62-1563

MEHL, Jr., Joseph Martin, 1916- INTELLIGENCE REPORTING BY AMERICAN OBSERVERS FROM THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS, 1917-1919: SELECT CASES.

The American University, Ph.D., 1962 History, modem

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright

by

Joseph Martin Mehl, Jr.

1962

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING BY AMERICAN 05SERVERS FROM THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS, 1917-1919: SELECT CASES

"by

Joseph Martin Mehl, Jr.

Submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Decree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

History

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: jf&j'njJL

J&Lcvf IKoX^C. • a* Af u TKf.ML \oL*jL

Date: i T li t 1 / rh . v------June 1962 v

AMcWC.ANJJNIVERSfT^g university TheSiS Washington, D. C. DEC 5 1961 l78&

WASrtlNGTUi't. D. a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

The central problem which confronts any government in its formu­

lation of foreign policy is immediately identifiable on the basis of one

obvious fact: that governments exist within a context of interaction and

conflict. The objectives of any government are invariably confronted with

the counter-objectives of its international competitors. Therefore a

viable foreign policy can emerge only from a decision process that takes

adequate account, not only of the probable actions, but also the foresee­

able reactions of alien power centers.

In response to the demand for correct anticipation of this con­

tinuing process of interaction, intelligence organizations and operations

are engendered. In the international, context, information concerning

national values, ethos, attitudes, and objectives is equally as important

as accurate factual information. Both types of information represent

crucial inputs to the foreign policy decision process.

As its primary objective, this study attempts to reveal some signi­

ficant facets of the intelligence proaucer-consumer relationship, with

respect to problems encountered by the United States Government in the face

of events which occupied the European scene during World War I and the

subsequent period of peace negotiations. The period under examination dis­

closes American intelligence operations in their formative stage. The fitful

and uncertain contributions of intelligence to policy making in this era

merely presage the ultimate development of the present critical dependence

upon a vast and elaborate intelligence system. Yet such a study as

here attempted comprises an important prerequisite to an understanding of the

history, of the period 1917-1919* Examination of the intelligence reports

- i -

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. which filtered through neutral listening posts reveals the types of informa­

tion available to American officials at that time. The resulting awareness

of the quality of information available contributes to our understanding of

the background of certain decisions and actions because the availability,

quality - and often the lack - of information did, in fact, influence

policy making even in this period of rudimentary intelligence operations.

The objective of this study will be implemented by the examination

of specific cases of reporting by American observers in selected fields.

While attention will be focused upon the reporting per se, a general survey

of certain developments in intelligence collection and some description of

the intelligence organization will be presented in the first chapter. In the

second chapter an attempt is made to illustrate the range of reports, as

well as the diverse functions and techniques of the observers, by taking a

broad general cross section of their activities. The third chapter comprises

a more detailed examination of reporting on a selected area, namely, Russia

and East Central Europe. The fourth chapter deals with reporting on certain

problems connected with the peace and with the war’s aftermath. Here atten­

tion is turned from the reports filtering through the neutrals, to an examin­

ation of the Inquiry, a central information collecting body. This chapter

also illustrates the difficulty of tracing the influence of intelligence

production on policy; even the correlation between certain provisions of the

draft treaties of Paris and the re commendations made by experts cannot be

adduced of proof of such influence.

- ii -

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. How the intelligence effort vas regarded "by the higher authorities

and what use was made of the intelligence findings will he indicated in a

few cases. Examples of evaluation of intelligence hy military authorities

will be examined. It might be desirable to describe the enemy's estimate

of American intelligence efforts; however, it may be noted that regarding

the evaluation of American intelligence operations by German authorities,

a spot check of the microfilm records of the German Foreign Office reveals

little.

The description of the intelligence organization, which comprises

the first chapter, entails certain problems and limitations. Ibr example,

it is difficult to determine the precise lines of communication over which

. given information was routed, or to be certain of the distribution of copies

of a given report. The intelligence network, despite its intricacy and its

increase in complexities during World War I, was not coordinated in terms

of a definite pattern such as can be discerned in later intelligence

operations.

A further difficulty stems from the fact that often the ultimate

sources of reports remain undetermined because the middlemen have success­

fully protected the identity of their informants. Hie use of observers'

original reports in this study should indicate their possible value as

source material for other studies. Reports have limitations when used with­

out correlation with other sources, but the views of observers as reflected

in the reports form an intrinsic part of the history of the period. These

can be regarded as contemporary evaluations of facts often as significant

as the facts themselves.

- iii -

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ......

CHAPTER

I. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION FOR

INFORMATION COLLECTION ......

Informational Requirements and Networks

in the U. S. Government ......

The State Department ......

The War Department ......

The Navy Department ......

The Committee on Public Information ......

Informational Requirements at the Top Level ......

Inter-Agency Relations ......

American-Allied Relations in the

Intelligence Sphere ......

A Typical American Listening Post ......

Observers ......

II. OBSERVERS IN AC T I O N ......

Surveillance by Observers of Enemy Activity ......

Some Techniques and Specialized

Functions of Observers ...... ‘......

Routine Procedural Techniques ......

Specialized Functions ......

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Economic Intelligence ......

Biographical Intelligence ......

The Role of Evaluation ......

III. REPORTING ON RUSSIA. AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE......

Russia and Russo-German Relations ......

The Provisional Government Era ......

Intervention ......

German-Russian Relations ......

Influence of the Russian Reporting ......

East Central Europe ......

Austria-Hungary ......

Hungary ......

Poland, the Ukraine, and Lithuania ......

Bulgaria ......

IV. THE QUEST FOR INFORMATION ON PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE

The "Inquiry" and the American Commission

to Negotiate Peace ......

The Nature of the Inquiry ......

The Schleswig-Holstein P r o b l e m ......

The Rhine River Problem ...... /

The Genesis of the Commission to Negotiate Peace . . .

The Work of Voska ......

Relations between Experts and Policy Makers ......

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Reporting on Post-Armistice Germany and

the Cessation of Hostilities...... 126

G - 2 ...... '...... 127

Special. Missions...... 130

Count 3rockdorff-Rantzau...... 132

E r z b e r g e r...... 13k

Russian Problems...... 139

CONCLUSION ...... 1L2

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... lL6

APPENDICES

Appendix I. List of U. S. Military Attaches and

Assistants, February 1, 1919, and list of

Naval Attaches, December 23, 1 9 1 8 ...... 162

• Appendix II. Captain Voska's report on the

Corridor between the Czecho-Slovak and

the Yugo-Slav States ...... • ...... l 6 k

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Appendix III. Note on the Appointment of

"Inquiry" experts and of Military and

Naval Attaches...... 169

Appendix IV. Photographs from the National Archives .... 171

Mr. Dresel and his staff...... 173

Mr. Bullitt and his s t a f f ...... 175

The American Commission To Negotiate Peace ...... 177

Captain Voska and other Americans in Prague ...... 179

Officers of G-2 Headquarters of the A.E.F...... l8l

Lt. Schellens leaving for Coblenz ...... 183

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TABLE

I. General Outline on Foreign Country (Neutral)

War Information Service by Office of Naval

Intelligence (from R.G. 120) ......

II. Chart of Organization of C—2 B Secret Service,

April 12, 1918 (from R.G. 120) ......

III. Chart showing general organization of the American

Commission to Negotiate Peace ......

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION FOR INFORMATION COLLECTION

Immediately prior to World War I, a number of government agencies bad

personnel that vas already engaged in foreign intelligence collection. These

government employees, both military and diplomatic, comprised the decentralized

and rather loosely coordinated structure of the American foreign intelligence

system at this time. The agencies vithin whose ranks intelligence personnel

mainly operated included the following: the Navy and War Departments, whose

military and naval attaches and other officers stationed abroad operated an

intelligence network; the Department of State, whose diplomatic and consular

service comprised an important intelligence organization. Also, many

agencies had a lesser number of men who, by virtue of skill or experience,

could have been pressed into foreign intelligence service: the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, of whose 400 U.S.-based'agents, about 100 were suitable for

foreign service; the Treasury Department's Secret Service, and its Division

of Special Agents, with some men already abroad, assigned to cover commerce;

the Department of Labor's Bureau of Immigration; and the Department of

Commerce, with ten men already stationed abroad (with the Department's

Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce) who cooperated yith the American

Consular Services in their districts.

After the entry of the United States into the war, however, the need

for more and better intelligence was recognized, and new agencies with

information collection functions were created. The Committee on Public

Information, organized in April and May of 1917, "was such an agency. Its

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intelligence activity was mainly concerned with gauging the effect of

propaganda in enemy countries. Within the newly formed War Trade Board the

Bureau of War- Trade Intelligence and the Bureau of Foreign Agents and

Reports also functioned as intelligence gathering agencies, the former serving

the American government and the Allies as a clearing house for war trade

intelligence. A "body of experts known as the "Inquiry" also performed some

major intelligence functions. Major roles in the collection of foreign

intelligence during World War I were played as well by the State Department,

the War Department, and the Bavy Department.

I. INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND NETWORKS

IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

The State Department. From its inception the State Department has

been both a producer and a consumer of intelligence information. It was

normally the agency most intimately concerned with obtaining accurate in­

formation regarding foreign governments, and its routine operations have

always included a form of intelligence reporting on foreign countries.

Efficient diplomacy has always required good sources of information and

intelligence. James McCamy emphasized the fact that intelligence need not

be restricted to highly secret operations. He wrote:

The practice of intelligence work in the conduct of United States foreign affairs . . . js as old as the practice of American diplomacy'. It has not been called intelligence work, but it has been such. From our missions and other sources abroad we have tried to ascertain the effects of actions by other countries. . . .1/

1/ James L. McCamy, The Administration of American Foreign Affairs "(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 282.

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State Department intelligence activities have encountered difficulties

and criticism of many types. One of the chief causes for this arises from

the intrinsic disparity between the two functions: Diplomatic representatives

must be wary of too prominent a role in an aggressive program for intelligence

collection, as such a role would compromise the mutual good faith upon which

the successful practice of diplomacy rests. f

At the time of World War I it was erroneously supposed that there

was no separate and distinct intelligence function in the State Department.

There was a little known organization in this Department at that time, however,

which did serve this purpose. This secret service organization had developed

during the period when the United States was neutral. Prior to World War

I, the State Department had had no permanent secret service, and whenever it

was found necessary for the Department to conduct confidential investigations

it was necessary to detail operatives or experts from other departments. Also,

the use of agents in other countries by the Department necessitated an office

to issue instructions to them, and to digest and analyze their reports.2/

In April 1916, to systematize this work at home and abroad,

Leland Harrison, a diplomatic secretary, was designated to take charge of

the collection and examination of information of a secret nature which came

to the Department. He was also made responsible for the direction of the work

of the agents. Under Harrison, and the general supervision of Mr. Frank Iyon

Polk, an Assistant Secretary of State, the Bureau of Secret Intelligence

became a valuable adjunct to the Department. It was an independent office

2/ Bobert Lansing, War Memoirs (Hew York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935), p. 318.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. organized without sanction of law and had no legal standing, hut nominally

connected with the Division of Information of the State Department.3/

Secretary of State Robert Lansing was aware of the development of

intelligence work, and his general attitude was conducive to the growth of

an independent American intelligence service. Although he was strongly pro-

Alliedand an advocate of a decisive Allied victory, he jealously guarded the

autonomy of the American intelligence system from that of the Allies. After

the entrance of America into the war, he tried to frustrate the efforts of

the Allied envoys to associate the United States more closely with their

policies.

The War Department. Another active consumer and producer of intel­

ligence was the War Department. American military attaches, transmitting

intelligence reports to the War College Division in Washington, comprieed

a vital intelligence network. They maintained close liaison with the foreign

service of the State Department and reported on political affairs through the

diplomatic representatives. Army intelligence officers were not unanimous

in their regard for the military value of secret service. Colonel Solan of

G-2 in the American Expeditionary' Forces Headquarters regarded combat \ - intelligence as the only dependable intelligence service, and was skeptical

of information furnished from sources other than the actual field of

operations, b j

3/ Ibid., p. 319.

k j Thomas M. Johnson, Our Secret War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1929), p. 193.

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Newton D. Baker, the Secretary of War, was reluctant to approve of

certain secret service activities. For example, he refused to accept

Emanuel Voska as a military intelligence officer when the State Department

requested a commission for this Szech-American whose connections inside

.Austria-Hungary were considered a vital intelligence source. The reason

Baker opposed Voska1s commission was that Voska proposed to cause distur­

bances, strikes, and disruption in Austria-Hungary. The Secretary of War did

not believe such activity should be considered because of the often expressed

disapproval of the President of such tactics and his condemnation of Germany

for similar attempts in the United States. Only after insistent requests

by the State Department did the Secretary finally consent to Voska*s

commission as a captain in the United States Army. 5/ Baker’s attitude

reflected the American liberal viewpoint of the time that a war should be

fought simply and honorably. War, in Baker's view, was the concern of

soldiers, and diplomacy the concern of diplomats; the two should not be mimed.

When the soldiers produced the victory, they would retire and only then would

the diplomats and politicians take over.

The intelligence activities of War Department and the State Department

were often interrelated. As early as January 19, 1917* § J the discussion

of the problem of enlisting the services of the diplomatic and consular

representatives stationed in the Allied and neutral countries for military

purposes was taken up by the War Department with the State Department through

the Chief of the Military Intelligence Branch of the War Department.

5/ Memorandum to Colonel Nolan from Colonel Van Deman, July 5* 1918, -File 0h2.2, G-2-B, Record Group 120 (Records

6/ "Colonel Nolan's file," January 19, 1917, R.G. 120.

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The Navy Department. When the separate intelligence services are

measured against their own specialized requirements for intelligence production,

the office of Naval Intelligence appears to some advantage. There are several

possible reasons for this. The .American Navy vas maintained much closer to its

normal fighting complement during peacetime than was the Army; consequently,

it was better able to make the transition to war status and its problems of

rapid expansion were less acute. Also, the widespread activities of the

• American Navy had stimulated the Office of Naval Intelligence to adopt a scheme

for acquiring information that included the use of many sources. rjJ For

example, liaison with the Office of British Naval Intelligence, which had pos­

session of the German naval code, offered significant source of information, as did certain contacts between Scandinavian and American naval officers. Although

the Navy was somewhat more sensitive to the importance of foreign intelligence,

even it had not been lavish with funds for the training of naval attaches, e.g.,

it failed to provide for language training of assistant naval attaches. 8/

In spite of the relatively favored status that intelligence was accorded

in this Department, however, the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels,

was not personally disposed to further an aggressive policy regarding such an

important aspect of intelligence as espionage. He shared with 3aker certain

views on "fair play" and was opposed to some drastic methods which Naval

Intelligence was ready to employ. For example, he reprimanded those suggest­

ing that a woman agent be employed to obtain information from one of the

German officials stationed at the Copenhagen Legation. £/

The Committee on Public Information. The S cretaries of State, War,

and Navy were members of the agency that was responsible for wartime

J/1 See chart on page 7*

8/ Letter of November lo, 191^, File 1151-298, General. Files, Bureau of Navigation, Record Group 2k, National Archives.

£/ John A. Gade, All My Born Days: Experiences of a Naval Intelligence Officer in Europe (New York C. Scribner's Sons, 19^2), pp. 124-127* Information on the use of the German naval code can be found in William James, The Code Breakers of Room bO (New York: St. Martins'Press, 1956).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GENERAL OUTLINE ON FOREIGN COUNTRY (NEUTRAL) WAR INFORMATION SERVICE

OTHER NEUTRAL COUNTRIES ENEMY COUNTRIES

OTHER SOURCES ~|~" EMBASSY OR LEGATION COMMERCIAL SOURCES AMBASSADOR OR MINISTER NAVAL DIPLOMATIC ATTACHE, MILITARY DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE AGENTS, EXCEPT m » oraERS WAR.STATE & NAVY

i t- i VARIOUS STATE DEPT. SPECIAL DEPTS OF COMMERCE AGENCIES AGENCY LABOR, AGRICULTURE TREASURY, POST OFFICE & JUSTICE

'COMMERCIAL FIRMS O.N.I. Reproduced Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 8 -

propaganda, the Committee on Public Information. This agency, created in

April 1917 for the original purpose of supervising the handling of govern­

ment news, was under a civilian executive. George Creel. The functions

expanded and by October 1917 "the Foreign Section of this Committee was opera­

tive. Its field offices abroad supported, or were supported by the regular

diplomatic representatives and theoretically were coordinated with Military

and Naval Intelligence as well as with the War Trade Board. 10/

Though this Committee was more concerned with the dissemination of

propaganda than the collection of information, its responsibility for

censorship brought it into certain phases of internal counterespionage.

At some diplomatic posts the military or naval attache served as the

Committee on Public Information representative during emergency periods.

In other cases Committee on Public Information employees did work which

normally would have fallen to Military Intelligence, so that in indirect

ways the Committee on Public Information often stepped into the military

and political intelligence fields. 11/

Informational Requirements at the Top Level. Theoretically, Presi­

dent Wilson was the ultimate consumer of intelligence, but many important

reports did not reach him or went unnoticed by him. The President pre­

ferred naval and diplomatic intelligence to military intelligence and he ap­

pears to have had little interest in military secret service operations. 12/

10/ James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1939)> P * 73*

11/ Ibid., p. 237.

12/ Thomas M. Johnson, G-2 Intelligence service american pendant la guerre (Paris: Payot, 1939)* P« 160.

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Wilson vas to a great extent his own Secretary of State and was even reluctant

to use the network of America’s foreign diplomatic missions as vital intimate

agencies of policy. He seldom took career envoys into his confidence, sought

their opinions or used their facilities for achieving his objectives in

foreign policy. Occasionally, the President showed concern for the qua!ity

of information at his disposal. This was particularly the case with

information relating to Russia; for example, he gave approval to a newly

selected representative to Denmark to give special attention to Russian

affairs, Norman Hapgood.

Colonel Edward M. House, President Wilson's advisor, was an important

consumer of intelligence and played an active part in directing the search

for information. House’s experience and knowledge of foreign affairs was

limited to that acquired in the service of the President after 191^-, but in

that period he became acquainted with an extensive circle of European

politicians. His manner of dealing with facts and problems has been subjected

to the following criticism:

He had a remarkable knack for reducing complex situations to simple formulas, but while he readily grasped the externals of a problem, he seldom troubled to sit down and work to its core. For all his hustle and bustle, he was mentally an indolent man. In conference, as soon as a question passed from generalities to technicalities, he lost interest. Weighty memoranda bored him. He preferred to gather information by tajkfng to people rather than by reading and study. While he thus always kept abreast of the latest political currents, his information was frequently superficial and colored with the bias of his interlocutors. 13/

Colonel House made an important contribution to informating gathering

when he organized, in September, 191?, a group of experts known as the "Inquiry."

13/ Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe 191^— 1918 Xftrinceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957) > P« 83*

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This group vas to collect and collate data on geographical, ethnological,

historical, economic, and political problems of European and other areas of

the world, in preparation for the peace conference which was to follow the

war. Something more of this group*s activity will be described in Chapter

IV, "The Quest for Information on Problems of the Peace".

II. INTER-AGENCY RELATIQBS

Some administrative conflicts and misunderstandings between various

governmental agencies during the war involved information gathering. Suspicion

and divergent opinions often characterized the relations between the State

Department and the Committee on Public Information. State,Department officials

were displeased that there was another agency charged with formulating policy,

especially that concerning relations with foreign governments. George Creel,

the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, vas impatient with the

red tape of government and his personality clashed with that of

Bobert Lansing.

Friction between the State Department and the Committee on Public

Information had several causes and assumed many forms. Some officials of

the Committee operated with considerable latitude .and even ventured into the

field of diplomacy, which the State Department representatives regarded as

an encroachment on their functions. Such was the case with Mrs. Vhitehouse,

the Committee representative in Switzerland, who was implicated in rivalries

between her agency and the State Department. The American Minister to

Switzerland, Pleasant Stovall, was not sympathetic to the open publicity

which was practiced by Mrs. White house and the Committee on Public Information.

When Mrs. Whitehouse first arrived in Berne, the Legation claimed that the

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vagueness of her instructions placed her credentials under suspicion, and

refused the recognition and facilities needed for her work. Only after a

special trip to Washington were these obstacles removed. Until the end of

the var there remained contention over such matters as the communication of

reports. Mrs. Whitehouse also had a disagreement vith Mr. Wilson, Charge

d*Affaires, over sending reports which a Committee on Public Information

informant, Mr. Mostowski, entrusted to the Legation. 14/ She objected to

the sending of these reports to the State Department instead of to the

Conmittee on Public Information, and disagreed with Mr. Wilson that the

Committee might be careless in the handling of such confidential communica­

tions. Mrs. Whitehouse also could see no danger in such a coded report

being deciphered in Washington for Mr. Sisson or Mr. Creel, members of

the Committee, rather than for a member of the State Department.

Here was an instance of the conflict which arose when one agency

used the facilities of smother agency over which it had little control.

When security regulations are involved such differences are intensified.

The State Department could not be aure that its code might not be jeopardized

by the publication, without proper precautions, of messages which it had

deciphered. In Russia the American code was jeopardized when a report

by Robins, the Red cross representative in Switzerland, and Sisson to the

effect that the Soviet government continued to grow stronger was sent from

the Embassy. 15/ Not only was. it dispatched in code through official

channels, but it was sent independently through commercial channels.

14/ File CPI 21, September 26, 1918, Record Group 63 (Records of the Committee on Public Information, National Archives, cited hereafter as R.G. 63, Lt. B.F. Mostowski was with the Lithuanian Bureau of the CPI).

15/ George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 400, footnote 7*

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In this case it was Robins, rather than Sisson, the Committee represen­

tative who was responsible for the indiscretion.

Edgar Sisson, as chairman of the Committee on Public Information,

had dual responsibility as a secret intelligence agent and a propagan­

dist. In a sense he was acting in competing roles. A famous case in

point is the story of the "Sisson Documents” which related to the "German-

Bolshevik conspiracy" and which he sponsored. These were a source of

contention between the State Department and the Committee on Public

Information. In September 1918 the Committee on Public Information suc­

ceeded in bypassing the State Department and obtained Wilson's authority

for the publication of the Sisson documents. This caused State Department

officials to fear possible repercussions on American personnel remaining

in Russia. Philip Patchin of the unofficial intelligence section of the

State Department learned from British sources that typewriter tests of

the documents showed that the same typewriter had been used to type

supposedly original documents coming from different offices or sections

of the same city. 16/ The State Department's caution regarding the

authenticity of the documents has-been proved more than justified: '

Mock and Larson, on. cit., p. 317*

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Recently George Kennan convincingly demonstrated flaws in the contents,

such as the improbability of German officers recording the names of

German espionage agents in formal communications to the 3olshevik gov­

ernment. 17/

17/ George F. Kennan, "The Sission Documents, " Journal of Modem History, June, '1956, p.' 138*

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III. AMERICAN-ALLIED RELATIONS IN THE

INTELLIGENCE SPHERE

The Allied Intelligence systems exerted important influences on the

American intelligence gathering. Both cooperation and competition vere

features of the relations between the Allied and American intelligence systems.

American intelligence gathering organizations succeeded in establishing varying

degrees of liaison with the Allied organizations. Some American officers were

detailed for training in the British intelligence. As early as June, 1917*

American Army intelligence officers attempted to l e a m from the example set

by British intelligence. The Wan College in Washington was warned by a.

informant that "unless we hasten to take advantage of the British and French

machinery for acquiring information, while we are organizing our own, we will

certainly be at a great disadvantage." 17/

An American intelligence officer, conferring at the British War Office

with members of the British General Staff Intelligence, vas advised to

organize a central section in Washington with subdivisions similar to those

in the British War Office and to arrange for American military attaches to

establish confidential relations at once with the British, French, and other

Allied military attaches in foreign capitals. The Intelligence Headquarters

at London and Paris were designated storehouses of information which could be

tapped if a suitable American staff were provided. Holland and Switzerland

were mentioned as important because the British large agencies with

which the American military attaches could work. Scandinavia was suggested

as an important field for the United States to develop, and Bulgaria, a

17/ Army War College Document File 944, June 1, 1917* Record Group 165 "(Records of War Department General. Staff* Army War College Documents, National Archives, hereafter cited as B.G. 1 6 5 ).

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country with which the United States was not at war, was recommended for

further exploitation. The British advised the American intelligence

officers that it would "be superfluous to duplicate their secret service work

in Europe, and also suggested that individuals belonging to American business

firms in foreign countries be used for employment in the secret service in

preference to new men sent out for that purpose.

This extensive cooperation "between the Allied and American

intelligence systems indicated by the foregoing can also be demonstrated by

the frequent designation of French and British sources in reports by American

attaches and diplomats. Yet, in spite of this pooling of information, there

was always an element of apprehension, especially by the British, regarding

competition from the American system which, as the war progressed, extended

into such British preserves as commercial and industrial information.

Questions of American-Allied competition in the field of intelligence

were discussed at a conference held in Paris on February 17, 1918. 18/

Colonel E. D. Dansey and Colonel B. J. Brake represented the British

intelligence, while Major Wallner spoke for the French intelligence service.

Colonel Dennis E. Nolan and M$jor N. W. Campanole represented American Army

intelligence. The British and French officers maintained that because the

intelligence field in Switzerland was well covered by their services, the

establishment of a new one by the United States might be a source of

considerable harm to their serviees and a danger to their agents. It was

their opinion that the American service should confine itself to the use of

influential persons, of whom there were many who were versed in German

15/ "Colonel Nolan*s file,"• February 20, 1918, R.G. 120.

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politics and conmerce. Certain prominent persons with headquarters in

Switzerland could bring to the Americans much more valuable information than

either the French or English could obtain at the time. The French and English

thought that the "small agents” employed by them generally failed to obtain

the important information desired, and that the organization of another similar

system was not worth while. Furthermore, the information obtained by the

Allied agents was available to the Americans.

The French representative stated that all information given to them

would be available to the Americans, but failed to propose any concrete method

for the exchange of this information. The American officers detected more

desire, to cooperate on the part of the French than on the part of the British.

The British stressed the necessity of establishing American services in Sweden,

Denmark, and Russia. They mentioned reports which they received from American

representatives in Sweden that furnished excellent information on internal

conditions in Germany. The American Harvester Company was praised as an

institution with a high intelligence-producing potential, and it was suggested

that the Standard Oil Company in Russia, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark could

become an excellent agency for information.

With regard to the problem of recruiting agents, the -French and

British representatives pointed to Spain and South America as likely areas

from which to select American agents able to travel in enemy countries with

small danger of detection. The Slavic element in the United States was also

suggested as comprising recruitment material for posts with the information

service operating in Russia. Spaniards and South Americans were thought to

be able to enter Germany through Switzerland or Holland with comparative

safety. The British agreed to facilitate the work of American agents in

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Russia by giving them expulsion orders vhich would operate to establish them

in the confidence of the Russian and German authorities.

From his estimate of the conference, General Macdonogh, who was

Colonel Dansey's superior, informed Colonel Nolan that he was confident that

the American secret service would not form any organization or engage agents

for Belgium or the occupied part of France, but would endeavor to send agents

into Germany. 19/ Because of the business contacts American citizens had in

Scandinavia, superior to those of the Allies, the General thought that the

American secret service would form an active organization there for obtaining

military information about Austria and Germany. In his judgment there was so

much activity in Switzerland and the ground so well covered, that the American

service would not engage agents in that country, but endeavor rather to obtain

military- information by the use of certain businesses and other organizations

which had been active in the past in relations with Austria and Germany. The

individuals selected for this work would be directly under the control of the

-American military authorities, and would not themselves engage other agents

locally. The United States would form an organization to obtain military

information from Germany through Russia, as soon as possible. In Russia,

the field was so large that the General thought there would be no danger of

the various Allied organizations clashing or coming into contact with each

other.

The American Major Campanole1s interpretation of -the results of the

conference, which he communicated to Colonel Nolan, was quite different. 20/

1 2 7 IbidI

20/ "Colonel Nolan's file." March 11, 1918, R.G. 120.

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Because the French and British appeared to be willing to cooperate only to

the extent of sharing certain information, and this only after concurrence

by their headquarters, the Major thought that the delay in the transference

of information might be a serious matter. If the British and French

suggestions were followed, the immediate sector occupied by American

troops would be covered only by the British and French systems on which the

Americans would have to rely for information.

Major Campanole pointed out that, on their own admission, the Allied

services in Holland and Switzerland were unsatisfactory; consequently, he

thought it probable that the American system would improve rather than harm

their services. The Major could have pointed out that the Allied used

inconsistent arguments and diversionary tactics to inhibit American intelli­

gence expansion. For example, contradictory aspects of the system in

Switzerland were emphasized, as expediency demanded: at one point the fact

that it was well covered; at another that the quality of information was poor.

In Major Campanole*s opinion, since the American troops depended on reports

transmitted by American intelligence for information as to activity in the

rear of the enemy lines, these reports should not exclusively reflect British

and French information. Therefore, he recommended the establishment of

Americans own system in Switzerland and Holland which, while cooperating

with the Allies, would be independent in every respect. He concurred in the

British and French suggestions for establishing American services in Swedeny

Denmark, and Russia, and recommended that the Russian service cover the

territory occupied by German troops in Russia. A further suggestion was that

a mobile service be established for the use of agents who would travel from

Russia to Switzerland by way of the Central Powers.

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Major Campanole also ■thought that a special information service

should be created in Switzerland which would be charged with Near Eastern

affairs, and political, economic, and propaganda information available

should be collected by a special division at Berne under the direction of

the military attaches.. The Swiss service should cover Austrian territory,

and for this purpose should maintain close liaison with the Italian

•service. A division for this purpose was suggested with headquarters at

Lugano. Major Campanole's suggestions were very eloae to the actual

structure of the American organization of April 1 8 , 1 918 . 21/

Although this conference between Allied and American intelligence

representatives apparently was concerned with a hypothetical future American

intelligence network in the European neutral countries, such a structure

was in fact existent and in operation, particularly in such areas as

Switzerland.

