THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

CASE NO.: ICTR-00-56-T THE PROSECUTOR CHAMBER II OF THE TRIBUNAL v. AUGUSTIN NDINDILIYIMANA FRANÇOIS-XAVIER NZUWONEMEYE INNOCENT SAGAHUTU AUGUSTIN BIZIMUNGU

WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005 0909H CONTINUED TRIAL

Before the Judges: Joseph Asoka de Silva, Presiding Taghrid Hikmet Seon Ki Park

For the Registry: Mr. Roger Kouambo Mr. Abraham Koshopa

For the Prosecution: Mr. Ciré Aly Bâ Ms. Ojemeni Okali Mr. Moussa Sefon Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou

For the Accused Augustin Ndindiliyimana: Mr. Christopher Black

For the Accused François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye: Mr. Charles Taku

For the Accused Innocent Sagahutu: Mr. Fabien Segatwa Mr. Seydou Doumbia

For the Accused Augustin Bizimungu: Mr. Gilles St-Laurent Mr. Ronnie MacDonald

Court Reporters: Ms. Verna Butler Ms. Karen Holm

NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005 I N D E X

WITNESS For the Prosecution: FRANK CLAEYS Cross-examination by Mr. Black (continued) ...... 2

EXHIBIT

Marked for identification: No. ID. 11 [Ndindiliyimana] ...... 11

VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page i NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 MR. PRESIDENT:

3 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Sessions are on. The appearances as before. 4 5 Yes, Mr. Black, you may continue.

6 MR. BÂ: 7 Just a moment, Mr. President. Before Mr. Black starts, Witness Claeys was expected to go back to 8 Belgium on Friday, 15th, and that is the ticket that was bought for him. Now we know that that is no

9 longer possible. All we want to know is how much time Defence intends to take so that we can make 10 the necessary reservations and also inform his sector ministry. And with the ticket we need a bit of time 11 to be able to make the reservations. If each Defence team can tell us how much time they will require,

12 then we can make our calculations and make the reservations for his return. 13 MR. BLACK: 14 This is only an estimate, but I -- because we're doing half days, it will be today and tomorrow for sure.

15 If things go speedily, we can -- I can finish maybe at the end of Friday -- I mean, end of Thursday, but it 16 may go into Monday. 17 MR. PRESIDENT:

18 Yes, Mr. MacDonald. 19 MR. MACDONALD: 20 Of course, it depends on what has been covered by Mr. Black. I'm not going to reinvent the wheel, but

21 at least a day; maybe one and a half. 22 MR. PRESIDENT: 23 Mr. Taku.

24 MR. TAKU: 25 Your Honours, I may need two to three hours. 26 MR. PRESIDENT:

27 Mr. Segatwa. 28 MR. SEGATWA: 29 Mr. President, that depends. If the line of questioning I've prepared is covered by my colleagues, I will

30 not need more than two hours. 31 MR. BÂ: 32 We can, therefore, take it that at the latest we will be through by Wednesday next week so we can

33 make his reservation from Thursday. 34 MR. PRESIDENT: 35 Yes.

36 37 Yes, Mr. Black. VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 1 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 FRANK CLAEYS, 2 CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued)

3 BY MR. BLACK: 4 Q. Colonel, I just want to show you something. Perhaps I show you -- 5 MR. BÂ:

6 Can we also have that document? 7 MR. BLACK: 8 I will make you a copy. I think we may have forgotten to make several copies of this particular

9 document. 10 BY MR. BLACK: 11 Q. Before I get to that, let me just ask you, Colonel, though -- since you reported to General Dallaire --

12 MR. BLACK: 13 Oh, and the photocopy machine is not working, I'm told. 14 BY MR. BLACK:

15 Q. Since you reported to General Dallaire -- 16 MR. BÂ: 17 Yes, it's working; the photocopier. Give it to the representative of the registry and he can maybe make

18 a copy for everyone. 19 MR. BLACK: 20 (Microphones overlapping) ... questions for another half an hour or so. It's only seven pages. Make

21 maybe five. Thank you. 22 BY MR. BLACK: 23 Q. Anyway, that -- I'm gonna show you that report later. What it is -- I take it that since -- start again.

24 Since you reported to General Dallaire, do I take it that you obviously saw reports he made, or you 25 helped him in drafting reports from time to time, or was that Major Beardsley's role? 26 A. It was, in fact, the role of Major Beardsley. I used to see the general to report to him on my activities,

27 but I was never involved in the drafting of the -- of reports that were to originate from him, except for the 28 famous -- infamous fax that was sent on the 11th of January. 29 Q. Okay. Now, the report I've just asked the registrar to photocopy, so we can look at properly, is a report

30 made by General Dallaire to General Baril in New York on March 30th at General Baril's request. It's 31 an analysis of the gendarmerie and it echoes almost identically the report we discussed yesterday, the 32 report contained in General Dallaire's reconnaissance mission report. Essentially, the conclusion is that

33 the gendarmerie was completely ineffective, because of the problems we discussed yesterday. He 34 repeats those problems and that's, again, his opinion on March 30th, 1994, to General Baril. Did you 35 see a copy of that report, from your memory? I can show you a copy later. But do you remember

36 seeing that report? 37 A. I'm sure I did not see that report because the date of the 30th March -- on the date of the 30th March, I VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 2 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 was not in Rwanda, and when I came back to Rwanda, I was no longer part of the UNAMIR mission; I 2 was part of the Belgian contingent in charge of evacuation of expatriates.

3 MR. BLACK: 4 Oh, all right. We have a couple -- we've found a couple of the reports. Maybe, Mr. Kouambo, if you 5 could give one to the colonel, and I can give one to Mr. Bâ. Thank you.

6 BY MR. BLACK: 7 Q. As you see, that report is to Baril -- 8 MR. BLACK:

9 And for the Judges' information, that's another Canadian general who had a high position – or, in 10 charge of this mission in New York, from General Dallaire dated March 30th, 1994; the subject, 11 “Gendarmerie capabilities”. And it goes through an analysis of the gendarmerie; the units; the

12 capabilities; the resources, and so on; and their personnel. And at paragraph 11 on the third page, 13 General Dallaire says to General Baril, "The gendarmerie is assessed to minimum -- minimum -- 14 minimally, if not" --

15 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 16 The interpreters do not have that document. If the counsel can read slowly. 17 BY MR. BLACK:

18 Q. Fine. "The gendarmerie is assessed to minimum -- to minimally, if not, ineffective." And then he 19 discusses why. And he, again, talks about the rapid expansion of the gendarmerie and the lack of 20 training, on the next page, attracting recruits who didn't want to go into real combat, political

21 implications -- 22 MR. BÂ: 23 Mr. President.

24 MR. BLACK: 25 Mr. Bâ, just let me finish. 26 MR. BÂ:

27 Mr. President, a question of procedure: You cannot continue in that manner. You cannot conduct a 28 parallel examination-in-chief. He did not testify in this. He was not there during this period. He did not 29 have an input in the drafting of the -- why do you want to make your Defence case with this witness?

30 You cannot conduct a second examination-in-chief. He's not your witness. He testified on issues that 31 he's aware of. 32 MR. BLACK:

33 Mr. President -- 34 MR. BÂ: 35 You cannot change the rules. That is not how it happens. That is not the purpose of

36 cross-examination. 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 3 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 Mr. President, Mr. Bâ can't change the rules. Mr. Taku read to you the rules yesterday. Mr. Bâ seems

3 not to want to recognise the rules. He doesn't like what's coming out in this trial. And we warned them 4 when they had this -- they charged General Ndindiliyimana: they wanted a trial; they're gonna get a 5 trial. And if they regret the trial, that's their problem. I'm allowed to bring out from this gentleman what I

6 can to help the Defence. He was there at the time, Mr. Bâ. He served as a serving officer at the UN 7 with General Dallaire on March 30. Around that time, he was on vacation, he says, that particular day, 8 but anyway.

9 MR. PRESIDENT: 10 Counsel, since Dallaire is coming, why do you want to waste this witness's time on this? 11 MR. BLACK:

12 I could have finished by now. 13 MR. PRESIDENT: 14 Yeah. No, he has said that he doesn't -- he has not even seen these reports.

15 MR. BLACK: 16 I want to ask him if this is his appreciation of the situation as well. I'm entitled to ask him that. So I can 17 get two officers to say the same thing.

18 MR. PRESIDENT: 19 Yeah, but then -- 20 MR. BLACK:

21 It makes it much stronger for my case if -- 22 MR. PRESIDENT: 23 You might --

24 MR. BLACK: 25 -- I'm gonna get General Dallaire -- 26 MR. PRESIDENT:

27 You run the -- 28 MR. BLACK: 29 -- the Canadian army to say so, but I also get the Belgian army to say so.

30 MR. BÂ: 31 You are not reading Rule 90 correctly. 32 MR. BLACK:

33 Nor are you. 34 MR. BÂ: 35 Paragraph (G): Cross-examination shall be limited to issues raised in examination-in-chief or having --

36 touching on credibility of the witness. "Cross-examination shall be limited to the subject matter of the 37 evidence in-chief and matters affecting the credibility of the witness, and where the witness is able to VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 4 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examining party to the subject matter of the case." 2

3 The witness has not given evidence on this matter. And the second point is, in the cross-examination 4 of a witness who is able to give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examinating (sic) party -- 5 cross-examining party, counsel shall put to that witness the nature of the case, or the party. If you are

6 questioning the witness, you should bear this in mind. You want to challenge his credibility, you should 7 do so. But the subject should be related to the examination-in-chief or the matters on which the witness 8 was questioned in examination-in-chief, otherwise you have to wait for your witness to come and give

9 evidence, or wait for General Dallaire to appear before you can put such questions to him. 10 MR. BLACK: 11 Mr. Bâ is not reading the rules. The rule says, and I'll say it in French for Mr. Bâ. Rule 90(G)(ii): "In the

12 cross-examination of a witness" – sorry; let me try this again. "In the cross-examination of a witness 13 who is able to give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examining party, counsel shall put to that 14 witness the nature of the case or the party for whom that counsel appears which is in contradiction of

15 the evidence given by the witness." 16 17 I can bring out anything (microphones overlapping).

18 MR. BÂ: 19 Either I have an old version of the rules -- we probably do not have the same versions. And you don't 20 have the updated version?

21 MR. BLACK: 22 I've got the updated version. I got the updated version. Mr. President, what this shows from the 23 Prosecution -- I'm shocked, and I think the world will be shocked, and those watching this trial will be

24 shocked, to find out that the Prosecution does not want -- 25 MR. BÂ: 26 (No interpretation)

27 MR. BLACK: 28 I'm speaking, Mr. Bâ. 29

30 Mr. President -- 31 MR. PRESIDENT: 32 One at a time.

33 MR. BLACK: 34 I think the world's gonna be shocked to find out the Prosecution, which is charged, with this Tribunal, 35 with bringing out the truth of what happened in Rwanda, is trying to prevent us from using UN

36 documents to help defend our clients. 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 5 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. PRESIDENT: 2 No, Counsel, I think –

3 MR. BLACK: 4 And -- and I'm not getting any assistance from the Bench, frankly. 5 MR. PRESIDENT:

6 No. Counsel, you are not prevented from using these documents. Why are you saying that you are 7 prevented? 8 MR. BLACK:

9 Because, I -- 10 MR. PRESIDENT: 11 When the witness comes, you can put these documents.

12 MR. BLACK: 13 Because Mr. Bâ is standing up to interrupt my cross-examination which is proper. He's not being told to 14 sit down. And now I have spent 20 minutes on this unnecessary waste of time. I could have finished

15 this line of questions 10 minutes ago. 16 MR. PRESIDENT: 17 Well, Counsel, if you will -- the rule says you can suggest to the witness your defence.

18 MR. BLACK: 19 That's right. 20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 Yes. So you can suggest to the witness, instead of reading all these documents. They have given an 22 undertaking that they will call the maker of the document. 23 MR. BLACK:

24 No, no, no. Why can't UN documents -- why do I have to do that? This is a UN document from 25 General Dallaire to General Baril. He doesn't want -- because it helps my client because he says he's 26 not responsible because he couldn’t have done anything. They don't want the world to hear that, and

27 they don't want me -- and you don't want me to obviously read what is in this report so the world can 28 find out that. 29 MR. PRESIDENT:

30 How can you say that I don't want you to read? I have told you, you can produce the entire document 31 when Dallaire comes. 32 MR. BLACK:

33 No. I don't wanna do that. I don't wanna wait a -- maybe another nine months before Dallaire comes, 34 before the public knows my client's not guilty. 35 MR. PRESIDENT:

36 Yeah. This is not for the public. We are not recording the evidence for the public – 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 6 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 With respect.

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 So let them -- 5 MR. BLACK:

6 Well, with respect -- 7 MR. PRESIDENT: 8 -- let them --

9 MR. BLACK: 10 With respect -- 11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 -- know what is happening. 13 MR. BLACK: 14 With great respect, Mr. President --

15 MR. PRESIDENT: 16 So this is not about the -- the public is not going to take a decision on this. 17 MR. BLACK:

18 With great respect -- 19 MR. PRESIDENT: 20 We will take the decision.

21 MR. BLACK: 22 Resolution 955 -- 23 MR. PRESIDENT:

24 You want to make it public, for I don't know what. 25 MR. BLACK: 26 Resolution 955, Mr. President, requires that this Tribunal be constructed in order to teach the world

27 what happened in that war and why we shouldn't let these things happen again. So, it's important. 28 That's -- the whole Tribunal is -- otherwise, you'd have secret trials. It's an open public trial so the 29 public can know. The world wants to know, otherwise this Tribunal wouldn't exist.

30 MR. BÂ: 31 Mr. President. Mr. President, believe me, I do not have any problem with what he wants to read except 32 that it should not be -- it should not happen that way. He wants to conduct a second

33 examination-in-chief. The cross-examination is subject to rules. I have no fear for you establishing that 34 the gendarmerie was under-equipped. I have evidence that your client ordered -- gave orders for 35 people to be killed. What do I have a fear -- have to fear about what you have to read? Just that

36 Dallaire is not here. You cannot conduct a second examination-in-chief. He did not testify on that. 37 What you want to establish does not contradict his examination -- his testimony in-chief. He did not VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 7 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 testify on the equipment of the gendarmerie. At best, you can make one or two propositions, but you 2 cannot go on like this.

3 MR. TAKU: 4 Your Honour, with your kind permission and that of my colleagues, I think this argument is 5 unnecessary, and I submit, very respectfully, that it is not for the Prosecutor to tell the Defence how to

6 ask the questions under cross-examination, for the simple reason that it is for the Defence. The 7 Defence knows exactly what the Defence case is. Furthermore, Your Honour, the witness who has 8 come today to testify is not an ordinary person. He worked in UNAMIR. He testified that he worked

9 very closely with General Dallaire, and it would not be inappropriate for the witness to be asked 10 questions about things which he knew when he worked with General Dallaire, things which he came to 11 know after, based on documents which he saw, based on the nature of the relationship, which the

12 witness could reasonably have given an opinion. And I think, Your Honour, that the line of questioning 13 on what -- on what happened in UNAMIR is appropriate. Besides -- besides, the Prosecutor, himself, 14 has forwarded to us documents relating to investigations that were conducted in Belgium about the role

15 played by this particular witness, not only him alone, but about events that took place involving the 16 Belgian contingent long after he had left. 17

18 He answered these questions, and I think, Your Honour, it will only be in the interests of justice that we 19 be allowed to ask questions in that direction, more particularly, as the indictment itself, Your Honour, 20 talks about the death of the Belgian soldiers. He was not a witness. He has testified to that. He was

21 not present, Your Honour. But, I think that to the extent that he has been questioned about that, that is 22 evidence before us – or, disclosures indicating that he had been questioned about those issues, I think 23 would be appropriate. How the question will be formulated is left to Your Honours, who are the sole

24 Judges who are policing this audience. But to say that it is the Prosecution to indicate the areas on 25 which we will testify, I think, Your Honour, is inappropriate. 26 MR. PRESIDENT:

27 I think -- no, Counsel -- 28 MR. BÂ: 29 Mr. President.

30 MR. PRESIDENT: 31 -- the problem is this: the rule says that you propose your defence to this witness. So if your defence is 32 the gendarmerie was ill-equipped and your client is -- was not in a position to execute what was

33 expected, you can put it to him, and you can say that in order to -- you are basing your proposition on 34 the documents sent or prepared by the UN, itself. So -- otherwise, we will be wasting unnecessary time 35 on this question by reading all these documents to him.

36 MR. BLACK: 37 That's -- that's what -- VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 8 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. PRESIDENT: 2 He is not the maker.

3 MR. BLACK: 4 Then we are in complete agreement. We are arguing about nothing, because that's what I was just 5 gonna do. I'm not gonna read the entire document at all.

6 MR. PRESIDENT: 7 You -- 8 MR. BLACK:

9 I just summarised what it said, and -- 10 MR. PRESIDENT: 11 So you can summarise what you have to say --

12 MR. BLACK: 13 That's what I was attempting to do -- 14 MR. PRESIDENT:

15 -- and put it to the witness. 16 MR. BLACK: 17 -- when he jumped up and wasted 20 minutes of our time.

18 MR. PRESIDENT: 19 No, no -- that's right -- Mr. Black, we are not depriving you. You can put all these documents. When 20 Dallaire comes you can take -- put all the documents that he had prepared. This witness says, "I had

21 nothing to do with the preparation of the documents" -- 22 MR. BLACK: 23 Right.

24 MR. PRESIDENT: 25 -- "and I have no knowledge of that." So, therefore, by reading these -- the contents of this document, 26 we will be wasting time. You sum up your proposition and put it to the witness; we will move on.

27 MR. BLACK: 28 Well, if Mr. Bâ would sit down, I could do that in two minutes. 29 MR. PRESIDENT:

30 Yeah. 31 MR. BÂ: 32 Two comments, Mr. President.

33 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 34 Counsel's microphone. 35 MR. BÂ:

36 The witness is not here as an expert witness, but he is a witness of facts. He's testifying on specific 37 facts. And when we were intervening yesterday, you were on your feet several times, telling me, "This VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 9 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 is not the way it is done; it is not in the rules. It is not the standard", and I accepted what I was told 2 about what I said not being the standard. But, you, here, cannot conduct a second

3 examination-in-chief. It does not happen that way. 4 MR. PRESIDENT: 5 Mr. Bâ, he's entitled to put his proposition – or, his defence to the witness, Mr. Black. So we will -- I

6 have told him how it should be done, so he will proceed now. 7 MR. BLACK: 8 Yes. And just -- another caveat is that he did, in fact, talk about the situation of -- he made a report. He

9 talks about the gendarmerie in his statements given to us. 10 MR. PRESIDENT: 11 Yeah.

