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Vygotsky (1987), the founder of cultural his- theories from different disciplines. Building torical psychology, criticized the reduction of a theoretical framework connecting the high- higher-level psychological processes to the level structures with the lower level, beyond sim- lower-level elements. Vygotsky demonstrated plistic reductionism is a crucial issue for contem- the limitations of the analysis of psychological porary science. phenomena into separated elements studied in isolation. In contrast to analysis by elements, he suggested analysis by units which contained the References basic characteristic of the whole. The issue of units of psychological research remains Barendregt, M., & van Rappard, J. F. H. (2004). Reduc- a crucial, open-ended question in psychology. tionism revisited on the role of reduction in psychol- ogy. Theory & Psychology, 14(4), 453–474. Reductionism is not a purely scientific or phil- Bem, S., & Looren de Jong, H. (2001). Theoretical issues osophical matter, but it has political significance in psychology an introduction. London: Sage. in our social life. The reduction of the social to Gould, S. J. (1996). The mismeasure of man. New York: the individual is not a neutral theoretical stance, W.W. Norton. Jones, R. H. (2000). Reductionism: Analysis and the full- but it could diminish the importance of social ness of reality. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University relations as an explanation of psychological phe- Press. nomena. The treatment of individuals as solely Leahey, T. (1991). A history of modern psychology. responsible for their problems, ignoring the wider Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Lewontin, R. (1982). Biological Determinism. The Tanner social context of their activity, is a politically Lectures on Human Values. Retrieved January 18, 2012, problematic approach. from http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/ From the standpoint of biological determin- lewontin83.pdf ism, society can be reduced to a collection of Ney, A. (2008). Reductionism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved January 25, 2012, from http:// individuals and the individuals to a collection of www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/ genes which provide a sufficient explanation of Ratner, C. (1997). Cultural psychology and qualitative human behavior. Biological determinism claims methodology: Theoretical & empirical consideration. that natural and intrinsic differences between New York: Plenum. Verschuren, P. (2001). Holism versus reductionism in individuals determine inequalities in their status, modern social science research. Quality & Quantity, wealth, and power (Lewontin, 1982). Cultural 35, 389–405. evolution is presented as a mere extension of Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). Thinking and speech. In R. Rieber biological evolution through natural selection. & A. Carton (Eds.), The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky, volume 1, problems of general psychology The political implication of biological determin- (pp. 39–288). New York: Plenum. ism is that society cannot be transformed, R because the characteristics of human nature are genetically fixed, eternal, and unchangeable (Lewontin, 1982). Gould (1996) and other critical scientists analyzed various episodes of biological Reflexivity determinism in North America psychology (the introduction of the IQ test, the publication of Jill Morawski book The Bell Curve by J. Herrnstein and Charles Department of Psychology, Wesleyan Murray, etc.) and demonstrated how biological University, Middletown, CT, USA determinism serves particular sociopolitical pur- poses (immigration restriction, racial discrimina- tion, student classification, reduction of Introduction government spending on social programs, etc.). In conclusion, it can be said that reductionism Over the last half century, reflexivity has received is a controversial epistemological and methodo- attention across the human sciences although far logical stance which serves to bridge different less so in psychology than in its kindred R 1654 Reflexivity disciplines. In the broadest, epistemological reflexivity’s functioning as an epistemological meaning, reflexivity refers to the back-and-forth condition, a property of research techniques, process whereby an account of reality depends on a feature of psychologists’ own thinking, and preexisting knowledge of that account. This a socio-cognitive capacity of all human actors. sense of the concept acknowledges that the knower and knowledge generated cannot be fully separated. Within the human sciences, Definition where the knower and the object to be known are of the same kind (human beings), reflexivity As employed in contemporary inquiry, reflexivity has additional meanings since any knowledge enjoys neither singular nor simple definition. about humans attained through human science Consequently, several scholars have argued that inquiry refers to the human observers as well as its multiple conceptualizations are warrant for the human objects of observation. This particular retiring reflexivity as a viable subject within epistemological understanding of reflexivity is human science inquiry, yet such critiques them- not the only one for across the human sciences, selves might reflect less a concern with concep- psychology included; reflexivity thus has tual precision than resistance to acknowledging acquired several meanings. The term has been the thornier complexities of human science used to refer