ENTRETIEN with/avec Q&A Leveraging Canada-US relations “to get big things done”

As the architect of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the Acid Rain Accord, former prime minister Brian Mulroney has unique experience of the importance of Canada-US relations, and the relationship between the US president and the Canadian prime minister. In the run-up to the McGill conference, he sat for an extended interview with Policy Options Editor L. Ian MacDonald.

Architecte de l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain et de l’Accord sur les pluies acides, l’ancien premier ministre Brian Mulroney connaît de première main l’importance des relations canado-américaines et des liens personnels qui peuvent unir les chefs d’État des deux pays. À la veille de l’importante conférence de l’Université McGill, où il prendra la parole, il a accordé une longue entrevue au rédacteur en chef d’Options politiques L. Ian MacDonald.

POLICY OPTIONS: Mr. Mulroney, BRIAN MULRONEY: President became prime minister. But it was key thanks for doing this. March 2011 Reagan came to Ottawa. And acid rain in leading to the ultimate solution. marks the 20th anniversary of the Acid was a cover story in all our major mag- PO: Vice-President Bush, after vis- Rain Accord. When you first met azines, front page stories in our news- iting you at 24 Sussex in January 1987, President Reagan in 1984, when you papers on a daily basis, pretty well. So, famously said, “I got an earful on acid were leader of the opposition, he it was a major problem, and we had rain.” How much of an earful? apparently thought that acid rain was major difficulties in pushing this BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, it was caused by trees. Yet, seven years later, through the American system. pretty tough, because I was at that point after you stayed at it, you got the Acid PO: At the Shamrock Summit in negotiating with them on free trade, Rain Accord, signed on March 13, March of 1985, part of the commu- acid rain, NATO troops in Europe, and 1991. How difficult was it to get the niqué that issued from your meeting so on. We were in constant negotiations Americans to engage on that? with President Reagan was on the with the Americans, and at that point BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, it was envoy process of Drew Lewis and for- very little was going our way. extremely difficult. It required con- mer premier Bill Davis of Ontario. How When Vice-President Bush came stant efforts with two American presi- important was that as a step forward in up — he was sent up by the president dents, perhaps more accurately an getting Reagan to take it seriously? to see me, because they were aware of American president and then vice- BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, it was the fact that I was pretty furious at president, George Herbert Walker important for that reason. Until that the inaction and the manner in Bush, who then became president, of time, I thought that he was essentially which they were constantly skating course, in 1989. being polite. I raised acid rain with things off into the boards. The priori- There was reluctance by the presi- him at every single meeting we had, ty that we were giving free trade dent because of the science, there was and there was resistance at every single negotiations in Canada was not recip- resistance from the business communi- meeting we had. Significant resistance. rocated in the United States. It was ty, the commerce department, because But, by engaging two distin- being handled by a good man, but at of the costs and, it was, from what I guished people like Drew Lewis and a much lower level. I wanted Jim could see, the major irritant between Bill Davis in the process, we elevated it Baker engaged in this, because with- Canada and the United States. When — we moved it to a new level — so out Baker, the treasury secretary and Mr. Trudeau was there, I think it’s accu- that he could not automatically — or I former White House chief of staff in rate to say that there was a demonstra- shouldn’t say “he” — the American Reagan’s first term, I felt we wouldn’t tion of some tens of thousands of side could not automatically dismiss be able to do the deal. people outside Parliament. the findings and the recommenda- PO: We’re going to come to that. PO: In March of 1981 when tions. So, that was an important first BRIAN MULRONEY: That was the President Reagan made his first visit… step that he agreed to take after I kind of resistance then, so I had it out

