conference. Consequently, Cambodia too, like the Philippines and Japan, hesitated about whether it should attend because ‘there was strong American pressure against acceptance, coupled with the threat that American economic aid to Cambodia might be cut off’.117 US policymakers had been concerned about ‘Cambodia’s drift towards neutralism’ which they attributed to influences from Burma, India and Indonesia.118 Its roots were, however, ‘in resentment against years of French colonial rule and a fear and distrust of the Chinese and Vietnamese’. Cambodia was also tormented by ‘fears of becoming a pawn in big power politics with the possible consequence of liquidation in World War III’. At any rate, the State Department’s assessment of Cambodia suggests a hint of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 38 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

38 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

frustration: that they might find it difficult to influence Cambodian policies and orientation. Thus, the overall prediction was pessimistic: ‘We may expect a gradual US withdrawal from Cambodia’ for ‘in any event, it would appear Cambodia cannot be [depended] upon to contribute to the collective defence of South East Asia’. On that note, Cambodia, as expected, attended the conference as a staunch neutralist. On the other hand, Washington knew that it could rely on Thailand. Bangkok responded to US pressures by proposing to send an observer as opposed to an active participant. By February 1955, however, the US had changed its attitude to the conference. The State Department had realized, by then, that it had little choice but to resign itself to the new currents in international politics. It was, perhaps, a realization that the day of reckoning had arrived: Yalta and Bandung were two sides of the same coin, but with different implications for post-war international relations, and therefore had to be carefully balanced. The change in policy was perhaps forced by the realization that, like it or not, the Third World countries had neatly ensconced themselves between the major blocs with the firm intent to actively influence events. Since there was a need for the administration to operate from within the ranks of the new wave in international politics, attempts were made to appease the leaders of the Third World to some extent. At the same time, public remarks by administration officials were presented in ideological garb, so as not to over-sensitize right-wing representatives in Congress and the Senate, as noted earlier. Brands argues that: ‘American policy towards the Third World during the first decade and a half of the Cold War demonstrated considerable insight and flexibility’. As he further argues, ‘if the American people and many legislators had a difficult time balancing the demands of Yalta and Bandung, the persons who handled day-to-day decisions were surprisingly adept in the exercise’.119 Confirmation of the change in US attitude to the conference was first registered in the acceptance of its allies and satellite states of the invitation to the conference. From then on, the US modus operandi was to recruit as many as possible of America’s friends who had been invited to attend. The assumption was that the interests of the US and the West would be better served at the conference by filling the ranks of the participants with pro-American representatives. In the event, fifteen anti- communist countries attended, including Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. However, some of these went to the convention with divided loyalties. Despite its relationship with the US, Japan, as we shall soon establish, remained ‘pseudo-neutral’ throughout the proceedings, which was consistent with the foreign policy behaviour of the Hatoyama administration.120 Meanwhile, the State Department had gained a great deal of insight into the workings of the conference organizers and their most important guests. Consequently, it was able to correctly predict that China would behave moderately at the talks. What it could not predict, however, was the extent of the geniality and AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 39 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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ﬂexibility of Zhou Enlai, nor could it predict that China would make the US look like the aggressor. As to the delegations at the conference, thirteen (of the twenty-nine countries invited) were led by their national Heads of State and seven by foreign ministers. There were three princes, representing Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Thailand; Cambodia sent an ex-king, and Japan sent a minister, as did the Gold Coast, although the conference organizers wanted the chief delegates to be the equivalent of a prime minister or foreign minister. As to the event itself, Nehru hoped that it would be ‘business- like and effective’, not ‘vague and amorphous’121 and he was also determined that it would avoid controversy. In the event, he seemed to have been too optimistic, or perhaps he conveniently overlooked the con- ﬂicting interests of some of the major organizers of the conference.

DIVISIONS WITHIN A UNIFIED FRONT The event was supposed to bond the new states together in their struggle against marginalization in international politics. It was also designed to help them consolidate their aims and ambitions towards economic development. Instead, it was riddled with ideological conflicts and personality clashes. In particular, the political differences of the five organizing members made the situation rather difficult, if not impossible. As a corollary, the pro-West and anti-communists – Ceylon, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam, Sudan, Thailand and Turkey – were well aware of the ambitions of the (neutralists) – Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Laos, North Vietnam, Peoples Republic of China, Nepal, Syria and Yemen. As such, they were determined to challenge and undermine them. There was clearly a contestation of discourses. According to Keynes, it was not entirely clear where Egypt, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia stood in this divide.122 However, Nasser’s neutralist credentials became less ambiguous after the conference. Apparently, ‘Bandung brought Nasser forward on the world stage; at the same time it opened his eyes to the uses of neutralism as a tool of Egyptian foreign policy’. Although Washington was thoroughly convinced that Nasser would not tip over to the side of the Soviet Union, Eisenhower felt that Nasser’s neutralism, if not the man himself, was a ‘stumbling block’ to American interests in the region.123 Ethiopia also dithered initially, but eventually, as we shall show, adopted the neutralist position, which did not please Washington. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was successfully courted by the US after the conference, and hence used to challenge Egypt’s emergence as the leading Arab country. A resounding measure of real politik is evident in certain covert actions employed against Egypt and underwritten by Eisenhower himself:124

I suggested to State Department that we begin to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world – in the thought AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 40 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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that mutually antagonistic personal ambitions might disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing. My own choice of such a rival is King Saud.

As is evident enough, the leader of the West was applying the old formula of the British colonial establishment: ‘divide and rule’. The anti-communists, of course, saw the gathering as ‘an opportunity to defend their choice of alignment with the West, and to draw the attention of the non-aligned to the dangers of communism’,125 which was what Washington expected them to do. Nevertheless, China, as the clear target of this initiative, remained hopeful that with a bit of diplomatic civility and finesse it would be able to circumvent the isolation in which America persisted in trapping it. It was also determined to show the conference participants that American perceptions of her were built on paranoia. However, Zhou Enlai also went to the conference to demonstrate China’s leadership skills. In both cases, Peking did exceptionally well. While the Chinese premier openly advocated communist neutralism as a facet of Chinese foreign policy even before the conference it was also clear from Zhou’s pronouncements at the event that ‘one of the cardinal elements of. . .Chinese strategy [was] the encouragement of neutralism among Asian countries. . .’126 Ultimately, China cast itself in a conciliatory role: a responsibility that Zhou Enlai fulfilled rather effectively. From the beginning of the talks, the Chinese Premier, ironically, became the ‘link – almost the mediator – between the two camps’127. According to Krishna Menon, Nehru’s closest adviser on foreign policy, ‘Chou’s role at Bandung. . . was that of a good liberal who wanted a settlement.’128 The Indian contingent and many others ‘. . . found him very useful’,129 because of his mollifying approach to issues and attitudes that ordinarily China would have found unacceptable. Consequently, the Chinese premier won over many of his critics, even turning some against their ‘master’, the US. Despite the conflicts that marred some of the sessions, especially those between Nehru on the one hand and Mohammed Ali and Kotelawala, on the other, the conference agreed on the major agenda items without much debate. These were economic cooperation, which was under the responsibility of the Economic Committee, and cultural cooperation. The Political Committee, the most important of these committees, was in charge of problems concerning the Dependent Peoples (people under colonial rule), Human Rights130 and Self-determination, the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation. It was also responsible for issues relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Universality of United Nations membership. The speedy agreements among the delegates on the first day of the conference (which was seven short of its twenty-nine delegates) gave the impression of a tension-free gathering; apparently, Nehru had orchestrated these swift sessions. In essence, the agreements were reached so easily, in part, because of Pakistan’s absence. Not surprisingly, the Pakistan delegation (when they arrived) rejected those decisions, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 41 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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demanding a fresh discussion of the issues by all of the conference atten- dees. This confirmed the simmering tension between Nehru and Ali, and reaffirmed the political antagonism between India and Pakistan. At the same time, it identified the main points of confrontation within the camp. Apart from our earlier polarization of the countries into ‘aligned and non-aligned’ camps, participants at the conference fell into three clearly discernible groups. There were, on the one hand, China and North Vietnam, the communist participants. On the other was a group of roughly ten countries whose sympathies lay firmly with the capitalist West. These included Pakistan, Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. As indicated by our earlier analysis, there was a middle group, the ‘neutrals’, who customar- ily avoided involvement with one side or the other in the Cold War, within which India, Burma and Indonesia stood out. Although, technically, Japan belonged to the second group, it hovered, refusing to commit itself at the conference. Essentially, the demands of self-interest exposed Japan’s apparent, though unstated, neutrality on most matters, whereby it was inclined to avoid supporting its strategic ally, the US, on Cold War matters. At the same time, the Japanese delegation showed no proclivity to support the cause of the Third World countries. The issues of ‘decolonization and self-determination’ and even ‘Human Rights’ seemed beyond their conception. Yet, the indications were that they were aware that by supporting the Third World on those pertinent questions it would be offensive to the Europeans – Britain, France and Holland, in particular. As such, they chose to respond to non-contentious issues such as ‘Peace’ and ‘International Cooperation’, in an attempt to avoid any questions that were likely to offend anyone who mattered. Effectively, the Japanese delegation maintained a self-composed and neutral disposition on all the pertinent and troublesome areas that were dealt with at the event. On the whole, the conference’s decision-making process worked well in Japan’s favour, since agreements were reached on the basis of unanimity, and there was no shortage of dissenters on ideologically contentious issues. At any rate, the overtly pro-Western delegates did what the Japanese delegation wanted by rejecting proposals that the US disapproved of. Consequently, Japan could always count on its anti- communist friends to veto any motion that it censured. Essentially, it conveniently hid behind the dissenters while being spared the wrath of the radicals. Carlos Romulo, the head of the Philippine delegation and a die-hard anti-communist was one of its shields. Romulo threw a challenge to the friends of America, calling on them to prevent the conference from becoming an ‘anti-democratic’ meeting, and enthusiastically organized them into a team when it came to dealing with controversial matters. In that sense, the aligned countries displayed significant accord on targets, and even in the phraseology they used. Suffice to say, rather than forging a community of Afro-Asian states, Bandung exposed the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 42 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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fractures within the group. But then, to some extent, the fractures were evident even before the conference. The extent of partisanship was such that even ‘accommodation had tentatively been assigned to delegations from Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Iraq and perhaps Turkey in one hotel separate from all the other participants of the conference’.131 The unedifying evidence of stalemate between the two sides (the communists and the neutralists were one bloc) at the conference was particularly pronounced in the debate on colonialism. The problem really concerned the two groups’ respective conceptions of the essence of ‘imperialism’, most importantly ‘who was an imperialist’? Essentially, the aligned nations dragged the Soviet Union into the dispute, fervently insisting that Russia was an imperialist state, in view of its many satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe.132 As Mohammed Ali (the prime minister of Pakistan) noted, having spoken at length about Western imperialism, ‘It would be wrong on our part to ignore or make no mention of another form of imperialism, Soviet imperialism.’133 Kotolawela was particularly vocal on this issue and provocatively asked: ‘. . .Should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?’134 The position adopted by the non-aligned group on this issue was a highly legalistic one. Their carefully, but questionable, thought-out response was that countries that were members of the United Nations could not be regarded as colonies. As Nehru later explained, the countries in question in Eastern Europe ‘were sovereign nations . . .[and] independent in terms of international law and practice. They have diplomatic relations with ourselves and other countries. . .including the Big Powers.’ The prime minister of India was therefore of the opinion that ‘irrespective of whatever views may be held in regard to the conditions prevailing in these countries or of relationships that may exist between the Soviet Union and them, they could in no way be called colonies nor could their alleged problems come under the classification of colonialism’.135 Thus began the conflict of nerves between the highly-charged ideological opponents. The recriminations, apparently sparked off by Kotelawala, followed freely. The Political Committee (composed of the Leaders of the Delegations) was in session over this matter from 21 to 22 April, and clearly exposed the ideological tensions between the two groups. The neutralists and the communists were totally against the description of the Soviet Union as presiding over a colonial empire. In the end, after a series of musical chairs in terms of how many non-aligned as opposed to aligned delegates would be on the drafting committee on problems with Dependent Peoples, the composition of the key drafting committee was balanced. In a five to five ratio, the two camps were represented by China, India, Burma, Lebanon, the Chairman of the committee, the foreign minister of Thailand, whose country was pro-West, but who was to remain neutral on this crucial drafting committee on the one hand; and Turkey, Ceylon, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 43 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Pakistan, Syria and the Philippines on the other. The African delegates were offended by their exclusion from this drafting committee,136 especially since the topic was, in fact, more immediately relevant to Africa. After two-and-a-half days of tedious deliberation, the members could still not agree on the issue of colonialism, with the aligned countries pressing for the application of the phrase ‘ “colonialism old and new” or “colonialism in all its forms” ’ and hoping that would expose the Soviet Union as a colonial power. Finally, the committee settled on the anodyne phrase ‘colonialism in all its manifestations’ to encompass, from the point of view of the supporters of the West, Soviet imperialism – although the non-aligned countries saw it differently. Pleased with what he perceived as a clever verbal formulation, Mr Krishna Menon triumphantly boasted that he had managed to get the aligned countries ‘. . .to agree to something they don’t understand’.137 Another issue of contention, which surfaced at the conference, concerned military armaments. The non-aligned group tried to implement a total ban of nuclear arms and the elimination of tests of such weapons without reference to conventional arms. In particular, they wanted nuclear weapons to be regarded as a separate entity – one that could be prohibited without reference to general disarmament. The aligned countries, on the other hand, insisted on the Western view that the West would be hugely disadvantaged if its nuclear deterrent alone were prohibited. In the end, as a form of compromise, the draft composed on the matter linked conventional disarmament and nuclear prohibition. On the question of nuclear testing, the draft appealed to the relevant powers to reach agreement to suspend experiments. The Indian Government advocated that countries in the region should establish stations to test the radioactivity of the atmosphere. The idea was to bring further pressure to bear on countries possessing atomic weapons to suspend tests.138 Apparently, the Japanese delegation sprang back to life when the matter of the use of atomic weapons was under discussion. After all, Japan is the ﬁrst and only victim of the atomic bomb. In spite of the resolute chairmanship of Nasser, discussions leading to the formation of the conference’s Ten-point Declaration also brought many moments of tension. According to Krishna Menon, ‘Pakistan made hell’.139 However, the decision regarding the Ten Points created fewer problems among the conferees compared to the acrimonies brought about by the Five Principles (also known as Panch Shila, as ﬁrst established in the preamble to the Sino-India Agreement on Tibet of 30 April 1954) that they replaced.140 Firstly, the Ten Points were more precise, and less open to interpretation. They also allowed for ‘the right of any nation large or small to live out its life with the economic and political system which it chooses, free from intervention of any kind from outside. . .’ Furthermore, it supported the right of collective self-defence, although this aspect of it was rephrased to meet the concerns of China and India. The reworded stipulation was that all the participants would ‘abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 44 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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particular interests of any of the big powers’. In contrast, the Five Principles141 simply read as follows:

(1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (2) Non-aggression (3) Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (4) Equality and mutual beneﬁt (5) Peaceful Co-existence

Of the above, the principle of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’142 created much tension during the discussions, particularly between the pro-Western group and the neutralists. While the latter had no problem with it, the former did. To the pro-Western group it suggested an acceptance of the communist system and respect of the ideals of the PRC. They also argued that the principle itself was no assurance that the PRC would reciprocate. The indications were that some of them, in particular Ceylon and the Philippines, were deeply concerned about what they perceived as the Chinese ambition to topple their governments through their local communist parties. Evidently, the threat of the communist revolution hung around their necks like a bomb ticking and ready to explode at any time. This notwithstanding, other decisions were made without acrimony. The resolutions on racism and United Nations’ membership were passed relatively peacefully. As already noted, China’s participation in the decision-making at the conference was positive, as a result of which Zhou Enlai won the hearts and minds of many of the pro-West participants. His attitude and response to questions regarding China’s relations with the US in particular epitomized his geniality and commitment to finding a peaceful outcome to the political problems in the region. Following Zhou’s conciliatory gestures towards America, the latter’s allies became dismayed at Washington’s unyielding attitude, especially after what seemed like Dulles’s diplomatically offensive response that China was perhaps ‘playing a propaganda game’.143 The juxtaposition of China’s pursuance of peace and America’s uncompromising and seemingly belligerent attitude ‘alienated America from her friends and allies and made the United States appear churlish and intransigent’, at least temporarily.144 According to General Romulo – America’s most committed friend at the conference –‘Washington’s reaction gave most people the impression that America was spoiling for a fight.’145 In that sense, the Bandung Conference superficially united the Asian countries against the US without necessarily disturbing the relationship between America and its friends. Hence, despite the inspiration behind the conference and the determination of the participants to unite as a third force, there was enough disagreement among them, as demonstrated above, to show that there was no inherent unity. Nehru himself underlined this fact in his comments concerning the controversy outlined above: ‘it reflects a projection of the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 45 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Cold War affiliations into the arena of the Asian-African Conference’,146 and confirmed that there was no discursive conformity among the participants. All the same, at Bandung the non-aligned movement gained self-confidence and momentum. The relationship between the Afro-Asian group and the UN warrants further comment here. Given the critical tone adopted by the conference organizers regarding the nature of the international system, it was no surprise that the UN secretariat hit back. The Secretariat thought the Colombo powers were interfering with the de-colonization process, which was under the management of the UN. Indeed, the newly- independent states were in a confrontational mood regarding a number of issues, including questions that had not been considered as important by the UN. From the point of view of the Afro-Asian countries, it was evident that the West had no ambition to end the colonial system. On the contrary, they were determined to maintain the colonial empires which most of the conference participants perceived as a defining weakness of the status quo. The other question that would come to exercise the minds of the leading Western countries and the UN Secretariat was, as mentioned earlier, the issue of ‘justice’. As more African countries won their independence and joined the UN, the world body was forced to deal with the timeless principles of equality and justice. Thus, by the early 1960s, the newly-independent states of Asia and Africa had enforced a more holistic rhetoric of peace, an ideal that was only achievable, as they argued, in the context of social justice. By so doing, these countries forced upon the powerful states some of the moral questions with which international politics was supposed to concern itself, but had conveniently avoided. In that sense, it may be right to note that the Bandung Conference raised the curtain to expose the weaknesses of the international system as the Afro-Asian states saw it, and subsequently transformed the UN into a relatively liberal, ‘caring’, institution.

NEUTRALISM AND JAPAN’S RETICENT FOREIGN POLICY As noted above, Japan remained politically uncommitted within the workings of the Afro-Asian movement. It was in it but not of it. Nevertheless, like India, Japan saw and presented itself as a peacemaker in a post-war world threatened by the ambitions of belligerent superpowers. Unlike India, one might say, it had lost a brutal war and somehow crept out of the debris of that encounter as a well-tutored student of peaceful diplomacy, utterly passive in the midst of a rather confrontational Cold War world. A cynic might say that it had learnt its lesson, but might also say that Japan only did things in the extreme, swinging from a blatantly uncompromising position to one of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with all nations, an idea central to the ideals of neutralism. Yet one could also say that these extreme positions were dictated by the objective circumstances that Japan found itself in. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 46 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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In any case, despite the abhorrence of neutralism by Japan’s ruling elite, there were aspects of the doctrine that they felt inclined to support, if not openly so. Thus, the ‘progressive conservatives’ in particular showed some affinity with the ideals of neutralism in spite of the constraints imposed by the US-Japan security treaty or perhaps because of them. Hatoyama Ichiro and Ishibashi Tanzan were two leading conservatives of the 1950s who seemingly attempted to steer Japan closer to the neutralist perspective because they were determined to establish an independent foreign policy for their country. They were also determined not to involve Japan in the Cold War between the US and the USSR. As was common at the time, Japanese domestic politics reflected the global political situation in that it was essentially split up into two ideological forces: the ruling conservative forces on the one hand, and the opposition – the Japan Social Democratic Party (SDP) – on the other. While the latter assiduously and openly subscribed to the sentiments and promises of neutralism, the conservative leaders of the country, formally at least, ‘firmly rejected all overtures in favour of neutralism. . .’147 Certainly, the State Department was well aware of the fact that: ‘the dominant forces and groups in Japan. . .[we]re in favour of cooperation with the US and the free world, which they believe[d] can continue to offer political and economic benefits well beyond communist abilities’. The dominant forces were the ‘conservative political elements, officialdom, [and] the bigger businessmen’.148 Indeed, later in 1959, the Japanese Prime Minister, Kishi Nobusuke (a right-wing conservative) affirmed that: ‘Under the prevailing world situation Japan cannot survive independently as a free and democratic nation by taking a neutral policy.’149 All the same, Japan’s obsession with peace, together with an ambition to rebuild its economy, demanded the implementation of a universally amiable foreign policy. As a result, in spite of its anti-communist conservative government and its alliance with the US, Japan (at Bandung) projected itself as being in favour of the principle of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’,150 which the US, its most importantly ally, was vehemently opposed to. In line with its peace-oriented foreign policy, Japan attempted to present itself as capable of facilitating understanding and breaking down the mutual suspicions that existed between the Afro-Asian states and the Western countries. In essence, not only were the Japanese policymakers attempting to mediate between the US and the Soviet Union, but they were also carving out yet another role for their country as a peacemaker between the neutralists and the West. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) entertained the aspiration of directing the radical ambitions of the newly-independent states away from confrontation with the Western countries.151 In other words, although Japan was not unaligned, it hoped to use the Bandung Conference as a vehicle to steer a middle course between the opposing camps. What is also striking about Japan’s situation, in this regard, is that unlike the committed neutralists (who were also peace-mongering), Tokyo had the qualifications for the job, not AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 47 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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least because Article 9 of its new constitution (to be discussed later) clearly set it out as a pacifist nation. Moreover, the fact that Japan was the victim of the atomic bomb provided it with a moral and an intellectual understanding of violence which made it well qualified to evange- lize against the attractions of war.152 To borrow from Lyon, Japan saw ‘itself as a prophylactic; seeking to prevent tension by removing its causes, calming the atmosphere by keeping calm itself, evoking goodwill by showing it’.153 This is so observable throughout Japan’s involvement in the talks and even beyond that it may be fair to say that none of the major participants in the conference demonstrated such calmness, both during and subsequent to the event, in their foreign policy behaviour. At any rate, despite the protestations of successive conservative governments and their rejection of neutralism as an illusion,154 the concept was central to the repertoire of Japanese domestic politics. However, it was the socialists, and the left within the socialist party in particular, who championed and advocated it. On the whole, the socialists were determined that their country would not become embroiled in another war. They were, therefore, resolved against the possibility of Japan taking sides in the Cold War and becoming trapped in the potential conflict between the rival blocs. Thus, ‘a permanently disarmed Japan was put forward by the Left as the essential means of preventing “rearmament on behalf of the United States” ’. More subtly, neutralism ‘was also advanced as a unique contribution which Japan could present to the world’.155 While the left were committed to this idea, many among the conservatives looked upon it merely as perhaps a reasonable option without making any commitment to it. Like the socialists, however, they were firmly aware that Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution would easily legit- imize a neutralist foreign policy as no other constitution anywhere could. Article 9 affirms that:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

THE SOCIALISTS AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY The determination on the part of the socialists to turn Japan into a neutralist country was equally motivated by ‘a thorough distrust both of the motives of American policy towards Japan and the validity of the strategic premise upon which the Security Treaty was ostensibly founded’.156 In other words, the left-wing politicians and their sympathizers had no faith in the pledges made by America to guarantee Japan’s security. On the contrary, as the socialists argued, the presence of American bases on Japanese soil was enough to engage Japan in war with the former’s Cold AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 48 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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War enemy in East Asia. It is no surprise then that the Social Democratic Party (SDP) saw the Security Treaty as a source of provocation, not least because it made Japan a target of the Soviet Union. Consequently, as early as December 1949, the ofﬁcial SDP foreign policy was neutralism and was based on the following three principles:157

(1) A peace treaty with all the belligerent powers; (2) Permanent neutrality; and (3) No military bases to be given to a foreign power.

The socialists were also mindful of Japan’s immediate interests with its neighbours in their articulation of a neutralist foreign policy. In particular, they were supportive of a constructive relationship with the PRC that would be built on a policy of interdependence. This was irrespective of the political and economic ethos of the PRC. The assumption was that Japan would provide China with economic assistance towards industrialization, while China, on its part, would serve as a market for Japanese products. In pursuing this position the SDP, like the progressive conservatives and many of the pan-Asianists among the conservatives, such as Hotoyama Ichiro, Ishibashi Tanzan, Matsumura Kenzo and Miki Takeo, among others, were prioritizing China over America’s obsession to turn Japan against Peking.158 As we shall later see in Chapter 4 successive conservative governments encouraged economic relations with the PRC against the wishes of their country’s most important ally, the US. Be that as it may, in the early 1950s the left-wing socialists pursued a more radical form of neutralism after the SDP split up in October of 1951. In 1952, they formulated what became known as the ‘third force’ neutralism, which was strongly inﬂuenced by the neutralist policies of India. The ‘third force’ consisted:159

...of all those forces working to prevent World War III. Such forces do exist in America and the Soviet Union, but it is rather the world outside these two countries that contains the third force.

In that vein, the party rejected a link between American and European socialists160 in an attempt to ‘correct a certain European bias which the Socialist International tended to show’.161 On the other hand, the right-wing socialists, were not particularly comfortable with the ideals of neutralism. Their main objection stemmed from their belief that it provided Japan with no form of security. As part of the initiative towards the reuniﬁcation of the two parties, however, the left-wing socialists proposed that Japan’s unarmed, neutral security would be conﬁrmed and ‘guaranteed by a treaty of non-aggression between her and “countries concerned, in the area of Japan” ’.162 By the end of 1953, the right seemed to have come round to the concept and the ethos of the ‘Third Force’. A year later, both the left and right of the socialists concurred that China was indeed more concerned with economic AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 49 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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development and better life chances for its massive population than with ideology. They also agreed that China was essentially interested in ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the rest of the international community. China therefore became a source of tremendous inspiration for the socialists. Accordingly, they adopted the policy that Taiwan should be returned to the PRC, restrictions on trade between Japan and China should be abolished, and a principle of non-aggression and non-interference should be concluded between Japan and China. By the time the two socialist parties re-emerged as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in November 1955, they had reached an agreement on how to proceed with Japan’s foreign and defence policies. It was evident from that agreement that the left-wing socialists – the neutralists – had won the ideological debate. The concept of neutralism and its relevance to Japanese foreign policy was of fundamental interest to all those who were even only vaguely concerned about Japan’s standing in the world. As Morris cogently put it:

To say that Japan must secure great independence implies that she must reduce her close dependent ties with the United States; from this it is only a short step – though a step that no ofﬁcial conservative candidate would take in public – to say that Japanese policy must move in the direction of greater neutrality.163

The State Department confirms that ‘Japanese neutralist sentiment dates back to the end of the War’.164 Yet the official conservative stance against neutralism remained strong. More significantly, Japan’s ‘national leaders recognized that because of its strategic location and significance, particularly to the West, Japan could not hope in fact to avoid involvement by remaining neutral as long as Japan was weak, and the policy of overt alignment with the US provided the best hope of security in the period of weakness’. Economic factors also influenced the Japanese position. After all, Japan was dependent on the US for markets, both in terms of exports and imports. In addition, the US was the chief supplier of numerous strategic raw materials to Japan. Tokyo was also reliant on Washington for the implementation of ‘various plans for profitable economic cooperation with South-East Asia.’165 Moreover, Japan needed the US for admission into various international institutions, such as the UN, World Bank and GATT, the last two of which were perceived as crucial to Japan’s economic rejuvenation and survival. Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister of Japan (1946–47 and 1948–54) and President of the Liberal Party, believed that Japan’s security, with a pri- ority on economic security, hinged on its association with the US. In that sense, the Japanese Government’s decision to follow the ‘leader’ was no more dictated by ideology than its desire to establish constructive trade relations with the PRC. Thus, while Yoshida believed that Japan’s destiny lay in close association with China, he was also aware that ‘its continental ambitions could not be realized in the teeth of British and American opposition’.166 The mainstream Japanese political sentiment in that AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 50 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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regard demanded careful balancing. After all, although they knew that a neutralist foreign policy was not a viable option for Japan’s economic and political security they could not overlook the fact that, at the very least, a vague form of neutralist feeling was extremely widespread among the population.167 As John Welﬁeld points out, ‘An overwhelming majority of Japanese intellectuals, acutely aware, from personal experience, of the immense destructive potential of modern warfare, conscious of Japan’s extreme vulnerability, and also of their country’s complex, inter- penetrating ties with East Asia and the West, became convinced that non-alignment offered the most realistic foreign policy option.’168 It was partly because of this widespread neutralist sentiment among the Japanese that the State Department169 was concerned that the US’s most important ally in East Asia might switch. In the event, it warned that:

Japan’s historic nationalism, its restiveness under US tutelage, its need for economic outlets, its inexperience with international cooperation, and its fear of involvement in nuclear war are important forces impelling Japan away from its twin conditions of weakness and dependence on the US. . .These forces could eventually push Japan into a position of neutralism.

It is important to note that the document in which this quote appears was written in July 1955, when Hatoyama was prime minister, and less than three months after the conference. The election of Hatoyama as prime minister in December 1954 followed by the choice of Ishibashi by the Liberal Democratic Party in December 1956 (as prime minister) perhaps confirmed the anxieties of the US. Hatoyama brought a different, somewhat independent and liberal flavour to Japanese foreign policy. Firstly, Hatoyama was determined to normalize diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. He was also, unlike the right-wing conservatives who dithered, eager to advance Japan’s relations with China, especially in the economic sphere. This was a reflection of his ambition to free Japan from US encroachment on its foreign policy.170 It was therefore no coincidence that Hatoyama chose Ishibashi (who was instrumental in the conclusion of the first Japan-China Private Trade Agreement in 1952) as the Minister of International Trade and Industry. Incidentally, like Hatoyama, Ishibashi also harboured strong anti-American sentiments. Nor was it a coincidence that Shigemitsu Mamoru (President of the Progressive Party) became foreign minister in the Hatoyama cabinet. Shigemitsu too ‘had never believed that Japan’s destiny lay in exclusive association with Anglo-American powers’.171 On the contrary, he ‘believed that Japan’s future lay in the development of a special relationship with China’ and South East Asia. It is also worth noting that the third unofficial trade agreement between Japan and the PRC was negotiated in May 1955, just after the Bandung Conference. Although the Japanese side was fronted by an AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 51 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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unofficial Japanese trade delegation, the whole process had government approval. Indeed, just before the signing of that agreement, a Chinese trade mission had visited Japan and had been met at the welcome lun- cheon by the Minister of International Trade and Industry, Ishibashi. Ishibashi was, therefore, ‘the first cabinet minister in post-war Japan to establish formal contacts with Chinese officials’.172 That Ishibashi succeeded Hatoyama as prime minister and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP – the Liberal Party and Democratic Party having joined into a single party by then) was perhaps indicative of the mood of the nation, which was anti-American,173 and also of the ideological tensions within the LDP at the time. Ishibashi, unlike his conservative colleagues, would have liked to dissociate his country from the strictures of the US-Japan Security Treaty to satisfy, at least, one of the motives of a ‘genuine neutralist’ which was ‘. . .the traditional nationalist urge for “complete independence” ’.174

CONCLUSION It is right to speak of the Bandung Conference as representing the crossroads of key Cold-War tendencies. As Keynes175 aptly put it, Bandung brought into perspective three political movements. Firstly, it brought into perspective ‘the struggle of the independent nations of Asia and Africa to break loose from psychological dependence on the West, to dis- cover and assert their separate and common identity’. Secondly, it highlighted the ‘competition among the nations of Asia and Africa themselves for power and leadership; and finally the struggle between the communist and the non-communist’. The conference also brought into perspective the complex nature of the concept of neutralism. By so doing, however, it shattered the notion of another ‘competing bloc’, confirming that the conference ‘involved nations with different political systems and objectives and with varying degrees of participation in or avoidance of the major power constellation’.176 In essence, Bandung brought the Asian countries together and so, ironically, exposed their differences. Inevitably, the acrimonious arguments and recriminations among the five sponsoring states of the conference confirmed the divisions within the ‘unity’. Nevertheless, the conference legitimized the idea of the Afro-Asian group, at least within the context of UN bloc politics, and institutionalized a concept – ‘The Third World’ le tiers monde. Moreover, the idea of a Third World generated hope for the newly- independent states who took courage from the fact that in negotiating from a weaker position they did not have to do so alone or be submis- sive to the dominant discourse for that matter. They were all firmly against Western domination, or any form of domination. But the participants were also very sure about the collective need for economic and social progress. Also crucial to the movement was the fact that, as Nehru put it, the conference had a great psychological impact that lasted for a AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 52 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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long time. In turn, that had a resounding impact on world opinion forcing, at the very least, Western liberal society to approach the developing countries with some measure of ‘political correctness’. Where exactly did Japan stand in the overall scheme of things? If neutralism were ‘defined as a national policy of maintaining more-or-less equal relations with the communist and the free nations and of avoiding close cooperation with either bloc. . .[then] Japan is not neutral’, says the State Department. This is as close a definition as we can come to of neutralism and the Japanese position in the matter. All the same, the US policymakers perceived neutralist tendencies177 in the Japanese approach to global politics. And they were cognisant of the fact that there were certain forces that could ‘eventually push Japan into a position of neutralism’.178 These included a definite undercurrent of feeling in Japan that ‘the nation should avoid entanglement with either side [of the Cold War] and should try to be a peacemaker or bridge between the two sides’. The question raised here is, if Japan had decided to join the neutralists what would have the US done about it? Perhaps they would have done nothing, apart from feel irate and vindictive. In any case, the State Department seemed to have taken consolation from knowing that ‘the probability that it [Japan] will become neutral in the next few years appears small’. All the same, these were difficult times for US-Japan relations. The whole conundrum of the neutralist upsurge in Asia hugely upset US foreign policy initiatives in the region, as subsequent chapters will show.

NOTES 1 Bendetta Rossi, ‘Revisiting Foucaldian Approaches: Power Dynamics in Development Projects’, The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 40, No. 6, August 2004, p. 23. 2 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2, Planning Coordination Group Series, White House Office NSC Staff: Papers, 1945–1961), 1 July 1955, p. 1. At the time he prepared the report, Robert Watland Rinden held the rank of Foreign Service Officer 3 and was in the Department of State’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Mr Rinden had previously seen overseas duty as a Foreign Service Officer in Hong Kong, Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria, Ottawa, Shanghai, Chungking, Djakarta and Taipei. I am very grateful to David J. Haight (archivist) of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library for the above information; United States Government, ‘The Significance of Neutralism’, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Fourth Congress on Draft Bills Proposed on Executive Communications No. 863, No. 953, and No. 1601’, 6, 7, 13 and 15 March 1956, Washington. Jason Parker’s discussion of the Planning Coordination Group’s take on neutralism is illuminating. See Jason Parker, ‘Cold War II: The Eizenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era’, Diplomatic History, vol. 30, no. 5. November 2006, pp. 83–4. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 53 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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3 Ibid., p. 15; Kuo-kang Shao, ‘Chou En-lai’s Diplomatic Approach to Non- aligned States in Asia: 1953–60’, The China Quarterly, No. 78, 1979, pp. 324–32. 4 Peter Lyon, Neutralism, London: Leicester University Press, 1963, p. 16. 5 F. Low-Beer, ‘The Concept of Neutralism’, American Political Science Review, vol. LVIII, June 1964. 6 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 62. 7 Ibid., p. 64. His emphasis; Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941–1956, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, p. 22. 8 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 87. 9 M.S. Rajan, Non-alignment and Non-aligned Movement: Retrospective, and Prospects, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd, 1990, p. 2. 10 G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, London: Faber and Faber, 1966, pp. 16, 283–4. 11 The Third World as a concept has been the subject of much political and academic commentary. See in particular the articles in Special Issue: After the Third World, Third World Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, 2004. 12 Vicky Randall, ‘Using and abusing the concept of the Third World: geopolitics and the comparative political study of development and underdevelopment’ in Special Issue: After the Third World, Third World Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, 2004, p. 45. 13 Prados, John, ‘The Central Intelligence Agency and the Face of Decolonization under the Eisenhower Administration’, in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Lanham: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006; Adamson, Michael R., ‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?: The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World’, Ibid. 14 Examples of successful acts of post-war bravery were Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956; Fidel Castro’s permanently ‘clenched fist’ in the face of the US since the Cuban Revolution in 1959; the nationalization of foreign oil companies by the Arab states followed by the 1973 oil embargoes against ‘enemy countries’; Muhammat al-Gaddafi’s challenges to the US for over two decades; the brazen acts of defiance by the leaders of Iran against the US since the demonstrations from January 1978 that eventually led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic in December 1979. More recently we have wit- nessed Hugo Chavez’s constant vitriolic against the George W. Bush administration (although the jury is still out on how that will eventually end); and Pyonyang’s ongoing defiance of the US. Failed acts of bravery include (the Iranian prime minister) Mohammad Mossadegh’s nationalization of the British-owned oil industry in his country in the early 1950s, resulting in a CIA and British Intelligence orchestrated coup against his government. Saddam Hussein’s downfall would also go down as a product of an eminently reckless act of bravery on the part of the former dictator in recent times. 15 Mark T. Berger ‘After the Third World? History, destiny and the fate of the Third World’ in Special Issue: After the Third World, Third World Quarterly vol. 25, no. 1, 2004, p. 10. 16 Ibid., p. 30. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 54 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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17 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 18. 18 Arnold Wolfers, ‘Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists in the Context of US Defense Policy’, in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, pp. 157–8; C.V. Crabb, ‘American Diplomatic Practices and Neutralism’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 78, No. 3, September 1963, p. 420; Low-Beer, ‘The Concept of neutralism’, pp. 389ff.; Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of the Third World Alliance, London: Frances Pinter Ltd, 1978, pp. 18–19. 19 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 17. 20 Ibid., p. 20. 21 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 2. 22 Ibid., pp. 27–9; J.A.A. Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and its Foreign Policy, London: Melbourne University Press, 1968, pp. 4–10. 23 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 33. 24 Ibid., pp. 19–20. 25 Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, p. 331; Towsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, London: Andre Deutsch, 1974, attempts to explain Dulles’ vitriolic attitude against neutralism. 26 Daniel Yergin, ‘American Ideology: The Riga and Yalta Axioms’ in Robert J. McMahon and Thomas G. Paterson (eds), The Origins of the Cold War (4th Edition), New York: Houghton Mifﬂin Company, 1999; Melvin P. Lefﬂer, ‘America’s National Security Policy: A Source of Cold War Tensions’ in Robert J. McMahon and Thomas G. Paterson (eds), The Origins of the Cold War (4th Edition); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, ‘Stalin’s Road to the Cold War’ in Robert J. McMahon and Thomas G. Paterson (eds), The Origins of the Cold War (4th Edition); Robert J. McMahon, ‘The Cold War Comes to Asia’ in Robert J. McMahon and Thomas G. Paterson (eds), The Origins of the Cold War (4th Edition). 27 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 246. 28 Ibid., p. 246. 29 Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, p. 332. 30 H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 23. 31 Ibid., pp. 33, 39; Lyon, Neutralism, pp. 122–3. 32 Brands, The Spectre of Neutralism, p. 45. 33 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 251. 34 Lyon, Neutralism, pp. 127, 128, 132. 35 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 32. 36 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 34. 37 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, pp. 84–94. 38 Ibid., p. 73. 39 Wolfers, ‘Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists’, p. 160. 40 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 72. 41 C.V. Crabb, ‘American Diplomatic Practices and neutralism’, p. 430; Robert J. McMahon, ‘Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 55 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Revisionists’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, No. 3, 1986, p. 457; This is a recurring theme in the essays in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006. 42 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 73. 43 John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, London: The Athlone Press, 1988, p. 15. 44 Ronald Dore, ‘Left and Right in Japan’, International Affairs, vol. 32, No. 1. January 1956, p. 22. 45 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 71. 46 Ibid., p. 71. 47 Ibid., pp. 73–4. 48 Quoted in Matthew Jones, ‘A “Segregated Asia”: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955’, Diplomatic History, vol. 29, No. 5, November 2005, pp. 848–9. 49 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 45; Jones, ‘A “Segregated Asia”. . .’ pp. 848–51; Mackie, Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asia Solidarity, Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005, p. 96. 50 Ibid., p. 59. 51 Ibid., p. 33. 52 Ibid., p. 60. 53 The leading Dependency theorists included Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Peter Evans, and Andre Gunder Frank. 54 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 307. 55 Ibid., p. 208; Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, p. 332; Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, pp. 315–17. C.V. Crabb, ‘American Diplomatic Practices and Neutralism’, p. 433. 56 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 9. 57 C.V. Crabb, ‘American Diplomatic Practices and neutralism’; Robert J. McMahon, ‘Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists’. The essays in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War arrive at a similar conclusion. For example, according to David L. Anderson ‘In general the essays. . .find the Eisenhower administration’s policies in the Third World to be less than inspired. They reveal that the US officials often had limited, faulty, or biased knowledge of conditions in post-colonial and developing areas.’ See David L. Anderson, ‘The Devil Is in the Details: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Third World’, in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, p. 276. 58 From Hugh S. Cumming, Jr. (ambassador to Jakarta) to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1046), 2 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; United States Government, ‘Colonialism and United States Foreign Policy’, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Fourth Congress on Draft Bills Proposed on Executive Communications No. 863, No. 953, and No. 1601’, 6, 7, 13 and 15 March 1956, Washington; United States Government, ‘First Anniversary of the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 56 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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African-Asian Conference: Extension of Remarks of Hon. Adam C. Powell, Jr.’, in the House of Representatives, Wednesday, 18 April 1965, Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 84th Congress, Second Session, Vol. 102- Part 5, 28 March 28 to 26 April 1956, pp. 6594–98. 59 ‘Asian Conferences, 1947–1955’, 8 December 1955, (Public Record Office: PRO) FO 371/116987 [D 2232/3]. 60 Wolfers, ‘Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists’, p. 160; ‘Asian Conferences, 1947–1955’, 8 December 1955, FO 371/116987 D 2232/3. 61 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 117. 62 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 110. 63 Conor C. O’Brien, To Katanga and Back, London: Hutchinson, 1966, pp. 17–18. 64 ‘Results of the Bandung Conference: A Preliminary Analysis’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 2, Box 2, Operations Coordinating Board Central File Series, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961) 27 April 1955, p. 6; United States Government, ‘The Significance of Neutralism’, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty- Fourth Congress on Draft Bills Proposed on Executive Communications No. 863, No. 953, and No. 1601’, 6, 7, 13 and 15 March 1956, Washington. United States Government, ‘Colonialism and United States Foreign Policy’, Ibid. 65 From US Embassy in Djakarta to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2035), 26 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; ‘Results of the Bandung Conference: A Preliminary Analysis’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 2, Box 2, Operations Coordinating Board Central File Series, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961), 27 April 1955, p. 1; George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956, p. 21. 66 Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Liberia and the Sudan. Egypt and Libya were primarily concerned about Arab issues. 67 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, Chapter III, Chapter II; Lyon, Neutralism, p. 142. 68 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 113. 69 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), pp. 1 and 3. 70 These countries, except Mongolia, were federal republics of the USSR, and not sovereign states, even though the Soviet Union no doubt wished to portray them as such. Mongolia was technically a sovereign state, though a satellite of the USSR. 71 ‘Asian Conferences, 1947–1955’, 8 December 1955, PRO FO 371/116987 [D 2232/3]; Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, p. 112. 72 ‘Asian Conferences, 1947–1955’, 8 December 1955, PRO FO 371/116987 [D 2232/3]. 73 Ibid ; Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, p. 113. 74 ‘Asian Conferences, 1947–1955’, 8 December 1955, PRO FO 371/116987 [D 2232/3]. 75 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 3. 76 Ibid., p. 4. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 57 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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77 Kenneth A. Osgood, ‘Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the Third World’, in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, p. 7; John Prados, ‘The Central Intelligence Agency and the Face of Decolonization under the Eisenhower Administration’, Ibid.; Michael R. Adamson, ‘“The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy?”: The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World’, Ibid.; Robert J. McMahon, ‘ “The Point of No Return”: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953–1960’, Ibid.; James H. Meriwether, ‘“A Torrent Overrunning Everything”: Africa and the Eisenhower Administration’, Ibid.; David L. Anderson, ‘The Devil Is in the Details: Eisenhower, Dower, and the Third World’, Ibid. 78 Kenneth A. Osgood, ‘Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the Third World’, Ibid., p. 4. 79 Jason Parker, ‘Cold War II: The Eizenhower Adminstration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era’, Diplomatic History, vol. 30, no. 5, November 2006, p. 888. 80 ‘Southeast Asia,’ No. 4448, January 6 1955, PRO FO 370/116977 [D2231/85]. 81 Nicholas Tarling, ‘Ah, Ah– Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955,’ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 23, 1 (March 1992), pp. 75–9. 82 G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, London: Faber and Faber, 1966, p. 172. 83 Wajima Eiji (ambassador in Jakarta) to Shigemitsu, 2 January, ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi e no nihon no sanka mondai’, gaimusho gaikô kiroku bunsho [Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives], B0049; Kimura Toshio (minister of legation) to Shigemitsu, 29 March 1954, Ibid. 84 Kimura Toshio (minister of legation) to Shigemitsu ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni oite nihon chukyo no shosei mondai togi ni kansuru ken’, 29 March 1954, Ibid; Wajima Eiji (ambassador in Jakarta), to Shigemitsu ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru ken’, 2 January, Ibid. 85 Dr Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 (English translation by Molly Bondan), Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981. pp. 27–31; Keynes, ‘The Bandung Conference’, p. 363; Asian Conferences, 1947–1955, PRO FO 371/116987. 86 Kimura Toshio (minister of legation) to Shigemitsu ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni oite nihon, chukyo no shosei mondai togi ni kansuru ken’, 29 March 1954, gaimusho gaikokirokubunsho [Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives] B0049; ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru shiryo’, 10 January 1955, Ibid.; ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru’, 25 February 1955, Ibid; Jansen, Neutralism, p. 173; Shu onrai to Atte: Murata Shozo kikoku dan’, Sekai, No. 112, April 1955, pp. 42–3. 87 Wajima Eiji (ambassador in Jakarta) to Shigemitsu, ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi e no nihon no sanka hoshosei ni kansuru ken’, 5 January 1955, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho (Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives), B’ 0049; Kimura Toshio (minister of legation) to Shigemitsu ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni oite nihon, chiukyo no shôsei mondai togi ni kansuru ken’, 29 March 1954, Ibid. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 58 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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88 Crowe (in Colombo) to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1) January 3, 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; From Colombo to Secretary of State, (Telegram No. 204), 4 January 1955, Ibid. 89 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, 7 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 90 From US Embassy in Rangoon to the Department of State (Telegram No. 369), 28 February 1955, Ibid. 91 Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, p. 178. 92 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni okeru’, 10 January 1955, gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho (Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives), B’0049. 93 Mary Knatchbull Keynes, ‘The Bandung Conference’ International Relations, 1, October 1957, p. 368; Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia- Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, pp. 32–9. 94 Telegram from Kimura Toshio (minister of legation) to Shigemitsu, ‘Ajia- Afurika kaigi e no nihon no sanka mondai’, 29 March 1954, gaimusho gaikô kiroku bunsho [Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives], B0049. 95 The Federation consisted of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi). 96 Wajima Eiji (ambassador in Jakarta) to Shigemitsu, ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru ken’, 2 January 1955, gaimusho gaikô kiroku bunsho [Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives], B’0049. 97 ‘Report on the Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO FO 371/116985. 98 From US Embassy in Jakarta to the Department of State, 22 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. Whitehall was of the opinion that India would support the invitation of Australia and New Zealand [and there was ‘also a suggestion (D2231/19) that the UK Government might also be’ invited] but that neither of these countries ‘welcome the idea of attending.’ See J.E. Cable, 10 January 1955, FO 371/116982 [D2231/23]. Also relevant is Telegram No. 351 from High Commission in Australia, 14 April 1955 (delivered at 21.05), PRO FO 371/11690 [2231/225]. 99 Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p. 75; Wajima Eiji (ambassador in Jakarta) to Shigemitsu, 2 January, ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi e no nihon no sanka mondai’, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho (Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives), B’ 0049. 100 ‘Report on Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO FO/371/116985, p. 15. 101 Ibid. 102 J.W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 115. 103 G.H. Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, p. 176–7. 104 Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 184. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 59 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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105 Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, pp. 4–5. 106 Wolfers, ‘Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists’, p. 156. 107 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 2; Wolfers, ‘Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists’, p. 160; United States Government, ‘The Significance of neutralism’, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 1956. 108 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 2. 109 Wolfers, ‘Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists’, p. 156. 110 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 2; David L. Anderson, ‘The Devil Is in the Details: Eisenhower, Dower, and the Third World’, in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, pp. 277–8. 111 Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 84. 112 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 18; ‘Exposing the Nature of the Afro-Asian Conference’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 2, Box 9, Operations Coordinating Board Central File Series, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961), 21 January 1955, p. 1. 113 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 18. 114 Ibid., p. 15. 115 Ibid., p. 3. 116 ‘Exposing the Nature of the Afro-Asian Conference’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 2, Box 9, Operations Coordinating Board Central File Series, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961), 21 January 1955, p. 2. 117 Jansen, Non-alignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 185. 118 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. a. 119 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 5. 120 Tanaka Takahiko, ‘Soviet-Japanese Normalization and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, in Peter Lowe and Herman Moeshart (eds), Western Interactions with Japan’s Expansions, the Armed Forces and Readjustment 1859–1956, Foshestone: Japan Library, 1991, footnote 21, p. 114. 121 Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 172. 122 Keynes, ‘The Bandung Conference’, p. 375. Ambassador Yamagata was not sure of Ceylon’s position. Yamagata to Shigemitsu, ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru’, 8 March 1955, gaimusho kiroku bunsho (Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives), B’ 0049. 123 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, pp. 264–6. 124 Ibid., p. 266. 125 Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 191. 126 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 17; Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, pp. 119–49. 127 Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, pp. 196–7, 211. 128 Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 54. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 60 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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129 Ibid., p. 58. Kuo-kang Shao, ‘Chou En-Enlai’s Diplomatic Approach to Non- aligned States in Asia: 1953–60’. 130 Roland Burke, ‘“The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom”: Human Rights at the Bandung Conference’, Human Rights Quarterly, 28, 2006. 131 From Djakarta to Secretary of State (Telegram 1758), 11 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 132 Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, pp. 202–14; Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 53; From Takasaki Tatsunosuke to Shigemitsu Mamoru ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi e no nihon no sanka mondai’, 22 April 1955, gaimusho gaikô kiroku bunsho (Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives), B’0049; General Carlos Romulo, ‘What Really Happened at Bandung, and Where do we go from Here’, Town Journal, June 1955, p. 24; Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1956, p. 10; Roland Burke, ‘The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom’, p. 958; Makie, Bandung 1955, pp. 87–95. 133 Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, p. 204. 134 Ibid., p. 203. 135 From the US Embassy in New Delhi to the Department of State, ‘Transmitting Nehru’s Report on Bandung’, 2 May 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, p. 205. 136 Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, p. 208. 137 Ibid., p. 215. Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, pp. 159–160. 138 ‘Report on Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO FO 371/116985, p. 9. 139 Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, pp. 159–60; Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 53; Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 216. 140 ‘Report on Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO FO 371/116985. p. 9; Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States, pp. 15–17; Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955: Non- Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity, Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005, pp. 59–60. 141 Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1989, pp. 117–20. 142 According to Kuo-kang Shao, the concept of ‘Peaceful-Co-existence’ ‘was first enunciated in Chou’s political report to the National Committee of the People’s Political Consultative Conference on 4 February 1953. In this report, Chou affirmed the principle that “countries with different systems can co-exist peacefully” ‘. Apparently, the tenets of the principle were ‘elaborated and defined in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet as well as in many communiqués and policy statements signed jointly by Chou and other Asian leaders’. See ‘Chou En lai’s Diplomatic Approach to Non-aligned States in Asia: 1953–60’, p. 327. 143 Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, p. 218. 144 Ibid., pp. 218–19. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 61 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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145 Ibid., p. 218. 146 From the US Embassy in New Delhi to the Department of State, ‘Transmitting Nehru’s “Report on Bandung”, 2 May 1955’, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 147 I.I. Morris, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and neutralism’, International Affairs, vol. 36, no.1, January 1960, p. 11. 148 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 16. 149 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Foreign Ministry Blue Book, 1959. 150 Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955, p. 96. 151 Miyagi Taizo, Bandon kaigi to nihon no ajia fukki, p. 78. 152 Telegram fromTakasaki Tatsunosuke to Shigemitsu Shigemitsu, 22 April 1955, ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi e no nihon no sanka mondai’, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho (Department of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic archives), B’0049; see also Appendix 3: Address of Mr Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Principal Japanese Delegate, Before the Asian-African Conference, April 1955. 153 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 65. 154 Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism, p. 12. 155 Ibid., p. 15. 156 Ibid., pp. 17, 32–3, 34; Shozo Murata, Sekai, April 1995; Cole, Toten and Uyehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan, 1966, p. 208. 157 Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism, p. 31. 158 Ibid, pp. 34–5. 159 Ibid., pp. 49, 61. 160 Ibid., p. 51. 161 Ibid., p. 62. 162 Ibid., p. 71. 163 Morris, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism’, p. 10. 164 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), pp. 3–4. 165 John Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Essays on History, Culture and Race, London: Fontana Press, 1993, pp. 183–4; Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, p. 112; Morris, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and neutralism’, p. 13; Dore, ‘Left and Right in Japan’, 13; Yoshida Shigeru, ‘Japan and the Crisis of Asia’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, No.2, 1951, p. 171. 166 Welﬁeld, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 39. 167 Morris, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism’, p. 19. 168 Welﬁeld, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 55–6. 169 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 15; United States Government, ‘Are We Losing Japan?’, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Michael A. Feighan of Ohio in the House of Representatives, Wednesday, 7 July 1955, Congressional Record Vol. 101, Part 6, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 26 May to 15 June 1955; Tanaka Takahiko, ‘Soviet-Japanese Normalization and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, p. 110. 170 Tanaka Takahiko, ‘Soviet-Japanese Normalization and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, p. 113. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 62 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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171 Welﬁeld, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 84, 104. 172 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, p. 119. 173 Tanaka Takahiko, ‘Soviet Japanese Normalization and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, p. 111. 174 Morris, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism’, p. 19. 175 Keynes, ‘The Bandung Conference’, p. 373. 176 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 15. 177 Ibid., p. 3. 178 Ibid., pp. 15–16. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 63 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

2 US Attitudes Towards the Conference: From Revulsion, to ‘Benevolent Indifference’ and Reluctant Acceptance

s shown in Chapter 1, the news that the relatively insignificant Aand newly independent states of Asia were organizing a conference to address issues about the balance of power in international politics set off alarm bells in the corridors of the State Department. The fact that the conference was, in part, motivated by a neutralist tendency vis-à-vis the Cold War was a source of great concern. The American attitude to the conference, no doubt, revealed an intriguing confluence of events, showing how a hegemonic state can be so jittery in anticipation of the potential capabilities of a coterie of weaker states. In a most uncompromising fashion Washington adopted the ‘who is not with me, is against me’ attitude of a big power. In that sense, Bandung, along with its supporting principle – neutralism – which Dulles in a moment of panic branded an ‘immoral and short-sighted conception’, became ideologically intolerable in the US. It was with utter revulsion that the State Department viewed the impending conference. However, the intolerant and intransigent attitude soon metamor- phosed into a more objective and logical view of what was to be inevitable in world politics. Consequently, despite the rhetoric, ultimately the actions of US policymakers ‘. . . demonstrated a shrewd weighing of the effects on the international balance of power of the particular activities of specific non-aligned countries’, according to H.W. Brands.1 The fact is that the administration had to, at least, attempt to deal with the neutralists and Bandung – the ‘third force’ – on the latter’s own terms, meaning outside the Yalta framework. Essentially, grappling with the grievances of Bandung demanded a great deal of sober reflection and compromise on the part of the American administrators. Thus, as Brand argues ‘in an era of anti-communist prohibition, they bootlegged Bandung in Yalta bottles’.2 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 64 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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PRE-CONFERENCE ANGST On 25 January1955, the State Department sent a circular3 to all the major embassies of the US Government stating that the Department ‘continues to be concerned about [the] implications [of the] Afro-Asian Conference’. The concern emanated from the belief that the:

(a) Communists will attempt to ‘rig’ the conference; (b) Main purpose of the communists will be to divide the free Asian countries from their Western friends; and (c) Conference will be used by the communists as a vehicle for propaganda purposes throughout Asia.

The circular, therefore, contained a warning to the effect that: ‘unless the non-communist countries exercised utmost caution and alertness, they will find themselves joining in [the] adoption of resolutions suggesting common purposes with the communist bloc’. This, it stated, could only be misunderstood by non-communist nations not participating in the conference. In view of these concerns, the State Department, as would be demonstrated, detracted from its original policy of ‘benevolent indifference’ to the event and its potential outcomes. It concluded that on the basis of reports and advice from missions concerned ‘it would be preferable for friendly Asian countries to accept the invitation to the conference’. As might be obvious from the above, the change of policy did not mean that the US had warmed to the idea. Indeed, the circular affirms that the department had no illusions about the risks represented by the talks. However, it felt that these risks would be overcome by a clear presentation of the view that the ‘fraternity of peoples must not be divided by arbitrary geographical or racial distinctions’. This referred to the department’s anxiety, rightly or wrongly, that something similar to the Monroe Doctrine was in the offing in Asia. The perception was that such a defined area would be controlled by China and therefore the communists. As Dulles had noted, ‘this would be suicid[al] for the independent countries in that area’.4 These concerns did not provide any immediate means of effectively dealing with the problem. The predicament was compounded by the overwhelming awareness that neither the US nor any of the Western countries would be party to whatever decisions, good or bad, might be taken at the conference. Thus, in one of its circulars, the State Department noted that the event was primarily the concern of the countries invited, admitting that the US could only do so much in dictating to its friends who might attend.5 Washington, therefore, instructed the US missions to question, where appropriate, whether attendance should be decided solely by the local government. In other words, the missions should let the local governments know that: ‘on balance the US believes that it would be preferable for its friendly Asian countries to attend’. The second instruction was that if a local government should decide to AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 65 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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attend the ‘US believes [that] it would be advantageous to our common interests that it [would] send [the] ablest possible representation’. Thirdly, the local governments should be guided against the attempts of the communists to ‘bend’ the talks in their favour. The fourth and ﬁnal instruction was that the non-communist delegations should cooperate effectively towards (and at) the conference if they want to frustrate the ambitions of the communists and their supporters.

INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE CONFERENCE: THE POLICY OF ‘BENEVOLENT INDIFFERENCE’ On 4 January, a memorandum from the Bureau of East Asian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State raised a rather disturbing matter regarding US relations with the countries of Asia vis-à-vis the People’ Republic of China. It referred to ‘a growing divergence between an increasing number of Asian countries on the one hand, and the US on the other, regarding our respective relations with Communist China’. The memorandum expressed concern that ‘the trend has grown during the past year’, and that the ‘evidence seems to bear out the fact that there is a trend towards normalization of relations on the part of Asian countries, while at the same time Peking’s diplomacy seems to be cleverly stimulating and reciprocating the same trend’. Speciﬁcally, fears were expressed about the developments between the Hatoyama administration and the two leading communist countries. It was noted that: ‘Certainly, there is something going on between the Soviet bloc and Japan at the present time so that it would not be at all surprising if Japanese relations with Russia and Communist China were far more developed by the end of the year.’ In view of the above perceptions, the author of the memorandum (K.T. Young (PSA)) expressed what was clearly a frustration with regards to dealing with the situation as it was evolving: ‘I for one, and perhaps there are others, am not sufﬁciently prepared to deal with it’, especially since the Asian-African Conference “would go even further to increase the status and acceptability of Communist China in Asia.6 Indeed, in October 1956, Japan normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, against the wishes of the US. Earlier, on 3 January, James Bell of the State Department (FE/PSA)7 had expressed a similar sentiment: ‘The problem of Communist China raises some general and also some concrete questions in our dealings with other Asian countries’, a fact which he felt was not being taken seriously by the National Security Council (54429/4). He posed a more pertinent question: ‘If it is true that there is a growing tendency to accept Communist China and to regularize relations – a tendency conceived in fear and logic – what can we do about it? . . .’ As with his colleague above, he confessed: ‘I don’t know the answers’ and hoped that ‘some group could look into these questions’. The issue of the growing unpopularity of the US in Asia on certain matters, in particular colonialism, was entangled in the question of the popularity of the PRC in the region.8 It was AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 66 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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clear that the State Department and the government had some tough decisions to make about the threatening posturings of the peripheral nations of Asia. The situation, it seemed, demanded an elaborate national strategy. Thus, on 7 January, a departmental meeting involving fifteen participants was called in the Secretary of State’s office.9 Dulles defined the purpose of the meeting as the formulation of a US position towards the impending Afro-Asian conference. Among the assessments was the concern that the attendance of Zhou Enlai was an indication that the gathering would be ‘rigged’. Another concern was that the ‘Communists would introduce one or more anti-colonial resolutions which no Asian leader would dare oppose, and would very probably ensnare the relatively inexperienced Asian diplomats into supporting resolutions seemingly in favour of goodness, beauty and truth.’ The paternalistic attitude of US foreign policy is most evident here. From the start it was assumed that the conference would be ‘rigged’ because the non-communist Asian countries and friends of the US were too inexperienced to fully appreciate the dangers that Zhou Enlai represented. This paternalistic attitude, as will be demonstrated throughout the course of this discussion, is evident in most of the State Department’s approach towards its friendly countries. Referring to specific countries, the meeting noted that the Arab states were most likely to attend the conference as a bloc. It was, therefore, explained that it would be counter- productive to try and induce Egypt to abstain from Bandung. As was clearly noted, ‘We might cause considerable trouble for the Nasser government and expose our hand by so doing.’10 Egypt under Nasser appeared to be a total enigma to the US; Nasser remained defiantly non-aligned and therefore a threat to US interests in the Middle East.11 With reference to the Japanese, it was inferred that they would participate in the conference because they wanted to ‘overcome the diplomatic isolation they had felt since the end of World War II and would therefore not want to be isolated from other Asian nations’,12 if most of them should accept the invitation. It was, however, also apparent that the Japanese were ‘quite confused’ about the conference due to lack of information about the agenda. Upon realizing, however, that the talks were likely to attract many of the US’s friends in the region, it was mooted that perhaps they might be ‘able to delay and forestall the meeting by suggesting to friendly countries that they ask the sponsors to furnish a detailed agenda and information regarding procedures to be followed’.13 This was part of the department’s initial policy of ‘benevolent indifference” towards the event. Meanwhile, the hard-liners wanted effective retribution. One official, perhaps expressing the mood of the meeting, urged the application of an economic threat. The State Department should ‘point out to our friends abroad that, should they attend, they would antagonize many influential members of the United States Congress and make it extremely difficult to obtain the needed support for an Asian economic program’,14 he stated. He was not bluffing. The era of anti-communist prohibition had AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 67 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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produced some fiercely intolerant congressional conservatives whose primary ambition was to destroy anyone who even dared to question the objectives of US foreign policy and who, not deliberately, it seems, ‘confused neutralists with communists’.15 A more subtle approach was, however, thought appropriate, whereby friendly nations might be goaded to delay acceptance or rejection of the invitation by asking the sponsors for details about the agenda. This suggestion, however, overlooked the fact that the communiqué announcing the conference stated that its agenda would be determined when the meeting convened, a point that was picked up by the Secretary of State. Underlying all of that was, of course, the anxiety that the communists were trying to form continental groupings that would exclude the US. Concern was also expressed by the Secretary of State about the possible emergence from such regional meetings of a solid block of anti-Western votes at the United Nations, a prediction that turned out to be correct. To counteract these, the Secretary agreed that a short telegram should be sent to the Chiefs of Mission to urge ‘friendly governments to neither accept nor decline invitations until the situation was developed further. We should point out that we see very serious implications in the conference in terms of the exclusion of US cooperation with them, a step which could weaken and expose them to Communists.’16 On the same day, a circular17 explicitly stating the government’s concern that the conference ‘might become a step forward for the communists in their design to drive a wedge between the Asian states and the US’, and signed by the Secretary of State, went out to the US missions. The circular confirmed that the matter was under urgent review in the department, and promised that the appropriate US policy towards the conference would be made available to the relevant missions in due course. Meanwhile, at the meeting on the 7th, the Secretary of State stipulated that he did not ‘feel there was much value in passing on to Chiefs of Mission our philosophizing’, by which he meant the department’s thoughts about the conference, and he seriously questioned the ‘wisdom of “encouraging consultation among the invitees” ’.18 Dulles would later change his mind on both of these matters. The statement about not making the Chiefs of Mission party to the department’s deliberations raises one simple question. Why? Suffice to say, most of the missions seemed to support the idea of having friends of the US at the conference, unlike the State Department. Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr19 (of Jakarta) presciently thought there were two alternative courses of action open to the US: ‘We can turn a cold shoulder to the whole affair, although in my opinion this would be a mistake.’ He pointed out that a press dispatch from Washington, widely publicized during the Bogor Conference to lay down the ground work for the talks, ‘offended not only the Indians but other participants at the conference friendly to the US’; and he warned that such a negative response to the convention ‘would, in my opinion, be counter-productive’. He felt that this would not only stimulate communist propaganda but also expose the US to false accusations. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 68 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

68 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

The alternative course, which he preferred, was that the US should be sympathetic to such a conference, not least because it was bound to happen sooner or later. As he argued, it was inevitable for such a gathering to occur ‘if only as a manifestation of the powerful and sensitive nationalism of the new governments of Asia’. Basically, given the popularity of neutralism, Cumming knew that Bandung was a foregone conclusion. Most interestingly, he also thought that a gathering such as this one ‘was a necessary expression of passage from political adolescence to maturity’. As such, he hoped that the State Department would aspire to the success of the meeting, and ‘make moderate expressions, short of [any] condescension, of approval of this example of the growth of a sense of responsibility to and in the world of these new nations even though we may not agree with their methods or all of their aims.’ Evidently, he hoped that the US government would encourage rather than discourage these countries in their efforts to find solutions to their collective problems. Cumming was not just being magnanimous; he seemed convinced that such an open-minded attitude ‘taken in advance of the meeting and augmented by the positions which will be taken by our anti-communist friends amongst the invited powers’ would thwart the ambitions of the communists. Putting a positive slant on the whole event, he made note of how ‘fortunate’ it was that, ultimately, Chinese domestic problems had prevented China from initiating and orchestrating such a gathering. Moreover, he felt convinced that the South and South East Asian sponsors of the event ‘with the sole exception of Indonesia’ were a group of countries ‘whose opposition to domestic communism has been firmly expressed’. Even Nehru, according to the US mission in New Delhi, could be counted on to combat any attempts by China to dominate the conference.20 It would seem from Ambassador Cumming’s comments, compared to the position of the State Department as orchestrated by Dulles, that he was somewhat divorced from the policy outlook of the US Government. While Washington was still scheming to forestall the conference and prevent it from taking place, Cumming confirmed in January: ‘I think now there can be no doubt that the Afro-Asian conference will actually take place.’21 One reaction to this in Washington, on the other hand, was that if that was the case then:

We should discreetly attempt to limit the size of the conference and to discourage the attendance of a really representative group of the concerned nations. Our advice not to attend should be carefully couched in terms of the self-interest of the nations addressed, and should not imply that we disapprove of widespread Asian international consultation under conditions which will be to the real interest of the nations themselves.22

Interestingly, this missive was composed as late as 1 April. Meanwhile, the ambassador to Jakarta had warned, in his telegram of 2 January, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 69 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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against ‘discouraging our friends from participating’ in the conference for ‘there can be no advantage to us’. Instead, as he pleaded, ‘I would hope that our influence would be brought to bear to induce the Philippines and Thailand and especially Iran, Egypt and Iraq and above all Turkey to attend so that their voices may be heard.’23 It seems that Cumming was not properly informed about the inherent problems between his country and Egypt. By then, Dulles found Nasser ‘rather undependable’, not least because the administration hated the odour of his neutralism. The problem ‘was that he proposed neutralism for a country at once vitally important to the West and hitherto under effective Western control;’.24 In any case, Ambassador Cumming, as it happened, was one of many US ambassadors who, even at this early stage, supported the participation at Bandung of countries friendly to the US. There were, however, others who were highly sceptical of the calibre of some of these friendly states. If Dulles had been uncomfortable about sharing the department’s ‘philosophizing’ with its Chiefs of Mission in the early part of January because he was concerned that they were not as anxious about the impending conference, he calmed down a little later in the month. Perhaps Cummings and others made enough of an impression on the State Department to force it to change its attitude to the conference. By 26 January, the US had made a slight shift in policy regarding the gathering. As was noted by a Whitehall official, ‘Washington’s instructions to their missions, now tend to a “not to discourage” (rather than a “not to encourage”) formula.’ The perception that the conference presented dangers eventually motivated the US to encourage25 its friendly states, such as ‘Turkey, which were likely to put up a firm and well-informed counter to the communists, to attend’.

THE QUEST FOR A RELIABLE PERSON TO REPRESENT WESTERN INTERESTS Prior to the above shift in policy, the State Department stubbornly clung to the belief that it was only the neutralists and the communists who wanted the conference, in part because of some of the feed-back from some of its missions abroad. For example, a telegram message26 from Colombo to the State Department comments on the position of Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala with regard to the event. It claimed, incorrectly, that neither the prime minister nor anyone in his cabinet was particularly serious about or even interested in the conference. At the same time, it warned that ‘Ceylon could not be persuaded to decline’ the invitation to attend, because it was one of the sponsors. Ceylon’s participation was, however, perceived as potentially useful for the US by the mission in Colombo, which thought that the US could count on Kotelawala to lead the ﬁght against the communists, a prediction that turned out to be correct. On 7 January, however, a slightly alarming telegram27 arrived at Washington from Colombo expressing concern that members of the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 70 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Ceylon and Pakistan Delegation to the Bogor Conference went unin- formed and without a proper plan of action. It indicated that, as a result, the delegations of the two countries were no match for the well-prepared Indian deputation. This was in view of the fact that Peking would be at the conference in April, fully briefed and perhaps well-rehearsed in its anti-Western rhetoric, the telegram frantically stated: ‘It seems imperative that the anti-communist countries . . . [should] start doing some hard thinking on their own strategies.’ The alarming prospect of the ‘known ability’ of Zhou Enlai juxtaposed with those of the leaders of the above two countries seemed paramount to the concerns expressed in the telegram. Another telegram issued from Karachi on 7 January did nothing to assuage the anxieties of the anti-conference group in the State Department. Although it noted that ‘With usual bounce and enthusiasm’ the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr Mohammed Ali, had eloquently expressed his commitment to the anti-communist position and determination to stand up to Zhou Enlai, it was rather dismissive of his capabilities. The telegram quotes the prime minister as boasting that he was not intimidated by the Chinese premier or by the neutralists: ‘Why should we be afraid of him. I am not afraid of him, I am not afraid to fight. This will be the first time he has crossed the equator and if all the anti-communist nations attend, we can clobber him and any neutral efforts of Nehru.’ Apparently, Mohammed Ali was also determined to show the world that ‘this man [Zhou Enlai that] they are so afraid of’ cannot ‘pollute the anti-communist bloc. We can and will deflate him.’ These boastful remarks attracted some comments from the American Embassy in Karachi, where it was noted that Ali was clearly spoiling for a fight with Zhou Enlai. The telegram from the embassy further states: ‘Obviously [the] prime minister . . . is in an aggressive frame of mind’ and wanted to avail himself of the opportunity ‘to show that Asian nations are not dominated by [the] neutralist bloc or by fear of [the] communist bloc’. The staff in Karachi were, however, not impressed: ‘We have no doubt of the spirit or intentions of [the] prime minister but his abilities may not equal his spirit.’ A memorandum of a conversation sent to the State Department from the embassy in Karachi28 further stated that Pakistan’s leadership prospects were questionable. It was noted: ‘it would be unrealistic to expect Pakistan to provide effective leadership to the anti-communists at the conference’. It warned: ‘unless there is a change of sentiment, it seems likely that the Pakistan delegation will be inadequately prepared, will have failed to coordinate plans with other countries which share Pakistan’s outlook, and will depend on enthusiasm and improvisation to overcome any trials which the conference may impose’. Despite the negative observations at both Colombo and Karachi, there was no indication that either mission was opposed to a robust representation of US interests at the conference. In other words, there was nothing in their messages that suggested that they objected to the participation of US friends at the gathering. On the contrary, they AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 71 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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seemed to be suggesting that Washington should identify people with the right kind of calibre to represent its interests. In fact, the memorandum from Karachi implied that unless Washington took a stronger and more positive attitude towards the event, the interests of the US might be represented by a weak leadership. After all, it seemed to say, the conference, if not its outcome, was a foregone conclusion. As if to underline the point, another telegram was dispatched from Karachi on 19 January which cast further aspersions on Prime Minister Ali’s leadership skills, at least as far as the conference was concerned.29 That aside, it was suggested in the telegram that something had to be done to bolster the Pakistan delegation. The missive remarked that the addition of Chaudhri Mohamad Ali, the Finance Minister, to the delegation, as suggested by the prime minister ‘[would] materially strengthen the Pakistani delegation’. Referred to as the ‘best brain of the cabinet’, Mr Ali was said to have analytical intelligence and good judgement which ‘should provide effective balance to the bounce and enthusiasm of the prime minister’. These disparaging comments about Prime Minister Ali notwithstanding, there was no doubt in the minds of the US Embassy staff that he was willing to do his best for the interests of the US.30 The search for a strong leader produced further doubts, this time about the Ceylonese delegation. As late as early April, similar disparaging comments to those made about Prime Minister Ali were made about the Ceylonese contingent, reiterating the observations which the embassy in Colombo had made in a number of its previous telegrams. One long and detailed telegram about a discussion with Ceylonese officials on the conference speculates on the ability of the prospective Ceylonese delegation. It makes the point that: ‘although it can be expected that the . . . delegation will be strongly anti-communist, anti-neutralist and generally favourable to the principles and ideals of the Western world . . . the prime minister and other members of his delegation will neither be strong enough, well briefed enough or sufficiently versed in international affairs to cope with such giants as Nehru and Chou Enlai.” Concern was also expressed that Ceylon lacked ‘the range of contacts which the Indian Government had with other Asian and African leaders and therefore had no influence among the Afro-Asian states’.31 However, the lack of trust in the two Heads of State was rather unfair, as shown in Chapter 1. Mohammed Ali’s tough stance against Nehru and the neutralists seemingly paid some dividends in protecting America against its potential critics at the conference. Moreover, Kotelawala’s stubborn position on the colonial question largely contributed to the more balanced outcome of the talks. By bringing the Soviet Union right into the centre of the debate on imperialism, Kotelawala and others made what might have otherwise been a harsh treatment of the West less severe. In other words, the juxtaposition of what was perceived as Soviet and Western colonialism, respectively, made the perceived wickedness and inhumane outcomes of the West’s domination of Asia and Africa nothing unique to capitalism. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 72 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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As to why the two South Asian leaders were selected for such harsh treatment it is difficult to say. One assumption is that they were being held partly responsible for the actuality that such a conference would be taking place at all. The fact that they were at the Colombo Conference and could not prevent the organization of such a gathering was, perhaps, enough indictment against them. Presumably, from the perspective of the US policymakers, it was indicative of how ineffective these men were as leaders. That they, as pro-American as anyone could be, were unable to prevent the participation of the PRC in the conference must have also weighed heavily against them in the eyes of the State Department. It is, therefore, highly plausible that the comments by the American Embassy in Colombo to the effect that neither Kotelawala nor anyone in his cabinet was interested in the conference might have been deliberately, though falsely, stated by the Ceylonese prime minister to create the impression that he had nothing to do with the decision to hold the event. But the Americans were only interested in the fact that Kotelawala and Ali could not prevent the conference from taking place. At the same time, we might be right in assuming that the main reason for the above rash of criticism of the South Asian leaders partly originated in the paternalistic attitude of US policymakers towards the new leaders of Asia. All that notwithstanding, the two leaders were determined to go to Bandung, if only to state their case against Nehru and his ambitions. As Ambassador Crowe notes, ‘I am sure . . . Ceylon could not be persuaded to decline’ the invitation to attend,32 and evidently Pakistan was ‘threatening’, from the perspective of the State Department, to represent the interests of the US at the talks.33 Given what he perceived as the poor competence of the friends of America, it is not at all surprising that, on 8 January, Dulles sent a telegram to the American Embassy in London reiterating the position that: ‘If without strong-arm methods [the] conference could be prevented or considerable number [of] significant countries influenced to decline [to] attend [the] US would welcome [the] outcome.’34 Being aware of the position of countries such as Pakistan and Ceylon, Dulles was cautious enough to note that the US would not want to take any open action which ‘could be considered threatening since [it] would probably bring bad reaction from all’. However, he was hopeful that the Arab countries would decide not to attend. But he could not have really believed at that time that Egypt could be persuaded from going. Nasser clearly ‘demanded independence for Egypt . . . and understood that independence required non-alignment’.35 He was not going to miss the conference, even if just to make a show of the fact that he was doing what the Western countries did not want him to do. In any case, this was before the US decided to encourage its friends to attend the event. Since the gathering was a foregone conclusion, and countries like Pakistan and Ceylon were determined to attend, Dulles’s telegram suggested an alternative approach, whereby ‘US efforts should . . . be directed towards encouraging our close friends to attend with [the] ablest possible AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 73 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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representation’.36 It also proposed that US efforts should be directed towards establishing close contacts with the countries attending and their delegations. There were two things that close contacts with the friendly states would hopefully achieve: (1) encourage the introduction of resolutions and amendments which would embarrass Communist China; and (2) minimize the danger of the talks leading to the formation of a bloc of Asian-African states since that would weaken the relationship between the non-communist Asian countries and the US. The telegram ended with a statement to the effect that the department was under great pressure to provide US missions abroad with a firm policy decision about the conference. The department’s position was that it would do so after it had been provided with the British policy (which had been asked for the week before) on the matter. This point is relevant in the sense that it shows the coordinated efforts between the United Kingdom and the United States of America in dealing with the perceived threat from the neutralists. It also confirms the anxieties of the State Department. Not surprisingly, therefore, Dulles instructed the embassy in London to ‘accelerate British decision’ on the matter. In the meantime, the issue of identifying a capable person to lead the pro-Western group remained paramount in the minds of US policymakers. By 20 January, the State Department was making efforts to get all the potentially good people to attend the conference, if the friendly states would accept the invitation. In relation to that, a telegram from the State Department to the US mission in Ankara stated that if a large number of countries decided to attend the conference, ‘it will probably be essential to our interests that Turkey also participates’. The telegram further notes: ‘It seems doubtful that any other participant would be willing and able to provide a forthright and effective anti-communist leadership which is to be expected of Turkey.’ Thus, the Secretary of State instructed the mission in Ankara to try to ensure that Turkey did not prematurely assume a negative position against the conference. His other instruction was that they should neither encourage nor discourage attendance by other friendly governments.37 Another telegram, this time signed by Herbert Hoover, Jr in his capacity as acting Secretary of State, was sent to Bangkok, and instructed the US mission to encourage the non- communist participants to ‘send [the] strongest possible delegates’. It also affirmed the department’s stand that should Thailand decide to accept the invitation to the conference, the embassy should encourage Prince Naradip, who could serve as a skilful protagonist in the interest of the West, to attend.38 Still desperate to find a robust and able anti-communist to lead and orchestrate the US offensive against the suspected communist sympathizers and China at the conference, General Romulo (the leader of the Philippine delegation at the United Nations) was approached by an official of the State Department, as had been agreed by its department’s Working Group on the Bandung Conference, which was set up by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Romulo was told what role ‘he AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 74 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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might play in influencing the deliberations of the conference’, even though it was still not clear whether the General would be attending the talks. Meanwhile, Romulo had bought into the suggested role. Thus, when it became apparent that the General was not technically qualified to attend since he had no ministerial ranking, he lobbied the State Department to influence the Philippine Government to secure his appointment instead of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs as head of the Philippine delegation.39 The State Department was more than willing to do this for, as William J. Sebald of the Far East Department put it, ‘If Romulo is not head of the (Philippine) delegation, it is probable that the position will go to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Garcia. We would regard Garcia’s presence at Bandung, with or without Romulo, as unfortunate because he might be played upon by the neutralists if not the communists.’40 Evidently, feelings were running very high about the leadership question. Romulo did indeed attend the conference, and from the perspective of the State Department he performed rather well in his efforts to defend the interests of the United States. We shall come to the leadership issue again in due course.

THE U-TURN The British decision that the State Department had been waiting for finally arrived on 12 January. Whitehall had decided that nothing should be done to put off the holding of the conference. In fact, the Foreign Office was prepared to give the conference a ‘guarded’ welcome; they also stressed that non-communist participation should be supported in order to counter communist propaganda, which was expected to get worse during the course of the event.41 Meanwhile, the US foreign missions kept up their efforts to make the State Department adopt a more positive, if guarded, stance towards the conference. Thus, the embassy in New Delhi, for example, noted that the press in India had picked up on the British response of ‘cautious welcome’ to the gathering, which they realized was markedly different from the American position. It then reiterated its belief that ‘encouraging countries friendly to the US to attend the conference would constitute [a] bold stroke which might pay substantial dividends, whereas nothing is likely to be gained by influencing friends of the US to stay away, or by allowing [the] situation to drift’. On the contrary, it warned: ‘if some friends of the US go [to the conference] and others stay away’ that in itself will create the impression that ultimately ‘the US influence even among Asian countries beholden to Washington [was] so weak that the US [was] unable to create a united front among its Asian friends either on a positive or negative basis’.42 Ambassador Warren (in Ankara) agreed with Kennedy (in New Delhi) and affirmed that ‘the alternatives of influencing friendly anti- communist governments not to attend, or of allowing the situation to drift with no positive action by us, are negative and in fact dangerous’.43 Australia, which by then did not expect to be invited to the conference, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 75 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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also felt that discouraging friendly states from attending would not be the best course of action to be pursued.44 The Dutch also seemed to support the idea of participation by countries sympathetic to the West to ‘dilute’ communist domination.45 To this, William J. Sebald of the Far Eastern Department said ‘that might work if their leadership is strong’. Subsequently, on 13 January, the State Department produced an interim report46 on the talks and proclaimed that: ‘there was little interest on the part of prospective invitees and no common understanding of the purpose of the conference’. Still, at this stage, the assumptions remained that ‘a substantial number of countries might refuse invitations’. They also held to the belief that ‘most of [the] invited countries do not believe the conference holds any great promise and they would rather not see it called’. The department attributed this conclusion to ‘the consensus of our missions’. Nevertheless, it admits, as predicted by the missions, that ‘the invited government will not want to miss a conference held in the name of African and Asian nations’. The British and the Dutch governments had also confirmed that ‘the conference will be held in spite of any adverse efforts’. Perhaps, in view of this, the question of leadership (at the conference) to safeguard US interests remained vital to the State Department. According to the interim report, therefore, ‘Subject to the strength of the leaders . . . and their ability to fend off communist tactics, 21 of the invited group could be expected to pursue an anti- communist line.’ Despite the sense of anxiety, however, the emerging sense of optimism on the part of the US cannot be ignored. Washington, quite optimistically, calculated that only seven of the participants would be in the communist and neutralist camps (the PRC, North Vietnam, Burma, Afghanistan, India, Nepal and Indonesia). Japan, it seemed, even at this early stage, was seen as tangential to whatever strategies Washington had in mind. The assumption was that ‘Japan, in its first international conference, would not be expected to take a strong line’, although it was expected that ‘in a showdown it would be anti-communist’.47 As predicted, Japan did the former, but not the latter. Essentially it remained ‘neutral’, as discussed in Chapter 1 and as shown later in this discussion. The indications that there were other more liberal opinions within the State Department are observable from the developments at a ‘Background Press Briefing’ involving three of its officials. George Allen,48 soon to become Assistant Secretary of State (for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), offered what he claimed were his personal thoughts regarding the pending conference. These included the observation that ‘the holding of such a conference by the nations in question is a normal thing, a manifestation of independence growing out of their new nationalism’. He believed that desire for such a gathering by the newly independent states was attributable to the perception among them that the rest of the world had not given sufficient attention to their national interests. In view of this, he observed that it might be sensible to ‘insist that primary responsibility of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 76 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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who goes and what is discussed rests with the countries’. He was of the conviction that: ‘if we [Americans] inject ourselves into such aspects of the conference we would be playing into the hands of our critics who have said all along that the West tries to dominate’ the political scene of South East Asia. Nevertheless, Allen was confident that the interests of the West would prevail at Bandung, and that ultimately it would be Peking rather than ‘our friends’ who would be on the defensive at the event. This, perhaps, is an indication that despite the one-dimensional attitude adopted by the administration towards the conference there were moments of outstanding reflection on matters of pressing importance in certain corridors of the administration. By 28 January, the Secretary of State had come to the agreement that: ‘In the case of Arab-Asian countries (as distinguished from African) . . . it [is] preferable for friendly members [of ] this group to accept invitation.’49 Effectively, Dulles succumbed to a policy shift and discarded the attitude of ‘Benevolent Indifference’. It was a case of accepting the inevitable. Having now accepted the event as a fait accompli and perhaps as something more manageable than originally thought, Dulles decided that the US was confronted with two pressing issues: the first was the fact that the African countries would be participating in the conference. The second problem related to what he perceived as the mediocre delegations which ‘. . . our friends were likely to send’,50 which we have already mentioned but should come back to later in our analysis. Meanwhile, a comment about the US position on African participation in the conference might be appropriate at this stage. The participation of the African states at Bandung was deemed as ‘clearly premature and dangerous since it could easily stimulate African nationalism’,51 and ‘embroil them, in particular, in dangerous entanglements or even lead unwittingly to [a] gradual alienation from the West’.52 There was concern that the whole of Africa might become ‘contaminated’ with, at best, communist pretensions if those who attended the conference became, in any way, influenced. On this, the US was supported by France which, like the United Kingdom, was mainly concerned about preserving its colonies in Africa. Consequently as the US ambassador to Paris noted, while France was supportive of the participation of the Asian countries at the talks, they felt rather strongly that African participation for the most part ‘was unwise and should be discouraged’.53 By 28 January 1955, however, Dulles had come to realize that there was very little he or the State Department could do to prevent the African countries from participating. Resigning himself to the fact that both Liberia and Ethiopia might attend, he sent two telegrams to the relevant missions abroad with some instructions. With respect to Liberia, the telegram stated: ‘We have concluded it [would be] inadvisable [to] attempt [to] influence Liberians [in] this regard. You should therefore maintain [a] hands-off attitude and neither encourage nor discourage attendance.’ The ideal situation, of course, would have been for Liberia to remain absent and clandestine efforts were devised accordingly. The strategy the State Department adopted in AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 77 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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that regard was one of exploiting the rivalry between the prime minister of the Gold Coast and the president of Liberia in their quest for regional leadership. Thus, it was noted: ‘It seems possible [that] the strongest inducement [to] attend would stem from Tubman’s rivalry with Nkrumah for West African leadership.’ The same telegram further specu- lated that if Nkrumah, the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, chose not to attend the conference, Tubman might also choose not to go, which would be the desirable outcome. Consequently, the telegram intimated: ‘it might be useful to have the British ambassador bring this casually to Tubman’s attention’.54 The message was designed to achieve two aims: to encourage the United Kingdom to prevent the Gold Coast from sending a delegation to the conference and, as a corollary based on their own calculations, to stop Liberia from also attending. The telegram to Addis Ababa concerning the attendance of Ethiopia, on the other hand, simply said: ‘In view [of the] apparent decision by Ethiopia to attend [the] . . . conference [the] department has concluded it undesirable [to] attempt [to] exert [a] negative inﬂuence. You should therefore maintain a hands-off attitude and neither encourage nor discourage.’55 In any case, by then the US had decided that its Arab and Asian friends may accept the invitation to attend the talks. Acceptance of the inevitable demanded more sober reﬂection on the possible outcomes of the conference. It reinforced the need for a thorough analysis of the policies and attitudes of the individual states who had been invited that elicited certain objective predictions,56 as follows:

(a) The cultures, national interests, and foreign alignments of the . . . nations invited to attend differ so greatly that the conference is not likely to produce spectacular results; (b) These nations’ common feeling that they ought to be taken more into account, and their common desire to enhance their status, may provide a meeting ground at the conference between Communist China and the non-communist nations . . . (c) Although both Communist China and India will be prepared for and eager to assume a leading role at the conference, each will have to conduct itself with restraint in the quest for regional leadership. Resolutions adopted by the conference will probably call for peace, the self-determination of dependent peoples, economic development free of foreign domination, suspension of H-bomb tests, cultural and commercial intercourse, and similar subjects in highly generalized language which will probably be interpreted by most Far East countries, at least, as an extension of the Zhou-Nehru ‘Five Principles’. These resolutions will lend themselves to reinterpretation and utilization as propaganda by both Western and communist nations.

The predictions contained some interesting insights. For example, with respect to (b), it was also noted that ‘the conference alone . . . can hardly AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 78 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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change any nation’s orientation’. On the whole, the predictions were spot on, not least because the conference did not really change the orientation of the Asian countries, and the resolutions adopted at the conference did indeed lend themselves to convenient interpretations by both sides of the ideological fence. Nevertheless, the US position still remained that it should not volun- teer any public comment on the event. At the same time, Washington was determined to counteract, indeed pre-empt, the potential effects of certain issues that were likely to be raised by taking a public stand on them. It wanted to do so without making any speciﬁc reference to the conference itself. The unwilling leap of faith to go along with the trend also necessitated other measures, or even strategies, to assuage the persistent apprehensions. Washington insisted, not surprisingly, on keeping in close contact with its supporters through the normal diplomatic channels, giving advice where appropriate. This was seen as a way of offset- ting the ‘exclusion rule’ adopted by the sponsors of the conference against the Western countries. In other words, although the US itself was not invited to Bandung it was determined to engage with the participants with the view to maximizing its interests in the region. Engaging with the conferees also meant keeping an eye on the uncommitted participants from the neutralist countries and, if possible, wooing them over. Likewise, it meant that conferees from friendly countries were also to be watched to make sure that they did not jump. This also meant making sure that communist charges against the US were rebutted, and the West’s, and speciﬁcally the US’s achievements and goals were properly represented and highlighted.57 Consequently, Carey Fraser58 has made the point that ‘the United States was . . . participating in the Afro- Asian conference although it had not been invited’. Indeed O.C. Morland, the British High Commissioner to Jakarta reported in 1955 that ‘The Americans got out from Washington a team of cipherers and secre- taries, who were stationed in Bandung and who reported direct’.59 A more substantial analysis and assessment of the potential problems that might emanate at the conference, and how to deal with them, was circulated by Washington to all the relevant missions on 25 February. This contained the department’s thinking on major aspects of the talks. Interestingly, it gave the missions the discretion to decide the extent to which they would make the views in the circular known to the local governments. At the same time, it advised the missions to have full and frank discussion about Washington’s major concerns ‘with friendly and allied governments such as Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey [and] Iran’. To underline how sensitive an issue the conference had become within the context of Cold War politics, it appealed to the missions to conduct consultation with local government and individuals sympathetic to the interests of the US ‘. . . on an informal oral basis without repeat [or] handing over of documents which might turn up at [the] conference to our embarrassment’.60 This possibly throws further light on Dulles’s initial apprehensive position that the missions should AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 79 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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not be informed about the deliberations of the department regarding Bandung. In any case, if maintaining optimum secrecy was the reason why the missions abroad could not be kept informed about the department’s position on the conference (in early January) then, conceivably, there were certain missions that Dulles could not trust. By March, the above-mentioned friends and allies of the US were being encouraged to consult each other before the event, although, ‘such consultation [was] not to take on the appearance of the formation of an exclusive bloc and for this reason should be carried out privately’;61 at any rate, those who were not friends of the US were not to know. Apart from China the other country that caused the US anxiety was India. It was obvious to the State Department that Nehru had grand designs for Asia that did not include the US. It was claimed that he envisioned his neutral Asia as ‘consisting of India, Japan, China and himself in a central position’. In 1951, Loy Henderson, the Ambassador to New Delhi, wrote that Nehru was scheming for ‘the evacuation of all American armed forces from Japan and the return to Japanese control of such islands as the United States might occupy’.62 Nehru was perceived as hitting at America’s Achilles’ heel in Asia. We noted in Chapter 1 that he refused to sign the peace treaty with Japan because of the US domination of the agreements, and was bitterly opposed to the US-Japan Alliance. Nehru’s neutralist position was bad enough, but his closest adviser on foreign policy, Krishna Menon, was a menace as far as the State Department was concerned. A memorandum sent to the President claimed: ‘he has a reputation for pro-communist sympathies and has been regarded as a fellow traveler’. Suspicions that he had communist connections were, however, not proven. What was clear to the State Department, though, was that Krishna Menon was ‘not friendly toward the United States’.63 A conversation between Menon and Arthur H. Dean (US Consulate General to Madras) on 11 March gives a clear indication of why Nehru’s adviser was perceived, at the very least, as unfriendly towards the US. In the conversation, Menon was particularly ﬁrm on his and India’s opposition to the US ‘two-China theory’. He was also forthright in his criticism of the US inability ‘. . . to think India can follow an independent foreign policy but must always be on “your side” or the “other side” ’, referring to the US doctrinal position that classiﬁed countries on the basis of whether they supported the US or not; and if the latter, then the said country was labelled as an enemy. Indirectly, Menon’s criticism referred to the US inability to accept neutralism as a force capable of operating independently and uncommitted to either of the Cold War protagonists. Thus, he dismissed Dean’s comment that the US ‘had no aggressive tendencies and wanted to be a constructive element in the pursuit of peace’ as self-serving. He responded as follows: ‘Yes, but to the Asian mind there is no essential difference between the present economic control policies of the United States and your military installations in Formosa and the imperialism of Great Britain.’ AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 80 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Evidently, Krishna Menon – India’s Mr Dulles – pulled no punches. Being aware that not all Asian minds subscribed to the above description of the US role in Asia and to pre-empt his critics, he referred to Washington’s allies in the region – Nationalist China (Formosa), Japan and the Philippines as ‘colonial’ states.64 Dulles disliked him, evidently; he referred65 to him as ‘a very adroit and unscrupulous maneuverer who likes to have his finger in every pie’, and believed that he was ‘very close to the Soviet and Chinese Communist viewpoint . . . and [was] strongly anti-American, although he usually conceals this rather effectively when talking to Americans’. The Secretary of State further warned the President, who would be seeing Menon that ‘you can assume that what you say [at the meeting] will be transmitted to the Chinese Communists. . .’ If Zhou Enlai and Nehru had to be watched at the conference, Krishna Menon also had to be carefully observed, not least because of his communist pretensions. The greatest worry for the US, nevertheless, remained China and its bellicose communist utterances. The agitations of the Afro-Asian states against colonialism, and their demand for social justice was less of a problem; and Nehru, he was a democrat after all. The apprehension about Zhou Enlai dominating the talks is clear in almost all the official documents. What is evident from all of this is that the State Department, despite its public protestations, was deeply worried about the gathering and its ramifications. The main preoccupation was China and its potential domination of the region. If the grievances of the newly independent states and their aspirations were a concern, it was because they were seen as issues or areas that the PRC could exploit and by so doing take control of the region. Consequently, the ambitions of the conference organizers and their fellow travellers – to bring an end to colonialism and enforce social justice – were peripheral to the main concerns of the State Department. Friends of the US tried to highlight some of the reasons for the talks to US officials, in an apparent attempt to educate them, as it were. For example, Ambassador Charles Malik of Lebanon, a confirmed friend of the US, informed Henry S. Villard that: ‘the conference was the product of long and deep seated resentment against European rule and European treatment of native peoples, and of a desire for recognition by what were now sovereign and independent states’. At the same time, he assured Villard that: ‘there would be plenty of delegates at Bandung amply experienced’ – referring to their ability to deal with the communists – ‘and thoroughly committed against communism, who could be relied upon to offset any attempts by Chou Enlai to dominate the proceedings’. Nevertheless, as he warned, ‘it would not be so easy to dissociate the participants from the common denominator of an “anti-Western” or “anti- colonial” bias along racial lines’. The ‘danger’ as he saw it, ‘lay in the emergence of a racial-colour bloc, perhaps stimulated by the Chinese Communists, which could only intensify existing Western alignments and increase the antagonism between white European and Asiatic-African AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 81 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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viewpoints’.66 In other words, if the causes of the anti-Western feeling were resolved, then there would be no need for the US and the West to worry about any threats by the PRC to dominate Asia. The Asian countries would not allow it any way. Malik’s prognosis was right, but it did not seem to have made much of an impression on the US administrators with their cultic devotion to the Cold War. For the US, communism was the problem, and the core of this problem in Asia centred on the issue of Formosa; and Dulles felt very strongly that the Bandung Conference could have a strong bearing on the Formosa situation. He was worried that it might ‘give a green light to the PRC to take Formosa’, and feared that would enhance ‘the possibility of hostilities which could not be confined to the offshore islands and Formosa’. Dulles referred to the building and improvement of airfields along the coast, and in the interior area which lay opposite and just to the north and south of Formosa, as a sign of danger. On the other hand, he felt that: ‘If . . . some resolution or statement could come out of Bandung calling for a cease-fire and calling on both parties not to resort to force, the chances of maintaining peace in that [region] would be very considerably enhanced.’ Most surprisingly, therefore, Bandung seemed to hold the key for ‘war or peace in the Far East’, as far as Dulles was concerned. Nevertheless, he remained deeply suspicious of the sentiments of the conference. As a result, in a conversation with the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Roger Makings, he confessed that he had been ‘considerably depressed in thinking over the general situation in Asia’67 because ‘He felt . . . there were signs that Asian solidarity in an anti-Western sense might be hardening.’ A speech by Nehru in which he ‘attacked the Manila Pact as an organization which might lead to hostilities; NATO . . . claiming it gave Portugal Western support in Asia with respect to Goa; the Union of South Africa; the West for “meddling” in the Middle East’, in part confirmed his worries. From the Secretary of State’s perspective, therefore, the hitherto powerless and peripheral states of Asia were reinventing themselves in response to the evolving dynamics of international politics and aiming too high. This, he thought, could only be at the expense of the US and the West. Apparently Nehru’s speech, which ‘he did not . . . like at all’, reminded him of a speech made during the 1948 World Council of Churches by the Czech Hromada whose general line was that: ‘Western civilization had failed and that some new type of civilization was necessary to replace it.’ Nehru’s embrace of neutralism and the support it seemed to be gaining in Asia was perhaps suggestive of the new things to come. Most of all, Dulles was concerned about certain ‘Asian elements that were pushing for a pan-Asian movement which would be by its very nature and concept anti-Western’. He viewed the pan-Asian movement as ‘a bigger and more long-term problem than the details or incidents which make daily headlines in the press’, and, therefore, ‘hoped that the British might, prior to Bandung, also use their very considerable influence with AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 82 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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certain friendly Asian countries so that both the Formosa situation and the overall problem of pan-Asianism might not become aggravated’. Of course, the role of the PRC in the overall equation could not be overlooked. The State Department believed that the PRC would raise the issue of Taiwan as an issue of colonialism at the conference and attempt to present it as a case of ‘direct Western military intervention in the affairs of Asian countries’. Within the context of the struggle of the Afro-Asian states against colonialism, and since China included ‘the Korean and Indochinese issues as well as those of Goa in India and Western New Guinea in Indonesia’ as part of the remaining vestiges of colonialism, the concern was that the PRC would win the support of at least India and Indonesia for its claims on Taiwan. On this issue a US ‘Intelligence Note’ on the ‘Probable Communist Position at the Bandung Conference’, which was sent to Dulles three days before the event, observed rather pessimistically that ‘no real Chinese Communist con- cessions on Taiwan and no new and startling proposals concerning negotiations appear imminent’.68 As we shall later show this prediction was to be proven wrong. The perceived Chinese threat in Asia continued to exercise the State Department, as demonstrated in the following press statement issued by Dulles (on 18 April, the first day of the conference), following a meeting with the President.69 He confided: ‘We discussed the grave implications of an extensive build-up, now in progress, by the Chinese Communists of offensive airpower on the China mainland opposite Formosa.’ Referring specifically to the Bandung Conference, he made note of the President’s ‘hope that it will heed the universal longing of the peoples of the world for peace and that it will seek a renunciation of force to achieve national ambitions’. Apparently the President hailed the conference as providing an opportunity at a critical hour ‘to voice the peaceful aspirations of the peoples of the world and thus exert a practical influence for peace where peace is now in grave jeopardy’. The administration’s attempt to publicly ‘hug’ the event as part of its damage limitation exercise is patently obvious here.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S DAMAGE LIMITATION STRATEGIES One way to break up this seeming crystallization of a pan-Asian position was to try and persuade friendly nations to drive a wedge between Zhou Enlai and Nehru. This strategy of ‘divide-and- rule’ had been used earlier with respect to the Gold Coast and Liberia to prevent them from attending the talks. With respect to Asia, the intended plan was that Pakistan, for example, would be encouraged to make ample references at the conference to the Sino-Soviet military pact and the Soviet-Eastern European satellite pacts as a way of getting a reaction from India. Exploiting the disagreements between the PRC and India was also seen as potentially expedient. In this case, references would be made to AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 83 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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China’s ‘threat of force against Taiwan and Nehru’s public protestations against force’.70 The Nehru-Zhou ‘Five Principles’ of international intercourse, or Panch Shila – mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and common beneﬁt, and peaceful coexistence – were to be blocked by friends of the US.71 Much earlier in February, however, it had been perceived as strategically useful to send a message of amity to the gathering. The goodwill missive was, incidentally, sent in February from a SEATO meeting in Bangkok. As Brands put it, ‘Considering Nehru’s frequently voiced opposition to the Manila Pact, not least because it included Pakistan, many observers interpreted the Bangkok gathering as a pre-emptive American riposte to the Indonesian conclave.’72 That expressions of goodwill were sent from there to the Bandung group must have been deeply offensive to Nehru at least. There are also indications that some of the friendly states were given instructions concerning the speeches they were to make at the conference. General Romulo, for example, sent a copy of what was to be his opening statement to the State Department. Upon reading it, Dulles complimented him and then gave him a short draft resolution which, as the Secretary of State put it, ‘might be considered at the Bandung Conference’.73 It stated:

Considering that the occurrences of armed hostilities in the area of the Formosa Strait has created a situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; we call upon the parties concerned to renounce forthwith the use of force or the threat of force as a means of securing their stated rights.

That is how deeply concerned Dulles was about the Formosa Strait problem, and how he hoped the conference could be used to soften the tension. Romulo thought the resolution was ﬁne and promised to ‘make use of it’ at Bandung. As if to drive the importance of the draft resolution home to the ‘mes- senger’, Dulles reafﬁrmed its essence by revisiting his perennial nightmare: ‘the Chinese Communists have publicly and at great length announced their intention of attacking Taiwan’. He further observed: ‘if the communists were to refrain from such announcements and were to announce they had no intention of attacking Taiwan, at the same time agreeing to a cessation of all hostilities, our position with respect to Quemoy and Matsu would be subject to change’. Dulles was preaching to the ‘choirboy’ who inevitably agreed when the Secretary of State remarked that ‘the Bandung meeting might be very dangerous’. That was why Dulles was articulating his anxiety about the Formosa situation to him, expecting him to carry the message to the conference. As noted earlier, the State Department went to extraordinary lengths to get General Romulo to be selected as the chief representative of the Philippine delegation. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 84 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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THE CONFERENCE AND ITS SURPRISES: ZHOU ENLAI’S DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES As part of the State Department’s overall strategy, the US pretended to have no interest in the talks; in reality, however, the State Department and its chief could not take their mind off it, as is already evident. In any case, the plan was to try and belittle the conference as much as possible – to cut it down to size, that is. Not having many observers there and, as far as possible, keeping the US ambassador in Jakarta away from Bandung, was perceived as the appropriate way to do this. Nevertheless, Ambassador Cumming was at President Sukarno’s opening speech, and rumour also had it that two African-American press representatives ‘were State Department officers in disguise’.74 Reporting on Sukarno’s speech, Cumming wrote that contrary to expectations he was less critical of the US than anticipated. He added, however, that the Indonesian President’s ‘fairly high flung rhetoric [was] clearly directed against Western colonialism. . .’. Rather triumphantly, he announced that ‘the US came off somewhat better than its European friends’,75 not least because in his speech Sukarno invoked the American War of Independence, referring to it as ‘the first successful anti-colonial war in history’.76 The next day another telegram was sent to Washington reporting that ‘Romulo had delivered a most reasoned and persuasive pro-Western speech’, which also ‘cautioned against the dangers of extreme nationalism’. Furthermore, Cumming referred to the speech as ‘a clever condemnation of Soviet colonialism’.77 Sir John Kotelawala was perhaps less clever with his speech, nevertheless he issued a strongly worded attack on communism. Snapshots of his speech are appropriate here. He made it absolutely clear in his views on ‘Coexistence’ that he had ‘some doubts and misgivings’ about the proposals for the concept. He noted that although ’Coexistence implies the ability to live together, as distinct from dying together’, it appeared at least in Asia and Africa ‘like the wolf of communist subversion in the sheep’s clothing of peaceful talk’. Kotelawala was restless and relentless in his attack on communism, arguing the point that: ‘Many of us find it difficult to understand how the doctrine of “Coexistence” can be recon- ciled with the activities of the Cominform’ since it is ‘the central agency directing all forms of subversion in our countries’. He then called on China to exert every possible influence ‘[upon] Russia . . . to press for the immediate dissolution of the Cominform’. What is interesting to note is that copies of all the speeches that Kotelawala made at the conference were forwarded to the State Department about a week or so before it started.78 Obviously, they attracted some comments from the State Department, or at the very least they gave Washington the reassurance that it had some staunch supporters at the Bandung. The Ceylonese prime minister’s speech on colonialism was an aggressive attack on the ‘other forms of colonialism . . . those satellite states under communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe’. He threw AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 85 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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a bold challenge to the conference participants and in particular supporters of the Soviet Union, to ‘make it clear that we are opposed to any form of colonial exploitation by any power in this region’. That was enough to drive a wedge between India and Ceylon, and it did – perhaps more than the State Department had bargained for. The unexpected, like it or not, had happened: Kotelawala had stood up to both Nehru and Zhou Enlai. Not surprisingly, most of the Indian press dismissed his performance and condemnation of the Soviet Union as a non-starter, since after all Russian had no colonial possessions in either Asia or Africa.79 In doing so, they were simply echoing the sentiments, and indeed the anger, of the Indian prime minister. It was Zhou Enlai’s performance at the conference that, understandably, attracted the most comments. On 20 April, the US Embassy in Jakarta reported to Washington that two speeches by Zhou Enlai were both ‘clearly phrased in diplomatic language, largely avoiding abusive language about the US’. That was perhaps not what the State Department wanted to hear, although it expected that of the Chinese premier. It was also reported that the Chinese premier’s supplementary speech was so effective as to make the delegates and newsmen highly impressed with his performance. There were, of course, some critical voices. General Romulo, Tani Masayuki (an adviser to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and a member of the Turkish delegation thought Zhou’s speech was ‘very dangerous’ in view of its ‘lulling effect’. Yet, Zhou was unequivocal on the Taiwan question, stating that: ‘the will of Chinese people to liberate their own territory, Taiwan and coastal islands, was a just one. It is entirely a matter of our internal affairs and exercise of our sovereignty.’ Ambassador Cumming, however, attempted to reassure the officials in Washington that: ‘at this point in the conference we believe [the] weight of this speech while dangerous has been and will be counter-balanced by speeches by Romulo and other friendly delegates’. He included Japan among the said friendly states because Tokyo was expected to introduce a Bandung Peace Declaration renouncing the use of force in resolving Asian problems.80 A subsequent telegram to Washington announced that Zhou Enlai was under enormous pressure. Specifically, it noted that ‘throughout the conference Chou En-lai has maintained calmness even in [the] face of what some observers considered provocative statements’, referring to comments from some of the countries friendly to the US. The telegram also confirmed how resilient and unflinching the Chinese premier was by reporting that ‘not even the offensive statements on April 21 drew sharp retort’. A crack was, however, beginning to show: ‘[in] his three-way conversation with Nehru and Sir John he left [the] latter in no doubt as to how he (Chou) felt about [the] attack [on communism]’. Apparently, ‘he showed the face of [an] aggrieved guest who has been invited to attend [a] party and was then attacked by not only other guests but even one of [the] hosts’. On the whole, however, as the telegram noted, Zhou Enlai’s performance on the fringes of the conference was reasonable and AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 86 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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affable.81 Indeed, his supplementary speech was a resounding glorification of the ‘Five Principles’ of international intercourse. The problem is he delivered it with a fluency that won him a standing ovation and caused the US to lose face. Referring to different ideologies and political systems, Zhou Enlai rather gently decried the situation where ‘some people dislike . . . the fact that the 600 million Chinese people have chosen a political system which is socialist in nature and led by the Chinese Communist Party’. In saying that, he implied that China, unlike some of the Asian countries, was truly liberated from imperialist control. The speech was essentially about the need for the Asian countries to ‘seek common ground’ which should not be hindered by our different ideologies and systems. He also broached the question of religious belief asserting: ‘We communist are atheists, but we respect all those who have religious belief’, and then appealed to ‘those with religious beliefs . . . [to] also respect those without’. By presenting the Chinese viewpoint in that way, Zhou Enlai not only placed the responsibility for independent association and political systems on the US, but also attempted to isolate the US by evoking a sense of regional identity. Indeed, he referred to ‘the subversive activities which [were] being carried out without any disguise by the United States of America [against China]’ and challenged those who doubted this to come to China to see for themselves. Zhou’s final performance took place on the evening of the 23rd, the day before the end of the conference. At an informal ‘political’ dinner organized by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in his bungalow and involving a handful of dignitaries,82 Zhou apparently agreed to publicly announce what he had privately said about Chinese intentions regarding how the Formosa problem should be approached.83 The proposal, as put forward by the Chinese premier, was stated as follows:

The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States of America. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relieving tension in the Far East, especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.

The ‘three sentence statement . . . electriﬁed the conference’, Carlos Romulo later wrote.84 What was described as: ‘Chou En-lai’s offer at the Bandung Conference to negotiate with the United States on relaxing tension in the Far East, including the Taiwan area’, was said to have ‘reached the department early on the morning of Saturday, April 23’.85 It seemed that the department was at a total loss as to how to respond to this proposal which they had not expected to be announced in public. As far as the complexities of the situation can be properly understood, it was not so much the formulation of a response to Zhou’s proposal that was the problem – it was the lack of a balanced statement to the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 87 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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international community, the countries that had congregated at Bandung in particular, that was bothering Washington. This created some commotion within the department and the policy-making corridors of the administration. While the department was consulting at a meeting to put together a draft statement in response to the proposal, word came in that the President’s ofﬁce ‘might wish to make a statement on the matter’. The department’s response was an unequivocal refusal. Since such a direct response from the President ‘would dignify the statement unduly’, it was agreed that a statement drafted by the department and the President’s ofﬁce would be issued as a departmental press release86 instead. When this came out, it simply stated that:

The Department of State has received press reports concerning the statement of Chou en lai at the Bandung Conference. The United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in the free Republic of China and of course the United States would insist on free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area.

The second paragraph of the statement itemized three things that the PRC could do ‘if it was sincere about clearing the air considerably and giving evidence before the world of its good intentions’. These were that China could ‘place in effect in the area an immediate cease-ﬁre. It could also immediately release the American airmen and others whom it unjustly holds. Another could be the acceptance of the outstanding invitation by the Security Council of the United Nations to participate in discussions to end hostilities in the Formosa region.’ As is evident, the State Department’s response to Zhou Enlai’s proposal was cold and unrelenting, indicative of the suspicions of the US administrators.87 They claimed that the Chinese premier’s attempt at rapprochement ‘was designed to lead the Bandung conferees with the impression that Communist China, without modifying in the slightest its basic demands for the “liberation” of Taiwan and the liquidation of the Government of the Republic of China, had gone more than half-way in a constructive effort to relax tensions over Taiwan’. It was also stated that the proposal was designed ‘. . . to establish a basis for throwing the onus for Far Eastern tension on the United States, thus enabling the communist propagandists to utilize the fear of war as a means of isolating the United States’. In essence, there was no attempt to give the Chinese leader any credit for his effort; instead the credit went to the conference, surprisingly. According to Dulles, ‘the . . . conference, as we had hoped, seems to have exerted a restraint on the Chinese Communists’.88 He claimed: ‘I had always felt that it would be salutary if the Chinese Communists were confronted with the opinion of the free nations of Asia.’ However, to several of the delegates, including America’s friends, Zhou Enlai’s proposal was a positive gesture. They saw it as a sincere attempt AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 88 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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on the part of the PRC to reduce friction in the region. Dulles’ reply, therefore, ‘caused great disappointment in Bandung’.89 General Romulo, for example, confirmed that the department’s initial response to ‘Chou En-lai’s offer to negotiate was very badly received in Bandung, particularly by friends of the United States’. Apparently, ‘several delegates came to him in consternation over what they felt was a slamming of the door which put them in a very bad position vis-à-vis Chou En-lai after their strong attacks on communism’.90 One of those delegates was the prime minister of Ceylon, who apparently referred to Dulles’s response as ‘too hasty’.91 Meanwhile, the Indian press applauded Zhou’s statesmanship and dismissed the department’s initial reaction as ‘brusque’ and too ‘hasty’.92 There is clearly something rather intriguing about that episode; apparently, the United States had known about the Chinese offer before the conference. Nehru confirmed that ‘the announcement itself does not represent a new attitude on the part of China’.93 Hence, our argument that the source of consternation for the State Department was not so much the lack of a response to Peking, but how to save face. In any case, as one observer at the conference put it, ‘Both the tone and content of [the US reply] amounted to a virtual rejection of the Chinese offer . . .’94 In the end, as a State Department memorandum noted, Zhou’s erudite performance and his open invitation to those who cared to visit China ‘paid dividends, for many of the leading delegates at the conference have agreed to accept this invitation to China, although it will involve the red carpet treatment’. It lamented that, ‘Mohammed Ali of Pakistan turned out to be our greatest disappointment when he stated that he would be the first to go.’95 We shall now take a look at how the US approached the issue of Japan’s participation in the conference.

THE JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA The issue of the Japanese participation in the conference was of immense strategic concern to the US, as shown in Chapter 1, for Japan was its most important ally in East Asia. Within the State Department, on the other hand, there were genuine concerns that Japan was showing signs of a lack of commitment to the partnership. Moreover, there were suspicions that Japan was, if not physically, psychologically drifting away from the relationship. This was made all the more pertinent because Japanese public opinion had been raising serious questions and doubts about the nature of the relationship between their country and the US. Nevertheless, the State Department, without much hesitation, mentioned Japan as one of the friendly states that would be participating in the conference. This was because, according to the department’s working deﬁnition of neutralism, ‘Japan [was] not neutral’ and ‘the probability that it will become neutral in the next few years appear[ed] small’. Yet, doubts remained. The department’s report on ‘Nationalism AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 89 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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in the Far East’96 which deals with neutralism is insightful in this respect. Since the report is fundamental to our analysis, it is worth examining again some of its contents in greater detail here. For example, it notes that: ‘Japan . . . today relies heavily on the US for support, guidance and protection. In this situation there is general agreement in Japan that the nation must build its strength and, as it does so, strive for greater freedom of action.’ Japan’s over-dependence on the US was, therefore, noted; its unhappiness about the situation irrefutable. The report, therefore, notes that: ‘Japan’s restiveness under US tutelage . . . and its fear of involvement in nuclear war are some of the important forces impelling [the country] away from its twin conditions of weakness and dependence on the US.’ It further warns that: ‘These forces could eventually push Japan into a position of neutralism’, and identifies the ‘significant, although far from dominant, groups working to this end’. These were ‘the many socialists, particularly left socialists . . . intellectuals, such as social science teachers and writers, leaders of the labour movement and internationalists’. Loss of confidence in the US to provide Japan with the opportunities it needed for political and economic expression against the perceived communist threat might also have forced Japan to flirt with the neutralist ideals, the report noted. It also mentions the ‘definite undercurrent of feeling’ pushing Japan ‘to steer clear of becoming entangled with either side [of the Cold War]’. On the contrary, Japan was determined to serve as ‘a peacemaker or bridge between the two sides’. It is significant to note that these forces mentioned above were roughly the same ones that had forced countries such as India and Indonesia to adopt the path of neutralism. As alluded to in Chapter 1, the uncertainties on the part of Japan might also have been caused not so much by impotent weakness but by an eagerness ‘to regain a leading position in Asia’. Having noted the factors that might push Japan ‘over the edge’, the report then reassuringly declares that the ‘dominant forces and groups’ in Japan were in favour of cooperation with the US and the free world. This is because they believed such cooperation would continue to offer political and economic benefits well beyond communist abilities, it was noted. The dominant forces were identified as ‘the conservative political elements, officialdom, the bigger businessmen and a generous cross- section of the population’. With regard to the course of action to be taken to pre-empt Japan from becoming neutral the report advised that the ‘US should encourage Japan to attain greater national strength’. It also recommended that the United States ‘should not interfere with Japan’s efforts to establish limited political relations with the Soviet Union and trade with Communist China . . . particularly since Japan will probably appreciate its ties with the free nations more as it learns how little the communist nations have’. This was obviously stated with an eye on the fact that indeed, the Hotoyama administration had already started making efforts to establish better relations with Japan’s communist neighbours. Finally, the report affirmed that ‘the risk will be present for AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 90 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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some time at least that Japan’s recovery of strength could go in the direction of neutralism and ultra-independence rather than cooperation’ with the US if the international and domestic circumstances should unexpectedly change the course Japan was now following. This was the context in which the US viewed Japan’s participation in the Bandung Conference. The following account and analysis of events as presented by ofﬁcials in the State Department, the US Embassy in Tokyo, and other US missions abroad should provide us with a clear insight into how the US perceived Japan’s role in the conference. These should invariably inform us about the expectations that the US had of Japan. They should also, as a corollary, shed some light on the essence of the US-Japan Alliance, as well as on Japan’s relations with the other participants at Bandung. Additionally, we could derive from them some pointers towards an evaluation of Japan’s own understanding of the conference.