12 MR. BLACK: 13 So I'm entitled to ask him whether his opinion stays the same on March 30th. 14 BY MR. BLACK:

15 Q. Anyway, Colonel, sorry about that disruption. Anyway, that's the sum – that’s the conclusion of 16 General Dallaire, and he goes through various reasons why, and they're basically the same reasons put 17 forward in the other document yesterday. Is that -- I know you weren't there on exactly March 30th, but

18 around that time, before you left and after you came back, would that be your assessment of the 19 gendarmerie, as well? 20 A. Indeed, we discussed this issue yesterday and I have nothing to add. But since this document has

21 been given to me, let me just add that this is a document that was not sent to New York. It was a 22 working document. There's no dispatch number. It was in the hands of General Dallaire, and on 23 page 3 -- or, rather page 4, there's a question: is it really correct? So it is a document that needed to be

24 fine-tuned before being sent to New York. 25 Q. I agree with that. 26 A. So if you want to look at this document, we can; but it was not a document that was sent to New York,

27 certainly not. 28 Q. Nevertheless, it was written by General Dallaire. I agree with you. There are some notations on there. 29 But the conclusion -- there's no question about the conclusion. That remains the same.

30 MR. BLACK: 31 Right. Mr. President, can I ask that this could be an ID document for General Dallaire when he comes, 32 as well? Or I can wait. I guess --

33 MR. PRESIDENT: 34 There is no problem. General Dallaire is coming. 35 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:

36 Your Honour's microphone, please. 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 10 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BÂ: 2 Tendered as what, as the draft of Dallaire? He has said that it is no more than a draft, that it didn't go

3 to New York. And you want to tender that into evidence and through this witness? 4 MR. BLACK: 5 No, I wanna make it a document for identification purposes only, and if General Dallaire can't -- doesn't

6 come or doesn't acknowledge he wrote it, then we can't use it, Mr. Bâ. 7 MR. PRESIDENT: 8 It's an ID document. We can accept that.

9 BY MR. BLACK: 10 Q. Some other small matters on the gendarmerie. Did you have any discussion -- in Dallaire's book, the 11 English version at page 202, he states that -- he says this about a meeting between various officials --

12 MR. PRESIDENT: 13 One second, Counsel. I think -- 14 MR. BLACK:

15 Sorry. 16 MR. PRESIDENT: 17 At this stage, Mr. Black tenders a document purported to be written by General Dallaire as ID. 11 of

18 Ndindiliyimana. 19 (No. 1D. 11 [Ndindiliyimana] marked for identification) 20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 Yes. 22 BY MR. BLACK: 23 Q. You were aware of a meeting on March 1st at which General Dallaire -- defence minister, Bizimana,

24 the -- Nsabimana, General Nsabimana, and Genera Ndindiliyimana met with the General Dallaire to talk 25 about the situation? Are you aware of that meeting, March 1st, or do you have any memory of a 26 meeting like that?

27 A. I do not remember any such meeting, and I certainly did not participate in it. 28 Q. I was going to ask you if, maybe, General Dallaire talked to you about it because he says in his book 29 that there was such a meeting on March 1st, and that during that meeting General Ndindiliyimana -- he

30 says this, "Then Ndindiliyimana" -- 31 MR. PRESIDENT: 32 Counsel, he says that he didn't participate.

33 MR. BLACK: 34 No, but he may have discussed with General Dallaire afterwards, and that's why I asked, "Did you know 35 about this, that then Ndindiliyimana again tried to insist that, since his gendarmerie were overtaxed, I

36 should allow him to beef up his forces with the RGF troops. That would breach the KWSA 37 agreement" -- VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 11 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 2 Could counsel slow down a bit, please?

3 BY MR. BLACK: 4 Q. So, "I should allow him to keep -- to beef up his forces with RGF troops. That would breach the KWSA 5 agreement, and I said no." Did General Dallaire talk about the gendarmerie, General Ndindiliyimana

6 asking to get reinforcements into the gendarmerie to help the situation? Did you have any conversation 7 like that at all? 8 A. I do not remember being provided with such information.

9 Q. He also says at page 212, the simple statement: "The gendarmes had very limited transport and 10 couldn't control the situation." Is that also your view of the situation at that time, that's in March? 11 A. We discussed the same issue yesterday in discussing the reconnaissance report of General Dallaire.

12 That was common knowledge. It was nothing new. 13 Q. Did you ever discuss with Luc Marchal any issue about weapons searches and their effect? Because 14 General Dallaire states at page 215 that, about a particular search on April 1st, the gendarmes had

15 come up empty-handed. "Obviously the plan had been leaked and the weapons moved, but Luc had 16 not lost faith. He had been training the gendarmerie and was certain of their good faith and the next 17 time they would achieve success", and the time was -- they picked for a search was April the 7th. Did

18 you have any discussion like that with Luc Marchal about his view of the gendarmerie? 19 A. I remember that we discussed the efficacy of the combined actions of UNAMIR and the gendarmes who 20 were supposed to accompany them, but, as I stated yesterday, the gendarmes, who accompanied the

21 UNAMIR patrols to the various roadblocks, did their work without any hitches with regard to the search 22 for arms caches. I know none of those searches took place, because we had to coordinate 24 hours 23 beforehand the activities of the gendarmerie and the UNAMIR, which could allude to information that

24 had arrived at the locations where arms were hidden. It was not coordinated action, but it was action 25 following the attack of an observer, so coordinated search was carried out to recover his identification 26 papers in houses close to where the UN observers resided. So, as far as I remember, there was no

27 organised search of arms caches in cooperation with the gendarmerie. 28 Q. Right. Switching subjects, going back to my questions yesterday in which I suggested to you that there 29 was an anti-government bias in the Belgian government forces, which you've denied, are you aware

30 that in the Belgian senate hearings that Major Podevijn, P-O-D-E-V-I-J-N, testified in front of that 31 commission and stated that, "We were pro-RPF", that is, the Belgian forces, "We were pro-RPF"? Are 32 you aware that he said that?

33 A. I never read or heard that he said that, but it's very -- 34 MR. BÂ: 35 En français, s'il vous plaît. Continuez en Français.

36 THE WITNESS: 37 I was not aware of that statement by Major Podevijn. If he said such things, that would be very VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 12 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 surprising, because years before, I believe before the war, he had dealt with technical military 2 cooperation in Rwanda. At that time he worked with government forces. So I would be surprised if he

3 made any such statements. 4 BY MR. BLACK: 5 Q. He did. It's at page 258 of the report of the commission. You'll find it there.

6 A. And that would be binding only on him. I don't think that was the official position either of the 7 government or the Belgian defence. 8 Q. When you received your briefing from your headquarters staff about your mission in the Belgian partic --

9 decision to participate in the MINUAR, were you advised about the Belgian government policy and 10 objectives in taking part in that mission, why they decided to take part in that mission, what they hoped 11 to achieve?

12 A. No, it was not part of the briefing received as part of the reconnaissance mission. 13 Q. So you weren't aware at all of your government's position on the circumstances in Rwandan and the 14 situation there, politically?

15 A. The position, as far as I was concerned, was very clear: we were going out on an, initially, 16 reconnaissance mission to find out whether Belgium could engage in assistance missions in Rwanda. 17 There was no ethnicity in that context.

18 Q. So then you are not aware then after the meeting between the Rwandan ambassador -- do you know a 19 man by the name of Jaenen or Yaenen (sic) , J-A-E-N-E-N, director of African affairs under Mr. Claes, 20 which is Willy Claes, then minister of foreign affairs. Do you know that name?

21 A. That name does not ring a bell. 22 Q. Apparently, he was the director of African affairs and, in the place of Mr. Claes, had a meeting with the 23 Rwandan ambassador on January 15th 1993 in which Mr. Jaenen, on behalf of the government, told

24 the Rwandan government that it would be better to, um, basically cede power to the RPF, failing which 25 there would be a war whose amplitude and extent and damage would be incalculable. You are not 26 aware -- I have this letter here concerning that. You know -- you weren't briefed on that meeting, that

27 that was the policy, that they wanted the RPF to, basically, become the government? 28 A. Mr. President, I would like to point out that during that period I was a captain. I do not know how people 29 perceive the rank of captain in the army. That was a subordinate position. I don't think the minister of

30 foreign affairs of a country would talk to an officer to brief him on his meetings with a Rwandan 31 ambassador. I have nothing to add on that. 32 Q. I don't think -- I don't doubt that, as a captain, you may not have been privy to all the meetings at higher

33 levels, but I was wondering if you had ever been briefed on what the actual situation was politically, and 34 why your mission was taking place, but obviously you say no. Now, let's get to the fax -- go back to the 35 fax, itself. I'm going to ask you, are you -- this fax --

36 MR. BLACK: 37 Perhaps he can be shown the fax again, D. 67A, would be my preference. This is the fax of January VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 13 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 the 11th. 2 BY MR. BLACK:

3 Q. It was long time ago that you sent a fax concerning your meeting with Jean-Pierre. It's almost 12 years 4 ago now. And I'm sure you sent -- you helped send other faxes. So are you certain this is the actual 5 fax you sent that night? Because I'm gonna suggest to you that you're mistaken, that you've conflated

6 certain events, as people tend to do over time, and have the impression that this is the fax that you 7 sent, but it's not actually the fax you sent, and I'm gonna point out why it can't be. 8 MR. PRESIDENT:

9 Yeah, Counsel Black, put a question. 10 BY MR. BLACK: 11 Q. My question is: are you sure that you sent this particular fax, with these contents, or is that your

12 impression that you sent that fax? 13 A. First of all, I participated in the drafting of a fax with General Dallaire, and only one fax was sent. The 14 fax that was sent on the 11th of January in the morning, very early, had been drafted on the 10th in the

15 evening. And if this is an original copy of it, that is the fax that I sent and which I helped draft with 16 Major Beardsley. 17 Q. Can you explain -- I guess you don't know then why General Dallaire says that you did -- you took no

18 part in drafting that fax; it was drafted by him and Major Beardsley alone. He says in his book -- 19 MR. BÂ: 20 Please give us the reference.

21 MR. BLACK: 22 It's page 142 and continuing. 23 BY MR. BLACK:

24 Q. At page 142, at the top on the English version, Colonel, he talks about Luc. He -- Colonel Marchal, he 25 refers to as Luc. 26 MR. BÂ:

27 Which version are you using, French version or the English version? 28 MR. BLACK: 29 The English version, Mr. Bâ.

30 MR. BÂ: 31 And the French version, that is what I have. Perfect. 32 MR. BLACK:

33 All right. 34 BY MR. BLACK: 35 Q. Anyway, he says that Luc, along with you and Major Kesteloot, arrived at his bungalow at the times you

36 say, but he doesn't mention Deme for some reason. Was Deme there, at that meeting? 37 A. As I explained yesterday, yes. We, first of all, brought him the informant from Kigali -- night -- to the VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 14 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 general's bungalow. We started by giving him an oral report. 2 Q. All right. So, I don't know why he leaves out Deme's name; maybe it's just a slip, but anyway. He then

3 says, that you fellows briefed him -- or Luc -- he talked about Luc -- Luc giving the briefing. And then, at 4 page 144, in English, he says that, "He then thanked everybody for a job well done, instructed you, 5 Captain Claeys, to keep meeting with Jean-Pierre for more information, and then he ordered Luc and

6 his staff to begin planning search and seizure operations on weapons caches." He says, on page 145, 7 "After Luc" -- "then Luc left", which I assume means everybody in your group left, and left Dallaire with 8 Beardsley. And then he says, "I decided and also put together for General Baril the carefully-worded

9 code cable." And he talks about -- on page 146, "Brent and I fiddled around with the wording for over 10 two hours." He doesn't mention you. He says Brent Beardsley and he wrote the fax, and that you had 11 no participation in it, whatsoever. I mean, that's not what you've said. Are you sure that what you've

12 said to us is actually what happened? That's your memory? 13 A. I stand by my position. We came in another vehicle, Adamou Deme and myself, to the president's 14 residence. We gave him an oral report. I admit that Luc Marchal and Major Kesteloot left

15 Captain Deme who lived on the same road -- left in the same vehicle in which we came. I remained 16 behind to draft the fax with Major Beardsley. I was to his right. He was the one typing on the general's 17 white laptop. He drank tea; we ate biscuits from Canada. I was offered a tin of maple syrup, and when

18 the paragraph with the information from my notebook were (sic) entered in the paragraph at the 19 beginning of the fax, the general added other paragraphs explaining his intentions. We had to -- there 20 was no printer. We had to take the laptop to the headquarters to print the fax and dispatch it, so we

21 were together with the driver, who was also a Belgian, the military assistant, Beardsley, and the general 22 and myself, in the general's Mercedes, went to the villa of communications officer of the United Nations. 23 It was at night. We had to wake him up. We were in a convoy of two vehicles. We brought that officer

24 back to the headquarters of UNAMIR and then we dispatched the fax. That was after midnight, and you 25 will see on the fax that there's an hour indicated in Zulu, 23 hours 25 Zulu. All official faxes were sent in 26 Zulu time, GMT -- that is, Greenwich mean time -- in order for there to be an hour -- a type of reference,

27 the time. So the date of the 11th of January was already the following day, but that fax was sent on the 28 10th at 23 hours 25. That is local time in Kigali. 29 Q. Where do you -- sorry; where do you see that in the fax, the time?

30 A. Below the first page there is a 95/422. Then you have 23:25 and then Zulu. And above, you have 31 outgoing code cables CNR 12, NIR 67. 32 Q. Okay. Thank you. I see that.

33 MR. BÂ: 34 (No interpretation) 35

36 You say that he did not participate in the drafting of this fax. I can read what General Dallaire said to 37 the effect that he was one of those who drafted it, so don't say that General Dallaire said that he did not VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 15 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 participate in the reading of the fax. 2 MR. BLACK:

3 You can't give evidence. 4 MR. BÂ: 5 I have the transcript of General Dallaire's testimony.

6 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 7 Counsel, your microphone, please. 8 MR. BÂ:

9 Do not assert half-truths or falsehoods. 10 MR. PRESIDENT: 11 The book, he has not mentioned.

12 MR. BLACK: 13 Just because you -- 14 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:

15 Your microphone, Counsel. 16 MR. BÂ: 17 In the book General Dallaire does not make that assertion. He says that, after the report was given,

18 Luc Marchal left. He did not say that Frank Claeys left; he said that Luc Marchal left. 19 MR. BLACK: 20 He says this on page 146, Mr. Bâ, if you'd read. He says, "Brent and I fiddled around with the wording

21 for over two hours", "Brent and I". "When we were satisfied with the document, Brent raced to the 22 Amahoro to print it out and send it." Brent alone. That's what General Dallaire says. If he came here 23 and lied, that's not my problem; it's your problem.

24 MR. BÂ: 25 (No interpretation) 26

27 Let me tell you what he said to the Chamber here. 28 MR. BLACK: 29 Mr. Bâ, you can't do that. If you wanna bring General Dallaire to counter that, you bring him. You can't

30 read it out. 31 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 32 Your microphone, Counsel.

33 MR. BÂ: 34 He should not start making comments and reading passages, whereas we are not able to do so. That 35 document is just as official, or even more official, than the other one. This is testimony that was given

36 before the Judges. This is what Dallaire said in answer to a question posed by Counsel Erlinder. "On 37 the 24th of January", and if you like I can tender into evidence -- VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 16 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. PRESIDENT: 2 You can verify when General Dallaire comes here. You can ask him whether he participated.

3 BY MR. BLACK: 4 Q. All right. What I suggest to you, sir, is that your version is probably correct. 5 A. Thank you.

6 Q. And I believe you did send a fax that night and I believe it was about a meeting with Jean-Pierre, and -- 7 but it wasn't about anything other than arms caches. And I think, over time, you conflated -- you heard 8 so much and you conflated events, and now think that you sent a fax containing other information. And

9 I'm gonna point out why that -- I think that has to be so. Um, Faustin -- you met Faustin Twagiramungu, 10 didn't you, that day? 11 A. Indeed. We met at about midday. I was not alone. I was with Captain Amadou Deme.

12 Q. Now, Mr. Twagiramungu, who I've also met, says that he provided the information to you, but he never 13 spoke about massacres, or extermination of Tutsis, or killing Belgians. And when he learnt about this 14 alleged fax being sent to New York containing such information, he was very surprised, and he said

15 nobody ever talked to him about it. He heard nothing more about it -- about those contents. 16 A. That is also what I stated yesterday. Mr. Twagiramungu simply told us that there was someone who 17 was ready to talk, and he gave us his first name and the phone number. I never said that he talked

18 about massacres and arms caches. He did not divulge such information. 19 Q. Well, Mr. Twagiramungu goes further. He said that he did tell general -- Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh 20 and you – or, General Dallaire, at least -- maybe not you, but one of those people at least, that

21 Jean-Pierre was willing to give information about arms caches, only; nothing about killing Tutsi; nothing 22 about killing Belgians; nothing about any other aspects of the now-alleged fax we have here. So he 23 was very surprised to hear that Jean-Pierre went on, and there were -- a fax of this nature was sent,

24 and then more surprised that nobody ever came back to him and spoke to him further about this -- 25 these allegations. So I put it to you that that's just one piece of the puzzle that indicates that -- 26 MR. PRESIDENT:

27 Counsel, from where are you reading? 28 MR. BLACK: 29 I'm reading from my own interview with Twagiramungu, and there's an interview from Mr. Robin Philpot

30 where Mr. Twagiramungu, saying the same thing and there's another interview -- where did I put it, just 31 a minute -- a newspaper, the Diplômat judiciare , with Thierry Cruvellier. He says the same thing. 32 MR. PRESIDENT:

33 I thought you were reading from the evidence given by these people somewhere. 34 MR. BLACK: 35 No. These are --

36 MR. PRESIDENT: 37 So you must -- VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 17 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 -- interviews --

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 So you must -- 5 MR. BLACK:

6 -- with journalists. 7 MR. PRESIDENT: 8 So you must tell the witness, otherwise he won't know what you're talking about.

