Norwegian Perception of Russia in the Arctic

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Master’s Thesis

BC. ADÉLA FICOVÁ

Supervisor: Mgr. Barbora Padrtová, Ph.D.

Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations Brno 2019

NORWEGIAN PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC

Bibliografický záznam

Autor: Bc. Adéla Ficová Fakulta sociálních studií, Masarykova univerzita Department of International Relations and European Studies Název práce: Norwegian Perception of Russia in the Arctic Studijní program: International Relations Vedoucí práce: Mgr. Barbora Padrtová, Ph.D. Akademický rok: 2019 Počet stran: 100 (180 802 znaků) Klíčová slova: Norsko, Rusko, Arktida, percepce, bezpečnost, vztahy, Kodaňská škola, obsahová analýza, chronologické posloupnosti NORWEGIAN PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC

Bibliographic record

Author: Bc. Adéla Ficová Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and European Studies Title of Thesis: Norwegian Perception of Russia in the Arctic Degree Programme: International Relations Supervisor: Mgr. Barbora Padrtová, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2019 Number of Pages: 100 (180,802 characters) Keywords: Norway, Russia, Arctic, High North, perception, security, relations, Copenhagen School, content analysis, chronological sequences NORWEGIAN PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC

Abstrakt

Arktická oblast nabývá na významu a dostává se jí čím dál více pozornosti v médiích. Cílem předložené diplomové práce je zhodnotit norsko-ruské vztahy v Arktidě a norskou percepci Ruska v této oblasti. Práce využívá jako analytický rámec Kodaňskou školu a obsahovou analýzu a chronologické posloupnosti jako metody. V neposlední řadě je záměrem práce zjistit, zdali ruská expanzivní zahraniční politika ovlivnila norsko-ruské vztahy a pohled Norska na svého souseda. NORWEGIAN PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC

Abstract

The Artic area is becoming of bigger importance and it gets more attention in the media. The purpose of the thesis is to assess the Norway-Russia relations in the Arctic and the Norwegian perception of Russia. The thesis uses the Copenhagen School as an analytical framework and methods of content analysis and chronological sequences as tools. Last but not least, the aim is to determine whether the Russian expansive foreign policy influenced the Norway-Russia relations and the Norwegian perception of their neighbour.

NORWEGIAN PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Master’s Thesis concerning the topic of Norwegian Perception of Russia in the Arctic independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno, 1 May 2019 ...... Bc. Adéla Ficová

NORWEGIAN PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Mgr. Barbora Padrtová, Ph.D., for her patience, helpful guidance and valuable advices. I also thank my mum and my library friends for their encouragement and support.

CONTENT

Content

1 Introduction 1

2 Literature review 3

3 Theoretical part 5 3.1 Copenhagen School ...... 5 3.2 The multi-sectoral approach as used in this thesis ...... 8 3.3 Methodology and data ...... 13

4 Analytical part 20 4.1 Historical context from till 2008 ...... 20 4.2 Content analysis ...... 24 4.3 The military sector ...... 27 4.4 The environmental sector ...... 52 4.5 The economic sector ...... 66 4.6 The societal sector...... 75 4.7 The political sector ...... 78 4.8 Analysis synthesis...... 101

5 Conclusion 105

Biography 107

Raw data 127

INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic region is getting more and more attention of not only politicians and scholars but also of the public. This change originates in well-known processes such as globalization and climate change which are of interest to many actors. The prospect of natural resources extractions and commercial shipping is attractive for many companies; on the other hand, environmental NGOs and indigenous people’s organisations take interest in their activities. Clearly, these changes affect also individuals and have a political impact. There has been written a lot of literature about challenges which arise together with these changes, including security. Nevertheless, most of the literature deals with the region as a whole. The author of this thesis would like to contribute to the field of international relations by analysing the security aspect of a particular bilateral relation – between Norway and Russia, focusing on the Norwegian perception of Russia in the Arctic. The goal of the thesis is not only to analyse Russian behaviour in the Arctic, but especially to ascertain how particular actors (the government, NGOs, media, etc.) in Norway perceive this behaviour. This is due to the fact that security is a rather an abstract concept; in practice, an issue becomes a security issue ‘not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.’1 Scholars agree that the conflict potential in the Arctic is overestimated. Nevertheless, the security regarding Russia is a topic in Norway, and therefore, I would like to analyse whether there is a gap between the reality and the perception of the Russian threat. The Norway-Russia relation is historically characterised by the absence of an armed conflict.2 However, it is also important to point out that even though we have witnessed a long history of a successful cooperation in the region, and the conflict potential in the Arctic might be exaggerated, security is indivisible, and the Arctic cannot be seen in

1 BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER a Jaap de WILDE. Security: a new framework for analysis, p. 24. 2 Norges offentlige utredninger: Et nytt forsvar, p. 29.

isolation. Conflicts or events in other parts of the world might have an impact in the Arctic too3. In this sense, it should be interesting to analyse the Norwegian perception of the Russian security threat after the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and after Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. A conflict in the Arctic seems to be more likely caused by a spill-over effect from tensions in other regions than to emerge from within.4 Firstly, the author points out in the literature review that there is a gap in literature and therefore a need for such a research. Moreover, she introduces the methodology and data used in the theoretical part. The thesis uses the Copenhagen School as an analytical framework and the methods of content analysis and chronological sequences as an analytical tool. In the analytical part, the author provides the historical context of Norway-Russia relations; however, the main body of the text is divided according to the five sectors developed by the Copenhagen School: military, political, societal, economic and environmental parts of the perception. Besides analysing the sectors by the means of chronological sequences, the author adds also the quantitative aspect to the analysis: by the means of content analysis, she ascertains which of the sectors are most covered in the media, and whether the events in 2014 increased the interest in the topic of Norway-Russia relations.

3 TAMNES, Rolf. Arctic Security and Norway, p. 63. 4 ZYSK, Katarzyna. Military Aspects of Russia's Arctic Policy, p. 105. LITERATURE REVIEW

2 Literature review

The literature about the Arctic is getting more and more extensive in the last decades. The main reason are the global changes which bring not only new opportunities such as natural resources extraction or new possible transport routes, but also challenges, mainly security ones. Nevertheless, most of the literature is focused on the Arctic in general (for example International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance by R. W. Murray and A. D Nuttall), or on Arctic policies of individual countries. There is a gap in the international relations literature with regard to bilateral relations of the Arctic states, which holds true for the relations of Norway and Russia as well. As for Norwegian policies of the Arctic, we can mention International Relations in the Arctic: Norway and the Struggle for Power in the New North by Fridtjof Nansen Institute researcher L. Ch. Jensen from 2015. Two chapters in the book Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change are also interesting: Arctic Security and Norway by Rolf Tamnes and Norway and the Arctic by Geir Flikke. Both of them focus on security challenges for Norway in the region which is going through transformation. As noted above, the literature covering bilateral Norway-Russia relations is not extensive. In 2015, a two-volume history of Norway- Russia relations was published on the occasion of two hundred years anniversary of the Norwegian constitution. The first volume entitled Russland kommer nærmere (Russia Is Coming Closer) by J. P. Nielsen covers the years 1814–1917, the second volume Naboer i frykt og forventning (Neighbours in Fear and Expectations) by S. Holtsmark follows up till 2014. However, as L. Rowe points out, already the title is full of emotions.5 Moreover, the time-frame ends with the year 2014 which is crucial for the thesis. In the same year, there the book entitled Norge og Russland: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nordområdene (Norway and Russia: Security-political Challenges in the North) was published which also reflects the bilateral relations. The book is seminal because it has been the first to introduce a chapter concerning challenges after the Ukraine

5 ROWE, Lars. Fornuft og følelser: Norge og Russland etter Krim.

crisis, even though it is very short (9 pages) as the book was published just a year after the crisis. Nevertheless, this book is focused mainly on the military aspect of security and does not provide the whole picture which the multi-sectoral approach offers us. Finally, the researchers from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute provide a great contribution on this topic. Especially Lars Rowe and Geir Hønneland are occupied by the Norway-Russia relations in the long term. Unfortunately, their major works are already outdated: Barentsbrytninger (The Barents Sea Reflection) by Hønneland is from 2003, and their collective works Russlandsbilder (Russian Pictures) and Nordområdene - hva nå? (The North – What Now?) were published in 2007 and 2010 respectively. Notwithstanding this fact, the researchers wrote some articles connected to the topic later too. Norge og Russland: Tilbake til normaltilstanden (Norway and Russia: Back to Normality), where they evaluate relations between the two neighbour countries from 1990 till 2010, is worth mentioning. Lars Rowe himself continues in his research interest, and he published another article called Norge og Russland etter Krim (Sense and Sensibility: Norway and Russia after Crimea) just last year. The article discusses Norwegian perception of Russia in the mainstream media, and it is therefore the most related literature to this thesis. As both of the texts are articles, a deeper understanding is only beneficial. Moreover, the texts are opinion articles based on authors’ observation and the authors do not provide any type of data-based analysis. To sum up, even though there is some literature on the topics related to the thesis, the subject remains unexplored. Most importantly, the most of the texts are outdated or they consist of only opinion articles. Finally, minimum of the texts is written in English as Norwegian dominates. For all of the above stated reasons, I believe that a thorough analysis of the Norway-Russia relations in the Arctic, as well as of Norwegian perception of the neighbouring power would be seminal for the field of international relations. THEORETICAL PART

3 Theoretical part

3.1 Copenhagen School

This chapter provides a general insight into the thoughts of the Copenhagen School, presents its criticism and the sectoral approach as it is used in the thesis. The Copenhagen School emerged at the Conflict and Peace Institute of Copenhagen. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde are the main representatives of the school, as well as the authors of the book Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). The school has played an important role in broadening the concept of security. This attempt might be seen as a reaction to the end of the Cold War. The authors widen the traditionalist view of security by introducing a multi- sectoral approach which includes five sectors of analysis – military, environmental, economic, societal, and political. In addition to widening the concept of security, the school also deepens the analysis by including non-state actors. 6 To summarise, the Copenhagen School introduces three units of analysis in each of the sectors: referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors. Referent objects represent things that are perceived as threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival. Securitising actors are those actors who securitise issues by declaring a referent object existentially threatened (common players are e.g. political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyist, and pressure groups). Finally, functional actors refer to actors who affect the dynamics of a sector.7 Subsequently, in the chapters devoted to each sector, the authors describe the agenda within the sector and the types of actors operating there. The author of the thesis tackles this topic more closely in the part dealing with how the framework is used in this thesis. Besides the sectoral approach, the school has contributed the securitisation model to security studies. Buzan et al. argue that any specific matter can be non-politicised, politicised or securitised. Non-

6 EMMERS, Ralf. Securitization, p. 131-132. 7 BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER a Jaap de WILDE. Security: a new framework for analysis, p. 36.

politicised issues are those that the state does not deal with and that do not have a place in public debate. Politicised issues are part of public policy and they require government action. Securitised issues are those presented as an existential threat and which call for extraordinary measures, beyond normal political procedures. Individual issues are moved from the politicised to the securitised side of the spectrum area via an ‘act of securitisation’. The reverse process of moving an issue back to politicised is called desecuritisation.8 A securitising actor defines an already politicised issue as an existential threat to a referent object. Such an actor uses the language of security, speech act, to convince specific audience of the existential nature of the threat.9 It is essential that a successful securitisation depends on the acceptance of the security threat by significant audience. By the audience, it is understood political elites and some state institutions (e.g. military); however, wider population is excluded.10 Finally, it is important to note that the Copenhagen School takes an explicitly social constructivist approach. Security is looked upon as a self-referential practice because ‘the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.’11 In other words, security is a matter of perception and rhetoric. This also implies that the task of the analyst is not to assess some objective threats but to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is considered to be a threat.12

3.1.1 Criticism of the Copenhagen School Emmers ruminates on whether the concept of security can be broadened to such an extent without losing its coherence and warns of

8 Securitization theory. Available from: https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719. https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719 9 EMMERS, Ralf. Securitization, p. 144. 10 Securitization theory. Available from: https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719. https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719 11 BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER a Jaap de WILDE. Security: a new framework for analysis, p. 24. 12 Ibidem, p. 26. THEORETICAL PART a risk of overstretching the definition of security which could lead to vagueness.13 Despite the widening approach to security, the Copenhagen School is often criticised for being too limited in the sense that it is too focused on the speech act and language. That leads to a risk of ignoring other components which construct security such as images, materials or bureaucratic practices. Some authors therefore call for broadening the theory by incorporating media, structures and institutions.14 Specifically McDonald argues that artists and media represent the key securitising actors.15 Furthermore, some concepts are viewed as under-theorised. This concerns for example the concept of audience which is according to some authors too vague and lacks precision.16 Others refer to the securitisation model itself, asserting that the boundaries between securitisation and politicisation are sometimes blurred. Finally, some authors argue that the school is Eurocentric, i. e. it reflects only European security issues.17 The author of the thesis reflects the criticism of the Copenhagen School especially by encompassing media in the analysis. She believes that media is an important actor for forming whatever kind of perception. On the other hand, criticism towards the securitisation model is not taken into consideration as the analysis takes from the Copenhagen School only the sectoral approach which is used for analysing Norwegian perception of Russia.

13 EMMERS, Ralf. Securitization, p. 132. 14 Securitization theory. Available from: https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719. https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719 15 MCDONALD, Matt. Securitization and the Construction of Security. 16 Securitization theory. Available from: https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719. https://books.openedition.org/iheid/719 17 EMMERS, Ralf. Securitization, p. 137.

3.2 The multi-sectoral approach as used in this thesis

This thesis uses the Copenhagen School as a framework. Nevertheless, the author applies only the multi-sectoral approach, not the securitisation model. The goal of the thesis is to ascertain Norwegian perception of Russia which can be both positive and negative for what the sectoral analysis is useful. The author however looks not only for threats as in the original model but also for signs of cooperation. The aim of this chapter is to define the five sectors of analysis on the basis of the original book Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). The author defines the agenda in each sector and the actors whose perception is going to be analysed. Finally, as a reaction to the critique of the Copenhagen School, media are categorised as an actor in all of the sectors.

3.2.1 The military sector In the military sector, the most important referent object is the state. Moreover, according to traditional theory in international relations, the state is the only legitimate referent object in this sector. Nevertheless, as many states do not fit the perfect national model, other units, such as tribes or nations can be viewed as referent objects as well. More abstractly, principles such as the balance of power or international law can also be referred to as a referent object.18 When the referent object is the state, the actors analysed are to be the state representatives who speak security on the state’s behalf – that is the government. However, the analyst should bear in mind that the state is not always coherent because other voices, such as pressure groups and defence intellectuals want to be heart as well. Ultimately, there are actors who influence the dynamics of the sector – functional actors. Those are most notably armies and the arms industry.19 The main military agenda is the ability of the government to preserve itself against both military and non-military (immigration,

18 BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER a Jaap de WILDE. Security: a new framework for analysis, p. 52, 55. 19 Ibidem, p. 55-56. THEORETICAL PART rival ideologies) threats to the state’s existence. Regarding the interplay between two states, history has an impact on perception of the neighbour – heavily armed states with a history of aggression are more easily seen as threats. The classical military security dilemma and the escalating spiral should be also reminded regarding the military sector.20 In the analysis, the state of Norway is going to be the referent object in the military sector. It would be wrong to say that Norway is a unitary state due to immigration and the Sami population; however, no separatist groups operate there. The analysed actor is the government of Norway (Regjeringen) with an emphasis on the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other actors which play role in the sector should be revealed by the analysis of the media. As it has been stressed before, the author in not searching only for military threats but also cooperation.

3.2.2 The environmental sector The environmental sector has two different agenda: a scientific agenda and a political agenda which overlap and shape each other. The scientific agenda is represented by scientists and research institutions which point out to environmental problems. Often, the agenda is embedded in nongovernmental activities. On the other hand, the political agenda is essentially governmental and intergovernmental. The sector is typical by its great variety of issues, of which the most purely environmental is the disruption of ecosystems (namely climate change and pollution).21 While the environment as such is the referent object in this sector, the actors are those mentioned above: the state (the government), NGOs and researchers. There is also a large category of functional actors: economic actors (transnational corporations, agriculture industries, fishing etc.) whose activity is directly connected to the quality of the environment.22

20 Ibidem, p. 49-50. 21 Ibidem, p. 71. 22 Ibidem, p. 78.

It is crucial whether individual states accept the scientific agenda. Generally, two factors determine the priority of the environmental issues (lead or veto position): geographic location and the level of welfare. It is interesting that Buzan et al. specifically name Norway and Russia in this sector. They name Norway as a leading actor with a strong commitment to effective international action on environmental issues. Such leaders finance research, inform the public, take unilateral action (lead by example) or use diplomacy. Nevertheless, they also point out that the lead/veto position tents to be issue specific.23 As for Russia, the authors mention that global warming may be a benefit for the state due to thawing of the permafrost areas.24 For the political agenda, the author is going to analyse the governmental position – especially the Ministry of Climate and Environment, however, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries might be a useful source of information too (because of the functional actors’ position). Regarding the scientific agenda, the author is going to focus on Norwegian NGOs and research centres.

3.2.3 The economic sector The authors themselves admit that the idea of economic security is controversial and that the sector is much more blurred than e.g. the military one. The agenda is broad and can include trade relations, finance, the possibilities that economic dependencies within the global market will be exploited for political ends, economic embargos, illegal trade (e.g. drugs, light weapons), etc.25 Regarding the referent object, the state is remarkable because it appears in all the five sectors. It is the main referent object in the economic one too. Firms, especially if they have a place in state’s industrial base, can also be referent objects. Nevertheless, the state outshines them. In a similar way, the actors are especially representatives of states and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs)

23 Ibidem, p. 77-78; Norway is known for its environmental policies, however Norwegian position on moratorium on whaling is negative. 24 Ibidem, p. 87. 25 Ibidem, p. 98-100. THEORETICAL PART and sometimes more quietly firms. Firms have mainly the role of functional actor that affect the dynamics within the sector.26 Based on the above mentioned, the analysis is going to identify perception of the Norway-Russia economic relations by the government (the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries are crucial). At the same time, it is important to ascertain if there is a company which affects these relations and government’s perception of them.

3.2.4 The societal sector Unlike state, the society is not based on a fixed territory. The key concepts of the societal sector are identity and self-conception. The most common issues within the sector, that is the agenda, are: migration (the community is becoming different because of immigration and its identity is changing by a shift in the population composition), horizontal competition (although the community still lives at the same place, it changes its ways because of the dominant cultural and linguistic influence from neighbouring culture), vertical competition (the community is changing because there is either an integrating or regionalist project). These challenges can be both intentional and unintentional.27 The referent objects are these collective identities, which can be tribes, clans, nations, ethnic minorities, religious and race. These groups can react to the above-mentioned issues in two ways. They can themselves carry out some activities or they can try to move the issue to the political sector by putting it on the states agenda. This makes the societal sector difficult to analyse because it gradually merges with the political sector.28 The actors are therefore both the society and the state. In the thesis, the society is the Sámi people. The actor should be represented by the Sámi Parliament of Norway (Sametinget), however the author did not find sufficient information on their website, and therefore focused only on issues which were moved to the state agenda

26 Ibidem, p. 100, 103. 27 Ibidem, p. 191, 121. 28 Ibidem, p. 122-123.

– the actor is the government (the Ministry of Local Governance and Modernisation and Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

3.2.5 The political sector The political sector is the widest one, and therefore it is problematic. It is, as the authors call it, a residual category because somehow all security is political. The sector should not include military, identification, economic or environmental means, and because of that it becomes less coherent. We can say that the sector is made up by cases which are political, that is those which are connected to the state sovereignty. If we talk about threats, the political ones are those which aimed at organisational stability of the state (e.g. pressuring the government on a particular policy or overthrowing the government) but still, they are non-military. 29 The main referent object of the political sector is the territorial state. The actors are also well defined – it is primarily the government but occasionally also NGOs and IGOs. Buzan et al. also mention the role of the leading media in this sector.30 Accordingly, the referent object of the analysis is the Kingdom of Norway, and the main actor is its government. It will be ascertained from the media if other actors play the functional role in the sector.

3.2.6 Synthesis As Buzan et al. remind us, the analytical method of sectors starts with disaggregation but must end with reassembly. The disaggregation is carried out solely with the purpose of achieving simplification and clarity. Nevertheless, to achieve understanding, it is necessary to reassemble the parts together again.31 The authors offer a few different ways of how the sectors can be synthesised again. The one which is the most appropriated for the thesis is to look at linkages across the sectors and to draw conclusions. After all, the sectors are only lenses focusing

29 Ibidem, p. 141-2. 30 Ibidem, p. 145-146, 149. 31 BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER a Jaap de WILDE. Security: a new framework for analysis, p. 8. THEORETICAL PART on the same world, and it should be no surprise that the sectors are full of cross-references.32 Thanks to the synthesis, it is not detrimental that some of the sectors are blurred or they overlap (as it was demonstrated in the case of the societal and political sector); the whole picture is what matters in the end.

3.3 Methodology and data

The chapter describes how the research is conducted, the data collection process, methods and techniques of the research. Moreover, the research questions are presented, key terms are conceptualized and the time-frame of the analysis is defined.

3.3.1 Goals and research questions The goal of the thesis is to analyse Norway-Russia bilateral relations in the Arctic and Norwegian perception of Russia in the area. The secondary goal is to determine whether the Russian expansive foreign policy influenced the Norwegian perception of their neighbour. With this regard, the research questions are the following:

Research questions: • What role does the Artic play in the Norway-Russia relations? • What role does the Artic play in the Norwegian perception of Russia? • Is Russia perceived as a threat in Norway? • Has the Ukraine crisis influenced the Norwegian perception of Russia, and if so how?

3.3.2 Methodology The thesis is a qualitative case study. A case is a sufficiently delimited aspect of a historical episode which must be demarcated by both time and topic. A case study is then a detailed analysis of such a case. The aim is to provide a deep understanding or causal explanation of the

32 Ibidem, p. 167.

case. A general context must be taken into consideration and the study must provide a complex image.33 While the time demarcation of the thesis is specified bellow in the part ‘Time-frame of the analysis’, the topic is set by the research questions. Many authors use different terminologies of case studies. For example, in R. Stake’s nomenclature, the thesis is an analytical intrinsic case study. The goal of an intrinsic case study is to provide better understanding of a particular case, not theory building (if a researcher draws a generalisation for more cases, we are speaking of another type of case studies – instrumental ones).34 Other authors term this type of research explanatory studies (see R. Yin). Moreover, a researcher can study the case analytically or holistically.35 When conducting an analytical case study, we systematically search in the data with a goal of finding some regularities and classifying the data’s individual parts. After completing this phase, it is always important to make an attempt to interpret the results of the analysis as a whole, so that it would be possible to “tell a story” about them.36 As the thesis is using the Copenhagen school as a framework – dividing the research into five sectors, analysing them separately and synthesising the individual conclusions –, it is exactly this type of case study.

