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Secretary G McLoughlin Address 1 Alfred Street Balaclava, 3183 ABN 81379286447

Senate Standing Committees on Economics

Without Prejudice Date 14 July 2017

Submissions: to the Senate Inquiry Operations of existing and proposed toll roads in

Who we are IMPA is a not-for-profit organisation dedicated to the creation of an evidence-based, participatory planning process for the Inner area. We seek to review and reform the existing systems so that significant, long-term planning decisions are only made with the equal participation of the community, developers and city planners. As such, we become equally responsible for socially, economically and environmentally sustainable change and we share a common ground in the need for clarity and transparency.

Our membership is across community groups, individuals, academics and business people. Our membership reach extends to the Western suburbs, North and West Melbourne, Kensington, Flemington, Moonee Ponds, Brunswick and Coburg, the eastern suburbs and the south of the central city area, Fishermans Bend and beyond. Many of our members have been actively engaged with the WestGate Tunnel project and are on the Community Reference Group. We have made a submission on that project in the Environmental Effects Statement process which closed on the 10th July 2017.

IMPA Inc. has participated in assisting member groups in organising Forums recently, one at Spotswood on the 27th April and the 3rd of July at Hoppers Crossings of this year and organised to inform the broader community about the WestGate Tunnel Project and its potential impacts on the overall city functioning. IMPA members have attended briefings and information days and on the basis of the information given and other briefings from a range of experts we make this submission on the operations of existing and proposed .

A number of IMPA Group are signatories to this submission. They include

- North and West Melbourne Association - Port People Association - Spotswood Kingsville Residents Association - Dockland Association - Flemington Association - Southbank Residents Associations - Port People - Fishermans Bend Network - Community Alliance of

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Introduction

IMPA Members face several Federal and State deadlines this month, forcing us to make this brief submission, together with an offer to expand upon the issues and evidence by telephone/Skype conference or Melbourne-based meeting at a future date.

Our submission is limited to defining the range of issues perceived by our Members with a few following comments.

Terms of Reference

“On 15 June 2017, the Senate referred the following matters to the Senate Economics References Committee for inquiry and report by 10 August 2017:

Operations of existing and proposed toll roads in Australia, including:

a. financial arrangements of existing and proposed private toll roads, and transparency, accountability and equity aspects of these arrangements; b. interaction of commercial considerations of private operators with federal and state transport and infrastructure policy; and c. any other related matters.”

Issues Perceived by IMPA Members

IMPA Members have expressed concern over a range of issues which we attempt to enumerate in the following list. Given our time constraint we will leave it to the Inquiry to research the veracity of these concerns.

1. Whereas private road building and private public partnerships (PPPs) were once effective methods of delivering specific large infrastructure projects for marginally higher financing costs with lower risk for governments, the small number of experienced specialist private toll road builder-operators can still command high financing costs as well as retention of significant risks by governments. 2. This is despite public finance rates being historically low e.g. the cost of public infrastructure bonds being at record lows (e.g. only ~5%) and only a fraction of PPP financing (e.g. IRR of 29%). 3. However, Governments would seem to s prefer to avoid the scrutiny of their own auditors through the use of off-balance-sheet financing by private toll road builder-operators and ‘confidential’ audit trails that are not transparent to the public. This avoidance also relates to desire to be seen to be avoiding creating public debt; nevertheless, toll roads impose substantial inequitable imposts on citizens in paying for mobility where in central areas, public transport rich citizens can avoid paying tolls, unlike those without good access to public transport. 4. Governments have shortened their preferred public tender bidder lists to a small number of these experienced specialist private toll road builder-operators despite their uncompetitive costs. A recent decision of ASIC under the Abbott Government was to approve TransUrban’s takeover of Queensland Motorways etc. giving TransUrban a virtual tollway monopoly throughout Australia’s Eastern States. 5. TransUrban has since earned windfall profits with revenue typically guaranteed by the respective government that takes full responsibility for collecting the toll revenue from motorists, collecting fines from non-paying tollway users.