12 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2011 Leveraging Canada-US relations “to get big things done” Q&A with Vice-President Bush. I knew he right. And we tried to make the point ist, and people like John Sununu, who was not responsible, because I had when I spoke to Congress about the was his chief of staff, and Dan Quayle, been, of course, to meet with him many dramatic nature of the ecological his vice-president, who was chairman times. I knew he was an environmental- catastrophe that was befalling us with of the Competitiveness Council, took ist. I thought that he shared my point this inattention to acid rain, that it an entirely different position on acid of view, largely, and I knew that if he was only going to get seriously worse. rain and felt that the United States were Reagan’s successor, we’d eventual- What’s interesting now is to look could continue to skate us into the ly get this resolved. But I really back, 20 years later, and to reflect on boards to their great advantage on this. Bush reviewed the matter What’s interesting now is to look back, 20 years later, and to himself, and came down reflect on the fact that acid rain is rarely — if ever — mentioned and said, “No, I’m not in the newspapers, because the matter has been resolved. But in going to do this. We owe this to Canada. We owe it to the process of resolution, you can just imagine the new health the Mulroney government, that’s been given to our industries and our rivers and streams which has been pressing and forests — they’ve been re-energized by this new policy, and this issue upon us for five that gratifies me a great deal. years now, nonstop. And we owe it to our common envi- unloaded on him, because I knew that the fact that acid rain is rarely — if ever ronment to do this.” That is when the this was the only way that I was going — mentioned in the newspapers, logjam was broken, when he got back to get the message through to the rest because the matter has been resolved. from Camp David and decided this and of the administration. So, when he said, But in the process of resolution, you conveyed his decision to the council, “I got an earful,” he really did. can just imagine the new health that’s to the American government. PO: And then you were able to get been given to our industries and our PO: When you signed this Accord an agreement with the seven provinces rivers and streams and forests — they’ve in the Reading Room of Parliament, of east of Saskatchewan to reduce sulphur been re-energized by this new policy, the Centre Block, on March 13, 1991, dioxide emissions by 50 percent. How and that gratifies me a great deal. did you have a sense that this was a big important was that in your being able PO: Do you think the Acid Raid moment? to go before the US Congress in 1988 Accord could in some sense serve as a BRIAN MULRONEY: Yes, I did. For a and say, famously, “We ask nothing template for climate change and clean number of reasons: firstly, the environ- more than this from you”? energy in North America? ment, for me, has always been an BRIAN MULRONEY: It was very BRIAN MULRONEY: I do. extremely important policy issue; sec- important, because it was the begin- Certainly, the manner in which we ondly, acid rain was a big ticket item in ning of a Clean Hands Policy, because went about it, the persistence we Canada that had remained unresolved our opponents in Congress and else- showed, the desire to participate in the for years, in spite of the efforts of many to where, the administration, would resolution of this, rather than just bring it to resolution; thirdly, I had made always say, “Yes, we may be somewhat stand on the sidelines and shout at this a litmus test of the Canada-United responsible for this, but so are you.” So your neighbour, it helps when you States relationship, and had told both we decided to develop this Clean Hands engage constructively, doing some- presidents Reagan and Bush that we Policy, at the end of which we hoped thing yourself. We were able to do that. would so regard a resolution of this issue; that the Americans would have no such When President Bush came in, he fourthly, because I thought Canada had comeback when we said, “The emis- called me the day before his State of taken a mature and somewhat selfless sions from acid rain are killing our the Union speech, his first one, and attitude in approaching this by adopting lakes, rivers and streams and forests in told me that he wanted to come to the Clean Hands Policy in advance of res- Central and Eastern Canada, and you Canada on his first visit — which we olution; and fifthly, because the manner are solely responsible for this. quickly arranged. But he also told me in which this was resolved I thought at Therefore, you’ve got to put an end to that he had gone to Camp David with the time would definitively resolve this it.” That’s why it was so important. a briefing book that dealt with nothing entire ecological disaster, as I called it, in PO: And you said in that same but acid rain. He was determined, I favour of both countries fairly and once speech that acid rain fell on both sides later found out internally; he had and for all. And it did. of the border, but on the US side it fell spent a lot of time with me and with PO: As we look back on it now, years from Maine to Michigan, and that it Canada on this matter, and he wanted later, it had that beneficial effect. fell on the White House, and it fell on it resolved. BRIAN MULRONEY: It also had a the roof of the United States Congress. The conflict in his term was with psychological effect; it showed that BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s exactly people — Bush was an environmental- two great countries can deal together