9 MR. BLACK: 10 It doesn't matter. That's what he said. The fact is that's what he said. He said it twice. In 11 Robin Philpot's book, "It didn't happen that way in Kigali", a loose translation of the French title, and an

12 interview with Thierry Cruvellier, who wrote for the then magazine Diplômat judiciare , which covered 13 these trials for some period of time. 14 THE WITNESS:

15 I am, nevertheless, surprised to be told that someone may have said -- or, suggested that the contents 16 of the fax be given to the prime minister at the time. I believe it remained confidential at the UN. That 17 is the first comment. And the second is that I stand by my position. All he gave us was a phone

18 number and he said that the person had information to provide to us. So he didn't say anything else. 19 BY MR. BLACK: 20 Q. Don't you find it surprising that if Jean-Pierre had told you fellows about these allegations about killing

21 Tutsi en masse that -- trying to drive out the Belgians that Mr. Twagiramungu, as somebody who should 22 be apprised of that, so that he could tell everybody in the political circles in Kigali this is going on, and 23 yet nobody had told him this was going on? Don't you find that surprising, he says he was never

24 informed of such -- the contents of such -- those contents of that meeting? 25 A. It is indeed very surprising, but Mr. Twagiramungu's statements are also very surprising. To say that it 26 was a poor little driver, a deserter; why then did he ask us to meet him?

27 Q. Well, he does indeed say that. He said that he was -- didn't have any of the positions Jean-Pierre 28 claimed to have: he was never in the Presidential Guard; never trained in Egypt; had never had any 29 high official position in the MRND. At the time he put you in contact with Jean-Pierre, Jean-Pierre had

30 been fired from the MRND two months before for indiscipline, not being reliable. 31 A. Again, that would have been very surprising for him to have asked us to contact that person and to 32 have misled the United Nations.

33 Q. Well, he just put you in contact with an alleged informant. He didn't say how reliable he was. And, as 34 far as he knew, he was just a chauffeur who had been fired from the MRND. That's all he was. 35 MR. PRESIDENT:

36 Counsel – 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 18 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 Passed on some information, but you --

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 Counsel, does he deny the fact that he asked these people to contact Jean-Pierre? 5 MR. BLACK:

6 No. 7 MR. PRESIDENT: 8 That is the crux of the matter.

9 MR. BLACK: 10 He was, in his view, a small fry who could talk about some arms caches. 11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 Yeah. So why did he direct him -- why did he direct these people to contact him? 13 MR. BLACK: 14 Because he had some information about arms caches. He thought he should pass it on to the UN.

15 MR. BÂ: 16 Mr. President, I have Faustin Twagiramungu's statement before the Belgian senate. Can I read what 17 he says in this statement? Can I read what Twagiramungu said?

18 MR. BLACK: 19 No, you can't. 20 MR. BÂ:

21 And do you know who Twagiramungu is? Do you know who Twagiramungu is? 22 MR. BLACK: 23 Mr. Bâ, are you listening? I've met with Mr. Twagiramungu. I've had tea with Mr. Twagiramungu.

24 MR. BÂ: 25 Let me tell you who he is. Twagiramungu was the prime minister-designate. When the RPF came to 26 Kigali in July 1994, he was indeed appointed prime minister. He was prime minister for a year from

27 July 1994 to July 1995. He had problems with the RPF and he had to go into exile in Belgium and 28 became a revisionist. And that was when he gave those statements and he gave the interviews that 29 you are referring to. From 1995, when he was no longer a prime minister of Rwanda, he went into exile

30 in Belgium and the RPF and the new regime became his enemy and he became a revisionist. He even 31 denied that there was a genocide. 32 MR. BLACK:

33 Yes, because there wasn't a genocide, Mr. Bâ, and Mr. Twagiramungu knows it 'cause he was there. 34 MR. PRESIDENT: 35 This is not a debate. We must continue with your --

36 MR. BLACK: 37 Well, no. Why are we allowing Mr. Bâ to go on for 20 minutes without stopping him about this VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 19 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 nonsense? I have met Mr. Twagiramungu, Mr. Bâ. That's not what he told me. You haven't met him. 2 MR. PRESIDENT:

3 Mr. Black, I hope you bring him here. 4 MR. BLACK: 5 Ah, I would love to bring him in, if he'll come, but the trouble is we got no subpoena power here. That's

6 the problem. But if they want to counter what I'm saying, they can bring him in and we can 7 cross-examine him. Okay, now -- 8 MR. PRESIDENT:

9 (Microphones overlapping) … he says outside court is not any evidence, Counsel. 10 MR. BLACK: 11 Well, it is evidence, or a sort. It's indirect evidence, but it's evidence.

12 BY MR. BLACK: 13 Q. Anyway, moving on; another thing which indicates the subject of discussion that night, on the 10th, was 14 nothing more than arms caches is indicated in your initial statements to the authorities in Belgium. I

15 have a document titled CLAEFRA-06, in French and English. It was given to me by the Prosecutor, and 16 you were cross-examined on this in the Military I and recognised it as your statement -- all right, one of 17 your statements. And there are five questions asked of you. Do you remember that statement?

18 Because it's not dated, and -- 19 A. As you said, I have made so many statements that I would have difficulty in determining which one. 20 Q. This statement -- maybe my friend can give you that statement. It starts at page K0103683. I don't

21 have another copy. 22 MR. BLACK: 23 Does -- Mr. Bâ, you have a copy of that one, CLAEFRA-06, in either French or English you can give to

24 him? 25 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 26 Counsel's microphone, please.

27 MR. BÂ: 28 Is it CLAEFR-06? 29 MR. BLACK:

30 K0103683; is that French or English? That's the French version? 31 MR. BÂ: 32 Both.

33 MR. BLACK: 34 Okay. If you don't mind, I'll -- if I can -- I don't know which is the original. 35 THE WITNESS:

36 The original ought to be in Dutch. 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 20 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 Right.

3 BY MR. BLACK: 4 Q. Do you prefer French or English? I can use either one. 5 A. Go on.

6 Q. All right. Question -- talking about a question -- this meeting in -- question 1 is, "Did you send this fax 7 on January 11 -- a fax, in which --" and it says -- I'll read it to you: "Did you on 11th January '94 at the 8 request of General Dallaire send a telegram to the UNO authorities in New York, in which the general

9 asked for permission to seize the stockpiled arms, based on the information from a certain 10 Jean-Pierre?" 11

12 And your answer is: "General Dallaire did indeed send a fax to New York to the DPKO on this date." 13 And you say, "I composed that fax on the general's computer. The general requested the protection of 14 our source and his family, as he would be threatened if he made any disclosures. He was a certain

15 Jean-Pierre Turatsinze. He was trainer of the Interahamwe and was responsible for the distribution of 16 weapons to the cell leaders in part of Kigali. He knew about the various stores in Kigali", and goes on. 17

18 Then question 2: "Did the telegram contain the information that the plotters" -- quote, unquote -- "were 19 planning to kill Belgian soldiers to force the withdrawal of the UNAMIR Belgian battalion?" 20

21 Answer -- and your answer was: "I do not believe that information was contained in it. Jean-Pierre 22 never informed us of the existence of such a plan." 23

24 Question 3: "Did the telegram contain details about the planned genocide?" 25 26 Answer: "I remember that the first fax did not refer to genocide, but I made other faxes, three in total,

27 which did contain the information related to the plan to murder Tutsis." 28 29 "Who was the telegram" -- and he goes on: "Who was the telegram addressed to?"

30 31 "The telegram was sent to a senior officer at the DPKO who was responsible for the UNAMIR 32 assignment, a certain Martin. There was no other addressee to the telegram. I did not get a copy of

33 the document." 34 35 Question: "Did you know the informer? Did you talk with him? When?"

36 37 "I first met the informer on the 11th January, together with Colonel Marchal, Major Kesteloot, in the VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 21 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 office of Colonel Marchal. General Dallaire sent my fax after the first meeting with Jean-Pierre." 2

3 And that's about it. So you explicitly deny in that statement that there was any mention as contained in 4 the fax now before us of killing Belgians or killing Tutsis. So, can you explain -- that's why I am 5 suggesting to you that you have conflated what may have been told to you later with this fax. And it's

6 12 years ago, and it's hard to remember. I don't remember from 12 years ago what I did and signed. 7 So, I am suggesting to you that that actually is the accurate -- you did send a fax, but it only talked 8 about arms caches and not what you talked about in that statement.

9 A. It is obvious that the fax I saw only later, much later, but certainly before one of the first interviews, but 10 now to say that I completely denied the existence of such information, that would not be correct. To 11 translate "I do not believe" from the French, is rather doubtful then as an interpretation. And, at that

12 time, I did not believe that it was a plan targeting the Belgians but, rather, a plan targeting UNAMIR. 13 And I will explain. When the incidents occurred on the 5th of January -- that is, the demonstration at the 14 Meridien roundabout -- that was during the Ramadan. The other battalion that was considered to be

15 operating in Kigali was a battalion that respected -- or, observed the Ramadan. Therefore, the only 16 forces capable of engaging at any time were the units from Belgium. Therefore, it was reasonable to 17 interpret this as targeting the Belgians; however, basically, I did not believe, unless further proof had

18 been advanced, that these suspicions targeting UNAMIR – or, opposing the UNAMIR and the Rwandan 19 authorities -- they were not supposed to know this initially. 20

21 The information that Jean-Pierre gave us that evening came after the demonstration. It was easy, 22 therefore, to say that it was directed at the Belgians because it was the Belgians who countered – or, 23 contained the demonstration at the Meridien roundabout. As for the dates, once again, I could not say,

24 even down to a week, the first time that I met Jean-Pierre. I did not commit this to memory so as to be 25 able to recall it years afterwards. Therefore, there is some confusion in the details and the answers; 26 however, I do maintain my position -- I stand by my position about the facts. And if you look at the

27 answer that New York sent the following day on the subject, the same issues are dealt with. 28 Q. Well, that doesn't really address the matter because paragraph 2 of the fax says explicitly in the last 29 sentence: "Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgian soldiers resorted to force, a number of

30 them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda." It's quite clear. Then 31 you're asked: "Did the telegram contain the information that the 'plotters' were planning to kill Belgian 32 soldiers to force the withdrawal of the UNAMIR-Belgian battalion?" You say, "I do not believe that

33 information was contained in that. Jean-Pierre never informed us of the existence of such a plan." So I 34 don't -- that's why I am suggesting to you, sir, that the fax you sent was not this fax. Somebody else 35 created this fax.

36 A. When you talk of the word "plan", I do not suppose that at the level of the Rwandan authorities that 37 there had been an operational order in military terms, stating, "Look, there is such and such a number VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 22 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 of Belgians; we're going to kill them." We had been in Rwanda since the 26th of October. There was 2 an agreement with the Rwandan authorities to provide UN troops, and they were in agreement to have

3 Belgian troops in their country. We went about the country for three months. If such an intention -- 4 such a plan existed, there would have been a reaction much earlier on, because there were people 5 moving about, armed or unarmed, and if such an existed -- such an intention had existed, it could have

6 been organised or structured in such a way as to put the plan into action. So why restrict themselves to 7 a group of people much later on? There is no clear explanation. 8 Q. Well, if that had been your opinion when you were asked the question, I am sure you would have

9 expressed it that way. But you didn't; you just said flatly, "He never informed us that -- the existence of 10 such a plan." 11 A. I'd have to look at the document in Dutch to see how the questions were couched and the position that I

12 gave, because it is most likely it was when we were discussing Colonel Marchal. These statements 13 were made very early in the investigation; therefore, it has nothing to do with the interviews that took 14 place later with regard to my testimony here in Arusha. The people asking the questions were not

15 aware of the situation on the ground. This was a preliminary session to gather information with regard 16 to Colonel Marchal's case. 17 Q. The trouble is, sir, you repeat the same statement. On your interview pro justicia statement

18 CLAEFRA-01 of June 2nd, 1995, the one we were talking about yesterday, in which I suggested your 19 government had a pro-RPF bias or anti-government bias, on the last page -- second-to-last page at the 20 bottom page, you're asked, question: "How was your relationship with General Dallaire?" You state --

21 A. May I have the document? 22 Q. Yes. 23 MR. BLACK:

24 Mr. Bâ, I, again, only have one -- my copy. It's CLAEFRA-01, which is, um -- it starts at K0102077. 25 And I believe this is in French, English, maybe Dutch as well -- I'm not sure if this is -- no. Yes, it's also 26 in Dutch, Flemish, French and English.

27 BY MR. BLACK: 28 Q. So if you go to the second-to-last page, I'm reading from the English, the question is put to you, "How 29 was your relationship with General Dallaire?", and you state, "He was a demanding boss who I admire.

30 He was greatly disappointed about the lack of decisions from New York. At one stage" -- and this is the 31 important sentence -- "at one stage we informed New York that we had obtained interesting information 32 from informants" -- in plural -- "but that, in return, they asked for diplomatic protection in exchange for

33 further information. We received no answer from the UNO about this. I think the general informed the 34 ambassadors but to no effect. Had we been able to use that information, that is, to eliminate the arms 35 dumps, then the slaughter could have been prevented." So, again, you confirm the fax was sent, but

36 it's only talking about weapons dumps -- weapons caches. That's the second time you said that. 37 A. No, the end of the sentence -- the end of the sentence mentions a word and "slaughtering", about the VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 23 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 killings, if you don't want to use the word "genocide". 2 Q. I agree that there was slaughter on both sides, mainly on the RPF, in my view, but anyway, we’ll argue

3 about that later. 4 A. There's even a sentence that follows on the next page, if you do want to use this document, that is, 5 where the contingent was instructed about their attitude towards the mass murders. So already we

6 were talking about murders, killings. 7 Q. That's not the issue. The issue is, did you sent a fax talking about anything but arms dumping. And 8 you say, I'll repeat it, "I think that the general informed the ambassadors about this, to no effect." That

9 what the inform -- obviously, you are talking about the information from the informants. "Had we been 10 able to use that information, that is, eliminate the arms dumps." That's what you say. "Eliminate the 11 arms dumps", that's what you say. "That is, to eliminate the arms dumps." There's nothing -- how

12 could you say that, and not put in killing of Belgians and mass murder of Tutsis are planned in some 13 sort of concrete plan? 14 A. Once again, I refer you to my testimony yesterday where I said I was a UN officer. I was not a Belgian

15 officer. I was serving the United Nations. My military chain was the headquarters at the Amahoro 16 hotel, serving the UNAMIR mission, and it was a mission I was entrusted with after participating in a 17 recce mission for the Belgian contingent and, obviously, the information that had been provided during

18 that interview, since they were in the presence of Colonel Marchal, he was commander of the Kigali 19 sector and was in a better position to give instructions and advice -- the Belgian contingent. My role 20 was limited to working with the United Nations force and working on that plan, on that level. Therefore,

21 I was not there as a Belgian officer; I was there as a Blue Beret, serving with the United Nations. When 22 I returned for the evacuation missions, I was no longer a UN officer. I was there as a paracommando. I 23 worked for the evacuation mission. You should make the distinction between the two missions --

24 rather, three missions. 25 Q. Well, that's interesting. I didn't -- I don't think I confused your role. The fact is you say in response to 26 that question about General Dallaire that he sent a fax – or, they informed New York -- they informed

27 New York, anyway. And it's only about to "eliminate arms dumps". 28 29 Now, I'm gonna go to a third document in which you repeat that again, and that's an interview

30 conducted with you on the 28th of November 1995. 31 MR. BLACK: 32 Perhaps my friend -- it's only one page; sorry, one page and a quarter, K0244703. Perhaps Mr. Bâ

33 could give it to you. I only have it in English. 34 MR. BÂ: 35 It's not an interview, that one. It is a summary drawn up by the investigators of the interview you've

36 mentioned. It wasn't an interview, a question-and-answer session. It's not him speaking; it's merely a 37 summary of the document that you read out. VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 24 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 BY MR. BLACK: 2 Q. Then the criminal investigations department summarised their investigation with you by repeating that.

3 There was nothing added to their -- you are involved in the military investigation of -- I guess of 4 Colonel Dewez at that time; correct? 5 A. It was the same trial, the Marchal trial.

6 Q. Right. So I'm sure, because you know those two gentlemen, that you would want to be accurate and 7 fair to them. And the summary of the investigation, the interview they conducted with you, confirms the 8 interview notes, which is that a telegram -- it says, "The captain confirms" -- that's you -- prepared on

9 General Dallaire's computer, a telegram on 11th January '94, addressed to the authorities of the UN in 10 New York, in which he requested protection for an informant and his family. And it says, next 11 paragraph, "The captain claims that the said telegram did not contain information about a plan to make

12 an attempt on the lives of the Belgian soldiers. He claims that this information was not communicated 13 to him by Jean-Pierre." 14

15 That's the finding. That's what you sold 'em. I'm sure you didn't want to tell them anything untrue or 16 inaccurate because you -- I'm sure you would have like to have helped – or, be accurate for the military, 17 your army.

18 19 So, again, I put it to you that you couldn't have sent a fax which contains the documents we -- a fax we 20 now have before us. You had to send him -- that had to be another fax which we don't have before us.

21 A. The fax that I have here is the fax that we are discussing, and which we will be discussing in a previous 22 testimony, which we are discussing now. It’s the only one with the references. It's the one that came 23 from my notes following my interview with Jean-Pierre. There is a question of arms caches, a plan on

24 the Belgians, and since I did not have notes two years later, I could not know whether it was in there. 25 What I do know is that there was mention of weapons that were still proliferated in Kigali, arms caches 26 which were being maintained in connivance with the relevant authorities that -- authorities that were in

27 place at the time, so people who had requested the United Nations to intervene who were, however, 28 were playing another game. 29 Q. Well, it's certainly a game being played by somebody here. You also say, again, that the addressee of

30 the telegram was one Martin. I take it that's Major Martin in the UN reconnaissance report, senior 31 officer of the peacekeeping operation department in New York. And, yet, the fax we have, which is 32 supposed to be the fax sent by Dallaire, is addressed to General Baril. How do you account for that?

33 A. Once again, I was just a captain who was on the other end of the line -- and whoever was on the other 34 end of the line, I did not care about. However, I can recollect the name, M.A. Martin. We took note of 35 it. It wasn't a name that I was sure of, but I knew it was a general. Now, if this Martin may happen to

36 be a Canadian, very well. If not, I did not know that there was a Martin on the other end of the line. All I 37 knew is that I was corresponding with a general, a general I corresponded with regularly. I had no VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 25 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 documentation, electronic or in hard copy, to support this knowledge. 2 Q. Okay. I don't know if Martin's Canadian, or American, or English. I have no idea; but probably

3 Canadian. But the fact is you said twice that the addressee was Martin. Why would you make a 4 positive -- an affirmative statement that Martin was the addressee, when it was General Baril? Because 5 you say you helped type this in draft and typed on the computer the fax. So you must have known who

6 the addressee was. And you are sure -- in 1995, you are positive it was Martin? Twice you've said 7 that. 8 MR. BÂ:

9 Baril has first name. It is Maurice. Maurice, Martin; there is not much difference. 10 MR. BLACK: 11 Why not Michael? There's also an officer named Martin, a major, who was in New York.