IV. A TYPICAL AMERICAN LISTENING POST

The American information system established in Switzerland served

as a model for other American posts in the neutrals, and although in actual

operation it was probably not the most efficient, it was among the most

active and important. After the closing of the American embassies in

Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople, the Legation in Berne became particu­

larly useful as the "eyes and ears" of the United States for observation

of the enemy countries. Both the military and diplomatic officials

attempted to develop Switzerland as a field for open and clandestine

intelligence operations.

21/ See chart on page 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Espionage G.S.O. Major G -2 , B2 50 officers G -2 , B-3 G -2 , BU G -2 , B - l 25 officers 2 officers I

S.S. in Allied and neutral countries recruiting of agents from Liaison with military attaches accredited neutral and Allied countries. to foreign countries. Instructions on Correspondence with enemy, character of information to be obtained neutral, and Allied persons by use of S.S. sources. Dissemination on military, political, and of intelligence received from S .S . sources economic subjects. Adoption and issue of codes, ciphers. Examination of enemy’s ciphers o and letters, intercepted enemy o Allied wireless Service o C/!«-> O -P W © rH U • 0 O Neutral Service ® ? cn ai 17 officers __ o w c \j 1 5 cv h I a.

1 officer 1 officer 1 officer Courier St. Examination Agents Inform. Pontarlier of travellers Sta. Evian les Bellegard St. Julien Bains Reproduced Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 2 1 *

The military authorities decided to systematize and expand the

intelligence network at the disposal of the military attache to Switzerland.

By October 1917, a project for an "information service" in Switzerland was

formulated and presented to Colonel Dennis Nolan of the G-2 Intelligence

Staff Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces. 22/

A Swiss "information rendezvous" was planned which would be charged

with obtaining information frcm a "special zone" bounded on the north by

the Heims-Luxembourg-Mainz-Eisenach-Leipzig line; on the east by the Leipzig-

Begensburg-Munlch-Innsbruck line; on the south by the Switzer land-Lake

Constance-Tandeck line; and on the west by the immediate rear of the active

theatre of operations on the West Front. In addition to these areas, the

Swiss information rendezvous was to specialize in all classes of information

on the Near East. The conduct of espionage in other neutral countries would

follow the model established in Switzerland. The direction of the Swiss

information rendezvous was designated to be from or near Pontarlier, France,

in offices as inconspicuous as possible. Nine officers having connections

in Switzerland, if possible, were to be assigned. All propaganda work

required of this rendezvous was to be directed from the American Expeditionary

Forces Headquarters, and such propaganda was to extend to the use of the press

of Switzer],and and, if possible, to Germany. The work of the rendezvous

was to include the necessary espionage and counterespionage measures; close

liaison with the military attaches of the Allied and neutral countries in

Berne; postal and telegraph control in cooperation with the French, and,

227 "Colonel Nolan's file," October 20, 1917, R.G. 120.

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if possible, S w i s s authorities; the passport control in Switzerland,

cooperating vith the diplomatic and consular agents.

The principal "branch offices of the rendezvous w e r e to be under

the direct orders of the Pontarlier headquarters and w e r e to he located at

Bellegarde (in France near Geneva), Evian-les-Bains, France, and at Berne,

Basel, Geneva, Lucerne, and Zurich, all of •which vere on Swiss territory.

It was p lanned to send espionage recruits to Pontarlier for instructions

extending over a period of from one to two months. About two hundred

agents were to he grouped into (a) stationary agents; (h) mobile agents;

(c) troop train observers; and (d) intermediary agents. Intermediary

agents were to confine their activity to Switzerland and were to be used

as communicating agents between Pontarlier and points in Switzerland.

Mobile agents and troop train observers were to make reports to

Pontarlier, but if that were impractical, reports were to be transmitted

to the military attache at Berne and frcm there forwarded to Pontarlier.

The information headquarters in Switzerland was to be under the immediate

orders of the military attache and under the overall direction of the

rendezvous headquarters at Pontarlier.

The information service in Switzerland was charged with maintaining

close liaison with the Allied information services. It was to observe the

frontier for persons crossing from enemy territory to Switzerland and to

take part in the examination of repatriates and deserters; to establish a

system of counterespionage to detect enemy agents, with a view to obtaining

information frcm them; and to examine correspondence of prisoners of war

addressed to the "American Prisoners' Central Committee" in Berne. The

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service vas also to purchase and forward to Pontarlier important newspapers

and periodicals published in the Central Powers, in Switzerland, arifl in

Italy. The office in Geneva was designated to specialize in information

concerning the Sear East. Agents at the tourist resorts were to make the

acquaintance of persons arriving frcm. enemy territory, internees, and

German officers on leave of absence at these places. If practicable, the

Swiss rendezvous was to be furnished copies of reports of military importance

submitted by American diplomatic and consular agents -

Such were the plans formulated by the military for a segment of the

American intelligence system. The American military attaches to Berne,

Major Exton, and his successor. Colonel Godson, headed this military net­

work in Switzerland, but they were dependent on the chief of the American

diplomatic mission to Switzerland, Minister Pleasant Stovall, for facilities

and cooperation, as well as for approval of certain phases of their work.

Major Exton described Stovall’s reluctance to further certain aspects of

intelligence work when the Major and Hugh Wilson, the Charge d'Affaires,

were attempting to put passport control in the hands of the military intel­

ligence . They also recommended that a liaison man be placed in the British

Military Attache’s office, but this did not meet with Mr. Stovall's approval.23/

Hu^i Wilson considered Stovall to be a gentleman of integrity, courtesy and

courage, but limited in his knowledge of Europe by too few years residence

there, and by lack of familiarity with any language other than his own.24/

23/ Army War College Document File 944, R«G«. 16 5 .

24/ Hugh Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1931), p. 1 2 .

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V. OBSERVERS

A key role in the collection of intelligence in the European field

■was played "by a miscellaneous group of military and naval attaches

their subordinates, as well as diplomatic representatives and their agents

and informers, to whom the general term "observers" may be applied. These

observers represented varied types of backgrounds and experience. Seme

naval attaches were selected frcm civil life and given direct commissions.

John A. Gade, a former architect with personal connections in Scandinavia,

at the time America declared war went to Washington and was interviewed

by Roger Welles, the Director of Naval Intelligence. After a certain

amount of training he was commissioned a lieutenant and ordered to

Scandinavia, first as Assistant Naval Attache in Christiania, and later

as Naval Attache to Copenhagen.25/ The Army intelligence section also

recruited frcm outside the military service. A section of military

intelligence designated "M. I. 5" recruited, in addition to soldiers,

others, such as qualified financiers, diplomats, travelers, and scholars,

as well as "persons familiar by study and contact with the people, places,

and affairs of the world." 26/ The "M. I. 5" section had, among other

duties, that of "making an estimate and plan for a military attache system

to cover the world," and of "conducting classes of instruction at the War

College for newly-appointed attaches and their assistants."

The War Department provided criteria for the selection of a subor­

dinate class of agents in its Intelligence Manual.2?/ The manual, stated

25/ Gade, op. cit., p. 97 •

26/ "History of the M.I.D.," War Department, Historical, G-2 Activities, R.G. 120.

27/ Intelligence Manual, Edition lf-l8 , War Department Office of the Chief of Staff, Executive Division, Military Intelligence Branch, file 7-26-6, R.G. 120.

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that skill and motivation were the paramount factors in selecting suitable

personnel. Skill was difficult to determine before the fact, so to speak,

but to a certain extent it was feasible to test the agent's potential by

means of minor assignments in which his actions, methods of work, personal

characteristics and temperament could be observed. Various tests should

suggest themselves to the intelligence officer by which he could determine

the agent's temperament and his reactions under the effect of danger,

embarrassment, sudden emergencies, fatigue, liquor, etc. It was recom­

mended that a careful study be made of the special characteristics germane

to a given assignment, and that the agent to be employed for a particular

task be especially fitted for it. It was also stated that in the majority

of cases the agent was a relatively unknown quantity, unreliable, given to

duplicity, and more or less deficient in a moral sense. However, the

manual indicated that both men and women of the highest character entered

this work from a sense of patriotism and duty. When such were obtainable

and had the necessary qualifications, they were the best possible agents,

but such persons were described as not often available. Usually, it would

be necessary to utilize persons of both sexes whose personal and moral

integrity was open to question, and the manual stated that "in such cases

it is necessary to determine what the weaknesses and strengths of each

individual are so that the first may be discounted and the second utilized

for our purposes." 28/

These were the general guide lines suggested for the selection of

agents during Wold War I. Then, no elaborate testing and screening such

H 7 Idem.

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as used by the Office of Strategic Services in World War II had been

developed. Detailed psychological criteria for observers such as suggested

recently by Sherman Kent were also little known. According to Kent, the

basic personality of a good observer should be that of an extrovert who

can successfully handle people. Kent also stresses such points as the

following: that an observer should be able to detect the significant in

matters under surveillance and be sensitive to changes; that such sensitivity

is acquired by becoming a specialist who is fully aware of the information

requirements of the country’s foreign policy; that the observer must more

than passively participate in situations but exercise imagination in

searching for new sources of information, and confirming or contradicting

his data; and that the techniques of the trained researcher must be at

the obwrver's command, even though these are not his prime function. 29/

Kent's standards represent an ideal which World War I observers

could not realistically be expected to meet, as the diplomats and military

personnel‘were generally burdened with manydduties other than observing

and reporting. The State Department, however, has always recognized certain

members of the Foreign Service for their ability as "good reporters.” The

importance of reporting and the way in which observers performed under

wartime conditions will became evident as the observers' varied activities

eure described and some cases of their reporting examined.,

W) Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19^9)> P P • 69-7 0 .

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CHAPTER II

OBSERVERS IN ACTION

I. SURVEILLANCE BY OBSERVERS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY

Information on the Central Powers was a main concern of American

observers located in the European neutrals, and Switzerland was a key point

for observing enemy activity. Attention was also directed to Germans

residing in Switzerland and to suspected German agents there.

For example, on May 30, 1917> "the American Legation in Berne

notified the State Department that Alexander Fuehr, formerly an assistant

to ifon Papen in the German Bnbassy in Washington, was in Switzerland. 1/

It was further reported that he had an American-horn wife and was

endeavoring to secure funds frcm America. The State Department advised -

the Berne Legation to keep the Department informed on the activities of

Fuehr and to inform the French representatives that Fuehr was trying to

secure funds frcm America, so that his mall through France might he

properly covered. The Legation was also requested to ascertain if Fuehr

was using any special code address or signature. This attention to Fuehr

was understandable because he had been the director of German propaganda

activities in America.

In addition to reports covering specific facts, individual activity,

«-nd particular events, reports and studies of broader scope were prepared

by American representatives in Europe. On June 15, 1917> an American

intelligence officer prepared seme "Notes on the German Spy System in

i7 State Department Decimal File No. 862.2025^, R.G. 59-

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Europe,11 2/ which emphasized German activity in Switzerland. Introducing

the subject, he said:

We have used, almost exclusively original sources; that is, the results of investigations carried out directly, up to May 31> 1917 , by the Counter-Espionage Sections of the Intelligence Service. In other words, we have almost entirely separated the similar data, collected monographs, compiled and communicated to us by the Allies. This with the sole object of giving a more original and hence more effective contribution to our future combined action. 2 /

In picturing the typical German agent, the Notes stated, that for

every agent who fell into Allied hands and gave reliable and conclusive

information on a segment of the enemy's activity, there were "a hundred

others who gave details shorn of all value," k j or related stereotyped

narratives. The informer employed b y the Germans and especially by the

Austrians was described as rarely having "an interesting personality."

The Notes maintained that private institutions were involved in

spying which was disguised under various types of activity. Seme of these

institutions, internationally known through decades of business inter­

course, were: The Singer Sewing Machine Company, The Baedecker Guides,

The Maggi Soup Company, The Berlitz Language Schools, and the General

Electric Company (A.E.G.).

It was contended that an ingenious and serious form of espionage

was practiced by the insurance companies. The "Schweizerische

. Ruckversicherungs Gesel Ischaft" of Zurich with which several Italian an<3

French fire insurance associations were affiliated, received from the

affiliated branches reports about munition and war materiel factories

2 } "German Methods," File 532 (l)-5ln(l00), R.G. 120.

2 / Idem.

k j Idem.

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with valuable data on their production. This information the vice-director

of the company transmitted, to the German and. Austrian Consulates.

The roles of Prince von Bulov and his secretary Baron von Stockhammern,

as veil as Deputy Matthias Erzberger, in German intelligence work in

Switzerland vere given brief notice in the Notes.

Unresolved problems also vere treated, such as the question of the

identity of a German agent knovn as "Simon." It vas stated that shortly

after his arrest on July 12, 1916, there arose "mysterious influences to

conceal or confuse his responsibility" in the eyes of the judicial inquiry.

"Simon" appeared to have been an officer in the Sviss Federal Army. This

vas deduced frcm the nature of the information furnished by him. Therefore,

the fact that he could correspond vith a member of the Sviss intelligence

service did not appear strange. But it did appear strange vhen the

possibility of his being an agent of the Central Powers vas admitted. It

vas speculated that since a double game in espionage vas not infrequent,

it vas possible that "Simon's" double character vas knovn to both services

vith which he vas dealing. The question is then raised, "Have these

services — a hypothesis which must be uttered only vith the greatest

reserve — seme element in ccmmon?"

It is difficult to understand how these Notes could have represented

an entirely original contribution of the Auerican intelligence service, one

which did not include, as its authors claimed, communications by the Allies.

Although Switzerland vas the neutral country most .prominent as a

listening post, American surveillance of enemy activity vas maintained

diligently in all other European neutrals. American intelligence estimated

17 Idem.

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that the German espionage system in the Netherlands, together vith that

in Scandinavia, formed a larger and no less active field Switzerland.

In Switzerland, German activities were mainly directed against France and

Italy; in Scandinavia and Holland, German activities were concentrated

against England and Russia.

.American intelligence was aware that in the Netherlands the activity

of the German system turned on the diplomatic and consular organizations.

The German Legation at the Hague was for a time directed by Dr. Rosen,

assisted by Counsellors von Schmidthals and von Stumm, as well as by

L t . Colonel Renner, the Military Attache, and Captain von Muller, the

Naval Attache. 6/ The Commercial Attache, von Gneist, later became a

division director in the German Foreign Office. One of the informants of

Colonel Edward Davis, the American Military Attache, was in contact with

von Stumm.

The British regarded the Netherlands as their special preserve for

intelligence activity, and viewed American intelligence activity there as

amateurish interloping. Captain Landau of the British service stated that

by June 1917 the French had recognized that competition among the different

services was destructive and had curtailed their facilities in Holland in

deference to those of the British. Landau was critical of the Belgians and

cl aimed that the Belgian intelligence heads resented any Belgians working

for the British and even went so far as to draft some of them into the

army, j J

Z} Idem. 4 * 7/ Henry Landau, Secrets of the White Lady (New York; Putnams, 1935), p. k j .

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From Denmark, too, American representatives kept a vigilant eye on

German activity- Grant-Smith, the Charge d'Affaires, reported on January 31 >

1918, to the Secretary of State that the German "Erzberger spy center" at

Copenhagen, also knovn as the "Vinz Bureau," had just closed. 8/ Its chief

task had been to supervise German espionage and intelligence work at Petrograd.

Orders vere reported to have arrived from Berlin to the effect that German

espionage and intelligence activity vas so veil placed throughout Russia

that the need for such an intermediary office at Copenhagen Sad passed.

On July 22, 1918, suggestions on hov to counter German counterespionage

vere submitted by the American military attache at Copenhagen g/ He indicated

that the Germans vere getting anxious about the number of deserters vho

escapad-into Denmark, not only because of the numerical loss but because

of the information which might be conveyed to Allied intelligence services.

To counter such tendencies, the Germans vere reported to have made aggressive

plans. The form of the German offensive vas to be twofold: first, inducing

the Danish authorities to interpret the giving of information by deserters

as a breach of Danish neutrality; and secondly, by denouncing in the pro-

German Danish newspapers all persons concerned in the giving and receiving

of such information so as to ensure their persecution or to frighten them

into inactivity. The military attache described this German policy as

fairly successful, so that if not resisted, it might be extended until it

paralyzed American intelligence vork in Denmark. His report cited denun­

ciation in the press as a step in the German tactics. Provocateurs,

57 State Department Decimal File No. 862.202/30, R.G. 39-

2/ Military Attache Reports-Copenhagen, July 22, 1918, R.G. 120.

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passing themselves off as deserters, were to get the names addresses

of persons who directed them to Entente officials or who accepted state­

ments frcm deserters for communication to the Allies. Facts thus collected

would be included in sensational articles in the press and the result would

usually be an inquiry by the police so that the persons named would also

be interrogated. Such German attacks were designed to put the police on

the track of those contravening the so-called "neutrality" and to isolate

Entente officials by scaring away people who were disposed to help them.

In order to counter these attacks, the.military attache recommended

that publicity be met with publicity. 10/ He indicated that the Germans

who engineered these attacks were as deeply implicated in espionage as

were the Allied officials, and had more to conceal because they worked

against Danish shipping as well as against the Allies. Reprisals in the

form of publicity could be made through the Danish press or through the

Allied press. The first means would act more quickly, but would be limited

in scope because of censorship. The military attache recommended as suitable

for reprisals such items as information on financial methods of the pro-

German press, and biographies of the propaganda agents who launched the

anti-Allied articles. Such material should be kept ready for immediate

use, so that as soon as an attack began it could be countered.

Articles in the Entente press were thought to be more effective as

a reprisal since .these would act upon the T)ani sh government as well as upon

the instigators of the attacks. It was recommended that the gist of an

article be telegraphed throu^i an Allied foreign office and a summary of it

10/ Idem.

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telegraphed "back to Copenhagen to be released through regulation nevs

channels. Quick results could be attained if an Entente representative

telegraphed an exposure of pro-German intrigues with comments on the

policy that connived at them. The Danish censor would first stop such at

telegram, but if the correspondent held his ground, an offer of compromise

would probably follow. This method was described as successfully employed

by M r . Conger of the Associated Press. 11/

The report by the American military attache at Copenhagen indicated

an awareness of the importance of propaganda and psychological warfare as

an auxiliary to intelligence operations. It also illustrated the growing

tendency on the part of American observers to make reccmmendations rather

than to merely report their findings.

Seme broad generalizations were also made with respect to Denmark

by American observers on the basis of their surveillance of enemy

espionage. For example, American naval intelligence officers estimated that

it was of only secondary importance to Germany as an espionage center.

Owing to its geographical position, it was regarded as less important than

Holland or Norway and Sweden as a base of activity against the Allies. 12/

Denmark lacked large harbors, and with the exception of Copenhagen, was not

so favorable a point from which to observe North Sea Allied and neutral

ship movements, as was Norway or Holland. German intelligence concerning

Russia could also be collected much better at Stockholm than at Copenhagen.

317 Idem.

12/ Subject File VE-2, ONI Report No. 319, July 21, 1915> R.G. ^5 .

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Geiman officials, however, had stationed many agents in Denmark. Some of

these operatives were intermediaries for intelligence networks in other

countries. Commander Gade, the American naval attache at Copenhagen,

remarked on the number of German spies and agents receiving and sending

information in Denmark, or going to enemy countries. 13/

II. SOME TECHNIQUES AND SPECIALIZED

FUNCTIONS OF OBSERVERS

Routine Procedural Techni ques. It is generally known that reading

and clipping of the foreign press are standard practices of military attaches

and other members of diplomatic missions. This work is necessary and is

not trivial when properly performed with a view to systematically ordering

relevant facts. The taking of facts frcm such readily available sources as

newspapers and magazines, and abstracting, arraying and indexing them are

important aspects of intelligence operations.

During World War I, military and naval attaches as well as diplomatic

representatives scanned the press in the neutral countries for evidence of

enemy activity and propaganda, and, of course, news of developments in the

neutrals themselves. A product of this scanning was often a series of

reports covering the propaganda efforts of the enemy or an analysis of some

of the political opinions of neutral journalists. The report on the Danish

press covering the period of July to November 1917, l W for example,

included comments -MMr»h indicated a sensitive awareness to the various trends

137 Gade, op. cit., p. 8 7 .

1k j Inquiry Document No. 773> Records of the American Ccmmission to Negotiate Peace, Record Group 156, The National Archives (cited hereafter as R.G. 15 6 ).

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appearing in the leading Danish newspapers. It described the Socialdemokraten

as the only Dan1sh paper which confined its editorialized propaganda targets

to a few subjects such as the Stockholm Conference; the democratization of

Germany; English and American responsibility for the continuance of the

war; and the growing war weariness in France and Italy. The sympathies of

the paper were alleged to be entirely with the German Socialists, and in

all matters concerning the war the paper was held to echo Vorwarts, the

German Social Democratic organ.

The foreign press was reviewed extensively but it is often difficult

to estimate the effectiveness with which American observers exploited this

press. News items were sometimes merely translated without any analysis,

interpretation, or critical comment.

Spot censorship by American representative s of personal communications

between suspected intriguers sometimes disclosed information of a positive

intelligence nature and data useful for counterintelligence purposes.

American observers also intercepted and deciphered enemy communications.

It is probable that code-breaking, when not accomplished by the British,

was performed under the direction of Mr. Yaraley's code-breaking section of

the State Department in Washington. Radio messages were intercepted from

Nauen, and Spain, a point at which much German activity, especially that

directed to agents in South America, was monitored.

Ex-nationals of the enemy countries were used as sources of informa­

tion by American observers with varying success. In Berne, Switzerland,

Hugh Wilson enlisted the aid of a group of^political exiles during

Minister Stovall’s leave of absence to the U. S. These exiles were

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organized into an intelligence service which attempted to form a picture'

of developments in the Central Powers. The Bellegarde center, part of the

previously described network under the Military Attache, was a collecting

point for information derived from the interrogation of travelers, deserters,

and other persons likely to have recent knovledge of the enemy countries.

One Swiss traveler named Greiner’, on being interviewed by an American

agent, on his return frcm a trip to Leipzig, Berlin, and Munich, voiced

some opinions of the significant Bolshevik-German relationship during

October 1918. 15/ He mentioned a league of officers formed in Germany to

safeguard the future. This was interpreted as preparing for a new war.

The Swiss thought that the submission of Germany, if it should happen,

would be only a facade and he indicated that the pan-German party planned

the organization and exploitation of Russia on large scale. A few cases

of conversations with relatives visiting wounded German soldiers in

Switzerland were also included in reports, but these visitors were

apparently not in a position to give important information.16/

A recurring criticism of the intelligence contributions of military

attaches was that insufficient use was made of such interviews with travelers

.and deserters. There were, however, many instances of intensive interviews

with German nationals, particularly those of some prominence. For example,

the American Naval Attache and the British and American Military Control

Officers in Denmark held an extensive interview on August 12, 1918, with

Professor Nicolai, a German pacifist who had fled Germany by airplane. 17/

19/ Military Attache Reports-Beme, November 5> 19^8. (Recktaan Report No. 66), R.G. 120.

16/ Military Attache Report s-Beme, August 3> 19^8. (Rechtman Report No. 45), R.G. 120.

Y j j Military Attache Reports-Copenhagen, August 12, 1918, R.G. 120.

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The object of the interview vas to learn as much as possible about Nicolai,

his work, and his intentions, as veil as to determine and report on the

manner in vhich he could be best used by the Allies. The interviewers

also tried to learn the state of mind of the German people anrj hov the

pacifists and anti-militarist sections of the population proposed that

peace should be brought about.

Professor Nicolai said that the movement in Germany -which aimed at

peace, anti-militarism, anti-Hohenzollemism, and a league of equal nations,

vas attaining enormous proportions. Eovever, this movement vas not unified,

and vas leaderless as veil as voiceless. He thought that increased

monetary support vould be of no assistance to the movement, and expressed

the certainty that there vould be a revolution in .Germany after the war.

Dr. Hans Schlieben -was another German in voluntary exile vhose

services vere enlisted by American representatives for informational

purposes. He had been in the German Consular Services and in the German

Foreign Office before coming to Switzerland and editing the Freie Zeitung.

He vas particularly helpful to Mrs. Vhitehouse in working for the American

Committee on Public Information in Switzerland. 18/

German expatriates such as Dr. Schlieben and Dr. Nicolai vere helpful

in interpreting events in Germany even though seme of them saw events frcm

the viewpoint of their own particular causes. Recently it has been written

that the successful analysis of a culture or the "national character" of

a people iinaccessible to the investigators depends heavily upon the

18/ File CPI 21-Al, Letter of March 2k, 1918, Records of the Committee on Public Information, R.G. 6 3 .

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mediation of persons vho to some degree share the cultures of both. 19/

This mediation vas of seme importance in World War I vhen German emigrees

and ex-nationals of Austria-Hungary contributed services to American and

Allied officials. The Interviewing technique of World War I vas of a more

modest scope and vas less systematic than the methods employed during

World War II.

nationals of the neutral countries also proved to be useful sources

of information once their confidence had been gained by American representa­

tives. This vas particularly true of traveling representatives of business

firms. Neutral pilots, captains, harbor masters, and lighthouse keepers

often became important instruments of American intelligence for obtaining

information concerning enemy maritime activity.

The degree of success attained vith these techniques for exploiting

the various intelligence instruments and information media can be better

judged wien the reporting by American observers is considered in seme

detailed cases in Chapter III.

Specialized Functions. In addition to routine procedural skills,

American observers vere sometimes prominent in more specialized forms of

intelligence operations such as psychological warfare, propaganda warfare,

19/ Margaret Mead and Bhoda Metraux, The Study of Culture at a Distance "^Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953)> p. 21. There vas un- doubtedly important use of persons with background knowledge of Germany in the United States as veil as in the European theater. During World War I, Robert H. Lovie, vho vas bora in Vienna, lectured on German culture to two successive groups of American soldiers in a specialized training program. Results of such a training program vould be difficult to appraise. Judging on the basis of material subsequently published by Professor Lovie, such efforts should have been an aid in achieving a broader understanding of Germany and the German people.

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and naval intelligence, which included submarine surveillance. American

military intelligence included a propaganda section which was later known

as the "Psychologic Subsection", and the State Department, as well as the

Committee on Public Information, had representatives interested in observ­

ing propaganda warfare results.

Military and naval attaches sometimes made observations coupled with

recommendations in the field of psychological warfare. Colonel Edward Davis,

the American military attache at the Hague, had some awareness of the im­

portance of psychological warfare. A report he made on October 27, 1918,

indicated his interest in this subject. 20/ He stated that his information

from many sources in touch with the masses of German people shoved that the

exchange of notes and official comments on the imminence of peace acted as

an "anesthetic upon the German body politic," temporarily dulling and post­

poning many small but painfully evident symptoms of revolutionary convulsion.

Colonel Davis recommended that if the Allies should remain silent on the

subject of peace, the consequent oppressive, apprehensive suspense among

the German people would disrupt the artificial unity then prevailing.

This stand by Davis is open to debate in view of the fact that

Wilson's peace publicity, according to such experts as George Creel, did

much to undermine the' Central Powers. Some writers, as for example

Hildegard Gauger, 21/ have emphasized the role of understatement and

silence in psychological warfare.

20/ Military Attache Reports-The.Hague, October 27, 1918, R.G. 120.

21/ Hildegard Gauger, Die•Psychologie des Schweigens in England (Heidel­ berg: Winter, 1937)•

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Early in America's participation in the ■war, diplomatic and military

agents in Sweden and Denmark as well as in the Netherlands recognized the

possibilities of propaganda warfare and requested assistance for it from

the home government before the Committee on Public Information began

operations in these countries. By February 1918, Mr. Richey, the Committee

on Public Information Commissioner in London, had arranged to distribute

propaganda in Holland through the British Information Service. 22/ Later

Mr. Sjjydam became the Committee on Public Information representative in the

Netherlands, a post considered pivotal because Holland was the important

source for German knovledge about America and the Western Allies. The

press was not the only means employed in Holland for the propaganda attack

on Germany. Revolutionary agitation was quietly encouraged. Deserters

frcm the German army, political refugees, and people who desired the over­

throw of the German government played a part in this campaign.

In Sweden, the American naval attache, Edward Robinette, represented

the Committee on Public Information, in addition to his other duties, until

April 1 918 . Counteracting German influence in the Swedish press was

something of a challenge to American representatives. Commander Gede, the

naval attache in Copenhagen, received orders from Admiral Sims to go to

Stockholm and confer with Robinette concerning the Swedish press.

Robinette, doubtless profiting frcm his banking experience, gave the

financial aspect of the question special attention. Because the Germans

owned the majority of stock in the Swedish Foreign News Service, only such

foreign dispatches as were favorable to them were published. The British

22/ Mock and Larson, op. cit., p. 2 8 3 .

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Minister to Sweden, Sir Esme Howard said it would only enrage the Swedes

if they thought that the Allies wished to tamper with their press. He

presented a plan, subsequently successfully carried out, to wrest control­

ling interest in the news bureau from the German stockholders, and

re-establish it under the auspices of neutral Swedish interests. 2 k f

Robinette was directed to cooperate with the Allied agents in

establishing the new agency to distribute cabled news to the daily news­

papers, and in general, to do whatever possible to gain sympathy for the

Allied cause. This new bureau was functioning by June 1918. 25/ Seme

American correspondents, as for example, Stephen Bouton, were overly

pessimistic about the establishment of the new bureau and advised against

it; however, the bureau met with fair success.

There was some criticism of American propaganda and publicity. For

example, J. O ’Donnel Bennett wrote to the Chicago Tribune on April 18, 1918,

that Americans, if they knew of the "patience and ingenuity which Germans

devoted to a mass of minor facts" to get at one important fact, would be

appal led at the manner in which America was daily spending thousands of

francs on cables concerning America’s war preparations.26/ These cables

disclosed actual figures and facts useful to German submarine commanders,

Bennett thought that they could readily make estimates from these data

concerning the strengthening of their fronts in vital particulars. He

2 k / John A. Gade, oj). cit., p. $ 8 .