JAPAN AND THE US: CONFERRING ABOUT THE CONFERENCE On 5 January, the US Embassy in Tokyo sent a telegram to Washington97 informing the State Department about the current Japanese attitude towards the impending conference. The message also noted that the Japanese had been slow in outlining their views on how they would react if they were invited to the talks. In addition, it established that ‘the press has treated [the] conference with considerable caution’. The telegram, signed by Ambassador John Allison, also intimated that a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, Tani Masayuki, had made some disparaging comments about the conference, in part because he felt the sponsors did not know its purpose. The following views from the telegram are particularly interesting and therefore deserve to be extensively quoted. Firstly, it notes that despite the lack of excitement in Tokyo about the conference, ‘in [the] end Japan [is] likely to decide on participation largely for reasons of enhancing its prestige in Asia’. It elaborates on why Japan could not avoid the talks by affirming: ‘the Japanese are deeply sensitive about isolation from mainstream Asian politics, and desirous of exploiting any opportunities to re-establish Japan’s status as [a] major Asian power’. The other reason why Japan was more than likely to be present was because it ‘offers such an opportunity as the first important post-war meeting Japan had been invited to attend’. Also crucial to the issue was the question of Japan’s independence. There were compelling domestic political reasons at play here. As the telegram noted: ‘particularly if decision must be made prior to [the] March elections,98 [the] government will be under strong political pressures to attend since rejection would be viewed as contrary to the “new” foreign policy of “independence” and increase emphasis [on its Asianness]’. We have already mentioned the pan-Asian inclinations of the Hatoyama administration in Chapter 1, and have also taken note of Dulles’s anxieties about the potency and potential spread of this idea of ‘Asia-for-Asians’. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 91 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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All of these, including the question of an ‘independent foreign policy’ for Japan notwithstanding, Ambassador Allison’s telegram mentioned that since Japan was genuinely concerned about the US attitude towards attendance, the Japanese were unlikely to act without close consultation with Washington. It also asserts that: ‘Japan would probably be hesitant about attending without at least the tacit consent of the US’. In the same breath, however, he warned that if the US should decide that Japan should decline the invitation, ‘great effort would be required to persuade Japan [to do so]’. In reality, it intimates that whether or not Japan went to the conference, would depend on how the other anti-communist countries respond to it. In other words, the ‘decision of [the] other anti- communist Asian invitees to attend would . . . strengthen Japanese determination to accept [the] invitation’. Similarly, the telegram warned that if Japan declined the invitation, ‘under pressure from the US’, the decision might be interpreted as a product of US intervention. It added: ‘In that event, [the] US would be subject to strong public criticism for treating Japan as [a] “puppet”.’ This, as the telegram affirmed, might force the government to assert the country’s ‘ “independence” from the US on other issues in order to establish public prestige’. The issue of the Japanese desire for independence from the US was of major concern to the State Department, as discussed in Chapter 1. It was also of immense concern to the PRC and India, both of which wanted to ‘liberate’ Tokyo from Washington’s grip so that it could regain control of its own affairs and develop better relations with its neighbours. As to the extent to which Japan would cooperate in efforts to combat the communists at the conference, the ambassador’s remarks were simply that it was impossible to forecast this with any certainty, ‘until [the ] domestic political situation clears up and [the] pattern of [the] conference [was] more clearly defined’. The telegram then notes that: ‘although it was relatively certain [that] Japan can, at least, be expected to side with [the] anti-communist bloc where necessary, or undertake no actions which [would] alienate the US’ it might be necessary for some influence to be applied in ‘favour [of] innocuous compromises and against [the] adoption [of] controversial resolutions’. In other words, it was felt that Japan should not be allowed into a situation where it might be forced to take a position against the interests of the US. Conversely, expecting Japan to assume a leadership role at the conference among the anti-communists was unlikely, as Allison stated. However, he also noted that Japan had the ‘capabilities and ambitions for [a] more prominent role in Asia’. Yet, he identified certain constraints on those ambitions. He alluded to his belief that: ‘Japan may be inhibited from this course by [a] reluctance to seem too “forward” at [its] post-war “debut” ’ and by the concern that ‘a strong stand [might be] misinterpreted as [an] indication [of] the resurgence [of] pre-war Japanese aggressiveness’. Besides, he added that the Japanese leaders may think that their country’s ‘prestige [may] be better built around issues which unite rather than divide’ the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 92 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Afro-Asian countries. They ‘may also feel [that a] passive role among the anti-communists [might] be necessary to satisfy domestic pressure for asserting some independence from [the] US . . .’ Such pressure, he felt, may also come in handy in the ‘efforts [to] use the meeting with the PRC to foster trade expansion’, and settle problems with regards to fishing and reparations. That Japan’s attitude at the conference would also be dictated by the performances of India and the PRC was obvious; the soft tactics of the two countries might pre-empt the Japanese from undertaking a strong anti-communist stand, Allison thought. The telegram then suggests that if the Japanese thought a more active role at the talks would not conflict with their ambitions for independence and prestige then ‘it may be possible to awaken’ their leadership potential. In sum, the ambassador advised Washington not to try and ‘dissuade Japan from attending the conference’. Instead, he felt it should be encouraged to attend through consultations with the US Government; and it should be inspired to play an active role in ‘combating [the] communists’. Allison also suspected that if the Japanese were consulted at all stages of planning about what the US wanted to achieve at Bandung, they would abandon their reluctance to play a more conspicuous role. Consequently, he asked for the freedom to freely engage the Japanese as partners regarding their preparations for the gathering. ‘It is particularly important that I be in [a] position [to] keep . . . Tani fully informed regarding pre-conference developments and [show] our desire [to] deal with [the] Japanese as partners in this’, he stated. As is clear enough, while the US was viewing the event with suspicion, Allison was exhorting Washington to let Japan attend. The above detailed assessment of the Japanese participation in the conference sets the tone for how the US approached the question of Japanese attendance. Following the above telegram, Ambassador Allison sent another message to Washington on 5 January,99 in which he expressed the concern of the Pakistan Embassy in Tokyo, which was that the Philippines Government had declined an invitation to the conference. There were, indeed, rumours that the Philippines and Thailand might decline the invitation. Officials at the Pakistan Embassy had apparently expressed concern that their delegates might be isolated at the talks if staunch anti-communist countries, such as the Philippines, did not attend. In alerting Washington to this, Ambassador Allison was also attempting to put pressure on the State Department to encourage participation by friends of the West, not least because the ‘premature’ decision of the Philippines not to attend might be interpreted by some of the Asian countries as stemming from pressure from the US. Indeed, the Pakistan Embassy also hoped that Japan would be persuaded to attend the conference since its participation ‘would on balance be helpful to the anti-communist countries’.100 After all, Pakistan had been very instrumental in getting Japan invited to the event because it saw the strategic usefulness of having Japan at the conference. The AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 93 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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indications from the above telegram were that Ambassador Allison, like the heads of other missions in Asia, was using every opportunity available to him to encourage friends of America to attend. Meanwhile, he was also trying to get Washington to respond positively to the conference. Yet, the news that Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru favoured Japanese participation at the Afro-Asian Conference made Dulles jittery. Shigemitsu had made a statement alluding to the Japanese Government’s ambition to reclaim and reassert the country’s independence. The fact that he made the statement without consultation with the US was enough to rankle rather badly with the Secretary of State. Incidentally, the fact that Allison’s telegram states that Shigemitsu was aware of the US’s cool attitude towards the event and would, therefore, consult the US before Japan made any concrete decisions about attending, hardly, it seems, lessened Dulles’ anxieties. In his panic, Dulles wrote to the US Embassy in Tokyo to ascertain what exactly Shigemitsu had said.101 Dulles’s response was that for the time being, the Japanese Government should not assume any public position on whether or not Japan would attend the conference. Since Japan had not received a formal invitation by then, the instruction caused no real problem for the Japanese Government. The response was, nevertheless, clearly indicative of Washington’s anxieties about Japan’s desperate ambition to act freely in international politics. At the same time, it confirmed Washington’s determination to continue orchestrating Japan’s foreign policy. The US Ambassador in Tokyo wrote back, but only to confirm that the Japanese were more than inclined to attend the conference. Ambassador Allison also persevered with his position that it would be best to have Japan attend.102 He made reference to Tani’s comments to the effect that: ‘in his opinion there was considerable merit in having as many non- communist countries attend [the] conference as possible . . . otherwise Chou En-lai and Nehru would dominate [the] meeting’ at the expense of the West. That was plain enough. Allison tried even harder this time. He affirmed: ‘for [the] above reason, as well as for [a] strong desire of [the] government to be part of any Asian conference’ Japan would accept the invitation ‘unless a most persuasive reason can be adduced for not doing so’. He also tried the carrot. As if to assuage the anxieties of the State Department, he stated that Tani had assured him that: ‘if Japan should accept [the] invitation, it was his intention that [the] strongest possible delegation be sent and that it should be composed at least in part of officials who spoke English fluently so that they would be able to influence [decisions] taken at the conference’. Towards the end of the telegram he reverted to his initial strategy, stipulating that, ‘it would be difficult to persuade [the] Japanese Government not to accept the invitation’. In a final act of persuasion he added: ‘. . . I think it would also be difficult to keep it a secret that we had attempted to dissuade [the] government from going’. He then signed off with the words, ‘Our best interests would seem AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 94 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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to be served by encouraging Japan to attend and giving [the] Japanese as much material as possible with which to counter communist propaganda at [the] conference.’103 Allison seemed to have exhausted all his skills of persuasion by this time, but he would not give up.

PRE-CONFERENCE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE US EMBASSY (TOKYO) AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Although the Japanese Government was keen to respond to the invitation to the conference independently of the US, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) remained in deep consultation with the US Embassy about the event. When the formal invitation finally arrived, on 25 January, the ministry duly informed the US Embassy.104 It also provided the ambassador with a copy of the full text of the invitation as well as a copy of the Japanese Government’s brief statement that was issued in response to the invitation.105 Arrangements were then made between MOFA and the embassy for regular consultation on what reactions Japan should adopt. Thus, Ambassador Allison requested immediate confirmation from Washington that it would not discourage Japanese and other Asian attendance at the conference.106 A ‘response was needed urgently’, he noted, ‘so as not to give the press the impression that the Japanese Government’s delay in replying to the invitation was a result of American influence’. He further warned that ‘the Japanese Government which now, with yesterday’s dissolution of [the] Diet faces [a] bitter election campaign will be tempted to act independently without our final views’. Indeed, on 23 January, Shigemitsu was under immense pressure from the opposition parties to state how the government was going to respond to the invitation.107 It is interesting to note that by this time State Department, perhaps following Dulles’ stated position (on 7 January) that there was not ‘much value in passing on to Chiefs of Mission our philosophizing’,108 had not responded to any of the telegrams (since 5 January) that the embassy in Tokyo had sent it about the conference. Allison was desperate for a response, preferably a positive one. On 25 January, the day Allison sent the last telegram, State Department officials had been in the Secretary of State’s Office brooding over what to say to the friends of the US who were likely to be present at Bandung. At the meeting, involving Dulles, it was noted that Ambassador Allison had urgently requested instructions in order to consult with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In response, the Secretary of State stipulated: ‘our relationship with Japan would be served by consultation or the appearance of consultation prior to our making a decision’.109 The exercise of hegemonic power cannot be overlooked here. For our purposes, the operative phrase in Dulles’s statement was ‘our making a decision’. In other words, Japan would have to wait until the US made a decision about what do in regard to the conference. When the Department decided that its friends may in fact attend, it sent a message to Tokyo through its embassy.110 Among other requests, Ambassador AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 95 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Allison was to inform Japan of the possibility that the PRC may try to use the conference to discuss the relationship between their two countries. It was also stipulated that Japan would need to put together a delegation that was highly competent and ‘carefully instructed’ to handle the subject. Allison wrote on 3 March111 to reassure Washington that his embassy staff and MOFA’s officials had formed a ‘Working Group’, which would be meeting on a weekly basis to exchange views about the impending conference. The telegram he sent also contained a detailed description of what the ministry was doing in anticipation of the talks. It further noted, however, that the ministry was afflicted with indecision about what attitude Japan should adopt at Bandung. The indecision was, in part, because ‘one section [of the ministry’s working group] advocates close cooperation’ with the West while the other section ‘recommends’ less commitment to any side. Apparently, MOFA was also divided over what stand Japan should take about the issue of trade with the PRC should it arise at the talks.112 Allison’s telegram further intimated that the most disturbing issue for the Japanese in relation to the conference, apart from the question of East-West relations, was its history as a colonial power. Because colonialism was designated as an agenda item, the Foreign Ministry anticipated that further discussions about reparations might take place under the cover of the proceedings.113 Evidently, Japan was being haunted by the legacies of its colonial history, one of history’s cunning ways of ‘sticking around’. The controversy about tactics and what position to adopt at the conference was won, on the whole, by the ‘doves’, conceivably the supporters of the prime minister who were keen to pursue the policy of ‘peaceful diplomacy’. Nevertheless, as Allison’s telegram points out, Shigemitsu (who was seen more as a hawk and therefore pro-American) also wanted a non-controversial role for Japan at the conference. In any case, as the US ambassador points out, MOFA’s policy paper on the matter represented a compromise between the ‘hawks’ and the ‘doves’ within the ministry.114 Thus, while the general approach was to avoid projecting itself as an anti-communist nation on specific issues, Japan was likely to adopt an anti-PRC stand. Among the key aspects of this policy was the need to place emphasis on the importance of the UN on all matters in order to avoid antagonizing the US and the European countries, general economic problems and issues of economic development in the region.115 The policy also recommended that Tokyo should ‘avoid issues of direct interest to Japan which [were] controversial to countries in [the] area or [that] might lead to the criticism of Japan’s pre-war and wartime actions.’ On 17 March, Allison reported to Washington that upon consultation with Ozawa Takeo, the head of the Japanese Working Group, he had ascer- tained that Shigemitsu would lead the Japanese delegation to the conference.116 Ambassadors Kase Toshikazu and Ota Saburo (Ambassador to Burma) were to serve as Shigemitsu’s principal advisers. The issue of the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 96 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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composition of the Japanese delegation will be taken up again (in this chapter and more extensively in Chapter 4), as will the role of MOFA’s Working Group in the deliberations about Japan’s participation in the conference. The telegram, however, revealed one problem still unresolved by the Japanese, which was how should Shigemitsu handle any private interviews requested by Zhou Enlai? By suggesting that Shigemitsu was far from certain that he would meet privately with the Chinese Premier, it gave Washington the assurance that nothing on that matter was quite decided yet. It is plausible, though, that Ozawa, who furnished Allison with that inside-information, was merely trying to assess how the US would react to the news of a meeting between Zhou Enlai and Shigemitsu. In effect, Ozawa, or perhaps the MOFA might have been throwing Allison a bait. The query (how should Shigemitsu handle private interviews initiated by the Chinese Premier?) suggests a solicitation for instructions from Washington, not least because MOFA would have known by then that Zhou Enlai would want a meeting with the head of the Japanese delegation. It is also highly plausible that they knew what the meeting would be about, perhaps because the new Japanese administration wanted the meeting anyway. If these assumptions are substantially correct, then one might be inclined to suggest that, despite the ‘hang-up’ about an independent foreign policy the Hatoyama administration did not feel confident enough to ‘fly’ on its own, not even in relation to a regional conference. Interestingly, as diplomatic logic or domestic political uncertainties would have it, Shigemitsu did not attend the conference. The reasons will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4. As the date of the conference approached, Dulles sent a message to the relevant embassies, including the ones in Ankara, Bangkok, Manila and Tokyo.117 It contained the advice that it would be strategically useful for Japan to exchange views with Pakistan, Turkey and Thailand about the event. Dulles thought that these countries were potentially capable of ‘influencing Japan along constructive lines’. Such an exchange of views, the Secretary of State wrote, ‘could have important political effect in strengthening Japan’s identification and cooperation with the free world participants at the conference’. Evidently, Dulles was worried that, if Japan was not brought into check, it might wander off and perhaps join the wrong train. The sooner Japan was approached by Pakistan, Turkey or Thailand and confirmed as an active member of the Western camp, the better, Dulles suggested. Nevertheless, he was also careful to warn that the plan to get Japan firmly on the side of the West ‘should not be attributed [to] the US’s initiative’. Instead, it should be explained as having come from the three countries who were simply taking advantage of the conference to foster ties with Japan, he cautioned. Obviously, the master puppeteer was worried about offending the puppet, which was already agitating for an independent existence and platform. Perhaps he was more concerned about how Japanese public opinion might react to his attempts to control Japanese foreign policy. Moreover, he had to be careful not to offend Nehru. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 97 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Curiously enough, Dulles thought it would be ‘inadvisable’ for the Philippines to approach Japan, although he wanted the Philippines to be included in all exchanges of views involving the pro-Western countries. This was necessary ‘particularly since [the] Philippine delegation would be headed by General Romulo’ who, as Dulles said, was ‘likely to be one of [the] most effective spokesmen [of] the free world at Bandung’. The telegram also contained a suggestion for discussions with Japan. Firstly, he noted that the pro-Western states should anticipate attacks on the Manila Pact and other regional bilateral defence arrangements and should therefore be ready to rebut any such attacks, as well as justify these regional arrangements. Secondly, they should defend the advantages of remaining within existing international economic organizations, such as: the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT); the regional UN economic commissions; specialized agencies of the UN; and the Colombo plan. This was meant to circumvent any attempts by the neutralists to establish ‘breakaway’ regional economic organizations. As part of the State Department’s tactical shift, Dulles also recommended that it would be desirable, when rebutting such proposals at the conference, ‘not to alienate the neutralist countries’.118

THE JAPANESE LEADERSHIP QUESTION AND REACTIONS TO US INTERVENTIONS It was noted above that, as part of the plan to outwit the neutralists and communists at the conference, the State Department had instructed its friends to send a delegation composed of the best and the brightest. News about problems relating to the composition of the Japanese delegation arrived at the Secretary of State’s ofﬁce on 29 March.119 Apparently, Tokyo was having problems deciding who the leader of the delegation should be. The telegram pointed out that it was ‘almost impossible that Shigemitsu’ would attend the conference. At the same time, Tani Masayuki (adviser to the Foreign Ministry and the chief informant to the US Embassy in Tokyo) had been excluded as leader of the delegation because he could not be given the ministerial rank required of such a role. Thus, the US Embassy in Tokyo noted that the indecision about who the head of the Japanese delegation would be was creating tension within MOFA. Ozawa (the head of the ministry’s ‘Working Group’), for example, was deeply frustrated.120 He was particularly worried that the inability to decide on a leader quickly was an indication that Japan would not be sending a strong delegation to the conference. A resolution to the leadership question had to be found and soon enough MOFA arrived at a decision about who the chief representative of the Japanese delegation would be. On 1 April, the Secretary of State was informed that Takasaki Tatsunosuke (Minister of State and Director of the Economic Council Board)121 had been selected as head of the Japanese delegation, with Tani as Chief Deputy. Although there was no mention of other members of the delegation, it was noted that it might AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 98 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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include representatives of the major parties, including some members of the socialist parties. These representatives would serve as advisers to the delegation. The inclusion of socialist politicians in the delegation, as one can imagine, was bound to cause some consternation within the State Department. When eventually the full list of the Japanese delegation arrived at the American Embassy in Tokyo, it made brief evaluative comments about the more important members of the delegation and sent it to Washington.122 This was an attempt to assess how the delegates would fare confronted by the neutralists and communist sympathizers, of which Japan itself, at least from the American perspective, had plenty. Takasaki, it was noted, was ‘primarily a businessman and not [an] experienced diplomat’. Because he had ‘little knowledge of [the] major problems likely to arise at the conference’,123 it was felt that he ‘was likely to act as [a] figurehead’. A covering note attached to the list of delegates further recorded that Takasaki could ‘not . . . deal on equal terms with such men as Nehru or even Romulo or Prince Wan’. In other words, faced with Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic antics, Takasaki would not stand a chance. It also clearly meant that Takasaki could not be depended on to defend the interests of the US. On the whole, the Japanese representatives were found to be ‘not as strong a delegation’ as ‘Japan could have sent’. Nevertheless, the delegation was perceived as ‘. . . generally competent’. The staff might have been able, but the fact that it did ‘not include any of the top men in the Foreign Office Asian Bureau’ was perceived as a serious weakness. Yet, the telegram contained a message that the State Department would have found, perhaps, reassuring, which was that any view of the representatives from the political parties ‘will reflect their personal biases and should not be interpreted as official views of the Japanese Government’. The views expressed by the representatives of the socialist parties should, therefore, not be taken to heart, so to speak. The comments about the other principal members of the delegation are equally instructive and interesting. Tani was referred to as an ‘experienced diplomat’ and perceived as the one who ‘will probably make [the] decisions for the delegation’. He was also referred to as a ‘close friend of Shigemitsu’, and seen as likely to ‘be cooperative in dealings he may have with US representatives’. Kase Toshikazu had, apparently, recently been given the post of an ambassador in preparation for attending the conference. The biographical résumé on him noted that he was a Harvard graduate with fluent English. He was also the principal confidant of Shigemitsu, although ambitious and vain. Accordingly, he ‘might not be above twisting facts or manipulating situations to suit his own interests’. Ota Saburo was the current Japanese Ambassador to Burma and a career diplomat. He apparently left MOFA in 1947 to serve as Mayor of Yokosuka; as a result, he was active in domestic political circles. Another principal member of the delegation, Wajima Eiji, was formerly head of the Asian Affairs Bureau of MOFA but, at the time of the conference, had been posted to Indonesia as ambassador and was seemingly well known and AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 99 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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liked by the staff at the American Embassy in Jakarta. Asakai Koichiro was the last of the prominent delegates commented on. He was said to be an able diplomat who was then the head of the Economic Bureau of MOFA. Like Wajima, he had good English and was ‘generally cooperative’. With or without a strong delegation, Japan had its own agenda for attending the conference. The Japanese reactions to US expectations of how Japan should conduct itself with regard to the talks are interesting. Apart from noting that Ozawa did ‘not mention any Japanese plans for bilateral discussion[s]’124 with the countries that Dulles mentioned in an earlier telegram, the telegram also alluded to another problem regarding Japan. It was observed that Japan was reluctant to have its delegation join Turkey to make a proposal for a discussion about Formosa. Nor was it in favour of joining Pakistan to make laudatory statements about SEATO, as recommended by Dulles. Ozawa had apparently told Allison that it would be tactically wrong and therefore inadvisable for Japan to make comments about SEATO because ‘Japan was not geographically part of South East Asia and therefore not covered by the Manila Pact.’125 MOFA also informed Allison that on the question of the two Chinas, Shigemitsu ‘was anxious to push hard’ on settling the conflict peacefully. This was a confirmation that Japan was determined to avoid all situations of conflict at the conference. In other words, Tokyo would not be the carrier of any belligerent policies. In any event, Allison formed the impression that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘now seems to be coming to [the] view that [the conference] will be on balance [a] useful meeting – particularly if Japan can avoid committing herself on controversial questions’, as they planned to.126 Ozawa had informed him that the conference would be useful to Japan in establishing top-level contacts with the other countries in the area. It would also help Tokyo to ascertain, as Ozawa thought, ‘what the countries in the region . . . [thought] about Japan’. Invariably, the question of trading with others in the region also needed assessment and the talks would provide Tokyo with the opportunity to do so. On security issues as well, Ozawa felt the gathering would provide Tokyo with an insight into the views held in the region, particularly in relation to the Formosa problem. All the same, consultations between the American Embassy in Tokyo and MOFA continued as planned. On 14 April, the two groups met again, for the seventh time, to discuss the conference.127 At that meeting, Ozawa informed Allison about some of Takasaki’s anxieties concerning the delegation he would be leading. Takasaki was apparently worried that the Diet members (party representatives) might prove ‘troublesome at [the conference] since they might take [a] position [different] from that of the delegation’. The chief delegate was, therefore, ‘anxious to exercise control over [the] Diet men during the conference’. The problem was that Takasaki was not sure ‘how he could do so’. That could not have been too surprising to the officials of the State Department. What might have bothered them a little was the fact that they had been given the assurance by Ambassador Allison that the views of the political representatives AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 100 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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would have no bearing on the Japanese Government’s position. The assumption had been that the views of the politicians would merely represent their personal biases. What had somehow become apparent by now (through Takasaki’s concerns) was that, whether their views would carry any weight or not, the Diet members, especially the socialists – Sone Eki (of the right of the Social Democratic Party, SDP) and Sata Tadataka (of the left) – could be a nuisance. Suffice to say, it had become apparent that, in all likelihood, these representatives (who were officially designated as ‘political advisers’) were not going to ‘serve primarily as observers who will watch the proceedings of the conference and report back to their individual parties the final results’,128 as predicted by Ambassador Allison. In fact, five of the Diet members had a two-hour meeting with Zhou Enlai during which Zhou is said to have asked them to transmit his views directly to Hatoyama and Shigemitsu. Apparently, the Chinese Premier ‘found Takasaki too taciturn’.129 The seventh consultation meeting between the embassy and MOFA also revealed what seemed to be crucial changes in the Japanese attitude to the conference. These were, incidentally, favourable to the US. It was revealed that Japan would seek:

(1) For the avoidance of the formation of an Asian-Africa bloc (because all important matters to the region are of world-wide concern and not limited to any particular geographical area); and (2) To replace the Five Principles with a ‘Peace Declaration’ phrased to reﬂect the framework of the United Nations Charter.

The idea was to make the objectives of the conference identical to those of the UN;130 and linking the conference to the UN was part of Japan’s attempt to make the event less intimidating to the European countries and the US.131 In addition, Ozawa also intimated that Japan desired to always side with the aligned group of states at Bandung. The Japanese delegates might, therefore, have consultations with the delegates from Pakistan, and were prepared to discuss procedures and positions with delegates from Thailand, Turkey and the Philippines, as Dulles expected. At a meeting with Tani, Ambassador Allison was given further assurances of Japan’s intention to cooperate with the US, and to pursue a peaceful resolution of the problems in East Asia.132 Ozawa also informed him that the MOFA had ‘studied carefully records of the behaviour and tactics of [the Peking] delegation at the Geneva conference’ where they were, apparently, at their best. That had been necessitated by, it seems, a determination on the part of Japan to try and counter Chinese inﬂuence at the conference. Consequently, Allison started to express satisfaction with Japan’s preparations for Bandung. These positive signals to America notwithstanding, the overall Japanese strategy, as intimated by Ozawa as head of the ministry’s Working Group, remained unchanged; it was simply that Japan should ‘refrain from taking a positive stand on delicate issues’.133 That was a more simple rendition of Shigemitsu’s AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 101 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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recommendation for ‘a soft, non-controversial tone . . . even in response to communist propaganda’.134 If Japan stuck by that approach then the chances that it would even attempt to rebut Chinese inﬂuences at the conference were nil.

AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE JAPANESE PERFORMANCE AT THE CONFERENCE Tani returned from the talks believing that Japan ‘did not do badly’.135 That, incidentally, is open to interpretation. As discussed above, the Japanese wanted to leave the conference feeling untroubled about anything, and were determined to keep a low proﬁle. In his capacity as the chief informant to the US Embassy upon returning to Tokyo, Tani duly informed Allison of what was supposedly his great achievement. Apparently a second meeting which was scheduled between Takasaki and Zhou Enlai upon the latter’s request, was cancelled by Takasaki. In an act of self-adulation, Tani claimed that he advised against it. The expectation was that the Americans would be immensely grateful. Evidently Tani, or perhaps MOFA, was attempting a form of damage limitation in regard to Japan’s reputation with the US. At the very least, it was an attempt to appease the US and dispel any American misgivings about Tokyo’s performance at the conference. The State Department picked up on this rather mediocre attempt at appeasement, which to US observers was moot, at best. Thus, as one of its memoranda noted, the Japanese ‘most profusely explained away the “coincidence” of Takasaki and Chou being seated beside each other for a photograph’.136 In addition, the Operations Coordinating Board were dismayed that137 ‘the Japanese failed to submit the so-called ‘Bandung peace declaration’ which included a strong statement that ‘the Afro-Asian countries would “desist from resort, or threat of force” under any circumstances’. There was clear disappointment with this aspect of the Japanese behaviour: ‘Because we did not realize that the Japanese were not submitting this declaration until too late, we were unable to take action.’ Apparently other ‘friendly delegations which had been interested in the resolution found themselves in similar situations’. Consequently, the department was not in the least impressed, and when it came to distributing ‘medals’ to the defenders of American interests at the conference, Japan was singled out. The Assistant Secretary of State wrote, rather matter-of-factly:138

The Secretary of State intends to call in the Ambassadors of certain countries, primarily those which were particularly friendly toward the United States at the Asian-African Conference, to express satisfaction and elicit any comments they may want to make regarding the outcome of the conference. [The] FE (Far Eastern) Department has not recommended that Ambassador Iguchi be included among those to be called in since we do not consider that Japan’s role at the conference was positive enough to warrant a special expression. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 102 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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With regard to the Phillipines, on the other hand, it was suggested that the Secretary of State should see General Romulo personally and ‘compliment him on his vigorous advocacy of free world principles and effective exposition of the subversive tactics of world communism’. It was also to be noted that he ‘helped to channel the activities of anti-communist representatives into constructive channels’.139 As planned, the Secretary of State met with General Romulo and showered him with praise.140 It was also decided that ‘laudatory statements from the Secretary in quotes’ would be transmitted by the ambassadors in Manila and Bangkok to their respective governments. If not, the ambassadors should use their own discretion and should ‘convey orally to Prince Wan [of Thailand] and Romulo an expression of appreciation’. Interestingly, though not too surprisingly, no such laudatory statement was to be sent to either Mohammed Ali or Sir John Kotelawala.141 Yet the ambassadors of Pakistan and Ceylon to Washington were among those invited by the Secretary of State. With respect to Japan, diplomatic etiquette still demanded that ‘despite the rather insignificant Japanese contribution at the conference . . . an informal word of appreciation’, in view of the cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the American Embassy in Tokyo, would be in order.142 In any case, expressed in terms of Olympic medals, Japan did not qualify for even a bronze for its performance at the conference as far as the US was concerned. What cannot be denied is that, by keeping what amounted to a low profile and ruffling no feathers – by pursuing what amounts to ‘a Reticent Foreign Policy’ – the Japanese delegation offended no one with its ‘strategic non-participation’. Invariably, that behaviour was perceived as intro- verted and self-serving by the Americans, although it was expected.

THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE The Final Communiqué of the event was an all-embracing proclamation to persevere with the positive political and economic aspirations of the Asian and African peoples. It further afﬁrmed that the peoples of the region had no intention of ‘precluding either the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital’. In fact, the communiqué applauded the usefulness of the assistance, ‘through international or under regional bilateral arrangements’, that some of the participating countries had received towards the implementation of their development programmes. Its emphasis on the need for all states to cooperate with the United Nations to ensure world peace was also clear, and was placed without undermining the need for the total eradication of colonialism and racism. The President of the US, Eisenhower, noted this even in the statement on 27 April in response to the overall proceedings of the conference, which ended on 24 April. The President’s statement was, without doubt, a reﬂec- tion of the State Department’s obvious satisfaction with the outcome of the conference. But behind every positive Cold War statement lurked a AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 103 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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cautious attitude. Consequently, the President’s statement also included a message to the PRC and its friends.

If the communists, who also subscribed to the communiqué, could be counted upon to carry out the spirit of its provisions, the major existing threat to peace would be removed and the world could look to the future with far greater conﬁdence.143

Coming from the leader of a country that had supposedly turned down a proposal for a peaceful settlement to potential military confrontation, the President’s message sounded rather disingenuous. Whether Zhou Enlai’s offer was genuine or not is beside the point; the US simply made no effort to embrace the proposal, nor even to call his bluff. But then the administration had to look over its shoulder constantly in order not to call down the wrath of the right-wing conservatives in Congress, according to Brands. He argues that the ‘. . . sensitivities of Congress placed upon [the administration’s] dealings with the third world’144 demanded that the right are placated with bombastic pronouncements against the perceived enemies. All the same, even for the US, the conference produced some refreshing outcomes. Contrary to his earlier protestations, by the end of the conference, Mr Dulles had become seemingly converted to the cause of the Bandung nations and sounded quite reverential in his comments about the outcome of the talks. He thought that, in the main, the participants at Bandung adopted ‘a fine lot of resolutions’. He was also, as he noted, encouraged by the ‘. . . evidence of hope and faith of the Asian nations in the United Nations’. Incidentally, he was contrasting this outcome ‘. . . with the misgivings of some Western nations’ about the international body. The opportunity to wag a finger at China could not be missed, however. Thus, he insisted that the conference had served the good purpose of making China realize that it ‘could not take Formosa by force and that to do so would antagonize the good will of the free Asian countries’. He hoped that the ‘. . . Bandung Conference would result in a more peaceful attitude on the part of [China]’. Finally, notwithstanding his earlier objections and anxieties, he rather confidently proclaimed that ‘he had always had faith that the Bandung Conference would serve a useful purpose’.145 Dulles, in his public comments about the conference, had started to take on the aura of a man who had escaped his worst nightmare, and was justifiably pleased with himself. Assessments of the outcome of the event by the State Department bordered on proclamations of triumph. As was noted in one memorandum, ‘Departmental, public, and friendly nation estimates tend to view the general results as potentially favourable to the United States’ objectives in the area and in relation to most of the separate countries.’146 Regarding specific events, a previous memorandum glorified General Romulo for how he ‘very cleverly [took] Nehru apart and [set] forth AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 104 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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the fundamental truths about international communism’. The same memorandum referred the president, to whom it was addressed, to the ‘extremely useful and interesting material and passages which from time to time might be useful to quote as coming from an Asian’. The Asian in question was indeed Romulo. The issue of Nehru’s ‘impotence’ at the gathering was naturally a source of excitement and elation for certain members of the United States Government. The inaction of the Soviet Union was also a source of some jubilation. Thus, the memorandum implicitly revels in the rash of accusations that were levelled at the Soviet Union and how no one, not even Zhou Enlai, rebutted those charges.147 On this point, Dulles felt that Zhou Enlai chose not to defend the Soviet Union because he wanted to make capital for himself and Peking. Zhou’s quietness was devised, Dulles seemed to argue,148 to establish ‘Chinese leadership and influence in Asia and encouragement of faith in the feasibility of peaceful coexistence with Communist China’. Interestingly, such triumphalist assumptions invited some sober, if critical, comments from other offices in the department, revealing signs of contention between some of the government departments. A memorandum by J. Jefferson Jones III (SOA), for example, dismisses comments about Nehru’s failure at the conference as premature. It states: ‘we have noted from material originating in other offices of the department an inclination to rush to the conclusion that Nehru lost face at Bandung as a result of the ‘failure’ of some of his manoeuvres. SOA does not consider that we are yet in a position to make such a definite determination.’ The reason, which was eminently objective, was given as follows: ‘Our sources of information on the conference and its outcome have been primarily American newspaper [reporters] or pro-Western participants in the conference and, therefore, it is entirely possible that some of this information is either biased, distorted, or based on wishful thinking.’ Jones’ memorandum further claims: ‘Our ignorance of what transpired at the tête-à-têtes between Nehru and other delegations inhibits our evaluation.’ It concludes by stating, correctly it would seem, that: ‘we have the feeling that any loss of stature suffered by Nehru was suffered in the countries west of Suez, particularly in Europe and the United States where any apparent “defeat” of Nehru is frequently viewed with a certain amount of whimsical satisfaction’.149 Not only was Jones exposing the premature sense of schadenfreude circulating in the offices of the Northeast Asian Department, but also he was alerting them to the possibility that some of the information they had collected about the conference might be incorrect. Effectively, he was saying that it was not yet time to arrive at any firm conclusions about the gathering: it was work in progress and therefore nothing could be taken for granted yet. Obviously, certain officials within the State Department were, at the very least, trying to suspend judgement on the outcome of the conference until such a time that all the facts were available for a proper assessment of the situation. The attempt to control the self-indulgent attitude of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 105 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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some of the staff of the department with regards to the conference is also clear. The above comments notwithstanding, the preliminary report on the results of the conference was that on the whole the conference had been favourable to the interests of the United States. Interestingly, Nehru was given some credit for this outcome; and for steering the talks away from controversial issues. The report notes in particular that: ‘Chou En-lai acted at all times in harmony with Nehru’s concept of the conference and refused to quarrel with the strongly worded anti-communist statement of Sir John Kotelawala and Mohammed Ali.’150 It further affirms that: ‘Chou En-lai’s air of moderation, reasonableness and earnest desire to avoid altercation clearly met with Nehru’s approval and contrasted with the behaviour of the less manageable leaders of the other delegations.’ It is intriguing that Zhou Enlai and Nehru are praised for good behaviour; and interesting that the State Department finally saw in Zhou, the archenemy, a flicker of hope for peace. The so-called ‘less manageable leaders’ were, on the other hand, friends of the US, Kotelawala and Ali. Before the conference they were dismissed as lacking leadership qualities and therefore incapable of standing up to either Zhou Enlai or Nehru. It is interesting that the two leaders were being criticized again, this time for doing exactly what they were supposedly incapable of doing, that is, asserting their pro-Western credentials in defence of the US. On careful reflection, however, one might say that although the performances of Mr Ali and Sir John Kotelawala were laudable, their methods fell well below the standards of gentle diplomacy, the kind that was perfectly exe- cuted by Zhou Enlai. That was perhaps one reason why their performance had not been appreciated as much. Ultimately, the department came to assume a more objective stance on the outcome of the conference, as reflected in a circular of 2 May.151 Entitled, ‘Preliminary Evaluation of Results of Asian-African Conference’, it itemizes the most significant features of the talks. Inevitably, it states that ‘the most gratifying aspect of the conference (from our point of view) was the vigorous and effective manner in which the free world position was set forth and defended by certain of the anti-communist and non- communist delegations’. As noted above, however, Japan was not mentioned as one of the countries that defended the ‘free world position’. Ceylon and Pakistan are, of course, mentioned. Despite the crass performance of their prime ministers, at least they tried. The assumption was that the ‘outspoken espousal of the free world position . . . may have had a sobering effect’ on Zhou Enlai and Nehru. Yet the circular, which is signed by Dulles, also admits that Zhou was famously terse and erudite at the conference. It also seems to acknow- ledge that what Dulles had previously perceived as negative charisma on the part of the Chinese Premier turned out, instead, to be viewed as positive. There was, however, an element of unease about Zhou’s performance. The circular states that ‘Chou Enlai rolling with the punch, may have succeeded to a significant degree in persuading other delegations of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 106 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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the peaceful nature of Peiping’s intentions and consequently of the feasibility of “living together in peace” with Communist China, while at the same time enhancing his own personal prestige as an Asian statesman.’ Of course, Dulles was uncomfortable with this outcome, especially when some of America’s own friends were won over by the Chinese Premier’s demeanour and forthrightness. Nevertheless, the circular admits that: ‘whatever his intentions may have been, it appears that Chou’s conduct at Bandung may have had the effect of bringing about a change of climate in the Cold War characterized by renewed hope in the possibility of avoiding a shooting war, a change which might in fact prove to make any breach of the peace more difficult’. These complimentary comments about Nehru and Zhou were, of course, for internal purposes only. Also significant in that preliminary evaluation was the admission that the conference ‘would appear to have resulted in a marked enhancement on the part of the participating nations of their own self-esteem as Asians and Africans’. That this was ‘not for the most part in a context unfriendly to the Western and white nations’ was also noted. The Secretary of State also saw the general tone of the Final Communiqué of the conference as being ‘in general favourable to the free world position’. Satisfaction was also expressed about the ‘submergence of the Chou-Nehru “Five Principles”, heretofore a major weapon in the communist propaganda arsenal, in a new set of Ten Peace Principles’.152 The State Department, therefore, felt that the ghost of the Asian threat could, at least, be put to rest, and was confident once again that its friends would defend the interests of the West against communism. The ambivalence about Zhou’s role at Bandung nevertheless persisted within the department and remained, incidentally, one of the points of contention between the US and Britain. The British were, singularly, of the view that ‘Chou scored a great victory’.153 To the Americans, victory was on their side, and National Security demanded safeguarding the gains. Thus, a memorandum was circulated on 3 May about suspected ‘readjustments’ in the PRC’s foreign policy. The ‘readjustments’ were ‘apparently designed to overcome some of the “deviations” which were involved in Zhou Enlai’s adherence to the Bandung communiqué’. From the point of view of the State Department, China was trying to resurrect the ‘Five Principles’ that had been replaced by the ten principles. Thus, it argued that China was ‘conveniently for- getting the ten principles’ that were adopted at the conference and which it, during its moments of high propaganda, supported. While ‘the implications of this apparent snapping back of the Chinese Communist line to its pre-Bandung direction are not yet clear’ the memorandum predicted that ‘the attitude of Communist China in any negotiations that may grow out of Zhou Enlai’s Bandung proposal will be as close or closer to the standard, tougher position than to the attitude of reasonableness displayed by Zhou at Bandung’.154 Effectively, the State Department perceived China in the post-Bandung period as attempting to renege on the immaculate promises Zhou had made at the conference. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 107 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Nevertheless, during a conversation between ofﬁcials of the State Department and British Embassy staff, ‘it was agreed . . . that Chou’s tactics had placed the Chinese Communists in a position from which it would be difﬁcult, in the face of public opinion, to withdraw’. They were, perhaps, being too optimistic, if not selective in their assessment of the situation. If public opinion really mattered to the State Department, as one is tempted to surmise, then maybe the US would have made attempts to meet Zhou Enlai at least half-way in his peace gesture. Conversely, if the US policymakers did not care about world public opinion, why should the Chinese care? Better still, why did the Americans think that the Chinese would care? It is, however, conceivable that perhaps the US felt that China owed more to the Bandung group,155 and to Nehru in particular, to deviate from its public announcements at the conference.

CONCLUSION The Afro-Asian Conference, not to mention the process leading to it, was a damnable itch in the side of the US until the event ended. As is evident enough, it evinced and exaggerated US anxieties about the Cold War in Asia, in part because it confronted Washington with the trauma of possibly losing its allies and friends in the region. For example, it was widely believed in the State Department that pan-Asianism was working hand- in-glove with neutralism, and that the latter was only one step behind communism. This sharpened the Secretary of State’s neurosis about the conference. Thus, as Dulles confessed, he felt depressed about the evolving turn of events in the area. That Washington initially did not want its friends to attend the talks is obvious enough. When it became apparent that it could not prevent some of its friends from attending, and having considered the potential dangers of not being represented at all at Bandung, it took the alternative strategy – a U-turn. The revised position was that its friends may attend the conference but should do so with the best possible delegation and after consultation with Washington. Invariably, that necessitated the State Department’s frantic search for a strong and capable leader for the pro-American countries that would attend the event. The overall strategy was to ﬁnd someone who could stand up to Zhou Enlai and Nehru. Zhou Enlai was the embodiment of the communist threat at the conference. Washington was, therefore, determined to match him with someone who would be able to challenge and undermine his charisma. This caused a great deal of anxiety within the department, and produced some disparaging comments about the prime ministers of Pakistan and Ceylon, who were thought to lack the qualities expected of such a leader. In the end, Zhou’s performance at the conference, his geniality and sense of moderation, created ‘a considerable variation in the views held by different sections in the [State] Department’.156 There is no doubt that Zhou, as demonstrated above, out-staged Washington by turning diplomacy on AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 108 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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its head, so to speak, while his offer to settle the Formosa problem ami- cably caused a stir within the department. Dulles’s response was cold. The reaction to that, even from the friends of the US, was one of total disappointment. Despite its earlier protestations, the overall US assessment of the conference was a positive one. According to one observer, ‘the official line endeavour[ed] to give a balanced consensus between the extremes of those who think Bandung was an unqualified success for the United States and those who class it as an unqualified success for Zhou Enlai’.157 Ultimately, however, the State Department saw the moderate tone of the Bandung communiqué as a victory for the West, which it attributed to the outspoken espousal of the cause of the West by its friends (especially Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand, Ceylon and the Philippines). The indications are that the State Department became almost reverential about the outcome of the conference and complimented some of its friends, in particular General Romulo, for ‘the good work’. The overall view within the department, however, was that Japan’s contribution in that regard was almost negligible.158 In fact, as shown above, Japan was a source of concern for the State Department, not least because there was an awareness of Japan’s ‘neutralist sentiments’. It was also noted that the desire on the part of Tokyo to regain a leadership role in Asia was enough to make Japan adopt a non-active posture at the talks.159 It was thought that in particular Japan would steer clear of all controversial matters. Indeed, MOFA had made it clear to Ambassador Allison that Japan would not be drawn on issues relating to Formosa or SEATO. Tokyo was, therefore, determined to avoid being the carrier of belligerent US policies towards the conference. Japan’s burning desire for independence from US encroachment on its foreign policy was also noted by the State Department. Tokyo’s role at the conference was not deemed positive enough for any medal. Nevertheless, an informal word of appreciation for Tokyo’s ‘cooperative attitude’ prior to the conference was duly expressed in the footnotes, as it were. In the words of the State Department:

The United States appreciates the opportunities afforded by the Japanese Government for a very useful exchange of ideas prior to the Bandung Conference . . .We were gratified to note certain similarities between ideas expressed by the Japanese to our Embassy at Tokyo prior to the conference and the final communiqué issued at the close of the conference, and we assume that Japanese influence was responsible to some degree for the rather moderate tone of the final communiqué.160

The comments were designed to keep Japan content within the alliance. After all, Tokyo was Washington’s most important ally in East Asia and therefore strategically crucial. On balance, the US believed that the conference brought about a greater self-esteem among the participants as African and Asian countries, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 109 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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although not necessarily at the expense of the US. This was partly because of the moderate tone of the Final Communiqué,161 which:

(a) Emphasized the importance of the United Nations and its principles; (b) Acknowledged the right to individual and collective self-defence in terms of the United Nations Charter, and its implied approval of NATO and the Manila Treaty; (c) Appealed for the renunciation of the threat or use of force, and to settle disputes by peaceful means; (d) Linked the banning of nuclear weapons to the broader question of universal disarmament, and its reference to the need for international controls; (e) Endorsed the initiative by the powers concerned (by inference, the United States) in making proposals for the peaceful use of atomic energy, and its encouragement to participating governments to avail themselves of the training and other facilities offered; (f) Emphasized the importance of extra-regional cooperation, both economic and cultural, and particularly its acknowledgement of the value of economic aid and capital investment from outside the Afro- Asian area; (g) Listed seven countries excluded from the United Nations by the Soviet Union as qualiﬁed for admission, and excluded from this list of Soviet-sponsored countries; (h) Submerged the ﬁve principles of Chou and Nehru, hitherto a major weapon in the communist propaganda arsenal, into a new set of ten more satisfactory principles.

These did not detract attention from the lyrical but powerful performance of Zhou Enlai at the conference. His attempts to facilitate a political settlement over Formosa certainly unnerved Dulles and the State Department, simply because it made China acceptable to the Asian countries. That invariably evoked the menace of pan-Asianism and neutralism in the minds of US policymakers. There was, nevertheless, some consolation for the US despite Zhou Enlai’s dominance of the talks. The popular conception was that whatever his intentions, Zhou’s conduct at Bandung may have led towards a change in the climate of the Cold War. He had affected it with renewed hope for a peaceful settlement of the situation, and he was to be held hostage to it. It was assumed that he had placed China in a position where any breach of the peace by Peking would be more difﬁcult, but that was being overly optimistic.

NOTES 1 H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 9. 2 Ibid. p. 9. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 110 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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3 Department of State, 5 February 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 4 ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, Minutes of a Meeting in the Secretary of State’s office (at 12:00 pm), 27 January 1955, Ibid. 5 Department of State, 5 February 1955, Ibid. 6 ‘US Asian Policy and Communist China’, 4 January 1955, Ibid. 7 Department of State Memorandum, 3 January 1955, Ibid. 8 Views of General Romulo on Afro-Asian Conference and Pacific Pact, 3 January 1955, Ibid. 9 Department of State Memorandum, 14 January 1955, Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, pp. 223–303. 12 Department of State Memorandum, 14 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 111. 16 Department of State Memorandum, 14 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 17 Department of State, Circular No. 351, 17 January 1955, Ibid. 18 Department of State Memorandum, 14 January 1955, Ibid. 19 Hugh S. Cumming (ambassador in Indonesia) to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1046), 2 January 1955, Ibid. Robert J. McMahon’s comments about Hugh S. Cumming’s, Jr., period as ambassador to Jakarta is insightful. See McMahon, Robert J., ‘ “The Point of No Return”: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953–1960’, in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006, especially, pp. 78–87. 20 Kennedy (New Delhi) to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 915), 5 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 21 Cumming to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1046), 2 January 1955, Ibid. 22 Walter P. McConaughy to Robertson (FE), ‘Communist China and the Bandung Conference’, 1 April 1955, Ibid. 23 Cumming to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1046), 1 January 1955, Ibid. 24 Quoted in Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 311. 25 Minutes by A.A.W. Landymore, 26 January 1955. FO 371/116976. 26 Crowe (in Colombo) to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 204), 4 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 27 Crowe (in Colombo) to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 214), 7 January 1955, Ibid. 28 Memorandum of Conversation between First Secretary of US Embassy (Karachi) and M.S.A. Baig, 19 January 1955, Ibid. 29 From Karachi to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 976 [6 p.m.]), 19 January 1955, Ibid. 30 From Karachi to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1320), 26 March 1955. Ibid. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 111 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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31 US Embassy (Colombo), Discussion with Ceylonese Ofﬁcials: The African- Asian Conference to be Held at Bandung, Indonesia on 1 April 1955, Ibid. 32 From Colombo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 204), 4 January 1955, Ibid. 33 Memorandum of Conversation between Nicholas G. Thacher and Mr Syed Amjad Ali (ambassador of Pakistan), 11 January 1955, Ibid. 34 Dulles to US Embassy (London), 8 January 1955, Ibid. 35 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 244. 36 Dulles to American Embassy (London), 8 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 37 Dulles to US Embassy (Ankara), 20 January 1955, Ibid. 38 Telegram No. 2023, 1 February 1955. Ibid 39 William J. Sebald to the Secretary, 17 February 1955, Ibid; Memorandum by William S. B. Lacy, 18 February 1955, Ibid; Memorandum from Herbert Hoover Jr. to Mr Murphy (G), 25 February 1955, Ibid; See also Memorandum for the Record, 9 February 1955, Ibid. 40 From William J. Sebald to the Secretary of State, 17 February 1955, Ibid. 41 Archilles (in Paris) to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2953), 1 January 1955, Ibid. 42 Kennedy (in New Delhi) to the Secretary of State, 11 January 1955, Ibid. 43 Warren (in Ankara) to the Secretary of State, 13 January 1955, Ibid. Emphasis in the original document. 44 From Canberra to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 208), 11 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 45 Memorandum of Conversation involving William J. Sebald (FE) and Baron S.G.M. van Voorst to Voorst (minister, Embassy of the Netherlands), 11 January 1955, Ibid. 46 Memorandum from Walter S. Robertson (FE) to Murphy (G), 13 January 1955, Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Memorandum of Conversation, 20 January 1955, Ibid. 49 From State Department to Addis Ababa (Telegram No. 205), 28 January 1955, Ibid. 50 ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, Minutes of a Meeting in the Secretary of State’s ofﬁce (at 12:00pm), 25 January 1955, Ibid. 51 Steere (in Salisbury) to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 49), 5 January 1955, Ibid. 52 From the State Department to US Embassy (in London, and relevant embassies in Africa), 12 January 1955, Ibid. 53 Archilles (in Paris) to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2953), 1 January 1955, Ibid. 54 From the State Department to US Embassy in Monrovia (Telegram No. 91), 28 January 1955, Ibid. 55 Telegram 205, 28 January 1955, Ibid. 56 Memorandum from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Various Sections of the Department of State, 1 February 1955, Ibid. 57 R.P. Gilman to the Secretary of State, 8 February 1955, Ibid. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 112 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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58 Cary Fraser, ‘An American Delimma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955’ in Brenda Gayle Plummer (ed.), Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 129. 59 O.C. Morland to F.S. Tomlinson (South East Asia Department, Foreign Ofﬁce) 3 May 1955, Public Record Ofﬁce, FO 371/116984 [D2231/348]. 60 Circular No. 491, 25 February 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 61 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Pakistani Proposals for Conduct of Afro-Asian Conference’, 22 March 1955. Ibid. 62 Quoted in Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 71. 63 Memorandum for the President, ‘Appointment of ambassador of India and Mr V.K. Krishna Menon’, 15 March 1955’, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; see also From American Consulate General in Madras to the Department of State (Despatch No. 738), ‘Conversation with V.K. Krishna Menon’, 4 April 1955, Ibid; Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, pp. 100–104, 118–19. 64 From American Consulate General in Madras to the Department of State (Despatch No. 738), ‘Conversation with V.K. Krishna Menon’, 4 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 65 Dulles, ‘Memorandum for the President, The White House’, 14 March 1955, JFD Chronological Series, 1951–1951, Dulles papers (Eisenhower Library). Maneuverer: his word and spelling. 66 Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Malik and Henry S. Villard, 6 April 1955, Ibid. 67 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British ambassador, Sir Roger Making, 7 April 1955, Ibid. 68 To the Secretary of State, 15 April 1955, Ibid. 69 From Department of State to US Embassy in Djakarta (Telegram No. 1748), 18 April 1950, Ibid. 70 Telegram No. 1448. From US Embassy in Karachi to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1448), 8 April 1955, Ibid. 71 From US Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1758), 11 April 1955, Ibid; From US Embassy in Karachi to Department of State (Despatch No. 639), 12 April 1955, Ibid. 72 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism,p.111; Matthew Jones, ‘A “Segregated” Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1945–1955’, Diplomatic History, vol. 29, no. 5, November 2005, p. 851. 73 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Carlos P. Romulo, 14 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 74 ‘Report on Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO FO 371/116985. According to this report ‘Whether this was true or not, it was believed to be so in press circles, and was widely regarded as ridiculous.’ 75 From Djakarta to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1869), 18 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 113 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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76 See Appendix 4. 77 From Djakarta to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1869), 18 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 78 From the US Embassy in Colombo to Department of State (Despatch No. 505), 12 April 1955, Ibid. 79 From the US Consulate in Madras to Department of State, ‘South Indian Press Reaction to Bandung Conference’, 18 April 1955, Ibid. 80 From US Embassy in Djakarta to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1925), 20 April 1955, Ibid.; From Roy P. McNair to Dr H.S. Craig, ‘Evaluation of Afro- Asian Conference’ (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 2, Box 1, Operations Coordinating Board Central File Series, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961), 13 May 1955, p. 1. 81 From US Embassy in Djakarta to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2002), 23 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 82 Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 (English translation by Molly Bondan), Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981, pp. 149–52; Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1956, pp. 18–19. The carefully selected guests were the chief representatives of the five sponsoring countries, Zhou Enlai, General Romulo of the Philippines, and Prince Wan of Thailand. The meeting was apparently the brain-child of Sastroamidjojo who deliberately steered the dinner conversation towards the Taiwan problem so as to get Zhou to commit himself to what he has apparently said at one of the official meetings. 83 ‘Report on Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO, FO 371/116985. 84 Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung, pp. 18–19. 85 From Sebald (Far Eastern Department) to The Secretary of State, ‘Developments Over Week-End Relating to Chou en lai’s Negotiation Proposal’, 25 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 86 Department of State for the Press, No. 226, 23 April 1955, Ibid.; John Foster Dulles, ‘Memorandum for Governor Adams: Proposed Presidential Speech before the Bandung Conference’, (Eisenhower Library, JFD Chronological Series, Box No. 11, Dulles Papers, 1951–1959), 31 March 1955. 87 Sebald to the Secretary of State, ‘Developments Over Week-end Relating to Chou en lai’s Negotiation Proposal’, 25 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Groups 59. 88 Quoted in Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, p. 115. My emphasis. 89 ‘Report on Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO, FO 371/116985, p. 11. 90 Memorandum of Conversation Between the Secretary of State and General Romulo, 24 May 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 91 From American Embassy in Colombo to the Department of State, ‘Ceylonese Reporting and Notes and Comments on the Asian African Conference Held in Bandung. . .’ 28 April 1955, Ibid. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 114 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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92 From American Consulate in Madras to Department of State, ‘South Indian Press Reaction to Bandung Conference’, 28 April 1955, Ibid. 93 From Embassy in New Delhi to the Secretary of State, ‘Transmitting Nehru’s “Report on Bandung” ‘ (Despatch. No 1196), 2 May 1955, Ibid. 94 ‘Report on Asian-African Conference, Bandung’, Reports and Minutes of the Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO, FO 371/116985., p. 11. 95 From Roy P. McNair to Dr H.S. Craig ‘Evaluation of Afro-Asian Conference’ (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 2, Box 1, Operations Coordinating Board, Central File Series, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961), 13 May 1955, p. 1. 96 Rinden, R.W., ‘Nationalism in the Far East’ (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2, Planning Coordination Group Series, White House Office NSC Staff: Papers, 1945–1961), 1 July 1955. 97 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1596), 5 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 98 The elections were held in February. 99 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1597), 5 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 100 Ibid. 101 From the Department of State to the US Embassy in Tokyo (Telegram No. 1375), 8 January 1955, Ibid; From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 164), 18 January 1955, Ibid. 102 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1663), 12 January 1955, Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1778), 25 January 1955, Ibid. 105 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1781), 25 January 1955, Ibid. 106 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1778), 25 January 1955, Ibid. My emphasis. 107 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1782), 25 January 1955, Ibid. My emphasis. 108 Department of State Memorandum, 14 January 1955, Ibid. 109 Memorandum of Conversation at the Secretary of State’s office, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 25 January 1955, Ibid. My emphasis. 110 From the Department of State to the US Embassy in Tokyo, 15 February 1955, Ibid. 111 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2139), 3 March 1955, Ibid. 112 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Report, ‘Developments Relating to the Bandung Conference’, Intelligence Report, No. 6830.4, 1 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116982 [D2231/283/B],. p. 8. 113 Ibid. 114 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2218), 11 March 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. In: from US AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 115 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2358), 1 April 1955, Ibid., Allison reports that ‘Ozawa said Shigemitsu was anxious to push hard on item of settlement by peaceful means of all conﬂicts in this area and said that in carrying out this abstract idea to practical application, Shigemitsu was talking of two Chinas. According to Ozawa this was all Shigemitsu’s own idea and not rpt not inspired so far as he knew by anyone else.’ 115 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2218), 11 March 1955, Ibid. 116 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2288), 17 March 1955, Ibid. 117 From Department of State to the relevant American Embassies (Telegram No. 1409), 23 March 1955, Ibid. 118 Ibid. Emphasis in original document. 119 From US Embassy in Djakarta to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 1636), 29 March 1955, Ibid. 120 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2468), 1 April 1955, 2:07 am, Ibid. 121 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2486), 1 April 1955, 10:54 am, Ibid. 122 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State (Telegram No. 2575), 14 April 1955, Ibid. 123 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, ‘Composition of Japanese Delegation to Asian African Conference’, 14 April 1955, Ibid. 124 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2486), 1 April 1955, 10:54 am, Ibid. 125 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2468), 1 April 1955, 2:07 am, Ibid. 126 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2575), 8 April 1955, Ibid. 127 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2622), 14 April 1955, Ibid. 128 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State (Telegram No. 2575), 14 April 1955, Ibid. 129 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2761), 27 April 1955, Ibid. 130 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2627), 14 April 1955, Ibid. 131 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2218), 11 March 1955, Ibid. 132 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2627), 14 April 1955, Ibid. 133 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2575), 8 April 1955, Ibid. 134 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State (Telegram No. 2218), 11 March 1955, Ibid. 135 From US Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State (Telegram No. 2768), 28 April 1955, Ibid. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 116 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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136 Memorandum from Robertson (FE) to Young (PSA), ‘Asian-African Conference Developments’, 30 April 1955, Ibid. 137 ‘Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board: Bandung Conference of April, 1955, “Evaluation of Bandung Conference”‘, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 2, Box 2, Operations Coordinating Board Central File Series, White House Ofﬁce, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–1961), 12 May 1955, p. 1. 138 From W.J. Sebald [FE] to the Under Secretary, ‘Comment to Ambassador Iguchi re Asian-African Conference’, 2 May 1955, Lot File, 58–D–118. Emphasis added. 139 From W.J. Sebald to the Secretary of State, ‘Talks with Representatives of Governments which participated in the Asian-African Conference’, 28 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 140 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary of State and General Romulo, 24 May 1955, Ibid. It is worth noting at this stage that while the Philippine Government supported Romulo in his capacity as leader of the delegation, the local press was sceptical and indeed critical of the General and of his conferees. The press was of the view that the delegation was not truly representative of the Philippine Government. Romulo ‘was accused of being the spokesman for the United States’ and was referred to, ironically, as the ‘Voice of America’. Incidentally, Romulo was also bitterly disliked by many of the Philippine politicians who perceived him as a stooge of the US. As a result, they availed themselves of the opportunity to criticize the delegation. See From the British Embassy in Manila to the Foreign Ofﬁce (Southeast Asia Department), 16 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116981[D2231/281]. 141 Memorandum from Young to Sebald, ‘Proposed Action to Express Appreciation of Support [for] Free World Principles by Friends of the United States at Bandung, 21 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 142 From Sebald [FE] to the Under Secretary, ‘Comment to Ambassador Iguchi re Asian-African Conference’, 2 May 1955. Lot File, 58-D-118 143 Memorandum for Mr James Hagerty, 26 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 144 Brands, The Specter of Neutralism, pp. 317–18. 145 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Meeting with Delegates of Asian Town Hall Mission’, 27 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 146 From Robertson (PSA) to Mr Young (Far Eastern Department), 30 April 1955, Ibid; United States Government, ‘The Asian-African Conference’, Extension of Remarks of Hon. John W. McCormack of Massachusetts in the House of Representatives, Thursday, 12 May 1955, Congressional Record, Proceedings of Debates of the 84th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 101, Part 5, 5 May 1955 – 25 May 1955, pp. 6259–62. 147 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 28 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; From US Embassy in Djakarta to Secrtary of State (Telegram No. 2141), 5 May 1955, Ibid. 148 Telegram from the Department of State (signed by Dulles), 2 May 1955, Ibid. 149 Memorandum from Jones (SOA) to Allen (NEA), ‘Nehru’s Part in Bandung Conference’, 28 April 1955, Ibid. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 117 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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150 Memorandum from Young to Robertson, ‘Asian-African Conference Developments’, 30 April 1955, Ibid. 151 ‘Preliminary Evaluation of Results of Asian-African Conference’, 2 May 1955, Ibid. Emphasis in original document. 152 Ibid. 153 Memorandum of Conversation: ‘Exchange of Views on the Bandung Conference’, 11 May 1955, Ibid. 154 From David L. Osborn to Walter P. McConaughy, 3 May 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 155 Indeed Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic initiative at Bandung was designed to establish workable relations between China and its neighbours, especially the neutralists. See Kuo-kang Shao, ‘Chou En Lai’s Diplomatic Approach to Non-aligned States in Asia: 1953–60’, The China Quarterly, No. 78, 1979, pp. 328–32. 156 G.D.L. White to G. Crombie, ‘Asian-African Conference’: Memorandum for the Secretary of State of External Affairs, Wellington (by G.R. Laking of the New Zealand legation), 5 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116984 [D2231/321]. 157 Ibid. 158 Sebald to Under Secretary, ‘Comment to Ambassador Iguchi re Asian-African Conference’, 2 May 1955, Lot File, 58-D-118. 159 Rinden, R.W. ‘Nationalism in the Far East’ (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No.9, Bandung, Box 2, Planning Coordination Group Series, White House Ofﬁce NSC Staff: Papers, 1945–1961), 1 July 1955. 160 Sebald to Under Secretary, ‘Comment to Ambassador Iguchi re Asian-African Conference’, 2 May 1955, Lot File, 58-D-118. 161 G.D.L. White to G. Crombie, ‘Asian-African Conference’, 5 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116984 D2231/321]. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 118 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

3 Britain and Bandung: Whitehall’s Prognosis

s was the case with the US, Britain had premonitions about the poten- Atial dangers that the impending conference represented. Whitehall became particularly restless when it became obvious that African countries that were still partially under British rule would be invited to the talks. Thus intuitively, it ‘. . . tried to discourage the holding of [the] conference, but failed’.1 Consequently, W.J.M. Paterson (of the Foreign Ofﬁce) noted, in January 1955, that there were three problems, seemingly in order of importance, requiring decisions by the British Government as follows:

What should be (a) our attitude towards the invitations to be sent to the Gold Coast and the Central African Federation, for whose international relations we are responsible? (b) our attitude towards the invitations to be sent to the Sudan, for whose international relations we share responsibility with Egypt? (c) our general attitude towards the conference?

