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3.2

Sudan

Sudan continued to be one of the most stability in the south. As the 2009 elections and challenging environments for peacekeepers in 2011 referendum approach, all of these issues 2008. Following intense international pressure become increasingly difficult to sidestep. In the to deploy UN troops to Sudan’s Darfur region, meantime, implementation of the CPA contin- the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UN- ued to be overshadowed by the Darfur crisis AMID) took over from the existing AU Mis- and the 2008 indictment of President Omar al- sion in Sudan (AMIS) in December 2007. But Bashir by the Prosecutor of the International its deployment began slowly, marred by inse- Criminal Court (ICC). curity, lack of cooperation from the Sudanese government and sensitivities surrounding the composition of the force, as well as logistical Darfur: Background challenges. UNAMID was intended to be one UNAMID’s predecessor mission—AMIS— element of a three-pronged approach involving was deployed in June 2004, a year after the peacekeeping alongside humanitarian and commencement of large-scale hostilities in Dar- peacemaking efforts.1 But the challenges of fur. Initially a force of 60 observers with 300 this approach became manifest as various par- troops to protect them, it was later expanded ties continued to pursue military solutions to to 6,171 personnel and given a more robust the conflict, the peace process stalled, and the security situation declined. An unprecedented rebel attack on the Sudanese capital and a seri- ous attack on the mission itself demonstrated the difficulties that lay ahead for UNAMID. The question of Darfur’s participation in na- tional elections scheduled for 2009 also remains unresolved. The peacekeeping environment in southern Sudan remained equally difficult, despite the presence of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The south has seen relatively little in peace dividends, and deep-seated differences between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) have hampered the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Disagreements revolved around key aspects of the CPA such as border demarcation and the re- deployment of troops. Interethnic rivalry, often exacerbated by the civil war and its aftermath, continues to disrupt both security and political

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3.2.1 Humanitarian Organizations Struggle with the Private Security Dilemma

At about the same time that scandals re- organizations (UN and international non- quality, low pay, and weak management of garding the actions of private security governmental organizations) that have local private security providers, despite the companies in Iraq and Afghanistan were been contracting private security provid- regularity with which these entities are emerging, speculation grew that these en- ers, but primarily for unarmed, “soft secu- contracted. tities were cultivating new markets within rity” services such as training, risk assess- Humanitarian organizations were humanitarian operations. Humanitarian or- ment, and security management consulting. found to favor contracting private security ganizations operate in many of the world’s While armed protection remains an excep- providers in order to reduce costs and in- most dangerous environments, and for the tional practice, every major international crease time efficiency, as well as to cope past several years have suffered increasing humanitarian organization cited at least one with a perceived lack of in-house capacity casualties. Reports suggest that humanitar- instance of contracting armed security in and expertise. However, the report found ian agencies have been increasingly turning the past year. Most aid practitioners agree that the anticipated benefits of employing to private security companies for armed that the use of arms is a deeply problematic private security providers did not always protection. A study released in October approach to humanitarian security, both in ring true. Additionally, the report empha- 2008 by researchers from the Humanitarian theory and in practice, to be undertaken only sized the risks that are posed when private Policy Group of the Overseas Development as a last resort or as dictated by local secu- security providers lack understanding of Institute and from the Center on Interna- rity dynamics. the core principles that underpin humani- tional Cooperation at New York University In its most striking finding, the report tarian activities. featured the first quantitative analysis of the found a near universal lack of policies and Given the potential dangers of con- use of private security providers by human- protocols among agencies for hiring and tracting private security providers in an itarian organizations, with an aim of provid- managing security contractors. Field staff unregulated environment, the report advo- ing a foundation for discussion of the often lack guidance on how to properly vet and cated for a dialogue within the humanitar- controversial issue of the role of private se- oversee security providers, and headquar- ian community to establish good practices curity outfits in conflict zones. ter personnel are much less informed about and common guidelines. The report found a measurable in- field-level security contracting practices crease in the number of humanitarian as well. Other concerns include the poor

Source: Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Victoria DiDomenico, “The Use of Private Security Providers and Services in Humanitarian Op- erations,” Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report no. 27, September 2008, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/hpgreport 27.pdf.