Chronological sequences In the book Case Study Research: Design and Methods, R. K. Yin presents several ways of case study analysis. As this thesis is not based on theoretical propositions, the general strategy is to work with data from the ground up – it is therefore an inductive strategy.37 Besides the general strategy, a case study also needs to have a specific analytical technique. The thesis uses time-series analysis, namely its special form – chronological sequences. Case studies allow us to trace events over time and compiling of chronological events is a frequent technique in such a type of research. Yin emphasises that the researcher should not think of the arraying of events into a chronology only as a descriptive

33 KOŘAN, Michal. Případová studie, p. 32-33. 34 STAKE, Robert. Qualitative Case Studies, p. 445. 35 Ibidem, p. 443. 36 HENDL, Jan. Kvalitativní výzkum: základní metody a aplikace, p. 226. 37 YIN, Robert K. Case study research: design and methods, p. 136-138. THEORETICAL PART device. Description is important; however, the process has an important analytical purpose: to investigate presumed causal events. Some events must always take place before other events and the reverse sequence is impossible (perception is a consequence of some events which occurred before); and at the same time, some events must always be followed by other events, on a contingency basis (the perception leads to some actions, which can again cause another reaction from the other actor).38 A chronological sequence should contain causal postulates, otherwise the chronologies risk becoming only chronicles – descriptions of events which lack any explanatory value. Moreover, certain time periods in a case study may be marked by some type of events which differ substantially from events of other time periods.39 The thesis operates with a hypothesis that the Ukraine crisis in 2014 could change the Norwegian perception of Russia and could therefore be a milestone in Norway-Russia relations even in the Arctic area.

Content analysis It is only a benefit, if a qualitative analysis is supplemented by some of the quantitative methods, for example the content analysis. Like this we can conduct a statistical analysis of frequency of particular content elements. That can be useful because frequency of a topic can express increased interest in the issue. In other words, we can trace the intensity of concerns over specific issues over time. For example, it can be anticipated that around the year 2014, there would be more articles and reports regarding Russian policies. Moreover, we will get an insight into which of the five sectors are perceived as the most burning. There is a lot of sources describing the process of conducting quantitative content analysis40. In general, the steps are as follows: first, the researcher selects a data sample. Secondly, she/he develops systematic criteria of sorting the data into various categories. Subsequently, the unit of analysis (e.g. word, theme, sentence, concept, etc.) is determined and defined. Then the content is coded according to

38 Ibidem, p. 150-155. 39 Ibidem, p. 155. 40 WIMMER, Roger D. Mass media research: an introduction, p. 167-8.; BERG, Bruce L. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences, p. 362.

established rules, and the amount of units in each category is counted for descriptive statistics. Finally, the researcher analyses the collected data and draws conclusions.41 The data sample is represented by news articles published in certain newspapers, in the given time framework, including specific key words (for more see chapter Data). That means that the quantitative part of the thesis regards only the perception in media. This is due to the fact that other documents used later in the qualitative part (government documents, NGO reports etc.) are of various quality while newspaper articles are the same type of units. The level of unit is therefore a document, a news article to be precise. Then we need to define categories for every variable. The categories can be constructed inductively or deductively, the latter is the case of the thesis. While the inductive approach derives the categories from the data analysed, the deductive one uses a categorical scheme which had been developed from a theoretical perspective beforehand.42 The categories correspond to the five sectors of the Copenhagen school. As a result, I will get the data about the frequency/interest of media in specific issues in the Norway-Russia relations. Nevertheless, there is a technical problem: according to some authors, the category system should be mutually exclusive – every unit of analysis can be placed in one and only one category.43 However, a news article can deal with more topics which could be assigned e.g. to political and military sector. Therefore, sometimes it is necessary and allowed to assign two codes to a unit.44 The solution is following: a unit can be split; however, it depends on the scoring dimension. In other words, if a unit needs to be split into two (or more) categories, the total number of units needs be increased accordingly too, to obtain the correct proportions. I will present the conclusions in graphs with proportional representation of the categories.

41 The process description is adopted from my bachelor thesis. 42 BERG, Bruce L. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences, p. 247. 43 WIMMER, Roger D. Mass media research: an introduction, p. 166. 44 STRIJBOS, Jan-Willem, Rob L. MARTENS, Frans J. PRINS a Wim M.G. JOCHEMS. Content analysis: What are they talking about? [online]. THEORETICAL PART

3.3.3 Data The data used for the analysis are the data produced by the individual actors as defined in the chapter The multi-sectoral approach as used in this thesis. For the state as an actor, they consist of official statements of the Norwegian government (published on the webpage https://www.regjeringen.no/no/id4/): these might be e.g. reports, plans, strategies, brochures, articles, press releases, speeches etc. On the governmental webpage, it is possible to search for documents according their topic. The author used articles with the topic ‘nordområdene’ (The High Nort) which include the key word ‘Russland’ (Russia). Nevertheless, the analysis includes also other documents, for example published by NGOs or the Sámi Parliament of Norway. An important part of the thesis is the analysis of media. 79 percent of Norwegians read newspapers (printed or online) every day according to statistics45, and media has therefore a significant impact on individuals’ opinion, among other thing also on their perceptions of the country’s security. The author has chosen three media for the analysis: Aftenposten, NRK.no and Nordlys. The justification of the selection is following: according to Statistics Norway, Aftenposten and VG are most sold printed newspapers in Norway. While VG is also the most read newspapers online, it is followed by government-owned media NRK.no. It would be natural to include VG in the analysis too; however as VG is a tabloid, the author has decided to exclude it despite its reach. Finally, as the Norway-Russia relations are especially tangible in the north of Norway, the author analysis also the local newspapers Nordlys. From these three newspapers, the author analysis articles published in the selected time-framework (see below) which include key words ‘Norge’ (Norway), ‘Russland’ (Russia) and ‘Arktis’ (the Arctic). This selection leads to the data sample of 56 articles from Aftenposten, 30 articles from NRK and 15 articles from Nordlys.

Time-frame of the analysis The time-frame of the analysis is ten years, from January 2008 to December 2018. There are several reasons for choosing the year 2008

45 VAAGE, O. F. Norsk mediebarometer, p. 16.

for the beginning of the analysis. Mainly, it is because the US Geological Survey (USGS) published a study which is the first to estimate undiscovered oil and gas resources north of the Arctic circle. The study has definitely increased interest in the region. Moreover, in May 2008, The Ilulissat Declaration was announced. The declaration is a milestone for Norwegian Arctic policy and it bolsters the continuity of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and disclaims other frameworks that shall regulate relations in the region.46 Last but not least, in May 2008, Vladimir Putin became the president of Russia. Rowe and Hønneland argue that when Putin came to power it meant return to ‘normalcy’47 in Russian politics, while the period after the Cold War was more of an anomaly. Indeed, the Russian military intervention in Georgia in August of the same year can be interpreted as a sign of it.

Moreover, the author of the thesis would like to define the Arctic. In literature, many synonyms such as the Arctic, High North, Circumpolar North or just North, which refer to the same area, can be found. To be consistent, the author is going to use only the term ‘Arctic’. There are also many definitions of the Arctic region, however, it can be defined as the area ‘north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33’N), which is the limit of the midnight sun and the winter twilight’.48 Secondly, the author would like to define the perception which is regarded as ‘a mode of apprehending reality and experience through the senses, thus enabling discernment of figure, form, language, behaviour, and action. Individual perception influences opinion, judgment, understanding of a situation or person, meaning of an experience, and how one responds to a situation.’49 The perception is reflected in the language of an individual actor, which is going to be analysed by the means explained above.

46 FLIKKE, Geir. Norway and the Arctic, p. 76. 47 ROWE, Lars a Geir HØNNELAND. Norge og Russland: Tilbake til normaltilstanden. 48 Arctic region. Available from: https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/communications/arcticregion. 49 Perception. Available from: http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/research/n314.xml. THEORETICAL PART

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that although the thesis encompasses Norway-Russia relations, the analysis is one-sided, from the Norwegian perspective. That is firstly due to the fact that Russia is not a democratic country and access to many documents is limited, and also due to linguistic limitation since the author speaks English and Norwegian. To conclude, the author would like to point out that the analysis opens door to further research. Naturally, an analysis of Russian sources concerning Norway-Russia relations would be of benefit. Moreover, a comparative analysis of perceptions of Russia in Norway and Finland could be interesting too.

4 Analytical part

4.1 Historical context from till 2008

The point of this chapter is to summarise the milestones and important events which have affected current Norway-Russia relations and therefore also the Norwegian perception of Russia. The establishment of diplomatic relationships between Norway and Russia dates back to 30th October 1905, the same year was Norway separated from the union with Sweden.50 As pointed out in the introduction, the Norway-Russia relations are characterised by the absence of violence. In the next few paragraphs, the author would like to highlight certain points of disagreements as well as cooperation. The Svalbard Treaty, signed in 1920, is significant for Norway- Russia relations. The treaty recognised full Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago; however, it forbids the use of warlike purposes and requires that the nationals of the signatory countries will be treated equally in certain activities (commercial activities). In this regard, Norwegian legislation and its enforcement in Svalbard have been a source of friction with Russia. Moreover, legal status of the waters and the continental shelf around the archipelago remains disputed.51 Rolf Tamnes points out that since 1970s, Norway’s investments in modernisation and environmental policies in Svalbard are often seen in Russia as an attempt for expelling Russians from the archipelago.52 The Cold War is an important chapter in the bilateral relations. Generally, it can be said that during the Cold War, Arctic policies of Norway were framed as ‘normalcy’. This was due to two facts: firstly, the norther flank of the NATO was inscribed in the strategic balance between the US and the Soviet Union53, and secondly, because the Artic was considered a remote an inaccessible area. Norway therefore contributed to the stability between the two blocks by reassurance and

50 Norway Country Study Guide, p. 84. 51 TAMNES, Rolf. Arctic Security and Norway, p. 61 52 TAMNES, Rolf. Arctic Security and Norway, p. 56-57. 53 Norway was the only NATO member to have a common border with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. ANALYTICAL PART normalisation in the border regions. After the Cold War, the policies remained in the same manner, i.e. those of normalisation, even though there has been made a reference to a new security situation in the region.54 With regard to the Cold War period, two milestones should be mentioned. The first one is the year 1957, when the first maritime boundary between Norway and Russia was settled and signed (Varangerfjord Agreement). Nevertheless, both of the countries made claims with respect to the continental shelf the upcoming decades.55 The dispute was not settled until 2010, i.e. already in the time-frame of the analysis. The second one is the Grey Zone Agreement signed in 1978 through which the countries have been co-managing fisheries.56 After the Cold War, Norway initiated the creation of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) in Kirkenes, in 1992. The policies of interstate cooperation and regionalisation were besides other things also a good way out of a delicate situation: in 1989, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Ryzhkov proposed to establish a bilateral economic zone between the two countries; however, Norway preferred to frame the cooperation in the context of regions, which is not surprising, given the asymmetrical position of Norway. It can be said that while Russia was aiming for stronger bilateral relations after the end of the Cold War, Norway preferred a multilateral approach. This position is visible to this day.57 Furthermore, both Russia and Norway are members of the Arctic Council since its establishment in 1996. This platform was created on the initiative of the Government of Finland to discuss cooperation in protecting the Arctic environment.58 Lars Rowe and Geir Hønneland argue that the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union must be looked upon as an anomaly, or state of emergency as they call it. Even though this period is over, the

54 FLIKKE, Geir. Norway and the Arctic, p. 65. 55 STEPHENS, Tim a David L. VANDERZWAAG. Polar oceans governance in an era of environmental change, p. 136-137. 56 Ibidem. 57 FLIKKE, Geir. Norway and the Arctic, p. 70-71. 58 History of the Arctic Council. Available from: https://arctic- council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council.

authors claim that some Norwegian policies are still stuck in the 1990s in their perception of Russia. It must be acknowledged that Norway- Russia relations are the most important bilateral relations in Norwegian foreign policy. Given the size of Russia and its great power status, it is clear that any change in the bilateral relation will arise from behavioural changes in Russia, not Norway.59 In 1990s, the relations between Russia and Norway started to grow thanks to bilateral environmental cooperation. Soon, there was a specific problem which fuelled the cooperation – pollution from the Petsjenga nickel plant close to the Norwegian border. Later, another issue arose as it was confirmed that Russia was dumping radioactive waste in the Barents and the Kara Sea. In both the cases, an action plan was prepared, and Norway assigned money for solving the issues. Another threat which needed action was the spread of infectious diseases (especially multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis). To sum up, Norway-Russia cooperation in the 1990s consisted of the general Barents cooperation, environmental cooperation, especially nuclear safety, and fight against infectious diseases. Nevertheless, Rowe and Hønneland draw attention to the fact that the relation had an aid discourse. Norwegian authorities called these measures ‘cooperation’; however, in fact it was a form of aid to Russia.60 In the authors’ interpretation, Russia returned to what is ‘normal’ with Putin, and Norway should therefore change its discourse. After the turn of the century, Norway-Russia relations were stable. It is worth to note that in Norway, the new centre-left government declared the Arctic Norway’s most important strategic priority in the years ahead in the new strategy released in 2006.61 No significant change took place until the year 2007 when Russia planted a flag on the Arctic Ocean seafloor beneath the North Pole and when Russia resumed flights in the North Atlantic. 62 The Arktika expedition was allegedly endeavoured to scientific research proving Russian claim to an extended continental shelf. Katarzyna Zysk emphasises the remarkable increase in regular aircraft surveillance

59 ROWE, Lars a Geir HØNNELAND. Norge og Russland: Tilbake til normaltilstanden. 60 ROWE, Lars a Geir HØNNELAND. Norge og Russland: Tilbake til normaltilstanden. 61 TAMNES, Rolf. Arctic Security and Norway, p. 58. 62 FLIKKE, Geir. Norway and the Arctic, p. 69. ANALYTICAL PART patrols by Russia across the Arctic63 and points out that Russia renewed the activity after 15 years pause. The activity of the Russian navy was increased too.64 On the other hand, Rolf Tamnes reminds us that we need to keep in mind that activity levels are far lower than during the Cold War.65 Nevertheless, on the whole, Geir Flikke sees the year 2007 as a milestone when Russia started to bring the Arctic out from the low politics (compared to the 1990s) up to the geostrategic agenda.66 Last but not least, it should be noted that Russia and Norway have had a long history of successful and peaceful regional cooperation. The conflict potential might be exaggerated as most promising petroleum reserves are in areas of undisputed national jurisdiction,67 and there have been no critical moment in Norway-Russia relations till the end of the year 2007.

63 While 14 Russian bombers flied along the Norwegian coast in 2006, it was 88 in 2007. 64 ZYSK, Katarzyna. Military Aspects of Russia's Arctic Policy, p. 86. 65 TAMNES, Rolf. Arctic Security and Norway, p. 52. 66 FLIKKE, Geir. Norway and the Arctic, p. 66. 67 TAMNES, Rolf. Arctic Security and Norway, p. 60.

4.2 Content analysis

As outlined in the theoretical part, the quantitative analysis by the means of content analysis in conducted in the media, i.e. three Norwegian newspapers to be precise. The analysis comprises only newspaper articles publish between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2018 which include the key words ‘Norway’, ‘Russia’ and ‘Arctic’, and which are not behind a paywall, i.e. articles for which subscription is needed are excluded. Moreover, articles which were evaluated incorrectly are excluded too.68 This selection gives us a sample of 101 articles in total: 30 articles from NRK, 56 articles from Aftenposten and 15 articles from regional Nordlys. It can be therefore said that the private Aftenposten published almost twice as many articles as the state-owned NRK69. Even though local newspapers have usually less resources (which can be seen, for example, from the fact that Nordlys sometimes adopts articles published by the nationwide media), the author anticipated that Nordlys would publish more articles with the given keywords as it represents the region most affected by the topic. The first graph offers a statistical analysis of the frequency of the topics represented by the five sectors of the Copenhagen School proportionally (expressed as a percentage). It is evident that the political sector and subsequently the military sector are by far the hottest topics in all of the media. Furthermore, while the state NRK and regional Nordlys are concerned with environmental issues, the private Aftenposten deals more with economics. This can be linked to the fact that Aftenposten is traditionally profiled as a right-wing newspaper. The least represented sector is the societal one. The Nordlys is an exception, which should not

68 Example: an article discusses Norway in the Artic, however the keyword Russia is found only in the phrase ‘Russian roulette’. 69 It seems already from the headlines that the state news is more careful about what they publish about Russia than the private news, however this cannot be confirmed until the qualitative analysis is conducted. ANALYTICAL PART be of surprise as regional newspapers are usually more interested in local societies.70

Graph 1: Frequency of the topics in % 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Military Environmental Economic Societal Political

NRK.no Aftenposten Nordlys

Source: author

Graphs 2 and 3 show the timelines of the military and the political sectors, the most represented ones. The graphs are useful for expressing how many articles in total numbers were published on each of the sectors in individual years. Since the frequency of a topic expresses how high/low is the interest in the issue, the author assumed an increase in the number of articles from the year 2014 and onwards specifically in these two sectors given the crisis in Ukraine. This projection was fulfilled in both of the sectors only in the case of Aftenposten. For NRK, the increase is visible only in the political sector, even though the military one is also marked by a moderate growth. For the military sector, the year 2017 looks much more significant, but only a deeper insight will show why. On the other hand, for Nordlys year 2010 and 2012 seem to be more significant for the

70 It should be noted that NRK has also a section NRK Sápmi which writes about topics connected to the Sámi population, however, only countrywide news from NRK are included in the analysis.

political and military sectors respectively; on the contrary, the year 2014 marks an absolute decline.

Graph 2: Military sector – timeline Military sector 7

0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

NRK.no Aftenposten Nordlys

Source: author

Graph 3: Political sector – timeline Political sector 7

0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

NRK.no Aftenposten Nordlys

Source: author

ANALYTICAL PART

4.3 The military sector

As it has been already demonstrated, the military sector, together with the political one, is the most covered sector in the media. The private newspaper Aftenposten has 21 articles out of 56 articles, i.e. 37.5%, on the military topic. This is the highest number, compared to the other newspapers, both in total numbers and in a proportional share. Moreover, Aftenposten is the only platform with a substantive increase in the articles after 2014, as it was expected. The state-owned NRK presents the total of eight articles out of 30 articles which represents a share of 26.67%. A more moderate number of articles was anticipated as it is a state platform. Nevertheless, the year 2014 cannot be marked as a milestone here – an increase of articles about military does not come before 2016. Finally, the regional Nordlys published only four articles from total 15 about military with the given keywords. However, this means a share of 26.67% which corresponds to a higher level than NRK. The author finds it interesting that all the articles were published before 2014; in fact, not a single article on this topic has been published after 2014. Regarding the documents published by the Norwegian government, we do not see the same trends as in the newspapers in the military sector. There are only five documents in total. This is probably due to the fact that any government needs to be circumspect regarding this topic.

2011 There are not any articles from the beginning of the analysis framework up to 2011. Regarding the government, there is only one document. It is an article which reminds us of the Chemical Weapons Convention which was negotiated in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. The agreement obliges the signatory states to the destruction of chemical warfare agents. According to the document, Norway has

contributed a total of NOK 2.4 million to building destruction facilities in Russia for the destruction of chemical weapons.71

In 2011, the first article of the analysis was published by Aftenposten. Nevertheless, it follows the previous tendency, as its topic is that ‘Nobody Cares About Norway in NATO’. A journalist carried out an analysis and came to a conclusion that the Arctic, ‘Norway’s matter of the heart’, were barely mentioned in NATO’s top meetings in recent years (2006-2010). He claims that while the most mentioned issue at the meetings was Afghanistan, the Arctic was briefly discussed only at two of the over two hundred NATO meetings, which means that Norway has become much less visible. Nevertheless, when Norway’s ambassador to the NATO speaks in the Council, he speaks the most about Russia, just after Afghanistan and the Balkans. Norwegian researcher Nina Græger reacts to this by saying that it is more difficult for a small country like Norway to be heard. She adds that the relations with Russia are important for Norway and that the Norwegian authorities do not want increased tensions between the NATO and Russia to have an impact on the bilateral relations.72 This article can be read as a herald of the subsequent development: while journalists would like to devote more attention to the Norway- Russia relations and the Arctic, the same trend is not found at the governmental level.

2012 Three articles, all of them by Nordlys, were published on the topic in 2012. In March, Nordlys warns that ‘Russians are provoked by a NATO exercise’. The military exercise was named Cold Response and took place in Northern Norway. It involved 16,000 soldiers from 15 different countries and was the largest in Norway in the last decade. According to Russian military experts, the exercise was a provocation and a sign that

71 Masseødeleggelsesvåpen en trussel mot fred og sikkerhet. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrikssaker/sikkerhetspolitikk/nedrust ning-og-ikke-spredning/nedrustning-og-ikke-spredning/id440542/. 72 Ingen bryr seg om Norge i NATO. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/GaGGV/Ingen-bryr-seg-om-Norge-i-NATO. ANALYTICAL PART the NATO wanted to strengthen its geopolitical and diplomatic position by the means of military force. The newspaper also cited a Russian editor who claims that the NATO’s increased activity in the Arctic because of the division of natural resources in the area.73 It is important to note, that this claim came after the agreement about the maritime border between Norway and Russia, which was signed in 2010 (this is analysed in the political sector).

In the given year, presidential elections took place in Russia, and Vladimir Putin became the president. Nordlys informs readers that the new president promised to increase the Russian defence budget. According to the proposal for the state budget for 2013, the Russian defence budget should increase by 25%. The journalists point out that only the annual increase is worth two full Norwegian defence budgets.74 Norwegian Minister of Defence, Espen Barth Eide, reacts to this by saying that Norway does not want any militarisation or arms race in the Arctic, however, the country will not let the Russians do whatever they want in the region.75 As it will become obvious later, any statements of this type are unusual for Norway. The journalists however conclude that the Norwegian position in the Arctic is weak. The Norwegian Sea area has grown after the division agreement between Norway and Russia (2010); however, its presence is weak. Moreover, they believe that it is only a matter of time when Norway will be challenged in its fishing protection zone in Svalbard. Nordlys states that claiming sovereignty requires presence. Therefore, the newspapers made an interview with a Coast Guard captain who says that they do not have capacity. He explains that the Coast Guard is responsible for fisheries and resource control, while the Royal Norwegian Marine is the purely military part of the Navy.

73 Russerne provosert av NATO-øvelse. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/russerne-provosert-av-nato-ovelse/s/1-79- 5971114. 74 ARTICLETITLE. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/articletitle/s/1- 79-6215200. (Note: the article does not have a title) 75 Ibidem

The Captain complains that Norwegian vessels are stationed in Bergen, not in the North. The only other base which could serve for the vessels was in Tromsø; however it was despite protests closed in 2008. Nodlys writes that the Royal Marine is 90% of time in Southern Norway and leaves the North only to the Coast Guard. Another atypical thing is that Nordlys claims they got an e-mail from the Ministry of Defence in which it is stated that the government plans more sailing and increased presence in the North.76 Generally, it can be said that later on, such a type of analysis conducted by the media is unusual. A response by the government is even more unusual.

Nordlys continues in the report and devotes a separate article to the fact that the Navy barely sails to the North, and that only the Coast Guard is guarding Norway’s waters. The authors put this in contrast with the situation in Russia as Vladimir Putin announced that Russia will start building 11 new naval bases in the North.77 To sum up, in 2012, it is only the regional Nordlys which is interested in the topic. The country-wide newspapers did not publish a single article with the given key words. It can be said that the newspaper expresses concerns about Norwegian capacities in the Arctic, and that the government does not pay enough attention to the region.

2013 Only two articles were published in 2013, both of them on Russian military activity in the Arctic.

The first article published by Nordlys says that the Russians are stepping up military activity in the Arctic, exercise more frequently, and renew the airplane and vessels. The journalists made an interview with Vice-Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen who says that there is no reason for concerns. Norway neighbours with a former superpower and regional power; however, there are no signs of threats to Norway. He

76 Ibidem 77 Et akterutseilt sjøforsvar. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/et- akterutseilt-sjoforsvar/s/1-79-6215176. ANALYTICAL PART adds that as a great power, Russia has considerable capacities, but they are not aimed at Norway. The journalist speculates that because of the stable and peaceful situation in the Arctic, the NATO does not prioritise the area.78

In March, Aftenposten writes about a threat assessment report published by the Norwegian Military Intelligence Service (often referred to as e-service) according to which Russia increases funding for armed forces. On the one hand, Russia wants to emphasize good cooperation with Norway, on the other hand, Norway as a NATO country can get involved in a conflict with Russia because of issues that do not concern relations between the two countries, the report states. Moreover, according to the assessment, the region is characterised by low tensions. Last but not least, the Intelligence Service points out that the political system in Russia is increasingly characterized by authoritarian features, especially after Putin took over the leadership again.79 The newspaper does not give any further comments. It should be noted that Russia is not considered a threat neither by the Navy, nor by the Intelligence Service, nevertheless, it has a place in the Norwegian threat assessment.