Not surprisingly, the question of the attendance of the African countries was of major concern to Whitehall and was, therefore, thoroughly examined by the Colonial Office (CO), the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) and the African Department of the Foreign Office (FO). The following account looks at, in the first instance, the complex responses of Whitehall to the Bandung Conference and its political ramifications especially in relation to the issue of decolonization in Africa. As such, the British reactions to the participation of the African countries and the Gold Coast in particular in the conference are extensively examined here. The position that Whitehall adopted on this question, on the whole, was that the British Government ‘should be consulted before any reply to invitations’2 extended to the Gold Coast was made. The issue of Japan’s participation in the conference is also considered, as are issues about the PRC-Formosa snafu and their relevance to the conference. The rest of the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 119 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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chapter concerns itself with the British assessment of the conference, including its potential consequences on the UK’s economic interests in Asia and Africa, which attracts extensive commentary. It is worth noting that the FO, CRO and the CO were primarily in charge of orchestrating Britain’s overall responses and attitude towards the event. Since attempts to discourage the holding of the conference had been unsuccessful, Paterson advised that: ‘it would be a mistake to continue our opposition now that it could do no good’. ‘In particular’, he noted, ‘it would be wrong to try to discourage foreign countries from attending’, since ‘the only countries likely to be influenced by us would be precisely those countries that might be expected to exert a favourable influence at the conference.’ Paterson then suggests that attempts should be made to ‘urge such friendly countries as may accept invitations to take a reasonable and constructive line at the conference . . . rather than merely to urge them to resist the adoption of anti-colonialist resolutions’. W.D. Allen3 (FO) concurred and added, ‘we should do our best to persuade the French and Americans to follow it also’. Paris assumed a similar disposition to the conference to that of Washington; both were concerned that: ‘if a good many African countries attend . . . the conference might prove to be the first step in a longer term plan on the part of Asia to assume increasing influence over the affairs of Africa with probably unfortunate results’. Effectively, the French Government was in favour of discouraging the African countries apart from Egypt, from attending. After all, Egypt ‘. . . might properly be regarded as an Arab rather than a purely African’ country.4 In an earlier letter, Allen had made clear to a French official the general view of the UK Government, which was that: ‘it would be better that all the intended participants should attend and that we should concentrate upon persuading those capable of doing so to exercise a moderating influence within the conference’.5 He believed the UK had a chance of influencing American thinking on the matter.6 By early January, therefore, Whitehall’s position seemed to have been that the reverse was not acceptable. According to Lord Reading,7 if Britain adopted the same negative attitude as the Americans ‘not only might the countries invited resent our influence’ but the countries organizing the conference ‘would most probably believe that we had been secretly lobbying against the conference’. It is important to note, however, that earlier Whitehall had been influenced by the American attitude ‘that took the line that the United States Government should not appear to be condemning the conference or encouraging those invited not to attend’. Emboldened by this, London had sent ‘. . . out suitable instructions on similar lines to British posts abroad’ in December 1954.8 In any event, as this discussion will further demonstrate, although both the United Kingdom and the US were opposed to what the conference represented, the two countries approached the conference differently. This was in part because their major concerns were different. The US’s immediate concern, it seemed, was the communist threat and its implications for US interests in Asia. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 120 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Britain was less disturbed by the spread of communism perhaps because it was convinced that the US would contain it. The British Government’s immediate concern pertained primarily to the threats to its remaining colonies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In that sense, the CRO saw the invitations to be extended to the Central African Federation (CAF) and Gold Coast, ‘for whose external relations [Britain] still retain[ed] responsibility’ as a ‘considerable embarrassment’.9 This was, in part, because the invitations would be sent directly to these countries against ‘the correct procedure’ which according to the CRO, was ‘for [the] invitation to be conveyed through [the] United Kingdom government’.10 Meanwhile, the CO was concerned that the prime minister of the Gold Coast’s ‘inclination would be to accept the invitation’. The temptation then was to attempt to dissuade Kwame Nkrumah from accepting.11 These issues, therefore, ‘. . . raised rather difﬁcult problems’ for the United Kingdom Government.12 We shall discuss the matter of the attendance of the Gold Coast and the Central African Republic in more depth in due course.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE FOR WHITEHALL On a more general level, the British High Commissioner in Jakarta noted that: ‘the fact that Communist China and North Vietnam are likely to achieve an international forum in Bandung, to which wide-scale international publicity will inevitably be given, is unfortunate’. He was, however, optimistic, like his American counterparts, that there was ‘no lack of effective counterweight in the invitation list’. He seemed convinced that: ‘if Asian communism [was] exposed and answered [to] by . . . the Afro-Asian anti-communists, [the] process may prove mutually salutary and educative to [the] latter’.13 The High Commissioner then afﬁrmed that on balance it would seem a mistake not to have the friends of the West at the conference because it would amount to leaving the ﬁeld to the communists. He therefore recommended that:

(a) In our publicity we give the conference a guarded welcome without any hint of patronage . . .; and (b) Whilst remaining in the background, we spare no effort to persuade key anti-communist countries to attend.

The High Commissioner noted that he had discussed his recommendations with his American counterpart, who was ‘in general agreement with them’. It is important to note here the general agreement between the FO and its missions as opposed to the differences in attitude held initially by the State Department on the one hand, and the US missions on the other, about the best possible approach to the conference. Also of importance were the evolving policies of the State Department. By 15 January, the State Department had assumed the position that the Asians and Arabs should not be dissuaded from attending the conference. On the other hand, it recommended that a different policy should AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 121 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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be pursued with respect to the African countries south of the Sahara. In both of these the British and American positions were very similar. They did, however, differ in their reasons for discouraging the African countries from attending the conference. The argument advanced by the State Department was that: ‘the black Africans [were] likely to be easier victims for communist propaganda’. It also felt that: ‘whereas a certain common feeling among the Asians and Arabs is already a reality, there is no inevitable link’ between Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.14 J.E. Cable (of the South East Asian Department of the FO) marvelled at why ‘the State Department should consider [“black Africans” as] more susceptible to communism than the unstable Arabs’. There was more that he felt confused about: ‘I am not sure whether all ‘black Africans do actually live South of the Sahara.’15 Despite these differences, Cable exhorted the FO to ‘welcome Anglo-US cooperation between our representatives in the various countries’. However, he warned against attempting to ‘coordinate the guidance given to [Her Majesty’s] representatives with that given by the State Department to their representatives abroad’.16 It was obvious to Cable that the relations between the FO and its missions abroad were different from those of the State Department and the American missions. The former were positive; the latter not necessarily so. The general consensus within Whitehall seemed to be that no attempt should be made to discourage those who would be invited from attending. As Cable argues, ‘If none of our friends go, the impression will be created that Asian and African countries are . . . in favour of Mr Nehru’s neutralism’ even if not sympathetic to communism. Thus, he recommended that ‘any delegate who can be expected to stand up to the Chinese and the Indians and to point out that colonialism is a dwindling menace, whereas communism is an ever growing one . . .’ should be encouraged to go.17 F.S. Tomlinson (FO) also afﬁrmed that if Britain opposed the conference and discouraged ‘all our friends to stay away, the conference would inevitably be dominated by China and India and its proceedings might well take a turn decidedly less acceptable to our views’. He further notes, rather poignantly, that: ‘Our opposition to the conference might reduce the numbers attending’,18 but the result would be:

(a) Some deterioration in the relations between Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) and the Colombo powers; and (b) A crop of resolutions denouncing colonialism, supporting neutralism and favouring communism that might create the impression that these were really the views of Asia and Africa.

All the same, as demonstrated later, the policy of not discouraging invitees from attending was used selectively. At any rate, on 27 January,19 Whitehall received conﬁrmation that the State Department had ﬁnally given US ambassadors in Asian and Arab countries the ‘discretion to express the opinion that attendance of friendly governments would, on AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 122 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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balance, be desirable and to suggest that they should send the strongest possible delegations’. The issue of the communist participation in the conference had certainly influenced the US towards the option of encouraging its friends to attend the talks. The potential communist and neutralist domination of the conference was also beginning to rankle with certain people within Whitehall. Consequently, a Japanese Embassy official in London was informed that it would be advantageous if ‘voices other than communist voices could be heard at the conference’, an indication that the British Government was keen for the Japanese to participate in it.20 It is worth pointing out that while the FO was anxious to follow every aspect of the event and its outcomes, as with the State Department it went to great lengths to conceal its interest in it, at least publicly.21 In the meantime, an interdepartmental meeting was held in the Foreign Office on 2 March ‘to consider the general lines of the guidance to be given to friendly governments sending representatives’.22 It was agreed at the meeting that, in attempting to influence foreign governments, Britain’s general objectives should be to:

(a) Prevent the adoption by the conference of any resolution advantageous to the communists or inimical to British interests; (b) Prevent the emergence from the conference of any more lasting Afro-Asian bloc; (c) Cause the maximum embarrassment to the communists.

The first point was clearly about preserving Britain’s colonial interests. As we have already shown, however, there was nothing to prevent the conference from questioning the justification of colonialism. Indeed, one of the primary aims of the talks was to ‘liberate’ existing colonies and to beat ‘imperialism in all of its manifestations’. Thus, on the specific question of how to counter the anti-colonialist upsurge within the ranks of the conference participants, Whitehall was aware that it would be an impossible task since it had no supporters on that issue among the participants. Thus, the CO’s representative advised against laying too much emphasis on the colonial question ‘in our approaches to foreign governments’. He felt that: ‘it would not necessarily be an advantage if the conference were to produce relatively moderate and responsible resolutions on colonialism, as these might exert more influence than something obviously extravagant’.23 Point (c) was, therefore, amended to read as follows: ‘to cause the maximum embarrassment to the communists by a realistic presentation of the facts’. On the question of how to approach individual foreign governments, it was agreed that these might be divided into four categories:

(a) Those to whom no approach whatever should be made – Afghanistan, China, Ethiopia, Vietminh [i.e. North Vietnam] and Yemen; (b) Those to whom any approach should be left to the French or Americans or to the discretion of HM Representatives: Cambodia, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 123 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Liberia (for the Americans), Nepal, Philippines (for the Americans), Syria (for the French), Saudi Arabia (for the Americans); (c) Those who should be given factual information, but to whom no special approach should be made: Burma, Indonesia, Egypt; (d) Those who should be both informed and persuaded: Commonwealth countries (to be left to the discretion of the high commissioners), Gold Coast, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Persia, Siam, Sudan, Turkey and Vietnam.

On 3 March, another meeting was held to further discuss the nature of the guidance to be given to UK missions. Again, only representatives of South East Asia Department (SEAD), Information Policy Department (IPD), Information and Research Department (IRD), Far Eastern Department (FED), Permanent Under Secretary Department (PUSD), the Colonial Office (CO) and the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) attended. The guidance to the missions was finally dispatched with a few amendments24 in three separate telegrams, the most important of which (for our purposes) was that Japan was moved from cate- gory (d) to (b). In essence, Japan was, thus, designated as a country that was best handled by the US. The instructions to the missions also stressed the need for ‘British and US representatives to work in close cooperation and exchange documents’.25 At the above meeting, Cable’s other telegram about ‘probable communist objectives at the conference’ was also discussed with the view to providing instructions as to how these might be countered. The following are the more specific objectives that the communists were expected to seek at the talks:

(a) Condemnation of the embargo on strategic exports to China and North Vietnam; (b) Endorsement of the ‘Five Principles of Peace’; (c) Support for their allegations that the US are violating the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China (with particular reference to the Manila Treaty and elections in Vietnam); (d) Support for the communist peace campaign and condemnation of nuclear weapons; (e) Anti-Western resolutions on colonialism and racialism; (f) Possible support for their claims on Formosa and a seat and membership of United Nations.

Cable26 had also warned that China would perhaps support proposals by other delegates to embarrass Britain. Furthermore, India’s brand of neutralism was mentioned as one of the ‘causes’ China might champion in its attempts to undermine British interests. In addition, as with the State Department, the meeting agreed that the PRC delegation could ‘seek to exploit the ignorance or indifference of other delegations by offering them support on secondary issues’. In view of that, the friends of the UK AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 124 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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who would be attending the conference were to be warned against bargaining with the ‘communists’. To counter these potential threats to British interests, a number of recommendations and points were made. For our purposes, we shall cite only three of these:27

(a) Other nations cannot reasonably be expected to export strategic goods to China while that country’s policy remains so bellicose and her armed forces so large; (b) Our friends might be encouraged to support any resolutions endors- ing the Five Principles, but to add the rider that these should be more strictly applied, (c) Anti-colonialism is likely to receive much attention at the conference and may well be the only subject on which delegates will agree.

On the question of the Five Principles (b), the position that was adopted was that ‘emphasis should be put on the importance of non-interference in the affairs of other countries’. This included subversion through local communist parties, as noted by the prime minister of Ceylon. With regard to the issue of anti-colonialism it was agreed that opposition to it must be de-emphasized, for the reasons already noted above. The recommendations further stated that:

(a) Our more trustworthy friends should be warned of any kind of Afro- Asian bloc designed to disrupt existing regional organizations; (b) Our friends should be urged to resist proposals that the conference should endorse controversial claims for extensions of sovereignty.

The issue of the ‘extensions of sovereignty’ concerned the weight placed by the neutralist countries on the question of national independence for the Asian states. To Britain, it smacked of Asian nationalism and was therefore perceived as a threat to British interests. Moreover Whitehall, like the State Department, was deeply anxious about the possibilities of an Afro-Asian bloc and the potential inﬂuence that a bloc such as that could have on international politics. Inevitably, it was also concerned about the possible impact of the bloc on the colonial issue, as well as on the problem of minority rule in South Africa. In attempting to counter what was perceived as the Chinese objectives, Whitehall was essentially seeking to temper the perceived ambitions of the conference. At the same time concern heightened about the possible repercussions on Britain if its efforts to steer the work of the conference became apparent to its organizers. A letter from the CRO therefore warned that China was ‘already alleging that it is the intention of the SEATO powers to attempt to wreck the Afro-Asian Conference’.28 Indeed, a telegram from the High Commissioner in Peking (No. 227, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 125 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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2 March) noted allegations made by China against the US and UK, one of which claimed that:

The United Kingdom is trying to maintain its colonial control in Asia by going along with the United States, but a contradiction exists between the two countries since the United States is taking advantage of British support in order to take over Britain’s colonial position in South East Asia.

In addition, Peking apparently alleged that if it was not for British support the United States would not have been so wanton in its aggression. If these allegations are correct, then China was attempting to pit the ideological soul mates against each other. Given the nature of these comments, the CRO warned that:

In view of the delicacy of Asian feelings, we are afraid that this Peking propaganda line might all too easily gain acceptance if, as a result of any activities of our own (or of our Allies) in seeking to steer the working of the conference on to constructive rather than destructive lines, it should become too obvious that we were trying to bring outside pressure to bear upon countries attending the conference and attempting to form a sort of bloc within the conference under Western inﬂuence.29

A great deal of discretion was therefore necessary, as the CRO’s letter noted, in endeavouring to manipulate the talks for ‘any such suspicion would have very unfortunate repercussions on our relations with the Colombo powers and especially with India’.30 As part of the plan to make the event organizers less suspicious of the UK, it was suggested that an attempt should be made to play down the importance of the convention. Thus, while the FO informed the Jakarta mission that: ‘there is a good deal of interest here in the Afro-Asian Conference . . .’, it instructed Ambassador Morland to stay clear of the talks ‘lest this should create an exaggerated impression of our interest in the conference or even suggest that we were attempting to exercise undue influence on its proceeds’. On the other hand, Morland was advised to send one of his staff to Bandung, ‘where he could pick up the gossip and make himself available should any of the friendly delegates want information or advice’.31 Regarding the issue of influencing the event behind the scenes, the British High Commissioner to Ceylon, Sir Cecil Syers, noted that he had met with Sir John Kotelawala on 15 April and had emphasized to him that the Chinese, with their crystallized ideas and definite objectives would:32

(a) Be quick to take advantage of [the] ignorance or indifference of other delegations; and (b) Undoubtedly take every opportunity to interpret even apparently innocent pronouncements as communist victory. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 126 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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In response, the Ceylonese Prime Minister apparently gave the high commissioner the assurance that ‘he intended to speak frankly’ at the conference; and also promised to ask Zhou Enlai ‘blunt questions’. For example, he intended to inquire from him why the communists support attempts to subvert his government, and raise questions about the colonial enclaves of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he aimed to raise the matter of Formosa, the ‘Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence’ and assail the Cominform. He backed up his intentions by handing Ambassador Syers, as he did with the State Department, a copy of the speech that he planned to deliver at the opening of the convention. He also subsequently sent him a draft of the speech he had planned to make on Formosa, the ‘Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence’, and on colonialism. Syers further observed that there was some conflict between the Ceylonese Prime Minister and Nehru. Interestingly, unlike the officials of the US mission in Ceylon, the British High Commissioner seemed to have a positive opinion of the Ceylonese Prime Minister, whom he thought was ‘taking [a] realistic view . . . of the conference’. Thus, as he intimated, ‘So far not so bad . . .’ Yet he also remained vaguely cautious: ‘. . . I must repeat that Kotelawala is unpredictable and liable to sudden changes of intention’. Subsequent to this, the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, confirmed that he had also seen the drafts of the three strongly and outspokenly anti-communist speeches to be delivered by Kotelawala. He apparently ‘urged him to be sure to deliver them’ in part because he felt that although Sir John ‘was full of good resolutions . . . he may weaken at Bandung’.33 The Commissioner-General further indicated that he had ‘talked with several of the other anti-communist delegation leaders . . . and encouraged them to be firm’ at the conference. He was optimistic that their actions would ‘put courage into men like Kotelawala’. It is evident from the above that between the Americans and the British an opinion, and not a very positive one, had certainly been formed about the Ceylonese Prime Minister, and perhaps incorrectly. Four days into the meeting, Ambassador Morland confirmed the ‘deep cleavage of views between delegations [that] has now come into the open’.34 These were in part because of the anti-communist sentiments that were expressed at the introductory session by some of the leaders of the anti-communist delegations, including Kotelawala. In any event, although the conflict between the PRC and Formosa was not part of the conference’s agenda, the issue reverberated in all policy-making circles, confirming the fact that the tensions among the conference participants were indeed partly a reflection of the tensions outside, between the two Cold War powers. We shall deal with the China-Formosa conflict and its relevance to the conference, as well as its effects on Anglo-American relations, more extensively later. For now let us turn our attention to the nig- gling and more immediate problem of the participation of the African countries in the conference. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 127 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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THE PROBLEM OF THE ATTENDANCE OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES The awareness within Whitehall that colonialism would be one of the major concerns of the conference created a flurry of excitement among British policymakers and in particular in the Colonial Office. It was clear to the British administrators that the colonial institution was not going to be given a standing ovation but a thorough condemnation. Consequently, the news that Central African Federation (CAF) and the Gold Coast would be invited to the conference unleashed a confluence of diplomatic foot- work, all designed to prevent these two countries from attending at Bandung. The CRO argued that the attendance ‘. . . of these two territories, for whose external relations we still retain responsibility, [will be a] considerable embarrassment’.35 The main grievance with this concerned what Whitehall perceived as a lack of proper protocol because ‘correct procedure would . . . be for [the] invitation to be conveyed through [the] United Kingdom Government’. Basically the CRO, as the CO, was anxious that the invitation was being sent directly to the governments of the two countries. While they were confident that G. Higgins (the prime minister of the CAF who was white) would turn down the invitation, they were deeply worried that Nkrumah’s inclination would be to accept the invitation. As a result the governments of these sub-Saharan countries were instructed by London to consult with the British Government if they should receive invitations to the conference directly from the sponsors. In relation to that, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Gorell Barnes, confirmed to Sir Charles Arden-Clarke (the Governor of the Gold Coast) the correct procedure to be followed, as stated above.36 Essentially, he instructed the governor to send the CO a copy of the invitation to Nkrumah, if he had access to it. With a copy of the invitation in hand, the issue would be formally submitted to the British Government for a ministerial decision. Gorell Barnes also thought ‘it would be useful for us to have an assessment of Nkrumah’s probable reaction’. Thus Barnes asked: If Nkrumah was in favour of attending the conference what ‘considerations [do] you think would be most likely to dissuade him from accepting’? Despite the anxiety, the prescribed Whitehall attitude was one of untrammelled aloofness, hence their statement: ‘We do not wish to appear too excited about this development.’ We shall further demonstrate that the United Kingdom was radically opposed to the attendance of the African countries for whose external relations it was responsible. However, the respective reasons why it did not want the CAF and the Gold Coast to attend were different. As would become more apparent, the Gold Coast was dissuaded from attending for fear that the neutralists, or worse still, the Chinese would negatively influence it. A communist influence on the Gold Coast would be too costly to British interests locally and in other parts of Africa. The reason for not wanting the CAF at the conference was far less complicated. It was specifically to protect the latter’s delegation from, as Whitehall apparently saw it, ridicule. G.H. Baxter37 felt that Nehru AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 128 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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was ‘double-faced’ and perceived his motives for inviting the CAF as under- handed, stating: ‘It is most likely that his motive is to pillory the Federation or drive it into an uncomfortable corner.’ J.E. Cable, on the other hand, saw the Pandit’s gesture as encouraging.38 G.H. Middleton (New Delhi) also found Nehru’s interest in having the CAF at the conference laudable.39 From Baxter’s point of view, however, ‘So far as one can conjecture the probable course of the conference, the Federal representative is likely to ﬁnd himself continuously in a most embarrassing situation – not only as a target for attacks, but as having to choose between assenting to, or dis- senting (possibly as a minority of one) from, nebulous resolutions ostensibly innocuous but carrying sinister connotations.’ Thus, he counted on Higgins to refuse to go in person if the Federation decided to accept the invitation. Additionally, he felt ‘[Higgins’s] deafness makes him inadequate to the demands of a large conference’. At the same time, Baxter did not want any ‘second-rater’ from the CAF to be sent to the conference since ‘that would increase the danger of incurring positive embarrassment’. Regarding the issue of the Gold Coast’s attendance, Arden-Clarke duly informed Gorell Barnes (on 8 January)40 that Nkrumah had given him the assurance that he had not received, as yet, a direct invitation. Nkrumah had also promised to consult him if such an invitation came to him. The Governor of the Gold Coast moreover intimated that Nkrumah’s ‘. . . preliminary reaction [was] that he would not wish to attend [the conference] himself, but might consider sending a representative if non-attendance was likely to lower the prestige of the Gold Coast’. He believed that Nkrumah was drawn to the kudos that the country would gain from being represented at a conference of that stature. At the same time, Nkrumah was aware of the conditions that the British Government had laid down for the early attainment of independence for the Gold Coast. The governor therefore noted that: ‘[Nkrumah] would not . . . wish to do anything that might impair the goodwill of the United Kingdom or prejudice early attainment of independence’. In other words, Nkrumah was aware of the potential problems that his acceptance of the invitation might lead to if he failed to follow the appropriate procedure. It seems however that Arden-Clarke was keen to impress on London that a delegation from the Gold Coast would not be an embarrassment to the United Kingdom. Consequently, he noted that: ‘On anti-colonialism . . . the representative might be briefed to speak up for the way in which the United Kingdom has treated Gold Coast aspirations and so provide an anti- dote.’ Apparently, Nkrumah had given his promise. Nevertheless, it is, however, difﬁcult to imagine, even at that early stage, Nkrumah serving as a mouthpiece for British Colonialism; not when he had been imprisoned for his political activities as well as his determination to liberate the Gold Coast from colonial rule. At any rate, Alan Lennox-Boyd (Secretary of State for the Colonies)41 underlined the concerns of the CO rather cogently in a letter to Arden- Clarke, which was discussed at the Cabinet meeting of 13 January. Lennox- Boyd was of the opinion that even the Afro-Asian states who were friendly AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 129 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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to the West were still of no real value to the speciﬁc interests of Britain. He was perceptive enough to note that: ‘. . . Most of the anti-communist countries which have been invited are also strongly anti-colonial, and I fear that the only thing such a polyglot conference could agree upon would be the denunciation of “racialism” and “colonialism”.’ He was therefore insistent that: ‘The attendance of Nkrumah or his representative at the conference seems most unlikely to beneﬁt the Gold Coast materially, and might involve us all in considerable international embarrassment.’42 He continued; ‘It would be a great pity if Nkrumah were associated with unfortunate decisions or statements which the conference might well produce on current international controversies and disputes, and in particular on the issue of “colonialism” or “racialism”.’ Thus, he expressed the wish that he ‘. . . hoped to be able to dissuade Nkrumah from going himself or sending a representative, and I would hope the same advice can be offered to Sir Godfrey Higgins’. Lennox-Boyd further suggested that other African states should also be discouraged from attending the conference. On 13 January, the Cabinet43 agreed with the views of Lennox-Boyd. As a result, it was decided that the Gold Coast and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be discouraged ‘as far as possible’ from attending the conference. The Cabinet’s decision was nevertheless striking in one particular sense whereby it agreed not to insist on the policy that all communications to the above two territories (for which the UK was still responsible for their external affairs) should be made through the FO. The reason was strategic. In essence, it was to prevent any embarrassment to the British Government. As the Cabinet argued:

... it would be better for the replies refusing the invitation to be sent direct from Accra and Salisbury. If they were sent through the Foreign Ofﬁce, the conveners of the conference would be more likely to regard the refusals as having been dictated by Her Majesty’s Government. There is much to be said therefore for our not insisting on the correct channels of communication in either direction on this occasion.

It was also agreed that the Cabinet’s conclusions and intentions as regards the Gold Coast and other countries invited to the conference were not to be made public.44 Additionally, it was not to be revealed that Whitehall was anxious about the outcomes of the talks.

THE GOLD COAST, NKRUMAH AND THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE The decision against the attendance of the Gold Coast was to be supported by the following ‘detailed points’, which were designed to discourage Nkrumah from sending representatives to the conference:45

(a) In view of [the] polyglot nature of the conference and absence of any fundamental community of interest, the conference cannot serve any practical purpose. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 130 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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(b) It may well be dominated by Asian communists or neutralist inﬂu- ences, and is likely to be concerned primarily with Asian economic and cultural problems. (c) It is already being used to support communist policies and propaganda. (d) It may be used to further the territorial claims of some of its members (e.g. on West Irian, in which Australia is interested, or Formosa) and to pronounce upon other controversial international issues, e.g. peaceful coexistence, thermo-nuclear experiments. (e) It will probably only be able to agree on ‘colonial’ (and ‘racial’) themes, and while the United Kingdom Government would much appreciate anything helpful Nkrumah would say about [the] progressive nature of HM Government’s policies, the conference is far more likely to be interested in involving him in pronouncements about events in Asia and in parts of Africa other than [the] Gold Coast. (f) The conference may constitute precedent for even more embarrassing conferences in future. (g) As India is already our main champion on the Togoland issue, it is doubtful whether discussion with other Asian representatives would strengthen our position.

The last point refers to a comment in Arden-Clarke’s telegram46 suggesting that a representation of the Gold Coast might be useful if Nkrumah saw the conference as ‘an opportunity to gain Asian support in the UNO for [the] Togoland Policy’ of the British Government. The Togoland question concerned whether the southern part of the United Nations Trust Territory of Togoland was to become part of the Gold Coast or French Togoland following the end of colonial rule in the Gold Coast.47 Interestingly, the decision to prevent the Gold Coast and the other African countries from attending the conference was not well received by some of the UK misisions in Asia.48 Just as his American counterpart had been, G.H. Middleton, the British High Commissioner in New Delhi, was evidently appalled by his government’s attempts to discourage active participation by friendly states. He was unreserved about his position: ‘. . . I feel that I should let you know that from the point of view of this post the decision seems to be of doubtful wisdom.’ Middleton was convinced the effect of the conference was ‘likely to be less mischievous’ if friends of the UK attend than if they did not. In particular, he hoped that the Gold Coast would attend the conference ‘. . . to show how much progress the African countries had achieved under British tutelage’. He thought that this would put colonialism into ‘proper perspective’ and forestall ‘any violently anti-Western line’. The Foreign Ofﬁce’s response, penned by W.D. Allen, to Middleton,49 was icy albeit interesting. The pleasantries were clearly there: ‘Thank you for your interesting letter . . . about the Bandung Conference.’ Mr Allen expresses sympathy with Middleton’s views which, as he notes, ‘closely AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 131 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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correspond to those originally taken in the Foreign Office’. In other words, the views of the High Commissioner were a little outdated. Allen puts forward two general arguments against the representation of the Central African Federation and the Gold Coast at Bandung. The first, he said, ‘. . . springs from our reluctance to permit any avoidable strengthening of the existing links between Asian and African nations or to encourage Asian countries in the idea cherished by many of them that they are the natural saviours and champions of the Africans against the white man’. He then notes that ‘the Arab-Asian bloc in the UN has frequently been a source of embarrassment’ to the United Kingdom, perhaps with regard to Africa. The second argument stems from the ‘risk that our friends might be induced to support anti-colonialist resolutions in order to secure the defeat of others more favourable to communism’. Apparently, the fact that the friends might be both anti-colonialists and anti-communists at the same time was conveniently overlooked. Allen offered the British High Commissioner in Delhi the standard explanation for Whitehall’s reluctance to have the Gold Coast represented at the conference. He stated that: ‘. . . our main objection to their representation at Bandung springs from our anxiety to avoid involving them in the highly publicized discussion of colonialism’ as well as racialism, which he believed would probably be a feature of the conference. The real question, however, was what did Britain stand to gain from Gold Coast’s attendance? Allen had the answer: ‘Although we should be grateful for anything helpful Nkrumah might say, if he attended . . . we doubt whether this would make much impression on the conference.’ He elaborated on this by saying, ‘However favourable and useful his remarks about British West Africa might be, it could scarcely be expected to put up much of a defence against attacks on our policy in East Africa or against the South African Government.’ On the contrary, he surmised, ‘The conference [is] . . . likely to be more interested in getting Nkrumah to associate himself with pronouncements about events in other parts of Africa and on international issues on which our views are very different from others.’ In other words, Britain would gain nothing from Nkrumah’s attendance. Indeed the primary concern was that Nkrumah might become a bell-wether for the other African countries demanding liberation from British Colonial rule. Allen had a relevant concern. Allen then warned Middleton, ‘With the Gold Coast so far advanced along the road of constitutional development it would be dangerous to encourage Nkrumah to involve himself in a conference of which the result would almost inevitably embarrass his relations with us and perhaps with other members of the Commonwealth as well.’ Suffice to say, the above remarks reflect Whitehall’s attitude towards Nkrumah in the mid-1950s; and it would seem from Allen’s and others’ comments that the British perceived Nkrumah as a potential ally against anti- colonialist agitations. From the British perspective then, the only thing wrong with Nkrumah was that he was suggestible and was therefore potentially corruptible by anti-colonialist influences. What is interesting, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 132 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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however, is that Nkrumah had been imprisoned in January 1950 for organizing a strike in support of his campaigns for ‘Self-Government Now’ for the Gold Coast. One would therefore be inclined to assume that Nkrumah had already ‘graduated’ from the anti-colonialist school. In any case, it was indeed the CO that was determined to prevent the Gold Coast’s attendance. According to W.A.C. Mathieson,50 the attendance of friendly countries at the conference would only serve the purpose of making its predetermined decisions reasonable. As he argued:

There is also something to be said for the view that the more out of hand the conference gets, the more easily we shall be able to laugh off its ﬁnal pronouncements. We think it must be expected that even if the conference is well attended, it will still produce recommendations which will be unpalatable to the United Kingdom Government, and in that case the more reasonable and more generally supported the recommendations are the more difﬁcult it will be for the United Kingdom to criticize or ignore them.

Thus, while by early February the driving policy was that ‘attendance by African countries at the conference was neither to [be] encouraged nor discouraged’, the attitude towards the Gold Coast was however markedly different. As a Foreign Office minute states: ‘Only in the case of the Gold Coast were we making a delicate and confidential approach to Dr Nkrumah, with a suggestion that his attendance at the conference might be unwise.’51 In any case, Nkrumah himself had not ‘expressed any positive inclination to attend’, according to Arden-Clarke.52 On 18 March, the Colonial Office confirmed that Nkrumah had declined to attend the conference.53 It also noted that he had rejected the invitation for the Gold Coast to attend as a full member. Instead, he opted for an observer status and decided that two observers would represent the country. According to the CO, Nkrumah’s decision was ‘disappointing’ although there was ‘no alternative to accepting it’. Morland (Jakarta), on the other hand, was unhappy to learn that Nkrumah would not be attending the conference, and was also unhappy about the observer status given to the Gold Coast. His attempts to turn things around, as in getting the Gold Coast to reconsider its ‘isolated attendance in inferior status . . .’54 and send full participants were politely rebuffed with stylized explanation by the Foreign Office. According to J.E. Cable (FO) ‘Mr Nkrumah is too busy to leave the Gold Coast himself and the CO would certainly not wish to attempt to persuade him to do so.’ It was clear to Cable that the CO would be unwilling to let the Gold Coast send full participants. After all, ‘They have throughout disliked the idea of the Gold Coast attending at all and have done their best to discourage this.’55 Given the circumstances, therefore, the observer status was the best option, Cable argued.56 The situation also created a stir at the Jakarta diplomatic mission about the correct procedure to follow. The CO had eagerly dispatched a telegram to the Jakarta mission announcing Nkrumah’s decision, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 133 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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essentially ignoring the Cabinet’s decision on 13 January that the invited government itself will respond directly to the sponsors of the conference. In actual fact, the CO wanted to get ‘. . . in first with the news by telegram through [the UK] ambassador in [J]akarta’ before Nkrumah’s letter to the sponsors of the conference arrived in Jakarta.57 Apparently, the CO was intransigent about maintaining the policy ‘to which the CO attach importance’, that the external relations of the Gold Coast are conducted through the metropolitan government in London, according to Cable’s minute. Nevertheless, the CO agreed that Morland might ‘. . . make it clear [to the sponsors] that it is not we [Her Majesty’s Government] who have restricted the Gold Coast to observer . . .’ status.58 The FO was not impressed. Naturally, it was concerned that the UK would be held responsible and criticized for the Gold Coast’s poor representation at Bandung,59 as a result of the CO intervention. It also felt that ‘the absence of delegates from British African colonies would expose the UK to charges’, that is, accusations that Britain had exerted pressure through colonial governments to prevent either active participation or any participation at all. Why Nkrumah opted for the observer status can be easily explained and justified. The sponsors of the conference had instituted a requirement that the leader of every delegation should be either a prime minister or a foreign minister. Indeed, the Gold Coast had no equivalent of a foreign minister and the Prime Minister, Nkrumah, had declined to go himself. Given the circumstances, ‘. . . (since the Indonesians have already demonstrated how sensitive they are on this point) observer status is perhaps less inappropriate . . . than it must have seemed at first sight’. This was, however, an obfuscation from Whitehall. Neither the Indonesians nor the other sponsors of the conference were particularly adamant about the requirement. Morland tried to impress this fact on the FO: ‘I don’t think there will be any difficulty about the delegate not being a prime minister or foreign minister. All the Colombo powers insist on is a minister and not an official.’ Morland added, rather cyni- cally: ‘But there may be some fun over the observer status, since, by agreement between the five Powers, it does not exist.’60 As to be expected, Indonesia did not like Nkrumah’s decision to send an observer. Consequently, the conference secretariat ‘. . . bluntly expressed its dissatisfaction . . . and . . . asked the [Gold Coast] . . . government for further explanation’. Incidentally, not all in Nkrumah’s government liked the decision either. Kojo Botsio, the Minister of State, for example, attempted to get Nkrumah to alter it61 because the observer status prevented the country from either voting or speaking at the committee sessions. In the end it seemed that both the CO and FO got half of what they wanted without either side being fully satisfied about the situation. At the same time, Whitehall was anxious about paragraph 2 of Nkrumah’s letter to Jakarta because they felt it ‘might be interpreted as meaning that the United Kingdom Government had prevented full representation of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 134 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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the Gold Coast by virtue of its responsibilities for the Gold Coast’s international relations’.62 The paragraph in question states:63 ‘As you are aware, the Gold Coast is not yet a Sovereign state, and although it controls its own internal affairs, the governor is responsible for external affairs, including all matters affecting relations with foreign states.’ Nkrumah was, of course, following what was undoubtedly the correct constitutional procedure from the point of view of the constitutional responsibilities of the governor. However, the paragraph also included a vague reference to the fact that the negotiations for national independence demanded sober reﬂection and self-discipline on the part of Nkrumah:

It is expected that the Gold Coast will achieve independence in the very near future, and negotiations between this Government and Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, and preparations for the attainment of independence, are being conducted on that basis. In view of these reasons, I very much regret that we shall not be able to send delegates to the conference.

Indeed, in his letter dated 18 January to Gorell Barnes,64 Arden-Clarke had alluded to certain conditions that the British Government had laid down for the Gold Coast’s attainment of independence. The paragraph demanded some measure of damage limitation on the part of the British Government. Thus, the CO initiated measures for Morland to ‘make the point, if necessary, that the decision stated in Dr Nkrumah’s letter was his own, and that in fact his statement of the Gold Coast’s international status is undoubtedly correct, and that the UK Government hopes that in these circumstances no objection will be taken to it’.65 The Foreign Office duly forwarded the CO’s instructions to Morland. The final paragraph of Nkrumah’s letter, perhaps simultaneously sums up Nkrumah’s muffled enthusiasm about the conference and his disappointment at not being able to personally and actively participate in it. It is also indicative of the level of his solidarity with the Asian leaders:

I should like to take this opportunity to say how heartened we have been in the Gold Coast by the progress which has been made by the new countries of Asia since the achievement of independence by them, and how much we have been encouraged by the kindly interest which they have taken in those territories which are still under colonial status . . .

The original plan was that the Gold Coast would be represented by Kojo Botsio, the Minister of State, as head of the ‘Observers’, and Francis Dei- Annan. Nkrumah subsequently added to the list J.G. Markham, who was then in Rangoon as Joint Secretary to the Asian Socialist Conference. The biographical piece put together by the CO66 described Botsio as harbouring Stalinist tendencies, and as a petty Royalist at the same time. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 135 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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As a result, he was seen as ‘. . . likely to express his gratitude to Her Majesty’s Government for making Gold Coast independence possible’. Moreover, despite his Stalinist tendencies, he was ‘a profound believer in the Commonwealth and a man who has largely learned and is still learn- ing to put his country’s interests before his own despite his misgivings’. Botsio had also been imprisoned along with Nkrumah and other leaders of the Convention People’s Party for staging the ‘Positive Action’ campaign for self-government. It seemed, however, that despite his ‘Stalinist tendencies’, he was perceived by the British establishment as manageable, even a ‘jolly good fellow’. As to be expected, Botsio’s address67 at the conference was devoid of any spectacular or vitriolic statements about the United Kingdom or colonialism. After the usual formalities, however, and perhaps to the chagrin of the CO, he spoke of ‘the struggles and sacriﬁces’ of the Asian countries that have ‘re-established and fortiﬁed the right of the people of all races to govern themselves’. He also invoked the newly independent Asian countries as ‘a shining example to all those labouring under racial discrimination, political subjection and economic exploitation’. He then made note of the lessons that the Gold Coast had gleaned from their achievements, dropping a few delicate hints as he went along. Words, it seemed, had to be carefully woven:

Although in our present transitional stage towards nationhood we are not yet responsible for our external affairs, nevertheless we were most anxious not to miss the unique opportunity of being represented at this epoch-making conference. Many of the questions which will be discussed here are matters in which we have a natural and legitimate interest; colonialism and racialism we have never ceased to denounce; world peace and happiness we all desire. However, because of the reasons already mentioned, our delegation attends this conference mainly as observers.

The minister of state then announced the time-frame during which the Gold Coast hoped to attain its independence, as if to publicly bind Britain to an agreement:

The Government headed by Dr Nkrumah is pledged to achieve independence for our country within the term of ofﬁce of our present Parliament, and plans for the assumption of independence are well under way.

He added that:

Discussions between the United Kingdom Government and ourselves have been marked by statemanship and cordiality on both sides, and we hope that soon it will be possible for us to make an announcement declaring the actual date when full sovereignty and independence will AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 136 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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be transferred to the Government and people of the Gold Coast. The transitional problems which face us in our country today are, however, immense, some of them very challenging. We are nevertheless consumed by the will to conquer, and we dare not fail.

The burden of responsibility was clearly staring straight in the face of the pioneers of liberation for, and independence in, sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, Botsio declared that: ‘Failure in the Gold Coast would be a disastrous blow to the hopes and aspiration of countless millions in Africa and elsewhere struggling to be free.’ Finally, he proclaimed: ‘A new spirit stirs Africa to activity and the continent is shaking itself like a giant from sleep, fresh with the strength that follows rest. Let us all, therefore, work together for a newer and happier world in which all of us shall be free.’ It is worth noting that, apart from the opening speech, Botsio made no other public statement at the conference, and the delegation left for the Gold Coast before the chief delegates made their closing statements. The report68 by the British Embassy about the performance of the Gold Coast is insightful because it reveals a sense of relief on the part of the British diplomats in Jakarta. Primarily, it emphasizes the fact that Botsio did not ‘misbehave’. In the main, it provides an account of ‘the film show and drinks party’ put on by the Gold Coast and not surprisingly, it was symptomatic of a schoolmaster’s report for a good pupil. Firstly, it makes note of the distinctive national costume, and the unabashed behaviour of the delegation: ‘They made a very favourable impression’, it notes. Thus, ‘other delegates were anxious to give this territory on the threshold of full independence both a warm welcome and a helping hand’. The ‘film show and the drinks party was an enormous success’ and the guests included Nehru, his daughter Mrs Indira Ghandi, and all the other African delegations. Apparently, they all enjoyed themselves, ‘with the exception of Pandit Nehru, who was thoroughly put out by Sir John Kotelawala’s attack on communism an hour or so before and positively monosyllabic’. The two films were described as excellent Gold Coast newsreels, conceivably because they ‘effectively’ showed the other side of colonialism. Naturally, Botsio wanted to show his country in a good light and that won him some accolades from the ‘wise schoolmaster [who] canalizes youthful enthusiasm’, to quote Parkes. Although, J.G. Markham69 seemed to have slightly upset the British, it was nothing to write home about. ‘In general’, the report states, ‘the Gold Coast delegation did us proud, and may well have been – very partially – responsible for the generally satisfactory way in which Britain emerged from the conference. Botsio and [Dei-]Anang impressed all the delegates with whom they came into contact most favourably, not only with their admirable command of English but also with their general intelligence and good sense.’ With that report, the Gold Coast was bound to get its independence within the time frame set by the government. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 137 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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THE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES AT THE CONFERENCE The Central African Federation turned down the invitation to participate in the conference in mid-March. It was the only country to refuse the invitation and was not unexpected. Regarding the other invited African countries, Whitehall had decided that they would not approach Liberia on the question of attendance: America was to be given that honour. It was thought, moreover, that Ethiopia would not want to go to the conference anyway. The assumption was that if they did they ‘would find it extremely difficult to send a delegation since they have no minister . . . who would have the slightest knowledge of the matters to be discussed at the conference. . .’. Whitehall was also confident that ‘attendance by the Prime Minister . . . could almost certainly be ruled out’.70 Contrary to these assumptions, Ethiopia did attend the talks,71 sending a delegation of six. Apparently, they sent a rather weak delegation since Foreign Minister Ato Aklilou Habtewold could not attend (due to illness) although the American ambassador ‘had pressed hard’ for him to go. In his absence Yilma Deressa, the Ethiopian ambassador to the US, led the delegation. Interestingly, the delegation also included John Spencer, an American and a Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who served the delegation as a legal adviser. The British Embassy in Addis Ababa did its best to alert the delegation to the ‘underlying communist bias of the conference’ through the background information that they prepared for it. Ethiopia gave D.L. Busk, the British ambassador, the impression that ‘theirs [was] nothing but a “watch brief” and they had no intention of putting their name to any controversial resolutions which may come up at the conference’. The American Embassy had impressed on the Ethiopians the anti-communist issue even harder but apparently to no avail. The Ethiopian Government subsequently made it known to the US that: ‘the delegation will probably side with the . . . neutralist bloc’. The excuse was that they wanted to serve as a moderating influence at Bandung. At the same time, Ethiopia informed the US that it was ‘considering de facto recognition of . . . China’, although not with the ‘intention of exchanging diplomatic missions or concluding trade agreements with [it] at the present time’. Consequently, Ethiopia’s attitude was perceived as a shift in position by Washington,72 not least because through appeals to Emperor Haile Selassie, the US prevented the appointment of Ras Imru, the Ethiopian ambassador to India, to the delegation. He was suspected of harbouring neutralist inclinations.73 Among the prevailing reasons for the shift in Ethiopia’s position were that74 it was irritated with the US for its failure to support Ethiopia in the Somali frontier issue when it was discussed at the UN. Others interpreted it as a reaction to America’s failure to give more financial support to Ethiopia. Sudan also attended the conference with Prime Minister Sayed Ismail el-Azhari as head of the delegation consisting of five government officials and three accompanying staff,75 including the prime minister’s private AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 138 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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secretary. As with the Ethiopians and Liberians, they went as full participants. We shall now turn our attention to a brief account regarding the British interest in the Japanese participation in the conference.

BRITISH REACTIONS TO JAPAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE Because Japan was designated as a country that was best handled by the US there is very little discussion of the Japanese participation in the British documents. In the main, references to Japan concerned its primary aim for attending the conference, which the British saw as economic. Thus R.W. Parkes76 notes that: ‘even the Japanese, whose sole concern appeared to be trade, entered a two point candidate (of which economic cooperation was not unnaturally one)’ in relation to the concluding Ten Principles of the Final Communiqué. Nevertheless, there were clear contacts between Tokyo and London, either directly or indirectly, in relation to the conference.77 As early as January, even before Japan had firmly decided to attend the talks, Mr Oda, the Japanese minister in London, had a meeting with W.D. Allen78 during which he is said to have expressed concern that the conference would be an anti-colonialist and anti-racist jamboree which would be exploited by the communists. Mr Oda’s mission at the meeting was essentially to assess how Tokyo and London could best cooperate over the conference. Most importantly, he wanted to ascertain how the British would react to the Japanese attendance at Bandung. Allen seemed satisfied that: ‘Despite the slightly different line being taken by the new [Hatoyama] government on the question of relations with [the] Soviet Russia and Communist China, they were still conscious of the importance of cooperation with other free nations in combating communism.’ He therefore recommended cooperation between the two countries, and indicated that it would be advantageous to Britain if other friendly countries like Japan attended. In view of that, when Japan finally received an invitation to attend the conference, it duly informed the British Ambassador in Tokyo and sought his advice.79 Unlike his American counterpart, Sir Esler Dening was apparently surprised by the Japanese approach to him: ‘I think it is interesting that [the] Minister for Foreign Affairs should have sent [Mr] Kase to see me and to seek our views.’ The overture from the Japanese was clearly unexpected, in part because it had been agreed that Japan would be left to the Americans. It might also have been due to the extent of the US influence on Japan at the time, compounded by the dominance by Washington of the bilateral US-Japan Alliance. The perception might well have been that Japan was too constrained by the nature of its relationship with the US to attempt to adopt an independent relationship with the UK. It could also be that the British did not think the Japanese rated the UK highly enough to want any advice from them. In any case, Dening took advantage of Kase’s request for guidance and put together an elaborate four-page paper on what might be appropriately called the ‘The Chinese Threat to Japan’. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 139 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Oozing with predictions of the PRC’s plans for Japan and East Asia as a whole, the paper conjures up images of the schemes that China might use to ensnare Japan and take control of it. Apparently, Dening enjoyed writing the paper. As he put it: ‘. . . in the light of such experience as I had gained about Chinese communist tactics I amused myself by setting down on paper what I thought might be the kind of directive which the Central People’s Government might issue for its delegation at the Afro- Asian Conference’. The contents of the paper that he gave Kase to read (in Dening’s office) must have unnerved the Japanese official. Either that or it confirmed his (and other Japanese) beliefs that the West was punch- drunk from their obsessions with the communist threat.80 Upon reading the paper, Kase’s only comment was that: ‘the paper set out the menace of Communist China very clearly and asked whether [Dening] thought the Chinese delegation would be clever enough to carry out such a policy’. The ambassador replied that although he had not met him, he thought that: ‘Chou En-lai was clever enough to carry out such a policy without anyone being aware at the conference that he was doing so.’ Interestingly, Dening’s prediction about how Zhou Enlai would conduct himself at the talks, and his grievances against the West, were pretty correct. The rest of his divinations were, however, too fantastic. Kase was right: Dening overrated the capabilities of the Chinese delegation. Some of the main points in Dening’s paper are indeed dramatic.81 Starting from the premise that the Soviet Union and China were working towards a world revolution, he naturally defined the Afro-Asian Conference as a platform for the exposition of the communist strategy to take over the world. In a didactic fashion, the paper warns that at Bandung China would apply the strategy rather surreptitiously so as ‘not to antagonize or frighten individual nations or groups of nations in such a way as to encourage them to combine to resist the onward march of communism’. He was correct in predicting that a ‘general attitude of friendliness and tolerance towards all . . .’ would be applied at the conference by the Chinese delegation. In that sense, the paper was clearly written in anticipation, in expectation almost, of the tactics that the Chinese were likely to adopt at the talks. It is also a parody in that it pre- judges the mind-set of a mythical Chinese political strategist, the Central People’s Government, that was bent on detaching Japan from whatever political arrangements it had with the US and also conquering the world. Thus, it intimates that:

... the main aim of the Central People’s Government must be to loosen the ties between the Afro-Asian states and the West, and in general discreetly to inﬂuence the conference to adopt a critical, and if possible even a hostile attitude towards the West in general and the United States in particular.

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diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, as were soon to be implemented by the Hatoyama government, ‘will pave the way for the Central People’s Government to exploit the situation’. Given China’s determination to develop better relations with Japan, Dening argued, it would try to utilize the opportunity provided by Japan’s invitation to the conference to approach them. He also insinuated that China would ‘. . . play . . . upon Japan’s awakening nationalism, upon her aspirations and her fear of becoming involved in a conﬂict between the communist and capitalist worlds, to stimulate her sense of independence, arouse antagonism against the United States and encourage neutralism’. The mythical strategist states further that:

To the extent that the outcome of the conference can be shown to be inimical to the United States and the Western powers, and that Japan can be associated with this outcome, it should be possible to aggravate relations between Japan and the West as a ﬁrst step towards detaching her from her present association.

The paper further alludes to a Chinese attempt to use Japan to achieve their objects against the West: ‘ Japan has said that she can act as a bridge between East and West. This is no part of the Central People’s Government’s programme, but the idea should not be actively discouraged, since bridges can serve more than one purpose.’ It also suggests that China would encourage and fan ‘Japan’s nationalism and racialism. . . discreetly . . .’ The paper continues with the exhumation of other probable tactics that the PRC might have carefully designed and tailored for the conference Dening crafted his paper especially with a Japanese audience in mind. Thus, it was designed to make Kase and the rest of the Japanese policymakers wake up to China’s hidden ambitions and intentions for Japan. It is, therefore, no surprise that Kase’s only comment upon reading the paper was that it ‘sets out the menace of communist China very clearly’. Nevertheless, he wondered if Dening really believed that the Chinese were clever enough to carry out such a grandiose scheme, which suggests that he thought Dening was exaggerating the situation. In his covering letter to the paper, however, Dening notes that he had been in consultation with the American ambassador, John Allison, about the conference and had actually shown a copy of the paper to him. Allison was apparently delighted82 and asked for his own copy. Dening hesitated: ‘I did not refuse him outright [and] though I trust him personally I am a little frightened of giving such a paper to the Americans because one never knows what they might do with it.’ In London, too, the paper went down well. Tomlinson of the Foreign Ofﬁce referred to ‘the probable tactics of the Chinese at the Afro-Asian Conference’ as ‘admirable’. He thought ‘it provides as good a forecast as anyone is likely to be able to make of the tactics the Chinese will follow’. Consequently, he added ‘it would be an excellent idea if [Dening] were AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 141 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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to give a copy of the paper to John Allison’ for there was ‘every advantage in letting the Americans have this paper’.83 Incidentally, in late January, Humphrey Trevelyan, the British Ambassador to Peking had informed his Prime Minister Anthony Eden,84 that the Chinese thought ‘their chances of winning over Japanese opinion have been improved by the fall of the Yoshida government. . .’. Consequently, Peking was doubling its efforts to drive a wedge between Japan and the US, he added. It was in this context that Dening85 wrote his missive. He also subsequently reported the supposedly ‘clandestine’ trade arrangements between the PRC and Japan, which we take up in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, the tensions between China and Formosa were also having an effect on Anglo-America relations, and indeed on the British attitude towards the conference.

BRITISH CONCERNS ABOUT THE FORMOSA AFFAIR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF BANDUNG In any event, although the conflict between the PRC and Formosa was not part of the conference’s agenda, the issue reverberated in all policymaking circles, confirming the fact that the tensions among the conference participants were indeed partly a reflection of the tensions outside, between the two Cold War powers. On 20 April 1955, Sir R. Scott, the British High Commissioner to Washington sent a telegram to London informing the FO that in a meeting between himself and Dulles it was revealed that: ‘Admiral Radford and Mr Walter Robertson were leaving at once for Formosa’.86 Dulles apparently referred to ‘the continued con- struction of airfields by the communists’ and alluded to ‘Nationalist pressure on the United States . . . to destroy these airfields’. He was patently concerned about ‘the heavy responsibility and indeed moral commitment assumed by the Americans in refusing to consent to Nationalist attacks’. Actually, the Secretary of State had requested this meeting because he was also concerned about reports that ‘British registered ships were carrying oil to Chinese Communist ports adjacent to the new airfields and wanted to have confirmation as to whether this was so’. Moreover, he wanted to know whether the British Government was ‘willing to join in the search for a peaceful solution and if so, what could they contribute to it?’ Not fully understanding what Dulles meant by ‘contribute’, the High Commissioner spoke openly about the British position on the Formosa situation, stating quite forthrightly, that: ‘the situation in the Formosa Straits gave Her Majesty’s Government grounds for anxiety’. He further pointed out that the aim of the British Government ‘was to help extricate the Americans from these offshore islands’. This is perhaps an indication that there was a mutual understanding between the two countries that the US had involuntarily become embroiled in an unpleasant affair from which it would like to disengage itself. As the High Commissioner noted, however, ‘the difficulty was how to effect this in a way that would not lead AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 142 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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to reversal of our Far Eastern policy’, which essentially meant ‘. . . the possibilities of reaching a stable modus vivendi in Asia’. As he intimated, ‘it was important not to put that policy in jeopardy’. The High Commissioner further commented: ‘On the other hand, we were not clear as to the long term aims of American policy in the Far East’. Thus, Sir R. Scott hoped Mr Dulles ‘could disclose in somewhat more detail the ideas in his head’. ‘This’, he laments, Dulles ‘. . . felt unable to do’. According to the High Commissioner, ‘it was this . . . which made it difficult to suggest how the United States Administration could best be helped out of its difficulty’, implying how he felt America was embroiled in something of its own making. As we have shown in Chapter 2, however, Dulles hoped, having realized the potential usefulness of the conference by now, that the participants would rouse Zhou Enlai to explore peaceful methods with regard to Formosa and the offshore islands. Sir R. Scott confirmed too that the US was looking to the UK to find Washington ‘a way out of the offshore islands’,87 and further noted that ‘this, though not unexpected, is a development of cardinal importance’. The High Commissioner to Washington saw an opportunity for the UK ‘. . . to initiate action on a broader basis’, that is, broader than originally planned, ‘and to work for a cease-fire not as an end in itself but as a prerequisite to negotiations on the issues of substance’. He thought Britain could attain from the US ‘. . . clarification of longer range American policy’. Consequently, he implored London as follows: ‘. . . I strongly urge that your response should not be confined to requests for elucidation but should at the same time rehearse the policy of Her Majesty’s Government and indicate the action we are ready to take to help the Americans to extricate themselves and the Nationalists from the offshore islands.’ In return, he expected the US to give the British Government some assurance ‘. . . about the more distant targets of American policy and the line they would take in discussing the wider issues in any negotiations or debate that may be arranged later’. The essence of Sir R. Scott’s telegram was, apparently, that action about the Formosa problem should be taken within the UN. The UK delegation to the UN,88 however, saw it differently, feeling that: ‘. . . in the present circumstances, and in the absence of any basis for settlement’ the UN could not ‘. . . be used as a place for negotiating a settlement with the Chinese Communists’. After all the PRC was not a member of the UN. In view of this, the telegram pointed out, ‘It is virtually impossible to use the [UN] to solve any Far Eastern problem by conciliation, e.g. to achieve an agreed cease-fire.’ It further noted that: ‘It would be completely unrealistic to place the wider problem of the future of Formosa in the lap of the organization.’ Consequently, it called upon the US to make ‘a very substantial contribution’ to a peaceful resolution of the problem. The contributions would be:

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(2) An assurance from the Americans that they regard the future status of Formosa as an open question.