12 THE WITNESS: 13 It was the only name that came to mind at the time. I never saw the fax again. The heading was done, 14 most likely, by Major Beardsley because he was in a position to know who it was addressed to, and I

15 was certainly not aware of the room that General Baril was in. To go into such details, one must really 16 be in the United Nations and must be in the defence staff headquarters of a mission, and I was merely 17 a captain and I was at the lowest level. Certainly, I must have telephoned or faxed that number, but I

18 was, personally, present during the drafting and sending of this document. 19 BY MR. BLACK: 20 Q. Correct, you were. You say -- and you said you read it -- after it was typed up and printed, you read it

21 line by line by line. So you must have known who the addressee was. And if you knew it was 22 General Baril, a very senior man, how could you say in 1995 to your own military investigators it was 23 Martin?

24 A. It was -- it was, to the best of my recollection. 25 JUDGE PARK: 26 Witness, when did you see this fax document which you sent January 11, 1994? When did you see this

27 fax document again? 28 THE WITNESS: 29 The first time that I saw this document again, it was printed in a Belgian newspaper on the first page of

30 the newspaper, and it was a document that had been sent – or, with relation to a book that 31 Professor Reyntjens was writing about Rwanda. He had got his hands on it; I don't know how. But that 32 was the first time I'd seen it again, and it was in small print on the -- it was headlined in the newspaper.

33 JUDGE PARK: 34 When? Which year? 35 MR. BLACK:

36 That would be 1995, Mr. Park, 'cause I'm aware of that article. 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 26 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 THE WITNESS: 2 Five or six, I can't say.

3 JUDGE PARK: 4 Okay. 5 BY MR. BLACK:

6 Q. Well, you know the first time this fax appears. If you look at the fax I have given to you, it has a stamp 7 on it on at the top on the fax page. It says the following: "This cable was not found in DPKO files. The 8 present copy was placed in the files on 28th November 1995, which corresponds with the appearance

9 of the first reports about the fax in the Belgian newspaper and also the London Observer around the 10 same date. And I know who the informant was to the London Observer . And the date that this is first 11 placed in the files, DPKO files -- this particular copy anyway -- is exactly the same date you were

12 interviewed -- no, it's not the same date. It's the same date, I guess coincidentally, that the summary of 13 your interview was made by the military -- criminal investigations department of your army. Maybe 14 that's just coincidence. Do you know a colonel -- a British army colonel, R.M. Connaughton,

15 C-O-N-N-A-U-G-H-T-O-N? 16 A. I do not know that person. 17 (Pages 1 to 27 by Verna Butler)

18 19 20

21 22 23

24 25 26

27 28 29

30 31 32

33 34 35

36 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 27 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 1030H 2 BY MR. BLACK:

3 Q. Well, he's the man that sent it in to New York from British military academy in Camberly in Surrey, 4 which as you may know is the home of the British military academy of Sandhurst, and various other 5 establishments there. Colonel Connaughton sent this into DPKO without a covering letter and it was

6 placed in the files, because if you look on the top of that page, it's very indistinct. On the second page, 7 it's much more distinct. It says -- this is the origin of this fax, from Connaughton, Camberly, Surrey. It 8 gives his phone number and a date and time.

9 10 So this fax, the only copy we have, the only source we have of this fax is from the British army and 11 Colonel Connaughton is involved in writing pamphlets, and as a professor at a British think-tank, army

12 think-tank there? 13 MR. PRESIDENT: 14 Mr. Black, he also produces this as the original -- or, copy of the original.

15 MR. BLACK: 16 No, what I'm saying is, this is the only version of this fax anybody in the world's ever seen; this is it. 17 And it comes from one place, Colonel Connaughton in the British army.

18 MR. PRESIDENT: 19 That is the one which bears the GMT time? 20 MR. BLACK:

21 This one, the one I placed before you, that's right. 22 BY MR. BLACK: 23 Q. So you're not aware then of how Colonel Connaughton got his hands on it, how -- why it was sent to

24 him by the British army to New York? 25 A. I have no idea. I can only suppose or make assumptions. However, I think General Dallaire had a filing 26 system for all documents he sent and it was his ADC who was – or, military assistant who kept these,

27 and once the mission ended, I think they took them away, because he did not stay long after the events 28 began. He was, therefore, in a position to collect all this material. I went, suspecting nothing, on 29 holiday, and when I came back, I never went back to the Amahoro. I was never able to collect any

30 data, electronically. Somebody brought me my pistol at the Kanombe airport, and that was the last 31 contact I had with Major Beardsley, as well as the general whom I was able to seem at Kanombe, not at 32 his headquarters.

33 Q. Well, I can inform you that -- and Colonel Connaughton would say the same, say that he met 34 General Dallaire and Major Beardsley in the summer of 1995, in England, in order to write a pamphlet 35 on the British army on the military aspects of the war in Rwanda, and he interviewed both those

36 gentlemen. It is just after that, that this fax appears. Before that date of November 28th, 1995 nobody 37 every talks about such a fax, neither General Dallaire, nor you, nor anybody else in the world, mentions KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 28 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 the existence of such a fax containing these contents. 2

3 And I put it to you, sir, that -- my suggestion is -- I'm not saying you were involved in constructing this 4 fax; I don't think you were, but my suggestion is that Colonel Connaughton, General Dallaire, 5 Major Beardsley and others constructed the fax after the fact and had it placed in UN files in 1995. And

6 I'm going to again point out some other things why I think that must be so, and not just that it was sent 7 in by a colonel in the British army, which is shocking enough but, you know, Shaharyar Khan, who took 8 over Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh's position at MINUAR after Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh left, did a

9 study, or asked -- because the UN was receiving such heavy criticism about RPF allegations that the 10 UN knew that there was a plan to commit genocide, and so on, and that they had done nothing about it, 11 Shaharyar Khan, that's S-H -- the first name is S-H-A-H-A-R-Y-A-R, middle initial M, Khan, K-H-A-N,

12 ordered a study done of all the UN code cables and faxes and other documentation to Kigali and 13 elsewhere to determine whether there was any information in UN files which indicated any such 14 planning and foreknowledge. And they went through everything, and I have their report here, dated

15 November 20th, 1995, in which he says, "I appointed a committee consisting of Colonel Fletcher, 16 Mr. Tikoca,” T-I-K-O-C-A, “who was chief military observer, and Isel Rivero,” that's I-S-E-L; Rivero is 17 R-I-V-E-R-O. And then he said, "They confirmed the view that there was no information or indication of

18 planned genocide. There were, of course, warnings of armed clashes," and so on. 19 20 In the body of the report they set out -- they did find some cables which indirectly talk about the

21 situation, but there's nothing -- the closest code cable we get to that is a code cable of January 6. 22 MR. PRESIDENT: 23 Counsel, did these investigators find anything relating to the cable of 11th of January?

24 MR. BLACK: 25 No, sir. There is -- not from this man, not from General Dallaire, nothing. 26 MR. PRESIDENT:

27 No, from what you read, I understand that they have examined the documents there in New York. 28 MR. BLACK: 29 That's right, and in Kigali. There was nothing. And there is a code cable -- at least, the Prosecution

30 claims to have one -- - from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh to Annan, concerning Jean-Pierre and the arms 31 cache. There's that -- there is that, but nothing about killing Belgians, killing Tutsis, nothing, not one 32 document. Now, this was dated -- this is very --

33 MR. PRESIDENT: 34 If they have received this in New York and if no action has been taken by the New York authorities, isn't 35 it damaging to them to keep it there?

36 MR. BLACK: 37 No, because it's the truth. It's not damaging. It's not damaging to the UN at all. The UN is not KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 29 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 responsible for that war, not (Microphones overlapping) ... 2 MR. PRESIDENT:

3 Having been informed of the situation, that they had been inactive. 4 MR. BLACK: 5 Huh?

6 MR. PRESIDENT: 7 Having been informed of the situation, that they had been inactive. 8 MR. BLACK:

9 I'm not sure what your question is. 10 MR. PRESIDENT: 11 Having received this information --

12 MR. BLACK: 13 This report? 14 MR. PRESIDENT:

15 -- if the UN had not taken anything or any action, wouldn't that go against them? 16 MR. BLACK: 17 Well, if you're saying that (microphones overlapping) ... that --

18 MR. PRESIDENT: 19 Wouldn't that be a reason as to why -- (microphones overlapping) 20 MR. BLACK:

21 That's one theory. Just a minute. 22 MR. BÂ: 23 Mr. President.

24 MR. BLACK: 25 I mean, the Prosecution will claim that. 26 MR. BÂ:

27 (Microphones overlapping) ... I'm an employee of the United Nations. 28 MR. BLACK: 29 Mr. Bâ, the President has asked me a question. I'm responding to it.

30 MR. BÂ: 31 (Microphones overlapping) ... last year, during the tenth anniversary of the genocide, Kofi Annan 32 apologised on behalf of the United Nations, saying that the United Nations was wrong; they were

33 informed and they did not take the appropriate measures. He made a public apology on behalf of the 34 United Nations. 35 MR. BLACK:

36 We all know who Kofi Annan works for, really, so let's not discuss him. The fact is, Mr. President, the 37 only documentary evidence we have indicates there was no such fax. This report, dated KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 30 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 November 28th, sent by the personal representative -- I don't know how Mr. Annan can say that 2 because Shaharyar Khan wrote to everybody in New York, sending this report, dated November 20th,

3 1995, saying there's no such information in the files. November 20th -- it's on November 28th this fax 4 suddenly appears. Because somebody realised, "We don't have the fax so we got to create one to 5 make it look like we knew."

6 MR. PRESIDENT: 7 Well, Counsel, in light of your submissions, this witness has identified the fax, so we'll go on. 8 MR. BLACK:

9 Well -- 10 THE WITNESS: 11 Mr. President, in any event, if you read the paragraph in question, the word "plan" is not used. It was

12 an intention and not a plan. So if you want to take me on the words, there was no plan; there was 13 probably an intent. And those who can read from the crystal ball can probably find a plan. For me, it 14 was intent. The only ones who were active at the time, fortunately or unfortunately, were the Belgian

15 soldiers and, by extrapolation, one could say that it was an intent, but it was not a plan; probably, an 16 assumption. 17

18 I don't think the authorities or the secret forces would have known the reaction of the Belgian 19 authorities, which proved to be true some months later, that admit -- accept that at that point, too, there 20 were insiders.

21 MR. PRESIDENT: 22 As a co-author, do you recognise that this is the text that you sent? That is what we wanted. 23 THE WITNESS:

24 It is the only fax. It is the fax. I do not deny that in the statement that faxes and telegrams are referred 25 to. These were documents that were found later on, again, in General Dallaire's place and his contact 26 is General Dallaire (sic) .

27 MR. BÂ: 28 Mr. President, words have a meaning. "Co-author" appears to be a very strong word. He is the one 29 who met Jean-Pierre. He was there to give information, but it was Major Beardsley and Dallaire who

30 had the choice of the terms, particularly Dallaire, because he said that, later on, Dallaire fine-tuned the 31 document before signing it. So the choice of words did not fall to him. 32 MR. PRESIDENT:

33 (Microphones overlapping) ... from his evidence because he said that he also took part in drafting. In 34 that context he is a co-author; that is why I referred to that word. 35 MR. BLACK:

36 Anyway, this came from the Prosecution. It's -- their number is L0005011. It's MIR number 3961. It 37 also contains a summary of another report by Diego Zorrilla, another UN person -- Zorrilla is KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 31 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 Z-O-R-R-I-L-L-A -- dated 8th November. He reports on the genocide. 2 MR. BÂ:

3 (No interpretation) 4 MR. BLACK: 5 Mr. President, if you don't control Mr. Bâ --

6 MR. BÂ: 7 You should not make such comments to me. You are party to the case, just as myself. I'm asking 8 which document you are referring to, and you are making such comment. What does that mean?

9 MR. PRESIDENT: 10 Don't be angry with that. 11 MR. BÂ:

12 Which document are you referring to? I'm entitled to know. 13 MR. BLACK: 14 Wake up, Mr. Bâ. It's the same document we've been talking about the last 15 minutes. This

15 document contains a subreport, Mr. President, which -- from this man Diego Zorrilla, talking about, on 16 November 5th, the so-called genocide conference chaired by Paul Kagame in Kigali in which they 17 discussed all sorts of things, including about how to establish that there was such a plan to commit

18 genocide and there was no -- and that UNAMIR was being heavily criticised because the RPF was 19 saying UNAMIR knew about it, and were being heavily criticised. That's why they did this study. 20

21 There's no documentation to prove that UNAMIR knew anything about it -- or, at least, the UN knew 22 anything about it. And suddenly, on November 28th, this fax mysteriously is placed in DPKO files from 23 a British army colonel in England. So, people can ask questions, because I think it's very --

24 MR. PRESIDENT: 25 Counsel -- (microphones overlapping) ... 26 MR. BLACK:

27 Not only mysterious, but very sinister. 28 MR. PRESIDENT: 29 (Microphones overlapping) ... Counsel --

30 MR. BLACK: 31 I would like, if I could, to have this made -- marked as a ID document, so we can call Shaharyar Khan to 32 identify it and explain it when he comes.

33 MR. PRESIDENT: 34 Counsel, you said that it mysteriously appeared. 35 MR. BLACK:

36 That's right. 37 KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 32 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. PRESIDENT: 2 But there is a date on that. So if it has mysteriously appeared, then they wouldn't have put a date

3 there. 4 MR. BLACK: 5 Then why is the Prosecution giving you a copy on which they have removed all those indications of

6 where it came from? They'd been circulating in the world, for the last 10 years, a copy of that fax with 7 all those details removed, but it came from the British army, not from General Dallaire. British military 8 intelligence sent that in; that's who sent it in. And it had to be worked -- written because

9 General Dallaire has testified about this fax, Major Beardsley, this man. So, the Canadian army must 10 have been involved in constructing this, Belgians and the British military, and maybe others because, 11 otherwise, they wouldn't have this story now. And that's what my client's facing.

12 MR. PRESIDENT: 13 What is your proposition to this witness? 14 BY MR. BLACK:

15 Q. So I would like to -- my proposition is that, sir, again, that's another indication that the fax you said you 16 sent was never sent because it's never been found in the files up until November 28th, 1995. 17 Shaharyar Khan, the Secretary General's personal representative, did a study and found no such

18 document, no such fax existed at that time. So I'm saying to you, sir, that you sent a fax in about 19 weapons caches. There is such a fax dealing with that, but not this fax, otherwise, they would have 20 mentioned it. So, again, I'm saying you couldn't have sent that fax, the one in front of you.

21 A. For me, there is only this fax, and on this fax, General Baril -- because I've seen the answer -- has 22 answered on the actions to be taken, and it is answered on the 11th of January, so there must have 23 been a fax that requested these answers.

24 Q. No sir, there's no such fax. 25 A. And that's also a fax from Booh-Booh that was sent also on the 11th of January, somewhere around 26 five o'clock in the morning, with the same contents --

27 Q. No, sir. 28 A. -- speaking about interview or the things -- on the things on which -- the issues discussed by 29 General Dallaire with Mr. Booh-Booh after sending a fax, and Mr. Booh-Booh said that. Indeed, in spite

30 of the fact that it's not indicated in the fax of General Dallaire, we have some information on the 31 informant on the content of the fax. So this goes together with the information contained therein. 32

33 Now, when we -- if we talk about a coded message, they wrote that document. My English would have 34 been more rudimentary in a document -- in a fax message of three pages, but since we wrote it 35 together, that is the information. When you read the text even in English, there is no plan to kill. There

36 are intentions, assumptions -- and clearly indicated and if -- and that is very clear. So it is an 37 assumption and definitely not a plan. So if you take me on the words, there were no plans. KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 33 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 Q. We're not talking about plans. We're talking about this fax. 2 MR. PRESIDENT:

3 Yeah, he denies the fact that it's a concoction -- 4 MR. BLACK: 5 Well, you're wrong, because there was no answer to that fax, ever. There's nothing in the files

6 indicating it was a response to such a fax. In fact, I have here a summary of every code cable sent by 7 the UN, right here, produced by the Prosecution. 8 THE WITNESS:

9 In that case there are some that you are missing, because it was available in Military I. In Military I, the 10 fax of General Baril and Mr. Annan were included. 11 BY MR. BLACK:

12 Q. They don't respond to your fax, sir, because the paragraphs don't concord. The fax -- 13 MR. BLACK: 14 Mr. President, there's this fax. I've got --

15 MR. PRESIDENT: 16 Mr. Black, I think the witness's response is that he referred there -- he saw the answer in Military I. 17 MR. BLACK:

18 No, he didn't, because I've read the transcript and the whole cross-examination in Military I was about 19 the fact that the so-called response to that fax do not correspond with what's in that fax. There's an 20 action paragraph saying -- they write back to Booh-Booh, talking about paragraph 7, and it doesn't

21 correspond to the fax that they sent. All the cross-examination was based on the fact this fax couldn't 22 have existed because the answer doesn't correspond to this fax; it corresponds to another fax. 23

24 And January 11th, there is a -- they have in their files this fax before you, MIR-67, but there's no 25 response to that fax in the files. There is, on the same date, a fax from Booh-Booh to Annan, talking 26 about Jean-Pierre and arms caches only. There's a response to that from Booh-Booh to Dallaire --

27 sorry, to Booh-Booh and Dallaire from Annan, and it talks about their reaction to that fax, only about 28 weapons caches. There is no other response. There is no other fax mentioned. So the reason there's 29 no response to this alleged fax from Dallaire to Baril is because it never existed and it was never sent,

30 sir. And that supports the findings again of Shaharyar Khan in the UNAMIR study. UNAMIR did their 31 own study. There is no such fax. 32 MR. BLACK:

33 I'd like to have -- maybe, Mr. President, to have this -- Shaharyar Khan's report marked for identification 34 so when he comes to testify, he can explain what they went through and how -- what they searched, 35 and my friend can cross-examine him about how they missed this fax.

36 MR. BÂ: 37 The answer to this fax does exist. We did not want to produce it through this witness because he was KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 34 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 not the one -- he was not the one who received it. We want to introduce it through Dallaire, and the 2 answer does exist.

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 (Microphones overlapping) ... because he says that he had seen it, and the Defence also refers to it. 5 (Microphones overlapping) ...