Up till this point, Nordlys published exactly the type of articles the author anticipated. Nevertheless, here, in 2013, it stops, and the platform does not write any more articles which could be labelled by the military sector. The reason remains unclear.

2014 A year later, Aftenposten writes again about the Intelligence Service’s threat assessment, where Russia's strong interests in the Arctic are named as one of the security challenges that Norway meets in 2014. The ‘e-service’ notes that Russian civilian, paramilitary and

78 Russerne trapper opp militæraktiviteten i nordområdene. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/russerne-trapper-opp-militaraktiviteten-i- nordomradene/s/1-79-6449365. 79 Voldsom militær opprusting i Russland. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/GGMwQ/--Voldsom-militar-opprusting-i- Russland.

military presence in the Arctic is increasing. The expectation of ice melting leads to the Russian need for monitoring and controlling previously inaccessible waters. Nevertheless, the development in the Arctic does not go as fast as many have believed e.g. commercial shipping traffic did not increase. The Intelligence Service therefore believes that the real conflict potential in the Arctic is limited, taking into account relatively low activity all in all. Sveinung Berg Bentzrød, an Aftenposten journalist who from this point writes the majority of articles about Russia and the Artic, once again mentions that the Norwegian navy struggles to be regularly present in the Arctic.80

In October, NRK publishes its first article. It is also the first article in the military sector after the Russia annexation of Crimea; the political situation is mentioned there. The article deals with ‘increased Russian activity in the north’. It says that Russian aircrafts fly along Norway's border areas weekly. Although the Norwegian Intelligence Service does not interpret the increased activity from Russian aircrafts and ships as any threat, they monitor what is happening. The chief of the Intelligence Service, Kjell Grandhagen, claims that the most important change is the higher level of activity of Russian strategic aircraft forces, those who have the ability to carry cruise missiles with nuclear weapons. He emphasizes that the activity close to Norwegian border areas is normal; the increased activity takes place in the northern areas of the Arctic.81 Grandhagen believes that the situation in Ukraine has put the spotlight on Russia, and that the country is willing to use military power when national interests are at stake. Nevertheless, he thinks that there is not a real threat from the Russian side at the moment. Andrej Kulikov from the Russian Embassy in Oslo points out that the Russian aircraft approaching Norwegian border areas are not a sign of threat, but just an ordinary exercise. Kulikov says that when it comes to increased presence in the Arctic, Russian forces are just returning

80 Varsler større terrortrussel mot Norge. Avilable from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/WLPQj/Varsler-storre-terrortrussel-mot- Norge. 81 Økt russisk aktivitet i nord. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/okt- russisk-tilstedevaerelse-i-nord-1.11983657. ANALYTICAL PART there. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the area was not a priority; however this has changed. He adds that ‘there is no basis for saying that the threat from the Russian side is increasing. Very often, the assumptions that the threat is greater is based on errors, and sometimes deliberately wrong information about what is happening in Ukraine’.82 NRK presents pure reporting, the authors do not provide any own opinions.

Finally, the Ministry of Defence reflects the Russian annexation of Crimea in its proposal for the state budget for the year 2015. In the proposal, it is written that military training in the North of Norway is a priority. Moreover, it points out that Russia has recently expanded its military activity in the area. The Government sees this activity as an expression of Russian superpower ambitions, not specifically targeted against Norway. The Russian military activity is nevertheless an important factor which must be taken into consideration in assessments of security and defence policy challenges for Norway. Furthermore, the development of the Norway-Russia relations is considered to be good. We also learn some information which is hidden from the media analysis, e.g. that the Norwegian Minister of Defence visited Moscow.83

In the year 2014, we have seen the first article connected to the situation in Ukraine. That only marks a change in the media as there are seven articles in the upcoming year.

2015 In January, Aftenposten informs that Russia wants to strengthen its military presence in the Crimean Peninsula, the Arctic and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad in 2015. Moreover, it says that president Vladimir Putin signed a document describing the NATO's expansion as an external threat to Russian interests. In the same document, the need

82 Ibidem 83 Prop. 1 S (2014–2015) FOR BUDSJETTÅRET 2015. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/Prop-1-S-20142015/id2005450/.

to protect the country's interests in the Arctic is emphasized.84 The newspaper does not give any comments to that.

An increased interest in Norway-Russia relations in the Arctic after 2014 is visible from the second article. Aftenposten publishes an article about ‘Nine Points about Norway and the Threat from Russia’, written by the already mentioned journalist Bentzrød. The article is interesting because it expresses the journalist’s ideas and opinions. It is written prior to the next Intelligence Service report about Norway’s security situation, which will be ‘more than ever about Russia.’ Bentzrød made a pre-interview with the chief of the service, Kjell Grandhagen, and spoke with several experts on Russia. According to the author, Russia’s violation of international rules by the annexation of Crimea and the use of force against Ukraine has also affected the Norwegian-Russian trust. Much military cooperation has been put on the shelf while Russian military activity stepped up sharply.85 When the journalist asks whether Norway has any reason to fear confrontations with Russia, the chief of the Intelligence Service says he finds Russia’s basic military strategy still defensive. Bentzrød nevertheless believes that Svalbard is an area where Norwegian vulnerability can be challenged, and he writes that it could be an arena for demonstration of Russian military power. An important point is the upcoming Norway-Russia military cooperation which should not be stopped. Grandhagen says that the defence budget for 2015 counts with continued cooperation with Russia in important areas such as search and rescue, border guard and coast guard with fisheries supervision. Finally, the low capacity of Norwegian armed forces is mentioned once again.86

84 Russland vil trappe opp militært på Krim og i Arktis. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/A2JGq/--Russland-vil-trappe-opp-militart- pa-Krim-og-i-Arktis. 85 Ni punkter om Norge og trusselen fra Russland. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/kaK2j/Ni-punkter-om-Norge-og-trusselen- fra-Russland. 86 Ibidem ANALYTICAL PART

As is was planned, Vladimir Putin ordered a great military exercise in the Artic already in March. It was supposed to take place on the Kola Peninsula and involve almost 40,000 soldiers. Russian Minister of Defence, Sergey Shoygu, commented the situation: ‘new challenges and threats to military security require the armed forces to further strengthen their military capacities. Strategic formations in the Arctic are particularly important’. Since the minister did not elaborate what are the new challenges, the NRK journalists assumed that it has to do with the increased tensions in the West-Russia relations after the situation in Ukraine. Finally, they mention that Russia is increasing its military presents in the Artic, and they inform that there is going to be a large-scale exercise in Norway in 2018.87 Although moderately, NRK journalists expressed their speculations which is not typical for the state-owned platform.

Just next day, Aftenposten publishes an article on the same topic by the already mentioned journalist Bentzrød. It is nevertheless a more thorough analysis, not just pure information. The difference is that Bentzrød tries to find a connection between the Norwegian exercise Joint Viking 2015 in West Finnmark and the newly announced Russian exercise. What is the same is his belief that the situation is affected by the events in Ukraine in the previous year. The title of the article is 'Both Russia and Norway Show Strength in the North’, and the author claims that a Russian invasion of Finnmark has been part of the Armed Forces threat scenarios for decades, and that given Russian operations in Ukraine, this has gained more focus. At the same time, both the countries are going to hold large exercises in the Arctic.88 The exercise Joint Viking 2015 is the first large one in Finnmark since 1967 (exercise Barfrost). Shortly after the Norwegian exercise, Russia is going to start an exercise in the north too. Bentzrød therefore asks whether the Russian exercise is a response to the Norwegian one?

87 Putin beordrer stor militærøvelse i nord. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/putin-beordrer-stor-militaerovelse-i-nord-1.12262088. 88 Både Russland og Norge viser styrke i nord. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/O9RA/Bade-Russland-og-Norge-viser- styrke-i-nord.

He interviewed several researchers; however, they disagree on whether Russia’s sudden large exercise is a respond to the Joint Viking 2015. Despite the fact that Norway informed Russia of the exercise already in autumn 2014, Norway is accused of using the exercise for intelligence activities with the intention of getting more information about neighbour’s defence capabilities. A Russian news agency which is financed and run by the state wrote that the Norwegian military exercise is a provocation against Russia, and that Norway increases its activity in the Arctic in compliance with NATO instructions.89 The journalist claims that a source in the Armed Forces told him that a Russian invasion has been one of the scenarios in the Norwegian Armed Forces for decades. Nevertheless, the scenario’s position has changed: while it was given a little attention in the end of 1990, currently, the attention has become significantly stronger. Anyway, the Ministry of Defence said that they will not comment on the scenario in principle as it is classified information. Finally, the chief of the Intelligence Service, Kjell Grandhagen, stated that ‘despite the significant military and security policy changes that have become a fact in 2014, the Service insists on that Russia does not constitute any military threat to Norway.’ Moreover, General Morten Haga Lunde denied journalist’s hypothesis that the Norwegian exercise had been planned after the Ukraine crisis, saying that it was adopted already in November 2013. At the end, it is mentioned, just as in NRK, that the NATO has agreed to the Norwegian offer to have a large exercise in NATO's northernmost region in 2018.90

To sum up, even though the two country-wide newspapers present the same news, the perspective is rather different. While NRK is presenting just information, Aftenposten is giving more of an opinion article. Both of them are connecting the situation in the Arctic with the events in Ukraine. Finally, NRK does not publish any more articles with the given key words in 2015.

89 Ibidem 90 Ibidem ANALYTICAL PART

In December, Aftenposten informs that Russia plans another major military exercise next year (2016), this time directly at the North Pole, which would be the first exercise of its kind in the Arctic area. According to the newspaper, Vladimir Putin shows that Russia is serious about its demands in the Arctic. Russian air forces should land at the North Pole, scientists should be on board too. The exercise is part of the ‘battle for the Arctic’, in which Norway, Russia, Canada, the United States and Denmark claim the enormous natural resources which lie beneath the ice in the Arctic. In autumn 2015, the Russians advanced their territorial claims (1.2 million square kilometres, 650 kilometres from the shore).91 What is interesting for the analysis is that the situation is commented by Lars Rowe from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, who was already several times mentioned in the thesis. Rowe says that the fact that Russia has submitted its claims to the United Nations is presented by many media as something aggressive. Nevertheless, the reality is that the Russians have been working for many years to support their claims scientifically. ‘In fact, they are doing exactly the same as Norway and other countries’, he says. Moreover, Rowe believes that it is actually a strong signal that Russia wants a process based on the international law in the Arctic.92 Despite the content of the article, Aftenposten chose a catchier headline: ‘Russian Soldiers are Going to Train War at the North Pole’.

Just a day after, Aftenposten publishes an article ‘Responding to Russian escalation: Russia Sails More Warships Closer to Norway. Now Our Navy Responds.’ Sveinung Berg Bentzrød made an interview with the head of the Norwegian Navy, Lars Saunes, who says that they are focusing on the most demanding task, which is to wage war. He believes that Norway should be able to fight against a state actor. At the same time, when asked about Norway-Russia conflict potential, Saunes says he is not worried that there could be a conflict between the two countries. Nevertheless, he argues that we live in great uncertainty and

91 Russiske soldater skal øve krig på Nordpolen. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/rngA/Russiske-soldater-skal-ove-krig-pa- Nordpolen. 92 Ibidem

that Norway could be pulled in a conflict by superpowers. The journalist adds that the new normal situation is to be ready for battle.93

It is evident that the year of 2015 is a milestone in the rhetoric of Aftenposten. The question is how much it is influenced by the personnel in the newspaper as the more offensive texts are written by the same person (this will be further discussed in the analysis of the year 2016). Simultaneously, Nordlys stopped writing articles on the topic and NRK is presenting only objective facts.

A week later, in December 2015, Aftenposten informs that a Russian nuclear submarine shot up an intercontinental nuclear missile in the Barents Sea, and that the previous test of such a nuclear rocket in the Barents Sea took place in November 2014.94

To conclude, there was only one text published at the governmental webpage containing the given keywords. It was a transcript of an opening speech by the State Secretary Tore Hattrem at a conference on Russia and the Nordic countries which took place in Oslo in October. He stated that the conference was timely as for the first time in Europe since WW II, a country seized a part of a neighbouring country by military means. Hattrem believes that the annexation of Crimea and destabilisation in eastern Ukraine, have changed the security landscape also in the Nordic region.95 We can say that the year of 2015 is characterised by military build- ups in the Arctic by both Norway and Russia; one could say the situation resembles a small ‘arms race’. Nevertheless, such a narrative is noticeable only from Aftenposten.

93 Svarer på russisk opptrapping: Marinen jobber for å komme i stridsmodus. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/zlQq/Svarer-pa-russisk- opptrapping-Marinen-jobber-for-a-komme-i-stridsmodus. 94 Russisk atomubåt testet atomraketter i Barentshavet i morges. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/e55a/Russisk-atomubat-testet- atomraketter-i-Barentshavet-i-morges. 95 Russia and the Nordic Countries – Relations and Cooperations. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/russland-norden-tale/id2459215/. ANALYTICAL PART

2016 In the following year, articles were published only by Aftenposten. The interesting fact is that the most of them (five out of six) are written by the same journalist, Sveinung Berg Bentzrød, and they are on the same topic, the Intelligence Service, or, to be precise, on its chief – not Kjell Grandhagen anymore, but the already mentioned former head of the Navy, Morten Haga Lunde. The question therefore is which one of them fuels the increased interest in the topic of Russian military in the Arctic. Moreover, there are few texts from the Norwegian government. The author considers especially important the new long-term strategy for the Norwegian Armed Forces (Forsvaret).

In February, the Norwegian Intelligence Services published an annual report, evaluating areas which are considered particularly relevant for Norwegian security and national interests, FOKUS 2016. Aftenposten writes a report based on the press conference about the document. The Defence Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide opened the conference and said that we are living in an uncertain time; the threat picture is changing faster than we are used to: ‘The stability we are used to can no longer be taken for granted… The key word is unpredictability.”96 Søreide moreover mentioned that the Government gave a rise in the state budget for 2016 250 million NOK to the Intelligence Service. Afterwards, the new chief of the service, Morten Haga Lunde, presented the FOKUS 2016 report. Lunde said that Russia is not a military threat to Norway today, but there is a considerable concern about Russia's internal situation, however, the ‘assessment is that Russian development in the long-term can pose a significant threat to Norway’. Aftenposten chose the second information for its title (The e-boss: The development in Russia can in the long run constitute a major threat to Norway).

96 E-sjefen: Utviklingen i Russland kan på sikt utgjøre en stor trussel mot Norge. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/na35/E-sjefen-Utviklingen- i-Russland-kan-pa-sikt-utgjore-en-stor-trussel-mot-Norge.

After the conference, the Aftenposten journalist asked how the relation will develop. The chief of the service answered that the relationship between Norway and Russia will not improve in 2016.97

The second article, and the first one in 2016 written by Bentzrød, was published in March. The article is based on a lecture which the ‘e- boss’ gave at the Oslo Militære Samfund (Oslo Militaere Samfunn), which had two main points: the effect of Russia's military escalation in the Arctic, and the danger of terrorists coming from the refugee flow. Taking into consideration that the newspaper used only the first point of the lecture for its headline (E-boss: Russia Sees the Arctic as its Rescue Plan) and also the fact that this type of lectures does not usually get much attention in the media (after all, other newspapers do not cover it at all), the author suggest that it is mainly the author who is pushing the topic on the agenda. According to the article (and the lecture), the Russian government sees the Arctic as a ‘rescue plan’ for Russia which should be the way out of the economic crisis. This should be so thanks to the Northeast Passage as the future export route for Arctic energy. The Arctic plays an important role for Russia on three different levels: as an area of crucial military strategic importance, as a potential economic rescue plan, and as a region with a high symbol value.98 The chief of the Intelligence Service emphasises that over the last 18 months, they have seen a shift towards a more threat-oriented perspective from Russia in the Arctic, and that they see repeated statements that Russian interests in the Arctic must be defended militarily. Finally, Lunde says that NATO is mentioned as a threat in the new Russia's security strategy.

In April, Bentzrød writes that the Norwegian Armed Forces were weaker in 2015 than in 2014. He wrote the article based on a speech by the chief of the Armed Forces, Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, about an annual report. The journalist writes that this development is taking place at the

97 Ibidem 98 E-sjefen: Russland ser Arktis som sin redningsplanke. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/ddO11/E-sjefen-Russland-ser-Arktis-som- sin-redningsplanke. ANALYTICAL PART same time as the security situation for Norway has become more difficult, given a more aggressive Russia, the annexation of the Crimea and the situation in Ukraine.99

In September, Bentzrød writes about why Norway needs two spy ships in the Arctic – it is a direct response to Russia's massive build-up and increased activity in the area. The journalist himself writes that the chief of the Intelligence Service, Morten Haga Lunde, gives very few interviews, however, he made an exception to answer Aftenposten's questions.100 This confirms the hypothesis that the increased interest in Russia in the Arctic is driven by the Aftenposten journalist. The ships are going to remain in international waters, but close to Russian territory, and their purpose is to monitor the Russian activity. Russia has established new and re-established old military bases in the Arctic and increased its activity in the area. the Intelligence Service believes there is a need for more monitoring capacity, and thus also the new two spy ships.101

In the next month (October), there was a conference in Vadsø. The organizer of the conference claimed that very little about what is happening at the intelligence station is known. The critics also believe that the station can provoke Russia, which could have consequences for the local communities. In response to that, the chief of the Intelligence Service gave an interview to Aftenposten. On the basis of the interview Bentzrød writes an article ‘Norwegian Intelligence Stations in the North are Accused of Secrecy. Now the E-boss Strikes Back’.102

99 Forsvarssjefen: Forsvaret svakere i 2015 enn i 2014. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/a2wqA/Forsvarssjefen-Forsvaret-svakere- i-2015-enn-i-2014. 100 E-sjefen: Derfor trenger Norge to spionskip i nord. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/A9oqM/E-sjefen-Derfor-trenger-Norge-to- spionskip-i-nord. 101 Ibidem 102 Etterretningsstasjoner i nord anklages for hemmelighold. Nå slår E-sjefen tilbake. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/mwgog/Etterretningsstasjoner-i-nord- anklages-for-hemmelighold-Na-slar-E-sjefen-tilbake.

Reading the text, it is unclear who initiated the interview, and if it was the journalist again. Anyway, Lunde says that Russia is an assertive neighbour. He mentions that Russian exercises take place more often. When asked about the local concerns that the stations in the Arctic could provoke Russia, the chief of the Intelligence Service replies that what the service does stabilizes the situation in the area. The goal is to prevent Norway from entering an armed conflict. He adds that the stations purpose is to give Norwegian decision-makers the best foundation for making the right decisions.103

Bentzrød’s last article in 2016 informs that Russia cuts the defence budget for 2017 by 100 billion NOK, and that it should be cut even more in 2018. The cut in the budget means 26 per cent less compared to the budget for 2016. According to the researchers the journalist has spoken with, this is one of several signs that Russia is changing its rhetoric and would like moderate the conflict with the West. Furthermore, the article deals with main points in Russia defence strategy towards 2020 (e.g. a sharp increase in the number of bases and air stations in the Arctic; strengthened logistics supplies for all Russian bases in the Arctic; an increase in the number and size of Russian military exercises; creation of a new Arctic task force in the Russian military structure, etc.).104

As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Defence published a long- term plan for the defence sector in June 2016. The document replaces the long-term plan from 2008, which the author did not discover by the means of analysis. This is due to the fact that Russia in the Arctic is not discussed there much.105 The most important points in the plan which are significant for the thesis are following:

103 Ibidem 104 Russland kutter forsvarsbudsjettet med 100 mrd. - vil dempe konflikten med Vesten. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/J83EX/Russland- kutter-forsvarsbudsjettet-med-100-mrd---vil-dempe-konflikten-med-Vesten. 105 For more information, see the document at: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e6b0d7ef3c26457ab6ef177cd75b5d3 2/no/pdfs/prp201120120073000dddpdfs.pdf ANALYTICAL PART

• The Government considers the Arctic to be Norway’s most important strategic area; • The Arctic is still largely characterized by stability and cooperation; • Cooperation with Russia, based on international law, is a prerequisite for long-term stability in the Arctic. Although Russian strategies for the Arctic still emphasise international cooperation, it should be assumed that in certain situations Russia may regard military power as one of several relevant instruments in the area; • Russia has invested in both material and training recently and is much more capable in the military sector, also in the north, than a few years ago; • Through the military reform that was launched in 2008, Russia has invested heavily in military power. The political will to prioritize defence has continued despite the downturn in the economy; • Russia’s ambition is to re-establish the country as a great power; • Russian military activity near Norwegian borders is not considered to be directed at Norway; • Russia’s increased military capability makes up the most important change in Norway's security policy environment since the last long-term plan (2008); • Through the war in Georgia in 2008, the internationally illegal annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 and the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, Russian rulers have shown the will and ability to use a wide range of instruments, including the military power, to maintain political dominance and influence; • Russia today does not constitute a military threat to Norway. Nevertheless, Russia’s military development reinforces the asymmetry in relation to Norway. The combination of Russian military development and a more unpredictable political behaviour means that Russia is a key factor in Norwegian defence planning; • Russia does not consider Norway to be part of its so-called "sphere of interest". Norwegian conditions therefore cannot be seen through the prism of Russian acts in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the Russian approach, with combinations of overt and covert military and non-military means, could be a demonstration of how Russia could act in a complex crisis also in Norwegian neighbourhoods. A potential crisis will probably not start in Norway's neighbouring area, however, it may have consequences there.106 It is obvious from the document, that the Russian position in Norwegian strategic planning has changed significantly from the previous document from 2008, the year which happens to be also the starting point of this analysis. The increasing interested in the neighbouring country in the Arctic in connection to the military situation is therefore visible both in the media (besides the local newspaper) and in the government. Moreover, even though the plan specifically does not consider Russia as a threat to Norway, it is clear that the events of 2014 changed the security setting.

2017 In 2017, there are five newspaper articles, this time NRK (with three articles) is more represented than Aftenposten (two articles). There is no document from the government.

In April, NRK publishes an article ‘New Tension in the Arctic?’ about a delicate situation between Norway and Russia. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly plans to hold a seminar on Svalbard in May, however, according to Russia ‘it is contrary to the spirit of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920’. The journalist therefore asks whether the militarisation of the Arctic is fully underway?107 Norway wanted to aim the NATO’s and the United States’ attention to this strategically important area for a long time. The main topic of the meeting is supposed to be climate change and new opportunities for economic cooperation in the Arctic; however, security policy challenges

106 Prop. 151 S. Dostupné z: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop.-151- s-20152016/id2504884/. 107 Ny spenning i Arktis?. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/ny-spenning-i- arktis_-1.13484927. ANALYTICAL PART in the area were also on the list. Regardless the main focus of the meeting, Russian authorities released a statement that the archipelago is ‘an inappropriate place for such a meeting.’ The statement, which according to the journalist has an unusually sharp tone, calls the meeting on Svalbard a provocative act and that the meeting can lead to increased tension between Russia and NATO in the Arctic. Furthermore, Russian authorities believe that by organizing the seminar, Norway helps to increase the level of tension. The journalist says that the Russians forget that they themselves have built up a military base just a few hundred kilometres east of Spitsbergen. Moreover, he comments that there is no doubt that a military build-up, even though so far relatively limited, is taking place in the Arctic. ‘After Russia annexed the Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, the tension has increased sharply in Europe. Now we see that this spreads also to the Arctic.’108 Whereas the journalist considers the Russian tone to be sharp, the author would like to note that the tone of the article is unusually sharp too, taking into consideration that the article is published by the state NRK. Last but not least, the article could be placed in the political sector as it is civilian NATO parliamentarians gathering in Svalbard, however, weighting up the journalist’s claims that a military built-up is happening in the Arctic, the author decided that the media’s perspective matter more for the analysis.