mandate, including protection of civilians. The UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) mission lacked the capacity to implement this mandate, however, and was constrained finan- • Authorization Date 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769) cially and logistically. • Start Date 31 December 2007 The government of Sudan, strongly resist- • Joint UN-AU Rodolphe Adada ant to a UN operation in Darfur, agreed in mid- Special Representative (Republic of Congo) • Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria) 2007 to the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU • Police Commissioner Michael J. Fryer (South Africa) force. Security Council Resolution 1769 au- • Budget $1,699.7 million thorized the deployment of UNAMID under (1 July 2008–30 June 2009) Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission • Strength as of Troops: 8,935 was to comprise 26,000 uniformed personnel, 31 October 2008 Military Observers: 138 including 19,555 military, 3,772 police, and 19 Police: 2,342 formed police units of 140 officers each.2 It International Civilian Staff: 743 was to incorporate AMIS personnel as well as Local Civilian Staff: 1,404 those provided through UN light and heavy UN Volunteers: 246 “support packages” for AMIS agreed to during For detailed mission information see p. 255 2006. 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 42

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the initial impact of the transfer of authority was UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) largely symbolic; even the old AMIS markings remained on vehicles and buildings for some time. From the start, relations with Khartoum • Authorization and 24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590) were a strong focus; difficult discussions en- Start Date • SRSG Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) sued, including over the use of blue “UN” • Force Commander Major-General Paban Jung Thapa (Nepal) helmets; land, air, and water rights; and the ne- • Police Commissioner Brigadier Kai Vittrup (Denmark) gotiation of the status of forces agreement. • Budget $820.7 million Meanwhile, it was necessary to establish com- (1 July 2008–30 June 2009) munications and support mechanisms for the • Strength as of Troops: 8,728 hybrid UN-AU mission, including the staffing 31 October 2008 Military Observers: 622 of a joint support coordination mechanism in Police: 687 Addis Ababa, which had not been fully opera- International Civilian Staff: 768 tional by December 2008. Failure to opera- Local Civilian Staff: 2,447 tionalize the joint mechanism was perhaps an UN Volunteers: 232 indication of the UN’s desire to maintain full For detailed mission information see p. 329 control of UNAMID, partially undercutting the notion of a hybrid arrangement. The major immediate challenge, and the UNAMID was mandated to help provide preoccupation of UN member states, was the security for the provision of humanitarian as- deployment of the mission. In compliance with sistance and protect civilian populations under demands by the Sudanese government, Resolu- imminent threat of physical violence, as well as tion 1769 stressed that the force would have a to monitor compliance with cease-fire agree- “predominantly African character.” However, ments, report on the security situation along the existing African battalions in Darfur and those borders with Chad and the Central African poised to deploy did not meet UN standards of Republic (CAR), and assist with the implemen- “self-sustainability,” limiting their ability to carry tation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.3 out the mandate. Thus, UNAMID’s urgent task However, the agreement was signed by only one was to help African battalions meet the required of the three major rebel movements, and the se- standards as soon as possible. curity situation deteriorated in its wake as the In April 2008, an “enhanced deployment movements fragmented. Talks launched by the plan” was put in place, envisioning an ambitious AU and UN in October 2007 were boycotted by deployment of 80 percent by the end of 2008, several key rebel leaders and immediately but delays continued, for three main reasons. stalled. With ongoing hostilities and displace- First, ongoing insecurity, including banditry, sig- ment, widespread insecurity, and only a precar- nificantly constrained the movement of equip- ious and partial peace agreement in place, con- ment and personnel. Second, the Sudanese gov- ditions for the fulfilment of UNAMID’s mandate ernment continued to obstruct the deployment were inauspicious from the start. through various means, including a lack of blan- ket clearance for night flights, failure to provide requested land in a timely manner, and slow Darfur: Key Developments visa-processing and customs-clearance require- UNAMID took over from AMIS on 1 January ments, although some improvements were seen 2008 under the leadership of Joint Special Rep- in the second half of the year. Third, and most resentative Rodolphe Adada and Force Com- significant, logistical challenges arose due to the mander General Martin Luther Agwai, already 2,000-kilometers distance between Darfur and in place under the old AMIS structure. As the Sudan’s nearest port, and the poor quality of the force comprised only existing AMIS battalions, roads, especially during the rainy season. 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 43