6 MR. BÂ: 7 He has seen it in a trial, in Mil I -- in Mil I -- but at the time in 1994 he hadn't seen it. 8 MR. BLACK:

9 Yes. Mr. MacDonald has been kind enough to show me this, the response, and there is a response, 10 but it has nothing to do with the fax that they say they sent. And I think that's the reason -- since they 11 knew that he was cross-examined extensively in Military I on the discordance between the fax he says

12 he sent and the response coming back, it doesn't match at all. He's talking about, obviously, some 13 other fax. I'm very surprised that they did not produce that through this witness, again, when they knew 14 he'd be cross-examined on it, and they're trying to hide that from the Bench and the public that the

15 response to that fax doesn't exist; there's a response to Booh-Booh's fax only. 16 BY MR. BLACK: 17 Q. Another thing I put to you, Mister -- Colonel, is that the reason Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh says he

18 never saw this fax that you say you sent, never seen it, never aware of it, and you say -- General 19 Dallaire says and you say you bypassed Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, your boss, General Dallaire's 20 boss, bypassed him, broke protocol, the only time you broke protocol to send it, which indicates to me

21 you didn't break protocol to send it because, in fact, it was never sent. 22 MR. BÂ: 23 You are making inaccurate assertions. Where did Booh-Booh say he was never informed? If you are

24 saying that Dallaire did not respect the military structure -- channels and sent it directly to New York, 25 fine, but if you said Booh-Booh was not informed by Dallaire, that is wrong. 26 MR. BLACK:

27 No, it's not. 28 MR. BÂ: 29 And I dare you to show me any document whatsoever stating that Booh-Booh was not informed --

30 Dallaire was not informed. Show me that document. 31 MR. BLACK: 32 I'll bring Mr. Booh-Booh here and he'll say so. You don't like me reading from documents. Every time

33 I've tried to, you object, Mr. Bâ. Mr. Booh-Booh will say that. Read his book. 34 MR. BÂ: 35 Bring Booh-Booh; we'll cross-examine him, and let's see if he would dare assert here that he was not

36 informed. 37 KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 35 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 He was not informed, and the reason he was not informed was because the fax was never sent.

3 BY MR. BLACK: 4 Q. Well, then, explain to me, sir, why this is the only time Dallaire broke protocol and bypassed his boss to 5 send a message directly to Baril, and it's not even that -- really, that important, if it's just about weapons

6 caches. Why, if this really concerned -- 7 A. You asked a question and I have to answer it -- 8 Q. I'm not finished my question.

9 A. -- and not five questions at a time. 10 Q. Let me ask my question then. 11 A. No.

12 Q. Let me ask my question. 13 A. You are speaking about the book of Mr. Booh-Booh. If you want to take Mr. Booh-Booh's book as your 14 source of information, then you will see that he complained a number of times that he breached

15 protocol. So you have to be complete in your allegations, not just once. 16 Q. It was you, and General Dallaire in his book, who say this is the only time. You said that in your 17 testimony in-chief that this was the only time, that you're aware of, that protocol was breached and

18 Booh-Booh was not -- did not sign off on that fax, was not shown that fax. 19 A. I never stated that. The “first time” and the “only time” are two different things. 20 Q. In any event, Mr. Booh-Booh never saw it. And I put it to you that the reason Mr. Booh-Booh,

21 General Dallaire's boss, never saw it was because it was never sent. No protocol was breached 22 because he never -- it was never sent, sir. There was a fax sent, the one he sent, containing 23 information about your meeting with Jean-Pierre. Booh-Booh did send a fax about Jean-Pierre. That's

24 the real fax you actually constructed and the one that was really sent. 25 A. How then do you explain that Mr. Booh-Booh is aware of Jean-Pierre if he was not informed? I did not 26 meet him to make an oral or written report on my meeting, so someone might have done it, except if

27 Mr. Booh-Booh met Jean-Pierre himself. So he was informed by somebody from among the authorities 28 who sent an urgent message, and I spoke about the time difference between Kigali and New York. 29 Later on, and that was unknown to me, the general found Mr. Booh-Booh in his house to inform him

30 about the content and the measures he had taken. 31 32 Following that, Mr. Booh-Booh at 5:25 in the morning, also sent a fax message to New York.

33 Q. That's right. I don't want Mr. Bâ -- -- 34 MR. BÂ: 35 That is contained in Mr. Booh-Booh's book. You never read that book.

36 MR. BLACK: 37 Will you stop helping the witness? Sit down. If you want to get in the box, I'll cross-examine you, too, KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 36 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 how you -- how you took off the indications on this fax and forged the document -- or, somebody in your 2 office did.

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 Counsel, I think -- sit down. Let him do his job. 5 MR. BÂ:

6 He should read Booh-Booh's book. 7 MR. PRESIDENT: 8 (Microphones overlapping) ...

9 MR. BÂ: 10 He's making assertions, "Booh-Booh said so," "Booh-Booh said so." 11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 (Microphones overlapping) ... the book so you continue to read. So, you sit. 13 MR. BÂ: 14 Mr. President, I did not understand to read a book is different from understanding a book. What does

15 that mean? 16 MR. PRESIDENT: 17 (Microphone not activated)

18 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 19 Your Honour's microphone, please. 20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 You can read a book and understand it in different ways. 22 MR. BÂ: 23 Yes. It's just that he's ascribing statements to Booh-Booh which he did not make, and that is not

24 honest. 25 BY MR. BLACK: 26 Q. Sir, the only reason that Mister -- you never -- this fax was never sent; is that --

27 MR. PRESIDENT: 28 He has denied that, Counsel. 29 MR. BLACK:

30 No, it's another point. 31 BY MR. BLACK: 32 Q. If, Colonel, Jean-Pierre had told you these things about killing Belgians and mass killings of Tutsis, that

33 was such a shocking, important thing, you would have been sure to tell Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh 34 about it, and that, for sure, would have been in Booh-Booh's message to New York to Annan. It wasn't. 35 Unless you're telling me that Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh deliberately left out an important message

36 about that, killings of Belgian soldiers, driving the Belgian contingent out of Rwanda, mass killings of 37 Tutsis, I can't understand -- I couldn't fathom at all how he could not relay that to New York. And I say KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 37 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 he didn't do it because your fax was never sent because you never had a meeting with such contents, 2 sir.

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 So let him answer that now. You have spoken for about five minutes. 5 THE WITNESS:

6 First of all, It's for me to go and see Mr. Booh-Booh. I was in a military chain. My chief was 7 General Dallaire. It's for him -- to inform him of my activities. And, secondly -- we are always coming 8 back to the same thing -- it was the UNAMIR, and that had nothing to do with the Belgians. If I were an

9 officer, in my position as military information officer, and not been a Belgian, this question would not 10 have been put to me. That has nothing to do with my nationality. My mission was a UNAMIR mission. 11 And for me, there was no plan. There were assumptions, and people who wanted to read from the

12 crystal ball. But the paragraph in this fax message -- all the paragraphs are contained there and, to my 13 knowledge, there was a paragraph 13, but not paragraph 12. I don't know if you have observed that 14 thus far.

15 BY MR. BLACK: 16 Q. Yes, I noticed that when I first read it. It seemed very strange to me that you skipped paragraph 12. 17

18 Another thing which indicates this fax was never sent with this information in it is that if there had 19 been -- you had discussed with Jean-Pierre that certain individuals, the parties in the government, had 20 -- were waiting for a chance to kill Belgians, to drive the Belgian contingent out, that warnings would

21 have been given to the Belgian soldiers and forces to take precautions against an action or such 22 eventuality, and no such precautions were taken. 23

24 Colonel Dewez, who was here, said no precautions were taken. He was jogging on the morning of 25 April 7th, without any escort. He testified to that here just last month -- a couple of months ago. He 26 said there were no warnings given to Belgian troops about any menace towards the Belgian forces at

27 any time about some special plan to try to kill them. So, if you say Jean-Pierre had told you about 28 trying to kill Belgians, how can you explain the lack of action by Colonel Marchal or General Dallaire in 29 warning their forces to take precautions against that?

30 A. It is not in the mind of a soldier to do something and -- to be sent for a mission and hide himself. If he's 31 there, it's for a mission. There was a contingency plan. They are colour-coded in relation to the alert 32 situation. So, according to the colonel, if there was no plan in a crisis period, either he forgot or he got

33 it wrong. But there was a plan during which there was a reinforcement of the cantonnement , depending 34 on the degree of alert, and personnel was limited in terms of access and could only go out for specific 35 missions that had been authorised. Specific missions.

36 37 So all military operations in -- be it in crisis time or normal times, be it under Chapter 6, makes provision KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 38 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 for contingency plans, but at the least suspicion -- if it provides that there's the least suspicion, you 2 have to stop and pack and get out.

3 MR. MACDONALD: 4 Following Mr. Bâ's intervention with respect to Mr. Booh-Booh's book, I have the passage here, and 5 Mr. Black is absolutely right. Mr. Booh-Booh says in his book that he was not informed of that fax, and

6 he says it at page 91, and it goes like this, second paragraph. It's in French. 7 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 8 Sorry, we do not have that document.

9 MR. MACDONALD: 10 (No interpretation) 11 MR. BLACK:

12 It's not being translated. 13 MR. PRESIDENT: 14 We are not getting the translation.

15 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 16 Sorry, Your Honour, we do not have a copy of that. 17 MR. MACDONALD:

18 It goes like this, Your Honour. 19 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 20 We need a copy of the document being read, Your Honour.

21 MR. PRESIDENT: 22 It's a book he's reading. 23 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:

24 Yes, Your Honour. We need a copy to be able to follow. 25 MR. MACDONALD: 26 Well --

27 MR. BLACK: 28 Just translate it. 29 MR. MACDONALD:

30 He says at page 91: (No interpretation) 31 MR. BLACK: 32 They're not translating it.

33 MR. MACDONALD: 34 Clearly, at page 91, he says, "Dallaire preferred to ignore me ..." 35 MR. BÂ:

36 I do need a translation myself. 37 KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 39 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 2 Your Honour, we do not accept the situation where the interpreters are constantly insulted. Counsel

3 has just said the interpreter cannot interpret it. It is my duty to interpret, but I need a copy of the 4 document being interpreted. 5 MR. BLACK:

6 It is just one passage. Why can't you do it as -- 7 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 8 That is not the way it is done. Standard practice, I need a copy.

9 MR. MACDONALD: 10 It says it on page 91. It's just in response to Mr. Bâ's assertions. He says it clearly here, he preferred -- 11 "Dallaire preferred to ignore me and transmit directly his message to General Baril."

12 MR. PRESIDENT: 13 So he doesn't deny that the message was not -- he says -- (Microphones overlapping) ... 14 MR. MACDONALD:

15 Eventually, yes. He agrees with -- 16 MR. PRESIDENT: 17 (Microphones overlapping) ... so that is an internal problem between Dallaire and this Booh-Booh, but

18 he doesn't deny the fact that -- he says that, well, he used to bypass me and send on -- 19 MR. MACDONALD: 20 No, no, no, no, no.

21 MR. BLACK: 22 No, sir, that's not what he's saying. He's saying, "I'm told that Dallaire sent a message to Baril. If he 23 did, he bypassed me. I was never advised of it, I never knew about Jean-Pierre saying these things."

24 That's what he says in his book. 25 MR. PRESIDENT: 26 Yes, to that, only, he gave the answer that how does he know about Jean-Pierre to send another --

27 (Microphones overlapping). 28 MR. BLACK: 29 Because --

30 MR. PRESIDENT: 31 (Microphones overlapping) . 32 MR. BLACK:

33 Mr. President, if you read -- we will bring Mr. Booh-Booh here. Mr. Booh-Booh will say he was met. In 34 fact, he says in his book and several other places, indicates that -- 35 MR. PRESIDENT:

36 (Microphones overlapping). 37 KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 40 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 Mr. President, please.

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 If he's coming, Counsel, it is useless talking about him now. 5 MR. BLACK:

6 We have a chance to respond to Mr. Bâ's outrageous falsification of what Mr. Booh-Booh says. 7 Mr. Booh-Booh says he met Faustin Twagiramungu. He's the one that then contacted Dallaire to 8 contact Claeys, and that Dallaire also told Booh-Booh about the meeting, and Booh-Booh sent his own

9 fax about weapons caches. That's what he did. That's how he found out. But there was nothing in 10 that -- in the meeting that he was told by Dallaire or Faustin Twagiramungu about killing Belgians or 11 killing Tutsis.

12 MR. PRESIDENT: 13 Well, Counsel, if Booh-Booh is coming, they will listen to him when he comes. 14 MR. BLACK:

15 We better stop listening to Mr. Bâ, because everything he says is wrong, everything. And he's another 16 one of these Senegalese who are going to -- this whole -- 17 MR. BÂ:

18 Booh-Booh was informed. What he denies is the fact that Dallaire sent the fax and only informed him 19 later. He sent a fax to -- he received a fax from New York, and Booh-Booh responded to it. That is 20 what he says in his book.

21 MR. BLACK: 22 No, he doesn't, Mr. Bâ. 23

24 Mr. President, he's deliberately misinforming the Bench. He should be sanctioned for that -- 25 MR. PRESIDENT: 26 (Microphones overlapping)

27 MR. BLACK: 28 -- because it's a deliberate misinformation. He's telling you something which is absolutely blatantly 29 false. Mr. Booh-Booh never said that. He says there was no such conversation with Jean-Pierre

30 concerning -- 31 MR. PRESIDENT: 32 Well, Counsel -- (Microphones overlapping).

33 MR. BLACK: 34 -- killing of Tutsis, killing of Belgians, and everybody here wants to hide that fact; that's clear. 35 MR. PRESIDENT:

36 Well, Counsel, if Booh-Booh wants to come here, let him come here and say he was never informed. 37 KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 41 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 He does want to come here.

3 MR. PRESIDENT: 4 (Microphones overlapping) ... Why are we fighting over this if he is coming? 5 MR. BLACK:

6 Because Mr. Bâ keeps telling you false information and -- (Microphones overlapping). 7 MR. BÂ: 8 In the passage read by Counsel MacDonald, where it is said that Dallaire exaggerated the role of

9 Jean-Pierre regarding planning, that means that that fax exists and that the information therein exists. 10 That is the source of the passage you read. Booh-Booh believes that Dallaire exaggerated the role of 11 Jean-Pierre --

12 MR. PRESIDENT: 13 (Microphones overlapping) 14 MR. BÂ:

15 -- or the revelations given by Jean-Pierre regarding planning. 16 MR. MACDONALD: 17 (Microphones overlapping) ... after 1995.

18 MR. PRESIDENT: 19 Court is adjourned for ten minutes. 20 (Court recessed from 1105H to 1125H)

21 MR. PRESIDENT: 22 Yes, Counsel, before you start, I want to tell you that, please, don't engage in cross-talks, and we will 23 conduct this matter in an amicable and acceptable way. And I think the interpreters should know that

24 even if the text is not with you, just try to give an interpretation to the best of your ability, but saying that, 25 well, it is a free interpretation or something. Sometimes it will be difficult for them to provide documents 26 every time they refer to a document. So please keep that in mind.

27 28 Yes, Mr. Black, you may continue. 29 MR. BLACK:

30 Thank you, sir. 31 BY MR. BLACK: 32 Q. Colonel, we have actually found mysteriously, from our own files, the response from Kofi Annan and to

33 Booh-Booh and Dallaire, the response to the MIR-79 and, again, it doesn't talk about anything about 34 weapons caches. I can show that to you and to the president. 35 A. So if I understand correctly, a fax was indeed sent numbered MIR-67.

36 Q. Yes, and that was the original fax which now has gone missing. As you were told in Military I, 37 Alison Des Forges, who testified in Military I as a Prosecution expert witness, when cross-examined KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 42 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 about -- when cross-examined about that fax, states that the original fax was in the files in New York, 2 then for several months was taken out of the files, went missing, and then replaced with the present fax.

3 She thought it was put in by some NGO, but now we proved it was sent in by the British army. So I 4 agree with you, you sent a fax -- or, somebody sent a fax that night, talking about meeting with 5 Jean-Pierre and arms caches. That was that number. That fax has been taken out of the files and

6 probably destroyed, and replaced with this fax which appears on November 28th, 1995. So, as you can 7 see from just reading that response to -- there's nothing in it about killing Belgians or killing Tutsis. 8 A. I believe that if we read paragraph 7 of MIR-67, paragraph 7 to which Kofi Annan alludes, there is a

9 term "anti-Tutsi extermination, killing of innocent persons." 10 Q. No, sir, it doesn't concord. You're right, that's what paragraph 7 says in this, what I say is a fabricated 11 fax. But paragraph 1 of Kofi Annan's fax says this: "We have reviewed the situation in light of your

12 MIR-79. We cannot agree to the operation contemplated in paragraph 7 of your cable." There is no 13 operation recommended in paragraph 7 of this fax you say you sent, which is why I say both -- Annan's 14 fax is responding to another fax that you sent, not this one. There's no operation recommended in

15 paragraph 7. How do you account with that? 16 A. That is a verbal interpretation. As far as Mr. Annan was concerned, the operation in question was the 17 anti-Tutsi extermination. That is the operation he is referring to. So it is a plan, an operation, an

18 intention, and so on and so forth. And that is why he advises that they should go and see the president 19 of the republic to talk to him about it. It has nothing to do with it because it was not part of UNAMIR's 20 terms of reference to -- to go and look into arms caches.

21 Q. Sir, that's not correct at all, because -- and you know it from reading it, because -- let's read this 22 carefully again. Annan says, "We cannot agree to the operation contemplated in paragraph 7 of your 23 cable as it clearly goes beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR."

