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The Other Vanguard of International Terrorism. Despite Setbacks Al Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments The Other Vanguard of International Terrorism WP S Despite Setbacks Al-Qaeda Profits from Yemen Civil War Guido Steinberg Yemen has been in the grip of open civil war since spring 2015. The biggest beneficiary of the conflict is the Yemeni al-Qaeda, whose recent capture of territory in southern Yemen opens up new opportunities. Its current gains will hinder a future stabilisation of Yemen and exacerbate the terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia. It also presents new dangers to the West, given that the Yemeni al-Qaeda is by far the strongest group in the network, and has already made repeated attempts to bring down transatlantic air- liners. The danger it presents was underlined by the attack it instigated on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015. Although al-Qaeda in Yemen has lost important leaders since then, and a number of its fighters and commanders have de- fected to the Islamic State (IS), the collapse of the Yemeni state increases the risk that it will exploit its expanded radius of action and prepare new attacks on the United States and Europe. The Yemeni civil war pits the international- al-Qaeda, as indicated by two developments ly recognised government of President Abd in particular: in April 2015 it took control Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, supported by Saudi of the important port of Mukalla, and since Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other the summer has been visibly present in allies, against Houthi rebels and forces loyal Aden. By autumn 2015 al-Qaeda in Yemen to ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although controlled a significantly larger area with the Saudi-led coalition captured Aden and a much larger population than in 2011/12, has advanced towards the capital Sanaa, when it was previously able to exploit the the strength of the Houthis and their allies weakness of the Yemeni state in a similar in the north presages a protracted civil war. manner. One outcome of the conflict is already clear: the government has completely suspended its fight against the local al-Qaeda and the The Organisation US military has had to withdraw its per- The Yemeni al-Qaeda was founded in Janu- sonnel. This has considerably strengthened ary 2009 as “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pen- Dr. Guido Steinberg is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 4 January 2016 1 insula”. It profited from the particularly under its control, and establish an Islamic strong representation of Yemenis in Osama state. Secondly, it seeks to topple the ruling Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network, stretching family in Saudi Arabia. Thirdly, like its par- back to the 1990s. In fact, though, it is not ent organisation in Pakistan and Afghani- a purely Yemeni organisation, but more an stan, it aims to force the United States out alliance of Yemenis and Saudis, since joined of the Islamic world. In pursuit of these by smaller groups of foreign fighters. objectives, al-Qaeda conducts attacks on In 2005 the Saudi security authorities Yemeni, Saudi and American (as well as succeeded in ending a campaign of terror British and French) individuals and insti- that had begun in May 2003, and completely tutions. eliminating the al-Qaeda group there. From 2006 Saudis seeking to join a jihadist organi- sation were forced to look abroad. Until the Capturing Territory emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Alongside its traditional terrorist activities, Syria (ISIS) in 2013 they almost always al-Qaeda in Yemen has worked since 2011 opted for Yemen and the al-Qaeda group to capture and hold territory, and establish there. About one third of its fighters are state structures there. This new strategy Saudis, who are also strongly represented became possible after protests in spring in its leadership. Although the long-serving 2011 weakened the regime of President leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi is Yemeni, his Saleh and caused the government to with- deputy was the Saudi Ali al-Shihri. After draw forces from remoter parts of the coun- Shihri was killed in 2013, military com- try. From its stronghold of Azzan in the mander Qasim al-Raymi became the new province of Shabwa, al-Qaeda went on the number two. Although he is a Yemeni citi- offensive between March and May 2011 and zen, some sources report he was born in captured a string of towns in the neigh- Saudi Arabia. After Wuhayshi was killed in bouring province of Abyan, including the June 2015 Raymi took over the leadership. provincial capital of Zanjibar. It declared The new group profited from the weak- the area it controlled an “Islamic emirate” ness of the Yemeni state and the numerous and strove to establish a functioning ad- domestic conflicts, which hampered any ministration there. effective fight against the