The subsequent two articles deal with the Russian military parade which takes place annually in Moscow on the occasion of the Victory Day (9 May) celebrations. Both NRK and Aftenposten inform that Russia presented new weapons designed for the Arctic. This time, NRK used stronger words (Russia Presented New Military Equipment for War in the Arctic) than Aftenposten (Here Russia Shows its New Weapons for the Arctic) in the headline.

108 Ibidem

While NRK reminds us that Putin has said he is willing to use military force in the battle for resources109, Aftenposten points out that Russia military activity is still lower than during the Soviet Union, even though the wording about the Arctic has been sharpened, also against Norway.110

In June, Aftenposten informs its reader that Vladimir Putin scared Russians with potential nuclear attacks from the Norway. He said that US submarines stationed at the coast of Norway can wreck Moscow within 15 minutes. Moreover, announced that Russia will establish a new warning and rocket defence system in the Arctic.111 The article is purely informative.

In October, NRK journalist Arne Holm criticizes both the Norwegian government and Norwegian media in an article named ‘The war on Svalbard’. He says that while the government announces a sharp reduction in its involvement on Svalbard, Norwegian media publish claims that Russia is preparing a war in the archipelago. Holm is indignant: ‘the claims that Russia is training for a war on Svalbard are unverified, but still they get more attention than Norwegian Svalbard policy.’112 On the one hand, he criticizes that newspapers put the war claims between daily doses of house price statistics, affecting readers’ opinions. Holm explicitly names a news platform Aldrimer (Never More) which is not included in the analysis.

109 Russland viste fram nytt militærutstyr til vinterkrig i Arktis. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/russland-viste-fram-nytt-militaerutstyr-til-vinterkrig-i- arktis-1.13507951. 110 Her viser Russland frem sine nye våpen til bruk i Nordområdene. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/Wp3nQ/Her-viser-Russland-frem-sine- nye-vapen-til-bruk-i-Nordomradene. 111 Putin skremte russere med atomangrep fra kysten av Norge. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/oqAnj/Putin-skremte-russere-med- atomangrep-fra-kysten-av-Norge. 112 Krigen på Svalbard. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/ytring/krigen-pa- svalbard-1.13740857. ANALYTICAL PART

On the other hand, he is angry that while other Arctic states are strengthening their presence in the Arctic, for security policy and resource reasons, Norway is moving in the opposite direction. Moreover, it does not trigger any national debate when the government makes these changes in the Svalbard policy.113 Once again, this type of comments is rather rare in NRK. The analysis has not capture articles about which Holm writes because the author deals only with quality press. Unfortunately, the analysis has not captured neither the changes in Svalbard policy yet, hopefully this will change in the political sector analysis.

To sum up, it seems that compared to the years 2015 and 2016 (from the Aftenposten point of view), the situation has calmed down. The Ministry of Defence does not publish any (public) documents about Russia in the Arctic, there are no headlines about military step-ups or exercises. On the other hand, the media follow the Russia military parade which they did not used to do before Ukraine.

2018 In the last analysed year, there are seven articles, three published by NRK and four by Aftenposten. Twice, both the media report about the same event. As in the previous year, there are no articles from the government.

The first event mentioned by both NRK and Aftenposten is the speech given by Vladimir Putin in March, in which he claimed that Russia has a new strategic rocket that cannot be stopped by anti-missile defence.

NRK writes that the Russian president gives a speech every year about what has been achieved and what challenges the country is facing. According to the journalists, it was a well-prepared show. Besides the alleged weapon, NRK writes about the Russian increased focus on the Arctic. Putin also said that Russia should increase the freight volume through the Northeast Passage to 80 million tonnes by 2024. Moreover, he also emphasized that this must be done in parallel

113 Ibidem

with stronger military presence in the area. Nevertheless, the president assured in the speech that Russia threaten no one and it will not attack anyone or take anything from anyone. The Russian ‘new military force is a guarantee of the world peace,’ Vladimir Putin said.114

Aftenposten writes only about the weapon, saying that according to the United States Defence source, Putin only bluffs. According to the source, the nuclear missiles are not operational yet, that they are still in the research phase and that they have crashed while being tested in the Arctic.115

The second event mentioned by the media writes is the annual threat assessment by the Norwegian Intelligence Service (published in March) which was given attention from media from 2013 onwards.

Aftenposten writes that the Intelligence Service presented the assessment, and Russia is, not unexpectedly, the country that gets the most focus. The service stated that Russia wants to strengthen its presence in the Arctic and that it is increasingly emphasizing the NATO as a threat to Russian interests.116 The newspaper got, once again, an interview with the chief of the Intelligence Service, Morten Haga Lunde. Lunde announced increased Russian military activity from the Russian side in areas near Norway in the year 2018. He said that the Russian forces operate closer to the Norwegian border than they used to. When asked what it means, Lunde answered that Russia wants to signal, through showing military capabilities, dissatisfaction with Norwegian security policy.

114 Putin skryter av nye våpen. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/putin- skryter-av-nye-vapen-1.13940154. 115 Amerikanske forsvarskilder: Putin bløffer om nye våpen. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/XwayG7/Amerikanske-forsvarskilder- Putin-bloffer-om-nye-vapen. 116 Slik mener Etterretningstjenesten Norge vil merke den økte russisk militæraktiviteten. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/m6ex8L/Slik-mener- Etterretningstjenesten-Norge-vil-merke-den-okte-russisk-militaraktiviteten. ANALYTICAL PART

At the press conference, the Minister of Defence, Frank Bakke- Jensen (who replaced Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide in October 2017), said that the Norwegian Armed Forces are moving back to Finnmark, they fly and sail there more often.117

Even though NRK writes about the same report (FOKUS 2017), they do not put such an emphasis on Russia. In fact, NRK speaks of Russia as one of the six chapters in the report, while Aftenposten builds the story on Russia. Nevertheless, the author finds crucial the point where the article says that ‘Russia is the biggest threat to Norway and Norway's interests’.118 We have not seen such rhetoric before, especially not in the state news, therefore this moment should be highlighted.119 The text moreover mentions increased Russian activity in the Arctic. It concludes that there might be a new normal situation in the Arctic, which will be characterized by the fact that Russian forces more often train in the Arctic and that the military power is used more actively to signal Russian positions.120 To sum up, even though Aftenposten devotes more space, both in the article and in general, to Russia in the Arctic, NRK has chosen stronger words.

In April, Aftenposten writes about meeting of Ministers of Defence of the Nordic countries which took place in Bergen. A new joint military strategy has been the number one job there, however they also worked on agreements and legislation that will make it easy to move military forces between countries, both during exercise and in a potential war. Sweden and Finland, who are not members of the NATO, are going to

117 Ibidem 118 E-tjenesten: Digital etterretning den største trusselen mot Norge. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/e-tjenesten_-digital-etterretning-den-storste- trusselen-mot-norge-1.13945497. 119 The author has looked into the report, and the phrasing comes from the NRK journalists and their interpretation. The report can be found here: https://forsvaret.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/Fokus2018_bokmaal_oppslag_g odkjent.pdf 120 Ibidem

change their legislation so that they can provide and receive military assistance.121 The article is written by Sveinung Berg Bentzrød. He mentions the history of the Nordic cooperation in the military sector: in November 2009, the Nordic Defence Ministers signed a cooperation agreement thanks to which the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was established. The NORDEFCO has two functions: military cooperation in exercises and in the case of war, and cooperation on weapons systems and other materials. In 2018, Norway held the chairmanship of the NORDEFCO, and the meeting in Bergen in April was the first meeting under Norwegian leadership. The journalist writes that the cooperation was not concrete from the beginning; however the pressure from Russia has now made binding cooperation more interesting. Generally, he presents the Nordic cooperation as a result of Russian policies. The Minister of Defence Frank Bakke-Jensen said that there is not a military threat to Norway, nevertheless he emphasised that Norway is dealing with an unpredictable Russia. Moreover, Bentzrød writes that the chief of Intelligence Service, Morten Haga Lunde, said that Russia trained to attack Norwegian military targets last year (2017). The main topics in Bergen were an easier access to other countries' territories, reduction of bureaucratic barriers, and preparation of a new strategy for the Nordic defence cooperation, which should be ready by 2020.122 The development of the Nordic military cooperation certainly interesting. Nonetheless, the author slightly doubts that the article would show up in the analysis if Bentzrød would not connect the meeting in Bergen with increased Russian activity.

121 Russland presser frem tett nordisk forsvarssamarbeid. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/J1qB1R/Russland-presser-frem-tett- nordisk-forsvarssamarbeid. 122 Ibidem ANALYTICAL PART

In May, NRK once again informs about the parade on the occasion of the Victory Day in Moscow. Weapons and military equipment were shown there.123

The last article in 2018 was written by an Anftenposten Moscow reporter who informs the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a statement in October, in which they say that Oslo is irresponsible and militarise the Arctic, and that Russia will respond with the necessary measures.124

Summary It is vital to summarise the important points of the analysis in individual sectors. Firstly, let us mention that the military sector, together with the political sector, is the most covered one in the media. On the contrary, there are just a few documents by the Norwegian government (this does not hold true about the political sector). The reason might be that the government does not open so many documents about military to public. Secondly, Aftenposten published the most articles from the analysed media, both in absolute numbers and in percentage. Nordlys published all of the articles in the military sector prior to the analysis milestone 2014. The reason remains unclear. Moreover, the first article in the military sector whatsoever was not published before 2011. There is visible a clear trend of increasing interest in the topic by the media: from ‘nobody cares about Norway’ in 2011 to the alleged militarisation of the Arctic in 2018. Nevertheless, the curve is not linear, in other words, there is not only escalation: there is a moderate escalation from 2012 to 2014, sharp escalation in 2015, the trend continues in 2016 only in Aftenposten and the situation in 2017 and 2018 is clearly calming down. The beginning of the escalation

123 Russland viser muskler. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/over-i-moskva- for-seiersdagen-9.-mai-1.14038009. 124 Nye, kraftige utfall mot Norge fra Russland. Moskva anklager Norge for militarisering av nord. Nå lover de mottiltak. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/MgryM0/Nye_-kraftige-utfall-mot-Norge- fra-Russland-Moskva-anklager-Norge-for-militarisering-av-nord-Na-lover-de- mottiltak.

(in wording, more frequent exercises, military funding, etc.) can be tracked to 2012 when Vladimir Putin became the president of Russia. Since 2013 onwards, Norwegian media write about Russian increased activity in the Arctic. Another important thing is that the journalists are connecting the situation in Ukraine to the Arctic already since October 2014. Furthermore, there are two events which appear in the media regularly: firstly, since 2013, both of the nation-wide media took interest in the annual threat assessment published by the Norwegian Intelligence Service and warn about Russia in the Arctic; and secondly, since 2017, they also report about Russian military shows on the Victory Day. Last but not least, there is a striking correlation between Aftenposten sharpened rhetoric and the journalist Bentzrød. The connection is especially visible in 2016. Furthermore, the author would like to point out two things about the military exercises in the Arctic: a) the media inform about the planned exercises; however, they do not write about them when they actually take place; b) Norwegian and Russian military exercises seem to react to each other (especially since 2015), we can call this a small- scale spiral of arms racing. Finally, in the official Norwegian perception narrative, Russia is not considered a military threat, Norway could be put in a conflict with Russia just by superpowers, and the Ukraine scenario is not applicable to the situation in the Arctic. Nevertheless, there is one instance where the state-owned NRK labels Russia a threat.

4.4 The environmental sector

In the environmental sector, there are 17 articles from the media: seven by NRK (23.33% from all of the articles), six by Aftenposten (10.71%) and four by Nordlys (26.67%). While NRK and Nordlys have a similar share of the articles in the military sector, Aftenposten is not so interested in the environment topic it seems. Finally, the government published seven documents, i.e. more compared to the military sector. Moreover, as indicated in the theoretical part, the environmental sector has sector has a political agenda and a scientific one. The latter one is represented by scientists; the agenda is often embedded in NGOs’ ANALYTICAL PART activities. The author has therefore decided to add the perspective of the Norwegian environmental NGO Bellona, which was chosen for two reasons: firstly, media often approach the organisation and value its assessments, and also the government invites the NGO (together with other ones) to participate on governmental activities; and secondly, just from own experience, the author is aware that Bellona is highly regarded in Norway. Finally, Bellona’s interest in Russia in the Arctic is visible from its website – their articles are published not only in Norwegian and English but also Russian.125

2008 In February, the government presented a revision of the Nuclear Action Plan which was established in 1995. It is a document for nuclear safety cooperation with Russia in the north. The plan emphasises that it is important to continue in the nuclear safety cooperation with Russia. The clean-up in Andreev Bay is identified as one of the main focus areas.126 Moreover, the plan states that Norwegian priorities will be soon accomplished. Nevertheless, Norway wants a close and long-term nuclear safety cooperation with Russia as long as there are nuclear activities and sources of pollution in the neighbouring area. Three NGOs, Natur og Ungdom, Bellona and Naturvernforbundet, participated on the document.127 Later, it will be obvious that nuclear safety is the most important area for the Norwegian government in the environmental sector.

In November, Nordlys informs about high concentration of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) in Svalbard. For a long time, people believed that the man-made toxin had been transported there from far away by air and ocean streams. However, surveys from the period 1998-2008 showed that there are several local sources of PCB pollution

125 The author searched in the Bellona database for articles which are put in the subject ’Arctic‘ and include the key word Russia in the given time-frame. 126 In 1982, there was a nuclear accident at a Soviet naval base located near the Norwegian boarder. 127 Revisjon av regjeringens atomhandlingsplan 2008. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/atomplan08/id499420/.

in Svalbard. The soil from the Russian settlements is especially contaminated. The article reports on Norway-Russia cooperation on the issue. The Governor of Svalbard, Halvard R. Pedersen, said that he is pleasantly surprised by the willingness to cooperate and the good work that has been done. Also the journalist praises the cooperation which will have great effects in the future. The cooperation shall continue in 2009.128

2009 In April, Norway hosted foreign ministers from 12 countries on the occasion of an international conference on ice melting under the Arctic Council, writes Nordlys. The world’s foremost climate scientists on ice presented new knowledge on how the global ice melting has consequences far beyond the polar regions. The Norwegian Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, set the goal that the Tromsø meetings would represent a powerful play from the Arctic countries prior to the large climate summit in Copenhagen in December 2009. Støre said that Norway and Russia have an exciting agenda to cooperate on.129

2010 Exactly a year later, we can see that the individual sectors are interconnected: thanks to the delimitation agreement between Norway and Russia (for more see the political sector), the Centre for Climate and the Environment opened in Tromsø in the autumn 2010. A joint statement says that Norway and Russia attach great importance to joint activities regarding environment in the Arctic, writes Nordlys. The new centre is a concrete result of the Norwegian Government's Arctic Strategy, which was presented at the Polar

128 Rydder Svalbard for miljøgifter. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/rydder-svalbard-for-miljogifter/s/1-79- 3938095. 129 Tidenes toppmøte i Tromsø. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/tidenes-toppmote-i-tromso/s/1-79-4288539. ANALYTICAL PART

Environment Centre by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and in March 2009 (for more, see the political sector).130

Moreover, in November 2010, Bellona leader Frederic Hauge was guest at the parliament in Murmansk. Bellona writes that they believe it is the first time a Russian parliament invited an NGO for an official visit. The organisation wonders whether this means that Russia has finally begin to take the environmental problems seriously. The article also mentions that Bellona has branch in Murmansk too (since 1994).131

2012 2011 is the only year in which there is no document. In 2012, NRK informs that Norwegian and Russian researchers have found out that the eggs of ivory gulls have 17% thinner shell than eggs before 1930 due to pollution. The studies have been conducted by the Norwegian Polar Institute and Russian institutions.132

2013 The environmental NGO Bellona reacts to photos of Soviet military waste on the Russian island Kildin in the Barents Sea about 120km from the border with Norway. The head of Bellona, Nils Bøhmer, says that such military equipment is an environmental problem. However, he adds that the organization does not have any indications that radioactive waste is stored on the island. He also points out that Russia has initiated a project of cleaning-up clean up the Arctic.133

2014

130 Veldig gode nyheter. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/veldig- gode-nyheter/s/1-79-5093357. 131 Bellona på offisielt besøk. Available from: https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2010-11-bellona-pa-offisielt- besok. 132 Faretruande tynne eggeskal for ismåken. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/viten/tynne-eggeskal-hos-ismake-1.8836365. 133 Her ligger sovjetisk militæravfall strødd - 120 kilometer fra norskegrensen. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/her-ligger-sovjetisk- militaravfall-strodd-120-kilometer-fra-norskegrensen/s/1-79-7006048.

In April, an NRK journalists writes a piece of news and a critique in one: 25 years after ExxonMobil’s oil tanker Exxon Valdez caused one of the world's most serious oil disasters, the oil company plans to be the first in the world to drill in one of the most remote places – the Russian Kara Sea in the Arctic. The journalist appeals to learning from Exxon Valdez that oil drilling does not belong to Arctic waters, where the consequences are damaging. He believes that as an Arctic state, Norway must take responsibility for introducing international rules that keep Exxon and other oil companies away from the Arctic. He also encourages Exxon to cancel the plans to drill in the Kara Sea. ‘The fact that Putin gives them permission is not an excuse.’134

The first document which comes after the events in Ukraine comes from the government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs public that the Norwegian-Russian cooperation on nuclear safety is to be continued. State Secretary Bård Glad Pedersen led the Norwegian delegation to the 17th meeting of the Norwegian-Russian nuclear safety commission. The meeting took place at Kola Peninsula in September. Central issues at the meeting were the clean-up of nuclear waste in Andreev Bay, preparedness for nuclear accidents and the safety of Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants. The article emphasises that for over 20 years, the Norwegian- Russian nuclear cooperation has contributed to good results and a safer local area. This was the first meeting between Norway and Russia at the political level after Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimea. Pederson clarifies that although Norway has adopted restrictive measures against Russia because of the events in Ukraine, the government emphasises continuing cooperation in areas that are important for both parties.135 This text is the first which suggest that regarding the environment, Norway is willing to separate the individual sectors.

134 Exxon forbereder neste oljekatastrofe i Arktis. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/ytring/exxons-neste-oljekatastrofe-1.11621382. 135 Oppfølging av det norsk-russiske samarbeidet om atomsikkerhet. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/atomsikkerhet_samarbeid/id2001889/. ANALYTICAL PART

2015 A year later, the Norwegian government writes again about nuclear safety in the Arctic. Firstly, the article mentions that during the Cold War, there were extensive nuclear activities on the Kola Peninsula, and significant amounts of radioactive waste was stored there, representing a risk to health and the environment. Secondly, the text assures that the Norwegian efforts in this area will continue. In addition, a new cooperation on nuclear safety will develop with Ukraine.136

Subsequently, the State Secretary, Bård Glad Pedersen, led again the Norwegian delegation to a meeting of the Norwegian-Russian nuclear safety commission which took place in Kirkenes. As in the previous report, Pederson says that the Norwegian- Russian nuclear cooperation has contributed to good results and a safer local area, and that the government continues in the cooperation even though Norway and other countries have introduced restrictive measures against Russia because of their acts in Ukraine.137

Moreover, s in its first article in the environmental sector, Aftenposten writes that the Arctic countries, including Norway and Russia, agreed on a ten-year to save the polar bear. The journalist concludes that climate change, legal and illegal hunting, pollution, industry, tourism and human contact are the biggest threats to polar bears. In Canada, Alaska and Greenland, indigenous peoples hunt for polar bears. Quotas and other measures should be introduced there. On the other hand, in Russia and Norway, polar bears are completely

136 Atomsikkerhetssamarbeidet i nordområdene. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/atomsikkerhet_nordomraa dene/id449322/. 137 Norsk-russisk atomsikkerhetskommisjon. Availabe from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/atom-kommisjon/id2416771/.

protected. Nevertheless, Russia wants to allow its indigenous peoples to restore the old hunting traditions.138

Finally, NRK writes at the end of the year that Norwegian researchers have found large piles of greenhouse gas methane on the seabed outside of Siberia. They say that one day, they will probably explode which can have consequences, both for the climate and for the oil and gas industry.139 The article does not write about any Russian position on the topic.

The year 2015 was especially important for Bellona. In March, the organisation reports that even though it is not easy to be an environmentalist in Russia, Bellona's offices in Murmansk is fighting against industrial pollution and the old nuclear industry.140 Nevertheless, already in October of the same year, the organisation informs that it was forces to close down its office in Murmansk by Russian authorities. In fact, Bellona Murmansk was labelled as a ‘Foreign Agent’ under Putin’s new law about NGOs.141

2016 In 2016, there are two newspaper articles and one government document. In May, journalists react to forest fires in Canada which are a consequence of climate change. They write that for decades, researchers have warned that global warming will increase fire in the coniferous forest belt that extends through Russia, Scandinavia, Alaska

138 Arktiske land slår ring rundt isbjørnen. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/KaW7/Arktiske-land-slar-ring-rundt- isbjornen. 139 Frykter metaneksplosjoner i Nordishavet. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/viten/frykter-metaneksplosjoner-i-nordishavet-1.12681270. 140 Veien mot et miljøvennlig Russland. Available from: https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2015-03-veien-mot-et- miljovennlig-russland. 141 Kjemper for Bellona Murmansk!. Available from: https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2015-10-kjemper-for- bellona-murmansk. ANALYTICAL PART and Canada. Getting a full overview of developments over time in this vast area is difficult; nevertheless, several studies indicate a sharp increase in the extent of fires in Canada, Alaska and Russia after the turn of millennium.142 Both this and the previous article does not deal with Norway- Russia relations or the Norwegian perception of Russia. Nevertheless, they are about conditions which are common to the countries.

In June, the Ministry of Climate and Environment informs that Russia is working on the first version of the management plan for the Russian side of the Barents Sea, which is based on Norwegian experience. Moreover, in 2015, the Ministry writes they provide 21 million NOK for environmental protection cooperation with Russia for preserving common natural areas and ecosystems.143 Furthermore, the text states that the emissions from the nickel works in the Pechenga area have damaged nature for a long time to come. To document the pollution and to provide reliable information on the state of the environment, Norway financially supports environmental monitoring of the area. On the local level, the governor of Finnmark shall coordinate border-based environmental cooperation. Moreover, according to the document, Norway has noticed that NGOs in Russia have got more difficult working conditions lately. Therefore, Norway earmarks 5.2 million NOK for Norwegian NGO’s cooperation with Russian environmental NGOs. In general, the cooperation is based on a work program with projects in the marine environment, biodiversity, pollution, border cooperation, cultural heritage protection, and radioactivity.144

The last article of the year is one of those containing the keywords Norway, Russia and Arctic and it is about the environment; however, it

142 Brannfaren øker når klimaet endres. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/brannfaren-oker-nar-klimaet-endres-i-canada- 1.12944696. 143 Russisk Barentshav-plan basert på norske erfaringer. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/miljosamarbeidet-med-russland-far-21- millioner/id2505796/. 144 Ibidem

is not about Norway-Russia relation and therefore not vital for the analysis. The NRK article informs that scientists fear that summer ice in the Arctic may disappear and that the consequences of the global warming in the Arctic can be disastrous.145

2017 In March 2017, there was the Russian Arctic Conference in Arkhangelsk. The first two texts by Aftenposten discuss the topic.