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6. However, TransUrban can stipulate the regular increases in tolls on its CityLink and some other tollways. 7. Transurban may have avoided Australian taxation by using its Victorian profits to expand interstate as well as to underwrite the development in the USA. 8. Through joint ventures with Macquarie Bank subsidiaries, complex legal structures appear to have been devised to further minimise taxes and risks for the toll road builder-operator. 9. TransUrban has also vertically integrated through part ownership of Sun Finance (bank) to access cheaper funds without providing any public banking benefits 10. TransUrban has grown towards being a $25 billion company in about 30 years with an objective of long term profit maximisation regardless of public benefits/expenses. It has developed best practice legal/financing/construction expertise regardless of the need for projects. Its use of sophisticated structures can even make uneconomic and unviable tollway projects worthwhile and profitable. Dividends are paid regularly to shareholders despite the over-capitalisation in mega roads through ponzi-scheme like capital raisings. This is significant enough to be a weakness of some State economies as private toll road failure is possible with unexpected disruptions. 11. Its partnerships/teams have become expert at delivering justifications of sub-standard predictions and forecasts to serve its ends e.g. Aecom’s acoustic studies of City Link Tullamarine Widening were modelled at 85kph which underestimates the noise produced by traffic mostly operating close to 100kph. Models used were simplistic 2 dimensional instead of 3-dimensional needed to properly simulate noise from tall truck exhaust pipes in a valley situation. This can reduce the design heights of noise barriers and lead to significant loss of residential amenity. 12. None of the noise monitoring specified in the City Link Concession Deed for TransUrban to produce has been made available to the public. No politician or public servant is known to have seen any regular monitoring of noise levels by TransUrban although TransUrban is known to have engaged Aecom to monitor noise in response to some written complaints. However, homes found with noise in excess of the City Link 63dBA L10 18 hour standard have been left to their own devices. It has taken 22 years for the State Government to fund noise treatments along City Link (as the issue has been raised as an objection against the City Link Tullamarine Widening and against the Project). 13. TransUrban has failed to properly address unnecessary noise from truck engine brakes despite receiving complaints of residents being awakened between midnight and 6am – the 18 hour standard does not apply to these sleeping hours. 14. TransUrban is regarded as demonstrating little care about residential amenity loss or property devaluation as it has never been held to account against the Concession Deed noise standard. For the East West Link proposal it sought a relaxation of the 63dBA standard to a much higher maximum noise level to reduce noise attenuation costs even though that would have caused significant health impairment and increased public health costs. In this regard private toll road builder-operators takes the opposite approach of the of VicRoads’ professional road planning developed over many decades. 15. Air pollution hot spots impact residential areas near tollways such as City Link as the Concession Deed is too weak to protect public health and ‘standards’ are not checked/enforced by the EPA or Government despite being raised many times by epidemiologists. Why should the private toll road builder-operator care? Smoky vehicle detection devices have not been installed. 16. The environmental ‘noise and pollution plume’ of multilane tollways affects neighbouring communities for up to 2 km from the tollway, witness the 24/7 roar of traffic across South Melbourne from City link near Montague Street and westward. Elevated structures without noise barriers shed their noise footprints downwind for over 2 kilometres distance.