to an inescapable epistemological inquiry. Understood as an epistemological mat- condition, a comparably unavoidable cognitive ter, reflexivity refers to inescapable, dynamic process, and a self-conscious act whereby the relations between accounts of reality and reality. human science researcher appraises his or her In this usage reflexivity names that back-and- relations to the processes knowledge creation as forth process through which an account of reality well as to the knowledge generated. Although the depends on preexisting knowledge of what reflexive conditions of knowledge making have (worldly object) that account refers to, and vice been periodically addressed in philosophy and versa. This conception implicates all investiga- the human sciences for centuries, reflexivity tions aiming to produce observation-based emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century accounts of an object in the world given that as one key to analyzing the conditions and limits such inquiries are structured with and guided by of objectivity. Along with that overarching mean- already extant understandings of that object in the ing, it came to be used to describe the relations world. When considering the human and social between expert and lay knowledge as well as sciences, reflexivity has an additional meaning as being forwarded as a general capacity of humans an unavoidable self-referential quality of theory. to make sense of and engage in the social world. Here it comprises “an aspect of all social science Regarding psychology specifically, claims since any statement which holds that humans act made about reflexivity generally have been either or believe in particular ways in particular circum- ignored or countered by assertions that reflexive stances refers as much to the social scientists as to processes are sufficiently controlled if not elimi- anyone else” (Gruenberg, 1978, p. 22). Finally, nated by that science’s objective methods, nota- reflexivity sometimes is defined as a form of bly by psychologists’ techniques for distancing or human reflection, as an active turning back on dissociating themselves from their empirical oneself or enacting some form of self-regard; observations and subjects alike. Such pervasive such reflection is taken to be essential to engaging neglect or dismissal of reflexive conditions has in and making sense of one’s place in the material meant that there remain unrealized opportunities and social world. Upon appraising the heteroge- to investigate reflexivity either constructively neous definitions along with their shared subject (as a feature of theories or a cognitive process) matters, Roger Smith proposes that “reflexivity” or critically (as investigative “bias”). What then be “understood as a term denoting a number of awaits future psychological study are the genera- topics related by family resemblance rather than tive possibilities that emerge when we attend to identity” (2005, p. 3). Reflexivity 1655 R

Despite distinct implications for scientific Across the family of definitions along with practice, all three conceptions engage a general the questions imbedded within them, reflexivity assumption about humans, namely, an apprecia- is found to present two overarching matters, one tion of the social, practical, and cognitive oper- of paradox and the other of irony. Paradox arises ations of reflection (conscious or nonconscious) from the fact that critical regard of the reflexivity that are constitutive of human thinking and act- of human science itself comprises a reflexive ing. While unified in a specific assumption about act: it entails reflexivity about reflexivity. This human thought and action, the conceptions actu- state of reflection about reflection can prompt ally vary in a number of respects. First, notions what Steve Woolgar has called the “methodo- differ in regard to the degree to which reflexivity logical horrors” of reflexivity, the seemingly is taken to be an essential, inescapable condition unending regress of reflection. However, this or one that can (and sometimes should) be con- paradox might be apparent abstract than mate- trolled, avoided, or eliminated from inquiry. rial. The second matter is of more basic signifi- Relatedly, reflexivity is sometimes understood cance for human scientist as it ensues from the as being intended, as in the case of self-regard or fact that they, the human sciences, were founded critical self-reflection, or unintentional, as in the with the belief that self-reflection is a superior necessary relation between observational means to better understand and improve the accounts and preexisting beliefs (often human condition. Given the foundational place described as observer bias). Third, these concep- of reflection in the human science, psychology tualizations differ in presumed implications of included, there arises a certain irony whenever seeing reflexivity either as a matter of “benign human scientists disregard or dismiss reflexivity introspection” (Woolgar, 1988), an investigative as something that might operate in intellectual problem believed to be controllable if not life or as an important attribute of the human removable, or a tool for critically interrogating condition while at the same time they are knowledge claims and productively examining engaged in a scientific enterprise dedicated to previously neglected aspects of human thought self-reflection as means to knowledge and and action. Finally, these conceptions are melioration. Beyond these two matters that deployed differently to examine discrete realms emerge when reflexivity is taken seriously is of human affairs. Some versions of reflexivity a practical one of how human scientists should direct analytic focus to the actions of scientists proceed with their inquiries once the circuitry of or technical production of knowledge. Some are reflexive processes is acknowledged. Numerous taken up as purchase for better understanding scholars have claimed the significance of reflec- how everyday actors make sense of social tion to human science inquiry (earlier scholars R life. Other approaches toward analyzing including Stuart Hampshire and R.G. reflexivity trace the dynamic traffic between Collingwood and contemporaries including Ian expert knowledge and lay knowledge. Still Hacking, Bruce Mazlish, Graham Richards, and others consider whether and how reflexivity Roger Smith) and have, in turn, concluded that comprises a distinctive, perhaps even aesthetic, the human sciences must be understood histori- condition of modernity more generally cally: they must be historical in the sense that (Giddens, 1992;McMylor,2005). Ultimately, over time the looping and circuitry of reflexivity whether defined as an ontological, epistemolog- can change not only the science but also the very ical, methodological, or psychological phenom- objects of science. enon, reflexivity invites four broad questions: Where does reflexivity operate? Is it intended or unintended? Is it acknowledged or Keywords unacknowledged? Is it a fundamental human capacity that affects both knowledge and object Reflexivity; epistemology; methodology; ontol- or an avoidable, removable practice? ogy; history R 1656 Reflexivity

History relations between reality and representations of reality potentially unsteady these technical and Philosophers have long considered the limiting scientific operations. Additionally, engaging conditions of a science of human nature and reflexivity with its premise of dynamic ontology knowledge making in general, raising questions challenged notions of a stable, universal subject related to reflexivity (Brinkman, 2005). In the who is suitable for experimentation. twentieth century such considerations surfaced Not all psychologists adhered to the possibil- in distinct intellectual realms: natural science, ity of escaping reflexivity. In Principles of philosophy of science, and post-structuralist the- Psychology William James warned of “the ory. Physicists’ attention to the effects of the psychologist’s fallacy,” asserting “the great observer on observations called critical attention snare of the psychologist” to be “the confusion to the inadequacy of aperspectival (view from of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact nowhere) notions of representation. Writings in about which he is making his report”(1890, the philosophy of science probed the limits of p. 196). Between James’ 1890 statement and the language to adequately represent the world and 1970s, some researchers located some specific refuted the presupposition of independence of reflexive conditions of experimental psychology. observer and object being observed. Philosophers In the 1920s, Horace Mann Bond enumerated the from Nietzsche to Derrida and Foucault presuppositions embedded in programs for inves- challenged claims about essential foundations of tigating racial differences in intelligence. Bond knowledge (Smith, 2005), while analytical revealed numerous racial assumptions made by philosophers proffered critiques of scientific the nearly exclusively white research community positivism, claiming that even positivist thereby linking observers to the reality being knowledge contains presuppositions. observed. In the 1930s, Saul Rosenzweig exca- Psychologists’ engagements with these vated the psychological dynamics that transpire twentieth-century investigations of reflexivity in experiments yet go unnoticed or suppressed, have been relatively sparse. Professional invest- thereby revealing similar dynamic relations ments crucial to establishing the discipline as an within laboratories (Morawski, 2005). In 1962, unequivocally scientific one appeared at odds experimentalists Donald Oliver and Alvin with acknowledging and incorporating ideas of Langfield pronounced reflexivity to be an reflexivity. Substantive acknowledgement of “unfaced” issue in psychology, claiming that its reflexivity in any of its meanings risked the disregard undermined scientific psychology perception that psychology is a subjective, or because “any psychology venture is a failure if soft, rather than objective, or hard, science. in its accounting it fails, or refuses, to take into In establishing experimental methods psycholo- account its own accounting” (1962, p. 117). gists labored to distinguish the observer from Oliver and Langfield’s assertion reflects post- the object (the subject) through technical, World War II apprehensions about the conditions conceptual, and rhetorical means; they honed of human experimentation and consequents ques- a representation of the experimenter’s self, tions about validity, representativeness, and the insisting in E.G. Boring’s words, that the volunteer subject. Coupled with advances in the psychologist “cultivate dissociation” from his philosophy of science (notably the work of subjective self thereby apparently eliminating Thomas Kuhn), post-structuralist critiques of the the possibilities of reflexivity (quoted in foundations of knowledge, and human rights Morawski, 1992). Textbooks accordingly incor- issues, some psychologists became interested in porated a binary of human actors, distinguishing reflexivity. For their part, feminist psychologists between empirical psychologists who operate turned to reflexivity when investigating how gen- objectively and the ordinary persons who dered experiences shape knowledge making purportedly rely on subjective experiences. (Unger, 1983; Wilkinson, 1988), and critical psy- Reflexivity’s assumptions of the dynamic chologists interrogated the logics through which Reflexivity 1657 R psychology is implicated in governing people. that the concept is rarely the explicit subject of Methodologists identified situations in which interrogation or debate. This situation diverges the conceptual language or experimental design from the other human and social sciences: outside contains and sustains nonscientific assumptions, psychology there has ensued debate over the util- thus challenging claims that experiments yielded ity of a concept that has plural meanings and the veridical accounts of reality. These explorations extent to which reflexivity is a distinctive condi- of reflexivity, produced from the 1970s onward, tion of modern sociology. Despite the modest were enriched by a burgeoning literature on attention given to it within psychology, several reflexivity appearing in sociology, history, sci- related developments in the study of reflexivity ence studies, and philosophy (Ashmore, 1989; are of substantive and potentially transformative Gouldner, 1970; Sandywell, 1996; Woolgar, relevance to contemporary psychological 1988). research. The first concerns the implications of Problems related to reflexivity have been more the reflexive conditions of language whereby our common than appears to be the case. As an onto- classification of psychological states is not inde- logical and epistemological matter, reflexivity also pendent of our psychological vocabulary. In figured in early twentieth-century debates over the other words, psychologists depend on linguistic viability of introspection and over quality-quantity categories in structuring and testing knowledge distinctions, and the “controversies” over what claims. Modern psychology’s conceptions of constituted adequate theory in psychology. “motivation” and “addiction,” for instance, However, in these debates the term “reflexivity” depended on preexisting understandings of was largely absent nor was it used in the extended “will,” and residuals of those prior understand- conversations about what counted as an adequate ings persist in scientific studies of motivation and “psychologist’s standpoint” despite the fact that addiction. To critically examine that language reflexivity actually was a central to ascertaining one requires historical analysis of how terms the psychologist’s distance from and affective and concepts are connected to ways of life. Sec- disinterestedness in the experimental phenomena. ond, the implications of seeing the binding of As feminist and science studies researchers psychological knowledge to language as well as delineated the unavoidable reflexive processes cultural experiences go beyond the need for of knowledge production by undertaking a historical psychology. They raise matters of methodological and epistemological critiques, “historical ontology” that acknowledge the cir- historians and philosophers documented the cuitry or looping between psychological knowl- macro-dynamics of psychologists’ dependence edge and psychological phenomena through upon cultural, political, and personal ideas even which knowledge changes psychological phe- R when they formulated and tested scientific ones nomena. As Bruce Mazlish notes, social sci- (Capshew, 1999; Morawski, 1992). For example, ence’s aspirations of prediction, control, and Jamie Cohen-Cole (2005) documented psycholo- determinist explanations of human action are gists’ incorporation of attributes of the ideal complicated if not precluded by the capacities scientist (flexibility, rationality, and creativity) of social actors. Social science discoveries and as conceptual basis for new cognitive models of laws have uncertain existences given that “any personhood, models that would challenge and law in the social sciences is part of a process replace behaviorist conceptions. including prescriptions that foster change, which then creates new conditions in which that law no longer effectively applies” (1998, p. 189). Critical Debates As somewhat more acidly stated by Alastair MacIntyre, “Psychologists have had varying Psychologists’ persistent abeyance of reflexivity, (sometimes striking) success in interpreting the whether considered in its epistemological, human world; but they have been systematically ontological, or methodological forms, has meant successful in changing it” (1985, p. 897). The R 1658 Reflexivity dynamics through which psychological knowl- International Relevance edge can change psychological phenomena, along with the dependence of that knowledge on Since the 1970s, when research on the subject preexisting, linguistic categories, intimates grew in both number and foci, scholars from a need to understand ontology as historical, as across Europe, the United Kingdom, and North a circuitry or looping that connects ways of being America have participated. Scholarship with knowledge about those ways of being. pertaining specifically to psychology likewise The circuit of such knowing and being “is has been produced within these geographic flexible, often indeterminate in its effects, some regions; however, researchers in the USA where level ‘natural’ as opposed to ‘artificial’ and the preponderance of empirical psychological emanates...from its own reflexive struggles to research originates have been far less active than know itself” (Richards, 2002, p. 30). Examining those working in Europe, the United Kingdom, this looping of human kinds, as Hacking terms it, and Canada. Conceptual and empirical work that or this circuitry of the psychological, as Richards extends neuroscience to engage eflexive matters names it, “Must itself be a Psychological model” is being undertaken in Europe (Brenninkmeijer, (8). Recent work in critical neuroscience calls for 2010; Choudhury & Slaby, 2012). examining these reflexive processes in the mak- ing and disseminating of neuroscience knowl- edge and techniques (Choudhury & Slaby, Future Directions 2012). Some researchers have proposed even more substantive implications for the nature of The multiple associations of reflexivity and psy- the social and human sciences, though most are chology along with that sciences’ relative disre- not specifically addressing the discipline of psy- gard of those associations open way for vital chology. Concern with the dynamics of ontology innovations. Promising future research includes in economics has prompted investigation into genealogies of psychological categories and con- how economics is performative and how eco- cepts, tracing them as they are drawn from con- nomics knowledge shapes subsequent economic ventional language to be empirically examined, behavior (McKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007). rendered in quantitative forms, redefined or Others have advanced network models that take altered, made causally explicable, and extended entities, objects, and knowledge as interactive, to give new meanings to psychological phenom- relational processes. According to John Law, ena. Likewise warranting historical study are “People, technologies, ‘natural’ phenomena, doc- relations between the lifeworlds of psychologists uments, non-human life forms, knowledges, and their psychological ideas (McMylor, 2005). social facts, collectivities and phenomena – all Studies of contemporary investigators and their of these are relational effects, materials, being lifeworlds, the laboratory included, are essential done in interaction” (2004, p. 632). Such theory to development of reflexive methods that take projects indicate that taking seriously the reflex- into account the researcher’s presence in the full ive conditions of the human and social sciences course of scientific practice, from the formulation ultimately calls for reconstruction of root pre- of hypothesis to reporting of results. mises about persons, culture, knowledge, tech- Perhaps the most transformative potential of nologies attending that knowledge, and the psychology’s fully acknowledging reflexivity is interrelations of these. Whether investigations development of pioneering theories and models of reflexive processes center on epistemology, that account for the dynamic circuitry or looping methodology, or ontology, they invariably will of psychology and those so classified through that reveal the necessity for new psychological knowledge. These ventures necessarily require theories as well as modified investigative empirical work that extends beyond the experi- practices. mental situation. They would constitute at once Reflexivity 1659 R both critical examinations of knowledge and also Brenninkmeijer, J. (2010). Taking care of one’s brain: constructive scientific undertakings that might How manipulating the brain changes people’s selves. History of the Human Sciences, 23(1), fundamentally change psychology. Advances in 107–126. network theory (Law, 2004), the performativity Capshew, J. (1999). Psychologists on the march: Science, of the human sciences (McKenzie et al., 2007), practice, and professional identity in American, and mapping the broad reflexive cycle of psy- 1929–1969. New York: Cambridge University Press. Choudhury, S., & Slaby, J. (2012). Critical neuroscience: chology (Hacking, 1995; Richards, 2002) offer A handbook of the social and cultural contexts of templates for such inventive theories and models. neuroscience. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. For a recent example, “critical neuroscience” Cohen-Cole, J. N. (2005). The reflexivity of cog- (Choudhury & Slaby, 2012) and related research nitive science: The (cognitive) scientist as model of nature. History of the Human Sciences, 18(4), (Brenninkmeijer, 2010) illustrate how incorpo- 107–139. rating reflexivity into scientific programs enables Giddens, A. (1992). The transformation of intimacy. Cam- researchers to conduct critical interrogations and bridge: Polity Press. build innovative models that integrate cultural, Gouldner, A. (1970). The coming crisis of western sociology. New York: Basic Books. material, and experiential knowledge with Gruenberg, B. (1978). The problem of reflexivity in the neuroscience. sociology of science. Philosophy of Social Science, Engaging reflexivity in its methodological, 8, 321–342. epistemological, and ontological forms forwards Hacking, I. (1995). The looping effect of human kinds. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A. J. Premack (Eds.), crucial objectives long professed in psychology. Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate A reflexive psychology, for one, moves us toward (pp. 351–383). Oxford: Clarendon. realizing the science’s aim of enabling our subjects James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. to become “more self-aware than they were before New York: Holt. Law, J. (2004). After method: Mess in social science they involved themselves in our procedures” research. New York: Routledge. (Unger, 1983, p. 28) or than they were before MacIntyre, A. (1985). How psychology makes itself true – they were implicated in our scientific understand- or false. In S. Koch & D. E. Leary (Eds.), A century of ings of them. Attending to the recursive flows of psychology as science (pp. 897–903). New York: McGraw-Hill. beliefs and commitments within psychological Mazlish, B. (1998). The uncertain sciences. New Haven: research requires expansion of our empirical Yale University Press. observations with the consequence of bettering McKenzie, D., Muniesa, F., & Siu, L. (2007). Do our observations of psychological phenomena. economists make markets? On the performativity of economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Likewise, attention to these intellectual and cul- McMylor, P. (2005). Reflexive historical sociology: tural forces casts brighter light on the ways psy- Consciousness, experience and the author. History of chology is involved in the governing of social and the Human Sciences, 18(4), 141–160. R personal life. Most importantly, a reflexive psy- Morawski, J. G. (1992). Self regard and other regard: Reflexive practices in American psychology, chology appreciates, just as it provides grounds for 1890–1940. Science in Context, 5, 281–308. studying, the dynamic connections between per- Morawski, J. (2005). Reflexivity and the psychologist. sonal identities, social relations, and techno- History of the Human Sciences, 18(4), 77–105. scientific practices that are constitutive of modern Oliver, W. D., & Langfield, A. W. (1962). Reflexivity: An unfaced issue of psychology. Journal of Individual psychological experiences. Psychology, 18(2), 114–124. Richards, G. (2002). The psychology of psychology: A historically grounded sketch. Theory and References Psychology, 12(1), 7–36. Sandywell, B. (1996). Reflexivity and the crisis of western Ashmore, M. (1989). The reflexive thesis. Chicago: reason: Logological investigations volume 1. University of Chicago Press. New York: Routledge. Brinkman, K. (2005). Consciousness, self-consciousness, Smith, R. (2005). Does reflexivity separate the human and the modern self. History of the Human Sciences, sciences from the natural sciences? History of the 18(4), 27–48. Human Sciences, 18(4), 1–25. R 1660 Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy

Unger, R. K. (1983). Through the looking glass: No won- shifted, in relational psychoanalysis and psycho- derland yet (The reciprocal relationship between meth- therapy, from the individual as an isolated entity odology and models of reality). Psychology of Women Quarterly, 8, 9–32. to the relational interactions and experiences Wilkinson, S. (1988). The role of reflexivity in feminist through which the individual comes into being psychology. Women’s Studies International Forum, (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Where the analytic 11(5), 493–502. dyad is concerned, relational psychoanalysis is Woolgar, S. (1988). Knowledge and reflexivity. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. a two-person alternative to the one-person view of the classical theory (Harris, 2011), in that the patient-analyst unit, rather than the patient alone, is the focus of exploration (Mitchell & Aron, 1999).

Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy Keywords

Esther Rapoport Relational; relationality; intersubjective; inter- Private Practice, Reidman College, Tel Aviv, subjectivity; two-person psychology; analyst Israel self-disclosure; enactment; multiple self-states; psychoanalysis; co-construction; feminist; queer

Introduction History Relational theories have become increasingly influential in the international psychoanalytic Stephen Mitchell is widely credited with being community in recent decades, profoundly affect- the catalyst and pioneer of the relational move- ing the practice of psychoanalysis and psychoan- ment, which was launched with the publication, alytic psychotherapy. These theories have in 1983, of the text Mitchell coauthored with Jay reenvisioned the fundamentals of psychoanalytic Greenberg, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic work, including what gets explored in the con- Theory. Lewis Aron, Neil Altman, Jessica sulting room, who does the exploring, and how Benjamin, Robert Stolorow, Jody Davies, Muriel the patient and analyst perceive and interact with Dimen, Philip Bromberg, Emmanuel Ghent, and each other. Adrienne Harris are some of the other influential relational theorists. In 1989, the first relationally oriented journal, Definition Psychoanalytic Dialogues, was founded, and in the same year, the first relational training pro- Drawing on British-school object relations gram was formed at the New York University. theories, attachment theory, self psychology, and In 2001, the movement, originally overwhelm- interpersonal psychoanalysis, relational theorists ingly American, made an attempt to go interna- have developed an understanding of the human tional with the establishment of the International psyche as shaped primarily by interpersonal inter- Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and actions rather than internal forces. What the many Psychotherapy. varied and heterogeneous relational approaches have in common is the view of humans, not as the solitary biological drive machines of the Traditional Debates classical Freudian theory, but as shaped by rela- tionships and always embedded in relational The major theoretical innovations of the relational contexts, past and present (Mitchell, 1988). The school include the relational matrix (Mitchell, focus of the psychoanalytic exploration has 1988), intersubjectivity (e.g., Benjamin, 1990;