The first article’s headline is ‘Putin: Climate Change can be Natural’. The newspaper writes that Putin said at the conference that it is impossible to stop global warming because it can be linked to some global cycles. Instead, the president suggested that we shall adapt to global warming. He also claimed that the warming had begun already in the 1930s in the Russian part of the Arctic, and that there were no emissions at that time.146

Aftenposten mentions that previously, Putin has often expressed scepticism about the research on climate change. He has also said that global warming can be good for Russia. The authors think over whether the president has changed his opinion because during the 2015 climate summit in Paris, the tone was different as Putin called climate change one of the biggest challenges. Nevertheless, Russia has not committed itself to real cuts in its greenhouse gas emissions. The country’s emissions from the use of fossil fuels and industry are the world's fifth largest.147 The statement is significant since it is in contrary to the Norwegian position.

145 Forskere frykter at sommerisen i Arktis kan forsvinne. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/forskere-frykter-at-sommerisen-i-arktis-kan-forsvinne- 1.13244764. 146 Putin: Klimaendringene kan være naturlige. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/aRzzE/Putin-Klimaendringene-kan-vare- naturlige. 147 Ibidem ANALYTICAL PART

In the second article, the journalist mentions that the Arctic is getting warmer twice as fast as the rest of the Earth. The ice melts and many people fear a climate catastrophe. However, at the same time, there are enormous opportunities for oil, gas and mineral extraction, trade routes, agriculture and fishing which is attractive for Russia. The newspaper informs that the Russian president Vladimir Putin said that Russia is going to spend trillions of roubles in the Arctic. Russia announced that there are 150 plans prepared for the Arctic. Almost half of them is for extraction of resources, while only two percent are for ecological measures, according to the text.148 The text just ‘by the way’ says that a part of the Arkhangelsk summit was the first bilateral political meeting between Norway and Russia after more than three years.149 Obviously, the environmental issue is at that moment more important to the Norwegian newspaper that the political situation between the two countries.

Moreover, in June, there is a press release from the Norwegian government. It reacts to the fact that the Russian Rosatom has confirmed a floating nuclear power plant will be transported without nuclear fuel on board when moved from St. Petersburg to Murmansk along the Norwegian coast. The government states that Norway is satisfied with Russia's planned shipment of the nuclear power plant along the Norwegian coast because it is in line with the requests for safe shipping from the Norwegian authorities.150

148 Amerikanere, russere og kinesere er helt enige om en ting: Det er på tide å høste Arktis. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/wom6L/Amerikanere_-russere-og- kinesere-er-helt-enige-om-en-ting-Det-er-pa-tide-a-hoste-Arktis. 149 Ibidem 150 God løsning for frakt av atomkraftverk. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/god-losning-for-frakt-av- atomkraftverk/id2564925/.

Bellona warned that Russia is committed to extensive use of floating nuclear power plants at sea to extract oil and gas in Arctic in its report ‘From Polar to Nuclear?’ already in 2008.151

In the summer, Aftenposten informs that a tanker has crossed the Northeast Passage without icebreaker for the first time in history. It was a commercial Russian tanker carrying liquid natural gas, and the whole journey took 19 days, which is around 30% faster than the traditional sea route via the Suez Canal. Of course, it was possible due to the warmer temperatures in the Arctic. That might be good for business, however, the development worries climate activists, writes the newspaper.152

The last piece of news comes from Aftenposten too. It says that Russia has finally confirmed mysterious nuclear emissions and that it seems that Russia has tried to hide a nuclear incident in the Ural. In fact, already in October, small amounts of radioactivity were measured in Norway and other European countries. For a month and a half, everything was denied; however, in November, Russian authorities admit that unusually high radioactive emissions were measured in the Urals. Norwegian authorities emphasized that the concentration of ruthenium-106 was very low in Norway and did not pose any risk to health and the environment. Nevertheless, the problem is that Russia could not inform about it.153

2018

151 Russland vil bruke atomkraft i arktiske strøk. Available from: https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2008-11-russland-vil-bruke- atomkraft-i-arktiske-strok. 152 Et tankskip har krysset Nordøstpassasjen uten isbryter for første gang. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/528Jb/Et-tankskip-har-krysset- Nordostpassasjen-uten-isbryter-for-forste-gang. 153 Mystisk atomutslipp bekreftes nå i Russland. Flere målinger tyder på at en atomhendelse i Ural ble holdt skjult. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/0Ej3vo/Mystisk-atomutslipp-bekreftes- na-i-Russland-Flere-malinger-tyder-pa-at-en-atomhendelse-i-Ural-ble-holdt- skjult-. ANALYTICAL PART

In the last analysed year, there is one document from the government and three newspaper articles. All of the stories are continuation of previous events.

In March, NRK catches attention by the following headline: ‘Radiation from Putin's Horror Weapons May Have Reached Norway’. The article is a follow up to the high measurements of Ruthenium-106 in Norway. In the article, the journalist writes that Russians claim they tested a cruise missile driven by a nuclear reactor last autumn. At the same time, the radioactive substance came to Norway, and therefore, there could be a connection.154 The weapon is a cruise missile, and Putin claimed that it has unlimited range because it is powered by a nuclear reactor. Moreover, the president said that Russia had a successful test of the weapon. However, sources in the US administration claim that the Russians recently had an accident with the weapon, and that it crashed in the Arctic. The journalist gives space to the Bellona scientist Nils Böhmer who says that the cruise missile, if it really has a nuclear reactor, can emit the radioactive substances even if there is not an accident. The connection between the weapon and the measurements in Norway was not confirmed by Russia. In the end, it is mentioned that ruthenium-106 is not normal to measure in Norway; the last time it was caught was after the accident in Chernobyl in 1986.155

The next news article is reports about the planned transportation of the Russian floating nuclear power plant Akademik Lomonosov which shall be moved from St. Petersburg along the Norwegian coast to Murmansk. The power plant does not yet have nuclear fuel on board, as Norway wished. It is estimated that the nuclear power plant should be on the Kola peninsula in three weeks. There, nuclear fuel is to be loaded

154 Stråling fra Putins skrekkvåpen kan ha nådd Norge. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/radioaktiv-forurensning-fra-nytt-russisk-vapen-kan- ha-nadd-norge-1.13943211. 155 Ibidem

on board, and Akademik Lomonosov is going to proceeds to the northeast coast of Siberia.156 NRK mentions that last year, the Norwegian authorities were strongly critical of the Russian plans to move the nuclear power plant along the Norwegian coast with nuclear fuel on board. After talks between the Norwegian and Russian authorities, it was agreed that nuclear fuel should not be taken on board before the power plant was in Murmansk. Once again, NRK gives space to the NGO Bellona. Nils Bøhmer says that ‘the nuclear power plant will be located in a very deserted area where weather conditions are hard. If an accident happens, it will be very difficult to limit it, as well as making it more difficult to clean up’.

When the floating nuclear power plant reached Murmansk, the Norwegian government informs about the annual meeting of the Norwegian-Russian nuclear safety commission in Murmansk. The report states that the nuclear safety cooperation between Norway and Russia is a central dimension of the bilateral relationship and contributes to security and confidence building on both sides. One of the topics at the meeting was the transport of the Russian floating nuclear power plant Akademik Lomonosov.157 The power plant came to Murmansk in spring 2018, and it is located there during the meeting. The nuclear power plant is scheduled to be transported to Pevek in Russia in the summer of 2019. The government emphasises that an accident with a floating nuclear power plant can have major consequences for both mankind and the environment. Therefore, the Norwegian authorities are going to follow the further transport from Murmansk carefully. Moreover, during the meeting, the parties highlighted the good cooperation in environmental monitoring, especially with regard to

156 Flytende russisk atomkraftverk på vei mot Norskehavet. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/flytende-russisk-atomkraftverk-pa-vei-mot- norskehavet-1.14027567. 157 Flytende kjernekraftverk tema i norsk-russisk atomsikkerhetskommisjon. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norsk-russisk- kommisjon/id2610059/. ANALYTICAL PART joint expeditions and impact assessments of dumped material in the Kara and Barents Sea.158

The last text is an article by Aftenposten. It is about a new research which shows why it is necessary to slow down global warming. The journalist makes an appeal to world leaders, regardless of the fact that Russia and other counties made it clear that they do not accept the scientific facts of the recent UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report.159

Summary As a result of the analysis, the following can be said on the environmental sector: Firstly, the Norwegian government continuously focuses especially on the nuclear safety in the Arctic, with an emphasis on clean-up of the Andreev Bay. Secondly, in the environmental sector, Nordlys writes only about issues which take place in the region, such as for example pollution on Svalbard or establishment of the new Centre for Climate and Environment in Tromsø. NRK and Aftenposten inform about all other types of information, e.g. joint research, agreements, climate change, opinion articles etc. Moreover, besides the government and media, the author was also concerned with the Norwegian NGO Bellona which takes interest in Russia in the Arctic and represents the scientific agenda of the sector. In the beginning, the Russia cooperation with the organisation seemed positive, with the highlight being the invitation of Bellona to the Murmansk parliament in 2010. Nevertheless, in 2015, the NGO was forced to shut down its office in Murmansk. Regarding the analysis milestone, 2014, Ukraine is mentioned just in one of the documents from the environmental sector, which indicates that Norway wants to separate the agenda from high politics. Furthermore, the government highlights that the environmental cooperation should be continued despite the Russian acts in Ukraine.

158 Ibidem 159 Derfor er maks 1,5 grader så viktig: Nordpolen og Sydpolen snakker nemlig sammen. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/gP9Vw1/Derfor- er-maks-1_5-grader-sa-viktig-Nordpolen-og-Sydpolen-snakker-nemlig-sammen.

From the analytical perspective, it is interesting that the first official meeting after Crimea between the two counties took place within the environmental sector. Additionally, it can be said that the cooperation functions well in research. Nevertheless, cooperation in the environmental agenda as a whole has become more problematic since 2017 when Russia shifted its position on the climate change (Putin: global warming can be natural and good for Russia) and puts more emphasis on extraction of resources in the Arctic. Moreover, the floating nuclear power plant which sailed along Norway and the emissions of rhuthenium-106 which may come from a new Russian weapon created friction in the Norway- Russia cooperation in the environmental sector. All in all, the Norway-Russia relation in the environmental sector is becoming more difficult with time, and the Norwegian perception of Russian activities in the Arctic is getting more negative too. This is the opposite development than in the military sector.

4.5 The economic sector

The economic sector is one of the less extensive ones. Nordlys published just one article in the sector (which corresponds to 6.67%), NRK three (10%); however, Aftenposten published eight articles (14.29%). The higher share at Aftenposten might be due to the fact that the newspaper traditionally profiles itself as right-wing. No article was published until 2010.

2010 In March, the first article is published by Aftenposten. It is about possible economic advantages for Russia and China thanks to the sea route via the Arctic which should be soon accessible due to the climate change. The article informs that a commercial Russian tanker is going to cross the Northeast Passage without an icebreaker for the first time in history (that did not take place before 2017). We know that already from the environmental sector. Once again, we can see that the sectors are interconnected. Aftenposten points out also to the military sector in the text. Finally, an example of cooperation in the sector is the Russian ANALYTICAL PART gas field Stockman in the Barents Sea, where Norwegian Statoil and French Total work on the project together with Russian Gazprom.160

A day after, Aftenposten comes back to the topic. The journalist asked some researchers about the economic prospects of the sea route in the Arctic, and they doubt it would be profitable given the speed of ice-melting. Firstly, they point out to large natural variations in the ice conditions in the Arctic which does not give predictability to the shipment industry; secondly, they are sceptical because of Russia bureaucracy; finally, they claim that even if there would be a large increase in international shipping traffic through Arctic waters, it will not have any major consequences for business and settlement in Norway.161 As of 2010, the evaluation is therefore there should not be any economic changes for Norway or Russia in the Arctic.

2011 A year later, NRK writes about the same topic with the headline ‘Ice Melting Opens Trade Routes’. The journalist writes about undisputable advantages of the sea route that is especially faster shipping between Europe and Asia and avoiding the pirates around the west coast of Africa. A researcher from Fridtjof Nansen Institute told to NRK that to make the ship route a source of income is a Russian dream. Nevertheless, he comes to similar conclusions as the researchers Aftenposten interviewed in the previous year: the prediction that the Arctic will be ice-free in 40 years applies only for the summers, moreover, it cannot be guaranteed that the sea will be completely ice- free every year, it will vary. This is problematic for the shipping companies, which are dependent on predictability in order to deliver cargo in time. Last but not least, the researcher also questions the

160 Russisk-kinesisk maktkamp om sjøveien i Arktis. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/0K7g2/Russisk-kinesisk-maktkamp-om- sjoveien-i-Arktis. 161 Tvil om Arktis-trafikk. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/wemlo/Tvil-om-Arktis-trafikk.

infrastructure (ports, navigation aid) in Russia which is not prepared for the changes.162 To sum up, NRK comes to the same conclusion as Aftenposten regarding the Northeast Passage.

2012 A year later, the regional Nordlys writes about the ‘shortcut to Asia’ too, this time in more concrete context. The newspaper informs that Russia has opened the Northeast Passage for a Norwegian gas tanker for the first time. The permission to sail the route was given to a tanker which belongs to the shipping company Knutsen OAS Shipping. The company said it will save them a lot of time and money. Nordlys writes that first two commercial ships went through the passage in 2009. In 2011, total of 34 ships sailed the route.163 NRK writes about the event too.164

No texts were published in 2013 and 2014. However, it is important to note that in 2014, Norway implemented the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia.165 The analysis has not revealed this, since the documents about the economic sanctions do not contain the key word ‘Arctic’.

2015 In the first half of the year, a more complex issue which technically covers all of the sectors occurred: the Norwegian coal mining company Store Norske, which is based on the Svalbard, got into a crisis and announced it would probably go bankrupt. People living on the archipelago are dependent on the business, and Store Norske therefore

162 Issmelting åpner handelsruter. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/viten/issmelting-apner-handelsruter-1.7737584. 163 Får ta snarveien til Asia. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/far-ta- snarveien-til-asia/s/1-79-5872824. 164 Åpner Nordøstpassasjen for norsk gasstanker. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/forste-seiling-i-nordostpassasjen-1.7944331. 165 Norge vil innføre nye restriktive tiltak mot Russland. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/Norge-vil-innfore-nye-restriktive-tiltak- mot-Russland/id765675/. ANALYTICAL PART asked the Norwegian state for a loan. Even though the issue emerged as an economic one, it has political consequences. The topic is discussed in an Aftenposten article called ‘A Coal City is Waiting for the Putin- effect’.166 The mayor of Longyearbyen, Christin Kristoffersen, said that given the current Russian activity in the Arctic, to close Store Norske down would be a very unfortunate signal to send out to the world. She believes that Norway needs to preserve its settlement on Svalbard to assert Norwegian sovereignty and to safeguard Norwegian interests in the Arctic. Experts agree with the mayor: a researcher says that Norway does not need coal. He believes that Store Norske's future is more about security policy, than about finances, and points out that Svalbard is Norway's Achilles heel regarding Russians. Moreover, Aftenposten connects the story also to the Russian military activity in the Arctic. In contrary, environmental movements welcome closing of the company because they believe that the polluting coal industry belongs to the past.167 To sum up, the aspects are following: from the economic point of view, the operation of the mines is not profitable, moreover, it goes against Norwegian environmental policies; however, on the other hand, it is vital for preserving the community living there (societal sector), which is according to many necessary for the political sector (preserving sovereignty). The author has decided to put the issue in the economic sector because the driving force was the financial situation of Store Norske.

The Norwegian government actually financially helped to Store Norske, and the company has been preserved till these days.168

166 Kullbyen venter på Putin-effekten. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/8A81/Kullbyen-venter-pa-Putin-effekten. 167 Ibidem 168 Funding for Store Norske on Svalbard. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/funding-for-store-norske-on- svalbard/id2408414/.

The issue is very interesting for the analysis because it shows that the political sector outweighs the economic and even the environmental sectors in relation with Russia.

In the same year, the Fridtjof Nansens Institute published a report concluding that the development of the petroleum activities in the Arctic is slower than expected just a few years ago. Nevertheless, Norway is still the leader in the activities. An Aftenposten journalist compares the Norwegian activity to the Russian one: while Russia has great ambitions, the development is dependent on cooperation with Western companies, and the development is therefore uncertain.169

2016 In 2016, the Norwegian government published an article about employment and welfare in the north of Norway. Regarding Russia, the text says that as long as the restrictive measures against Russia and the Russian import ban, which Russia introduced as a countermeasure in 2014, are in force, the opportunities for trade and business development with Russia is limited. However, in areas not covered by the restrictions, business cooperation with Russia continues on a regular basis.170 It is clear that that the situation in Ukraine affected the economic relations between Norway and Russia, however, for the analysis, it is important that it has an impact also for the Arctic area.

2017 At the beginning of the year, Aftenposten informs that while the Norwegian government continues in the sanctions against Russia, Statoil, the state-dominated company, has strengthened its relations with the Russians. To be precise, Statoil and its Russian partner Rosneft signed a so-called ‘joint venture’. Statoil claims that it is not a violation of the sanction regime. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs comments: ‘Norway has introduced

169 Norge leder oljekappløpet i nord. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/pVoV/Norge-leder-oljekapplopet-i-nord. 170 Sysselsetting, verdiskaping og velferd. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/nord_velferd/id2483578/. ANALYTICAL PART restrictive measures because of Russia's international law violation in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. At the same time, we have always emphasized cooperation in areas that are in both countries' interest. There is nothing in the way of business cooperation with Russia as long as this is in line with the restrictive measures.’ On the other hand, researchers warn that it is politically dangerous because it sends a signal that the Russians get what they want.171 The journalist mentions that the oil and gas resources in the Arctic account for about 35% of the world's future oil reserves. Russia has launched gigantic plans to invest in the Arctic, however, the Russians need foreign investors and technology.172

In March, the Norwegian-Russian Chamber of Commerce held a meeting. Most importantly, the Norwegian side emphasised there that the trade between Norway and Russia can be characterized as limited, despite the proximity of the counties and the size of the Russian economy. In recent years, trade sharply declined, especially in exports from Norway (as a direct result of Russia's import ban on food).173

In April, Aftenposten publishes a news report about a Russian icebreaker, saying that the Arctic shortcut between Europe and China increased traffic last year by 35%. Russia believes the Northeast Passage can replace 20 percent of all sea traffic that today goes to Asia via the Suez Canal in a few years.174

In the same month, a milestone for Norway-Russia economic relation, as well for the analysis of the economic sector, took place. It

171 Mens Norge har sanksjonert mot Russland, har Statoil styrket forholdet til russerne. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/i/6GXwO/Mens- Norge-har-sanksjonert-mot-Russland_-har-Statoil-styrket-forholdet-til-russerne. 172 Ibidem 173 Tale på norsk-russisk handelskammers frokostmøte. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/tale-russisk- handelskammer/id2541503/. 174 Jaroslav bryter snarveien til Kina. Sergej tetter igjen hullene. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/G7Wz4/Jaroslav-bryter-snarveien-til- Kina-Sergej-tetter-igjen-hullene.

was the Norwegian-Russian Government Commission for Economic, Industrial, Research and Technology Cooperation which took place in Moscow. The meeting was special because it was the first one in almost four years on the level of Ministers of Trade (although Ministers of Fisheries met in 2015). The gap between the meetings were due to the Russian annexation of the Crimea.175 NRK evaluates that the fact that Monica Mæland, the Minister of Trade and Industry, visited Moscow is the most visible sign that the relations between the Norway and Russia are slowly going back to normal. According to the journalist, the relationship between the two countries has recently returned almost to the level it was at during the Cold War. Even though it is not expected that the meeting would somehow accelerate further cooperation, both Norway and Russia see the meeting as an important symbolic of willingness to get the economic cooperation back on track, writes NRK. Some Norwegian companies would like to lift the sanctions: firstly, it is companies within fisheries (Norway used to export fish for about 6.5 billion NOK to Russia, and this export has completely stopped); secondly, it is some companies within oil and gas production (the newspaper mentions that e.g. Statoil continues in a limited cooperation with the Russian oil and gas industry). Despite that, the Minister of Trade said that ‘it is not appropriate to cancel sanctions against Russia now, even though there is dissatisfaction in the business sector,’ informs NRK.176

In August, a commercial Russian tanker has crossed the Northeast Passage without icebreaker for the first time in history, informs Aftenposten. This event was already analysed in the environmental sector, however, it has clearly consequences for the economic sector too.177

175 Ikke aktuelt å oppheve sanksjonene mot Russland nå. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/_-ikke-aktuelt-a-oppheve-sanksjonene-mot-russland- na-1.13480382. 176 Ibidem 177 Et tankskip har krysset Nordøstpassasjen uten isbryter for første gang. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/528Jb/Et-tankskip-har-krysset- Nordostpassasjen-uten-isbryter-for-forste-gang. ANALYTICAL PART

In the same month, the Norwegian government writes it will strengthen business cooperation in the Arctic, and merge two investment funds into one. The new fund will invest in companies in Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. The Minister of Trade and Industry, Monica Mæland, said that the government wants to contribute to increased business activity across national borders.178

2018 In September, Aftenposten informs that the first container ship sailed the Northeast Passage. The ship was accompanied by an icebreaker. The shipping company emphasised that the voyage is primarily a test, and that they do not consider the passage as a commercial alternative to the traditional routes.179

In October 2018. Another Norwegian-Russian ministerial meeting in the economic sector took place, this time in Oslo. Norwegian Minister of Trade and Industry, Torbjørn Røe Isaksen (who replaced Monica Mæland), met with his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Kobylkin, to discuss trade and economic cooperation. The issues debated were e.g. general business cooperation, contacts in fisheries management, shipbuilding, tourism, or aviation. The government adds some facts about Norwegian-Russian economic cooperation. Firstly, they point out that the trade between Norway and Russia has increased by about 40% in 2017 (partly due to increased imports of aluminium and mineral oils from Russia). Secondly, the Norwegian maritime industry expressed interest in the renewal of the Russian fishing fleet. And finally, the text mentions that

178 Utvidet investeringsfond for Nord-Norge og Russland. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/utvidet-investeringsfond-for-nord- norge-og-russland/id2568840/. 179 Første containerskip fremme etter å ha seilt Nordøstpassasjen. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/A2wwB5/Forste-containerskip-fremme- etter-a-ha-seilt-Nordostpassasjen

seafood accounted for about 80% of Norwegian exports to Russia before an import ban was introduced in August 2014.180

Summary The economic sector is one of the least covered ones, nevertheless, it brings very interesting findings for the analysis. The major topics within the sector is the Northeast Passage, Norwegian sanctions against Russia and Russian import ban or the oil and gas industry. The analysis presents following conclusions: Firstly, the topic of possible economic advantages of the Northeast Passages pervades the whole analysed period, starting with the debate in newspapers (2010) and ending by the report of the first container shipment (2018). It is important to acknowledge that even though there is a debate about the shortcut to Asia, no economic changes or impacts took place in the given time-frame. Secondly, it is clear from the analysis, that the Norwegian restrictive measures against Russia, as well as the Russian countermeasures have had an impact on Norway-Russia economic relations, also in the Arctic. In this sense, we can state that the milestone Ukraine 2014 effected the economic sector significantly. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that there were no texts about Norway-Russia economic relations prior to 2015. Up till then, all of the texts were just about the Northeast Passage. That suggest that even prior to the 2014 milestone, the economic relations were not vital for Norway. Subsequently, this conclusion can be supported by the Store Norske case (2015). By financially supporting the company, the Norwegian government have sent a signal that the political sector outweighs the economic one in relation to Russia. Nevertheless, the continued cooperation within the petroleum activities shows (state-dominated Statoil and Russian Rosneft in 2017) that even though politics are superior to economic, oil is still a vital factor for Norway.