24 25 They're not talking about an operation by Interahamwe to kill people; they're talking about your 26 operations, and there's no such recommended operation in paragraph 7 of this alleged fax of yours. So

27 there must be a recommendation in paragraph 7 in another fax, and I put it to you that we can 28 reconstruct your fax from the statements you made to the military authorities in Belgium in 1995 and 29 from these replies. You can reconstruct the fax, the one you actually sent, and it was only about

30 weapons caches. 31 32 And I'm saying to you that you're -- I believe have conflated things because you read so much over the

33 years, it's been such a long time, you're under the impression the fax you sent is this one, and in fact it 34 wasn't. None of us have perfect memories, and things get put together in wrong places in our minds. 35

36 I'm putting to you that this fax was never sent by you. It was fabricated by other persons after the fact 37 and then presented to you as if it was the fax you sent. You'd been told that, so you assumed it was. KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 43 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 And in fact – 2 MR. PRESIDENT:

3 Wait for his response. 4 THE WITNESS: 5 I revert to my earlier position: It is the fax and the only fax that was sent, and the drafting of which I

6 participated in. 7 BY MR. BLACK: 8 Q. Colonel, I'm trying to give you a way out of this, but you're not taking it. In that case I have to challenge

9 you and suggest to you, sir, that that's not true. You didn't send this fax. You sent the fax they are 10 referring to in this reply, which is another fax. 11 A. So you'd better show me another fax because this is the only fax I have knowledge of and which was

12 written in this way, in my presence. 13 Q. Well, as you said, nothing -- as you've testified in response to my questions, nothing you are telling me 14 makes sense. Nothing -- everything indicates -- the fax you say you sent, everything indicates that

15 never existed until November 28th, 1995. 16 A. I do not understand that remark. Is it a question? I'm supposed to answer a question. This is not a 17 question.

18 Q. I'm putting to you again my last suggestion, to just repeat it for the audience here: The fax, the 19 so-called famous genocide fax upon which the entire Tribunal is constructed, is a fake, it's a forgery, it's 20 a fabrication, it's a black operation, it's an intelligence operation. It was constructed after the fact

21 in 1995 and placed in DPKO files to try and support the idea there was a planned genocide because 22 there was no -- not one item of documentary evidence there was such a plan, and the whole world and 23 this Tribunal has jumped on this one document to say, "Ah-hah, there it is," and it's a forgery.

24 A. There's still no question. 25 Q. I'm telling you, sir, it's a forgery. Don't you agree with me? 26 A. No.

27 Q. Why don't you agree with me? 28 A. Because -- 29 MR. PRESIDENT:

30 Let him answer. 31 THE WITNESS: 32 Because that fax originated from my notes. It was typed by Major Beardsley, reviewed by

33 General Dallaire, and at that point it was sent. I do not know what else -- or, what other fax you could 34 be referring to, dated 11th January, which contains a paragraph 7. I do not know of another fax to 35 which Mr. Annan of the United Nations would have replied with reference to that paragraph 7. So if you

36 want to try us on the fax, you better try the United Nations and not disturb me on that matter. 37 KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 44 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 BY MR. BLACK: 2 Q. All right. I'll show you this other fax then. This is from Booh-Booh to Annan, January 11st,

3 paragraph 7. This is the operative paragraph. I'll give you this. This is the fax. It's in response to -- FC 4 is referred to as Brigadier General Dallaire, not you. "FC," this is paragraph 7 -- 5 MR. BÂ:

6 Could we have the reference in the document? 7 MR. BLACK: 8 Yes, we're going to give you a copy.

9 BY MR. BLACK: 10 Q. "FC" -- 11 MR. BLACK:

12 Mr. Registrar, if you could come and get this. 13 BY MR. BLACK: 14 Q. This is a fax from Booh-Booh to Annan dated January 11 the, MIR-79, and it talks about an informant.

15 It says, "Brigadier General Dallaire briefed me" -- this is briefed Booh-Booh -- "briefed me during the 16 night." And he talks about how they came in contact with this informant in paragraph 3 and 17 paragraph 4. Paragraph 5, they talk about his reliability. Then paragraph 6 talks about, "The informant

18 does not have long before he must continue to distribute the remaining arms." And then seeking 19 protection, and then the operative paragraph, the action paragraph, to which they respond, "Force 20 commander is prepared to pursue this operation in accordance with military doctrine with

21 reconnaissance, rehearsal and implementation, using concentrated overwhelming force. Should at any 22 time during the reconnaissance, planning or preparation any sign of a possible contravening or 23 possibility of an undue risky scenario present itself, the operation will be called off. Regards."

24 25 That is the operative paragraph to which Annan responds, saying, "No, don't do that." 26 MR. BÂ:

27 If you show him documents, at least give him one or two minutes to read them before he gives you an 28 informed answer. 29 MR. PRESIDENT:

30 Let him go through the document. 31 THE WITNESS: 32 Mr. President, at paragraph 2 there is reference to General Dallaire briefing Mr. Booh-Booh and there is

33 reference to another code cable. Where is that code cable? You need to read it and see if there is a 34 reference and take note of what the content of that fax is. 35 BY MR. BLACK:

36 Q. That doesn't change anything, Colonel, because there's no mention in this code cable at all of very 37 important information about killing UNAMIR soldiers, about killing -- mass killings of Tutsis. You're KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 45 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 telling me that everybody seems to have ignored the most essential points of what you say the 2 interview was, killing Belgians and killing Tutsis. How come, if you actually sent a fax talking about

3 killing Belgians and killing Tutsis, everything that comes back only talks about weapons? 4 A. Because this was stage one of the implementation of the Arusha Accords before proceeding with 5 implementation of the broad-based transitional government. This was stage one, as agreed in the

6 Arusha Accords, and as long as that stage had not been executed, we did not have the necessary 7 conditions. This, I suppose, was with reference to the political scenario as provided for in the 8 agreements.

9 Q. It's not an answer to my question about why is it every response -- the only responses we have and the 10 only faxes we have talk -- and the only -- and when you talk about faxes being sent in 1995 in your 11 interviews, you only talk about weapons and arms caches. There's no mention ever again in any other

12 document of the so-called plot to kill Belgian soldiers or to mass -- kill Tutsis en masse, nothing. It's not 13 contained in any further document and that's very strange, don't you think, if your fax was actually sent? 14 A. With what means do you think the killings of the UNAMIR soldiers were carried out? They needed

15 weapons, and so the weapons caches were to be used to kill and eliminate, and then they would 16 continue. So if you had removed the weapons, this plan would have had no reason to be in existence 17 and there was no precise instruction under the charter to remove these weapons or keep them in the

18 possession of the UNAMIR. And this was stage 1 of the KWSA; at that time we were still not in a 19 position to take control of these weapons. The weapons were the important factor. If there were no 20 more weapons, there would be no massacres.

21 Q. That's not true. 22 MR. BÂ: 23 Perhaps the code cable he is requesting is this one, because I have another fax here from Annan to

24 Booh-Booh, No. 74. 25 MR. PRESIDENT: 26 Dated?

27 MR. BÂ: 28 The date is 10 January. 29 MR. PRESIDENT:

30 Yes, because in this one, the document that you put here, Booh-Booh refers to paragraph 2 of an 31 earlier cable. 32 MR. BLACK:

33 Well, Mr. Bâ could have given -- since he now admits he's got all these documents, why didn't he 34 produce them with this witness in-chief? Why did he hold them back? I've only got parts of the puzzle. 35 He's got the whole puzzle.

36 MR. BÂ: 37 But -- (Microphones overlapping) . KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 46 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 Explain that, Mr. Bâ --

3 MR. BÂ: 4 It is not true. All these documents were disclosed to you -- I will give you the date. In March 1994 we 5 gave you 2,732 documents. In March 2004. And this is the document, the reference number -- you can

6 make a copy and distribute it to everybody. 7 MR. BLACK: 8 No, no, no, this is my case now, not yours. You're too late. You should have done that in-chief.

9 MR. BÂ: 10 And why -- you ask me why I did not submit them to the witness, this witness. They were not 11 addressed to the witness. He was not supposed to see them. This was correspondence between

12 Booh-Booh, Dallaire and Annan. He was a captain. He took part in the drafting of the 11th cable -- 13 11th January cable, but he did not take part in the drafting of all the others. We were waiting for 14 Dallaire to be here to discuss the others. And this cable is here. You can have a copy, although you

15 got a copy. You've had a copy for more than a year. In March 2004 I gave you all these documents. 16 MR. BLACK: 17 That's not the point. Why didn't you use them with this witness and held them back with your own

18 witness, not why -- 19 BY MR. BLACK: 20 Q. Anyway, I'm sorry, Colonel. You gave me a response and Mr. Bâ has totally erased it from my memory,

21 something about -- 22 MR. PRESIDENT: 23 No, I think, Counsel, you can't find fault with the Prosecutor for not putting that document because he

24 says that that is irrelevant as far as he is concerned. 25 MR. BLACK: 26 But he can't put them forward. I mean, if he's going to say -- they put this fax in. They put this fax in,

27 not me. They then should have put in all the corresponding faxes that goes with it to support their case 28 that there was such a fax. They hold those documents back from you because they indicate there was 29 no such fax.

30 MR. PRESIDENT: 31 No, I think what Mr. Bâ was trying to do was to show that that the fax that is dated 11th January here 32 is -- has nothing to do with the other fax but a reply to the fax that Annan had sent on the 10th.

33 MR. BLACK: 34 Exactly. That's my position, too. This fax never existed; it was never sent. The January 11th fax he 35 says he sent was never sent. That's a fabrication after the fact. There was a fax sent. Nobody's been

36 listening. I've been saying that for two days now. There was a fax sent by this team, Dallaire and 37 company, about weapons caches only, and that's the response you get back. All the responses only KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 47 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 talk about weapons caches, whatever you response you look at. 2 MR. PRESIDENT:

3 Well, Counsel, there is a distinction between this one; the other fax was sent to Booh-Booh and 4 Dallaire -- 5 MR. BLACK:

6 Right. 7 MR. PRESIDENT: 8 -- and this one is only to --

9 THE WITNESS: 10 Booh-Booh. 11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 -- Booh-Booh. 13 MR. BLACK: 14 It doesn't change anything. The fact is, there's nothing mentioning killing of Belgians or killing of Tutsis

15 en masse; that's the point. It doesn't matter who the fax was sent to. There's nothing coming back 16 from New York discussing a fax he says he sent, nothing. All right, let's change the subject. 17 BY MR. BLACK:

18 Q. When did you go on leave in March? 19 A. I can recollect I left on the 26th of March, 1994. 20 Q. And why did you go back to Belgian, just to be on leave?

21 A. In fact, it was the last aircraft of the Belgian contingent that was going back with personnel. There was 22 a seat available which allowed me to be with my family for the Easter festivities. After this, there was a 23 6:30 aircraft going for the Belgian forces, and I came back with the 6:30 aircraft to return, to take up my

24 place in the UNAMIR mission. 25 Q. So you were out of the country -- what date do you leave, do you think? 26 A. It was the 26th of March. I have said it.

27 Q. All right. And around the same time, General Dallaire goes to Ottawa to ask for more support from the 28 Canadian army and then goes to -- and meets with, he says in his book, all the chiefs of the defence 29 staff and all the three-star generals in Ottawa. Do you happen to know what that meeting was about?

30 A. I did not know the general's intentions during that visit so I cannot say for sure. I can suppose he was 31 seeking helicopters for the mission. I knew that that was one his main concerns. 32 Q. Do you know why he would do that and not address that request to his boss in New York at the UN?

33 Why would he go to the Canadian army and directly ask the Canadian army for that assistance and 34 bypass the chain of command again? 35 A. This is a method used by some military commanders. Colonel Marchal did the same to obtain more

36 heavy artillery in Kigali, and there, as well, he, too, was unsuccessful. 37 Q. On March 28th he goes to New York, discusses things with people at DPKO. Did you know about that KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 48 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 meeting? 2 A. No. As I said earlier, I was on holiday -- on leave, rather, and had no contact with General Dallaire or

3 the mission in general. 4 Q. And you're aware that when you were away that Prudence Bushnell, the US -- the American Deputy 5 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, arrives in Kigali on March 31st and had a meeting with

6 Kagame and Habyarimana, the contents of which are unknown? Are you aware of that meeting? 7 A. No, I was not aware. There were many visits by diplomats and diplomatic delegates -- delegations, and 8 I'm certainly not aware of that one in particular.

9 Q. But these are all leading up to April 6th. This is all just a week before the president of Rwandan is 10 murdered and the president of Burundi is murdered. 11 A. That is correct, yes.

12 Q. And you also leave for Brussels around the same time and then come back on April 6. There's no 13 connection? 14 A. As far as I know, there is no connection between the actions taken by foreigners in Canada, actions

15 taken in Canada, and my leave in Belgium. 16 Q. There's no connection with the attack on the president's plane and your presence on the C-130 17 Hercules following it, coming into Kigali that night?

18 A. I'm afraid not. We were in an aircraft that was unable to land because Kigali was plunged into 19 darkness, and radio contact with military technical cooperation who were there, they told us that we 20 should look for a nearby airport because there was no way of landing in Kigali. We had no idea of what

21 was happening. We have found out from the CNN channel in Nairobi the following morning. 22 Q. My information is that that Belgian plane following the president's plane was equipped with radar and 23 directional capability to guide missiles and to ward off missiles, if missiles came near that plane or

24 missed that -- in fact, the plane you were present on was involved in the shoot-down of the president's 25 plane. It was in contact with the shoot-down team on the ground to give it direction, targeting positions, 26 and in case the missiles missed, they could destroy them. Were you aware of that being present on the

27 plane you were in? 28 A. Mr. President, I believe -- the Belgian armed forces have sophisticated equipment that no other army in 29 NATO has available at this point? Which would come as a surprise to me.

30 Q. Going back to -- I remember what my answer was to my question which I couldn't remember, and you 31 were saying that you had no right -- with respect to this fax, you had no right or mandate to seize arms. 32 Is that what you said?

33 A. That is correct. Our mandate did not allow us to carry out -- coordinate search operations or search 34 places or houses. We needed special authorisation and which, among others, was one of the things 35 that General Dallaire asked for in his fax. There is talk of a plan to do so -- or, the intention to do so the

36 following day, of course, with the approval of New York. 37 Q. Well, that's not correct because -- look at the subject -- you got that fax still in front of you, the -- KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 49 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 A. Oui . 2 Q. Read the subject heading.

3 A. "Request for protection of informant." 4 Q. The subject matter of the fax -- the entire purpose of that fax was not to request permission to search 5 and seize arms, it was to protect that informant. And General Dallaire says in his book that he had a

6 complete mandate to search and seize weapons anywhere he wanted to in the KWSA area. And it also 7 states that under section 11, article 11, of the KWSA agreement, which I can show you. 8 A. Those operations were only authorised in coordination with the gendarmerie.

9 Q. Right. 10 A. They were not authorised by UNAMIR -- for UNAMIR to conduct on its own. It was a peacekeeping 11 operation and not a peace enforcement operation.

12 Q. Right. So you had, with the cooperation of the gendarmerie, the right to go and search, as Luc Marchal 13 was saying the next search was scheduled for April 7th. You had the full cooperation of the 14 gendarmerie; you could have made that search. So that request, as the subject heading says, was not

15 to request permission to search and seize arms, it was to get permission to protect the informant and 16 accede to his request for asylum. And you're forgetting the fact that your forces -- the UN seized -- the 17 UN seized weapons on a French plane, a DC-8 that landed around January 22nd, your forces entered

18 that plane, French plane, inspected it, and seized tons of mortar bombs, isn't that right, without 19 anybody's permission, including the gendarmerie. 20 A. I don't know if you are aware that the capacity of an aircraft to carry ammunition and the account you

21 have given concerns a French aircraft which had loaded a Belgian mission as well and which was part 22 of a command of the previous night. Therefore, there was no provision for reinforcement of materiel -- 23 military equipment, or anything of that nature. Therefore, this aircraft was confiscated -- or, rather, its

24 cargo was confiscated by members, civilian members of the UNAMIR administration. The movement 25 control was not linked to the military element. Those troops at the time were Bangladeshi troops. They 26 were personnel specialised in dealing with customs operations regarding aircraft. And the coordinate

27 search operation you mentioned took place on the 7th of April, therefore, you can see how much time it 28 took -- or, would take New York to give authorisation to dismantle the initial arms cache, and yet as you 29 yourself concerned -- you yourself indicated, the first mention was on the 11th of January. That would,

30 therefore, explain why it would take some time for the administration to process. 31 Q. Explain to me why that French plane was seized, its contents were seized. French aircraft, its contents 32 were seized and never delivered over to the government. Under what authority did they do that without

33 the gendarmerie? It's in Kigali. It's part of the Kigali weapons secure area agreement. That could be 34 considered, I suppose, if you say it's a hidden weapons cache or weapons cache -- 35 A. Indeed, as you say yourself, the weapons had to be secured, and I am afraid that it wasn't just the

36 bombs. There was military equipment, textiles and gamelles , for those who know the term; that is 37 kitchenware, equipment, utensils. That is what was filed (as interpreted) as well. KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 50 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 Q. Right, and they were seized without any authority, according to you. But as I put it to you, 2 General Dallaire in the KWSA agreement stipulated that you had that right to go and seize arms, so

3 there was no reason to write to New York to write for permission to search for arms. That's what I'm 4 saying to you. The subject heading on that fax indicates what the real subject was, to ask for protection 5 of the informant. That was the only reason the fax was sent, it wasn't -- well, go ahead. Sorry.

6 A. Mr. President, I'm not a specialist in international law, but as far as I know, the area covered by an 7 airport under international law is considered a sort of no man's land, and so on. So that I think that 8 international law was in force and I think that the airport was dealt with as such. The airport played that

9 role, whether or not the authorities at the time or the powers that be were agreeable to it. I was not 10 privy to the inner secrets, but I know that ammunition and other equipment was not handed over to the 11 Kigali authorities, to neither of the parties.

12 Q. Where did those weapons end up, do you know? Were they given to the RPF by your forces? 13 Because they've never been seen by the government which had bought them. 14 A. When you ask the question by "forces," I'm referring to the UN forces, and I said that the equipment

15 was warehoused. It was not given to either party. And this is the second time I'm saying this. 16 Q. Our position is it was given to the RPF, but you deny that. Okay. Did you ever receive reports, or the 17 UN forces ever receive reports about weapons caches of the RPF?

18 A. It is correct that at one point in time there were allegations to the effect that the convoys, the trucks, 19 were going to Mulindi to fetch wood, to build shelters in which the RPF forces were -- that is the only 20 reference that one could make. That is the only reference one could consider as arms caches but not

21 those at the CND. 22 Q. Did you ever make any searches of RPF weapons caches? 23 A. The area in which RPF was established was their area. The UNAMIR, to my knowledge, did not have

24 the authority to do the search there or elsewhere. The only place they were -- they had to warehouse 25 weapons which was not being used by soldiers was in the armoury, as provided for. 26 Q. I'm talking about, let's say Kigali, the greater Kigali area. You never did any weapons searches of RPF

27 positions or suspected hidden RPF weapons caches? 28 A. We did not have any information to that effect. If it was known to the authorities in Kigali, we would 29 have been interested to know.