25/ Ira Kelson "Morris, From an American Legation (New York: A. Knopf, 1923), P- 130.

26/ CPI File 10-A1 to A3, R.G. 256.

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complained that Baron Lucius, the German Minister to Sweden, other

German officials had only to glance over the Auerican publicity service

material and have their secretaries make a digest. The next day, it would

he in the Foreign Office in Berlin. Bennett conceded that the intention

of these dispatches was understandable and laudable because they were

supposed to stiffen the backs of the neutral countries so that they would

not go over to Germany or surrender under German tonnage threats. But he

concluded that the war had passed the press agent stage, and that the only

kind of press agency which the neutrals took seriously was the laconic

daily official war reports frcm headquarters. Bennett's alarm appears to

have been exaggerated. Despite so-called news leaks, no .American troopships

were lost.

Sometimes intelligence officers thought it necessary to

American news media. For example, while Captain Voska was in Paris

discussing the Russian and Austrian situations, and acting under instruc­

tions dated July 29, 1918, he learned of the death sentence passed on

Mil?da Jaruskova, one of his operatives in Austria. He also learned

that his own name had been mentioned by the American press relating to

Miss Jaruskova's activities. Voska, therefore, asked the military attache

in Paris to cable Major Biddle a request that in the future officers of the

Intelligence Department would not be mentioned by name in any espionage

items in the press. 27/

In addition to reporting on existing conditions in the field of

psychological and propaganda warfare, American military attaches made

recommendations as a part of their intelligence activity,and there was

a propaganda unit included in the American Intelligence Division. The

27/ "Voska Reports" File 54-4, R.G. 120.

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joint efforts of the military intelligence branches and the Committee on

Public Information vere especially important in producing the "Psychological

Estimates" of various countries • Walter Lippmann vas a member of the

Propaganda Section of the 0-2 Headquarters, having the rank of Captain.28/

Captain Heber Blankenhom, Chief of the Psychologic Section, maintained

personal contact vith Committee on Public Information representatives and

commissioners. His unit, -without the benefit of professional psychologists,

developed a German morale analysis chart. 29/ This vas done before polling

became a common technique, and vas based on a group of selected factors

•which vere given an arbitrary -weight and then averaged into a total.

A specialized function of observers vhich generally concerned those

in military intelligence vas train -watching. Train -watching itself vas

conducted on enemy-held territory, but its direction vas frcm neutral

countries. Holland.vas an especially important center for the placing of

train -watchers in Belgium, parts of Germany, and occupied Prance. A report

from Holland among the War College Documents concerned the train-watching

service in Belgium and its control from Holland. 30/ This system of train

\ watching, as described in June 1917, consisted of a post at Liege on the

Liege-Tirlemont line, and a post at Genial1 e-Haute on the line from Li^ge

\ to Namur. Reports on train watching arrived from Liege by courier about

every five days. The courier and the "grouper"(who arranged groups of

watchers) operated from Maastricht, Holland. The train watchers Vere

largely Belgians and invalided soldiers.

28/ See nPropaganda-F3nal Report" G-2-D, R.G. 120.

29/ Paul M.A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington: The Infantry Journal Press, 1954), p. 70.

gO/ A m y War College Document File 944, No. 9944-10, June 30, 1917, R«G» 1^5•

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Two other posts comprised another train-watching system. One post

was at Namur and covered the line Namur-Charleroi, and the other was also

at Namur covering the line Namur-ArIon. A third system used a post at

Louvain to cover the Louvain-Brussels line. There was a system of runners

for Liege and Namur who also watched the movement of troops on the march,

and reported the location of aviation sheds and parks. Runners were also it if supplied to cover Dusseldorf, Cologne, Duren and Aachen.

Submarine surveillance was a function of special interest to naval

attaches and the attache to Denmark was in an important post for its

exercise. The passage of the Great Sound and the Little Belt in Denmark was

considered a significant indicator of German submarine activity. The American

naval attache to Denmark, Commander Gade, received repeated and emphatic

orders to report all German submarines passing through the waters near his

station. One submarine or destroyer a day passed, on the average, through

the Little Belt or the Sound, hut the attache felt that he or the other

officers were fortunate if they reported the exact passing time of one vessel

a week. Finally, he received an intimation from Admiral Sims, Chief of * Naval Operations, that he would be considered to have failed in his work

unless he could improve the record. 31/

Because the adm-t-rai in charge of Danish Coast Guard Service had

been friendly to Commander Gade, the American told the Danish officer about

his (Gade's) predicament. He asked if information gathered frcm coast

guard vessels, lighthouses, and other Dmrtfib sources kept the government

informed of vessels passing above or below the waters of the Sound. The

317 Gade, op. cit., p. 1 0 b .

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Danish officer replied affirmatively, but quickly changed the subject,

as Commander Gade departed, said that they had better not meet in the future.

Shortly thereafter, Gade 'a assistant received information on submarine move­

ments from an unknown source, information later confirmed as accurate.

Commander Gade not surprisingly connected this information with his inter­

view with the Danish officer.

This incident is typical of the good relations that existed between

Danish naval officers and Americans • After the war, a report was submitted

by an Auerican naval officer which stated that the truest friends the Allies

had in Denmark were the officers of the Danish Navy. This friendship

which the Danish Admiralty showed toward the Allies the report contrasted

with what it considered the pro-German attitude of the Danish foreign

office. 32/ In October 1917 a report to the Office of Naval Intelligence

described the general features of German maritime activity near Denmark. 33/

It explained that there were three different types of objectives sought by

Germany in maritime operations: those directed toward purely naval or

military results; those directed against commerce; and those undertaken

principally for political reasons.

The report, which was evidently based mainly on British opinion and

information, maintained that less secrecy was employed by the Germans in

carrying out maritime operations having a strictly naval or military

character than in those having a political objective. Operations having

a political objective often involved neutral governments who were only too

willing to keep full knowledge of the facts of the operations frcm their

public•

32/ Subject File NE-2, R.G» ^5-

33/ Subject File NX-7, October 26 , 1917, R.G.

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The degree of secrecy with which naval activities directed against

commerce vere pursued lay between that of the comparative publicity

surrounding military operations and the extreme secrecy of those with

politically oriented objectives- The report said that the general rule

which guided Denmark in her attitude towards the question of German maritime

activities was the same as that she adopted on larger issues- This vas

an attitude of non-resistance coupled with a desire to conceal concessions

in order that an outward appearance of neutrality and independent action

might be maintained.

The belligerents, and especially Germany, assisted Denmark in this

desire for secrecy out of regard for the concessions she had made, such as

those outlined in the report of Danish-German relations at the outbreak of

the war. Germany vas reported to have presented an ultimatum to Denmark

demanding that the Great Belt be mined and closed to international traffic.

This vas done, and the mine fields vere guarded by the Danish fleet.

According to the report, Germany apparently not only feared, but

considerably overestimated England’s desire, necessity, and power to make

an attack through Danish waters - This description of German-Danish relations

regarding maritime affairs vas essentially correct.

Other reporting in the field of naval intelligence dealt with rather

general questions. Such a question concerned a proposed base of operations

in Norway upon which a report vas submitted in August 1917- 3^/ An argu­

ment in favor of the base vas that Norway vas thought to be pro-Allied

and in particular pro-American. Norway feared Germany as a close and

3V "ME-6 Subject File, August 6, 1917, R.G. b-5 ■

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dangerous neighbor, but her fear vas not so great as Denmark's- The

American naval attache suggested, that if Norvay vere handled vith wisdom

and patience, she might prove of no small value to the Allies. On

geographical and tecrpramental grounds, Norvay vas recommended as the

c o u n t r y for the location of the proposed base.

A campaign to pave the vay for the establishment of the base vas \ outlined by the naval attache. He suggested that the promulgation from

Scandinavian countries of anti-German propaganda would cause Germany to

discontinue the traffic of Scandinavian vessels. After Germany forbade

the America-bound vessels the seas, the United State's would announce that

it vas ready to consider the export of food to all Scandinavian countries,

provided,these countries would send for it themselves. None would be

able to send for the food, as Germany would have forbidden their ships

the seas. Norway’s food having been shut off by Germany, and the United

States having offered to supply it, should place Norway in a receptive mood

toward entertaining an American base. 35/

This report by the American naval attache in Christiana a went far

beyond the function of furnishing intelligence information. It vas a

recommendation in the field of planning political warfare and contained

suggestions for the use of propaganda as an irritant.

Econcmic Intel 1 1gence■ The surveillance of economic conditions

relating to the Central Powers vas of special interest to the War Trade

Board, and, in addition, to the special representatives of that Board.

357 Idem.

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Naval, military, and regular diplomatic officers vere helpful in reporting

on this subject. A Captain Mason of the Army War College played an important

role in spotting as veil as in exploiting enemy economic vulnerabilities.

He took the initiative vith the State Department and the War trade Board

in planning for the interruption of the flov of Swedish iron ore to Germany.

Captain John Foster Dulles vas associated vith Mason at the time, and

Dulles’ vork vas considered essential in the carrying out of this plan,

vhich adversely effected munitions production in Germany. 36/

A report made in May 1918 by the American military attache in

Copenhagen concerned the flexibility of German economic planning. 37/

It described the preparatory vork done by Germany in this area to meet

anticipated problems during the transitional period after the var. It

also dealt with the German demobilization plans. Another report at the

same time by the military attache to Denmark 38/ directed attention

to Germany's economic utilization of the Scandinavian states during the

var. Because of Scandinavia's geographical situation, Germany commercial

and industrial circles hoped that after the var good use could be made of

these countries, not only as seme of fev remaining markets, but also as

outlets for German products into the Allied countries.

In peacetime, Germany had had a monopoly on supplying many

chemicals and drugs. After the onset of the var, Allied countries having

a shortage of these commodities experienced considerable difficulties,

.36/ "History of M.I.D." War Department Historical G-2 Activities, R.G. 120.

37/ Military Attache Reports-Copenhagen, May 14, 1918, R.G. 120.

38/ Idem.

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■which vere, however, partly overcome "by the Allies' efforts to redistribute

■between them the available stock. This situation explains why initially

some of the prohibitions on trading vith hostile countries vere not strictly

enforced, among the Allied, countries. (This vas especially true of Russia

which, owing to the ranal 1 stoclspiles and general economic conditions,

suffered from a lack of Imported goods. Russia vas compelled for some time

after the var broke out to abstain frcm prohibiting the import of German

chemicals, surgical instruments and various iron articles.)

To return to the report dealing with German manipulation of

the economic factors vis-a-vis Scandinavia, the latter had, since the first

months of the var, been an important legal and illegal intermediary between

Germany and its enemies. The report observed that although better known

representatives of Scandinavian trade and industry had shown sufficient

moral integrity to resist German blandishments, many less known had been

less scrupulous. The Germans vere described as having organized these

illicit commercial liaisons vith such success that within a short time a

network of organizations existed all over Denmark, Sweden, and Norway through

which the Germans sold their goods to Russia, Great Britain, and other

countries. The defeat and inner crisis of Russia induced the Germans to

further strengthen their influence in Scandinavia in the hope of a future

submission of Scandinavia and the Baltic provinces to German hegemony. 39/

Cyril Brown, an American newspaper correspondent in Sweden, also

kept his finger on the German economic pulse and transmitted information to

American officials. Attempting to analyze the problem of how long Germany

could sustain its war effort, he M i d that all its liabilities in this aim

W ------'

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vere intimately interconnected, ho/ His reporting also dealt with the

var sociology" of Germany. He noted that the abnormal vartime change in

distribution of wealth in Germany had caused a significant displacement of

certain old class lines. In his opinion this process vas continuing at an

increasing rate, so that in general the rich vere growing richer, the poor

vere becoming richer, but the middle classes vere growing poorer. The

broad middle classes were described as undergoing a slow process of attrition

which the Germans termed "proletarianisation."

Biographi cal Intelligence. Biographical intelligence may be considered

a specialized type of intelligence even though it is often a component of

other types of intelligence. The label "biographical intelligence" is

mainly a matter of convenience and is generally applied to information

after it is appropriately arranged. An example might be counterintelligence

where much attention is given to the personalities involved in espionage.

Potential biographical intelligence is found in many types of reports.

Sherman Kent remarks concerning intelligence in general that "the phenomena

of life which appear in the formal encyclopedias can be regarded as frozen

in midpassage" hi/ He adds that such an accumulation of data would be

virtually all the intelligence required were it not for the element of

motion in human, events. This applies as veil to biographical intelligence.

Kent says that the perfect biographical note must include both factual

•information and critical appraisal. According to him the critically

evaluative part of the biographical note requires high competence, and a

successful intelligence operation implies a great knowledge of men.

ho/ Cyril Brown, Germany as It is Today (New York: George H. Doran, 1918) P* 12.

hi/ Sherman Kent, op. cit., p. 30*

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Biographical intelligence concerning such German officials as Count

Brockdorff-Rant zau (the German minister to Denmark, and an emergent German

leader "whose importance will be discussed in Chapter IV), could be found

dispersed through a number of reports transmitted by American diplomatic

and military representatives. Information relating to Brockdorf f-Rant zau was

often included in reports by the American Military Attache to Denmark. A

report dated October 1918 discussed at length Brockdorff-Rantzau' s personal

diplomatic aspirations, especially concerning the German ambassadorship to

Russia, and 'the German chancellorship; his anti-Bolshevism, particularly

as it concerned the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; and his convictions regarding the

development of democratic institutions in Germany, which he considered not

only a safeguard against the spread of Bolshevism there, but ethnologically

inevitable. 12/

Occasionally, it happened that relevant biographical data was not

available on an individual during the time he was most influential. Such

was the case with information on Dr. Alexander Helphand, a German agent

better known as Parvus, which became definite and detailed only after his

support of revolutionary activities had ceased to be an important factor

in helping to undermine the Russian military effort. Helphand was the

chief German agent in starting the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. A report

submitted by the American military attache in Copenhagen in May 1919; gave

the substance of Helphand*s views on a possible Russo-German alliance, and

on the future of the German socialist republic. 43/

42/ Military Attache Reports-Copenhagen, R.G. 120.

^3 / Military Attache Reports-Copenhagen, May 9; 1919; R.G. 120.

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There vas some inter-Allied pooling of information in the field, of

biographical intelligence relating to suspects. For example, there vas a

group of "suspect folders" — a roguei1 gallery of possible intriguers —

obtained by the American service from French and English sources.

There vas also considerable interchange of biographical intelligence

among American officials. Sometimes the American missions in the field would

ask Washington for further information oli file concerning persons in their

sphere of interest. Such a request came in June 1917 from Albert Schmedeman,

the American Minister in Norway, to the State Department for information

concerning Admiral von Hintze, vho had just arrived to take charge of the

German Legation in Christiania, 44/ The request vas processed through the

files of the Division of Information and information vas compiled based on

previous reports frcm American representatives in St. Petersburg and

Mexico City vho had knovledge of von Hintze's character and activities.

Apparently there vas an effort to add some depth and perspective to

information.relating to biographical intelligence. Past performances of

the subject vere investigated and officers sought the aid of other officials

vho had experience vith the person under study. William M. Collier, a

former Minister to Spain, on the basis of his intimate acquaintance vith

Don Antonio Maura, the Spanish politician, presented his interpretation of

him. 4jj/ Collier suspected that although from Maura's recent record one

could not infer sympathy vith the Entente, Maura might suddenly advocate the

cause of democracy as identical with the program of reform which he desired.

1<4/ State Department Decimal File No. 701*6257* R.G. 59-

49/ Inquiry Document 99> July 22, 1918, R.G. 2 5 6 .

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If he did, it vould he vith a force that vould go far tovard a change in

Spain's government that might he revolutionary.

By the cessation of hostilities, American biographical intelligence,

together with other phases of intelligence, reached a high level of activity

vhich vas maintained throughout 1919- Ih vas reported that American

psychologists prepared a report for President Wilson vhich analyzed the

character of the German representatives at the Versailles Peace Conference, k6/

Much attention vas devoted to the probable stand of German statesmen at the

conference, as vill be indicated in Chapter IV, "The Quest for Information

on the Peace."

Ill. THE HOLE OF EVALUATION

Evaluation is a crucial element of effective intelligence. The

amount of evaluation expected at subordinate levels appears always to have

been unclear. The naval intelligence network, while allowing evaluation at

the lover echelons, appears to have placed the responsibility for overall

interpretation of intelligence in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Also, naval intelligence observers vere expected to report information

vhich vas circulating even if it vas known to be false. For example, when -

Admiral Sims, Chief of Naval Operations, wired Commander Gade demanding an

explanation of his failure to send certain information which the Admiral's

office, believed had been received, Gade answered that he considered the

information to be false. A subsequent explanation from Gade informed the

Admiral that the same false information had been given attaches in four other

k6j Ladislas Farago, German Psychological Warfare (New York: Committee For National Morale, 19^1)> P* 5^"

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posts, as the enemy •wanted to plant it. bj/ The naval Attache vas none­

theless advised not to withhold any information, but to hand everything in

for the central office to judge, though his evaluation should accompany it.

Military intelligence vas guided to some extent by the notion that

frcm a plurality of reports the true facts could be sifted and verified by

reflexive comparison. During World War I, a spokesman for the General Staff

Intelligence stated:

Three principles for the digest of information are fundamental. The first one prescribes that there is practically no such thing as a wholly accurate report. If the attitude is taken that all reports are false but contain elements of truth, a process of elimination is engendered vhereby the worker is forced to positively determine, search for and find the true statement and cull avay the false. The second principle is that accuracy of deduction and authority of statement can only be obtained through a multiplicity of interlocking reports; that having three or more reports of a given incident, all of them false, the truth will automatically begin to appear by a process of elimination. As the reports frcm divergent sources on the given incident increase, so is increased the accuracy and amount of truth so deduced therefrom. bQ/

This vould imply the importance of a critical appraisal of reports,

since the authenticity of new intelligence is partly established by the

credibility with which it fits into the emerging picture. During World War I

errors in the evaluative interpretation of reports vere subsequently

disclosed by critiques. For example, a study of the older reports submitted

by the Berne military attache disclosed that if such reports had been

interpreted carefully at the time they vere received they vould have given

earlier indication of the German concentration against Italy. k$/

kj/ Gade, op. cit., p. 108.

kQj Colonel Mason, "The Doctrine and Practice of General Staff Intelligence," War Department Historical Records, R.G. 120.

h S { "Colonel Nolan's File," February 8 , 1918, R.G. 120.

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Critiques of the military information in reports submitted by military

attaches vere made periodically at General Headquarters by Major Moreno of

G-2. A report of July 29; 1918; from the military attache in Berne; vhich

contained information frcm an informant designated "Rechtman;" vas submitted

to Major Moreno for criticism. This report stated that, according to a

Sviss hospital attendant, a division returning frcm Russia had "brought

(besides typhus, Spanish grippe, etc.) such a spirit of rebellion" that a

number of secret Bolshevik societies had been formed among the vorkers and

soldiers. The report continued that:

. . . Three divisions, sent at the end of March to von Hutier's army had to be sent back from the front and disseminated among units considered safe. 50/

On this item Major Moreno commented that comparison vith information

on file in the "Battle Order Section" shoved the statement to be inaccurate

and that "the only division that came over in March to von Hutier's Army,

that vas later dissolved, vas the 12th L.W." (Landvehr). Tvo infantry y regiments of this division had been identified in the Vosges area,. If the

entire division had been contaminated vith Bolshevism, Major Morenodoubted

that the entire regiment vould have been allowed to continue existing as

such. He explained that one vould expect the regiments, the battalions,

and even the ccmpan1.es to be broken up and scattered, adding that the

statement vas "but another example of the utterly misleading hearsay vhich

the informant -appears to be so fond of incorporating" in the reports. 51/

Seme evaluation vas primarily directed to the correction of inadequacies.

Colonel Solan in G-2 52/ Headquarters found it necessary to suggest -that

50/ Military Attache Reports-Berae, July 29, 19^8, R.G. 120.

51/ "Colonel Solan's File," February 8 , 1918, R.G. 120.

52/ Ibid., May 1, 1 918 .

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the Berne Military Attache reports would be of increased value if sources

were instructed to differentiate between infantry regiments and reserve

infantry regiments. He also had to suggest that the regimental numbers

should be checked with the 3ritish manual, before information was for­

warded to headquarters, as he found that in numerous instances the

regimental number given did not check with the German army organization.

In May 19lS, Colonel Holan reported that the information service

in Spain did not seem to be developed as thoroughly as it should be and

that the military attache there did not seem to be fully informed of the

situation. 53I Back of funds was cited as a cause hampering the intelli­

gence work there.

Criticism by Major Campanole was directed to reports transmitted

through American consular agents in Switzerland during April and May

1918. 5 V Information signed by "Robertson" was described as dealing

principally with the economic situation in Germany and with propaganda,

but since this type of information came entirely from the German and Swiss

press, it was not too well regarded in higher headquarters. An agent named

"Lex" also received -unfavorable comment, but "Atkins" was described as one

of the most enterprising American agents in Switzerland. A report by him

on airplane factories in Germany was described by airplane specialists

at Headquarters as of considerable military value, and the efforts of

Atkins to obtain first-hand information from near Friedrichshafen were

commended.

52/ Ibid., May l6, 1918. '

Ibid., May l6, 1918

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The American system in Holland •was criticized by Headquarters for

its failure to interview travelers vho arrived frcm enemy countries. The

failure to examine deserters, prisoners, and Belgian citizens vho arrived

daily vas also mentioned. Prior to June 1, 1918, 55/ the American military

attache in the Hague vas described as relying excessively on the Allied

services in Holland for his information. The practice of mw.v-sr»g monthly

reports instead of forwarding information as soon as received vas also

criticized.

The use to vhich observers' reports vere put by higher echelons

implied, of course, an appraisal. For example, certain decisions made by

the Situation Office in the Military Intelligence Branch vere obviously

based upon reports in vhich vere placed a reasonable degree of confidence.

Colonel Mason, vho had reported in August 1917 to Colon Van Deman for duty

in vhat vas then termed the Military Intelligence Section of the Army War

College, became the Situation Officer.

War Department reports credit Colonel Mason with playing a key role

in preventing German intrigues from closing Holland to the Allies before

the drive of March 21, 1918. 56/ The German plan vas to interrupt Allied

observation and information services in the base provided by Holland.

Germany had presented an ultimatum to Holland suing for the passage of

German gravel trains across Dutch territory to the western front. This

vas to create a menacing crisis in Dutch neutrality so that either by

|^7 Ibid., June~28, 1918.

56/ "History of M.I.D.," War^Department Historical Section, G-2 Activities, R.G. 120.

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acquiescence Holland vould aid the German cause, by necessitating the closing

of Allied information services, or by refusal, open direct German action,

to that end. Neither event occurred. The Dutch Prime Minister asked the

American Secretary of State, Mr. Tansing, vhat ansver to give, and he

inquired of Colonel Mason vhat the military factors vere. The problem vas

thought important enough to take to the Chief of Staff, vho directed Colonel

Mason to report vith full data and give a verbal opinion. On American

advice, the Dutch acquiesced in the demands; but at the same time, it became

knovn to Germany that the friendliness betveen Holland and the Allies vas

not lessened but actually strengthened. Accurate information regarding the

situation in Hoi],and facilitated this decision.

Reliable and timely information also played an important part in

preventing another German intrigue aimed at closing Switzerland to the Allies

before the March 21st drive. 57/ This intrigue vas precipitated by the

delay in American food shipments to Switzerland caused by transport require­

ments for American reinforcements. The Germans capitalized on the resulting

food shortage by sending Ukrainian grain made available through the Treaty

of Brest-Litovsk. This act created enough popular pro-German sentiment so

that the German faction's plan to cripple the Allied information services

operating in Switzerland vould not be thwarted by the people. An important

Allied observation post vould be blinded when the 1918 spring drive vas

prepared. This German plan became knovn to the Situation Officer, vho

prepared to act at the first opportunity to block it. Such an opportunity

came on Easter vhen a German shell killed a Swiss citizen in a Paris church.

5j7 Idem.

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_ The news of the hilling spread in Switzerland, and at the same time the i Allies rushed their delayed food shipment across the border. This fortuitous

combination of circumstances created a public sentiment no longer conducive

to the German intrigue.

fieports by observers, coordinated with research, produced "Strategic

Estimates" which the Situation Officer used. One of the initial uses to

■which these Strategic Estimates were put was to deduce German vulnerabilities

and to shape American propaganda to the exploitation of such vulnerabilities.

Even allowing for possible exaggeration the military made of their

own activities, it seems probable that findings by observers helped in­

fluence decisions.on minor policy matters. Whether the advice and counsel,

vhich many observers preferred giving to the bare reporting of information,

had much effect on high decisions, is more doubtful, however.

In treating observers in action, a cross section of diverse intelli­

gence activity has been illustrated by sampling. In this sampling, no

analysis was made of the comparative value of information obtained through

the different neutrals, but the indications are that American posts in

each of the different countries contributed unique information. The post

in the Netherlands, for example, gave specialized attention to the

conducting of train watching, and was also an important base for

psychological, warfare against Germany. The base in Switzerland was well-

suited for the collection of information on Austria-Hungary, and officers

stationed in Switzerland often cooperated with those stationed in Italy.

The Italian phase of intelligence activity vas not described in this study.

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Had it been, the relative role of Switzerland as a base of operations

against Austria might have been more apparent. $8/ Switzerland and

Denmark were also important points for observing German affairs. Spain,

as well as Denmark, was a point for observing German submarine movements,

and the former, in addition, for monitoring German communications with

agents in South America. This latter activity was, however, only an

adjunct to the more effective work done by American intelligence in

Mexico and South America.

The rivalry between the American and British intelligence systems

which assumed various forms in the different neutrals, had an indirect

affect on evaluation. There were British complaints that American officers,

by overpaying thair agents, were "spoiling the market" in the Netherlands.59/

The British also, by diversionary tactics, attempted to maintain their

exclusive intelligence preserve in Switzerland. Anglo-American difficulties

58/ Had the Italian phase been treated, the role of the ubiquitous Captain Voska would have been also more apparent. Voska often left his base in Switzerland where his daughter, Villa, was incognito in an American Consulate, and where his son, Lieutenant Arthur Voska, was usual 1 y stationed. Voska frequently conferred with officers in Padua, Italy, and sometimes collaborated with Dr. Charles Clark who in turn worked under Colonel Buckley and with Dr. Gavagan on such tasks as observing pro-Allied or pro-German Vatican officials in Rome or observing officers of the Greek Fifth Army vho vere suspected of having agreed to surrender to the Germans in the Balkans. Captain Voska had been associated with Carl Byoir, associate nha-irman of the Committee on Public Information. In 193-9; Voska went to Prague and founded- the Czechoslovak Commercial Corporation and represented American business organizations. He was arrested by the Nazis when they entered Czechoslovakia, and he escaped to the United States where he joined the Office of War Information. He was sent to Turkey by that agency. After World War II, Voska resumed his business activities in Prague and was arrested by the Communists in 1950- He was released December 23, 1959, because of ill health and he died in April i960, at the age of 8 8 . New York Times, April 5, i960, and May 17, i96 0 .

39/ Subject File WX-7, Naval Attache Report No. 29 , The Hague, February 18, 1918, R.G. 45 -

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also arose in Sweden. Wien the time came for the U.S. to expand Its

intelligence operations there, England was reluctant to cooperate in

sharing information. 60/ Fear of future commercial rivalry was believed to

be a principle reason for this reluctance, since much of the intelligence

information included commercial and industrial data. Another symptom of

British jealousy regarding their intelligence system in Sweden was their

attempt to plant British agents in the office of the American Military

Attache in Copenhagen. 6l/ With the coming of the Revolution, Sweden

was to assume importance as an important post for observing Russian

affairs- This should be more evident when the case of reporting on

Russia is treated.

T j S J Subject File WE-9, October 19, 1918, R.G. k $ .

6l/ Herbert 0. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (New York: Bobbs- Merrill Co., 1931)> PP- 210-1^.

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CHAPTER III

REPORTING ON RUSSIA AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

IRUSSIA AND RUSSO-GERMAN RELATIONS

The reporting by American observers on Russian affairs after the fall

of the monarchy is the subject of the following case study, and illustrates

the attempts by these observers to appraise an especially bh&l 1 engt ng

situation. In the summer of 1917 most American diplomatic and military

representatives or other observers were aware that it was desirable for

the American government to be informed about the probable chances of

survival for the Provisional Government in Russia, and to learn whether the

Russian army could and would continue to fight.

Ira Morris, the American Minister to Sweden, succeeded in making

significant reports on Russia by utilizing indirect means of observation.

He was among the first to report that the chances for political stability

in the new Russian regime were slight. All his private and confidential

advice indicated that the Russian situation was very unsatisfactory, and

furthermore, it would grow worse. He advised Washington to that effect. 1/

Throughout June, July, and August of 1917, his information continued to

indicate the steady approach of a breakdown of Russia as a factor in the

war. The first week of September he was informed through a neutral source

that Russia was eager to stop the war and to negotiate a peace with the

Central Powers at an early date. If by Russia the Russian people were

TJ Ira Morris, Pram An American Legation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923), P- 156.

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meant, this information was well founded, for the majority of the Russian

people yearned for peace, although the Provisional Government remained

officially in favor of the prosecution of the war. In September, Morris

talked with a prominent Polish leader, two of whose sons were in the Russian

army. The Pole warned that it was out of the question to expect any offen­

sive from the Russians. From another source, Morris learned that the Russian

troops along the whole front were holding regular meetings to discuss

political affairs, and were refusing to obey orders to attack. 2/

On September 25, 1917* Morris advised the State Department that an

able source reported conditions in Russia as approaching anarchy, and

steadily growing worse. The Russian Minister to Stockholm, Mr. Goulkevitch,

who had been in frequent conferences with Minister Morris, had. up to this

time been optimistic but now had begun to lose hope.