180 Norsk-russisk ministermøte i Oslo. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norsk-russisk-ministermote-i- oslo/id2617321/. ANALYTICAL PART

Finally, a development in the Norway-Russia economic relations can be tracked. As mentioned, the business relations were dampened since 2014, however since 2017, we can clearly follow that the relations are getting warmer (Norway-Russia Chamber of Commerce, the Government Commission in Moscow and the ministerial meeting in Oslo), showing that the situations is moving back to normal, even though the sanctions are still in place. The analysis goal was also to ascertain if there are businesses affecting the Norway-Russia relations. In this respect, distinctly fisheries and the oil and gas industry (Statoil) are the main driving force.

4.6 The societal sector

The societal sector is the most neglected one. While NRK did not publish any articles on the topic, Aftenposten and Nordlys published just one (which corresponds to 1.79% and 6.67% respectively). This fact suggests that Norway-Russia cross-border cooperation regarding local societies, in the theoretical part defined as the Sámi people, is not an issue. However, the topic is well-discussed on Sámi language websites, and the state NRK has a section devoted to the Sámi people too. The conclusion therefore must be that societal sector is not an issue on the analysed level – the state one. The author intended to analyse also texts published by the Sámi Parliament of Norway; however, their website does not provide sufficient information for the analysis. The author therefore supplemented the two news articles with texts on the website of the Norwegian government (texts under topic ‘Samer’ and ‘urfolk’, i.e. Sámi and indigenous people, with the keyword ‘Russia’ in the given time- frame). There are some issues which appear repeatedly, and the author will not report about them further: firstly, it is the annual congratulation to the Sámi National Day (6 February) performed by the Ministry of Local Governance; secondly, it is the annual white papers about the activities of the Sámi Parliament of Norway; and finally, it is the annual awarding of The Nordic Sámi language prize Gollegiella.

2011 The first and only article published by Aftenposten is on dangerous conditions for indigenous people in Jamal, a peninsula in Russia. The nomadic people follow reindeers; however, their traditional way of living is to be destroyed because they live on the world's largest gas reserves (19 times larger than the Norwegian gas reserves in total). Gazprom wants to exploit the area, and the newspaper informs that Russia, unlike Norway, has not signed the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention on indigenous peoples' land rights, which is binding by international law. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Norway seems to care more about the oil than about the people. Aftenposten writes that with such a large Russian production, Norwegian competitiveness and gas revenues will be affected. Moreover, they inform that currently no Norwegian partners are participating on the Jamal project, but Statoil has started a dialogue with Gazprom about it.181

2013 Two years later, Nordlys publishes a similar article. The article mentions 100 years from Fridtjof Nansen’s travel on the Russian Jenisej River, from where he reported about local indigenous people. Nordlys writes that Russia still has a large number of unique indigenous peoples, many of them still living in a traditional way. Just like Aftenposten, Nordlys informs that their culture is under strong pressure from the oil industry. The journalist appeals for following Nansen's example and speaking up when the existence and rights of minority people are threatened.182

2015 In 2015, the Norwegian government allocated 3.5 million NOK to various Sámi language projects. The only connection to Russia is that

181 Gassjakt ved verdens ende. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/i/KMEdG/Gassjakt-ved-verdens-ende. 182 Nansen, urfolk og menneskerettigheter. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/nansen-urfolk-og-menneskerettigheter/s/1-79- 6897541. ANALYTICAL PART the Eastern Sámi Museum in Neiden (Norway) will, among other things, prepare a Sámi language courses in Norway and Russia.183

2017 The Norwegian government informs that since March 20017, the border agreement between Norway and Russia is going to be extended. The agreement is of great importance to those who live close to the Norway-Russia border (not only Sámi people) because they can apply for border resident’s certificate thanks to which they can travel across the border, and the people-to-people contact is therefore strengthened. The agreement has been in force since 2012, now it is going to include more territory. Since 2012, the Norwegian Consulate in Murmansk has issued more than 2 800 certificates, while the Russian Consulate in Kirkenes has issued 5800 certificates. Børge Brende, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, commented that the agreement is a good example of the well-functioning practical cooperation Norway has with Russia in the Arctic.184

The other document in 2017 informs that the State Secretary, Anne Karin Olli, is going to attend the 1st Barents Indigenous Peoples' Summit in Moscow. The conference will promote dialogue between indigenous peoples in this region and the authorities in Norway, Russia, Sweden and Finland.185

2018 The last text from 2018 is an article about the Cooperation in the Barents Region. It states that indigenous people have an important place in the cooperation. The text mentions that the Sámi Parliament of Norway and Norwegian municipalities with the Sami population play

183 3,5 millioner kroner til samiske språkprosjekter. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/35-millioner-kroner-til-samiske- sprakprosjekter/id2396823/. 184 Hele Neiden inkluderes i grenseboeravtalen mellom Norge og Russland. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/grenseboer-avtale/id2526365/. 185 Statssekretær Olli deltar på 1st Barents Indigenous Peoples' Summit i Moskva. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/statssekretar-olli-deltar- pa-1st-barents-indigenous-peoples-summit-i-moskva/id2551296/.

an active role. From the state, their work is supported by financing measures and projects, and by the indigenous peoples being heard in all important cooperation issues. Finally, the article says that the cooperation within the framework of the Barents Cooperation shall continue include the Sámi population on Kola Peninsula.186

Summary The societal sector is the least represented in the analysis. The finding that the sector does not play a significant role on the state level is nevertheless important. Moreover, even from the small number of documents, we can draw some conclusions. Firstly, both of the news articles report about the worsening living conditions for indigenous people in the Arctic due to natural resources exploitation. Furthermore, the author finds the border agreement between Norway and Russia the most important document in the sector. The extension of the covered territory in 2017 shows that the people-to- people cooperation in the Arctic is a priority for Norway even after worsening of the bilateral relations after 2014. Finally, it seems that regarding the societal sector, Norway prefers multilateral action within the Barents Cooperation framework over bilateral arrangements with Russia.

4.7 The political sector

The political sector is the most complex one by definition. In fact, the sector has the most news articles (37). While Aftenposten has traditionally the highest number of articles – 20 (35.71%), the political sector represents the largest share of articles in NRK – 40% – even though the total number is smaller, 12. Nordlys published five articles (33.33%).

2008

186 Barentssamarbeidet. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/urfolk-og- minoriteter/urfolkryddemappe/barentssamarbeidet/id87028/. ANALYTICAL PART

The first and only article in the political sector in 2008 was published by Aftenposten, and as expected in the theoretical part, it is about the analysis starting point – the Ilulissat Declaration. The article informs that the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and United States) signed a joint declaration on 28 May, in which they promised to respect international law and comply with international rules in further negotiations in the Arctic. Aftenposten says that one of the reasons for the meeting was the fact that the Russians planted their flag on the seabed at the North Pole in 2007. Because of that, a spotlight was placed on the international power struggle in the Arctic. Even though the declaration is a success, the journalist warns that the long-standing disagreements between the five countries persist, the most well-known being the division line negotiations between Russia and Norway.187

From the analysis perspective, it is important that two of events (the Russian planting flag at the North Pole and the Ilulissat Declaration) which were chosen as significant marking points for the beginning of the analysis are in the first article. However, it is strange that such an important event is captured by just one of the media.

2009 In the beginning of the year, another important event took place: the Norwegian government published a new Arctic strategy named ‘New Building Blocks in the North’. They call it step two in the Norwegian Arctic initiative – it is a follow-up to the previous strategy from 2005 which called the Arctic Norway’s highest priority, and a step towards the latest version from 2017. Therefore, in the analysed period, there are two Arctic strategies. The strategy was presented in Tromsø in March 2009. It focuses on a broad range of activities, however, as it is a political act, the author decided to place it in the political sector. Besides other things, the strategy deals with: climate and environmental protection (e.g. the new research centre in Tromsø which was captured in the environmental sector); monitoring, maritime safety and emergency response (e.g.

187 Konfliktene i nord består. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/y791g/Konfliktene-i-nord-bestar.

pollution response systems or oil spill response); sustainable use of petroleum and marine resources (fishing); promoting business on the mainland and further development of infrastructure; exercising sovereignty and cross-border cooperation in the Arctic; and finally, indigenous people. Cooperation with Russia is mentioned many times, for example, in improving the transport system in the border area, easier border crossing, fisheries, cultural exchange, research and education, nuclear safety.188

The new Arctic strategy comes from the beginning of the given time period, and it nicely shows Norwegian priorities which were captured also in the analysis.

In May, Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, visited Moscow, where he spoke about Norway-Russia cooperation in the Arctic, energy and fisheries management. Moreover, he said that Norway and Russia are used to meet often and not only on the highest but every other level. Nevertheless, for the regional Nordlys, the most important moment of the visit (also used for the headline) was that Putin congratulated Norway for winning 2009 Eurovision Song Contest in Moscow.189 The article therefore shows how priorities have changed within the studies period.

Furthermore, Aftenposten informs that an anonymous source in the President Dmitry Medvedev's administration made exceptionally sharp accusations against the Murmansk governor, Yuri Jevdokimov. Allegedly, he betrayed Russia and attempted to give the Murmansk County to the Scandinavians and Americans. The newspaper mentions

188 Nye byggesteiner i nord. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nordstrategi_trinn2/id548803/. 189 Putin gratulerte Norge med seieren. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/putin-gratulerte-norge-med-seieren/s/1-79- 4342969. ANALYTICAL PART that the governor sits in the office for 11 years and was given the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit in 2007.190

2010 The year 2010 marks another important event in the Norway- Russia relation – the two countries resolved the Arctic border dispute. Interestingly, only articles by Nordlys were found in the analysis thanks to the given keywords.

Nordlys informs that in September 2010, Norway and Russia entered a new era in cooperation thanks to the delimitation agreement. The historic border agreement was signed by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg after a long process which took almost 40 years. The newspaper writes that the agreement would not be possible if Ministers of Foreign affairs of both of the countries would not work hard on Medvedev’s visit in Oslo which took place in April. Both Stoltenberg and Medvedev emphasised that the agreement provides the basis for continuing fisheries cooperation but also for new cooperation on possible joint oil/gas fields in the Barents Sea. President Medvedev moreover pointed out transport as a possible growing industry in the Barents Sea, he pointed particularly to the Northeast Passage.191

A month later, Nordlys writes that ‘The Boundary Line Gives a New Svalbard Acceptance’. The article discusses the ‘High North Conference’ which took place in Tromsø, where Norwegian researchers discussed, beside other things, the impacts of the historical delimitation agreement between Norway and Russia. According to the researchers, the border line agreement is a signal that both Norway and Russia respect international rules of the game. Moreover, they claim that it is another proof that the Arctic is a civilized

190 Kreml kaller guvernør forræder. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/o6pjm/Kreml-kaller-guvernor-forrader. 191 Innleder en ny æra. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/innleder-en- ny-ara/s/1-79-5311164.

region where states resolve their inconsistencies by peaceful means and in accordance with the international law. Furthermore, they say that the agreement indirectly means that the waters around Svalbard got a new status from the Russian side. Russians had previously insisted that the fishing zone around Svalbard is a part of international waters, however, a ratification of the agreement indicates that Russia realised that Norway has a certain authority over the sea areas around Svalbard.192

The article is a good example of how Norway has not expected (despite Georgia) that Russia would break the international law in the foreseeable future, and how important the agreement is among scholars, even though it has not gotten much attention in media.

Nevertheless, 2010 was not only about settling borders but also expanding them, as Aftenposten writes in the article about ‘struggle about the North Pole’. The newspaper writes that the Russian research ship Akademik Fjodorov heads from Arkhangelsk towards the Arctic to determine where the Russian continental shelf goes. Just a week later, a Canadian- American expedition with the same goal, finding where the US and Canadian continental shelf are, left too. Aftenposten harps on the well-known story: due to the global warming, ice malts, and new oil and gas reserves are available. Because of that, arctic costal countries are trying to document where their continental shelfs goes because each country has the exclusive right for mineral extraction on its continental shelf. The newspaper concludes that with the two above-mentioned expeditions, the ‘Arctic race’ is underway.

192 Grenselinjen gir ny Svalbard-aksept. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/grenselinjen-gir-ny-svalbard-aksept/s/1-79- 5374893. ANALYTICAL PART

The article also mentions that Russia planted a flag at the North Pole in 2007, and that Denmark and Canada have a conflict over the Hans Ø/Hans Island.193

2011 Once again, Nordlys informs about event which were not captured on the state level: representatives of the member states of the Arctic Council travelled through the Northeast Passage to discuss the Arctic on board a Russian icebreaker. Norway has spent a lot of money on the exploration of the Arctic. In particular, the possibilities thanks to the passage are considered commercially interesting, writes Nordlys.194

In 2011, there is the first article from NRK in the political sector. It is also about the territorial claims in the Arctic. The headline askes: ‘Who owns the North Pole?’ And the journalist answers that for sure it is not Santa Claus. The journalist discusses the plans of Canada, Russia and Denmark to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge belongs to their continental shelf. She writes about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, mentions the Russian expedition Arktika 2007 and the US Geological Survey which estimates the oil and gas reserves in the Arctic. NRK spoke about the topic with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, who claims that the North Pole is still in international waters, and therefore belongs to all of humanity. The Minister calms the situation down, saying that although there are conflicts of interest, it does not mean that the Arctic is conflict area.195

2012 In 2012, there is no development in the political sector.

193 Kampen om Nordpolen drar seg til. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/MR42E/Kampen-om-Nordpolen-drar-seg- til. 194 På sjøtokt. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/pa-sjotokt/s/1-79- 5696199. 195 Hvem er det som eier Nordpolen?. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/hvem-eier-nordpolen_-1.7923397.

In an Aftenposten article about Jonas Gahr Støre and Hillary Clinton meeting, there is only a small note that they both agreed that more pressure must be put on Russia, which has stopped a number of resolutions against Syria in the UN Security Council. The keyword ‘Arctic’ is there in connection with the US, not Russia.196

2013 The year of 2013 is interesting because even though there are just two articles in the media, the Norwegian government produced an increased number of documents.

In March, Aftenposten writes that the delimitation agreement between Norway and Russia from 2010 is used against Medvedev. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate published new estimates of oil reserves in the Barents Sea. These new estimates led Russian newspapers to accuse Dmitry Medvedev that he has given away the oil wealth to Norway. Reportedly, Russian media compared Medvedev to Alexander II who sold Alaska, or to Nikita Khrushchev who decided to give the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine. Moreover, Aftenposten connects the sectors, writing that at the same time Putin plans to militarise the Arctic, and about the Intelligence Service’s new threat assessment.197

The second article, also by Aftenposten, informs about domestic politics: an FrP (Progress Party) MP was appointed news special adviser for the Arctic in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is interesting because at that time, Ap (Labour Party) is in the government. In other words, the government appointed an opposition member of Stortinget (the Norwegian Parliament). Morten Høglund, the appointed politician, commented to Aftenposten that it was possible thanks to only small

196 Hillary Clinton fikk 500 millioner grunner til å elske Norge. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/zGw5b/Hillary-Clinton-fikk-500- millioner-grunner-til-a-elske-Norge. 197 Delelinjeavtalen brukes mot Medvedev. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/50BQ6/Delelinjeavtalen-brukes-mot- Medvedev. ANALYTICAL PART contradictions in the foreign policy views in the political spectrum. ‘The Arctic and relations with Russia in the area, as well as Svalbard issues, are of strategic importance for Norway, and we are largely synchronised here’.198

This is a good example that it is not a problem to analyse Norwegian perception of Russia even if the Norwegian government changes. The article is moreover a nice bridge: the above-mentioned increase in the governmental articles comes in the second half of 2013. At that time, there was a change in government from the left-wing Ap- led (Labour Party) government to the incumbent right-wing government (Conservative and Progress Party). Some of the documents are simply up-dates in general documents about bilateral cooperation with Russia or the Barents Cooperation, and it is therefore likely that there are more documents just because of the governmental change.

Firstly, there is an assessment of Norway-Russia relations. It states that in recent years, there has been an increase in official political visits. Moreover, it evaluates that trade has been stable, and environmental cooperation has been extensive. It praises cooperation in fisheries and nuclear safety or mentions the delimitation agreement. Nevertheless, it states that Norway is concerned about a part of Russian law (mentions specifically human rights or treatment of NGOs).199 The author has touched all of the topics throughout the thesis. This shows that the political sector link between all the sectors.

Furthermore, Norway hosted a Barents Council meeting in Tromsø in October, which marked the end of the two-year Norwegian presidency in the council.200 As a result of the meeting, the Barents Council adopted a communiqué in which were discussed e.g. a joint

198 Frp-topp går fra Stortinget til UD. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/vQWbl/Frp-topp-gar-fra-Stortinget-til-UD. 199 Norges bilaterale forhold til Russland. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrikssaker/sikkerhetspolitikk/russland /id451591/. 200 Møte i Barentsrådet i Tromsø 29. oktober. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/priv_barents/id744187/.

transport plan for the Barents Region, cultural cooperation and the establishment of a Barents summer university.201 On the occasion of the meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende, held a speech about the government’s Arctic policy, including cooperation with Russia, at the University of Tromsø.202

Finally, there is an updated article about the Barents Council, where it states that the council has provided a political framework for cooperation with Russia and has contributed to normalisation of the bilateral relations.203 It was already mentioned that Norway prefers multilateralism over bilateralism.

2014 There are no signs of development in our milestone year 2014. Just one article about a minor event was found.

The article was published by Nordlys, and it reports that there was a sharp discussion at the University of Nordland which organised the Arctic Dialogue Conference. There, the Norwegian Secretary of State, Ingvild Næss Stub, made it clear that Norway supports Ukraine and condemns Russia's approach to the Crimea. At the same time, she approached directly Russian and Ukrainian students in the hall, saying they are the proof that it is possible to have dialogue and cooperation. The Icelandic President, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, who attended the conference, said it was inappropriate to use a dialogue conference to condemn one of the major Arctic countries. Nevertheless, the Secretary

201 Barentsrådets vedtak fra Tromsø. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/barents_vedtak/id744723/. 202 En aktiv nordområdepolitikk – vekst og nyskapning i nord. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nord_vekst/id744676/. 203 Barentssamarbeidet. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/barentssamarbeidet1/id2 008480/. ANALYTICAL PART of State answered that the situation is too serious and dramatic for it not to be mentioned at a conference like that.204

2015 The increase in the number of documents is significant in 2015. There are nine news articles in that year, however, it is important to note that five of them are concerned with the same event. Moreover, there are four documents from the government.

The first document is a report from the government about the Kirkenes Conference. Actually, the conference is held every year since the analysis period, i.e. 2008, however this is the first time it was capture thanks to the keywords. The topic of the conference was political development in the Arctic. The document states that security situation in Europe is a consequence of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which affects also the Norway-Russia relations. Nevertheless, it is important to cooperate in areas where it is possible.205 This position will be visible also later on.

Even though the first news article in 2015 reacts to the Intelligence Service annual threat assessment which has been discussed in the military sector, its topic is sovereignty over Svalbard, and therefore it is placed in the political sector. A researcher said in an interview for Aftenposten, that given the current situation in Europe, Russia could put Norway under pressure at Svalbard. He said he does not fear a Russian military attack; however, Norway might be pressured from Russia as many Russians live on the archipelago, and defending Russian citizens is now an important issue in Russia’s security policy.206

204 Islands president ga norsk statssekretær det glatte lag. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/islands-president-ga-norsk-statssekretar-det- glatte-lag/s/1-79-7239282. 205 Kirkeneskonferansen: Folk til folk-samarbeid fortsatt viktig. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/kirkenes_konferanse/id2394200/. 206 Det kan fort bli en situasjon hvor Norge blir satt under press på Svalbard. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/d1OX/--Det-kan-fort-bli-en- situasjon-hvor-Norge-blir-satt-under-press-pa-Svalbard.

The analysis shows that concerns over Svalbard may have been justifiable: the incident which is the reason for increased number of articles took place at Svalbard in April.

The issue is that after Russian annexation of Crimea, Norway sanctions certain Russian politicians and officials who cannot travel to Norway. Among the listed people, there is the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who came Svalbard and made several statements about the visit on social media. Because of the special status of Svalbard, his visit is not a break of the Norwegian law. Nevertheless, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it clear that the listed personalities are not welcomed on the archipelago. The Ministry asked the Russian Embassy in Oslo for explanation, and announced they consider enhanced measures which would include also Svalbard. Aftenposten is the first to inform about the incident, describing also Rogozin’s inappropriate comments on social media. For example, he wrote that Russians and Ukrainians work as one nation at Svalbard or he posted a picture of the mines at Svalbard commented ‘our coal’.207 A day after, Aftenposten writes what Russian media say about Rogozin’s visit of Svalbard. Beside other things, Rogozin said that Russian presence at Svalbard must be strengthened or that there are too few Russians on the archipelago. He also made fun of Norwegian complains about his visit.208 Under the headline ‘We are going to make the Arctic ours’, NRK reports about the incident too, emphasising that Rogozin wants increased Russian presence at Svalbard and makes fun of Norwegian authorities.209

207 Sanksjonsrammet russer på Svalbard-besøk. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/nj1n/Sanksjonsrammet-russer-pa- Svalbard-besok. 208 Synes det er for få russere på Svalbard. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/EAAo/Synes-det-er-for-fa-russere-pa- Svalbard. 209 Russisk visestatsminister: – Vi skal gjøre Arktis vårt. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/russisk-visestatsminister_-_-vi-skal-gjore-arktis-vart- 1.12317923. ANALYTICAL PART

The following day, it seems that the tensions are increasing. While Rogozin says that the Arctic is the Russian Mecca and the Russian ambassador in Oslo calls the Norwegian reaction absurd, Russian authorities try to calm the situation down. Reportedly, Rogozin was supposed to have just a stopover at Svalbard; however, his flight from there was delayed due to bad weather conditions, and in the meantime, he decided to visit the Russian settlement.210 Subsequently, NRK informs that according to a Norwegian researcher, if Norway really steps up the measurements regarding Svalbard, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested, it will provoke not only the Russians and create a conflict environment in the Arctic.211 The last document underlines, how much the situation was delicate. On a press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Nordlys journalist asked whether the Ministry did not make a mistake in reactions to Rogozin’s visit of Svalbard. The Ministry not only rejected it was a mistake but also published on their webpage reasons why it is so. There it is written that the reaction was a critique of Russia’s breach of trust, and that Norway wants to have a good relationship with Russia, however, that requires mutual respect.212 This type of reaction, almost as a justification, is unusual. This, together with the high number of articles about the incident marks the significance of the seemingly not so important event in the Norwegian perception.

In April, there was also a meeting of the northern counties (fylker) of Norway in Bodø. A representative from the government emphasized

210 Rogozin: «Arktis er det russiske Mekka». Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/bv7e/Rogozin-Arktis-er-det-russiske- Mekka. 211 Norge risikerer å vekke en sovende bjørn. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/_-norge-risikerer-a-vekke-en-sovende-bjorn- 1.12321036. 212 Svalbard og uskyldige spørsmål. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/innlegg_nordlys/id2408504/.

there that the cross-border cooperation with Russia is should be given a priority even when Russia does not obey the international law.213

Another important event took place in August. Russia submitted additional data in support for new territories in the Arctic to the United Nations. The Russia request includes the Lomonosov Ridge, which extends below the North Pole, and both Denmark and Canada claim the area too. This is the second time Russia claims the territory, however, the first request was returned for lack of scientific evidence. Aftenposten writes that ‘the battle for the Arctic’ gathered momentum after US Geological Survey and mentions the possible advantages of the future ice-free sea route. Nevertheless, a Norwegian scientist tells to Aftenposten that even though it might seem dramatic, especially after how Russia acted in Ukraine, the request complies with the international law, and is therefore a step in the right direction.214 In another article, Aftenposten discusses what worth the territory claimed by Russia has. However, when they asked Norwegian experts, they said that for now the area is not lucrative, more it has a symbolic value for Russia, they believe.215

In the same month, the Norwegian government announced that they set aside funds for a research on Russian politics in the Arctic. The research should focus on Russian security policy in the Arctic and Russia's economic plans and activities in the Arctic. The statement says that good knowledge about Russia is important ‘in the new security policy image of Europe’.216

213 Nordområdene – der utenrikspolitikk møter innenrikspolitikk. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nordomraadene-ks-tale/id2411977/. 214 Russland gjentar krav på Nordpolen. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/EE32/Russland-gjentar-krav-pa- Nordpolen. 215 Hvorfor kjempe om Nordpolen?. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/kxR9/Hvorfor-kjempe-om-Nordpolen. 216 20 millioner til ny forskning og innovasjon i nordområdene. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/forskning_norruss/id2435341/. ANALYTICAL PART

Finally, in October, the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tore Hattrem, met with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Titov. Even though NRK called this meeting sensational, Hattrem emphasised that Norway’s policies are unchanged, and that Norway does not support Russian interference in Ukraine. They discussed the Arctic, border policies and Ukraine. The Norwegian side assured that the cooperation should continue where it is possible, e.g. fisheries, nuclear safety, and environment.217

From the analysis perspective, 2015 marks a sharp increase in documents in the political sector. This is especially because of the Rogozin’s visit of Svalbard. It is clear that politically, the Norway-Russia relation got colder, and that Norway stays firm on its values.

2016 In 2016, there are four news articles and a few governmental documents which do not have a connection, still, some conclusions can be drawn.

Like in the previous year, relations to Russia got space at the Kirkenes Conference. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brendes, repeated there the Norwegian position: Norway wishes to have good relations with Russia, however, the respect of international law is the number one priority. Nevertheless, cooperation between Norway and Russia should continue in areas of common interest.218

Aftenposten starts the year with a catchy headline ‘A New Cold War Has Broken Out’, which is a quotation of the Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev from the Munich Security Conference. Even though the article is not about Norway-Russia relation itself, it is about NATO’s, of which Norway is a member, relations to Russia. Norwegian researchers decline to Aftenposten that there would be a new cold war,

217 Må samarbeida med Russland der me kan. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/ud-hadde-samtalar-med-russland-1.12598963. 218 Tale på Kirkeneskonferansen. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/kirkenes_konferanse/id2475116/.

nevertheless, they point out to the Arctic and Ukraine as sources of disagreement.219

In May, a summit of the Nordic countries and the US took place. Aftenposten writes that the Norwegian Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, commented she is going to remind the President Barack Obama why the NATO was established. Specifically, she said that with the unpredictable Russian presence in the Arctic, it is important for Norway that the Americans focus on the region.220

In the same month, NRK presents an interview with a Svalbard expert who believes that the government should discuss the Svalbard policies on the international level because the archipelago is Norway’s weakest point regarding Russia. The government spokesman replies that Norwegian Svalbard policies are characterised by long-term continuity and predictability, and no changes are to be made.221

Finally, in the last article, NRK informs about an exhibition about the Norwegian-Russian polar history in St. Petersburg. This is the first article about cultural cooperation, and since the political sector is somewhat a ‘residual category’, as mentioned in the theoretical part, the author decided to place it here. Moreover, the article discusses also politics. The Russian ambassador to the Arctic Council held the opening speech, where he mentioned that Norway and Russia had never been in conflict. He also said that the relations built on friendship and trust. Moreover, the head of the Norwegian Fram Museum, a partner of the exhibition, said that Norwegian and Russian scientists are able to

219 Russland: - En ny kald krig har brutt ut. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/XqRW/Russland---En-ny-kald-krig-har- brutt-ut. 220 Skal minne Obama om hvorfor vi har NATO. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/1kWmJ/Skal-minne-Obama-om-hvorfor- vi-har-NATO. 221 Regjeringen skjuler Svalbard-utfordringer. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/_-regjeringen-skjuler-svalbard-utfordringer- 1.12945945. ANALYTICAL PART cooperate excellently, even though the current political climate is not particularly pleasant. Even though the article is about culture, NRK writes also about militarisation of the Arctic, and mentions Arktika in 2007 and Ukraine in 2014 and the fact that the political contacts between Norway and Russia have been at a very modest level.222

Last but not least, in 2016, there are several governmental documents which at different occasions (e.g. a speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs223 or an article about changes in the Arctic224 mention the current Norwegian position: Norway is against Russian acts in Ukraine in 2014, however cooperation shall continue where it is possible.

The content of the documents from 2016 is anyhow interesting for the analysis, nevertheless, they are important because they are a sign that Norway-Russia political relations are a topic compared to the pre- 2014 period. Moreover, the government constantly reiterates the Norwegian position.

2017 Even though it might seem that politically, the relations between Norway and Russia are getting better, the development in 2017 goes in the opposite direction. The Norwegian parliamentary delegation was supposed to travel to Moscow at the invitation of Russia. In February, however, the Russian Embassy in Oslo made a statement that Russia has a blacklist of Norwegian politicians (on the list are Trine Skei Grande and Bård Vegar Solhjell).

222 «Nye» bilder viser del av norsk-russisk polarhistorie. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/_nye_-bilder-viser-del-av-norsk-russisk-polarhistorie- 1.13134779. 223 Utenrikspolitisk redegjørelse. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/redegjoerelse_160301/id2477557/. 224 Nordområdene i endring. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/intro_nord/id2483584/.

The Russian Embassy justifies the visa refusal by pointing out that it is a reaction to Norway's participation in the EU's sanction list and introduction of discriminatory rules for Russian citizens to arrive at Svalbard from September 2015.225 Only in this moment, it is clear from the analysis that Norway actually did strengthened the restrictive measures as it contemplated. Moreover, as Aftenposten points out, it means that Russia links the visa rejection to the Rogozin’s visit of Svalbard in 2015. Regarding the situation, Rogozin himself e.g. joked that tanks do not need visa; other Russian sources conclude that the political environment is Norway’s choice as it joins the EU sanctions even though the country is not a member state. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed they called in Russia's ambassador to Oslo, Tejmuraz Otarovich Ramisvili, to express protest against the visa rejection.226

The following day, Aftenposten presents the reasons why Norway's Svalbard policy is so controversial and is a major source of disagreements between Norway and Russia. The newspaper writes that the Svalbard Treaty states that Norway has full sovereignty over the archipelago; however, the agreement gives equal access to Svalbard to all countries that have signed it. Norway and Russia have a different interpretation of the treaty, and Russia believes that Norway broke the principle of equal treatment when they reacted to Rogozin's visit of Svalbard in 2015. Aftenposten asks law experts, and a Norwegian professor clarifies that the treaty is so vague that it is not easy to say whether Russia or Norway's interpretation is correct.227

225 Russland begrunner visum-nei med at Norge har sagt nei til russiske politikere. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/neE1o/Russland- begrunner-visum-nei-med-at-Norge-har-sagt-nei-til-russiske-politikere. 226 Ibidem 227 Dette er grunnene til at Norges Svalbard-politikk er så omstridt. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/aMzra/Dette-er-grunnene-til-at-Norges- Svalbard-politikk-er-sa-omstridt. ANALYTICAL PART

NRK then presents a reflection over why everything is going in the wrong direction between Norway and Russia, and why all attempts to normalise the relations fail. Of course, the basis for the reflection is the Russian rejection of visa to the two Norwegian politicians. The article reveals that the government knew about the situation from November 2016, and for months, there have been hectic meetings both in Oslo and Moscow to find a compromise. Apparently, that did not happen. NRK moreover mentions that besides the visa fiasco, the Norwegian Intelligence Services pointed to Russia as a growing threat in the same week. The journalist concludes that the bilateral relation is cold. Even though there have been contacts on the lower political level, the Minister of Foreign Affairs have not visited Russia in more than three years.228

The relations seem to worsen. Moreover, Russia was a topic at the Kirkenes Conference for the third year in a row.229

Nevertheless, the situation might not be so bad. In March, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende, the Russian Arctic Conference which had a title ‘The Arctic: The Territory of Dialogue’ in Arkhangelsk. More importantly, he met the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, in a separate meeting. Therefore, the three-year gap about which the media were writing about was broken. Brende himself wrote a contribution about the visit. There it is stated that the events in Ukraine have affected relations between Norway and Russia, however, Norway has placed great emphasis on continuing dialogue and cooperation in areas where of common interests. E.g. he specifically mentions the border agreement from 2016. Last but not least, he makes it clear that the Arctic is Norway's most

228 Norge og Russland – går alt i feil retning?. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/norge-og-russland-_-diplomatisk-isfront_-1.13363730. 229 Åpningsinnlegg på Kirkeneskonferansen. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/innlegg_kirkenes/id2538051/.

important foreign policy area, and he says that a new Arctic Strategy will be presented soon.230

Both Aftenposten and NRK inform about the meeting with a similar headline: quoting Lavrov saying that it is good that Norwegians finally comes to their senses. It is the first bilateral meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs after Crimea. Nevertheless, the topics of the meeting remain those which were unproblematic order issues, search and rescue cooperation or nuclear safety.231 232 Putin was present at the conference too. An NRK correspondent writes a report about the events.233

Even though the year 2017 began dramatically because of the visa rejection, the ministerial meeting in Arkhangelsk is a positive step in the Norway-Russia relations. In April, as Brende announced, the new Arctic Strategy was published. There, the Brende-Lavrov meeting is mentioned.

Compared to the previous strategy (2009), there is a separate chapter about cooperation with Russia. There it stands that regardless of the Russian violations of international law in Ukraine, Norway and Russia must work together to address key challenges in the Arctic, and that the bilateral cooperation has produced concrete results in areas of

230 Russland og Norge møtes i nord. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/russland_norge/id2546048/. 231 Lavrov til Brende: - Folk forstår at de trenger å komme til fornuft. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/0aaGB/Lavrov-til-Brende---Folk-forstar- at-de-trenger-a-komme-til-fornuft. 232 Lavrov: – Bra dere endelig har tatt til fornuften. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/lavrov_-_-bra-dere-endelig-har-tatt-til-fornuften- 1.13451323. 233 Med Putin på tur. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/med-putin-pa-tur- 1.13455311. ANALYTICAL PART common interest. Subsequently there is a list over areas where Norway and Russia cooperate in.234

The positive tone continues. In April, the Russian Natural Resources and Environment Minister, Sergei Donskoj, and the Norwegian Minister of Industry, Monica Mæland, met in Moscow. In fact, this was the first meeting on the state level about economic cooperation since Norway introduced the restrictive measures because of Ukraine. Aftenposten writes that their sources suggest that the Norwegian authorities are looking for platforms where relations with Russia can be improved without coming into conflict with the sanctions.235

This means that after a three-year gap, two meetings at the ministerial level between Norway and Russia took place. This is very important for the analysis because it signals, at least in the political sector, a change of course in the bilateral relation.

In Autumn, the Norwegian Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, exchanged the Minister of Foreign Affairs.236 The former prime minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, wrote a commentary in NRK to bid farewell to Brende. Besides other thing, he wrote about his contribution to the Norway-Russia relation in the Arctic.237

In the last piece of news, the Norwegian government informs that the research on the Arctic and Russia is going to be strengthened.238

234 Nordområdestrategi - mellom geopolitikk og samfunnsutvikling. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/strategi_nord/id2550081/. 235 Norge gjenopptar kontakt med Russland på politisk nivå. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/mo35p/Norge-gjenopptar-kontakt-med- Russland-pa-politisk-niva. 236 Even though the text is just about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is not a personal change – Solberg made many more changes in the government. 237 Skifte av person - og kurs?. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/ytring/skifte-av- person---og-kurs_-1.13737073. 238 Styrker forskningen på nordområdene og Russland. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/styrker_forskning/id2578590/.

2018 Russia in the Arctic is once again a topic at the Kirkenes Conference.239 Furthermore, the warming relations between Norway and Russia seems to worsen again. The Russian Embassy in Oslo is more visible actor.

In January, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) presented its annual threat assessment, where they mentioned, among other things, that "insiders", recruited by a foreign country's intelligence, can try to obtain sensitive, national information.240 Moreover, the chief of PST, Benedicte Bjørnland, warned that workers from countries such as Russia could experience pressure from the intelligence service in their home country. The Russian Embassy in Oslo reacted sharply. In its statement to NRK they say that it is not the first time PST is trying to deter Norway's population in connection with the mythical Russian threat. Specifically, they say it is meaningless regarding topics such as security policy, arctic policy, technology and innovation.241

Later in spring, Aftenposten publishes an interview with the Russian Ambassador to Norway, Teimuraz Otarovich Ramishvili. The interview is made after the Norwegian decision to expel one Russian diplomat as a result of the poison attack against the former KGB spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the United Kingdom. As a response to the expel, the Russian Ambassador says it is an unfriendly act from Norway, and that it will not help to improve the relations which are far

239 Innlegg på Kirkeneskonferansen. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/innlegg_kirkenes/id2590617/. 240 PST and the Intelligence Service which was many times mentioned in the military sector are different state bodies. 241 Russlands ambassade slår tilbake mot PST. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/russlands-ambassade-slar-tilbake-mot-pst- 1.13893986. ANALYTICAL PART from perfect at the moment. Moreover, he said the mood between Norway and Russia is ‘poisoned’.242

In May, NRK presents a reflection over Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard by a Norwegian book writer. The headline is ‘Svalbard increasingly Less Norwegian’, the author believes Norwegian will be in minority at the archipelago in a few years. He claims that even though Norwegian authorities assure that Svalbard is not under pressure, Norwegian interpretation of the Svalbard treaty is disputed by many actors, e.g. Russia. He believes that as the relations between Russia and the West is full of conflict, Svalbard's strategic importance is greater than ever. It is Norway’s Achilles heel.243

The article can be interpreted as a sign of doubts. Regarding Svalbard, the metaphor of the Achilles heel is showing up often. Moreover, let us remind Rogozin’s statements that there are too few Russians at Svalbard.

In September, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) held an Arctic conference about Norway-Russia relations. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, had a speech there. Afterwards, an Aftenposten journalist asked about the 75-year anniversary of the liberation of Finnmark during World War II, which shall be celebrated in 2019. The Minister said she does not exclude Putin’s visit at the occasion.244

To sum up, the year 2018 is not any more turbulent than the previous years. Nevertheless, the friendly environment which was set

242 Russlands ambassadør i Norge: – Ta vare på forholdet vårt. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/9mMOww/Russlands-ambassador-i- Norge--Ta-vare-pa-forholdet-vart. 243 Svalbard stadig mindre norsk. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/ytring/svalbard-stadig-mindre-norsk-1.14040876. 244 Søreide utelukker ikke Putin-besøk til Kirkenes. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/e1LOba/Soreide-utelukker-ikke-Putin- besok-til-Kirkenes.

in 2017 is toned down. The question is whether the planed celebrations for 2019 open the door for better relations.

Summary The military sector is together with the military sector the most complex one. Regarding the media, Aftenposten published 20 articles, NRK 12 and Nordlys just 5. Nevertheless, expressed in percentage, the share is similar, expressing the same significance of the sector. Moreover, it is interesting that some important events, such as the 2010 delimitation agreement, are captured just by the local Nordlys. The main topic in the political sector is territory, and especially Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, which is present during the whole period of analysis. Nonetheless, the political sector contains a broad range of other topics, which is given by the character of the sector (‘residual category’ as the Copenhagen School calls it). Regarding the development of Norway-Russia relations and the Norwegian perception of Russia in the Arctic, there is a clear development in the political sector: from a very positive period up till 2014, change in rhetoric, worsening in 2015, improvement in 2017, and something like balancing in 2018. Firstly, the analysed period starts well with the Illulisat Declaration (2008), the new Norwegian Arctic Strategy which speaks positive of Russia (2009), through the Minister of Foreign Affairs meeting with Putin. The top point is of course the 2010 Delimitation Agreement. The new government from 2013 updates documents and also presents positive assessment of Russia. Subsequently, the milestone 2014 is characterised by silence, and it is clear that Norway adopted a new strategy in relation to Russia: Norway condemns Russian acts in Ukraine, however, it wants to cooperate in areas of common interest, where it is possible. This sentence pervades the whole post-2014 period. After this change, 2015 brings significant worsening due to the unexpected and unwelcomed Rogozin’s visit of Svalbard. In the same year, Russia presents claims for more territory in the Arctic, and Norway launches a research about Russia in the Arctic. Then, the relations are reserved, with the visa rejection being a large set-back. Nevertheless, in 2017, it seems that the situation calms down and the two meeting between Norway and Russia on the ministerial level signal improvement. The last year of analysis, 2018, is characterised by ANALYTICAL PART something which can be called balancing on the edge. While there is sharp criticism from the Russian Embassy, Norway leaves the door open to Putin’s visit. To conclude, the milestone 2014 did bring worsening of the relations and Norwegian perception, which is more and more concerned about the status of Svalbard. Moreover, the number of documents (both media and government) increased significantly after 2014, confirming that Russia in the Arctic is a topic for Norway. Finally, the analysis shows that regarding Russia, Norway prefers multilateralism over bilateralism.

4.8 Analysis synthesis

As pointed out in the theoretical part, the sectoral approach begins with disaggregation, however, it must end with a synthesis. Thanks to the sectors, we gained more clarity over the issues. Nevertheless, to gain understanding, the sectors need to be put together again. It is the whole picture which matters, and only thanks to the whole picture, the research questions can be answered. There have been cross-references throughout the whole analysis. Now it is time to look at these linkages and to draw conclusions.

The analysis presented four research questions: What role does the Artic play in the Norway-Russia relations? The Arctic plays a significant role in the Norway-Russia relations, after all, it is the place where the two neighbouring countries meet. Firstly, when it comes to the military sector, the Arctic is an area where the countries want to protect their borders. Russia, unlike Norway, also wishes to expand its territory in the arctic region. Regarding military, there is an escalation in the relation, especially after 2014. Nevertheless, in the last two years, the relations are getting better. Norway and Russia react to each other, and concerning military exercises, a small-scale spiral of arms racing has been detected in the Arctic. Secondly, the environmental sector is characterised by a long-term cooperation. In this field, the relation is very good, nevertheless, even here comes worsening, even though much later than in the military sector. From 2017 onwards, the communication is visibly problematic

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due to Russia’s position to climate change and global warming which is seen economically positive, the Russian floating nuclear power plant or emissions of rhuthenium-106. Yet, it is the sector where the relations are the warmest. Subsequently, regarding the economic sector, the pervading topic is the Northeast Passage, even though it has not had real economic impact yet. Norway and Russia cooperate well in fisheries, and especially oil and gas industry. The relations got worse after 2014, when Norway introduced economic sanctions against Russia and Russia introduced an import ban as a countermeasure. After 2017, the relations are normalising. Furthermore, regarding the societal sector, the relations are not visible on the state level, however cooperation exists on the regional level. Namely the extended border agreement from 2017 shows that the sector is unproblematic. Finally, the political sector shields the Norway-Russia relations as a whole. In this regard, Svalbard is an important factor in the relations. In the pre-2014 period, the relations were very good (Ilulisat Declaration or the delimitation agreement), however after 2014 we observe worsening in the relations (Rogozin’s visit of Svalbard or Russian visa rejection). Nevertheless, after 2017, the situation gets better with the two ministerial meetings. To sum up, it can be said that during the time-frame (2008 – 2018), the Norway-Russia relations were very good and characterised by cooperation between 2008 and 2014, subsequently they got worse and tensions escalated up till 2017, when we see normalisation of the relation. The exception is the environmental sector where the trend goes the opposite way around. The Arctic affects the relations in the following areas: military exercises and possible militarisation of the peaceful Arctic; environmental protection (nuclear safety, pollution), however, the topic of climate change creates tensions as Russia believes that the Northern Passage will be beneficial for the country; oil and gas industry in the area rich for natural resources; indigenous people; Svalbard.

What role does the Artic play in the Norwegian perception of Russia? The analysis shows that the Arctic is the number one priority in Norway regarding Russia, and Norway looks on Russia’s actions through the lenses of the Arctic. ANALYTICAL PART

In the military sector, Norway follows Russia’s actions in the Arctic carefully and reacts to it. Both state and media report about increasing Russian military activity in the area since 2013. The environmental sector is the only one where the situation in Ukraine is not mentioned. Norway prefers to separate the environmental agenda from high politics. In long-term Norway perceive Russia as more cooperative, however there are issues which are seen negatively, for example the treatment of NGOs in Russia, specifically Bellona. The analysis shows that the economic sector is not vital for the Norwegian perception of Russia. The case of Store Norske (2015) clearly means that the political sector is for Norway more important than economics. The economic relations moreover are not vital to Norway: Norway have not had a problem to implement the restrictive measures and have not suffered from the Russian import ban. Both of the countries have strong oil and gas industry and are not competitors in this sense. Subsequently, the societal sector is rather neglected in Norway, at least on the state level. On the political level, Norway perceives Russia as unpredictable due to Ukraine 2014. As a small country, international law is very important to Norway in relations to Russia. The pre-2014 period is perceived positively, territorial disputes ended. Later it is visible that Norway emphasises the importance of international law. Because of the asymmetry, Norway tries to be clear and predictable. Norwegians stay firm when it comes to their values but at the same time they do not want to provoke and prefer multilateralism over bilateralism.

Is Russia perceived as a threat in Norway? In the traditional sense, that is the military threat, the answer is no. Russia is not perceived as a threat neither by the state nor by experts and media. There is just one instance when the media (surprisingly NRK) labelled Russia a threat; nevertheless, it is not important in the whole picture because it does not reflect the Norwegian perception as such. In the extended sense, Russia is not perceived as a threat either. The only sector where such statement could stand up is the

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environmental sector. Norway is critical to Russia’s position to the climate change and pollution.

Has the Ukraine crisis influenced the Norwegian perception of Russia, and if so how? Yes, in general, the Ukraine crisis of 2014 significantly influenced the Norwegian perception of Russia, although not in all sectors. While it did not have an impact for the environmental and societal sectors, in the other three, military, economic and political, the consequences are large. Even though the conclusion in the military sector is that Russia is not a threat and the Ukraine scenario is not applicable in the Arctic, the more negative perception is visible, especially in the annual threat assessments by the Norwegian Intelligence Service or the media, namely Aftenposten evinces more negative rhetoric. In the economic sector, the Ukraine crisis led first and foremost to the economic sanctions, and economic support of Store Norske. Finally, in the political sector, the perception was significantly affected by the Rogozin’s visit of Svalbard. After all, Norway has repeated many times that even though the Russian acts in Ukraine are against the international law and Norwegian values, Norway wishes to continue cooperation where it is possible.