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As a result, by the end of October 2008, UNAMID’s uniformed personnel stood at 11,416—just over a thousand more than were deployed at the close of AMIS—including 9,074 military personnel and 2,342 police. At the end of the year, UNAMID had registered 63 percent of its deployment. Recruitment of civilian posi- tions was at 41 percent of full capacity. The force lacked a number of capabilities vital to the implementation of its mandate, in- cluding eighteen medium-lift helicopters, six attack helicopters, one aerial reconnaissance unit, one medium transport unit, one heavy transport unit, and one multirole logistics unit.4 Meeting these crucial needs is essential, but by the end of 2008 no concrete agreements had materialized, hampering UNAMID from re- STUART PRICE/AFP/Getty Images sponding to growing insecurity. A Rwandan soldier from UNAMID guards girls as they collect water UNAMID’s police have received praise for in the town of Tawila, North Darfur, Sudan, 14 July 2008. immediately developing a three-phase plan for patrolling camps of internally displaced per- sons (IDPs), culminating in a twenty-four-hour 3,000 civilians. In August, an exchange of fire presence established inside the extremely tense in the Kalma camp left 33 dead, after Sudanese Kalma IDP camp in southern Darfur in Sep- government forces were sent to enforce a search tember 2008. However, for the police, just as warrant for weapons. for the military, progress has been constrained In May 2008, in the most dramatic incident by gaps in capacity, including a shortage of ra- of the year, the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, was dios and the continued unavailability of formed brought directly into the conflict for the first police units to provide protection. Of the au- time when approximately one thousand JEM thorized strength of nineteen formed police fighters launched a surprise attack, infiltrating units, only twelve have been pledged and only the city of Omdurman across the river from the one has been deployed. capital. The attack led to many casualties and arrests and the government cut off diplomatic ties with Chad, which it accused of sponsoring Darfur: Security Situation the rebels. The event highlighted the regional Meanwhile, UNAMID faces a deteriorating se- tensions surrounding the cross-border move- curity environment, characterized by banditry, ment of armed groups, which neither UNAMID clashes among rebel groups, the militarization nor the parallel UN and EU missions in Chad of IDP camps, ethnic clashes over resources, and the CAR are mandated to address. Three and fighting between government and rebel months earlier, Chadian opposition groups had forces. In January and February 2008, attacks attacked N’Djamena, allegedly with Sudanese by government forces on villages in western support. They came close to toppling the regime Darfur, controlled by the Justice and Equality of Idriss Déby and solidified his dependence on Movement (JEM), left 115 people dead and Darfur rebels linked to him by a common Zag- over 30,000 forcibly displaced, according to hawa lineage. The aftermath of the May attack some estimates.5 In May, clashes between fac- saw a renewal of clashes between the Sudan tions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in Armed Forces (SAF) and JEM in west Darfur north Darfur resulted in the displacement of and aerial attacks in other rebel strongholds, a 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 44