30 Q. And yet -- and you've never seen any weapons caches yourself belonging to the government, have 31 you? 32 A. That is correct. The only warehousing of illicit weapons which was reported to me by Captain Deme of

33 the United Nations, he is the one, he visited at the headquarters of the MRND. 34 Q. I suppose it would surprise you to learn then that since that time Mr. Deme has stated that he never 35 saw any weapons at the MRND headquarters.

36 A. I'm not aware of this statement made by Captain Deme. 37 Q. Well, he did say that, that he never saw any such weapons at the MRND headquarters. You weren't KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 51 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 aware that the RPF was infiltrating in, as of January at least, 3,000 extra men into Kigali and by April, 2 10,000 men, as is stated by several RPF officers who fled the regime?

3 A. I'm not aware of these figures, nor the data. 4 Q. When they state it -- they state it's true, in which case the only group which would have reason to have 5 hidden weapons caches are the RPF forces being infiltrated into the capital, who needed to have

6 hidden weapons caches, correct? As a military officer, you would agree that they infiltrate in -- they 7 infiltrate in as civilians or some other cover and would need to have weapons at the -- at hand when 8 battle was joined? So they would have reason to have weapons caches, wouldn't you say?

9 A. That is an assumption. 10 Q. You never heard the rumours -- or, the information that the RPF had installed anti-aircraft missiles at 11 the CND building?

12 A. To my knowledge, in the inventory that was declared when they came to Kigali, there was no reference 13 to anti-aircraft -- missile-type anti-aircraft equipment. 14 Q. That's right. That's not answering my question. Did you hear from anybody that the RPF had brought

15 in, with the help of the UN, anti-aircraft missiles to be installed in the CND complex and held there for 16 use? 17 A. I never heard that.

18 Q. You never talked to Colonel Marchal about missiles? He never talked to you about that subject? 19 A. Not to my recollection. 20 Q. Because it seems very important, because he was -- he says in his book and in meetings with me that a

21 French colonel named Colonel Cussac, C-U-S-S-A-C, came to see him one day and informed him the 22 RPF had anti-aircraft missiles at the CND. And Colonel Marchal expressed in his book that he was 23 shocked at that news. So I -- I would take it that he would have talked to several people about that,

24 including you and General Dallaire. He never mentioned it? 25 A. I have no recollection having discussed this issue with Colonel Marchal, but I saw him every day. 26 Q. I take it regular inspections were made of the government-force barracks and bases around Kigali to

27 make sure they were in compliance. 28 A. That was the mission of the military observers, and they were under Colonel -- the Fijian, 29 Colonel Tikoka.

30 Q. Did they make similar inspections of the RPF position on a regular basis, and were they allowed 31 access? 32 A. I will not be able to answer that question. To my knowledge, that was provided for, but I don't know if

33 they were doing it. If they had reports to say that they were able to do it or it was -- they were not 34 allowed, I wouldn't be able to say that. 35 Q. Did you see a report from Colonel Haque, Azrul Haque -- A-Z-R-U-L, his first name; his second name is

36 H-A-Q-U-E -- concerning shipments of weapons and ammunition from the Ugandan army, the NRA, 37 so-called, to the RPF? KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 52 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 A. I did not see the report. 2 Q. Were you aware that the Ugandan army was holding meetings about supporting an RPF offensive to be

3 launched from Byumba and Ruhengeri? 4 A. I never heard this information. And, from Ruhengeri, that would surprise me because Ruhengeri was 5 under control of the governmental forces.

6 Q. Well, that surprises me that you say that because -- maybe I should refresh your memory. 7 General Dallaire, in his book at page -- page 201, two hundred and one, says, "I received a report from 8 the new commander of UNOMUR," U-N-O-M-U-R, "sector, Colonel Azrul Haque, confirming that

9 shipments of weapons and ammunition were going from the NRA" -- that's the Ugandan army -- "to the 10 RPF. At the same time, Claeys's" -- that's you -- "intelligence team reported that Ugandan army officers 11 had held meetings about supporting an RPF offensive to be launched at either Byumba or Ruhengeri.

12 13 "Claeys had also sniffed out information about a boatload of arms destined for the RPF that had been 14 seized by authorities in Goma on the Zairian shore of Lake Kivu."

15 16 Sir, doesn't that refresh your memory that you did -- you were aware of such information? 17 A. If it is the case, it should be in one of my reports. And I can't recall from memory. I have no recollection

18 that I had it one of my reports. If it's there, I can check it, and let General Dallaire base his book on 19 that. But, from memory, I don't know. I can't say. 20

21 And the mission on the border with Uganda was under General Dallaire. So I would not have access to 22 that report except if it was made available to me. 23 Q. Are you aware of a -- a report dated -- what's the date on this -- February the 7th, from

24 Colonel Matiwaza to a General Dallaire, stating that several reliable sources from the NRA -- that's the 25 National Revolutionary Army -- Ugandan army, intimated to the UNOMUR officers that resumption of 26 hostilities between the RPGF -- sorry, the RPF and RGF could start this week.

27 28 And according to this -- to the informants, the RPA -- that's the Rwandan Armed -- RPF armed forces, is 29 said to be on standby. And this information is closely linked to the crossing last week at

30 Kamwazi (phonetic) of 64 recently graduated soldiers from the military training school in that area, and 31 that large amounts of -- 32 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:

33 Sorry. The French booth has a problem. 34 MR. BLACK: 35 That large amounts of material were being shipped into the RPF from the NRA --

36 MR. PRESIDENT: 37 Mr. Black. KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 53 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BLACK: 2 I'm not reading, I'm just summarising. My words.

3 BY MR. BLACK: 4 Q. Were you aware that that report existed and was sent by Dallaire -- to Dallaire from Colonel Matiwaza, 5 M-A-T-I-W-A-Z-A?

6 7 Because I have the cable here, if you would like to look at it. 8 A. Once again, the message -- or, the fax doesn't mean much to me. But it is clear, and that we knew

9 since October, that the RPF -- the branched -- the armed branch of the RPF had a logistic base on the 10 Ugandan territory, and that is why there was the observation -- the United Nations observation mission 11 on that border, to control and take note of -- of possible movement of military equipment.

12 Q. I have another one dated March 1st from UNOMUR to Dallaire, stating, "The M1 -- the MI branch of 13 UNOMUR gathered -- gathered some sensitive information, that the NRA itself is effectively supporting 14 the RPF with a large amount of ammunition and weaponry."

15 16 They go on to list the following weapons being shipped in by the NRA into Rwanda to help the RPF 17 build for an offensive: weapons and ammunition, including 122-millimetre guns, A2 and 60-millimetre

18 mortars, heavy machine guns of various types, RPGs of various types. Were you aware of that report? 19 MR. BÂ: 20 Can't you at least present the document to him so he has this before him so he can say if he knows

21 them? But you are hiding it in your corner. We don't know if you drafted that this morning before 22 coming here. 23 MR. BLACK:

24 (Microphones overlapping) ...I asked the witness if he wanted to see them. He didn't mention -- respond 25 "yes." I said I'd show it to him if he wanted. If he wants to see them, he can see them. They're right in 26 front of you, Mr. Bâ. You gave them to me, as you say.

27 MR. BÂ: 28 Make them available to all the parties, as we do. 29 MR. BLACK:

30 (Microphones overlapping) ...you've got them. You disclosed them to me. 31 MR. BÂ: 32 (Microphones overlapping) ...but we have thousands of documents. In the morning before coming here,

33 we would not know the ones you intend to use. At least the previous day, send us an e-mail, informing 34 us that "we intend to use this or that document" so we bring them out and bring them with us. But we 35 cannot move all of them. We cannot move every morning with 4,000 documents.

36 MR. BLACK: 37 I'm not going to help you in -- KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 54 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 BY MR. BLACK: 2 Q. Were you aware of that report?

3 A. I have no recollection of the report in question, but, as I said, it was known -- common knowledge that 4 at the border between Uganda -- the border with Uganda was attached to the area controlled by the 5 RPF. And considering their very specific tactic of infiltration, it was possible to get supplies from their

6 logistic base in Uganda. So it is not a new fact. It's of -- of common knowledge. 7 8 And possibly there are reports with specific figures, but I have no recollection of that. But that was --

9 this was sources that informed us on that. But we never went to that zone to control that. There was a 10 United Nations -- a mission assigned that specific task. 11 Q. So you were aware that the NRA was shipping your weapons to the RPF, but you didn't make any --

12 you didn't make any searches for those weapons? 13 A. We were aware that there was the possibility of supplies. And I must recall that the UNAMIR mission 14 was based in Kigali: Phase one, weapons, secure area; phase two, implementation of the broad-based

15 transitional government, installation of all new members of parliament, and everyone should respect 16 that. 17

18 The RPF zone was not directly in the area that interested us in Kigali. If I recall, there was a Ghanaian 19 battalion that was in charge of that area. So if there were activities of coordinate and search, it would 20 have been conducted by those units and, once again, with the authorisation of the United Nations --

21 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 22 Of New York, rather, corrects the witness. 23 BY MR. BLACK:

24 Q. Are you aware of a report from the same UNAMIR observers to Dallaire, setting out the general 25 situation and, concluding, comments, "It seems that RPF is building up its strength, both military -- 26 militarily and logistically, which indicates that they may go for offensive."

27 28 Are you aware of that document? I can show all these to you. 29 MR. PRESIDENT:

30 Document dated what? 31 MR. BLACK: 32 March 2nd, 1994.

33 THE WITNESS: 34 It is possible that it passed over my hands, but, from memory, I do not recall having read that passage. 35 But if you made it available to me, I could see.

36 BY MR. BLACK: 37 Q. Maybe the registry can give you all these documents to look at. KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 55 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BÂ: 2 With copies for us, please.

3 MR. BLACK: 4 Sorry, Mr. Bâ, you have copies of your own. I didn't make them. We can make them later, if you want. 5 MR. BÂ:

6 Then you should never complain about non-disclosure of documents. The rules should be the same for 7 all of us. You should not insist on a certain practice from us, and we respect this and you just behave 8 anyhow.

9 MR. BLACK: 10 There's no obligation on the Defence to provide disclosure, Mr. Bâ, only you. 11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 It is not a question of disclosure, Counsel. When you use it to facilitate them to follow what you are 13 doing, you must give the copies. Disclosure is a different obligation. 14 MR. BLACK:

15 (Microphones overlapping) ... they won't even let me read from these documents before. So I wasn't 16 even going to use them like this. That's why I didn't copy them. But, anyway. 17 BY MR. BLACK:

18 Q. You made at -- while they're doing that, Captain Claeys, on the same date, 2nd of March, I take it, in 19 response to that cable you're going to see, you were asked to do an -- an inventory of the -- the 20 weapons the NRA army had; isn't that correct?

21 22 Maybe you can read those first. 23 A. The fax of the 1st of March -- the 1st March fax, even though I do not recollect, I must have read it,

24 either myself or my assistant. 25 26 The second, I'm not sure I have seen it, but the information contained therein rings a bell.

27 MR. BÂ: 28 The second you are referring to is dated as what date? 29 THE WITNESS:

30 3rd November 1993 -- 3rd December 1993 -- (microphones overlapping). 31 MR. BÂ: 32 I have only one; it is the one dated 7th February 1994. That is the only one I have.

33 THE WITNESS: 34 Fax dated 7th February does not ring a bell, neither the information nor the paper. 35 BY MR. BLACK:

36 Q. (Microphone not activated )... the March fax? The March fax? 37 A. The fax dated 1st March, at least it passed through our office one way or the other because the general KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 56 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 made an annotation. But it is not indicated whether it was myself or Captain Deme. 2

3 But there was no weaponry, apart from the one used by the infantry, in infantry operations of the RPF, 4 as well as equipment that could be used by the Rwandan government forces. 5 (Pages 28 to 57 by Karen Holm)

6 7 8

9 10 11

12 13 14

15 16 17

18 19 20

21 22 23

24 25 26

27 28 29

30 31 32

33 34 35

36 37 KAREN HOLM - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 57 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 1230H 2 BY MR. BLACK:

3 Q. All right. Now I'm gonna show you a cable sent to you from Colonel Asrar. I'm not sure if it's a name or 4 an acronym, ASRAR, from Kibare. And it says the subject, "Iinformation about NRA", and attached is a 5 copy of the military annual balance of the NRA, so lists the weapons contained by the NRA. Do you

6 remember receiving that document? 7 A. I've seen it and I've signed on the bottom of the page. I saw it and I signed at the bottom of the page on 8 the bottom on the 2nd of March 1994. But, from my recollection, the NRA refers to the Rwandan -- to

9 the Ugandan army and not the RPF army. That would have been RPA. 10 Q. Correct. Could you tell -- do you know why -- did you request that inventory? Or -- why was that 11 document sent to you?

12 A. I believe that was an initiative of UNAMIR as part of the mission that was being organised. 13 Q. But was that at your request that that was sent to you because you had interests in the resources 14 available to the Ugandan army?

15 A. Not from my recollection. I had no authority on the UNAMIR mission, so all information they sent was 16 at their own initiative. 17 Q. I take it you would agree with me, as a military officer, that -- and knowing something about

18 international law, military law, that Uganda, by supplying offensive weaponry to the RPF and crossing 19 Rwandan borders -- to do so constituted an act of war against Rwanda by Uganda. 20 A. This was not a new fact. This was a case for the 1991 and 1993 wars, so it was not a new fact. RPF

21 was permanently supported in its bases and its training in Uganda. 22 MR. BÂ: 23 But I have the impression that you are talking in (sic) cross-purposes. Where did you see that the

24 Ugandan army crossed the border? Where is it written? Is it written somewhere here? 25 MR. BLACK: 26 You confirmed. Listen to your witness and listen (sic) to the document, Mr. Bâ. The documents,

27 Mr. Bâ, state that the NRA is shipping to RPF in Rwanda, their positions -- these weapons into Rwanda, 28 sir. Because UNAMIR observers were only stationed in Rwanda, not north of the border. 29 THE WITNESS:

30 Not exact. 31 MR. BÂ: 32 (No interpretation)

33 MR. BLACK: 34 Wait, wait, wait. 35 MR. BÂ:

36 But I just wanted to be informed whether it is -- it appears in the document or not. I just want to be 37 informed. VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 58 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. PRESIDENT: 2 The witness wanted to say something about this.

3 BY MR. BLACK: 4 Q. It doesn't matter. The fact is the NRA was supporting the RPF; you'd agree with that? 5 A. But that was not a new fact. That is not a new fact. That was the case in 1991 and in 1993. The

6 situation had not changed. It is something that continued. I would not even be able to say how many 7 observers would be on the border, but there was logistic support. And I think there were about a dozen 8 controlled points on that border, which was about some hundred (sic) of kilometres long, to control the

9 movement of weaponry from north to south and south to the north. I think that was a mission 10 impossible. 11 Q. So you would agree with me, then, that Uganda, by supplying arms to the RPF and aiding in their RPF

12 build-up to an offensive, was engaged in an act of war against Rwanda? 13 MR. PRESIDENT: 14 What is the relevance of that, Counsel?

15 MR. BLACK: 16 Pardon me? 17 MR. PRESIDENT:

18 What is the relevance of that? 19 MR. BLACK: 20 Let me get the answer and I'll tell you the relevance, because it may change his answer.

21 THE WITNESS: 22 All states that supplied the one party or the other were actively involved, and so the grenades provided 23 by Egypt or the arms provided by Belgium in the first two wars also contributed actively in the war

24 between the two parties, and each party had its supporters. 25 MR. BÂ: 26 You are trying to say that it was not an internal armed conflict, but an international armed conflict.

27 MR. BLACK: 28 That's exactly it. 29 MR. BÂ:

30 But each party had its supporters. 31 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER: 32 Mr. Bâ didn't speak into the microphone, so we couldn't hear him.

33 MR. BLACK: 34 That is the point, Mr. President, that since Uganda was engaged in helping an invading army from 35 Uganda, the RPF, that Uganda was engaged in an act of war against the sovereign state of Rwanda.

36 The fact that Rwanda received arms as a sovereign state from other governments is legitimate because 37 they were the national government. As a sovereign state, they were entitled to do that. But supplying VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 59 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 an invading army with weapons, as Uganda did, is, under international law, an act of war. Therefore, 2 what the indictment says is incorrect when it states this was an internal conflict. It was an international

3 conflict. 4 MR. BÂ: 5 There is nothing to amend in the indictment. Since -- whether Rwandans were on the side of the

6 government forces or the RPF -- did not produce arms, each party had its source of supplies, but the 7 RPF was supplied by Uganda and the FAR by Egypt and France and Belgium. That doesn't change 8 the nature of the conflict. It was the dissident Rwandan forces that were fighting the Rwandan standing

9 army. It was an internal armed conflict. 10 MR. BLACK: 11 Mr. Bâ doesn't know his law. Sovereign state has a right to seek --

12 MR. PRESIDENT: 13 Counsel -- counsel, you -- 14 MR. BLACK:

15 No, can I reply to Mr. Bâ, Mr. President? 16 MR. PRESIDENT: 17 No, Mr. Counsel, you can't give a lecture to --

18 MR. BLACK: 19 He's giving me a lecture -- 20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 -- Mr. Bâ on international law. 22 MR. BLACK: 23 He's giving me a lecture. He just gave me a lecture. I'm supposed to listen to that and I can't reply.

24 Why? With respect, why can't I? 25 MR. BÂ: 26 (No interpretation)

27 MR. BLACK: 28 He's wrong; he's wrong in law. 29 MR. BÂ:

30 Wait for our closing arguments. 31 MR. BLACK: 32 (Microphones overlapping) ... closing arguments, and I’m entitled to respond to it.

33 MR. BÂ: 34 You will present your legal arguments and we shall present ours. 35 MR. BLACK:

36 Well, you just presented it, and I'm gonna reply because you're wrong on this law. 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 60 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 Under international law, Mr. President, a sovereign state has a right to seek help and buy weapons 2 from any country in the world. It doesn't mean they are engaged in an act of war because they're

3 supplying a sovereign state. The RPF was not a dissident force, native to Rwanda. They were an 4 invading army from Uganda, and all -- most of -- the majority -- almost the entire officer corps and most 5 of the soldiers carried NRA identity cards and were still members of the Ugandan army, and that's a

6 fact. So -- 7 MR. BÂ: 8 (No interpretation)

9 MR. PRESIDENT: 10 Mr. Bâ, don't get involved in this now. 11 MR. BÂ:

12 (No interpretation) 13 MR. PRESIDENT: 14 Mr. Bâ, you must stop this now. Yes, continue.