CONCLUSION

5 Conclusion

The purpose of the presented thesis is to analyse Norway-Russia relations in the Arctic and Norwegian perception of Russia in the area. Even though the Arctic comes to focus of international relations researchers, there is still a lot of gaps in the literature. Another goal of the thesis is to ascertain whether the Russian expansive foreign policy, demonstrated by the situation in Ukraine, influenced the Norwegian perception of its neighbour. The author used the Copenhagen School as an analytical framework and the methods of content analysis and chronological sequences as tools. For better understanding, the analysis was disaggregated into five sectors: military, environmental, economic, societal and political. The content analysis has shown that the political and military sectors are the most present when Norwegian media (NRK, Aftenposten and Nordlys) write about Russia in the Arctic. The statistical analysis also confirmed a correlation between the number of documents and the milestone 2014. Thanks to the chronological sequences applied on the individual sectors, the research questions could be answered. Firstly, the analysis proves that the Arctic is a foundation for both Norway-Russia relations and the Norwegian perception of Russia. Despite the fact that the Ukraine crisis strongly affected the relations, Russia is not considered a threat in Norway. The most influenced are the political, military and economic sectors. Cooperation in the other two, environmental and societal, continues more or less without negative impacts. Nevertheless, generally, the tensions increased. As a simplification, the author suggest that the overall relations are rather good. After 2014, there is visible worsening, however in most of the sectors, improvement takes places from 2017 onwards. To conclude, the question is in which direction the Norway-Russia relations are going. As for now, the Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg and the Russian President Vladimir Putin met in the spring of 2019. This, together with the analysis conclusions, suggests normalisation in the relations. Therefore, the author believes that the Arctic remains one of the most peaceful regions in the world.

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Analysed documents • «Nye» bilder viser del av norsk-russisk polarhistorie. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/_nye_-bilder-viser- del-av-norsk-russisk-polarhistorie-1.13134779 • 20 millioner til ny forskning og innovasjon i nordområdene. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/forskning_norruss/i d2435341/ • 3,5 millioner kroner til samiske språkprosjekter. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-20]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/35-millioner-kroner- til-samiske-sprakprosjekter/id2396823/ • Amerikanere, russere og kinesere er helt enige om en ting: Det er på tide å høste Arktis. Aftenposten[online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-13]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/wom6L/Amerikanere _-russere-og-kinesere-er-helt-enige-om-en-ting-Det-er- pa-tide-a-hoste-Arktis

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• Amerikanske forsvarskilder: Putin bløffer om nye våpen. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-10]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/XwayG7/Amerikansk e-forsvarskilder-Putin-bloffer-om-nye-vapen • Åpner Nordøstpassasjen for norsk gasstanker. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2012 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/forste-seiling-i- nordostpassasjen-1.7944331 • Åpningsinnlegg på Kirkeneskonferansen. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/innlegg_kirkenes/id 2538051/ • Arktiske land slår ring rundt isbjørnen. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04- 12]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/KaW7/Arktiske-land- slar-ring-rundt-isbjornen • ARTICLETITLE. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2012 [cit. 2019-04-08]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/articletitle/s/1-79-6215200 • Atomsikkerhetssamarbeidet i nordområdene. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/atoms ikkerhet_nordomraadene/id449322/ • Både Russland og Norge viser styrke i nord. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/O9RA/Bade- Russland-og-Norge-viser-styrke-i-nord • Barentsrådets vedtak fra Tromsø. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/barents_vedtak/id7 44723/ • Barentssamarbeidet. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: BIOGRAPHY

https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/barent ssamarbeidet1/id2008480/ • Barentssamarbeidet. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-20]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/urfolk-og- minoriteter/urfolkryddemappe/barentssamarbeidet/id8702 8/ • Bellona på offisielt besøk. Bellona [online]. Oslo, 2010 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from: https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2010- 11-bellona-pa-offisielt-besok • Brannfaren øker når klimaet endres. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-13]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/brannfaren-oker-nar-klimaet- endres-i-canada-1.12944696 • Delelinjeavtalen brukes mot Medvedev. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04- 23]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/50BQ6/Delelinjeavtal en-brukes-mot-Medvedev • Derfor er maks 1,5 grader så viktig: Nordpolen og Sydpolen snakker nemlig sammen. Aftenposten[online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-14]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/gP9Vw1/Derfor-er- maks-1_5-grader-sa-viktig-Nordpolen-og-Sydpolen- snakker-nemlig-sammen • Det kan fort bli en situasjon hvor Norge blir satt under press på Svalbard. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-24]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/d1OX/--Det-kan-fort- bli-en-situasjon-hvor-Norge-blir-satt-under-press-pa- Svalbard • Dette er grunnene til at Norges Svalbard-politikk er så omstridt. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04- 26]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/aMzra/Dette-er- grunnene-til-at-Norges-Svalbard-politikk-er-sa-omstridt • En aktiv nordområdepolitikk – vekst og nyskapning i nord. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04-23].

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Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nord_vekst/id74467 6/ • E-sjefen: Derfor trenger Norge to spionskip i nord. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/A9oqM/E-sjefen- Derfor-trenger-Norge-to-spionskip-i-nord • E-sjefen: Russland ser Arktis som sin redningsplanke. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/ddO11/E-sjefen- Russland-ser-Arktis-som-sin-redningsplanke • E-sjefen: Utviklingen i Russland kan på sikt utgjøre en stor trussel mot Norge. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/na35/E-sjefen- Utviklingen-i-Russland-kan-pa-sikt-utgjore-en-stor-trussel- mot-Norge • Et akterutseilt sjøforsvar. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2012 [cit. 2019-04-08]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/et-akterutseilt- sjoforsvar/s/1-79-6215176 • Et tankskip har krysset Nordøstpassasjen uten isbryter for første gang. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019- 04-13]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/528Jb/Et-tankskip- har-krysset-Nordostpassasjen-uten-isbryter-for-forste- gang • E-tjenesten: Digital etterretning den største trusselen mot Norge. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-10]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/e-tjenesten_- digital-etterretning-den-storste-trusselen-mot-norge- 1.13945497 • Etterretningsstasjoner i nord anklages for hemmelighold. Nå slår E-sjefen tilbake. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/mwgog/Etterretningsst BIOGRAPHY

asjoner-i-nord-anklages-for-hemmelighold-Na-slar-E- sjefen-tilbake • Exxon forbereder neste oljekatastrofe i Arktis. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/ytring/exxons-neste- oljekatastrofe-1.11621382 • Får ta snarveien til Asia. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2012 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/far-ta-snarveien-til- asia/s/1-79-5872824 • Faretruande tynne eggeskal for ismåken. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2012 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/viten/tynne-eggeskal-hos-ismake- 1.8836365 • Flytende kjernekraftverk tema i norsk-russisk atomsikkerhetskommisjon. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-14]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norsk-russisk- kommisjon/id2610059/ • Flytende russisk atomkraftverk på vei mot Norskehavet. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-14]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/flytende-russisk- atomkraftverk-pa-vei-mot-norskehavet-1.14027567 • Forskere frykter at sommerisen i Arktis kan forsvinne. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-13]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/forskere-frykter-at- sommerisen-i-arktis-kan-forsvinne-1.13244764 • Første containerskip fremme etter å ha seilt Nordøstpassasjen. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-19]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/A2wwB5/Forste- containerskip-fremme-etter-a-ha-seilt-Nordostpassasjen • Forsvarssjefen: Forsvaret svakere i 2015 enn i 2014. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/a2wqA/Forsvarssjefen -Forsvaret-svakere-i-2015-enn-i-2014 • Frp-topp går fra Stortinget til UD. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from:

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https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/vQWbl/Frp-topp-gar- fra-Stortinget-til-UD • Frykter metaneksplosjoner i Nordishavet. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-13]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/viten/frykter-metaneksplosjoner-i- nordishavet-1.12681270 • Funding for Store Norske on Svalbard. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04- 18]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/funding-for-store- norske-on-svalbard/id2408414/ • Gassjakt ved verdens ende. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2011 [cit. 2019-04-20]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/i/KMEdG/Gassjakt- ved-verdens-ende • God løsning for frakt av atomkraftverk. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019- 04-13]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/god-losning-for- frakt-av-atomkraftverk/id2564925/ • Grenselinjen gir ny Svalbard-aksept. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2010 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/grenselinjen-gir-ny- svalbard-aksept/s/1-79-5374893 • Hele Neiden inkluderes i grenseboeravtalen mellom Norge og Russland. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-20]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/grenseboer- avtale/id2526365/ • Her ligger sovjetisk militæravfall strødd - 120 kilometer fra norskegrensen. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2013 [cit. 2019- 04-12]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/her-ligger-sovjetisk- militaravfall-strodd-120-kilometer-fra-norskegrensen/s/1- 79-7006048 • Her viser Russland frem sine nye våpen til bruk i Nordområdene. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-10]. Available from: BIOGRAPHY

https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/Wp3nQ/Her-viser- Russland-frem-sine-nye-vapen-til-bruk-i-Nordomradene • Hillary Clinton fikk 500 millioner grunner til å elske Norge. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2012 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/zGw5b/Hillary- Clinton-fikk-500-millioner-grunner-til-a-elske-Norge https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/A2JGq/--Russland- vil-trappe-opp-militart-pa-Krim-og-i-Arktis. • Hvem er det som eier Nordpolen?. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2011 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/hvem-eier-nordpolen_-1.7923397 • Hvorfor kjempe om Nordpolen?. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/kxR9/Hvorfor- kjempe-om-Nordpolen • Ikke aktuelt å oppheve sanksjonene mot Russland nå. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-19]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/_-ikke-aktuelt-a-oppheve- sanksjonene-mot-russland-na-1.13480382 • Ingen bryr seg om Norge i NATO. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2011 [cit. 2019-04-07]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/GaGGV/Ingen-bryr- seg-om-Norge-i-NATO • Innleder en ny æra. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2010 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/innleder-en-ny-ara/s/1-79- 5311164 • Innlegg på Kirkeneskonferansen. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-27]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/innlegg_kirkenes/id 2590617/ • Islands president ga norsk statssekretær det glatte lag. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/islands- president-ga-norsk-statssekretar-det-glatte-lag/s/1-79- 7239282 • Issmelting åpner handelsruter. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2011 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from:

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https://www.nrk.no/viten/issmelting-apner-handelsruter- 1.7737584 • Jaroslav bryter snarveien til Kina. Sergej tetter igjen hullene. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04- 18]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/G7Wz4/Jaroslav- bryter-snarveien-til-Kina-Sergej-tetter-igjen-hullene • Kampen om Nordpolen drar seg til. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2010 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/MR42E/Kampen-om- Nordpolen-drar-seg-til • Kirkeneskonferansen: Folk til folk-samarbeid fortsatt viktig. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-24]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/kirkenes_konferans e/id2394200/ • Kjemper for Bellona Murmansk!. Bellona [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from: https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2015- 10-kjemper-for-bellona-murmansk • Konfliktene i nord består. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2008 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/y791g/Konfliktene-i- nord-bestar • Kreml kaller guvernør forræder. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2009 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/o6pjm/Kreml-kaller- guvernor-forrader • Krigen på Svalbard. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019- 04-10]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/ytring/krigen- pa-svalbard-1.13740857 • Kullbyen venter på Putin-effekten. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-18]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/8A81/Kullbyen- venter-pa-Putin-effekten • Lavrov til Brende: - Folk forstår at de trenger å komme til fornuft. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: BIOGRAPHY

https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/0aaGB/Lavrov-til- Brende---Folk-forstar-at-de-trenger-a-komme-til-fornuft • Lavrov: – Bra dere endelig har tatt til fornuften. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/lavrov_-_-bra- dere-endelig-har-tatt-til-fornuften-1.13451323 • Må samarbeida med Russland der me kan. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/ud-hadde-samtalar-med-russland- 1.12598963 • Masseødeleggelsesvåpen en trussel mot fred og sikkerhet. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2009 [cit. 2019-04- 07]. Available from : https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrikssaker/sikkerh etspolitikk/nedrustning-og-ikke-spredning/nedrustning-og- ikke-spredning/id440542/ • Med Putin på tur. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04- 26]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/med-putin-pa- tur-1.13455311 • Møte i Barentsrådet i Tromsø 29. oktober. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04- 23]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/priv_barents/id7441 87/ • Mystisk atomutslipp bekreftes nå i Russland. Flere målinger tyder på at en atomhendelse i Ural ble holdt skjult. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-13]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/0Ej3vo/Mystisk- atomutslipp-bekreftes-na-i-Russland-Flere-malinger- tyder-pa-at-en-atomhendelse-i-Ural-ble-holdt-skjult- • Nansen, urfolk og menneskerettigheter. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2013 [cit. 2019-04-20]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/nansen-urfolk-og- menneskerettigheter/s/1-79-6897541 • Ni punkter om Norge og trusselen fra Russland. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04- 08]. Available from:

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https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/kaK2j/Ni-punkter-om- Norge-og-trusselen-fra-Russland • Nordområdene – der utenrikspolitikk møter innenrikspolitikk. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nordomraadene-ks- tale/id2411977/ • Nordområdene i endring. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/intro_ nord/id2483584/ • Nordområdestrategi - mellom geopolitikk og samfunnsutvikling. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/strategi_nord/i d2550081/ • Norge gjenopptar kontakt med Russland på politisk nivå. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/mo35p/Norge- gjenopptar-kontakt-med-Russland-pa-politisk-niva • Norge leder oljekappløpet i nord. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-18]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/pVoV/Norge-leder- oljekapplopet-i-nord • Norge og Russland – går alt i feil retning?. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/norge-og-russland-_-diplomatisk- isfront_-1.13363730 • Norge risikerer å vekke en sovende bjørn. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/_-norge-risikerer-a-vekke-en- sovende-bjorn-1.12321036 • Norge vil innføre nye restriktive tiltak mot Russland. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2014 [cit. 2019-04- 16]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/Norge-vil-innfore- nye-restriktive-tiltak-mot-Russland/id765675/ BIOGRAPHY

• Norges bilaterale forhold til Russland. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04- 23]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrikssaker/sikkerh etspolitikk/russland/id451591/ • Norsk-russisk atomsikkerhetskommisjon. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/atom- kommisjon/id2416771/ • Norsk-russisk ministermøte i Oslo. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-19]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norsk-russisk- ministermote-i-oslo/id2617321/ • Ny spenning i Arktis?. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019- 04-10]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/ny- spenning-i-arktis_-1.13484927 • Nye byggesteiner i nord. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2009 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nordstrategi_tr inn2/id548803/ • Nye, kraftige utfall mot Norge fra Russland. Moskva anklager Norge for militarisering av nord. Nå lover de mottiltak. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04- 11]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/MgryM0/Nye_- kraftige-utfall-mot-Norge-fra-Russland-Moskva-anklager- Norge-for-militarisering-av-nord-Na-lover-de-mottiltak • Økt russisk aktivitet i nord. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-08]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/okt-russisk-tilstedevaerelse-i- nord-1.11983657 • Oppfølging av det norsk-russiske samarbeidet om atomsikkerhet. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/atomsikkerhet_sam arbeid/id2001889/

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• På sjøtokt. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2011 [cit. 2019-04- 23]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/pa- sjotokt/s/1-79-5696199 • Prop. 1 S (2014–2015) FOR BUDSJETTÅRET 2015. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-08]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/Prop-1-S- 20142015/id2005450/ • Prop. 151 S. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019- 04-10]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop.-151-s- 20152016/id2504884/ • Putin beordrer stor militærøvelse i nord. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/putin-beordrer-stor-militaerovelse- i-nord-1.12262088 • Putin gratulerte Norge med seieren. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2009 [cit. 2019-04-23]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/putin-gratulerte-norge- med-seieren/s/1-79-4342969 • Putin skremte russere med atomangrep fra kysten av Norge. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-10]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/oqAnj/Putin-skremte- russere-med-atomangrep-fra-kysten-av-Norge • Putin skryter av nye våpen. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-10]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/putin-skryter-av-nye-vapen- 1.13940154 • Putin: Klimaendringene kan være naturlige. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04- 13]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/aRzzE/Putin- Klimaendringene-kan-vare-naturlige • Regjeringen skjuler Svalbard-utfordringer. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/_-regjeringen-skjuler-svalbard- utfordringer-1.12945945 BIOGRAPHY

• Revisjon av regjeringens atomhandlingsplan 2008. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2008 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/atomplan08/id 499420/ • Rogozin: «Arktis er det russiske Mekka». Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04- 25]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/bv7e/Rogozin-Arktis- er-det-russiske-Mekka • Russerne provosert av NATO-øvelse. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2012 [cit. 2019-04-08]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/russerne-provosert-av- nato-ovelse/s/1-79-5971114 • Russerne trapper opp militæraktiviteten i nordområdene. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2013 [cit. 2019- 04-08]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/russerne-trapper-opp- militaraktiviteten-i-nordomradene/s/1-79-6449365 • Russia and the Nordic Countries – Relations and Cooperations. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019- 04-09]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/russland-norden- tale/id2459215/ • Russisk atomubåt testet atomraketter i Barentshavet i morges. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04- 09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/e55a/Russisk- atomubat-testet-atomraketter-i-Barentshavet-i-morges • Russisk Barentshav-plan basert på norske erfaringer. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04- 13]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/miljosamarbeidet- med-russland-far-21-millioner/id2505796/ • Russisk visestatsminister: – Vi skal gjøre Arktis vårt. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-24]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/russisk-visestatsminister_-_- vi-skal-gjore-arktis-vart-1.12317923

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• Russiske soldater skal øve krig på Nordpolen. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04- 09]. Availeble from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/rngA/Russiske- soldater-skal-ove-krig-pa-Nordpolen • Russisk-kinesisk maktkamp om sjøveien i Arktis. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2010 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/0K7g2/Russisk- kinesisk-maktkamp-om-sjoveien-i-Arktis • Russland begrunner visum-nei med at Norge har sagt nei til russiske politikere. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/neE1o/Russland- begrunner-visum-nei-med-at-Norge-har-sagt-nei-til- russiske-politikere • Russland gjentar krav på Nordpolen. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/EE32/Russland- gjentar-krav-pa-Nordpolen • Russland kutter forsvarsbudsjettet med 100 mrd. - vil dempe konflikten med Vesten. Aftenposten[online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/J83EX/Russland- kutter-forsvarsbudsjettet-med-100-mrd---vil-dempe- konflikten-med-Vesten • Russland og Norge møtes i nord. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/russland_norge/id2 546048/ • Russland presser frem tett nordisk forsvarssamarbeid. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-11]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/J1qB1R/Russland- presser-frem-tett-nordisk-forsvarssamarbeid • Russland vil bruke atomkraft i arktiske strøk. Bellona [online]. Oslo, 2008 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from: BIOGRAPHY

https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2008- 11-russland-vil-bruke-atomkraft-i-arktiske-strok • Russland vil trappe opp militært på Krim og i Arktis. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-08]. Available from: • Russland viser muskler. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-11]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/over- i-moskva-for-seiersdagen-9.-mai-1.14038009 • Russland viste fram nytt militærutstyr til vinterkrig i Arktis. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-10]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/russland-viste- fram-nytt-militaerutstyr-til-vinterkrig-i-arktis-1.13507951 • Russland: - En ny kald krig har brutt ut. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Avaiable from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/XqRW/Russland--- En-ny-kald-krig-har-brutt-ut • Russlands ambassade slår tilbake mot PST. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-27]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/russlands-ambassade- slar-tilbake-mot-pst-1.13893986 • Russlands ambassadør i Norge: – Ta vare på forholdet vårt. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-27]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/9mMOww/Russlands -ambassador-i-Norge--Ta-vare-pa-forholdet-vart • Rydder Svalbard for miljøgifter. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2008 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/rydder-svalbard-for- miljogifter/s/1-79-3938095 • Sanksjonsrammet russer på Svalbard- besøk. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-24]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/nj1n/Sanksjonsramm et-russer-pa-Svalbard-besok • Skal minne Obama om hvorfor vi har NATO. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from:

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https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/1kWmJ/Skal-minne- Obama-om-hvorfor-vi-har-NATO • Skifte av person - og kurs?. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-26]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/ytring/skifte-av-person---og-kurs_- 1.13737073 • Slik mener Etterretningstjenesten Norge vil merke den økte russisk militæraktiviteten. Aftenposten[online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-10]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/m6ex8L/Slik-mener- Etterretningstjenesten-Norge-vil-merke-den-okte-russisk- militaraktiviteten • Søreide utelukker ikke Putin-besøk til Kirkenes. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04- 27]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/e1LOba/Soreide- utelukker-ikke-Putin-besok-til-Kirkenes • Statssekretær Olli deltar på 1st Barents Indigenous Peoples' Summit i Moskva. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04-20]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/statssekretar-olli- deltar-pa-1st-barents-indigenous-peoples-summit-i- moskva/id2551296/ • Stråling fra Putins skrekkvåpen kan ha nådd Norge. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-14]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/urix/radioaktiv- forurensning-fra-nytt-russisk-vapen-kan-ha-nadd-norge- 1.13943211 • Styrker forskningen på nordområdene og Russland. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04- 26]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/styrker_forskning/id 2578590/ • Svalbard og uskyldige spørsmål. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/innlegg_nordlys/id2 408504/ • Svalbard stadig mindre norsk. NRK [online]. Oslo, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-27]. Available from: BIOGRAPHY

https://www.nrk.no/ytring/svalbard-stadig-mindre-norsk- 1.14040876 • Svarer på russisk opptrapping: Marinen jobber for å komme i stridsmodus. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-09]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/zlQq/Svarer-pa- russisk-opptrapping-Marinen-jobber-for-a-komme-i- stridsmodus • Synes det er for få russere på Svalbard. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04- 24]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/EAAo/Synes-det-er- for-fa-russere-pa-Svalbard • Sysselsetting, verdiskaping og velferd. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-18]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/nord_ velferd/id2483578/ • Tale på Kirkeneskonferansen. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/kirkenes_konferans e/id2475116/ • Tale på norsk-russisk handelskammers frokostmøte. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019- 04-18]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/tale-russisk- handelskammer/id2541503/ • Tidenes toppmøte i Tromsø. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2009 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/tidenes-toppmote-i- tromso/s/1-79-4288539 • Tvil om Arktis-trafikk. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2010 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/wemlo/Tvil-om- Arktis-trafikk • Utenrikspolitisk redegjørelse. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2016 [cit. 2019-04-25]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/redegjoerelse_1603 01/id2477557/

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• Utvidet investeringsfond for Nord-Norge og Russland. Regjeringen [online]. Oslo, 2017 [cit. 2019-04- 13]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/utvidet- investeringsfond-for-nord-norge-og-russland/id2568840/ • Varsler større terrortrussel mot Norge. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-08]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/WLPQj/Varsler-storre- terrortrussel-mot-Norge • Veien mot et miljøvennlig Russland. Bellona [online]. Oslo, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-16]. Available from: https://bellona.no/nyheter/internasjonalt/russland/2015- 03-veien-mot-et-miljovennlig-russland • Veldig gode nyheter. Nordlys [online]. Tromsø, 2010 [cit. 2019-04-12]. Available from: https://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/veldig-gode-nyheter/s/1- 79-5093357 • Voldsom militær opprusting i Russland. Aftenposten [online]. Oslo, 2013 [cit. 2019-04- 08]. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/GGMwQ/--Voldsom- militar-opprusting-i-Russland

BIOGRAPHY

Raw data

News articles in total: NRK 30 Aftenposten 56 Nordlys 15 Total 101 Military sector NRK 8 Aftenposten 21 Nordlys 4 Total 33 Environmental sector NRK 7 Aftenposten 6 Nordlys 4 Total 17 Economic sector NRK 3 Aftenposten 8 Nordlys 1 Total 12 Societal sector NRK 0 Aftenposten 1 Nordlys 1 Total 2 Political sector NRK 12 Aftenposten 20 Nordlys 5 Total 37

127