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significant escalation of the low-level conflict But just before Bassolé was to commence between the government and the armed groups. his duties, the political landscape shifted with UNAMID was not spared the violence, as the announcement by the ICC Prosecutor of an it was directly targeted. It suffered an attack on application for a warrant of arrest against Pres- a supply convoy in its very first month and ident Bashir, the very first indictment of a sitting then, in April 2008, two UNAMID containers head of state by the Court. UNAMID braced for holding equipment for a Chinese engineering a possible political backlash and a further dete- company were hijacked along a major supply rioration of the security situation. Khartoum’s route and not recovered. In July, in the most initial reaction was instead to search for a polit- serious incident to date, seven UNAMID ical solution, lobbying for the use of Article 16 troops were killed and nineteen were wounded of the Rome Statute to suspend the proceedings after 200 militia members armed with machine for one year, renewable. Meanwhile, the Na- guns and anti-aircraft weapons attacked a mili- tional Congress Party reached out to its part- tary and civilian police patrol in a government- ners in the Government of National Unity and controlled area of north Darfur. UNAMID’s opposition political parties to garner support lack of air assets rendered it unable to respond and drew up plans for a multiparty mechanism and protect its own troops. With its focus on to resolve the Darfur conflict. In early Novem- staff security and recruitment of police officers ber the government launched the Sudan Peo- and other personnel restricted, the speed of ple’s Initiative and declared a cease-fire, fol- UNAMID’s deployment was further curtailed. lowing an earlier initiative led by Qatar. But prospects for the success of the initiatives were An Elusive Peace dampened due to a boycott by the main rebel UNAMID’s mandate to assist in the implemen- groups. Whether such initiatives will contain tation of the Darfur Peace Agreement is prob- the beginnings of an inclusive settlement or lematic because the agreement is ignored by will convince Security Council members to im- parties on the ground, unrecognized by nonsig- plement Article 16 remains to be seen. But the natories, and disliked by much of the popula- ICC announcement compounded the chal- tion. Meanwhile, prospects for a new and more lenges facing UNAMID. inclusive peace agreement remain remote. In In addition to the ICC announcement, Bas- December 2007, a meeting of the rebel move- solé’s quest for an inclusive peace must con- ments under the auspices of the SPLM led to front the national and regional political realities the creation of two new coalitions, significantly that intersect with the Darfur crisis, not least reducing the total number of factions (one has the timeline for implementation of the CPA. since collapsed). However, there remained a Sudan’s fifth population and housing census critical lack of unity among the movements on was conducted in Darfur in April and May whether to proceed to peace talks. From March 2008, but there was widespread opposition, es- 2008, the UN-AU mediation focused instead pecially from IDPs, and insecurity prevented on informal and confidence-building measures enumerators from reaching many areas. There toward a cessation of hostilities, but failed to is similar opposition in Darfur to the elections convince the main rebel movements to engage. scheduled for 2009. Yet the exclusion of the re- After the UN and AU were criticized for ap- gion risks undermining Sudan’s democratic pointing part-time mediators, UN Special En- transition and the CPA. voy Jan Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim Meanwhile, Chad and Sudan appeared to Ahmed Salim sought to identify a single UN- have mended fences following the JEM attack. AU joint chief mediator to be based in Sudan. A Contact Group established in support of the In June 2008, the UN and AU announced the ap- March 2008 Dakar Agreement has held discus- pointment of Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, foreign sions on the establishment of a border-monitor- minister of Burkina Faso, providing hope for a ing mission. It is not clear, however, whether renewed and focused leadership and direction. such a mission can be credible or result in 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 45

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either government suspending its assistance to on helping to implement the CPA. Its responsi- the other’s opposition groups. bilities include monitoring and verifying troop redeployments, assisting with the formation of Humanitarian joint integrated units to help secure contested In this environment of insecurity, the humani- regions, promoting the rule of law (including tarian situation deteriorated in 2008, with combating impunity), supporting preparations 200,000 persons newly displaced during the for elections and referendums, and investigating first half of the year (bringing total IDPs in CPA violations. UNMIS’s mandate also specif- Darfur to 2.5 million). In the same period, over ically includes certain tasks not directly linked 120 vehicles were hijacked (more than double to the CPA, including coordinating humanitar- the number for the corresponding months of ian assistance, protecting and promoting human 2007), 8 humanitarian workers were killed, 103 rights, and protecting civilians under imminent were abducted, and 51 humanitarian premises threat of violence, using force under Chapter were assaulted by armed men. Humanitarian ac- VII of the UN Charter if necessary. cess decreased to only 70 percent of the affected population, having declined over the previous three years. Some humanitarian organizations North-South: Key Developments withdrew staff or suspended operations, while the World Food Programme was forced to halve Security food rations and warned of a possible suspen- On 10 May 2008, approximately 300 armed sion of food distribution. Meanwhile, interna- pickup trucks loaded with JEM troops raced tional efforts toward the reconstruction and de- across the 1,200-kilometer stretch from Darfur velopment of Darfur remained stalled, pending to Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, reaching an improvement of the security situation and Omdurman, on Khartoum’s outskirts. An esti- the start of a credible peace process. mated 465 people, including 57 civilians, lost their lives during the fighting. The attack and the security measures that followed had an im- North-South: Background mediate impact on UNMIS’s operations, restrict- The Darfur crisis continues to complicate ing staff movement and impeding the return of UNMIS’s tasks in implementing the CPA. The displaced populations to their homes in the south. May attack from Darfur on Omdurman, for ex- In spite of government restrictions, UNMIS ample, not only created a security and humani- launched investigations into human rights and tarian crisis, but also had far-reaching political humanitarian law violations alleged to have consequences. Less direct but perhaps even taken place during the attack, and publicly raised more difficult to address is the potential impact concerns that the trial of thirty accused JEM of efforts to prosecute President Omar al-Bashir members convicted of participating in the attack before the ICC. The international community may not have met international standards. remains focused on Darfur, largely at the ex- The attack had significant political fallout. pense of the CPA, whose implementation has While JEM forces were ultimately repulsed, floundered. they succeeded for the first time in bringing the The Security Council first authorized the Darfur conflict to the government’s doorstep, creation of a mission to Sudan—the UN Ad- challenging the NCP’s political standing. The vance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)—in Reso- NCP reacted by jailing opposition leaders who lution 1547, on 11 July 2004, and charged it had links to JEM, while rallying other opposi- with laying the groundwork for the UN’s role in tion parties to decry the attack and establishing supporting the CPA. On 24 March 2005, Reso- a temporary détente with the SPLM. The attack lution 1590 expanded and converted UNAMIS closely resembled a rebel assault on the Cha- into UNMIS, a full-fledged peace operation. dian capital, N’Djamena, three months earlier. UNMIS was given a broad mandate, centered Chad accused Sudan of supporting the rebels 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 46