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17. Excess vehicle speeds, tail gaiting and other dangerous driving are seen to fail to have the level of monitoring and adherence to road rules as applies to public roads. Speed cameras are mostly non-existent. Toll revenue raising is clearly paramount and more important than the public good. 18. Nonetheless, TransUrban proposes introduction of monstrous Super b-Double and b-Triple combination truck-trailers currently illegal on public roads in Australian capital cities, with the aim of competing with railed freight and generating tolls from a greater amount of Australian freight. Rail utilisation will suffer greatly as will road trauma. 19. Toll maximising organisational culture and behaviour’ has led to ‘interference’ in normal social planning that focussed on the public good. The toll road builder-operators become profit maximising entities without the normal social obligations of public road authorities e.g. to provide rest spots, truck stops, public toilets, roadside afforestation and landscaping beautification, traffic litter and spillage control (which is allowed to pollute Moonee Ponds and Gardner’s Creeks in the case of City Link. Waterways are treated as drains, decked over by bridge/road structures and concreted excessively thus diminishing their flora, fauna, habitat and environmental values. 20. It follows that huge volumes of fast moving traffic are disgorged at exit points with amplified negative community impacts. Local municipal councils are powerless against the private toll road builder-operators which typically impose traffic management, road maintenance, road litter removal/spillage, landscaping and other costs on such third parties without subsidising it. This is then at ratepayers’ expense. 21. Planning for maximum person movements becomes secondary to maximising tolled vehicles e.g. Bus Transit/High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes originally on were never policed or enforced thus reducing their value, and were then removed. WGTP is designed with up to 19 lanes plus 4 emergency lanes at its widest point but there is not even one lane devoted to Buses or High Occupancy Vehicles. This is inefficient. 22. Toll road builder-operators usurp some of the roles of the public road authorities e.g. both TransUrban and the WDA have arranged to procure public road building expertise by seconding VicRoads executives and officers to the WGTP, which has meant that governance has been compromised. These public servants are paid to act for private profit maximisation plans/designs rather than act for the public good. This bites at the heart of democracy as the Government has compromised its true role in the name of progress. There has been no watchdog over costs which have mushroomed. Business cases have used ‘favourable’ assumptions and any public documents have been sanitised and redacted (e.g. WGTP). 23. Competitive tendering is reduced as designs favour the same tunnel boring machines as used previously and readily available even though the need to the same capacity is has not been demonstrated for WGTP. The WDA has announced that CPB Contractors (formerly Leightons) will continue with construction of the WGTP as soon as it finishes the City Link Tullamarine Widening, without so much as a performance audit. 24. In the case of City Link Tullamarine there have been several major road upgrades/expansions without EES updates. TransUrban’s environmental studies have been cover-ups and denials of the increasing social and environmental problems affecting over 10,000 people all along the Moonee Valley. Property devaluations are significant. Both the State and Federal Governments have partly funded these road capacity expansions without guarding the public interest. 25. Toll road builder-operators jealously guard their toll revenue potential to the point of taking legal action against public road authorities, governments and municipal councils to stop any building or even widening of ‘competing’ roads. Cite Wurundjeri Way legal action which prevented upgrading of that road for years. Now the Government is paying to upgrade it prior to extending it into WGTP, which financially benefits TransUrban’s WGTP tolling.