POLICY OPTIONS 13 MARCH 2011 Brian Mulroney ENTRETIEN on sensitive matters and resolve mat- given the reluctance that was going would intrude on and diminish ters to their satisfaction, as Canada on and the fact that we were going to American sovereignty — congression- and the US have done for 200 years. run out of time on the special presi- al sovereignty — over international PO: The second big item that came dential power to negotiate compre- trade. I said, “Well, you know, Jim, out of the Shamrock Summit in 1985 was hensive Free Trade Agreement for fast that doesn’t make much sense, the decision to move ahead with free track authority, I instructed Simon because every time you sign an inter- national agreement, every The value of the dispute settlement mechanism — I think we time you join the United used to call it chapter 19. But chapter 19, if you look back on it Nations or you join NATO, after 25 years, you’ll see how few matters were brought to the we all surrender a little bit panels because firstly it forced people to really put water in their of our sovereignty. That’s just the way life is. But if wine to avoid binding arbitration, and secondly, look how often you’re telling me that they’ve come down in Canada’s favour, in spite of the imbalance. there’s no deal, that’s fine. Because, you just give me a trade negotiations, in 1986 and 1987. But Reisman to return, and used it as a minute, and I’m going to call there was a moment right at the end of manner of getting the attention of President Reagan. It’s Saturday night. the negotiations, before there was finally the American government big time. I’m going to call him at Camp David a deal on October 3, 1987, when you That happened, and I think it led to and he’s going to want to know why it called from Toronto on October 1, from a the resolution of the impasse and the is that the United States of America dinner at the York Club — I remember it Free Trade Agreement. can sign a nuclear nonproliferation very well — when you called your nego- PO: Well, you’re an old labour nego- deal, a reduction deal, with the Soviet tiating team in Washington and told tiator. The importance of walking away Union, their worst enemies, and they them to come home. Was that just a from the table sometimes is what hap- can’t sign a Free Trade deal with negotiating posture? And if not, why was pens just before you get the deal, isn’t it? Canada, their best friends?” a dispute settlement mechanism a deal- BRIAN MULRONEY: Yes. And you Whereupon, Baker, says, “PM, can you breaker for Canada? have to do it at the right time and in give me 20 minutes?” I said, “Sure.” BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, because the right manner. And what happened PO: He didn’t want you to have without the dispute settlement mecha- there (you can see it from Allan that conversation with Reagan. nism, given the relative and profound Gotlieb’s diaries), the calls immediate- BRIAN MULRONEY: He didn’t imbalance in the size of our economies, ly started to flood in — “What the want me to have the conversation with the strength of our economies, without hell’s going on? What happened?” — Reagan, and 20 minutes later, half an that, the Free Trade Agreement could because the Americans, the senior hour later, whatever it was, he called have been used against us on a regular Americans who were involved in this, back and said, “The deal is done.” basis and we’d have had no recourse — were of the opinion things were going What I didn’t know at the time is, whatsoever — except to go the route along quite swimmingly, when in when Gotlieb’s memoirs came out, that used to obtain, that is, through point of fact they weren’t — at all. So, apparently Baker, who had a rough American courts or to American quasi- they got a rude awakening that day. time with the American delegation — judicial panels. Then, from the night we signed it … he had to ram a number of things PO: You could spend your whole PO: October 3, 1987. A Saturday down their throats, as well — he came life in litigation. night, and the hands of the clock were into the room in the Treasury BRIAN MULRONEY: You’d spend it almost literally ticking at five minutes Department, where the Canadian del- all in litigation. The value of the dis- to midnight, the importance being egation was, and he took the Free pute settlement mechanism — I think that President Reagan’s fast track Trade Agreement, threw it on the we used to call it chapter 19. But chap- authority, which is to say to negotiate table, and his answer was, “There’s ter 19, if you look back on it after 25 a deal up and down without amend- your goddamn dispute settlement years, you’ll see how few matters were ments, would expire at midnight. mechanism.” So, we had the deal. brought to the panels, because firstly, BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s right. I PO: I remember you being on the it forced people to really put water in was at the Privy Council Office that phone with that night, say- their wine to avoid binding arbitra- night. Jim Baker came on the phone, ing to him, “Is this better than what we’ve tion, and secondly, look how often and my recollection of it was that he got?” and time stood still for a second. they’ve come down in Canada’s was indicating that everything was BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s right. favour, in spite of the imbalance. pretty well resolved, but that there PO: His answer was, “Yes, Prime I thought it was a condition sine was no way we could have the dispute Minister,” and then I think you said, qua non that we had to have and, settlement mechanism, because it “Then go ahead.”