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who carried out that attack. Given JEM’s close UNMIS forces were accused of failing to ties to the government in N’Djamena—and ru- protect civilians caught in the fighting; the joint mors that JEM had helped fight off the February integrated units (JIU) deployed in the area ef- attack—Sudan asserted that the JEM offensive fectively dissolved once fighting began. While was intended as retribution, and cut off diplo- Special Representative of the Secretary-General matic ties with Chad. (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi acknowledged some er- The Abyei region remains perhaps the most rors, he noted that peacekeepers sheltered more sensitive flashpoint in both local interethnic than a hundred civilians during the fighting. He and national north-south conflicts. Neither side also highlighted that UNMIS forces lacked was willing to concede the oil-rich border area both the mandate and the capacity to intervene during the CPA negotiations, but both eventu- or suppress combat on the scale seen in Abyei ally agreed in a separate protocol to create the during May. Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), to de- In the aftermath of the fighting, UNMIS termine the territory’s precise borders. A local helped broker a series of meetings that culmi- referendum would then determine Abyei’s sta- nated in the adoption of a “road map” on 8 June tus. The NCP rejected the final ABC report im- that included provisions on the withdrawal of mediately upon its release in 2005. The two SAF and SPLA forces and deployment of new parties have remained deadlocked over the JIUs, the return of the displaced civilian popu- issue, preventing either from establishing an ef- lation, the establishment of a civilian adminis- fective civilian administration. tration, and the distribution of oil revenues. The security environment around Abyei Most significantly, the parties agreed to refer began to deteriorate seriously in late 2007; re- the border dispute to the Permanent Court of ported incidents included the placement of Arbitration in The Hague. As of September roadblocks around oil fields, kidnappings, and 2008, the parties have chosen four of the five incursions by rebel groups based in southern members of the arbitral panel. But despite this, Darfur. The SPLM’s appointment, with the Su- Abyei was the scene of another clash between danese government’s approval, of a temporary SAF nd SPLA soldiers in December. administrator generated concern among the The role of the JIUs, meant to provide se- Misseriya Arabs in the area. On 22 December curity in disrupted areas, will become increas- 2007, a dispute over transit rights sparked a se- ingly important as the 2009 elections and 2011 ries of firefights between Sudan People’s Lib- referendum approach, especially because the eration Army (SPLA) units and the Misseriya JIUs will be responsible for preventing elec- that continued sporadically through May 2008. tion-related violence and ensuring peaceful im- On 13 May 2008, the killing of an SAF plementation of the results. According to the soldier at an SPLA checkpoint in the town of Secretary-General’s July 2008 report on Sudan, Abyei triggered the most severe violation of UNMIS had verified about 85 percent of the the CPA cease-fire since 2005. In spite of sev- total authorized JIU strength, and was soliciting eral agreements to de-escalate and redeploy international support for training and equipping troops away from the area, combat between the the units. The JIUs’ performance in Abyei, how- SAF and SPLA continued through 20 May, re- ever, highlighted concerns about their practical sulting in eighty-nine deaths and the destruc- effectiveness. tion of most of Abyei. Approximately 50,000 Continued distrust between the CPA signa- civilians fled the town and surrounding vil- tories as well as concerns over interethnic con- lages. Both sides kept substantial forces in the flicts have impeded disarmament, demobiliza- area, and tensions remain high. On 7 July, a UN tion, and reintegration (DDR) efforts, as have observer was fatally shot in the head thirty funding shortfalls, logistical difficulties, and a kilometers south of Abyei during a dispute be- lack of local infrastructure and capacity. Slow de- tween SAF and SPLA troops. velopment in the south and the lack of economic 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 47