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26. Originally tolls were set by the ‘user pays principle’ whereby tollway users would pay for their tollway benefits such as travel time reduction. Competing roads/routes are typically traffic treated to discourage any toll dodging. That seems fair and equitable except that politics has determined which roads are built from the public purse and which are PPP developments. But whenever tollways become congested/blocked no refunds/discounts are given and only slower alternative routes exist. 27. Reversion from tollway to public road at the end of the ‘concession deed’ term is critical for the public good as with The Great Ocean Road and The Harbour Bridge; however, it has never happened with modern private toll road builder-operators and PPPs. The State-TransUrban venture called the Western Distributor Authority (WDA) proposes for the West Gate Tunnel Project (WGTP) to funded by way of about $8 billion of tolls from City Link users with an extension of City Link Concession Deed for 15 years after its termination date of 2034. 28. This concession deed extension makes a mockery of the Kennett Government promises to convert the free Tullamarine Freeway to a tollway for 34 years then return it to public use. It is so inequitable and unfair to toll City Link users for a (WGTP) tollway they may never use especially when it will only increase congestion on City Link. Even former Premier Jeff Kennett has spoken out publicly against this. It departs from the user pays principle so much that it has recently fuelled calls for a ubiquitous toll on all Melbourne motorways instead of just the politically chosen ones. This is being assessed by Infrastructure . 29. The risks to transport planning itself and the social implications, of being progressively ‘privatised’ through an extension of the CityLink Concession Deed and widening of contractual commitment with a private company such as TransUrban evidenced by the unintended consequences of the criminalisation of the unpaid tolling processes currently in place (See Denis Nelthorpe’s Briefing Paper Report Our Plan For A Fair And Effective Toll Enforcement System For Victoria April 2017) and private companies limits to scope of responsibility. 30. The substantial financial benefits to TransUrban of its CityLink contract in Melbourne has enabled the company to dramatically expand its base to construct toll roads interstate and finance building the Washington/Pennsylvania expressway. Because of concerns with public debt, and granting concessions to TransUrban, State governments in Australia have lost huge potential sources of revenue which could help finance public transport, hospitals schools and other infrastructure. 31. Limitations of road tolling to manage congestion. 32. The examples abound such that road pricing should not be seen as a remedy for congestion, particularly in the absence of adequate public transport. People already pay a high price for road congestion in their travel time especially considering the hourly rate for people stuck in peak hour traffic, including tradesmen travelling throughout the day in the course of work, the impacts of stress, multiple car ownership per family, etc; 33. Tolling can be seen as inequitable when as in much of Melbourne there is no effective public transport alternative, because some 70% of Melbourne is beyond the effective reach of rail, or tram services. Bus services are infrequent and poorly routed, with an average service gap of 40 minutes and few/far lesser services on weekends and evenings. Road tolling has far higher impacts on people who are transport disadvantaged living in outer suburbs and regional areas driving longer distances and both paying more for road pricing while not having good public transport. Tolling is thus regressive falling more heavily on the disadvantaged and public transport poor given the costs of running a motor vehicle averaging $14,000+ per annum compared to an annual public transport pass of around $2,000 pa. The major debts to City Link (697,793 fines issued in 2015-16) and East Link (519,369 fines issued in 2015-16) with the largest number being in key growth areas, reflects the high cost of tolls and the economic disadvantage suffered by residents in public transport deprived growth areas (Ref: Age 10 July 2017, Pages 1,10: “70% of toll

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road fines go unpaid”. 34. Contrast this with the more affluent in inner and middle Melbourne suburbs served by trams and trains which have been paid for by taxpayers generally and not by residents. So disadvantage and inequity becomes further entrenched! 35. There is considerable complexity in the endeavour to toll roads to impact behaviour change. Timing of any introduction is critical and it must be noted that the examples of and Hong Kong apply to cities with good reach of public transport services including good cross-town networks in contrast to our radial system ignoring the fact the some 60% of jobs and services are outside the CBD in local and diverse activity centres. The absence of a proper cross town public transport network for cities like Melbourne is a major limitation for an effective road pricing system. 36. Federal Government interest in road tolling/pricing to offset the impact of lost revenue from fuel excise with the shift to electric vehicles. However, the Commonwealth has limited constitutional power over road pricing because roads are a State responsibility. Commonwealth power relates to providing funding for roads not policy over roads unless ceded by the States as part of federal co-ordination or particular programs such as funding Local Government roads through Roads to Recovery; funding Black Spot and other Grant funding. As 80% of roads are local government roads, sharing of revenue from both Commonwealth and State governments to local government to ensure local road construction and maintenance is essential irrespective of how roads are priced.