14 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2011 Leveraging Canada-US relations “to get big thingsQ &done”A

White House photo Brian Mulroney, then Leader of the Opposition, and US President Ronald Reagan at the Rose Garden of the White House following their first meeting in June 1984. It was at this meeting that Mulroney first raised the issue of acid rain, leading eventually to the signing of the Acid Rain Accord in March 1991.

BRIAN MULRONEY: I said, “Go and all the other opposition parties tural industries were going to be ahead and sign.” There were a small being opposed? destroyed and, most of all, the bor- number of Canadians there in the BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, we rec- der would be erased. room, from memory, I think, Derek, ognized that was very helpful to us. BRIAN MULRONEY: Regional Stanley Hart, Michael Wilson, Don And so we encouraged that as best development was going to go. Campbell, , and Derek we could. I’ll always remember when Medicare was gone. And official lan- Burney. my old friend John Turner said pub- guages would be abolished. These were PO: And Bill Dymond was there, too. licly one day that summer that he had just some of the losses that we were BRIAN MULRONEY: Yes, Bill was instructed the unelected Senate to going to endure, and we would lose there. Of course. A great man. Bill block the Free Trade Agreement, there- millions of jobs, because we were made a very valuable contribution to by, of course, freeing me to call an elec- going to be swallowed up by America, all of our efforts. Derek had canvassed tion on it. I was so concerned by what and I would be the governor of the 51st the others, and everyone was in firm he had done that I took Nicholas to see state. Of course, none of it turned out agreement that the Free Trade Bambi. My son Nicholas was about to be true whatsoever. What the Free Agreement as drafted and negotiated three, I guess, at the time. Trade Agreement has done is strength- that night would be a tremendous PO: The 1988 campaign was en Canada’s economy enormously, boon for Canada economically, and it quite memorable in that sense, and thereby enhancing our sovereignty, turned out to be the case. there are certain echoes of it in con- because without economic strength PO: Selling it to the country cerns about sovereignty being there is no sovereignty possible. And proved to be another matter. expressed today by the Liberal oppo- it’s been a great benefit for our coun- BRIAN MULRONEY: [Laughter] sition over Mr. Harper’s talks on bor- try. I’m very proud of it. PO: Was the partisan divide of the der security and a smart border with PO: It was the forerunner of 1988 election actually what you want- President Obama. You remember it NAFTA, but that was a negotiation ed? A polarization that had you and better than anyone. Our health care that you had to fight your way into, the Conservatives selling it on one side was going to be demolished, the cul- wasn’t it?

POLICY OPTIONS 15 MARCH 2011 Brian Mulroney ENTRETIEN BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, yes. with Cabinet. It was on a Saturday. I er in SDI. And so we did what we did, and PO: In 1991. know it was a weekend, for sure. I told I think that worked out, as well. BRIAN MULRONEY: In 1991, the the caucus our position and then I By the way, President Reagan Bush administration decided that under went upstairs to my office and called said, “Well, Brian, I’m disappointed. pressure from President Salinas, they Reagan and said, “Now, Ron, I know Very disappointed that Canada won’t would negotiate a similar pact with this means a great deal to you. Canada participate. But I appreciate the man- Mexico. This filled me with concern — my government — thinks this is a ner in which you’ve done this. You’ve because it meant the United States would very valuable and important matter spoken to me before there’s been any be in the middle with a spoke into you’re talking about, but it’s too rich reference to the media. I know about Canada and a spoke into Mexico, but for our blood. We’ve inherited a terri- it. I’ll alert my guys to this. I appreci- only they would have a bilateral relation- ble economic situation, and we don’t ate your courtesy in this. We were ship with both. And so I said to President