terrorists. The At the same time it founded a civilian most important difference between al-Qaeda arm, named Ansar al-Sharia (supporters of in Yemen and its precursors in the country sharia). This echoed a suggestion made by is the new organisation’s irreconcilable Osama Bin Laden in 2010 in a letter written hostility towards the Yemeni state, whose from Abbottabad, calling on his followers representatives and institutions first came to find a new name for al-Qaeda that better into its sights from 2009. Since then al- reflected the organisation’s religious and Qaeda has conducted numerous attacks political goals. This was part of a broader on Yemeni security forces. As well as major strategy designed to win the populations suicide bombings it has also carried out of Muslim countries for al-Qaeda and its hundreds of assassinations on individual agenda. In the towns of Jaar, Shaqwa and members of the army and security forces, Zanjibar the Yemeni branch consequently accelerating since 2012, with the aim of tried to operate not only as a militant orga- demoralising its adversaries. nisation but also to secure the population’s supplies of water, electricity and food. It also promised a functioning justice system and Goals and Strategy set up sharia courts to that end. But this The Yemeni organisation has developed a approach only partly succeeded, because set of objectives of its own. First of all, it Ansar al-Sharia also enforced Salafist codes wishes to destabilise Yemen, bring territory of dress and behaviour and had local oppo- SWP Comments 4 January 2016 2 nents executed. When the new Yemeni gov- agement of Salafist missionising among ernment launched a counter-offensive in the Zaydis in the north. The government, May 2012 al-Qaeda was quickly forced to they asserted, was seeking to block potential retreat to the southern mountains. political competition from leading Zaydi When civil war broke out in spring 2015, families. The result was civil war, which has al-Qaeda again grasped the opportunity, erupted on seven separate occasions since initially joining Sunni tribal militias from 2004. In the most recent round the Houthis the south against advancing Houthi rebels. joined with forces loyal to former President After the Saudi-led coalition began air strikes Saleh, who has never accepted his ouster in in March, al-Qaeda again captured large 2012. After first capturing Sanaa in Septem- parts of the provinces of Abyan, Shabwa ber 2014, they toppled the Hadi government and Hadramaut. At the beginning of April, and marched south, provoking the inter- together with allied tribes, it captured vention by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Mukalla, the country’s fifth-largest city and Emirates. capital of the south-eastern province of Since 2004 the Saleh regime branded the Hadramaut, where it took over the adminis- Houthi rebels as Islamist terrorists and, on tration together with its allies. In August the basis of their “Shiite” identity, as agents reports also appeared of the presence of of Iran. Riyadh shared this assessment of al-Qaeda units in Aden, shortly after it was the Houthis as Tehran’s fifth column and taken by the Saudi-led coalition. With the consequently backed the Yemeni govern- number of Saudi, Emirate and Yemeni ment in its fight in the north. In the Arab troops too small to fight both the rebels world, where tensions between Sunnis and and al-Qaeda, the latter was able to operate Shiites have heightened enormously since largely unhindered. 2003, the view that the Houthis were fight- ing on behalf of Iran has become increasing- ly accepted. Stoking Religious Tensions Al-Qaeda in Yemen always regarded the In the course of the advance of the Houthis Zaydis as heretics on a par with the Shiites and their allies, al-Qaeda modified its strat- as a whole, presenting them as the Yemeni egy, now seeking to profit from growing arm of an alliance consisting of the United religious tensions in Yemen through attacks States, Iran and their respective allies on the Shiite Houthi rebels. In this way it fighting against (true) Islam. Nevertheless hoped to win the support of the numerous al-Qaeda concentrated on its war against opponents of the Houthis among the coun- the Yemeni state. One reason for this was try’s Sunnis. that al-Qaeda’s strongholds were in the The Houthi rebels belong to the Zaydi south of the country, whereas until 2015 minority whose leaders – “imams” – ruled the Houthis operated exclusively in the Yemen until 1962. Although the Zaydis are north. Another is that this strategy corre- Shiites, they are much closer to Sunni Islam sponded to the priorities set by Bin Laden than the other currents of Shiism. Zaydis and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri, who represent considerably less than half of had long insisted that al-Qaeda should Yemen’s overall population, but are heavily restrict itself to the struggle against the concentrated in the capital Sanaa and above United States and its allies.
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