Comments specifically on the Proposed WestGate Tunnel Project

The West Gate Tunnel Project (WGTP) - No Mandate / No plan / selective Policy basis 37. In considering the merits of this proposal it is worth reviewing if this government has a clear mandate or policy basis on which to carry out a project of this city shaping scale. In 2014 the Andrew’s ALP Government electoral platform proposed an alternative works to the East West Link. This included a West Gate Distributor (WGD) designed to address longstanding freight issues, including taking 5000 trucks per day off the . The WGD aimed to create a freight road upgrade between the Dynon Port freight precinct and the at a cost of $0.5 Billion. The proposal involved widening Shepherd Bridge over the , upgrading Whitehall Street and building ramps to and from West Gate Freeway but funding was only provided to VicRoads for the first part (almost completed). Shortly after the ALP took office, the Government’s focus turned to TransUrban’s unsolicited Western Distributor bid, a hugely inflated $5.5 Billion project, recently re-named the West Gate Tunnel Project (WGTP). Many in the community believe this to be a breach of the mandate this government was given at the 2014 election and is the western extension of the East West Link. 38. The WGTP has now morphed into a mega project 11 times the cost of WGD and a city-shaping scale with many issues to be considered and negative community impacts unless proper governance, planning and objective appraisal processes are adopted to balance the conflicts between public and private interests. Many professional associations and community groups argue that the WGTP will not address critical needs or deliver optimal outcomes for Victorians and should be drastically scaled down in size and properly planned as part of a comprehensive multi-modal solution. 39. The policy basis for the development of the Western Distributor Business Case has been highly selective in the policies that it refers to. There are significant omissions as follows, substantially around the Port and Freight Transport planning.  Freight Futures (State of Victoria, 2008)

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 Melbourne @ 5 Million (State of Victoria, 2008)  Port Futures (State of Victoria, 2009)  Port Development Strategy 2035 Vision ( Corporation, August 2009)  Shaping Melbourne’s Freight Future (Department of Transport, 2010)

2010 State Election – Liberals Victoria/The Nationals – [No integrated Transport Policy]

 National Ports Strategy (Infrastructure Australia and the National Transport Commission, 2011)  2014 State Election – Victorian Australian Labor Party policy Project 10,000 40. One of the repeated calls from our membership is for the reinstatement of the line (removed by Kennett as part of the Docklands Development) and port shuttle train services to attract heavy freight off road which is consistent with the state’s GHG emission reduction target objectives as well as local campaigns to remove trucks form local roads. $58 million of the total $120 million Federal-State funding allocation was never used as intended for the approved port shuttle train intermodal terminal enhancement works. It was recently re-assigned to the new Melbourne Port Manager to produce a rail strategy within 3 years. However, the main public statement from the Manager has called for widening or duplication of West Gate Bridge over the Yarra because the WGTP does not provide the future road capacity they envisage. IMPA’s Members are very concerned about the new Port Manager’s commitment to both a rail strategy and its implementation in view of its recent pro-road expansion statements so soon. We believe freight on rail will serve the city far more efficiently and environmentally responsibly into the future. Market-led proposals guidelines 41. Victorian Government Department of Treasury and Finance’s (DTF) procedures for assessing private sector proposals (unsolicited bids):

1. Preliminary assessment of ideas and proposals 2. Strategic assessment and recommendation  The Government conducting a strategic assessment of the merits of the proposal to determine whether the proposal should proceed, and if so whether this should be through a competitive tender process or through an exclusive negotiation 3. Detailed due diligence, investment case and procurement preparation 4. Negotiation and assessment of final offer 5. Award contract “Government will only pursue proposals that offer something genuinely unique, deliver on Government priorities, provide benefits to the community and provide value to Victorians” (DTF website)

42. The WGTP project was assessed (by DEDJTR) as if the Government was the proponent, using the same team of people and consultants who wrote the East West Link Business Case for Linking Melbourne Authority (LMA) and reportedly with the same shortcomings and even more questionable assumptions behind the numbers. 43. upgrade has been added to shore up the benefits because the TransUrban Western Distributor did not stack up in the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) Analysis extending the project to a Werribee to Pakenham project. It removes only slightly more trucks from West Gate Bridge than the 6,000 trucks that can be removed by the WGD at a cost of only $0.5 Billion.