As a corollary, the US would also give some assurance to the effect that it was working for the ultimate regularizing of their relations with the Peking government and the seating of Peking in the United Nations. While noting that: ‘All this would doubtless be very difficult for the United States Government to swallow’, it was suggested that: ‘unless they [the US] are prepared to meet these requirements we should be ill-advised to offer by way of a contribution any undertaking to join in resisting attempts by the Chinese Communists to settle the Formosa question by force’. It added, ‘the recommended solution would be one which got the Nationalists out of the Islands and, while not prejudicing the conflicting claims of either side, condemned the use of force in the prosecution of those claims’. Not surprisingly, the British Government was concerned about the possible implications of a PRC attack on Taiwan for the Anglo-American alliance.89 From the British perspective, it claimed, ‘It is only too clear that so long as the Americans are unable to get Chiang out of the coastal islands, a Chinese Communist attack on them could place our alliance in jeopardy.’ There was also the obvious concern that: ‘Even if the Americans were to decide not to intervene at first, they would find it hard to maintain that decision if fighting were protracted and the Nationalists were being overwhelmed.’ Thus, attempts had to be made, since the UK was anxious about the situation, ‘to take such action as we can to help enable the Americans to get the Nationalists to evacuate the coastal islands’. Evidently, this put the onus for peace in East Asia on the US, without overlooking the fact that such a withdrawal would not auto- matically bring about peace in the region. It was, nevertheless, felt that: ‘after such withdrawal any attempt to resolve the Formosa problem by force would be wholly unjustified, and would necessitate immediate reference to the United Nations for action’. Meanwhile, the British position on Formosa was stated as follows:90

In our view Formosa is not at present legally part of China and the Chinese Communist argument that the Formosan problem is purely an internal Chinese affair can accordingly be refuted on legal grounds . . . But, whatever the legal position, the situation in Formosa is such that any Communist attempt to take Formosa by force might lead to world war. No peace-loving country can be indifferent to such a possibility. Nor, for humanitarian reasons, should the eight million inhabi- tants of Formosa be handed over to Communist rule against their will.

Nevertheless, Britain wanted to draw America’s attention to the fact that as long as the islands remained under the occupation of Taiwan, it would be futile to expect a negotiation of the problem to lead to any early settlement for ultimately, ‘The Chinese Communists [were] not likely to accept any solution which leaves Chiang Kai-shek in control of Formosa AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 144 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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or even any scheme which purport[s] to set up an independent Formosa or a trusteeship . . .’ While taking cognisance of the strategic importance of Formosa, ‘as well as the obligations which the United States have assumed in regard to its defence’, the FO agreed that ‘we can hardly urge the renunciation of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes on the one hand, but at the same time refuse to negotiate on the other’. In essence, Britain was compelled to commit itself to contributing to a resolution of the problem.91 The UK and US had to agree on how to persuade ‘the Chinese nationalists to abandon the coastal islands but also to meet the situation of a sudden Chinese Communist attack on them’, while they discussed the matter. Evidently, the British were every bit as anxious as Dulles to find some way out of the impasse, but as the telegram stated: ‘the plain fact is that the Nationalists [were] on the coastal islands with American support and we do not know what the Americans’ intentions are’. Moreover, the British felt that Taiwan was occupying the islands illegally because they regarded them ‘as legally part of the mainland’. It was, therefore, noted that if the PRC should attack the islands, ‘it would be a civil war, in which we could not intervene. Nor would it really be suitable to condemn the Chinese attacks as a threat to the peace . . . without going further and calling for action against the Chinese’. Inevitably, this puts Dulles’s response to Zhou Enlai’s proposal at the conference for a peaceful resolution to the Formosa problem in a much wider context, impinging on Anglo-American relations to some extent. Despite the above position, Whitehall still remained wary of the intentions of the PRC. It was noted that Zhou Enlai’s speech at the conference did not ‘indicate any real softening of the Chinese position. . .’. This was based on the assumption that there was no suggestion in the speech that the PRC would ‘sit down with the Nationalists’ in an attempt to resolve the tensions. ‘Nor does the speech give any indication that the Chinese are prepared to renounce the use of force.’92 All the same, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Harold Macmillan, confirmed the intentions of the British Government to find a peaceful solution to the problem. Yet, he also affirmed that the ‘[British] Government have no commitment, other than such general obligation as might arise from their membership in the United Nations’. This was in response to a question raised by Denis Healey (a Labour Party Member of Parliament) as to what new commitments Her Majesty’s Government have accepted concerning the defence of Formosa. Mr Healey’s question had been prompted by speculation in the Press, both in the UK and the US, about arrangements between the British and American Governments that would make the UK ‘accept an obligation to prevent any change in the status of Formosa by force, provided that the Nationalists evacuated Quemoy and the Matsu’ islands.93 We shall come to the issue of Taiwan again. Suffice to say, with reference to the above comments, Macmillan was simply stating that the UK would only work within the framework of the mandate of the UN to find a solution to the problem. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 145 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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As mentioned earlier, the issue of Formosa was not discussed at the conference because the organizers aimed to protect the gathering from controversial issues that might destroy the ‘unity’ of the Afro-Asian community. As a result, Formosa was discussed in private conversations in dark corners at the talks. Nehru admits that: ‘I myself had opportunities to have several talks with Chou Enlai. I also asked Krishna Menon to pursue this matter in private talks.’ He felt that the conference provided the venue for an exploration of the matter ‘which we must all hope will lead to further steps in the lowering of tensions’.94 Leaning on the side of caution, however, Nehru prayed that: ‘. . . nothing will be done to cast doubts on the bona fide of the statements that Chou Enlai has now publicly made or to permit new obstructions to emerge and block the approach to reconciliation that is now somewhat more open than hitherto’. Most importantly, he felt that although not all the Bandung participants might have been convinced by Zhou Enlai’s overtures, they had not dismissed his offer as had the Americans. The course to pursue, which Nehru was trying to impress on the British, was one that acknowledged that the PRC would not give up China’s right to Formosa; at the same time it was not necessarily inclined to use force to resolve the matter. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Anthony Eden confessed that: ‘it was still not easy to see the final outcome’. He was simply ‘. . . quite sure that United States opinion would not be willing to see Formosa pass into communist hands’. Stating the British position, he wondered ‘whether Chiang Kai-shek could be persuaded to remove his forces from Quemoy and Matsu and some arrangement arrived at which would mean that Chou Enlai would not attempt to use force to decide the immediate issue of Formosa’.95 At the same time, Eden was sceptical of the positive responses that seemed to be coming from the US about the issue, because Washington had intimated that it was prepared to talk to the Chinese Communists about a cease-fire in the Formosa Straits. As Eden pointed out, ‘our American friends were sometimes inclined to move from one extreme to the other and having been pessimistic as to the chances of a settlement with Communist China might now . . . become too optimistic’. Effectively, he was concerned that ‘if after this there was a failure, the reaction might not be good’. Nehru shared the concern, not least because the PRC had been com- plaining96 about what they saw as US intransigence and its uncompromising attitude. In June, a rather insightful ‘Record of conversation with Mr Dulles’ over what seems to be a two-day period, arrived at the Foreign Office.97 It revealed the extent of Dulles’s discomfiture with the Formosa affair, including his suspicions of Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan émigrés, all of whom he felt were unreliable and ungrateful. Nevertheless, he hoped that ‘some kind of self-government in Formosa could be created’, and he had not given up hope of getting Formosa off the islands. Apparently, ‘the real purpose’ of the mission by Robertson and Redford to Formosa was to persuade Chiang to vacate the islands but Chiang had refused. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 146 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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When asked ‘what would happen if the Chinese attacked the islands . . . he [Dulles] said he could not tell’, an indication that the US was capable of deserting Formosa. Dulles felt that the pressure to support Formosa was less at the time ‘than it would have been earlier in the year’. After all, ultimately, he argued, the Americans ‘were gradually calming down over’ the matter. But Dulles ‘did not feel that the Chinese . . . would attack the islands, still less Formosa . . .’ itself, given the conditions. It will be appropriate now to examine the British assessment of the conference and its outcomes, ﬁrst by brieﬂy touching on their views on the implications of the conference for the UN and how this might affect their interests within the world body. British concerns about the potential effects of the conference on British economic interests are also examined.

BRITISH VIEWS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF BANDUNG FOR THE UN Commenting on the conference and its likely effects on the United Nations,98 Sir Pierson Dixon, the chief representative of the British legation in New York, was optimistic that the Bandung Conference would not weaken Afro-Asian support for the UN. He was responding to the Secretary-General’s concerns that ‘under the inﬂuence exerted by Chou Enlai and in view of the fact that several of them are not represented [at the UN]’, the Afro-Asian countries ‘would turn against the United Nations which is so largely dominated by the struggle between the Western powers and the Soviet’. According to Dixon, ‘to judge from the commu- niqué [of the conference], these fears do not seem to have been altogether justiﬁed’. He argues that although ‘the communiqué fails to voice support for the United Nations and its purposes and principles as a general propo- sition . . . the ten principles at the end of the communiqué are, in a sense, an Asian-African rewriting of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations’. He was, therefore, hopeful that: ‘We might possibly be able to make some use of the Chinese acceptance of Principle No. 8 (calling for the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means) in connection with the renunciation of force in the Formosa Straits, if this question comes before the United Nations.’99 Indeed, it is clear from the communiqué and the general attitude of the delegates that the countries that participated in the conference had no inclination or intention to discount the UN as a negotiating body in international affairs. On the contrary, they valued what the UN represented, not least because they felt that the organization was, at least in theory, non-partisan enough to accommodate the views and interests of the new states. Thus, in the communiqué, the Afro-Asian countries called for a better Asian-African representation on the Security Council. Dixon expected this to happen sooner rather than later, ‘We must this year expect a concerted effort to achieve it’, he warned. Although he suspected that the admission of new members into the UN might affect the membership of the Security Council he felt philosophical about the situation.100 His reaction was, therefore, that: ‘[judged] . . . from the terms AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 147 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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of its Final Communiqué . . . the Bandung Conference, while it certainly cannot be said to have proved helpful to our position here, may perhaps be regarded as having done much less harm than might have been feared’. Regarding other aspects of the talks, he noted:101 ‘it seems likely that one of the general results of the conference may be to produce a greater degree of cohesion among the Afro-Asian delegations at the United Nations’. Yet, he also intimated that: ‘although these delegations have at recent sessions of the Assembly met as a group, there have been, except on some colonial questions, few occasions when they have voted as a solid bloc’. Dixon further predicted that the conflicts between these countries would persist and prevent them from voting as a bloc ‘but it may, for example, no longer be easy for Burma and Syria, on the one hand, or Persia, on the other, to take a different line from India on East- West issues . . .’ as was argued in Chapter 1. Geoffrey Caston’s102 comments on Dixon’s reflections on the conference’s potential influences on the UN are interesting, if slightly discon- certing. His remarks and those of E.G.G. Hanrott throw some light on the tensions between the uneasy bedfellows, Britain and America. Caston refers to Dixon’s observations as ‘not . . . especially illuminating’, although he admits that its main conclusions ‘provided an authorized version of the old ones which the Afro-Asian members will not hesitate to use except on particular occasions when it is in the interest of any of them to avoid doing so’. He was referring to what he perceived as the selective attitude of the Afro-Asian states to the UN Charter. One might argue that the reaffirmation of these principles in the Bandung commu- niqué was perhaps a testament to how they felt the UN had ignored them, and how desperately they wanted to be included in the world body. In essence, the Afro-Asian states were not opposed to the UN itself but to the interests of those controlling it, and, as the new states saw it, how the organization was being used against the interests of those negotiating from a weaker position. The Afro-Asian states were therefore determined to ‘sway the proceedings’ of the UN in their favour as both Dixon and Hanrott predicted.103 As the latter points out:

When the conference was barely over, it appeared that at least the Indians and the Burmese intended to use the success of the conference as a means of asserting the Arab/Asian point of view and of claiming that the Bandung countries were entitled to a far bigger share of world authority (as represented by the UN) than they had when the United Nations was founded.

Perhaps Hanrott realized that as the independent movements unfolded in Africa, and as more African states were admitted to the UN, their demand for a share of the leadership in world affairs would become greater. Thus, he predicted that: ‘Bandung is likely to make our task more difﬁcult, to stimulate the Arab/Asian anti-colonials and to encourage AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 148 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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those in Africa who are seeking their sympathy.’ He also took notice of the fact that although ‘there was disunity at the conference on many of the items under discussion’, he believed that ‘. . . the “evils of colonialism” was not one of them’. As such, he predicted that on this as with others they could ‘expect a renewal of past fervour and perhaps the application of new techniques’. Roddie Parkes’s report (following) had also noted that the delegates at the conference were indeed determined to make the UN work more effectively for them. At the same time he felt that the prestige of the organization emerged enhanced at the end of the Bandung talks. It seems that Caston’s104 assessment was an attempt to absolve Britain of any blame. As he argues, the communiqué’s ‘. . . blunt declaration that “colonialism is an evil . . .” ’ is to be expected. He was also cynical enough to suggest that ‘the reference . . . to “subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” enables us to say that it is clearly not our colonial territories to which the conference is referring’. Moreover, he hoped that the UK would be able to ‘convincingly present our kind of “trusteeship” as a desirable alternative to Soviet “colonialism”.’ This is with reference to the phrase ‘Colonialism in all its manifestations’ which was supposedly designed as an attack on both Western and Soviet colonialism. Caston’s comment about this is revealing in terms of how he perceived the US, the interplay of events between the West, the Soviet Union and the countries of Asia and Africa. He described the State Department’s attempt to blame the spread of communism on colonialism as unhelpful. He was also displeased that even the friendly Asian states equated Western colonialism with that of what they saw as Soviet colonialism. Hanrott’s105 comment about the US’s supposed attitude to Western colonialism is even more striking. As he argued:

The facile habit which the Americans have now adopted . . . of bracketing together European colonial rule and Communist domination of neighbouring countries is likely to prove a very mixed blessing from our point of view. On the one hand it implies acceptance of the idea that ‘colonialism’ is something evil; and on the other it makes it more difﬁ- cult for us to show that, consciously or unconsciously, the rabid anti- colonials are playing the Communist game by helping to create conditions of instability and disturbance in areas which can only develop in the peaceful and orderly way under the umbrella of colonial rule.

Thus, while the communiqué of the conference was on the whole mild, there was concern within Whitehall that the after-taste of Bandung might not necessarily suit the desires of the Empire; not if the US was also waving the anti-colonialist ﬂag. As such, one response from the Colonial Ofﬁce106 was despondent: ‘. . . we will probably be faced with a renewed attack on “colonialism” which will be pressed home with renewed fervour and possible new techniques’. The reason was that: ‘the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 149 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Band[u]ng states have probably learned to “mix” the bowling now and will also bowl with increased confidence’. Continuing with the cricket metaphor, the CO implored London ‘to play the bowling positively and on its merits attacking it whenever it deserves rough treatment. We should at the same time encourage the Band[u]ng states to bat attrac- tively.’ It was convenient, it would seem, to apply cricket metaphors to the situation because at the time Britain would have easily won in a game of cricket. In any case, the metaphors were inspired by a reality. They implied, for example, that where necessary the UK should clamp down on the avid anti-colonialists and dissuade the use of violence by the Bandung states. There was nevertheless a glint of hope although it had certain requirements: ‘those who learned the game from us are keen and have the team spirit and we must see to it that they are not won over by those who prefer to play for a draw or who are dismayed by fast bowling and would like to change sides in order to avoid it’. The phrase, those ‘who prefer to play for a draw’ presumably refers to the neutralists, and indicates that there were others who might switch sides to join them. Mindful of the fact that the British Empire was in retreat, the memorandum is nevertheless forceful about fighting a rearguard action, suggesting even that it would be the honourable thing to do. What is particularly worth noting here is that the above three memoranda (Caston’s, Hanrott’s and the last one by J. Steward) were all from the Colonial Office, thus the ululation about attacks on the Empire. What is also striking about them is that they demonstrate glimpses of bureaucratic unease between some of the departments. Dixon’s missive, for example, was dismissed as ‘naturally not an especially illuminating document’ by Caston, while the last memorandum was cynical of Roddie Parkes’ measured and illuminating observations about the conference in certain areas.

AN ASSESSMENT OF PARKES’S REPORT ABOUT THE CONFERENCE Ambassador Oscar C. Morland duly used the advice from Whitehall to stay clear of the conference himself so as not to make it seem as though Britain was too concerned. As a result, he had the talks covered by two of the embassy’s ofﬁcials. Morland then informed F.S. Tomlinson (FO, South East Asia Department), from whom the advice came, that:

On the whole I think the plan I adopted may have met your requirements as well as could be hoped. Roddie Parkes (Counsellor), and Micklethwait (Information), were in Bandung the whole time, and gave me some useful information, but their main achievement . . . was the way in which they were able to keep in touch with a great many of the delegations and help them with background views and information.107

On the whole, R.W. Parkes’s long report108 cast a positive light on the outcome of the conference. After accounting for the mundane events of the 17th and 18th, Parkes assesses the essence and dynamics, weaknesses AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 150 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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and achievements, of the event. Of particular interest to us here are Parkes’s comments on Zhou’s Enlai’s peace proposal. As with most commentators, he was awed by Zhou’s personality and demeanour. Thus, he notes that the Chinese Premier’s opening statement ‘was concilliatory in the extreme’ (p. 2). He further admits that the statement was more remarkable for its repetition of his readiness to ‘sit down with Americans and negotiate to relax tension in Taiwan’, although he also observed that Zhou did not discount China’s right to liberate Taiwan. According to Parkes, Zhou’s additional comment about China’s right to liberate Taiwan was attributable to ‘the prompt and rather discouraging reaction of the State Department to his previous day’s offer to negotiate . . .’ stating that: ‘Indeed this offer, more than anything else, had put the conference on the map and its reasonableness seemed in tune with the spirit of Bandung.’ He then conﬁrmed that: ‘By contrast the tone and timing of the American statement were alike deplored by every delegate I met.’ Regarding the American airmen who had been arrested in China as spies, Parkes suspected that but for the rebuff of Zhou’s offer he ‘might have announced the release of the . . . airmen, like a ﬂight of symbolic doves, in his closing speech’ at the conference (p. 5). Nevertheless, Parkes was rather suspicious of the audacious performance of the Chinese Premier, including even his offer to resolve the Taiwan problem peacefully. As he put it, ‘I am inclined . . . to think that his offer to negotiate with America should be read in this context only’, the context being the goal that he perceived Zhou as having established:

I think that he has set himself the task of leaving the delegates with an impression of himself not as an iron man of destiny . . . but of someone who was open to argument, not unkindly disposed to his Asiatic and African brothers, and above all reasonable and with whom one could do business.

In other words, Zhou’s performance at the conference camouflaged his real intentions. Parkes was not really sure about this. Thus, he observed: ‘I hope I may be proved utterly wrong’. Parkes comments about the general composition of the conference are endearing. For example, he notes in paragraph 19 (vi) of his report that: ‘. . . with the possible exception of Japan and Turkey on the outer periphery of the area represented at Bandung, the mixture that invariably titil- lated the palate of this heterogeneous Oriental assembly was a nice blend of the philosophic and spiritual, to which had been added a sprinkling of salient facts and a strong flavouring of sincerity’. Parkes also felt (paragraph 19 (ii)) that: ‘the conference showed in marked degree a universal desire for peace . . .’ and argued that ‘the term “peace” was debased cur- rency in the West but full in most of the Orient’. The diplomat had clearly ‘gone native’. The CO, which was observing at best the downsizing of its dominion – the Empire – must have found this glorification of the Afro- Asian gathering rather offensive; thus the cynical remarks. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 151 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Parkes captured the zeitgeist of the 1950s; he pronounced Asia as ‘. . . young, eager, drunk with nationalism and freedom, but also desperately anxious to behave with maturity and make a good showing before its elders if not betters. It loses its angularity only when treated as a grown- up and an equal, and like all adolescents is easily offended, and as easily inﬂuenced for good.’ Thus, he exhorts the West to show leadership. As he put it, ‘I think that we in the West, jejune, cynical and exhausted, have need of greater imagination and understanding of the new Asia and Africa, and more patience with it.’ Moreover, he thought that the West’s ‘. . . approach, at this critical time, is too materialistic (realistic if you like) and too destructive. We should appeal at least as much to idealism and the things of the spirit as to materialism . . . At the same time we should not always be on the defensive, anti-this or anti-that.’ Observing from the collapsing frontiers of the British Empire he warned that: ‘Any suggestion . . . of bullying or sabre-rattling would boomerang immediately in the area’s present mood.’ He did, however, add that the West should make clear its determination to act ‘promptly and decisively should necessity arise’. Parkes was no doubt optimistic about the unfolding events:

Let us if possible be constructive . . . talk of the glorious future that may open up for the Orient – if not disrupted by the Communist subversion and aggression – when Eastern nations, strong, united and free from fear, can share with us the full enjoyment of those civil and other lib- erties for which we, in Western history, fought with such determination and sacriﬁce.

Evidently, Parkes was attempting to evoke historical familiarity with the developments in Asia and alerting his colleagues – the policymakers in Whitehall – to the fact that what was happening in Asia was nothing new, and certainly not foreign to the West. He alluded to the ambitions of the newly-independent states, the neutralists in particular, to avoid the Cold War with the following remark: ‘the adolescent Oriental politician sees what he considers the shortcomings and failures of his Western elders and is inwardly determined to avoid them and go one better’. Evidently, he was fully in favour of encouraging the upsurge of optimism that had engulfed the Asian and African states. Yet his metaphors did not make his concerns any less real: ‘A wise schoolmaster canalizes youthful enthusiasm, and an unwise one sours it.’ At the same time, he believed that: ‘We are genuinely respected and indeed have a unique position in the Orient today – a favourite uncle, shrewd, calm, tolerant and worldly wise, with no “Big Brother” connotation.’ This was a suggestion that compared to the US, for example, the UK was faring better in popularity in Asia. Thus, Parkes summons the UK ‘to be wise and seize our opportunity with both hands before it is too late’. His romanticizing aside, Parkes made some particularly forceful points. He noted, for example, that: ‘. . . although Chou Enlai scored an AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 152 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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outstanding success by his personality as much as by his consistent moderation and ﬂexibility, he probably failed materially to lull the suspicions of any key nations’. He also acknowledged the ‘setback suffered by . . . neutralism’ at the conference despite the importance of the conception to some of the prominent organizers of the conference. Consequently he indicated that: ‘Pandit Nehru . . . failed to sell . . . neutralism to a panel, not of imperialists or potential aggressors, but to fellow Asiatic and African statesmen whose general weakness and incapacity for aggression is not in doubt.’ Apparently, one of the delegates (Dr Fadhel Jamali) had made the point that: ‘however serviceable such a philosophy might be in the case of India, it simply could not be applied to small nations which had to unite to defend themselves effectively’. The point had been made to Nehru following his ‘brilliant ninety-minute exposition of . . . neutralism’ at the end of which he cas- tigated ‘Pakistan and Iraq as lackeys of the West. . .’.109 Nevertheless, Parkes thought the long-term effect of the principle of neutralism would be ‘salutary not only to the numerous fence sitters represented at the conference but also to Pandit Nehru himself’. Time was, however, to prove Parkes wrong about his view of the ‘incapacity for aggression’ of the Asian and African statesmen. What is equally important to note is that Parkes’s conclusions had the full support of his boss, Oscar C. Morland.110 Interestingly too, J. Steward111 of the CO also agreed with Parkes’s comments in many areas. Steward noted, for example, that: ‘. . . Parkes has hit one nail very squarely on the head when he says that delegates at Bandung showed a perceptible determination to make the [United Nations Organization] work more effectively though on lines less favourable to the big powers’. He also thought that Parkes was probably entirely correct ‘. . . when he emphasizes the need for a constructive (as opposed to a defensive and over-materialistic) approach to Oriental adolescent nations’. At the same time, he concurred that the note on the effects of the conference should be based, among other things, on:

... the likely intensiﬁcation of Asian attention to Africa and the necessity for us to make clear the difference which now exists between Occidental and Oriental forms of ‘colonialism’.

Additionally, Steward thought that making use of Parkes’s comments would be beneﬁcial, if only to ‘stress the status achieved by 750 million persons lately emerged from Occidental colonial rule and thereby enabled to take their place in the world as free sovereign states and, incidentally, to take part in the Band[u]ng Conferences’. Naturally, others at the CO felt that the importance of the talks was exaggerated. According to one commentator in a handwritten remark (2 June 1955) at the bottom of Mr Steward’s minutes ‘I fancy it will turn out to be a bit of a 1-day wonder . . .’ AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 153 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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ANXIETIES ABOUT THE ECONOMIC INITIATIVES OF THE AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES Parkes’s comments influenced Whitehall thinking as well as those of its outposts, as evident in a covering letter on a ‘report’ on the conference from the Office of the Commissioner-General (for the United Kingdom in South East Asia)112 to the Foreign Office: ‘We have revised [the note] in light of Mr Parkes’s comments, with which we are for the most part in entire agreement.’ The letter nevertheless expressed concerns about aspects of Parkes’s remarks. Basically, they were seen as failing to give an adequate ‘account of the possibly detrimental effects on Western interest of some of the economic aspects of the work of the conference, which, it seems to us, may well assume increasing importance in the future’. Consequently, the Commissioner-General’s Office expressed the following concern:

It is perhaps in its economic aspects that the results of the conference are potentially more damaging to the interests of some of the Western nations. Although the conference specifically disclaims its intention to establish any kind of regional bloc, it is evident that its recommendations are directed against what is often thought of in the East as economic imperialism. Many of the economic recommendations are unexceptionable in themselves, but if fully implemented must be inimical to some important Western interests. The proposal about freight rates for instance may seriously affect the United Kingdom, and may, moreover, attract support from other ‘user’ nations, e.g. Australia and New Zealand, who have often in the past complained about their inability to influence freight rates fixed by the shipping monopolies.

We shall come back to this issue again in due course. Sufﬁce to say any initiative to create an economic bloc in Asia was bound to be perceived by Whitehall and its enclaves abroad as an attack on British interests and was guaranteed to be resisted. Meanwhile, the Commissioner-General’s Ofﬁce described what it perceived as the positive aspects of the conference as follows:

(a) The meeting of delegations from a number of countries with many varying points of view must have been a mutually instructive and educative process. (b) There was a good deal of forthright anti-communist speaking which may have opened the eyes of some of those too ready to accept communist pretensions at their face value. (c) Indian neutralism as expounded by Pandit Nehru found little support. (d) The conference heard a defence of SEATO from its Asian members and acknowledged the right of collective self-defence, within the United Nations Charter. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 154 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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(e) There was little or no anti-Western feeling. (f) There was much support for the principles of the United Nations, and a general desire for peace. (g) There was an increased readiness to undertake development, by self- help and mutual aid, in the economic ﬁeld. (h) The conference disclaimed any intention of forming a regional bloc.

On the debit side the following points were made:

(a) There was over-emphasis on the community of interest of the Asian- African powers, from which the white races are excluded or have excluded themselves. This might lead to the creation of a ‘little United Nations’ or a stronger regional bloc. (b) A forum has been created where China is accepted and welcomed. (c) Many countries have been brought into close contact with Communist China and may, therefore, if, as is probable, a permanent organization is set up, be under continual and increasing Chinese inﬂuence. (d) There may be renewed efforts to achieve economic independence of the West in ways which may be detrimental to some Western interests. (e) There may be demands for revision of the United Nations Charter on lines more favourable to Asia and Africa, e.g. in the allocation of seats in the Security Council.

Hence, it is clear from the above that the possible influence of China on the Afro-Asian countries was of great concern to the Office of the Commissioner-General in Singapore. That was, however, not as pressing as the ‘threat’ of economic cooperation among the Afro-Asian countries which, it was suspected, might be formulated through some form of regional agreement to the exclusion of all others outside the region. As already noted, there was concern that some form of economic regionalism was in the making. From the perspective of certain pockets of the British establishment this merely underlined the demise of the Empire. Again, a memorandum from Singapore113 examining the ‘Economic Recommendations of the Band[u]ng Conference’ highlighted the problem by identifying what it referred to as the ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘indifferent’ aspects of the ‘recommendations’ as far as British interests were concerned. Amongst the more positive aspects of these was ‘the emphasis on the desirability of cooperation with countries outside the region’. The reference to the relevance of foreign capital to the region’s development was equally perceived as good. So was the recognition of the importance of economic assistance from the West, and ‘the acceptance of the principle of increasing the scope of multilateral trade’. The memorandum notes that: ‘the last, even though qualified by a recognition of the need of some countries to make use of bilateral trade arrangements under present AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 155 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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circumstances, is particularly encouraging’ given that the true advocates of free trade such as the United States, United Kingdom and Hong Kong were not invited to the conference. The British saw the call for a collective action to stabilize the prices of, and demand for, raw materials by the Afro-Asians as laudable. However, the idea confirmed to Whitehall and its enclaves the ambition of the Afro-Asians to form an economic bloc to the exclusion of the West. Thus, it was noted that, although it was natural for producer countries to act in a coordinated effort, it was nevertheless conceivable that: ‘in the long run it may be contrary to the interests of the United Kingdom and other European countries for the producers of such raw materials as rubber, tin and jute to combine too closely’. However, there was indeed some hope for the West, according to historical precedence, which shows ‘that it is the producer who tends to suffer in the long run from such attempts’, since they invariably lead to the ‘development of synthetic and other substitutes’, and the common front of the producers is often short-lived. The recommendations that were particularly inimical to British interests included the demand for a study of freight rates and for a concerted action ‘to induce shipping companies to adopt a more reasonable attitude’. The memorandum notes that the issue of shipping rates is of deep concern to the Asian countries, ‘especially India. . .’. Britain’s opposition to the above recommendation naturally ‘increased Asian suspicions’. As the memorandum further points out, however, ‘it seems unlikely that the Band[u]ng countries will undertake such a study themselves. They are more likely to press for it to be done by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), or some other UN body.’ The British were apparently anxious that India, for example, might stir up trouble with the shipping lines on the basis of the recommendation in the communiqué. It was thus thought that perhaps it would be ‘in the United Kingdom’s interest to cooperate with such a study in order to try and ensure that it puts the case for the United Kingdom shipping companies as favourably as possible’. Of equal concern in this regard was the call by the Afro-Asian countries for an ‘in-house’ processing of raw materials before export, evidently as a way of increasing the export value of the product. It was also meant to augment the chances for job creation in the region but as the memorandum from Singapore affirmed: ‘Increased processing of primary commodities by their producers is often to [the UK’s] disadvantage.’ It further claimed that: ‘. . . we are already suffering because of the determination of the Indonesians, motivated by economic nationalism, to process their raw materials . . .’ before exporting them. There was some optimism, however, that oil-exporting countries among the participants, such as Indonesia, would have no success with the sale of the product if they nationalized their oil industries. This was because ‘doubts . . . about their ability to make a success of the production and marketing of so difficult a product [had] been increased by AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 156 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Dr Moussadeq’s’ (p. 3) failed attempt to take control of the Iranian oil industry, which had been under the control of the British oil majors. Essentially, the memorandum predicted that it was unlikely that the recommendations regarding shipping and the processing of raw materials would ‘. . . have any immediate effect’. There was, nevertheless, the nagging concern that persistence of these ambitions might produce the wrong effect in the long run, not least because it might ultimately create the impression among all the countries that ‘such measures are an essential part of economic independence’. The recommendation for the ‘encouragement of the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies’ was also perceived as suspicious by certain quarters of the British establishment. Nevertheless, the memorandum confidently makes the argument that even where local banks and insurance companies have been formed, the United Kingdom’s financial institutions could not be edged out because they were too important to those economies (p. 2). It was also felt that regional rivalry would make it difficult for regional financial institutions to take root. Yet, there was also concern that ‘nationalist governments can drive out or harass’ European financial institutions ‘and still obtain a good deal of Western capital ‘especially from countries like Germany and the Netherlands’. South America was cited as an example. Interestingly, the UN comes in for some harsh criticism on the question of economic advancement for the developing countries. It was accused of spreading ‘harmful ideas about the desirability of economic autarchy and about the right of the underdeveloped countries to blame any shortcomings in their economic situation on the failure of the richer nations to ladle out large and uncontrolled grants for economic development’ (p. 2). This could be seen as the beginning of the heated wrangles over the distribution of wealth between the rich countries on the one hand, and the Third World countries on the other, that has become a facet of the post-war development discourse. In other words, these early tensions forewarned the potential conflicts over problems about underdevelopment. In any case, concerns about Britain’s economic standing in the immediate and long-term future were very real. It was felt that if the Bandung spirit was allowed to proceed to its most logical point, British economic interests in the developing countries might become engulfed by economic nationalism which, as it was perceived, would be ‘harmful both to the interests of the United Kingdom and to their own real interests’ (p. 3). Their own real interests referred to those of the Asian and African countries. Nevertheless, the memorandum seemed ‘indifferent’ about the recommendations for an ‘increased exchange of technical assistance within the region’, the demands for Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) and more money from the international banks. The British High Commission in Jakarta114 was surprisingly, if interestingly, rather philosophical about the problem of economic nationalism. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 157 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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In response to the above report from Singapore, the Chancery in Jakarta wrote:

... We are not apprehensive of any early action detrimental to our interests, though we agree, of course, that their ultimate objective is to set up some sort of united front to oppose what the countries concerned might regard as oppressive measures by powerful Western governments or interests.

It also added, unperturbed, that:

The plea for collective action on commodity prices by raw-material producers . . . is nothing new. The resolutions on freights, banking and insurance, and oil . . . are not surprising, and the objectives behind them are obvious, but it is possible that the action which can be effectively taken, in practice, will be so limited by difﬁculties of implementation that it will not exceed the limits of what we should agree was proper.

Finally, in a sort of grand dismissal of the concerns of the Singapore office, the memorandum states that: ‘the proposal to exchange liaison officers may perhaps bear fruit much sooner . . . and we think it is a thoroughly good one’. There was clearly a difference in attitude between the Jakarta mission and the Office of the Commissioner-General in Singapore, which was essentially an outpost of the CO overseeing the unfolding events in Asia. One was liberal, the other was apprehensive and determined to hang on. Yet, A.G. Gilchrist (Singapore) nevertheless thought that the ‘conclusions we have reached seem to be much in line with [J]akarta’s’.115 He was wrong.

CONCLUSION As demonstrated above, Whitehall and the British Government were very concerned about the Bandung Conference and what it represented. Whitehall’s main preoccupation concerned the potential effects of the conference and its organizers on the British colonies in Africa. The perception that the Asian countries were attempting to lead the African countries against the Empire was very strong, especially in the Colonial Ofﬁce. Indeed, Whitehall seemed more concerned about Nehru’s ambitions to undermine the British Empire than about the supposed threat of communism. To that extent, the CO in particular viewed the invitation of the Gold Coast, the Central Africa Federation and Sudan to Bandung as an encroachment on British interests. As a result, it did what it could to mitigate the potential costs of the attendance of the above countries. Consequently, the Central African Federation turned down the invitation, and the Gold Coast went merely as an observer. Sudan, however, attended as a full member. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 158 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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The conference’s recommendations for the economic development of the Afro-Asian countries were considered even more serious by certain departments of Whitehall. In particular, the Office of the Commissioner- General of Singapore admitted as much: ‘It is perhaps in its economic aspects that the results of the conference are potentially more damaging to the interests of some of the Western nations.’116 Specifically, it noted that: ‘The proposal about freight rates . . . may seriously affect the United Kingdom . . .’ The recommendation for producer countries of primary resources was also perceived as a threat to British interests. These suggested an attempt on the part of the Asian and African countries to form an economic bloc to the exclusion of all other countries, and especially the Western countries. Naturally, Japan’s role in these economic initiatives must have exercised the minds of some of the Whitehall officials, especially those in the Colonial Office. After all, ‘South East Asia . . . was also the area of Japan’s biggest present and potential market for exports.’117 As is evident from the above analysis, both the US and the UK were uncertain about the geo-political implications of the conference in East Asia. However, unlike the US, the UK was less apprehensive about how the conference might affect the political dynamics of the region. On the other hand, the British Government was concerned about America’s involvement in the Sino-Taiwan dilemma and the potential escalation of the problem. Thus, Whitehall endeavoured to extricate the US from its predicament in East Asia. At the same time, Britain seemed uneasy about America’s game-plan in relation to the region, not least because this was not clear to Whitehall. Moreover, the fact that the US had emerged as the dominant power in the region troubled certain sections of the British establishment, evidently. There was, of course, concern within Whitehall about the potential threat of communism. As a leading ally of the US, naturally Britain shared America’s concerns about the expansion of communism, if only because its colonial interests were invariably linked to the calculations of the Cold War protagonists. Yet, Whitehall lacked the State Department’s obsession with the perceived Chinese threat. Certainly, it seemed less worried about whatever dangers Zhou Enlai’s participation in the conference posed to the interests of the West. Nevertheless, Esler Dening dwells extensively on the supposed intentions of the PRC and gets applauded by the Foreign Office for his insights. All the same, regarding the question of national interests, Britain was perhaps more concerned about the potential threats to these by India and, incidentally, its own ideological ally, the US. Indian foreign policy included the determination to rid the world of colonialism, primarily Western colonialism. The US, on the other hand, had turned to seeing Britain’s colonial holdings as a reason for the expansion of communism, and therefore wished it away. The CO’s memorandum on the results of the talks that was circulated as ‘The views of the United Kingdom . . .’ in mid-June encapsulates the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 159 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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nature of the problems posed by the conference for the UK.118 The memorandum addresses three main themes as follows: ‘anti-colonialism’, ‘Asian involvement in African affairs’ and ‘evidence of an Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations’. Let us examine the last theme first. The memorandum takes note of the conference’s objective to produce a greater coherence between the Arab and Asian delegations at the UN and suggests that the Asian delegations at the UN viewed Bandung as evidence of the growing strength of the Afro-Asian bloc. In that regard, the Asian delegations intended to use their new-found alliance to acquire a greater voice in the UN. The CO, however, thought that there was no real intention on the part of the Afro-Asian countries to reformulate the Bandung experience as an ‘Asian substitute for the United Nations’. Nor was it felt that the group would oppose the essence of the organization. Nevertheless, the memorandum anticipated a growing cohesion among the Afro-Asian countries in a manner that would lead to a ‘. . . closer Asian attention to African affairs, particularly on the part of Egypt and India’. On ‘anti-colonialism’, the memorandum admits that the phrase ‘colonialism as an evil in all its manifestations’ as agreed by the delegates at the conference represented ‘the unity of feeling in the conference against the continued existence of colonial rule’; all the same, the memorandum admits that in its context, the statement ‘colonialism is an evil in all its manifestations’ ‘was something of an achievement by the friendly states at the conference, and it is certainly better than a declaration directed exclusively against “Western” colonialism such as would doubtless have emerged without their efforts’. The memorandum did, however, take issue with what it saw as an equation of colonialism and communism as evils of the same order. That this was ‘being vigorously canvassed in some quarters of the United States’, was seen as a tremendous nuisance. Consequently, it argued that the ‘bracketing of colonial rule and communism does the Colonial Powers no good and makes the task of justi- fying their continuing colonial responsibilities still more difficult’. This made it difficult for Britain to make the case that ‘anti-colonialism, consciously or unconsciously, plays the communist game by promoting conditions of instability and disturbance’, it further argued. Finally, however, the memorandum expressed the CO’s qualified satisfaction with the outcome of the conference. It stated: ‘We should not exaggerate the results of the conference or, on present evidence, assume that they will necessarily be lasting in their effects. It is the UK view that the conference is likely to make the task of the Colonial Powers in the United Nations more difficult than in the past, though not so disas- trously.’ It was recognized that Britain had not been harshly treated at all on the colonial question, given the circumstances. As with the US, therefore, Britain found the tone of the conference remarkably moderate, despite their initial apprehension. The FO certainly felt that the outcome was indeed very moderate. This is evident in the corrections suggested by the Foreign Office to the original draft of the CO’s report. For example, E.R. Warner (FO)119 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 160 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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disagreed with the draft report when he stated: ‘We think [the report] goes a little far in suggesting that the conference equated “colonialism” and communism as evils of the same order.’ Thus, he advised the CO on how to rephrase that section of the paper. Based on the evidence available to us, Whitehall was beset with bureaucratic feuds in relation to the conference. Nevertheless, as has been argued elsewhere,120 the views of the departments, especially the FO and CO, differed perhaps because of the focus of their responsibilities, and not necessarily because of disagreement over policy.

NOTES 1 W.J.M. Paterson, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 4 January 1955, (Public Record Office: PRO) FO 371/116975 [D2231/12]. 2 Ibid. 3 W.D. Allen, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 5 January 1955 PRO FO 371/116975. Ibid. 4 W.D. Allen, 6 January PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/24]. 5 W.D. Allen, 1 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975; J.E. Cable, ‘French and UK Attitudes toward Afro-Asian Conference: Discussion with M. Lebel’, 5 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/7]. 6 W.D. Allen, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 3 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/12]. 7 ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 5 January 1955 PRO FO 371/116975 [D 2231/12]. 8 W.D. Allen, 30 December 1954, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/26]. 9 Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) to High Commissioners, 31 December 1954, PRO FO 371/116975. 10 Telegram from CRO to High Commissioners, 31 December 1954, PRO FO 371/116975. 11 Telegram No. 97 from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Sir C. Arden- Clarke, 31 December 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/3]. 12 W.D. Allen, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 1 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/7]. 13 Telegram No. 4 from CRO to High Commissioners, 4 January, PRO DO 35/4665; see also Telegram No. 11 from Singapore [Commissioner General for the UK in South East Asia] to Foreign Office, 4 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/11]. 14 Telegram No. 102 from Washington to Foreign Office, 15 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [2231/46]. 15 J.E. Cable, ‘United States Recommendations on Attitude to adopt towards Afro- Asian Conference: Mr Dulles to Make Final Decision on February 17th’, 18 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/46]. The Arabs were presumably unstable because Nasser, unpredictably, nationalized the Suez Canal. 16 J.E. Cable, ‘Guidance on Afro-Asian Conference sent by State Department to United States Missions in Countries Concerned’, 26 February 1955, PRO FO 370/116977 [D2231/119]. 17 J.E. Cable, ‘Persians Reluctant to Attend Conference’, 10 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/28]. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 161 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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18 F.S. Tomlinson, 12 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/47]. 19 Telegram No. 243 from Washington to Foreign Office, 27 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [2231/76]. 20 Draft Telegram No. 53 to Tokyo, 28 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976. 21 F.S. Tomlinson to Morland, 22 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979 [D 223/175]. 22 J.E. Cable, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 2 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/123]. 23 Ibid. 24 Amendments were to reach the South East Asia Department by 12 o’clock on Thursday, 10 March. 25 Telegrams 409, 410, 411, 14 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/136]. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 G.E. Crombie to F.S. Tomlinson, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 10 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/135]. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 From F.S. Tomlinson to O.C. Morland, 22 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979 [D223/175]. 32 Inward Telegram No. 163 from UK High Commissioner in Ceylon to Commonwealth Relations Office, 16 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116981 [2231/242]. 33 Telegram No. 384 from Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia to Foreign Office, 19 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116981 [D2231/243]. 34 Telegram No. 152 from Djakarta to the Foreign Office, 21 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116981 [2231/269]. 35 Telegram No. 462, 31 December 1954, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/3A]. 36 The Governor of the Gold Coast, Personal No. 97, 31 December 1954, PRO FO 371/116975. 37 From Baxter to Clark, 7 January 1955, DO PRO 35/4665. 38 J.E. Cable, ‘Inclusion of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Afro-Asian Conference’, 10 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975. 39 From G.H. Middleton to W.D. Allen, 22 January, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/70]. 40 Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Personal No. 3, 8 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/33]. 41 From Alan Lennox-Boyd to Arden-Clarke, 11 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976. 42 13 January 1955, PRO CAB 128/82, London; From Alan Lennox-Boyd to Arden-Clarke, 11 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976. 43 Bromley, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 14 January 1955, FO 371/116976 [D 2231/521]. 44 Ibid. 45 Draft for Concurrence, Reports and Minutes of Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [IRD 168/164/01]. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 162 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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46 Telegram No. 3 from Arden-Clarke to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975, 67942 [D2231/33]. 47 David Owusu-Ansah and Daniel Miles McFarland, Historical Dictionary of Ghana (Second Edition), African Historical Dictionaries, No. 63, London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1995, pp. 222–223; Richard Rathbone (ed.), Ghana: British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B Vol. I, Part II, 1952–1957, London: HMSOC, Published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1992, pp. 84, 108. 48 From G.H. Middleton to W.D. Allen, 22 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/70]. 49 From W.D. Allen to G.H. Middleton, 12 February 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/70]. Concerns regarding Asia’s interventions in African affairs were also raised in various memoranda including Telegram No. 30 to UK High Commissioner to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 14 January 1955. DO 35/4665. 50 From W.A.C. Mathieson to J.E. Cable (Foreign Office), 28 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/80]. 51 C.O.I. Ramsden, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 31 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116977 [D2231/87]. 52 From Sir C. Arden Clarke to Gorell Barnes, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975 [D2231/33]; From W.A.C. Mathieson to J.E. Cable, Foreign Office, 28 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/80]. 53 From J.E. Marnham to A.A.W. Landymore, 18 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/138]. 54 Telegram No. 96 from Djakarta to Foreign Office, 20 March 1955, FO 371/116978 [D2231/140]. 55 F.S. Tomlinson to O.C. Morland, 24 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [2231/140]. 56 J.E. Cable, ‘Attendance of Gold Coast at Afro-Asian Conference: Considers Gold Coast Should be a Full Participant and not an Observer’, 21 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/140]; F.S. Tomlinson to O.C. Morland, 24 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/140]. 57 From J.E. Marnham to A.A.W. Landymore, 18 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/138]. 58 J.E. Cable, ‘Attendance of Gold Coast at Afro-Asian Conference: Considers Gold Coast Should be a Full Participant and not an Observer’, 21 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [D2231/140]. 59 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, ‘Developments Relating to the Bandung Conference’, Intelligence Report, No. 6830.4, 1 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116982 [D2231/283/B] . 60 O.C. Morland to F.S. Tomlinson, 29 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979 [D2231/199]. 61 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, ‘Developments Relating to the Bandung Conference’, Intelligence Report, No. 6830.5, 15 April 1955, p. 13, PRO FO 371/116982 [D 2231/332]. 62 E.M. West to J.E. Cable, 25 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979, 67942 [D2231/159]; Telegram No. 88 to various UK High Commissioners, 28 March AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 163 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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1955, PRO DO 35/4665; Telegram No. 139 from Foreign Office to Djakarta, No. 139, 28 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979. 63 From Kwame Nkrumah to Dr Ali Sastroamidjodjo, Prime Minister of Indonesia, 17 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979 [SCR. 0129/19]. 64 Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Personal No. 3, 18 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116975. 65 E.M. West to J.E. Cable, 25 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979 [D2231/159]; Telegram No. 88 to various UK High Commissioner in India, 28 March 1955, PRO DO 35/4665; Telegram From Foreign Office to Djakarta, No. 139, 28 March 1955, PRO FO 370/116979. 66 From W.H. Formoy to T. O’Leary (Commonwealth Relations Office), 5 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116979. 67 ‘An Address delivered by the Honourable Kojo Botsio, Minister of State, Gold Coast Government, at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April, 1955’, 370/116985. Emphasis added. 68 From Chancery, British Embassy, Djakarta to Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, 5 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116984. 69 The report states only that ‘Mr Markham’s behaviour might have been decidedly less correct had he been on his own . . .’ 70 Minute by C.O.I Ramsden, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 31 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116977 [2231/87]. 71 From D.L. Busk to Harold Macmillan, 15 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116981 [D2231/254]. 72 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, ‘Developments Relating to the Bandung Conference’, Intelligent Report, No. 6830.5, 15 April 1955, p. 5, PRO FO 371/116982 [2231/332]. 73 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Developments Relating to the Bandung Conference’, Intelligent Report, No. 6830.2, 4 March 1955, p. 13, PRO FO 371/116982 [2231/283]. 74 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, ‘Developments Relating to the Bandung Conference’, Intelligent Report, No. 6830.5, 15 April 1955, p. 13, PRO FO 371/116982 [2231/332]. 75 Chancery, Office of the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner, Khartoum, to The Chancery, British Embassy, Djakarta, 25 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979. 76 R.W. Parkes, ‘Some Impressions of the Bandung Conference, 18–24 April’, 4 May, PRO CO 936/350 [2231/319]. 77 Chancery, British Embassy in Tokyo, 25 April 1955, PRO FO 371/115049. 78 W.D. Allen to Southeast Asia Department, ‘Afro-Asian Conference’, 21 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [2231/75]; From Foreign Office to Tokyo, Telegram No. 53, 28 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D2231/68]. 79 From Tokyo to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 35, 26 January 1955, PRO FO 371/116976 [D 2231/68]. 80 From Esler Dening to C.T. Crowe, 22 February 1955, PRO FO 371/116978 [2231/128]. 81 Ibid., [enclosed paper]. 82 Ibid. 83 Tomlinson to Esler Dening, Minutes, 8 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116978. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 164 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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84 Humphrey Trevelyan to Sir Anthony Eden, 22 January 1955, PRO FO 371/115005. 85 From the British Embassy in Tokyo to Harold Macmillan, 4 May 1955, PRO FO 371/115005; The Chancery, British Embassy in Washington D.C., 13 August 1955, PRO FO 371/115005. 86 Telegram No. 926 from Washington to Foreign Office, 20 April 1955, PRO FO 371/115047 [FC1049/739]. Walter S. Robertson was the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs and a fierce anti-communist. 87 Telegram No. 932 From Washington to Foreign Office, 20 April 1955, PRO FO 370/115047 [FC1049/739]. 88 Telegram Nos. 464, 444, 299 from the CRO to UK High Commissioners, 08:15 hrs, 23 April 23, PRO FO 371/115047 [C1041/744]. 89 Telegram Nos. 450, 305, 470 from CRO (at 02:30 hours), 23 April 1955, PRO FO 371/115047. 90 Telegram No. 411, 10 March 1955, FO 371/116978 [2231/136]. 91 Telegram Nos. 447, 302, 467 from CRO to UK High Commissioners, 23 April 1955 (at 04.15), PRO FO 371/115047 [FC1041/739F]. 92 ‘Formosa - Chou en lai’s speech at Bandung’, 24 April 1955, PRO FO 371/115047. 93 C.T. Crowe, ‘Parliamentary Questions’, 26 April 1955, PRO FO 371/115049 [FC1041/795]. 94 Telegram No. 910 from CRO, 30 April 1955, PRO FO 371/115049 [FC1041/817]. 95 Anthony Eden, 2 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116984; See also ‘Reply to Pandit Nehru’s Message of 29 April to the Prime Minister, PRO FO 371/116984; Prime Minister of India to Sir Antony Eden, 29 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116984. 96 From Trevelyan (in Peking) to Foreign Office (Dispatch No. 447), 3 May 1955, PRO FO 371/115049. 97 ‘Far East’, 20 June 1955, FO 371/115054 [FC1041/943G]; ‘Far East’, 22 June 1955, PRO FO 371/115054 [FC1041/944]. 98 Pierson Dixon to Harold Macmillan, Foreign Office, 4 May 1955, No. 12, PRO CO 936/350. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Caston, 24 May 1955, ‘Reactions in the United Nations to the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung’, April 1955, PRO CO 936/350. 103 Hanrott, 26 May 1955, Ibid. 104 Caston, 24 May 1955, Ibid. 105 Hanrott, 26 May 1955, Ibid.; See also Robert J. McMahon, ‘The Cold War Comes to Southeast Asia’ in Robert J. McMahon and Thomas G. Peterson (eds), The Origins of the Cold War (Fourth Edition), Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1999, pp. 227–243. 106 Steward, 27 May 1955, Reactions in the United Nations to the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung, April 1955, PRO CO 936/350. 107 O.C. Morland to F.S. Tomlinson, 3 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116984 [D2231/348]. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 165 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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108 R.W. Parkes, ‘Some Impressions of the Bandung Conference’, 28 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116983 [D2231/319]; Morland to Macmillan, ‘The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung’, 28 April 1955, PRO CO 936/350 [D 2231/319]. 109 Morland to Macmillan, ‘Some Impressions of the Bandung Conference, April 18–24’ (by R.W. Parkes), 4 May 1955, PRO CO 936/350 [2231/319]. 110 Morland to Mr Macmillan, Ibid. 111 Steward, 27 May 1955, ‘Reactions in the United Nations to the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung’, April 1955, PRO CO 936/350. 112 Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia to Foreign Office, Southeast Asia Department, 7 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116984 [2231/345]. 113 A.G. Gilchrist (Office of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom, Singapore) to F.S. Tomlinson, 7 June 1955, PRO FO 371/116986 [D2231/370D]. 114 British Embassy in Djakarta, to the Chancery, Office of the Commissioner- General, Singapore, 17 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116985 [No. 1071/290/55]. 115 Office of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingodm to F.S. Tomlinson, 7 June 1955, PRO FO 371/116984. 116 Commissioner-General to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 67969, 7 May 1955, PRO FO 371/116984. 117 The Chancery, British Embassy, Ankara, to the Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, 29 March 1955, PRO FO 371/116979 [2231/177]. 118 Reactions in the United Nations to the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung, April 1955, 16 June 1955, PRO CO 936/350 [IRD 168/164/03]; ‘Effect of the Band[u]ng Conference upon the Attitude of Delegations toward Colonial Questions: Extract from pre-General Assembly UK/US Talks on Colonial Questions’, 25 August 1955, PRO CO 936/350. 119 E.R. Warner to J.E. Marnham, 21 June 1955, PRO CO 936/350. 120 Nicholas Tarling, ‘ “Ah-Ah”: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 23, 1 (March 1992), p. 110. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 166 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

4 Japan’s Journey Back to Asia and the New Foreign Policy of Independence

JAPAN AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR he analysis of Tokyo’s participation in the conference demands Tfurther clarification about Japan’s circumstances in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, both in terms of its international standing and its domestic political situation. Essentially, it would suit our purposes to attempt to understand some of the issues surrounding the question of Japanese sovereignty in the early post-war era. It is worth noting, in the first instance, that the occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces, which began with the defeat of the country, ended in 1952. Nevertheless, a 260,000-strong US force stayed on in the 2,824 bases in the country as part of the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty arrangements. Yet, to many, it was not immediately obvious that the Treaty provided Japan with the security it craved for. Conversely, it had the opposite effect, since from the perspective of its critics, it made Japan a sitting target for the Soviet Union. Indeed the Sino-Soviet Mutual Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of February 1950, with its anti-Japanese military clauses, was perceived among influential circles in Japan as directed against their country because of its association with the US. Consequently, the Japanese interpretation of the pact was that the Soviet Union was training China to attack Japan.1 Moreover, the continued presence of American forces in Japan and the evident influence of the United States on the foreign policy of the conservative government often made it appear as though the occupation was being maintained in a new and more subtle form. After all, sovereignty did not necessarily bring with it ‘the capability of pursuing an independent foreign policy’.2 In essence, the alliance was seen by many as emas- culating the independence of Japan. This, inevitably, generated demands from both the left and right of the domestic political spectrum that Japan should strive for ‘genuine’, as opposed to ‘formal’, independence – dokuritsu. Consequently, although the US was not perceived by the Japanese as an imperialist per se, as it was by numerous Asian states, there was one thing that many in Japan, even among the conservative forces, shared AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 167 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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with their Asian neighbours. This was the desire for a less intrusive America in their country’s domestic and international affairs. According to I.I. Morris, this was ‘. . . an aspect of renascent nationalist feeling’,3 but if that is correct then all nations, including the US, are guilty of renascent nationalism, simply because all modern states desire an independent foreign policy. The popularity of neutralism in Japan in the early post- war years was, however, inspired by a sense of (positive) nationalism, which also naturally necessitated the desire for ‘real’ independence. It is fair to contend that Japan’s attendance at the conference signified an appetite on the part of the Hatoyama administration for, what the State Department referred to as, ‘. . . opportunities for demonstrable independence in national action. . .’.4 As a corollary, it went to Bandung with a firm determination to establish good relations with its Asian neighbours, and on its own initiative. Attendance at the conference was expected, for example, to rekindle Japan’s affinity with China. On the whole, however, its policymakers saw the talks as offering their country the opportunity to put an end to its estrangement from the community of Asian states. More significantly, given its ambition to ‘regain a leading position in Asia’, the invitation to Bandung was an opportunity that it could not turn down. Meanwhile, the State Department was concerned about ‘the beginnings of a shift toward neutralism’ in Japanese foreign policy.5 As noted in Chapter 1, the US concerns about the neutralist tendencies in Japan was partly related to the emergence of Hatoyama and Ishibashi as prime ministers in the 1950s.6 The choice of these two as prime ministers from 1954 to 1957 might have been striking in terms of the timing, but there was nothing coincidental about it. Indeed, like all Japanese political leaders they went through the perennial ritual of fac- tional and personality conflicts that is endemic in Japanese politics, in order to reach their prime ministerial positions. At the same time, the domestic and international political climates were equally important in dictating the choice of these two leaders. In the case of Hatoyama, it is highly conceivable that he might have assumed office earlier had the occupation forces not purged him. Instead, he became prime minister after a period of intense enforcement of American impositions on Japan, notably the Security Treaty, and before the emergence and consolidation of two-party politics – famously known as the 1955 system – in Japan. Hatoyama had been bidding his time to snatch the post from his political rival, Yoshida Shigeru. The two were members of the same political party, the Liberal Party. However, due in part to the tactical abstention of the Hatoyama Liberals, the opposition passed a motion of no-confidence in the Yoshida cabinet in early 1953, as a result of which the Diet was dis- solved just six months after the previous election. The 19 April elections for the House of Representatives that followed showed that the Liberal Party, led by Yoshida, was further losing its popularity with the voters: they lost forty-one of their 240 seats while the Hotoyama wing of the Liberal Party managed to hang on to their thirty-five seats. The conservative AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 168 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Progressive Party also lost twelve of its eighty-eight seats. On the other hand, the left-wing socialists did better than the right-wing socialists, increasing their seats to seventy-two compared to sixty-six for their rivals. Finally, the Japan Communist Party secured one seat. In addition, in the House of Councillors elections the socialists improved their standing, gaining a combined number of sixty-six seats, up from sixty-one. As in the House of Representatives, however, the Liberals became the plurality party, with ninety-three seats. Most importantly, the issue of the selection of the prime minister underlined the growing influence of the so-called ‘peace force theory’, which emphasized ‘Peaceful Co- existence’ with all countries, irrespective of political ideology. This was said to have ‘added weight to the socialist demand in Japan for more independent and neutral foreign policy’.7 Due to much infighting among the socialists however, Yoshida won his fifth term as prime minister. By December 1953, the Liberals, not too surprisingly, were embroiled in a series of scandals and journeying down the slippery slope out of power. Given that the party’s popularity was getting progressively lower, taking advantage of the situation, in November 1954 the Hatoyama Liberals joined forces with the Progressive Party to form the Democratic Party, and together with the socialists, brought a motion of no-confidence in the Cabinet almost a month later. Yoshida’s response was to resign, instead of calling for new elections. Accordingly, Hatoyama, the progressive conservative, was designated as caretaker prime minister. His emergence on the scene in this role was refreshing,8 because he was more accommodating than Yoshida, who was perceived as a stubborn autocrat. On the other hand, the outcome did not suit US interests. As expected, the elections on 27 February 1955 returned Hatoyama as prime minister, with the Democratic Party winning 185 seats compared to 112 for the Liberal Party, and confirming that Yoshida, the US’s ideological partner, had been replaced. As a reflection of the evolving trend in Japanese politics, the combined socialists took 156 seats, one seat more than one third. Of these the left socialists had eighty-nine seats, compared to the right’s sixty-seven. In terms of actual votes, the socialists won 10.8 million, compared to the 7.1 million when they headed the government in 1947. On the whole, the popularity of the socialists and their neutralist sentiments seemed to be growing, thus boosting their confidence to the extent that their leaders felt they would soon assume power.9 Certainly, the popularity of the socialists at the time was, to a large measure, attributable to the growing anti-American sentiment in Japan, which we mentioned in Chapter 1. What might have also made it possible for Hatoyama, and later Ishibashi, to head the government in the mid and late 1950s was the international political climate. Indeed, the position of the other leaders of Asia against being ‘drafted’ into the Cold War did have some bearing on domestic Japanese politics. As such, an air of ambivalence and anxiety did permeate the policy circles of this most pro-American Asian country, simply because staying clear of war was of paramount importance to all AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 169 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Japanese. The principle of ‘Peaceful CoExistence’,10 buttressed with the ideals of neutralism – which was then gaining popularity in Asia – was, as was widely believed, the safest bet for the nation. The question, however, was would it serve Japan’s interests overall? Further examination of some of the cross-currents in Japanese foreign policy in the early post-war era would be useful for our understanding of the Japanese participation in the conference

THE DILEMMA OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY POST-WAR ERA Transformed into a country of a peace-loving disposition after the war, Japan had also become ferociously anxious for all nations to live in peace and contentment, and not to dare live otherwise. Consequently, a week after the Bandung Conference, Prime Minister Hatoyama declared in Parliament that ‘one way or the other, Japan will pursue its goal of ensuring that the world is free of wars’ so as to improve the life chances of the citizens of Japan.11 Accordingly, the canon of post-war Japanese foreign policy became ‘peaceful coexistence’ with all nations.12 To that extent, the US-Japan Alliance had become, ironically, a threat to Japan’s very security – a cleverly constructed package of security arrangements that had given way to a sense of insecurity, as it were. Consequently, despite its alliance with the US, or perhaps because of it, the single most popular opinion across the political spectrum of Japanese society was neutrality13 in relation to the Cold War. This stance was also desirable for its material benefits. Basically, coexisting peacefully with its neighbours and all nations was seen as a strategy potentially capable of opening up avenues for lucrative international trade. The desire for trade with China, in particular, was obvious and intense. Even Yoshida who was viciously opposed to the neutralist position, believed that: ‘Japan’s long-term future lay not with North America but with the Asian continent, above all China.’14 This was also Hatoyama’s firm belief. In essence, it was also obvious to Japan’s policymakers that their country’s natural allies were its immediate neighbours. Emboldened by the ambition to build its economy in a peaceful environment, Japan pursued its peaceful diplomacy, underpinned by a strong desire for an independent foreign policy with its neighbours. Interestingly, while the outbreak of the Korean War practically undermined the efficacy of the Peace Constitution and all of its other permutations, it also reinforced the debate about Japan’s neutrality,15 and essentialized the principle as an option for the country’s foreign policy. Consequently, at the general meeting of the left-wing Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1952, the party adopted the position that neutralism was the ‘third force’ for world peace,16 and argued that Japan’s security could only be ensured by an independent neutralist policy (jishu churitsu seisaku).17 Thus, after ten years of intensive bick- ering, in October 1955 a united Japan Socialist Party wholeheartedly AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 170 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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adopted neutralism as a working formula for Japan’s international relations.18 At the same time, they agreed to submit Japan’s security to the United Nations19 as opposed, metaphorically, to placing it under the US (security) umbrella. Thus, the socialists settled for a neutralist approach for Japan’s routine diplomacy (nichiyo no gaiko), with the firm understanding that Japanese diplomacy would be predicated on ‘positive neutralism’.20 Among other things, it meant attempting, by all means possible, to resolve tensions between the Cold War powers through diplomatic means. In that sense, the SDP, and the nation as a whole, hoped to offer Japan up to the world as a peace-broker, acting between the belligerent superpowers, and between the West and the emerging Third World. That also, inadvertently, demanded complete independence from either of these powers. A point to note here is that Hatoyama also perceived the existing security arrangements for Japan as highly unsatisfactory. Indeed, he was convinced that the objective circumstances of Japan’s place in international politics had changed since the signing of the US-Japan Security Alliance,21 making Japan much weaker as a result. Thus, his demand for a sovereign and independent (jishu dokuritsu) Japan, executing a policy of Peaceful Diplomacy (heiwa Gaiko),22 originated from his position that the US-Japan Security Treaty by itself was not a firm guarantee for peace and security for the country. His determination to restore relations with the Soviet Union and China, for example, was motivated by that vision, as well as by the understanding that perhaps it was only through a neutralist policy that Japan would be able to contribute to world peace.23 YetHatoyama was not a neutralist, nor was he oblivious to the fact that the supporting pillars of Japan’s foreign policy precluded it from being neutralist. On the whole, the realization that national security could be achieved through the application of the diplomacy of peace instead of the threat of war remained an ambition, nevertheless.24 Responding to a query about the policy of peaceful diplomacy, the prime minister admitted that while every country or government entertains the ambition to achieve amicable and peaceful relations with all countries, they differ in terms of how they pursue that objective. Some, he said, hope to achieve peace through the application of force, but peace achieved in that manner could not last. Invariably, he hoped that the US would not object to his efforts to develop good relations with both the Soviet Union and the PRC. Addressing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet, again Hatoyama25 reaffirmed his ambition to develop amicable relations with all countries and demanded the normalization of relations with both Moscow and Peking. As he confidently proclaimed, ‘that is exactly what I am going to do’, although he was also aware that given America’s pre- dominance in the US-Japan Alliance careful balancing of diplomatic skills was crucial. Consequently, he noted that normalizing relations with Russia and China did not mean scrapping what was an essential part of the structure of Japanese foreign policy: the US-Japan Alliance.26 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 171 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Sufﬁce to say, the sequence of Japanese foreign policy since 1952 (when the occupation of Japan ended) has consistently rested on the twin pillars of the US-Japan Alliance and ‘peace diplomacy’, necessitating what some critics referred to as a duplicitous foreign policy.27 But regaining, sustaining and enhancing its security and prestige in global politics required far more than devising and achieving amicable relations with all states. There was, in the ﬁrst instance, the need to rebuild the national economy, not least because Japan’s leaders became aware that national power could be constructed and strengthened through the development and sustenance of a strong national economy. It was expected that a robust and powerful national economy should also bring prestige – essential in the operations of international politics – to the country. Indeed, Japanese foreign policy towards Asia was to be strengthened through economic cooperation with the South East Asian countries. This meant disbursing reparations and economic assistance to its neighbouring countries and, through that, developing viable economic relations with these nations. These were to be followed by investments in the region. The ambition to make the US the main market for Japanese products was also very strong from the start,28 although it soon became clear that it was rather too early for the Japanese companies to compete in that market, further reinforcing the importance of the neighbouring countries to Japan’s pressing ambitions. Basically, the need to establish cordial relations with the South East Asian countries in particular, and the importance of economic assistance to the region in that regard, was the prescribed remedy for Japan’s redemption.29 Shigemitsu Mamoru’s comments on this matter perhaps encapsulate the opinion of Japan’s policymakers at the time: ‘Trade and economic relations with our neighbours are a matter of life and death’, implying that Japan’s national security essentially depended on the economic viability of East Asia.30 That made attendance at the conference imperative.