.American observers devoted some attention to Russo-German relations

but not in the summer before the Bolshevik Revolution.3/ The Grimm-Hoffmann

affair points up Germany's attempts to gain a peace with Russia while the

Provisional Government was yet in power. The affair originated in May

1917 just after the fall of Czarism when a Swiss Socialist Delegate, Robert

Grimm, went to Petrograd for talks with Socialists regarding separate peace

possibilities between Russia and Germany. Before departing, Grimm revealed

his purpose to Arthur Hoffmann, Chief of the Swiss Political Department,

who advised him that should he encounter difficulties in Russia, he had

only to turn to the Swiss Legation.

|7 Ibid., p. I57I

3/ State Department Decimal File No. 862.2025^, R.G. 59» which is dated June 19, 1917# is the first note of the Grimm-Koffman affair.

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On May 25, 1917, Grimm requested the Swiss Legation in Petrograd to

telegraph a dispatch to Hoffbiann requesting possible information

Germany's war aims so that negotiations for peace could be facilitated.

Hcfftnan replied by secret cable on June 3 that he empowered Grimm to

orally assure the Provisional Government that Germany would undertake no

offensive so long as a settlement with Russia appeared possible. From

conversations with prominent Germans, Hoffmann was convinced that Germany

was striving for a mutually honorable peace with Russia, 4/ However,

Hoffmann's assurances that his relations with important Germans per­

mitted him to vouchsafe conciliating dispositions in Berlin, were com­

promising. This message was supposed to be confidential, but in sending

it, the Swiss forgot that Russian code breakers had no rivals in Europe. 5/

Hoffmann's implication in this affair effected his resignation, but he

nevertheless remained in touch with German officials.

The Provisional Government Era. During the period of the Pro­

visional Government, many American observers were prone to make overly

optimistic interpretations of the difficulties confronting Russia. Morris

however, had a more immediate knowledge of these events and attempted

appraisals free from the delusions produced by wishful thinking. There

were also some warnings from American consular and military officers

stationed within Russia. General William Juason, the American military

attache to Russia, was in close contact with Guchkov, the Minister of War

4/ Jacob Ruchti, Geschichte der Schweiz wahrend des Weltkrieges 1914-1919 (Berne: Paul Haupt, 192b), p. 231-

J Albert Pingaud, Les Heutralites et les tentatives de paix Vol. Ill of Histoire diplomatique, Paris: Alsatis, 1940), p. 231*

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in the Russian Provisional Government during the Revolutionary period. Judson

was one of the few American observers to note closely the scale and implica­

tions of the decline in military morale during the final weeks of the Provisional

government in Russia. He warned Washington of these developments, but his

warnings did not receive the attention they deserved. Morris defended General

Judson who, he said, fell under suspicion because his objective views of % Russian affairs led to unpopular conclusions. 6/ Raymond Robins, head of the

American Red Cross in Russia, credited Judson with observing "events with eyes

accustomed entirely to scientific and administrative facts." 7/ George Kennan,

while in general praising Judson as an observer, commented that the General,

like many foreigners, was hard-pressed to find any "adequate connection between

cause and effect in the rapid and confusing sequence of events" in Russia

during the summer and fall of 1917* 8/ In spite of the unpopularity of the

interpretations Judson and others expounded, however, there is some evidence

that their warnings were heeded by American officials. Secretary of State

Lansing expressed skepticism to the President regarding the staying power of

the Provisional Government. The Secretary was also critical of the optimism

disseminated by the members of the Root Mission. 8a/

Raymond Robins has been characterized as a person for whom the

realities of the moment were a working frame of reference. His image of

Russia in the revolutionary period, having been obtained from a few inten­

sive but brief experiences, lacked historical, perspective. In spite of

£/ Morris, op. cit.,p. 168.

2/ William Hard, Raymond Robins* Own Story (New York: Harper & Bros., 1920), p. 110. 8/ George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, New Jersey: Prince­ ton University Press, 1956), p- ^1 8a/ The Root Mission was a group of good-will envoys sent to Russia after our entry into the war, with the objective of influencing public opinion ■under the Provisional Government. Its recommendations for an informational program were ignored.

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his executive ability, lively interest in the Russian Revolution, and

knowledge of the contemporary labor movement, he was hampered by of

familiarity with Russian history, language, and literature. %J He is held

to have failed to recognize the compulsions that would force a revolutionary

regime to seek monopoly of power, and to have placed unreal hopes on the

possibility of moderating Soviet power. Nevertheless, Robins saw more of

the Soviet leaders in the early months of their power than any other

American, and was able to test pragaatically the reality of Soviet power

while professional diplomats had the opportunity only to scoff. 10/

Captain Newton A. McCully, the Naval Attache to Russia, performed

some valuable reporting services during this period. Unlike many American

officials in Russia he was fluent in Russian. He had been an observer

with the Russian forces during the Russo-Japanese War and was present at

the siege of Port Arthur. A report which Captain McCully made in July 191?, 11/

describing the conditions of the White Sea and Munaan coast area, and

based on an actual trip through this area, contained technical data of value

for naval operations. The bad. labor conditions were mentioned and German

submarine activity was described. Sews of the Bolshevik revolution was

reported by the Washington press before it was relayed thru channels to

Government officials there. Ira Morris was the first American representative

to officially report on the Bolshevik, coup to Washington. This was about

midnight of Saturday, November 10, 1917; 12/ the first news dispatches

arrived on Thursday, November 8th.

^7 George Ksnnap, Russia Leaves the War, p. 62.

10/ Hard, o£. cit., pp. 57-61•

11/ Office of Naval Intelligence report by Capt. N.A.M. McCully, July 1917, Subject File WA-6, R.G. k-5.

12/ George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 2 5 .

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The changing scene in Russia made it both difficult and important

for Minister Morris to obtain information concerning that country. To meet

this challenge he established a "Russian Bureau" in the Stockholm Legation.

Hie purpose of this bureau was not merely to gather information and pass

it on, but to "handle such information in a manner so as to make it valuable

and understandable." 13/ Presumably, this would imply the classification,

indexing, and arranging of information into a coherent pattern. Interpre­

tation and evaluation would also be necessary to make the information

understandable, a purpose Morris served by employing men of differing

viewpoints to function as critical controls of one another. Morris described

Dr. Morris Davidson as of Russian birth and a conservative by nature, and

with a feeling for the underdog. Another associate, Frowenfeld, was,

according to Morris, rather sympathetic to the Bolsheviks; and Mr. Nagel,

a Pole, held views regarded as midway between the other two. 1k j The

State Department approved of Morris's bureau and sent Professor

Archibald Coolidge of Harvard University to assist Morris with it.

Coolidge had been Acting Secretary of the American Legation in St. Petersburg

in I89O-9I and at Vienna in 1893- He was later sent as a special agent to

northern Russia as well as to Sweden during the war. The bureau which Morris

created became important as a means of acquiring information on Russia

during the troubled period of the Bolshevik revolution, because, for a time,

Ambassador Francis in Petrograd was rendered incommunicado by the revolution.

Morris regarded inadequate means of communication with Russia as responsible

13/ Morris, op. cit., p. 1 6 5 .

1 k j State Department Decimal File 12 4 .583/86, March 6, 1919> R^Gj_52*

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for a large part of the absurd rumors and alleged nevs dispatches published

in the rest of the world.

Later the Soviet government relied mainly on a wireless station

near Petrograd which transmitted to the Karls krona station in Sweden. 15/

Morris received many messages by this route from Chicherin, who later

became Soviet Foreign Minister. On November 27, 1917, Morris cabled

Washington that all his information was of such a nature as to destroy any

former hope that help could be expected thereafter from Russia in the war.

The information regarding what help could be expected from Russia

was important, but there were other aspects of the Russian question that

equally concerned American observers. During the period between the

Bolshevik seizure of power and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a prime

objective of observers was information indicating whether or not the Soviet

Government was going to conclude a separate peace. There were also the

questions of the stability of the Bolshevik regime and its character, upon

which depended America’s future relations to the Soviet government.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, General Judson reached certain con­

clusions based on his knowledge and observations. He advocated working

through, rather than against, the Soviet leaders in the effort to prevent

the removal of the German forces from the eastern front. Furthermore, he

believed that the revolution was stronger than the counterrevolution• 16/

This belief probably helped determine his recommendation for working through

the Soviets, as well as did the fact that he was aware of the possibility

15/ Morris, op. cit., p. 157*

16/ Hard, op. cit., pp. 66-109-

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of Russian supplies falling into German hands. According to Robins,

Judson had the ability to think of Russia, Germany, and materiel in terms

of actual Russian political facts, and -was penalized for his objectivity.

He vent to see Trotsky, the one man in Russia vho could withhold copper

from Germany, and for this was recalled to America. 17/

On November 30, Judson reported that something could be saved of

Russian influence for Allied interest, in that if a long armistice rather

than a separate peace vere arranged, German troops might be forced to

continue occupying their position on the Russian front. 18/ This view

proved to be over-optimistic and soon after the Brest-Litovsk armistice

Judson advised Ambassador Francis to recognize the impossibility of Russia’s

■waging war, and the fact that America should try to stiffen her hands for

the peace she would inevitably have to conclude. 19/ This advice proved

to be very realistic. At the same time Ira Morris reported that the Congress

of Soviets had adopted a resolution that all belligerents commence negotia­

tions for a just, democratic, and immediate peace without annexations and

indemnities.

On December 20, 1917, William Coffin, the Consul General at the

Stockholm Legation, reported to the State Department that Karl Radek, head

of the Bolshevik propaganda bureau, had stated that peace negotiations would

not take place at Brest-Litovsk but either in Stockholm or Copenhagen. 20/

He said that undemocratic or unfair terms would not be- accepted and that

aii troops under thirty were being kept at the front. The war would be

1X7 Idenu

18/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. I, p. 273*

19/ George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 231*

20/ State Department Decimal File No. 763-72119/1030, R.G. 59•

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resumed if German proposals proved unacceptable. Coffin cautioned that

Radek's statement should be seriously considered only if confirmation

were obtained from Russia. This warning was well founded, for Radek's

primary concern was propaganda, and shortly thereafter he was instrumental

in creating a misunderstanding on the part of American representatives

regarding the Soviet position in the peace conference.

This misunderstanding began December 31, when Raymond Robins gained

the impression from Trotsky that the Bolsheviks had just discovered the

Germans guilty of a "conspiracy" and that they planned to resume hostilities.21/

This impression was erroneous and the "conspiracy" merely referred to a

German announcement that certain eastern European territory would be re­

tained by them, a fact which the Bolsheviks knew before but suppressed.

Robins informed Ambassador Francis of this "conspiracy", and Edgar Sisson,

head of the Committee on Public Information office in Russia, questioned

Radek concerning it. Radek informed him that the Bolsheviks would fight

because they would perish if they did not. This remark strengthened the

misconception.

During the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations other doubtful

information found its way into the reports of American observers.

Lt. Col. Colvin, the military attache at Stockholm, reported on December 26,

1917, that there was considerable dispute in the Russo-German negotiations

regarding Poland. 22/ Both were said to be desirous of giving Poland her

independence, but the Russians demanded that the Polish government be

21/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. I, p. 4l8.

22/ Military Attache Reports-Stockholm, December 26, 1917, R.G. 120.

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fixed on "very democratic" lines • The Germans, on the other hand, said

that the Poles must "be free to choose their own form of government, which

was interpreted to mean that propaganda efforts would persuade than to elect

a form of government favored "by the Germans- The military attache reported

talk that the fate of Lodz was in dispute. He commented that Austria was

said to want to retain this city, which would mean the retention of a

considerable part of Poland by Austria.

This part of the attache's report reflected the confused picture

of the various "Austrian solutions" considered for Poland, as opposed to

various "German solutions." Seme desired a union of Poland with Galicia

as a partner in a tripartite Hapsburg Monarchy as a type of "Austrian

solution." 23/ A "German solution" advocated by some members of the

General Staff called for the widening of the narrow neck of German territory

between Danzig and Thorn and the annexation of another belt of Polish

territory to protect Silesia. Presumably these general staff officers

were not concerned whether the remainder of Poland became independent or

was given to Austria. It does not appear that Lodz itself ever figured

as a proposed boundary point for any partition or other solution regarding

Poland.

The initial armistice and the breaking off of negotiations followed

by the renewed German offensive, as well as the final treaty of Brest-Litovsk,

were reported in the Swedish press, and Minister Morris included extracts

frcm this press in his reports. The newspaper accounts reaching the American

23/ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk, March 1918 (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1939J, PP- 105-106.

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public for the period between the Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of

Brest-Litovsk have been described as the best of such reporting of Russian

affairs for this period. 24/ Diere was an eager curiosity on the part of

the public about the Brest-Litovsk negotiations; and the viewpoints that the

news reports expressed were diversified, and the interpretations generally

neutral. However, the news correspondents, in common with officials and

observers, somewhat optimistically assumed that the Soviets would refuse-

to make peace.

Same reports affecting the recognition of Russia were received during

this period. An example of such a report was addressed from Arthur Bullard

to George Creel late in November 1917* 25/ Arthur Bullard was a Committee

on Public Information representative in Russia and later became Sisson's

successor as head of the Russian office of that agency. He had been in

Russia during the 1905 revolution and had followed Russian affairs closely

after that .26/ One of his main interests in going to Russia was for the

purpose of studying the effects of the revolution on Russian foreign policy.

As an observer, Bullard has been described as hampered by poor linguistic

ability, since he never achieved real fluency in Russian. But in spite of

this limitation, and others — a frail physical constitution — and-an

aversion to the habits and atmosphere of government offices — one authority

has called Bullard's the most penetrating American observation on the scene

of the Russian Revolution. He has been described as:

24/ Wai-hia-r T.-ippTnnnn and Charles Merz, The New Republic, August 4, 1920.

25/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918? Russia, Vol. I, p. 270, file 861.00/740, November 27, 19.17- ’

26/ Arthur Bullard, The Russian Pendulum (New York: Macmillan Co., I919L p. ix.

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A sensitive and quiet man, scholarly, and veil-informed, de­ testing the limelight, endowed with a personal modesty vhich is one of the firmest foundations for intellectual penetration, he alone, of all the members of the official American com­ munity succeeded in producing -written analyses of the situation that achieved independent literary and historical distinction, not lost even after the passage of nearly forty years. 27/

Bullard was convinced that both indirect and direct evidence over­

whelmingly supported the conclusion that Russian revolutionaries accepted

German money. He explained that what the Allies needed was "conservative,

orderly upbuilding," but that all the Germans needed vas disorder. 28/

In a report dated November 1917 he described the Bolshevik Revolution,

"in sharp contrast to the revolution of March," as being a "minority

insurrection." 29/ He also reported that the Bolsheviks vere only one

small, fraction of the socialist movement and that their influence vas limited

to a fev well-defined localities. He recommended against de facto recog­

nition, and reasoned that "having overthrown the Provisional Government by

armed revolt, lacking a majority support they [the Bolsheviks] can only

hold power by sheer terror."

As 1917 drew to a close, watchful waiting characterized the attitude

of most American observers and officials with respect to Russia. With the

conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, many observers became more

anti-Bolshevik in their reporting, probably as a result of disappointment

in the conclusion of peace by Russia. Even able observers, emphasizing

that the Bolsheviks controlled only a portion of Russian territory in the

27/ rwvrgo K^TinftTij Russia Leaves the War, p. ^9 .

28/ Bullard, op. cit., p. 97

29/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. I, p. 270.

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early period of their regime, vere misled to impute too great a significance

to the consolidation of non-Bolshevik centers of resistance. There vere

reports portraying General Kaledin' s Cossacks as bulwarks of resistance

against Bolshevism and likely centers for the revival of the eastern front

against Germany. Decisions regarding official postures toward such centers

of anti-Bolshevism vere made on outdated and insufficient information, filtered

through many persons holding unrealistic and overoptimistic viewpoints.

By May 1918, advice concerning armed intervention became evident in

reports by observers. On May 2, Ambassador Francis reported he had reached

the conclusion that Allied intervention vas timely; and also that Mirbach,

the German Ambassador to Russia, vas dominating the Soviet government. 30/

Ambassador Francis mentioned that it vas the opinion of one of his staff

that the local Soviet would not oppose Germany without Allied encouragement,

and furthermore, that the Soviet government would approve Allied intervention

if it saw that it vas inevitable. On May 11, Francis reported that monarchical

sentiment vas growing as veil as opposition to Bolshevik domination. 30a/

Intervention. A report by the military attache in Stockholm trans­

mitted a proposal for intervention 31/ based on the impressions of a Russian

officer who claimed to be an emissary of a group of Russian businessmen.

He stated that many parties in Russia vere willing to be united but due

30/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. I, p. 519*

30a/ Ibid., p. 526.

31/ Military Attache Reports-Stockholm, May 2h, 1918, R.G. 120.

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to lack of initiative in Russia they could not ionite without” foreign help.

Such help could he given if the Allies vere to send an army corps. This

expeditionary force should he landed.at Archangel. A Murmansk landing vas

thought dangerous because it vould.-be too close to Finland, vhich vas

occupied hy German invading troops. Before beginning such an operation it

vould he necessary to address a manifest to the Russian nation asking it to

overthrow the Bolshevik government, and to state that the form of govern­

ment in Russia vould he established hy a free-voting constituent assembly.

The military attache in Stockholm did not agree vith the Russian:,

on the advisability of sending an army corps to Russia. He maintained

that there vould he too many problems of transport, and also that sending an

army corps on "such a vild and uncertain project" 32/ vould he a military

adventure resulting merely in one army corps less at some vital point of

the vest front. He added that the English minister and military attache

vere in favor of the project, and the French attache vas opposed to it.

The French officer said the Russians vere through fighting. Concluding

his report, the American officer varned that the limited period in vhich

the port of Archangel vas open to commerce vould place any expeditionary

force in a precarious situation during the winter.

This report and other reports broaching the subject of intervention

may veil have been inspired! by British views, in addition to those of

interested anti-Bolshevik Russians. The report frcm the Stockholm

attache vas made only two days before General Tasker Bliss wired an

32/ Idem.

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important message to Secretary of War Baker concerning the meetings of the

Allied military representatives on the question of intervention in Russia.

He advised that it -was of first importance to learn -whether the Russian

government and people -would -welcome such intervention. Bliss distrusted

everything he heard on the subject in Paris. He complained that he heard

only denunciations of the Bolsheviks and everything they stood for, and he

■thought that most of those making such denunciations would like to see

something like the old regime restored. He continued:

It is from the old Russian regime that come declarations in favor of intervention. Members of that regime will listen to anyone who favors its restoration. But when the time is ripe for listening to them, the Germans can help them more quickly than can the Allies. My present disposition is to consent only to a recommendation that the Allied Governments ascertain beyond a shadow of doubt what the real attitude of the Russian people will be toward this intervention. But it must be that these Governments have been trying to do this for months and are not yet satisfied. 33/

General Bliss was aware of the importance of accurate information,

and felt that his effectiveness fcas reduced due to lack of it. Not being

in direct communication with the State Department, he had no access to any

independent source of official information other than the War Department.

This was a satisfactory situation with respect to military matters, but

unsatisfactory insofar as questions of a political nature were involved,

and he was frequently obliged to use such data and reports.as he could obtain

from his Allied colleagues.

33/ Cables Sent, No. 115, General Bliss to Secretary of War Baker from Versailles, May 26 , 1918, Records of the Supreme War Council, R.G. 120.

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On July 12, 1918, an American intelligence officer, Captain Vo ska,

submitted, a report concerning intervention in Russia. 3k j He stated that

the latest events in Russia had convinced him that it -was very urgent to

take steps toward military intervention. The Czech army, according to

his latest information, -was in control of Vladivostok. Fifty-two

thousand fully equipped Czech soldiers and almost as many enlisted hut

■unequipped Czechs were in different parts of Russia. Voska thought that

if the Russian people were free to organize themselves, to pass upon their

constitution, and elect their own representatives, military intervention

would serve to preserve order. This would he accepted hy the Russian

people in a friendly spirit. Japanese intervention was not wanted.

According to Voska, Japanese intervention would help the plans of the

Germans hy throwing into the arms of Germany even the element in Russia

which had been anti-German. The Russian people were described as disliking

the Japanese hut looking upon the American nation more favorably than

any other Allied nation. The American government, therefore, could

handle military intervention better than any other nation. According

to Voska, intervention was necessary if the Germans were not to have

a free hand. It was argued that the Czech and Polish armies and Russian

military groups in Russia could he easily organized so that it would not

he necessary to send a large number of soldiers. 35/

Voska contended that even though an absolute 'Allied victory on

the western front was certain, this alone would not defeat Germany, because

3Kj "Ruditsky and Voska Reports," July 12, 1918, Secret Service Records, G-2B, RJSi_120.

35/ Idem.

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the future was in the east. Germans, once in control of the unlimited

deposits of wealth in Russia, would control the manufacturing and commer­

cial areas, and have the cheapest labor at their disposal so that competi­

tion would be impossible. He explained that the French government had

extended support to the Czech and Polish armies in Russia and would agree

to have these armies changed into American units.

This report by Voska illustrated the trend toward support of inter­

vention that developed during tiay, June, and July of 1918. Even Felix Cole,

the Consul at Archangel, softened in his opposition to intervention. June

1, 1918, he had reported to Ambassador Francis concerning obstacles and dis­

advantages involved in an intervention. 36/ He pointed out the difficulties

of; supply, arguing that supplies would have to be brought by Allied ships

from Europe and maintained entirely by Allied means, because the Russians

could not be depended upon to work willingly, or, effectively, if at all.

He also reported that the ground for landing an interventionary force

had not Jpeen properly prepared and that the north of Russia was "nowhere

near as pro-Ally as it might be." He warned that every foreign invasion

that had gone deep into Russia had been swallowed up. But by July lp,

1918, Cole was reporting that the inhabitants of Archangel anticipated 37/

36/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. II, P- ^77. .

37/ Ibid., p. b9J.

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more favorably the arrival of Allied forces. He stated that the publicly

expressed disfavor toward military intervention vas the result of propaganda

efforts made by the local Bolshevik leaders at Moscow's behest. Cole

believed that the executive department of Archangel would eventually

cooperate and welcome the Allies, if they proceeded with tact.

Seme observers were opposed to intervention. Such an observer was

Post Wheeler, who served as Charge d'Affaires in Stockholm while Minister

Morris was on vacation, and who later succeeded to the post in Minister

Morris' place. Working with the original personnel of the "Russian Bureau"

organized by Morris at the Stockholm Legation, Wheeler gathered evidence

that the intelligencia had either been executed, succumbed to disease, or

escaped, and that the remaining population in Russia was mainly composed

of ignorant peasants and resentful workmen. 38 / A counter-revolutionary

movement seemed possible to Wheeler only through such Czarist officers

as were left in the army, and would have to overcome pitiless espionage

and purges.

Wheeler was convinced that his reports were not well received in

Washington, a belief to which the following incident lent support. A

series of articles appeared in the Chicago Daily News by Isaac Don

Levine, who had independently reached conclusions similar to those of

Wheeler. These articles caused Wheeler's superiors in the State

Department to cable him, charging that Levine's "pro-Bolshevik

tendencies so apparent in his articles strongly suggest a certain rapport

with the Legation.1139/

38/ Post Wheeler and Bailie E. Rives, Deane of Many Coloured Glass XNev York: Doubleday, 1955)> P- 6ll.

3g/ Ibid., p. 612.

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A full and immediate report -was demanded. Wheeler replied that though the

press had appraised him of Mr. Levine's presence in Stockholm, he had not

called at the Legation, and naturally, had not had access to any confidential

reports to Washington or Paris. Wheeler later spoke with Levine and wired

the latter's proffered statement that his articles in Chicago had been

based wholly on his own observations and the contents of the local Swedish

and Russian newspapers.

Wheeler complained later of the attitude of various State Department

officials and stated that they refused to weigh the accumulating evidence

regarding Russia. In Wheeler's view, the Bolsheviks had first counted on

American altruism, but events tended to convince them that the United

States was as imperialist at heart as the old Czarist government.

On July 21, 1919> Wheeler reported to the Secretary of State that

a Russian, recently escaped from Russia and known to the Legation, said

a group of German and Austrian prisoners of war in Russia were organizing

a so-called Council of Deputies- 40/ This was in effect a Soviet working

in harmony with the Bolshevik government and especially charged with the

establishment of connections with western Europe and the United States,

for the purpose of Bolshevik propaganda. Wheeler, who did not tend to

be an alarmist anti-Bolshevik in his reporting, thus could not but be

aware of the extensive propaganda plans of the Bolsheviks. There had

been many such reports much earlier.

40/ State Department Decimal File 86l.OO/U879> R.G. 59-

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The period vhen the White armies vere threatening Petrograd is a

postscript to Wheeler's services in Stockholm during 1919 that illustrates

the attitude of certain State Department officials to his reporting.

There vas excitement on the day vhen the Stockholm papers announced that

Deniken's army had entered Petrograd. Two of Wheeler's experts vere

credulous enough to accept the story, hut one of his colleagues, Davidson,

in vhose judgnent and information he had placed most- reliance, vas distrust­

ful. Davidson's confidential reports indicated that Deniken's forces had

been repulsed, if not decimated. Wheeler, therefore, sent no verification

of the fall of the city. A cable arrived frcm the Secretary of State's

office directing Wheeler to vire immediately the cause of his silence

in the face of aaaouncements by nevs agencies that Petrograd had fallen.

Wheeler vas soon able to reply that these reports vere fallacious. 4l/

A question subidiary to that of American and Allied intervention

in Russia concerned reports of the German and Austrian prisoners-of-var

in Russia. Incorrect reporting of the alleged danger to Siberia frcm the

German prisoners-of-var probably caused certain vacillations in the policy

of the State Department -which are difficult to trace. Tvo -writers interested

-in this question have reached different conclusions. George Kennan has

stated that the American decision of July 6 , 1918, to make a landing at

Vladivostok had freqnent references to German and Austrian prisoners,

vho vere pictured as the only opponents confronting the Czechs. 42/: .'

4l/ Wheeler, op. cit., p. 613.

42/ George Kennan, Decision to Intervene (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp • 400-401,.

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This vas a stereotyped analysis in vhich the complexity of the var-

prisoner problem vas ignored, and reports vhich vould have shovn this

complexity vere'disregarded. Thus the government sponsored an alarmist

image of a Siberia threatened vith seizure by armed detachments of the

Central Powers. Such an observer as Robins vould, according to Kennan,

have challenged this image if given a chance. Walter Lippmann is less

critical of the American contribution to the prisoner-of-var formula,

and attaches more responsibility to the French. In his opinion, the

Americans dealt more realistically vith certain factors of the Russian

situation than did the French. ^3/ He attributes this to the fact that

they had less time to develop stereotypes about the var, because prior

to 191^ they had no recollection of a var on the continent. According

to Lippmann, a French stereotyped conception of the var being fought on tvo

fronts vas a prime cause of their demand for the reestablishment of an

eastern front vhen Russia withdrew frcm the var. Germany had been regarded

as held between France and Russia and with Russia's withdrawal Japan could

replace Russia. The difficulty of the Japanese reaching the Germans

5,000 miles away was somewhat overcome by bringing the Germans more

than bai-r -way to meet them. For this purpose, the reports that German

prisoners were forming armies were eagerly seized upon as evidence

of another German front.

German-Russian Relations. German-Russlan relations also received

attention during this period. May 29, 1918, Consul Poole reported from

Moscow that a reliable American had been sent to observe the prisoner-of-var

43/ tfftH-.g-r T.-jppnann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt Bros. & Co., 1922), p. 9 9 -

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exchange in Orsha (near Smolensk), 44/ This observer said "that "three

trains from both directions arrived daily with four hundred to a thousand

men on each train. The returning Russian prisoners were without exception

invalids, and all Russian officers and soldiers capable of bearing arms

were retained in Germany. The trains of German prisoners were filled with

healthy soldiers. The observer reported that the majority of the Russians

were bitter against the Germans because of the treatment they had received.

Other aspects of German-Russian relations were described in a report

by Lt. Col. Colvin, the military attache in Stockholm. This report, made

in August, explained that in Germany there was a struggle between two

factions, the "Russophiles" and the "Russophobes." 45/ He chose the terms

"Russophiles" and "Russophobes" to reflect Germany's long-range plans anri

not her immediate goals. Russophiles, paradoxically, would invade and

occupy Russia for constructive purposes, while Russophobes would ignore

and neglect Russia anticipating that it would disintegrate by itself.

Mirbach, the German Ambassador to Russia, was thus termed a Russophobe

because he held that the best interests of Germany required giving full

support to the Bolshevik regime. This regime would do everything which

tended to destroy the economic and industrial life of Russia, thus

weakening her so that Germany could gradually absorb the cast-off

parts such as Poland, Livland, Kurland, and the Ukraine, and ultimately

encompassing the greater part of what were formerly the western districts

44/ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. I, p. 546.

45/ Military Attache Reports-Stockholm, August 23, 19l8> R.G. 120.

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of the Russian Qupire. The recent appointment of Helfferich as

Ambassador-designate vas interpreted by the military attache as signifying

that the Russophiles had been given a chance to see vhat they could do

vith Russia. After a fev days in Moscov, Helfferich decided it vas im­

possible for a self-respecting government to continue an official

relationship vith this "group of bandits" labeled the Russian government,

and he so reported on his return to German headquarters. Furthermore,

he recommended that Germany immediately take steps to occupy both Petrograd

and Moscov and to assist vhat vas left of the former Russia to form a

government. Colvin reported that after much discussion, the Russophobes

succeeded in convincing German headquarters that Helfferich’s plans vere

not in Germany’s interests, and therefore, that Petrograd and Moscov

should not be occupied. As a result of this nev decision, orders vhich

had been given vere countermanded.

The American military attache inferred that Helfferich's idea vas

at first accepted, for steps had been taken to implement it. k6/ A Russian

vho just arrived fraa Petrograd after journeying through Riga and

Helsingfors, confirmed this reasoning. When in Riga, he found that the

German commander complained of the foolish instructions vhich he continued

to receive frcm German headquarters. The German officer stated that on

August 11th he received orders to prepare tvo divisions for dispatch to

Petrograd and Moscov. After preparations vere veil on the vay, on

August 15th, he received instructions countermanding the orders of the

11th. In Helsingfors, the Russian learned that between August 12th and 15th,

kb / Idem.