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44. Costs and benefits are distorted, traffic modelling is erroneous and (critical) peer reviews have been suppressed (Reference Presentation by William MacDougall Transport Planner) 45. On the basis of the obligation of Government to …..”only pursue proposals that offer something genuinely unique, deliver on Government priorities, provide benefits to the community and provide value to Victorians” it is in our judgement that this project fails. The West Gate Distributer – Does it stake up? 46. One of the most obvious ways to measure the relative merits of this proposed project is if it meets its own stated objectives as set out in the project business case which, the government has made available for review. The State Government’s Investment Logic Map (ILM) puts forward five problems to be addressed together with some nominated Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): In summary our principle reasons for not supporting this project are as follows

1. Issue: Transport capacity on M1 is poor relative to growing demand. o The nominated KPI’s are travel time and volumes over the Westgate. After the project is completed, the business case shows travel times will be exactly the same as now and more vehicles will be using the Westgate. 2. Issue: Melbourne is over reliant on the Westgate. o KPIs are again the vehicle volumes on the Westgate and in addition vehicle mass limits. There is no improvement to the mass limits to Webb Dock, and mass limits can be increased to Swanston Dock far more cheaply by the Westgate Distributor {the Truck Action Plan (TAP) as part of the 2008 }. The new roads also fail to provide a direct bypass of the Westgate should this be necessary. 3. Issue Port and freight connections are inadequate to cater for the growth and reduce amenity in the west. o KPIs are access to jobs and project related employment. The latter would apply to any project and is therefore not unique/relevant. The former only applies because it becomes easier to drive into the CBD. 4. Issue There is a mismatch between transport and land use. o KPIs are access to jobs and reduced trucks in the inner west. The truck volumes in the inner west are NOT expected to be reduced compared to current levels. In any event any reduction in truck volumes can more cheaply be achieved by the TAP.

Better Transport Options for Melbourne Transport Network 47. The risk of not pursuing Metro Rail 2 as part of building a truly networked public transport system for Melbourne which is experiencing population growth projected to grow to 8 Million by 2050 would be a public policy failure of significant proportions. The risks of it not being funded or delays in its delivery as it conflicts with the commercial objectives of the Toll operator has implications for the whole of the city train network plan. 48. Further risks are evident to transport planning for the city itself (and the social implications) of being progressively ‘privatised’ through an extension of the CityLink Concession Deed and widening of contractual commitment with a private company such as TransUrban evidenced by the social impacts of unintended consequences of the criminalisation of the unpaid tolling processes currently in place (See Denis Nelthorpe’s Briefing Paper Report Our Plan For A Fair And Effective Toll Enforcement System For Victoria April 2017) and private companies limits to scope of responsibility. These risks are one that we have experienced in the public transport privatised

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operations contract to no benefit to the public. Privatised toll roads are going in the wrong policy direction. Public Money funding privately owned Tolls Roads 49. Substantial public funding has been allocated by government for this project. Toll roads are only of benefit if they are self-funded with the benefit to the provider derived from the tolling rights. This project is attracting $1.6 billion in public funding and a continuance of the Concession Deed of 15 years on the CityLink Tolls .

WGTP design process to date 50. This WGTP began as a market led and unsolicited bid to the Victorian Government by TransUrban, an ASX listed company, to build the Andrew’s Government West Gate Distributor (WGD) which was advocated as part of a package instead of the East West Link, the contracts for which were cancelled after the election in 2014. The electoral mandate was for those “Project 10,000” projects important to the western suburbs including the $0.5b WGD component. VicRoads was funded to build WGD Stage 1 and it went ahead soon after the election and is almost completed. West Gate Distributor West Gate Distributor (WGD)– a 4km 4-lane road connecting the West Gate Freeway to Footscray Road, allowing trucks to bypass residential areas of the inner west. Sections of the WGD would be elevated (Hyde St, Francis St & Whitehall St). Estimated cost: up to $0.5 Billion

Stage 2 of the WGD has been deferred for 6 years and incorporated into the WGTP , a market led proposal from Transurban, a much longer and larger project than the WGD.

