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RIPENESS AND JOINDER TARA L. SOHLMAN and JOANNA M. TOLLENAERE Cooper & Scully, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 100 Dallas, TX 75202 Telephone: 214-712-9501 Telecopy: 214-712-9540 Email: [email protected] [email protected] 18th ANNUAL COVERAGE AND BAD FAITH SYMPOSIUM April 1, 2011 City Place Dallas, Texas D/800672.1 RIPENESS AND JOINDER TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE A. RIPENESS........................................................................................................................................ 1 1. Analysis of Ripeness under Texas Law ........................................................................................... 1 2. Analysis of Ripeness under Federal Law......................................................................................... 1 3. Declaratory Judgments: A Potentially Gray Area............................................................................ 2 B. JOINDER......................................................................................................................................... 5 1. Proper Parties under Texas Law ...................................................................................................... 5 2. Proper Parties under Federal Law.................................................................................................... 5 3. Improper Joinder.............................................................................................................................. 7 a. The Browning Case.......................................................................................................................... 7 i. Improper Joinder Analysis............................................................................................................... 7 i D/800672.1 RIPENESS AND JOINDER TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 ....................................................................... 1 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)................................................................ 1 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) .................................................................................................................. 3 American States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................... 2 Armstrong World Industries v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1992)..................................................................................................... 3 Blanchard v. State Farm Lloyds, 206 F. Supp. 2d 840 (S.D. Tex. 2001)....................................................................................... 6 Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1995) ..................................................................................................... 2 Browning, 2011 WL 240338....................................................................................................................... 7 Browning v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2011 WL 240338 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2011) (NO. H-10-4478)................................................. 6 Bunting v. State Farm Lloyds, 1999 WL 134642 (N.D.Tex. Mar.4, 1999)................................................................................ 7 Burch, 442 S.W.2d at 332-33................................................................................................................ 4 Camerena v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1998) ..................................................................................................... 1 Campbell v. Stone Ins., Inc., 509 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2007)...................................................................................................... 7 Cowley v. Texas Snubbing Control, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 1437 (S.D. Miss. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Cowley v. Stapleton, 15 F.3d 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 80 (1994).............................................................................. 4 Dagley v. Haag Eng'g Co., 18 S.W.3d 787 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) ................................................ 7 ii D/800672.1 RIPENESS AND JOINDER Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1983) ..................................................................................................... 4 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (U.S. 1978) ............................................................................................................ 1 Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 584 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1979) ..................................................................................................... 2 Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1997) .......................................................................................................3 Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1968) ..................................................................................................... 3 First Baptist Church of Mauriceville, Texas vs. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4533729 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 29, 2008) (NO. 1:07-CV-988) .......................................... 6 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) ................................................................. 1 Fort Worth Lloyd's v. Garza, 527 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)................................. 3 Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir.2007).......................................................................................... 7 Getty Oil v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos v. Getty Oil Co., 510 U.S. 820 (1993) .................................................................................................................. 3 Great American Ins. Co. v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1969) ..................................................................................................... 3 Jobs, Training & Servs. v. East Tex. Council of Gov'ts, 50 F.3d 1318 (5th Cir. 1995)..................................................................................................... 1 Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 575 F.3d 510 (5th Cir.2009)...................................................................................................... 7 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) ...................................................................................................................... 1 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941) .................................................................................................................. 3 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 315 U.S. 270, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941) ..................................................................... 2 McDonald v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.2005)...................................................................................................... 7 iii D/800672.1 RIPENESS AND JOINDER Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 F. App'x 62, 70 ................................................................................................................... 7 Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. L.C.C., 5 F.3d 911 (5th Cir. 1993)......................................................................................................... 1 Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Airport Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 111 S.Ct. 2298, 115 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991)............................................................ 1 National Savings Ins. Co. v. Gaskins, 572 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1978, no writ)................................................... 4 North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971).................................................................. 2 Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 843 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, writ denied)........................................................... 1 Owens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1998, pet. denied)............................................................ 4 Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442 ..................................................................................................................... 1 Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) ..................................................................................................... 1 Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001) .......................................................................................................1 Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................... 2 Providence Lloyd v. Blevins, 741 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.--Austin 1987, no writ).................................................................. 4 Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) .................................................................................................................. 1 Ruth v. Imperial Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ)...................................... 3 Save Our Springs Alliance v. City of Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, no pet.) ...................................................................
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