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German troops were being sent towards Viborg, -while on the l6th all east-

bound German military trains were stopped.

The attache's report concluded that reliable sources indicated

Helfferich had resigned as Ambassador-designate to Russia and would not

return, and that an announcement to this effect would be made momentarily.

The Russophobes, having attained this objective felt assured that their

plans for the continued disorganization of Russia would be followed.- This

report by Col. Colvin and the attention it gave to the different German

orientations toward Russia was a sophisticated view of a significant

question of depth and perspectives.

On August 27, 1918, three often forgotten supplementary treaties

to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty were signed between Germany and Russia, kj/

It was doubtless the financial agreement of that date which was the

subject of a report by the Office of Naval Intelligence to the State

Department on September 14, 1918. 48/ This information bad reached

the Office of Naval Intelligence from a "reliable source" in Sweden.

It reported that Germany was ready to accede to the anti-capitalistic

policies of the Soviet government and to assume payment to her citizens

•of all damages on condition that Russia pay five billion marks. Germany

would recognize all nationalization completed before the first of July

1918, and all demands of German holders of annulled or nationalized proper­

ties were to apply only to the German Government. Russians suffering

4-7/' -Dinnershtein (Ed.), Dokumenti Vneshnei Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoi izdatelstvo, 1957), Vol. I, pp. 437-53; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. I, p. 615.

48/ Subject File WA-6, R.G. 4-5.

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damages from Genian legal acts of a military nature had no right to demand

compensation from the German government.

The interpretation placed on this agreement in the report -was that

under the guise of reimbursement Russia vas obligated to pay Germany an

original and practically undisguised contribution. The report stated

that there vas no doubt of this even in Soviet circles, but it vas explained

that the Soviets found it possible to agree to this contribution in viev

of the political and economic concessions made by Germany. This

interpretation in the report misplaced the emphasis somewhat. The "political"

concessions mentioned vere actually more favorable to the Russians and have

even been described recently as foreshadoving "the coming German withdrawal."1+9/

On October 21, 1918, the American naval attache in Stockholm submitted

a report which included a translation of a telephonic conversation between

Commissar Zorin, pO/ Chief of the Foreign Department of the Petrograd

Commune, and Commissar Chicherin, Chief of Foreign Affairs. This transcript

had somehow been obtained and brought to Stockholm by Captain William B. Webster

of the American Red Cross Mission to Russia. This conversation vas of

importance as signifying an attempt on the part of the Bolsheviks to

establish communication vith America. In the conversation, vhich took

place September 30tk, Zorin proposed to Chicherin that Webster discuss with

Raymond Robins, the American Red Cross representative in Russia, the question

of the representation of America in Soviet Russia. Chicherin replied that

49/ John A. Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), P- 1-2 •

50/ Subject File WX-7, R.G.

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it vas important that the Soviets should he able to go officially to the

United States and desirable to be in contact with Colonel Robins and

send him cables. Chicherin described Robins as cooperative but Consul

Poole as solidly vith the Anglo-French. Chicherin complained of Poole’s

unfriendly attitude and stated that "this same Poole vas our only connec­

tion vith America ..." pi/

During 1919* Norman Hapgood served as an interim appointee to

Denmark. His appointment vas an example of the President and Colonel

House making a special effort to judge Russian affairs from a vantage

point other than that of career diplomat.

On July 2, 1919* he took the opportunity of raiaag some questions

on Allied policy toward Russia by including a clipping from an English

newspaper. A letter to the editor in this paper had questioned the Allied

statement that an offer to relieve famine conditions in Russia had been

withdrawn because the Soviets refused to accept conditions for suspending

hostilities. It stated that the impression, had been given that the cues-

tion depended on the assent of the other Russian parties and not merely

t the Bolsheviks, but before the Bolsheviks made their reply, the prompt

refusal of the other parties settled the question. What, it was asked,

vere the exact terms in vhich the proposal for a conference dealing vith

relief in Russia had been answered? Hapgood appeared to agree vith the

writer that there vas some question on these issues. Attached to Hapgood*s

report vas a State Department routing slip from the "Division of Near

Eastern Affairs (Russia)" bearing the comment:

51/ Idem.

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The attached papers indicate the pro-Bolshevik tendencies of Mr. Norman Hapgood. The general tenor ofthis correspondence is that he cannot believe the Department is veil informed about Russia and the facts of the results of the Bolshevik rule and purpose. 52/

Hapgood later recorded that the State Department held different

vievs on the question of Russia from those of Colonel House and the

President. At the time of Hapgood’3 appointment, the question of Hapgood's

political leanings had arisen and Senator Lodge, 53/ head of the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, sided vith the State Department and refused

to act on Hapgood1 s nomination. Hapgood vas sent to Denmark only after the

Senate had adjourned.

Influence of the Russian Reporting. A serious difficulty in

evaluating the significance of intelligence reporting lies in estimating

its impact on the State Department and on policy making in general. To

correct this difficulty vould involve an extensive examination (beyond the

scope of this study) of American policy regarding Russia at this time;

nevertheless, a tentative judgment indicates that the reporting vas not

effective in influencing policy in any positive direction. The fact that

reporting tended to exaggerate the veaknesses of the Bolshevik regime

probably did not act as a deterrent to recognition, because even if the

strength of regime had been exaggerated, it is unlikely recognition

vould have been accorded. The exaggeration of the strength of anti-

Bolshevik centers in Russia apparently vas not so extreme as to inspire

]j|7 Ibid., File~~No. 861.00/4897-

53/ Hapgood, o£. cit., p. 250.

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confidence on the part of the State Department in the opponents of

Bolshevism, but only reenforced the "do nothing" policy that the State

Department followed in early 1918 . This information on the anti-

Bolshevik centers in Russia seems to have been regarded by the President

and State Department as inconclusive. In April, 1918, Wilson found it

necessary to solicit further information on these anti-Bolshevik centers

of resistance.

The turmoil in Russia doubtless affected certain judgments on the

character of individual Russians. The American military attache in Sweden

stated that it was a safe principle that all Russians, whatever their

rank, station, or family, should be thoroughly distrusted until one was

absolutely sure of them. >4/ Arthur Bullard was more moderate in his

judgment of "Russian character." He thought it unfair and impatient

to conclude that the Russian mind could "not comprehend honest proposals,"

and he remarked that Russians were suspicious not only of foreigners but

of each other. 55/ 2 e did not think that Russians per se were less honest

than Americans, only that their experiences had been different. He did,

however, admit that the Russian habits of indirect, corrupt methods, and

of imputing sordid motives to others were obstacles to dealing successfully

with them. Bullard speculated that a psychiatrist might explain same

Russian actions as a form of "mania persecution." The label "delusion

of grandeur" he thought appropriate to the Russian's surprise that the war

could continue after they had made peace.

547 Military Attache Reports-Stockholm, May 24, 19lS, R.G. 120.

55/ Arthur Bullard, The Russian Pendulum (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1919), PP- 195-201.

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In a situation so ambiguous as that of Russia during the revolutionary

period, the initial attitude of a given observer could prove decisive in

his final estimate of the situation. The "halo effect-," veil-known to

psychologists, was manifested by some American observers with socialist

or radical crusading tendencies who were slow to believe that Russian

revolutionaries could do any wrong. The previous experience of a given

observer often served as a frame of reference for his interpretations

of events in Russia. The fact that Raymond Robins, for example, had been

a leader in Christian Evangelistic movements may help explain the fact

that he often used a religious frame of reference in describing and

explaining the Bolsheviks. Thus he posed the following questions:

Is it possible that the Bolsheviks are missionaries and we are not? Is it possible that Bolshevism is a religion and Americanism is not? Is it possible that agents from Moscow can dare adventure themselves in our cities and can convert our people, and that we do not dare to adventure ourselves in their cities and cannot convert their people? 56/

II. EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Austria-Hungary. Switzerland was regarded as an important post

for observing Austria-Hungary and adjacent areas of east-central. Europe.

In the early stages of America’s war effort, information on the possibility

of detaching Austria-Hungary from the alliance with Germany was eagerly

sought. Austrian peace feelers made through Switzerland by secret envoys

hari doubtless alerted American representatives in Switzerland to possibili­

ties of a separate peace between the Allies and Austria-Hungary. One

American observer, Frank E. Anderson, in his eagerness for information,

$6/ Hard, op. cit., p. 239-

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exceeded his instructions, and created uneasiness in the minds of his

superiors. December 1917, be telegraphed from Berne through Charge

d'Affaires Wilson to Leland Harrison of the Information and Intelligence

Section of the State Department, suggesting that he could be given a safe-

conduct from the Austrian Legation to proceed to Vienna and meet Count

Apponyi. 57/ Anderson had expected Apponyi's arrival in Berne, but the

latter did not come, so Anderson thought he "could get the true inwardness

of conditions" in Austria by going there. On December 7, 1917, Anderson

wired the State Department that he was leaving for Vienna, as the safe-

conduct had been granted. 58/ Charge d'Affaires Wilson informed the

Secretary of State the same day that he had not been informed of the nature

of Anderson's mission and regarded his trip with apprehension, lest the

Austrians attempt to interpret it as a proposal of peace. 59/ On December 10,

Lansing wired Wilson instructions to hold Anderson’at the border if possible,

and if he. had crossed to try to instruct him to return at once. Anderson's

mission was to obtain information regarding political conditions; consequently,

he had exceeded instructions. Anderson reported that the most important

result of his trip was the information sent throughhim to the Entente

citing interest in a "conversation" to discuss democratization of Austria-

Hungary. A meeting, not a peace conference, between three or four from

57/ Foreign Relations of the United States 1917, Supplement 2 , p. ^5^.

58/ Ibid., p. 46l.

59/ Ibid., p. K6S.

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each side, vas suggested by Apponyi so that many misunderstandings could

be removed. 60/

An unofficial observer in Switzerland, Professor George D. Herron,

contributed a considerable number of informative reports on Austria-Hungary.

He was a former Congregational minister who had been forced to resign a

professorship from Grinnell College because of unconventional views on

morality and politics. He had wide experience and acquaintance with

European political leaders. British officials first realized that Herron’s

contacts with intellectual circles in Germany and Austria could be valuable

and he first reported information to them. Sharp, the American Ambassador

in Paris, was also impressed with Herron's connections and sources of

information and before Herron started sending his dispatches to Berne, he

made a few reports to Paris. 6l/ In addition to his connections with

German and Austrian political leaders, Herron was in touch with groups of

Yugoslavs, Czechs, and Poles who came to Switzerland. On January 25, 1918,

he reported that the Yugoslavs saw in Wilson's attitude no premise of a

union of the Yugoslav people, but rather an implicit decision to maintain

the status quo. 62/ Herron said they felt they had been abandoned by the

Allies and the United States for the sake of detaching Austria from

Germany. This was in fact very close to the policy which the United States

was pursuing at this time because of its hope that Austria might make a

separate peace.

60/ State Department Decimal File 783*72119/1271/2 (January 2k, 1918), R.G. 59- ■

6l/ Mitchell P. Briggs, George D. Herron and the European Settlement “(Stanford University Press, 1953)> PP* 30-36.

62/ Ibid., p. Jk.

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Herron, himself, became implicated in some of the secret peace

feelers. On February 3rd and Irth, 1918, he met Professor Laamasch, the

Austrian vriter, near Berne. Laamasch claimed to have came with the

approval of the Emperor Karl and stated that the Emperor vas anxious to

reform the iispire and to attain peace. A project of regrouping the SHpire

into autonomous units on the basis of nationality -was mentioned. Herron

reported on this visit saying he did not doubt the authenticity of

Laamasch's proposal, but advised against it. 63/ His analysis of the

proposal convinced him that it vas meant to be a means of capturing and

using the new order without the intention of serving it. B y April 22,

1918, Herron vas advising the State Department through Minister Stovall

that the possibility of detaching Austria from Germany vas unlikely, and

that the best strategy in east-central Europe, inhis opinion, vas support

of Italy, and the Yugoslavs. 6k/ He did not seem to be avare of the

possibilities of conflict between the Yugoslavs and Italy at this time.

Although the State Department folloved this course it is unlikely that

Eerron's report vas decisive. By May, a full report recommending a similar

policy had been prepared for the inquiry by Robert J. Kemer. 65/

Austrian dependence on Germany received considerable attention in

the reporting from Switzerland at this time. The German idea of

"Mitteleuropa" vas probably given exaggerated importance. In June 1918,

63/ - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Supplement 1, Vol. I, p. 6 8 .

6kJ Ibid., p. 1 8 2 .

69/ See p. 147 of the next chapter

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Minister Stovall reported from Berne to the Secretary of State that there

vas no doubt that throughout Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria a reaction vas

setting in against the political and economic domination of Germany in

central Europe. 66/

The Slavic elements vere described as forming a nucleus of opposition

to the German plan, and they vere joined to sane extent by other minorities.

In Austria these vere the German Social Democrats, and in Hungary, the

Karolyi party. There vas apprehension that a customs union vith Germany

vould be disastrous for Austrian industry.

In Hungary, a representative of the Karolyi party, Count Theodore

Battyany, 67/ spoke openly against a close alliance betveen Hungary and

Germany, and characterized the formation of "Mitteleuropa" 68/ as a danger

to the political and economic independence of Hungary. It vas also

reported that Karolyi's party had been holding meetings, vith the object

of exposing the economic danger to Hungary of Germany's plans for economic

development.

Hungary. Developments in Hungary at the end of the var vere the

subject of various interpretations by American observers. In Switzerland,

66/ Inquiry Document No. 37 (Berne Dispatch, June 2b, 1918), R.G. 2$6.

67/ Idem.

68/ It vas believed in policy-making circles of the Allies that the German desire to create Mitteleuropa had been a fundamental cause of the var and a major objective of the Berlin government. Discussion of Naumann' s book by the German press and vague announcements by German spokesmen vas interpreted in the Entente as evidence of official sanction by Berlin policy makers. Naumann's Mittel-Europa vas a plea for closer political and economic union of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

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Mrs. Whitehouse, the C.P.I. representative, on one occasion learned early

of important developments in Hungary. On October 7, 1918, she received

a letter saying that she vas requested by "our Hungarian friends" to cable

the President that Rumania had sent an ultimatum to the Hungarian govern­

ment demanding the immediate evacuation of Transylvania. 69/ The letter

maintained that since an armistice had been signed betveen Hungary and the

Allies, the Rumanian government, a part of the Entente, vas also bound by

the conditions of the armistice, and had no right to follov her ovn policy.

Hungary could not believe that it vould be the intention of the President

to let the Rumanians attack a vholly defenseless country and to give the

Austro-Germans the satisfaction of seeing the Hungarian government,

after capitulation, be the victim of a treacherous assault. A Rumanian

attack vould doubtless overturn the vhole country, drive the turbulent

elements tovards Bolshevism,.and frustrate the sincerest exertions of

Count Karolyi, head of his party, to create order.

Captain Voska made a rather hostile report on the Hungarian situation,

saying that during the course of the var the Magyars had fought on one side

and had conducted an active campaign of propaganda on the other .70/ Count

Karolyi, he alleged, pretended to be a friend of the Entente and pro­

mulgated on the outside reports of Magyar sympathies for France and

England. Other Magyar counts vere described as depending on their personal

relations vith Paris and London politicians, their acquaintances in

diplomatic circles, and on the sympathy vhich the democratic West felt

WJ File CPI 21A1, R.G. 6 3 .

70/ "Voska Reports" File A-8-71 Svitzerland Branch A, R.G. 120.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for the Magyar nation since 1848. Voska said these counts vere also

counting on the fact these factions in the West vere unavaxe of the "brutal

force employed by the Hungarian government. He added that vith "characteri

tic brazeness," the Magyars, during the days of the overthrov of the

Monarchy, tried to declare themselves allies of the Entente. It vas

explained that they succeeded in establishing vith the French commander a

boundary line and armistice conditions, giving them full authority over

Slovakia.

Hugh Wilson's report on Karolyi vas scmevhat more sympathetic.

He vrote that Karolyi assumed pover in Hungary on the breakup of the

Empire after the armistice, and threv himself on the mercy of the Allies,

relying on President Wilson's declaration to claim the application of the

Fourteen Points to Hungary's fate. In the spring of i919, Karolyi

learned of the Paris peace conference's proposed frontiers for Hungary,

•whereupon he abandoned the country to Bela Kun. 71/ He vas later accused

of corresponding vith the enemies of Hungary during the var. Hugh Wilson

vrote that even tventy years after the event he regretted to see his

dispatch published in the Foreign Relations of the United States, because

Karolyi’s reputation — a man "in his ovn land and . . . still living" —

should not be "besmirched by any publication of the United States" of

steps negotiated in private and related in confidence. 72/

Poland, The Ukraine and Lithuania. Poland vas an area of east-

central Europe that received attention in reports from American observers

in various neutrals. In August 1918, the American Military Attache in

71/ Huj& Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (Nev York: Longmans, Green & Co., 19^1), P- 39-

72/ Ibid., p. 4-3.

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Copenhagen sent a report on the importance of Poland "which stated that as

long as Germany could realize her pan-Germanic plans in the East, she vould

remain a dangerous neighbor to France and England. 73/ Nothing more nor

less vas said to be happening in the old Russian Empire than the actual

carrying out of the pan-Germanic plans "elaborated long ago and accepted

by Wilhelm II as the actual aims of the var." Regarding Russia, these

plans vere said to consist in destroying the very foundation of modern

Russia and then reconstructing such portions of It as vere vanted by

Germany. The report contended that the Russian Revolution vas brought

about in order to facilitate this task. Russian Bolshevism, guided

adroitly by German agents, vas described as succeeding in a short time

in destroying the Russian army, ruining the finances, and turning the

government upside dovn. In its program of "social demolition", Bolshevism

prepared the foundation for a restoration of the Russian monarchy planned

by Germany. The report said that everything led one to believe that such

an event vas not far off. The German government knev that a devastated,

mutilated, and ruined Russia vould cease to be a dangerous and decisive

factor in international, politics, especially in matters relating to

central and eastern Europe. In ceasing to be dangerous, hovever, Russia

might not only became an object of economic exploitation, but also a

collaborator in the vork dreamt of by William II. In order to bring

about such a coalition and cement such an alliance vith a'nev Czar,

Berlin vould be "willing to sustain appreciable sacrifices. To begin vith,

73/ Military Attache Repoits-Copenhagen, August 3; 1918? R.G. 120.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Poland might be sacrificed. It would be easy to fan the flames of discord

among the different elements; and if it were not the actual intention to

rob Poland of the independence which had so loudly been proclaimed, such

independence would at least be stripped of all reality.

The future of the Ukraine as an independent state was described

as most problematic, because Russia, daring to rise from her present

ruin, would find an independent Ukraine with large territorial ambi­

tions to be absolutely ’unacceptable. If Germany wished to restore a

Russian monarchy, she would not limit the latter to the ancient Duchy

of Moscow. She would prefer to exploit an undivided and allied Russia

rather than to deal separately with the Ukraine, a much more ’uncertain

friend. A plan, reportedly emanating from Austria, providing for the

installation of a Hapsburg ruler at the head of a principality extending

from Galicia to the Daiper, was described as neither practicable nor

realizable. Germany, awaiting the disintegration of the Austrio-

Hungarian Dmpire, would, according to the report, Have little interest

in seeing the extension eastward of the influence of the Viennese

court.TV It was maintained that in a "milieu" so unsympathetic to

the Ukrainian cause, Poland alone becoming a strong and independent

state, would deal advantageously with that eventuality. Since Russia

was considered negligible, one had to. count upon other forces which might

replace her. The creation of the new states actually proposed by Germany

should be seized upon by the Allies and utilized to Germany’s disadvantage.

7y Ibid.

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In order to attain this objective, the creation of a large and strong

Poland vas held to be indispensable. It vas further reported that

hostility tovard Poland on the part of the Lithuanians, the White Russians,

and even the Ukrainians vas not based upon national antagonism, but vas

the result of a long and methodical campaign in vhich Germany attempted

to discredit the Poles. A Poland united vith Lithuania, White Russia,

and the Ukraine vould ansver the problem of providing a factor of

stability.

The source of information contained in this report vas not identified.

One feature of this report vhich vas common to several other reports vas

the underlying assumption that the Russian Revolution vas guided by German

agents. The report had a strong pro-Polish bias, and vas based on specu­

lation as veil as fact, but there vas no evaluation of it by the military

attache. Except for the fact that he considered it vorth transmitting,

there is no indication of the extent to vhicrr he agreed vith it.

Through Lithuanian emigrees in Svitzerland, seme information

relating to Lithuanian plans vas obtained. In April 1918, a report by

Sugh Wilson for Mr. Irvin of the Committee on Public Information indicated

that the Lithuanian Ccanmittee at Lausanne posed as pro-Allied but vas

understood not to be anti-German by conviction. 75/ The speculation vas

that it vould probably not hesitate to turn to Germany if the latter vere

friendly and the Allies vere cool; Wilson therefore recommended that further

investigations be made.

757 State Department Decimal File 102-93/187, Tel. No. 3093, April 17, 1918, R.G. 59 •

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The basis for the suspicion that the Lithuanian group in Switzerland

might turn to Germany could veil have been the fact that Reichstag Deputy

Erzberger had established contact vith Lithuanian emigrees in Svitzerland

earlier, and through his efforts a Landesrat had been established in

Lithuania, albeit -without pover. j 6 J After the Lithuanians declared

their independence in February 1918, they sent a group of deputies to

Lausanne in September. Although this group crossed Germany and appeared

to place their hopes on Germany, they changed their opinion after they

made contact vith a delegation of their compatriots from America vho came

to Svitzerland to meet them. In Svitzerland the Committee on Public

Information assigned Lt. B. F. Mostovski to the Lithuanian Bureau and

he reported to Mrsl Whitehouse.

Bulgaria. Much information relating' to Bulgaria vas transmitted

through Geneva, vhich had been designated as the collection point

specializing in Near-eastern affairs. In October 1917, a report by

"Leumas" from Geneva vas transmitted through the military attache in

Berne. 77/ He reported that on September 20th the Balkansi Pochta of Sofia

had stated that, according to information still -unconfirmed, a conference

had been held in Stockholm by the Bulgarian Socialist, Skyzoff, the German

Socialist, Muller, and Russian delegates vho, on returning frcm the

Entente countries, had arrived in Stockholm. "Leumas" attached importance

76/ Klaus Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University PressJ 1959) PP- 236-39-

77/ Military Attache Reports-Berae, October 19, 1917 (Near-eastern Intelligence-Geneva), R.G. 120.

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to this information and thought it "merited verification at the base."

Since the report concerned an interview between Russian, German and

Bulgarian delegates, he claimed that if it were confirmed, it meant that

the Russian delegates were the same that had been received three months

before in France, Italy, and England. Further, he thought that the

declarations that these delegates had made of loyalty to the Entente were

evidently incompatible with the interview with the German and Bulgarian

Socialists. "Leianas" also directed attention to the fact that Yanko

Skyzoff was the Bulgarian Socialist delegate to the Syndicalist conference

in Berne.

In December 1917, Hugh Wilson transmitted a report from Vice Consul

Bdelmann in Geneva concerning Bulgaria. 7 8 / This communication explained

that the part of the President's message forecasting the possibility of

a war declaration against Bulgaria had led Sdelmann's British colleague

to urge the British. Foreign Office to prevail upon the American government

to declare war on Bulgaria. immediately. It was claimed that the

Bulgarian government, through friendship with America, was assuring its

population that it would find America an ally affording economic favor

and support when the war should be over. Thus, the Bulgarian government

was enabled to find support even from the opposition parties and to

continue the war against the Entente. The British held that the American

Consul in Sofia, Mr. Murphy, was being plied with Bulgarian schemes of

friendship, while vital news was kept from him. The British also warned

that the Bulgarian representative in Washington, Mr. Panartoff, was

t

78/ State Department Decimal File No. 76 3 .72/856l, R.G. 59-

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keeping up a campaign of Bulgarian peace aims ■which was harwi the Entente

cause.

Consul Edelmann stated, as he had done "before, that he did not

agree with the British agent’s conclusions. He felt that it was the

ardent desire of Germany to dominate all her allies and to secure a common

declaration of war against all her enemies, including America. This

Germany had signally failed to achieve in Bulgaria. Edelmann did not

know of Panaratoff1s activities in Washington, "but his acquaintance with

him at Roberts College led the Vice Consul to believe that he "would be

far removed from carrying on a pernicious campaign" of untruth, or to

jeopardize American interests in any way. He though that if Germans,

after endless intrigues and difficulties, had been able to win over King

Ferdinand and his cabinet to their side, it was America's duty to under­

mine German influence by vigorous propaganda among the Bulgarians. Edelmann

explained that Bulgarian participation in the war was admittedly selfish

and that she recognized that she was treated with little consideration

at the Bucharest Conference. No Bulgarian force had been dispatched to

the aid of the Turks, who were indignant at this. Recognition of these

facts by the American government, according to Edelmann, would help

toward starting a cleavage among the Central Powers and Bulgaria.

Later there were other reports and recommendations along the line

taken by Consul Edelmann. In the summer of 1918, Lt. Charles Campbell

proposed a propaganda campaign in Bulgaria 79/ on the basis that it.was

79 j "Campanole Reports," R.G. 120. (Undated, but just before July 2, 191 8 .)

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possible to take advantage of an opportunity to detach. Bulgaria from its

allies at a moment -when Austria-Hungary must he the cause of much alarm on

the part of the Germanic Allies. A state of var did not exist betveen

Bulgaria and the United States. The Bulgarian Minister had not left

Washington, and it vas believed that the American diplomatic agents

remained in Bulgaria. To detach Bulgaria from the Central Povers, there

should be first a series of inspired articles in the American press. Then

confidential agents vithout credentials should be sent to Svitzerland and

Holland to get in touch vith Bulgarian representatives in these countries.

Such agents vould have no diplomatic character, and, if the need arose, they

could be disavoved. The Bulgarian Minister at Washington vas considered

pro-American and could perhaps be interested, not only by the State

Department, but by the Roberts College interests in the United States.

Without direct means of communicating vith Sofia, it vould be possible, if

agreeable to the State Department, for the Minister to get in touch vith

Sofia through neutral means. After preliminary investigations, the Allies

should be discreetly informed of the move.

A critique of Lt. Campbell’s proposal vas included in a memorandum

vhich Lt. Schellens, of the military attache's office in Berne, submitted

to Major Campanole. 80/ He joined issue vith tvo of Campbell's statements,

contending that the Bulgarian graduates of Roberts College in Constantinople

vere, if anything, more chauvinistic than other Bulgarians. Schellens also

explained that Mr. Stephan Panaratoff, the Bulgarian Minister at Washington,

WJ Ibid., July"!, 1 91 8 .

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had on several occasions been suspected of espionage on behalf of the

Central Powers and that the United States had no diplomatic representative

in Bulgaria. He explained that the Charge d 1Affaires at Sofia vas re­

called in 1916 and not replaced and that American interests vere in the

hands of Consul General Dctninic Murphy, "an aged and respectable politician

■whose knowledge of Ba]kan matters vas practically nil." 8l/

Lt. Schellens considered Lt. Campbell's scheme inadvisable because

the United States "could not coquet vith the Bulgarians and at the same

time retain the confidence of their allies, the Serbs." The collapse of

the Austro-Hungarian Empire appeared more desirable than Bulgaria's

detachment from her allies. England had tried in 1915 4o reconcile the

interests of the Serbs and the Bulgarians and had tried, without success,

to bring the latter into the wax on the.Entente's side. Lt. Schellens

also maintained that England's policy of "managing" Austria, of refusing

■ to regard Austria as an enemy, vhile hoping thereby to "break up" the

Austro-German Alliance, had failed; apparently he meant that this situation

paralleled the attempt to detach Bulgaria.

Hugh Wilson, in Berne, attempted to follow the Bulgarian situation.

He noted that, through same anomaly of policy, the relations between

the United States and Bulgaria were never severed, and that a Consul

General remained in Sofia, in spite of the fact that the Bulgarians vere

associated with the Central Powers and the United States with the Allies.

Wilson mentioned that a Bulgarian businessman of large interests, Theodore

Shipkoff, vas constantly earning to Switzerland and reporting Bulgarian

Bl7 Idem.

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conditions to the American Legation. 82/ The Bulgarian Legation in

3erne vas itself a useful source of information; American representatives

vere able to send cipher messages through its code to American repre­

sentatives in Sofia and to get replies. Wilson indicated that practically

all the information about Turkey that reached the American side came from

this source, although he had no doubt that the British and French had

built up their ovn Arab sources in Syria for espionage.

Because contact vith the Bulgarian Legation in Berne had been

informally maintained by the American Legation, it caused Hugh Wilson no

great surprise to receive, on September 21, 1918, a telephone call frcm

the Bulgarian Minister requesting an appointment. 83/ Wilson thought it

vould be vorthvhile to get the Minister's vievs as to the extent of the

victories the French press claimed had been gained over the Bulgarian

forces. Hcvever, the Minister handed hi™ a paper signed by the American

representative in Sofia, vhich reported that Bulgaria had demanded an

armistice.

Reports such as those by Campbell and Schellens, in combination

vith recommendations frcm the "Inquiry", may have influenced Wilson to

treat Bulgaria as a victim of Germany rather than as an accomplice for

an extended period. War vas never declared against Bulgaria, nor vere

relations broken; but Bulgaria vas being generally discounted by the time

military collapse vas imminent. East— central Europe had never been

considered important to the security of the United States, and the reporting

82/ Wilson, op.,cit., p. 30-

83/ Ibid., p. 5 8 .

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on that area can hardly he said to have influenced State Department policy.

A possible exception is the reporting of Herron, vho may have helped to

convince American officials that it vas impossible to detach Austria from

the Alliance vith Germany. Criticism of the reports submitted by the

agent "Leumas", vhich vere transmitted through American Consular agents

in Svitzerland, appeared in April and May of 1918. 84/ His reports

touched on the military, political, and economic situation in Bulgaria,

Turkey, and Southern Russia. These vere described as taken principally

frcm German, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish nevspapers. When they

arrived some of the items vere very old. A number of information items

sent by "Leumas" vere taken verbatim from the British War Office Summary,

and sometimes vere from three to six months old. 85/

There vas considerable ignorance of East-central Europe on the part

of American representatives in that area. One of the most glairing instances

of this occurred in Rumania before that country became a neutral. In May

1917> Father Lucaciu, a spokesman for the Transylvanians, departed for

Washington, vith Premier Bratianu’s blessing, to meet vith Secretary of

State Lansing. Lansing immediately demanded full information frcm

Andrevs, the American Charge in Rumania, because the State Department

had not been informed of the mission of Father Lucaciu. Andrevs then

tried to cover his failure to keep his government informed by belittling

84/ Colonel Kolan's File, May 1, 1918 .

85/ Ibid., May l6 , 19 1 8 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the purpose and personnel of the mission. He described Father Luiaciu as

a "sort of semi-roving Catholic priest" and cited the fact that he had

a son thereby accusing him of "lax morals." Thus, Andrevs apparently

vas ignorant of the simple fact that a Uniate Church existed -whose priests

vere alloved to marry, as vere those of the Orthodox Church. 86/

There vere other instances of naivete on the part of American

representatives regarding East-central Europe, as for example, Minister

Stovall in Svitzerland, in -whose mind East-central Europe vas populated

by the "enemy". Differentiation betveen Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and

Germans seemed to him not only unimportant but dangerous. Wien Foerster,

the Bavarian pacifist, told Doctor Herron of conversations vith the

Austrian Superor, he thought he vas gaining the ear of the President.

At that time, hovever, Herron had no channel to Washington, but only to

London. According to Mamatey this vas because "the simple-minded Stovall

frovned on Americans vho had any truck vith the enemy." 87/

After the armistice, reporting on East-central Europe continued

to occupy the attention of several American representatives. The

"Inquiry" and its successor, the American Commission to Negotiate Peace,

vhich remain to be described, sought and obtained varied information on

conditions in this area.

86/ Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 12L-25-

87/ Ibid., p. 1 3 9 .

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CHAPTER IV

THE QUEST FOR INFORMATION ON -

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE

I . THE INQUIRY AND THE AMERICAN

COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

The Nature of the Inquiry. Territorial and other questions relating

to a peace had "been anticipated by American experts aiding government

officials. Long before the establishment of the American Commission to

Negotiate Peace, the research group known as the "Inquiry" had been

organized, largely by Colonel House. In September 1917, at the request of

President Wilson, Colonel House began to assemble in New York a group of

experts to collect and collate data on geographical, ethnological, historical,

economic, and political problems in Europe and other areas of the world,

in preparation for the peace conference -which was to follow World War I .

This group of experts was first under the direction of

Sidney E. Mezes and later Isaiah Bowman. The Inquiry's staff was composed

largely of professors recruited from American universities and colleges.

It was a remarkable innovation, as one of its historians, James T. Shotwell,

wrote:

. . .This strange experiment in the mobilization of the political and social sciences to help in shaping the outlines of the new world structure which had to be built out of the

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ruins of the var vill offer a subject vith unique possibilities. 1/

It is difficult to appraise the expertise of the experts. Ho

doubt many vere specialists mainly by fiat. Harold Nicolson, vho vas

a minor British adviser at the Conference, conceded that the American

delegates vere the best informed; la/ foreign delegates usually did not

require evidence because facts presented by the Americans had proved

irrefutable. Stephan Bonsai mentions some unspecified instances of mis­

casting of experts. For example, an archaeologist vho had spent most of

his time in the region in question exploring caves vas designated a

territorial expert of that region. The Inquiry's personnel vas

scrutinized for pro-German sympathies, and its operations vere surrounded

in secrecy. The expenses involved appear to have fallen largely on the

various universities vhich vere honored by the selection of their

personnel. The desired men vere loaned on paid leave by the institutions.2/

One of the early important assignments for the Inquiry came just

before the "Fourteen Points" speech vhen Wilson asked for a memorandum

from this body on how to deal vith various European territorial questions.

This memorandum vas submitted December 22, 1917? and indicated certain

1/ James T. Shot veil, At the Paris Peace Conference (Hev York: The MacMillan Co., 1937)? P- 11-

la/ Ibid.

2/ Ingram Bander, "Sidney Edvard Mezes and 'the Inquiry'" Journal of Modem History, Vol. XE (1939)? P- 199-

Much information on the personnel of the "Inquiry" can be found in a recent dissertation by Lawrence E. Gelfand, "The Inquiry: A Study of American Preparations for Peace 1917-1919" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1958).

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differences between the thinking of the President and that of the Inquiry,

on the problems of war and peace.

While Wilson was a "practical idealist" and moralist, the Inquiry

experts were devotees of economic determination. 3/ They sought solutions

which would make economic sense and blandly ignored the President's

principle of national self-determination. Unlike the President, they

did not consider Germany's allies as her innocent, downtrodden victims,

but recognized that the Central Alliance was based on an "alliance of

interests between the ruling powers at Vienna, Sofia, Budapest,

Constantinople, and Berlin." In the judgment of one authority, the

Inquiry was poorly informed about conditions in Austria-Eungary, and was

completely unaware of the organized Czechoslovak and Yugoslav.' . movements

abroad.

In studying the Balkan questions, the Inquiry arrived at certain

recommendations for prying Bulgaria loose frcm the Central Alliance. It

thought that the. binding interest of Bulgaria to the Central Powers lay

chiefly in Germany's ability to exploit the wrong done Bulgaria in the

Treaty of Bucharest which ended the Second Balkan War. Consequently, the

Inquiry found much in the Treaty of Bucharest that required revision in

favor of Bulgaria.

Professor Mamatey has written that in historical retrospect the

Inquiry's blueprint for victory was neither wise nor noble. He thinks

that the Inquiry was blinded by a doctrinaire economic judgment, and

greatly underestimated the dynamism of nationalist and social movements.

37 Mamatey, op. cit., p. 173*

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The recommendations of the Inquiry to stir up a nationalist revolution

in Austria and to deny the revolutionists the fruits of their battles,

he characterized as revealing an opportunism and irresponsibility -which

"harmonized ill with the usually straightforward methods of American'

diplomacy." h / Ho State Department official was consulted in the preparation

of the "Fourteen Points", and Mamatey thinks it was regrettable that the

President did not have more confidence in the State Department; many of

its officials were able men who had greater experience in, and understanding

of, European affairs than had members of the Inquiry.

The later work of the Inquiry contrasted favorably with its work

at the time of the Fourteen Points vhich Professor Mamatey has criticized.

A report on "A New Policy for the United States in Central Europe" prepared

by R. J. Kemer in May 1918 for the Inquiry 5/ did not have the same

limitations as the recommendations made at the time of the Fourteen Points.

This later report stated that the recent completion and amplification of

the secret convention between Germany and Austria-Hungary 6/ made possible

and necessary a definite step forward in American foreign policy. The

question was, what strategy would be most likely to break up this

combination and destroy its pan-German, militaristic, and autocratic aims?

Kerner suggested that it would not be a mistake for the Allies to declare

publicly for a policy of dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and of the libera­

tion of ai1 subject peoples of the eastern and central Europe on the basis

57 Ibid., p. 183-

5/ Inquiry Document No. 839; May l6, 1918, R.G. 2 3 6 .

6/ This doubtless refers to the Spa conference between Snperors William II and Charles. The report exaggerated the importance of this meeting.

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of ethnically defined frontiers.• This would he justified because the

Central Powers had concluded the new pact at a time when the Western Powers

not only had proclaimed a more conciliatory policy, but even gone so far

as to declare that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was not part of

their program. The report stated that only in this way would the Allies

be "able to strengthen the opposition to the Germans and Magyars, to

foster revolutions in that part of the world, and to gain by them, if they

really take place as nay be expected." It was urged that such nations as

revolted be given de facto recognition and definite assurances that the

great disinterested power of the United States would "be thrown on the

sides of democracy and justice in a careful delimitation of the ethnic

boundaries" with just compensations in regard to military, economic, and

political considerations.

The Sdh!eswig-Holstein Problem. Although Mamatey stated that the

professionals of ~fche State Department were more steeped in the isolationist

tradition of American diplomacy than the amateurs of the Inquiry and were

consequently less inclined to take a bold stand on European problems,

many of the reports turned over to-the Inquiry were actually prepared by

State Department representatives and naval or military attaches. For

example, Commander Gade, the naval attache to Denmark, anticipating that

the question of Schleswig-Holstein would figure in the Peace Conference,

submitted a report on South Jutland to the Navy Department on March 27,

1918. August 12, 1919) ke sent another copy through the State Department

for the use of the Inquiry at the request of Professor Archibald Coolidge.7/

27 Inquiry Document Ko. 170, R.G. 2 5 6 .

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In this report G.nde perhaps exaggerated German domination of the Baltic.

He emphasized the role of the Kiel Canal as the key to this area. Accord­

ing to him, South Jutland signified the ability to develop Germany's

political and commercial power in the Russian and 3altic provinces.

Schleswig-Holstein made certain Hamburg's dominating position as a trade

harbor, and provided Germany’s most important naval base, the harbor of

Kiel. The Kiel Canal enabled Germany to employ her naval power doubly,

which caused increased Allied naval expenditures.

Commander Gade minimized the loss of Germany's colonies, com­

pared to the assurance she had that a territory would be at her disposal

that had limitless possibilities for colonization, industrial products,

and foodstuffs. Gade described the Kiel Canal as the key to Eastern

Europe. He argued for the return of a large section of Schleswig to

Denmark as a means of neutralizing German plans to dominate Eastern

Europe. 8/

Gade regarded the war as likely to prove indecisive or,to end in

Germany's defeat. In the first case, according to how the situation in

Russia developed, the loss of the German colonies would mean merely a

systematic blockade of eastern Europe by Germany. An economically

mutually dependent central power would be created, consisting of

some three hundred million people, stretching from the middle of

Eurooe to the border of France and from the north of Eurone to

8/ Idem.

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the Persian frontier. Gade foresaw the establishment of a trade union

of this area that vould make it possible for the Prussian military power

to rise with renewed strength, and perhaps after another generation to

shake the world once more. One condition for such a state of affairs would

be if Denmark were given over to German influence and exploitation. If

the war ended with Germany's defeat, then victory could be real only if by

it the world were ensured against a repetition of the war. This could

be accomplished only by making it impossible for any single state or

confederation to shut off a portion of the world frcm communication with

the other nations. Thus the establishment of the international character

of the Baltic was indicated. Gade described the question of the ownership

of South Jutland as European rather than Danish. In the light of Baltic

developments, its resolution vould very nearly equal in importance that

of the Kiel Canal. That the Kiel Canal could not remain the property

of any single nation was not a question for Danish or German-Danish

voters, but rather one to be decided at the peace conference.

The concluding sections of Gade's report treated the historical

background and the language question of Schleswig-Holstein from a view­

point distinctly favorable to Denmark. In doing so he carried the

argument of the encroachment of the German language on territories where

formerly Danish was spoken to unreasonable lengths. Gade's report

exaggerated the significance of the South Jutland question and reasoned

from one contingency to another in a purely speculative manner, but it

was an attempt to deal boldly with large geopolitical concepts.

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Gade's report obviously was -written primarily frcm the standpoint

of naval power and omitted other important aspects. The Schleswig-Holstein

problem was regulated by a plebescite provided for by the Treaty, and self-

determination rather than the weakening of German naval strength in the

area determined the extent of the territory transferred to Denmark.

The Rhine River Problem. The Rhine River navigation question was

one of the many minor problems of the peace that received attention from

American observers and experts. As early as July 8 , 1918, 10/ Professor

Herron had written to Minister Stovall to call his attention to the danger

that lay in a proposed water connection between Switzerland and the North

Sea by way of the Rhine River. He warned Stovall that it was the German

plan "to so enlarge the Rhine and connect it with Zurich by canal as to

make Zurich and Basel essentially seaports." Herron favored a counter­

proposal to connect Geneva with the Rhone River so as to provide an outlet

through French soil to Marseilles.

Apparently stimulated by this communication frcm Herron, Stovall

on July 9> 1918; 11/ described to the State Department the German plans

to connect Switzerland to the North Sea by way of the Rhine. He referred

to the rivalry between the Rhine plan and the Rhone plan. If the German

plan could be put through first, Switzerland's commerce with the rest of

the world would fall largely into the hands of Germany, who thus would be

10/ Mitchell Briggs, George D. Herron and the European Peace Settlement, p. 5 6 .

11/ Inquiry Document No. 175 (Dispatch 3773 of the Berne Legation, July 9, 1918), R.G. 296.

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able to control the industrial life of Switzerland. If, on the other hand,

the Bhone project could be put through first, vessels of 1,000 tons could

come directly from Marseilles to Geneva, and all of Switzerland's commerce

with America would pass through French soil. It was claimed that it was

important to America that the commerce of Switzerland should reach New York

by this Rhone route. Stovall urged that because of German pressure in Berne,

and because of the inability of the Canton of Geneva to undertake the

project alone, American capital should be used to put through the enter­

prise. He recommended that this be done without delay to establish

economic and political cooperation between America and Switzerland.

After the Armistice the problem of the Rhine continued to receive

some attention. In January 1919* Professor William Rappard of Geneva

informed James Shotwell of the Inquiry that Switzerland had not suffered

from the lack of port. He said that free navigation of the Rhine should

be secured but that the improvement of the Rhone would cost too much. 12/

The Treaty of Versailles solution of the Rhine problem did not please

the Swiss. Article 354 stipulated that the Rhone navigation would con­

tinue to be regulated by the Mannheim Convention of 1868, but with the

condition that a general convention of navigable waters should be set

up by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Artiele 358 gave France the right to take water from the Rhine for

supplying a canal and for other purposes, as well as the right to use

the German side of the Rhine for the execution of this right. The

right applied to the whole source of the Rhine between Rastatf and Basel. 13/

W 7 *7 >Shotwell, op. cit., p. 1 5 9 -

13/ Jacob Ruchti, Geschichte der Schweiz wahrend des Weltkrieges 1914-1919, PP- 378-382: : :

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Furthermore, France had the exclusive right to the energy produced "by the

control of the river on the condition of payment to Germany of frftif the

value of the energy effectively produced. The Swiss saw a contradiction

between the conditions for the exercise of these rights by the French and

a statement in the Article that the navigability of the Rhine and its

tributaries should not be damaged. France was not to damage the navigation,

but acquired the right to water in unlimited quantities. It was well

known that navigation between Mannheim and Basel was maintained with great

difficulty when the level- of water became lowered, and thus traffic was

often brought to a standstill.

The information collected by the Americans had no effect on the

resolution of the Rhine problem, which was regulated in accord with

French interests and to the disadvantage not only of Germany but

Switzerland as well.

The Genesis of the Commission to Negotiate Peace. The Inquiry

assembled many other reports on national boundaries and other questions,

but in November 1918 the organization of the American Commission to

Negotiate Peace was begun and in December 1918 the Inquiry ceased to

exist as an independent body. It was then absorbed into the Intelligence

Division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. It was at this

time that Colonel House suggested that men from the United States military

and naval forces and from other available sources should be temporarily

appointed agents of the State Department and should constitute the basis of

a "political intelligence section" of the American delegation at the Peace

Conference. The Secretary of State approved the plan "in principle", and

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suggested that it vould be desirable for Grev to consult with Colonel

Van Deman as to the quickest and safest method of communication. 1k j

This plan ■was later implemented; the proposed political section became a

part of the Commission to Negotiate Peace, as did the Inquiry.

During this period, Colonel House also showed concern for some

trends in information collection with respect to problems of the peace.

On November 8 , 1918, he wrote to the President and Secretary of State:

We are getting a mass of misinformation respecting the present conditions in Austria, Bohemia, and Ukraine, practically a.11 of which is being provided us by the English, French, and Italians. 15/

He added that there were no American sources of information, and

that the reports received were often colored by the self-interest of

the persons furnishing them. House thought it important that agents

sent to those countries be in a position to furnish accurate and unbiased

information on conditions. On November 12, 1918, he again wrote to the

Secretary of State, enlarging upon his original suggestions. 16/ He

reported that the American officials in Europe charged with considering

political and economic questions relating to the war's end were receiving

"practically no.dependable information" concerning political and economic

conditions in Poland, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary,

Bulgaria, and Turkey. Same information was obtained on Rumania and Greece,

but it was incomplete. Colonel House also considered it essential that

information on the political conditions in these countries be seen "through

American eyes."

ll/ The Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1919? Paris Peace Conference, Vol. I, p. 19 6 . '

15/ The Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1919> ParisPeace Conference, Vol. I, p. 194.

16/ The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, ParisPeace Conference, Vol. I, p.

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Colonel House felt that this work should, be under the direction of

a man who was entirely familiar with German and Austrian affairs, and

therefore suggested Joseph Grew. The latter was quite surprised when he

found that Colonel House had recommended him as the chief of this work.

He requested the services of Captain Gherhardi as naval attache, General

Frank McKoy as military attache, and Hugh Wilson, Hugh Gibson, Walter

Lipmann, Captain Voska, and several other specialists. Y j J

Mr. Grew himself was to have headed the group reporting on the

actual conditions. He was unable to go, however, and Professor Archibald

Coolidge of Harvard, a member of the Inquiry, was chosen instead. He was

assigned to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace for the purpose of

proceeding to Austria and neighboring countries. 15/

The Work of Voska. Although not always "through American eyes" as

recommended by House, the observations of Voska were provocatively specu­

lative. It appears more than coincidental that his report of December 11,

1913, concerning the corridor between the Czechoslovak Republic and the

Yugoslav state paralleled the proposal made by Dr. 3enes about a month

later. 19/ Vcska said that the Czechoslovaks "demand the creation of a

corridor that would link their country with the Yugoslavs." The main

advantage of this proposal was to give Czechoslovakia access to the sea.

17/ Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years /Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955), P- 355-

18/ Harold J. Coolidge and Robert H. Lord, Archibald Cary Coolidge /Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932), pp. 1 9 b - l $ 6 .

19/ "Voska Reports" G-2-B records, R.G. 120. (See Appendix II).

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SCOTT KERNAN MILLER NAVAL MILITARY EXECUTIVE OFFICE EXECUTIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL DIVISION TECHNICAL MAJ. JAMES BROWN JAMES MAJ. BENSON W.S. AIM. MR. DAVID HUNTER MR. DAVID MAJ. GEN. F.J. GEN. MAJ. CAPT. R. C. PATTERSON C. R. CAPT.

DIRECTOR MR. J.C. GREW J.C. MR. COL. R.H. DEMAN VAN R.H. COL. NEGATIVE INTELL. NEGATIVE SITUATION COMBAT FIELD OBSERVERS FIELD CHURCHILL GEN. BRIG. PRESIDENT WIL30N PRESIDENT & COORDINATING OFFICER COORDINATING & BRIG. GEN. M. M. CHURCHILL GEN. BRIG. SECRETARY & SUPERVISING & SECRETARY GENERAL MILITARY LIAISON MILITARY GENERAL

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

MR. LANSING MR. LANSING WHITE MR. HOUSE MR. BLISS GEN.

Intell. Current Summaries W.C. Bullitt W.C. History J.T. Shotwell J.T. ECONOMIC & POLITICAL & ECONOMIC P.H. PATCHIN P.H. ASS'T SEC. ASS'T

SECRETARIAT

INTELLIGENCE Balkans TERRITORIAL SPECIALIST TERRITORIAL & EXEC. OFFICER EXEC. & Dr. C. Seymour C. Dr. Prof. Note8tein Prof. W.L. Westermann W.L. Austria-Hungary Capt. Hornbeck Capt. Mr. Williams & Williams Mr. LELAND HARRISON ASS'T SEC. ASS'T DR. S.E. MEZES, DIRECTOR MEZES, S.E. DR. CHIEF BOWMAN, I. DR. TERRITORIAL Belgium-France Schleswig Haskins C.H. Dr. Western Asia Western Germany Pacific & East Far R.H. Lord R.H. Russia & Poland & Russia Africa G.H. Beer G.H. Africa

Organization of the American Commission To negotiate Peace Adapted from data in Shotwell, oj). eit. Appendix.

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From the Allied viewpoint, according to Voska, it would separate the

Germans from the Magyars "in the interests of peace."

The similar argument for a corridor presented by Dr. Benes during

the peace conference was generally considered unjustified and impractical. 20/

Voska also, in a report submitted in December 1916, directed his

attention to political tendencies in post-Armistice Germany. 21/ He stated

that under the leadership of Dr. Albert Dernburg, leaders of political

and intellectual thought in Germany had held a number of secret meetings,

the results of which had been withheld frcm the public. According to

Voska's information the purpose of these conferences had been to determine

the tactics to be adopted by the Germans for the eventualities resulting

from the peace conference. Subjects which had received close attention

were: the principle of self-determination of nations; the federalization

of certain nations and states; and the organization of the League of

Nations. Voska reported that various plans were discussed in conjunction

with possible alternative terms of the peace, whereby the future influence

of Germany would be impaired as little as possible. He attempted to

indicate how the Germans intended to use the principle of self-determination

for their own purposes. German newspapers had disclosed that there was a

movement for dividing Germany into a number of independent republics.

This rearrangement appeared to Voska contrary to the entire historical

development of the German Empire, and he attempted an inquiry into the real

motive behind the movement.

20/ David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939); Vol. II, p. 611

P i / Records of the Military Intelligence Division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, December 20, 1918, R.G. 120.

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His conclusion was that if Germany were divided into four republics,

this example would be followed by the different races and peoples that

composed Russia. Germany would thus get rid of one of its sources of

anxiety, a united Russia. It was hoped that certain peoples composing

the British Empire might also follow suit. The peoples that composed

the Austro-Hungarian Snpire, instead of deciding to unite with their

conationalists beyond the borders, might be tempted to set up smai l

republics of their own. For example, the Poles of Galicia, whose

traditions differed from the Poles of former Russian and Prussian Poland,

might desire to support a Galician republic. The Romanians of Transylvania,

instead of .joining their brethem beyond the Little Carpathians, might

also form an independent state; it might be the same with the Slovaks.

All these new political entities would be weak and economically dependent

on others. Thus, by perverting the principle of nationality, a chain of

weak states would arise that would fall easy victim to future German

aggression. Voska contended that since certain' diplomats who would

represent the Allies at the peace conference’were in favor of forming

confederations of certain states, the Germans would feel this gave them

the right to demand a complete federation of all Germanic peoples of

Europe. 22/

Voska's conclusions in this report appear to have been extra­

polated from highly speculative assumptions. There is no indication

that his recommendations influenced any delegates at the peace conference,

or even gave them foresight into.Germany1s plans;to anticipate any German

moves, since these did not ultimately confirm Voska's anticipations.

H 7 Idem.

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Relations Between Experts and Policy Makers. In summarizing the

activities of the American Commission to Negotiate the Peace, it can he

said that many problems which were dealt with at the peace conference had

been anticipated by this body. Some reports prepared by this group fore­

shadowed problems that did not culminate until after the peace conference.

Such a report was that on the Aaland Islands by Longfellow Milmore, an

American Consul in Sweden, who placed this particular problem in a rather

penetrating historical perspective. 23/

It is difficult to estimate the degree of influence which the

experts of the Inquiry and the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

exerted on the resolution of particular issues of policy confronting

Wilson and the treaty makers, but some general effects can be noted.

For example, the administrative organization of the experts, when

counterposed to that- of the treaty - and policy-making groups, had reper­

cussions on the composition of the draft treaty. The work of the Commission

proceeded, as it were, in a vacuum. An internal administrative compart-

mentilization hampered coordination between the experts themselves, tending

to perpetuate their conflicts of opinions, and to prevent their recommenda­

tions to the policy-makers from being formulated on a well-integrated,

overall basis. Also, the Commission^ as an entity, received neither effi­

cacious, authoritative guidelines nor wholehearted moral support from

the policy-makers. 2h f There were few problems due to lack of information

but there were many problems created due to lack of reliable interpretive

evaluation of information.

23/ Inquiry Document No. 382, R.C-. 256.

2 k j Shotwell, op. cit., p. Mi.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Furthermore, there was a lack of coordination between England's

experts and those of the United States. On January 29, 1919? President

Wilson became impatient of the disagreement over facts and policy between

American and British experts and asked the American experts to iron out

their technical differences with the British, and to submit a body of facts

for discussion of policy. (This marked a significant turn in the concept

of policy-making, according to Shotvell, and was the beginning of the

"diplomacy of fact-finding.” 25./) Wilson also considered it unreasonable

to expect that, once undertaken, such a study in depth would apply only to

a preliminary document. Thus preparation of and adherence to a detailed

provisional text would could not readily be rewritten, tended to preordain

the tone and direction of the proceedings, and imbue negotiations that were

originally planned as preliminary ■with the significance and effect of a

final peace settlement. 2?a/

Some problems confronting the experts involved the difficulty of dis

tinguishing between technical and political considerations. The Fiume case illustrates such a problem, and was one over which Dr. Kezes, the first

chairman of the Inquiry, came into conflict with certain of his colleagues who were territorial experts. 26/ Meaes espoused the conviction that the

experts were blinded by their study of geographical and ethnological maps

to the latent explosiveness of this particular political situation.'

In another case the experts ’..’■ere impressed by historical and economi

arguments regarding the retention of the Saar by France, but Wilson was

moved more by the philosophy of self-determination than by the fact that

France had held a part of the territory for a brief period under Napoleon.

2 5 / Ibid., pp. 37-38. 25a/ Idem. 26 / Bailey,- on. cit., p. 260. 26a/ Ibid., p. 220.

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Often -when certain areas such as Africa and the Pacific Islands

vere considered "by the peace conference, the discussions were of such a

general nature that the detailed data collected "by the experts could have

had but little bearing on the decisions reached.

Informed opinion agrees that questions of the President could be

answered more quickly and comprehensively because of the naterial gathered

and organized by the experts; and also that, not only^did the President

make use of the experts, but many of his decisions were based on the facts

they furnished- 27/ The degree to which these specialists influenced

important portions of the treaty, is, however, more debatable.

Although they played a rather important part in drafting the more

nonaebatable articles of the peace and in fortifying the diplomats with

information, in general the numerous entourage of advisers and experts

was too cumbersome for the settlement of delicate subjects. The delegates

at Paris could not be expected to digest the large volume of research

papers prepared by the Inquiry, and its successor agency. Also, in

explaining the influence of the experts or lack of it on the final outcome

of the peace, it should be remembered that the conference itself was not

omnipotent. It had little means of enforcing its decisions in the

unoccupied regions, and a most important country, Russia, was not even

represented.

27/ Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris "(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), p. k-5?T. (Appendix, replies by Seymour to questions on January 2h, 1921.)

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II. REPORTING ON POST-ARMISTICE GERMANY

AND THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

There was a covert struggle between the military and civil authority

for the control of the American Ccsnmission to Negotiate Peace. Joseph Grew,

Secretary of the Commission, reported to Assistant Secretary of State

Phillips on January 1, 1919> that there had been a very marked attempt

on the part of certain military authorities to militarize the Commission,

which he had fought against from the beginning. 28/ He realized that the

Ccsnmission was a purely civilian and diplomatic organization-and that that

status should be preserved. General Marlborough Churchill made a survey

of the organization. He was originally motivated to make this survey by

a desire to support the military's contention that they should exercise

more authority in the Commission. His findings, however, did not confirm

this viewpoint,' and in fact, effected a lessening of rivalry between the

militaiy and the civilian elements. The report indicated that the

Ccsnmission was not overstaffed, and, with only two or three exceptions,

every officer assigned was performing duties essential to the efficiency

of the organization. Grew was also enabled to disprove the charge that

the Ccsnmission personnel was of mediocre ability, because Churchill

examined individual capabilities, and found that an exceptionally efficient

lot of men had been chosen. The effort to militarize the Commission was

superfluous too, because there were already certain sections within the

military framework that cooperated with the civilian diplomatic officials.

28/ Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), p. 3 6 8 -

29/ Idem.

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G-2. For example, the political section of G-2 of the American

Expeditionary Forces Headquarters was formed shortly after the signing of

the Armistice in order that sources of information then available at

General Headquarters with regard to current events in European countries

might be placed at the disposal of General Bliss, Colonel House, and other

American officials connected with the Peace Conference, who were then at

Paris. Such sources of information were described as consisting principally

of reports and telegrams from American military attaches and special agents,

reports from the armies in the field, extracts from the press of various

countries, 'and reports from intelligence sections of the Allies.

In memoranda prepared frcm this information, special attention was

paid to the rapidly changing political situation in enemy countries and

Russia. Financial, economic, and military matters were also dealt with,

and in general, any information which was thought to be of interest and

importance to the peace conference and to the commander-in-chief was

digested and published by this section in the daily resume. 30/ Special

reports and monographs on different countries and nationalities were

prepared at the request of General Bliss and others.

The scope of the political section of G-2 was enlarged gradually

and copies of the daily resume of information were distributed to the

American representatives of the Supreme War Council, the American

Commission to Negotiate Peace, and to the American Section of the Permanent

International Armistice Ccsnmission as well as to various military units.

30/ Colonel Nolan's File, Report of February lU, 1919, R.G. 120.

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This daily resume was first issued on November 2 k , 1918 . 31/

It contained memoranda on different countries compiled from information

received during the day digested and presented in the briefest form

possible. In addition to its daily brief, the section prepared a weekly

estimate of the situation in regard to Germany, Russia, or other countries

in which any notable changes had occurred. This weekly estimate was

distributed to the American military attaches in the more important Furopean

countries. Later, the section furnished General 31iss and the Peace

Commission a special nightly report on the political and military situation

in Germany based on telephonic and telegraphic reports frcm American

officers and agents operating in the enemy territory.