West Gate Tunnel Project West Gate Tunnel Project (WGTP) – a 14+km 12-lane road connecting the to CityLink, Dynon Road, Wurundjeri Way, Footscray Road and Hyde Street. Sections of the WGTP would be tunnelled (beneath Yarraville) and elevated (over the Maribyrnong River and Footscray Road). Estimated cost: $5.5 Billion 51. This WGTP proposal was the subject of a Business Case (November 2015). The project has subsequently become a TransUrban and Victorian State Government joint venture and governed under a newly created statutory body, the Western Distributor Authority. This project is a much expanded and more costly project for which the Government has no mandate and that will be funded through a combination of public allocations, extension of the Concession Deed on City link of 15 years, tolls and TransUrban contributions,. WGTP business case (November 2015) 52. Project scope as set out in the business case includes:

- An alternative to the West Gate Bridge with a new toll road under Yarraville and a Maribyrnong River Crossing - A dedicated freeway link to the Port of Melbourne to support a growing freight task while reducing the number of trucks on local roads in the inner west - A high productivity freight vehicle compliant freeway link to the Port of Melbourne and improved access to Webb Dock to lift national productivity

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- Additional lanes and road management technology on the Monash Freeway to unblock Melbourne’s M1 Corridor and improve access to important economic and education clusters - Improved links to the important innovation and education cluster in the inner north - Upgrades to the West Gate Freeway from the M80 Ring Road to Williamstown Road to cater for growing demand for west-east trips - A new cycling connection over Williamstown Road to complete the Federation Trail and encourage more active transport - An extension of truck curfews and proactive planning to support urban renewal in the west.

53. The Business Case was heavily redacted; crucial traffic modelling and costings/revenue were not made available for public scrutiny. In mid-2016, a further concept design iteration was developed resulting in the Reference Design which was different again from those displayed to the public. This changed concept design went to tender retitled as the Western Distributor Reference Design on the basis that the successful tenderer wins the right to develop the project design. The successful tenderer was a consortium led by John Holland and the project was subsequently renamed again as the West Gate Tunnel Project with a new set of objectives which is the subject of this EES process.

West Gate Tunnel Project Environment Effect Statement 54. The limits of the formal EES process confines commentary on the specific environmental impacts of the proposed project under specific headings outlined in the submitted documents by the proponent. The proponent as we understand it, is essentially TransUrban though there is some blurring of the lines between government and private sector as the Western Distributor Authority, as we understand it merges parts of VicRoads and TransUrban consortium (John Holland Consortium) with some public servants reporting to TransUrban on this project. It is noted that the Panel Hearing and final Panel Report is an advisory document only to the Planning Minister The Hon Richard Wynn in his role as the responsible authority in determining the planning permit and the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) in determining the Work Permit for the project to proceed.

Comments: Design changes and Consultation Process 55. These transitions from one project design name and scope has meant that there is considerable confusion in the community about the objectives and the technical claims of the project under assessment. Further, IMPA members have made it clear that they have been bombarded with a sophisticated marketing program under the guise of community consultation and engagement, to sell the benefits, making claims about improvements in commuting times, freight volumes and efficiencies, truck removals from residential streets in the inner west, provision of second crossings that have not been subject to any rigorous substantiation process prior to the EES. Formal responses to letters of compliant have simply reiterated these marketing claims with no action to address issues. 56. Member groups have made complaints by letters to the Independent Chair of the Community Liaison Group, to local MP, the member for Williamstown, and to responsible Ministers about these consultative processes which have ignored most of their contributions. We regard these processes as not being consistent with the State government’s own consultative standards (The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2)) barely meeting the inform level on this spectrum). 57. Member Groups have also regarded the consultation reports and the EES reports to be based on an assumption that the ‘inner west’ refers to Maribyrnong only. This bias is evident in information generated from that area and attributed benefit referred to in reports. Areas south

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of the Westgate Freeway and in Hobsons Bay are not represented in the data and believe amenity impacts are underestimated and devalued in terms of views from residents about amenity in Hobsons Bay. An example of this bias is evident in the quote below.