have the money to participate in this. kind of used to headlines coming at Bush, there’s no way this is going to hap- But we recognize that you view it as us from Canada with no warning, pen. This is going to trivialize our rela- important, and that indeed it is impor- attacking America and our aims and tionship and diminish the impact of the tant to your national security. So, we objectives. The way you put it to me Free Trade Agreement, and there has to will not be joining SDI, but on the today, if that’s the manner in which be the three of us negotiating together to other hand, you’re not going to get any it’s articulated later, I can readily live bring the equivalent of the Free Trade critical comments from the with that, and you and I can work Agreement to Mexico. Government of Canada or from me together in the future on other mat- The irony of that, of course, ters.” was that again my critics We were going to be swallowed up PO: The second example thought that, well, here he’s get- by America, and that I would be the being your support and, indeed, ting worse. He did a Free Trade st your leadership on economic Agreement with the United governor of the 51 state. Of course, sanctions against South Africa, States which, by the way, no one none of it turned out to be true because of the apartheid regime in the US Congress wanted. We whatsoever. What the Free Trade and Nelson Mandela being held had to fight our way to get into Agreement has done is strengthen in prison as a symbol of it. You that. And also on NAFTA, the were leading one camp and Americans tried to exclude us. Canada’s economy enormously, Margaret Thatcher and Reagan We had to fight to get into that. thereby enhancing our sovereignty, were in another. And yet the conventional wis- because without economic strength BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s dom in Canada, as put out by there is no sovereignty possible. And right. I wasn’t able to move some of the media and the either of them in any consider- opposition, was that the it’s been a great benefit for our able way, in spite of my many Americans were just sitting there country. I’m very proud of it. efforts. They were no less com- waiting to suck poor old Canada mitted than I was to the eradi- into a deal, whereby we would be swal- about the nature of SDI. You go ahead cation of apartheid, but they felt that lowed up by both the Americans and the with our full support and our good my insistence on sanctions against Mexicans. None of it was true at all. We wishes in trying to develop this, and South Africa would only cripple the had to fight to get in, and I’m glad we we will remain on the sidelines.” South Africans and not be advanta- did. It’s been very beneficial for Canada. PO: But in the real world, if he could- geous to the masses, the working class, PO: You’ve often said about the n’t deliver the Canadians, essentially it in the country. This, of course, ran Americans and the relationship meant that SDI was a dead letter with the counter to what we were being told by between the US president and the rest of the NATO Alliance, wasn’t it? the ANC. Canadian prime minister that we can BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, we PO: Mandela himself had quite disagree without being disagreeable. thought that it would have an impact, another view, did he not? Let me give you two instances where obviously. The other thing, from BRIAN MULRONEY: Yes, indeed he you disagreed with President Reagan, Canada’s perspective, is that given the did. When he came out, Mandela said first on the Strategic Defence polarizing nature of the times, I didn’t that he supported what we had done Initiative, or “Star Wars” (SDI). Can want to do anything that would irretriev- 100 percent and that he considered you recall the conversation you had ably place Canada in the American orbit that Prime Minister Thatcher and with President Reagan saying you — political orbit — on the international President Reagan were completely weren’t coming in on that? scene, on East-West matters. Therefore I wrong on this. But we hadn’t heard BRIAN MULRONEY: Yes, I can. I didn’t want the Soviets to be able to from him personally, obviously, while called a special caucus after a meeting point out that Canada was a major play- he was in jail.