Captain Dexter Perkins, who was in charge of one of the subsections

of the political section, made some significant observations concerning

the work of the subsection. In February ISIS, he wrote to Colonel Coxe

that, as officer in charge of the subsection on current information, he

understood the purpose of the section was to furnish the commander-in-chief

and certain special bodies with an interpretation of the daily events which

had a bearing on world policy, or a synthesis of current happenings.32/

To transmit isolated facts in the form of daily memoranda seemed to him

inadvisable. Facts presented thus unconnected with others, and unrelated

to any large conception of policy, might be forgotten or lose their signifi­

cance with respect to an overall view.

3l/ Idem.

32/ Idem.

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The prime ‘business of the subsection, in the viev of Captain

Perkins, should be to prepare generalized reports on the basis of current

news that would furnish an adequate indication of current economic and

political trends in Europe. Such reports would be drawn up at intervals,

as the accumulation of sufficient facts for generalization dictated.

In the case of Germany, it would be feasible to submit a regular weekly

report on German internal and foreign policy. In the case of Poland or

the Ukraine where the information was more meager, the period would be

longer, but the results aimed at similar. Such reports could not

be undertaken by any one man. A great quantity of material came into his

own office, for example, and could not be sifted by a single officer. He

proposed to divide the work of preparing these reports according to subject.

Each officer would concern himself with a certain number of countries, and

the daily memoranda on current happenings would be abandoned. Perkins

thought that reports of the kind he suggested would have, for those who

prepared them, a more vivid interest than the daily memoranda of unrelated

facts; and, for those who received them, a greater usefulness. In this

form, he thought the reports would constitute an original and distinct

contribution. Perkins wrote that the information was immense in quantity,

but far from satisfactory in quality; much was repetitive and in many

cases arrived late.

Captain Perkins'proposed changes had obvious merit and were sound

from the administrative point of view. Although such a reorganization of

procedure could hardly remedy deficiencies in the training and capabilities

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of the personnel, specifying the areas of responsibility would encourage

the personnel to become "specialists" and make it easier to evaluate

their abilities. The proposals were quickly put into effect. 33/

Beginning February 17, 1919, selected officers were given respon­

sibility for processing information on specific countries as follows:

Lieutenant Gunster, Germany; Lieutenant Sellers, Yugoslavia and Italy;

Captain Mika, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania; and Lieutenant Townsend,

Russia and Poland.

Covering a similar function, that of getting in touch with political

movements in Geimany, another political section of G-2 was established in

Coblenz, Germany, 'under Colonel Newbold Morris. 3 V General Pershing

also established his own advanced general headquarters at Trier for keeping

abreast of the German situation. American reports to both Colonel House

and to President Wilson on conditions in Germany were valuable checks on

the information transmitted to them by the French and English.

Special Missions. After the Armistice, a number of American

diplomatic and military representatives who had been stationed in the

neutrals were sent to central amd eastern Europe on special missions. One

of these was Ellis Loring Bresel, a member of the Berne Legation with

special responsibility as a representative of the War Trade Board, was

selected to head, a special mission to Germany. In January 1919,

reported concerning his mission to Joseph Grew. 35/

337 Ibid., February 15, 1919-

3b/ Thomas M. Johnson, Our Secret War: True Americam Spy Stories 1917-1919 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Co., 1929), P- 255-

35/ The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, p. 132.

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Among the important German leaders that Dresel interviewed was

Dr. Solf, the former Colonial Minister. Dr. Solf told of the accusation

made by the Soviet envoy that a Reichstag member had accepted Bolshevik money

for the purpose of social revolution. Dresel also noted that Solf con­

sidered the presence in Berlin of Radek most dangerous.

Dresel also interviewed Dr. Rathenau, who expressed the opinion

that American influence with the Entente was decreasing rapidly. In this

German industrialist's view, now that the American army was no longer

necessary, the French would make every effort to push matters to extremes.

He favored Dr. Solf as one of the German delegates to the peace conference,

but expressed fear that they would be badly treated. ^ 6 /

Mr. Dresel also served as an intermediary between Colonel House

and Rathenau on one occasion. In December 1918, Rathenau wrote to

Colonel House that never in history had so much power been entrusted to one

body as that now conferred on Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George; and

never before had the fate of a healthy, unbroken, gifted, and industrious

people been dependent on one single decision of a group of men. 37/

Rathenau said that his work was done, and that he had. nothing more to hope

or fear. His country had no further need of him, and he did not suppose

he would outlive its downfall. The impression which this letter made on

House revived in Rathenau a small measure of hope for more favorable terms

for Germany. At the end of the year, he wrote that Colonel House informed

him through an emissary, Mr. Dresel, that he was shocked at Rathenau's

letter and had given it to the President.

^57 Ibid., p. lf5.

37/ Harry Kessler, Walter Rathenau (London: Putnams. 1929), p • 273-

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Count Brockdorff-Rantzau■ While on his mission, Mr. Dresel also

interviewed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau,

who acted as Chief of the German Delegation to the Peace Conference. The

Count informed him that his policy would "be to sign any peace treaty on

the "basis of the "Fourteen Points" of Wilson, "but not to accept conditions

which made Germany the slave of the Entente. Once Bolshevism "became

rampant in’ Germany, he was sure that it would immediately spread to

Scandinavia, and also, that it could not fail to affect France and

Italy. 38/

The findings of Captain Walter Gherardi, a naval attache on a

mission in Germany, were similar to Dresel's. He stressed the idea that

Germany was preparing to use the danger of Bolshevism as an argument to

obtain-concessions at the peace conference. Gherardi advised that a

uniform in Germany was a handicap. 39 / This advice was accepted "by the

commissioners in Paris, and gradually officers were withdrawn from Germany

so that only a few American civilians and a secretariat were left in Berlin.

Information regarding Count Brockdorff-Rantzau continued to "be

gathered by American observers. On May 6, 1919? the American military

attache -in Copenhagen reported on the probable stand which the Count would

take at the peace conference at Versailles, ho/ The attache had asked his

German polxtrcal agent to obtaxn as mucn mfcrmntxcn on tncs cues

possible. The agent reported that it was expected Count Rantzau would

38 / The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919? Paris Peace Conference, Vol. II, p. 162.

39/ Grew, o£. cit., p. 377-

h o / Military Attache Reports - Copenhagen, May 6, I919? R.G. 120.

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insist on Germany's inclusion in the League of Nations, indicating the

weak "basis on "which the League would stand if it were built on Germany1 s

humiliation.

This line of reasoning referred to the League of Nations as the "New

Holy Alliance," comprised of statesmen of bourgeois, even liberal views-

It was pointed out, however, that nevertheless millions of people — the

Bolsheviks — considered these bourgeois democratic opinions extremely

reactionary. Thus the bourgeois democratic League of Nations had a potential

common enemy. Would the Allies, Brockdorff-Rantzau asked, strengthen the

position of this enemy by throwing Germany into the arms of Bolshevism,

which would surely result if Germany were left out of the League? This

argument illustrates a type of rationale that led seme observers to predict

that German statesmen would summon up the spectre of communism as a weapon

for negotiations.

The agent also thought that the Count would raise the Polish

question as follows: Suppose, to counter the potential danger from

Russia and Germany, buffer states (such as Poland would be) were founded.

The lure to aggrandize these buffer states would surely prove irresistable

to their "neighbors, and strife would be inevitable. Given this, how then

could one be sure that these buffer areas would be drawn into the Allied

orbit? What if, rather, it were Germany, through its newly built-up

industry, that absorbed them?

The military attache in Copenhagen later devoted another report

to the probable German attitude toward Russia, hi/ Among leaders in

hi/ State Department Decimal File 86l.OO/hfi95, Norman Hapgood to the Secretary of State, Copenhagen, June 28, 1919; R.G. 59-

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German foreign affairs, there were said to be two factions. One was led

by Erzberger, who favored an understanding with the regime in Russia.

Another was headed by Bemstoff, who thought the Soviet authority would

soon be overthrown and that Germany's best policy was to do nothing until

the new government came into power. Regarding Russian attitudes toward

Germany, the report described Trotshy as favoring an alliance with Germany,

while Lenin was thought to be more cautious of such an alliance. The

concluding phase of the report noted also that every nation east of the

Rhine and as far as the Pacific had representatives in Berlin. This attested

to the influence of Russia and Germany regarding any decisions about possible

new states to be located between these two countries.

Erzberger. Many reports such as this frcm military attaches in

the European neutrals transmitted important reports on conditions in Germany,

but the American Commission to Negotiate Peace was often able to obtain

more direct information through other military channels. Such was the case

with respect to some significant contacts made by American officers with

the German statesman Erzberger, an important postwar figure of whom one

historian has commented: ". . .If the history of the period leading up

to the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles were written, it should

be entitled 'The Erzberger Era'."42/ In May 1919* a Major Henrotin sub­

mitted a report to the Ccmmission to Negotiate Peace giving his impression

of two recent interviews he participated in with Erzberger. 43/ Henrotin

Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference w York: Columbia University Press, 1957), P- 102.

43/ File 862.00/244, Vol. 385, Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, R.G. 2 5 6 .

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alone interviewed the German on the second meeting, "but also attended the

first, at which an American intelligence officer was the primary participant.

Erzberger had attempted to establish indirect contact with President

Wilson by inviting Colonel Arthur Conger, an intelligence officer, to Berlin.44/

The interview was considered to have been rather unprofitable, and Colonel

Conger has been described as misleading the Germans, intentionally or

unintentionally, about the peace terms that were to be expected. Because of

the unfavorable result of this interview, Brockdorff-Rantzau refused to have

further dealings with the Colonel when the Allied proposals were formally made. 45j

Major Henrotin noted a change in Erzberger's attitude between this

interview and the subsequent one with Henrotin later that same month. In the

first, Erzberger appeared to be convinced that "the peace terms were im­

possible. Germany would not sign, and the Allies coulu come and take over

the country." In Major Henrotin's opinion, the German government did not

realize_ the consequences of not signing the Treaty. Apparently, the German

officials had the impression that the Allies would then simply occupy

Germany, and altruistically assume responsibility for feeding the civilian

population.

In the second interview, however, Erzberger adopted a far more

conciliatory attitude and stated that it was necessary for Germany to sign

the peace, although he felt that some concessions should be made by the

44/ Klaus•Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy "(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959L P- 305-

45J Fritz Epstein, "Zwischen Compiegne und Versailles" Viertaljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. Ill, 1955, PP* 415-28.

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Allies to mitigate the severity of the terms, and to camouflage them in

the eyes of the German people. Erzberger was a controversial figure.

Many people believed that he initiated the retreat. It was claimed that

his meddling in the affairs of the German delegation led to disagreements

with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau. While

the German delegation at Versailles strove for a revision of the Treaty,

Erzberger pursued at home what his opponents termed a "defeatist" policy.

It was increasingly difficult for Brockdorff-Rantzau to convey the im­

pression to the Paris Conference that the German government would refuse

to sign unless the Allies redrafted the terms, and the Allied press con­

tinually spread rumors that a delegation led-by Erzberger would sign the

Treaty if Brockdorff-Rantzau should refuse. 46/

Possibly Erzberger's policy was more subtle than most people

realized at the time. He had been impressed- by the events of the

Russian Revolution, in which the Kerensky regime had been overthrown

because it had deceived the Russian people's hope of peace. Erzberger

also had a full appreciation of Lenin's tactics in accepting the

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, with the intention of sabotaging its execution.4-7/

When Erzberger submitted his views to the Cabinet, its members

innocently declared it to be dishonest to undertake obligations which

they did not intend to fulfill. Erzberger, however, replied that if

one were coerced by force to sign (durch Gewalt) then one was guilty of

no dishonesty (Unwahrhaftigkeit)• 48/ Cabinet members opposed to ratification,

46/ Luckau, op. cit., p. 103-

47/ John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954-), p. 50*

48/ Matthias Erzberger, Erlebniss im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1920), p. 37^*

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remained unconvinced "by this argument. Later Erzberger drew a pointed

analogy with Kerensky's failure to make peace, and only after a new

ministry was formed did final unconditional ratification of the treaty

gain acceptance in time for the deadline.

A conclusive judgment on the degree of Erzberger's deception or

intention to sabotage the Treaty of Versailles is hardly possible. Some

light might be thrown on this problem by examining the period immediately

after the signing of the Treaty. A recent biography of Erzberger states

that he looked upon the revision of the Treaty as the main objective of

German foreign policy, but thought that a flexible policy of concession,

rather than a national policy of defiance, was the only feasible way of

attaining the goal. 4g/

The American officers were obtaining information from one of the

most significant sources in Germany when they interviewed Erzberger.

It is doubtful, however, whether the advantages gained by such information

were not counteracted by the political irritations misleading statements

made by the officers aroused. Furthermore, the information obtained from

Erzberger could have been made more meaningful by an insight into his

motivations which a more thorough study of his political career would have

yielded. Such a study might have suggested the possibility of guile in

his maneuvering. It was well known that his attitude toward annexations

had undergone marked changes during the war.

_ These contacts between American officers and Erzberger as well

as the secret American missions to Germany have been cited as evidence

49/ Epstein, op. cit., pp. 379-80.

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by the Soviet historian, Voslenskii, that America vished to strengthen

\ German imperialism and to exploit German armed forces on the anti-Soviet

intervention front. pO/ He accuses the Inquiry of preparing to use

German imperialism against Soviet Russia, and of contemplating Germany

as a future American vassal. The American missions in Germany are

described as strengthening the armament interests for the purpose of

suppressing revolutionary movements among German workers. Voslenskii

asserts that the American military mission headed by General Harries -which

was charged with the repatriation of Russian prisoners was actually

recruiting criminal elements for the "White Guardist Bands" on the anti-

Soviet front. 31/ Voslenskii's biased interpretation is not an isolated

case among Soviet historians. Naida, editor of the official Soviet

history of the Civil War, has also accused American imperialists of

secretly attempting to strengthen Germany. He cites evidence purporting

to show there was a scheme for the dismemberment and enslavement of

Russia in 1919. He attributes to the State Department a map which was

actually prepared by the intelligence section of the American peace

conference delegation for the guidance of the President. The map was

only a recommendation and there is no evidence that it was ever formally

approved. 52/

50/ ' Miha. 1 1 Vnslenskii, Iz istorii politiki S. Sch.A. v Germanskom Voprose, 1918-1919 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdat1, 195^)j PP- 3&ff•

51/ Ibid., p. IU3 .

52/ George Kennan, "Soviet Historiography and America's Role in the Intervention," The American Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (January, i960), P- 307-

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Russian Problems• The American officials, in preparing for the Paris

peace conference, were concerned about Russia in addition to the other

problems of the peace. A note addressed to President Wilson on December

24, 1918, by Maxim Litvinov presented him with an opportunity to study the

new regime, and on January 10 he urged that an agent be dispatched to

confer with Litvinov in Stockholm. W. H, Buckler was then ordered to

Stockholm, and on January 15 received proposals which were transmitted

to the Council of Ten on January 21, 1919* Litvinov told Buckler that the

Russian people had been impressed by Wilson's expression of friendship and

sympathy for their revolution. However, intervention in northern Russia

had raised doubts of the sincerity of the President's belief in the right

of a people to regulate its own affairs. Russians had also resented the

fact that Americans had been misled by such forgeries as the "Sisson

documents." 53/ Another unofficial approach to Russia was made by

American officials that same year. William C. Bullitt, who had been

briefing the American commissions on incoming intelligence, was willing

to go as an unofficial representative for whom the government would have

no accountability should he embarrass it. Accompanied by Lincoln Steffens,

he reached Moscow on March 8, 1949- Conversations were held with Litvinov,

Chicherin, and Lenin. Bullitt saw in Lenin a straight forward man of quick

intelligence and a certain serenity, humor and broadmindedness. Bullitt

was also convinced by this mission that an early agreement with the

Bolsheviks was necessary. When his advice was ignored, he denounced the

53/ Arthur Walworth, World Prophet (Vol. II of Woodrow Wilson New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1958), p- 264. Buckler, while with the American Bnbassy in London, had anticipated some of the research problems of the Inquiry. On April 30, 1917; be re­ quested permission of his superior that he be provided facilities for collec­ ting information about the Balkans. He suggested such topics for study as: ethnic group aspirations, rival claims for the Straits, Church problems, anfi the use of language as a test of nationality. Gelfand, op• cit., p. 22.

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whole structure of the Versailles Peace Conference. However, in later

years, when he became Ambassador to Russia, he became disillusioned and

convinced that the "aim of the Soviet government is, and will remain, to

produce world revolution." p4/ He added that "there is no weapon at once

so disarming and effective in relation with the communists as sheer honesty.

They know very little about it." Thus one American observer underwent a

full cycle of change in attitude concerning Russia.

Bullitt's return terminated one of the last sources of objective

information on Russia. The majority of American observers in the Baltic

states viewed Russian affairs from an anti-Bolshevik bias, which led them

to unrealistically anticipate a Bolshevik collapse. Seme of the American

observers in the Baltic, as for example Greene and Gade, found it difficult

to operate within their assigned spheres of responsibility because of the

lack of any official American representation in these countries. Such

a situation created a vacuum of authority in which, almost of necessity,

the observers had to make decisions and become involved in policy. Instead

of objective observers, they acted as officials seeking to vindicate their

actions.

Russia was a pressing European problem, but it was not on the agenda

of the peace conference. When the Inquiry had been created, it was believed

likely that the Russian question would be considered at the peace conference.

This did not prove to be the case, and, aside from the training which the

staff received frcrn such work as was accomplished on the Russian problem,

the material collected and the conclusions drawn from it were of little

use to the conference.

5^7 Ibid., p. 290.

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Whether this information could have been made useful to the State

Department is a matter of speculation. Some of it might have aided in

the interpretation of current information on Russia during the period of

the intervention. Although President Wilson had a comparatively realistic

appreciation of the pitfalls of Allied intervention, Colonel House and his

leading colleagues shared in the general. anti-Bolshevik sentiment of the

State Department and the Allied circles. The important figures in the

American government drew most of their information from the factions they

favored.

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Under the impact of war, indications appeared of the inadequa­

cies consequent upon increased reliance on existing channels of reporting

(Mainly the State Department's foreign service representatives abroad, and

the naval military attaches.) Organizations and agents operating under

their direction vere increased and new channels of information were estab­

lished. This expansion of intelligence activity stimulated by the war

was largely on an ad hoc basis.

Elements of rivalry between the intelligence systems of America and

her allies, Great Britain and France, persisted in various forms throughout

the war. Efforts az cooperation on the part of the British especially often

appeared to be compromised by a desire to influence and at time even

dominate the American system. There was ample justification for the

American effort to establish a separate system even at the risk of dupli­

cation of effort because of several conditions: tendency of America's

allies to use intelligence information as a political weapon, the trading

value of independently obtained intelligence as a quid pro quo, and the

intrinsic merits of an independent system.

A. sampling of the various types of activity by American observers

revealed a broad range of functions and indicated that certain neutral

posts better fulfilled specialized information requirements than did others.

The Office of Naval Intelligence appeared to have more successfully

met its specialized requirements for information than most of the other

services. Whether this was merely due to the fact that it possessed

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a more fully developed system at the beginning of the war, or because

of certain accidental factors operating in its favor, or because of a

more systematic rationale cannot be decided conclusively. However, the

evidence would indicate that the superiority of the naval intelligence

was largely due to the first two factors rather than to the third.

In demonstrating how the informational background of certain

questions and issues relating to Russia unfolded, it was apparent that

an undue dependence on White Russians for facts and a disregard for

information showing Bolshevik strength were two of the main weaknesses

in the intelligence obtained. There was a tendency on the part of

observers to overestimate the extent of German-Bolshevik collaboration,

and a widespread belief that the Bolsheviks were mere tools of the

Germans. In general, the results of the equivocal reporting on Russia

were that a "wait-and-see" policy continued. The reporting on Russia

was a striking example of the ad hoc nature of the American intelligence

effort. The lack of long-established intelligence'system partially ex­

plains the skepticism of the higher level authorities toward the reporting•

and the consequent lack of its influence on policy.

More evaluation was undoubtedly involved than that specifically

disclosed by the cases cited or the records consulted, but evaluation

and interpretation on the part of all American intelligence gathering

agencies could have been better coordinated and systematized. Inade­

quacies in evaluation and analysis were probably greater than those in

the information collected, and efforts to improve the processing of

r information into meaningful reports were made rather belatedly. The

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digestion of information was admittedly a problem that overtaxed the

available facilities and personnel. The mass of reports tended to become

overwhelming and much trivial matter, including petty gossip, obscured

more important information.

There was a growing tendency on the part of observers to editori­

alize and make recommendations. This inclusion of advice and counsel in

reporting may not have been an unmixed blessing. In some cases objectivity

might have been sacrificed through the inclination to become involved in

policy matters subsequent to taking a position by giving advice. The

power of the technical expert - and this included intelligence personnel -

depended in a large measure upon his separation from decision-making and

upon not having an "ax to grind." The divorce of intelligence from

policy-making had a place in theory favoring a centralized intelligence

organization. It was apparently Colonel House's conviction that an

autonomous fact-finding body would be more objective and efficient than

information-collecting'branches dispersed under the auspices of various

government agencies.

In World War I decentralization was the prevailing pattern - with

one notable exception. This exception was an experiment, and can be

considered a prototype of the Office of Strategic Services of the World

War II period. This was the Inquiry, an organization of experts which

became the nucleus of.the intelligence section of"the Commission to

Negotiate Peace. It was a significant early effort to requisition

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. academic talent for var-connected service, a practice which has subse­

quently become standard. Uhe difficulty of distinguishing between the

technical and political aspects of the problems which confronted the Inquiry

compounded the problems. Also, the Inquiry was handicapped in its attain­

ment of concrete results by the fact that its efforts were dispersed over

too vide a range of investigative topics. The experts of the Inquiry were

often possessed of high academic qualifications, but their training was

usually not specifically applicable to the tasks confronting them.

There was felicitous use by the Inquiry of regular governmental information

facilities. However, the Inquiry achieved only nominal cooperation with

such old-line agencies as the State Department, and possibilities for

administrative conflict and rivalry in information collecting were always

present. This deficient coordination, either consciously stimulated by

internal bureaucratic competition or engendered by organizational ineptitude,

led to extensive inter-agency duplication of intelligence efforts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Unpublished Documents

Records in the Library of Congress:

Series VIII-A The Woodrow Wilson Papers. "The Outline of a Tentative Report and Recommendation" prepared by the Intelligence Section for the President and the Plenipoteniaries, January 21, 1919 (commonly referred to as Black Books Nos. 112).

Records in the National Archives:

Record Group 2k. Records of the Bureau of Navigation (Predecessor of the Bureau of Naval Personnel) Files 6156-297 and 6156-2 9 8.

Record Group i-5* Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library: Subject File 1911-1927 Files WA-6 (Russia); WE-2 Denmark; WE-6 Norway; WE-7 Spain; WE-9 Neutral Countries; VJX-7 German activities in Denmark.

Record C-roup 59« State Department Decimal File 1910-1929 Files 121.55 Naval Attaches; 763-72 European War; 861.000 Conditions in Russia; 862.20252 German military activity in Spain; 862.2025^ German military activity in Switzerland; 862.20256 German military activity in the Netherlands; 862.20257 German military activity in Norway; 862.20258 German military activity in Sweden; 862.20259 German military activity in Denmark; 85I.O2I8 Political affairs in Switzerland.

Record Group 6 3 . Records of the Committee on Public Information Files CPI-15-A1 to A3 Reference Division correspondence; CPI-19-A1 Telegrams from London dealing with work of CPI in Holland, France, and Sweden; CPI-19-A2 to Henry Suydem in Holland; CPI-19-A3 Inter­ cepted telegrams regarding U. S. propaganda work in Scandinavia; CPI-20-B1* Reports on Bolshevism by Spargo; CPI-21-A1 Berne corres­ pondence; CPI-22-A1 Hague correspondence; CPI-23-A1 Spain.

Record Group 120. Records of the American Expeditionary Forces General Headquarters. Intelligence Manual War Department Edition L-l8 War Department Historical Records G-2 Activities of G-2 Branch; "The Doctrine and Practice of General Staff Intelligence" by Colonel C. H. Mason, October 23, 1919; File G-2-B "German Methods" Folders 532(1)-5^1 G-2 Military Attache Reports - Berne; Copenhagen;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -14B-

Christiania; The Hague; Madrid; Stockholm; Press Review issued by the Second Section of The General Staff G-2-B Secret Service Files - Voska Reports; G-2 "Colonel Nolan’s File"; Organization Records of Military Intelligence; American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

Record Group 16 5. Army War College Documents File 9 ^ .

Record Group 182. Records of the War Trade Eoard.

Record Group 2 5 6. Records of The American Commission to Negotiate Peace Inquiry Document Nos. 37* 99> 110,. 170, 175, 2o2, 382, 576, 721, 773» 115} 78l, 78^, 839; Peace Conference Document Nos. 175, 308, 3 10 .

Vol. U85 of records of The American Commission to Negotiate Peace File 862.00.

Microfilm of the Records of the German Foreign Office. Microfilm con- tainer No. 1787 Brest-Litovsk; 1800 Brest-Litovsk Preliminaries; 2009-19 Peace Moves of the Central Powers; 205^-55 Swedish affairs 1878-1920 Gesandsschaft zu kcepnhagen. University of California series; Container 28h0 Sweden and Norway; 28h2 Sweden and Norway; 28^3 Swedish statesmen; 253^- Imperial Mission to Copenhagen; 2505-2506 German Legation Copenhagen; 2508-11 Espionage. Reel T 120 File 1013 unpublished biography of Count rrockdorff-Rantzau by Erich Brandenburg.

2. Published Documents

The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918. James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 193^*

Documents diplomatiques frangais. 3 Series 1911-191^. Tome XI, Imprimerie Nationale Olfred Costes. Par-is: Olfred Costes, 1936.

Documents of Russian History, 191^4— 1917« Edited by Frank Golder. New York; Appleton Century, 1927*

Dokumenti Vneshnei Politika USSR (Documents of the U.S.S.R.’s Foreign Politics). 3 Vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat’, 1957-59*

Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918. Documents from the - Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Z.A.B. Zeman, Editor. London: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -•249-

Iswolski im Welkriege. Per Diplomatische Schriftwechasel Iswolskis, 191^-19iT. Friedrich Stieve, Editor. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte, 1925*

Official German Documents Relating to the World War. 2 Vols. New York; Oxford University Press, 1923*

Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals. Edited by Janes Brown Scott. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1921.

Senate Committee Documents. Unification of the War and Navy Departments and the Postwar Organization for National Security. Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy. Washington: U. S. Govern­ ment Printing Office, October 22, 19^5.

The United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1916-'1917, 1918 and Supplements on the World War and Russia. The Paris Peace Conference 1919« Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office.

War Information Series No. 20. The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy. Committee on Public Information. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, October, 1918.

3. Memoirs and Letters

Ackerman, Carl W. Trailing the Bolsheviki. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, May, 1919*

Benes, Eduard. My War Memoirs. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1928.

Blahkenhorn, Eeber. Adventures in -Propaganda. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919*

Brockdorff-Rantsau, Graf. Dokumente. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte, 1922.

3ullitt, William C. The Bullitt Mission to Russia. New York: Huebsch, 1919*

Egan, Maurice Francis. Ten Years Near the German Frontier. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1919*

Erzberger, Matthias. Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gade, John A. All My 3 o m Er.ys. Experiences of a Naval Intelligence Officer in Europe. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 19^2.

Gerard, Janes W. Face to Face with Kaiserism. New York: George H. Doran Co., 19lHI

Goltz, Rudiger, Graf von der. Als Politischen General im Osten. Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 193°*

Greene, Warwick. Letters of Warwick Greene, 1919-1928. Edited by Richard W. Hale 3oston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931*

Grew, Josejh. C. Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952.

Hanssen, Hans Peter. Diary of a Dying Empire. Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1955*

Eapgooa, Norman. The Changing Years. New York: Farrar * Rinehart, Inc., 1930•

Hendrick, Burton J. Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page. New York: Doubleday, Page Sc Co., 1925*

Karolyi, Michael. Memoirs of Michael Karolyi: Faith without Illusion. New York: Dutton, 1957*

Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs, 191^-1918. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1936.

______. Memoirs of the Peace Conference. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939*

Lansing, Robert. War Memoirs. New York: . The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935*

Lichnowsky, Prince. Heading for the Abyss. Reminiscences. New York: Constable Sc Co., 1928.

Lockhard, Bruce, Sir. British Agent. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1933-

Mannerheim, Marshall. Erinnerungen. Zurich: Atlantis Verlag, 1952.

MaximiIlian, of Baden, Price. The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1928.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 1 5 1 -

Meriwether, Lee. The War Diary of a Diplomat. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1919*

Moffat, Jay Pierrepont. The Moffat Papers. Cambridge, Mass.: Earvard University Press, 1956.

Morris, Ira Nelson. From an American Legation. New York: A. A. Khoof, 1923.

Mott, Colonel T(homas) Bentley. Twenty Years As Military Attache. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937.

Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. London: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1952.

Rathenau, Walter. Briefe. Dresden: C. Reissner, 1926.

Reynoso, Don Francisco ae. The Reminiscences of a Spanish Diplomat. London: Hutchison & Co., Ltd., 1933*

Rosen, Baron Roman Romanovich. Forty Years of Diplomacy. London: A. A. Knopf, 1922.

Seymour, Charles. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926.

Solov’ev, Yuri U. Vospominaniya Diplomata, 1893-1922 (Memoirs of a Diplomat, 1893-1922). Moscow: ~Gospolitizdat’ Bibliotiki Vneishnei Politiki, 1959*

Stovall, Pleasant Alexander. Switzerland and the World War. Savannah, Georgia: Mason, 1939*

Voska, Emanuel and Will Irwin. Spy and Counterspy. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 19^0.

Wheeler, Post and Eallie Ermine Rives (Mrs. Wheeler). Dome of M=*ny Coloured Glass. New York: Doubleday, 1955.

Whitehouse, Vira B. A Year As a Government Agent. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920.

Wilson, Hugh Robert. Diplomat between Wars. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 19^1.

Yardley, Herbert 0. The American Black Chamber. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 1 5 2 -

B. SECONDARY WORKS

1. Books

Abrahamsen, Samuel. Sweden’s Foreign Policy. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957*

Albertini, Luigi. Le Origini della Guerra del 191k. Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 19^3.

Bailey, Thomas. The Policy of the United States toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918« Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 19^tO.

. Wilson and the Peacemakers. New York: The MacMillan Co., 19^7♦

Ballesteros, Lazaro. La Guerra Europea y la Neutralidad Espanola. Madrid: Jaime Rates, 1917*

3erara, Victor. Geneve, La Prance, et la Suisse. Paris: A. Colin, 1928.

Bilmanis, Alfred. A Eistory of Latvia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951*

Black, C. E. Rewriting Russian History. New York: Praeger, 1956.

Bonjour, Edgar. Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralit&t. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 19^6^ ' -

______. Swiss Neutrality. London: George Allen & Unwin Co., 19^6.

Bonsai, Stephan. Suitors and Suppliants. New York: Prentice-Eall, 19^6.

3outon, Stephan Miles. And the Kaiser Abdicates - The German Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.

Bozeman, Adda B. Regional Conflicts Around Geneva. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953*

Bretton, Henry L. Stresemann and the Revision^ of Versailles. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953* " ""

Briggs, Mitchell P. George D. Herron and the European Settlement. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -155-

Brown, Cyril. Germany As It Is Today. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1918.

Broye, Eugene. Ia Censure ■politique et Siilitaire en Suisse pendant la guerre. Paris: V. Atlinger, 1933*

Bruntz, George G. Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932.

Bullard, Arthur. The Russian Pendulum. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919*

Cardona, Luigi. Altre Pacine Sulla Grande Guerra. Milan: Mondalori, 1925*

Chambers, Frank. The War Behind the War. London: Faber 2: Faber, 1939*

Churchill, Winston S. The World Crisis. London: Butterworth Co., 1923.

Coper, Rudolf. Failure of a Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955*

Corbett, Julian S. Naval Operations. History of the Great War. London: Longmans Green & Co., 1920.

Craig, Gordon and Felix Gilbert. The Diplomats, 1919-1939« Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953•

Craig, Gordon. The Politics of the Prussian Army. l6to-19^5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955*

Creel, George. 5ow We Advertised America. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920.

Croft, Sutton. Was Switzerland Pro-German? London: Watson and Viney, 1920.

Crozier, Emmet. American Reporters on the Western Front. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cumming, C. K. and Walter W. Pettit. Russian-American Relations: March, 1917-March, 1920. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920.

Dahlin, Ebba. French and German Public Opinion on Decta-ned War Aims. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1933.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 1 5 4 -

Daniels, Josephus. Cur Wav:/ At War. Washington: Pictorial Bureau, 1922.

Drevry, Elizabeth 2. Historical Units of Agencies of the First World War. National Archives Bulletin No. ~July 19^2.

Durand, Paul. Agents secrets, l ’affaire Fauquenot-Pirckel. Paris: Payot, 1937-

Epstein, Klaus. Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959*

Painsod, Merle. International Socialism and the World War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935*

Farago, ladislas (Editor). German Psychological Warfare. New York: Committee for National Morale, 19*1.

Fester, Hichard. Die Politik Khiser Karls und der Wendepunkt des Weltkrieges. Munich: Lehmanns Verlag, 1925•

Feyler, Colonel F. La Suisse strategiaue et la guerre europeenne. Geneva: George i Co., 192k. "

Fischer, Louis. The Soviets in World Affairs. Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Freund, Gerald. Unholy Alliance. Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin. New York: Chatto Sc Windus, 1957*

Gauger, Hildegara. Die Psychologie des Schweigens in England. Heidelberg: Winter, 1937*

Gatzke, Hans. Germany’s Drive to the West. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950*

Golovachev, F. F. "Spartak i Brestkii Mir." in Iz Istorii Germanii Novogo i Novelschegco Vremeni. Edited by Yerusalemski. Moscow: Academii Nauk S.S.S.R., 195&*

Gooch, George P. Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy. London: Longmans Green Sc Co., 1927*

Guinand, Marcel. Un Proces militaire. Geneva: George & Co., 1916.

______. Les Violations du secret postal. Geneva: George & Co., 1917•

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 1 5 6 -

Hanggi, Karl. Die deutsche Propaganda in der schweizerischen Prssse. Berne: Polygraphische Gesellschaft, 191$.

Hard, William. Raymond Robins1 Cr.m Story. Heir York: Harper & Brothers, 1920.

Hart, 3. H. Liddell. The Red A m y . New York: Harcourt, Brace 1 Co., 195c.

Heckscher, 311 (Editor). Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland in The World War. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1922.

Helling, Carl H. General Ulrich Wille. Zurich: Fretz & Wasmuth, 1957.

Herre, Paul. Die KleinaiStaaten Suropas und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges. Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlag, 1937*

Hoover, Herbert. The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson. New York- McGraw-Hill, 1958.

James, Admiral Sir William. The Code Breakers of Room ^0. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1956.

Japikse, N. Dr. Die SteHung Hollands im Weltkriege. The Hague: Mat. Ninhoff, 1921.

Johnson, Thomas M. Our Secret War: True American Spy Stories, 1917-1919* Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1929.

. G-2 Intelligence siervice americaln pendant ga guerre. (A translation and revision of the above)Paris: P a y o t , 1939.

Kennan, George F. Decision to Intervene. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.

______. Russia Leaves the War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^9.

Kessler, Count Harry. Walter Rathenau. London: Putnams, 1929.

Kolarz, Walter. Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe. London: Lindsay Drummond Ltd., 19^6, *

Landau, Captain Henry. The Enemy Within. New York: Putnams, 1937.

______. Secrets of the White Lady. New York: Putnams, 1935.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 1 5 6 -

Lowie, Robert H. Toward Understanding; Germany. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195*4-*

Lukacs, John A. The Great Powers and Eastern Europe. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953•

Lasswell, Harold D. Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Peter Smith Reprint, 1938* ° 1

Levine, Isaac Don. The Russian Revolution. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1917*

Linebarger, Paul M. A. Psychological Warfare. Washington: The Infantry Journal Press, 195^-*

Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt Bros. & ~Co., 1922.

Luckau, Aina. The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. New York: Columbia University Press, 19*4-1.

McCamy, James.L. The Administration of American Foreign Affairs. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

Mamatey, Victor S. The United States and Sast Central Europe, 191*4--19l8. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957*

Kanteyer, George. Austria’s Peace Offer, 1916-1917* London: Constable & Ch., 1921.

Mathews, Joseph J. Reporting The Wars. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957*

Mead, Margaret and Rhoda T. Metraux. The Study of Culture at a Distance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953*

Meiburger, Sister Anne Vincent. Efforts of Raymond Robins Toward the Recognition of Soviet Russia and the Outlawry of War, 1917-1933. Washington: Catholic University Press, 195°*

Meine, Arnold. Wilson’s Diplomatie im Friedensfrage. Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1938.

Meyer, Henry Cord. Mitteleuropa in, German Thought and Action, 1815-19*4-5» The Hague: Martinus Mijhoff, 1955.

Mock, James R. and Larson, Cedric. Words That Won The War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 1 5 7 -

Nelson, Otto L. National Security and the General Staff. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 19^6.

Nicolai, Walter. Nachrichtendienst, Presse, und Volkstinnung is Weltkrieg. Berlin: Mittler 4 Sohn, 1920. tl ______. Geheime Machte. Leipzig: K. F. Koheler, 1923.

Notoveg, Fh. I. Bukharestskii mir 1918 g. (The Peace of Bucharest, 191?)• Moscow: Sotsekngz., 1959*

Palmer, Frederick. Bliss, Peacemaker. New York: Dodd, Meade G Co., 193U.

______. Newton D. Baker - America at War. New York: Dodd, Meade 4 Co., 1931*

Pinguad, Albert. Eistoire diplomatique, Vol. Ill les r.eutralites et les tentatives de paixl Paris:Alsatia, 19^0.

Platt, Washington, General. Strategic Intelligence Production. New York: Praeger, 1957*

Plischke, Elmer. Conduct of American Diplomacy. New York: Van Nostrand, 1950*

Ransom, Harry E. Central Intelligence and National Security. Cambridge, MassT:Harvard University press, 195?.

Riviere, Louis. Un Centre de guerre secret, Madrid, 191^-1918. Paris: Payot, 2.936 . '

Ronge, Max. Les Maiires de l ’espionnage, 191^-1918. Paris: Payot, 1935*

Rowan, Richard. Modern Spies Tell Their Stories» New York: McBride 4 Co., 193 U.

Ruchti, Jacob. Geschichte der Schweiz Wahrend des Weltkrieges, 191^-1919« Berne: Paul Eaupt, 1926.

Seymour, Charles and Edward M. House (Editors). What Really Happened At Paris.' New Yorlc: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921.

Shotwell, James T. At The Paris Peace Conference. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1937.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Sweeney, Walter C. Military Intelligence. Hew York: Stokes, 192U.

Strakhovsky, Leonid. I. Intervention at Archangel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^4.

______. American Opinion about Russia, 1917-1920. Toronto: University of Toronto Press^ 1961.

______. The Origins of the American Intervention in North Russia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1937*

Stuart, Graham H. American Diplomatic and Consular Practice. Hew York: Applenon-Century-Crofts, 1952.

Tansill, Charles C. America Goes to War. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 19 35.

Thilo, Smile. La Repression de I'espionnage en Suisse. Lausanne: ?. Haeschel-Diffy, 1917*

Tuchnan, Barbara. The Zlmmermann Tc-legram. New York: Viking Press, 1953*

Vali, F. A. Servitudes of International Law. London: Praeger, 1953.

Van Ber Slice, Austin. International Labor, Diplomacy and Peace. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941.

Vigness, Paul G. The Neutrality of Norway in the World War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932.

Voslenskii, M. S. Iz istorii politiki S. Sh. A. v germanskom Voprose, 1918-1919 (From the history of the policy of the United States on the German question). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Iadat', 195^-

Wagniere, George. La Suisse et la grande guerre. Lausanne and •Geneva: Julien) 193°*

Walworth, Arthur. Woodrow Wilson. Vol. II, World Prophet. New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1958.

Warth, Robert D. The Allies and the Russian Revolution. From the Fall of - the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. Durham: Duke University, 195^•

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -159-

Weber, Karl. Die Schweiz la Nervenkrieg. Berne: K. Lang, 19^8.

Wheeler-Bennett, John. The Forgotten Peace-Brest-Litovsk March 1918. New York: Morrow, 1939*

______. Nemesis of Power; The German Army in Politics, 1918-^5. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 195^.

Willert, Arthur. The Road to Safety: A Study in Anglo-American Relations. London: Derek Verschoyle, 1952.

Wrist on, Henry. Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929*

2. Articles

Bander, Ingram, "Sidney Edvard Mezes and ’the inquiry’," Journal of Modern History, Vol. XI, 1939> PP« l89ff.

Bingham, Woodridge. "Historical Training and Military Intelligence." Pacific Historical Review. June, 19to, pp. 201 ff.

Campbell, Edward G. "Old Records in a New War." 'The American Archivist. ~I!o. 3, Vol. V, July, 19U2, pp. 16k ff.

Epstein, Fritz T. "Zwischen Compiegne und Versailles." Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte. Vol. Ill, 1955* ia the Document Section.

Eahlweg, Werner. "Lenins Reise aurch Deutschland.." Vierte 1 jahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte. Vol. V, No. b. October, 1957* pp. 307 ff.

Kann, Robert A. "Emperor William II and Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Their Correspondence." American Historical Review. January, 1952, pp. 322 ff.

Katkov, George F. "German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917*" International Affairs. Aoril, 1956. pp. 181 ff.

Kennan, George F. "The Sisson Documents." Journal of Modern His tor?/-. June, 1958, pp. 130 ff.

______. "Russia and the Versailles Conference." The American Scholar. Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter, 1960-61, pp. 13 ff. — —

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -160-

Kennan, George F. "Soviet Historiography and America’s Role in the Intervention." The American Historical Review. Vol. 65, Ho. 2, January, 19^0, pp. 302 ff.

Langer, William L. "Scholarship and the Intelligence Problem." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. March, 19^8, pp. 43 ff.

Mamatey, Victor S. "The United States and Bulgaria in World War I." The American Slavic and Bast European Reviev. XII, April, 1953, pp. 236 ff.

Merz, Charles and Walter Lippmann. "A Test of the News." New Republic. XXIII, August U, 1920, Special Supplement.

Mohrenschildt, Dimitri von. "The Early American Observers of uhe Russian Revolution, 1917-1921." Russian Review. No. 1, Vol. Ill, Autumn 19^3, PP* 6U ff*

Rowan, Richard. "Espionage." Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. Vol. 5, pp. 59^ ff., Hew York, 1930.

3 . Dissertations. (Ph.D. unless otherwise stated)

Alexander, A. John. The First World War in American Thought to 1929« American University, 1951 (typewritten manuscript).

Anderson, Paul H. The Attitude of American Leftist Leaders Toward the Russian Revolution, 1917-1923. Notre Dame University Press, 19^-2.

Babey, Anna Mary. Americans in Russia, 1776-1917. Columbia University Press, 1938.

3acon, Eugene. Russian-American Relations, 1917-1921. Georgetown University, 1951 (typewritten manuscript).

Beauvais, Armand P. Attaches milltaires, attaches navales, et Attaches de l ’jfeir. University of Paris, 1937*

Conroy, Dorothy A. The Psychological and Political Factors Influencing the Formation of the Reparations Clauses at the Paris Peace Conference. Georgetown University, 19^9* (m .A. Thesis, typewritten manuscript).

Cooper, Joseph D. Decision Making and The Action Process in The Department of State. American University, 1951 (typewritten manuscript). ■

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -151-

Egger, Heinz. Die Entstehung der Kommunistschen Partel und des Konrrmn-f stischen Jugendverbandes der Schweiz. Zurich University, 1952.

Gelfand, Lawrence E. The Inquiry: A Study of American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919. University of Washington, 1958 (microfilm).

Eilsman, Roger, Jr. Intelligence and Policy Making in Foreign Affairs. (Abstract of Yale Ph.D. Thesis reprinted in World Politics, October, 1952).

Kemter, Max. Das Verhalten der Schweiz zu Deutschland wahrend des Weltkrieges. University of Jena. Published Leipzig, 1939*

Lassner, Franz G. The Historiographic Efforts of the German Foreign Office during the Weimar Republic.Georgetown University, i960 (typewritten).

Olszewski, George J. Allied Intervention in North Russia, 19lS-1919» Georgetown University, 1958 (typewritten manuscript).

Symmes, Harrison M. Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Germany, 19l8-1933«Geo r g e Washington University, 19^8 . (M.A. Thesis, typewritten manuscript).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -1J2-

APFENDIX I.

LIST OF U. S. MILITARY ATTACHES AND ASSISTANTS, FEBRUARY 1, 1919

DENMARK

Col. Oscar N. Solbert Maj. T. A. Sicueland

1st Lt. A. 0. Larsen 1st Lt. W . C . Preus

NORWAY

Lt. Col. Rufus F. Maddux 1st Lt. Henning Larsen

1st Lt. C. D. Gulbrandson

NETHERLANDS

Col. Edward Davis Maj. James E. Ord

Capt. H. D. Rose Capt. R. W. Goelet

1st Lt. Frank Waldo 1st Lt. 0. W . DeGruchy

2nd Lt. F. .. Burton

SPAIN

Lt. Col. T. F. Van Natta Capt. H. B. Eaves

SWEDEN

Lt. Col. Wm. M. Colvin Capt. Samuel Shellabarger

Capt. Chas. ; . Thorling..

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SWITZERIAND

Col. F. H. Godson Lt. Col. Herbert Parsons

Maj. E. H. Schelling Capt. Walter G. Davis

1st Lt. Ernest Dewald 1st Lt. D. W. King

1st Lt. E. Hinchliff 1st Lt. Wilgred Bull

1st Lt. Joseph Quittner 1st Lt. W. E. Eastings

1st Lt. H. C. Bordeau 1st Lt. Alfred D. Mason

1st Lt. D. L. Vonschaussen 1st Lt. Antonin Raymond

1st Lt. D. L. Rairden

LIST OF U. S. NAVAL ATTACHES AND ASSISTANTS, DECEMBER 2 3 , 1 91 8

DENMARK

Lt. Commander John Allyne Gade

Lt. (Jr. Grade) Horace U. Gade

NETHERLANDS

Lt. Morton Billings Downs

Lt. (Jr. Grade) Eugene Delapointe

NORWAY

Colonel Arthur T. Marix

SPAIN

Captain Chester Wells

Lt. Arnos Dorsey

SWEDEN

Lt. Edward B. Robinette

Lt. (jr. Grade) William A. Herlitz

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. - 1 6 4 '-

AFPENDIX I I

Captain Voska’s report on The Corridor Betveen The Czecho-Slovak

Republic And The Yugo-Slav State.

From R.G. 120, The National Archives.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A M n R i w A N EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

ris , December I I th , 15 :

i o: B. Goros 0-2, GS*

Scbjeci: CBS Qgp?ragR ESS TI50-3LAY STAE2.

i. Eh© Cxecho—Slovak Republic is it will so constituted will 'so an in­ land state; at no point will it touch say of the waters. As a result of its geo­ graphical position, it will be essential that seme sort of a territorial »rr&agsa®nC be as da fbr the purpose of granting it fi*©e access to cocao sea. It is only by securing such *a scoess to a seaport that the Czech o-Slovaic Republic will be gusrsu- toed and assured of an unhampered cczsaercisl, economic and political development.

Co ths north, this access aay be reached, through the friendly ter­ mitary of Poland , which will undoubtedly be given possession of the Port of Danzig, file relations of Poland and the Qsacho-Slovak Republic have always been friendly in. the pest and all indications point to the fact that in the future these relations will be Just as friendly, fiia sutaai interests of the two peoples demand that they if C^r wcric in oosplete hnraoay with each other. Only by mutual co-operation #*** an ua— qualified support of aac& other oan these two nations hope to successfully cope with say danger that aay threaten them from the part of Germany. This co—operation is taken for granted by all the Polish and Csecho-Siovak factors.

fine possession of the Port of Danzig, however, is not sufficient, file eoaraeroial interests of the Csecho—Slovaks, as well as the interests of ths leading industrial concerns of the southern part of Poland require an access to the Adriatic for the purpose of assuring their future development. A vast portion of Bohaoda, as well as the southern portion of Poland possess large industrial establishments which require foreign aarksts for their products, in the past, a large portion of the output was continually sent to the Balkans or other lands through the ports of Trieste and flume. It Is to be expected that in the future one of these ports will be utilised for the purpose of enabling these regions to transport their products to foreign lands. Rven now, the commercial circles of Gscsho-SlOTskia are saving the neoessary preparations fcr the purpose of estab­ lishing olose trade relations with the Allies, and especially with America. They expect to be able to export msny of their products to the latter oountries, while hoping at the same time to be able to Import other products froa them. It is realised, however, that if the trade between America* and the Czecho-slcvak Republic is to be brought to its highest point of development, some access must be secured to the Adriatic.

Ths Csecho-Slovaks therefore demand the creation of a corridor that would link their oountry with the TBgo-Slavs, who have already had friendly relations with the Csecho-Slovaks and who in the o ourae o f the past war have co­ operated with them in every undertaking, fids territorial corridor, whose creation they it+nanA would be a strip of land extending free the vicinity of the City of Press burg (in the oounty of Pressburg), Hungary, on the north of the city of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SagyHthisea cu the south. it vculd be about 80 Til rwwtrM in width axtendiaf JiPh- -•lly present ‘boundary of Hungary Austria. It# length weald be tg| T O > isntely 130 kilometres. 3aa territory that would be eofcmoed within t k U oorridcr ib inhibited by a population that is very , Saare w a tine all of ttla territory raj inhabited by Slave. in the oouree of oeatnrlee of forcible ijp r w itc i, nany of those siare hare been either Semoaixed or Uegynxised, bat even tb the preaent day the Slovak population an the north extende eoath ae fhr ee the LtOm of Seusiedl, while on the south .the TUgo-Slsv population axtaade ee fhr north ae the Hirer irury and eren farther. In between these points there are na n r o a e «sat are still inhabited by siare, consequently, if this corridor is to be created no great injustice vould be dene either to the Germans or the Ihgyare, both of a lain this territory as their own. At the wares* ease of the wooes of the prerloas oppressive policies of the Austro-Hungarian Government would only be undone. Territories that were oaoe Slav would merely be given back to 'tike Slavs. It the . present tine quite a controversy is going on between the Magyar# end the Seasons . as to who le entitled to this territory. SieOoreramnt of Vienna has passeda : resolution flwaands the annexation of this territory parts of the oosntiae of posBctny, hoson, Sopron, Z Q Z and the in Hungary. She Magyars an the other head have issued proolegations to the effect that all of these oounties sast TWits a part of Hungary because of the fact that t*«y are not inhabited by Qexasts bat rather by Magyars and Slavs. It is only now that Magyar circle# have oooe to adsit that in these territories the Jiagyar# are not in the majority. 23ie TUgo-Slavs have also a direct interest in the creation of this corridor. Soe.Zingdaoi of the Serbe, Croat# and TUgo-Slsv# is for the snet port agricultural. =± x ± s x . large 1r.daetries are as pet found within its bcrdars consequently it will have to lap art a great many raanu featured articles. In the past* ussy of these things were inported free Bohasiia and exchanged far agricultural products. It is also expected that in the future this trade end caaaaarae will con­ tinue. So, the Tago— Slavs are anxious far the areatlan of this corridor in ardor that they nay be enabled to import and expert crtiolos of coonaroe to and froa the Ocecho-Slovsk Hepublic ever territory which would not be controlled by any hostile country. This can only be dene if the Allies sad Ameriae. will demand the creation of the corridor linking the Czecho-Slovaks and the TUgo-Slavs. iron the point of view of the Allies, the creation of this cerridor is also an absolute necessity. In the first place, it is essential that in the interests of peace and concord in Central Sarope, the Germans be separated firms the liagyars. It is largely due to the fact that these two nations were permitted •' j conspire with each other and to carry on their intrigues that the present war broke out. The creation of this corridor would plaoe an effective barrier in the path of their intrigues. In the second place, the creation of this barrier will assure the Allies of a direct rail connection between the Adriatic sad the Baltic 'seas as well as Husain. Articles of cosnerce could be shipped by water from , ^nerica or 2ngland to Fiusa and then transported by rail to Pragoe, Cracow, Ifcrssw, icscow and Hetrograd and the interior points of Poland, mamlns and Sossia. flbe s railroads over which these goods would be shipped would be entirely in the hands of nations that have proved theaseives fiierdly to the Allies tbs present war. Thus, at no part of their transit would 'these goods have to pass over Semen territory. In addition to the fhet that thdsajrailroad? leading from Pinas to the y-- north would be in friendly hands throughout their entire extent, they would offer a cheaper means of transportation than the present railroad which leads fiea Trieste to Laibach and to Vienna. Shis railroad which has been most used up to the present tine on account of the favoritism bestowed upon it by tho Austro-Hungarian

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. jfc'it oqe to aa&d t o t tto.avaaifcjtai' of .tM© 'oon&dor %o tgM&At &&£'tortatll of t o (BUS'Of toAoM^'M-'^.tgr t o vital lataraata' of ,::.^Cto^.®seto»Silf®^ .t&oso eotsia^sial sad eeocai© dsrolcrpo ,v.. ,.... toajktoBRBttnfcm tip stetrol of trsdo rente-3 liiticlBg eaea asm® t&o, political lats&oata of tfeo Allies ted Asscrica t^ic!i t o @ m s m ted to. tonrltoriaMsr diraoi-tod in order to toir intricate ted forming offeotlvo military ©ecaszsio ted oossEsroial interests of tbo -tetabllto»t.of tm & > roatca botoon t o Adriatic cca « $ . & & lBtn^flrvpMjs^B'v,.9f Cteteal Esrcpoi trad© rentes t o t w o a l d tUroa^iont t!pS2i‘csstteti to 'Cozst^ollsd'.^r thoso cations that tov© ehonai tbcssol'vos in ccrplbto h z & z & s y ted aesord tdtJb t o principles advocated by president Wilson*

m m u E L v . v q s iL, Captain, U. S« Ars^.

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...... \ •'Yo\vv

. ' ' .. - .t"' )!., ,.~, .~~ I __j , . if1i ii mi ii I ,11— „ I II f 1'IT I i Reproduced" ^ ^ ^ p e with m permission is ^ o i^ of c the o pcopyright y r fe owner. h , ownerFurther Further reproduction reproduction prohibited prohibitedwithout permission. wi^ou, perm,ss,on. -26S-

APPENDIX III-

NOTE ON THE APPOINTMENT OF "INQUIRY" EXPERTS

AND OF MILITARY AND NAVAL ATTACHES

From November 13, 1917 to June, 1918, Mezes had general super­

vision of appointments to the Inquiry. In June, Mezes asked Isaiah

Bowman to be responsible for men, money and plans for the Inquiry.

Apparently Division Heads in the Inquiry sometimes initiated action on

the appointment of experts subject to the approval of the Director.

Dana C. Munro, head of the Middle East Division of the Inquiry, proposed

to acquire gratis the services of a considerable portion of the history,

politics and sociology departments of Princeton University, but failed

to receive an appreciative response. Apparently the Directors were 1 afraid that too many Middle East experts would spoil the broth.

It was the practice for the Office of the Chief of Staff of the

War College. Division to recommend the detail of officers to the Military 2 Attache posts. At the time of America's entry into the War, Colonel

Van Deman and Brig. General Marlborough Churchill played a decisive

role in assigning military attaches. The State Department in some

instances caused the recall of Military Attaches. Later, during the

war, Colonel Dennis Nolan played an important role in making recommenda­

tions controlling the work of military attaches, but it does -not appear

^Gelfand, on. cit., pp. 85-89.

S-iles 8873-3 (Dec. 30, 191*0 and 90b6-60 (Aug. 13, 1917), r.g . 165.

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that he made any actual appointment:-.. Rear Admiral Roger Welles, the

Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, made most of the appointments

to Naval Attache posts. The first appointments of military attaches by

the United States Government vere made in 1539 in accordance vith an

Act of Congress of September 1638.-'

■? Armand Beauvais, Attaches militaires, attaches navales et attaches de l 1air (Paris: Presse Moaernes, 1937)., P- 33*

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APPENDIX IV

Photographs from the National Archives Still Pictures Branch

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Signal Corps

Photograph 155^90

Mr. Dresel and Staff

Current Diplomatic and Political Correspondence, American Commission

To Negotiate Peace.

Left to Right, sitting:

F. R. Dolbeare, Colonel R. Van Deman; E. L. Dresel, E. T. Williams;

Mr. J. H. Stabler.

Standing: A. W. Dulles, J. G. D. Paul; Major R. Tyler; Major Delancey

Kometze.

Hotel Crillon 4 Place de la Concorde, Paris.

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; .

- ~-

. - --......

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Signal Corps

Photograph I57U70 taken 4-17-19

Mr. William C. Bullitt, in Charge of Current Intelligence and

his staff, Upper Rov, left to right. Neil Bumshav; Lt. David T. Nelson;

Lt. G. E. Noble; Robert Lynch; J. G. Praul; Lt. Milton Garver; Clyde Loven;

H. M. Deane.

Sitting: Dr. W. L. Westerman; C. A. Herter; William C. Bullitt,

Chief of Current Intelligence Division, Dr. H. Lord and A. W. Dulles

American Commission To Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, 4 Place de

Concorde, Paris.

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. ·. :·-·.··.... - l·

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I I

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Signal Corps

Photograph 159289 taken 6-25-19

Shows the American Commission To Negotiate Peace. Included among

the Delegates at the Hotel Crillon in Paris are:

President Wilson Mr. Patchin

Mr. Baruch Mr. Buckerl

Prof. Johnson Mr. Henry White

Mr. Vance McCormick Colonel Van Deman

Colonel House Joseph S. Grew

Mr. Allan Dulles Dr. Shotwell

Mr. Osborne Admiral Grayson

Mr. Harrison Secretary of State Lansing

Mr. Whitehouse Mr. Taussig

General Bliss Dr. Lord

Normal Davis Professor Coolidge

John F. Dulles Dr. Dominian

Ray Stannard Baker Mr. Dresel

Mr. Herter Mr. James Brown Scott

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Signal Corps

Photograph 15^762 taken 1-28-19

Americans under American Flag at Prague.

Miss Marie Cavan, Grand Opera singer, who did Czecho-Slovak

propaganda work for the Allies (3) Mr. Otto Marok, husband of Miss Cavan;

(5) Captain E. Voska. interested in organizing political, social, economic,

and health improvement; (4) Dr. Joseph Beck, Major in Czecho-Slovak army,

former Major in the U. S. Army. Now in charge of Medical Clinic at Prague;

(6) Miss Hanna Ninskora, Secretary to Captain Voska; (7) 2nd Lt. Hessell

attached to Captain Voska; (8) Corp. Toral, official photographer of

Dr. Beck.

NOTE: (The above caption, found with photograph among the records

of the Signal Corps in the National Archives, is obviously incorrect.

Captain Voska is fourth from the left.)

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Signal Corps

Photograph 63928

Shovs officers in the G-2 of the General Headquarters of the American

Expeditionary Forces.

Included are:

Brigadier General Dennis Nolan (No. 4l)

Colonel Alexander B. Coxe (No. 43)

Colonel Roger Alexander (No. k 2 )

Captain Dexter Perkins (No. 22)

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f ..

·~· ..

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Photograph 39558

Major Loy, Front Seat; Rear Seat left to right: Major Ramsey,

Lieutenant Scheliens, and Lieutenant Walter of the German Army leaving

Spa for Coblenz.

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