Summary Report p16

58. Similarly, Member Groups to the east, north and west of the Study Area have wrongly been assumed to have no concerns about the significant negative impacts outside the narrowly-defined Study Area. 59. This fails to recognise that the distribution of a huge increase of trucks and traffic as a result of curfews and bans in Maribyrnong transfer the truck problems to other suburban streets. This bias pervades and skews the study and gives an unbalanced incomplete picture of truck projected patterns. These continuing conflicts between residential streets and the needs of the supply and logistic sector is demonstration of a planning failure to provide sustainable freight pathways. 60. We contend that the West Gate Tunnel Project fails to meet its own objectives and claims and therefore does not meet the EES requirements based on the studies submitted by the proponent. This failure is summarised below as we address the four objectives as each relates to the West Gate Freeway section of the project. 61. Evidence of how we’ve made this conclusion and alternatives are offered as we go through data provided in the EES studies. A set of recommendations conclude our submission.

Conclusion and recommendations 62. The benefit to the public is not being met with the WestGate tunnel Project and on this basis alone fails the ‘Pub’ test.We outline a number of matters that are of concern to many members around the process of the development of this project, the detail of this project and at a bigger picture level in terms of the direction this city needs to be taking to be liveable and sustainable into the future with a population explosion on our horizon.

63. In summary we find that the WestGate Tunnel Project fails in - meeting its own five critical transport challenges objectives - the objectives of the strategic vision for the state as outlined in PLAN Melbourne 2017-50 as a 20 minute neighbourhood walkable city, - meeting City of Melbourne’s Municipal Strategic Plan objectives on urban forest, heat island mitigation, urban renewal areas (EGate, Dynon Road, Foostcray Road Precinct and Arden Macaulay Precincts) urban design and open space objectives, Public Transport and walkable city transport objectives and - impacts on the community in North and West Melbourne of a flood of cars descending on to North and West Melbourne and Wurundjeri Drive - 12-14 hours of traffic gridlock daily (reference City of Melbourne Traffic modelling) - meeting City of Port Phillip & City of Melbourne objectives for Fishermans Bend urban renewal strategic objectives programme conflicted with the prospect of a tripling of freight on road and induced car traffic from this project

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- of Melbourne Metro Rail 2 not being funded as it conflicts with the commercial objective of the toll operator with implications for the whole of the city public transport network plan - meeting City of Maribyrnong and Hobsons Bay’s objectives of a liveable city and getting trucks off local roads - meeting the objectives of other Councils, communities and Friends of the various creeks and waterways e.g. Friends of Moonee Ponds Creek - placing the state of Victoria at risk of ‘locking in’ Melbourne‘s future to a road based transport with high Greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting transport system thereby compromising the state in meeting its zero emission targets by 2050 (Transport is the 3rd highest GHG emitter in Australia and approximately 85% coming from passenger vehicles (PTUA) - risks to transport planning itself (and the social implications), of being progressively ‘privatised’ through an extension of the CityLink Concession Deed and widening of contractual commitment with a private company such as TransUrban evidenced by the unintended consequences of the criminalisation of the unpaid tolling processes currently in place (See Denis Nelthorpe’s Briefing Paper Report Our Plan For A Fair And Effective Toll Enforcement System For Victoria April 2017) and private companies limits to scope of responsibility. - Public money funding toll roads -substantial public funding has been allocated by government for this project. Toll roads are only of benefit if they are self-funded with the benefit to the provider derived from the tolling rights. This project is attracting $1.6 b in public funding and a furtherance of the Concession Deed of 15 years to the City Link project. The benefit to the public is not being met with this project and on this basis alone fails the ‘Pub’ test.

Yours sincerely

Gerry McLoughlin on behalf of the Membership and was authored by a number of IMPA Inc members Secretary IMPA Inc

14/07/2017 Inner Melbourne Planning Alliance inc ABN 81379286447