16 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2011 Leveraging Canada-US relations “to get big things done” Q&A But to that, both Mrs. Thatcher and BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s right. that they showed me on Air Force Reagan would say, yes, but the ANC are PO: On that one, you were essential- One, Brian.” a bunch of Communists. It’s a ly John Diefenbaker’s heir, weren’t you? BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s right. Communist-dominated organization, BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s right. PO: This was in April 1987, and and so on. I said, “Well, how do you Mr. Diefenbaker began it all, I think in you were showing him a globe in your know that?” “Well, Mandela’s a 1961, when, at a Commonwealth con- office, right? Communist.” “How do you know that? ference, he — Mr. Diefenbaker — BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s right. Have you talked to him? He’s been in jail moved for the expulsion of South Colin Powell, who was then his deputy for 27 years. How would you know what Africa from the Commonwealth. I’ll national security adviser, was with him, and later told the story. Acid rain was a big ticket item in Canada that had remained PO: Their view was that unresolved for years in spite of the efforts of many to bring it to the Northwest Passage was the open sea and our view resolution; thirdly, I had made this a litmus test of the Canada/ was that it was our waters, United States relationship and had told both Presidents Reagan right? and Bush that we would so regard a resolution of this issue. BRIAN MULRONEY: Right. I said to him in my he is?” And so they developed this always remember these little anecdotes office, “There it is, Ron. This belongs to Communist argument, and I would take of life. But Diefenbaker said that day – Canada. Lock, stock and icebergs. This is the position that, look, if I were Mandela in London, I guess it was — “We’ll it.” And it was after that, by the way, and had been in jail for 27 years, and keep a light in the window for South down at 24 Sussex, where, according to that the only people coming forward to Africa.” He left London and came back the taped interviews given by Frank help me — my organization — financial- to Ottawa for a Progressive Carlucci, who was then the national ly and in any other way, were Conservative convention, and I was security adviser himself, he indicated Communist countries like Cuba or one of the delegates there to cheer him that Reagan got angry with the American Libya, I’d accept their assistance. I’d on his arrival at the Chateau Laurier. delegation, and said, “I want this matter accept their assistance 100 percent And He showed great leadership. resolved now. And you do it.” Carlucci if you wanted to call me a Communist PO: I don’t know whether it was came running out in 24 Sussex looking for that, go right ahead. That’s Mandela’s you or someone around you, perhaps for Derek Burney, and when he found position, I’m sure of it. And I said he’s Derek Burney, who said the only way him, he said, “Derek, what is your posi- not a Communist. We’re going to find for Canada to get the attention of the tion on Arctic sovereignty, acid rain and out that any ideas that you have in that Americans is with big ideas. free trade?” and Derek said, “Well, why regard are going to turn out to be wrong. BRIAN MULRONEY: That’s right. do you want to know?” He said, “Because So we fought that battle very And a prime minister who will be unre- they’re our positions now.” strongly, as you know, over many lenting in his pursuit of those limited There was a classic illustration of years. Finally, when Mandela came objectives, and so, as a result, I served as what can be done. Colin Powell always out, one of the first calls that he prime minister for nine years. The most used to say that the Arctic resolution placed — one of the first calls I got — important file on my desk and on the matter came about because Prime was to me saying that he had heard, desk of any prime minister of Canada is Minister Mulroney had a Rube Goldberg when he was in prison, on the BBC the Canada-US relationship. map in his office of the Arctic. shortwave, that a young Conservative During that time, in terms of big PO: Reflecting on, if you don’t prime minister had taken over in ticket items, we achieved the following: mind, relationships between presi- Canada and had lead the the Canada-United States Free Trade dents and prime ministers going back Commonwealth to this sanctions pol- Agreement, the North American Free to, say, Franklin Roosevelt and icy, and that, because of his gratitude, Trade Agreement, the Canada-United Mackenzie King: They happened to be he would like to make his first visit to States Acid Rain Treaty and the Canada- the longest-serving president and a democratic country Canada, to United States Arctic Sovereignty prime minister. They were both in speak to Canadians and to thank Agreement. Those are four big ticket office during the Great Depression them and their government for what items that we were able to resolve that and both in office during the Second they had done on his behalf. That was have withstood the test of time for World War. Taking that as the starting very gratifying. As you may remem- Canada — in nine years. point, where do you think that the ber, it was a wonderful occasion when PO: And in fact, Reagan, on the Mulroney-Reagan/Bush years could he came to Ottawa in 1990. Arctic sovereignty issue, began with a fit, in terms of interpersonal relations PO: June 1990, and he endorsed different view. I think he said, “That’s between the two principals and in the Meech Lake Accord. not the map of the Northwest Passage terms of achievement?