15 MR. BLACK: 16 So, Mr. President, it was not an internal conflict; it was an international -- 17 MR. PRESIDENT:

18 Right. So what is the submission? You will get -- you ask questions from this witness. He has to go. 19 MR. BLACK: 20 He's -- Mr. Bâ stood up and said this. I didn't start the subject; he did.

21 MR. BÂ: 22 You chased Rwandan nationals from the country. 23 MR. PRESIDENT:

24 Stop this, Mr. Bâ. 25 MR. BÂ: 26 They went abroad, they organised themselves, and they returned.

27 BY MR. BLACK: 28 Q. Isn't it a fact, sir, that many members, if not the majority of the members, of the RPF – or, the RPA force 29 carried NRA identity cards?

30 MR. PRESIDENT: 31 How can this witness answer that? 32 MR. BLACK:

33 Because he was a military information officer, he knows these things. 34 THE WITNESS: 35 We never checked the identity cards of soldiers, be they Rwandans who were natives of Rwanda or

36 Rwandans on the other side of the border, in the zones approved of in the Arusha Accords. 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 61 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 BY MR. BLACK: 2 Q. And are -- are you aware that the government forces captured Ugandan forces in Kigali during the

3 fighting? And they stated they were from Uganda. 4 A. Are you referring to incidents that occurred after the 6th of April? 5 Q. Yes. And up until you returned as well, and beyond. I know you weren't there for a certain number of

6 days. But are you aware they captured soldiers who carried NRA identity cards? 7 A. I was not aware of that and I never heard of that. 8 Q. Are you aware that captured NRA and Ugandan soldiers said to their interrogators that they could not

9 lose because they were being supported by the Belgians? 10 A. No, I'm not aware of that. 11 Q. Are you aware that your forces attacked government forces in Kigali after the night of April 6th?

12 A. I am not aware of that, as well. 13 Q. Not aware that a unit -- a section of Belgian forces attacked the gendarmerie camp near Amahoro 14 stadium, allowing the RPF to seize it from behind; they machine-gunned that position?

15 A. To my knowledge, the Belgian troops at Amahoro stadium were not -- there were Bangladeshi 16 UN troops also in charge of protecting the UNAMIR headquarters, and the compound – or, the parcel 17 on which -- the plot on which Amahoro stadium -- or, complex was based. If there was an exchange of

18 gunfire with Belgians at that time, it means that they were in a situation in which they were not 19 protected, they were not supported, and they were reacting in accordance with their right of legitimate 20 self-defence.

21 Q. No, the action was an aggressive action taken by the section of the UN forces, Belgian contingent, 22 which hit the gendarmerie base next to Amahoro stadium, machine-gunned it, fixing them in a position 23 so the RPA could attack them from behind, and they almost -- they decimated that position and killed

24 almost all the gendarmes there. You are not aware of that action? 25 A. I did not know the positions of the Rwandan gendarmerie at the UNAMIR headquarters, unless there 26 was a new position that was created at the beginning of the conflict. And, again, I was not there. I was

27 at the airport and I was not able to observe it and I received no information in that regard. 28 Q. Are you aware that the Belgian soldiers -- Belgian contingent at the ETO school ceded that position to 29 RPF troops, I believe, on the 13th?

30 A. Are you referring to Don Bosco's school, or to another location? 31 Q. I believe the ETO is also called that, yes; technical officer school, ETO. 32 MR. BÂ:

33 I heard 13th. The 13th of which month, please? 34 MR. BLACK: 35 April 1994.

36 THE WITNESS: 37 I do not know the abbreviation ETO. I would like to know it to know where -- in order to know where it VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 62 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 was situated before I can answer your question. 2 BY MR. BLACK:

3 Q. École technique officielle . 4 MR. PRESIDENT: 5 Witness wants to know where it is, not the name.

6 MR. BLACK: 7 It's in the middle of Kigali, Kiciro (sic) ; sorry, Kicukiro. 8 THE WITNESS:

9 Would that be near the prime minister's office? 10 MR. BÂ: 11 École technique officielle or des officiers?

12 MR. BLACK: 13 Officielle; that is, government technical college. 14 THE WITNESS:

15 I do not know where it is situated so I cannot answer your question. If it was near the prime minister's 16 office, I can imagine where that is; otherwise, it doesn't ring a bell. 17 BY MR. BLACK:

18 Q. So it's called Don Bosco, as you said. That's the place. 19 A. Okay, so that's not in the centre of Kigali. 20 Q. Well, it's Kigali. So I'm sorry.

21 A. Thank you. It would appear you have never been to Kigali in order to know where that is. That location 22 was a place where a large number of refugees had assembled. I don't know where they hailed from. 23 They were requesting the protection of UNAMIR at that location. Soldiers executed orders that were

24 issued to them at that time, but if you put it to me that that position was handed over by UNAMIR 25 soldiers to the RPF forces, that would be a lie – or, that is a lie. They had to abandon that position, and 26 what happened after they left was a tragedy.

27 Q. Well, we have had witnesses here say -- and you must have been aware of this because you worked 28 directly for General Dallaire, so he must have been aware of it. 29 A. Correction. At that time, we were already involved in the operation to evacuate expatriates. I was

30 commanded by a brigade commander who was Belgian. 31 Q. Thank you. 32 MR. BÂ:

33 (No interpretation) 34 BY MR. BLACK: 35 Q. Were you aware of Belgian government plans to withdraw their unit from Belgium as of, say, April 6,

36 when you were on that plane? 37 A. No, I was never aware of any intention whatsoever. It took me totally unawares during the evacuation VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 63 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 operation. The Belgian forces came to Kigali to evacuate expatriates. And, on the contrary, they 2 thought they would remain on the spot to establish a ceasefire between both parties.

3 Q. In the KIBAT report, it stated that they had -- KIBAT had received orders to be on alert and stand by for 4 evacuation as of April 9th. Were you aware of such orders from Brussels to Kigali? 5 A. No. I was, again, in a Belgian -- in a Belgian operation, and KIBAT received its orders from

6 Colonel Marchal, that is, commander of the Belgian contingent, who was in contact with Brussels. If 7 there were contacts at that level and on that subject between Colonel Marchal and the colonel 8 commanding the evacuation force in charge of evacuating expatriates, I was not, in any case, aware of

9 that. 10 Q. Since you have returned after the fact, were you aware -- did you become aware of that order and why 11 it was given and what -- and on what political decision it was based -- that is, the Belgian government

12 had decided very early after the shoot-down of the plane that they were going to pull out, or maybe 13 before? 14 MR. PRESIDENT:

15 Yes, what's your objection, Counsel? 16 MR. BÂ: 17 He has just talked of eventual evacuation, which means that the order had not yet been issued. You,

18 yourself, talked of eventual. You know that the death of the 10 Belgians caused an uproar in Belgium 19 and the Belgians demanded the withdrawal of their troops. 20 MR. TAKU:

21 Your Honour, I will object very strenuously to these comments made by the learned Prosecutor, and I 22 do so, Your Honour, because he is giving evidence. And I don't think that was even the question that 23 was asked. And the question was, did he know the reasons why they had to withdraw. This is very,

24 very prejudicial and, Your Honour, I will submit that Your Honours would try to ask both parties not to 25 give answers. 26 MR. PRESIDENT:

27 Yes. Yes, Counsel, and you must not give the answers. And I think counsel also must put clear 28 questions. We can't put "eventually they went in on the 9th". So you’re combining two. If you ask -- 29 give him a specific date, he might be able to answer, but when the question is confusing -- I think the

30 objection comes from the other side. But, Mr. Bâ, you must not give the answers. 31 32 Yes.

33 BY MR. BLACK: 34 Q. Now, Colonel, were you aware at any -- were you aware at the time, or have you become aware since, 35 the reasons that such orders were given and the political basis for that decision?

36 A. I do not know the political basis. I don't know when the decision was taken. What is certain is that the 37 death of the 10 paracommandos created a certain feeling within the population, and that population put VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 64 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 the political authorities under pressure. I also know that, during the period of the evacuation, I was at 2 the airport in Kigali. We had political statements made -- or, political intervention from Belgium in favour

3 of the evacuation of orphans, who were Rwandans, at that time. I do not know their ethnic origin. They 4 were evacuated to neighbouring countries. I, myself, left Rwandan territory on the 15th or 16th April, 5 and at that time the decision to withdraw the Belgian battalion was still being negotiated. No order had

6 been given to that effect but, like every military operation, there's a plan, and there are warning orders, 7 operational orders, and orders for execution. So whether there were possibilities of planning, whether 8 there was a corridor to be followed, or air or land measures to be taken, that has to be prepared. It is

9 not done suddenly. 10 Q. Right. The KIBAT report states that at 1415 hours, there was communiqué issued that the 11 Security Council of the United Nations was going to pronounce at four o'clock a proposal to evacuate

12 UNAMIR; that's on the 9th. You weren't aware of something nobody else in the world seems to -- the -- 13 your Belgian contingent seems to be aware of something that nobody else in the world was aware of at 14 the time, that there were moves afoot to withdraw UNAMIR forces as early as the 9 th ?

15 A. They were referring to the withdrawal of UNAMIR forces and not of Belgian forces. To my mind, when 16 the UN Security Council sits, it knows all ambassadors of member states and if something is discussed 17 in the Security Council, it is normal that the ambassadors would report it to their capital cities. So at

18 that time, it was very likely that the entire force would be withdrawn because there was no will on either 19 side, on the side of both parties to respect the agreement. 20 Q. Well, I don't know why you say that. First of all, you are wrong --

21 A. So there was no Belgian connotation here. 22 Q. First of all, I don't know why you say what you just said. Secondly -- about the plan to withdraw troops 23 because -- and the lack of cooperation by both sides. I'm talking about a communiqué issued from the

24 GQ -- GQ sector, stating that the Security Council was going to announce at 1400 hours the evacuation 25 of UNAMIR on the 9th of April. And this is before the 13th when the Belgian ambassador 26 communicated to the Security Council that they intended to ask that they be allowed to withdraw. So

27 you are not aware of any developments behind the scenes which indicated that they'd -- somebody had 28 made a decision to pull UNAMIR out before any of these discussions had begun? 29 A. At my level I was not aware of that -- of the -- and the general staff of -- the sector general staff was an

30 organ of the United Nations and received orders from units in Kigali, and that general staff was under 31 the responsibility of a Bangladeshi unit. The message had to be passed on to the general staff to the 32 units involved, and to obtain clarifications on this you have to ask those involved.

33 Q. You are also wrong -- well, you're wrong about your statement that both sides -- both parties were not 34 willing to cooperate. Don't you know that the Rwandan government proposed ceasefires with the RPF 35 several times in April, including when you were there, in order so that both the RPF and FAR forces

36 could control killings in the capital and other places, and the RPF continually refused? So how can you 37 say both sides were willing to cooperate? It's only the RPF who wasn't willing to cooperate. VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 65 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 A. The only thing I know is that there were, indeed, ceasefire agreements during the evacuation period 2 to -- to allow passage of the convoys of expatriates out of Kigali. And it was very likely that it couldn't

3 last, and I don't know why, because I was not involved in the negotiations because those negotiations 4 were carried out between the UN and the parties. Those negotiations took place and the ceasefire was 5 observed. So at that time there was a specific will to allow for a specific objective, the ceasefire to be

6 applicable -- to be applied. 7 Q. The RPF continually refused to have a general ceasefire and even threatened that any foreign forces 8 remaining in the country after a certain date were going to be attacked, including UN forces, and you

9 state to me that both parties were not willing to cooperate when it was quite clear it was the RPF who 10 even threatened the UN forces, themselves, which never happened from your government side. 11 Doesn't that show your bias and your government's bias against the government forces and the

12 government itself? 13 A. No, that doesn't mean anything. I was not involved in those negotiations, first of all. So if those threats 14 were made by the RPF against the United Nations, we were not informed of that.

15 MR. BLACK: 16 Mr. President, it's a good time to break, I guess. 17 MR. PRESIDENT:

18 Tomorrow, we will work till about 12:30. 19 MR. BLACK: 20 Two-thirty?

21 MR. PRESIDENT: 22 There's some meeting called by the Registrar. 23 MR. BLACK:

24 Sorry, what time? 25 MR. PRESIDENT: 26 Nine to 12:30.

27 MR. BLACK: 28 Nine to -- 29 MR. MACDONALD:

30 Twelve. 31 MR. BLACK: 32 Twelve-thirty.

33 MR. TAKU: 34 Your Honour. 35 MR. PRESIDENT:

36 The Registrar must call these meetings on Fridays. I mean, he's disturbing the whole court system by 37 doing this. VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 66 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. TAKU: 2 With respect, Your Honour -- with respect, Your Honour, I rise once more, Your Honour, to mention the

3 issue which is of fundamental interest to the defence of my client. At the beginning of this session, 4 Your Honour, we brought your attention to the question of a co-counsel. We informed Your Honour that 5 we already got somebody and we made all the arrangements with the team in which he formally was

6 counsel, Mr. Rety. He accepted to come and join us but, to my daily surprise, Your Honour, I think, 7 Your Honour -- one minute, Your Honour; just one minute. 8 MR. BLACK:

9 While he's doing that, I got -- he has several documents over there. I wonder if I could mark them as 10 I -- his document he received on March 2nd can be marked as a Defence exhibit, and the other 11 documents which are to Dallaire, could they be marked as ID documents for Dallaire when he comes?

12 MR. PRESIDENT: 13 We could do it tomorrow morning. 14 MR. BLACK:

15 Mr. Registrar, could you take these documents and keep them for me? 16 MR. PRESIDENT: 17 Yes, Mr. Taku, what do you have to say?

18 MR. TAKU: 19 Yes, Your Honour, we said Your Honour did make a specific order. 20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 Yes. 22 MR. TAKU: 23 First, on the 29th of August --

24 MR. PRESIDENT: 25 Has anything happened now? 26 MR. TAKU:

27 Your Honour has made two other orders to the same effect and, to the best of my knowledge, I've not 28 received any reply. And, Your Honour, we say this because -- for the defence of my client to be 29 complete, the team needs to be complete. And if we go to the end of this session without a co-counsel

30 joining me, it will mean that a lot of time will be lost, because if he came -- were appointed now, he 31 would be in a position to familiarise himself with the file so that we will not be able to delay the 32 proceedings --

33 MR. PRESIDENT: 34 Yes, yes, Registry. 35 MR. TAKU:

36 -- further. So, Your Honour, we crave your indulgence that you make a special instruction that this 37 matter be settled immediately. VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 67 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. PRESIDENT: 2 Yes, Registry, please attend to this immediately because I find that the registry is moving very slowly. I

3 am working without a secretary for the last one year. They are still looking into it. 4 MR. BÂ: 5 Mr. President, there's a concern here for the Prosecution. When is the next session? For how long

6 would it last? If the parties need disclosures, we need to know. 7 MR. PRESIDENT: 8 I want to finish this Prosecution case. So how many more witnesses do you have for next session?

9 MR. BÂ: 10 How long will the next session last? We need to know in order to be able to determine the number of 11 witnesses we'll call. But I can tell you immediately that we'll not call all the witnesses on our list. We

12 are at 42, 43. We'll call, maybe, 25 to 30 and then stop. But regarding the duration of the session, it 13 will all depend on the duration of our sittings every day, whether we will sit half day or full day. 14 MR. PRESIDENT:

15 Yes, Mr. Prosecutor, the only thing is I have no control over the allocation of courthouses. But I 16 propose to sit for at least three months and finish this next session. 17 MR. TAKU:

18 Your Honours, at the beginning of the session I did indicate to you in writing that I did not intend to 19 cause a delay because of the fact that the session had been fixed. And I did talk to the Prosecutor 20 about the problems I have. Because I've not been able to read all the transcripts. I have to read all.

21 And I said that in the course of fixing the next schedule, Your Honour, I would love to be heard about 22 when -- I mean, I would like to be heard about my specific concerns and also, Your Honour, we take 23 into consideration the effort that I've been making to complete my team.

24 MR. PRESIDENT: 25 Yeah. 26 MR. TAKU:

27 The delay is not my fault; it is that of the registry. 28 MR. PRESIDENT: 29 The only thing is, Counsel, I can give you one assurance, that this next session will not be held this

30 year. 31 MR. TAKU: 32 Thank you, Your Honour.

33 MR. BLACK: 34 Can we take it it will start at the beginning of January sometime? 35 MR. PRESIDENT:

36 Yes, I think so. I will speak to the President and get a courthouse reserved at least for three months to 37 go on without any disturbance and finish -- come to some kind of conclusion. VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 68 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 MR. BÂ: 2 There is something here which I don't quite understand. The next session we will be calling witnesses

3 like Dallaire, witnesses who will take a lot of time. I have written to Dallaire. I'm waiting for his answer. 4 I wanted to know whether he was ready to come during the first quarter or the second quarter next 5 year. He has not yet responded. We also have Alison Des Forges who has to give evidence. She is

6 coming here on mission. I have to disclose this report to the Defence at least two, three months before 7 she appears. So we will need about two sessions before we close our case. 8 MR. ST-LAURENT:

9 Mr. President. 10 MR. PRESIDENT: 11 Whatever it is, I think we can start in January next year. I will speak to the President and try to adjust

12 the calendar. So be ready for -- to go for about two, three months at a stretch. 13 MR. ST-LAURENT: 14 A question, Mr. President: do I understand that 006 is not coming this session?

15 MR. BÂ: 16 I believe he is giving evidence in Government I and he is completing his evidence on the 24th or the 17 25th in Government I.

18 MR. ST-LAURENT: 19 That would be too late for us, but it's for the Chamber to decide. 20 MR. PRESIDENT:

21 I think some other witnesses are ready till we close. 22 23 So Court is adjourned till 9:00 tomorrow.

24 (Court adjourned at 1305H) 25 (Pages 58 to 69 by Verna Butler) 26

27 28 29

30 31 32

33 34 35

36 37 VERNA BUTLER - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II - page 69 NDINDILIYIMANA ET AL WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 2005

1 2

3 C E R T I F I C A T E 4 5 We, Verna Butler and Karen Holm, Official Court Reporters for the International Criminal Tribunal for

6 Rwanda, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings in the above-entitled cause were taken at the 7 time and place as stated; that it was taken in shorthand (stenotype ) and thereafter transcribed by 8 computer; that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of said proceedings to the

9 best of our ability and understanding. 10 11 We further certify that we are not of counsel or related to any of parties to this cause and that we are

12 nowise interested in the result of said cause. 13 14

15 16 ______Verna Butler 17

18 19 ______Karen Holm 20

21 22 23

24 25 26

27 28 29

30 31 32

33 34 35

36 37 ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER II