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John Buridan on the Predicables

2.1 Chapter 1. On the Predicables

2.1.1 Several senses of the term ‘predicable’ [The term] ‘predicable’ is sometimes taken strictly, sometimes broadly. A predicable, strictly speaking, is what is predicated of many [things]; a predicable, taken broadly, is what is predicated whether of only one or of many things; of only one thing, as ‘Socrates’ is pred- icated only of him [i.e., Socrates], when we say: ‘Socrates is Socrates’, of many things, as when ‘animal’ is predicated of man and horse, and ‘man’ of Socrates and Plato, and so forth. The second treatise deals with predicables. It contains seven chapters: the first is about a dis- tinction concerning the name ‘predicable’, the second is about genus, the third is about species, the fourth is about difference, the fifth is about property, the sixth is about accident, and the seventh is about the proper and common characteristics of predicables. The first chapter con- tains three parts: the first is the distinction concerning the name ‘predicable’, the second is about the accord between the names ‘predicable’ and ‘universal’, and the third is the divi- sion of predicables. Concerning the first part, and the whole treatise, we should note that the terms ‘predicate’ and ‘predicable’ do not differ in their significations, except with respect to actuality and potentiality. And although we may say that Porphyry discussed predicables and Aristotle, in the Topics, discussed predicates, we should not think that Aristotle and Porphyry wanted to draw a distinction in their discussions between these with respect to actuality and potentiality; indeed, both of them call that which is predicated . . . etc., that is, what can be predicated...etc., a genus. Second, we should note that although every conventionally significative utterance when taken materially can be the subject or the predicate in a pro- position, not all such utterances when taken significatively can thus be the subject or the predicate. But here we intend to consider only terms that can be predicated when taken significatively. Third, we should note that the things that exist without any operation of the soul, such as stones or plants, are neither predicates nor subjects in propositions, but the concepts in the mind, insofar as they occur in mental propositions, can be [subjects or pred- icates], as can vocal or written terms, which are rendered significative by the mediation of MP_C08.qxd 11/17/065:29PMPage80

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 80 the Seineandthatwaslastyear. e.g., howtheterm‘Seine’isasingularterm,althoughitnotsamewaterthatnow the questionwillberaisedaboutidentityofparts[takentogether]withtheirwhole);as, or insomesuchmanner(whichisnottobediscussedhere,butelsewhere,namely,where ing fromthecontinuityofseveralpartssucceedingeachotherinsomething,asariver, it denominatesthewholeonaccountofaprincipalpart,orunityresult- cannot suppositforanyothers,unlessthishappensbyequivocation,oritbecause for whichitsuppositsconjunctively[ for whichitsupposits,cannotsuppositanother.Indeed,evenifwemarkseveralthings many thingsdividedly,i.e.,foreachandeveryone,inthesensethatifwemarkonething ‘Socrates’, isnotapttobepredicatedofmanythings,meaningthatitcannotsuppositfor [the distinction]shouldbeexpoundedinsuchamannerthatsingularterm,as only ofone,butmany,i.e.,eachandeveryonemanydifferentterms.Therefore, term trulypredicableorsubjectibleinatrueaffirmativepropositionisnot many others. animal isSocrates,arisible[animal]white[thing]andsoforthfor (Paris, 1509;reprint,FrankfurtamMain:Minerva,1964),bk.1,q. 10. SeeJ.Buridan, 2 detail below. proprium laughter’. Inanycase,inthissense,theterm ‘ridiculous’, butinthesomewhatoutmoded,stillquitecommonly recognizedsenseof‘capable Obviously,‘risible’hereandthroughoutshouldnotbetakeninthemodern vernacularsenseof 1 ‘animal’, ‘risible ‘Socrates’ ispredicatedofagreatnumberterms,asforexample,‘Socrates’,‘man’, of anothersignificativeterm,aswassaidabove.Nowitisobvious,however,thattheterm tion ofthesoul,suchasstonesortrees;butitis[only]asignificativetermthatpredicated for athingisnotpredicatedofthing,speakingaboutthingsthatexistwithouttheopera- crete’; butthisisnotthecase,forterm‘Socrates’predicableofmanythings.Proof: For suchwouldbetheterm‘Socrates’orsomeotherthatwecall‘singular’,‘dis- ious doubtarisesastowhetheranytermispredicableonlyofonething.Anditappearsnot. and itisinthisstrictsensethatPorphyryintendstodiscussthepredicables.Butthenaser- ing, thename‘predicable’isrestrictedtosuppositonlyfortermspredicableofmanythings, himself illustrates;andbroadlyspeakingboth[kinds]arecalled‘predicable’.Butstrictlyspeak- predicated, orareapttobeofmanythings,andsomeonlyonething,ashe tain propositions. wise becalledsubjectible,insofarastheycanalsosubjectedtocertainpredicatesincer- they areapttobepredicatedofcertainsubjectsinpropositions;andcouldlike- these concepts,ashasbeensaidelsewhere.Andarecalledpredicablesinsofar ing singularterms. supposit formanythings,andnotonlyonethinginthewaywejustdescribedconcern- sense intendedhere,isdescribedasatermapttobepredicatedofmanythings,i.e., Now, withoutanydoubtIbelievethattheobjectionisvalidinitsownway,andevery Therefore, weshouldnotewithreferencetotheauthor’sdistinctionthatsometermsare (property) ofman,inthetechnicalsense‘property’tobeexplained byBuridaninmore 1 Quaestiones superoctoPhysicorumlibrosAristotelis:KommentarzurAristotelischen Physik [animal]’, ‘white[thing]’,‘educated[person]’,etc.;foramanisSocrates,an supponit coniunctim risibilis 2 Therefore, a‘predicable’,strictlyspeaking,inthe (risible) wastakentobethestockexampleofa ], asdoestheterm‘thispeople’,it MP_C08.qxd 11/17/065:29PMPage81 question] ‘What[isitlike?]’[ then itiseitherpredicatedin[replytothequestion]‘What [is it]’[ opposites. If,therefore,somethingispredicatedessentially, intheabove-describedmanner, the significationofother.Thisdivisionisclearlyexhaustive, foritisgivenintermsof or itispredicateddenominatively,sothatonetermdoesadd someextrinsicconnotationto tially, sothatneithertermaddssomeextraneousconnotation tothesignificationofother, of predication.Therefore,everythingthatispredicatedsomething iseitherpredicatedessen- the speciesormodescontainedunderterm‘predicable’accordingtodifferent predicable becauseitisapttobepredicatedofmanythings,reasonabledistinguish The thirdpartdividestheterm‘predicable’intoitsspecies.For,sincesomethingiscalleda Thedivisionofpredicables 2.1.3 posits formany,aswassaidearlier. a commontermbecauseitsignifiesmanythings,orrather,toputbetter,sup- said tobeuniversal,orinsomeotherways,nevertheless,‘universal’isheretakenonlyfor many things,asisGod,orauniversalonaccountofdistribution,whenproposition times somethingissaidtobeauniversalwithrespectcausation,becauseitcauseof SeePeterofSpain, 3 erly speaking[ same [thing]. and universalare[the]same[thing],and,conversely,everypredicable icate ‘[the]same[thing]’istrulyaffirmedofthemtakensignificatively.Foreverypredicable idem convertibiliter ‘universal’ arenotthesame,buttheyconvertiblysaidtobe[the]same[thing][ differ fromtheother.Therefore,Iabandonhistext,andsaythatterms‘predicable’ would notdiffer,exceptverbally[ in’ [ should wethinkthatauniversaltermis to suppositformanythings,ashasbeensaid,whetherasubjectorpredicate.Nor the sametermiscalledauniversalbecauseitindifferentlysignifiesmanythings,andapt of asubject,andsubjectible,becauseitcanbesubjectedtopredicateinproposition.But ‘predicable’ and‘subjectible’;foratermissaidtobepredicable,becauseitcanpredicated the terms‘predicate’and‘subject’arepredicatedcorrelatively,thusalso cepts, fortheywereimposedaccordingtodifferentconceptssignifythesamethings.For h eodpr si codnewt tefruaino ]ourauthor, The secondpartisinaccordancewith[theformulationof Thedifferenceandagreementbetween‘predicable’‘universal’ 2.1.2 the samething). Thisisinfacttheexplicationofphrase 4 Predicables, takenstrictly,aredividedintogenus,species,difference,propertyandaccident. and auniversalassomethingthatisapttobeinmanythings. fer becauseapredicableisdefinedassomethingthatapttobepredicatedofmanythings, Therefore, apredicable,strictlyspeaking,isthesame[thing]asuniversal,buttheydif- inesse forbeingtrulypredicatedaffirmatively, sothat‘beingpredicated’andin’ ] 4 de proprietatesermonis But theterms‘predicable’and‘universal’aresaidtobediverseintheircon- ], sothateverypredicableisauniversalandconversely,thusthepred- Tractatus ed.L.M.deRijk(Assen:vanGorcum,1972),p.17. , in quale secundum vocem ]; forifAisthesame[thing]asB,thenonedoesnot ]; andif in the termscontainedunderit,excepttaking‘being dicuntur idemconvertibiliter in quale ]. Andweshouldnotethatalthoughsome- , thenitisadifference,andif in quid (are convertiblysaidtobe 3 but isnottrue,prop- orin[replytothe ] dicuntur in quid , 81 JOHN BURIDAN ON THE PREDICABLES MP_C08.qxd 11/17/065:29PMPage82

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 82 ‘Where?’ [ to thequestion‘When?’[ cubits-long’, orinreplytothequestion‘Howmany?’[ ‘How much?’[ way, sayingthateverypredicableiseither will havebeendiscussedinparticular.Butsomepeoplewanttodrawthedistinctionsanother to becalledeitheragenus,orspecies,difference,property,anaccident. Thus itisobviousthateverypredicable,withrespecttoofwhichhas respect tothatitiscalled‘property’;ifnot,thenwith‘accident’. either predicatedconvertiblywiththatofwhichitispredicated,ornot;ifso,then a ‘species’,aswillbeexplainedlater.If,however,itispredicateddenominatively,then it ispredicatedofmanythingsdifferinginspeciesandhasasuperiorgenus,stillcalled is predicatedofmanythingsdifferingonlynumerically,thenitcalled‘species’,orevenif then, ifitispredicatedofmanythingsdifferinginspecies,thencalled‘genus’,but [ there aremanypredicablesthatneitherpredicatedinreplytothequestion‘Whatisit?’ if accidentally,theneitherconvertiblyornot.Butthiswhole[division]iswronglystated,for either agenusorspecies,andif in quid [Some] doubtsconcerningthisdivisionwillbeconsidered,whenitsindividualmembers ] norinreplytothequestion‘Whatisitlike?’[ in ubi nquantum in ], as‘inthehouse’,‘outsideetc. ,[i.e.,‘Howbig?’,long?’,etc.]as‘two-cubits-long’ or‘three- ], nquando in in quale ], as‘yesterday’,‘tomorrow’,orinreplytothequestion , theneitheressentiallyoraccidentally;andthen, nquid in in quale nquot in or ], as‘three’,‘four’,orinreply ], butinreplytothequestion in quale if ; nquid in , thenitis