POLICY OPTIONS 17 MARCH 2011 Brian Mulroney ENTRETIEN BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, I think interest groups, and the leaders of because of the respect and the regard in that Roosevelt and King had a good rela- the media — Kay Graham and Ben which they were held in Washington. tionship and that considering they were Bradlee, and so on. So, you pull it together and we had a war years, much was achieved. I think PO: Is it fair to say that if the prin- good team. that Mr. St-Laurent had a good relation- cipals engage, the system engages? PO: How do you think that ship. He concluded the St. Lawrence BRIAN MULRONEY: There’s the Stephen Harper and Barack Obama are Seaway agreement with Eisenhower. Mr. key point. If you have that kind of doing? Diefenbaker, as we know, really didn’t relationship with the president and BRIAN MULRONEY: From what I have a great relationship down there. you come together for a meeting, that can see, they get along well. They do PO: Not with Kennedy, that’s for sure. summit energizes the entire system. It well together. The body language is good. I was there in If you have that kind of relationship with the president and Washington just the other you come together for a meeting, that summit energizes the day. I had dinner with entire system. It sends a signal out to the American Senator John Kerry, who is bureaucracy that the president likes the prime minister, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the president wants America’s interests to be advanced through United States Senate. He con- greater harmony with Canada, and if they want their careers firmed my impression that to move they’ve got to get going quickly. the Canada-United States relationship was back on a BRIAN MULRONEY: Not with sends a signal out to the American sound footing. President Kennedy. Then we had bureaucracy that the president likes PO: And this Beyond the Borders Pearson and Kennedy, who got on very the prime minister, the president conversation that we’re having with well, and Pearson and Johnson. That wants America’s interests to be the Americans now, does this qualify didn’t go very well. And then Trudeau advanced through greater harmony as a big idea? with a number of them. I think Mr. with Canada, and if they want their BRIAN MULRONEY: I think it does. Trudeau did well in his relationship with careers to move, they’ve got to get We’ll see when and what comes out of Gerry Ford. Less well, of course, with going quickly. It is the intensity of the hopper. But from what I have heard President Nixon and President Reagan. those meetings that provokes the poli- and seen so far, Prime Minister Harper PO: Let me rephrase it. How impor- cies that result in agreements, because and President Obama are pursuing a tant is it that the president and the they see that the president is saying to big idea. There will be no shortage of prime minister be on a first-name basis, the prime minister, who then says “I opposition in the Congress and here at as you were from the moment of your want this done.” Look at President home, there will be the usual outcry first meeting with Reagan. As Reagan’s diaries, the number of times about selling out our sovereignty. I’ve Diefenbaker wrote in his memoirs, he he says, “I want this done for Canada,” been to that movie before. was on an Ike and John basis with and the times he said it publicly. PO: To end on a personal note, you’re Eisenhower, and that the phone was So, I think that it’s a very compli- going to be turning 72 in March. What right there. How important is that? cated and tricky relationship down are your thoughts on where you are in BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, it’s not there that requires an enormous your life, and how is your health? You just the question of the first-name rela- amount of attention and sensitive learned last fall that you had diabetes. tionship. It’s being able to leverage it work by the prime minister himself. How are you doing with that? to get big things done. It’s not just the It’s not something that he can delegate BRIAN MULRONEY: Well, Mila question of the prime minister with to assistants and to advisers. He’s got and our four kids and our seven the president. You’ve got to work at it. to do much of it himself, and he has to grandchildren are all in great shape, The majority leader of the have the instinct. He has to under- and it’s a very happy time in our lives. United States Senate, in my time, stand that if he doesn’t get the When I was told I had diabetes, I had George Mitchell and Bob Dole, I had Canada-United States relationship some psychological difficulty at first both of them come to Canada on the right, very few big things are going to getting my mind around it, and equivalent of ministate visits. I had happen to his time in office. around the idea of injecting myself in them to 24 Sussex, I had lunches for Now, it happens if you’ve got great the stomach several times a day. But them. We really courted them — ambassadors like I had when I was compared to what young people with obviously. I would go down and see there, people like Allan Gotlieb and diabetes go through, it’s nothing. And Bob Michael in the House and Tip Derek Burney and John de Chastelain. thanks to insulin, and two great O’Neill, and Newt Gingrich and peo- These people were outstanding. On Canadians, Banting and Best, I’m still ple like that, and I would see the their own they made things happen here. Still alive.

18 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2011