JAPAN’S POLICY OPTIONS TOWARDS THE CONFERENCE Asked about which of the ideological factions at the conference Japan would align with, Shigemitsu stated that Japan was a member of the Liberal Democratic camp (minshu jiyu jin’ei) – meaning it would side with the pro-West faction. However, as was consistent with Japan’s pragmatist foreign policy, he quickly qualified what he said by adding ‘Nevertheless, Japan would not confine itself only to the interests of the powerful states.’ ‘Japan’, he added,31 ‘would hold on to its sovereign independence (jishu dokuritsu no tachiba) till the bitter end and would therefore, consider the confluence of all the factors before deciding on its policy position.’ Ultimately, the foundations of post-war Japanese foreign policy had to be as Shigemitsu the ‘realist’ put it, ‘Japan centred’ (nihon chushin), and ‘objective’. Presumably, an objective foreign policy had to be balanced, not biased or influenced by an alliance partner, and had to be eminently scientific (kagakuteki)32 in its approach. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 172 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Much earlier, in March, Shigemitsu had referred to Asia as Japan’s natural habitat where its interests, in particular trade, lie. This was an afﬁrmation by the foreign minister (and inadvertently the Foreign Ministry) that Japan’s future was really in Asia and, as such, it was in that region that it should invest its efforts. In saying that, Shigemitsu was simply stating the reason why ‘the [Asia-Africa] conference was important to us’.33 Yet, he also expressed some reservations about the conference, at least in terms of how it might affect Japan’s other interests. He was concerned, for example, that the gathering might be used as a platform for the examination and elucidation of questions relating to Japan’s payment of reparations34 to its neighbours. Consequently, Japan had to approach the event cautiously; answering questions to the Foreign Affairs Committee35 a few weeks before the conference, Shigemitsu declared that Japan’s policy position with regard to Bandung was still under discussion. At the same time, he did not fail to afﬁrm that: ‘in any case Japan’s post-war foreign policy was essentially one of “peaceful coexistence” with all countries’. It was his ambition, he noted, to drive that objective home to all the participants at the conference. The foreign minister then emphasized the importance of South East Asia within that policy framework and reminisced: ‘putting the war aside for a moment, Japan’s attempts to develop the region up to now had been grossly misunderstood’. Consequently, he exhorted the members of the committee to work hard to get rid of the misunder- standing so that ‘we can trade with and develop the economy of the region’. That was the primary ambition with which Japan approached the conference.

ISSUES AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE It is hardly necessary to say that the issue of Japanese participation in the conference was confounded with conﬂicting interests even before Japan had received an invitation to attend. The issues for Japan’s policymakers presented by the impending talks included, in the ﬁrst instance, whether Japan should accept an invitation to a conference that would be dominated, in the main, by countries with profound grievances against Japan for the atrocities it had committed against them. As mentioned earlier, there was, in particular, concern that by attending the gathering, Japan might be walking willingly into a trap on the question of reparations for the countries that had been victims of Japanese aggression. The other issue that exercised the minds of Japan’s policymakers was, what were the ideological imperatives behind the conference? Given Japan’s credentials as a humiliated former colonial power, the anti-colonial agenda of the meeting made its conservative leaders jittery. At the same time, Tokyo did not want to be seen by the colonial powers, Britain in particular, as giving succour to decolonization. The Bandung countries’ relentless criticism of the West, and the US in particular, also made the Japanese slightly uncomfortable about participating in the talks. The immediately pressing AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 173 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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issue, however, was how the US would react to Japanese participation. What, for example, was Japan to do if the US objected to its attendance? After all, General MacArthur had summarily rejected the invitation extended to Japan to attend the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, in 1947. Thus, the issue of attendance also reflected on the issue of an independent foreign policy for Japan, and specifically concerned the question of Japan’s political affiliation. In other words, it brought into perspective the one daunting question: whether to side with the US against its immediate neighbours or support the neutralist aspirations of Nehru and his supporters? After all, siding with countries against the US, or even adopting neutralism as a line of policy, was not an option. Most importantly, it brought into perspective Japan’s ‘twin conditions of weakness and dependence on the US’.36 The reasons why Japan would relish an opportunity to participate were more important. The chance for reconciliation with its neighbours was of utmost importance and was necessary if Japan wanted to rejuve- nate and strengthen its economic position within the region. Moreover, although Japan had lost the war, not to mention its territorial acquisi- tions in the region and the glory that came with it, it had not lost its ambition to win back its former position as the leading country in Asia. In essence, the desire to attend the conference was predicated on the aspiration to become fully integrated in the region, economically, politically and culturally. Japan was also determined to attend the conference, not least because it would give it the chance to ‘clearly demonstrate the extent of its sovereignty to the world’.37 The desire to show the world that it had regained its sovereignty from the occupation and the US, therefore, influenced its decision. As noted earlier, the Americans were rather aware of this over-zealousness on the part of the Japanese to redefine the relationship between the two countries. It should, however, be noted that early post-war Japan was not totally isolated from its neighbours, for as early as 1949 Japan attended the ECAFE (The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) meeting, and became an associate member of the group in January 1950. In March 1954, Tokyo hosted the ECAFE meeting. Moreover, only a few days before the Bandung Conference, an unofficial Japanese delegation of politicians, academics, novelists and unionists, among others, attended the conference of Asian Countries, 6–10 April 1955, in New Delhi. This was a non-governmental gathering, and a symbolic attempt on the part of the leaders of Asia to actively participate in, if not determine the outcome of, world politics. The countries represented at the event included India, China, the Soviet Union, Burma, Pakistan, the People’s Republic of Korea and Ceylon. In all, there were representatives from fourteen countries. By all indications, the gathering was a by-product of the Stockholm Conference of June 1954, which was held to alleviate international tensions.38 Accordingly, the delegations made their usual anti-war pronouncements and promises, the Japanese delegation being no exception. For example, they apologized for their country’s selfish AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 174 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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invasion of, and implementation of colonial policies in, the Asian countries, and affirmed that Japan had duly reflected on its actions and sincerely regretted them. Japan, they also said, had taken a firm resolution against the repetition of such an action and committed itself to the earnest preservation of world peace. The confession and subsequent declaration included a plea to the effect that Japan’s desire for peace could be made possible only with the mutual trust between, and full cooperation of, the peoples of Asia. We should note here that the views of the delegation did not represent those of the Japanese Government, but they were no less significant given the strength and popularity of the ‘Peace Movement’ in the country. Be that as it may, the Japanese delegation saw the conference as seminal and of immense historical importance. Thus, they justified their participation in it by claiming and stressing overwhelming support from the people of Japan,39 which was meant to discount possible recriminations that they were a fringe group. On the whole, the conference, which was rather anti-West in its tone and objectives, expressed deep concerns about the threat of possible war in Asia, and gave the Japanese delegation the opportunity to articulate the pacifist ideals of their country. Taking advantage of the forum, they made the point that: ‘as the first victims of the atomic bomb the people of Japan would like to take the lead in preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction’. From that perspective, they pledged that: ‘Japan would serve as a fortification (toride) for world peace.’ That was a ‘mission (shimei) that the people of Japan had committed themselves to bear (ou)’,40 they declared. Not surprisingly, Takasaki Tatsunosuke’s opening statement41 to the Bandung Conference, which we shall later examine in some detail, also evoked identical sentiments.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE News about the planning of the conference and the Japanese invitation to it had reached the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) following the Colombo Conference of April 1954. Yet, by mid-January 1955, Japan had not received a formal invitation to the event. Interest in it was of course high within MOFA, but as the US Embassy in Tokyo reported to the State Department in January 1955, the Japanese were rather reticent about their country’s interest in, and expectations of, the conference. As such, the Americans were initially suspicious of the intentions of the Japanese, although it seems the US Embassy’s contact in the ministry, Tani Masayuki, subsequently succeeded in alleviating the concerns of the Embassy by making sure that MOFA discussed Japan’s plans and preparations for the conference with them. Tani also seemingly remained receptive to the Embassy’s comments and advice. On balance, Tani seems to have cooperated quite extensively with the US Embassy. Among other things, through him the weekly meetings to discuss the impending event were held between embassy staff and MOFA ofﬁcials responsible for the planning of Japan’s participation in the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 175 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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event.42 Presumably sensing the apprehension of the Americans, Tani said, although half-facetiously, that ‘he did not think [the] sponsors knew the purpose of the conference or had an agenda in mind.’43 This was, perhaps, meant to reassure the Americans that there was nothing ominous about Japan’s intentions to participate in the conference. He also readily gave Ambassador John Allison the assurance that should Japan accept the invitation it would send a strong delegation. ‘It was his intention that [the strongest] possible delegation [will be] sent and that it should be composed at least in part of Japanese who spoke English fluently so that they would be able to influence actions taken at [the] conference,’44 Allison reported. He also hoped that the Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Party, ‘Frank’ (as the Americans affectionately called him) Matsumoto Takio, would be one of the delegates, if not the chief delegate. Matsumoto was a Harvard Graduate who spoke English fluently, and was, Allison ‘believe[d] truly a friend of [the] United States’. In view of that, Allison was elated. ‘I am convinced [Matsumoto] would be a most useful friend to have at such a conference.’ The point to stress here is that Allison, as already discussed in Chapter 2, wanted Japan to attend the talks. ‘I would be in favour of encouraging Japan, particularly if such [a] person as Matsumoto is sent’, he intimated to his superiors at the State Department. He was therefore anxious for the US to reach a decision ‘on the advisability of attendance’ for Japan at the earliest possible moment. Of course, he did not know that the Japanese Government’s plans for Bandung, at least in terms of the composition of the delegation, would not be the same as those of Tani. We shall examine the make up of the Japanese delegation in due course. Meanwhile, it would be useful to look at some of the comments made by some of the leading figures of the Japanese foreign ministry before the conference, and see how some of these fed the decision-making process in relation to Japan’s policy attitude towards the conference. On 18 December 1954, and even before the Colombo Conference,45 Shigemitsu wrote to Yamagata Kiyoshi (Ambassador to Karachi) to affirm Japan’s profound interest in South East Asia, evidently because of the geographical proximity between the two entities. He expressed a desire for closer relations between Japan and the region, and noted Tokyo’s ambitions to assist in the maintenance of peace and stability in the area, as well as in its economic development. He felt convinced that, for the moment, Japan would concentrate its efforts on developments in the region. Nevertheless, the foreign minister was mindful of the problems percolating in the region, obviously because the countries in the area were caught up in the rather unsavoury dynamics of international politics at the time. Moreover, the region, as he put it, had its own peculiar brand of politics. Thus, it was necessary that Japan’s participation in the conference was handled with a measure of prudence and a sense of caution. His advice was, therefore, that ‘we wait for the outcome of the Colombo Conference, and ascertain the views and position of the relevant countries, before we start thinking of what policy responses Japan should adopt in relation to the [impending] conference’. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 176 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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It would be fair to assume that Shigemitsu’s comments were in anticipation of an invitation to Japan from the Colombo powers to participate in the conference, if such a thing were to be organized. Meanwhile Wajima Eiji, Japan’s Ambassador to Jakarta, wrote to the foreign minister on 1 January 195546 to give a general account of some of the events and issues relating to the impending conference. He noted that one of the most important aspects of the conference would be its contribution to the development of the economies of the participating countries. Consequently, he mentioned that the Colombo powers would be establishing a committee for economic cooperation, with the view to setting up a structure to oversee the reconstruction process; and he did note that Japan’s participation in this structure was highly anticipated. As the events unfolded, on 4 January Shigemitsu wrote to Iguchi Sadao (in Washington) conﬁrming that as yet Japan had not received a formal invitation to the conference. He further noted that since the government had not seen the proposed agenda of the conference it was not in a position to decide what attitude to adopt in relation to the event.47 After expressing Japan’s heartfelt desire to improve relations with the diverse countries in Asia, he stated that he could not see any reason why Japan might turn down an invitation to participate in the conference. Indeed, as Okamoto Suemasal (Ambassador to the Hague) implied in his message to Shigemitsu on 18 January,48 the conference was too important for Japan to turn down. As he explained, ‘Japan had been invited alongside the People’s Republic of China, which is a very significant opportunity for Japan’s post-war foreign policy.’ He further noted that participation in the conference should stand Japan in good stead in world politics, but would also serve as a basis for the ideal situation in world politics, namely peaceful co-existence and prosperity of all countries. It may even serve as a kick-start for Japan’s leadership role in the region, he thought. However, he warned that in accepting the invitation Japan would have to be mindful of certain issues, the ﬁrst of which was the US’s extremely jumpy reactions (kyokudo ni shinkeishitsu) to the China problem. Consequently, he noted that: ‘naturally we have to reach an understanding with the US about participating in the conference’. Okamoto also felt that: ‘as far as Japan was concerned the conference was more than just ensuring the political independence and security of Asia and Africa’. It was also about intensifying cooperative efforts between the countries in the region; ‘but above all, it calls for more constructive discussions about economic cooperation’, he stated. In relation to the latter point he felt Japan ought to take the initiative in charting the course of such discussions. Nevertheless, Okamoto enumerated a number of concerns. Firstly, he thought the conference would be dominated by the anti-West countries; and was also anxious that China might use the conference as a platform for the diffusion of its propaganda. Alternatively, he thought, the conference might become a forum for the vigorous denunciation of colonialism, which would only exacerbate the tensions between the developing countries and the West. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 177 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Okamoto, as with most leading figures in Japan, was keen for Japan to assume a leadership role at the conference. To be able to achieve that, ‘we have to make plans for all contingencies and agenda items anticipated at the meeting’, he suggested. Thus, he identified certain topics that might crop up, including the admission of China to the United Nations, New Guinea and Goa. He further predicted that the participants were more likely to agree on these matters, which would leave Japan isolated should it vote against them or even abstain. On a more sympathetic note, Wajima Eiji wrote in February that even if no agreed declaration or resolution emerged from the gathering, in view of the complexity of issues facing the participants, the event would still be deemed a success. This is simply because the representatives of ‘thirty countries, including Nehru and Zhou Enlai, would gather in Bandung to pore over and discuss matters of profound importance to international politics; as well as exchange views and ideas and reflect on problems of common interest’, he stated. Evidently, Wajima saw the conference as a signal for a major development in international politics: ‘the emergence of a major force in world affairs – hitotsu no ikioi wo umidasu’. Writing from the vantage point of Jakarta49 the ambassador could feel the tempo of the occasion progressively rising, as events leading to the conference unfolded and the date for the gathering drew closer. Consequently, he felt that the world’s attention would be turning towards the conference, for at least two main reasons. Firstly, the world powers had been excluded from the conference, which was such a powerful political statement in itself; and secondly, Asian affairs, including which direction the region was heading, would be fervently discussed at the event. He felt that the emerging countries could no longer be ignored in world events. Wajima also predicted that some of the issues to be discussed at the event, such as the ‘so-called’ Five Principles of Peace (including the issue of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ with communism), West Irian, Taiwan, and a ban on atomic and hydrogen bombs, were likely to generate a lot of tension. His advice to Shigemitsu was, therefore, that the Chief Japanese delegate would have to spell out in his address to the delegates a concise principle of Japan’s position on these issues. Effectively, since the other participants were likely ‘to tease out our take on these matters we should be armed with a basic position on them’, he added. Basically, he thought Japan should be prepared with some guiding principles on how to approach the conference. Compared to these inflammable topics, the issue of economic cooperation, which was the main attraction for Japan, was a safe option, he noted. As such, he suggested that the issue should be thoroughly explored and spiritedly discussed with the other participants. He further suggested that since most of the countries who would be in attendance ‘expect technical aid from us we should be ready with a concise and a realistically gainful plan’ about the matter. Thus, he suggested having among the delegates someone of authority on such matters. His last AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 178 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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point was that the delegation should be made up of the best and the brightest, the elite. On the whole, Wajima felt positive about the impending conference in part because he saw great significance in it for Japan; but he was not oblivious to how ‘suspicious’ the Asian countries were of his country. As the date of the conference inched closer, Ambassador Yamagata50 (Karachi) noted that the conference would be a success if it confined itself to manageable problems such as colonialism and arms reduction. He warned, however, that if the occasion was used for the propagation of neutralism, or even to question the foreign policy behaviour of the participants, then the conference was bound to fail, simply because the SEATO member countries would object to it. Evidently, the local political climate was having a bearing on Yamagata’s judgement and analysis of events, as with Wajima and Okamoto. Incidentally, he was writing from Karachi. In any event, reflecting on the essence of the conference, among others, Wajima noted on 31 March51 that the conference was essentially about cooperation between the Asian-African countries for a deeper understanding of their common problems, which should be useful for the future development of the region. Suffice to say, the formal invitation arrived on 25 January. That same day, the government made the full text of the invitation available to the press, as Tani also made it accessible to Allison.52 The decision over Japan’s participation or not was to be made by the new cabinet that was to be established after the February general election. Meanwhile, the current cabinet, headed by Hatoyama, was making the necessary arrangements in anticipation of sending a delegation to the conference53 although all such decisions had been officially withheld until about 19 March, when the new cabinet would be sworn in. The actual preparations were being carried out by MOFA. Among other things, the ministry was making arrangements for its propaganda operations, which would include showing Japanese movies and the distribution of pamphlets with up-to-date information about the new Japan, democratic and positively ambitious. Also among the more mundane of its responsibilities included finding good accommodation for the Japanese delegation, since the local Chinese landlords had apparently reserved the best accommodation for the Chinese delegation.54

THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS In preparation for the conference, MOFA set up a Working Group in February to prepare for all contingencies and agenda items likely to come up at the meeting, but speciﬁcally to make policy recommendations for the conference. Essentially, the Group was given the task of collating information about the conference, and devising a plan of action for Japan. It is worth noting that most of what is in the following section is taken from Miyagi Taizo’s Bandon Kaigi to Nihon no Ajia Fukki. Sufﬁce to AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 179 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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say, by early March the group, headed by Ozawa Takeo of the Asian Bureau, met about once or twice a week, but as the date of the conference drew closer it met daily. Ultimately, the Working Group drew up the following plans according to which Japan would participate in the conference. In terms of the speciﬁc attitude with which to approach the event, it was agreed that:

(1) ‘From the vantage position of an advanced nation, through cooperation with the other participating countries, Japan should take positive initiatives towards advancing the fortunes of Asia and Africa’. (2) Japan should endeavour, by cooperating with all countries, to demonstrate its commitment to the achievement of genuine peace – ‘makoto no heiwa.’ (3) Aside from the fact that the conference itself has the potential to bring out the best in Asia and Africa, it also provides Japan with the opportunity to recover its leading position in Asia. Japan should therefore approach it with that objective, since after all there were many countries that would readily support it in that endeavour.

The next matter of concern was what issues Japan should aim to table at the gathering. These included questions of utmost importance to Japan such as:

(1) Clearing up the root causes of international disputes so as to achieve ‘genuine peace’; achieving ‘economic prosperity and the advancement of the life-chances of the people of these regions through cooperative efforts amongst the Asian and African countries’; and (2) A proposal about nuclear weapons.

The attitudes that Japan should assume in relation to anticipated agenda items were enumerated as follows:

(1) The root causes of international tensions should be investigated; and every possibility should be made to establish genuine peace. (2) It would be preferable for the conference to reafﬁrm the UN Charter, which is universally acclaimed, than uphold the Five Principles of Peace. In relation to this the following points were made: (a) International communism was indeed a threat to peace, which necessitates the defence systems established by the pro-West states; (b) To rid the world of international tensions and to remove the root causes of war – in other words to establish ‘genuine peace’ – the power of international communism to effect a world revolution should be renounced in the ﬁrst instance; and (c) The economic hardships of the people, and the economic inequity between nations among others, have a potential to AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 180 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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engender wars. It was felt that an ideal package for national security should therefore include guarantees for economic security, without which the maintenance of security was difﬁcult. Thus, it was noted that national sovereignty should be augmented with cooperative efforts to create better life chances for the populace.

In relation to the above, the economic development of Asia and Africa, and cooperative efforts to improve the welfare of the citizens of the two regions, were considered and it was thought that:

(1) On the basis of Japan’s capabilities, and with the certainty of economic aid from America, the ambitions of the different countries for economic progress could be implemented. (2) While the state-run economies of Asia (with protectionist trade policies, and restrictions on foreign companies) were understandable to some extent such policies should not be applied too liberally. (3) While the conference’s agenda emphasized the deepening of economic relations between the participating countries, the customs privileges instituted among the Commonwealth nations were dis- advantageous to the non-commonwealth members. This was seen as contrary to the spirit of economic cooperation among the Asian and African countries.

It was also agreed that Japan would make a recommendation for racial equality:

(1) It was thought that as a basic requirement for international justice and peace this was bound to attract universal appeal.55

A suggestion was also made to the effect that an international super- vision of the peaceful uses of nuclear power should be instituted. It was felt that this would:

(1) Have much impact, coming from the only country that had actuality experienced the effects of nuclear power.

The issue of colonialism also attracted suggestions along the following lines:

(1) Getting involved with issues about individual colonies would affect ‘our relationship with the colonial powers, so these should be avoided. It was recommended that support should simply be given to the usual pronouncements against colonialism made by other countries.’

The Taiwan problem also, naturally, received some attention. It was decided that: AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 181 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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(1) Since it was such a controversial issue, should it come up Japan would gain nothing by making quick decisions and expressing rash comments about it. In other words, it would be strategically sensible to stay clear of the matter. If necessary, it was suggested, Japan should say the return of Taiwan to the PRC was a problem yet to be resolved by the international community; and that Japan was in favour of the co-existence of the two Chinas.

On the whole, it was decided that Japan’s proposals, along with the line of policy that it would pursue in relation to anticipated agenda items, should be decided quickly; and ‘as much as possible, alliances should be made through side negotiations with the other participants before the event’. In this way, within MOFA, Japan’s elite bureaucrats cultivated and fomented a strategy with which their country would approach the impending conference. Evidently, the preparations included planning for the speeches to be delivered by the chief delegate at the conference sessions, and side negotiations with other participants. In the end, the Working Group recommended56 that Japan should propose three main items for discussion at the conference: Economic Cooperation (with emphasis on the exchange of technical assistance between the participating countries), Cultural Interchange and Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. In general, it was recommended that Japan should take positive initiatives on Economic and Cultural matters and stay clear of sticking its neck out on delicate issues.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION In mid-March it was rumoured within MOFA that Shigemitsu would lead the delegation with Kase Toshikazu (Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister) and Ota Saburo (Ambassador to Burma) as his principal advisers. There was, however, the unresolved question of how Shigemitsu should handle any private meetings proposed by Zhou Enlai, since Japan and China did not have diplomatic relations. MOFA saw this as a rather ‘serious problem’.57 Indeed, Japan lacked formal relations with several of the participating countries, including Indonesia, which made its position at the conference rather difficult.58 The speculation about the identity of the chief delegate later focused on Tani, but only for a brief period, it seems. The possibility of the appointment of the prime minister as head of the delegation without him actually attending the conference was also mooted.59 Aside from the question of who the chief delegate would be, the government had to formally accept the invitation first. This official acceptance went to the Conference Secretariat on 22 March.60 By 31 March, the decision over the chief delegate was still unsettled. Shigemitsu’s attendance had been agreed by the Liberal Party but on condition that he would not be absent from the Diet’s discussion of the Budget. However, since the Diet’s consideration of this coincided AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 182 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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with the conference, it was highly unlikely that the foreign minister would go to Bandung. Meanwhile, sending Tani as the chief delegate would have been impossible, apparently because he was not a cabinet minister – officially the lowest qualification required by the conference organizers. In fact, MOFA wanted Shigemitsu to head the delegation. Thus Ozawa, the head of the Working Group, met with the Policy Committee of the Liberal Party and explained to them the importance of having the foreign minister attend the event.61 He also persuaded the press to stress the importance of the foreign minister’s attendance in response to the government’s proposal to send Takasaki Tatsunosuke as the chief delegate. In any event, by this time, MOFA was desperate for a firm decision about the chief delegate, in part because they were embar- rassed about the vacillation and indecision. Finally, they resigned themselves to the choice of Takasaki as chief delegate and hoped that if he were indeed selected, Tani would accompany him as his deputy, given Takasaki’s lack of experience in international diplomacy and poor command of English. The government’s decision to send Takasaki as chief delegate was finally announced on 1 April and, as expected, Tani was to serve as his Chief Deputy. The other members of the delegation, including representatives of the major political parties who would serve as ‘advisers’, were to be decided later. Meanwhile it was thought that the President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce, Fujiyama Aichiro, would represent the business community. When the complete list of the delegation was finally decided on 8 April it consisted of three main groups: the official government representatives; ‘advisers’ representing the major political parties; and the technical staff. As noted earlier, Takasaki Tatsunosuke (Minister of State in charge of the Economic Council Board) was designated head of the delegation. The Economic Council Board was a government agency primarily concerned with long-range economic planning for Japan. Takasaki’s main concern then was ‘economics with special interest in the development of Japanese technical assistance programmes for Asia’. This was not surprising because he had been a pre-war industrialist and war-time head of the Manchurian Heavy Industries Development Corporation with particular interest in iron and steel production and metallurgical industries. This provides us with some clues as to why Takasaki was selected as the head of the delegation,62 and invariably it should inform us of Japan’s primary interest in the conference and how it hoped to approach it. Suffice to say, Takasaki was primarily a businessman with hardly any experience in international diplomacy, as noted by the US Embassy in Tokyo. Moreover, he spoke hardly any English. He was, therefore, perceived as lacking knowledge of the ‘major problems likely to arise at the conference’.63 The British Embassy in Tokyo, on the other hand, saw him as a ‘capable, experienced industrial leader, man of integrity, vision, energy in the field of economic planning’. Apparently, he also spoke ‘quite fair English’.64 Evidently the Americans and the British saw the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 183 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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same man differently. The Americans were, however, right that Takasaki was a novice at international diplomacy, and spoke hardly any English. That said, he was deeply passionate about the economic development and welfare of Asia.65 Given Japan’s objectives and aims, Takasaki was perhaps an excellent choice for the head-ship of the delegation. The other representatives and their duties were as follows, in order of importance. Tani Masayuki was expected to carry out the major share of the delegation’s work in the area of diplomacy, not least because he was an astute diplomat and very close to Shigemitsu. The choice of Tani as Deputy Head of the delegation must have delighted Allison enormously, because Tani was determined that the Japanese delegation should influence the conference proceedings and decisions. In other words, although Matsumoto Takio was not chosen to attend, Tani was perhaps a better option as far as Allison was concerned. But then whether he and the delegation would be as ‘effective’ as Allison hoped was another matter. The next in line to Tani (of the representatives) was Kase Toshikazu who was given the rank of ambassador in preparation for the conference. A Harvard graduate and, like Tani, an anti-communist66 he was a retired diplomat and a principal confidant of Shigemitsu. The US Embassy thought, however, that because of his ‘reputation for personal vanity and ambition he might not be above twisting facts or manipulating situations to suit his personal interests’.67 Wajima Eiji, the Ambassador to Indonesia, who had had substantial experience in China and spoke English well, was the next in line. He was followed by Ota Saburo, who was also a career diplomat and the Ambassador to Burma. The final person on the list of representatives was Asakai Koichiro, the Director of the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office. He was also not only a long-time career diplomat but also, just prior to the conference, Chief Japanese delegate and Chairman of the ECAFE conference that was held in Tokyo. Moreover, Asakai had served as Minister to Britain from 1952 to 1953, and spoke impeccable English. In terms of specific assignments, Tani was designated to handle political matters while the responsibility for cultural and social affairs fell to Kase. Asakai was put in charge of economic matters, and Wajima was given charge of the Japanese delegation as a whole. He was also in charge of liaising with the Secretariat of the conference. Of the advisers, there was Uehara Etsujiro, who represented the Democratic Party, and Nadao Hirokichi, the representative of the Liberal Party. These two were members of the House of Representatives. Sata Tadataka (a member of the House of Councillors) stood for the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party, while Sone Eki (also a member of the House of Councillors) served as a representative of the ‘right’ of the same party. Meanwhile, Kajiwara Shigeyoshi went as a spokesman for the non- partisan group – Ryokufukai (Green Breeze Society). These were the five political advisers, designated to serve primarily as observers who would watch the proceedings of the conference and report back on its outcome to their respective political parties. Consequently, they were not to be AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 184 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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provided with any of the working papers of the Japanese delegation, and any views that might be expressed by them would, in theory, merely reﬂect their respective party-political biases and not those of the Japanese Government. Of this group, as expected, Fujiyama Aiichiro represented the business community as an ‘adviser’ to the delegates. Like Takasaki, Fujiyama (the President of the Society for Economic Cooperation with Asia – Ajia kyokai) was a pan-Asianist with a profound interest in the economic development of Asia. Takada Gisaburo was also ofﬁcially designated as a representative of the business community. The delegation consisted of thirty members in all, including the technical staff.68 Okita Saburo, who became one of the leading architects of Japanese overseas economic development and, much later, foreign minister in the Ohira Masayoshi administration, served as a member of the technical staff.

DIET DISCUSSIONS OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION As can be imagined, the issue of Japan’s representation at the conference was ferociously debated at the Diet. In particular, as it became more apparent that neither the prime minister nor the foreign minister would be attending the conference, criticisms of the Government’s attitude towards the event intensiﬁed. At a session of the Foreign Affairs Committee, for example, Kitazawa Naokichi, a member of the Liberal Party and a militant pro-Taiwan Asianist, accused69 the government of a lack of interest in the conference by pointing to the membership of the Japanese delegation. The fact that Shigemitsu would not be attending and was instead, apparently, planning a trip to Washington in ‘response to America’s ultimatum’, bothered Kitazawa immensely. He saw it as an indication of how unimportant Asia was in the government’s overall foreign policy, despite the rhetoric. Incensed by the government’s ‘dis- graceful’ attitude to the conference, he argued that this was bound to negatively affect Japan’s standing in Asia. Hatoyama strongly disagreed. Kitazawa was wrong, he said, in suggesting that Shigemitsu could not attend the conference because of his impending visit to the US.70 The trip, he pointed out, was much earlier, and the foreign minister should be back in Japan at least ten days before the conference began. As to why he himself could not attend, Hatoyama71 offered the explanation that: ‘since the Diet would be in session during that period I cannot afford to be absent’. It was convenient to send Takasaki, Hatoyama argued, because ‘he did not have to be at the Diet sessions. Moreover, he was the Chairman of ECAFE.’ Naturally, the socialist critics of the government registered a strong reservation over the last point. Tanaka Toshio72 (of the left-wing Social Democratic Party) made the point that Takasaki was chosen as head of the delegation precisely because of the prime minister’s expectations that the conference would deal with nothing more than issues concerning economic development. He then went on to dismiss Takasaki as a ‘good-for-nothing’, and argued that he AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 185 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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was not suitable for the post (as head of the delegation), whether or not the conference was about economic matters. From his perspective, Takasaki was simply incompetent because, apparently, he had been unsuccessful in negotiating a deal between Japan and India for the development of a steel industry in the latter country. Effectively, as far as Tanaka was concerned, Takasaki lacked the qualifications to handle simple questions about economic development competently.73 His main point of contention, however, was that the conference was not just about economic issues, nor was it ‘an ECAFE conference’. Thus, he reiterated his argument that the main thrust of the conference would be about finding solutions to international political problems. In relation to this he felt that in order to properly represent the opinion of the nation, either the prime minister or the foreign minister should attend the conference, ‘if even to show his face’. Tanaka, therefore, appealed to the prime minister to show a sense of vision, imploring the government: ‘This is a splendid chance for Japan’s return to Asia. It would be really regrettable if we should lose that opportunity.’ However, Hatoyama would not be cajoled or intimidated: neither he nor Shigemitsu would be attending the conference, he responded. The government’s choice of Takasaki as head of the Japanese delegation and the reference to his headship of ECAFE was confirmation, to the opposition at least, that Japan’s participation in the conference was motivated, in the main, by economic concerns.74 Thus, the reason given by the prime minister, that the Diet sessions made it impossible for both himself and the foreign minister to attend the conference, was perceived by the opposition as highly unsatisfactory. Responding to Sone Eki’s (the right-wing Socialist Foreign Policy Chairman) queries about the Japanese delegation as well as his disappointment that neither the prime minister nor his foreign minister would be attending at Bandung, Shigemitsu reiterated Hatoyama’s explanation but also embellished it slightly. He confirmed that the Diet’s consideration of the Budget demanded his presence in Japan during the week of the conference and further noted that: ‘there were also foreign policy issues that required my attention’. He referred to these (the Budget consideration and the foreign policy issues) as his most important responsibilities (saiko no sekimu). This, he explained, was why he had relegated the talks to the second best position, although he added: ‘if parliament makes it clear that it has no objection to my attending the conference then I shall of course go’.75 Sone was not the least impressed with Shigemitsu’s response, and consequently accused the government of having adopted a negative attitude towards the event. Like Tanaka, he criticized the government for wishing the conference to be purely about economic and cultural matters. Thus, he also referred the government to the fact that, in the main, the talks would be about issues concerning self-government and independence for countries still under foreign domination. A more sympathetic appreciation of the government’s reticent attitude towards the conference came from Sato Naotaka,76 who expressed AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 186 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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the hope that the conference would not devolve into a forum for the demonstration of nationalist aspirations. This was in part because he was particularly disturbed by the growing popularity of the concept of ‘Asia for Asians’. For that reason, he warned against the determination on the part of some of the Asian countries to alienate the region from Europe and America because of their obsession with notions of independence and self-reliance. Referring to Japan’s interactions with Europe and America since the Meiji Restoration (of 1868), and the beneﬁts that Japan had gained as a result, he entreated the government to continue with the same pro-Western stance, and not to be inﬂuenced by the trend. He also warned against the narrow position being drummed up by the Asian nationalists, by which he meant India and the PRC, whom he saw as advocating neutralism, and complete severance from international politics, respectively. Sato also spoke passionately of the need to develop the economies of the South East Asian countries to contain the spread of communism in the region, a rather popular theme with the State Department.

THE TAKASAKI-ZHOU MEETING AT BANDUNG Takasaki had private meetings with some of the chief delegates, and apparently the Japanese delegation repeatedly visited the bungalow of Zhou Enlai.77 When he and Zhou Enlai met, he was quick to inform the Chinese premier that, given the nature of Japan’s alliance with the US, Tokyo had no other choice but to abide by US stipulations regarding the PRC and Taiwan. In other words, since Japan had undertaken to approve of the Government of Taiwan it could not support the government in Peking. At the same time, he pledged the Chinese premier that it was the ambition of the Japanese Government to do whatever was possible to establish better relations with the PRC. In response, Zhou Enlai reassured Takasaki that he was aware of the dilemma facing Tokyo and would therefore not put any pressures on Japan to alter its agreements with the US.78 This was, indeed, very consistent with the premier’s behaviour at the gathering. It is most interesting to note that in his personal assessment of the conﬂict between Peking and Taipei much later, Takasaki asserted that it was nothing more than a domestic problem.79 That he made such an assertion during the time of the Kishi Nobusuke administration (known for its remarkably right-wing policies), and only a few years before the Takasaki-Liao Memorandum on Trade on 9 November 1962, is striking and might be seen as an afﬁrmation of a popular Japanese sentiment. Indeed, Ouchi Hyoe (Professor and President of Hosei University) had said as much in July 1955 when he stated that: ‘. . . Formosa belong[ed] to China (Taiwan wa chugoku no mono de ...) and it would be wrong for either the puppet government of Chiang or America to try and control it.’80 Although we have argued that Japan’s participation in the conference was motivated essentially by economic interests, it would be fair to AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 187 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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assume that deciding who the Chief Delegate would be might have been equally motivated by political reasons. After all, it was obvious before the event that the Chief Delegate would meet with the Chinese premier, and since Japan was determined to establish good relations with China, naturally Tokyo would make sure that its chief delegate would be someone who would get on well with Zhou Enlai. Sufﬁce to say, the chief Japanese delegate was ‘designed’ to ensure that the Japanese rapprochement with China would not be permanently subordinated to the peace settlement with the US. The choice of Takasaki as the leader of the delegation in spite of the misgivings of the State Department could, therefore, be seen as an indication of Japan’s determination to hone an independent foreign policy in the 1950s. As indicated earlier, Japan’s ambitions to establish better relations with China were complemented by similar sentiments from the Peking government. For example, during his meeting with Takasaki in Bandung, Zhou Enlai requested that a Japanese trade mission should visit his country.81 The request was made in respect to the fact that: ‘there ha[d] been in Japan since the 29th of March . . . a Chinese Trade Mission . . . apparently engaged in serious exploratory talks’.82 It seems, however, that in its enthusiasm the PRC expressed certain expectations that the Japanese could not meet.83 For example, although China had been invited to the Trade Fair to be held in Japan in May 1955, the Chinese were displeased with the small amount of space that had been allocated to them to exhibit their items, and said so. They hoped that Japan might hold an exclusive trade fair for Chinese goods, which they promised to reciprocate. They also hoped to set up a trade mission in Japan and were prepared to host a Japanese one in China. These notwithstanding, the general expectation of both sides was that trade between the two countries would expand, despite the restrictions placed on trade with China. On the Japanese side, Murata Shozo (President of Osaka Merchant Shipping Company), among others, wanted the Japanese Government and businesses to bring pressure on the US to relax the restrictions on trade with China. He was keen to promote the exports of materials for shipbuilding, machines and steel plates to China.84 Meanwhile, in 1954, exports of fertilizers increased remarkably, as did the export of dyes and medicines – in particular peni- cillin. Murata thought that if Japan could export iron plates, ships, machines, electric-power generators (both hydroelectric and thermal power) and ammonium sulphate among other resources, then it would also be able to import whatever raw materials it needed, irrespective of volume, from China. The main items Japan required from China were soya beans, salt, ores, coal and rice.85 The issue of the repatriation of Japanese prisoners was also discussed by Takasaki and Zhou Enlai at Bandung, although nothing concrete was decided.86 On the whole, the Chinese premier had intimated that although his government was prepared to return them, progress on the matter would have to be conducted through ‘ofﬁcial’ channels instead of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 188 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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the informal approaches favoured by Japan. Apparently, Zhou’s attempts to further explore the issue were discouraged by Takasaki with a response that ‘he was not authorized to discuss such matters’.87 Indeed, Takasaki had been instructed not to discuss anything of that sort with the Chinese.

POST-CONFERENCE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES: AN IN-HOUSE ASSESSMENT OF JAPAN’S PERFORMANCE AT THE CONFERENCE Even after the conference, the issue of the membership of the delegation would not disappear. Hori Makoto, a radical member of the Social Democratic Party and a member of the House of Councillors, registered his dissatisfaction about the fact that Japan had sent Takasaki Tatsunosuke instead of the prime minister or foreign minister. As he argued, ‘Japan, attended the conference merely as an observer and did not do anything more than just that.’ He further argued that by keeping a low proﬁle at Bandung, Japan ‘played the role of the “orphan” of the Paciﬁc, which brought no advantages (toku nakatta)88 to the country’. Moreover, comparing the Japanese performance at the talks to that of the PRC, Hori concluded that the Hatoyama government had a naive view of the concerns of the conference. Consequently, he asked Hatoyama to make a statement in support of the conference instead of merely ‘ “singing platitudes” about cultural and economic cooperation’. Hori also took the opportunity to make the point that trade with China, as desired by the Japanese people, would ensure Japan’s economic independence. Naturally, Hatoyama dismissed the criticism that he had not taken the conference seriously.89 On his policy of ‘peace diplomacy’, which Hori called into question, he defended his position with the argument that to crave peace without the capability for self-defence was unrealistic. As such, he stressed that Japan had to have its own self-defence (yahari nihon wa jieiryoku wo motanakutcha naranu). At the same time, he admitted, ‘Japan lacked that power’, referring to the fact that Japan did not have the constitutional right to effect such a military capability. Repeating a well-rehearsed argument, he endeavoured to explain that this was why Japan was in military alliance with the US. He did admit, however, that cooperating with America and the West alone might not be enough, and consequently he was making efforts to establish better relations with both the Soviet Union and the PRC in an attempt to strike a balanced foreign policy. Concerning the issue of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, which also came up during the discussion, his response was more obfuscating. He argued that (although the term itself was not enshrined in the Final Communiqué of the conference) sovereignty was a universal concept supported by all nations, implying that the principle was acceptable to him. Thus, he promised that it was his government’s intention to gradually expand Japan’s relations with the PRC.90 In any case, Japan supported the principle of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ when it came up for discussion at the conference. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 189 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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The issue of the Japanese representation at the conference was taken up again by another member of the Social Democratic Party, Kataoka Fumikasa,91 at the House of Councillors. Kataoka reiterated the point about Japan’s poor representation and questioned the reason for the foreign minister’s absence. As noted earlier, the official reason given was that Shigemitsu had to be in Japan for the opening of parliament and the discussion of the national budget, but Kataoka also insisted that the real reason was because of Shigemitsu’s trip to Washington in April. Kataoka felt the conference should have taken precedence over this. His point was that, in view of the country’s weak standing in international politics, Japan could have taken advantage of the gathering to make itself heard. Japan, he argued, lost that opportunity by sending a less than satisfactory representation to the conference. Commenting on Japan’s relations with China, Kataoka also noted that Zhou Enlai and the Japanese delegation had agreed that semi- governmental trade representatives (han kan han min soshiki) of the two countries would meet. However, he was concerned about the process towards the normalization of relations with the PRC and the role of the above trade representatives in these initiatives. Like many others, he was of the opinion that these unofficial channels for friendship were unsatisfactory. Kataoka92 also raised the issue of the Chinese premier’s peace initiative towards the Americans (regarding the Taiwan conflict) on the one hand, and Dulles’s rejection of it, on the other. He thought Dulles’s intransigence could land the Pacific region in a military conflict and, therefore, appealed to the government to intervene. In response, Shigemitsu admitted93 that Zhou’s initiative was a positive gesture that signalled the possibility of peace in the region, although he also expressed doubt about whether Japan could serve as a mediator between the warring parties. However, referring to the message of peace that the Japanese delegation carried to the conference, and which had been incorporated in the Final Communiqué, Shigemitsu hoped that Japan’s contribution might assist in bringing about a peaceful resolution of the problem between the PRC and Taiwan. He proclaimed that it was his ‘ultimate ambition to find a lasting solution to the problems of the region’. Uehara Etsujiro, in his capacity as a representative of the Democratic Party at the conference, also gave an account of the talks and proceedings to the Foreign Affairs Committee.94 Although he acknowledged that the outcome of the conference itself was moderate, he did not fail to note how ‘strongly they all condemned imperialism, racism and colonialism’. These issues, which occupied the attention of the gathering extensively, were, however, incomprehensible to him, he claimed. The passion with which the issues were debated, he noted, was ‘beyond the conception of the Japanese’. He could not follow the debate, he claimed, because of his poor English, which he saw as a national (Japanese) trait. Thus, he ostenta- tiously moaned that: ‘although we crave to be part of such International conferences when it comes to it we cannot express ourselves, because we AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 190 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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do not understand the medium of language being used at such gatherings’. He added, again in defence of his performance or non-performance at the conference, as the case may be, that while he made no proclamations of solidarity with the victims of colonialism he ‘did not oppose anything that they said either’. That, incidentally, was in tune with Japan’s overall strategy to stay clear of controversial issues, especially the issue of anti- colonialism. His comments might also be seen as an admission of the fact that Japan attended the event with an agenda that was perhaps divorced from the true spirit of Bandung; as we have argued already, in the main Japan went to the gathering to kick-start economic relations with its neighbours. As may be expected, Takatsu Masamichi95 (a left-wing socialist (of the labour-farmer faction)) took issue with Uehara’s report and some of his comments. In particular, he questioned his remarks about the inability of the Japanese to appreciate the intensity with which questions about colonialism and imperialism were dealt with at the conference. He argued that given Japan’s pre-war and wartime history as a colonial power, the Japanese delegates were in a perfect position to appreciate the issues that were central to the concerns of the Afro-Asian states. He, therefore, lamented the fact that Uehara, as a Japanese representative to the conference, could not take advantage of the opportunity granted to Japan to express solidarity with the victims of these oppressive institutions. Thus, he thought it was rather disappointing that the Democratic Party could send, as a delegate to Bandung, someone who was utterly removed from the central ethos and spirit of the conference.

TAKASAKI’S REPORTS From Bandung, Takasaki sent several telegrams to Shigemitsu. On 22 April, he reported that: ‘the overall atmosphere at the conference has been friendly, and the general sentiments towards Japan have been good’.96 He subsequently wrote97 that the Japanese delegation had raised the issue of economic cooperation at the conference and gained the overwhelming support of the participants, including India and Iran, although Ceylon and Indonesia did not seem to have warmed to the idea. According to Takasaki, the last two countries ‘responded prematurely’. The telegram touched on certain speciﬁc issues; for example, it made note of a discussion about shipping and the Japanese assurances to the other conferees that Japan had the expertise to build ships small enough to easily navigate the coastal waters in the region. This was in relation to the concerns raised by some of the conference participants, Iraq and Libya in particular, about their over-dependence on American and European shipping monopolies, which charged them exorbitant freight rates. The expectation of these countries was that Japan would assist them in their efforts to own their own shipping lines. Moreover, Takasaki wrote that he had informed the relevant countries of Japan’s desire to purchase its oil requirements from countries in the region. In AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 191 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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the same telegram he also noted that he had spoken about the peaceful uses of nuclear power and against the dangers of the experiments with hydrogen bomb. In another of his telegrams to the foreign minister he gave an account of the debate concerning colonialism and imperialism,98 and confirmed the raw intensity with which the delegates debated these issues. He noted that the discussions almost disrupted the proceedings of the conference. In addition, he confirmed that on the issue of whether the Soviet Union was an imperialist power, Japan supported Turkey’s rebuttal of Nehru’s argument that the Eastern European countries were independent states and could, therefore, not be classified as colonial enclaves of Russia. In the same telegram, he spelt out the general concerns of the conference participants about the potential dangers of neo-colonialism and expressed the hope99 that the comments made by the Turkish delegate about Soviet colonialism, ‘which attracted much support’, would be recorded in the proceedings of the conference. Evidently, Japan was, in some sense, uncomfortable about the anti-Western dimensions of the talks. Takasaki’s remarks above also suggest that Japan was perhaps more sympathetic to the anxieties of the colonial powers than those of the Third World countries. Indeed, Ambassador Okamoto (at the Hague)100 had written in relation to the question of self-government and national independence for the colonies, and had specifically stated that Japan should treat the anxieties of the colonial powers such as Britain, France and Holland, who were the targets of the ‘so-called de-colonization movement’, with the utmost consideration – jubun koryo no yo aru beku. He seemed rather concerned that the colonial powers might well be ‘psychologically affected’ by the attacks on colonialism. This is not surprising since, after all, media reports101 about the liberation struggles in Africa tended to be more sympathetic towards the concerns of the colonial powers. The reports that Takasaki delivered to the House of Councillors102 and House of Representatives were rather similar. After describing the background of the conference and giving an account of the procedures adopted by the various committees, Takasaki made a number of observations that are worth highlighting for our purposes. For example, he noted how the Western countries were rather wary of the objectives of the conference. Most importantly, he declared that before leaving for Bandung, Shigemitsu handed him instructions on how Japan should conduct itself at the conference. These were that Japan should:

(1) Express support for the UN Charter; (2) Strive to promote world peace as a member of the countries in support of the West; (3) Make every possible effort to establish cordial relations with all the participants; and (4) Attempt to direct the conference towards achieving a positive attitude towards world peace. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 192 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Following that, Takasaki essentially reiterated the speeches he had made at the conference but not until he had remarked on Japan’s pre-eminent position as ‘the only industrialized country among the participants’. He was pleased that what he had said to the Economic Committee ‘was widely circulated in the publications of the conference’. Takasaki further echoed the gist of Japan’s proposal for economic cooperation and development in the region, noting that they revolved around two main themes:

(1) Economic development; and (2) Improvement, and expansion, of trade in the region.