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opportunities, moreover, provide little incen- referendum law, more than a year after the tive for soldiers to reenter civilian life. The par- envisaged timeline in the CPA. Moreover, ties made some progress in 2008, however. The more than a year and half after enacting the Po- National Council for Disarmament, Demobi- litical Parties Act, the government has yet to lization, and Reintegration Coordination ap- create the Political Parties Affairs Council as proved a national reintegration policy, allowing required under that act; as of September 2008, the parties to agree upon a multiyear DDR the government was a month late in forming project outline in June 2009. The northern and the National Elections Commission. southern DDR commissions have created tech- For its part, UNMIS has begun to build its nical coordination committees, and begun joint own electoral support capacity, adding technical operations in Blue Nile State. staff in both Khartoum and Juba. Given the In the meantime, moves by the ICC Prose- state of election preparations, however, it re- cutor to try President Bashir place UNMIS in mains unclear how much and what kind of sup- an extremely precarious position. UNMIS has port the mission will be called upon to provide, neither the capacity nor the mandate to arrest leaving open the possibility that it may be forced Bashir, and indeed relies on the cooperation of to scale up its capacity suddenly as the elections Bashir’s administration to function. But work- draw near. ing directly with an individual sought by the ICC for such extraordinary crimes could prove corrosive both to the mission’s and to the ICC’s Conclusion perceived credibility, particularly given the Overall the peace operations in Sudan contin- mission’s mandate to promote human rights. ued to operate in a very hostile environment Relationships with other regional actors, includ- throughout 2008. Slow force generation, dete- ing neighboring states, the African Union, and riorating security and humanitarian situations, the League of Arab States, may also become a shortage of mission enablers (most notably more delicate as the Sudanese government works helicopters), and a stalled peace process com- to rally others to oppose any arrest warrant. plicated UNAMID’s first year of operation and cast doubts on the concept of “hybridity” as a Elections viable model for future peace operations. The year 2008 saw significant progress in the Meanwhile, the lack of progress in implement- preparations for the 2009 national elections and ing key aspects of the CPA—primarily border the 2011 referendum as provided for by the demarcation, troop deployment, and wealth- CPA. After successive delays, data collection sharing—occupied UNMIS throughout the for the national census was completed on 6 May year. Despite taking the initial steps toward the 2008 with extensive UNMIS support. While a 2009 elections by conducting a census, the cen- number of irregularities and difficulties were sus itself was criticized for the way it was con- reported, including a boycott in southern Kord- ducted in the war-torn Darfur region, raising ofan, material shortages, and logistical and secu- more questions about the nature of the planned rity problems, the Sudanese government reported elections and its impact on the referendum in a 90 percent nationwide coverage rate. As 2008 2011. But it is the efforts by the ICC to prose- drew to a close, the results were yet to be re- cute President Bashir for crimes committed in leased. Meanwhile, in July, after more than two Darfur that could have the most far-reaching and half years of delays, the National Assembly consequences for UNAMID and UNMIS, with adopted the national election law. potential for wider regional repercussions. Preparations remained behind schedule, however. The government has yet to pass a 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 48

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Notes 1. This approach was outlined by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2007. 2. UN Security Council Resolution 1769, UN Doc. S/2007/468, 30 July 2007. 3. UNAMID’s mandate is laid out in United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General and the Chair- person of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2007/307/Rev.1, 5 June 2007, paras. 53–55. UNAMID is mandated to protect civilians “within its capability” and “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan.” 4. This issue was highlighted in a recent report endorsed by many nongovernmental organizations. See Thomas Withington, Grounded: The International Community’s Betrayal of UNAMID, July 2008, http:// www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/shig-7h2c66?opendocument. 5. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ninth Periodic Report of the United Na- tions High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, 20 March 2008, p. 2.