These, in effect, were what Japan hoped to contribute directly to the development of Asia. Under the theme of economic development, he emphasized the need to ‘increase production and employment by encouraging industrialization’. Secondly, he called for the coordination of the (economic) growth plans of the countries of the region. Thirdly, he reiterated the importance of the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The need for the introduction and active application of funds from the World Bank and other international organizations into the region was the next item he spoke of. He then made note of the proposal for more branches and active participation of the World Bank and other international organizations in the region. The above proposals were meant to bring the Asian economies within the ambit of the liberal economic framework. Lastly, he requested the promotion of technical assistance between the countries. On that specific point, Japan was vital to the group since it was the only industrialized country amongst them. His comments on the second theme further confirmed Japan’s interest in the expansion of trade within the region as a whole, and in stabilizing trade in raw materials, indigenous products and, especially, prices. Takasaki also spoke of Japan’s proposal for the promotion of the exchange of sample products and information and trade fairs. Finally, he made recommendations for the adoption of a multilateral trading system. Takasaki’s report also included comments regarding Japan’s ‘Peace Declaration’ to the conference. The original Bandung Peace Declaration, which Japan apparently failed to submit, consisted of two parts, ‘the first rejecting the resort to force in an attempt to curb wars’, while the second advocated ‘cooperation in all fields of human endeavour so as to contribute to the peace and progress of our region’. This, according to the text of the proposal, ‘is an expression of the most fervent national aspirations of the Japanese people’ although it also noted that: ‘Peace is desired, of course, by all countries and peoples.’ To underline Japan’s unique position in this regard, the proposal emphasized how Japan ‘. . . caused so much suffering to other nations and almost completely ruined AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 193 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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herself in the recent war’. Thus, it ‘feels doubly the horrors of war and the desperate need for an enduring peace’, it stated. Moreover, the report included a proclamation to the effect that ‘for Japan, now on the road of reconstruction and recovery . . . peace means everything. Indeed, her very survival depends on peace.’ In his opening statement to the conference, he conjured up images of Japan’s ambitions and aspirations for the future, and lamented that although ‘within a space of one generation there had been two calamitous wars’ there was still no assurance of world peace. Consequently, he warned, ‘unless nations abolished war they will be consumed by it’, and pleaded that: ‘we must examine coolly and carefully the factors of international tension that may lead to war’, and cooperate ‘most sincerely for the eradication of those factors’. As should be evident enough, Japan’s anxieties were directly in relation to the Cold War in general and the tensions in Asia in particular. Certainly, its experiences in the Second World War necessitated the plea for ‘an earnest desire to save mankind from utter annihilation’. As Takasaki stated, ‘As the only people who have experienced the horrors of the atomic bomb, we have no illusions whatever about the enormity of the danger in attempting to solve international disputes by force.’ He then assured his neighbours and the international community that: ‘having learned [its] lesson at immense costs in lives and property . . . [Japan] is today a nation completely dedicated to peace’. He further afﬁrmed that: ‘contribut[ing] positively to the establishment of world peace is the guiding principle of Japan’s foreign policy’. Having already ‘. . . renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and . . . foresworn force as a means of settling international disputes’ Japan was now appealing to its neighbours to try and forget the past, but most importantly, to include it in the post-war reconstruction exercise. In essence, Takasaki was merely establishing the point that the success of the reconstruction process depended on cooperation among the countries, as well as on peace and stability in the region. Reporting back to the Diet, he also spoke of the pitch he had made for cultural exchange between the participating countries, the text of which contained a suggestion for the conclusion among the participants of bilateral cultural agreements. This contained a proposal for the ‘establishment of an “Asian-African Social and Cultural Prize” to be awarded annually to the best literary work or performance designed to promote the cultural advancement of the region’. The chief delegate’s participation in the conference and commitment to the economic imperatives of the Bandung experience is perhaps better captured in an article that he contributed to Chuo Koron in 1958103 which we alluded to earlier. The essence of the article is a further reafﬁrmation of what we may refer to as Takasaki’s true credentials, and perhaps the reason why he was chosen by the Hatoyama administration to head the Japanese delegation. From the article, it is apparent that Takasaki was sent to Bandung because he was perceived as a man with much passion for Japan’s AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 194 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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relations with its neighbours, and a determination to commit his country to the economic development of South East Asia. Relevant to this were Takasaki’s pan-Asianist sentiments, which we have previously mentioned. What is striking about the article is that it admits to Japan’s selfish ambitions in the early post-war era to appropriate raw materials from South East Asia (for the benefit of Japanese companies). Takasaki thought that, in the end, this would yield no real benefits for Japan but incur recriminations from its neighbours. In particular, he refers to attempts to take advantage of India’s iron ore, and alludes to his experiences in the pre-war era in what he called ‘the reconstruction and development’ of Manchuria which was then under Japanese control. In both of these cases, he claimed, he warned against the exploitation of resources in those countries for the benefit of the Japanese companies. Regarding his involvement in the negotiations between India and Japan for the development of India’s iron ore industry, for example (for which he was roundly criticized by Tanaka Toshio), he claimed he advised the Indian government to follow a policy of self-sufficiency. That is to say, he advised it to process the ore domestically instead of having it treated in Japan. He also insisted, in his own defence of course, that although the negotiations fell through, and India ended up cooperating with not only Germany, but also the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in the manufacturing of its iron, his original advice to Bombay was good. Takasaki’s reflections on Japan’s economic relations with the South East Asian countries are also thought provoking. He correctly perceived that economic assistance from both the US and the Soviet Union to the South East Asian countries was primarily motivated by Cold War politics. Consequently, he argued that the assistance given to the South East Asian countries had nothing, in essence, to do with economic development. He also referred, in particular, to America’s economic assistance to the region as tied (himotsuki) aid and warned against affiliating the Japanese Government’s funds for the development of South East Asia with US foreign policy in Asia. He also thought it would be best if the assets were not linked to the Colombo Plan, which had its origins in British colonial policies in Asia. His vision was, of course, to improve Japan’s relations with the region through the medium of economic cooperation, but he was fully cognisant of the fact that the people of South East Asia had not forgotten Japan’s pre-war and wartime aggressive policies. ‘In view of that, however well intentioned our aid to South East Asia may be, those on the receiving end might view it with some apprehension. They may even think that Japan still had territorial ambitions in the region’, he argued. Earlier in 1955, Wajima had expressed similar sentiments. He felt that the ‘South East Asian countries were more or less not sure of Japan’s intentions’. He was also of the impression that, perhaps, even Nehru and Ali (the Prime Minister of Pakistan) were unsure of where Japan stood in the overall scheme of things. Was it willing to cooperate with Asia to achieve the destiny (long-term interest) of the region or was it only interested in AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 195 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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pursuing immediate gains for itself by serving as an agent of the West?104 Naturally, the onus was on Japan ‘to demonstrate how sincere it was through its actions’,105 according to Takasaki. Effectively, he was thinking of Japan’s reparations to the countries in the region, and asserted that its importance in terms of developing better relations between the donor and the recipients could not be overstated. Accordingly, he advised the Kishi administration to formulate Japan’s reparations with a view to assisting in the development of the economies of the region.106

CONCLUSION The reference to Japan as ‘the orphan of the Paciﬁc’ encapsulates its standing in Asia in the immediate aftermath of the war. It refers, indeed, to the fact that Japan was ostracized in the region as a result of its aggressive behaviour towards its neighbours from about the 1890s to 1945, but especially in the inter-war period and during the Second World War. It is also suggestive of the fact that Japan had been subdued and humbled by its defeat in the war, and was grovelling for acceptance into the international community. The conference was, therefore, an opportunity for Japan to embrace, and be welcomed back into, a familiar community. However, as Hori and other socialist Diet members argued, it did not make good use of the opportunity. Rather, it chose to sit on the fence, trying to balance its interests in the Western camp on the one hand, and those that it was pursuing in Asia, on the other. In a sense, that was the best Japan could have done given the circumstances, since any signs of over-zealousness on its part could perhaps have been misinterpreted as ‘a resurgence of Japanese aggression’. Naturally, among the participants, a number of whom had been victims of its aggressive foreign policies, Japan was nervous; and it was jittery about being quizzed over reparations to these countries. Interestingly, however, nothing of that sort happened at the event,107 contrary to what was perceived by certain observers,108 although it seems Takasaki Tatsunosuke, head of the Japanese delegation, met privately with the relevant South East Asian leaders to thrash out issues concerning reparations,109 It is, however, true that the delegation was instructed110 to avoid issues of direct interest to Japan which might be controversial to countries in the region, or which might lead to criticism of Japan’s pre-war and wartime actions. It is a truism that following the war, Japan had been determined to stay clear of international political wrangles, and insisted on shying away from military tensions. This was a common-sense reaction to the nature of its defeat, but the reality of the security situation in East Asia, and the Japanese entanglement with the US, hugely compromised such an ideal stance in world affairs. As such, the Hatoyama administration, followed by the Ishibashi cabinet, attempted to apply what was obviously a fundamental dichotomy in their foreign policy. This amounted to submitting to the security arrangements of 1951 on the one hand, and ﬂirting with neutralist ideals as far as Japan’s routine operations in international relations AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 196 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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were concerned, on the other. Within the framework of the principle of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ this meant that Japan would endeavour to develop amicable relations with all countries, including the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. This was in line with its policy of sovereign and independent foreign policy in pursuance of genuine peace, makoto no heiwa. Yet, in general practice, Japan sidestepped the principle in solidarity with the US, obviously because of pressures from its political ally. Essentially, the US-Japan Alliance did not allow for sovereign decisions in foreign policy by Tokyo, despite the efforts of the Hatoyama and Ishibashi administrations. For example, Washington’s insistence111 that Japan should not give moral, political or economic support to the PRC undermined Tokyo’s ambitions to develop an independent and a meaningful relationship with Peking. Indeed, Ambassador Okamoto112 warned in relation to Japan’s participation in the conference: ‘above all else we have to reach a proper understanding with the US about participating in the conference.’ Nevertheless, what is clear from Japan’s behaviour at Bandung is that it refused to allow itself to serve as a ‘carrier’ for the US’s grand strategy in Asia at the time, contrary to the expectations of the State Department. Consequently, it declined to speak in support of SEATO, as shown in Chapter 2. In essence, although Japan cooperated with the US prior to the talks, it did not demonstrate its pro-American credentials well enough at the conference as, for example, did the Philippines, Turkey or Pakistan. Basically, Japan refused to ‘vigorously’ advocate American interests at the talks, leaving that work to be done by others. This might be seen as an example of the Hatoyama administration’s determination to test and underline an independent foreign policy for Japan, free from the strictures of American foreign policy. The nature of that foreign policy, as Shigemitsu explained, was to be ‘Japan centred’. Indeed, before the US decided what it had to do about the conference, Tokyo had already decided to attend. In essence, while remaining subservient to the hegemonic power, Japan still managed to manipulate the dominant discourse well enough to attain some of its objectives. In his assessment of the situation, Allison notes one of the compelling reasons why Japan had to attend the conference: ‘. . . rejection would be viewed as contrary to the new foreign policy of independence and increasing emphasis [on its Asianness]’.113 We have also noted that the main attraction for Japan in attending the conference was the economic imperative of the event. This manifested itself in the way Japan isolated itself from the political objectives of the gathering and instead emphasized its economic aspects. In view of that, the government’s domestic critics accused it of hiding behind a camouﬂage of ‘Peace Diplomacy’ while harbouring the primary intent of penetrating the economies of the South East Asian countries to dominate them. Hence, the critics argued that Japan’s relations with the Asian and African countries were mainly driven by a ‘one-sided’ self-interest.114 On the basis of that, the opposition socialist AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 197 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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party expressed dissatisfaction with the government for prioritizing the nation’s economic interests over international political matters and, in relation to that, heckled the Hatoyama administration over the composition of the delegation that was sent to the conference. Thus, Takasaki received some ﬂak since he was seemingly selected as chief delegate purely on the basis of his interest in the economic development of the region. We could perhaps end this analysis with a question for which there is conceivably no concrete answer: economic interests aside, how would Japan have felt if the Colombo powers had decided not to invite Tokyo to the conference? Certainly, Japan’s policymakers and the polity, not to mention the population as whole, would have taken it as the ultimate rejection, and would have been mortiﬁed.

NOTES 1 Shu Onrai to Atte: Murata Shozo kikoku dan’, Sekai, No. 112, April 1955; Allan B. Cole. George O. Totten and Cecil H. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 208. 2 John Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 371–2, 420. 3 I.I. Morris, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism’, pp. 9–10; Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism, p. 30. 4 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 9, Bandung, Box 2, Planning Coordination Group Series, White House Office NSC Staff: Papers, 1945–1961). 5 Ibid., p. 3. 6 See Tanaka, ‘Soviet-Japanese Normalisation and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, pp. 110–11. 7 Allan B. Cole. George O. Totten and Cecil H. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan, p. 43. 8 Ibid., p. 49. 9 Ibid., pp. 50, 57, 61. 10 See Tanaka, ‘Soviet-Japanese Normalisation and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, p. 109. 11 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 12, Address by the Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955, p. 134; Maebashi Kakuzo, Yamate Haruyuki (eds), (Yamaguchi Sadamu, Nawa Kenzo, Hatanaka Kazuo), Churitsu wa genjitsu dekiru ka, Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1961, p. 46. 12 Maebashi Kakuzo, Yamate Haruyuki, et al. (eds), p. 33. 13 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 3; Yamaguchi Fusao, Churitsu: kono minzoku no kadai, Tokyo: gendaijin sosho, 1959, pp. 139, 166; Maebashi Kakuzo, Yamate Haruyuki et al. (eds), pp. 33–4. Yoshida Shigeru of course abhorred neutralism. See John Dower, Empire and Aftermath, pp. 371, 373. 14 John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar Alliance System, London: The Athlone Press, 1988, pp. 41, 54–5. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 198 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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15 Yamaguchi Fusao, Churitsu: kono minzoku no kadai,Tokyo: gendaijin sosho, 1959, pp. 129–38, 148, 164; Maebashi Kakuzo,Yamate Haruyuki, et al. (eds), p. 34. 16 Yamaguchi Fusao, Churitsu: kono minzoku no kadai, pp. 148–9. 17 Ibid., p. 150. 18 Ibid., pp. 163–4. 19 Ibid., p. 164. 20 Ibid., pp. 166–7. 21 Ibid., p. 198. 22 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 11, Address by the Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 28 April 1955, p. 112. 23 Yamaguchi Fusao, Churitsu: kono minzoku no kadai, pp. 199–200. Although Hatoyama himself was not a neutralist Tanaka Takahiko referred to his foreign policy as ‘pseudo-neutralistic’. See Tanaka, ‘Soviet-Japanese Normalisation and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, (footnote 21) p. 114. 24 Shugiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Representatives), No. 12 (2), Address by Shigemitsu Mamoru, Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 25 April 1955, p. 83. 25 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 2, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 11 March 1955, p. 5. 26 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 3, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 6 April 1955, p. 2; Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 2, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 11 March 1955, p. 5; Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 11, Address by Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 28 April 1955, p. 113. 27 Kotaki Akira raised issue with what he referred to as Hotoyama’s perennial pragmatism and called it cynical. See Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 11, Address by Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 28 April 1955, p. 82. 28 Shugiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Representatives), No. 12 (2), Address by Ishibashi Tanzan, Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 25 April 1955, p. 88. 29 Shugiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Representatives), No. 12 (2), Address by Hatoyama Ichiro, Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 25 April 1955, p. 82. 30 Shugiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Representatives), No. 12 (2), Address by Shigemitsu Mamoru, Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 25 April 1955, p. 83. 31 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 2, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 31 March 1955, p. 8. 32 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 11, Address by Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 28 April 1955, p. 114. 33 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 2, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 11 March 1955, p. 5. 34 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 2, Kanpo (Offical Gazette), 31 March 1955; p. 14; from US Embassy in Djakarta to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1636, 29 March 1955, Department of State, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 199 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia, pp. 42, 56. 35 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 2, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 31 March 1955, p. 8. 36 R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 15. 37 Shugiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Representatives), No. 12, Address by Prime Minister Hatoyama, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 25 April 1955, p. 83; R.W. Rinden, ‘Nationalism in the Far East’, (Eisenhower Library, File Folder No. 9, Bandung, Box 2), p. 3. 38 The Preparatory Committee of the Japanese Representatives to the Asia Conference editors, Ju yon oku nin no koe – Asian Nations’ Conference: A record of the Asia-Africa Conference, April 1955, Tokyo: Orizon Company, 1955, p. 5; Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 11, Address by the Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955, p. 112. 39 The Preparatory Committee of the Japanese Representatives to the Asia Conference editors, Ju yon oku nin no koe – Asian Nations’ Conference: A record of the Asia-Africa Conference, April 1955, Tokyo: Orizon Company, 1955, p. 5; Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 1, Address by the Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955. p. 234. 40 The Preparatory Committee of the Japanese Representatives to the Asia Conference editors, Ju yon oku nin no koe – Asian Nations’ Conference: A record of the Asia-Africa Conference, April 1955, Tokyo: Orizon Company, 1955, p. 5; Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 1, Address by the Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955, p. 234. 41 Address by Mr Tatsunosuke Takasaki, Principal Japanese Delegate, before the Asian-African Conference, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 42 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 2139, 3 March 1955, Ibid. 43 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1596, 5 January 1955, Ibid. 44 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1663, 12 January 1955, Ibid. See also Tanaka Takahiko, ‘Soviet-Japanese Normalisation and the Foreign Policy Ideas of the Hatoyama Group’, p. 110. 45 ‘Ajia-Afurka kaigi e no nihon no sanka iko shokai ni kanshite tsuiho no ken’, from Shigemitsu to Yamagata, 18 December 1954, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho, B’0049. 46 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru ken’, from Wajima to Shigemitsu, 2 January 1955, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho, B’0049; ‘Aia-Afurika kaigi ni oite nihon- chukyo no shosei mondai togi ni kansuru ken’, from Kimura to Shigemitsu, 29 March 1954, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho, B’0049. 47 Ajia-Afurika kaigi e no nihon sanka mondai ni kansuru ken’, from Shigemitsu to Iguchi Sadao, 4 January 1955, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho, B’0049. 48 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi sanka ni taisuru roncho no ken’, from Okamoto to Shigemitsu, 18 January 1955, Gaimusho gaikokiroku bunsho, B0049. 49 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru’, from Wajima to Shigemitsu, 26 February 1955, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho, B’0049. 50 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru ekn’, from Yamagata to Shigemitsu, 8 March 1955, Gaimusho gaikokiroku bunsho, B0049. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 200 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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51 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni nihon sanka kata shosei ni kan suru ken’, from Wajima to Shimitsu, 31 March 1955, Gaimusho gaikokiroku bunsho, B0049. 52 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1781, 25 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59; from Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 2288, 17 March 1955, Ibid. 53 From Ichiro Hotoyama to Dr Ali Sastroamidjojo (prime minister of Indonesia), 12 February 1955, Gaimusho gaikokiroku bunsho, B0049. 54 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1781, 25 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 55 This was reminiscent of Japan’s request for a racial equality clause at the Versailles Conference in 1919. That request was made only on behalf of Japanese citizens and was incidentally rejected by the powers. See Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, London: Routledge, 1998. 56 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, 8 April 1955, Department of State, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 57 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1596, 5 January 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Ibid. 58 From Djakarta to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1826, 16 April 1955, Ibid. 59 From Ichiro Hatoyama to Dr Ali Sastroamidjojo (prime minister of Indonesia), Gaimusho gaikokiroku bunsho, B0049; from Djakarta to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1636, 29 March 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 60 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 2218, 11 March 1955, Ibid. 61 From Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 1596, 1 April, 1955, Ibid. 62 Reports and Minutes of Meetings of Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955 Public Records Office (PRO) FO 371/11682 [2231]. 63 From the US Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, ‘Composition of Japanese Delegation to Asian African Conference’, 14 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 64 Reports and Minutes of Meetings of Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955 Public Records Office (PRO) FO 371/11682 [2231]. 65 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Ajia no hanei to nihon no unmei, Chuo koron, No. 1 vol. 73, January 1958, pp. 105–109. 66 Reports and Minutes of Meetings of Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon: Proposed Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, later held in Bandung, 1955 Public Records Office (PRO) FO 371/11682 [2231]. 67 ‘Composition of Japanese Delegation to Asian African Conference’, from US Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 14 April 1955, Department of State, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 68 The technical staff were Counsellor Kojima Taisaku (Administrative staff); Ae Nobuzo (Private Secretary to the Minister of State); Okita Saburo (Researcher in charge of Economic Cooperation); Hirota Shigeru (Acting Consul-General in Jakarta); Obata Shigeyoshi (Interpreter/translator); Mori Tomio (Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Consul Yashiki Hiroshi (Consul in Jakarta); Kamikawa Yo (Officer in charge of Middle and Near-east Affairs); AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 201 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Okada Akira (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Specialist on Communist China); Yoshioka Ichiro (Consul in Jakarta); Sueoka Hidenori (Public Information Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Yamamoto Toshitada (Assistant Attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, Interpreter/translator); Nagai Nichiyo (Vice-consul in Jakarta); Muto Takeshi (Vice-Consul in Jakarta); Nagasawa Shiro (General Affairs [Accounting], Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Assistants to the Technial Staff were Ushida Hirozo (Information, English Typewriting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Nagai Shigenobu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); and Yamada Zenkichi (Assistant Clerk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 69 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 3, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 6 April 1955, p. 3. 70 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 71 Ibid., p. 17. 72 Ibid., p. 17. Tanaka Toshio was a member of the Matsumoto Ichiro faction of the Socialist Party. 73 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 3, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 6 April 1955, p. 17. 74 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 2, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 11 April 1955, p. 2. 75 Ibid., p. 14. 76 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 77 Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, trans. Molly Bondan (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981), pp. 153–4. 78 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, ‘Ajia no hanei to nihon no unmei’, Chuo koron, 1958, p. 107. 79 Ibid., p. 107. 80 ’Shu onrai to Atte: Murata Shozo kikoku dan’, Sekai, No 112, April 1955, p. 45. 81 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 12, Address by Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955, p. 134. 82 From Esler Dening (British Embassy, Tokyo) to Harold Macmillan, 4 May 1955, FO 371/115005 [C 10323/10]. Shu Onrai to Atte: Murata Shozo kikoku dan’, Sekai. 83 Shu Onrai to Atte: Murata Shozo kikoku dan’, Sekai, p. 48. 84 Ibid., p. 49. 85 Ibid., pp. 50–1. 86 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 12, Address by Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 6 May 1955, p. 4. 87 Telegram No. 2768 from Tokyo to Secretary of State, 28 April 1955, Department of State Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 88 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 11, Address by the Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 28 April 1955, p. 112. 89 Ibid., p. 113. 90 Ibid., p. 113–14. 91 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 12, Address by Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955, p. 132. 92 Ibid., pp. 132–3. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 202 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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93 Ibid., p. 134. 94 Gaimuiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee), No. 4, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 6 May 1955, p. 4. My emphasis. 95 Ibid. 96 ‘Bunka iinkai no moyo ni kansuru ken’, from Takasaki to Shigemitsu, 22 April 1955, Gaimusho gaikokiroku bunsho, B0049. 97 ‘Bandon kaigi no gaikyo ni kansuru ken’, from Takasaki to Shigemitsu, 22 April 1955, Ibid. 98 ‘A-A ni kansuru ken’, from Takasaki to Shigemitsu Mamoru, 23 April 1955, Ibid.; Masashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951–1966, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. 55. 99 ‘A-A kaigi ni kansuru’, from Takasaki to Shigemitsu, 23 April 1955, Gaimusho gaiko nkiroku bunsho, B’0049. 100 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi sanka ni taisuru roncho no ken’, from Ambassador Okamoto (The Hague) to Shigemitsu, 18 January 1955, Ibid. 101 Kawabata Masahisa, ‘Afurika no dokuritsu wa dono yo ni nihon de tsutaer- aretaka’, Ajia-Afurika kenkyu, No. 318, 1987, p. 8. 102 Sangiin kaigi roku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), No. 12, Address by Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955, pp. 142–3; Sangiin kaigi roku Proceedings of the House of Representatives, No. 12, Address by Takasaki, Minister of State, Kanpo (Official Gazette), 30 April 1955, pp. 145–6. 103 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, ‘Ajia no hanei to nihon no unmei’. 104 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi ni kansuru ken’, from Wajima to Shigemitsu, 26 February 1955, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho, B’0049. Emphasis in the original document 105 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, ‘Ajia no hanei to nihon no unmei’, p. 106. 106 Ibid., p. 107. 107 Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia, p. 56. 108 Telegram from Ambassador Cumming to Secretary of State, No. 1836, 17 April 1955, Department of State Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 109 Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia, p. 42. 110 From US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 2218, 11 March 1955, Ibid. 111 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 53–54. Shu Onrai to Atte: Murata Shozo kikoku dan’, Sekai, p. 49. 112 ‘Ajia-Afurika kaigi sanka ni taisuru roncho’, from Okamoto to Shigemitsu, 18 January 1955, Gaimusho gaiko kiroku bunsho, B’0049. 113 Telegram No. 1596 from US Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State, 5 January 1955, Department of State Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. 114 Maebashi Kakuzo, Yamate Haruyuki et al., (eds), pp. 69–70. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 203 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

5 Conclusion

BANDUNG’S LEGACY: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST MARGINALIZATION s shown in the previous chapters, in April 1955, Asia and Africa were Aswept up in one extraordinary moment of political drama that reverberated in the chambers and corridors of power throughout the world. The events that unfolded reflected, as well as epitomized, the evolving dynamics of international politics. Essentially, they gave momentum to the post-colonial ambitions of the newly-independent states of Asia and Africa by questioning, in the first instance, the justification for the status quo, and the decisions reached at Yalta. As we have already observed, however, Bandung defied a convenient definition, the very fact of which begs the simple question: what was the conference about, after all? According to the memorandum released after the Bogor Conference of 28 and 29 December 1954, the purpose of the conference would be:

(a) To promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly relations; (b) To consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented; (c) To consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, e.g. problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism; (d) To view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

The conference could therefore be seen as a statement of awareness on the part of the Bandung group of States of the regimes of power that at once regulated, disallowed and marginalized Asia and Africa in the world political and economic system. It was also symbolic of the formal cognizance on the part of the newly independent states of the conﬁgurations of AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 204 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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knowledge and power that defined the early post-war era, and most importantly of the readiness on their part to strategically manipulate the dominant discourses of international politics. In that sense, the conference was about coalescing around the problems posed by these regimes of power and throwing down the gauntlet. As such, they confronted the institutions of colonialism, as well as the new forms of ‘imperial interventions’1 – the neo-colonialist initiatives of the superpowers at various levels: military, political, economic and cultural. To what extent they were successful at these bold and radical endeavours is another matter. What is not in doubt, however, is the fact that the Bandung Conference initiated the post-war discourse on the imbalance in North-South relations, as well as index, however inadequately, the course of the future relations between the Third World and the Western countries. It also charted the course for a more constructive relationship between the Third World countries. In a nutshell, the event was symbolic of an attempt on the part of the emerging states of Asia and Africa to reinvent the dynamics of international politics in a way that would reflect their interests as well. It could, therefore, be said that through Bandung the subjects of the empire roared back, by rousing themselves and chanting their frustrations. What brought these countries together was that they had each lived through each other’s past, to some extent – being linked by a common history – and as a result felt a constant sharing of perceptions for the present and the future. To that extent, they carried a mutually familiar indignation that was easily ignited by a shared pining, and outrage at colonial systems whose existence depended on an elaborate system of racial discrimination, political manipulation and economic inequity. Yet being on the same platform, as we have shown, was no evidence of strategic convergence or even discursive conformity. After all, each of the participating countries went to the event with their distinctive form of nationalist ideals that percolated throughout the length and breadth of the proceedings, and even after. Nevertheless, most of the delegates were at the event to register defiance against a world system that took their national interests for granted. Indeed, as a statement against imperialism and the threat of war the conference was as resounding as it was provocative, and its economic imperatives were no less evocative. Basically, while politics mattered, and profoundly so, to the coterie of countries that attended the conference, economic matters were just as paramount, if not more so. They were, however, aware of the fact that their ambitions for economic development could only be pursued and realized after political liberation and a realistic sense of security had been achieved. Thus, secularizing a biblical exhortation Kwame Nkrumah, for example, famously declared: ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom and the rest shall be added unto you.’ We shall, therefore, assess the political issues that drew the participants together first and then move on to address their economic grievances and ambitions. We shall then end the discussion with an analysis of the evolution of the Bandung spirit into the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 205 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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and the latter’s attempts to affect the dominant discourses on economic development.

THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVES OF THE CONFERENCE We noted in Chapter 1 that the peace agreement that had been negotiated at Yalta in February 1945, although seemingly manageable among the powers, was unintelligible to the newly-emerging states of Asia and Africa. ‘What peace?’, and ‘in whose interest?’, were some of the questions evoked by the sentiments that brought the participants of the conference together. Soon enough, it became obvious that the negotiated peace itself was riddled with problems, the most debilitating of which was the contention between the US and the Soviet Union. As we argued in the previous chapters, the Colombo powers were agitated by the threats posed by the Cold War. All the same, even without the Cold War the newly-independent states of Asia would have coalesced around other issues pertinent to their collective interests, vis-à-vis those of the powerful rich countries of the West. The issue of colonialism alone would have demanded such a meeting, not least because in principle the political independence of the newly-liberated countries was perceived as incomplete while many more countries ‘suffered’ under colonial rule. The meeting in 1947 about Dutch attitudes towards Indonesia, for example, may be seen as a testament to this. Moreover, as is evident enough from the discussions in the other chapters, while the countries that met at Bandung might have been divided on ideological grounds, and as a corollary in relation to the Cold War between the superpowers, they were, on the whole, unified against the issue of colonialism. Thus, in the Final Communiqué of the conference it was affirmed that ‘the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights’ and an impediment to world peace, as indeed stated in the Charter of the United Nations. Not surprisingly, therefore, the communiqué stated that the participants support the freedom and independence of all peoples under alien subjugation, and, therefore, called ‘upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples’. Consequently, the political problems in North Africa were noted in the communiqué as was the issue of the Arab people of Palestine, in relation to which the communiqué called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolution on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. As such, the independence of the African countries was a sine qua non of the conference. Without doubt the countries that met at Bandung were bolstered by the injustices of the colonial system; but they were further empowered by a sense of moral superiority over the Western colonizers whose wealth and superiority depended, as they saw it, on the exploitation of the colonized people and countries. As was to be expected, the threat to the colonial empire by Bandung was well noted in Whitehall, and in particular by the Colonial Office, as AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 206 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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we show in Chapter 3. In view of that, attempts were made by certain relevant departments within Whitehall to prevent the participation of the African countries in the conference. Bureaucratic formalities were, for example, implemented as a way of throwing a spanner in the works, to prevent the Gold Coast from attending the conference. Whitehall’s main concern was that a negative portrayal of the British colonial administration by the Gold Coast at the conference would only exacerbate the problems of the British colonial system. Within Whitehall, another country that also became central to the debate about the African participation in the conference was the Central African Federation (CAF). In particular, certain officials of the Colonial Office felt that the participation of Higgins, the prime minister of the country, in the conference would only serve as further ammunition against British colonialism. Higgins was white and presiding over a racist government. Thus, as we show in our discussion in Chapter 3, the British Cabinet (under Eden) decided that the Gold Coast and the CAF should be discouraged ‘as far as possible’ from attending the conference. In the end, the CAF declined the invitation, as was expected by the conference organizers. The Gold Coast, on the other hand, accepted but opted for an observer status. Essentially, due to pressures brought to bear on Nkrumah and his government, including the fact that he did not want to do anything that would prejudice the timetable for the eventual independence of the country, the Gold Coast chose to keep as low a profile as possible at the conference. It was also obvious to Nkrumah and his government that as the first country scheduled to achieve independence in Africa south of the Sahara failure of the Gold Coast to do so (as scheduled) would be disastrous for the aspirations of the millions in Africa desperate for freedom from colonial rule. In view of that, Nkrumah himself did not attend the conference, to the disappointment of the host country, as expressed in a letter by Dr Ali Sastroamidjodo, the prime minister of Indonesia, on 17 May 1955. In response to the invitation, however, Nkrumah wrote that: ‘we have been encouraged by the kindly interest which [the countries of Asia] have taken in those territories which are still under colonial status’. In the end, having instead opted for an observer status, Nkrumah’s government sent Kojo Botsio, the minister of state, to represent the Gold Coast. Yet the colonial question grew in other dimensions as well, not least because the Eisenhower administration came to perceive the colonies as a ‘problem’ in the ideological warfare, thus exacerbating the anxieties of the British officials. As G. Hanrott argued, by putting European colonialism and communist domination of Eastern Europe in the same boat, the US was implicitly branding colonialism as an evil system.2 All the same, there were, as we have demonstrated, sympathizers for the initiatives of the newly-independent states within the British bureaucratic establishment of which R.W. Parkes was the most outstanding. He referred to the gathering as a ‘nice blend of the philosophic and spiritual’, supported with facts and a sense of sincerity. Parkes, therefore, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 207 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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enthused the Western countries to lay off their cynicism, and to show greater ‘understanding of the new Asia and Africa’. By evoking a sense of history, he referred to Europe’s own recent encounters with problems of foreign domination and pleaded with the Western countries to be more positive of the future that may open up for the Asian and African countries.

THE NEW DISCOURSE OF PEACE AND SECURITY As we have argued, those who had power were desirous of peace while those negotiating from a position of weakness saw the negotiated peace as irrelevant to their interests and therefore as esoteric. Those interests included decolonization, racial equality and respect for the sovereign rights of all nations, irrespective of their ideological inclinations. Inadvertently this called, at the very least, for a discussion with the powers through the highest diplomatic channels; and as a corollary it questioned the structure and membership of the Security Council since, at the time, it had neither an African nor Asian country on the Council. Not surprisingly, therefore, the conference reiterated in its Final Communiqué the importance of ‘universalizing’ the membership of the United Nations and ‘called on the Security Council to support the admission of all those States, which are qualiﬁed for membership in terms of the Charter’. Although not directly mentioned, the issue of the admission of the People’s Republic of China and its relevance to world peace was pertinent to this proclamation. Nehru, for example, believed that ‘the failure to recognize China was the failure of “recognizing a major event in history” ’.3 Also mentioned in relation to the promotion of world peace was the issue of the representation of the Afro-Asian region on the Security Council. The communiqué made an appeal to the effect that the Asian-African countries ‘. . . should be enabled to serve on the Security Council, so that they might make more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security’. Evidently, this was a criticism of the arrangements arrived at in London in 1946, which precluded these countries from serving on the Security Council. As shown in our discussions, the conference pursued peace within the context of a new discourse on security, an evangelical mission to save the world from nuclear war. There was in this what the British diplomat stationed in Jakarta, R.W. Parkes, referred to as a ‘. . . universal desire for peace’. Certainly, the spirit of Bandung was emboldened (perhaps as a result of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) by, according to Parkes, the spirit of romanticism, as opposed to the West’s approach which was ‘. . . too . . . realistic . . . and too destructive’. Thus, he thought it would be wise for the West to ‘appeal at least as much to idealism and the things of the spirit as to materialism’. The desire for a holistic peace and a world free of nuclear weapons was, in theory, the goal of the ideals of neutralism. Consequently, in the new discourse on security, the communiqué AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 208 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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spoke of the potential dangers and ‘risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, would be employed’. In view of that, it noted that ‘disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war [were] imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction’. Idealism aside, the gathering at Bandung felt that it had ‘a duty towards humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to the nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament’. Naturally, having only just won their independence, and riding on the wave of idealism, the Asian countries felt a glorious future ahead of them and did not want to miss out on it. That was what pushed some of them towards the new discourse of security framed in the theoretical postulations of neutralism, compared to the aggressive posturing of the powers. Parkes noted this in his report: ‘the adolescent Oriental politician sees what he considers the shortcoming and failures of his Western elders and is inwardly determined to avoid them and go one better’. Thus, the conference declared universal disarmament an absolute necessity for ‘the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts’ towards that goal. It also appealed to all concerned to speedily bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction’, and to establish an effective means of policing these. In a more general sense, the communiqué’s declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation affirms that: ‘The problem of peace correlates with the problem of international security.’ While appealing to all states to cooperate in bringing about the ‘reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons’, on the other hand, it advocated the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on the grounds that it would assist the Asian and African countries in their endeavours for ‘. . . social progress and better standards of life in large freedom’. The Chief Japanese delegate, Takasaki, expressed it in a more philosophical fashion:4 ‘. . . whether nuclear energy is to become a deadly instrument of destruction that will extinguish the human race, or it is turned to peaceful uses to bestow infinite benefits on mankind, will depend solely upon the intelligence of man’. In view of these concerns, the Bandung Peace Declaration5 was very clear in its intentions:

We delegates of the 29 Asian-African countries, met in conference at Bandung, being painfully aware of the calamities caused by the two world wars and . . . also fearful of the dire probability that the third world war will provoke the use [of] atomic weapons inevitably entail- ing the annihilation of mankind, and being anxious to ease the inter- AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 209 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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national tension and prevent war by seizing every opportunity and all available means; and to promote economic development and advance social welfare of the region, and thereby to contribute to the maintenance of world peace, based on the principles of justice, liberty and security, do solemnly declare as follows: (1) In conformity with the spirit and purpose of the UN Charter, all Asian-African countries shall desist from resorting to force, or threat of force, at any stage, or in any kind, of any situation, liable to lead to war, but seek its solution through peaceful means. (2) Recognizing the fact that the elevation of living standards is a vital factor for peace and stability, the countries of the Asian-African region shall promote cooperation among themselves in the economic, social and cultural ﬁelds so as to achieve the common prosperity of all.

THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES OF THE CONFERENCE The second item under the communiqué’s recommendations for Economic Cooperation concerned the issue of technical assistance, which stressed the need for experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment. The ‘exchange of know-how and the establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting knowledge and skills in cooperation with the existing international agencies’ was also emphasized. Within that context, the participants at Bandung chose to embrace the programme for economic development propounded in the economic growth theories of the World Bank. Consequently, while these newly independent states attempted to defy the existing world order, they could not ignore Western institutions like the World Bank that professed to have all the answers for economic growth, and as a result pushed through a discourse of development economics that promised a succession of afﬂuence for the Third World.6 Being in a hurry to pursue their economic ambitions and better life chances for their citizens, the Asian and African countries requested ‘the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development’. They also asked for the allocation of the greater part of the resources of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to the Asian and African countries. Meanwhile, the attractiveness of the Western developmental models made it impossible for these countries to disengage themselves from their former colonial masters. Inadvertently, the economic issues were, in the long run, the most important to the participants at the conference. Consequently, the Burmese Government had prepared a paper on Mutual Aid and Economic Cooperation to be presented at the conference. The paper, which had been leaked to the American Embassy in Rangoon7 by Robert Nathan Associates who, as advisers to the Burmese Government, drafted the paper, spoke eloquently of the efﬁcacy of economic cooperation. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 210 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Among others, it afﬁrmed that: ‘there [was] room for much greater interchange among us, not only of goods, but also of skills and services’. It goes on to say that: ‘There is probably no nation here, – particularly those of us who have been recently liberated from colonial domination, – which is not in acute need of certain kinds of technical skills.’ It further adds: ‘There are certainly some cases in which these could be effectively provided by others of the group.’ Furthermore, it notes that: ‘Beyond the possibility of increased economic cooperation in the exchange of goods and technical services, there exists also perhaps some possibility for the pooling and exchange of capital’, admitting that ‘in general, the nations represented at this conference are short of capital for investment’. The Burmese proposal also included a suggestion for a regional Bank for Reconstruction and Development to which member countries would contribute modest sums. Nevertheless, and perhaps more objectively, the paper also made clear the need for the countries of Asia and Africa to attract substantial sums and expertise from outside for the development process. This was because ‘few if any of the underdeveloped countries [in the region] can provide from their own resources adequate capital or technical skills’. To make these recommendations more feasible, the paper recommended the establishment of ‘a competent economic secretariat’. It would seem that the recommendations for economic cooperation in the Final Communiqué were largely based on the paper produced by the Burmese Government. In any event, the conference ‘recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region’. The communiqué further indicated that ‘there was general desire for economic cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty’; and this did not ‘preclude the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital’. Evidently, the desire for economic development was paramount in the minds of the participating countries, if only because it was seen as the panacea for poverty alleviation, which was perceived in direct correlation with issues of domestic political stability. Embedded in this vision was perhaps a desire, if not an ambition, to address the problems of economic inequity plaguing the countries. Thus, the delegates went back home having agreed among themselves the urgent need for economic development in the Asian-African region, and, in view of that, the ‘general desire for economic cooperation among the participating countries. . .’.8 As already mentioned above, the ‘. . . proposals with regard to economic cooperation within the participating countries did not preclude either the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries outside the region’, including investment of capital from countries outside Asia and Africa. Outside assistance was also needed ‘in the form of experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes’. The assumption was that such assistance, either through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, would make a valuable contribution towards the implementation of their development ambi- AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 211 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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tions. The exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and, where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills, in cooperation with the existing international agencies, were deemed equally important. This was further confirmation of the fact that development of the economies of the newly-independent countries was inseparable from related regimes and configurations of power. In essence, the leaders of the Asian-African countries made economic assistance from Europe and America an essential and integral part of their foreign and development policy. These countries, therefore, became dependent economies that were fed through, what might be referred to as, the ‘neo-colonial’ discourse of development. Basically, whatever negotiations took place between them and the aid donors, or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for that matter, did not occur between equals. Subsequently, however, the discovery of global poverty and the consequent ‘historical problematization of poverty’,9 which gave rise to the discourse of economic development, brought about the emergence of a counter discourse – the ‘development of underdevelopment’ – which became a potent force, a kind of empowerment of the South, against the North. We shall touch on this again in due course. Suffice to say, the despondency of the Third World’s economic situation created its own momentum. Essentially, given the changes in the political climate at the time – where the weak were beginning to adopt a questioning/defiant stance vis- à-vis the powers – the synergy between unequal ‘partners’ fashioned a political movement. This included the postulation of questions regarding the economic relationship between the Asian-African countries and the West. The Final Communiqué, therefore, ‘recognized the vital need for stabilizing commodity trade in the region’, as well as ‘enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments’, to counter-balance the dominance of the West. Being painfully cognisant of how badly the terms of trade were skewed in favour of the Western countries the Asian-African countries also recommended that: ‘collective action be taken by the participating countries for stabilizing the international prices of, and demand for, primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements’. What is also of crucial relevance to the issue of economic self-reliance for the participants at the conference was the stipulation in the communiqué that they ‘should diversify their export trade by processing their raw materials, wherever economically feasible, before export’. The dependence of most of these countries, if not all of them, on primary commodities whose prices were dictated by the vicissitudes of the so-called market forces, for their foreign exchange, necessitated this attempt at rationalization with interesting consequences, as, for example, the oil crisis of 1973. At the same time, the prospects of creating employment for the domestic population through the processing of the raw materials was seen as crucial for the political economy of the countries. As the movement of goods from one source to the next is essential to AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 212 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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international trade the problems with regard to shipping were also noted in the communiqué. As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, concerns about this problem elicited demands among the participating countries for the development of national shipping lines, which Japan was happy to contribute to. All these, one might say, were a manifestation of power, but in reaction to the attempts on the part of the existing systems and regimes of power to impose their will on the newly independent countries. In other words, they were manifestations of the struggles against exploitation and domination.

JAPAN’S ROLE IN POST-WAR ASIA As a member of the Asia-Africa region, Japan’s expectations of its own role in the process of economic development, in Asia at least, were enormous, evidently because its participation in the conference was predicated more on economic factors. It was also the most technologically advanced country among the participating countries. At the same time, it was part of the US strategic planning against the spread of communism, and had been specifically designated as the economic engine of East Asia to assist in the economic development of the region. The idea was to make the countries in the region less susceptible to communism with the help of Japan; the assumption being that poverty made communism attractive. Thus, as John Dower10 informs us, Tracy Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army, ‘quickly identified the Japanese- South East Asia nexus as crucial to future anti-communist regional integration of Asia’. As such, he ‘devoted much of his time from the beginning of 1950 to designing an integrated military and economic aid package that would promote such interdependence’. As planned, the responsibility for the economic development of South East Asia fell on Japan, and, knowing what the potential advantages for such a responsibility were, Japanese policymakers were more than happy to see their country cast in that role. After all, as we noted in Chapters 1 and 4, Japan was determined to reassume a leadership role in the region. More immediately and importantly, Japan wanted to gain access to the raw materials in South East Asia for its own economic interests , which suited Eisenhower's geo-strategic interests, not least because those resources were sure to keep Japan in ‘our orbit’, according to the President.11 This was why Japan had to walk a tightrope at the conference so as not to be embroiled in controversial issues that might deprive it of that opportunity. It was also precisely because of this that, while MOFA held extensive consultations with the American Embassy about the conference, when it came to the crunch Japan chose its own path, negotiating its way around the difficulties, imagined and otherwise, that the event presented. At any rate, Japan persisted with its ambition to retrieve its leadership role in Asia, and to place itself in the centre of the economic opportunities that the region could offer. The fact that Takasaki Tatsunosuke (apparently ignorant about international diplomacy) led AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 213 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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the Japanese delegation is a testament to that ambition, as well as to Japan’s attempts to underline an independent foreign policy. As we show in our analysis, however, the economic imperative behind Japan’s attendance came under intense criticism, even amongst the Japanese themselves. The Diet members of the Japanese Socialist Party were particularly vociferous in their condemnation of the economic-centred approach of the Japanese Government to the conference, berating it for lacking the political awareness to understand, much less appreciate, the concerns of the majority of the participants at the conference. What is even more intriguing in this case is how a few years later Takasaki himself expressed, in writing, his misgivings about Japan’s approach to the economic development of Asia. In any case, as we pointed out in Chapter 2 the State Department was rather displeased with Japan for its less than enthusiastic role in the event, and for its subdued support for US interests. On the other hand, Japan was taking advantage of the opportunities (that it had long coveted) that were being created, ironically, by the US hegemonic presence, and other events, in East Asia. As part of the peace settlement of September 1951, for example, Tokyo was obliged to negotiate war reparations with Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Through the reparations agreement with Indonesia in 1958, for example, Japan moved closer to the natural resources it needed in that country, especially oil. Indeed, Japan’s interest in Indonesia’s natural resources predates the Pacific War, and Japan’s southward advance in the late 1930s was motivated by the oil possessions of the South East Asian country,12 then the Dutch East Indies. It is also worth noting that Japan’s failure to have its oil quota (among other things) increased as part of its trade negotiations with the Dutch in 1940–41 instigated the country’s southward advance, with the view to taking control of the strategic resources and locations in South East Asia. The attempt to implement this plan sparked off the Pacific War in December 1941. Japan’s attempts to gain access to the natural resources in South East Asia were rekindled soon after the war. We are informed that ‘as early as 1951 the Japanese Government began discussing measures to develop Indonesian industries and to import Indonesian resources’,13 later to be framed as part of the reparations process. In essence, reparations to the South East Asian countries (which in total came to $1,152,800,000 in ‘damages’, plus $737,500,000 in loans) prepared the groundwork for Japan’s post-war involvement in the economic development of South East Asia. This, one might add, ultimately brought to fruition Japan’s promise at the Bandung Conference to assist in the development of the economies in Asia and Africa. What is crucial to the debate, as well as to the actual Japanese involvement in the development of East Asia, was the extent of the role of big business in the project, underlining the extent to which Japan was dependent on its neighbours for its own economic growth. Suffice to say, reparations evolved into economic assistance, AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 214 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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then to extensive loans to the South East Asian countries, and later to an onslaught of investments from Japanese companies from the latter part of the 1970s. It was a development which led to what has been referred to as Japan’s contribution to the post-war reconstruction and development of the region, a phenomenon that transformed an impoverished post-colonial economy into an economic miracle. Consequently, as J.A.A. Stockwin noted in 1998,14 ‘the economic record of [East Asia] over the past three decades or so . . . led easily to the argument that there must be some kind of ‘Asian model’ – deriving presumably from Asian values – that provided the secret of Asian economic successes’. Several researchers have sifted through the debate of course, but through an analysis of the processes of regionalism and regionalization in East Asia one author15 explores Japan’s roles in, and contributions to, the development of the region since the end of the Second World War. He does so by investigating specific issue areas – production, finance, security and knowledge – through which Japan has contributed to the reconstruction of the area into a cohesive entity within the wider fabric of the international political economy. By arguing that big business managed to regain its hold on economic power, he suggests that perhaps the pre-war historic bloc ‘managed to survive in a slightly modified form’.16 In any case, ASEAN is now a conglomerate of independent nation-states with substantial economic clout in the world economy. It would be appropriate for us now to look at what the legacies of the Bandung experience may well be.

THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT It is no exaggeration to state that for most of the 1950s the countries of Asia and Africa burned with vitality and fire, and sizzled with despair and hope at the same time. Indeed, they were imbued with the feral determination to redefine and reconstruct the essence of post-war international politics; and to reinvent a meaningful role for themselves in the overall scheme of things. Yet, by 1959, the dream, if not the vision, was fading away, even as newer states emerged from the shadow of colonial domination. For example, the concept of Peaceful Coexistence, which had been enshrined by China and India, was given a real kicking in the face, with the advent of the war between the two countries in 1962. The economic circumstances of the countries in the regions were not doing any better either. In view of that the Non-Aligned Movement, a new body of countries with grievances, became necessary. In that sense, perhaps Bandung did not achieve anything beyond making the colonial powers and America apprehensive for a short time, although the post- colonial narrative shows that the conference took on mystical properties. In essence, the Bandung spirit took on a life of its on, progressing in different stages and forms, as it embraced the sprawling Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In that sense, the Bandung Conference was not ‘a one-day wonder’, as a Whitehall official wished. Suffice to say, NAM was a beneficiary of a linear historical shift. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 215 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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As noted in Chapter 1, the first recorded use of the term ‘Non-Aligned’ was by Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1950,17 to describe the new attitude of staying uncontaminated by the foibles of ideological conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. As we have also noted in Chapter 1 the term was, by and large, interchangeable with neutralism, the popular concept among the newly-emerging States in the 1950s. However, Burton argued in 1965 that ‘non-alignment has become an institution . . . one which does not necessarily rest upon the continued existence of rivalry between two powerful groups’.18 Moreover, the movement seems to have developed the ability and quality to reinvent itself whenever necessary and, even after the end of the bi-polar world, it carries on defiantly and unde- terred. This is because it ‘survives’ in part on the dormant narratives that come alive perennially in response to the scandals in the relationship between the North and the South, the rich and the poor communities in world politics. To that extent, no objective analysis of post-war international politics can dismiss NAM as a blind alley. At the very least, one might say that NAM exists, even in the post-Cold-War era, to stir our memories, to find new stories and to re-evaluate old ones. Thus, like Bandung, NAM has become an established ‘opinion’. The first Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State was held in Belgrade in September 1961 primarily through the initiative of the Yugoslavian President Jozip Broz Tito, and attracted twenty-five countries. The second summit was in Cairo (1964). The Lusaka Summit (1970) was the third, followed by the summit in Algiers (1973); the one in Colombo (August 1976); the Sixth Summit, in Havana (September 1979); and so on. In all, there were fourteen NAM Summits from 1961 to 2006; and the membership of the movement stands at 116. Consequently, NAM is not just a turn of phrase as J.D.B. Miller argued in 1966 but an established vital interest. Granted, it is not a philosophy of international relations as Nehru wished.19 Indeed, the real activities of the NAM have been conducted at the United Nations General Assembly, starting with those in the 1960s, as the membership of the African states rose from 3 to 20 per cent of the membership of the UN between 1947 and 1961. The Arab, Asian and African countries together accounted for 47 per cent of the organization’s membership in 1961. Of course, this, by itself, is no index of harmony between these countries from disparate regions and cultures. Nevertheless, as we pointed out earlier, their indignation against the injustices of imperialism easily brought them together as a political unit. Thus, their solidarity on questions relating to Palestine, Portuguese colonies and apartheid was strong. That NAM, at the General Assembly, vociferously championed the case against apartheid cannot be denied, turning what looked like a regional action against minority rule into a universal force: the global anti-apartheid crusade. The Cairo Conference of July 1962 on economic links between ‘the uncommitted nations’ and the advanced economies was a point of departure in the assessment of the negative dynamics of the world AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 216 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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economy on the developing countries. By this time, it had become obvious to the developing countries that the broad commentaries, pre- scriptions and panaceas of the World Bank and other multilateral institutions might not improve the economic circumstances of the developing countries. Thus, initiated by Yugoslavia, the conference emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation between the neutralist nations by bringing into perspective (1) the impact of the EEC (European Economic Community) on outsiders; (2) the issue of how to manage and control the vicissitudes of the world commodity prices in the world market; and (3) the sources and conditions of foreign economic assistance. At the Georgetown Conference of 8–12 August 1972, an Action Programme (the conference’s main effort) for Economic Cooperation was put together. This emphasized the principle of self-reliance in national planning, full exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and cooperation in all fields among the members. The Programme included producers’ associations and joint marketing arrangements in primary commodities, preferential trading among the non-aligned, trans- port links, common policies towards foreign investments, and transnational corporations.20 The conference was the preparatory meeting for the 4th NAM Summit at Algiers in September 1973, which was convened with the firm knowledge that the economic conditions in the Third World were progressively getting worse. The increase in the price of oil made this absolutely clear although, ironically, the political decision by the Arab oil-producing nations to take charge of their natural resources and deal with it the way they saw fit, an affirmation of economic independence, was what the developing economies favoured. Effectively, the Arab oil-producing countries had done what was recommended at Bandung to all countries whose economy depended on the export of raw materials. On the other hand, the ideals of economic cooperation as enshrined in the Bandung Communiqué, and in other subsequent high- profile NAM economic programmes, failed the test of time. This ‘. . . [created] perhaps the first area of disillusionment within the movement at a time when “unity and cooperation’’’21 were much needed among the developing countries. As a matter of fact, the oil crises of 1973, and again in 1979, further widened the gap between the North (who after all coped rather well by pooling resources together) and the South. The outcome of the Algiers summit led to the sixth special session of the UN, which brought about the New International Economic Order as stated by the Preamble of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.22 Reflecting the desires and ambitions of the developing world, the Charter declared its fundamental purpose to be the promotion of ‘the establishment of a New International Economic Order, based on equity, sovereignty, equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states’. The Economic Declaration, and Action Programme, that the Charter embraced included six separate economic resolutions about transforming the existing economic and monetary policies which AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 217 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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determined the programme of economic development of the new states and at once made such objectives impossible. An active community of researchers (of the development of underdevelopment school) emerged to profess eloquently on behalf of the developing world, but most importantly to expose the imbalances and inequities produced by the international division of labour between the industrialized economies on the one hand, and the agriculture-based economies, on the other. Scholars such as André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein expressed what they saw as the flaws in the capitalist world system, and how in its operations the system was bound to undermine the development of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As Samir Amin23 would later write, ‘ “development” of the periphery has never allowed it to “catch up” the centre, since each stage of the centre’s evolution has meant a new stage in the international division of labour, and the latter goes on being unequal and assigning the periphery subordinate roles’. Essentially, these researchers highlighted the complaints of those in the periphery about the world economy and championed the cause of the NAM, affirming what they perceived to be the fatalistic outcomes of the capitalist mode of development. Meanwhile, as argued above, by the 1980s, some countries in the developing world had managed to circumvent some of the problems outlined by the above researchers, and were successfully improving their growth rates, along with the living standard of their citizens. We have already mentioned how the Arab oil-exporting countries seized control of their natural resource, oil, and used it to their advantage. The South East Asian countries (as argued above) were also defying the predictions postulated by the researchers above. Not surprisingly, the economic gap that developed between Asia and Africa as a result further weakened the solidarity between the regions. Inadvertently, this forced the geographical groupings under the umbrella of Bandung to strengthen their respective regional identities and interests, a fact that served the ASEAN and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) more than it did the members of the Organization of African Unity (now African Unity (AU)), apart from Nigeria which, as an oil-producing country, ben- efited enormously, at least in the short run, from the oil crises. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NAM’s previous preoccupations with issues pertaining to Cold War politics have given way to concerns about globalization and its ramifications on international trade, foreign direct investment, Third World debt, diseases and global environmental problems. Thus at the XIII Ministerial Conference in Cartegena, Colombia, in April 2000,24 NAM made clear in the final document of the meeting the fact that ‘the global economy has continued to marginalize a large number of the members’ of the movement, ‘particularly in Africa’. By itemizing some of the problems facing its members such as lack of ‘access to markets, capital and technology’, not to mention the problems of grappling with ‘the structural transformation necessary for practical and meaningful integration into the world AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 218 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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economy’, it highlighted what it felt was necessary for the improvement of the economic conditions in the developing world. Furthermore, it made the recommendation that ‘the central focus of the international development effort should be in the creation of an enabling international environment where developing countries will be able to acquire the requisite capacities to successfully compete and fully benefit from globalization. Still operating within the realms of the UN (in con- junction with the Group of 77 (G-77) since 1994) and other multilateral institutions, it ‘stressed the need for a better and more effective collabo- ration between the UN, the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), to promote coordination on economic, financial, technological, trade and development issues at the global level to help developing countries benefit from globalization. The awareness among the NAM members of attempts to either slow down or impede the development processes in the developing world is also evident. The final document makes it clear, for example, that the developing countries are overburdened with all sorts of conditionalities; and there is the perception that clever arguments about the environment are also used to deny the developing countries opportunities for economic development. Thus, the document appealingly states that:

While subscribing to the values of environmental protection, labour standards, intellectual property protection, sound macro-economic management and promotion and protection of all human rights, we totally reject all attempts to use these issues as conditionalities and pre- texts for restricting market access or aid and technology ﬂows to developing countries or linking them to the multilateral trade negotiations.

In view of these persistent problems, the spirit of Bandung has been evoked in recent years as a means of rekindling the old bonds between Asia and Africa, but most importantly in an attempt to apply the Asian experience to the problems of African development.25 The Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa Cooperation, for example, was adopted in 1994 to underline the possible relevance of the Asian experience to the African conundrum.26 The fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, which was celebrated in Indonesia, also confirmed the expo- nential growth in South-South relations.27 It has also rekindled the feeling that perhaps the successes of the South East Asian economies, the blueprint of which was partly mapped out on the basis of the promises that Japan made in Bandung in 1955, might be extended to Africa. Now, what could well be the long-term impact of Bandung (as a broadly conceived concept) on issues of regional and international politics, especially in relation to our case studies? We should focus in particular on the US, and Japan given the former’s position as the hegemonic state in world affairs and the latter’s prominent role in East Asian regional politics. Suffice to say also that in the case the UK decolonization has marginalized its role in Asian international affairs; and the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 219 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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vacuum that was created in the region by the displacement of London by this process has been filled, prominently, by Tokyo. With reference to current international politics, it might be appropriate to begin our analysis with an eye on the ‘terrorist’ attacks on the US on 11 September 2006 and the subsequent geo-political policies of the Bush administration on what is referred to as global terrorism. The first thing that could be said is that these events have highlighted the hitherto muffled political tensions between the West and the Third World. Admittedly, the attacks on the US were master-minded and orchestrated by a fringe group operating, apparently, under instructions of Islamic fanatics, yet the incident had connotations of the conflict between the North and the South in so far as the attacks were supposedly triggered off by issues concerning the role of the US in Middle Eastern affairs. Of particular relevance to this is the Israeli-Palestine problem; the problem of the impact of the policies of the Western countries on the economies and cultures of the Middle East countries also features in this conflict. Since those attacks on the US on 9/11 the policy responses of the Bush administration has been to attack the terrorist at the source, with emphasis on the military option. The result has been the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and the coalition forces, not to mention the coordinated operations against suspected terrorist cells around the world. The explosive responses of the fanatics have resulted in bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and London on 7 July 2005. There were also attacks on the popular tourist destination of Bali in October 2002 and October 2005. The invasion and presence of the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan following the attacks on the US in 2001 has further complicated the conflict between the Islamic fanatics and the coalition forces; at the same time it has underlined the perception that the powerful countries of the West still indulge in the politics of strength in their dealings with the weaker countries of the Third World. The fact that the invasion and occupation of Iraq was based on an unfounded intelligence report of the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has done nothing to alleviate Third World suspicions of super-power ambitions. Incidentally, the issue of weapons of mass destruction has become even more prominent recently in view of anxious reports that Iran is clandes- tinely developing nuclear weapons, and North Korea has conducted its first nuclear test in defiance of international opinion, despite repeated warnings from the US, Japan and the PRC, North Korea’s close ally. As it turns out, the two countries ‘carrying out’ these threats happen to be countries in the South with much grievance against the West; and it is perhaps a coincidence that President George Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ countries, Iran, North Korea, and Syria are all in the South, and incidentally Iran and Syria were participants in the Bandung Conference of 1955. As we noted in our earlier analyses of the conference, as part of the new discourse of peace and security, the Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference appealed to all states to cooperate in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 220 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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weapons. It bears emphasizing in this regard that so far Japan’s post-war Constitution still forbids the use of force to settle international disputes, and Tokyo has a policy of not producing, possessing or using nuclear weapons. Consequently, in relation to the nuclear test by North Korea, Japan’s Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, told a parliamentary session that despite the alleged test Japan has no intention of changing the policy against the possession of nuclear weapons. As such, it is tempting to suggest that Japan (unlike Iran, India or the US, for that matter) is still imbued with the spirit of resolving national security matters through peaceful means, as stated in its Constitution and confirmed by Takasaki at the Bandung Conference. Specifically in terms of its regional attitudes, what is apparent is that since Bandung Japan’s impulse to find a foothold in Asia through peaceful diplomacy has been amply rewarded with a strengthening of relations with the PRC since 1972, despite the US-Japan Alliance still being the leitmotif of Japanese foreign policy. Moreover, its relations with the rest of the countries in the region have never been better. This has been made possible, in part, through the transformation of the region from one that was lead, in the 1950s and 1960s in particular, by the tide of anti-colonialism and sentiments of nationalism, and later engulfed by the poiso- nous fumes of the Cold War, to a buoyant economic entity in the 1980s. Naturally, Japan’s contributions to the economic transformation of the region have confirmed its leadership role in the region, despite the ever- expanding growth of the economy of the PRC. Indeed the burgeoning growth of the Chinese economy adds a new twist to the dynamics of the geo-political arrangements of the region, not least in the sense that it clearly challenges Japan’s hegemonic position in East Asia in every sense. It is perhaps in that sense that Japan’s traditional alliance with the US becomes a blessing, if only because it provides Japan with a powerful external support, should Tokyo need it. At the same time that blessing has the potential of undermining Japan’s Asianist credentials since there seems to be, in Asia, a growing backlash against US foreign policies and their inherent intension to ‘Americanize’ every society.

NOTES 1 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making of the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 15. 2 R.W. Parkes, 'Some Impressions of the Bandung Conference’, 28 April 1955, PRO FO 371/116983 [D2231/319]; Morland to Macmillan, ‘The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung’, 28 April 1955 PRO CO 936/350 [D 2231/319]. 3 Quoted in Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989, p. 117. 4 Address of Mr. Tatsunosuke Takasaki, Principal Japanese Delegate, before the Asian-African Conference, April 1955, 670.901/4-2155, Department of State, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, Record Group 59. Text in English. See Appendix 3. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 221 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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5 The border clashes between India and China which ﬂared up as a war from 20 October to 20 November 1962 shattered the heroic ideals ‘which had become integral to the “Asian” reaction to the modern history of imperialism’. See Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, pp. 119–49. 6 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making of the Third World, p. 58. 7 From US Embassy in Rangoon to The Department of State, ‘Burmese Paper for Bandung on “Mutual Aid and Economic Co-operation” ’, 7 April 1955, Central Decimal Files, 1955–1959, National Archives Record Group 59. 8 Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 24 April 1955, p. 23. 9 Escobar, p. 58. 10 John Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Essays on History, Culture and Race, London: Fontana Press, 1993, pp. 183–4. 11 Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire, p. 70. 12 Masashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951–1966, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. 4. 13 Nishihara, p. 5; Jon Holliday and Gavan McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia’, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1973, pp. 21, 22. 14 J.A.A. Stockwin, ‘Beyond the “Asian Model" of Democracy?’, in Japanstudien: Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts fur Japanstudien der Philipp Franz von Siebold Stiftung. Munchen, Iudicum Verlag, 1998, pp. 55–69. 15 Dominic Kelly, Japan and the Reconstruction of East Asia, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002. 16 Ibid. 17 M.S. Rajan, Non-alignment and Non-aligned Movement: Retrospective, and Prospects, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd, 1990, p. 2. 18 J.W. Burton, International Relations, p. 115. 19 J.D.B. Miller, The Politics of the Third World, London: Oxford University Press (under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Relations), 1966. p. 65–68. 20 Rikhi Jaipal, Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace, Ahmedabad: Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 1987, p. 98. 21 Ibid., p. 101. 22 See Resolution 3281 XXIX of the General Assembly in 1974. 23 Samir Amin, ‘The Battle for a new international economic order’ in Maldevelopment: Anatomy of A Global Failure, Zed Books Ltd, 1990. http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu32me/uu32me05.htm# the%20excitement%20of%20the%20bandung%20plan%20(1955% 2073)2 24 http://www.nam.gov.za/xiiiminconf/ﬁnal3.htm#Development 25 http://www.unido.org/en/doc/37439 26 Kweku Ampiah, ‘Japan and the Development of Africa: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development’, African Affairs, 104/414, 2005. 27 The World Bank Group, ‘Patterns of Africa-Asia Trade and Investment: Potential for Ownership and Partnership’, Overview, October 2004. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 222 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

APPENDIX 1 Final Communiqué of The Asian-African Conference Bandung, 24 April 1955

The Asian-African Conference, convened upon the invitation of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, met in Bandung from the 18th to the 24th April, 1955. In addition to the sponsoring countries the following 24 countries participated in the conference:

1. Afghanistan 2. Cambodia 3. People’s Republic of China 4. Egypt 5. Ethiopia 6. Gold Coast 7. Iran 8. Iraq 9. Japan 10. Jordan 11. Laos 12. Lebanon 13. Liberia 14. Libya 15. Nepal 16. Philippines 17. Saudi Arabia 18. Sudan 19. Syria 20. Thailand 21. Turkey 22. Democratic Republic of Vietnam 23. State of Vietnam 24. Yemen

The Asian-African Conference considered problems of common interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political cooperation.

A. ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1.The Asian African Conference recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty. The proposals with regard to economic AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 223 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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cooperation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital. It was further recognized that the assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region, through international or under bilateral arrangements, had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programmes. 2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of: experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in cooperation with the existing international agencies. 3. The Asian-African Conference recommended: the early establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; the allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries; the early establishment of the International Finance Cooperation which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity investment; and encouragement to the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this will promote their common interest. 4. The Asian-African Conference recognized the vital need for stabilizing commodity trade in the region. The principle of enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments was accepted. However, it was recognized that some countries would have to take recourse to bilateral trade arrangements in view of their prevailing economic conditions. 5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective action be taken by participating countries for stabilizing the international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and that as far as practicable and desirable they should adopt a unified approach on the subject in the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International Commodity Trade and other international forums. 6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended that: Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw material, wherever economically feasible, before export; intra-regional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement given to the exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen; exchange of information and of samples should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade; and normal facilities should be provided for transit trade of land-locked countries. 7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable importance to Shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem, and collective action thereafter, to induce the shipping lines to adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was suggested that a study of railway freight of transit trade might be made. 8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies. 9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formulation of common policies. 10. The Asian-African Conference emphasized the particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, for the Asian-African countries. The conference welcomed the initiative of the Powers principally concerned in offering to make available information regarding the use of atomic energy for AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 224 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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peaceful purposes; urged the speedy establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency which should provide for adequate representation of the Asian- African countries on the executive authority of the Agency; and recommended to the Asian and African Governments to take full advantage of the training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programmes. 11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of Liaison Ofﬁcers in participating countries, to be nominated by their respective national Governments, for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest. It recommended that fuller use should be made of the existing international organizations, and participating countries that were not members of such international organizations, but were eligible, should secure membership. 12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc.

B. CULTURAL COOPERATION 1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural cooperation. Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilizations, which have enriched other cultures, and civilizations while themselves being enriched in the process. Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunately contacts among Asian and African countries were interrupted during the past centuries. The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world. All participating Governments at the conference reiterated their determination to work for closer cultural cooperation. 2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural cooperation but also suppresses the national cultures of the people. Some colonial powers have denied to their dependent people’s basic rights in the sphere of education and culture, which hampers the development of their personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture has been sup- pressed. Similar discrimination has been practiced against African and coloured people in some parts of the Continent of Africa. The conference felt that these policies amount to a denial of the fundamental rights of man, impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural cooperation on the wider international plane. The conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression. In particular, the conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression. 3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilizations and cultures that the conference viewed the development of cultural cooperation among Asian and African countries. True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and universality, the conference believed that Asian and African cultural cooperation should be developed in the larger context of world cooperation. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 225 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural cooperation the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and understanding. 4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa, which have not yet been able to develop their educational, scientiﬁc and technical institutions. The conference recommended that countries in Asia and Africa, which are more fortunately placed in this respect, should give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such countries to their institutions. Such facilities should also be made available to the Asian and African people in Africa to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied. 5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural cooperation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed towards:

a. The acquisition of knowledge of each other’s country; b. Mutual cultural exchange, and c. Exchange of information.

6. The Asian-African Conference was of the opinion that at this stage the best results in cultural cooperation would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by each country taking action on its own, wherever possible and feasible.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION 1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The conference declared its full support of the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a prerequisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights. 2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct is not only a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the dignity of man. The conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, especially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustain their cause; reafﬁrmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries; and pledged to use its full moral inﬂuence to guard against the danger of failing victims of the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.

D. PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENT PEOPLES 1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation and exploitation. The conference is agreed: AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 226 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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a. In declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end; b. In afﬁrming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; c. In declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples, and d. In calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian- African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.

E. OTHER PROBLEMS 1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. 2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands. 3. The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon as possible, to implement their obligations under the above-mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in ﬁnding a peaceful solution to the dispute. 4. The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen in the case of Aden and the Southern parts of Yemen known as the Protectorates and urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

F. PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND COOPERATION 1. The Asian-African Conference, taking note of the fact that several States have still not been admitted to the United Nations, considered that for effective cooperation for world peace, membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security Council to support the admission of all those States, which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter. In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference, the following among participating countries: Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, a unified Vietnam were so qualified. The conference considered that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, in relation to the principle of equi- table geographical distribution, was inadequate. It expressed the view that as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 227 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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being elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security Council, so that they might make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. 2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out. The conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition. The conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition and those speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end. Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo- nuclear weapons, this conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons. The conference declared universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

G. DECLARATION ON THE PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND COOPERATION The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and cooperation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection, all States should cooperate, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction, of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way, international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standards of life in large freedom. Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least possible delay, to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed, all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Free from mistrust and fear, and with conﬁdence and goodwill towards each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 228 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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another as good neighbors and develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the following principles:

1. RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOR THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 2. RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL NATIONS. 3. RECOGNITION OF THE EQUALITY OF ALL RACES AND OF THE EQUALITY OF ALL NATIONS LARGE AND SMALL 4. ABSTENTION FROM INTERVENTION OR INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. 5. RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF EACH NATION TO DEFEND ITSELF SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 6. (a) ABSTENTION FROM THE USE OF ARRANGEMENTS OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TO SERVE ANY PARTICULAR INTERESTS OF THE BIG POWERS. (b) ABSTENTION BY ANY COUNTRY FROM EXERTING PRESSURES ON OTHER COUNTRIES. 7. REFRAINING FROM ACTS OR THREATS OF AGGRESSION OR THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY COUNTRY. 8. SETTLEMENT OF ALL INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS, SUCH AS NEGOTIATION, CONCILIATION, ARBITRATION OR JUDICIAL SET- TLEMENT AS WELL AS OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS OF THE PARTIES OWN CHOICE, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 9. PROMOTION OF MUTUAL INTERESTS AND COOPERATION. 10. RESPECT FOR JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

The Asian and African Conference declares its conviction that friendly cooperation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural ﬁelds would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all. The Asian-African Conference recommended that the Five Sponsoring Countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the conference, in consultation with the participating countries.

Bandung, 24 April 1955 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 229 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

APPENDIX 2 Proposal for Economic Cooperation

Japanese Delegation [To the Bandung Conference], 18 April 1955

The fact that today earnest efforts are being made in the countries of the Asian- African region to promote economic development and to raise. . . [the] standard of living [of the region] is a signiﬁcant factor which contributes to world peace and prosperity. In order to accelerate and strengthen economic development and cooperation in the region, Japan proposes the following measures:

1. Economic Development

i. To increase production and employment by encouraging industrialization; ii. To coordinate individual economic development plans of the countries of the region; iii. To support early establishment of the Special UN Fund for Economic Development; iv. To introduce more actively into the region the development funds from the World Bank and other international organizations; v. To increase and reinforce. . . branches of the World Bank and other international organisations in the region; vi. To promote technical cooperation suited to the actual conditions of the region, and to set up or utilize technical facilities of various kinds.

2. Improvement and Expansion of Trade

i. To promote international consultations through [the] UN and other organizations for the purpose of stabilizing. . . transactions in the primary products of the region; ii. To promote exchange of samples and information and to hold actively trade fairs; iii. To work for the adoption of multilateral trade and payment practices. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 230 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

APPENDIX 3 Address of Mr Tatsunosuke Takasaki, Principal Japanese Delegate, Before the Asian-African Conference

April 1955

Mr President, Your Royal Highness, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is most gratifying that, thanks to the arduous labours on the part of the sponsor Governments, the representatives of many countries of Asia and Africa are able to enjoy this unique opportunity of meeting in a conference, historic in character, to exchange views on problems of mutual interests. This conference is an event unparalleled in the annals of mankind. In fact, it is eminently symbolic of the spirit of Asian-African renaissance. The Japanese Government fully aware of the importance of this conference, our Prime Minister was anxious to attend. Unfortunately, owing to the Diet now in session, which requires his constant attendance, I have come to take his place. I bring to you all the cordial greetings of Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Ichiro Hatoyama, and his best wishes for the success of this conference. It affords me a great pleasure to take part in this momentous conference and state the hopes and aspirations of the Japanese people as a member of the Asian- African region. I understand the chief objective of this conference is to promote neighbourly amity and mutual understanding among the peoples of the Asian-African region and to study intimately their common problems of the day in order to explore the means of establishing an enduring peace. This objective tallies exactly with the aim of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, calculated to preserve peace, freedom and justice. It will, I trust, appeal to all men and women who have at their hearts the progress of mankind. Japan as one of [the] Asiatic nations whose destiny is identical with that of Asia cannot but attach the greatest importance to this conference. It would be trite to say that the Asian-Africa region is the cradle of world civilization. The glorious traditions of our past constitute part and parcel of the contemporary civilization, and they form the life-blood that throbs within us. As such, these [are] the foundation of the sense of racial kinship among the Asian- African people. In spite, however, of the fact that these races are the pioneers of civilization, and they are possessed of abundant human and material resources, they have fallen behind in economic, scientiﬁc and technological development. We should, I think, recognize this fact and should achieve genuine independence and progress through self-help and mutual cooperation. I hope this conference will once again raise high the torch-light of our indigenous civilization. To survey the world situation of today, international tensions still unfortunately continue, obstructing both political stabilization and economic advancement of nations. The world has seen, within the span of one generation, two calamitous wars; it is not yet assured of peace. If nations do not abolish war, war AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 231 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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will abolish nations. Prompted, therefore, by an earnest desire to save mankind from utter annihilation, we must examine coolly and carefully the factors of international tension that may lead to war, and cooperate most sincerely for the eradication of those factors. In World War II, Japan, I regret to say, inflicted damages upon her neighbour nations, but ended by bringing untold miseries upon herself. She has re-established democracy, having learned her lesson at immense costs in lives and property. Chastened and free, she is today a nation completely dedicated to peace. As the only people who have experienced the horrors of atomic bomb, we have no illusion whatever about the enormity of an attempt to solve international dispute by force. Consequently, it has become our immutable policy to establish firmly peaceful democracy at home. Indeed, the new Japan is founded on peace and democracy. Thus, to work in hand with other democratic nations and to cultivate friendly relations with all peaceful countries of the world, and thereby to contribute positively to the establishment of world peace is the guiding principle of Japan’s foreign policy. Needless to say, our fundamental policy is to uphold the principles and purposes of the United Nations, which we believe is the best system yet devised for the maintenance of international peace and security on a basis of mutual trust. I wish to avail myself of this occasion to declare afresh that Japan has renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and has foresworn force as a means of settling international disputes; and that she is a nation dedicated to the cause of peace and democracy. The world’s most urgent need today is, I submit, to ban the use of force in any part of the globe and to establish the custom of settling by peaceful negotiation all manners on international disputes. And I believe the Asian-African countries should set an example in this respect. The present conference, by promoting mutual understanding and neighbourly amity among the Asian-African countries, can contribute vastly to world peace and, at the same time, accelerate the economic progress of their entire region. I have spoken of the scientific and technological lag of Asia and Africa. Introduction of modern science and technology is the indispensable condition for all Asian-African countries for achieving economic development as well as winning their rightful place in the society of nations. I wish to pay my sincere respect for the Asian-African nations who are over- coming many and manifold difficulties and are endeavouring strenuously in building up their economies by inducting the need capital and technology through the United Nations and other organs of international cooperation, the potential resources within these countries will be better utilized with consequent rise in the living standards of the broad masses of the people. Japan is anxious to contribute her share to the promotion of economic cooperation for the common prosperity of the region. Finally, I desire to stress the importance of cultural exchange. The countries participating in this conference possess splendid cultures of their own, and, at the same time, they all share in common spiritual heritages. Unfortunately, within this great circle of culture there has not been enough of cultural interchange. Channels for mutual edification and enlightenment are admittedly few and meagre. While adhering to the principles of respecting one another’s political system and way of living, the nations of the region should promote exchanges of knowledge and information, of scholars and artists, so as to exchange mutual understanding and to enrich our lives both materially and spiritually. That, I believe, will greatly conduce to general peace. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 232 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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In the light of the foregoing statement, the Japanese delegation will submit to the conference certain proposals on economic and cultural cooperation together with a proposal for the maintenance of international peace. I request that these be given careful consideration by the honourable delegates. Ladies and Gentlemen, the world is now entering upon the age of nuclear energy. Whether nuclear energy is to become a deadly instrument of destruction that will extinguish the human race, or it is turned to peaceful uses to bestow infinite benefits on mankind, will depend solely upon the intelligence of man. The proper choice is possible only on a high plane of spiritual culture. It is time, I believe, for we the peoples of the Asian-African region to work together to build the edifice for permanent peace, on a foundation of the moral and spiritual values handed down to them form the ages past. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 233 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

APPENDIX 4 President Sukarno’s Opening Speech, Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, 18–24 April 1955

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Sisters and Brothers. It is my great honour and privilege on this historic day to bid you welcome to Indonesia. On behalf of the people and government of Indonesia – your hosts – I beg your understanding and forbearance if some circumstances in our country do not meet your expectation. We have, I assure you, done our best to make your stay amongst us memorable for both our guests and your hosts. We hope that the warmth of our welcome will compensate for whatever material shortcomings there may be. As I survey this hall and the distinguished guests gathered here, my heart is filled with emotion. This is the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind! I am proud that my country is your host. I am happy that you were able to accept the invitations extended by the Five Sponsoring Countries. But also I cannot restrain feelings of sadness when I recall the tribulations through which many of our peoples have so recently passed, tribulations which have exacted a heavy toll in life, in material things, and in the things of the spirit. I recognize that we are gathered here today as a result of sacrifices. Sacrifices made by our forefathers and by the people of our own and younger generations. For me, this hall is filled not only by the leaders of the nations of Asia and Africa; it also contains within its walls the undying, the indomitable, the invincible spirit of those who went before us. Their struggle and sacrifice paved the way for this meeting of the highest representatives of independent and sovereign nations from two of the biggest continents of the globe. It is a new departure in the history of the world that leaders of Asian and African peoples can meet together in their own countries to discuss and deliber- ate upon matters of common concern. Only a few decades ago it was frequently necessary to travel to other countries and even other continents before the spokesmen of our peoples could confer. I recall in this connection the Conference of the ‘League Against Imperialism and Colonialism’ which was held in Brussels almost thirty years ago. At that Conference many distinguished Delegates who are present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence. But that was a meeting place thousands of miles away, amidst foreign people, in a foreign country, in a foreign continent. It was not assembled there by choice, but by necessity. Today the contrast is great. Our nations and countries are colonies no more. Now we are free, sovereign and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to go to other continents to confer. Already there have been important meetings of Asian States in Asia itself. If we look for the forerunner of this our great gathering, we must look to Colombo, capital of independent Sri Lanka, and to the Conference of the five AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 234 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Prime Ministers which was held there in 1954. And the Bogor Conference in December 1954 showed that the road ahead was clear for Asian-African solidarity, and the Conference to which I have the honour of welcoming you today is the realization of that solidarity. Indeed, I am proud that my country is your host. But my thoughts are not wholly of the honour which is Indonesia’s today. No. My mind is for a part darkened by other considerations. You have not gathered together in a world of peace and unity and cooperation. Great chasms yawn between nations and groups of nations. Our unhappy world is torn and tortured, and the peoples of all countries walk in fear lest, through no fault of theirs, the dogs of war are unchained once again. And if in spite of all that the peoples may do, this should happen. What then? What of our newly-recovered independence then? What of our children and our parents ? The burden of the delegates to this Conference is not a light one, for I know that these questions – which are questions of the life or death of humanity itself – must be on your minds, as they are on mine. And the nations of Asia and Africa cannot, even if they wish to, avoid their part in finding solutions to these problems. For that is part of the duties of independence itself. That is part of the price we gladly pay for our independence. For many generations our peoples have been the voiceless ones in the world. We have been the unregarded, the peoples for whom decisions were made by others whose interests were paramount, the peoples who lived in poverty and humiliation. Then our nations demanded, nay fought for independence, and achieved independence, and with that independence came responsibility. We have heavy responsibilities to ourselves, and to the world, and to the yet unborn generations. But we do not regret them. In 1945, the first year of our national revolution, we of Indonesia were confronted with the question of what we were going to do with our independence when it was finally attained and secured – we never questioned that it would be attained and secured. We knew how to oppose and destroy. Then we were sud- denly confronted with the necessity of giving content and meaning to our independence. Not material content and meaning only, but also ethical and moral content, for independence without ethics and without morality would be indeed a poor imitation of what we sought. The responsibilities and burdens, the rights and duties and privileges of independence must be seen as part of the ethical and moral content of independence. Indeed, we welcome the change which places new burdens upon us, and we are all resolved to exert all our strength and courage in carrying these burdens. Sisters and Brothers, how terrifically dynamic is our time! I recall that, several years ago, I had occasion to make a public analysis of colonialism, and that I then drew attention to what I called the ‘Life-line of Imperialism’. This line runs from the Straits of Gibraltar, through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan. For most of that enormous distance, the territories on both sides of this lifeline were colonies, the peoples were unfree, their futures mortgaged to an alien system. Along that lifeline, that main artery of imperialism, there was pumped the life-blood of colonialism. And today in this hall are gathered together the leaders of those same peoples. They are no longer the victims of colonialism. They are no longer the tools of others and the playthings of forces they cannot influence. Today, you are representatives of free peoples, peoples of a different stature and standing in the world. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 235 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Yes, there has indeed been a ‘Sturm über Asien’ – and over Africa too. The last few years have seen enormous changes. Nations, States, have awoken from a sleep of centuries. The passive peoples have gone, the outward tranquility has made place for struggle and activity. Irresistible forces have swept the two continents. The mental, spiritual and political face of the whole world has been changed, and the process is still not complete. There are new conditions, new concepts, new problems, new ideals abroad in the world. Hurricanes of national awakening and reawakening have swept over the land, shaking it, changing it, changing it for the better. This twentieth century has been a period of terrific dynamism. Perhaps the last fifty years have seen more developments and more material progress than the previous five hundred years. Man has learned to control many of the scourges which once threatened him. He has learned to consume distance. He has learned to project his voice and his picture across oceans and continents. He has probed deep into the secrets of nature and learned how to make the desert bloom and the plants of the earth increase their bounty. He has learned how to release the immense forces locked in the smallest particles of matter. But has man’s political skill marched hand-in-hand with his technical and scientific skill? Man can chain lightning to his command – can he control the society in which he lives? The answer is No! The political skill of man has been far outstripped by technical skill, and what he has made he cannot be sure of controlling. The result of this is fear. And man gasps for safety and morality. Perhaps now more than at any other moment in the history of the world, society, government and statesmanship need to be based upon the highest code of morality and ethics. And in political terms, what is the highest code of morality? It is the subordination of everything to the well-being of mankind. But today we are faced with a situation where the well-being of mankind is not always the primary consideration. Many who are in places of high power think, rather, of controlling the world. Yes, we are living in a world of fear. The life of man today is corroded and made bitter by fear. Fear of the future, fear of the hydrogen bomb, fear of ideologies. Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself, because it is fear which drives men to act foolishly, to act thoughtlessly, to act dangerously. In your deliberations, Sisters and Brothers, I beg of you, do not be guided by these fears, because fear is an acid which etches man’s actions into curious patterns. Be guided by hopes and determination, be guided by ideals, and, yes, be guided by dreams! We are of many different nations, we are of many different social backgrounds and cultural patterns. Our ways of life are different. Our national characters, or colours or motifs – call it what you will – are different. Our racial stock is different, and even the colour of our skin is different. But what does that matter? Mankind is united or divided by considerations other than these. Conflict comes not from variety of skins, nor from variety of religion, but from variety of desires. All of us, I am certain, are united by more important things than those which superficially divide us. We are united, for instance, by a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common detestation of racialism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilize peace in the world. Are not these aims mentioned in the letter of invitation to which you responded? I freely confess it – in these aims I am not disinterested or driven by purely impersonal motives. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 236 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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How is it possible to be disinterested about colonialism? For us, colonialism is not something far and distant. We have known it in all its ruthlessness. We have seen the immense human wastage it causes, the poverty it causes, and the heritage it leaves behind when, eventually and reluctantly, it is driven out by the inevitable march of history. My people, and the peoples of many nations of Asia and Africa know these things, for we have experienced them. Indeed, we cannot yet say that all parts of our countries are free already. Some parts still labour under the lash. And some parts of Asia and Africa which are not represented here still suffer from the same condition. Yes, some parts of our nations are not yet free. That is why all of us cannot yet feel that journey’s end has been reached. No people can feel themselves free, so long as part of their motherland is unfree. Like peace, freedom is indivisible. There is no such thing as being half free, as there is no such thing as being half alive. We are often told ‘Colonialism is dead’. Let us not be deceived or even soothed by that. I say to you, colonialism is not yet dead. How can we say it is dead, so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree? And, I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth. The battle against colonialism has been a long one, and do you know that today is a famous anniversary in that battle? On the eighteenth day of April, one thou- sand seven hundred and seventy ﬁve, just one hundred and eighty years ago, Paul Revere rode at midnight through the New England countryside, warning of the approach of British troops and of the opening of the American War of Independence, the ﬁrst successful anti-colonial war in history. About this midnight ride the poet Longfellow wrote:

A cry of deﬁance and not of fear, A voice in the darkness, a knock at the door, And a word that shall echo for evermore.

Yes, it shall echo for evermore, just as the other anti-colonial words which gave us comfort and reassurance during the darkest days of our struggle shall echo for evermore. But remember, that battle which began 180 years ago is not yet completely won, and it will not have been completely won until we can survey this our own world, and can say that colonialism is dead. So, I am not disinterested when I speak of the ﬁght against colonialism. Nor am I disinterested when I speak of the battle for peace. How can any of us be disinterested about peace? Not so very long ago we argued that peace was necessary for us because an outbreak of ﬁghting in our part of the world would imperil our precious independence, so recently won at such great cost. Today, the picture is more black. War would not only mean a threat to our independence, it may mean the end of civilization and even of human life. There is a force loose in the world whose potentiality for evil no man truly knows. Even in practice and rehearsal for war the effects may well be building up into something of unknown horror. AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 237 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Not so long ago it was possible to take some little comfort from the idea that the clash, if it came, could perhaps be settled by what were called ‘conventional weapons’ – bombs, tanks, cannon and men. Today that little grain of comfort is denied us for it has been made clear that the weapons of ultimate horror will certainly be used, and the military planning of nations is on that basis. The uncon- ventional has become the conventional, and who knows what other examples of misguided and diabolical scientific skill have been discovered as a plague on humanity. And do not think that the oceans and the seas will protect us. The food that we eat, the water that we drink, yes, even the very air that we breathe can be contaminated by poisons originating from thousands of miles away. And it could be that, even if we ourselves escaped lightly, the unborn generations of our children would bear on their distorted bodies the marks of our failure to control the forces which have been released on the world. No task is more urgent than that of preserving peace. Without peace our independence means little. The rehabilitation and up-building of our countries will have little meaning. Our revolutions will not be allowed to run their course. What can we do? The peoples of Asia and Africa wield little physical power. Even their economic strength is dispersed and slight. We cannot indulge in power politics. Diplomacy for us is not a matter of the big stick. Our statesmen, by and large, are not backed up with serried ranks of jet bombers. What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilize what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the majority, are for peace, not for war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on to the side of peace. In this struggle, some success has already been scored. I think it is generally recognized that the activity of the Prime Ministers of the Sponsoring Countries which invited you here had a not unimportant role to play in ending the fighting in Indo-China. Look, the peoples of Asia raised their voices, and the world listened. It was no small victory and no negligible precedent! The five Prime Ministers did not make threats. They issued no ultimatum, they mobilized no troops. Instead they consulted together, discussed the issues, pooled their ideas, added together their individual political skills and came forward with sound and reasoned suggestions which formed the basis for a settlement of the long struggle in Indo-China. I have often since then asked myself why these five were successful when others, with long records of diplomacy, were unsuccessful, and, in fact, had allowed a bad situation to get worse, so that there was a danger of the conflict spreading. Was it because they were Asians? Maybe that is part of the answer, for the conflagration was on their doorstep, and any extension of it would have presented an immediate threat to their own houses. But I think that the answer really lies in the fact that those five Prime Ministers brought a fresh approach to bear on the problem. They were not seeking advantage for their own countries. They had no axe of power-politics to grind. They had but one interest – how to end the fighting in such a way that the chances of continuing peace and stability were enhanced. That, my Sisters and Brothers, was an historic occasion. Some countries of free Asia spoke, and the world listened. They spoke on a subject of immediate concern AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 238 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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to Asia, and in doing so made it quite clear that the affairs of Asia are the concern of the Asian peoples themselves. The days are now long past when the future of Asia can be settled by other and distant peoples. However, we cannot, we dare not, confine our interests to the affairs of our own continents. The States of the world today depend one upon the other and no nation can be an island unto itself. Splendid isolation may once have been possible; it is so no longer. The affairs of all the world are our affairs, and our future depends upon the solutions found to all international problems, however far or distant they may seem. As I survey this hall, my thoughts go back to another Conference of Asian peoples. In the beginning of 1949 – historically speaking only a moment ago – my country was for the second time since our Proclamation of Independence engaged in a life and death struggle. Our nation was besieged and beleaguered, much of our territory occupied, a great part of our leaders imprisoned or exiled, our existence as a State threatened. Issues were being decided, not in the conference chamber, but on the battle- field. Our envoys then were rifles, and cannon, and bombs, and grenades, and bamboo spears. We were blockaded, physically and intellectually. It was at that sad but glorious moment in our national history that our good neighbour India convened a Conference of Asian and African Nations in New Delhi, to protest against the injustice committed against Indonesia and to give support to our struggle. The intellectual blockade was broken! Our Delegates flew to New Delhi and learned at first hand of the massive support which was being given to our struggle for national existence. Never before in the history of mankind has such a solidarity of Asian and African peoples been shown for the rescue of a fellow Asian Nation in danger. The diplomats and statesmen, the Press and the common men of our Asian and African neighbours were all supporting us. We were given fresh courage to press our struggle onwards to its final successful conclusion. We again realized to the full the truth of Desmoulin’s statement: ‘Have no doubt of the omnipotence of a free people’. Perhaps in some ways the Conference which has assembled here today has some roots in that manifestation of Asian-African solidarity six years ago. However that may be, the fact remains that every one of you bears a heavy responsibility, and I pray to God that the responsibility will be discharged with courage and wisdom. I pray to God that this Asian-African Conference succeeds in doing its job. Ah, Sisters and Brothers, let this Conference be a great success! In spite of diversity that exists among its participants – let this Conference be a great success! Yes, there is diversity among us. Who denies it? Small and great nations are represented here, with people professing almost every religion under the sun, – Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroasthrianism, Shintoism, and others. Almost every political faith we encounter here – Democracy, Monarchism, Theocracy, with innumerable variants. And practically every economic doctrine has its representative in this hall – Marhaenism, Socialism, Capitalism, Communism, in all their manifold variations and combinations. But what harm is in diversity, when there is unity in desire? This Conference is not to oppose each other, it is a conference of brotherhood. It is not an Islam Conference, nor a Christian Conference, nor a Buddhist Conference. It is not a meeting of Malayans, nor one of Arabs, nor one of Indo-Aryan stock. It is not an exclusive club either, not a bloc which seeks to oppose any other bloc. Rather it is a body of enlightened, tolerant opinion which seeks to impress on the world that all men and all countries have their place under the sun – to impress on the AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 239 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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world that it is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one’s individual identity; and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth. I know that in Asia and Africa there is greater diversity of religions, faiths, and beliefs, than in the other continents of the world. But that is only natural! Asia and Africa are the classic birthplaces of faiths and ideas, which have spread all over the world. Therefore, it behoves us to take particular care to ensure that the principle which is usually called the ‘Live and let live’ principle – mark, I do not say the principle of ‘Laissez faire, laissez passer’ of Liberalism which is obsolete – is ﬁrst of all applied by us most completely within our own Asian and African frontiers. Then only can it be fully extended to our relations with our neighbouring countries, and to others more distant. Religion is of dominating importance particularly in this part of the world. There are perhaps more religions here than in other regions of this globe. But, again, our countries were the birthplaces of religions. Must we be divided by the multiformity of our religious life? It is true, each religion has its own history, its own individuality, its own ‘raison d’être’, its special pride in its own beliefs, its own mission, its special truths which it desires to propagate. But unless we realize that all great religions are one in their message of tolerance and in their insistence on the observance of the principle of ‘Live and let live’, unless the followers of each religion are prepared to give the same consideration to the rights of others everywhere, unless every State does its duty to ensure that the same rights are given to the followers of all faiths – unless these things are done, religion is debased, and its true purpose perverted. Unless Asian-African countries realize their responsibilities in this matter and take steps jointly to fulﬁl them, the very strength of religious beliefs, which should be a source of unity and a bulwark against foreign interference, will cause its disruption, and may result in destroy- ing the hardwon freedom which large parts of Asia and Africa have achieved by acting together. Sisters and Brothers, Indonesia is Asia-Africa in small. It is a country with many religions and many faiths. We have in Indonesia Moslims, we have Christians, we have Civa-Buddhists, we have peoples with other creeds. Moreover, we have many ethnic units, such as Achenese, Bataks, Central-Sumatrans, Sundanese, Central- Javanese, Madurese, Toradjas, Balinese, etc. But thank God, we have our will to unity. We have our Pancha Sila. We practise the ‘Live and let live’ principle, we are tolerant to each other. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika – Unity in Diversity – is the motto of the Indonesian State. We are one nation. So, let this Asian-African Conference be a great success! Make the ‘Live and let live’ principle and the ‘Unity in Diversity’ motto the unifying force which brings us all together – to seek in friendly, uninhibited discussion, ways and means by which each of us can live his own life, and let others live their own lives, in their own way, in harmony, and in peace. If we succeed in doing so, the effect of it for the freedom, independence and the welfare of man will be great on the world at large. The Light of Understanding has again been lit, the Pillar of Cooperation again erected. The likelihood of success of this Conference is proved already by the very presence of you all here today. It is for us to give it strength, to give it the power of inspiration – to spread its message all over the World. Failure will mean that the Light of Understanding which seemed to have dawned in the East – the Light towards which looked all the great religions born AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 240 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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here in the past – has again been obscured by an unfriendly cloud before man could benefit from its warm radiance. But let us be full of hope and full of confidence. We have so much in common. Relatively speaking, all of us gathered here today are neighbours. Almost all of us have ties of common experience, the experience of colonialism. Many of us have a common religion. Many of us have common cultural roots. Many of us, the so-called ‘underdeveloped’ nations, have more or less similar economic problems, so that each can profit from the others’ experience and help. And I think I may say that we all hold dear the ideals of national independence and freedom. Yes, we have so much in common. And yet we know so little of each other. If this Conference succeeds in making the peoples of the East whose representatives are gathered here understand each other a little more, appreciate each other a little more, sympathize with each other’s problems a little more – if those things happen, then this Conference, of course, will have been worthwhile, whatever else it may achieve. But I hope that this Conference will give more than understanding only and goodwill only – I hope that it will falsify and give the lie to the saying of one diplomat from far abroad: ‘We will turn this Asian-African Conference into an afternoon-tea meeting.’ I hope that it will give evidence of the fact that we Asian and African leaders understand that Asia and Africa can prosper only when they are united, and that even the safety of the World at large can not be safeguarded without a united Asia-Africa. I hope that this Conference will give guidance to mankind, will point out to mankind the way which it must take to attain safety and peace. I hope that it will give evidence that Asia and Africa have been reborn, nay, that a New Asia and a New Africa have been born! Our task is first to seek an understanding of each other, and out of that understanding will come a greater appreciation of each other, and out of that appreciation will come collective action. Bear in mind the words of one of Asia’s greatest sons: ‘To speak is easy. To act is hard. To understand is hardest. Once one under- stands, action is easy.’ I have come to the end. Under God, may your deliberations be fruitful, and may your wisdom strike sparks of light from the hard flints of today’s circumstances. Let us not be bitter about the past, but let us keep our eyes firmly on the future. Let us remember that no blessing of God is so sweet as life and liberty. Let us remember that the stature of all mankind is diminished so long as nations or parts of nations are still unfree. Let us remember that the highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of human degradation, his bonds of poverty – the liberation of man from the physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for too long stunted the development of humanity’s majority. And let us remember, Sisters and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be united. As President of the Republic of Indonesia, and on behalf of the eighty million people of Indonesia, I bid you welcome to this country. I declare the Asian-African Conference opened, and I pray that the Blessing of God will be upon it, and that its discussions will be profitable to the peoples of Asia and Africa, and to the peoples of all nations! Bismillah! God speed AMPIAH (M839).qxd 24/8/07 10:37 AM Page 241 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

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Index

abbreviations key, xii African states feeling of being left out Abe Shinzo, 220 of discussions, 27 Action Programme for Economic agenda, broad agreement, 40–1 Cooperation, 216 amorphous membership, 30 Afghanistan, 219 antecedents, 29–31 Ali, Chaudhri Mohammed, 40–1, 70, 71 anti-colonialism, 204 Soviet imperialism, 42 anti-imperialism, 204 Allen, George, 75–6 Bogor Conference 1954 as origin, 31 Allen, W.D., 119, 130–1, 138 British post-Conference report, 149–52 Allison, John, 99, 100, 101, 108, 140–1, challenge to Yalta agreement, 30 175, 178, 183, 196 colonialism debates, 42–3 telegrams to Washington re Japanese country groupings, 41 attitudes, 90–6 crossroads of Cold War, 51 Ambassadors and their countries Dependent People, 42–3 British and American different Economic Cooperation proposal by situations, 120–1 Japan, 229 American-Formosa bilateral defence economic development of South East agreement 1954, 23 Asia, 212–13 ANZUS Treaty, 23 economic imperatives, 209–14 Arden-Clarke, Sir Charles, 127–8, 132 economic initiatives, British views, Asakai Koichiro¯, 99, 183 153–7 ASEAN, 214 economic matters, 204 ‘Asia for the Asians’ concept, 36, 90 International Bank for Reconstruction Asia-Africa Forum, Indonesia 1994, 4 and Development (IBRD), 209 Asian Countries Conference, New Delhi Japan’s attendance special situation, 1955, 173–4 6 Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi Japanese address, 230–2 1947, 2, 7, 29, 33, 33, 173 known differences exposed, 41–2 Asian Socialist Conference 1955, 134 long-term impact, 218 Asian states and independence metaphorical power, 2 consolidation, 21 military armaments, 43 ‘Asian-African Social and Cultural Prize’, Mutual Aid and Economic 193 Cooperation paper, 209–10 Australia neutralism, 208 Bandung Conference – participation neutralism doctrine institutionalized, negotiations, 33–4 25 ‘Axis of Evil’, 219 neutralism overview, 51–2 no inherent unity, 44–5 Baguio, Philippines, Conference 1950, 7, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 3, 30 204, 214–20 Bali, 219 Non-Aligned Movement gains, 45 Bandaraniake, S.W.R.D., 16 North-South relations imbalance, 204 Bandung Conference nuclear war, 207–208 African development, 218 objectives of Colombo powers, 34–5 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 246 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

246 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

opening Speech by President Sukarno, economic threats by USA suggested, 230–40 66–7 Palestine, 205 Egypt, 39–40, 66, 69, 72, 119 participating countries listed, 222 Ethiopia, 39, 76, 77, 137 Bandung Conference (cont.) France, views, 76 participation level of representation, Gold Coast, 33, 37, 77, 118, 120, 39 127–9, 129–36, 206 Peace Declaration, 208–209 India, USA anxiety, 79–80 peace mission, 207–208 Iran, 69, 147 Political Committee, 42–3 Iraq, 69 political imperatives, 205–7 Israel, 31–2 PRC participation positive, 44 Japan, 32–3, 36, 38–9, 88–90, 118, President Sukarno’s Opening Speech, 123 233–40 Japan, Pakistan views, 92–3 publications about Conference, 4–5 Lebanon, 80 purpose as seen at Bogor Conference, Liberia, 76–7, 137 203–4 Mongolia, 34 reflection of international politics, Nehru’s views, 31–4 203–204 Nepal, 33 shipping rates, 211–12 New Zealand, 33–4 Soviet imperialism, 42 North Korea, 34 Special United Nations Fund for North Vietnam, 34 Economic Development (SUNFED), Pakistan, 69–71 209 Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), 32, Takasaki Tatsunosuke’s reports, 190–5 34–5 Ten Principles, 146 Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), Ten Principles, discussions, 43 British predictions correct, 139–40 Third World, 18 Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), US Third World concept, 51–2 concerns, 35–6 two camps of participants, 8–9 Philippines, 37, 69, 73–4, 92 unanimity agreements, 41 Saudi Arabia, 39, 40 United Nations membership, 207 South Korea, 34 Bandung Conference - Final South Vietnam, 34 communiqué Soviet Asian Republics, 31 A. Economic Cooperation, 222–4 Sudan, 33, 137–8 B. Cultural Cooperation, 224–5 Syria, 147 C. Human Rights and Self- Thailand, 38, 69, 73, 92 Determination, 225 Turkey, 33, 69, 73, 139 D. Problems of Dependent Peoples, UK Foreign Office guidance to 225–6 Ambassadors, 121, 123 E. Other Problems, 226 UK views, 37 F. Promotion of World Peace and USA and pro-American nations, 38 Cooperation, 226–7 USA attempt to influence participating G. Declaration on the Promotion of countries, 78 World Peace and Cooperation, 227–8 Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa participating countries listed, 222 Cooperation, 4, 218 Ten Principles, 228 Barnes, Gorell, 127–8 USA – post Conference assessment, Bogor, Indonesia, Conference 1954, 31, 102 67, 69, 203 Bandung Conference – participation Bonin Islands, 22 negotiations and concerns Botsio, Kojo, 133, 134–6, 206 African countries still under British Burma, 209–10 rule, 126–9 Burton, J.W., 34 African countries, France views, 76 Bush administration, 219 African countries, USA views, 76 Busk, D.L., 137 anti-Communist countries to attend, 120 Cable, J.E., 121, 123–4, 128 Australia, 33–4 Cairo Conference 1962, 215–16 Burma, 147, 209–10 Cambodia, 37–8 Cambodia, 37–8 Caston, Geoffrey, 147, 148, 149 Central African Federation, 33, 118, Central African Federation 120, 127–8, 137, 206 participation negotiations and Ceylon, 69–70, 71 concerns, 118, 120, 127–8, 206 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 247 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Index 247

United Kingdom – pre-Conference Japan – Bandung Conference issues concerns, 118, 120 and concerns, 177 Chiang Kni-shek, 143, 145, 186 Japan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs China see Peoples’ Republic of China consultations pre-Conference with (PRC) USA, 100 Cold War USA – post Conference assessment, 106 definition, 19 USA – State Department, 77, 83 Japanese neutrality, 169 Zhou Enlai, 86 neutralism, 8 Formosa/Taiwan situation proxy wars, 19 Dulles, John Foster, 145–6 Colombo Conference 1954, 8, 31, 174, Japan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 175 consultations pre-Conference, 180–1 colonialism Nehru, 145 only Western colonialism recognized no formal discussion at Conference, by newly independent states, 26 145 UK Foreign Office, 122 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, 186 universally condemned, 26 UK – Foreign Office, 141–6, 145–6 USA ignorance, 55n57 USA – State Department, 81, 82, 83 Western and Soviet, 71 France Conference against Dutch action in colonialism seen as problem by USA, Indonesia, New Delhi 1949, 29–30 26 Crabb, C.V., 21, 25 pre Conference concerns, 119 Cumming, Hugh S. jr, 67–9, 84, 85 views on participation, 76 Fujiyama Aichiro¯, 183, 184 Dean, Arthur H., 79 Dei-Anang, Francis, 136 Garcia, Carlos, 74 Dening, Sir Esler, 138–9 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs Dependency theory, 24 (GATT), 97 Dixon, Sir Pierson, 146–7, 149 Georgetown Conference 1972, 216 Dulles, John Foster Ghana see Gold Coast, British concern at intransigence, 150 Goa, 177 concern over Japan participation in Gold Coast Conference, 93 address to and presence at Conference, Conference assessment positive, 103 135–6 Formosa/Taiwan, 145–6 observer status, 132–3, 206 intransigent response to PRC, 189 participation negotiations and Menon disliked, 80 concerns, 33, 37, 77, 118, 120, neutralism immoral, 63 127–9, 129–36, 206 pan-Asian movement concern, 81–2 United Kingdom - pre Conference concerns, 118, 120 ECAFE Tokyo Conference 1955, 183 Economic Commission for Asia and the Habtewold, Ato Aklilou, 137 Far East meeting 1949 (ECAFE), 173 Hanrott, E.G.G., 147–8, 149, 206 ‘Economic Recommendations, of the Hatoyama Ichiro¯, 50, 167, 168, 188 Bandung Conference’ neutralism, 46 memorandum, 154–5 non-attender, 36 Eden, Anthony and Formosa/Taiwan, PRC relations, 89 145 US-Japan Security Treaty 1951, 170 Egypt Healey, Dennis, 144 advantages available from Cold War, Henderson, Loy, 79 28 Higgins, G. (Sir Godfrey), 127, 128, 129, Bandung Conference – participation 206 negotiations, 39–40, 66 Hori Makoto, 188 Bandung Conference – participation negotiations and concerns, 119 Imru, Ras, 137 Eisenhower, Dwight, 4, 25, 26, 39, 102 India el-Azhari, Sayed Ismail, 137 advantages available from Cold War, Ethiopia 27–8 participation negotiations, 39, 76, 77 Bandung Conference – participation negotiations, 79–80 FitzGerald, C.P., 33, 34 neutralism, 19, 20 Five Principles Pakistan, 40–1 acrimonies when introduced, 43–4 Soviet aid programmes, 20 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 248 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

248 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

International Bank for Reconstruction Japan - Bandung Conference issues and Development (IBRD), 209 and concerns Iraq, 219 conﬂicting interests, 172–4 Ishibashi Tanzan, 46, 50, 167 economic co-operation, 177–8 Israel, 31–2 Five Principles, 177 Israeli–Palestine problem, 219 overall preparations, 174–8 participation decision, 178 Japan topics anticipated, 174–8 anti-American sentiment, 168 Zhou Enlai discussions, 181 appearance of consultation by USA, Japan – Foreign policy 94 Cold War neutrality, 169 ‘Asia for Asians’, 90 immediate post-war, 169–71 Asianist credentials, 220 independent approach, 50 Asia for the Asians, 186 independent policy emphasized, 212 Bandung Conference – participation Korean War, 169 negotiations, 32–3, 36 leading position in Asia ambition, 28 Bandung Conference – participation neutralism, 45–7, 49 negotiations and concerns, 118, overview, 195–7 123 ‘peace diplomacy’, 170–1 Bandung Conference options, 171–2 ‘Peaceful Co-existence’, 28, 168, 169, Bandung Conference overview, 195–7 170 ‘Chinese Threat to Japan, The’ British peacemaking role, 46, 47 paper, 138–41 PRC, 48, 50 claimed neutrality, 41 PRC trade, 169 desire for independence from USA, 91 pseudo-neutral position, 38–9 economic development of South East socialist parties, 47–51 Asia, 212–13 trade and economic relations essential, isolated position in Asia, 90 171 nationalism, 166–7 USA alliance, 170–1 neutralism, 167, 170 USA concerns, 50 peace obsession, 46 USA reliance, 49–50 ‘Peaceful Co-existence, 46 Japan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs post-war Constitution, 9, 47, 220 consultations pre-Conference PRC trade, 187 attitude overall, 179 prestige in Asia, 90 colonialism, 180 prisoners’ repatriation, 187–8 cultural interchange, 181 reparations post-War, 172, 195, 213 economic co-operation, 181 sovereignty post-war, 166–9 Formosa/Taiwan, 180–1 United Kingdom - pre Conference issues to be tabled by Japan, 179 concerns, 118, 122, 123, 138–41 nuclear power, 180 USA Ambassadors’ strong views on peaceful settlement of disputes, 181 Japan participation, 93–4 racial equality, 180 USA discussions pre-Conference, reactions to anticipated agenda items, 90–4 179–80 USA forces, in Japan, 166 three main items, 181 war avoidance at all cost, 168–9 US discussions, 174 Japan – Bandung Conference Working Group to prepare for attendance special situation, 6 Conference, 178–81 Economic Cooperation proposal, 229 Japan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tatsunosuke Takasaki’s address, 230–2 consultations pre-Conference with Japan – Bandung Conference USA delegation controversial matters to be avoided, 99 Diet debates post-Conference, 188–90 Five Principles, 100 Diet debates pre-Conference, 184–6 Japanese delegation composition, 95–6 economic development, 192 Japanese delegation composition, instructions, 191–2 97–101 non-government members, 183–4 ‘Peace Declaration’ plans, 100 overview, 181–4 United Nations importance, 95 ‘Peace Declaration’, 192–3 urged to exchange views with other reports on Conference, 190–5 countries, 96 Takasaki Tatsunosuke’s personal views, US discussions, 94–7 193–4 Working Group to prepare for technical staff, 200–1n68 Conference, 95 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 249 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Index 249

Japan – politics Nadao Hirokichi, 183 Bandung Conference delegation, Diet Naradip, Prince, 73 debates, 184–6 Nehru, Jawaharlal Conference participation decision, 178 Asia’s importance, 2 Democratic Party, 168 Bandung Conference – participation election 1953, 167–8 negotiations, 31–4 election 1955, 168 colonialism crisis, 26 Liberal Democratic Party, 51 Formosa/Taiwan, 145 Liberal Party, 49 inspiration behind Bandung ‘1955 system’, 167 Conference, ix Progressive Party, 49 keeping Cold War out of Asia, 21, 22 Ryokufukai, 183 Manila Pact attacked, 81 Social Democratic Party, 46, 48 neutralism, 17 socialist parties, 47–51 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 214 Socialist Party, 22, 169–70 non-alignment, 17 Japan-PRC unofficial trade agreement Pakistan, 40–1 1955, 50–1 peace prerequisite for economic Japan-US discussions pre-Conference, development, 21–2 90–4 praised in USA post Conference assessment, 105 Kahin, George McTurnan, US-Japan Alliance opposition, 79 Kajiwara Shigeyoshi, 183 Nepal, 33 Kase Toshikazu, 95, 98, 139, 140, 181, neutralism 183 advantages available from Cold War, Kataoka Fumikasa, 189 27–8 Kishi Nobusuke, 46, 186 aspirations to dampen Cold War, 20, Kitazawa Naokichi, 184 23 Korean War assistance accepted from any source, Japanese neutrality, 169 28 neutralism, 22 Bandung Conference, 208 proxy for Cold War, 19 Bandung Conference institutionalizing Kotelawala, Sir John, 7, 32, 40, 69, 71, doctrine, 25 125–6 Bandung Conference overview, 51–2 opening speech at Bandung, 84–5 branded as immoral, 63 Soviet imperialism, 42 British post-Conference report, 152 Cold War, 8 Lebanon, 80 Cold War reflection, 15 Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 128–9 Cold War, dissociation from, 15 Liberia, 76–7 communism equated, 67, 69 Libya oil production, 217 definitions, 15 Lyon, Peter, diplomacy valued, 23–4 five main threads, 16 MacDonald, Malcolm, 126 India, 19, 20 Macmillan, Harold, 144 India opposition to US approach, Madrid bombings, 219 79–80 Makings, Sir Roger, 81 Japan, 167, 170 Malik, Charles, 80–1 Japan’s foreign policy, 45–7 Manila Pact, 23, 81, 99 Korean War, 22 Markham, J.G., 134–5, 136 neutrality, 18–19 Mathieson, W.A.C., 132 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 215 Matsu Island, 23, 142–4 philosophy, 16 Matsumoto Takio ‘Frank’, 175 strategy to resist big powers, 27 McMahon, Robert, 25 USA see as heresy, 19 Menon, Krishna, 40, 43, 79–80 USA see as morally reprehensible, views on Zhou Enlai, 40 24–5 Middleton, G.H., 128, 130–1 USA seen as real villain, not UK, 37 Miyagi Taizo¯, 178–81 Yugoslavia, 19 Mongolia, 34 neutrality and neutralism, 18–19 ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for Asia, 9, 64 New Guinea, 177 Morland, Oscar C., x, 125, 132–3, 149, New International Economic Order, 152 216 Morris, I I, 167 New Zealand, 33–4 Murata Sho¯zo¯, 187 Nigeria oil production, 217 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 250 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

250 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

Nkrumah, Kwame, 127, 129–36, 131–3, Cold War alliance, 21 204 USA – post-Conference views, 102 letter in reply to Conference invitation PRC see Peoples’ Republic of China to Gold Coast, 134 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), x, 4, 13, Quemoy Island, 23, 142–4 24, 25, 45 Quirino, Elpidio, 30 Bandung Conference, 3, 204, 214–20 Radford, Admiral, 141 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 215 Reading, Lord, 119 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (cont.) Robert Nathan Associates, 209 (see also neutralism, 18, 214 Burma) recognition of importance, 34 Robertson, Walter, 141 self-confidence from Bandung Romulo, Carlos, 73–4, 83, 103–104 Conference, 45 anti-communism, 41 Third World, 17, 18 USA unyielding attitude to PRC, 44 Non-Aligned States Conference Belgrade Ryuku Islands, 21, 22 1961, 215 Non-Aligned States Conferences, 215–17 Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 86, 206 Non-Aligned States Ministerial Sata Tadataka, 100, 183 Conference Cartagena 2000, Sato¯ Naotaka, 185–6 217–18 Saudi Arabia, 39, 40 North Korea, 34 Scott Sir R, 141–2 nuclear weapons, 219 SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty North Vietnam, 34 Organization), 23 Nu, U, 32 SEATO and Japan, 99 SEATO meeting, Bangkok 1955, 83 oil production Sebald, William J, 74, 75 Arab exporting countries, 217 Shigemitsu Mamoru Indonesia, 155–6 Asian relationships, 50 Iran, 156 Bandung Conference options, 171–2 Nigeria, 217 favours participation in Conference, Pacific War, 213 93 Okamoto, Suemasa, 176–7 Japanese delegation, 95, 96, 181, Okita Saburo¯, 184 182 Ota Saburo, 95, 99, 181, 183 shipping freight rates, 153, 155–6, Ouchi Hyo¯e, 186 190 Ozawa Takeo, 95, 99, 179, 182 Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet 1954, 43, 60n142 Pakistan Sino-Soviet Mutual Treaty of Friendship Cold War alliance, 21 and Alliance 1950, 166 India, 40–1 Sone Eki, 100, 183, 185 Palestine, 205 South Africa pan-Asian movement concern, 81–2 anti-apartheid movement, 215 Panch Shila see Five Principles unified approach by Afro-Asian states, Parkes, R W ‘Roddie’, 136, 138, 149–52, 26 206–207, 207, 208 South East Asia, economic development Paterson, W J M, 118, 119 and Japan, 212–13 ‘Peaceful Co-existence’, 60n142 South Korea, 34 Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) South Vietnam, 34 Bandung Conference – participation Southeast Asian Collective Defence negotiations, 32, 34–5, 35–6 Treaty 1954, 23 Bandung Conference objectives, Soviet Asian Republics, 31 34–5 Soviet imperialism, 42, 71 economy, 220 Special United Nations Fund for Japan trade, 187 Economic Development (SUNFED), Matsu Island, 23 156, 192, 209 Quemoy Island, 23 Spencer, John, 137 United Nations membership, 207 Steward, J, 148–9, 152 USA relations, 65 Stockholm Conference 1954, 173–4 see also Zhou Enlai Stockwin, J.A.A., xi, 214 Philippine-American Pact, 1951, 23 Sudan, 33 Philippines (see also Romulo, Carlos) Sukarno, President, Bandung Conference Bandung Conference – participation opening speech, 233–40 negotiations, 37 Syers, Sir Cecil, 125–6 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 251 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

Index 251

Takada Gisaburo¯, 184 USA anti-colonialism approach, 148–9 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, 97–8, 99, 182–3, USA’s negative attitude, 119, 120–1 184–5, 212, 220 United Kingdom – post Conference Formosa/Taiwan, 186 assessment opening address at Conference, 230–2 Zhou Enlai achieved great victory, 106 opening statement at Conference, 174 United Kingdom – pre-Conference opening statement to Conference, 193 concerns personal views, 193–4 advice to Ambassadors, 121, 123 reports on Conference, 190–5 African countries still under British Zhou Enlai meeting, 186–8 rule, 118 Takatsu Masamichi, 190 Afro-Asian bloc formation, 124 Tanaka Toshio, 184–5 anti-colonialism agreement, 129 Tani Masayuki, 85, 97, 98, 101, 174, 175, Central African Federation, 118, 120 181, 182, 183 colonial concerns, 11 ‘terrorist’ attacks on US, 219 Conference overview, 157–60 Thailand economic initiatives at Conference, Bandung Conference – participation 153–7 negotiations, 38 Five Principles, 124 USA – post-Conference views, 102 Formosa/Taiwan, 141–6 Third World Gold Coast, 118, 120 Bandung Conference links, 18 Japan, 118, 122, 123, 138–41 bravery in confronting the West, 17, racialism agreement, 129 53n14 United Nations, 146–9 concept and, Bandung Conference, USA’s negative attitude, 119, 120–1 51–2 United Nations Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 17 African states membership, 215 Tito, Josip Broz, 28, 215 Afro-Asian countries cohesion, 147–8 Togoland Policy, 130 Afro-Asian states determined to use, Tokyo International Conference on 27 Africa Development (TICAD), 3–4 Apartheid, uniﬁed approach by Afro- Tomlinson, F.S., 121, 149 Asian states, 26 Trevelyan, Humphrey, 141 bloc votes perceived as threat, 67 Turkey, 33 economic advancement of developing countries, 156 Uehara Etsujiro¯, 183, 189–90 justice concept, 45 United Kingdom membership and Bandung Conference, African liberation movements resisted, 207 25 New International Economic Order, Anglo-American relationship tensions, 216 37 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 215 cautious approach to Conference, 37 PRC membership, 207 ‘Chinese Threat to Japan, The’ paper, priorities re-evaluated, 3 138–41 United Kingdom – pre-Conference colonialism seen as problem by USA, concerns, 146–9 26 valued by Conference speakers, 146 sceptical attitude towards, 25 United States of America views on Bandung Conference Anglo-American relationship tensions, participation, 37 37 United Kingdom – Foreign Ofﬁce anti-colonialism ignored, 31 anti-colonialism, 122 ‘Asia for the Asians’ concept, 36 Communist objectives at Conference, colonialism branded as evil, 206–207 123 communist expansion as a perceived Conference overview, 157–60 threat, 30 Five Principles, 124 concern over PRC’s attendance, 35–6 Formosa/Taiwan, 126, 141–6 ignorance of developing areas, 55n57 general objectives pre-Conference, 121 Japanese foreign policy concerns, 50 ‘guarded welcome’, for Conference, neutralism feared, 23 74 overview of attitudes pre- and post- guidance to Ambassadors, 123 Conference, 107–109 non-interference emphasis, 124 ‘Peaceful Co-existence, 46 protocol of invitations and replies, PRC relations, 65 127, 133 racism ignored, 31 United Nations and Conference, 146–9 UK colonialism seen as problem, 26 AMPIAH (M839).qxd 18/7/07 12:15 PM Page 252 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary

252 Political and Moral imperatives of the Bandung Conference

unpopularity in Asia, 65–6 Japanese participation, 88–90 unyielding attitude to PRC, 44 Japanese performance at Conference, United States of America – foreign 10, 101–2 policy Japanese reactions to US intervention, backlash against, 220 97–101 Egypt, 66 liberal opinions, 75–6 intolerant Congressmen, 66–7 opening speech by President Sukarno, neutralism and communism, 67, 69 84 paternalistic attitude, 66, 72 PRC domination of Conference United States of America – post- concerns, 80–1 Conference assessment, pre-conference objective predictions, disagreement within US ofﬁces, 77–8 104–105 Western interests. reliable Dulles welcome, 103 representatives, 69–74, 73–4 Final Communiqué, 102 Working Group on the Bandung Five Principles, 106 Conference, 73 Japan, 101 Zhou Enlai offer to relax Nehru praised, 105 Formosa/Taiwan tension, 86–8 Philippines, 102 Zhou Enlais’s initiatives, 84–8 preliminary evaluation, 105–106 US-Japan Alliance, 220 Romulo praised, 103–104 Indian opposition, 79 Soviet Union inaction, 104 US-Japan Security Treaty 1951, 22, 166, Tani Masayuki, 101 170 Thailand, 102 Zhou Enlai praised, 105–106, 109 Villard, Henry S, 80–1 United States of America – State Department Wajima Eiji, 98–9, 176, 177–8, 183, 194 1. pre-conference angst, 64–5 Wan, Prince, 102 2. initial reactions, ‘benevolent West Irian, 177 indifference’, 65–9, 76 Western policies on Middle East, 219 3. more positive stance, 72–3, 74–82 Wolfers, Arnold, 26 4. damage limitation strategy, 82–3 World Council of Churches 1948, 81 5. assessment of Conference outcome, 102–107 Yoshida Shigeru, 49–50, 167 6. overview, 107–109 Yugoslavia African participation, 76 advantages available from Cold War, 28 Ambassadors ‘informal oral’ neutralism, 19 instructions, 78–9 Ambassadors’ initial instructions, 64–5 Zhou Enlai Ambassadors’ views, 11, 67–9, 70–1, British prediction correct, 139–40 74, 93–4 conciliarity role, 40 appearance of consultation with Japan, critics welcomed to PRC, 86, 88 94 Five Principles, 86 attempt to inﬂuence participating Formosa/Taiwan situation, 86 countries, 78 impression on British listeners, 150 British policy, 73, 74 initiatives at Conference, 84–8 Dulles intransigence, 88 Japan delegation meetings, 100 Five Principles, 77, 83 leadership skills, 40 Formosa/Taiwan situation, 81, 82, 83 offers to USA to relax Formosa/Taiwan India, anxiety of USA, 79–80 tension, 86–8 interim, (pre-conference) report, 75 positive contributions welcomed, 44 Japan discussions pre-Conference, powerful performance, 109 90–4 praised in USA post Conference Japan’s participation at Bandung assessment, 105–106, 109 Conference, 88–90 pressure on him during Conference, 85 Japanese discussion with US Embassy, Takasaki Tatsunosuke meeting, 186–8 94–7 United Kingdom post-conference Japanese leadership, 97–101 assessment, 106